Writing Russia: Anglophone Historians Discursively Constructing AnOther Nation

Melissa-Ellen Dowling

Department of History
School of Humanities
The University of Adelaide

Submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
November 2019

History tells stories.

Arthur C. Danto, *Analytical Philosophy of History*

CONTENTS

ABSTRACT

Writing Russia: Anglophone Historians Discursively Constructing AnOther Nation

This thesis investigates how Western historians construct the nation of 'Russia' for the Anglosphere, and what histories of Russia reveal about the geo-cultural paradigm in the Western cultural context. In writing histories of Russia, Anglophone historians narrativise the past in a way which constructs a literary rendition of Russia in the Western discourse-historical space. This literary 'Russia' is an idea of Russia as a nation emerging from its textual representation.

Analysis of several sweeping history texts through the prisms of nationalism, post-colonialism, and literary criticism, suggests that histories of Russia construct Russia in a 'discordic' manner. The term 'discordus' is used here to describe the tension that exists in the texts of Anglophone historians and the process for reconciling such tension. Depending on the context, the same author can portray Russia as Western or non-Western, European or non-European, homogenous or heterogeneous. As a result, the Russia that is constructed by these historians cannot easily be slotted into a discursive paradigm that is based on the dichotomies between East and West, Europe and non-Europe, nation and region.

Historians employ a range of literary tactics to smooth over the contradictions in their narratives of Russia, which in turn allows them to maintain the integrity of their master narrative. This thesis explores these tactics in detail by analysing how different authors portray four key episodes in Russian history: the Mongol invasions, the reign of Peter the Great, World War II, and the Putin period.

DECLARATION

I certify that this work contains no material which has been accepted for the award of any other degree or diploma in my name, in any university or other tertiary institution and, to the best of my knowledge and belief, contains no material previously published or written by another person, except where due reference has been made in the text. In addition, I certify that no part of this work will, in the future, be used in a submission in my name, for any other degree or diploma in any university or other tertiary institution without the prior approval of the University of Adelaide and where applicable, any partner institution responsible for the joint-award of this degree.

I give permission for the digital version of my thesis to be made available on the web, via the University's digital research repository, the Library Search and also through web search engines, unless permission has been granted by the University to restrict access for a period of time.

I acknowledge the support I have received for my research through the provision of an Australian Government Research Training Program Scholarship.

Melissa-Ellen Dowling

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I have had the privilege of receiving support, encouragement, and inspiration from a number of people, without whom this work might not have seen fruition.

I am profoundly indebted to my principal supervisor, Gareth Pritchard. It was a privilege to work with a supervisor who showed considerable dedication, intellectual rigour, and kindness. I also thank my secondary supervisor, Czeslaw Tubilewicz, for pushing me to become more resilient and critical as a scholar.

Muchas gracias to Benito Cao for providing me with several teaching and learning opportunities during my candidature. Next, I thank David Olney, whose undergraduate courses and mentorship inspired me to take on a PhD. I am also grateful to my original supervisor, Felix Patrikeeff, for his belief in the initial incarnation of this project.

Thank you to my examiners for their effort and insights.

Thanks must also go to my colleagues in the History and Politics departments for the everyday interactions that made me feel like a part of a supportive community at the University of Adelaide.

Completion of this project would also not have been possible without the support from my family and friends. Special thanks to my parents, whose unyielding belief in my abilities helped me to persevere in difficult times.

Finally, thank you to the historians whose work inspired this project.

INTRODUCTION

While steeped in facts and analysis, history is also a literary creation in the form of the narrative. In this regard, history exemplifies a transversal of science and art. This is particularly apparent in the case of national histories. They tell the story of a nation, yet that story is constrained by evidence of the past. In writing histories of Russia, Anglophone historians narrativise the past and use language in a way which constructs a literary rendition of Russia in the Western discourse-historical space. This literary 'Russia' is an idea of Russia as a nation emerging from its textual representation. That a literary imagining of the nation is possible necessitates consideration of the writing of history, and history's role in the imagining of communities.

The way in which national narratives are written from outside the relevant nation is of particular interest to this thesis. Historians belonging to nations other than Russia, predominantly nations of 'the West', are the dominant authors of English language histories of Russia. Accordingly, the driving research questions for this thesis are: How do Western historians construct a Russian nation for the Anglosphere, and what can the discursive patterns in this construction reveal about the geo-cultural paradigm in the contemporary context of the West?

The way in which Russia is constructed as a nation through history sheds light on contemporary Western categories for the organisation of knowledge about the past. Through examining several sweeping histories of Russia using critical discourse analysis, this thesis investigates how Anglophone historians construct the nation of Russia through their use of literary techniques. The purpose of this is two-fold. Firstly, the thesis aims to increase understanding of the role of historians in shaping

national histories from the outside. Secondly, it seeks to reveal relatively obfuscated facets of Western structures of knowledge and understand how such structures are discursively sustained.

The concepts of history and nationalism are inextricably linked. History as an academic discipline developed alongside nationalism in the nineteenth century.[1] From this time, history became indispensable in the construction of national identities. Although concepts of nationality are varied, most understandings of nationalism, nationality, and the nation, rely on the idea of groups bound together by perceptions of a 'shared past'.[2] As Krishan Kumar observes, nations are 'formed in and by time'.[3] Eric Hobsbawm likewise notes that, '[n]ations without a past are contradictions in terms'.[4] Historians make 'the past' accessible by writing history. The past has ended so it cannot be directly accessed. The past can only be known through representations of it – by history.[5] Historians therefore have control (though not exclusively) of national narratives, which create and sustain nations. Jocelyn Létourneau writes that history is 'an excellent way to inoculate the nation against the germs of its potential disintegration'.[6] How historians choose to shape these narratives is therefore significant for the construction of the nation.

However, history is not only a crucial ingredient for nation-building and the maintenance of national identity, it also discursively produces and reproduces the geo-cultural paradigm. The geo-cultural paradigm refers to concepts of nations, regions, and civilisations which are fundamental to viewing and structuring reality. In a similar vein, Mark Donnelly and Claire Norton describe how 'the geo-political

[1] Paul Lawrence, "Nationalism and Historical Writing," in *The Oxford Handbook of the History of*
[2] Lawrence, "Nationalism and Historical Writing," 713.
[3] Krishan Kumar, "Nationalism and the Historians," in *The SAGE Handbook of Nations and Nationalism*, eds. Gerard Delanty and Krishan Kumar (London: SAGE, 2006), 2.
[4] Eric Hobsbawm, "Ethnicity and Nationalism in Europe Today," in *Mapping the Nation*, ed. Gopal Balakrishan, (London: Verso, 1996), 255.
[5] Keith Jenkins, *At the Limits of History* (Oxon: Routledge, 2013), 5.
[6] Jocelyn Létourneau, "Teaching National History to Young People Today," in the *Palgrave Handbook of Research in Historical Culture and Education*, eds. Mario Carretero, Stefan Berger, Maria Grever (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), 227.

division of territory into nation-states has had a profound influence both directly and indirectly on history writing'.[7] I contend that this relationship is mutually constitutive and history contributes toward the reification of political and cultural communities. Nationalism as a concept frames histories, and such histories cannot avoid the use of the language of nationalism because it has become so ingrained into social reality. As Eric Storm finds, history continues to be 'dominated by methodological, terminological and normative nationalism'.[8] The nation has become a 'natural' unit for comprehending, but also organising, the world.[9] Historians have also criticised nationalism, yet are nevertheless bound by the concept of the nation. While the practice of social and cultural history appears to be increasing, national history remains dominant in schools and universities. A look at the organisational structure of any university history department will attest to this.

Some of the most influential research into the relationship between history and nationalism includes Stefan Berger's edited volumes, *Writing National Histories*, co-edited with Mark Donovan and Kevin Passmore, *Nationalizing the Past: Historians as National Builders in Modern Europe History*, co-edited with Chris Lorenz, and, *The Past as History: National Identity and Historical Consciousness in Modern Europe*, co-edited with Christoph Conrad. One of the general conclusions emerging from these works is that history is a core mechanism for creating and maintaining national identities.[10] It has become a widely accepted assumption that national histories are important for binding the members of a community together as

[7] Mark Donnelly and Claire Norton, *Doing History* (Oxon: Routledge, 2011), 120.
[8] Eric Storm, "A New Dawn in Nationalism Studies? Some Fresh Incentives to Overcome Historiographical Nationalism," *European History Quarterly* 48, no.1 (2018): 117.
[9] Storm, "A New Dawn in Nationalism Studies?" 127.
[10] Stefan Berger and Chris Lorenz, *Nationalizing the Past: Historians as National Builders in Modern Europe* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010); Stefan Berger, Mark Donovan, and Kevin Passmore, *Writing National Histories: Western Europe Since 1800* (London: Routledge, 2002); Stefan Berger and Christoph Conrad, *The Past as History: National Identity and Historical Consciousness in Modern Europe* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015).

a ‘nation’, but what about when the national history is written by someone outside of that community for a different community?

The way in which historians shape the national histories of nations other than their own remains underexplored. Authors in the field have focused on how historians have constructed their own nations, whereas I analyse how historians construct other nations.[11] Increasing understanding of how history texts are written about other nations can provide additional insight into the phenomena of nationalism, and render the process of sustaining the national unit more transparent. This thesis contributes toward this goal by exploring how the language of nationality is used. It also evaluates how events from the past are juxtaposed as part of a national story, and how nationalism as a concept imbues such events with certain kinds of meaning.

National histories are stories of nations. The events of the past acquire meaning through the literary transformation from facts of the past to historical narratives. As Hayden White, one of the key proponents of the study of history as literature, articulates, ‘histories gain part of their explanatory effect by their success in making stories out of mere chronicles’.[12] Alun Munslow likewise describes history as ‘an authored narrative about the past’.[13] The fundamental point these historians make is that historians construct history.[14] For these scholars, the ‘study of the past is as much a narrative-linguistic as it is an empirical-analytical activity’.[15] There is an important distinction here between the past as what has happened, and history as the story of what happened in the past. Through selecting and presenting facts in

[11] See e.g., Berger and Conrad, *The Past as History;* Ruth Wodak, Rudolf de Cillia, Martin Reisigl, and Karin Liebhart, *The Discursive Construction of National Identity* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2009).
[12] Hayden White, “The Historical Text as Literary Artifact,” *Clio* 3, no. 3 (1974): 278.
[13] Alun Munslow, “Thoughts on Authoring the Past as History,” *Rethinking History* 20, no. 4 (2016): 556.
[14] See: Frank Ankersmit, *Meaning, Truth, and Reference in Historical Representation* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2012); Louis Mink, “History and Fiction as Modes of Comprehension,” *New Literary History* 1, no. 3 (1970); Arthur C. Danto, *Analytical Philosophy of History* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965); 5Keith Jenkins, *On ‘What is History’? From Carr and Elton to Rorty and White* (London: Routledge, 1995).
[15] Alun Munslow, *The New History* (New York and London: Routledge, 2016), 19.

narrative form, historians entwine facts with fictive elements of story-telling.[16] The way in which historians weave such narratives will become apparent from the case studies in this thesis.

The historians curate and process facts to create national histories. Historians select, order, frame, connect, and describe facts and events. As Stefan Berger and Chris Lorenz contend, '[w]e can only understand national history by paying attention to the diverse ways in which such histories have been framed in different narratives and also in which temporal and spatial frames of reference are implicitly chosen by the historian'.[17] Authorship and choice are again emphasised as fundamental to the process of writing history. Historians choose how to tell national stories. They wield power over representations of the past, and, therefore, representations of nations. This thesis considers how historians have chosen to tell the story of Russia. Because of the element of choice in the writing of history, deductions about the broader cultural context within which the history texts were produced become possible. Patterns in the choices made can reveal potential characteristics of the way in which the geo-cultural paradigm functions in the West.

While this project does not directly address the impact of the texts, it is necessary to point out that, in our society, the views of historians regarding the past are granted a high degree of epistemic authority. Such authority derives from the nature of history as a factual and seemingly objective undertaking. Because of this, history texts, such as those analysed in this thesis, have power in Western society. What historians write and how they write it matters because their texts typically have a factual framework. This makes it particularly important to understand how a literary construction of the Russian nation emerges. The literary techniques and fictive aspects of the texts provide the most insight into contemporary nationalism

[16] White, "The Historical Text as Literary Artifact".
[17] Berger and Lorenz, *Nationalizing the Past*, 11.

because those parts of the texts are not plucked from archives, but belong to the present. As E.H. Carr explains, history is a 'continuous process of interaction between the historians and his [sic] facts, an unending dialogue between the present and the past'.[18] Similarly, Mark Donnelly and Claire Norton emphasise that history is 'constructed at specific times and places'.[19] Thus, history texts, as texts about the past, can serve as sources for understanding the time in which they were written. Therefore, they become primary sources in and of themselves.

The Anglophone histories of Russia analysed in this thesis reflect a certain cultural predisposition towards Russia as a nation. It is founded on the assumption that culture consists of 'shared meanings', which can only develop through language.[20] Hence, this project's use of English-language history texts to investigate the cultural context of the Anglosphere, also loosely referred to as 'the West' due to the dominance of English-speakers within this community.

I chose to analyse histories of Russia for two main reasons. First, representations of Russia in the Anglophone mass media demonstrate strong bias regarding Russia. In her book, *Journalism and the Political: Discursive Tensions in News Coverage of Russia* (2011), Felicitas Macgilchrist engages with this issue. She concludes that news coverage of Russia in the West is political.[21] Russia is often portrayed as the villain to 'the West's' hero. In everyday conversations, Russia is sometimes spoken of as though it were still the Soviet Union and locked in an ideological conflict with the West. In contemporary popular culture, the villains are often Russian. Analysis of how Russia is represented in James Bond films exemplifies this. Scholars such as Katrina Lawless and Klaus Dodds observe the way

[18] E. H. Carr, *What is History?* (London: Penguin Press, 1961/2008), 30.
[19] Mark Donnelly and Claire Norton, *Doing History* (Oxon: Routledge, 2011), 7.
[20] Stuart Hall, *Representation: Cultural Representations and Signifying Practices* (London: Sage, 1997), 1.
[21] Felicitas Macgilchrist, *Journalism and the Political: Discursive Tensions in News Coverage of Russia* (Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing Company, 2011).

that the James Bond franchise stereotypes and 'Others' Russia.[22] These observations encouraged me to question why certain stereotypes of Russia seem to dominate the Anglophone discursive space. How history constructs certain ideas of Russia, and how it is written, therefore became the key focus of my investigation.

Second, international relations scholars often use history in analyses of Russian foreign policy. They deploy history as evidence to support claims of a new Cold War, or to argue that Russia has great power ambitions, or to assert that it suffers from an identity crisis.[23] Are they using only the 'facts' of the past, or are they using history as it is produced by historians? The key difference is that history is presented to such scholars in a narrative form and therefore projects a particular idea of Russia. Therefore, it is important to understand the way in which history constructs an idea of Russia since it informs other analyses.

The Thesis

Russia challenges the metanarrative of the West because it does not neatly fit into the dominant geo-cultural paradigm for interpreting and writing about the past. The geo-cultural paradigm consists of a three-tier model of the division of humanity into cultural-geographic categories: civilisations, nations, and regions. As anthropologist Mary Douglas argues, categories are crucial for imbuing the world with meaning.[24] However, the historians write about the nation of Russia as simultaneously Western and non-Western, European and non-European, and homogenous and heterogeneous.

---

[22] Katerina Lawless, "Constructing the Other: Construction of Russian Identity in the Discourse of James Bond Films," *Journal of Multicultural Discourses* 9, no. 2 (2014): 79-97. Klaus Dodds, "Licensed to Stereotype: Popular Geopolitics, James Bond and the Spectre of Balkanism," *Geopolitics* 8, no. 2 (2003): 125-156.

[23] See, for example, Robert Legvold, *Return to Cold War* (Cambridge, Polity Press, 2016); Anne L. Clunan, "Historical Aspirations and the Domestic Politics of Russia's Pursuit of International Status," *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 47 (2014): 281-290; Norbert Eitelhuber, "The Russian Bear: Russian Strategic Culture and What it Implies for the West," *Connections: The Quarterly Journal* 9, no. 1 (2009): 1-29.

[24] Mary Douglas, *Purity and Danger: An Analysis of Concepts of Pollution and Taboo* (London: Routledge, 1966/2002).

Historians also use the term 'Russia' in a way which traverses the tiers of civilisation, nation, and region. Depending on the context, Russia can be the whole entity – including Ukraine and Kazakhstan for example – or it can be the Russian part of the Russian Empire/USSR. Thus, Russia does not easily fit into the established categories.

Russia defies categorisation under the tiered taxonomy because the facts and events of Russia's past are contradictory. They are not inherently contradictory, but are contradictory from a Western perspective which is predicated on the geo-cultural paradigm. Stuart Hall explains that, 'the cultural order is disrupted when things fail to "fit any category"'.[25] Something that does not conform to an established category becomes 'matter out of place'.[26] As he observes, '[w]hat we do with "matter out of place" is to sweep it up, throw it out, restore the place to order, bring back the normal state of affairs'.[27] Russia is 'matter out of place' because it cannot be easily categorised under the geo-cultural paradigm. The historians must therefore construct Russia in a way which makes it conform to Western conceptualisations of world order.

The inconsistencies in Russia's categorisation are not obvious because historians use techniques to obscure them at the surface level of their texts. I call this condition and process 'discordus'. As a remedy to a conceptual lacuna, discordus is a linguistic construction playing primarily on the words and meanings of 'discord', 'discourse', and 'us'. The root of the word, discordant, is an adjective meaning 'disagreeing or incongruous' or 'characterised by conflict'. In music, we use the word 'discordant' to refer to sounds which are 'jarring because of a lack of harmony'. In conjunction with the 'us' portion of the term, the word is intended to be read as

[25] Hall, *Representation*, 236.
[26] Hall, *Representation*, 236.
[27] Hall, *Representation*, 236.

incongruity in relation to ‘us’ or ‘the West’. Western discourse reflects the challenge of accommodating a nation which challenges Western conceptualisations of the world. Much like discordance in music, discordant views of nations can be uncomfortable. They demand resolution either through enhancing similarity or difference to the point of conformity or complementarity rather than clash.

Critical Discourse Analysis allows me to tease out the tensions and identify the ways in which historians write to construct a Russia that makes sense according to the three-tiered framework. My analysis of the history texts involves ‘reverse engineering’. I assess the language and narratives of the texts to uncover the deeper tensions and see past the literary veneer.

Discordus therefore refers to historians’ attempts to smooth over tensions in historical facts and events that conflict with, and do not easily fit into, the three-tiered geo-cultural paradigm. Accordingly, discordus consists of three core assumptions. First, that the dominant Western paradigm for understanding the past and present is a three-tiered ideational division of humanity into cultural-geographic categories. Second, that discordus occurs when particular facts and events reveal inconsistencies and contradictions which resist easy classification within this taxonomy. Third, when faced with these contradictions, historians often (consciously or unconsciously) deploy a range of literary techniques to smooth over the contradictions. Masking the contradictions helps to maintain the integrity of the overarching geo-cultural paradigm and produce narratives that are consistent with that paradigm. As Table 1 (page 16) outlines, in histories of Russia, the historians use three main strategies to reconcile inconsistencies. These strategies are Othering, Saming, and homogenising. In turn, the historians predominantly use two tactics to facilitate Othering, Saming, and homogenising. These tactics are foregrounding and backgrounding.

Table 1: Main Techniques of Discordus

Technique	Definition
Othering	Representing Russia as different and inferior to the West.
Saming	Representing Russia as similar to the West.
Homogenising	Representing Russia as one homogenous entity in time and space.
Foregrounding	The emphasis of facts and events. A tactic for Othering, Saming, and homogenising.
Backgrounding	The suppression of facts and events. A tactic for Othering, Saming, and homogenising.

Historians 'Other' Russia by emphasising Russia's differences from 'the West'. At times, the texts Other Russia in a way which constructs it as inferior relative to the West. Othering is the dominant strategy that the historians employ in their accounts of the Mongol era. The narrative that drives the texts' Mongol chapters is framed around Othering. The chapters tell the story of how the Mongol conquest of Rus set Russia on a different, and inferior, path to that of the West. Historians use foregrounding in a way which emphasises causation between the Mongol conquest and Russia's different path. They tend to supress development similarities with Europe, thus 'backgrounding' certain facts and events which might complicate this narrative. For example, few texts give much attention to how the Mongol occupation

facilitated ‘progress’, such as the development of a sophisticated postal system in ‘Russia’. Backgrounding does not usually involve the total omission of facts. Rather, it describes how historians de-emphasise facts and events. Backgrounding therefore functions in synergy with foregrounding. Foregrounding emphasises certain facts, which necessarily suppresses other facts.

Historians ‘Same’ Russia by emphasising Russia’s similarities with the West. Saming is most apparent in the case study on the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries of Russia. In their texts on this period, the historians use foregrounding to highlight Peter the Great and Catherine the Great’s Westernisation efforts. They use backgrounding to supress the facts which suggest that both rulers consolidated autocracy – something which would undermine Saming and the narrative of Westernisation. Unlike Othering, Saming evokes positive connotative meaning.

Historians homogenise Russia by conflating components of Russia. Aspects of ‘Russia’ such as the state, citizens, regime and so forth are represented as one entity. Historians also homogenise Russia by conflating Russia in terms of time and space. For example, in the texts, Kievan Rus is Russia, just as the Soviet Union is also Russia. Homogenising Russia across time facilitates its representation as one entity. It enables historians to construct a Russia consistent with the geo-cultural paradigm. Regions and territory are also subsumed into the generic ‘Russia’, particularly in accounts of World War II where regional and ethnic differences are sometimes silenced.

The strategies of Othering, Saming, and homogenising interact to produce a Russia which corresponds with the dominant geo-cultural paradigm. Russia cannot be discursively emplotted in the grand narrative of Western civilisation as Occident or Orient, thus poses a literary dilemma. The texts resolve this dilemma by constructing

Russia as a liminal nation embedded within a tragic narrative. Russia is torn between East and West, and fluctuates between the binaries of Other and Self. Although liminal, its liminality is couched in the geo-cultural paradigm whereby civilisations, nations, and regions structure the (hi)story of Russia.

Chapter Synopses

In Chapter I, I present the theoretical and methodological underpinnings of this project. I explain the utility of critical discourse analysis for the thesis, and introduce the key foundational concept of nationalism. I also introduce the core texts which I analyse in the thesis.

Chapters II to VI are case studies. They identify and explain the primary discursive patterns in the sample texts. In Chapter II, I find that the texts on the Mongol period of Russian history tend to emphasise Russia's difference from the West which results in Othering. In Chapter III on the Petrine period, I determine that Othering is not absolute. Russia is culturally written as liminal because it is represented as like the West, but unlike the West. In Chapter IV, I analyse the use of the language of nationality in histories of World War II. My analysis reveals that the texts generally represent Russia as a linear, coherent, and homogenous nation. Despite this, there are tensions in this mostly homogenous representation. In Chapter V, I evaluate the how the texts historicise and securitise Putin and Putin's Russia. I conclude that Putin is historicised and securitised, but Russia as a nation is not definitively securitised. In Chapter VI, I analyse the history texts' prefaces and introductions. I make the point that Russia the nation is 'Othered' because it is regarded as liminal. The texts reflect a contemporary cultural context infused with discordus. Anglophone histories of Russia construct Russia in a way which reflects a discordic cultural disposition regarding the nation of Russia. In Chapter VII, I

provide a short history of Russian authoritarianism to highlight the discursive patterns identified in the case studies and to show how they work together to produce a representation of Russia as anOther nation.

Caveats

To limit excessive use of ironical quotation marks, words or phrases used frequently will only be written within quotation marks in the first instance in each chapter. 'The West' is used constantly throughout this thesis, and requires ironical denotation for its construction and debatable 'existence'. Reference to 'Russia' is also often intended in an ironical sense for similar reasons of its construction, contested meaning, and ambiguity. 'Nation', 'Other', 'Europe', and 'European', will also follow this formula. Although words such as 'real', 'reality', 'existence', 'fact' and several others recur throughout the text, they are not used as frequently thus will be presented within quotation marks to communicate the ironical meaning.

This thesis does not, and nor does it intend to, evaluate the 'accuracy' of representations of Russia in the texts. It is also not concerned with testing the veracity of the histories. In focusing on the 'fictive' aspects of the texts, the thesis does not intend to diminish the work of the historians. This project adopts as its core premise the idea that history is at least in part a form of literature, and as such accepts that history is coloured by its literary conventions. I do not regard this as a defect of history, the writing of history, or the particular history texts which I analyse. The nexus between fact and fiction, objectivity and myth is a fundamental feature of the genre of history.

References to the construction of Russia throughout this thesis refer to the literary construction of Russia. This means that the research is concerned with the construction of Russia through the history texts as forms of literature, but also its

construction as a literary form – the Russia which emerges from the texts. It does not refer to the construction of Russia in absolute, or to the construction of Russia the state. The thesis is also not about perceptions of Russia, and does not consider the practical impact of the texts because, aside from evidentiary problems, both are beyond the immediate scope of the project. The project is, however, concerned with how historians use literary techniques to represent Russia in particular ways, and what this reveals about the context in which the texts were produced.

I. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND METHODOLOGY

This chapter outlines the conceptual framework and methodology that I use to analyse Anglophone histories of Russia. First, I describe the project's primary conceptual and methodological foundation – Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA). Second, I explain my data selection methods and introduce the core texts and their authors. Third, I summarise how I analyse the texts and define key techniques of literary analysis. Fourth, I explore theories of nations and nationalism insofar as they are directly relevant to this project.

Critical Discourse Analysis

This thesis is informed, guided, and framed by a web of complementary theories, all of which are bound together by the research program of CDA. The following chapter describes the fundamental principles of CDA, and explains the utility of CDA for this research project, before introducing the core complementary social theories. CDA is a 'research program' within the tradition of Critical Theory.[28] It is best described as a research program rather than a bona fide theory because a plethora of theoretical and methodological approaches are employed within CDA. Prominent CDA theorists, such as Norman Fairclough, Ruth Wodak, and Teun van Dijk, have each developed their own variants of CDA.[29] These researchers draw upon different social theories,

[28] Ruth Wodak, "Critical Discourse Analysis at the End of the 20th Century," *Research on Language and Social Interaction*, 32 (1999): 186; Ruth Wodak, "Introduction," in *Language, Power and Ideology: Studies in Political Discourse*, ed. Ruth Wodak (Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing Company, 1989), xv.

[29] Maryam Jahedi, Faiz Sathi Abdullah, and Jayakaran Mukundan, "An Overview of Focal Approaches of Critical Discourse Analysis," *International Journal of Education and Literacy Studies*

emphasise different topics, and use different models of linguistic analysis, while nevertheless adhering to common fundamental principles of CDA.

There are several core assumptions of CDA shared by each school of CDA thought. Most CDA perspectives consider discourse as social practice, language as ideologically driven, and discourse as constructing social reality.[30] CDA research fundamentally concerns revealing dynamics of social power and, in particular, is concerned with investigating the role of discourse in shaping, sustaining, or challenging entrenched practices of inequality or discrimination.[31] CDA operates as an intermediary between thought and action. It is aimed at exposing ideological and power disparities between social actors.[32] Power, ideology, and hegemony, are therefore significant concepts for most varieties of CDA. However, each branch of CDA attributes slightly different emphasis and meanings to these concepts.[33]

Although CDA research focuses on these themes of ideology and power, the field consists of a variety of research topics across a number of academic disciplines. Racism, climate change, identity, and education, are some examples of topics frequently analysed using CDA.[34] Such research is interdisciplinary, as CDA research necessarily involves operationalising theoretical and methodological strategies from various disciplines.[35] Studies in CDA often draw upon linguistics in combination with social theory relevant to the particular topic under investigation.

---

2 no.4 (2014); Jan Blommaert and Chris Bulcaen, "Critical Discourse Analysis," *Annual Review of Anthropology*, 29 (2000): 454.

[30] Teun A. Van Dijk, "Principles of Critical Discourse Analysis," *Discourse & Society* 4, no.2 (1993): 249–283; Norman Fairclough, *Critical Discourse Analysis: The Critical Study of Language* (London: Longman, 1995).

[31] Blommaert and Bulcaen, "Critical Discourse Analysis," 448.

[32] Norman Fairclough, "Critical Discourse Analysis and the Marketization of Public Discourse: The Universities," *Discourse & Society* 4, no.2 (1993): 134-135.

[33] Martin Reisigl and Ruth Wodak, "The Discourse-Historical Approach," in *Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis*, eds. Ruth Wodak and Michael Meyer (London: Sage 2009), 87.

[34] See e.g, Teun A. Van Dijk, *Racism and the Press* (London: Routledge, 1991); Norman Fairclough, *Media Discourse* (London: Edward Arnold, 1995); Ruth Wodak, Rudolf de Cillia, Martin Reisigl, and Karen Liebhart, *The Discursive Construction of National Identity,* trans. Angelika Hirsch, Richard Mitten, and J. W Unger (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2009).

[35] Norman Fairclough, *Critical Discourse Analysis: The Critical Study of Language* (Routledge, London, 2010): 4.

For example, Ruth Wodak, Rudolph de Cilla, Martin Reisigl, and Karen Liebhart, incorporate theories of national identity to interpret their data using linguistic analysis in their investigation into the construction of Austrian national identity.[36] Similarly, in this thesis, CDA serves as the dominant theoretical framework and methodological guide, but is accompanied by theories of nationalism, postcolonialism, and literary criticism. The data collected from English-language history texts is interpreted through these theoretical paradigms in order to channel the data into answering the research question/s.

Although this project draws upon the insights of various CDA scholars relating to the fundamental principles of CDA shared across the spectrum of CDA work, it adopts Wodak and Reisigl's 'discourse-historical approach' (DHA) toward CDA. Some scholars refer to the DHA as part of the 'Vienna School' of CDA.[37] Given the DHA's epistemological origins in Basil Bernstein's sociolinguistics, this form of CDA emphasises the use of language by social groups within certain social contexts.[38] I selected the DHA for this thesis based on its specific development for investigating the discursive construction of social groups, along with its previous and effective application to analysis of discriminatory social structures. Given my focus on investigating how history texts represent and construct Russia as a nation (which is a type of group), the cultural, social, and historical contexts within which the texts were produced (and consumed) are significant. Understanding such context enables insights to be drawn regarding not only the effect of contexts on texts, but also the effect of texts on contexts. These aspects of the DHA will be explained further throughout this chapter.

[36] Wodak, de Cillia, Reisigl, and Liebhart, *The Discursive Construction of National Identity,* 7.
[37] Wodak, de Cillia, Reisigl, and Liebhart, *The Discursive Construction of National Identity,* 2-3.
[38] Wodak, de Cillia, Reisigl, and Liebhart, *The Discursive Construction of National Identity,* 7.

As an offshoot of critical linguistics, CDA is primarily concerned with the analysis of texts as constituents of 'discourse'. According to Wodak, 'discourse' is 'a complex bundle of simultaneous and sequential linguistic acts, which manifest themselves within and across social fields of action as thematically interrelated semiotic, oral or written tokens, very often as "texts"'.[39] Accepting this definition, one of the key distinctions between a text and discourse is that discourse consists of interrelated texts on a particular subject. It is, according to its standard dictionary definition, a 'conversation'. A discourse is composed of a number of texts which function in relation to each other, giving rise to 'intertextuality' as texts become thematically linked to other texts.[40] Although a variety of texts can form a discourse, often, a dominant discourse emerges, and a 'normal' way of 'talking about' or 'writing about' a certain topic develops within groups, institutions, or society more broadly. Discourse serves as, but also produces, practices which become 'accepted as 'obvious' or 'natural' in social context'.[41] CDA involves identifying patterns of language use within specific social contexts.[42] This analytic element contributes to CDA as a particularly useful tool relevant to this thesis. It provides a framework for investigating whether discursive patterns exist in the way in which historians represent Russia in the Anglosphere.

As a form of communication, discourse is unequivocally a 'social practice'.[43] It is, as Van Dijk describes, a 'situated interaction' because a discourse occurs within

[39] Ruth Wodak, "The Discourse-historical Approach," in *Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis*, eds. Ruth Wodak and Michael Meyer (London: Sage, 2001): 66.
[40] Reisigl and Wodak, "The Discourse-Historical Approach," 90.
[41] Thao Le, Quynh Le, and Megan Short, *Critical Discourse Analysis: An Interdisciplinary Perspective* (New York, Nova Science Publishers, 2009), 13.
[42] Stephanie Taylor, "Locating and Conducting Discourse Analytic Research," in *Discourse as Data: A Guide for Analysis*, eds. Margaret Wetherell, Stephanie Taylor, & Simeon J. Yates (London, Sage Publications, 2001), 8.
[43] Wodak, de Cillia, Reisigl, and Liebhart, *The Discursive Construction of National Identity* 7; Teun van Dijk, *Discourse and Power* (New York, Palgrave MacMilllan 2008), 3; Le, Le, and Short, *Critical Discourse Analysis;* Fairclough, *Critical Discourse Analysis: The Critical Study of Language*, 59.

a certain 'social, cultural, historical or political' context.[44] More specifically, discourse involves the interpretive process of producing and consuming, or reading and writing texts within contexts. Contexts are crucial for the process of making meaning out of texts.[45] Language, as a part of discourse, acquires meaning only within social contexts.[46] This is because language is a semiotic system of representation and communication dependent upon shared codes to produce common understandings of texts, discourses, and reality. As Wodak explains, 'readers … are not passive recipients in their relationships to texts'.[47] The reader interacts not only with the text, but with the discursive (intertextual) and non-discursive ('practical') context.

Historical context is particularly important for Wodak's discourse-historical conceptualisation of CDA because 'every discourse is historically produced and interpreted, that is, it is situated in time and space'.[48] This clearly relates to ideas of intertextuality because 'discourse ... is always historical, that is, it is connected synchronically and diachronically with other communicative events which are happening at the same time or which have happened before'.[49] Since the texts on Russian history analysed in this thesis are all written in English, mostly by Westerners, and for English-speaking Westerners, the texts exist within the context of the West. Texts can be situated in several contexts concurrently. However, the Anglophone segment of the West is the most salient context for this research because of its investigation into the geo-cultural paradigm in the West.

---

[44] van Dijk, *Discourse and Power*. 3.
[45] Ruth Wodak and Michael Meyer, "Critical Discourse Analysis: History, Agenda, Theory, and Methodology," in *Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis*," eds. Ruth Wodak and Michael Meyer (London: Sage, 2009), 20.
[46] Michael Stubbs, *Discourse Analysis* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1983).
[47] Ruth Wodak, "What CDA is About," in *Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis*, eds. Ruth Wodak and Michael Meyer (London: Sage, 2001), 6.
[48] Wodak, "What CDA is About," 3.
[49] Ruth Wodak and Christoph Ludwig, *Challenges in a Changing World: Issues in Critical Discourse Analysis* (Vienna: Passagen, 1999), 12.

Context is immensely difficult to define in a precise manner. As Charles Goodwin and Alessandro Duranti acknowledge in their seminal volume, *Rethinking Context*, developing a concise definition may be impossible.[50] Nevertheless, Goodwin and Duranti present a concept of context drawing upon the work of John Gumperz.[51] They explain context as involving 'a fundamental juxtaposition of two entities: (1) a focal event, and (2) a field of action within which that event is embedded'. Incorporating Goffman's theory of framing, they regard context as a 'frame' which 'surrounds the event being examined'.[52] Consequently, when evaluating an event in context, one must assess 'phenomena' beyond the event in order to understand the event.[53]

For the DHA, Wodak developed a four-level model of context. Three of the categories of context identified by the model are useful for my analysis. First, the 'immediate, language or text internal' context. For this project, this means the history texts themselves. For example, analysis of this level of context considers how a sentence gains a certain meaning when interpreted within the context of the rest of the text, i.e., what else has been written around it. Second, is the 'intertextual and interdiscursive' context. Analysis of this context requires us to know what else has been written on the topic. A comprehensive analysis of the interdiscursive context would exceed the parameters of this thesis. However, when necessary to interpret the meaning of the history texts, I consider texts relevant to the Russian history discourse which are outside of the core texts under detailed analysis. Third is the broader 'socio-political and historical contexts, to which the discursive practices are embedded'.[54] The West as a cultural context forms a core context within which the

[50] Alessandro Duranti and Charles Goodwin, *Rethinking Context: Language as an Interactive Phenomenon* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 3.
[51] See: John J. Gumperz, *Discourse Strategies* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1982).
[52] Duranti and Goodwin, *Rethinking Context,* 3.
[53] Duranti and Goodwin, *Rethinking Context,* 3.
[54] Ruth Wodak, "The Discourse-historical Approach," 67.

texts of Anglophone historians on Russia are situated. Context thus becomes significant for interpreting the texts, but also understanding the contexts emblematic of social reality.

To reiterate, as an interactive practice, discourse is both produced and consumed in society.[55] Yet, importantly, it is also produced and consumed *by* society. It is both a product of its context and a producer of such context.[56] Discourse occurs within a social context, but is simultaneously a result of this social context. This highlights the dialectical nature of discourse as 'socially constituted and socially constitutive'.[57] Such notions reflect Anthony Giddens' theory of structuration which emphasises a dynamic and mutually reinforcing relationship between structure and agency.[58] While actors and their realities are influenced by discourse, actors have a role in shaping discourse. On the other hand, some actors have more power to shape discourse than others. Shaping discourse can contribute toward shaping ideologies, social practices, and 'reality'. CDA goes beyond identifying and describing discursive patterns by seeking to connect such patterns with the context within which the discourse is situated, produced, and consumed. Accordingly, I identify discursive patterns in historians' texts on Russia in order to connect these patterns with the context within which the texts were produced and are consumed.

Historical context is crucial for hermeneutic analysis of meaning and effect. For Johnstone, DHA 'works outward from text to an understanding of [the text's] contexts'.[59] Understanding the cultural context of the Anglosphere or the West, in particular, is one of the aims of this thesis. From this CDA perspective, my project

[55] Blommaert and Bulcaen, "Critical Discourse Analysis," 448.
[56] Norman Fairclough, Jane Mulderrig, and Ruth Wodak, "Critical Discourse Analysis," in *Discourse Studies: A Multidisciplinary Introduction*, ed. Teun A. van Dijk (London: Sage, 2009), 372.
[57] Martin Reisigl and Ruth Wodak, "The Discourse-Historical Approach," in *Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis*, eds. Ruth Wodak and Michael Meyer (London: Sage 2009), 89.
[58] Jan Blommaert, *Discourse: A Critical Introduction* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 27.
[59] Barbara Johnstone, *Discourse Analysis* (Oxford: Wiley Blackwell, 2018), 33.

analyses how historians contribute to discourse on Russia, and in particular what the discourse reveals about the geo-cultural paradigm in the West. Given CDA's focus on social and relationship dynamics, it is concerned with the construction of specific components of social reality. The DHA, in particular, directs analysis of the construction of certain 'social conditions'. As Wodak and others propose, discourse can 'contribute to the restoration, legitimation or revitilisation of a social status quo', 'maintain or reproduce the status quo', or transform it.[60] She observes how discourse, understood in this way, can facilitate the formation of groups and impact relational power dynamics between and within groups.[61] This is clearly relevant to this project given the project's emphasis on the discursive construction of Russia as a socio-political community, and in turn the construction of a community of the West.

Although discourse facilitates the construction of these aspects of social reality, not all discourse has this constructive effect. Fairclough observes a fundamental difference between what he describes as 'construal' and 'construction'. He asserts that the world can be represented or 'discursively construed' in several ways, but not all 'construals' contribute toward the construction of reality.[62] Fairclough rightly argues that 'we cannot transform the world in any old way we happen to construe it. The world is such that some transformations are possible and others are not'.[63] This relates to the DHA's position that language becomes powerful when wielded by powerful people. [64] Some construals communicated via texts form part of the discursive space, yet lack the authority, prominence, and support to have a constructive effect on social reality. A number of factors can influence what discourse becomes dominant.

[60] Wodak, de Cillia, Reisigl, and Liebhart, *The Discursive Construction of National Identity,* 8.
[61] Wodak, de Cillia, Reisigl, and Liebhart, *The Discursive Construction of National Identity,* 9.
[62] Fairclough, *Critical Discourse Analysis: The Critical Study of Language*, 4-5.
[63] Fairclough, *Critical Discourse Analysis: The Critical Study of Language*, 5.
[64] Reisigl and Wodak, "The Discourse-Historical Approach," 88.

For this thesis, that the majority of the Anglosphere is restricted to reading English-language texts on Russia skews the discourse in that context. However, more specifically, historians as authors have epistemic authority in the area of discourse on Russian history. As Mills observes, 'history texts are privileged in their relation to truth'.[65] Consequently, these texts are perhaps more likely to be published, widely circulated, accessible, and accepted than texts concerning Russian history authored by non-historians. Since their construals are likely to have more weight, they become more likely to have some constructive effect on the relevant community. Discourse on the history of Russia is part of a much broader discourse on Russia. The discourse on Russian history analysed in this project therefore does not contribute to construction of the Anglo-reality independently of the wider discourse on Russia. While the construction of the Russian nation is assessed, it is the construction of literary Russia rather than the construction of the state of Russia as a 'real' political actor. The Russia which emerges from the texts likely falls between a 'true' construction and a construal. To make an argument that this literary Russia is a construction rendered real would require additional research into the discursive context and is beyond the scope of this thesis.

Clearly, various aspects of power are endemic in CDA. In particular, social power is of critical significance for CDA research.[66] In developing the DHA, Reisigl and Wodak describe power as 'an asymmetric relationship among social actors who assume different social positions or belong to different social groups'.[67] However, structures of power, or institutionalised inequality, are prominent research foci for all forms of CDA, forming the essence of the field. As Le, Le, and Short explain, the purpose of CDA is to 'examine social injustice which is manifested in various social

[65] Sara Mills, *Discourse* (London: Routledge, 1997), 23.
[66] Le, Le, and Short, *Critical Discourse Analysis: An Interdisciplinary Perspective*, 11-12.
[67] Reisigl and Wodak, "The Discourse-Historical Approach," 88.

practices and to take a stance against social abuse, racism, social prejudice, and discrimination against dominated or manipulated people with less power'.[68] This thesis is concerned with identifying instances of ethnocentrism in the texts which may contribute toward a negative construction of literary Russia. In accordance with the DHA's focus on the construction of affecting the 'status quo', CDA is fundamentally concerned with how discourse creates, sustains, or challenges power structures, and this is a part what this thesis is about. Consequently, CDA, and the DHA of CDA, serve as logical theoretical perspectives for this project.

Since CDA emphasises power, and the discursive construction of knowledge and reality, CDA is also concerned with ideology. Discourse facilitates the perpetuation of ideologies.[69] Wodak and Reisigl explain that, for the DHA, ideology is regarded as a 'one-sided perspective or world view composed of related mental representations, convictions, opinions, attitudes and evaluations, which is shared by members of a specific social group.'[70] The historians selected for this project are members of the Anglosphere and, as the thesis argues, the West. The way in which they write about Russia reveals shared liberal democratic ideology often manifesting in normative judgments regarding interpretations of Russia's political culture.

CDA is not only concerned with the observation of ideology in discourse but how ideology is 'an important means of establishing and maintaining unequal power relations through discourse'.[71] According to Reisigl and Wodak, one way this occurs is through 'establishing hegemonic identity narratives'.[72] This is applicable to this thesis because I argue that a hegemonic narrative of Russia as Other permeates the Anglo- discursive space. The discourse on Russian history is dominated by the story of 'the Wild East', to borrow from Martin Sixsmith's revealing text title. Reisigl and

[68] Le, Le, and Short, *Critical Discourse Analysis: An Interdisciplinary Perspective*, 4.
[69] Blommaert, *Discourse: A Critical Introduction*, 26.
[70] Reisigl and Wodak, "The Discourse-Historical Approach," 88.
[71] Reisigl and Wodak, "The Discourse-Historical Approach," 88.
[72] Reisigl and Wodak, "The Discourse-Historical Approach," 88.

Wodak further explain that hegemonic narratives are central to their conceptualization of the DHA because, 'one of the main aims of the DHA is to 'demystify' the hegemony of specific discourses by deciphering the ideologies that establish, perpetuate or fight dominance'.[73] The majority of the history texts analysed in this research subtly imply that 'Western' values and beliefs as superior to those of the East. This is not necessarily to contend that the historians intentionally manipulated their texts or shirked their commitment to scholarly objectivity. Rather, the historians are contextually situated like the texts themselves. They are embedded within a liberal-democratic cultural context and accordingly have been socialized into accepting particular norms, and thus are inescapably enculturated actors. Their texts therefore reflect aspects of the historians' enculturation and via extension reveal characteristics of their social realities.

Since discourse is an ideologically stimulated social practice, it is significant then that 'social practices are embedded in hegemony'.[74] This means that social practices, not only discursive social practices, become normalised, or taken as 'given', as ideological positions simultaneously become concealed.[75] This thesis contends that it has become 'normal' to write about Russia as if it is not a part of the West, and it has likewise become normal in the Anglosphere to write about both Russia and the West as if they are accepted or given socio-political communities.

CDA is applied in this thesis because it aligns with the fundamental elements of the area under investigation. This project is concerned with uncovering discursive patterns and the normalisation of social practices through the way in which historians write about Russian history. Therefore, CDA is clearly a logical choice of theory due to its emphasis on the analysis of texts, position on the discursive construction of

[73] Reisigl and Wodak, "The Discourse-Historical Approach," 88.
[74] Le, Le, and Short, *Critical Discourse Analysis: An Interdisciplinary Perspective*, 11-12.
[75] Wodak, "What CDA is About," 3.

reality, and understanding of the role of power and ideology in that social process. The DHA variant of CDA also provides a useful methodological precedent, from which this research borrows.

Data Selection

The research topic necessarily confines analytical material to English-language texts on Russian history. This corresponds to the project's emphasis on discourse of Russian history in the Anglosphere. The investigation analyses in detail six core texts per chapter, but supplements these texts with other works to support or challenge emerging patterns from the core texts. The same group of core texts is not used for each case study. Partly, this is due to necessity. While the texts are all sweeping histories of Russia, the time periods covered in the texts vary. For example, some texts begin their histories with Kievan Rus', whereas others begin with Imperial Russia. Therefore, the same texts cannot always be used since they do not always contain equivalent chapters on certain periods of Russia's past. The other reason for mixing the core texts is to provide a balanced analysis and investigate how pervasive certain patterns are across a spectrum of Russian history texts.

The core texts I use are: Martin Sixsmith's *Russia: a 1000-Year Chronicle of the Wild East* (2012), Geoffrey Hosking's *Russia and the Russians* (2012), John M. Thompson and Christopher Ward's *Russia: A Historical Introduction from Kievan Rus' to the Present* (2018), Robert Service's *The Penguin History of Modern Russia* (2015), Nicholas Riasanovsky and Mark Steinberg's *A History of Russia* (2011), Roger Bartlett's *A History of Russia* (2005), Michael Kort's *A Brief History of Russia* (2008), Charles Ziegler's *The History of Russia* (2012), Abraham Ascher's *Russia: A Short History* (2017), and Kees Boterbloem's *A History of Russia and Its Empire*

(2018).[76] These texts were selected based on their ubiquity and general popularity. This was determined through reference to Google Ngram, Google Books search results, and availability in mainstream Western English-language book retailers including Book Depository, Dymocks, Waterstones, and Barnes and Noble.

In order to further refine the scope of data and facilitate comparability, sweeping histories form the core body of texts analysed in this project. The research intentionally excludes specialised works devoted to a particular aspect of Russian history since the inclusion of specialist texts would distort results. For example, analysis of the World War II period of Russia's history does not include entire works exclusively concerning World War II. This is because the texts are produced in a significantly different style, for a more specialised readership, and for a different purpose. Accordingly, those texts delve into deeper analysis and detail than the general histories, rendering comparison between texts less informative. The project is also interested in investigating the narrative of Russia, and is most suited to analysis of generalist sweeping histories. The 'big themes' of Russian history become apparent in such large-scale histories. Each chapter of Russia's history is assembled to produce a broader narrative of Russia. How the events are juxtaposed is of significance for the construction of Russia and for developing further insights into the writing of history.

The majority of the texts selected were published between 2000 and 2018. This time period is widely represented in the Anglosphere as an era of increased economic prosperity but also growing authoritarianism in Russia under the leadership

[76] **Core Texts:** Martin Sixsmith, *Russia: A 1000-Year Chronicle of the Wild East* (London: Ebury Press, 2012); John M. Thompson and Christopher J. Ward, *Russia: A Historical Introduction from the Kievan State to the Present* (New York: Westview Press, 8th edn., 2018); Nicholas V. Riasanovsky and Mark D.Steinberg, *A History of Russia* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 8th edn., 2011); Geoffrey Hosking, *Russia and the Russians* (Cambridge MA: Belknap Press, 2012); Charles E. Ziegler, *The History of Russia* (Santa Barbara: Greenwood Press, 2nd end., 2009); Roger P. Bartlett, *A History of Russia* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005); Michael Kort, *A Brief History of Russia* (New York: Facts on File, 2008); Kees Boterbloem, *A History of Russia and Its Empire: From Mikhail Romanov to Vladimir Putin* (Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 2018).

of Vladimir Putin. This preliminary assumption of the political context within which the texts were produced serves as a basis for testing and evaluating representations of Russia in history texts. It supports this project's inquiry into historical discourse, and therefore whether the apparent contemporary narrative infuses the writing of history. It also refines the scope of what I have deemed to be 'the contemporary context'. Since only a relatively small number of sweeping histories were published during this timeframe, texts published outside this timeframe are included but analysed in a comparative style with consideration of their temporal contexts. The only other exception to the sweeping history approach concerns the case study of the history of the Putin era itself. Due to a lack of availability of Anglophone sweeping histories including sufficient material on the Putin period, I examine some works that deal exclusively with this part of Russia's history. However, these texts are analysed under the proviso that they are 'different' from the core texts and provide comparative value to the case study.

Table 2: Distribution of Core Texts

Text	Chapter II	Chapter III	Chapter IV	Chapter V	Chapter VI
Ascher		■		■	■
Bartlett		■			■
Boterbloem		■		■	■
Hosking	■		■		■
Kort	■			■	
Riasanovsky & Steinberg	■		■	■	
Service			■	■	
Sixsmith	■		■		■
Thompson & Ward	■	■	■	■	
Ziegler		■	■	■	■

Table 2 shows what thesis chapters the core texts appear in. The shaded fields in the table indicate that the text is used in a particular chapter. Additional texts are

analysed in each of the chapters. However, the texts listed in Table 2 are the texts used most often, and those that are used in more than one chapter. Not all texts contain material relevant to every case study. Though they are all sweeping histories, there is variation of the beginning and end points of the texts. For example, Service's text begins by describing events from 1900, and thus excludes material on the Mongol conquest and Petrine period. Others published in the early 2000s provide limited accounts of the Putin era. There are also differences in how the texts' chapters are organised, which required me to choose case study texts with comparable chapters.

Descriptions of the historians and their texts will demonstrate some of the similarities I have identified: publication after 2000, mostly 'Western' historians, and texts that cover numerous eras of Russian history. Given the project's emphasis on what the texts reveal about the contemporary context, it is beneficial to also have a basic awareness of the authors' backgrounds. As mostly university-educated 'Westerners', they have been socialised in similar cultural environments. I cannot make conclusive causal claims regarding the personal influences on historians or the extent to which their enculturation infuses the texts. Nonetheless, these attributes likely have an effect on the way that the texts are written and the kinds of stories that they tell about Russia. Histories are products of the time and space of their production, but are also products of human authors who have their own cultural predispositions.

Abraham Ascher is the author of *Russia: A Short History* (2017).[77] Born in Poland in 1928, Ascher became an American citizen in 1943.[78] He is a historian and Professor Emeritus at the City University of New York. His history of Russia was

[77] Abraham Ascher, *Russia: A Short History* (London: Oneworld Publications, 2017).
[78] "Ascher, Abraham," Encyclopedia.com, Accessed 29 June, 2019, https://www.encyclopedia.com/arts/educational-magazines/ascher-abraham-1928.

originally published in 2002. However, I use the 2017 edition in this thesis. The 2017 edition includes updates on the Putin period, and additional material on foreign affairs. The final chapter, 'The Rise and Rise of Putin' is therefore reflective of the contemporary context that is characterised by US-Russia tensions. *Russia: A Short History* begins the story of Russia in the year 862, thus it covers Russian history from the pre-Mongol time through to 2017.

Historian **Kees Boterbloem** authored *A History of Russia and Its Empire* (2018).[79] Born in the Netherlands in 1962, he migrated to Canada after his undergraduate studies. At the time of writing, Boterbloem is a history professor at the University of South Florida in the United States.[80] In an interview for *Perspectives on History*, Boterbloem comments that what he values most about the history profession is 'the opportunity it grants to continue to try to understand why we have become what we are today, and the opportunity to expose historical myth as such'.[81] *A History of Russia* begins with the seventeenth century, and ends in 2018, with the final chapter, 'The Fall of the Soviet Union and Beyond'.

Roger P. Bartlett's *A History of Russia* (2005) is analysed in two chapters of this thesis.[82] The text begins with Kievan Rus and ends in the early twenty-first century. He is Professor Emeritus at University College London.[83]

Russia and the Russians: *From Earliest Times to the Present* (2012) by **Geoffrey Hosking** is another of the core texts.[84] I use the 2nd edition, which includes material up to 2010. The final part of his text is titled, 'The Decline and Fall of

[79] Kees Boterbloem, *A History of Russia and Its Empire: From Mikhail Romanov to Vladimir Putin* (Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 2018).
[80] "Kees (Case) Boterbloem," Department of History, Accessed 29 June, 2019, http://history.usf.edu/faculty/cboterbloem/.
[81] Nike Nivar, "AHA Member Spotlight: Kees Boterbloem," *Perspectives on History* (2013), Accessed June 29, 2019, https://www.historians.org/publications-and-directories/perspectives-on-history/april-2013/aha-member-spotlight-kees-boterbloem.
[82] Roger P. Bartlett, *A History of Russia* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005).
[83]"A History of Russia," Google Books, Accessed 29 June, 2019, https://books.google.com.au/books/about/A_History_of_Russia.html?id=rBUfnwEACAAJ&redir_esc=y.
[84] Geoffrey Hosking, *Russia and the Russians* (Cambridge MA: Belknap Press, 2012).

Utopia'. His text begins, as the title suggests, early in the history of Kievan Rus, in the year 626. Hosking is one of the most prominent Anglophone historians of Russia. Like Bartlett, he is Emeritus Professor at University College London. He was born in Scotland in 1942, and has mostly lived in the United Kingdom, but has also lived in Russia, Germany, and the United States.[85]

American historian **Michael Kort** wrote *A Brief History of Russia* (2008).[86] Kort is professor of Social Science at Boston University, though he specialises in history.[87] The first chapter of his text is 'Before the Russians, Kievan Rus, and Muscovite Russia (Tenth Century B.C.E. – 1462 C.E.)'. The final chapter of his text is 'Conclusion: The Russian Riddle'. The last chapter on a period of Russian history describes the years of 1991-2008.

Nicholas Riasanovsky and Mark D. Steinberg co-authored *A History of Russia* (2011).[88] This is the 8th edition. Riasanovsky wrote the first edition independently, and that edition was published in 1963. Riasanovsky's last post before his death in 2011 was Emeritus Professor at the University of California. Riasanovsky was born in China in 1923 to Russian parents. He migrated to the United States in 1938. He served in the US army. According to a friend of his, Riasanovsky was 'a Russian-European American'.[89] Regarding his thoughts on the nature of history, Riasanosvky stated: 'I am increasingly impressed by another characteristic of history, namely, history as a bid for the survival, for a time, if not for eternity, of the events and record of the past, and with them, of the recorder

[85] "Russia: People and Empire," Google Books, Accessed 29 June, 2019, https://books.google.com.au/books/about/Russia.html?id=IJRlCuCJmKYC.
[86] Michael Kort, *A Brief History of Russia* (New York: Facts on File, 2008).
[87] "Michael Kort," BU College of General Studies, Accessed 29 June, 2019, https://www.bu.edu/cgs/profile/michael-kort/.
[88] Nicholas V. Riasanovsky and Mark D.Steinberg, *A History of Russia* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 8th edn., 2011).
[89] Yuri Slezkine, "In Memorium," University of California, Accessed 29 June, 2019, https://senate.universityofcalifornia.edu/_files/inmemoriam/html/nicholasriasanovsky.html.

himself'.[90] Mark Steinberg was a student of Riasanovsky's and he co-authored the latter editions of *A History of Russia*. At the time of writing, he is a History professor at the University of Illinois. He was born in, and resides in, the United States and previously worked as a taxi driver and a printer's apprentice.[91] Riasanovsky and Steinberg's text starts with Kievan Rus and ends in 2010.

Robert Service's text, *The Penguin History of Modern Russia: From Tsarism to the Twenty-First Century* (2015), is another staple of this thesis.[92] Service is an English Emeritus Professor of Russian History at the University of Oxford and a Senior Fellow of the Hoover Institution at Stanford.[93] Like several of the historians of the core texts for this project, Service is one of the key Anglophone scholars of Russian history. He has reportedly been granted privileged access to Soviet archives.[94]

I analyse **Martin Sixsmith**'s *Russia: A 1000-Year Chronicle of the Wild East* (2012) in four of the five case studies.[95] Sixsmith is of British nationality. He is an author and BBC radio presenter. He has worked as a foreign correspondent and also worked for the British government.[96] The text analysed in this thesis originated as a radio broadcast, thus it is slightly different in style to some of the more conventional academic histories of Russia. Parts of the text are written in first person, and the story format and entertainment value aspects are more apparent. The text is not a chronicle as the title suggests, but it is indeed a narrative-based history. Part One of the text is titled, 'Kiev and Proto-democracy' and starts the 'chronicle' at 862. The final part is described as, 'Democrats with Cold Feet' which covers material until 2011.

[90] Cited in Slezkine, "In Memorium".
[91] "Mark D. Steinberg," Mark Steinberg, Accessed 29 June, 2019, http://publish.illinois.edu/mdsteinberg/.
[92] Robert Service, *The Penguin History of Modern Russia* (London: Penguin, 2015).
[93] "Professor Robert Service," St Antony's College, Accessed 29 June, 2019, https://www.sant.ox.ac.uk/people/robert-service.
[94] "Robert Service," Alpha History, Accessed 29 June, 2019, https://alphahistory.com/russianrevolution/historian-robert-service/.
[95] Martin Sixsmith, *Russia: A 1000-Year Chronicle of the Wild East* (London: Ebury Press, 2012).
[96] Sixsmith, *A 1000-Year Chronicle of the Wild East,* front matter.

John M. Thompson and Christopher J. Ward wrote *Russia: A Historical Introduction from Kievan Rus' to the Present* (2018).[97] I use the 8th edition. Thompson was an American historian who worked for the US Foreign Service and subsequently at a number of universities such as Indiana University, the University of Hawaii, the Air War College, and Midcoast Senior College. He was born in 1926 and died in 2017.[98] Ward is Professor of History at Clayton State University in the United States, and co-authored the latter editions of the text with Thompson. This is the most up-to-date text I analyse for this project. The final chapter is 'The Putin Era: Russia in the Twenty-First Century'.

Charles E. Ziegler authored *The History of Russia* (2009).[99] At the time of writing, he is a Political Science professor at the University of Louisville in the United States. Ziegler was born in America and has spent much of his life there, but has also lived abroad.[100] I use the 2nd edition of his text. The text's abstract describes the 2nd edition as adding 'new material covering the last decade, showing how events fit into the overall story of Russia'.[101] The contemporary context is clearly relevant for the writing of history and structuring a narrative. Following a general introductory chapter, 'Russia and Its People', *The History of Russia* begins in Kievan times with the chapter, 'Kievan Russia and the Mongol Experience'. It ends with 'Return to Authoritarianism: Putin and Beyond'.

Data Analysis

The project investigates and tests the construction of Russia in Anglophone histories using a qualitative case study approach, supplemented by quantitative methods. Five

[97] John M. Thompson and Christopher J. Ward, *Russia: A Historical Introduction from the Kievan State to the Present* (New York: Westview Press, 8th edn., 2018).
[98] Alexander Rabinowitch, "In Memorium," *Slavic Review* 76, no. 3 (2017): 904-905.
[99] Charles E. Ziegler, *The History of Russia* (Santa Barbara: Greenwood Press, 2nd end., 2009).
[100] "Charles E. Ziegler", University of Louisville, Accessed 29 June, 2019, http://louisville.edu/politicalscience/political-science-faculty/charles-e.-ziegler.
[101] "Selected Works of Charles E. Ziegler," University of Louisville, Accessed 29 June, 2019, https://works.bepress.com/charles-ziegler/2/.

case studies are undertaken, with each case study concerning a particular period of Russia's history. Each case study constitutes a chapter of the thesis. The case study method is suited to interpretive research since it facilitates collection of empirical evidence and enables an interpretive method of analysis characteristic of CDA. For this project, case studies also serve to test whether ways of writing about Russian history are 'discursive patterns'. Since a pattern necessarily denotes recurrence, finding similar linguistic patterns, or observing differences, in each case study enables testing for whether patterns exist overall and whether the discursive attributes of the texts are representative across Anglophone histories of Russia.

The historical era case studies in this thesis include: the Mongol conquest, the Petrine era, World War II, and the Putin period. These periods of Russian history were selected for three reasons. First, they are representative of different types of narratives which allows for testing whether patterns are common to certain types of stories of Russia's history and complements the literary analysis approach. Second, they are written as periods of Russian history exhibiting strong international dimensions, which is valuable for the analysis of the construction of political communities in relation to others. Third, and most subjectively, the periods of history appeal to me for the genres to which they ostensibly conform. This demonstrates the challenge of overcoming enculturated perceptions of Russia's history, and serves to highlight the very issue of representations of exoticism, romanticism, and otherness. The final case study is of the texts' prefaces and introductions, which enables analysis of the overarching narrative of the Russian nation. It provides an opportunity to assess how patterns identified in the other case studies come together to construct a certain kind of literary Russia.

While the case study method provides the broad analytical and structural parameters for this research, this analysis of discourse adheres to a two-pronged

method involving the analysis of context and analysis of the texts. The convergence of these objects of analysis provides the substance of the thesis, and the two are seldom analysed in isolation in this project. It is the mutually reinforcing character and function of context and text which matters for the construction of social reality. This two-pronged method is adapted from the DHA's 'triangulation' method, whereby a text is evaluated in light of the various contexts relevant to the text's production as well as its socially constructive function.

A text cannot be separated from its context. Borrowing heavily from the DHA, this thesis adopts the Reisigl and Wodak's DH emphasis on the analysis of the 'broader sociopolitical and historical context, which discursive practices are embedded in'.[102] This project is concerned with what the history texts communicate about the time and space within which they were produced and the implications of this cultural and temporal embeddedness for the making of meaning. Historians' immediate or personal contexts are occasionally evaluated, along with their situation within particular cultural contexts. The purpose of this is not to make an argument that historians intended a particular rendition of Russia, but to support an argument that, irrespective of intention, encultured understandings of Russia permeate the writing of the history of Russia and thus reflect and reproduce Russia in a certain way or ways. While the personal circumstances of the historians are referred to at times, this is not the dominant approach or purpose of the project.

Defining the limits of context is one of the challenges of CDA research.[103] As discussed previously in this chapter, context is essentially limitless. However, by defining a particular form of context, and the aspects of that context relevant for analysis, the breadth of contextual material becomes more manageable and the analysis more specific. For this study, the analysis is primarily directed toward what

[102] Reisigl and Wodak, "The Discourse-Historical Approach," 93.
[103] Wodak, "What CDA is About," 12.

the texts might reveal about the context rather than what the context reveals about the texts, although both aspects of the context-text relationship are explored. The project is less about why certain patterns exist in the texts, but rather focuses more on what the discursive patterns can reveal about social reality. In sum, the analysis of the histories is a bidirectional process, with an emphasis on a text's contribution to context. Although reducing apparent analytical rigour, the inseparability of text and context reflects a complexity aligning with the intangibility of social 'reality'.

Analysis of texts is a fundamental undertaking of CDA. Throughout this project, specific methods of text analysis are employed. This is to achieve a degree of consistency and reduce evidence selection and presentation bias, but also to narrow the focus of the analysis to yield targeted results relevant to the research question. Nomination, predication, and argumentation are three of the categories of analysis in the DHA adopted in this thesis. Since history is regarded as literature, literary analysis techniques supplement these forms of analysis.

Nomination is significant for the discursive construction of social actors since it concerns how actors are named and 'referred to linguistically'.[104] Consequently, it is an important category of analysis for this research given the project's focus on constructions of community and identity. Instances of membership categorization is a particularly significant aspect of nomination for its role in designating and constructing groups such as East, West, and Russia. Use of deictics, or referent relational terms, is also analysed since the use of terms such as 'we', 'they' and 'us' can reveal a historian's perspective on categories of community and can serve to either reshape or reinforce Otherness. Ideological anthroponyms such as 'liberals' are also analysed, along with the use of collectives such as 'Russians' and 'the people',

[104] Reisigl and Wodak, "The Discourse-Historical Approach," 94.

and the use of synecdoche for labels of nationality.[105] Such nominations are laden with connotative meaning dependent upon a text's internal context along with its broader historical and cultural context. The ways in which historians refer to Russia and its prominent figures sheds light not only on the author's perspectives, but the context within which their texts were written and published. While the material is not ostensibly, or perhaps intentionally, subjective, analysis of nomination demonstrates some degree of inescapable subjectivity in the production of history and the construction of categories of difference through language.

Where possible, quantitative evidence of nominations is conducted and analysed. Comparison of word frequencies is the primary form of such evidence used throughout the project. Collection of this evidence involves counting the number of times certain words are used in each text. For example, in the chapter assessing historians' writing on World War II, I count the frequency of terms of nationality such as 'Russian', 'German', 'Polish' and so forth (see Chapter IV). Since the texts' chapters are of varying lengths, the six-page sample crosschecks the evidence, increasing its reliability. Comparability is further enhanced since the first six pages of each text generally describe similar events.

Predication extends on nomination by qualifying the social actors through describing them.[106] As an analytical class of the DHA, Reisigl and Wodak's variant of predication concerns the 'stereotypical, evaluative attributions of negative or positive traits'.[107] The main linguistic elements analysed include: adjectives, appositions, prepositional phrases, conjunctional clauses, explicit comparisons, similes, and metaphors. This is perhaps best regarded as the linguistic component of

[105] Synedoche refers to language whereby the part stands for the whole, or where the whole stands for a part. For example, when referring to 'Russia', sometimes the historians mean the Russian government, and sometimes they refer to Stalin but do not mean the man personally, but the Soviet state as a political actor.
[106] Reisigl and Wodak, "The Discourse-Historical Approach," 94.
[107] Reisigl and Wodak, "The Discourse-Historical Approach," 94.

the broader plot-inclusive 'characterisation'. As an aspect of literary analysis, characterization can include analysis of an actor's, in this case Russia's, behaviour as well as how they are, or it is, described. Although some CDA theorists such as Majid KhosraviNik, consider 'action' as a separate category for analysis, this thesis prefers to include action within characterisation and associates it with predication.[108]

Argumentation concerns identifying the historians' arguments pertaining to Russian history. While there is also a linguistic element to this, it is more content-based than nomination and predication, and involves analysing the evidence to determine what the historians are arguing.[109] Although not convention within CDA or the DHA, this thesis finds utility in linking argumentation with literary criticism. In particular, analysis of literary features such as themes, genres, emplotment, emotive language, and foreshadowing contribute toward argumentation insofar as they assist historians in telling their stories and in turn communicating their narratives or arguments to readers (refer to Table 3). Foreshadowing is particularly important for investigating the permeation of contemporary context in the writing of history. However, narrative is the most salient literary feature for argumentation since the narratives of Russia communicated through the texts constitute the core ideas advocated in the texts.

Table 3: Definitions of Key Literary Terms

Literary Term	Definition
Theme	'Theme refers to a general subject or issue that seems to be raised or explored in a text'.[110]
Genre	'Genres are categories set up for classifying texts. Genres are a product of the interplay between textual features and reading practices, which shape and limit the meanings readers can make with a text'.[111]

[108] Majid KhosraviNik, "Actors Descriptions, Action Attributions, and Argumentation: Towards a Systematization of CDA Analytical Categories in the Representation of Social Groups," *Critical Discourse Studies* 7, no. 1 (2010).
[109] KhosraviNik, "Actors Descriptions, Action Attributions, and Argumentation," 66.
[110] Brian Moon, *Literary Terms: A Practical Glossary* (Cottesloe: Chalkface Press, 2009), 160.
[111] Moon, *Literary Terms*, 60.

Emplotment	Emplotment refers to 'the way by which a sequence of events fashioned into a story is gradually revealed to be a story of a particular kind'.[112]
Emotive Language	Words which 'trigger our emotions' and 'direct and encourage certain attitudes and choices'.[113]
Foreshadowing	Foreshadowing is a 'device in the structuring of plot which brings information from the future into the current action'.[114]
Narrative	'Narrative refers to the techniques and processes by which stories are produced. These involve the selection and organisation of elements in a text, and ways of reading that emphasise some parts of the text over others'.[115]
Binary Opposition	'Binary oppositions are patterns of opposing features, concepts, or practices.'[116]
Character	'Characters are imaginary identities constructed through reports of appearance, action, speech, thought, and so on. Traditional reading practices assemble these reports to produce a "person". Modern practices explore characters as representing a set of beliefs and values'.[117]
Personification	'The description of a non-living force or object in terms of a person or living thing'.[118]

No specimen of interpretive research is entirely objective nor methodologically unassailable. As Felicitas Macgilchrist states in the preface to her CDA research, '[a]lternative interpretations will of course always be possible'. However, 'the aim is to present a description and interpretation which is plausibly argued and resonates with readers'.[119] Thus, while as inescapably enculturated as the texts under analysis, this thesis nevertheless aspires to the highest degree of 'objectivity' possible. Quantitative analysis in the form of counting word frequencies supports qualitative findings and is a form of evidential triangulation to crosscheck more interpretive findings.

I have included 'fine analyses' in four of the case studies which allows the reader to make their own determinations regarding my interpretation of the texts. The

[112] Hayden White, *Metahistory: The Historical Imagination in Nineteenth Century Europe* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973/2014), 7.
[113] Fabrizio Macagno and Douglas Walton, *Emotive Language in Argumentation* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 5.
[114] Mario Klarer, *An Introduction to Literary Studies* (London: Routledge, 2004), 140.
[115] Moon, *Literary Terms,* 90.
[116] Moon, *Literary Terms*, 6.
[117] Moon, *Literary Terms*, 10.
[118] Moon, *Literary Terms,* 46.
[119] Felicitas Macgilchrist, *Journalism and the Political: Discursive Tensions in News Coverage of Russia* (Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing Company, 2011), 25.

fine analyses are self-contained analyses of excerpts of text from the relevant chapter. For example, in the Mongol conquest case study, there is a fine analysis of an excerpt of text from Kort's *A Brief History of Russia*. In addition to serving as another cross-check for interpretation of texts, the purposes of the fine analyses are to provide further support for the finding of certain discursive patterns, as well as to show how the patterns come together within a text to create an image of literary Russia.

The use of theories to guide interpretation of the evidence is also intended not merely to narrow the scope and focus of interpretation, but explicitly to identify the project's theoretical assumptions colouring the interpretation of the data. Theory directs the way in which the data is processed and consequently frames the project's results. Most texts are biased. Acknowledging this mitigates negative repercussions of presenting interpretations as 'gospel'. As Le, Le, and Short observe, the ideological position of a CDA researcher only becomes a weakness if undeclared because it conflicts with the critical theoretical foundations of CDA through masking subjectivity. For Le, Le, and Short, researchers ought to 'declare their own 'social identities' and be self-critical in their analyses.[120] In postmodern thought, objectivity is a fallacy. Although different interpretations are possible, through the use of linguistic analysis, literary analysis, and theory, this thesis aims to present a persuasive case asserting the existence of a particular set of discursive patterns supported by evidence.

Nationalism

The application of theories of nationalism are indispensable for this thesis due to the project's investigation into the construction of the nation and interest in increasing understanding of the geo-cultural paradigm. In arguing that Russia is both

[120] Le, Le, and Short, *Critical Discourse Analysis: An Interdisciplinary Perspective*, 11.

represented and constructed as Other, I analyse how Russia as a nation is constructed in and for the Anglosphere. Through 'narrating the nation' of Russia, the historians also construct it, imagining a literary Russia into 'existence' for the Anglosphere. In doing so, the historians also inadvertently construct the West, reflecting the notion that identity is inherently relational and dependent upon perceptions of difference.

Accordingly, postmodern perspectives on nationalism are particularly relevant to this project due to the shared emphasis on construction, and, for some theories, discursive construction of communities. Such theoretical perspectives are particularly relevant for the analysis of history texts undertaken in this thesis, since, as Hobsbawn articulates, '[h]istorians are to nationalism what poppy-growers […] are to heroin-addicts: [they] supply the essential raw material for the market'.[121] Linking this to ideas of the DHA, nations derive from, and are situated within, historical context, rendering history an inextricable ingredient constituting nations. Consequently, theories of nationalism serve as ideal perspectives for interpreting history texts for the purpose of investigating such texts' potential effect on the construction of Russia. Theories of nationalism also offer insight regarding the effect of such construction on diplomatic relations insofar as the general position that nationalism influences 'political actions' because of its role in structuring national identity.[122]

'Nationalism' is an intensely contested concept among scholars and has a variety of meanings. However, certain meanings are more relevant for this project than others.[123] This brief discussion of nationalism is therefore restricted to the ideas of nationalism applied in this study. The conceptualisation of nationalism as the idea that 'humanity is divided into distinct groups called "nations"' is a foundational

[121] Eric Hobsbawm, "Ethnicity and Nationalism in Europe Today," *Anthropology Today* 8, no.1 (1992): 3.
[122] Lloyd Kramer, "Historical Narratives and the Meaning of Nationalism," *Journal of the History of Ideas* 58, no. 3 (1997): 526, 613.
[123] Paul Lawrence, *Nationalism: History and Theory* (London: Routledge, 2005), 8.

notion for this project. [124] This is because of the project's general aim of understanding how such groups form, and how ideas of difference bring about such division and perceptions of both others and the self. Representations of similarity and difference form the core of this research.

Early theorising on groups with shared characteristics emphasised unity of groups, and justified different groups, based on factors such as common language, climate, and 'ways of life'.[125] For Paul Lawrence, part of what constitutes 'nationalism' is populations' awareness 'of themselves as distinct social groupings'.[126] As Erika Harris similarly notes, regardless of its conceptual variances, nationalism always pertains to 'collective identities'.[127] Thus, a nation is, at a minimum, a collective of people sharing the perception of shared characteristics, values, and beliefs. It concerns a shared sense of ethnic and or cultural identity. For some scholars, a nation refers not only to a group sharing common culture, but also a group's 'desire to control a territory'.[128] A conclusion as to whether the definition of nation must include the territory aspect is beyond the scope of this project, but it is nevertheless important to consider that there is some element of territory linked to the idea of the nation in order to comprehend the form of identity explored. The idea of nationalism as referring to national identity and the 'sentiment felt by many people of belonging to a particular nation',[129] is also relevant for the aspect of the project concerning the construction of the West. Different forms of nationalism become relevant at different times throughout this thesis.

Nationalism emerged as an intellectual concept in the late eighteenth century, and by the nineteenth century debate over the conflation of the 'nation' and the

[124] Lawrence, *Nationalism: History and Theory*, 4.
[125] Lawrence, *Nationalism: History and Theory*, 2.
[126] Lawrence, *Nationalism: History and Theory*, 2.
[127] Erika Harris, *Nationalism: Theories and Cases* (Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press, 2009), 4.
[128] Lowell W. Barrington, "Nation and Nationalism: The Misuse of Key Concepts in Political Science," *Political Science and Politics* 30, no. 4 (1997): 713.
[129] Lawrence, *Nationalism: History and Theory*, 4.

'state' developed. The distinction between what are arguably two concepts remains disputed. Some scholars contend that nations refer to groups with shared characteristics such as language and ethnicity, while states are political units. Anthony Richmond, for example, regards the state and nation as separate entities and concepts since many nations can exist within a state.[130] Similarly, Lowell Barrington laments the 'incorrect' use of 'nation' and 'state' in political science research.[131] According to researchers distinguishing between the two concepts, few, if any, nation-states (where a single nation correlates with a single state) exist in the world today. For others, the terms are used interchangeably, creating a fluidity of the meaning of 'nation'.

Many of the historians cited throughout this thesis conflate the nation and the state. The generally ambiguous and unsystematic use of the language of nationality in the texts suggests that such conflation is likely unintentional. The imprecise operationalisation of concepts of nationalism has implications for the production of meaning, and, via extension, for the way in which Russia is discursively constructed. Hence, the use of the term 'nation' throughout this thesis may also appear ambiguous, but this is intentional. At times, I will draw attention to the way that the texts demonstrate an inconsistent approach to ideas of nations through analysing the way in which the historians use terms of nationality such as 'Russia' and 'Poland' within their intratextual contexts. The way that the history texts are written emphasise the nation-like aspects of the political community of Russia, almost forcing the image of national homogeneity. This is why reference to the nation of Russia in this thesis is not erroneous, but most accurately reflects the nature of the community being discursively constructed.

[130] Anthony H. Richmond, "Ethnic Nationalism: Social Science Paradigms," *International Social Science Journal* 11 (1987): 4.
[131] Barrington, "Nation and Nationalism," 713.

Based on these understandings of 'the nation', this thesis works from the premise that nationalism is not an ideology per se. This contrasts with Ernest Gellner's approach toward nationalism as a 'principle that holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent'.[132] The term 'nationalism' also has derogatory connotations in the West where it is often represented as dangerous for its potential to create division among societies. Like Benedict Anderson, this project regards 'nationalism' as more related to 'kinship' and 'religion', than to 'liberalism' or 'fascism'. [133] It is more to do with the idea of community than the beliefs of a community. Accordingly, for this research, a nation is regarded as 'an imagined political community'. [134]

In his seminal work, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (1993), Anderson argues that nations are imagined. He contends that nations are '*imagined* because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in their minds of each lives the image of their communion'.[135] Language is crucial for this imagination of the nation. According to Anderson, the origins of nationalism can be attributed to 'print capitalism' and the use of common vernacular. Communication enables the formation of shared ideas, connecting people who would otherwise not encounter each other. From this, a sense of belonging to a shared community can develop. Anderson's ideas are clearly useful for this thesis for the emphasis on both construction of community, but also the emphasis on the role of language in that process of construction. As vectors for the national narrative, history texts are invaluable for this imagining of community. They contribute toward the socialisation into national (or civilisational) communities. Kramer explains that nationalism is a

[132] Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983), 1.
[133] Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities* (London: Verso, 2006), 5.
[134] Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, 6.
[135] Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, 6.

dynamic and ongoing process involving socialisation, since, '[a]ll nationalisms require a constant 'cultural education' that teaches people the meaning of their nationality.'[136] Wodak and others employ Anderson's concepts in their CDA of Austrian national identity, arguing that national identity is partly constructed through discourse.[137]

However, national identity, in terms of the ideas of the national self, forms only a subsidiary part of this thesis. It is more concerned with the national Other and the civilisational Self. The construction of the West in the text is a product of Anglophone writing of Russia's history. In this regard, this project differs from existing work on the discursive construction of national identity because it concerns unintentional construction of not a nation per se, but, arguably, a civilisation as a political community. Conceptually, for the purpose of this research, a civilisation is comparable to a nation insofar as it is similarly a community with shared values, albeit on a large-scale. Such ideas will be further developed throughout the thesis.

Although this project predominantly focuses on the imagining of another nation in relation to others, the fundamental concept of the imagining of community is nevertheless applicable. Anderson's ideas remain applicable to this external imagining of community because while imaginings of Russia in the Anglosphere do not construct 'Russia' in absolute, they do construct a literary version of Russia accessible to the West. In this respect, this thesis proposes an expanded notion of imagined community whereby one community can imagine another community into existence in their cultural context. The West imagines a Russia into existence, but as it exists within the Western reality. The Russia of the West, or as the West knows it, might be different from how the state of 'Russia' imagines itself into existence.

[136] Lloyd S. Kramer, *Nationalism in Europe and America: Politics, Cultures, and Identities Since 1775* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2011), 5.
[137] Wodak, de Cillia, Reisigl, and Liebhart, *The Discursive Construction of National Identity,* 22.

Anderson's work suffered criticism for its concept of imagination, which some scholars interpreted as trivialising the nation and nationalism and positioning imagination against the 'real'. However, Anderson draws a distinction between 'imagined' and 'imaginary'. He asserts that the imagining brings into existence, or creates, nations rendering them 'real' – they become part of social reality. Social reality is not less real necessarily than natural reality, but it is perhaps more subjectively rendered and perceived, along with being less immutable since it can be discursively shaped.

Another aspect of Anderson's conceptualisation of the nation accepted and employed throughout this thesis, is his idea that nations are 'limited' due to their 'boundaries, beyond which lie other nations'. [138] Thus, the idea of distinct groups becomes significant for this understanding of 'nation'. Difference is a fundamental principle for the construction of any group identity since the process of identity formation is inescapably relational.[139] As Kramer explains, 'all nationalisms construct collective identities by stressing their *differences* from other nations and peoples'.[140] This is significant for this project, and highlights the necessary duality of the research. While arguing that Russia is constructed in a certain way, the thesis also addresses how, in writing Russia, the historians inadvertently also write the West. The texts generally adopt a relational position whereby what Russia is, is described with reference to what it is not. For example, Russia is described as 'autocratic', which is a relational term which gains meaning when understood in comparison with 'democratic', a label generally understood within the Anglosphere as descriptive of Western political culture. Sahlins explains that '[n]ational identity is a socially constructed and continuous process of defining 'friend' and 'enemy' … National

[138] Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, 7.
[139] Kramer, *Nationalism in Europe and America*, 21.
[140] Kramer, *Nationalism in Europe and America*, 5.

identities … do not depend on the existence of any objective linguistic or cultural differentiation but on the subjective experience of difference'.[141] Western identity is created and maintained through definition of what it is not, and what is left out of the national narrative is as important as what is included.

Defining an enemy therefore serves to augment a shared sense of national identity. Kramer observes that '[c]ampaigns for national unity or coherence thus achieve the greatest success when the majority of a national population agrees that they face dangerous enemies'.[142] He notes how the United States experienced a national identity disruption when the USSR collapsed, as it lost its main enemy. However, he contends that this was resolved as 'radical Islamic groups soon emerged as a new external threat and a new unifying 'other' for America's national identity'.[143] This is clearly relevant for this project's analysis of the effect of constructing Russia as Other. It is in the interests of political cohesion for some degree of national identity to be shared among members of political communities, and so 'nationalist narratives thus stress the coherence and unity of the nation'. [144]

Narrating the nation is a part of the process of imagining, and via extension, constructing a nation. For Uri Ram, nationality itself is a narration, 'a story which people tell about themselves in order to lend meaning to their social world'.[145] Stuart Hall similarly claims that a national identity is 'a narrative of self … the story we tell about the self in order to know who we are'.[146] Consequently, stories told about others likewise lend meaning to one's social world, and a narrative of an Other is the story told about an Other in order to know who they are. The 'narrative of the nation'

[141] Peter Sahlins, *Boundaries: The Making of France and Spain in the Pyrenees* (Berkeley: California University Press, 1989), 270-271.
[142] Kramer, *Nationalism in Europe and America,* 21.
[143] Kramer, *Nationalism in Europe and America,* 22.
[144] Kramer, *Nationalism in Europe and America,* 80.
[100] Uri Ram cited in Ruth Wodak, Rudolf de Cillia, Martin Reisigl, and Karen Liebhart, *The Discursive Construction of National Identity,* trans. Angelika Hirsch, Richard Mitten, and J. W Unger (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2009), 23.
[146] Stuart Hall, "Ethnicity: identity and difference," in *Becoming National: A Reader,* eds. Geoff Eley and Ronald Grigor Suny (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 346.

is an important aspect of a nation's creation.[147] The nation is 'presented in national narratives, in literature, in the media and in everyday culture and it creates a connection between stories, landscapes, scenarios, historical events, national symbols and national rituals which represent shared experiences and concerns, triumphs and destructive defeats'.[148] Clearly, these ideas of the nation as narrative complement CDA because discourse is a common element of the communication of such a narrative developing a sense of shared experience. History texts are quintessential carriers of national narratives, and history texts of other nations can construct that Other nation for the Self.

Homi Bhabha further develops the idea of the discursive construction of nations, and shares the fundamental assumption that nations are imagined. Bhabha argues that nations are 'a form of social and textual affiliation' developing discursively through interaction between cultures.[149] Similarly to Hall, Bhabha regards nations as discursive constructs untethered to any 'objective' reality.[150] For Bhabha, narrators of nations aim to 'produce the idea of the nation as a continuous narrative of national progress'. He regards this as problematic because nations are not culturally homogenous, and they do not necessarily develop in a historically linear fashion. As a consequence, nations are not, despite their portrayal as such, 'totalised'. Nations are not necessarily complete, continuous, or homogenous. As Bhabha explains, the 'problematic 'closure' of textuality questions the 'totalization' of national culture'. This suggests that nations, cultures, and identities are never completed texts, but are instead dynamic constructions. While seemingly entrenched

[147] Stuart Hall, "The Question of National Identity," in *Modernity: An Introduction to Modern Societies*, eds. Stuart Hall, David Held, Don Hubert, and Kenneth Thompson (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1996).
[148] Wodak, de Cillia, Reisigl, and Liebhart, *The Discursive Construction of National Identity,* 24.
[149] Homi K. Bhabha, *Nation and Narration* (Oxon, Routledge, 1990), 292.
[150] Lawrence, *Nationalism: History and Theory*, 205.

in the past, they are necessarily reimagined for utility in the present. Bhabha contends that

> the people are the historical 'objects' of a nationalist pedagogy, giving the discourse an authority that is based on the pre-given or constituted historical origin in the past; the people are also the 'subjects' of a process of signification that must erase any prior or ordinary presence of the nation-people to demonstrate the prodigious, living principles of the People as contemporaneity: as that sign of the present through which national life is redeemed and iterated as a reproductive process.[151]

The nation is thus dependent upon continual narrativisation, which in turn depends on the historical enculturation of its authors. Bhabha further infers that, in narrating the nation, cultural difference is 'enunciated', despite efforts to create a holistic nation through discourse. For the writing of Russian history, cultural homogeneity and linearity of a national narrative serve to create a more digestible story and image of Russia as a nation. Narrating the nation in history texts is an exercise in supressing certain aspects of the past and emphasising others, effectively reflecting and reproducing the dominant discourse to produce a generalised Russia for the Anglosphere. Likewise, for Lloyd Kramer, nationalism fundamentally concerns 'competing narratives that seek to define a social community' where competition arises from 'the complexity of difference' within communities.[152] This struggle can occur within the discursive space. Clearly, this relates to CDA because of the shared importance of the development of hegemonic discourses and the means in which such discourses shape national narratives in inconspicuous ways.

In the histories of Russia analysed throughout this thesis, events are written to conform to particular types of stories giving rise to a seemingly coherent unified 'Russia'. For national narratives, the difference within nations is minimised, while the difference between nations becomes more apparent. Evidently, these ideas apply

[151] Homi K. Bhabha, *The Location of Culture* (Oxon: Routledge, 1994), 145.
[152] Lloyd Kramer, "Historical Narratives and the Meaning of Nationalism," *Journal of the History of Ideas* 58, no. 3 (1997): 537.

to this thesis since in imagining the Other, the Self is also imagined in contrast to what it is not.

Michael Billig's notion of 'banal nationalism' similarly concerns the construction of the nation through the reproduction and communication of ideas. The language of nationality is inescapable. 'Everyday' expressions of nationalism habitually go unnoticed. Yet, because mundane expressions of nationality are inconspicuous, they serve as powerful reinforcements of national identity. As Billig explains,

> nationalism has seeped into the corners of our consciousness; it is present in the very words which we might try to use for analysis. It is naïve to think that a text of exposure can escape from the times and place of its formulation. It can attempt, instead, to do something more modest: it can draw attention to the powers of an ideology which is so familiar that it hardly seems noticeable.[153]

However, despite being almost invisible, nationalism in everyday discourse has a profound effect in sustaining and maintaining nations as components of socio-political reality. Since nations are dynamic, they must constantly be reimagined to remain in 'existence'. Accordingly, seemingly subtle ideas of nationalism within history texts can contribute toward reinforcing divisive categories of difference structuring the existing world order. This thesis contends that the constructed communities are not simply nations, but extend to civilisational communities of 'the West', the 'Anglosphere', the 'non-West', or 'the East'. In using these terms, their signified meanings are reproduced, sustaining the concepts for understanding but also structuring reality. Nationalism produces 'its own discourses of hegemony', making it important to understand how it works.

[153] Billig, *Banal Nationalism*,12.

II. OTHERING RUSSIA IN HISTORICAL ACCOUNTS OF THE MONGOL CONQUEST

The sweeping histories of Russia typically represent the Mongol conquests of the thirteenth century as an event that sundered Russia from the West and placed it on an alternative path of development. The Othering of literary Russia thus begins with the Mongol conquests. Historians use both language and narrative to homogenise Russia and categorise Russia as non-Western. It is not simply the categorisation that leads to Othering, but the way that the non-West is portrayed as an inferior category.

Since Russia's Otherness is dependent upon ideas of the West, this chapter begins with a general exploration of the concept of Othering and the ideas of the West and the East. Having provided the conceptual basis for textual analysis, I then explore the way in which language is used to categorise Russia as non-Western. Then, I highlight how the narratives of the texts emphasise the impact of the Mongols on Russian political culture.

Othering is one of the main strategies that the historians use to smooth over inconsistencies between the narrative that they want to tell, and the facts out of which they construct these narratives. Such inconsistences challenge the image of Russia that the narratives portray. They make it difficult to integrate Russia into the Western geo-cultural paradigm which categorises the world into nations, regions, and civilisations. In other words, friction between the narrative and the facts makes Russia difficult to classify, which in turn implicitly calls into question the system of classification. Some facts suggest that Russia could be categorised as Western, while other facts suggest that it is Eastern, or neither of the East or West. In the Mongol texts, Othering largely disguises the tensions which are characteristic of discordus. Russia is primarily portrayed as non-Western. While Russia is predominantly Othered in histories of the Mongol conquest, the factual inconsistencies which give

rise to discordic techniques become more apparent in the subsequent case studies of this thesis.

The core texts for this chapter are: Martin Sixsmith's *Russia: a 1000-Year Chronicle of the Wild East* (2012), Richard Pipes' *Russia under the Old Regime* (1974), Geoffrey Hosking's *Russia and the Russians* (2012), John M. Thompsons' *Russia and the Soviet Union: An Historical Introduction from the Kievan State to the Present* (2009), and Nicholas Riasanovsky and Mark Steinberg's *A History of Russia* (2005).[154] The chapter also includes a 'fine analysis' of an excerpt of Michael Kort's *A Brief History of Russia* (2008). The purpose of this fine analysis is to reiterate the presence of particular ways of writing about Russia. The fine analysis is also intended to illustrate how the various literary techniques operate in synergy to produce a generalised image of Russia as a form of anOther nation.

It is a well-established idea that Othering is central to the delineation of distinct communities. 'Othering' is a process through which groups or individuals are designated as 'the Other' to 'the Self' on the basis of perceived differences.[155] This process is part of identity formation. Othering influences constructions of the identity of the Self in opposition to the Other. Communities are imagined, not simply through the perception of in-group commonalities, but also through the perception and structuring of differences with out-groups. Since nationalism concerns the formation and maintenance of nations as groups, it also necessarily concerns inclusion and exclusion. As Lloyd Kramer articulates, '[n]ationalists typically describe their nations by emphasizing how they differ from others, so the history of nationalisms could be

[154] Martin Sixsmith, *Russia: A 1000-Year Chronicle of the Wild East* (London: Ebury Press, 2012); Richard Pipes, *Russia Under the Old Regime* (New York: Scribner, 1974); John M. Thompson, *Russia and the Soviet Union: An Historical Introduction from the Kievan State to the Present* (Boulder: Westview Press, 6th edn., 2009); Nicholas V. Riasanovsky & Mark D.Steinberg, *A History of Russia* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 7th edn., 2005); Geoffrey Hosking, *Russia and the Russians* (Cambridge MA: Belknap Press, 2001).
[155] Yiannis Gabriel, *Organizing Words: A Critical Thesaurus for Social and Organizational Studies* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 213.

described as a history of intellectual dichotomies (self/other) that create hierarchies of value'.[156] Defining oneself through the articulation of what one is not is a key theoretical assumption of this chapter (and of my thesis more broadly). The idea of Othering contributes to the dualistic thesis that historians simultaneously construct Russia and the West.

The West casts Russia in the role of Other, which serves to strengthen its own existence as a community. It achieves this through reiterating what it means to be Western by representing what it means to be Russian, or of the non-West, from a Western perspective. This is why Russia must be Othered – to sustain the integrity of the Western metanarrative.

Edward Said's idea of Orientalism provides the main conceptual framework for this chapter. Orientalism is a useful theory to apply in this case study because the concept is fundamentally about Othering. Said's most famous text, *Orientalism* (1978), explores how discourse produces a cultural community (the Orient) for the West. While Said's monograph concerns the relationship dynamics between colonisers and colonised, his ideas are nevertheless applicable outside of a traditional postcolonial context. He emphasises how discourse influences dynamics of domination and subordination – how texts produce and sustain unequal relationships between communities. Said argues that the European sense of self, or identity, is consolidated through the West's discursive practices in constructing the Orient. As he explains, Orientalism 'has less to do with the Orient than it does with "our" world'.[157] Likewise, Western writing on Russian history can reveal just as much about the Western cultural context as it can reveal about Russia.

[156] Kramer, "Historical Narratives and the Meaning of Nationalism," 541.
[157] Edward W. Said, *Orientalism: Western Conceptions of the Orient* (New Delhi: Penguin Books, 1995), 12.

Said considers how language sustains the hegemony of a particular group. He also highlights how this has a practical effect on relations. Regarding relations between Europe and the Orient, Said contends that the texts enabled colonialism and perpetuate on-going inequalities. I similarly seek to explore how discursive patterns that emphasise difference between the West and Russia are present in Anglophone histories of Russia.

Said also accepts a distinction between the natural world and the social world. For Said, 'the Orient is not an inert fact of nature' but, along with all 'geographical and cultural entities', is 'man-made [sic]'. The Orient is an imagined community. Consequently, as Said explains, it is 'an idea' couched in 'thought, imagery, and vocabulary that have given it reality and presence in and for the West'.[158] Russia, likewise, is an idea so widely subscribed to that it has acquired form in the socially constructed reality. The Russia as it exists in the 'mind's eye' of the West is at least partly fictionalised, just as the Orient became fictionalised. Certain characteristics are emphasised or suppressed in texts to construct a comprehensible image for the West.[159] While Othering is a well-traversed area of research, Othering Russia is seldom explicitly analysed, particularly in a context of historical writing. The Othering of Russia continues to be acceptable and 'normal' in the Anglophone discursive space.

One of the primary ways in which the historians typically construct the image of Russia as Other is through comparing Russia's development with Europe's development. The texts imply that Russia was not, and is not, European. Historians communicate a sense of difference between 'us' Anglosphere readers, and Russia. As social practice, the texts shape constructions of East and West, but they also support

[158] Said, *Orientalism,* 5.
[159] See Homi K. Bhaba, *Nation and Narration* (Oxon: Routledge, 1990), 1, for the idea of realizing the nation in the 'mind's eye'.

the broader construct of 'civilisations'. Historians possess discursive power. Through exercising their power, historians exploit the notion of binary opposition. They contribute to the entrenchment of divisive frameworks for understanding and acting within the social world. In short, historians reify the geo-cultural paradigm. This in turn consolidates the West as an imagined community, and sustains a hegemonic West vis-à-vis East through the depiction of the West as superior to the subaltern 'Other'.[160]

The West can be conceptualised as a civilisation, though such conceptualisation is not without flaws. As William McNeill states, the West is a 'civilization independent of locale'.[161] According to Samuel Huntington, a civilisation is 'the highest cultural grouping of people and the broadest level of cultural identity people have short of that which distinguishes humans from other species'.[162] Some scholars have critiqued Huntington's essentialist conceptualisation of civilisations because of how it categorises diverse cultures into macro-civilisational groupings.[163] His categories are indeed problematic, due to the generalisation of diverse peoples into relatively arbitrary and monolithic cultural groupings. However, regardless of whether one agrees with Huntington's typology of civilisations, such generalisations (for example, East versus West) are deeply embedded in everyday discourse. As Martin Lewis and Karen Wigen emphasise, no matter how the world is 'parceled', 'like areas are inevitably divided from like, while disparate places are jumbled together'.[164] Dividing humanity into groups through the geo-cultural paradigm therefore depends on Othering and Saming. Lewis and Wigen

[160] For analysis of constructs of East and West, binary categorisations of culture, and the use of discourse in creating dominance, see for example: Edward. W Said, *Orientalism: Western Conceptions of the Orient* (New Delhi: Penguin Books, 2nd edn, 1995); Bhabha, *The Location of Culture*.
[161] William H. McNeill, "What we Mean by the West," *Orbis* Fall (1997): 514.
[162] Samuel P. Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations?" *Foreign Affairs* 72, no.3 (1993): 23.
[163] Robert W. Cox, "Civilizations: Encounters and Transformations," *Studies in Political Economy* 47, no. 3 (1995); Edward Said, "The Clash of Ignorance," *The Nation* October; Hayward Alker, "If Not Huntington's 'Civilizations,' Then Whose?" *Review* 18, no. 4 (1995).
[164] Martin W. Lewis and Kären E. Wigen, *The Myth of Continents: A Critique of Metageography* (Berkley: University of California Press, 1997), 1.

continue, explaining how essentialising the world into parts might be 'convenient', but 'does injustice to the complexities of global geography'.[165] Nonetheless, the language of continents and civilisations is pervasive in the Anglophone discursive space. Civilisations, like nations, are central concepts for describing and organising knowledge about the world, irrespective of whether they are problematic or not.

Civilisations are malleable, intersecting, and often intertwined constructs.[166] The West and the East are ideas rather than fixed entities.[167] The idea of the West as a construction rather than a tangible 'real' entity is the most fitting approach for this thesis due to the fundamental assumption that the West is an imagined community.

Andrei Tsygankov articulates a definition of 'civilisation' that encapsulates the socially constructed view of civilisations. He defines a civilisation as:

> an idea-based community that extends beyond a nation and is reproduced across time and space. Civilisations form in response to various historical developments and may be expressed in religious traditions, social customs, economic, and political institutions. Idea-based civilisations are not static, but constantly evolve.[168]

Tsygankov further clarifies that civilisations are a part of a nation's 'culturally significant environment'.[169] From this perspective, perceptions of civilisations are a means of making sense of the world.[170] William McNeill likewise identifies civilisation with collective ideas. He contends that the term 'civilisation' is used to describe 'a shared literary canon, and expectations about human behaviour framed by that canon'.[171] Civilisational identity is thus about social connection and belonging to a broader community beyond the nation-state. They are macro-imagined groups. As

[165] Lewis and Wigen, *The Myth of Continents*, 1.
[166] Andrei Tsygankov, "Finding a Civilisational Idea: 'West,' 'Eurasia,' and 'Euro-East' in Russia's Foreign Policy," *Geopolitics* 12, no. 3 (2007).
[167] Stuart Hall, "The West and the Rest: Discourse and Power" in *Formations of Modernity*, eds. Stuart Hall and Bram Gieben (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1993), 276.
[168] Tsygankov, "Finding a Civilisational Idea," 377.
[169] Tsygankov, "Finding a Civilisational Idea," 377.
[170] Cox, "Civilizations," 11.
[171] William H. McNeill, *The Rise of the West: A History of the Human Community* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963/1991), 8.

groups, civilisations are affected by issues of 'sameness' and 'difference', inclusion and exclusion, along with constructs and perceptions of the Other.

The meaning of the West is fluid. As McNeill observes, 'the meaning of the West is a function of who is using the word'.[172] Stuart Hall similarly suggests that the West lacks a single meaning. Despite its historical geographical basis in Europe, the West is 'no longer only in Europe'.[173] For Hall, the West is a '*historical*, not a geographical, construct'.[174] In my thesis, the West is therefore regarded as a constructed cultural space consisting of posited shared values and beliefs.[175] The shared values and beliefs which constitute allegedly Western culture are debatable.

However, the core of Western ideology is political, social, and economic liberalism. The rule of law, capitalism, civil society, democracy, and individualism are emphasised in this understanding of Western ideology. Establishing the content, existence, and validity of the West, is, however, beyond the scope of this project and irrelevant to its analytical purpose. Despite the nebulous character of the West, as both a concept and a 'real' civilisational community, utilising the concept for analytical purposes is essential for my thesis because the idea of the West as a community is habitually reinforced in Anglophone discourse.

To summarise, the existence of the concepts of the West and the East enable categorisation which can lead to Othering.[176] Accepting the existence of the West as an imagined community enables analysis of the role of histories of Russia in discursively sustaining the West. The idea of the West reinforces the idea of global order dependent upon Othering along the lines of 'the West and the rest'.[177] Russia is not always clearly depicted as Eastern, but it is frequently portrayed as non-Western.

---

[172] McNeil, "What we Mean by the West," 514.
[173] Hall, "The West and the Rest", 276.
[174] Hall, "The West and the Rest", 277.
[175] Bogdan C. Enache, "What is the West?," *The Independent Review* 14, no. 3 (2010): 450.
[176] Hall, "The West and the Rest", 277.
[177] Niall Ferguson, *Civilization: The West and the Rest* (London: Penguin, 2011).

My sample history texts on the Mongol conquests maintain ideas of civilisational distinction, and reveal a common Eurocentric perspective of 'good' and 'bad' culture. Such differentiation arises through the use of comparison, which results in the categorisation of Russia as non-European (or non-Western). Sixsmith is the most overt in such East-West comparisons. For example, Sixsmith describes the Mongol conquest as 'setting back [Russia's] development as a European state'.[178] His use of the phrase 'setting back' in this context implies that the experience prevented Russia from moving forward, which in turn suggests that becoming European would be desirable and not becoming European was a misfortune. It also subtly implies that Russia had, or perhaps has, the potential to develop into a European state, alluding to Russia's cultural liminality.[179]

Russia's separation from Europe is a dominant theme in Sixsmith's text. He laments how, 'isolated from Europe, Russia missed out on the Renaissance, her national progress interrupted for more than 200 years. In some respects, she would never fully catch up with Western Europe's cultural and social values'.[180] Connotations of misfortune at disconnectedness from Europe are clear. 'Missed out' and 'national progress interrupted' conflates evolution and progress with becoming like Europe. The subtext is that Russia became culturally and socially stunted for its lack of contact with Europe as a positive socialising influence.

Sixsmith projects ideas of difference into both Russia's and Europe's narratives and frames the Mongol conquest as the beginning of a divergent path for Russia compared to Europe. Progress is relative, and Sixsmith's use of the term is evidently weighted with his liberal cultural baggage. His words 'never fully catch

[178] Sixsmith, *Russia: A 1000-Year Chronicle of the Wild East*, 29.
[179] This can be inferred because within the dominant discourse of nationality and civilisations, there could be no comprehensible meaning in referring to China's development as a European state, for example, because it clashes with ingrained mental models for understanding how the world is structured. Therefore, it only makes sense if the state in question could, within this discursive framework, conceivably be construed as European.
[180] Sixsmith, *Russia: A 1000-Year Chronicle of the Wild East*, 29.

up', suggest that Western Europe's values are superior and worth aspiring to. In never catching up, Russia of today is somehow lagging behind Europe or is inferior to it. The use of gendered language ('she would never fully catch up') to refer to Russia also feminises Russia akin to the way in which the Orient was feminised in relation to the masculine West.[181] Such language reinforces the binary structure of inferiority and superiority. However, it is important to note that it is not uncommon for nations in histories more generally to be referred to using the feminine pronoun.

Implicit in Sixmsith's text is the idea that Europe is advanced, while non-Europe is inferior. In this regard, there are similarities in the way that Russia is written to the way in which Said contends 'the Orient' is written. At its core, Orientalism is 'a political vision of reality whose structure promote[s] the difference between the familiar (Europe, West, "us") and the strange (the Orient, the East, "them").'[182] The inferiority/superiority dichotomy employed in the texts in relation to Russia and Europe therefore clearly fits the Oriental paradigm within which the familiar is superior to the strange.

Writing about Russia as Europe's inferior neighbour facilitates the hegemony of the West through iterating the superiority of Western values. One of Said's primary arguments in *Orientalism* is that the West discursively constructs the Orient in a way which establishes Western hegemony over a subordinate Other. Evidently, the writing of Russia also parallels the writing of the Orient in terms of this practical effect because Europe is constructed as the superior and dominant Self.

Other historians also use comparisons to Europe frequently. These comparisons likewise emphasise development disparities. Thompson, for example, describes how,

[181] Said, *Orientalism*, 138.
[182] Said, *Orientalism*, 43.

> at the very time when Europeans, as they emerged from the Middle Ages, were both enjoying increased protection from feudal infighting and external attack and benefitting from rising economic well-being provided by improved agriculture and reviving trade. Yet, Russians lived under Mongol domination … Trade and handicraft production languished, and agriculture remained primitive.[183]

His text establishes Russians as different from Europeans. He further writes that, before the Mongol period, Novgorod 'ranked in splendour and culture with the major towns of Europe'. One paragraph of Thompson's text strongly reflects this distinction between Europe and Russia and the advanced/inferior meaning evoked through comparison:

> in Kievan times, it was developing along a track parallel to that of western Europe and its Latin Christian civilization. But after the Mongols, the distance between them had perceptibly widened, and Russian society evolved along more distinctly different lines than it had a few centuries earlier. As a result, serfdom emerged in Russia just as it was disappearing in western Europe. Trade and commercial capitalism flourished in Europe, but languished in Russia. Europe bubbled over with intellectual ferment and social fluidity, particularly during the Renaissance. Thought in Russia remained quite traditional, even stagnant, as Russian society became increasingly rigid and stratified.[184]

Thompson clearly creates the image of Russia as backward compared to Europe. Within the cultural context of the West, freedom, modernisation, capitalism and so forth arguably dominate the cultural space. Phrases such as 'bubbled over with intellectual ferment', 'commercial capitalism flourished', and 'social fluidity' therefore evoke positive meaning in this context, whereas 'serfdom' and 'rigid and stratified' acquire negative connotations. Thompson's decision to compare Russia with Europe reflects the dominant organisational structures of the world at the time he wrote his text. These comparisons are also elitist in the way that they describe western Europe. Similarly to their more Eastern counterparts, many people in western

[183] John M. Thompson, *Russia and the Soviet Union: An Historical Introduction from the Kievan State to the Present* (Boulder: Westview Press, 6th edn., 2009), 29.
[184] Thompson, *Russia and the Soviet Union,* 45.

Europe were not 'bubbling over with intellectual ferment', but were likewise impoverished and illiterate. Said argues that constructing the Orient as inferior not only created an unequal relationship, but also justified Western hegemony. Perhaps the same can be said for Russia. In constructing Russia as backward and inferior through emphasising (and generalising) stark differences in the societies, the West establishes its hegemonic status but also justifies it.

Riasanovsky likewise represents Russia as backward in relation to Western Europe. However, Riasanovsky ordinarily frames Mongol impact on Russia as minimal. Despite this, he notes that 'in contrast to the earlier history of the country, a relative isolation from the rest of Europe became characteristic of appanage Russia'.[185] Riasanovsky suggests that this 'led to stagnation and even regression, which can be seen in the political thought, the law, and most, although not all fields of culture of the period'.[186] His comment 'stagnation and even regression' is value-laden, reflecting ideas of what is 'good' and 'bad'. Similarly to Sixsmith and Thompson, Riasanovsky frames Russia's separation from Europe as detrimental. However, Riasanovksy also specifically confines this to the period of the thirteenth century, whereas Sixsmith implies continuity to the present.

Unlike Thompson and Sixsmith, Riasanovsky seems to regard Russia as European. His words 'from the rest of Europe' indicate that, from his perspective, Russia's Mongol experience did not render it non-European. Dukes also shares the view that Russia was European. Dukes points out that Russia 'must be considered as an outpost of the West', and Russia's 'polity and society may still best be typified as frontier European rather than Asian'.[187] Despite these differences, the dominant tendency is to 'Other' Russia in histories of the Mongol conquest of Russia.

[185] Riasanovsky and Steinberg, *A History of Russia*, 52.
[186] Riasanovsky and Steinberg, *A History of Russia*, 52.
[187] Dukes, *A History of Russia: 882-1996*, 41, 35.

The texts refer to Europe and Russia as homogenous entities. During the thirteenth century, what one now refers to as 'Russia' and 'Europe' were not homogenous or unified communities (arguably, nor are they today). Much like the ambiguity around the idea of 'the West', there is a lack of clarity in the texts regarding what constitutes Europe and Russia. The historians homogenise peoples into 'Russia' and 'Europe', but it is not evident which peoples and on what bases. Homogenising is a tactic necessary for Othering because it allows for generalisations and stereotyping. It allows Europe to be represented as advanced, and Russia as backward, even though they consisted of diverse groups with varied levels of development. Fundamentally, the historians compare elite culture, while they largely leave out broader society within which more similarities might be apparent.

Although Russia was not a unified and homogenous entity, as the historians tend to portray, evidence suggests that a sense of collective consciousness did exist in the thirteenth century. The modern conception of nations and national identities did not emerge until the nineteenth century. However, a kind of collective consciousness was present in Kievan Rus and Muscovy. Dimitri Oblensky argues that elites created a form of collective consciousness predicated on 'land, language and religion'. There is evidence that writers in the eleventh and twelfth centuries wrote of 'russkaya zemlya' (the land of Russia), a term which 'inspired feelings of loyalty and pride'.[188] Paul Bushkovitch likewise contends that 'Russians of the sixteenth and seventeenth century had a defined national consciousness'.[189] Thus, while homogenising Russia is fundamentally a technique for Othering in the texts, the idea of Russia as a community (though not a nation) during the thirteenth century has some evidentiary basis.

[188] Dimitri Oblensky, "Nationalism in Eastern Europe in the Middle Ages," *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society* 22 (1972): 4.
[189] Paul Bushkovitch, "The Formation of National Consciousness in Early Modern Russia," *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 10, no. 3/4 (1986): 355.

In authoring Russia as 'Other', through highlighting its different path to Europe, and more broadly the West, the texts also reinforce Western identity. Comparisons help construct identities. The Other is necessary for the Self.[190] As Said argues, 'the Orient has helped to define Europe (or the West) as its contrasting image, idea, personality, [and] experience'.[191] Europe, or the West, cannot determine itself to be 'progressive' if there is no 'stagnant', cannot define itself as 'liberal' if there is not 'despotic', and cannot be 'the West' if there is no 'East'. In this regard, there are similarities in the construction of the Orient and the construction of Russia. Similarly to Said's idea that the Orient has 'helped to define Europe', Russia also consolidates what is European or Western through its Othering. The texts therefore contribute to discourse crucial for constructing and reconstructing Western identity and community in an Oriental manner.

The historians also reify the constructs of East and West along with Europe and Asia simply through using these terms to frame the narratives. Variants of 'the West' are used particularly frequently and repetitively throughout the texts. The context within which the words are used is significant. There are two predominant ways the historians use such terms. One way of using the terms 'West' and 'East' is primarily geographical, which evokes little normative meaning. When Hosking refers to the 'West' and the 'East', he is seemingly referring to them mainly, although perhaps not exclusively, as geographical territories. This meaning is interpreted through placing the terms within the context of their sentences. For example, Hosking refers to 'trade with the West' and 'trading routes to the East'.[192] Hosking also shows limited normative bias regarding Russia's political development. Combined, these features of Hosking's writing suggest that he rejects conflating

[190] Said, *Orientalism,* 2.
[191] Said, Orientalism, 1-2.
[192] Hosking, *Russia and the Russians*, 54.

Russia's past with its present. It also reflects a concerted attempt to avoid colouring the past with the present.

The terms West and East can also be used is in a way which imbues the words with meaning that denotes political and value systems. Thompson refers to 'Western development', and also acknowledges how some historians argue that a result of Mongol rule was to 'spur the divergence of Russian civilization from the West'.[193] While he disagrees with this idea to a large extent, his use of 'the West' is nevertheless significant. Using the term 'the West' reinforces the West. It also reifies civilisations as categories of community and difference. The West is not merely embedded in discourse but also the ideational fabric of reality. Through writing of the West as though it is self-evident, historians reproduce the concept and sustain the constructed cultural community.

Terms, concepts, and narratives used by the historians influence wider discourse. Though it is difficult to measure, the process of synthesising the ideas of historians into other forms of discourse is apparent in reviews of the texts. For example, several reviewers clearly interpreted Pipes' text through the framework of East versus West, or at least through the framework of difference from 'us'. For example, one reviewer writes, 'the Russian state developed in such a very different way than Western states'. Another reader notes that, 'the governmental system is historically totally different than the [W]est; it is much more like the Mongols'.[194] These readers clearly interpret the idea of a different developmental path, but also perceive the narrative through the geo-cultural paradigm. Through reading Pipes' history of Russia, and producing their own texts in the form of reviews, these

[193] John M. Thompson, *Russia and the Soviet Union: An Historical Introduction from the Kievan State to the Present* (Boulder: Westview Press, 6th edn., 2009), 45.
[194] William Dolinsky, Goodreads; Vern Glaser, Goodreads, <https://www.goodreads.com/book/show/206954.Russia_Under_the_Old_Regime> (5 September 2017).

reviewers also contribute to the dominant discourse of difference. The cultural circuit of the production and consumption of meaning is apparent.

The primary narrative that drives all of the historians' texts on the Mongol conquest is the impact of the Mongols on the development of Russia's political system. While the narrative is apparent across the texts, there are differences in the degree to which Mongol rule is said to have set Russia on a different path of development. Some of the historians frame the Mongol conquest as a pivotal experience which shaped Russia's political institutions and facilitated its autocratic political culture (see Thompson, Sixsmith, Pipes). Others downplay the Mongol impact on Russia's political culture (see Riasanovsky, Dukes). Some of the historians note that this is a common fissure in Russian historiography, which clearly highlights the subjectivity of history and the need for a critical approach in its analysis. What is most important for our purposes is that, irrespective of different conclusions on the impact of Mongol rule, every single one of the texts frames its analysis using comparison to the West.

Historians who emphasise the Mongol conquest as a watershed for Russia's political culture tend to describe the Mongol period as a transition from an 'embryonic democracy' pre-Mongol invasion to autocracy.[195] In this narrative, the dissolution of the *veche* is emphasised as a significant occurrence. Sixsmith describes the *veche* as 'consultative assemblies'. Thompson refers to it as 'a town meeting of all freemen'. [196] The institution of the *veche* figures prominently in the stories of those historians, thereby emphasising the impact of the Mongols on political culture. Sixsmith writes that the 'Mongol viceroys and their client princes abolished Kievan Rus's consultative assemblies – the remarkable *veches* at work in Novgorod, Pskov

[195] Sixsmith, *Russia,* 29.
[196] Sixsmith, *Russia*, 30; Thompson, *Russia and the Soviet Union*, 32.

and Kiev – and assumed unchecked authority'.[197] Sixsmith's words are imbued with value-laden meaning. While the overall content of the sentence strongly implies that replacing democratic institutions with authoritarian institutions was undesirable, specific words are particularly important in conveying such meaning. Sixsmith describes *veches* as 'remarkable', a word which in this sentence has apparent positive connotations.

Hosking and Pipes also incorporate the *veche* into their narratives in a normative way. Pipes argues that 'the Mongols did not like it, seeing in the *veche* a troublesome focus of popular discontent, and they prodded the princes to liquidate it. By the middle of the fourteenth century little remained of the *veche* except in Novgorod and Pskov. With it vanished the only institution in some measure capable of restraining political authority'.[198] Similarly to Sixsmith, Pipes' tone implies that this development was negative. Hosking comments on the *veche* noting how the Mongols backed the princes which 'enhanced' the 'position of prince vis-à-vis the veche'.[199] While less value-laden than the others, a subtle comparison between autocratic political power and democratic power is evident.

The historians tend to use the elimination of the *veche* within their broader narratives of autocratisation. Of the core historians, Sixsmith most clearly links the events of the Mongol conquest to today. He also continues with his creative style of writing by using more subjective language than most of the other writers. This could be attributed to his background as a journalist and radio presenter rather than a career academic. He writes that, 'most significantly for Russia's future development, a profound admiration for the Mongol model of an autocratic, militarised state began to enter the Russian psyche'.[200] Sixsmith's emphatic words 'most significantly' indicate

[197] Sixsmith, *Russia*, 30.
[198] Pipes, *Russia Under the Old Regime*, 56.
[199] Hosking, *Russia and the Russians*, 55.
[200] Sixsmith, *Russia*, 30.

his intention for the reader to place great weight on this aspect of Russia's national development. Sixsmith published his original text in 2011, a time in which Russia's (as a state political actor) increasing authoritarianism and divergence from Western liberal democracy permeated the Anglophone discursive space.

The way that Sixsmith writes about the Mongol impact on Russia represents it as negative, but also as a choice that led to an inevitable fate. Sixsmith's deliberate use of the phrase 'profound admiration' implies that Russia chose autocratic governance. He attributes agency to Russia rather than rendering it as a purely passive victim. Sixsmith represents Russia as a unified entity, and he personifies the nation by suggesting a homogenous 'Russian psyche'. Sixsmith's notion that autocracy 'began to enter the Russian psyche' implies some level of permanence, which therefore offers a subtle commentary on Russia's current political culture. This reading is supported by his assertion that 'the unifying force of autocracy seemed a necessity' and '[i]n the centuries beyond the Mongol era, it would become a default position for governance in Russia'.[201] Sixsmith further comments that 'the autocratic, centralised power system they assimilated from their occupiers would endure in Russia long after the Mongols had departed'.[202] While he refrains from explicitly adding reference to contemporary Russia, such an idea is strongly implied.

Pipes is similarly critical of the Mongol impact on Russia. He writes that the Mongol conquest had a 'debilitating effect on the political climate of Russia' in that it 'tended to isolate the princes from the population further than they were already inclined to be by the workings of the appanage system, to make them less conscious of political responsibilities, and yet more eager to use power to accumulate private properties'.[203] He further contends that, throughout the Mongol period,

[201] Sixsmith, *Russia*, 31.
[202] Sixsmith, *Russia*, 31.
[203] Pipes, *Russia Under the Old Regime*, 57.

> the population at large first learned what the state was; that it was arbitrary and violent, that it took what it could lay its hands on and gave nothing in return, and that one had to obey it because it was strong. All of which set the stage for the peculiar type of political authority, blending native and Mongol elements, which arose in Moscow once the Golden Horde began to loosen its grip on Russia.[204]

Pipes emphasises the political-economic nexus of patrimonialism, and alludes to the strengthening of vertical power structures, both of which, according to his narrative, culminated in a unified Russia.

Vernadsky similarly addresses the Mongol impact on Russia's political development as a component of national development. For example, he describes how the Mongol influence 'found expression in many aspects of the Russian governmental and social structure', and how the 'most substantial effect was felt in the political thought of the Russian people'.[205] This is similar to Sixsmith's idea that autocracy was part of the 'Russian psyche'. Again, the tactic of homogenisation is apparent in the way in which Vernadsky uses 'Russian' as a generalisation. It is unclear precisely to which 'Russian people' he is referring, which leads him to represent all 'Russians' the same way. Just because autocracy became attractive to some elites does not mean that everyone supported it. Elites are conflated with the mass of the population which comes to represent Russia as a whole.

Much like Said argues that the West created the Orient as it exists in and for the West, Anglophone historians produce an idea of Russia which exists in the Anglophone discursive space. The Russia which exists in this space is not necessarily the 'real' Russia, but a 'literary' Russia fused through common discursive patterns. This Russia is constructed as Other in histories of the Mongol conquest. Russia is Othered because it is predominantly represented as non-European and non-European is portrayed as inferior. The dominant narrative of the Mongol texts highlights

[204] Pipes, *Russia Under the Old Regime*, 57.
[205] Vernadsky, *A History of Russia*, 62.

Russia's deviation from its 'embryonic democracy' to autocratic backwardness. It is relegated to the status of the inferior Other to the superior Western Self. Russia is therefore written in a way in which conforms to the Oriental paradigm, which emphasises cultural binaries and facilitates the normative hegemony of the West.

The following is a fine analysis of Michael Kort's, *A Brief History of Russia* (2008). It demonstrates the way that language and narrative are used to Other Russia in one part of a single text. This enables the reader to appreciate how Russia is represented within a text's intratextual context, which is not always possible from selective use of quoted material. The analysis provides a sense of how the various aspects of a text work in synergy to Other Russia.

Fine Analysis

Michael Kort, *A Brief History of Russia*, 2008, pages 17-18.

1. The Mongol conquest also cut many of Russia's ties with the Byzantine Empire
2. and, more significantly, with western Europe. In the centuries to come, while
3. western European culture was enriched by Humanism and the Renaissance,
4. Russian cultural development was stunted and brutalized by poverty and
5. political oppression. Another important development was the threefold division
6. of the East Slavs. The Great Russians, about 70 percent of the East Slavs,
7. emerged from the principalities of the northeast that paid tribute to the Mongols.
8. Farther west, the East Slavs who became subjects to the rising powers of Poland
9. and Lithuania emerged as today's Belorusians, or White Russians, and the
10. Ukrainians, or Little Russians, the latter group being about five times as
11. numerous as the former. Notwithstanding the considerable historical and
12. cultural legacy that once united the three groups, there were enough differences
13. so that after 1991 centrifugal forces led to a parting of the ways and the creation
14. of three independent countries. Perhaps most important, the Mongol conquest
15. had a major influence on the development of the Russian state. The Kievan
16. inheritance was a complex one. Kievan princes had exercised a great deal of
17. power, especially those in the northeast. Kievan Rus also had learned the
18. Byzantine concept of caesaropapism – the idea that the monarch should have
19. both temporal and spiritual powers. Yet princely power in Kievan Rus had been
20. balanced by the power of the nobles and the activities and prerogatives of the
21. *veches*. This is what was destroyed by several centuries of Mongol rule. The
22. Mongol khan was an absolute sovereign. All of his subjects were obligated to
23. serve the state. He was the sole owner of all the land; all others held it on
24. condition of service to the state. The Mongol khan, to be sure, ruled most of
25. Russia indirectly through the princes, but he was their model, and they were his
26. agents as tax collectors and enforcers of the law. The Kahn's power over all of
27. his subjects bolstered the power of the princes over the Russian people. Mongol
28. rule in Russia gravely weakened the power of the boyar nobility and virtually
29. eliminated the *veches*, pushing Russia down the road to autocratic rule. That
30. tendency was strengthened as one principality – Muscovy – gradually gained
31. power at the expense of the others. Eventually the Mongols were driven out of
32. Russia, but they left behind an oppressive political legacy that over time evolved
33. into Russian autocracy.

The excerpt from Kort's *A Brief History of Russia* (2008) exemplifies several of the discursive patterns analysed in this chapter. I selected this excerpt primarily for this reason. In addition to reinforcing the discursive patterns identified, it highlights how these patterns intertwine to produce a representation of Russia.

Kort's use of the words 'more significantly' in line 2 can be interpreted as a subtle normative assessment of the value of western European compared to Byzantine culture. The following sentence comprising lines 2 and 3 confirms the positive evaluation of European culture, which infuses the text with an undercurrent of ethnocentrism given the author's situation within the Western community. The main way that the text communicates this evaluation of Europe is through the use of the term 'enriched' in line 3, which clearly portrays 'Humanism' and the 'Renaissance' as advantageous developments. This shows the way in which the text is discreetly inflected by subjectivity and reflects the contemporary cultural context surrounding the text's production.

Differences between Europe and Russia are emphasised in the sentence across lines 2 – 4. The use of the word 'western' signifies an implied distinction between western Europe and Europe. There is a subtle implication that western Europe is culturally superior to Europe in general, and especially compared to Russia. Kort chose to compare Russia's development with Europe's. His choice suggests that the West is central to the narrativisation of Russia. The construction of literary Russia is inextricably linked to the construction of the idea of the West.

The West, in this text, western Europe, is represented positively, whereas Russia is represented negatively. The difference is evident particularly through that comparison between western Europe's 'Humanism' and the 'Renaissance', and Russia's 'stunted' development. The term 'stunted' is explicitly pejorative. When used in the intratextual context of comparison as it has been in the sentence

discussed, it also contributes to the image of western Europe as superior, and Russia as inferior. The superior/inferior dichotomy is further consolidated through Kort's reference to poverty and political oppression in the same comparative context. Poverty and political oppression are relative terms, and are thus infused with meaning based on the comparison with western Europe and Western liberal ideology. In this relatively short amount of text analysed (4 lines), the image of Russia as a different kind of community compared to the West emerges. Russia is not only constructed as a nation, but as an Other to Western Europe.

In likening the West with progress and Russia with stagnation, Kort generalises the communities. The peasant populations of both Russia and Europe were poor, illiterate, and superstitious.[206] As explored in the main chapter, comparisons which show similarities are rare because the texts focus on elite culture. The homogenised terms 'Russia' and 'the West' are used as literary devices. They conceal the degree to which historians conflate early modern elites with the early modern population as a whole, and early modern political entities with modern ones. Russia of the thirteenth century is not the same Russia as the Russia of today.

Kort's text frames the Mongol conquest as crucial for nation-building. Lines 5-12 strongly reflect the primacy of the geo-cultural paradigm in writing this history of Russia. This part of the excerpt is laden with the language of nationality. Within lines 5-12, there are 11 references to nationality, ethnicity, and nations. For example, Kort refers to 'East Slavs' three times, 'Great Russians', 'Mongols', 'Belorusians', Ukrainians, 'White Russians', 'Little Russians', 'Poland', and 'Lithuania'.

As Kort's text shows, nationality is a key way of framing and writing about the past. Events of the past are interpreted through the prism of the geo-cultural paradigm and become 'history'. In lines 5-6, Kort identifies the division between the

[206] Dinah Hazell, "The Medieval Peasant" in *Misconceptions about the Middle Ages*, eds. Stephen Harris and Bryon Grigsby (New York: Routledge, 2008), 213-217.

East Slavs as an 'important development'. When read within his broader text, this part of Kort's chapter fits within the narrative of the national consolidation of a Russian nation. Understanding the world as consisting of differentiated groups is an indispensable assumption of Kort's text, as it also is for the other history texts analysed throughout this thesis. While this fragment of Kort's text only alludes to this centrality of the geo-cultural paradigm, when read in conjunction with the entire text it is an unequivocal observation.

Kort states that the Mongol invasions put various groups of Slavs on different paths of development, which eventually resulted in the Slavonic nations we know today: Russia, Ukraine, Belorussia (lines 13-14). However, national consciousness in east Ukraine and Belorussia remained weak into the twentieth century.[207] Kort's text directly refers to 1991 and draws a line from the thirteenth to fifteenth centuries to the present day. Through this reference, Kort connects the past with the (or a?) future relative to the period of the past which is under description. Through doing so, he links Russia through time, enabling the creation of a national narrative.

For Kort, the 'most important' aspect of the Mongol invasion is the 'influence on the development of the Russian state' (line 15). His use of the words 'most important' is again revealing of the extent to which history can be regarded as a form of literature, since histories demonstrate the subjectivity and authoring involved in the writing of history. Kort's comment communicates a value judgment on his part.

Kort refers to Kievan Rus instead of Russia in line 15. He uses the term 'Kievan Rus' to describe the society of the Mongol conquest era, after using 'Russia' from lines 1-13. Irrespective of whether intended or subconscious, the shift from using 'Russia' throughout the sample text to 'Kievan Rus' conveys an image of Kievan Rus as a semi-democratic society in contrast to Russia as an autocratic

[207] Arthur Takach, "In Search of Ukrainian National Identity: 1840-1921," *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 19, no. 3 (1996): 640.

society. The political culture of Kievan Rus, which consisted of some degree of distribution of political power between the parts of Kievan society, was destroyed. The text explains how Mongol rule 'eliminated the *veches',* which Kort had previously described as balancing the power of the princes. In the text, once this takes place, Kort reverts to using 'Russia' in line 25. In line 29, the text describes how this led 'Russia down the road to autocratic rule'.

The change in terminology from Kievan Rus to Russia has the effect of creating a sense of discontinuity between Kievan Rus and Russia. The semi-democratic society of Kievan Rus came to an end, and the autocratic Russian nation emerged in its place. The change of the language of nationality, therefore, may serve as a narrative device which has implications for the construction of the nation of Russia. Whether continuity or discontinuity is created between linear incarnations of 'Russia' appears to depend on narrative utility. Here, creating a figurative disconnect between Kievan Rus and Russia serves to sustain the overarching narrative of Kort's sweeping history of Russia which concerns Russia's struggle with authoritarianism.

Clearly, the latter part of Kort's text addresses the impact of the Mongol conquest on the political culture of Russia. Kort emphasises the role of the Mongols in destroying what he implies was a 'better' system, in which 'princely power' was 'balanced by the power of the nobles and the … *veches*' (lines 20-21). From line 16, the narrative of increasing authoritarianism is apparent. In lines 26-27, Kort describes how the Khan's power 'bolstered the power of the princes over the Russian people'. The tone of the texts also suggests that this shift to autocracy was unfavourable. Lines 32-33 describe the 'oppressive political legacy' that the Mongols left, which 'evolved into Russian autocracy'. It is clear that the text is written from a liberal perspective. This narrative of Russian autocracy is a pivotal element of creating an

image of a Russia which is fundamentally different from the West, facilitating a broader representation of Russia as Other.

However, the subtext of the passage complicates this seemingly clear image of the Russian nation. It conveys the idea of the potential for Russia to have become like western Europe but for the Mongol conquest. The role of the Mongol conquest in altering Russia's destiny is a particular theme throughout Kort's sweeping history. The text hints at discordus since it suggests an underlying understanding of Russia as culturally liminal. It further provides some indication that this has become part of the impetus for the habitual Othering of literary Russia in the Anglosphere.

III. ROMANCING RUSSIA AND QUESTIONING THE APPLICABILITY OF THE ORIENTAL PARADIGM

In contrast to the Mongol era, Russia during the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries is romanticised as a golden era. In this chapter, I apply Hayden White's theory of emplotment to analyse the type of story that the historians tell. The chapter begins by identifying the key texts for analysis, before introducing White's emplotment theory. Next, the chapter analyses the dominant narrative common to the texts, namely, Westernisation. The analysis focuses on how that narrative constructs Russia as a liminal, rather than Other, nation. The chapter then explores the way in which the historians inconsistently categorise Russia as European and how comparisons reinforce the superiority of Europe. Finally, it considers how the use of binary opposition contributes toward the representation of Russia as culturally liminal. Russia is represented as a nation between East and West. It is therefore not as unequivocally Othered in the same way as in the histories of the Mongol conquest. This necessitates the application of a new concept, 'discordus', to understand the discursive construction of a liminal literary Russia.

The six texts analysed for this case study are: Abraham Ascher's *Russia: A Short History* (2017), Roger Bartlett's *A History of Russia* (2005), Kees Boterbloem's *A History of Russia and Its Empire* (2018), Paul Bushkovitch's *A Concise History of Russia* (2012), Charles Ziegler's *The History of Russia* (2009), and John M. Thompson and Christopher J. Ward's *Russia: A Historical Introduction from Kievan Rus' to the Present* (2018).[208] I selected these texts based on the criteria

[208] Abraham Ascher, *Russia: A Short History* (London: Oneworld Publications, 2017); Roger Bartlett, *A History of Russia* (London: Macmillan Education, 2005); Kees Boterbloem, *A History of Russia and Its Empire: From Mikhail Romanov to Vladimir Putin* (Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 2013); Paul Bushkovitch, *A Concise History of Russia* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012); Charles E. Ziegler, *The History of Russia*, Santa Barbara: Greenwood Press, 2nd edn., 2009); John M. Thompson

outlined in my chapter on methodology: they are all sweeping histories of Russia, written in the English language by 'Westerners', and published after 2000. I also chose these specific works because they dedicate sections of their texts to the Petrine period. This facilitated comparability across the texts. Selecting these texts also increased the diversity of texts in the project, since they are not used frequently in my other case studies as the core texts.

Genre Theory and Emplotment

Narratives can be categorised into types of stories, or 'genres'. According to Elias Schwartz, the term refers to 'a group of texts that share certain similarities' which contain 'in-built codes, values and expectations'.[209] Genres are therefore 'expressive devices'. [210] They facilitate the communication of the text's ideas.[211] Narrative genre is distinct from the broader usage of genre as a type of text (such as history, fantasy, or biography) rather than type of story.[212] Narrative genres allow readers to recognise the kind of story, even if subconsciously. This promotes a sense of knowledge of the events and characters, leading to apparent understanding of them. Since the history texts are forms of literature with narrative form, they also belong to genres. Though it is a form of literature, history is not fiction. Nonetheless, the genre the texts of the Petrine period belong to reflects authorial choice. Consequently, a common emplotment in a particular mode can reveal the ways in which literary Russia is conceptualised.

---

and Christopher J. Ward, *Russia: A Historical Introduction from Kievan Rus' to the Present* (New York: Westview Press, 8th edn., 2018).

[209] Elias Schwartz, "The Problem of Literary Genres," 115; quote from William Allan, *Classical Literature: A Very Short Introduction* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 13.

[210] Elias Schwartz, "The Problem of Literary Genres," *Criticism* 13, no.2 (1971): 119.

[211] Schwartz, "The Problem of Literary Genres," 119.

[212] See Matti Hyvarinen, "Analyzing Narrative Genres," in *The Handbook of Narrative Analysis*, eds. Anna De Fina and Alexandra Georgakopoulou (Hoboken: John Wiley & Sons, 2015), 178.

White theorises that historians use genres to represent the past.[213] He argues that most histories fall into one of four basic genres: tragedy, comedy, romance, or satire. Characteristic of the romance genre is a narrative centred on surpassing obstacles, through which the hero crystalises his or her identity. It is optimistic in tone. In contrast, satire is defined by the hero's resignation that he or she cannot escape the constraints of the human condition. It is pessimistic in tone. Like satire, tragedy is pessimistic. The hallmark of tragedy is the hero's fatalistic fall and a transition to darker times. The comedy is optimistic, and involves a hero's triumph over social constraints.[214]

However, White acknowledges that these categories are not exhaustive and that different facets of the same text can conform to different genres.[215] Although these Anglophone histories of the Petrine period belong primarily to the romance genre, they also contain elements of tragedy and satire. Accordingly, genre is best regarded as a spectrum.[216] Romance is the most apparent emplotment in the Petrine texts from a Western enculturated perspective shaped by socialisation into Eurocentric story-types.

For White, 'identifying the *kind of story* that has been told' – its genre – reveals the form of 'explanation by emplotment' used in a history text.[217] Emplotment refers to 'the way by which a sequence of events fashioned into a story is gradually revealed to be a story of a particular kind'.[218] This becomes 'explanation by emplotment' because the story-form, or genre, imbues the events of the past with meaning for readers in the present (and, readers situated within a particular cultural context). Stories narrated with a comedic emplotment 'explain' events differently

[213] White, *Metahistory*.
[214] See White, *Metahistory*, 7-10; and Northrop Frye, *Anatomy of Criticism* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957/2000), 210.
[215] White, *Metahistory*.
[216] David Herman, *Basic Elements of Narrative* (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009).
[217] White, *Metahistory,* 7.
[218] White, *Metahistory*, 7.

than stories narrated with a tragic emplotment.[219] In the case of histories of Russia, the genres (or genre singular) in which they are written position Russia the nation within the Western grand narrative. Genre is therefore important for situating Russia within this narrative and explaining the significance of events for the Western cultural canon.

Although there are shortcomings of generic taxonomies, they are useful for analysis. Generic categorisation relies on arguably antiquated Eurocentric classical literary conventions, forcing diverse literature into narrowly construed genres.[220] There is also significant variance in the criteria for these classical genres depending on the genre theorist, which highlights the constructed nature of genre. As a result, genres are themselves relatively unstable and arbitrary constructs. However, despite these deficiencies, using the basic classical genre framework for analysis of history texts is beneficial. While a text might not perfectly conform to a set of genre criteria, fulfilment of basic generic features indicates the overarching kind of story being told. This, in turn, provides clues as to the meaning of the texts. Identifying the genre of the story, even if one disputes the parameters of the taxonomical framework, reveals the lens through which historians have interpreted the events of the past and shaped them into narratives.

Historians have choice regarding emplotment. The dominant genre that a text belongs to does not arise from an inherent story-structure in the past. Past occurrences do not occur in an inherently storied form. As Michael Roth writes, '[h]istorians do not find story types in the past; they form the past into story types'.[221] However, historians do not necessarily do this intentionally. Describing his interpretation of White, Munslow explains that 'historians make emplotment

[219] White, *Metahistory*, 7.
[220] See Anis S. Bawarshi and Mary Jo Reiff, *Genre: An Introduction to History Theory, Research, and Pedagogy* (West Lafayette: Parlor Press, 2010), 16.
[221] Michael S. Roth, "Forward" in Hayden White's *Metahistory*.

decisions even as/if they firmly believe the data of the past "proves" a set of events must constitute a particular meaning/explanation that could be construed as a romance or a tragedy'.[222] The process of emplotment can be a subconscious operation resulting from enculturation into a social context within which certain literary conventions dominate. In this regard, the emplotment choices of historians might be constrained by the dominant discourse of Russia in the West, and promote cognitive bias regarding emplotment decisions.

The consistent romantic emplotment of the Petrine period gives rise to a generalised romanticised discourse of this part of Russian history in these six English-language histories of Russia. According to White, romance is 'a drama of triumph of good over evil, of virtue over vice, of light over darkness, and of the ultimate transcendence of man over the world in which he was imprisoned by the Fall'.[223] In their narratives of 'Westernisation' and 'Europeanisation' (both labels denoting the same process), the texts exemplify these core features of the romance genre. In becoming European or 'like the West', in this story, Russia overcomes what the texts have presented as its Mongol legacy (the dark). Russia at least partially transcends conditions of backwardness and despotism, and embraces the enlightened European path (the light).

Westernisation Narrative

Rather than continuing the narrative of the Mongol era, which emphasised Russia's divergence from the West, histories of the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries of Russia narrate Russia's journey of Westernisation. The texts clearly convey the narrative of Westernisation through their description of events in terms of

[222] Alun Munslow, "Rethinking Metahistory: The Historical Imagination in Nineteenth Century Europe," *Rethinking History* 19, no. 3 (2015): 334.
[223] White, Metahistory, 7.

Russia becoming European. For example, Boterbloem describes how Peter the Great 'began to change his country and make it, in a sense, more European'.[224] In Boterbloem's text, becoming 'more European', seemingly consists of developing a navy, embracing science, and drawing architectural inspiration from unspecified cities.[225] Ascher posits that Peter sought to reform 'the country's institutions on the Western European model'. Thompson and Ward similarly note that Peter's 'models were the European nations of the time'.[226]

The historians credit Catherine the Great with continuing Peter's Western reforms by bringing Enlightenment thinking to Russia. As Ziegler writes, 'Catherine continued the Westernization process begun by Peter the Great. While Peter's interest in the West had been practical, Catherine's was largely philosophical and cultural.'[227] Ziegler's summation is largely reflected across the histories. The texts tend to highlight Peter's interest in borrowing European technological innovations, and adopting superficial European customs such as dress. Catherine is portrayed as holding deeper commitment to European Enlightenment philosophy. Bushkovitch likewise comments that Catherine 'was determined to speed' the process of Westernisation along.[228] Thus, Catherine's rule is represented as bringing Russia ideationally closer to Europe. The texts also comment on her patronage of the arts, her active participation 'in Europe's cultural life' through 'correspondence with Voltaire', and her introduction of a representative 'legislative commission'.[229] All these aspects of Catherine's reign are portrayed as hallmarks of 'civilisation'.

---

[224] Kees Boterbloem, *A History of Russia and Its Empire: From Mikhail Romanov to Vladimir Putin* (Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 2018), 31.
[225] Boterbloem, *A History of Russia and Its Empire*, 27-42.
[226] Abraham Ascher, *Russia: A Short History* (London: Oneworld Publications, 2017), 61; John M. Thompson and Christopher J. Ward, *Russia: A Historical Introduction from Kievan Rus' to the Present* (New York: Westview Press, 8th edn., 2018), 104.
[227] Ziegler, *The History of Russia,* 41.
[228] Bushkovitch, *A Concise History of Russia,* 125.
[229] Ziegler, *The History of Russia*, 41; Bushkovitch, *A Concise History of Russia*, 125; Thompson and Ward, *Russia,* 120. Note that the legislative commission is not represented as unproblematic or unequivocally 'good'.

The centrality of the concepts of "Westernisation" and "Europeanisation" as organising principles is underscored by the authors themselves, most of whom use these terms as chapter headings and subheadings. Thompson and Ward's chapter on this era is titled 'Peter the Great and the Conundrum of Westernization'.[230] Boterbloem refers in a sub-heading to 'Peter the Great: Russia's Europeanization'.[231] The inference is that Westernisation is not only a significant but also a progressive historical development. The underlying implication is that an 'undeveloped' Russia needed to be Westernised to achieve societal success and become European.

The use of Europeanisation and Westernisation in headings also reveals the objective of the story and the overarching theme of self-evolution characteristic of the romance genre. It emphasises the importance of Westernisation from a Western perspective. Munslow claims that 'historians always ask why an event is significant. But far too many still do not ask how significance is generated as a function of creating (hi)stories'.[232] It is therefore necessary in textual analysis of histories to identify what the historians frame as significant before understanding how significance is determined.

Continued use of the terms 'Europeanisation' and 'Westernisation' throughout the texts reinforces the narrative and frames events as part of this process of positive change. For example, Thompson and Ward argue that Peter 'had every reason to be proud of the progress his Europeanizing program has achieved'.[233] Similarly, Ascher contends that Peter's reforms reflected 'a worthy and even noble vision of modernization and Westernization'.[234] Although the other historians are less overtly normative in their appraisals of 'Westernisation', these excerpts reflect the generally positive regard for Westernisation and Europeanisation in the texts.

[230] Thompson and Ward, *Russia,* 95.
[231] Boterbloem, *A History of Russia and Its Empire,* 31.
[232] Munslow, *Authoring the Past,* 5.
[233] Thompson and Ward, *Russia,* 103.
[234] Ascher, *Russia: A Short History,* 61.

Westernisation and Europeanisation are apparently used interchangeably across the histories, indicating that to be Western was to be European during the late seventeenth century and to be European was to be Western. The pairing of 'modernisation' with 'Westernisation' also suggests that to become Western aligns with modernising. This association of terms implicitly positions the West as modern, and the non-West as backward. Clearly, with its positive connotations of modernisation, Oriental undertones are apparent.

Westernisation or Europeanisation represents the 'transcendent goal' characteristic of a romance. A romantic emplotment typically requires the protagonist to undergo a self-transformation through prevailing over obstacles.[235] The positive way in which Westernisation and Europeanisation are written supports the notion of a romantic emplotment of this part of Russia's history. As processes of change, the use of concepts and narratives of Westernisation and Europeanisation fit what is also part of romance mode – 'the emergence of new … conditions out of processes'.[236] The positive tone of the texts on the Petrine period also reflects the romantic tendency of 'idealising' events.[237] Westernisation is presented as the most significant part of the Petrine period, the point of the story, and is not only cast in the romance mode but also romanticised as a golden era.

The Westernisation narrative reflects ethnocentrism due partly to the centrality of the West, but more because of the way that the historians depict Westernisation favourably by framing Westernisation romantically. Historians are only able to tell the story of Westernisation because they homogenise the West and Russia from an ethnocentric position. For W.G. Sumner, ethnocentrism is the 'view of things in which one's own group is the centre of everything, and all others are

[235] Craig White, *Romance*, Accessed December 10, 2018. http://coursesite.uhcl.edu/HSH/Whitec/terms/R/romance.htm.
[236] White, *Metahistory,* 10.
[237] Bryan P. Reardon, *The Form of Greek Romance* (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1991), 3.

scaled and rated with reference to it'.[238] As discussed, since the actual events of the past do not occur in an inherently storied form, historians use literary techniques to turn events into stories.[239] Because historians choose the narratives of their histories, it becomes significant that the texts analysed in this chapter follow similar narratives. As Munslow asserts, the choice of narrative is important because it 'naturalises a certain view or philosophy of the world'.[240] It also reflects a certain view of the world, in this case a Western ethnocentric perspective.

Evidently, Westernisation is portrayed as the most significant aspect of this part of Russia's past. However, the content can only determine the form to a certain extent. As Robert Doran succinctly explains using White's notion of emplotment, '[t]he historian chooses where to begin, where to end, and what points are important in the middle. There is no scientific test for "historical significance"'.[241] Russia's status in relation to the West is what matters to them, which reflects the historians' identities as Westerners. It also corresponds with broader discourse in the Anglosphere concerning Russia's continued threat to liberal democratic values. Russia in relation to the West is given primacy in the texts which suggests the subconscious influence of ethnocentric bias in selecting material for the history of Russia.

The texts' focus on Westernisation reflects ethnocentrism because the Westernisation narrative is concerned with Peter the Great's assumed ambition to learn from Europe and its portrayal as a positive thing. Preiswerk and Perrot's description of ethnocentrism as the interpretation of 'the outgroup's behaviour

[238] W. G Sumner in *Strategy and Ethnocentrism,* ed. Ken Booth (Oxon: Routledge Revivals, 2014/1979), 15.
[239] Hayden White, "The Value of Narrativity in the Representation of Reality," *Critical Inquiry* 7, no.1 (1980): 8.
[240] Alun Munslow, *The New History* (New York and London: Routledge, 2016), 190.
[241] Robert Doran in Neil Genzlinger, "Hayden White, Who Explored How History is Made, Dies at 89," *New York Times*, March 9 (2018), <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/09/obituaries/hayden-white-who-explored-how-history-is-made-dies-at-89.html> (12 March 2018).

through the ingroup's mode of thinking' offers some insight into this.[242] The texts represent the outgroup's, Russia's, Westernising behaviour in a positive way.

Worldviews favouring Western values would likely predispose the historians to interpret and represent Westernisation positively and choose a romantic emplotment over a tragic or satirical emplotment. This is in stark contrast to the way in which the Mongol era histories emphasise the tragedy of Russia diverging from the West. Janet Maw, through her study of ethnocentrism in school history textbooks, contends that 'favoured concepts' and 'valorisation' indicate the presence of ethnocentrism in texts. In this context, 'valorisation' refers to attributing value to something, and, in this case, the object of valorisation is Westernisation.[243] Yet Westernisation is also a 'favoured concept' around which the texts are structured suggesting the ethnocentric underpinnings of the histories. The image of Russia is one created through the lens of the West. This construction of Russia does not exist independently of the West, and as such is imbued with external subjectivity.

The positive emphasis on Westernisation demonstrates historians' use of techniques such as silencing backgrounding and foregrounding to make Russia fit into the Western metanarrative. The Westernisation narrative highlights the facts and events which conform to a romantic story of evolution (foregrounding). However, it downplays the way in which Peter and Catherine consolidated autocracy in Russia during this period (backgrounding). If the texts focused more on consolidation of autocracy, the historians could not as easily represent Russia as a nation in transition to becoming more like the Self. It would introduce more elements of the Other. Blending traits of the Self and the Other would complicate the narrative and the broader image of the Russian nation.

---

[242] Roy Preiswerk and Dominique Perrot, *Ethnocentrism and History: Africa, Asia, and Indian America in Western Textbooks* (New Work: NOK Publishers International, 1978), 14.
[243] Janet Maw, "Ethnocentrism, History Textbooks and Teaching Strategies: Presenting the USSR," *Research Papers in Education* 6, no.3 (1991): 155.

Westernisation and Europeanisation are contemporary concepts which the historians apply to events of the Petrine era. While Bartlett uses the Westernisation narrative to frame events, he refrains from using the terms 'Westernisation' or 'Europeanisation' except to criticise the terms. He condemns other historians for using the term Westernisation, labelling it a 'value-laden' concept.[244] In this regard, Bartlett draws attention to ethnocentric bias in history, and, in particular, as expressed through the use of concepts. While Bushkovitch uses the term throughout his text, he also offers some meta-commentary. He explains how '[t]he new secular culture imported into Russia in Peter's time was undoubtedly European. At the time, no one thought of it that way. Neither Russians nor Europeans used the terms "Westernization" or "Europeanization".'[245] The use of Europeanisation and Westernisation to describe the occurrences of the Petrine period reflect contemporary ideas and ideas within a particular context: the Anglosphere. To borrow from Jenkins, 'the idea of a historicised past existing independent of our variously present-day constitutive concerns, is an absurd one'.[246] Hence, the terms reflect ethnocentrism because they apply Western contemporary modes of thought to the past and represent events using these concepts.

The notion of this literary Russia arising from Anglophone discourse evokes the Oriental model, but also challenges the applicability of Orientalism. Much like the Orient for Said, the Russia as the West knows it is a Russia which it has itself created. However, in place of the exoticism and Othering characteristic of Orientalism, these histories of Russia portray a Russia which is less exotic, and more familiar, despite some marked differences.[247] The romanticisation of the

[244] Roger Bartlett, *A History of Russia* (London: Macmillan Education, 2005), 92.
[245] Paul Bushkovitch, *A Concise History of Russia* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 96.
[246] Keith Jenkins, "Why Bother with History?" in *Reading the Past: Literature and History*, ed. Tamsin Spargo (Hampshire: Palgrave),151.
[247] Said, *Orientalism*.

Westernisation narrative positions Russia as less of a binary Other than in the Mongol histories because it is described as metamorphosing into the Self. Rather than Othering, the historians are 'Saming' Russia.

Consequently, the Oriental paradigm is not neatly applicable to the histories of Russia during the time of Peter the Great and Catherine the Great. Orientalism nevertheless provides a means of understanding the role of binary categorisations of societies and the discursive rendering of them. A concept is required which takes into account inconsistencies in Othering and Saming – where the nation is depicted as having elements of the Self and Other. For example, in the Mongol histories, Russia is mostly Othered. Its differences are emphasised over similarities with the West. By contrast, in the Peter/Catherine histories, the historians write as though there is tension between Russia's similarities with, and differences from, the West. As a result, literary Russia is constructed as culturally liminal and defies the typical East/West dichotomy.

The Petrine era texts show that Russia does not conform to the typical Western taxonomy for categorising societies into civilisations. My concept of discordus provides a way of understanding how such a nation emerges through discourse. Discordus describes discursive tensions in the construction of the nation. Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis allow me to assess how these tensions are textually reconciled to render a coherent nation. In this case, Russia is depicted as liminal, but the Westernisation narrative reconciles this liminality by framing it as a transition to the definable category of the Self. Russia is Western and non-Western simultaneously because it is in transition. Russia is also inconsistently categorised as European and non-European, which further demonstrates discordus.

Categorising Russia as European

Unlike in the texts on the Mongol era, Russia is categorised as European more inconsistently in the Peter and Catherine periods of Russian history. In the Mongol texts, Russia is generally (though not exclusively) described as non-European, whereas in the histories of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, Russia is depicted as both European and non-European. This occurs even within the same texts. Such inconsistency highlights the protagonist Russia's transitional state and fluctuating identity as per the romance genre. It therefore contributes toward the overarching romantic emplotment of the texts, and further necessitates the use of the discordus perspective to understand the discursive rendering of Russia. Russia is sometimes written as if it were a part of Europe, but other times as if it were not European. Russia is almost European, but not quite. It has nearly transcended. This is particularly relevant for the broader emplotment of Russia's story, whereby literary Russia never 'succeeds' in becoming European. This part of Russia's history, represented romantically, thus forms a pivotal part of the overarching tragic emplotment of Russian history because Russia nearly evolved. Russia during the Petrine period is represented as a nation in transition because this is how the texts can fit the inconsistent facts into a Western-appropriate narrative.

There are several instances where the texts refer explicitly to Russia as European. Ziegler contends that St Petersburg was made 'into one of Europe's most beautiful cities'.[248] This explicitly categorises Petrine Russia as European. Similarly, Boterbloem writes how 'Russia consolidated itself as one of Europe's Great Powers'.[249] Bartlett describes Peter the Great as 'the ruler who brought Russia into the European mainstream'.[250] Ascher also categorises Russia as European, asserting

[248] Ziegler, *The History of Russia*, 39.
[249] Boterbloem, *A History of Russia and Its Empire,* 27.
[250] Bartlett, *A History of Russia*, 92.

that 'Russia's position as a major European power has survived to the present day'.[251] Thompson and Ward write that Catherine was 'comparable to other European monarchs'.[252] The use of the word 'other 'alongside 'European', has the effect of placing Catherine in the European category and by association, Russia.

As often as Russia is categorised as European in the texts, it is also categorised as not European, occasionally by the same historians. For example, Boterbloem describes Peter's 'second journey to Europe', suggesting that Europe was somewhere else other than Russia.[253] He also categorises Russia as non-Western, as he contends that 'Russia remained the largest territorial state on earth, when all of the world's other great non-Western empires of the early modern era have been vanquished'.[254] The use of Russia as the subject in this sentence with 'other great non-Western empires' are the main aspects of this sentence which communicate that Russia is of the non-West. Ziegler asserts that Peter was 'determined to place the Russian language on par with European tongues', again implying that the Russian language is not European since it is to be placed 'on par' with European languages.[255] It also alludes to a sense that the non-global Russian language was somehow inferior to European languages. Thompson and Ward separate Russia from Europe when they explain how Peter's 'rowdy behaviour at times shocked the Europeans', implying that Peter's behaviour did not culturally fit European social standards, and that Peter himself was not a European.[256] Overall, the six historians most frequently describe Russia as European in the context of superficial characteristics such as costume, manners, and architecture. By contrast, they most frequently describe Russia as not European in terms of its deeper, cultural features.

[251] Ascher, *Russia: A Short History,* 68.
[252] Thompson and Ward, *Russia,* 118.
[253] Boterbloem, *A History of Russia and Its Empire,* 37.
[254] Boterbloem, *A History of Russia and Its Empire,* 42.
[255] Ziegler, *The History of Russia*, 39.
[256] Thompson and Ward, *Russia,* 100.

Evidently, Russia is not consistently represented as European, and this aspect of the romantic emplotment is significant because the discursive representation of geography can have geopolitical effect. In essence, the texts romanticise space as well as time. Discourse is practice, yet also informs practice. In other words, representations of Europe/Non-Europe/West/Non-West can influence power relations between the cultural and political communities the geographic designations represent.

To comprehend the implications of categorising Russia, the idea of 'geopolitical imagination' is useful. Similarly to Anderson's notion of 'imagined communities', the core premise of 'geopolitical imagination' is that geographies are socially and discursively constructed.[257] 'Meta-geographies', that is, 'the spatial framework through which people order their knowledge of the world' benefit those engaged in the 'constructing'.[258] This sheds light on how the historians, as contributors to the construction of geographies, perpetuate the Western hegemonic order, even if unintentionally. Through using 'the West'/'Europe' as the comparative reference points, the texts present a form of imagined geopolitics in which Europe is the most important region, and everything else forms a generalised 'out-group'. The way geography is represented can influence foreign policy and perceptions of security. Therefore, it is significant whether Westerners incorporate Russia into their imagined community or designate it as existing outside that community, and whether it is represented as the ideal standard through a romantic narrative genre.

Representing Russia, Europe, and the West as cultural spaces politicises geography. As Gearoid Ó Tuathail and John Agnew explain, geopolitics describes a 'discursive practice by which intellectuals of statecraft 'spatialize' particular types of

[257] Aylin Guney and Nazif Mandaci, "The Meta-Geography of the Middle East and North Africa in Turkey's New Geopolitical Imagination," *Security Dialogue* 44 (2013): 433.
[258] P. J Taylor, "A Metageographical Argument on Modernities and Social Science," *GaWC Research Bulletin* 29 (2000), <http://www.lboro.ac.uk/gawc/rb/rb29.html> (9 February 2018).

places'.[259] The geopolitical imagination is therefore about 'cultural representations of spaces'. This makes the concept particularly useful for analysing how the texts contribute toward construction of 'the West', which has a more cultural meaning than geographic meaning in the contemporary Anglophone context. Through 'spatialising' (representing as a cultural space) Russia and Europe and the West, the histories are inadvertently a part of geopolitical discourse. The notion of cultural and physical geographies is represented in the texts through the way in which the historians write about Europe, Russia, and the West. The same terms can have physical or cultural meaning depending on the intratextual context. Sometimes, this context is insufficient to interpret such a distinction. The romantic mode of emplotment is important for geopolitical imagination. However, the dominant geopolitical imaginations in the discursive space symbiotically fuel the romanticisation of Russia during the time of Peter the Great and Catherine the Great.

In their work, *The Myth of Continents* (1997), Martin W. Lewis and Kären E. Wigen raise a related point: that categorising continents as cultural, not only geographical, entities has become normal to the point that it is seldom questioned. For them, a key problem with this is the 'tendency to let a continental framework structure our perceptions of the human community'.[260] The geographical delineation of continents such as Europe and Asia extends to ideas of distinct peoples with characteristics different from one another. In their words,

> The East-West opposition maps a huge array of human attributes onto a stupendously simplified set of geographical coordinates, but its staple feature has historically been the linking of the West with reason and progress and the East with spirituality and stagnation. Baseless though it may be, this purported correspondence ultimately forms a central structure of our metageographical mythology.[261]

[259] Gearoid Ó Tuathail and John Agnew, "Geopolitics and Discourse: Practical geopolitical reasoning in American foreign policy," *Political Geography* 11, no.2 (1992): 190.
[260] Martin W. Lewis and Kären E. Wigen, *The Myth of Continents: A Critique of Metageography* (Berkley: University of California Press, 1997), 2.
[261] Lewis and Wigen, *The Myth of Continents*, 6.

Even though Russia is represented as more liminal, the division between East and West which Lewis and Wigen describe, is still reflected through the ethnocentrism evident in the history texts. Like this project, Lewis and Wigen's work concerns the socially constructed nature of the dominant organising schema for the world, or, as they describe it, the 'metageographical mythology'. Such mythology is partly reinforced and reproduced through the discourse of history.

Comparisons

As in the texts on the Mongol era, Russia during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries is compared to Europe in a way which highlights Europe's superiority to everything regarded as non-European. Europe is represented as the requisite standard to which all other societies must surely aspire. The use of comparisons also further complicates Russia's categorisation as European, and therefore also contributes toward the construction of a culturally liminal nation.

Historians' use of comparisons between Russia and Europe highlights the extent to which Russia at this time had almost 'transcended' and become European. For example, Ascher compares Russia's St Petersburg with France's Versailles, thereby implying that St Petersburg is European in style. He states that '[w]ith its formal gardens, terraces, fountains, and cascades it resembles the palace gardens at Versailles'. He explains how 'St Petersburg became the official capital of Russia in 1718 and remains to this day one of the world's most beautiful cities'.[262] He then comments on its beauty which creates a connection between similarity to the European style and beauty. Thus, a seemingly innocuous comment has subtle normative connotations through which what is 'European' is represented as 'positive'.

[262] Ascher, *Russia: A Short History,* 69.

Occasionally, the historians use comparisons which highlight the differences between Russia and Europe. For example, Thompson and Ward contend that

> unlike the West, the Russian Empire lacked many of the institutions and attitudes that could help carry out modernization. In the West, a reforming church, an entrepreneurial class, a developed higher education system, and well-established guilds and other associations all stood ready to assist any king or group of leaders who proposed modernizing techniques and changes.[263]

They infer that Russia did not have those attributes. From a liberal Western perspective, most of the attributes listed are generally regarded as positive features of society. In this regard, Russia was still in a transitional state and needed to overcome those things like absence of modernising institutions to fulfil the Westernisation goal.

Most of the texts are ambiguous regarding the precise meaning of European and what is 'European' is left to the reader to interpret. This exemplifies the assumption that the texts will be read within a particular cultural context within which understandings of 'European' are somewhat homogenous and unproblematic. Consequently, this way of writing about Russia not only suggests that the idea of Europe has become coherent and normalized to an extent in the Anglosphere, but also perpetuates such normalization. In this way, the texts have a similar discursive effect to those on the Mongol period.

Just as Said argues that Western writing of the Orient simultaneously produces the West as the superior Self, the histories of Russia likewise produce a superior West. This is most apparent when the texts use comparisons emphasising difference because those comparisons implicitly position Russia as the backward Other. In *Orientalism*, Said identifies how gender binaries contribute toward the construction of a superior West and an inferior Orient.[264] While Said suggests that the West feminized the Orient in relation to its masculine self, liminal Russia is not

[263] Thompson and Ward, *Russia,* 98.
[264] Said, *Orientalism*, 138.

obviously gendered in the histories analysed. The lack of ostensible gendering only adds to Russia's hybridity, and emphasises the limits of Orientalism for making sense of the discursive construction of literary Russia.

Russia is therefore not Othered in the same way as the Orient. Said implies that Oriental men and women are portrayed as defying Western gender conventions. He demonstrates how various texts on the Orient tell stories of sensual and promiscuous Oriental women. The Orient itself therefore is associated with sensuality as a 'persistent motif in Western attitudes about the Orient'.[265] Representations of the Orient's 'supine malleability' and 'feminine penetrability' construct the Orient as Other through the masculine/feminine binary.[266] In histories of Russia, this same gender polarity is not apparent. Because of Russia's representations of liminality as emphasised in the Westernisation narratives of the Peter and Catherine eras, such stark gender binaries cannot be used. Its liminalities blur the distinction between Other and Self, thus Russia is neither masculine nor feminine. Binaries remain important for Russia's construction, but only those binaries with degrees of variability such as inferiority/superiority rather than more categorical binaries such as gender.

The concept of gender is not absent from the history texts, but it is not used in a way which gives rise to a gendered Russian nation. For example, Boterbloem comments on 'female rule'. As ruler though, Catherine's gender was less significant as she 'stood above the law and occupied a zone somewhere between her subjects and God'.[267] The historians also use gendered pronouns like 'she' and 'her' when referring to Catherine. This is a necessary function of language relating to the facts rather than an exercise of literary license. Such terms do not affect the story of Russia

[265] Said, *Orientalism*, 188.
[266] Said, *Orientalism*, 138.
[267] Boterbloem, *A History of Russia and Its Empire*, 44.

as a nation. Comments relating to Catherine's gender also do not extend to broader representations of Russian women. Thus, unlike symbolic representations of the Oriental woman, gender-related descriptions of Catherine do not gender Russia. Furthermore, the gender of the rulers is not written as significant for the history of Russia. The Westernisation process continued irrespective of the monarch's gender.

Further complicating the meaning of 'Europe' is the way that it is personified through historians attributing human-type behaviour to Europe. For example, Ziegler describes how 'the victory at Poltava stunned Europe'.[268] Boterbloem writes that 'Europe duly took notice' of Russia.[269] Europe, as either a cultural or physical space cannot be 'stunned' and cannot 'take notice' because Europe is not a person. The lack of precision in the use of the term combined with the personifying language renders the meaning of Europe unclear, particularly to any idea of it being a homogenous identity.

Generalisations of Europe function as narrative devices rather than 'facts'. Or, to utilise the ideas of White and others, they are fictive or literary elements. It demonstrates the extent to which history follows literary conventions and tropes. If the historians were specific instead of general in regard to who was 'stunned', then the generic structure of romance steeped in conflict between light and dark would be compromised. This would occur because 'Europe' could not be generalised as a positive cultural idea for Russia to aspire to, or serve as a literary foil to Russia. In other words, these six histories are written in such a way that the countries and regions are depicted more like characters in a romance than locations or ideas. The generalised way of writing about them enables the historians to tell an overarching story of 'Russia' (and the West), and a particular kind of story (romance) through framing the events using the relationship between Europe/the West and Russia.

[268] Ziegler, *The History of Russia*, 36.
[269] Thompson and Ward, *Russia,* 97; Boterbloem, *A History of Russia and Its Empire,* 37.

Writing of Russia, Europe and the West as generalised synecdoches, where the whole represents the parts, also enables historians to convey the narrative of transcendence. Synecdoche further enables the associated subtext of superiority/inferiority and sameness/difference to emerge. It is a key mechanism for 'Saming' Russia. As Wodak notes in her study of discourse and national identity, synecdoches can 'create sameness between people'.[270] Wodak focuses on intentional use of the terms for that purpose, such as 'the whole of Vienna celebrates'.[271] However, it is possible for historians to use synecdoche and achieve this result of discursively creating groups without an intention to do so. This reflects a particular kind of geopolitical imagination in which Europe/the West is the group at the centre, and uncertainty regarding the extent of Russia's 'sameness' or difference from it. Thus, the result of using the terms in this way is that groups are represented or discursively imagined from the perspective of the Self. In the case of the histories of the Peter and Catherine periods of Russian history, the liminal imagination of literary Russia indicates that the line between Self and Other is unstable.

It is important to note that it is not merely the use of Europe as a comparative reference point which reflects Western ethnocentrism. Comparison in itself is not necessarily an ethnocentric act. It is the romanticisation which accompanies some of the comparisons and the exclusivity of comparisons to Europe which suggests ethnocentrism is present. The comparisons across the texts are primarily made in relation to Europe, rather than including comparisons to non-European communities. This indicates that Europe is the most significant benchmark against which Russia must be measured. In turn, this tacitly implies the idea of superiority of Europe compared to non-Europe, and positions Europe as a romanticised ideal worth aspiring to. Thompson and Ward's text is the only one from the core sample analysed in this

[270] Wodak, de Cillia, Reisigl, and Liebhart, *The Discursive Construction of National Identity,* 43.
[271] Wodak, de Cillia, Reisigl, and Liebhart, *The Discursive Construction of National Identity,* 43.

chapter which includes a comparison to an arguably non-European nation: Turkey. They contend that Peter's 'ships compared favourably with Turkish and Western ships of the time'.[272] In this text, Turkey is separated from the West, much like Russia is often linguistically separated from the West. This only marginally challenges the notion of ethnocentric comparison. The pattern of ethnocentric comparison remains because of the absence of similar comparisons to non-European communities in the other texts.

The intratextual context of comparison must also be considered to determine whether the comparisons are, in fact, ethnocentric comparisons. Not all of the comparisons to Western Europe reflect ethnocentrism. For example, Bartlett describes how 'Russia was less well endowed with fiscal techniques than the states of Western Europe on which the model is primarily based'.[273] Bartlett's use of the words 'on which the model is primarily based' communicates the reason behind the comparison. Western Europe is the reference point here because it was the reference point for Peter. Therefore, this type comparison is not necessarily evidence of ethnocentrism. This is because the comparison is based on the use of Western Europe as Peter the Great's inspiration for reforms. The comparison serves the purpose of addressing the issue of whether Peter's reforms were successful in light of their aims.

Binary Opposition

As in the histories of the Mongol conquest, Russia is constructed using binary opposition. However, different dichotomies are emphasised and produce a liminal literary Russia rather than an Othered Russia. While the East/West dichotomy is not explicit to the extent that it is in the Mongol histories, the polarisation is still apparent

[272] Thompson and Ward, *Russia,* 96.
[273] Bartlett, *A History of Russia*, 93.

through the way different binaries are portrayed. Although Russia is not written as Eastern or Western, the intellectual framework of East and West is reinforced.

The six texts all use the literary technique of binary opposition to chart the obstacles Russia faced in its supposed European evolution. The quintessential romance story is that of the quest in which the protagonist must overcome obstacles before being reborn.[274] In the texts on the Petrine period, the obstacles to Russia's quest for Europeanness take the form of internal conflict. The figurative battles occur between nobles and peasants, and between tradition and modernisation. For example, Ziegler describes how '[t]he upper classes had accepted many of the European customs he forced on them, while the great mass of the population remained culturally Russian'.[275] Here, Ziegler uses differentiation to separate the upper classes from the masses. This tactic de-homogenises Russia. The Europeanisation of elites created 'virtually two worlds having little in common'.[276] Similarly, Bartlett comments on 'the impossibility of integrating city with countryside, and Boterbloem explains how Peter 'combined Western-style modernization while preserving parts of Russian traditions'.[277] According to the texts, there was also resistance against Westernisation within Russia, which further represents inner conflict. As Bartlett explains, 'Peter met huge resistance from the traditionalist mass of the population'. Some of this dissent manifested in violent uprisings.[278] Thompson and Ward similarly describe how many people within Russia passively resisted, but others participated in rebellion.[279] The binaries such as tradition versus modernisation, urban versus rural, and nobles versus peasants are perhaps figuratively representative

[274] Frye, *Anatomy of Criticism*, 187.
[275] Ziegler, *The History of Russia*, 37.
[276] Ziegler, *The History of Russia*, 37.
[277] Bartlett, *A History of Russia*, 105; Boterbloem, *A History of Russia and Its Empire,* 42.
[278] Bartlett, *A History of Russia*, 90.
[279] Thompson and Ward, *Russia*, 108.

of the broader East versus West dichotomy, and therefore illustrate Russia's liminality.

Catherine's reign is also framed in a binary way. The texts tend to praise her early commitment to European Enlightenment principles, but contrast this with the latter part of her reign in which she is described as backtracking on European-inspired reforms. For example, Ascher writes that, despite her initial commitment to Enlightenment thought, 'Catherine grew ever more wary of liberalism' and 'merely paid lip service to principles of Enlightenment'.[280] Ziegler describes how 'Catherine the Great was determined to bring the great ideas of the Enlightenment to Russia.'[281] Then, notes that '[a]lthough she prided herself on being an enlightened monarch, Catherine could not tolerate criticism of her rule or the general principles of Russian autocracy'.[282] Thompson and Ward describe her as an 'enlightened despot', perfectly encapsulating the dichotomy.[283] These contrasts of Catherine's rule represent tension in Russia's European evolution, and further situate Russia as in-between East and West.

Becoming European represents the romantic quest. Russia must overcome its inner dichotomies to fulfil the quest, complete its journey, and transcend to a new European identity. Accordingly, at the core of this romantic story is the generally positive representation of Westernisation and of Europe as the ideal to which Russia aspires. Most romances include an ostensible villain as the chief barrier to fulfilment of the quest. In these six histories of Russia during the Petrine period, the role of villain is metaphorically performed by these inner conflicts. In Frye's seasonal taxonomy of genres, the romance is equated with summer because it represents the

[280] Ascher, *Russia: A Short History,* 83, 81.
[281] Ziegler, *The History of Russia*, 41.
[282] Ziegler, *The History of Russia*, 42.
[283] Thompson and Ward, *Russia,* 118.

defeat of the darkness of winter.[284] Representations of the internal conflicts and dualisms within Russia can be interpreted as symbolic of the battle between light and dark and good and evil which are at the core of romance literature.

Discordus is a useful lens for furthering understanding of the romanticisation of this period of Russian history in the texts. Discordus refers to historians' attempts to smooth over tensions in historical facts and events that conflict with, and do not easily fit into the geo-cultural paradigm. Adherence to the geo-cultural paradigm creates tensions by imposing a binary structure of 'us' and 'them' on a complex reality. The primary techniques that the historians deploy to manage the tensions are Othering, Saming, backgrounding, foregrounding, and homogenising. As a concept, discordus helps understand the way that discourse copes with 'grey' nations which fall outside the dominant binaries used to conceptualise the world in the Anglosphere. The concept of discordus therefore assists in comprehending the discursive process of shaping literary Russia as liminal and how that liminality is reconciled through romantic emplotment. A liminal Russia does not fit the Western global narrative couched in the Orientalist paradigm wherein there is the West and the peripheral rest. What is not Western must be Othered in order to fit the dominant categories of geopolitical imagination – East and West. Yet, Russia is not neatly Othered in these histories despite not conforming to either of the Oriental binaries. Russia does not fit into the Western compartment. However, it is not Othered because it can be made sense of within the Western grand narrative by framing its liminality as part of an evolutionary transition to become part of the Self. The history of Russia is fundamentally structured around the degree to which Russia was becoming more or less like 'us'. The underlying premise is that there is an us, 'the West' and Russia, which is not one of us, but is not entirely Other either.

[284] Frye, *Anatomy of Criticism*.

IV. THE LANGUAGE OF NATIONALITY IN HISTORIES OF WORLD WAR II

Although the previous case studies revealed the historians' strategies of Othering and Saming Russia, histories of World War II highlight how the tactic of conflation facilitates the historians' strategy of homogenising Russia. Historians are only able to write about literary Russia as a generalised and unified idea because of the way that they construct Russia as a nation. This chapter begins with a description of the national paradigm (as a part of the broader geo-cultural paradigm), before contending that the texts rely on the language of nationality for their narratives. However, national nominations are habitually used in an imprecise manner in the texts, producing a homogenous and linear literary Russia. The strategy of homogenisation is a part of the process of discordus in the way that it serves to reconcile disparate facts. It also linguistically merges diverse national components into one entity. By constructing Russia in this way as a 'totalised' nation, Russia becomes amenable to characterisation and representation as a generalised actor with its own agency.

The Texts

Although some of the historians in my sample devote specific chapters to World War II, others describe the events of the conflict within broader chapters. In the texts without clearly delineated World War II chapters, I determined the starting point for analysis as description of events from 1939 on the basis that the war commenced that year. Although the Soviet Union's direct involvement in the conflict did not commence until 1941, the events of 1939 are sufficiently connected to both World War II and the Soviet Union to be relevant. Table 4 (page 108) specifies the number of pages World War II occupies in each of the core texts. Since the texts are of varying lengths, quantitative evidence throughout this chapter is either gathered from

a six-page sample, or entire sections on World War II plus the first six pages of each text. The aim of this is to increase the reliability and comparability of the data.

Table 4: Comparison of Portion of Texts on World War Two

Text	Chapter Title	Entire chapter/s on WWII	Page Range	Number of Pages
Figes	'War and Revolution'	Yes	222-234	12
Hosking	'Soviet Society Takes Shape'	No	491-506	15
Riasanovsky & Steinberg	'Soviet Foreign Policy 1921-41, and the Second World War, 1941-45'	No	506-518	12
Service	'The Second World War' and 'Coda: 1941-1945'	Yes	238-268	30
Sixsmith	'Chapter Thirty-One', 'Chapter Thirty-Two', and 'Chapter Thirty-Three'	Yes	319-371	52
Thompson & Ward	'The Stalin Revolution and World War II, 1928-1946'	No	242-247	5

The Concept of Nationalism is Fundamental to the Histories

As articulated in Chapter I, nationalism in the context of this project does not refer to the derogatory understanding of the term common in Anglophone discourse. Instead, it refers to the fundamental idea that nations are the natural building blocks of humanity. Nations are 'imagined communities' which are social constructs sustained by continual reproduction through discourse.[285] History texts are a part of this process of sustaining national identities. They also contribute toward maintaining the national paradigm as a way of conceptualising the world and organising it accordingly.

Michael Billig's notion of 'banal nationalism' forms the theoretical basis for this chapter. For Billig, nationalism is an 'endemic condition'.[286] Nations are not static, and are instead 'reproduced as nations and their citizenry as nationals' on a daily basis.[287] This reproduction of nationhood occurs in 'everyday' social life, and has become normalised to the extent that the 'flagging' of nationhood goes largely

[285] Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities* (London: Verso, 2006); Michael Billig, *Banal Nationalism* (London: Sage, 1995).
[286] Michael Billig, *Banal Nationalism*, 6.
[287] Michael Billig, *Banal Nationalism*, 6.

unobserved, yet it nevertheless contributes toward national socialisation.[288] Banal expressions of nationalism are powerful because they are not usually noticed. As Billig describes, 'the metonymic image of banal nationalism is not a flag which is being consciously waved with fervent passion; it is the flag hanging unnoticed on the public building'.[289] Nations become seemingly 'natural', despite the fact that they belong, not to the natural world, but to the socially constructed world.[290] They are a part of a Foucauldian 'regime of truth' dependent on the power/knowledge nexus.[291] This is because banal nationalism embodies the kind of power which is composed of accepted types of knowledge. Citizens of nations are not only reminded that they are such, but are also reminded of their 'national place in a world of nations'.[292]

Mass media, popular culture, and politicians are prominent enactors of banal nationalism, but historians similarly promulgate ideas of nationalism, even if that is not their intention. History and nationalism are intertwined to such an extent that the academic discipline of history originated in the nineteenth century to consolidate ideas of nationhood.[293] Although the field of history has since diversified beyond this purpose, it remains saturated with banal nationalism. For instance, history texts in libraries are generally organised by nation. The language of nationalism is entrenched in the cultural canon.[294]

However, despite the fact that it is not always overt, nationalism in everyday discourse has a profound effect in sustaining and maintaining nations as components of socio-political reality. Since nations are dynamic, they must constantly be reimagined to remain in 'existence'. Accordingly, seemingly subtle ideas of

[288] Michael Billig, *Banal Nationalism*, 6-10.
[289] Michael Billig, *Banal Nationalism*, 8.
[290] Michael Billig, *Banal Nationalism*, 10.
[291] Michel Foucault, "Truth and Power: An Interview with Michel Foucault," *Critique of Anthropology* 4 (1979): 131.
[292] Michael Billig, *Banal Nationalism*, 8.
[293] Paul Lawrence, "Nationalism and Historical Writing," in *The Oxford Handbook of the History of Nationalism*, ed. John Breuilly (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 715-717.
[294] Michael Billig, *Banal Nationalism*, 12.

nationalism within history texts can contribute toward reinforcing the divisive categories of difference which structure the existing world order. I argue that the constructed communities are not only nations, but extend to civilisational communities of 'the West', the 'Anglosphere', the 'non-West', or 'the East'. In using these terms, their signified meanings are reproduced, sustaining the concepts for understanding but also structuring reality. Nationalism produces 'its own discourses of hegemony'. It is therefore important to understand the workings of the national paradigm and the broader, three-tiered geo-cultural paradigm consisting of civilisations, nations, and regions.

As a significant component of the Anglosphere's knowledge-structure, nationalism forms a lens through which the historians narrativise the events of World War II. According to Munslow, 'historians ascribe meanings to the past rather than discover its inherent or given meaning … through his/her historicised … situation'.[295] Hence, the personal and cultural contexts of the historians affect how historians emplot events. It also affects how they represent Russia as a construct embedded in both the past and the present. That the historians have unanimously framed events through a national paradigm highlights the extent to which 'the nation' as a construct dominates the Anglophone contemporary cultural context. For Munslow, 'the intellectual milieu of the historian is just as important in generating historical facts (justified historical descriptions) as the data itself'.[296] Nationalism evidently forms part of such an 'intellectual milieu' of the selected historians as a way in which they view global organisation. Consequently, their ideas of the world as being divided into nations inform their history texts on Russia. Without these basic national perspectives on world order, Russia could not be conceptualised as a nation since nationhood is predicated on a shared understanding of differences between 'national' communities.

[295] Alun Munslow, *The New History* (New York and London: Routledge, 2016), 2.
[296] Munslow, *The New History*, 14.

The Language of Nationality

The explicit use of conceptual terms such as 'nation', 'nationality', and 'national', demonstrates the extent to which the concept of nationalism is embedded in Western worldviews and the Anglophone 'reality'. However, it is not only constructive of the Anglophone reality, but structures the entire 'inter*national*' system which is reflective of Western hegemony in the global political order. All of the selected historians refer to concepts of nationalism in their World War II texts. For example, Riasanovksy and Steinberg recount 'the need to defend the nation' and the 'attractions of nationalism'.[297] Sixsmith describes 'the Russians' as the 'favoured nation' of the Soviet Union, and emphasises the importance of 'the question of nationality'.[298] Service proposes that the conflict increased a 'sense of cooperation among nations', but conversely notes how Stalin labelled 'whole nationalities as traitors'.[299] Figes refers to 'nationalist emotions', 'national unity', and the 'nation's survival'.[300] The frequent use of such terms further serves as an indication that nationalism forms what has become a crucial lens through which the past and present are interpreted.

The language of nationality also consists of national proper nouns, or, labels of nations. Descriptions of the conflict of World War II are laden with such terms. This further reflects the primacy of the national paradigm for the narration of the history of World War II in relation to Russia. The language of nationality referring to particular nations highlights the way in which histories of the war are discursively dependent upon nations as categories. For example, Bartlett explains that in 'September 1939 German [state], and then Soviet [state], forces invaded Poland'

[297] Riasanovsky and Steinberg, *A History of Russia*, 516.
[298] Sixsmith, *Russia,* 366, 363.
[299] Service, *The Penguin History of Modern Russia*, 263, 257
[300] Figes, *Revolutionary Russia,* 227, 223, 223.

[territory].[301] Thompson and Ward describe how 'Germany [state] launched the invasion of Poland [territory]', Ziegler comments on how '[m]ost Soviet [population] people fought fiercely', and also writes how 'Britain [state] and France [state] … promised to defend Poland [territory]'.[302] These excerpts illustrate the way in which descriptions of the beginnings of World War II rely on the national paradigm and reproduce it.

The frequent use of the language of nationality in the texts further supports the idea of the centrality of concepts of nationalism in the texts and in the Anglosphere. Table 5 (below) highlights the frequency of terms considered to fall within the description 'language of nationality' throughout the core texts. The language of nationality includes references to nations and nationality such as 'German', 'Germany', 'Russia', 'Russian', and so forth. In collecting this evidence, any references to a particular nationality were tallied, except those within quoted material.

Table 5: Frequency of Labels of Nationality

Text	First Six Pages of WWII Material
Figes	43 (7.2 per page)
Hosking	75 (12.5 per page)
Riasanovsky & Steinberg	153 (25.5 per page)
Service	127 (21.2 per page)
Sixsmith	69 (11.5 per page)
Thompson & Ward	133 (22.2 per page)

[301] Roger Bartlett, *A History of Russia* (London: Macmillan Education, 2005), 243.
[302] John M. Thompson and Christopher J. Ward, *Russia: A Historical Introduction from Kievan Rus' to the Present* (New York: Westview Press, 8th edn., 2018), 242; Charles E. Ziegler, *The History of Russia*, Santa Barbara: Greenwood Press, 2nd end., 2009), 186.

It would seem incongruous to write a history of World War II without using nouns and adjectives of nationality. Such language was reflective of the dominant mode of political organisation at the time, and continues to structure contemporary discourse. This shows the degree to which the concept of nationality has become intersubjectively woven into the fabric of reality. Nations have become real through being imagined and written into existence. They are reinforced through use of nationality terms. As Billig contends:

> nationalism has seeped into the corners of our consciousness; it is present in the very words which we might try to use for analysis. It is naïve to think that a text of exposure can escape from the times and place of its formulation. It can attempt, instead, to do something more modest: it can draw attention to the powers of an ideology which is so familiar that it hardly seems noticeable.[303]

Though use of the language of nationality is therefore expected in the context of histories of World War II, the conflation of state, population, and territory is not required and is avoidable. As I argue in the following section, the conflation of these national components has the most constructive effect on literary Russia and strongly reflects discordus.

The Language of Nationality is Ambiguous

Although nationalism serves as a dominant framework for understanding and writing about World War II, the historians' use of concepts of nationality is often imprecise. The way in which the historians tend to implement the language of nationality is often wrought with ambiguity. The meaning of labels such as 'Germany', 'Poland', and 'the Soviet Union' are therefore subject to reader interpretation as guided by the intratextual context of the text. Or, the use of the terms can be so ambiguous that

[303] Michael Billig, *Banal Nationalism*, 12.

even the intratextual context does not provide clarity regarding the author's meaning of such terms – whether the historian means the territory, citizens, government, or state. This has profound implications for how nations are represented not only as totalised homogenous entities, but generalised to such an extent to enable categorisation using the geo-cultural paradigm. The ambiguous use of national terminology is a literary mechanism for homogenising Russia. Homogenising is one of the three strategies of discordus that historians of Russia use to obscure inconsistencies in the facts which might jeopardise the narrative of a coherent nation. The ambiguous use of national language raises questions about the value of national nominations as categories for describing, understanding, and shaping the world. The imprecision with which the language of nationality is often wielded conceals whom the historians are referring to by such terms.

The significance of the imprecise use of the language of nationality largely, though not exclusively, derives from the way the labels are used in relation to an action. Through constructing nations as actors possessing the capacity to perform human-like actions, the texts contribute toward a cultural context whereby it is 'acceptable' to generalise entire communities.[304] It becomes possible to attribute abstract responsibilities on 'nations' as wholes by backgrounding heterogeneity. This fosters a degree of cultural subjectivity and also contributes to the construction of nations as homogenous and coherent entities.

Throughout the texts, all major components of a nation, such as its government, population, culture and territory, are often represented as one. The historians employ synecdoche regularly through representing either the whole for the part, or the part for the whole. For example, sentences such as 'Germany launched the invasion of Poland' (Thompson & Ward), the 'Russians did nothing', the 'Soviets

[304] As well as contributing toward constructing them as communities.

were bent on revenge' (Sixsmith), 'the British dithered' (Service), 'Britain and France declared war on Germany', 'Soviet intentions', 'the Soviet attitude', and 'the Germans wanted to exploit the occupied territories' (Thompson & Ward) highlight the personification of 'the nation', which generates ambiguous generalisations concerning the meaning of the terms.[305] Who precisely launched the invasion of Poland? What is Poland? Which Soviets were bent on revenge? Who in Britain dithered? What is a Soviet attitude? What Germans wanted to exploit the occupied territories? What is a German? Such questions are important for demonstrating that the imprecise use of terms of nationality can have the effect of representing 'the whole', when in 'reality' every citizen of the specified nation was not involved in the action described. Thompson and Ward are referring to the German government when they state that 'Germany launched the invasion of Poland'. It discursively represents the whole of the German nation due to the ambiguity in the use of 'Germany'. Yet, Thompson and Ward are not writing about German Jews, or most of the other German citizens who were not involved in the decision to invade Poland. The actions of individuals who happen to belong to a particular 'nation' come to represent and stand for the nation as a consolidated unit, or, 'black-box'.

Black-boxing the state refers to ways of analysing international politics which treat the state as a homogenous actor with its own agency irrespective of its internal workings. Political scientist Valerie Hudson criticises this type of work for reducing the state to a 'unitary rational actor' and minimising the idea that what 'occurs between nations and across nations is grounded in human decision makers'.[306] Clearly, such ideas are applicable to Russia as a nation, sharing with totalisation the critique of imposed homogeneity. Instead of being conceived of as representative of

[305] Thompson and Ward, *Russia,* 242; Sixsmith, *Russia,* 354; Service, *The Penguin History of Modern Russia*, 239, 240; Thompson and Ward, *Russia,* 242, 247, 246.
[306] Valerie Hudson, "Foreign Policy Analysis: Actor-Specific Theory and the Ground of International Relations," *Foreign Policy Analysis* 1 (2005): 1-2.

several potentially conflicting parts, Russia is conceived of as a generalised homogenous actor.[307] As Erik Ringmar observes, states have 'no unified consciousness, no single memory, and no subjective will'. [308] This can also apply to nations if regarded as interchangeable with states, which they commonly are in the history texts. By suppressing plurality by using the language of nationality, the texts create representations of a single Soviet response and a single, unified German intention. Such linguistic tendencies have obvious implications for stereotyping. The imprecise use of national terminology, which results in representations of unified nations, aligns with discordus. Where specific components of the nation introduce contradictions and complexities to the narrative, discordus requires those contradictions to be nullified. This facilitates the practice of generalising referent actors through the ambiguous use of national nominations to homogenise nations.

The use of 'Russia' and 'Russian/s' is particularly revealing of such lack of clarity in the language of nationality. One of the consistent ambiguities in the use of 'Russian/s' and 'Russia' stems from the lack of clarity around whether 'Russian' means Soviet, members of the RSFSR, or ethnic Russians. The way in which 'Russia' and 'Russian' are used in a relatively abstract and general manner obscures the precise actors involved. For example, Riasanovsky and Steinberg describe the 'bitterness between the Poles and the Russians'.[309] The meaning, or rather, meanings, of the term 'Russians' (and Poles) can be 'unpacked' based on the context, but also can vary considerably. One word can be interpreted in several different ways which affects how 'Russia' as a nation consisting of territory, culture, people, and government comes to be discursively represented. Table 6 (page 117) provides some examples of the flexible meanings Russia and Russian can have. The comments in

[307] Despite references to conflict between nationalities, it is still represented as one entity politically.
[308] Erik Ringmar, "Introduction: The International Politics of Recognition," in *The International Politics of Recognition*, eds. Thomas Lindemann and Erik Ringmar (London: Routledge, 2016), 4.
[309] Riasanovsky and Steinberg, *A History of Russia,* 513.

square brackets indicate possible meanings that the terms may have in the context of their sentences.

Table 6: Examples of Flexible Meanings of Russia and Russian

Meaning is clear	Meaning is slightly ambiguous, but context signals probable meaning	Meaning is highly ambiguous
'a term in Russian [language]'[310]	'intending to defeat the Russians [national military] within two or three months'[311]	'Moscow's defence was essential to the survival of the revolution and Russia [RSFSR? Soviet Union? Regime?]'[312]
'Their homes and jobs were given to ethnic Russians [ethnicity] as Stalin revived the worst excesses of the old Tsarist 'Russification' policies'[313]	'the Russians [soldiers? Ethnic Russians? Those from the RSFSR?] came to know the sniper's bullet as the "white death"'[314]	'Winter came to play havoc with unprepared German troops and to assist the Russians [Soldiers? Entire population of the RSFSR? Soviet population more broadly?]'[315]
'advanced Russian [nation-state] units met'[316]	'Many of the Russian [Russian army? Soviet army?] invaders had no winter uniforms and were easily spotted against the snow'	'bitterness between the Poles and the Russians [leaders of the RSFSR? Soviet leaders? Entire population of the RSFSR? Soldiers of the Soviet Union? Ethnic Russian soldiers?]'[317]

The language of nationality can also be exclusionary when it is used in an imprecise manner. There are some examples of this in Table 6. For example, using 'Russian' to describe the military forces of the USSR excludes other Soviet nationalities comprising the forces.[318] Drawing on an example cited recently, use of 'the Germans' in the sentence 'the Germans wanted to exploit the occupied territories' is similarly exclusionary. It implicitly excludes groups such as Jews from this constructed category of German.

[310] Figes, *Revolutionary Russia*, 227.
[311] Riasanovsky and Steinberg, *A History of Russia,* 508.
[312] Figes, *Revolutionary Russia*, 225.
[313] Sixsmith, *Russia*, 323.
[314] Sixsmith, *Russia*, 324.
[315] Riasanovsky and Steinberg, *A History of Russia,* 510.
[316] Riasanovsky and Steinberg, *A History of Russia,* 512.
[317] Riasanovsky and Steinberg, *A History of Russia,* 513.
[318] While ethnic Russians made up the majority of the armed forces of the Soviet Union, Soviet citizens of other nationalities also constituted the forces only to a lesser extent.

As demonstrated in Table 7 (see end of chapter – page 139), the rest of the texts' World War II material contains numerous instances of ambiguity. Overall, the texts have the effect of endorsing the idea of a whole homogenous nation as an actor in its own right. In turn, this sustains generalised notions of 'nations', enabling the proliferation of stereotyping through supporting the idea that a nation can exist and act as an entirety.

The historians' use of pronouns and articles can be similarly important for representing the Russian 'nation' conceptualised as a homogenous actor. As Billig asserts, the use of pronouns and articles are significant for reproducing nationalism in a 'banal' manner.[319] The 'little words' are unobtrusive, yet have a profound impact on meaning.[320] The use of the definite article, 'the', in a sentence affects the meaning of 'the' noun following it. It denotes specificity by distinguishing people or things as 'uniquely identifiable'. [321] For Billig, 'the' plays an important role in representing the nation. Billig focuses on the effect of articles on banal representations of nationality in cases where the language of nationality is absent. However, 'the' can also serve a valuable function when historians directly refer to a nationality. 'The' serves a unifying function, which transforms plurals into singular. There is a marked difference in meaning between 'Russian people' and 'the Russian people', whereby the latter is represented as a unified entity.

There are numerous instances in which the historians refer to 'the Russians'. For example, Sixsmith writes that it 'was unclear if the Russians were preparing to confront the advancing Germans', and Figes comments on 'the "Russian character"'.[322] Figes' reference to 'the "Russian character"' implies the existence of a unified 'Russian character' which generalises the diverse citizenry of Russia and the

[319] Billig, *Banal Nationalism*, 94-109.
[320] Billig, *Banal Nationalism*, 94.
[321] Tom McArthur (ed.), *Concise Oxford Companion to the English Language* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003): np.
[322] Sixsmith, *Russia*, 322; Figes, *Revolutionary Russia* 226.

Soviet Union. The use of 'the' creates an impression of specificity by imposing a superficial precision on 'Russian'. 'The Russians' become discursively represented as a 'uniquely identifiable' group, despite ambiguity in the use of the label 'Russian'. If the texts were to refer to 'Russians' without the definite article, then the generalisation of the term 'Russians' would be more conspicuous.

Despite the ambiguities in the use of national nominations, the historians are not always imprecise in employing such terms. At times, they are specific in describing the relevant national actor such as 'Soviet troops', 'Polish government', and 'German forces'. The more generalised use of the language of nationality appears to occur in instances where precision would complicate the narrative, or, where generalisation supports the narrative. Discordus therefore comes into play to guarantee a representation of Russia that is consistent with the geo-cultural paradigm characterised by civilisations, nations, and regions. The historians tend to be more specific in their use of national language when describing positive attributes ('The Russian soldiers' traditional strengths – tenacity, hardiness, the capacity to improvise and to sacrifice oneself for one's comrades – revived as never before'), or the suffering of 'ordinary Soviet citizens'.[323] National terminology is generally used more ambiguously when referring to negative actions ('those who died as a result of Soviet rather than German brutalities').[324] Such homogenising reflects historians' attempts to make Russia fit into the categories of nation and civilisation. As evident from the preceding case studies, the civilisation category depends on constructing nations as Other or Self. Positive actions and traits cannot neatly fit into the idea of Russia as Other because they render it less Other. Therefore, 'the people' or 'the troops' are referred to in order to separate them from the broader idea of Russia. The historians selectively differentiate and homogenise. As explored later, in the final

[323] Hosking, *Russia and the Russians*, 505, 492.
[324] Hosking, *Russia and the Russians*, 499.

section of this chapter, the historians are also more specific when drawing distinction between 'the Soviet people' and the regime.

Considering one of the examples cited previously, reference to the Soviets 'bent on revenge' would likely be less evocative if the text were to refer to specific individuals of Soviet citizenship possessing this desire for revenge. In this example, it represents the desire for revenge as a desire of the entire Soviet population. It further serves to construct the nations as homogenous and linear products of history, but also as characters in a story. This has direct implications for representations of nations. As characters, nations are personified and are subject to archetypal framing through representations.[325]

Segregating & Desegregating Russia & the Soviet Union

The nomination 'Russia' is not used often throughout the texts since the Soviet Union is cast as the protagonist and Russia is frequently conflated with the Soviet Union in each of the texts. Whether the terms 'Russia' and 'Soviet Union' are used synonymously appears unrelated to the subject matter. Thus, the interchangeable use of Russia and the Soviet Union might be unintentional, but is nevertheless reflective of ingrained assumptions about Russia as a nation. For example, Sixsmith describes how the Poles 'expected the Soviets to join them in expelling the Germans … But the Russians did nothing'.[326] The sentence structure indicates that he is referring to the same actor, yet instead of writing how the 'Soviets did nothing', he has substituted 'Russians' but clearly means the same actor. Figes similarly refers to them interchangeably by questioning the reason for 'Soviet soldiers' fighting with determination, and suggesting it might have been 'something in the 'Russian

[325] Categories are easier to make sense of than detail. It also shows the fluidity of the nation as a concept and can be manipulated to mean whatever is most convenient at the time.
[326] Martin Sixsmith, *Russia,* 354.

character''.[327] Hosking likewise equates the Soviet Union and Russia. He describes how the 'Germans who did not fully realize what atrocities their own troops had inflicted on the Soviet peoples nevertheless knew that the Russians could be expected to exact a terrible revenge.'[328] Similar substitutions occur occasionally throughout Riasanovksy and Steinberg's text. In one instance, they refer to the 'German-Russian agreement of strict neutrality'.[329] However, they subsequently refer to the same agreement with the USSR as the referent actor: 'the USSR utilized its agreement with Germany'.[330] The flexible meanings of 'Russian' and 'Soviet' enable the conflation to occur.

The mixing of 'Russia' and 'Soviet Union' in the manner described contributes toward conflating the two, but the way in which 'Russia' is used separately highlights its existence as a community within the USSR. Despite the clear emphasis on the Soviet Union in their chapters on World War II, the historians nevertheless refer to 'Russia' infrequently. While 'Russia' as an international political actor did not 'exist' during the 1940s, the texts make it clear that 'Russia' as a 'nation' culturally still existed as the RSFSR. As Franklin astutely observes, 'the ethno-cultural was disentangled from the geopolitical and the continuity of Russianness could be presented as a continuity of culture'.[331] The historians address the complexity of the inextricability of the Soviet Union and Russia, and inadvertently, of the state and the nation, through emphasising Russia's significant position within the Soviet Union. This further highlights how the texts do not unequivocally or consistently conflate Russia and the Soviet Union, but imply that they were socio-politically, or at least culturally, inseparable from each other.

---

[327] Figes, *Revolutionary Russia*, 226.
[328] Geoffrey Hosking, *Russia and the Russians* (Cambridge MA: Belknap Press, 2001), 498.
[329] Nicholas V. Riasanovsky and Mark D. Steinberg, *A History of Russia* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 7th edn., 2005), 507.
[330] Riasanovsky and Steinberg, *A History of Russia*, 507.
[331] Simon Franklin, "Russia in Time," in *National Identity in Russian Culture: An Introduction,* eds. Simon Franklin and Emma Widdis (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2006), 17.

The inconsistency and lack of clarity in the use of the terms Russia and Soviet Union highlights the way that discordus plays out across the three levels of the geo-cultural paradigm. Russia clearly challenges the clean division between region and nation. Sixsmith is most overt in describing Russia's prominence within the USSR, writing of Russia's 'leading role in the Union' and how Russia was 'at the heart of the equation'.[332] Service draws more attention to ethnic and national complexities he perceives existed at the time, explaining how '[t]he Russian nation was encouraged to believe that it was fighting for its Motherland … and that this included not only Russia but the entire USSR.' However, he still frames Russia as the primary unit of the USSR. This makes sense to an extent since Russia was the political core of the Soviet Union. Service's description of the 'special praise showered upon the Russians for their endurance' indicates such a view that the Russian nation occupied a favoured position within the Union. By extension, this reflects the cultural context whereby the two are regarded as almost the same entity.[333] Nevertheless, reconciling the history of Russia with the history of the Soviet Union clearly presents a narrative challenge. It reflects the tension characteristic of discordus because Russia seemingly refers to a multinational state, a nation and a region, or a blend of all three. This further indicates the conceptual difficulties in writing national history in cases where the nation has undergone several political transformations.

The tendency to conflate Russia and the Soviet Union allows for narratives of nation-building to be emplotted as central to the histories of Russia during World War II. Accordingly, these narratives further contribute toward constructing the idea of a historically entrenched nation of Russia. The way in which the majority of the texts refer to the impact of World War II on Russian nation-building serves as a clear indication of the historians' framing of the conflict as significant for Russian

[332] Sixsmith, *Russia,* 344.
[333] Robert Service, *The Penguin History of Modern Russia* (London: Penguin, 2015), 262.

'nationhood'. For example, Hosking posits that '[t]he Second World War did more than any other event to crystallize Russian nationhood'.[334] Similarly, Service contends that 'Russians in particular acquired a more intense sense of nationhood as millions of them came together as soldiers and factory workers.'[335] Figes also addresses related themes of nation-building, as he describes how World War II became 'the main foundational myth of the Soviet state'.[336] As Hall explains in his theorising of 'the nation', a 'foundational myth' is 'a story which locates the origin of the nation, the people, and their national character'.[337] Through suggesting that the War became the new 'foundational myth', Figes and the other historians communicate the significance of the Second World War for Russia's national identity. Since World War II is framed as central to 'who/what Russia is', what the historians write about the Russian/Soviet experience of World War II greatly contributes to representations of Russia as a political community and its construction as a nation in the Anglosphere.

Framing the War as central to Russia's 'existence' further constructs Russia as a nation by imposing a narrative structure of linearity and coherence on literary Russia through time. It connects contemporary Russia to Russia of the past. It also links Russia and the Soviet Union through creating the impression of a linear timeline leading to the present-day Russian Federation. Therefore, within the confines of the discourse on Russian history, what links Russia together as a continuous 'being' is the historians' manipulation of time and events through emplotment. The historians imply that Russia, as a coherent nation with a linear experience of time, consists of its historical experiences. In this regard, Russia is written about as if it were a living

[334] Hosking, *Russia and the Russians*, 505.
[335] Service, *The Penguin History of Modern Russia*, 268.
[336] Orlando Figes, *Revolutionary Russia 1891-1991* (London: Penguin, 2014), 234.
[337] Stuart Hall, "The Question of National Identity," 614.

person whose development and current identity is the product of his or her historical experiences.

In writing Russia as an entity embedded in time, the texts have the effect of what Bhabha might refer to as 'totalising' the nation.[338] Russia is represented as a coherent actor through the way in which the historians have tethered it to time. Literary Russia becomes the sum of its historical parts. Control over the historical narrative leads historians to exercise power over what Franklin terms 'the shaping of time'.[339] He hypothesises that 'the assumption that the way we shape time has significance for determining who "we" are; the belief in linear narratives through time as the key, or a key, to something which might commonly be termed 'historical' identity.'[340] In this case, while the texts create linear narratives of another nation, rather than one's own community, the basic principle remains applicable.

Time and events are not necessarily or inherently part of a coherent, connected, and linear story of development. Historians as authors piece facts together and make connections to produce such a story, and, in this situation, produce the story of Russia as a nation.[341] This is significant for understanding how literary Russia is written into 'reality'. If Russia is conceptualised as a linear, coherent actor with an almost human experience of time and life, it becomes more amenable to attributions of generalised character traits or stereotypes. In short, Russia becomes Russia; something (a nation) which can be represented as a whole, and therefore, something (a nation) which can be imagined into social reality through discourse.

---

[338] For 'totalisation' see Homi K. Bhabha, *The Location of Culture* (Oxon: Routledge, 1994), 145. While Bhabha seemingly uses the term to refer mainly to artificial homogeneity brought about by suppressing differences between intranational groups and thereby creating a complete whole, his concept is more widely applicable to temporal totalisation. He indicates this himself through explaining how narrators of nations aim to 'produce the idea of the nation as a continuous narrative of national progress.' The issue at the core of 'totalisation' is the artificial 'completeness' of the nation as a text itself.

[339] Franklin, "Russia in Time," 11.

[340] Franklin, "Russia in Time," 11

[341] See eg, Hayden White, "The Historical Text as Literary Artifact," *Clio* 3, no. 3 (1974), 280.

Homogenising Russia in this way also allows historians to fit Russia into the prevailing national paradigm of the Anglosphere.

The way in which Russia is constructed as a coherent actor in time reveals as much about the construction of Russia as it does about the construction of nationalism and the writing of history. Clearly, nationalism is such a central a concept to the texts that it has effectively become 'naturalised'. It is written about as if it were an immutable part of the natural world, rather than a socially constructed phenomenon. It is a concept through which the world is perceived and understood, and, in practice, ideationally structured. To borrow from Kramer, '[n]ations do not exist in nature'. Instead, '[t]hey are created by human cultures and they provide a good example of how human realities that appear to be 'natural' actually develop in history through specific institutions and the evolving use of languages, symbols, and imaginative narratives.'[342] Nations and nationalism are therefore discursively imagined into reality as products of collectively shared values and beliefs – culture. The history texts contribute toward such construction as part of the Anglophone or 'Western' cultural canon. While some contend that 'nationalism is out of fashion', analysis of these texts reveals that it remains woven into the fabric of social reality.[343]

The representation of effectively two 'Russias', Russia as the RSFSR and Russia as the USSR, reveals the conceptual complexities of nationalism. It also highlights the dominant Anglophone tendency to strive to create images of linear nations through historical narratives. In this case, the relationship between the USSR and Russia both during the time period under description, but also throughout time, complicates the seemingly 'natural' drive to conceive of nations as homogenous and continual entities.

---

[342] Lloyd S. Kramer, *Nationalism in Europe and America: Politics, Cultures, and Identities Since 1775* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2011), 18.
[343] Robert Cooper, "The Mystery of Development," *Prospect Magazine*, 2006 <https://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/magazine/themysteryofdevelopment> (14 December 2017).

Since history is a form of literature, it is unsurprising that the narrators of the texts endeavour to conform to the literary convention of a coherent, linear narrative. Narratives require continuity and consistency, and protagonists usually undergo some form of development as the narrative progresses. The nation, as a text itself, likewise requires at least a perceived sense of 'coherence and unity' to 'exist'.[344] However, Kramer, paraphrasing Bhabha, explains that narrators of nations 'must contend with contradictions and alien supplements that can never be fully accommodated within the master narrative that seeks to construct a fully coherent nation.'[345] That the master narrative of Russia always includes, even emphasises, this particular Soviet period reflects a need to anchor contemporary Russia to the past in order to make Russia into a nation in the present. This reflects notions of nationalism as a product of history. Consequently, the type of nation Russia becomes depends on constructions of the past which contribute toward its identity.

Through binding the Soviet Union to Russia and linking them in time in the descriptions of a shared past, the historians impose a form of narrative continuity and linearity on Russia. Since the USSR is represented as a form of Russia, and the RSFSR is inextricably linked to the USSR, the substantive distinction between the two Russias becomes blurred. Thus, despite the complication of the representation of 'two Russias', the tendency to conflate Soviet Russia with the Soviet Union nevertheless constructs Russia as a single nation which has apparently developed over a long period of time. The historians' decisions to emphasise the Soviet past affects the characterisation of Russia and, via extension, the discursive construction of Russia. Through totalising Russia by imposing coherence through a linear narrative, the texts render Russia into a mentally digestible idea.

---

[344] Ruth Wodak, Rudolf de Cillia, Martin Reisigl, and Karen Liebhart, *The Discursive Construction of National Identity,* trans. Angelika Hirsch, Richard Mitten, and J. W Unger (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2009), 23-24.

[345] Lloyd Kramer, "Historical Narratives and the Meaning of Nationalism," *Journal of the History of Ideas* 58, no. 3 (1997): 536.

Since the chapters on the World War II predominantly refer to the Soviet Union rather than Russia, whether they are interchangeable is important for considering the texts' representations of the Soviet Union as also serving as representations of Russia. Since this is the case, what is written about the Soviet Union, and how it is written, contributes toward the discursive construction of Russia.

Representing Russia in WWII

Through its construction as a linear, coherent nation, Russia can be represented and characterised since it is given form as a unitary actor. It is through representing Russia that knowledge and understandings of Russia are generated through the texts. As Munslow explains, 'the power to represent any thing, object, or process depends on the ability to create a mental image or picture of it', which is essential for 'the creation of knowledge'.[346] In describing Russia's actions and traits, historians represent Russia and create an image of what Russia is. This image is a product of the context of its composition.

The way that the historians write about Russia/the Soviet Union as if it were responsible for the Second World War illustrates how Russia is Othered as a whole through the imprecise use of the language of nationality. In this regard, the imprecision of the language of nationality becomes particularly important since such imprecision leads to generalised negative representations of 'Russia' as a whole, despite the particular actions of individuals. Homogenising is required for Othering. Russia cannot be Othered unless it is portrayed as a single entity.

The way that the texts describe the Nazi-Soviet aggression treaty provides a prime example of how linguistic homogenisation can produce a negative

[346] Munslow, *The New History*, 17.

representation of Russia as a whole. The texts generally describe this event as facilitating World War II. In turn, they discreetly impose blame on the USSR for one of the most significant conflicts in world history.

Causal attributions of blame are not necessarily problematic – the problem is with the way that the language of nationality is used in the context of causal connections to project responsibility onto entire nations. To illustrate, Figes explains that 'the Soviet Union signed a Non-Aggression Treaty with Nazi Germany, leading directly to the start of the Second World War.'[347] Service contends that through the agreement, 'Hitler was being given carte blanche to continue his depredatory policies' in Europe and was 'being enabled to invade Poland'.[348] Thompson and Ward are less direct in their causal connection. Nonetheless, they imply partial Soviet responsibility in their description of the agreement which is followed by the statement that 'within ten days, Germany launched the invasion of Poland that triggered World War II'.[349] While not directly making a link between the agreement and the invasion, the text nevertheless implies causality. The subsidiary texts further support this finding. For example, Ascher explains how '[t]he pact gave Hitler a free hand to attack Poland'.[350] Barber and Harrison write that it 'plunged France and Britain into war with Germany'.[351] Ziegler, less explicitly, writes how, '[t]he German attack on Poland one week later launched World War II'.[352]

The historians have clearly chosen to emphasise the causality between the Treaty and the start of the Second World War, and described the Soviet Union's role in this. Of course, the evidence relevant to such causal contentions may warrant these conclusions of 'Russia's culpability in instigating World War II. The issue here is not

[347] Figes, *Revolutionary Russia,* 516.
[348] Service, *The Penguin History of Modern Russia*, 240.
[349] Thompson and Ward, *Russia,* 242.
[350] Abraham Ascher, *Russia: A Short History* (London: Oneworld Publications, 2017), 214.
[351] John Barber and Mark Harrison, "Patriotic War," in *The Cambridge History of Russia*, ed. Ronald Grigor Suny (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2008), 221.
[352] Ziegler, *The History of Russia*, 86.

with these causal links, but with the way the use of national nominations in these conclusions create a generalised negative representation of Russia as a whole. Therefore, what is most significant about these representations is that these conclusions about 'Russian' responsibility incidentally encompass all of the components of the Russian nation. Such representations include the vast majority of citizens who lacked any direct or indirect involvement in the events. Consequently, by conflating all components of a 'nation' through use of the general term 'Soviet Union', the texts attribute the responsibility for the War not merely on the government of the Soviet Union, but on the ordinary citizens of the Soviet Union. This would not be a problem if the Soviet Union or Russia were only used in relation to governments. The conflation reflects and promotes an image of anOther Russia as a totalised nation. This seemingly undistorted critique of Russia's role in starting World War II, can accordingly serve to sustain an Otherness narrative and implicate all of Russia, not confining such representations to the political elite.

However, the historians do not consistently homogenise Russia when they describe the 'event' of the deportations of non-Russian nationalities. Instead, they sometimes draw a distinction between the regime and the nation. Consequently, Russia as a whole is not always represented negatively. Yes, this distinction is not obvious and only becomes apparent through text analysis. To illustrate, Sixsmith's use of 'Moscow' and 'Stalin' is more representative of the regime than Russia as a totality. He describes how 'Moscow had embarked on a concerted campaign of ethnic engineering within the borders of the USSR arresting, expelling and deporting members of national groups that Stalin viewed as potential Nazi collaborators'.[353]

He continues, explaining how,

[353] Sixsmith, *Russia*, 360.

> [b]eginning in early 1944, hundreds of thousands of Chechens, Ingush, Balkars, karachai, Kalmyks and Crimean Tatars were deported from their ancestral homelands in the north Caucasus and Crimea, allegedly as punishment for collaborating with the Nazis. In fact, only a small minority had collaborated. … The vast majority of Caucasian males had been drafted into the Red Army just like everyone else and had fought bravely for its liberation.[354]

The way that Sixsmith describes the deportations creates an impression of a brutal Soviet regime, but does not unnecessarily implicate 'the people' in the atrocities. Several features of his text contribute to this impression. For example, his use of 'hundreds of thousands' evokes a more emotive reader response than perhaps a specific numeric citation would. Describing the lands as 'ancestral homelands' frames the deportations as a significant injustice. Explaining that the Caucasian males had 'fought bravely' creates the impression of innocent 'good' people being wronged by the 'bad' regime. The distinction between people and regime epitomises historians' use of the technique of differentiation.

Although the texts generate a negative impression of the regime through their descriptions of the deportations, few of the historians refer directly to the regime. In the excerpt, Sixsmith uses 'passive' voice whereby he refrains from explicitly stating which actor is doing the deporting, cramming, and abandoning. Regime responsibility is implied through the broader context of the text, or, in Wodak's words, the 'text internal' context.[355] While perhaps not as strong an indictment of the Soviet regime's brutality as more direct references to the regime, such descriptions nevertheless contribute toward characterising the Soviet Union government as 'bad'. The historians' choice of passivity may be attributable to their preferred style of prose. However, it is also possible that their use of language reflects the academic professional standards mandating the appearance of objectivity.

---

[354] Sixsmith, *Russia*, 360.

[355] Ruth Wodak, "The Discourse-historical Approach," 88.

Evidently, although the dominant pattern in the texts is to conflate the sub-units of a nation with the nation as a 'whole', distinction in the depiction of the regime compared to 'the people' is apparent. The subtle and occasional segregation between these two 'parts' of the Russian 'nation' suggests that any Othering of Russia is political and directed more toward regimes than citizens. As discussed, the historians regularly describe the Soviet Union negatively. In doing so, they often inadvertently include the 'people' of Russia through the use of sweeping and ambiguous use of the language of nationality. However, when the people are described more precisely, they are predominantly represented positively as courageous and innocent victims of both Nazi Germany and their own government.

There are several examples of the desegregation of regime and citizens in the texts, in all of which citizens are portrayed more positively than the regime. For instance, 'Soviet troops stood their ground' (Hosking), 'fought bravely' (Sixsmith), demonstrated 'extraordinary courage and sacrifice' (Figes), and fought with 'fierce determination' (Figes).[356] The majority of the texts describe the reluctance of Soviet citizens abroad to return to the Soviet Union and maltreatment of returning POWs. Riasanovsky and Steinberg suggest that '[t]o the great surprise of the Western democracies, tens of thousands of Soviet citizens liberated by Allied armies in Europe did all they could not to return to their homeland'.[357] They also contend that 'the Soviet population often welcomed the Germans', implying that the Soviet population held its own government in disregard.[358] Barber and Harrison note how the authorities 'punished food crimes harshly, not infrequently by shooting', and 'stigmatised the behaviour of Soviet soldiers who allowed themselves to be taken prisoner'.[359] Kort similarly portrays 'the people' as 'good' and the regime as 'bad' in

[356] Hosking, *Russia and the Russians*, 495; Sixsmith, *Russia*, 327; Figes, *Revolutionary Russia,* 226.
[357] Riasanovsky and Steinberg, *A History of Russia*, 514.
[358] Riasanovsky and Steinberg, *A History of Russia*, 511.
[359] Barber and Harrison, "Patriotic War," 231.

describing how the 'Soviet people displayed their fortitude countless times, enduring enemy brutality alongside recklessly cruel treatment by their own government'.[360] Figes explicitly differentiates the 'people' from the 'regime', explaining how '[t]he actions of ordinary soldiers and civilians, who sacrificed themselves in huge numbers, made up for the failures of the military command and the paralysis of nearly all authority.'[361]

The differentiation between regime and people occurs when it has utility for the narrative. Historians tend to be more specific in their use of language regarding the referent actor when isolating the regime as the primary 'bad' element of Russia and portraying 'the people' of Russia positively. This is crucial for the overarching story of Russia because it has the effect of constructing Russia as a victim of its politics. This idea of Russia as a victim is explored in more depth in the following chapter, Chapter V. For now, it is sufficient to say that the dichotomy of bad regime and good people reveals discordus. There is tension in Russia's construction. From a discordic perspective, both 'Russias' – regime and citizenry – must be linguistically merged to an extent in order to render it capable of a homogenous representation that fits the Western metanarrative. This is what the historians do when they selectively conflate the components of the nation.

As in the previous case studies, representations of Russia often depend on how it is construed in relation to the West. Separating Russia from the West using language provides the discursive foundation for Othering Russia and constructing it as inferior to the West. In writing of 'Western freedoms' and 'Western ways of doing things' and how Soviet citizens learnt what 'life in the West was like … a long way from the gloomy images of Soviet propaganda'[362] makes the West appear 'better'

[360] Michael Kort, *A Brief History of Russia* (New York: Facts on File, 2008), 189.
[361] Figes, *Revolutionary Russia,* 228.
[362] Sixsmith, *Russia*, 367; Figes, *Revolutionary Russia,* 234.

than the seemingly backward USSR. The texts therefore inadvertently and subtly play a supporting role in entrenching divisive political and social structures in the world through discourse on the past.

However, similarly to how references to 'Russia' and 'Poland' are often ambiguous and reflect generalisations of diverse national components, the use of the label 'the West' is likewise problematic because of its ambiguity. The texts refer to the West frequently, yet it is unclear what this specifically means since the West, as an idea, lacks homogeneity and agency. For example, Figes describes how 'people began to understand what life in the West was like', but where was 'the West?' What nations constituted it at that time? The construction of the sentence reveals that it was somewhere other than Russia. Sixsmith explains that the Soviet people were exposed to 'Western ways of doing things' and 'Western freedoms', in a way which suggests that such 'ways' and 'freedoms' were previously foreign to the Soviet Union and therefore also implies that Russia was outside of 'the West'.[363] However, Sixsmith also refers to the 'big three Western Allies' in a way which encompasses the Soviet Union and thus describes it as Western.[364] This inconsistency highlights the fluidity of the concept and label the West.

As an imagined community, the West's membership and meaning is flexible depending on the context. The concept is as dynamic as the construction. Even within the same text, the meaning of 'Western' changes. As I argued in Chapter II, the imprecise nature of the term the West poses an interpretive and conceptual problem. Analysis of the way the language of nationality is used in the World War II texts reveals part of why it is an issue. As nations can be 'black-boxed' with their inner workings and diversity effectively ignored, so too can civilisational communities.

[363] Figes, *Revolutionary Russia,* 234; Sixsmith, *Russia: A 1000-Year Chronicle of the Wild East*, 367. Sixsmith implicitly includes the Soviet Union as one of 'the big three'. He does this by stating that the leaders of the big three met in Tehran, and continues by explaining Stalin's contributions to the meeting.
[364] Sixsmith, *Russia,* 353.

The West is arguably constituted by a diversity of nations and sub-national actors. Through their use of the label the West, the texts conflate and generalise to suit their narrativisations of the past. They create the West as a character serving as the literary hero to the villain Russia. Just as totalising Russia crystallises its nationhood, the West is discursively rendered into a totalised civilisational community. The West is the ultimate synecdoche which has become embedded in Anglophone discourse.

The historians construct Russia as a homogenous and linear entity in their histories of World War II. Representing Russia as a single entity is crucial for crystallising Russia into a literary nation. It enables it to be represented and portrayed as a character in a story. Exploring how historians use the language of nationality ambiguously revealed contradictions in Russia's narrative and an underlying contrast between the regime and the citizenry. Discordus is therefore at play because there is tension between the components of 'Russia' in time and space, and historians deploy homogenisation to makes those tensions less apparent. Historical discourse of this kind not only reflects banal nationalism – it also replicates, transmits, and legitimises it.

The following fine analysis of Charles Ziegler's *The History of Russia* (2009) demonstrates several of the discursive patterns identified and analysed in this chapter.

Fine Analysis

Charles Ziegler, *The History of Russia* (2009), page 87.

1. Most **Soviet** [Citizens? Military?] people fought fiercely in defense of their
2. homeland. Military historian William Fuller (in Gregory Freeze, ed., *Russia:*
3. *A History*) claims that the **Soviet Union** [state] was fairly even with
4. **Germany** [state] in both weapons and men at the start of the war; **Germany's**
5. [state] initial successes were due in large part to failures of leadership in the
6. **Soviet** [government] regime and to the vast destruction visited on **Soviet**
7. society in the 1930s. It is a telling comment on Stalin's cruelties that in many
8. parts of **Ukraine** [territory], **Belorussia** [territory], and the **Baltics** [territory],
9. the **Germans** [military] were welcomed as potential liberators. Peasants often
10. met the advancing **German** [military] troops with the traditional **Slavic**
11. [culture] welcome of bread and salt. It is also estimated that about 1 million
12. defected and served the Axis war machine in various capacities. However, the
13. barbaric treatment of **Slavs** [ethnicity], classified as sub- humans fit only for
14. slave labor by Hitler's racial scheme, quickly turned the population against
15. the invaders. **Jews** and Communist Party officials fared the worst—they were
16. shot, while others were herded into concentration camps.
17. Nazi atrocities encouraged the **Soviet** [citizens? Military?] people to fight
18. doggedly, either in the regular forces or in partisan detachments, and this
19. determined resistance contributed to the eventual defeat of the **Germans** [military? State?].

This excerpt from Ziegler's *The History of Russia* (2009), highlights several of the patterns identified in the chapter. The language of nationality is abundant. I emphasised terms of nationality by using bold font for the national text in the excerpt. This is to demonstrate their prevalence. As explored in the main chapter, national terminology such as 'Soviet', 'German', and 'Belorussia' reflected the order of the world as it was during World War II. The use of such national language is therefore necessary and expected. However, the inconsistency and imprecision in the use of the terms is not necessary. At times, Ziegler uses the terms with more precision than he

does at other times. For example, in line 10, he is specific in his reference to 'German troops', but in line 9 is vague with his use of 'the Germans'. It is not clear from the language alone which Germans he means.

In the excerpt, I have indicated the most likely meaning of national terms in square brackets. The likely meaning is based on my interpretation of the intratextual context. Ziegler's comment in line 9 that 'the Germans were welcomed as potential liberators' therefore implies that 'the Germans' means the armed forces because it is the military advances on Ukraine, and so forth. Line 8 refers to 'parts of Ukraine, Belorussia, and the Baltics'. Because of the use of 'parts of', it is apparent that those national terms mean the territory of Ukraine, Belorussia, and the Baltics.

The use of passive language such as 'were welcomed' (line 9) without stipulating the actors who welcomed the Germans furthers the general narrative but at the expense of precision – who welcomed the Germans? Which Germans were welcomed? Lines 8-9 are more specific, describing how '[p]easants often met the advancing German troops with bread and salt'.

Line 3 demonstrates the way in which the Soviet Union and Germany are used to refer to states. Lines 4-5 describe 'Germany's successes' which is a form of personification of the state which lacks specificity regarding the individual actors responsible for such 'successes'. Reference to the 'leadership in the Soviet regime' is more precise because the language clearly identifies the national component – the regime.

This excerpt also shows how, sometimes, the use of national terminology is ambiguous to an extent that the meaning is more debatable. In lines 1 and 17, Ziegler writes that '[m]ost Soviet people fought fiercely' and describes how 'Nazi atrocities encouraged the Soviet people to fight doggedly'. His use of 'most' suggests that perhaps ordinary civilian citizens of the Soviet Union were involved in fighting, not

just Soviet soldiers. However, it is unclear.

Similarly in line 17, use of the definite article, 'the' serves a unifying function. It implies that 'the Soviet people' were one. Therefore it includes all 'Soviet people' (which is itself ambiguous), which implies that all 'Soviet people' fought. His reference to 'partisan detachments' in line 18 supports a more general reading of this, rather than equating Soviet in line 17 with only the core military. The first line refers to '[m]ost Soviet people'. Use of the word 'most' softens what would otherwise be a sweeping generalisation. In this regard, the language of nationality, Soviet, is still somewhat vague because it is unclear which Soviet people Ziegler means in this context.

The way that Ziegler uses 'Soviet' also highlights the inclusionary yet also exclusionary effect of the ambiguous use of national language. In the example referred to above, not all Soviet people fought doggedly and not all Soviet people fought for the Soviet Union. In fact, according to Mark Edele, 1.6 million Soviet citizens defected and became 'military collaborators' for the Nazis.[365] The language is therefore inclusionary because it incorporates all 'Soviet people', but exclusionary because those who did not fight in the Red Army are not part of this construction of 'Soviet'.

Ziegler's use of adjectives is also crucial for representations of Russia. His descriptions of how 'the Soviet people' fought – 'fiercely' and 'doggedly' – evokes positive connotations associated with generally positive characteristics such as determination and perseverance. In line 19, Ziegler uses the adjective 'determined', commenting on the 'determined resistance'. In contrast, adjectives used in relation to the Soviet regime and the Nazi regime are more negative in connotative meaning. For

[365] Mark Edele, *How Red Army Soldiers Became Hitler's Collaborators* (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2017), 174.

example, Ziegler refers to the 'barbaric treatment of Slavs' (line 12). He also describes how victims of the Nazis 'were herded into concentration camps' (line16), which conjures imagery of animals and implies that Nazis treated people as such.

Sometimes, Ziegler is very specific, to the point that terms of nationality are not used, but specific actors are referred to instead. For example, he refers to 'Hitler's racial scheme' (line 14), 'Stalin's cruelties' (line 7), and 'Nazi atrocities' (line 17), 'peasants' (line 9). This kind of specificity occurs most often when he makes a narrative distinction between the regime and 'the people'. This contrast is apparent in this excerpt, which tells the story of how maltreatment by the Soviet regime prompted peasants to initially welcome 'the Germans' and how 'the Soviet people' resisted the Nazis. The nation of Russia (or Germany, for that matter) is not represented as a totalised entity when those national components, people and regime, are separated from Russia. The regime rather than 'Russia' is Othered, and the people are portrayed as victims of the regime. Even in this short fragment of one text, selective conflation affects Russia's construction.

Nonetheless, the more general use of the language of nationality still leads to an overall representation of a homogenous Russia. Thus, although Ziegler capitalises on some of the factual fissures in the idea of a homogenous Russia (or Germany) for the narrative, he still writes in such a way that attempts to smooth over these fissures with ambiguous terminology. Discordus is apparent. It facilitates selective homogenising and segregating of components which constitute the nations of Russia and Germany.

Table 7: Varied Meanings of Russia, Russian, and Russians

Text	Term within immediate context	Possible Meaning	Degree of Ambiguity
Figes	1. 'They were unprepared for a Russian winter'[366]	1. Geographical/Territorial Russia	1. Slightly ambiguous
	2. 'Was it something in the 'Russian character' [367]	2. Cultural Russia?	2. Moderately ambiguous
	3. 'a term in Russian'[368]	3. Russian language	3. Not ambiguous
	4. 'Military heroes from Russian history appeared on Soviet medals'[369]	4. Russia as a nation – but then, what does this mean?	4. Moderately ambiguous
	5. 'The Russian Orthodox Church was granted a new lease on life'[370]	5. Russian Orthodox Church	5. Not ambiguous
	6. Kill Germans 'in revenge for the fascist rapes of Russian mothers'[371]	6. Mothers of Russian ethnicity? Nationality? Only Russian or also Soviet?	6. Slightly ambiguous
Figes	1. 'Moscow's defence was essential to the survival of the revolution and Russia'[372]	1. Russia the RSFSR? Russia the Soviet Union? Russian regime?	1. Highly ambiguous
	2. 'Soviet propaganda increasingly jettisoned revolutionary symbols in favour of older nationalist ideas of "Mother Russia"'[373]	2. Russia as a nation, but in what sense?	2. Moderately ambiguous
Hosking	1. 'This was to the Soviet advantage, not because Russians suffer less in the cold'[374]	1. Russians as Soviets? Red Army soldiers? Ethnic Russians in the Red Army? All 'Russian' people?	1. Highly ambiguous
Hosking	1. 'Russia's past greatness'[375]	1. Russia as a nation? A state?	1. Moderately ambiguous
Riasnaovsky & Steinberg	1. 'a German-Russian agreement of strict neutrality'[376]	1. Russian government? Soviet Government? Specific political elites of Russia?	1. Moderately ambiguous
	2. 'intending to defeat the Russians within two or three months'[377]	2. Russian military. But only Russians or Soviets?	2. Slightly ambiguous
	3. 'German tanks broke through the Russian lines'[378]	3. Military but only Russian?	3. Slightly ambiguous
	4. 'Winter came to play havoc with unprepared	4. Soldiers? Entire population of the RSFSR? Soviet population more	4. Highly ambiguous

[366] Figes, *Revolutionary Russia,* 226.
[367] Figes, *Revolutionary Russia,* 226.
[368] Figes, *Revolutionary Russia,* 227.
[369] Figes, *Revolutionary Russia,* 227.
[370] Figes, *Revolutionary Russia,* 227.
[371] Figes, *Revolutionary Russia,* 227.
[372] Figes, *Revolutionary Russia,* 225.
[373] Figes, *Revolutionary Russia,* 227.
[374] Hosking, *Russia and the Russians*, 494.
[375] Hosking, *Russia and the Russians*, 496.
[376] Riasanovsky and Steinberg, *A History of Russia*, 507.
[377] Riasanovsky and Steinberg, *A History of Russia*, 508.
[378] Riasanovsky and Steinberg, *A History of Russia*, 508.

	German troops and to assist the Russians'[379] 5. 'As the Russians began to invade the Third Reich'[380] 6. 'advanced Russian units met'[381] 7. 'bitterness between the Poles and the Russians'[382]	broadly? 5. Soldiers, but only Russians or Soviets? 6. Military 7. Russian leaders? Soviet leaders? Entire population of the RSFSR? Soldiers of the Soviet Union? Ethnic Russian soldiers? Etc.	5. Slightly ambiguous 6. Not ambiguous 7. Highly ambiguous
Riasanovsky & Steinberg	1. 'Hitler increased the number of his and his allies' divisions in Russia'[383] 2. 'The great German campaign of 1941 in Russia failed'[384] 3. 'The second great German offensive in Russia'[385] 4. 'Germans tried one more major offensive in Russia'[386]	1. RSFSR territory 2. RSFSR territory 3. RSFSR territory 4. RSFSR territory	1. Slightly ambiguous 2. Slightly ambiguous 3. Slightly ambiguous 4. Slightly ambiguous
Service	1. 'the Wehrmacht would be in grave difficulties if it could not complete its conquest of the USSR before the Russian snows set in'[387]	1. RSFSR territory	1. Slightly ambiguous
Sixsmith	1. Film ordered by Stalin to 'portray Russian resistance to German aggressors in a previous historical era, was withdrawn from cinemas overnight'[388] 2. 'It was unclear if the Russians were preparing to confront the advancing Germans or merely profiting from Poland's disarray'[389] 3. 'Their homes and jobs were given to ethnic Russians as Stalin revived the worst excesses of the old Tsarist 'Russification' policies'[390]	1. Russian soldiers? Russian civilians? All members of the RSFSR? Soviet citizens? 2. Russian leaders? Soviet leaders? Russian regime? Soviet regime? Soldiers? Civilians? Ethnic Russians? All 'Russians'? 3. Ethnic Russians 4. Russian army? Soviet army?	1. Highly ambiguous 2. Highly ambiguous 3. Not ambiguous 4. Slightly ambiguous

[379] Riasanovsky and Steinberg, *A History of Russia*, 510.
[380] Riasanovsky and Steinberg, *A History of Russia*, 512.
[381] Riasanovsky and Steinberg, *A History of Russia*, 512,
[382] Riasanovsky and Steinberg, *A History of Russia*, 513.
[383] Riasanovsky and Steinberg, *A History of Russia*, 508.
[384] Riasanovsky and Steinberg, *A History of Russia*, 510.
[385] Riasanovsky and Steinberg, *A History of Russia*, 510.
[386] Riasanovsky and Steinberg, *A History of Russia*, 511.
[387] Service, *The Penguin History of Modern Russia*, 242.
[388] Sixsmith, *Russia,* 319-20.
[389] Sixsmith, *Russia*, 322.
[390] Sixsmith, *Russia*, 323.

	4. 'Many of the Russian invaders had no winter uniforms and were easily spotted against the snow'[391] 5. 'the Russians came to know the sniper's bullet as the "white death"'[392]	5. Soldiers. Ethnic Russians? Those from the RSFSR? Soviet soldiers?	5. Moderately ambiguous
Thompson & Ward	1. Soviet writers heralded the Soviet people as saviours … just as Kievan Rus' had saved Europe from the Mongols in the thirteenth century and the Russian Empire had defeated Napoleon in 1812'[393]	1. Russian Empire as a state. But clarity issue regarding the specific part of the Russian Empire.	1. Slightly ambiguous

[391] Sixsmith, *Russia*, 324.
[392] Sixsmith, *Russia*, 324.
[393] Thompson and Ward, *Russia,* 247.

V. THE HISTORICISATION AND SECURITISATION OF PUTIN'S RUSSIA

In this chapter, I analyse how Putin is embedded in the story of Russian authoritarianism and how this affects the construction of literary Russia. I build on the previous chapter by evaluating how national terminology is used in relation to, or instead of, reference to individuals. I argue that the sample of history chapters and current affairs texts historicise Putin in the way that he is represented as reinstating autocracy in Russia. Therefore, Putin is securitised, though Russia as an entity is not. Rather than homogenisation, differentiation is the dominant tactic that the authors use to write about the Putin era. However, there is some added complexity to this because of the way that Putin and Russia are connected (though not conflated). The chapter begins by introducing the texts, followed by an outline of securitisation theory. Next, I analyse how the historians and authors historicise Putin and consider the extent to which they represent him and his regime as a return to the default of Russian autocracy. Then, I examine how the historians and authors use the techniques of differentiation and homogenisation to produce a representation of Putin as yet another leader imposing autocracy on Russia.

The Texts

Rather than exclusively examining sweeping histories, this chapter also draws on non-history texts such as current affairs books and articles. I decided to supplement this chapter with non-history sources for three reasons. First, few of the sweeping histories cover the Putin era in sufficient depth because they were written in the early 2000s. That was only the beginning of the Putin era. Therefore, I can only use a small number of my core texts in this chapter. Second, like history texts, current affairs texts also service the system of representation as a source of meaning. Consequently,

introducing another type of text which covers similar material broadens the field of analysis. It allows me to draw some preliminary conclusions regarding the wider discourse on Russia in the Anglosphere. Third, current affairs texts are not constrained by academic conventions. They do not need to appear to be as objective as history texts. Accordingly, some of the patterns that I observe in the history texts become more apparent through analysis of non-history texts. The current affairs texts in my sample are more overtly politicised than their academic counterparts. However, both types of texts have a similar effect on the construction of literary Russia. I will identify any apparent differences between the types of texts throughout the analysis.

The four non-history texts that I analyse in this chapter are Steven Lee Myers' *The New Tsar: The Rise and Reign of Vladimir Putin* (2015), Susan Glasser's article, *Putin the Great* (2019), Edward Lucas' *The New Cold War: Putin's Russia and the Threat to the West* (2014) and Garry Kasparov's *Winter is Coming: Why Vladimir Putin and the Enemies of the Free World Must be Stopped* (2015).[394]

Myers is an American journalist. He has worked for *The New York Times* since 1989 and is currently based in China. Glasser is also an American journalist and author. She is currently a regular contributor to *The New Yorker*. Lucas is a British journalist who has worked as a foreign correspondent. He wrote for *The Economist* until 2017 and now works for the Center for European Policy Analysis. Kasparov is a former international chess champion, political activist, and critic of the Putin regime. He was a Russian presidential candidate, and uses his personal experiences of media censorship and harassment from authorities to inform his text. He was born in the Soviet Union (Azerbaijan), lived in Russia until 2014, and is now a Croatian citizen. Unlike the other authors discussed in this thesis, Kasparov cannot be categorised as a

[394] Garry Kasparov, *Winter is Coming: Why Vladimir Putin and the Enemies of the Free World Must Be Stopped* (London: Atlantic Books, 2015); Steven Lee Myers, *The New Tsar: The Rise and Reign of Vladimir Putin* (London: Simon & Schuster, 2015); Edward Lucas, *The New Cold War*: *Putin's Russia and the Threat to the West* (London: Bloomsbury, 2014); Susan B. Glasser, "Putin the Great: Russia's Imperial Imposter," *Foreign Affairs* September/October (2019).

'Western' author. However, on account of his international profile, he is an important contributor to Anglophone discourse on Russia. He often publishes his work in English and it is readily available in Western societies. As a case in point, I purchased my own copy of *Winter is Coming* from a bookstore at an airport in Melbourne, Australia.

I analyse material from four history texts in this chapter. They are texts that I have examined in previous chapters of this thesis. Those texts are Charles Ziegler's *The History of Russia* (2009), Robert Service's *The Penguin History of Modern Russia* (2015), Kees Boterbloem's *A History of Russia and Its Empire* (2018), and Thompson and Ward's *Russia: A Historical Introduction from Kievan Rus' to the Present* (2018). A portion of Abraham Ascher's text *Russia: A Short History* (2017) is used for a fine analysis at the end of this chapter.[395]

Securitisation Theory

I apply securitisation theory in this chapter to help understand whether, and how, Russia is constructed as a threat in the texts' chapters on the post-2000 period. The concept of securitisation derives from the discipline of International Relations. It emphasises the role of discourse in defining security and threats to security. In line with the constructivist foundations of this project, threats do not necessarily always exist independently of their discursive construction. As Michael Williams explains, 'issues become "securitized," treated as security issues, through … speech-acts which

[395] Robert Service, *The Penguin History of Modern Russia: From Tsarism to the Twenty-First Century* (London: Penguin Books, 2015); John M. Thompson, *Russia and the Soviet Union: A Historical Introduction from the Kievan Rus' to the Present*, (Boulder: Westview Press, 8th edn., 2018); Charles E. Ziegler, *The History of Russia* (Santa Barbara: Greenwood Press, 2nd end., 2009); Kees Boterbloem, *A History of Russia and Its Empire: From Mikhail Romanov to Vladimir Putin* (London: Rowman & Littlefield, 2018).

do not simply describe an existing security situation, but bring it into being as a security situation by successfully representing it as such'.[396]

However, as Williams' definition indicates, not all speech-acts 'successfully' securitise. The audience must internalise the speech-act by consenting, in an almost Gramscian sense, for securitisation to take place. One way that this occurs is through public acceptance of policies designed to mitigate the threat. In this chapter, I do not explore the audience stage of the securitisation process. Instead, I examine the initial stage of the securitisation process – discursive representation, or, the 'speech-act'. This corresponds with the project's focus on representation, the realm of ideas, and literary Russia, as opposed to 'Russia' the state actor in practice.

Given its focus on discourse, securitisation naturally emphasises the importance of language. Matt Macdonald highlights the significance of language for securitisation, describing how 'issues become security issues (or more accurately threats) through language'. As he asserts, language 'positions specific actors or issues as existentially threatening to a particular political community, thus enabling (or indeed constituting, depending on interpretation) securitization'.[397] Accordingly, in this chapter, I analyse the language and narratives used in histories of post-2000 Russia to evaluate whether and how Russia is securitised in Anglophone historical texts. It becomes evident that the use of the language of nationality, including instances of its absence, is particularly significant for the securitisation discourse.

Political elites are typically responsible for producing securitisation discourses. However, historians can also contribute toward securitisation.[398] While the role of history texts in security discourse is not well-studied, Bezun Coskun's

[396] Michael Williams, "Words, Images, Enemies: Securitization in International Politics," *International Studies Quarterly* 47, no.4 (2003): 513.
[397] Matt Macdonald, "Securitization and the Construction of Security," *European Journal of International Relations* 14, no. 4 (2008): 568.
[398] Bezen Balamir Coskun, "History Writing and Securitization of the Other: The construction and reconstruction of Palestinian and Israeli Discourses," *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, 23, no. 2 (2010).

research into how histories of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict securitise the parties illustrates the way in which history texts can support securitisation efforts by political elites.[399] In isolation, histories are therefore unlikely to successfully securitise an object, issue, or actor. In turn, they are also unlikely to prompt extreme threat reduction policies which normally result from successful securitisation. Nevertheless, histories can form part of a broader security discourse on a subject, such as Russia, and contribute toward reifying the threat. However, this chapter focuses on securitising literary Russia, rather than Russia the state as it is intersubjectively understood. In this chapter, I do not make claims regarding the potential wider contribution of the texts to broader securitisation discourse concerning Russia.

Historicising Putin in the Context of Russia's Grand Narrative

The history and non-history texts embed Putin in the overarching story of Russian authoritarianism. All of the texts write about Putin in a way which foregrounds his role in driving a return to autocracy in Russia after the attempt at democracy during Yeltsin's presidency in the 1990s. However, the non-history texts are much more explicit in historicising Putin. By historicising Putin, the authors position him as a return to the authoritarian Russian default. The emphasis on autocratisation due to Putin's leadership further indicates that Putin, not the nation of Russia, is securitised. Rather, Russia is represented as a victim of Putin's power.

The primary way in which the current affairs texts embed Putin within the larger narrative of Russian authoritarianism is through the authors' use of language and comparisons. For example, consider the title of Myers' book – *The New Tsar: The Rise and Reign of Vladimir Putin*. Clearly, the use of language in this example likens Putin to the autocrats of Imperial Russia. He is portrayed as a 'return to the

[399] Coskun, "History Writing and Securitization of the Other".

same' in alignment with tragic emplotment, and the familiar Russian tsarist tradition. Throughout his text, Myers continues to historicise Putin. One of his chapters is titled, 'Putingrad' which is an obvious wordplay on 'Leningrad' and 'Stalingrad'. In 1924, St Petersburg was renamed Leningrad after the Soviet Union leader, Vladimir Lenin (r. 1922-1924). It was restored to St Petersburg in 1991 after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Stalingrad, meanwhile, was named after Joseph Stalin in 1925. Nikita Khrushchev renamed the city Volgograd in 1961 as part of his de-Stalinization efforts. Myers describes Putin as exacting the 'benevolence of a tsar' in regard to Putin engineering the release of businessman Mikhail Khodorkovsky from prison.[400] Myers also describes him as 'the tsar of a simulated democracy'.[401] He further writes that Putin 'had restored neither the Soviet Union nor the tsarist empire, but a new Russia with characteristics and instincts of both, with himself as secretary general and sovereign'.[402] The connection and overtones are self-evident.

Putin and his role in Russia is also explicitly historicised by Glasser. Her article in *Foreign Affairs* journal is titled 'Putin the Great: Russia's Imperial Impostor'. As the title suggests, Glasser argues that Putin is no Peter the Great. Unlike Peter, Putin eschews the West. She makes several comments which compare and subtly embed Putin in Russia's grand narrative of autocracy. For example, in a similar fashion to Myers' comments, Glasser writes that 'Putin has in fact styled himself a tsar as much as a Soviet general secretary over the course of his two decades in public life'.[403] By relating Putin's leadership to the dominant and autocratic institutions of governance in Russian history, Glasser creates an image of Putin's presidency as another form of those institutions. Putin embodies the autocratic traditions of the past in his role as president. Glasser's point that Putin is

[400] Myers, *The New Tsar*, 461.
[401] Myers, *The New Tsar,* 462.
[402] Myers, *The New Tsar*, 490.
[403] Glasser, "Putin the Great", 10.

the 'longest serving leader of Russia since Joseph Stalin', further contributes toward this representation of Putin.[404] She also describes how 'the Russian emperors' motto 'Orthodoxy, Autocracy, Nationality' is a closer philosophical fit with today's Putinism than the Soviet paens to international workers' solidarity'.[405] Her words imply that the Putin era is somewhat of a return to the heyday of Imperial autocracy. Glasser also situates Putin in the broader narrative of Russia's perpetual tug-of-war between democracy and autocracy through her statement that '[i]n the early years of this century, when the post-Soviet wave of democratization still seemed inexorable, Putin reversed Russia's course, restoring centralized authority in the Kremlin'.[406] Through the words 'reversed' and 'restoring', her statement suggests a return to what was in the past – authoritarianism. 'Reversed' implies moving backward. It has normative connotations. Glasser also clearly foregrounds Putin's role in the reversal. The restoration of centralised authority did not just happen. Putin caused the reversal. Putin happened, and is happening, to Russia.

Another of the current affairs texts, Lucas' *The New Cold War: Putin's Russia and the Threat to the West,* similarly historicises Putin. The phrase 'The New Cold War' associates contemporary events with those of the Soviet era. The Cold War was a period of heightened animosity between the USSR and the West. Therefore, the Cold War association has the potential to reify antagonistic mentalities in a post-Cold War era. Once again, we can see the tragic pattern of the return to the same in the different. Like Glasser, Lucas also contends that Tsar Nicholas I's motto, 'Orthodoxy, Autocracy, Nationality', 'seems to be as potent now, in the days of modern Kremlin authoritarianism, as it was in the days of Tsarist feudalism'.[407] He also writes that 'Russia is reverting to Soviet behaviour … in its contemptuous

[404] Glasser, "Putin the Great", 10.
[405] Glasser "Putin the Great", 10-12.
[406] Glasser, "Putin the Great", 12.
[407] Lucas, *The New Cold War*, 152.

disregard for Western norms'.[408] Lucas' use of the term 'reverting', again implies a 'back to the future-esque' inescapability of Russia's past. One of his chapters is titled *The New Tsarism*. Continuity of history is described with the statement that Russia is 'picking up the threads from nineteenth-century Slavophiles'. However, Lucas points out the bipolar character of political ideology in Russia and the competing forces that have persisted throughout history – 'Soviet revivalism competed with somewhat naïve pro-Western liberalism, [and] half-digested Tsarist nostalgia'.[409] His words encapsulate the dominant narrative of Russia's liminality and its on-going struggles in regard to political culture.

Kasparov also historicises Putin and contemporary Russian politics, though he does so to a lesser degree than the other current affairs authors. He implies that Putin is a reversion to previous models. For example, Kasparov argues that 'Vladimir Putin … put an end to the democratic experiment in Russia'.[410] Kasparov's choice of the word 'experiment' suggests that democracy was an anomaly for Russia and therefore that authoritarianism was actually a return to the norm. This interpretation fits with the broader narrative of the nation of Russia within which it cannot escape its tragic fate. He also invokes the 'tsar' terminology when he refers to the Olympics as an 'opportunity for Putin to play his favourite role of the "good tsar"'.[411]

Surprisingly, in comparison to the current affairs texts, the history texts are significantly less overt in historicising Putin and the Putin era. While Ziegler's chapter indulges the overarching narrative clearly, *Return to Authoritarianism: Putin and Beyond*, most of the other history texts do not. Boterbloem's chapter title is *Vladimir Putin*. Thompson and Ward's chapter is *The Putin Era: Russia in the Twenty-First Century*. Robert Service's is *And Russia?* Some of the historians allude

[408] Lucas, *The New Cold War*, 27.
[409] Lucas, *The New Cold War*, 134.
[410] Kasparov, *Winter is Coming*, xxviii.
[411] Kasparov, *Winter is Coming,* 132.

to Putin as tsar-like. However, the references are infrequent. For example, Service writes that 'Putin was no longer merely the power behind the throne'.[412]

The most likely reason for the lack of explicit historicisation is that the history texts need to be seen as objective because they must conform to the conventions of the history discipline. As Mark Donnelly and Claire Norton explain, 'when historians write their accounts they follow the rules that govern the writing of history'.[413] Adherence to the 'historical method' separates 'history' from other forms of writing about the past. Historians must aspire to present an account of the past based on their source material. They need evidence to support hypotheses and they must at least aspire to represent the past in an unbiased fashion. Since entertainment is a key purpose for non-scholarly writing, authors of opinion pieces and current affairs texts must still rely on evidence, but they can take more overt creative liberties.

The absence of direct historicisation therefore does not necessarily indicate that the historians do not embed Putin and his rule within Russia's broader narrative. Putin is still situated within the larger tug-of-war between democracy and autocracy and the habitual fluctuation of Russia from East to West. However, it is achieved in a less obvious manner in the history texts than in the current affairs texts. One way that the Putin era is embedded in the grand story of Russia is through the introductions and conclusions to the histories which frame the entire story of Russia and take the Putin era as the end of the story so far (see Chapter VI). The other way in which the historians historicise Putin is by how their chapters are integrated into the entire sweeping histories. Producing evidence of this is difficult because the way that the Putin era fits into the story of Russia is apparent through reading the entire history texts. As complete books, the sweeping histories signpost patterns along the way such as Russia democratising, then re-autocratising repeatedly due to power-seeking

[412] Service, *The Penguin History of Modern Russia*, 503.
[413] Mark Donnelly and Claire Norton, *Doing History* (Oxon: Routledge, 2011), 6.

leaders. Therefore, in the intratextual context, descriptions of Putin's role in the autocratisation of Russia positions him within the dominant narrative and subtly historicises him.

Putin and the Autocratisation of Russia

The story of the Putin era is the story of Putin autocratising Russia. There are several statements which explicitly link Putin to Russia becoming increasingly autocratic. This follows the narrative of the sweeping histories. By foregrounding Putin's role in autocratising Russia, the historians reinforce the idea that leaders habitually crush bourgeoning democracy in Russia. The focus on Putin's autocratisation of Russia represents another familiar episode in Russian history wherein the ruler shifts Russia's trajectory away from the West. The pattern of Russia liberalising and then autocratising is explored in more depth in the next chapter, Chapter VI, and in Chapter VII. The key point is not that Putin has facilitated autocracy. That is factual. Rather, the point is the degree to which the texts foreground this fact. How the texts structure the entire plot of the Putin era around this shift to authoritarianism and place that in the context of Russia becoming more or less like the West is of key importance.

There are numerous examples of statements which connect Putin to the rising authoritarianism in Russia and foreground that narrative. For example, Thompson and Ward write that 'under [Putin's] aegis, the Russian political system became highly centralized and authoritarian', and that Putin 'forced closure of nearly all independent media outlets, substituting state ownership and control'.[414] They note that 'Putin weakened the regional governors' position in the upper legislative body,

[414] Thompson and Ward, *Russia*, 350.

the Federation Council', and 'Putin turned the electoral system into a farce'.[415]

Similarly, Charles Ziegler summarises Putin's reign as follows:

> Putin's legacy—the absence of an independent media, a weak and marginalized civil society, a supine legislature, regional governors beholden to the centre, and a state that rules outside the law—is a Russia with few effective constraints on executive power. In his attempt to restore Russian greatness, Putin in actuality created a fragile authoritarian state lacking the flexible, responsive institutions of a democracy.[416]

Ziegler's text communicates the liberal perspective of authoritarianism as undesirable compared to the superior system of democracy. It explicitly connects these aspects of authoritarian governance with Putin's actions. As Ziegler explains, 'Putin … created a fragile authoritarian state'.[417] Service likewise contends that Putin 'combined electoral abuse, legislative violence, violent repression and media control to sustain an authoritarian regime'.[418] He also argues that the 'dangers of opposition increased under Putin'.[419]

These examples which describe Putin as autocratising Russia do not directly historicise Putin's autocratisation of Russia by likening it to the past or using the language of 'return' or 'reversion'. However, when read in the broader context of the sweeping histories of Russia, such language is not needed to indulge the tragic emplotment. Russia is portrayed as a victim of Putin, as much as it was a victim of Ivan the Terrible, Nicholas I, and Stalin. Representing the Putin era as a return to autocracy serves the discordic purpose of supressing conflicting information which would complicate the categorisation of Russia using the geo-cultural paradigm. This way, though Putin is the problematised actor, and not the nation of Russia, the return to autocracy plot further entrenches Russia in an Orientalist discourse.

[415] Thompson and Ward, *Russia*, 350.
[416] Ziegler, *The History of Russia*, 208.
[417] Ziegler, *The History of Russia*, 208.
[418] Service, *The Penguin History of Modern Russia*, 760.
[419] Service, *The Penguin History of Modern Russia*, 489.

However, the history chapters and the current affairs texts frequently represent Russia as a willing victim. Such representations emerge from the texts' references to the economic benefits Putin's rule conferred on sectors of Russia's population and descriptions of widespread support of Putin. Ziegler describes how '[t]he improvement in living standards, a more aggressive foreign policy stance, and Putin's decisive leadership combined to give most Russians the feeling that their country was once again a great power'.[420] He also writes that 'Putin's popularity held steady … and many Russians were reluctant to see him go' in 2012.[421] Lucas comments that the 'paradox is that so many Russians seemingly want to live in a system that curtails their freedom'.[422] It is unclear whether 'Russian' means ethnic Russians or citizens of the Russian federation.

Thompson and Ward acknowledge positive aspects of Putin's presidency, and yet they juxtapose these with the autocratisation narrative. Ultimately, the text casts Russia as a victim despite it not being completely mistreated. For example, Thompson and Ward state that,

> Putin brought Russia much-needed stability, rapid economic growth, and a revived sense of national pride. However, the Putin years have also been characterised by the erosion of democratic governance, the spread of corruption and coercion, the continuing collapse of infrastructure.[423]

The combination of the positive and negative influence of Putin on Russia reduces the weight of the positives and portrays Russia as the submissive party subject to Putin's power, hence its construction as a type of victim. In line with the complex victim construction, Sixsmith explains how 'the reassertion of autocracy was carried out with the approval of the people'.[424] He argues that 'Russians wanted order, and

[420] Ziegler, *The History of Russia*, 192.
[421] Ziegler, *The History of Russia*, 192.
[422] Lucas, *The New Cold War*, 98.
[423] Thompson and Ward, *Russia*, 341.
[424] Sixsmith, *Russia: A 1000-Year Chronicle of the Wild East*, 529.

they didn't care if Putin suspended a few civil rights … to provide it. The *silnaya ruka* – the strong hand – was back, and Russians were happy about it'.[425] Evidently there are some problems with the ambiguity in the use of the term 'Russians' here. Not all 'Russians' were happy, as indicated by the mass protests of 2012 and 2013.

The way that some of the texts describe backlash against rising authoritarianism reinforces the idea that autocratisation was something Putin had inflicted on Russia. It therefore contributes toward the construction of Russia as a victim at the hand of yet another dictator. For example, Thompson and Ward explain how 'portions of the Russian electorate were displaying disenchantment with the Putin regime' and that the 'chicanery of the whole Medvedev-Putin swap angered many urban and educated Russians, who felt treated as fools, and contributed to the protests known as the Bolotnaya Square Movement'.[426] Marc Bennetts likewise describes the protests in a manner that clearly links Putin with some Russian citizens' dissatisfaction. He explains that 'for the first time in Putin's long rule, the scent of genuine revolt was in the air'. He describes how 'frustration at Putin's heavy-handed rule had finally exploded'.[427] While such descriptions of events likely correlate with the factual reality, the lexical connection to Putin in the texts emphasises Putin's power over the Russian nation and discursively constructs Russia as Putin's victim. The Putin era chapters reinforce the idea of Russia suffering as another leader subjects it to authoritarianism after a brief interlude of democracy.

Differentiation of Putin and Russia

The dominant pattern in all of the texts is the differentiation of Putin and Russia. Russia is still homogenised (see next section), but it is homogenised less than in the

[425] Sixsmith, *Russia: A 1000-Year Chronicle of the Wild East*, 529.
[426] Thompson and Ward, *Russia*, 354, 353.
[427] Bennetts, *I'm Going to Ruin Their Lives*, 100.

other chapters of Russian history. More specifically, there is less homogenisation in the context where use of the term 'Russia' actually means the leader or the government. As a consequence, Putin is portrayed negatively and as a threat, yet Russia the nation is constructed as a victim. Thus, in differentiating Putin and Russia, Putin is securitised but Russia is not. Putin's actions are described in a way that makes him seem like a threat. One possible reason for the change from homogenisation to differentiation as the dominant technique in the texts is the contemporaneity of the material. The Putin era is on-going. It has yet to end, and in that respect it is contemporary. This period of Russian history has not solidified into history in the same way that Peter's Russia has. Consequently, literary Russia and 'real' Russia become blurred. Russia (the state and the nation) and Putin are current actors which allows for the Russia which is represented in the Putin texts to be written in a different way.

However, another possible reason for the differentiation between Putin and Russia is that it fits into the grand narrative of Russian history. Separating the ruler from the nation serves a literary function. It reinforces the theme of repression, and strengthens the idea that rulers control Russia's destiny. Putin is another ruler in a series of leaders who exerts his will on Russia.

Differentiation is most apparent in the way that the authors specify Putin or his government as the primary actor, rather than Russia. This is significant for securitisation because Putin is portrayed as engaging in threatening conduct, not the nation of Russia. From the perspective of discordus, differentiation is used to smooth over inconsistencies which complicate Russia's categorisation as a nation or civilisation. However, here, differentiation only complicates Russia's categorisation more. Service describes 'Putin's gamble in foreign policy'.[428] Thompson writes of

[428] Service, *The Penguin History of Modern Russia*, 508.

'Putin's intervention' in Ukraine and 'Putin's foreign policy record'.[429] He also describes how 'Putin and his advisors … pursue[d] assertive foreign policies that at times bullied Russia's neighbours'.[430] Boterbloem similarly writes about 'President Putin's increasingly aggressive foreign policy'.[431] Service also describes '[t]he Russian government's bullying of foreign companies'.[432] Glasser suggests that 'in Washington and certain capitals of Europe, he [Putin] is an all-purpose villain, sanctioned and castigated for having invaded two neighbors'.[433] Lucas describes how '[t]he Kremlin's close friends are a rogue's gallery: Syria, Venezuela and Iran, plus a handful of ill-governed ex-Soviet republics such as Belarus and Tajikistan'.[434] He uses synecdoche in his reference to 'the Kremlin' to mean the government of Russia. He could have used Russia here, especially because the rest of the parties referred to are described in the national form – Syria, Venezuela, Iran, Belarus, and Tajikistan.

The dominant discursive technique in the Putin period chapters is differentiation between Putin and Russia. Putin is represented as an actor who has an effect on Russia. Accordingly, he is not often subsumed into 'Russia', but is discussed as a separate actor. While such differentiation is most obvious in discourse on the Putin period, it is not unique to it. Discourse on the Peter the Great era similarly differentiates between ruler and nation (see Chapter III). Like Putin, Peter is portrayed as an actor who had an effect on Russia. However, unlike Putin, Peter is represented as having had a positive effect on Russia. He Westernised Russia and brought Russia closer to the West. Conversely, Putin moved Russia further away from the West by consolidating autocracy. Although the effect of both rulers on Russia is represented in starkly different ways, the discourse about Putin and Peter

[429] Thompson and Ward, *Russia*, 363, 365.
[430] Thompson and Ward, *Russia*, 365.
[431] Boterbloem, *Russia*, 295.
[432] Service, *The Penguin History of Modern Russia,* 489.
[433] Glasser, "Putin the Great", 12.
[434] Lucas, *The New Cold War*, 37.

shares the similarity that leaders as individual actors wield power over Russia. Putin and Peter are portrayed as actors, whereas Russia is an object that these actors mould. The emphasis on leaders corresponds with the prevailing characterisation of Russia as an autocracy. In the context of an autocratic system, political elites are bound by fewer institutional constraints than in democracies. Leaders such as Putin can therefore have more of a role in changing the nation's political trajectory.

Stalin is likewise depicted as exerting his influence over Russia. However, as the World War II case study revealed (see Chapter IV), homogenisation rather than differentiation dominates the texts on that part of Russian history. Use of national terminology, particular 'Russia' or 'Soviet Union' is common in contexts where the historians could be more specific. Though, as the case study demonstrated, Stalin and Russia are differentiated similarly to the way that Putin and Peter are extracted from 'Russia'. As my analysis in Chapter IV showed, this separation is most apparent in descriptions of Stalin's atrocities toward 'the people' of the Soviet Union.

In some instances, the authors use national terminology for non-Russian parties, but refer to Putin instead of Russia. For example, Glasser writes of '[h]is [Putin's] military intervention in Syria's civil war' and '[h]is increasingly close alliance with China'.[435] Here, Glasser mixes the type of actors. She uses national terminology (China) alongside the non-national reference to Putin as an individual instead of using the national term of Russia. Thus, Glasser does not describe an alliance between two nations or states (Russia and China) or two individuals (Putin and Xi Jinping), but between an individual and a state (Putin and China). Service is also inconsistent in his use of individual and state. He describes how 'Putin, thinking he had nothing to lose, adopted an assertive manner in reaction to American

[435] Glasser, "Putin the Great", 12.

initiatives in international relations'.[436] Again, the national terminology is used for the non-Russian party, but the more precise 'Putin' is used instead of Russia. The leader of Russia is securitised, not Russia as an entirety. In any of these examples, the authors could have used the national nomination of Russia instead, but chose to be specific. Such specificity has the effect of constructing Putin as the threat, particularly when one considers the behaviour he is described as engaging in – befriending 'enemies' of the West, adopting 'assertive' policies, and 'invading' neighbours. In how the texts are written, Russia did not befriend Syria and Venezuela, the Russian government did. It is not Russia's aggressive foreign policy, it is Putin's. Putin is an all-purpose villain, not Russia. Consequently, Russia is not securitised because of the way that the texts differentiate between regime, leader, and nation.

The idea that Putin is securitised, rather than Russia, is also apparent in the title of Kasparov's book, *Winter is Coming: Why Vladimir Putin and the Enemies of the Free World Must be Stopped*. Many in the Anglosphere attuned to popular culture would likely recognise Kasparov's title as a play on a motif from novel turned television series, *A Game of Thrones*. In the show, the phrase refers not only to the seasonal change, but also to a threat of evil invading another political community. In Kasparov's text, Putin is that evil. He is portrayed as a threat to 'the free world', much like the creatures in Martin's *Game of Thrones.* The subtitle emphasises this threat aspect of his narrative, and throughout the text Kasparov refers to Putin as an 'enemy'.[437] He further contends that 'whether Putin or ISIS, these forces cannot be defeated with engagement'.[438] Kasparov explicitly refers to 'Putin's Russia' as a

[436] Service, *The Penguin History of Modern Russia,* 488.
[437] Kasparov, *Winter is Coming,* 253.
[438] Kasparov, *Winter is Coming,* 253.

threat, writing that 'Putin's Russia is clearly the biggest and most dangerous threat facing the world today'.[439]

The way that Putin is used in relation to Russia also demonstrates differentiation which positions Russia as a passive entity instead of an active actor. To borrow from a quote introduced earlier in this chapter, Glasser explains how 'Putin reversed Russia's course'.[440] Service describes that '[Putin] was …. expanding Russia's frontiers'.[441] Lucas states that 'Mr Putin consolidated his control of Russia'.[442] While Russia is homogenised in these examples, the regime and leader are not part of that particular construction of the nation since they are linguistically separated from it through isolation.

However, sometimes the national language appears to also encompass Putin and his regime due to inconsistent and varied use of the specific 'Putin' and the ambiguous 'Russia'. Differentiation, while more common, is clearly not consistent. To illustrate, Lucas describes how '[s]lice by slice, the Kremlin is adding to its sphere of influence. Russian tactics can also be more subtle'.[443] Because of the way that 'the Kremlin' and 'Russian tactics' are used in such close proximity, it is implied that the two are synonymous. Lucas does something similar with his words '[b]ehind the scenes Russia's behaviour is even more confrontational. The Kremlin's representatives throw habitual tantrums in international organisations'.[444] Such inconsistency is not confined to current affairs texts. Service refers to 'Russian assertiveness in international relations', but also describes how 'he [Putin] was luxuriating in a bath of national assertiveness'.[445] This indicates that, for Service, in this context, 'Russia' means 'Putin'. Using the nominations interchangeably

[439] Kasparov, *Winter is Coming,* x.
[440] Glasser, "Putin the Great", 12.
[441] Service, *The Penguin History of Modern Russia*, 508.
[442] Lucas, *The New Cold War*, 43.
[443] Lucas, *The New Cold War*, 38.
[444] Lucas, *The New Cold War*, 37.
[445] Service, *The Penguin History of Modern Russia,* 509.

implicitly conflates Russia and Putin. Similarly, Thompson uses the term 'assertive' in a sub-heading in his Putin era chapter, *Putin's Assertive Foreign Policy*. Within the section he refers to Russia acting in an 'abrasive and assertive manner' in foreign relations.[446] In Thompson's chapter title, it is Putin's foreign policy, yet Russia is described as acting abrasively.

The intratextual context and mixed references to Putin suggest that the threat is not Russia the nation, but Russia the state as directed by Putin. However, the vague and inconsistent terminology generates a more all-encompassing representation of Russia. At the surface level of the texts, all components of Russia appear enmeshed, similar to what I described in the World War II case study. The nation and state become merged to an extent so that a vague idea of a Russian threat emerges. An implication of this for the geo-cultural paradigm is that nations can appear to be securitised despite texts' 'really' securitising a particular part of a nation such as its government.

This confusion is compounded by a complex kind of conflation that occurs in the way in which some of the texts, including my chapter title, refer to 'Putin's Russia'. Earlier, I quoted Kasparov who referred to 'Putin's Russia' as 'the biggest and most dangerous threat facing the world today'.[447] While Kasparov emphasises the idea of Putin as a threat, he also presents Russia as a threat because it is under Putin's control. Consequently, Putin is the primary actor constructed as a threat, whereas Russia is partly securitised as a by-product. Glasser too, describes 'interpretations of Putin's Russia'.[448] Myers uses the expression several times in his book. One example is 'elections in Putin's Russia had been marred by abuses'.[449] There are no examples of this in the history texts analysed in this chapter. While

[446] Thompson and Ward, *Russia*, 381.
[447] Kasparov, *Winter is Coming,* x.
[448] Glasser, "Putin the Great", 16.
[449] Myers, *The New Tsar*, 406.

Putin is the problem, Russia is actually weakly securitised in the texts because of the intertwined relationship of Putin with Russia. While Russia is not Putin, it is controlled by Putin.

Less commonly, the history texts and the non-history texts homogenise Russia in a way which implicitly encompasses Putin and the regime. This is most apparent when the terminology of Russia is ambiguous but most likely refers to Russia as a state actor. I have identified instances where this occurs and Russia is used as the actor instead of Putin or the Putin government. Table 8 (below) provides some examples from both types of texts. Note that I have not listed all examples.

Table 8: Homogenisation of Russia

Author and Text Type	Examples of Homogenisation of Russia
Service (History)	'Russian assertiveness in international relations kept rising'.[450] 'Russia caused fear without gaining friends or admirers'.[451] 'Russia strengthened its ties with Venezuela and Cuba as if searching to help the enemies of successive American presidents in the New World'.[452]
Thompson (History)	'the Russians promised the Iranians help in building a nuclear reactor'.[453] 'Russia objected vehemently'.[454] 'The Russians, somewhat irrationally, brushed aside American explanations that the system obviously was not directed against Russia'.[455] 'Russia has also asserted itself outside of Europe'.[456]
Lucas (Current Affairs)	'Russia is like an aggressive man on crutches – no threat to the able-bodied, but still a menacing bully for someone in a wheelchair. It uses the Soviet Union's most powerful legacy, the monopoly hold on gas and oil pipelines running from east to west, to blackmail and bribe its former satellite countries'.[457] Russia's 'divide and rule' tactics.[458]

[450] Service, *The Penguin History of Modern Russia*, 492.
[451] Service, *The Penguin History of Modern Russia,* 492.
[452] Service, *The Penguin History of Modern Russia*, 493.
[453] Thompson and Ward, *Russia*, 361.
[454] Thompson and Ward, *Russia*, 361.
[455] Thompson and Ward, *Russia*, 361.
[456] Thompson and Ward, *Russia*, 367.
[457] Lucas, *The New Cold War*, 42.
[458] Lucas, *The New Cold War*, 44.

Conclusion

Putin is the primary object of securitisation in the history chapters and the current affairs texts. The dominant construction of Russia the nation is as a victim of Putin. The use of historicisation and differentiation confirm Russia's discordic construction. Historicisation embeds the Putin era in the grand narrative of Russia – yet another ruler quashes democracy and ushers in autocracy which once again distances Russia from the West. Differentiation highlights the difficulties in portraying Russia as a unified and totalised entity. The use of differentiation in the Putin texts undermines the purpose of discordus because it renders Russia's categorisation under the geo-cultural paradigm more difficult. In this regard, the Putin case study is somewhat of an outlier. The reason for the dominance of differentiation over homogenisation likely arises from the contemporaneous nature of the content. Such contemporaneity blurs the literary with the real Russia and prevents it from being cast as a caricature.

A fine analysis (page 163) of Abraham Ascher's *A Short History of Russia* (2017) allows the reader to observe how the use of 'Putin' and 'Russia' in context securitise Russia.

Fine Analysis

Abraham Ascher, *A Short History of Russia* (2017), Pages 291-292.

In his quest to reestablish Russia as a world power, Putin has focused on expanding his country's influence in areas beyond Eastern Europe. In September 2015, he decided to send military aircraft to bolster Bashar al-Assad, the Syrian president who for five years has waged a brutal war against various groups determined to end his authoritarian rule. Putin claimed that Russian pilots had been ordered to unleash bombs only on terrorist organizations such as ISIS (the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria), but in fact most of the targets were Assad's opponents in the civil war, who are favored by the West. Russia's military intervention in Syria has led to a further deterioration of relations between Putin and the West. President Obama and many of his advisers were convinced that Putin would be 'caught in a quagmire', but by early August 2016 it seemed to Michael Kofman, a specialist on the Middle East, that 'Russia has won the proxy war [in Syria], at least for now.' Russia's airstrikes, which have numbered ninety a day, and the four thousand Russian military men who serve in Syria, have inflicted far-reaching damage on the opposition to Assad. It is clear that Putin has gone far in achieving his goals in the Middle East. He has strengthened Assad's position, assured Russia of a naval base in the region, can test Russia's newest weapons without endangering Russian lives, and perhaps most important, he has demonstrated to the citizens of Russia that their country is once again a key player on the world scene. The Russian foray into Syria succeeded in part because Putin pursued conflicting policies that tended to confuse foreign statesmen. In the summer of 2016, it seemed that he was on the verge of reaching an agreement with the United States to unleash joint attacks on Islamic State fighters who were besieging the city of Aleppo with its two million inhabitants. But a day after the announcement of the agreement, it turned out that Russia had secured the right to bomb Syrian rebels on its own from a base in Iran. Those rebels were struggling, with the encouragement of the United States and the West in general, to overthrow Assad. In short, Russia had adopted a two-fold strategy designed to support Assad but also to give the impression that it is helping his opponents.

This excerpt is from the Putin era chapter of Ascher's *A Short History of Russia*. The event described in the sample is Russia's involvement in the Syrian civil war (2011-). The analysis focuses on agency and the characterisation of Russia and Putin.

In the first paragraph of the excerpt, Ascher explains how Putin assisted the Syrian president he has painted as 'bad', thereby creating a negative representation of Putin by association. Lines 3-5 not only villainise the Syrian Assad regime through reference to the 'brutal war', but also villainise Putin, since Putin is described as sending 'military aircraft to bolster' the Syrian president. The notion of Putin engaging in objectionable conduct, as apparently considered by Ascher, is reiterated in lines 6-7. In those lines, he alludes to the hypocrisy of Putin by stating that, 'Putin claimed that Russian pilots had been ordered to unleash bombs only on terrorist organizations … but in fact most of the targets were Assad's opponents in the civil war'. Clearly, the sample text indicates that Putin, rather than Russia, is the securitised actor. Ascher often refers specifically to Putin instead of using national nominations with ambiguity. However, in lines 29-30 Ascher describes how, 'Russia had adopted a two-fold strategy designed to support Assad but also to give the impression that it is helping his opponents'. On the one hand, the language of nationality creates a more generalised negative image of Russia as assisting the Assad regime. On the other hand, it is evident from the intratextual context that the 'Russia' to which Ascher refers is Russia the state as controlled by Putin.

In line 8, Ascher comments that 'Assad's opponents' are 'favored by the West', thus Putin, and to a lesser extent, the nation of Russia, is described as siding with the enemy of the West. Note that I am not intending to comment on the accuracy of the history in relation to 'reality'. Rather, I am highlighting the way in which the parties or 'sides' of the conflict have been constructed through Ascher's use of language and the self-contained narrative on Russia's involvement in Syria in this

sample text. It is evident from the way that the text is written that the narrative is one in which Russia via Putin has chosen the 'wrong' side. The reference to 'the West' also reinforces the notion of the West as a distinct community. This is again apparent in line 28, and also in lines 8-9, where Ascher refers to 'relations between Putin and the West'.

The reference to 'relations to Putin and the West' is also revealing of the way in which Putin almost supplants Russia as the primary character of the text. In one respect, the use of 'Putin' rather than 'Russia' is more precise and prevents an image of Russia as an entire nation as responsible for increasing tension with the West. However, in Russia's national history, focusing excessively on the actions of the leader inadvertently leads to a form of indirect conflation of Putin and Russia. This is because structuring the story around Putin represents him as the most important part of the nation for the West, and thus he becomes a key symbol of Russia. This facilitates the leader becoming representative of the entire nation in this representation. As the main chapter found, this also tends to occur because Russia is represented as an entity being controlled by Putin, rather than an actor with its own agency. Russia is inadvertently securitised, but Putin is constructed as the primary threat, the antagonist in the East versus West grand narrative.

Lines 16-19 also create an impression of Putin as the driver at the helm of the Russian nation which indirectly contributes toward an image of literary Russia as Other. This occurs because through emphasising the immense power of the individual leader, Russia is, by implication, characterised as autocratic.

Ascher raises the idea that through supporting Assad, 'relations between Putin and the West' have 'deteriorated', and in lines 12-13 quotes Kofman on the 'proxy war', suggesting indirect conflict between the West and Russia in the Syrian theatre.

The combination of these comments further constructs a binary opposition of the West and Russia as enemies and reinforces the Self/Other dichotomy.

The language of nationality is also used throughout the excerpt, with frequent reference to ‘Russia’, ‘Syria’, and two references to the ‘United States’. This reflects the indispensability of the national paradigm for the writing of history, further demonstrating the degree to which it is entrenched in Anglophone structures of knowledge. In lines 12-13, the term ‘Russia’ is used without precision. For example, Ascher quotes Kofman explaining that ‘Russia has won the proxy war’ and refers to ‘Russia’s airstrikes’. Such use of the terms personify Russia as an actor with agency independent of its parts. Such personification creates a representation of Russia as an entirety, which is crucial for constructing it as a nation. This is because the construction of the nation depends on a totalised representation in order for the nation to be imagined as a nation, or as a whole unit. Overall, this fine analysis demonstrates the inconsistencies in how Ascher refers to the agent performing actions, along with inconsistencies in the way in which the language of nationality is used.

VI. A DISCORDIC NARRATIVISATION OF THE RUSSIAN NATION & THE NECESSITY OF TRAGIC EMPLOTMENT

This chapter analyses the introductions and prefaces of general histories of Russia to identify more overt manifestations of discordus and explore its effect on the emplotment of Russian history. The prefaces and introductions of the histories exemplify discordus as they emphasise the tension between Russia's similarities and differences from the West. This tension is made apparent through analysis of three interrelated representations of Russia in the texts: Russia as culturally liminal, Russia as enigmatic, and Russia as Other. The texts attempt to resolve this tension by emplotting the histories of Russia in the tragic mode.

Selecting the texts for this chapter required that the texts had either a preface or an introduction, or both. Ideally, these would involve a summary of their entire sweeping narratives. Only history texts previously used in the thesis are included, which helps show how patterns previously identified are not necessarily restricted to the particular case studies. This supports the conclusions made regarding the prevalence of certain ways of writing about Russia in the sample of texts used in the project.

In line with the previous case studies, this chapter focuses analysis on six texts in particular, drawing upon others as support. The core texts for this chapter are: Ascher's, *Russia: A Short History* (2017), Bartlett's *A History of Russia* (2005), Boterbloem's *A History of Russia and Its Empire* (2013), Hosking's second edition of *Russia and the Russians* (2012), Sixsmith's Russia: A *1000 Year Chronicle of the Wild East* (2012), and Ziegler's *The History of Russia* (2009). The dominant narratives of Russia are clear in these texts because each of these texts' prefaces summarise the history of Russia.

Analysis of the texts' introductory material indicates that Russia's liminality forms both the narrative structure of the histories as well as a dominant representation of literary Russia. As observed throughout this thesis, the texts oscillate between representing Russia as European and Western, and Russia as non-European and non-Western. In their introductions, the historians generally draw greater attention to the idea of Russia as a hybrid nation. This suggests that discordus is not necessarily exclusively an abstract, subconscious phenomenon. Discordus can manifest in more direct ways.

Representing Russia as Liminal

There are several instances within the texts' introductory material where Russia is represented as directly liminal – where its 'in-betweenness' is highlighted. For example, Ziegler comments that '[s]traddling Europe and Asia, [Russia] is neither European nor Asian in outlook and culture.'[459] Ziegler associates culture with space, inferring that Russia's geographical position is related to its cultural hybridity. This is the second line of Ziegler's entire history of Russia, indicating the significance of Russia's geography for its liminality, but also the significance of its liminality for Russia's narrative. Ziegler continues by addressing the political liminality of Russia, describing how Russia is 'no longer an absolutist dictatorship … but it is not yet fully democratic, either. What then, is Russia?'[460] His question in this excerpt is perhaps the key question at the core of many of the history texts on Russia that use Russia's liminality as the primary narrative framework. In selecting such frameworks, the historians are engaged in a process of categorising Russia and deciding on its national identity. Ziegler's question of 'what is Russia' is also one of the core questions of

[459] Ziegler, *The History of Russia*, 1.
[460] Ziegler, *The History of Russia*, 1.

this text. Although, in this context, it is best rephrased as 'what is Russia for the West?'

Sixsmith similarly emphasises Russia's in-betweeness several times in his introduction. He describes Russia as 'a jarring combination of East and West'.[461] His use of the word 'jarring' strongly reflects discordus because it is the failure to fit Russia into one of the binary categories of East or West that creates ideological discomfort. In 1978, Said described the tendency 'to channel thought into a West or East compartment'.[462] The way that the texts are written suggests that this remains a dominant way of structuring and interpreting reality in the Anglosphere. It represents how Russia's liminality is a problem precisely because it does not fit neatly into the dominant East-West compartments which structure Western global knowledge. It is perceived and consequently promoted as something of a paradigmatic pariah. It does not conform to the script. Because of this, Russia presents a conceptual and literary challenge to the Western cultural canon.

Like Ziegler, Sixsmith describes Russia's political liminality, commenting that

> Russia looks both ways: to democratic, law-governed traditions of the West, but at the same time – and with more of this inherited DNA in her make-up – to the Asiatic forms of governance she imbibed in the early years of her history, what Russians refer to as the *silnaya ruka*, the iron fist of centralised power.[463]

In this sentence, Sixsmith has juxtaposed the 'positive' characteristics of the West with the 'negative' characteristics of the East. Russia's inferiority to the West is also implied through the way in which the nation is feminized through the use of the pronoun 'her'. Sixsmith's text represents not only Russia, but also the West. The West is portrayed as 'good' in comparison to the non-West. It also reinforces the idea

[461] Sixsmith, *Russia: A 1000-Year Chronicle of the Wild East*, 10.
[462] Said, *Orientalism,* 46.
[463] Sixsmith, *Russia: A 1000-Year Chronicle of the Wild East,* 10.

that the binaries of West and non-West or East remain fundamental structures crucial for shaping a reality to suit the Western metanarrative. Consequently, the hegemonic position of the West is reinforced in seemingly subtle ways in the writing of Russian history.

However, the historians also use 'Eurasian' as a conceptual category. On initial consideration, this appears to discredit the binary model of East-West. Sixsmith continues his summary of Russia as both European and Asian, describing how the 'historical intermingling of East and West is made flesh in the Eurasian faces of many Russians'.[464] The use of the term 'Eurasian' reflects the way Russia is constructed as a liminal nation. It is used in several of the introductions. For example, Kort describes Russia as being, 'uniquely Eurasian' which is 'a colossus astride both continents' of Europe and Asia.[465] He explains that, 'culturally and ethnically the vast majority of [Russia's] people are European'.[466] Hosking also uses the term, describing Russia as a 'receptacle for the most diverse cultural influences, infiltrating from all parts of Eurasia'.[467] Russia is depicted as a cultural crucible.

The use of the label 'Eurasia' demonstrates that a concept describing the blending of Europe and Asia exists as another cultural category for the West. This suggests that perhaps the binary East-West or, West-Non-West knowledge-structure is not as prevalent as previously thought. However, that the category is a merging of Europe and Asia actually reinforces them as the dominant categories for organising the world through the Western lens. This is because Europe and Asia still form the parts of 'Eurasia' in a lens blurred with this vague fusion.

The term Eurasia is also most often used with an implied geographical meaning rather than a cultural meaning. This indicates that it is not quite comparable

[464] Sixsmith, *Russia: A 1000-Year Chronicle of the Wild East*,11.
[465] Kort, *A Brief History of Russia*, xiii.
[466] Kort, *A Brief History of Russia*, xiii.
[467] Hosking, *Russia and the Russians,* 4.

to concepts of Europe and Asia which have both geographical and cultural meanings. For example, Thompson and Ward, along with Bartlett, refer to the 'Eurasian land-mass', and Bushkovitch refers to 'western Eurasia'.[468] Despite Kort's cultural use of Eurasia in his reference to Russia as 'uniquely Eurasian', he uses the term in a geographic way more frequently. To illustrate, in his preface and introduction, Kort refers to the 'Eurasian plain' on three occasions.[469] Unlike the terms Europe and West, Asia and East, Eurasian is rarely used normatively. Instead, Eurasian refers to territory, or, occasionally a biological phenotype as in the example of Russian faces cited above.

The use of the term Eurasia also reflects the cultural and temporal embeddedness of the historians and the influence of their contexts on the texts. As Carr encapsulates, 'we can view the past, and achieve our understanding of the past, only through the eyes of the present. The historian is of his [sic] own age, and is bound to it by the conditions of human existence. The very words which he uses – words like democracy, empire, war, revolution – have current connotations from which he cannot divorce them'.[470] 'Eurasia', too, is imbued with contemporary connotative meaning. Depending on one's own specific personal contexts, the meaning evoked will vary. However, irrespective of differences in meaning, the use of Eurasia inflects the description of the past with notions from the present. This highlights the subjectivity with which Russia is constructed through the story of its past.

Russia's blend of East and West also forms the narrative basis for Hosking's text. Continuing the notion of Russia as a product of both European and Asian influence, Hosking asserts that 'in its administrative structures it has been an Asian

[468] Thompson and Ward, *Russia*, 4; Bartlett, *A History of Russia,* 3; Bushkovitch, *A Concise History of Russia*, 4.
[469] Kort, *A Brief History of Russia,* xiii, xv, 1.
[470] Carr, *What is History?* 24-25.

empire … in its culture it has been European'.[471] This reflects Hosking's declared narrative framework centred on Russian bipolarity. His idea of Russia as 'bipolar', illustrates the extent to which discordus is embedded in narratives of Russia. Further aligning with discordus, Hosking characterises Russia as different and similar, but ultimately Other. Hosking clearly articulates this position in his preface. He writes that for 'most Europeans and North Americans, Russia is the great Other, understood yet not understood, the culture in whose mirror we better appreciate our own. It is sufficiently near to us and sufficiently like us for its fate to be important to all of us'.[472] His words encapsulate the problem of the blurring of the same and the different. They also exemplify the discordic strategy of Othering in order to render Russia as a comprehensible nation. Hosking continues, explaining that the 'combined distance and closeness means that we do not have about Russia the stable illusions which Edward Said accuses us of harbouring toward the Orient.'[473] His words indicate that, for Hosking, Russia can be a mixture of similar and different and still be Other.

Perhaps emphasis on difference results from the struggle to categorise Russia using certain markers, such as its political culture. Using political culture as a marker of identity will generally lead to an emphasis of what is different about Russia rather than a focus on what is similar. The choice of marker may depend on what is accorded priority in the Western cultural context. For example, since liberal democracy is represented as an indispensable tenet of the West, Russia cannot be of the West since it is missing something portrayed as central to the West's identity. The historians homogenise the West by silencing certain facts which would undermine the idea of the West as the bastion of liberal democracy. For example, in many parts

[471] Hosking, *Russia and the Russians,* 4.
[472] Hosking, *Russia and the Russians,* xiv.
[473] Hosking, *Russia and the Russians,* xiv.

of Western Europe, such as Spain, Italy, and Germany, the liberal tradition was also weak historically.[474] According to social psychologists Jolanda Jetten and Russell Spears, 'groups feel threatened by increased intergroup similarity and want to restore clear water between them …[this] was referred to by Freud (1922) as the 'narcissism of small differences''.[475] If this is accurate, then it is logical to write Russia in such a way as to differentiate it from the West. Otherwise, a non-liberal member of the Western community would challenge the core ideology constituting that community – liberalism. In turn, this has the potential to weaken the perceived bonds connecting the West together. If Russia can be written to fit in the non-West compartment, then, in a way, it becomes more comprehensible and less confronting for the grand narrative of the West. It is its liminality that is represented as problematic in accordance with discordus. The discordant elements of Russia are discursively mitigated by a greater emphasis on Russia's difference from the West.

The Problem of Russia's Liminality

Russia's liminality appears to be problematic because its failure to conform to the dominant prescribed categories of East and West poses a conceptual complication. Analysis of the texts suggests that Russia's liminality renders it enigmatic. It needs to be understood, and this need is part of what leads to Othering. Russia is presented and represented as a complex nation which needs to be deciphered. One of the recurring aims of the historians articulated in their prefaces relates to increasing understanding of contemporary Russia. For example, Ascher describes the purpose of his text as 'to present a coherent account of Russia's political, social, and economic institutions as they evolved over one thousand years, so to enable the reader to gain a

[474] Sheri Berman, *Democracy and Dictatorship in Europe: From the Ancien Regime to the Present Day* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2019).
[475] Jolanda Jetten and Russell Spears, "The Divisive Potential of Differences and Similarities: The role of intergroup distinctiveness in intergroup differentiation," *European Review of Social Psychology* 14 (2003): 204.

better understanding of contemporary Russia'.[476] Similarly, Sixsmith declares his interest in understanding contemporary Russia, as he questions whether '[i]nstead of today's renascent authoritarianism, could Russia have become a Western market democracy like ours?'[477] Hosking is more preoccupied by how the history of Russia can assist in better understanding 'our' (presumably 'Western') attitude toward Russia. He contends that his text 'is an attempt to seek the roots of our ambivalence toward Russia'.[478] That these texts endeavour to 'make sense' of Russia using history suggests that the historians consider there to be things about contemporary Russia that do not make sense; that perhaps it is still the 'riddle, wrapped in a mystery, inside an enigma' to which Winston Churchill famously referred.[479]

It is the perception of Russia's liminality from a Western perspective that renders Russia 'enigmatic'. Sixsmith is clear in his preface that Russia's authoritarianism is at the root of his inquiry. However, he frames this in relation to the West. He considers whether Russia could have, or alludes to whether it will, or will not, develop a political system 'like ours'. In writing about his purpose, and Russia, in this way, he uses a self-referential paradigm. The use of such a paradigm casts Russia as Other, but not entirely Other. The historians do not Other Russia to the extent that Said argues the Orient was Othered. Nonetheless, writing about Russia's divergence from the West reflects the propensity to Other what is a combination of similar and different. The combination of similar and different produces the tensions which form discordus. Historians must deploy authorial strategies to mask such tensions or somehow make them fit into the grand narrative of the West.

---

[476] Abraham Ascher, *Russia: A Short History* (London: Oneworld Publications, 2017), ix.
[477] Martin Sixsmith, *Russia: A 1000-Year Chronicle of the Wild East* (London: Ebury Press, 2012), xi.
[478] Geoffrey Hosking, *Russia and the Russians* (Cambridge MA: Belknap Press, 2012), xiv.
[479] Winston Churchill, Speech, BBC Broadcast, London, 1 October 1939, The Churchill Society, <http://www.churchill-society-london.org.uk/RusnEnig.html> (30 June 2018).

In *Orientalism*, Said observes that when the 'categories' of 'West' and 'Oriental' are employed, the 'result is usually to polarize the distinction – the Oriental becomes more Oriental, the Westerner more Western'.[480] This notion seems to be applicable to the use of Russia and the West as comparative categories. Russia, when written from a Western perspective, is written in a way that emphasises its dissimilarity. The difference is a relative difference vis-à-vis the West, which results in a more positive representation of the West. To reiterate, emphasising the distinction is part of the discursive process of sustaining a Western hegemonic global order, within which the West is rendered superior to Russia partly by virtue of the articulated differences between them.

For Sixsmith, Russia has a possibility of 'progressing' to democracy, highlighting the texts' rendition of Russia as an in-between nation which is torn between the bipolar extremes of East and West. This liminality appears to be a problem for Sixsmith who frames his entire history of Russia around the authoritarian-democracy tug-of-war of which Russia is caught (or discursively positioned) in the middle. Hosking's intention to understand what he labels Western 'ambivalence' toward Russia likewise reflects a similarly discordic disposition, albeit in a more subtle way. Ambivalence could stem from the perception that Russia defies standard categorisations of political and cultural communities.

Although there is clearly emphasis in the texts on Russia's liminality, the texts are written in a way which nevertheless characterises Russia as more different than similar, as Other. Othering is the outcome of the consideration of Russia's Eurasian hybridity through historical narrative. Ziegler, for example, contends that

[480] Said, *Orientalism*, 46.

the history 'should help us understand, and appreciate, Russia's distinctiveness'.[481] Sixsmith encapsulates the ultimate Other nature of Russia, explaining that,

> Russia has never fully been 'like us', if by that we mean liberal, market-oriented democracy where the wielders of power are there at the sufferance of the people and can be replaced through a law-governed process. The Russian model, with the exception of brief, recurrent periods of radical experimentation, has always been the opposite: autocracy places the wielders of power above the law; they rule by divine right, or 'by the dictatorship of the people', but almost always by brute force.[482]

Sixsmith's words demonstrate the way in which the history texts can be interpreted as part of a broader discursive process of integrating Russia the nation into the narrative of the West. It is liminal, but that liminality makes it liable to being Othered, which, is a more convenient way of imagining Russia because it can then conform to established categories of order and knowledge of how the world works.

As explored elsewhere in this thesis, the representation of Russia as non-Western or non-European is one way in which this is evidenced less directly. The introductory material also reflects this pattern in the subtle way the label 'Russia' is used in relation to 'the West'. For example, Ziegler suggests that a 'women's movement has emerged in Russia, but it is fairly small and not particularly radical by Western standards'.[483] The sentence construction implies that Western standards are separate from Russia, thus Russia is not of the West. It also implies that Western standards are superior. The statement is also only true of parts of the West, within which standards of rights vary considerably. Similarly, Ascher's assertion that, '[t]he West eyes these potential developments with much anxiety and there is a danger of continuing tension between the West and Russia' creates a relationship between the

[481] Ziegler, *The History of Russia*, 8.
[482] Sixsmith, *Russia: A 1000-Year Chronicle of the Wild East,* 9.
[483] Ziegler, *The History of Russia,* 7.

labels which communicates difference.[484] Bushkovitch also notes how Russia is 'an enigma in the West', implying that Russia is not a part of the West.[485]

Interestingly, in comparison to the other chapters of the history texts analysed, the introductory chapters of the histories represent Russia as either liminal or non-Western/European significantly more often than they represent it as European. In the other chapters, there is more inconsistency in descriptions of Russia as European or non-European. This suggests that discordus infuses the 'bigger picture' articulated in the introductions, and manifests in the propensity to render Russia Other despite reference to aspects that are similar.

Russia as Inferior to the West

Similarly to the previous case studies, the historians' introductory material represents Russia in a way which subordinates it to the West. Through describing Russia in ways which a 'Westerner' might regard as 'negative', the texts create an image of Russia that is inferior in relation to the West. While the West is not always mentioned, the way the sentences are written implies that there is some reference point external to the text. For example, Ziegler comments that the 'countryside is backward'.[486] Russia's countryside can only be described as backward if in relation to something providing the standard for not backward, i.e. the West. To illustrate this backwardness, he describes how some 'rural Russian homes still do not have indoor plumbing'.[487] His use of the word 'still' has subtle normative connotations which imply that rural Russia is behind in terms of development. All texts are situated within contexts, and when read within the context of the West, where indoor plumbing is 'the norm' almost everywhere, it creates a picture of a Russia which is

[484] Ascher, *Russia: A Short History*, x.
[485] Bushkovitch, *A Concise History of Russia*, xviii.
[486] Ziegler, *The History of Russia*, 4.
[487] Ziegler, *The History of Russia*, 4.

different but also inferior to the West. Through creating this picture of Russia, the text also indirectly establishes the West as the implied benchmark for development and via extension as superior in relation to Russia.

Hosking similarly refers to Russia's 'relative backwardness'.[488] The use of the word 'relative' in this context highlights that backwardness only acquires meaning in relation to something else. This evokes notions of Jacques Derrida's concept of différance.[489] Backwardness only means backwardness because of the reader's understanding of what is not backwardness. Backwardness is embedded in a network of language where other words and other meanings signified by those other words are crucial for knowing what Hosking means by backwardness. This illustrates the way in which meaning and language are contextual. Backwardness means backwardness by virtue of what is not backwardness, but also gains meaning in the context of Hosking's text because of cultural knowledge of what to be not backward means, or, 'forward', which has positive connotations. The flip side of this is that, in representing Russia as backward, the texts implicitly create a representation of the West as 'forward', or advanced.

The reason behind Russia's backwardness, according to Hosking, is not only 'natural handicaps (otherwise Canada, which has a similar geography, would be equally backward), but also to its tendency at each stage of historical evolution to replicate itself'.[490] There are a few elements of this sentence worth unpacking for the purposes of this study. First, Hosking's comparison with Canada reflects the predisposition for comparative ethnocentrism found throughout the majority of the history texts. Extending on the 'backwardness' point, it positions Canada as not backward, and differentiating Canada, as a Western nation, from Russia. There is the

[488] Hosking, *Russia and the Russians,* 6.
[489] Stuart Hall, "The Spectacle of the Other," in *Representation: Cultural Representations and Signifying Practices,* ed. Stuart Hall (London: SAGE, 1997), 235.
[490] Hosking, *Russia and the Russians*, 4.

assumption in his words that the reader will know, from their situation in the Anglosphere that Canada is not backward and likely will have some ideas as to why. Again, the context within which the texts are consumed is significant. That context has implications for how these words are interpreted and given meaning by the reader and for the reader.

Second, Hosking raises the idea that there are stages of 'historical evolution'. This is relevant to the ideas advanced consistently throughout this thesis that history, like the nation, is a construct. His words suggest that there exist in reality set stages of historical evolution, whereas the past is not necessarily narrativised in this way. Historians reshape what they know of the past into history, giving it narrative form which creates an impression of a series of linked events as part of a linear process of 'evolution'. This is significant for understanding the way that history texts can create 'Russia' as a nation, and, in particular, the way that such creation is ideologically inflected irrespective of intention on the part of the historian. Third, Hosking's reason for Russia's backwardness is that Russia tends to 'replicate itself'. This suggests that Russia has struggled to 'advance'. Clearly, this is Hosking's analysis rather than a 'pure' historical fact. From the facts selected for his history, this is the conclusion Hosking has drawn. Such a conclusion is subject to the influence of the cultural context.

The time in which the texts were written is a crucial contextual aspect. In their prefaces, the historians provide insight into the cultural and political contexts in which their texts were written. How they have chosen to frame the 'present' has an effect on the construction of literary Russia. The present serves as the end-point of the narratives, thus what comes before must lead to that ending. The texts' references to the current (at the time they wrote the prefaces) context further supports the idea of a discordic discourse.

The most prevalent way that the prefaces contextualize the rest of the texts is by reference to the political climate in Russia and internationally. Again, the political marker is used to frame the histories and Other Russia. For example, Thompson and Ward's preface to their 2018 edition text was written in 2016. Thompson describes the motivation for a new edition as stemming from 'Putin's brazen annexation of Crimea and his fomenting of anti-Ukraine separatism in eastern Ukraine'.[491] The deliberate use of the term 'brazen' signals to the reader that he disapproves of Putin. Since Thompson's disapproval is expressed in the preface, he communicates to readers that the history of Russia will explain Putin's behaviour. He establishes a narrative expectation at the outset – that the story is one of how Russia became somewhat Other.

Some of the other more recently written prefaces share this tendency to contextualize their histories with reference to political tension. For example, Ascher describes how Putin has developed an economy 'that favors the rich and that is riddled with corruption'. [492] Clearly, this represents Russia in a poor light based on Western values, which, at least in theory, reject inequality and corruption. The 'truth' or factual veracity of the material is not relevant here. This is because what is significant is not simply that the inclusion of such text, but how it is emphasised as a defining aspect of Russia which is crucial to its characterisation. Ascher highlights Russia's role in international affairs, situating his text within a context brimming with Russia-West tension. He describes how Putin's 'aggressive foreign policy toward Ukraine' has sparked fear and suspicion in the Baltic states of Russian expansion. Ascher also hopes 'that a revival of what was known as the Cold War … can be avoided'.[493] This statement in particular reveals the dominant mentality regarding

[491] Thompson and Ward, *Russia*, xiii.
[492] Ascher, *Russia: A Short History,* x.
[493] Ascher, *Russia: A Short History,* x.

Russia as a political actor in the contemporary West. His preface indicates that the text exists in a context within which Russia is viewed with disdain and suspicion, and is portrayed negatively.

Sixsmith similarly creates an impression of a context where Russia is viewed negatively and as a source of tension with the West. He explains that Russia is 'haunted' by 'the spectre of autocracy', and that the West made 'mistakes that would darken East-West relations … and contribute indirectly to the failure of Russia's liberal experiment'.[494] This excerpt implies that the end of the 'liberal experiment' is also part of the cause for declining 'East-West relations'. The use of the term 'failure' in this sentence indicates Sixsmith's assessment of the contemporary state of Russian political culture. The term 'experiment' also signifies an anomaly or a departure from the norm for a temporary time. Sixsmith's words also clearly place Russia in the 'East' compartment, the implications of which have been explored throughout this chapter, and thesis more broadly. The difference between Russia and the West is also implied through Sixsmith's description of Putin's return to the presidency in 2012. He explains how this, 'gave a clear green light to future would-be autocrats and rulers-for-life'.[495] His words reflect the democracy versus autocracy opposition infusing his text and contribute to the broader binary opposition between East and West.

Ziegler's preface in the 2009 edition has not been updated since before Putin came to power in Russia. As such, it reveals little about today's political context, yet nevertheless creates an impression of Russia as a dormant threat in the text. He describes how the USSR was a 'constant source of fear and attention' in the United States and that, while post-communist Russia 'seems to pose no threat to the United

[494] Sixsmith, *Russia: A 1000-Year Chronicle of the Wild East*, viii – ix.
[495] Sixsmith, *Russia: A 1000-Year Chronicle of the Wild East,* xi.

States', it might 'once again be a power to reckon with'.[496] Therefore, even though Ziegler is writing at a time when Russia was perceived as politically and economically weak, he still indirectly creates the impression that Russia is, or could be, a competitor. Even in its allegedly weakened state, it is depicted as being a type of nation which has characteristics that predisposes it to conflict with the United States. The implication of Russia as a threat arises from an apparent struggle to reconcile liminality. The example also illustrates the historical dimension of discordus. What Russia has been in the past, in the eyes of the historians, is interwoven with its contemporary construction. Discordus is inherently historical in this sense because, like nationalism, it is dependent on interpretations of the past and representations of the past while also affecting interpretations and representations.

Like Ziegler's preface, Hosking's preface in the 2012 edition is predominantly the same as his preface from the first edition of his text from 2001, despite the fact that it is dated as 2012. Hosking describes a weakened Russia which, for some, can 'be ignored in our thinking about international affairs'.[497] He continues to explain that, despite this, 'Russia will not go away; it will continue to play a major part in shaping the twenty-first century world, and by no means a negative part'.[498] Following this, he describes Russia as 'the great Other', as discussed previously. His words contrast in some respects to the more recent prefaces which emphasise Russia's Otherness in a negative way. Hosking is not denying that Russia is Other. In fact, he draws attention to this. Yet, for him, it does not necessarily give rise to a relationship of animosity.

The comparison of the prefaces from different temporal contexts demonstrates the way that context is a part of the ongoing shaping and reshaping of

[496] Ziegler, *The History of Russia*, xiv.
[497] Hosking, *Russia and the Russians,* xiii.
[498] Hosking, *Russia and the Russians,* xiii.

Russia through Anglophone historical discourse. Evidently, the construction of the nation of Russia is fluid. Imagining a nation from outside, and for outside that nation, is an ongoing process which is responsive to, and contributes to, the temporal, cultural, and political contexts in which the histories of Russia were produced and are consumed. Russia itself is a narrative that is constantly in flux to be continually written and rewritten, and a continuing story in a history continuum.

The Tragic Emplotment of Russian History

The narrativisation of Russian history is clearly dominated by notions of Russia's liminality. The tension between Russia's similarities and differences, and ultimately Otherness in relation to the West necessitates a tragic emplotment. Russian history is emplotted predominantly in the tragic mode due to a mutually reinforcing correlation with discordus. In Chapter III, I introduced Hayden White's theory of emplotment and outlined the four genre modes. The tragic emplotment both represents and reinforces discordus, and discordus facilitates tragic emplotment as well as arises from it. Emplotment is therefore another strategy historians use to smooth over tensions which arise from the facts. The tragic emplotment reveals how the texts 'make sense' of enigmatic Russia and reconcile its liminality. For White, tragedy is a 'mode 'of emplotment' reflecting 'an ongoing structure of relationships or an eternal return of the Same in the Different'.[499] In terms of the broader story of Russia, this is evident in notions of Russia as caught in a perpetual struggle between autocracy and democracy, and, between East and West. Tragedy 'privileges conflict'. [500] This genre characteristic is clear throughout the texts and at its most symbolic level is communicated through this identity conflict.

[499] White, *Metahistory*, 10.
[500] White, *Metahistory*, 105.

While avoiding the determinism of path dependency, the texts nevertheless impart a sense of the cyclical inevitability of authoritarianism as a condition of the Russian nation. This aligns with the notion of tragedies often concluding with, 'resignations of men to the conditions under which they must labor in the world'.[501] There are aspects of the constitution of Russia which cannot be overcome: autocracy and liminality. In the generic tragic emplotment though, there is the 'possibility of at least potential liberation from the condition of the Fall'.[502] The fall refers to the descent from a more desirable state to a state of ruin. The potential for liberation is expressed most clearly in the introductory material of the texts. For example, to borrow a quote used previously in my chapter, the guiding question of Sixsmith's text is '[i]nstead of today's renascent authoritarianism, could Russia have become a Western market democracy like ours?'. His question exemplifies the potential for liberation because it suggests the possibility that events could have, and may still, unfold differently.[503] However, by the conclusion of the story, the text is resigned to a Russia which will never be 'like us'.[504]

In his seminal work *Anatomy of Criticism* (1953/2000), Frye describes the 'fatalistic' aspect of the tragedy.[505] An example of a quintessential tragic assertion in the histories of Russia is one of Hosking's introductory remarks which signals the tragic emplotment from the first page of his text: '[t]he north Eurasian plain is not only Russia's geographical setting, but also her fate'.[506] Frye also suggests a certain transitional nature of protagonists in the tragedy genre. They exist between states and there is the potential to rise or fall in a given situation. Extending on transitional

[501] White, *Metahistory*, 8.
[502] White, *Metahistory*, 7.
[503] Sixsmith, *Russia: A 1000-Year Chronicle of the Wild East*, 12.
[504] Sixsmith, *Russia: A 1000-Year Chronicle of the Wild East,* 530.
[505] Frye, *Anatomy of Criticism*, 210.
[506] Hosking, *Russia and the Russians,* 1.

symbolism, Frye associates tragedy with the season of autumn which reflects the transition to darker times. These features of the mode of tragedy are clear in the texts' dominant narratives of Russia. There are moments in its past where it is on the precipice of democratisation and liberalisation (the rise) followed by an almost inevitable fatalistic return to autocracy (the fall). It is Russia's 'flawed' character which leads to the fall.

The effect of genre is also important in the construction of literary Russia. As Schwartz explains, 'the genre-concept enables us to classify a work, to understand the general relations between its form and effect'.[507] He describes Aristotle's insights into genre of tragedy – it can be defined not only by its 'manner and means, but in terms also of its distinctive effect: the arousal and purgation of pity and fear'.[508] It is in this way a 'function of its form'.[509] The histories analysed in the case studies generate a sense of pity regarding Russia's 'failed' transition to democracy. Some of the texts clearly represent fear, particularly in the unconventional history texts analysed in Chapter V. This emplotment contributes toward the idea that becoming Western is positive, and anything else is negative.

Another facet of the genre of tragedy which is apparent in the texts on Russian history is that the protagonist is, to some extent, relatable. As Frye describes, tragic works can tell 'the story of how someone recognizably like ourselves is broken by a conflict between the inner and outer world, between imaginative reality and the sort of reality which is established by social consensus … Such tragedy may be concerned … with a mania or obsession about rising in the world'.[510] This is apparent in the texts through their framing of Russia seeking great power status through international assertiveness as described in Chapter V, and becoming Western in

[507] Schwartz, "The Problem of Literary Genres," 115.
[508] Schwartz, "The Problem of Literary Genres," 114.
[509] Schwartz, "The Problem of Literary Genres," 114.
[510] Frye, *Anatomy of Criticism,* 39.

Chapter III, as a way to become powerful and relevant. This sits uncomfortably with the Western metanarrative, and would suggest that the Western nations have not, from a Fukuyaman perspective, transcended beyond 'history'.[511]

The question then arises – why is the story of Russia cast in the tragic mode? The events of the past do not inherently possess a generical predisposition. The emplotment of Russian history as a tragedy must therefore be an act of the historians' construction, whether intentional or not. Since the texts analysed in this thesis adopt the same genre for their histories of Russia, it indicates a broader contextual climate promotes viewing the past in this way. It further suggests that emplotting Russian history in the tragic mode is the most culturally suitable emplotment. In *The Fiction of Narrative* (2010), White hypothesises that 'narrative is an expression in discourse of a distinct mode of experience and thinking about the world, its structures, and its processes'.[512] Because of this, analysis of genre helps make sense of the context of the texts' production – situation within a Western cultural context with a dominant liberal ideology. The kind of story told reveals the dominant structures of knowledge because there are consistencies and patterns across the histories. In this case, the pattern is that the texts all emplot Russian history as a tragedy.

Cultural positioning and associated structures of knowledge affect the conceptualisation of the events of the past. For White, 'every historical narrative has its latent or manifest purpose the desire to *moralize* the events of which it treats'.[513] To 'moralize' something, one must use a normative framework. For the West, it is likely the liberal ideology as the defining feature of the West, which, as found in the case studies, permeates the texts. It is probable that Western historians may tend to emplot Russia's history in the tragic mode because of their socialization in Western

[511] Francis Fukuyama, "The End of History?" *The National Interest*, no. 16 (1989).
[512] Hayden White, *The Fiction of Narrative* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2010), 112, 274.
[513] Hayden White, *The Content of the Form*, 10.

societies favouring liberal values such as individualism, freedom, civil liberties, and democracy. Through the lens of liberalism, of course, Russia's apparent return to authoritarianism would necessitate a tragic emplotment since it fails to meet the requisite normative standards of the West. Drawing again on White's insights, there is a 'need or an impulse to narrate events with respect to their significance for one's own culture or group'.[514] As argued throughout this thesis, the history texts situate Russia as necessary to ensure coherence of the Western metanarrative.

The idea that context affects the mode of representation (and in turn, reproduces the context) is clearly based on the assumption that there is no inherent story in the events of the past and that emplotments are imposed and not found in historical data. Following this premise, in *The Historical Text as Literary Artifact* (1974), White argues that the same events can be emplotted in different ways. He explains that

> No historical event is intrinsically tragic; it can only be conceived as such from a particular point of view or from within the context of a structured set of events of which it is an element enjoying a privileged place. For in history what is tragic from one perspective is comic from another, just as in society what appears to be tragic from the standpoint of one class may be, as Marx purported to show of the 18th Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, only a farce from that of another class.[515]

White is not referring to the facts in question, rather 'the different story-meanings with which the facts can be endowed by emplotment'.[516] In his essay, *Historical Emplotment and the Problem of Truth* (1992), White revisits this idea and concludes that the events can be emplotted in different modes. It is not the data itself which restricts certain emplotments, but his text suggests that the normative context might

[514] White, *Metahistory*, 19.
[515] Hayden White, "The Historical Text as Literary Artifact," *Clio* 3, no. 3 (1974): 84.
[516] Hayden White, "Historical Representation and the Problem of Truth," in *Probing the Limits of Representation*, ed. Saul Friedlander (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992). 38.

restrict acceptable modes if such modes 'offend against morality'. [517] White contends that 'the relation between facts and events is always open to negotiation and reconceptualization, not because the events change with time, but because we change our ways of conceptualizing them'.[518]

Different modes of emplotment can therefore also be used for histories of Russia. However, despite the fact that they can be used, only one mode is used consistently: the tragic mode. Invoking Foucauldian ideas of discourse, Sara Mills explains how texts 'bring about the production of discourse, but only certain types of discourse'. She argues that discourse is self-limiting to an extent, which 'ensures that the knowledge produced within a particular period has a certain homogeneity'.[519] This is apparent in the common emplotment of the history of Russia in the tragic mode across a range of texts. The historical and cultural context imposes discursive constraints on how historians can write about Russia. In adding to the dominant discourse, the history texts themselves contribute toward sustaining norms concerning representations of Russia.[520] In this case, this restricts the available emplotment modes for histories of Russia written in and for the West. At a broader level, discursive constraints affect the ways of 'constituting knowledge' about Russia, which also affects the construction of Russia as an 'object of knowledge'.[521]

It is only the context of production, rather than the historical data itself which restricts emplotment of Russian history to the tragic mode. It follows then, that while culturally 'unacceptable', a romantic emplotment could be 'factually' possible. To test this theory, I have used an excerpt from Ascher's *A Short History of Russia* as the

[517] White, "Historical Representation and the Problem of Truth," 40-41.
[518] Hayden White, "Response to Arthur Marwick," *Journal of Contemporary History* 30 (1995): 239-240.
[519] Sara Mills, *Discourse* (London: Routledge, 1997), 75.
[520] In Foucault's words, discourse contributes to the 'delimitation of a field of objects, the definition of a legitimate perspective for the agent of knowledge, and the fixing of norms for the elaboration of concepts or theories'. Michel Foucault, *Language, Counter-memory, Practice: Selected Essays and Interviews*, ed. Donald Bouchard and trans. Donald Bouchard and Sherry Simon (Oxford: Blackwell, 1977), 199.
[521] Hall, "Foucault," 72.

basis to write a revisionist history of the annexation of Crimea in the romantic mode.[522] This text was chosen because it represents the event as a negative occurrence thus could be reframed as a positive event. It also was practically convenient to use because the text forms its own sub-section within Ascher's broader chapter which enables the text to function as a story in itself. This means that the excerpt has its own beginning, middle, and end, enabling the genre to become more apparent, since certain features of both tragedy and romance concern the journey but also the resolution.

As an example, I have rewritten the text using predominantly the same information, but with occasional exclusions or evidence-based additions to force the narrative into a romance. Most of the adjustments made to Ascher's text concern the 'filler' words which are crucial in turning facts into history. This corresponds with the function of genre and its effect on the writing of history. As White articulates, 'a specific plot type … can simultaneously determine the kinds of events to be featured in any story that can be told about them and provide a pattern for the assignment of the roles that can possibly be played by the agents and agencies inhabiting the scene'.[523] The genre, whether a conscious creative choice or a subconscious decision, therefore determines to some extent what is included or excluded from a history text.[524] Clearly, this has implications for the representations of the past which are generated in a given text.

In the following excerpt, Asher's original text is replicated in standard font and each line is numbered similar to the fine analyses throughout this thesis. The modified text is in shaded italics next to the original sentence. To gain a sense of the genre shift, it is preferable for the reader to read Ascher's original text first, skipping

[522] Ascher, *Short History of Russia*, 286-287.
[523] White, "Historical Emplotment and the Problem of Truth," 42-43.
[524] White, "Historical Emplotment and the Problem of Truth," 43.

the altered material, then read only the altered material. This will most effectively allow the reader to appreciate the different types of stories told. To observe in more detail the alterations in language and material, a reading of the text can be undertaken sentence by sentence.

Original Text	Modified Text
1. Without warning, a large contingent of well-armed Russian troops invaded Crimea 2. early in the morning of 27 February 2014, and within hours seized the two airfields 3. on the peninsula and numerous government buildings.	*A contingent of Russian troops arrived in Crimea early in the morning of 27 February 2014 and, within hours, successfully secured the two airfields on the peninsula and numerous government buildings.*
4. Ukrainian troops were ordered by their government not to resist, and by nightfall 5. Crimea was in the hands of the Russians.	*Ukrainian troops did not resist and, by nightfall, Crimea was returned to Russia.*
6. The invaders had removed the insignia from their uniforms, and officials in 7. Moscow declared that neither they nor their troops had played any role in the 8. military operation, a claim that few believed.	*Russian officials said that neither they nor their troops had played any role in the operation, but would judiciously assist the Russian-speaking Crimean population.*
9. The regional parliament in Crimea then held a meeting in secret and announced the 10. following month that the local population would vote on a referendum to grant 11. more autonomy to Crimea – in effect, to allow the people the right to secede from 12. Ukraine and join Russia.	*The regional parliament in Crimea held a meeting and announced the following month that the local population would vote on a referendum to grant more autonomy to Crimea – in effect, to allow the people the right to secede from Ukraine and reunite with Russia.*[525]
13. The entire military operation was shrouded in secrecy; even many of Putin's 14. subordinates were surprised by the audacious manoeuvre.	*The success of the military operation demanded discretion; even many of Putin's colleagues were surprised by the courageous intervention.*
15. Political leaders in Europe and the United States were stunned and quickly 16. imposed sanctions on numerous Russian officials who had been involved in 17. planning the invasion…	*Political leaders in Europe and the United States were stunned and quickly imposed sanctions on numerous Russian officials who they believed to have been involved in planning what they perceived as an incursion.*
18. The referendum was held, as Myers put it, 'under the barrels of Russian guns' and 19. yielded an overwhelming vote in favor of joining the Russian Federation.	*The referendum yielded an overwhelming vote in favor of joining the Russian Federation. According to media reports, approximately 80% of eligible voters participated in the referendum.*[526]
20. Putin announced the annexation of Crimea and Sevastopol, a Ukrainian city, parts 21. of which had been leased to Russia to be used as a port for its navy.	*Following the plebiscite, Putin announced the return of Crimea and Sevastopol, parts of which had been leased to Russia to be used as a port for its navy.*
22. According to polls conducted in Russia, a vast majority of Russians hailed the 23. bold seizure of foreign land, and Putin's approval rating rose dramatically, to over 24. eighty-five per cent.	*According to polls conducted in Russia, a vast majority of Russians hailed the return of the land its people to Russia, and President Putin's approval rating rose dramatically, to over eighty-five per cent.*
25. For Putin, the annexation of Crimea was only the first step in his plan to unravel Ukraine.	*For Putin, the reunification with Crimea was only the first step to correct historical injustice and restore what 'has always been an inseparable part of Russia'.*[527]

[525] Reunification is emphasized in Russian media. See e.g, TASS, "Crimea issue closed for Russia, says envoy to UN," *TASS Russian News Agency*, August 7 2018, <http://tass.com/politics/1014934> (10 August 2018).
[526] TASS, "Putin says he expressed disagreement with Trump's position on Crimea in Helsinki," *TASS Russian News Agency*, July 17 2018, <http://tass.com/politics/1013588> (August 7 2018).
[527] Vladimir Putin, Address by the President of the Russian Federation, March 18, 2014, <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/20603> (September 15 2018). These ideas are also emphasized in Russian media. See for example: TASS, "Crimea issue closed for Russia, says envoy to

In Ascher's version, words such as 'invaded' and 'seized' necessitated replacement given their negative connotations. In line 1, I replaced 'invaded' with 'arrived', and 'seized' in line 2 was replaced with 'secured' to create a more neutral-positive tone. In line 5, I altered 'in the hands of the Russians' to, 'Crimea was returned to Russia' to indulge the romantic mode. The point about the referendum occurring 'under the barrels of Russian guns' is a metaphor used in a 'loaded' way to influence readers' attitudes. Clearly, this needed omitted to satisfy the conventions of a romance in featuring a heroic Russia. I substituted that for the fact that approximately 80% of voters participated in the referendum to increase the sense that the referendum was legitimate. I modified the final sentence (line 25) most significantly for two main reasons. First, because referring to the event as 'annexation' has negative connotative meaning which it cannot have if emplotted romantically. It is a term which Putin rejects, suggesting the importance of the term for imbuing the event with a type of meaning (i.e. whether the event was 'right' or 'wrong'). Second, the text subjectively imposes an unsavoury motivation on Putin, which needed transformed into a more noble vision in order to suit a romantic emplotment. Both the original and the rewritten final sentence use the most creative licence. However, the rewritten text it is based on comments that Putin has made on the Crimean issue and evidence suggesting such perspectives.[528]

In Ascher's original text, the story is fundamentally about an unjust 'invasion' of a foreign territory. In my revised version, using almost the same facts, the story

---

UN," TASS, "Putin signs law commemorating Crimea's accession to Russian Empire," *TASS Russian News Agency*, August 3 2018, <http://tass.com/politics/1015999> (15 September 2018); VOA, "Putin Hails Crimea Annexation in Speech Ahead of Vote," VOA News, March 14, 2018, <https://www.voanews.com/a/putin-hails-crimea-annexation-speech-ahead-vote/4299055.html> (15 September 2018).

[528] For example, Putin commented in an interview: "I'd like to make a correction. The joining of Crimea to Russia is not an annexation." He continued, asking, "People in Crimea went to a referendum and voted for joining Russia. If this is annexation, what is democracy then?".
TASS, "Putin says he expressed disagreement with Trump's position on Crimea in Helsinki," *TASS Russian News Agency*, July 17 (2018), <//tass.com/politics/1013588>

becomes about a quest to reunite a divided land. Since Crimea was a part of Russia until 1954, this interpretation of history is still based on the facts.[529] The return of Crimea narrative conforms to the conventions of the romance genre for its quest for the ideal, success of the hero, and presence of nostalgia for a prior age.[530] The small adjustments made to Ascher's text radically alter the meaning of the event. Most likely, the revised history will sit uncomfortably with Western readers because it represents the annexation of Crimea in a culturally unacceptable mode. Use of the romance genre challenges the understanding of Russia as Other and the dominant representation of literary Russia as a tragic villain. In the revised text, Russia becomes heroic rather than villainous.

The dominant story of Russia articulated in the sweeping histories is that of a nation struggling with its liminality, but which ultimately succumbs to its entrenched autocratic nature. It fails to transcend its flaws and become a part of the West. If this sweeping narrative were emplotted romantically, then liminality and autocracy would become assets, rather than problems. Such a romantic emplotment would perhaps be preferred by the Eurasianist school within Russia, which represents Russia as the core of a unique civilisation superior to both the East and the West. In this Eurasianist discourse, Russia is still described as effectively liminal, but this is what makes it special.[531] Clearly, this exercise demonstrates the constructed nature of history, but also the way in which the Western cultural context is reflected in the texts and constructs a certain kind of literary Russia. It also reinforces White's fundamental assertion that history is indeed a form of literature and why the idea of 'truth' is problematic.

---

[529] John Biersack and Shannon O'Lear, "The Geopolitics of Russia's Annexation of Crimea: Narratives, Identity, Silences, and Energy," *Eurasian Geography and Economics* 55, no. 3 (2014): 250.
[530] Frye, *Anatomy of Criticism*, 186-187.
[531] See Dmitry Shlapentokh, *Russia Between East and West: Scholarly Debates on Eurasianism* (Leiden: Brill, 2007).

Analysis of the histories' introductory material reveals the manifestation of discordus in the texts. The way that Russia is represented as liminal, enigmatic, and Other collectively contributes toward the tragic emplotment of Russian history. From a discordic perspective, where Russia fails to conform to Western categories of global order, the tragic emplotment is necessary in order to reconcile the conflicting elements of Russia's story. By emplotting the histories in the tragic mode, the historians not only portray the history of Russia as tragic, but generate a representation of literary Russia as a tragic villain. In turn, this allows for literary Russia to be 'made sense of' and incorporated into the Western grand narrative in a way which reaffirms the Self. Discordus therefore necessitates that the story of Russia be emplotted in the tragic mode in and for the West.

What follows is a fine analysis of the conclusion chapter of Sixsmith's *Russia: A 1000-Year Chronicle of the Wild East*.

Fine Analysis

Martin Sixsmith, *Russia: A 1000-Year Chronicle of the Wild East* (2012) pages 527-528.

1. A historian is not in the business of predicting the future. But these pages have traced
2. underlying patterns in Russian history, and I think it is legitimate to ask if they will
3. continue. Russians have characterised the split in their national identity as a
4. vacillation between the pull of Europe and the grip of Asia. Each enshrines a matrix
5. of societal values – 'Europe' as participatory government, a civic society with
6. personal and economic freedoms; 'Asia' as centralised, authoritarian rule, with a
7. corresponding discount on individual liberty. Why has 'Asiatic tyranny' proved so
8. tenacious in Russia? Kievan Rus enjoyed the embryonic elements of participatory
9. government, a startling glimpse of 'European' civic values. But it failed. Kiev fell
10. because power devolved to the princes in the city states, and through them to the
11. people, left no strong authority to secure national unity and national self-defence.
12. The Mongols brought with them a different notion of statehood, one that recognised
13. no rights other than the right of the state. And when the Mongols departed, Moscow
14. prospered because it adopted a similar model. The eagerness with which Russians
15. have embraced strong rulers stems from those years. When autocracy became
16. Russia's default form of governance, the absence of a developed civic society
17. prevented the initiation of change 'from below'. Barring a revolution, the people did
18. not have the means to make change happen. So nearly every attempt at reform has
19. come 'from above' (from Russia's rulers), and all have been motivated by the
20. compelling reason that the autocracy was under threat. When a real revolution 'from
21. below' did happen, in February 1917, it promised to make colossal changes, to shift
22. Russia's historical paradigm to a liberal parliamentary system. But it was hijacked
23. by another form of autocracy in the shape of the idealist despots of Leninist
24. socialism. Lenin and Stalin revived the myth of Russia's messianic mission;
25. Moscow the Third Rome became Moscow the Third International, destined to
26. redeem the world through the new religion of Communism. Gorbachev's reforms
27. were also forced upon him. Just as Peter's and Catherine's changes were intended to
28. shore up tsarist autocracy, Gorbachev's aim was to maintain and reinvigorate that of
29. the Communist Party.

Sixsmith's conclusion to his book *Russia: A 1000-year Chronicle of the Wild East*, conveys the narrative of Russia as a politically and culturally liminal nation in a dichotomous struggle between autocracy and democracy. In this regard, the excerpt mirrors the introductory material analysed in this chapter. It weaves the key themes and events of the past together to create a picture of literary Russia. I selected this particular excerpt because it epitomises the primary discursive patterns identified in this chapter. It also demonstrates how the various phrases and words come together in their intratextual context to construct the nation of Russia as liminal, yet Other.

In the second line, Sixmith directly refers to 'patterns in Russian history'. Presumably, based on the context of the sentence, Sixsmith is in fact referring to 'the past' as he views it, rather than patterns in the authored stories of the past. Sixsmith's words therefore reflect the authored nature of history, and the associated subjectivity. His words indicate that, for him, certain patterns 'exist' in the past. Though he may not necessarily be wrong about those patterns, his text presents them as fact. The patterns that one sees in the past are also undoubtedly dependent to some extent on the lens with which the evidence of the past is viewed. As the excerpt reveals, the patterns Sixsmith describes what he regards as Russia's habitual return to authoritarianism following periods of potential liberalization or democratization. This pattern frames the narrative of his entire history of Russia, which is summarised in the sample text. Russia's authoritarianism is the main feature that Sixsmith uses to segregate Russia from the category of the West.

The idea of Russia as a culturally hybrid or liminal nation, torn between Europe and Asia, yet belonging to neither, is apparent in lines 3-4. Sixsmith describes the 'vacillation between the pull of Europe and the grip of Asia'. The word 'grip' in relation to Asia has negative connotations, and aligns with Sixsmith's subsequent

description of Asian authoritarianism in lines 4-6 due to the association of 'grip' with control. In contrast, the 'pull of Europe' has more neutral to positive connotations. 'Pull' evokes notions of attractiveness and appeal rather than the control and oppression of 'grip'. This seemingly simple use of language therefore positions Asia as 'bad' and Europe as 'good'. Lines 4-6 reinforce this opposition, with Sixsmith describing European social values as 'participatory government, a civic society with personal and economic freedoms' and Asian values as associated with 'authoritarian rule, with a corresponding discount on individual liberty'. While on its own this may not seem particularly significant, in conjunction with the rest of the text it becomes important for the construction of Russia and for understanding the contemporary geo-cultural paradigm. Such use of language inadvertently sustains the distinction between Europe and Asia, and uses political culture as the salient feature for generalising the diverse regions into binary civilisational communities. Consequently, using political culture as the defining feature of Europe and Asia is critical in constructing a narrative of Otherness. In turn, it highlights the significance political culture has for categorising communities. Perhaps it is this way because of the embeddedness of liberal democratic ideology in the Western grand narrative, and the associated collective identity of the West. This becomes important for Othering Russia because Russia cannot be of the West if it has an autocratic essence since autocracy is the antithesis to Western democracy in the Western canon.

Lines 7-8 further reinforce this Asia/Europe polarity, and clearly present Europe and democracy as superior to 'Asian tyranny'. It reflects the Western cultural context of the author since it is imbued with an apparent preference for liberal democratic ideology. Note that I am not implying that Sixsmith has a negative view toward Asia. I am suggesting that the text can be interpreted in this manner and has the effect of creating an image of Asia, and Russia, as inferior to Europe. These lines

also show the narrative taking shape – Russia's original incarnation, Kievan Rus, had the potential to become more like Europe and 'enjoyed the embryonic elements of participatory government', but this 'failed'. Sixsmith's use of the word 'enjoyed' portrays participatory government as positive, and, by implication, portrays the failure of Rus to continue along a democratic path as negative. This establishes the tug-of-war between democracy and autocracy and East and West characteristic of Sixsmith's representation of Russia.

Lines 10-12 directly employ the language of the national paradigm through terms such as 'national unity', 'national self-defence', 'statehood', and 'state'. Along with terms of nationality such as 'Russia', the excerpt demonstrates the extent to which concepts of the nation are entrenched within structures of meaning within the Anglosphere. The geo-cultural paradigm more broadly is also evident in the sample text. The use of terms 'Europe' and 'Asia' also reflect the need to label and categorise nations into larger civilisational units in order to strengthen ideas of the Self in contrast to the Others.

The phrase, 'The eagerness with which Russians have embraced strong rulers stems from those years' (lines 14-15) reflects two of the key patterns identified throughout this thesis. First, the use of the term 'Russians' in this sentence is ambiguous, and, a generalisation. This has the effect of homogenising 'the' society, and is a way that a 'nation' can be represented. Unifying 'the people' under a category such as 'Russians' facilitates the representation of a single 'Russia'. The nation is thereby totalized, which facilitates its representation and contributes towards its construction as a community. It enables Russia to be imagined. Second, the sentence also highlights the way in which history is an act of authoring. Sixsmith draws a subjective conclusion as he hypothesises that the 'eagerness with which Russians have embraced strong rulers *stems from those years* [added emphasis]'.

Russia's national narrative as a tragedy, whereby the country is trapped in a perpetual struggle between democracy and autocracy, is further made evident throughout the rest of the excerpt from line 14. Russia's rulers as a group are portrayed negatively, as only hoping to protect their power and 'shore up Tsarist autocracy' (line 28). Liberal democracy is again implicitly presented as the superior form of government in lines 21-23, and that several events prevented Russia from following this path.

Due to its length, I could not include Sixsmith's entire conclusion. While his text's concluding remark is not included in the excerpt, it is worth addressing here because it exemplifies not only Sixsmith's narrative of the Russian nation, but also strongly reflects discordus. Sixsmith concludes his text by stating that 'George Bush's suggestion at Christmas 1991 that Russia will now be 'like us' seemed misguided at the time and seems so today'.[532] The Western ethnocentric perspective is apparent through the inclusion of this reference. From Sixsmith's text, along with the cultural contextual knowledge employed in the interpretation of meaning, to be 'like us' most likely means to be a capitalist liberal democracy. Democratic capitalism is what unites the diverse national communities that constitute the West. To be 'like us', or, like the West, Russia needs to be a capitalist liberal democracy because the Western metanarrative is premised on such ideology.

[532] Sixsmith, *Russia: A 100-year Chronicle of the Wild East*, 530.

VII. A SHORT HISTORY OF RUSSIAN AUTHORITARIANISM

In the case studies of this thesis, I reverse engineered the sample history texts to understand how those texts were written. In this chapter, I reconstruct a version of Russian history which typifies the dominant discursive patterns. I deliberately employ the tools that the historians use to create a consistent narrative which is centred on Russian authoritarianism.

Accordingly, this chapter provides a short political history of Russia. It tells a story of Russia's authoritarian fate. The history explores the tension between democratic reform and autocratic consolidation which I identified as a dominant theme in the preceding case studies. The purpose of the chapter is to highlight the way in which authoritarianism can be framed as central to the Russian story. It demonstrates how all the literary tactics can be used together to create a cohesive narrative. The discordic tactics of backgrounding and foregrounding are crucial to this framing. Furthermore, through selective use of evidence, and the use of some of the key strategies of discordus such as Othering, homogenising, differentiation, and emplotment, I represent the nation of Russia as Other. Theme, tone, and binary opposition also contribute toward this construction of Russia. I have aimed to produce a text which highlights the strategies of discordus, but which does not exaggerate them to the point of parody. The text is written in such a way so that for a casual reader, it could pass for a legitimate summary of the history of Russia.

In my text, I depict authoritarianism as ingrained into 'Russia', thus the text constructs Russia as Other. Discordus permeates my text and plays a role in such Othering. Like the history texts analysed throughout this thesis, the basis of the narrative in this chapter is Russia's liminality. My text therefore demonstrates the dominant features of representations of the Russian nation identified in the case

studies: Russia is defined by its political culture, Russia is liminal, Russia is Othered because of its liminality, and Russia is ultimately represented as a tragic Other and a victim of its politics.

Some parts of my text deviate subtly from the more dominant plots of the histories analysed. For example, in the section covering the often-romanticised era of Peter the Great and Catherine the Great, I focus more on how Westernisation was not synonymous with democratisation. By emphasising the autocratic elements which continued to characterise Russia's political culture during that era, my text offers a somewhat different emplotment than the dominant approach identified in the case studies. This further demonstrates how selectivity and narrative framing can shape narratives of Russia, and, in turn, affect its discursive construction. However, the overarching narrative and representation of Russia conforms to the dominant representation of Russia identified in the sample texts.

Throughout the preceding chapters, I have emphasised the way that discourse tends to perpetuate similar kinds of discourse – that texts on Russia are used to produce similar texts on Russia. The source material for the history in this chapter is secondary texts on Russian history. The literary aspects of the secondary sources therefore influence the history because it relies on facts that historians have already preconfigured into narratives. Consequently, the history in this chapter was predestined (intentionally so) to conform to the dominant tropes of Anglophone histories of Russia.

This short history begins, like the first case study, with the history of the Mongol conquest. It ends with an account of the early post-Soviet period, weaving into the history references to the post-2000 era. It also includes material from time-periods which are not specifically analysed as case studies. This chapter therefore allows the reader to observe the various tropes characteristic of historical writing

about Russia. In the other chapters of my thesis, I presented only some episodes of the metanarrative and necessarily excluded others. It was not practically possible to produce case studies of the entirety of Russian history. In this chapter, I summarise whole of the narrative up to the Putin era. Readers are also able to observe the way that discordic themes are woven into the broader narrative of literary Russia across its 'existence'. In turn, this contextualises the case studies of the Mongol, Peter, World War II, and Putin epochs of Russian history. In short, I show how the parts fit into the whole. I include notes alongside my history text to highlight which tools and techniques that I have used to create a particular rendition of Russia. These are the same techniques that I identified and analysed in previous case studies. They include homogenisation, differentiation, backgrounding, foregrounding, emotive language, personification, theme, and emplotment. Within the history text, some key words are underlined to further draw the reader's attention to these techniques.

It is written as a political history because, as argued throughout the thesis, political culture is framed as the most salient point of difference between Russia and the West in historical discourse about Russia. Focusing on this allows for the tug-of-war narrative that is common across the sweeping histories (see Chapter VI) to be emphasised in a way that exaggerates the literary aspects for observational benefit.

A Short History of Russia

From Embryonic Democracy to Autocracy

The sub-title establishes the narrative and signals the tragic emplotment.

The conditions for the development of authoritarianism in Russia noticeably manifested during Mongol rule. The Mongol conquest provided a foundation for the autocratic society that emerged after Russia had regained its

The nomination 'Russia' imposes continuity and linearity on the nation of Russia. It connects events from the thirteenth century, prior to Russia becoming a nation in the modern sense, to contemporary Russia.

independence. Two factors were particularly significant for the emergence of Russian authoritarianism.

Imprecise use of national terminology.

First, the Mongols had mandated the eradication of the Russian popular assemblies, the veche. While most of these assemblies served an advisory rather than decisive role in princely policy, some assemblies acquired legislative capacity.[533] The Mongols recognised the institution as a potential outlet for resistance against their authority, and demanded that they cease.[534] Unfortunately, as Richard Pipes laments, the Mongols destroyed the 'only institution in some measure capable of restraining political authority'.[535] Eliminating the veche also eliminated society's active involvement in politics, heralding an era whereby society consisted of subjects rather than citizens. This was therefore a turning point toward authoritarianism.

Foregrounding: facts which conform to the narrative of democracy to autocracy are emphasised.

Anachronistic use of 'Russian'.

Facts shaped by the tragic emplotment – the beginning of the Fall.

Deployment of quote from eminent historian to add epistemic authority to claim. Use of adverb 'unfortunately' is normative and is intended, for narrative purposes, to influence emotional interpretation of the information.

Tone implies the destruction of the veche was a negative occurrence. Subjective conclusion presented as object fact.

Second, the nature of Mongol rule was such that Russian princes could strategically benefit from Mongol overlordship and consolidate their personal power bases. This eventually led to the emergence of autocracy after the liberation from Mongol control. Although ruled by the Mongol Khan, the Golden Horde did not occupy the Russian heartlands. Instead, the Mongols exercised control over Russia through the territory's princes. The Mongols only

Use of contemporary national terminology (Russian) connects Russia in time and space as a linear nation. Russia did not exist in the national form during the thirteenth century.

Anachronistic use of 'Russia'.

[533] Nicolai Petro, *The Rebirth of Russian Democracy* (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1995), 31; see also, Geoffrey Hosking, *Russian History: A Very Short Introduction* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 49.
[534] Richard Pipes, *Russia Under the Old Regime* (New York: Scribner, 1974), 31-56.
[535] Pipes, *Russia Under the Old Regime*, 56.

intervened directly in instances of rebellion, which they brutally quelled. This provided an example for Russia's leaders of how to manage centralised rule over vast lands. The Mongols' indirect form of rule enabled some of the princes to amass wealth and power through strategic use of their positions relative to the Khan. Over time, the princes of Moscow became the most dominant of the Russian princes, gradually acquiring other princes' territory, shirking Mongol rule, and forming the Muscovite state.[536] Russia's experience of Mongol domination destroyed the nascent democracy of Kievan Rus, but also provided the conditions for the formation of Russia.

Implicitly connects autocracy with the formation of Muscovy and nation-building. Presents autocracy as part of Russia's DNA.

Personification of the nation. Anachronistic and ambiguous use of 'Russia's'.

'Kievan Rus' is used in relation to democracy in contrast to 'Russia'.

Ambiguous use of national terminology.

Description of Russia as a homogenised, personified actor.

Foreshadowing.

Part of the apparent rationale for strong centralised governance was that it was necessary in order to mitigate Russia's susceptibility to invasion and ensure its independence.[537] Following brutal Mongol domination, safeguarding Russia's independence became paramount. Russian rulers throughout history would repeat similar justifications for intensifying their authority and reducing civil liberties, and thus promulgating an endless cycle of authoritarianism.

Imprecise use of national terminology. What does 'Russia' mean here?

Use of adjective 'brutal' against implied 'non-brutal' (Western?) forms of domination.

Ambiguous and anachronistic use of national terminology.

Metacommentary embeds past events into the broader narrative of Russia. Uses tragic emplotment – Russia cannot escape its fate.

It is unlikely that the Muscovite princes were solely, or perhaps even predominantly, motivated to unite the lands of Russia under their rule exclusively to guarantee the lands'

Opinion.

[536] Roger Bartlett *A History of Russia* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005).
[537] Marie Mendras, *Russian Politics: The Paradox of a Weak State* (London: Hurst & Company, 2012), 31; Geoffrey Hosking, *Russian History: A Very Short Introduction*, 84-85.

security and independence. Pipes' analysis of patrimonial practices in Muscovite Russia raises another more convincing possibility: becoming ruler of all the lands of Russia led to more extensive political authority. Importantly for Russian princes, this created greater opportunities to expand personal wealth and acquire and maintain the associated lifestyle benefits.[538] In the contemporary context, benefits of membership in the political elite remain remarkably unchanged.

Citing of historian for epistemic authority.

'More convincing' is subjective.

'Importantly' is subjective.

Metacommmentary suggests path dependency which is characteristic of the tragic emplotment.

Subtle normative judgement in regard to contemporary Russia.

Russian princes ruled the lands which they owned. The core benefit of this was the ability to profit, not only from the land, but also to collect tribute from those who lived in their territories. Under this system, princes ostensibly regarded political authority as a 'commodity' and a means of acquiring wealth through tribute and, subsequently, taxes.[539] A patrimonial state began to develop whereby rulers' personal property was indistinguishable from state property, and the economic and political became inextricably linked. It was therefore in the princes' personal interests to acquire more Russian lands for themselves. Accordingly, another possibility for the Muscovite princes' determination for 'gathering Russian lands' is that it was economically beneficial for them.[540] As Pipes describes, the Moscow princes turned Russia into their own 'giant royal estate'.[541]

Ambiguous and anachronistic use of national terminology.

Although this section does not make direct links to the contemporary Russian regime, it establishes patrimonialism as a defining feature of the nation of Russia.

Ambiguous and anachronistic use of national terminology.

Ambiguous and anachronistic use of national terminology.

[538] Pipes, *Russia Under the Old Regime*.
[539] Pipes, *Russia Under the Old Regime*, 41.
[540] Glenn Curtis, *Russia: A Country Study* (Washington: Library of Congress, 1998), 12.
[541] Pipes, *Russia Under the Old Regime*, 21.

Given that vast portions of the country were the votchina (a form of clear hereditary property title in pre-Petrine Russia) of the princes, there was limited scope for restrictions on the princes' authority or increased popular rights. Such proprietary mentality is significant for the evolution of authoritarian political culture since this way of perceiving the lands and its people shaped the princes' methods of governance. It established the precedent in Russia for a vertical and imbalanced state-society relationship and a self-perpetuating circuit of patrimonialism and autocracy that remains intact today.

The text is here foregrounding developments in high politics, and presenting them as the story of a homogenised Russia.

Ambiguous and anachronistic use of national terminology.

Concept of authoritarianism used as organising principle for history of Russia.

Connects facts and events to authoritarianism and the overarching narrative. Causal links. Foreshadowing and direct link to contemporary autocracy.

Use of contemporary concepts to frame and interpret the past (vertical state-society).

Unsurprisingly therefore, by the sixteenth century, the Muscovite state was under the rule of a single person: the tsar. Formally mandating the title of 'tsar' for Russia's rulers in 1547, Ivan IV (the Terrible) instigated several reforms which enlarged the powers of the tsar and further reduced the risk of other groups in society accumulating power. For example, assuming the title of tsar placed the ruler of Russia on par with emperors and rulers of leading Western civilisations. It had symbolic as well as practical significance for the autocratic institution. Ivan believed that Russian autocracy was superior. He criticised the British parliamentary system, and evidently regarded Queen Elizabeth as an imperfect monarch for allowing others a formal role in governance. For

'Unsurprisingly' is subjective and conveys a sense of inevitability. Use of the term 'unsurprisingly' suggests that past events put Russia on a particular trajectory toward autocracy. Based on the past, autocratic rule was almost inevitable.

The theme of power becomes even more prominent in this section of the text.

'On par' suggests a Russian inferiority complex vis-à-vis Europe.

Use of 'Western' implies that Russia is not Western.

Reifies the West.

Implies that a particularly Russian kind of autocracy existed.

Use of extended quote adds authority to claims.

example, corresponding with Elizabeth I, Ivan wrote:

> We believed that you were the queen of your state and attended to the honor and interests of your state . . . It appears, however, that in your country other persons around you wield power, including men of commerce, and that they attend not to the chief officials of your state or the honor and interests of the country but seek their own commercial profit.[542]

For Ivan, the issue was one of power.

Speculation presented as fact.

Of the various social classes in Russia, Ivan IV was particularly suspicious of the boyars, the most elite group in Russian society at that time and the predominant land-owners aside from the tsar. Boyars could amass private wealth and enjoyed relative freedom. This proved both a threat and a limit to the regime's political and economic power, and Ivan sought to ameliorate the dual economic and political risk they posed to him. The stage was set, and hundreds of years later the oligarchs of early Post-Soviet Russia presented a similar risk for Putin.

Differentiation: ruler and boyars

Foreshadowing and metacommentary which indicate persistent patterns in Russian history.

Political police and repression implied as part of Russia's historical experience and in turn its national identity.

One of the tsar's most infamous reforms to curtail the boyars' power was the oprichnina. In 1565, with the assistance of his brutal secret police corps known as the oprichniki, Ivan stripped the boyars of votchina, converting the land to the tsar's property.[543]The oprichniki was the precursor to the notorious Okhrana, Cheka, NKVD, and the

'infamous' is subjective and carries normative meaning.

Connects institutions in time.

'notorious' is subjective and carries normative meaning.

Emplotment. Lists organisations from different times together.

[542] Quoted in Alexander Polunov, *Russia in the Nineteenth Century: Autocracy, Reform, and Social Change, 1814-1914* (Armonk: M.E Sharpe, 2005), 9.
[543] See Curtis, *Russia*, 13; Bartlett, *A History of Russia*, 41-63.

KGB. The tsar bestowed the surviving aristocrats with pomestia in another area. Pomestie became another form of land title subpar to votchina, but superior to a modern tenancy. Boyars with pomestie possessed the land which could be passed down to heirs, yet continued possession was contingent upon rendering services to the tsar. In confiscating boyar votchina, Ivan IV had subjugated an entire class, significantly reducing the boyars' power and autonomy while augmenting his own.[544] The synonymy of political authority with economic enrichment therefore contributed to the development of patrimonial autocracy in Russia. These events highlight the unmistakable bourgeoning of the political elite's fear of the people, in this case, the economic elite. This also represents an early historical example of Russia's perpetual authoritarian struggle to balance repression, co-optation, and freedom. While Ivan IV disbanded the oprichnina in 1572, the remainder of his rule was characterised by violence and repression, which targeted nearly all social groups in his tsardom.[545]

The text is written in a way which works on the basis of a narrative structure with a beginning, a middle, and an ending. The text frames events of the past (here, Ivan IV's crackdown on perceived threats to his power) in light of the ending to the story (Putin's autocratic Russian Federation). How the story ends is crucial for deciding what to foreground and background. To create a coherent narrative, the text must selectively incorporate and frame events which connect the dots to Russia of the twenty-first century.

Theme: consolidation of autocracy

Russia cannot escape its innate struggles. Clear tragic overtones.

The largest class, the peasants, also suffered reduced freedom under Ivan IV through the imposition of policies that legally bound peasants to the lands they worked. This eradicated any vestiges of freedom of movement for the majority of Russia's population, and placed peasants at the

Anachronistic use of the concept of 'freedom of movement'. While the words could be taken literally, a Western audience might associate the expression with the political right of freedom of movement.

[544] Curtis, *Russia*, 13; Bartlett, *A History of Russia*, 41-63.
[545] Bartlett, *A History of Russia*, 61; Curtis, *Russia*, 15.

mercy of the servitor class (dvoriane) who 'owned', or held pomestie, over the estates. For example, dvoriane could sell, trade and even mortgage peasants.[546] The tsar restricted peasant freedom to the extent that it eventually gave rise to serfdom, which reached its peak in the eighteenth century. Peasants were commodified, yet nevertheless were required to pay taxes.[547] The restriction of peasant freedom epitomises the duality of pre-Petrine authoritarian political culture and pervasive patrimonial attitudes. As Curtis notes, these reforms 'subordinated the people to the state' and, through doing so, forced Russia further into a system characterised almost exclusively by vertical state-society relations.[548] Restricting freedom and removing power from the people to retain and increase the regime's power became a recurring theme throughout Russia's history.

Use of another historian's words to corroborate the idea.

Negative connotations of the word 'forced' implies that vertical political structures are 'bad'. From a Western perspective, they are. Demonstrates subtle ethnocentrism.

Repression as a motif.

Theme of power is apparent.

Differentiation between regime and 'the people'.

An opportunity for a change in governance style presented itself upon the death of Ivan's son Fedor in 1598, which ended the Rurik line (the widely accepted and, according to the sixteenth century Orthodox Church, divinely endorsed, ruling dynasty). Some boyar factions were partial to adopting more constitutional practices. However, the years following Fedor's demise were chaotic. The period is dubbed the 'Time of Troubles' because it was characterised by

Differentiation between parts of 'Russian' society.

[546] Curtis, *Russia*, 15-18; Bartlett, *A History of Russia*, 61-62.
[547] Bartlett, *A History of Russia*, 61-62.
[548] Curtis, Russia,18.

famine and war. This prompted the influential elite to support the continuation of tsarist absolutism which they perceived as the most effective means of restoring stability.[549] Russians accepted autocracy over freedom, a pattern repeated over centuries.

'accepted' autocracy frames Russians as passive subordinates. Generalisation of 'Russians' where the use of synecdoche creates an impression of homogeneity.

Anachronistic and ambiguous use of national terminology.

Obvious framing in the tragic mode.

Again, the text explicitly signposts the main narrative.

Having decided to retain tsarism, the provisional government convened an assembly of a relatively broad cross-section of society, called zemskie sobory,[550] which elected Mikhail Romanov as the new tsar in 1613.[551] Electing a new tsar ironically shattered the possibility of a shift away from authoritarianism, as Mikhail strove to consolidate his position as tsar and through doing so strengthened the autocratic institution. Features of the pre-Petrine system that had the potential to develop into progressive semi-democratic institutions, such as the zemskie sobory and the smaller-scale tsar's council or duma, progressively ceased to exist during the course of the seventeenth century. The council mainly served to legitimise the tsar's policies, and served as a 'proto-cabinet' instead of a 'proto-parliament' and were 'occasions' rather than institutions.[552] However, at least the regime recognised the benefit of displaying some appreciation,

The framing of this section continues to create an impression of a Russia which is continually fluctuating between democratisation and autocratisation.

'progressive' is subjective and reflects ethnocentric bias in favour of democracy.

Differentiation continues. Generates representation of barbaric regime and victims.

Use of 'regime' instead of 'government' accentuates difference from 'Western' political culture.

[549] Bartlett, *A History of Russia*, 64-69.
[550] 'Zemsky sobory' is name used by historians to describe the institution but the term was not contemporaneous of the seventeenth century.
[551] Petro, *The Rebirth of Russian Democracy*, 32.
[552] Pipes, *Russia Under the Old Regime* 106; Hosking, *Russian History*, 90.

limited as it may have been, for popular consultation. It further suggests that some degree of reciprocal connection existed between rulers and the ruled. As the Romanovs gained power, they relied on the duma less and it gradually disappeared, which further extended the divide between regime and society. The Romanovs decided that the façade of popular involvement in politics was no longer necessary to remain in power.[553]

Class as a framing device.

Although the distance between state and society had widened, the authoritarian socio-political system in pre-Petrine Russia narrowed the scope for resistance against the regime. Aside from the regime's mandate for its subjects to report on their neighbours, upper social classes such as the boyars and the dvoriane were reluctant to challenge the crown's monopoly on political power because their livelihood depended on the tsar's favour.[554] Since the tsar possessed the most superior title to the lands, the crown prevented others from accumulating power by precluding development of significant 'pockets of wealth'.[555] The tsar was the 'source of all material benefits' and, because the majority of land possessors held the land via pomestie, serving the tsar was mandatory.[556] Consequently, for pomestie holders to challenge the tsar's authority would have at minimum

[553] Pipes, *Russia Under the Old Regime,* 107; see also Petro, *The Rebirth of Russian Democracy,* 34.
[554] Despite this, members of the upper classes occasionally conspired to orchestrate coups throughout the 1680s, which highlights the necessity of managing competing factions of the political elite.
[555] Pipes, *Russia Under the Old Regime*.
[556] Pipes, *Russia Under the Old Regime*.

resulted in financial ruin.[557]

The lower classes of pre-Petrine Russian society, however, conducted the largest-scale revolt against the regime which required a state military campaign to subdue. Stenka Razin, a Don Cossack who claimed to be the true tsar, led an army of approximately 200,000 to Moscow to depose the tsar in 1670, and allegedly usher in an era of freedom and equality. His army consisted predominantly of disenfranchised and fugitive peasants. The Kremlin publicly tortured and executed Razin.[558] The regime was struggling to remain balanced on the tightrope of autocracy, and chose to strengthen repression rather than negotiate. Its repressive methods of addressing displays of discontentment with its rule facilitated an on-going cycle of authoritarianism.[559]

Emphasis on class divisions: foreshadowing and foregrounding.

Themes of repression and power are emphasised.

More explicit commentary to signpost the narrative and, in turn, remind the reader of Russia's tragic fate.

Westernisation not Democratisation

Peter I (the Great) Westernised Russian culture and politics to an unprecedented degree throughout his reign (r.1682-1725). In an apparent departure from Russia's pre-established patrimonial political culture, Peter sought to establish a Western-inspired state supported by an impersonalised bureaucratic structure and accountability for the newly introduced civil service. He strove

Text interprets an entire period in terms of Russia's journey towards, or away from, the West.

Imprecise use of 'Russia'.

Text again uses West as frame of reference.

Imprecise use of 'Russia'.

[557] Today, challenging the Putin regime can have similar results for the business elite.
[558] Curtis, *Russia*, 18; Martin Sixsmith, *Russia: A 1000-Year Chronicle of the Wild East* (London: Random House, 2012), 69.
[559] Future Russian leaders' such as Catherine the Great, and, more contemporaneously, Vladimir Putin, recognised the need to co-opt the people to some extent to guarantee the regime's survival.

to reduce patron-client and hereditary methods of entry into administrative roles, thereby promoting meritocracy.[560] Peter brought Russia closer to the West than ever before. Unfortunately, despite the promise of Westernisation, the project was derailed by Russia's Asiatic political heritage.

'Unfortunately' is subjective and reflects my values as a Westerner.

Imprecise use of 'Russia'. Reification of 'Asiatic'.

Autocratic ideals flourished as Peter embraced principles of absolute monarchy whereby the monarch possessed complete, unrestrained political authority over the realm. Peter reportedly passed a law declaring the tsar, 'an autocratic monarch who need answer to no one on earth for his deeds but holds power and authority, his states and lands, as a most Christian monarch, to govern by his own will and good judgment'.[561] In pursuing his absolutist agenda, Peter abolished the Orthodox Church's patriarchate, which subjugated the Church to the state and removed the Church as a 'moral restraint' on his authority.[562] Along with, and perhaps in pursuit of, the augmentation of autocratic power, Peter also further reduced societal freedoms across classes, despite the fact that he also improved property rights. Legal changes restrained peasants further, and endorsed serfdom, while the nobility was directed on what were once personal decisions, including how to dress (Peter mandated Western dress for the court aristocracy) and style hair.[563]

Foregrounding and backgrounding: The text foregrounds Peter's absolutism. The context implies that absolutism is 'Asiatic'. The text makes no mention of the fact that absolutism was a common orientation for monarchs throughout Europe during this period.

Foregrounding of issue of clothing to emphasise comparison with West. The West as the reference point.

[560] Bartlett, *A History of Russia*; Hosking, *Russian History*; Petro, *The Rebirth of Russian Democracy*.
[561] Quoted in Polunov, *Russia in the Nineteenth Century*, 15.
[562] Petro, *The Rebirth of Russian Democracy* 35; Polunov, *Russia in the Nineteenth Century*, 15.
[563] Bartlett, *A History of Russia*, 91.

Although Peter continued to encourage people to denounce their neighbours for disloyalty to Russia, he established the Preobrazhenskii Prikaz, which became a 'prototype' police state structure.[564] The organisation exercised more covert methods of control and punishment than Ivan IV's oprichniki, which paved the way for future Russian regimes' use of such organs to suppress rebellion, and, via extension, enable authoritarian regimes to survive.[565] Today, the primacy of the security services in governance highlights the permanency of this suspicion of others and the continuity of spy culture in Russia. In 1702, Peter also introduced the first Russian newspaper, Vedomosti, but primarily used it as state propaganda.[566] Accordingly, Peter entrenched control of the press and 'top-down' journalism into Russian culture.[567] Peter's changes to Russian cultural and political life promoted significant unrest throughout society, but particularly developed amongst cultural and religious traditionalists and the disenfranchised nobility.[568] Consequently, upon Peter's demise, various elite groups throughout the eighteenth century endeavoured to advance progressive governance ideas, including constitutional monarchism.[569]

Depicts spy culture as a core element of Russian national identity.

Theme: repression.

Backgrounding: Westernisation efforts.

Foregrounding: Peter fuelling internal conflict.

Normative language: progressive has positive connotations. Constitutional monarchism portrayed as 'good'.

[564] Pipes, *Russia Under the Old Regime* 129-130.
[565] Stephen J. Lee, *Russia and the USSR, 1855-1991: Autocracy and Dictatorship* (Oxon: Routledge, 2006), 71.
[566] See Anna Aruntunyan, *The Media in Russia* (London: McGraw-Hill, 2009, 59; Nadezhda Azhgikhina, "The Struggle for Press Freedom in Russia: Reflections of a Russian Journalist," *Europe-Asia Studies* 59, no. 8 (2007): 1254-1255.
[567] Aruntunyan, *The Media in Russia*, 59.
[568] Bartlett, *A History of Russia*, 90.
[569] Curtis, *Russia*, 106.

After a number of coups and competition for rule, the Privy Council, established by Peter's successor Catherine I, endorsed Peter's niece Anne for empress. The Council, composed primarily of the most powerful noble families, sponsored Anne provided that she agreed to their terms. The Council, spearheaded by Prince Golitsyn, convinced Anne to sign a charter in 1730 which constrained her authority and imbued the Council with power traditionally reserved for the tsar.[570] However, this attempt to reconfigure Russia's governing structure and modify the tsarist institution failed, primarily due to a lack of wider elite support. Many of the dvoriane class feared that Golitsyn's changes would result in an oligarchy, which would disadvantage them more than autocracy.[571] As Lefort, an emissary living in Moscow at the time professed, 'who will guarantee us that in time, instead of one sovereign, we shall not have as many tyrants as there are members sitting in the council, and that their oppressive policies will not worsen our bondage?'[572] Knowing that she had the support of key dvoriane, Anne reportedly publically shredded the charter of conditions that limited her power, and proceeded to strengthen autocracy. Unsurprisingly, one of her first steps to this effect was abolishing the Privy Council.[573] Just as it had done following the end of the Rurik line, Russians accepted autocracy because they

Emphasis remains on high politics.

Imprecise use of 'Russia'.

Inclusion of evidence to support claim. Enhances veneer of objectivity.

[570] Pipes, *Russia Under the Old Regime*, 184.
[571] Petro, *The Rebirth of Russian Democracy* 38; Pipes, *Russia Under the Old Regime*, 185.
[572] Cited in Pipes, *Russia Under the Old Regime*, 12.
[573] Curtis, *Russia*, 106).

perceived it to be the lesser evil.[574] Similar logic has presented throughout history. Russians have repeatedly accepted authoritarianism over more liberal forms of governance, and not because they necessarily regarded it as ideal. For them, authoritarianism was the invariably superior choice as it ensured stability and continuity.

Use of 'Russians' is vague. Sweeping generalisation.

Familiar pattern whereby limits to autocracy are introduced, but then scaled back. Tug-of-war between democracy and autocracy.

Imprecise use of the term 'Russians'. Homogenises 'Russians'.

Generalisation and conjecture.

Liberalising Russia

Sub-heading signposts the narrative. Ambiguous use of national terminology.

In 1762, Catherine II (the Great) seized power. Despite the fact that she acquired power through a coup against her husband, Catherine seemed to desire a less authoritarian Russia. During the earlier years of her reign as Empress, Catherine steered Russia in a democratic direction.[575] In many respects, Catherine continued Peter's Westernisation project, but promoted greater ideological change than Peter had pursued. As an avid admirer of Western Enlightenment philosophy, she increased the rights of the nobility, decentralised state control, promoted independent intellectual thought, encouraged interest in political ideas, and established a legislative commission.[576] Established in 1766, the legislative commission involved a broad spectrum of

Use of contemporary concept (Westernisation) to frame events of the past.

Homogenisation of the West.

Foregrounding: emphasis on the 'good' liberal aspects of Catherine's reign.

Backgrounding: Suppression of facts which complicate the image of Catherine as a liberal reformer.

[574] Pipes, *Russia Under the Old Regime* 185.
[575] Sixsmith, *Russia: A 1000-Year Chronicle of the Wild East*, 89.
[576] See Petro, *The Rebirth of Russian Democracy*; Pipes, *Russia Under the Old Regime*, 254-256; Hosking, *Russian History*; Sixsmith, *Russia: A 1000-Year Chronicle of the Wild East*, 89; Polunov, *Russia in the Nineteenth Century*, 16-17).

Russian society in politics, and gave members from most social classes the opportunity to participate in politics by codifying Russian legislation. Members were popularly elected, and there were provisions to ensure representation of ethnic minorities and the lowest classes.[577] Furthermore, her decentralisation policy, which provided locals with the power to administer their regions, reduced some of her power despite the fact that she remained the superior authority.[578] It enabled regions to articulate their interests even when such interests conflicted with central policy.[579] In contrast to her mostly power-hoarding predecessors, Catherine enshrined civil liberties for the nobility, and created a charter of inviolable rights for nobles vis-à-vis the state.[580]

Ethnocentrism: the text is clearly biased in favour of 'Western' values.

Her changes created the space for civil society to develop and the freedom for an array of alternative beliefs to be shared. However, while Catherine legalised private printing presses in 1783, she also mandated preliminary censorship, which suggests that she was strategically balancing freedom with repression for political advantage.[581] Consequently, as in the case of Peter the Great, historians have questioned Catherine's motives for reform. As Petro asserts, Catherine was

The text remedies some of the imbalance of the previous use of backgrounding and foregrounding. Strategic lifting of those tactics to suit the shift in narrative from democratic reform to consolidation of autocracy again.

[577] Petro, *The Rebirth of Russian Democracy,* 36.
[578] Bartlett, *A History of Russia*, 119.
[579] Petro, *The Rebirth of Russian Democracy,* 37.
[580] Curtis, *Russia*, 26; Polunov, *Russia in the Nineteenth Century*,16-17.
[581] Aruntunyan, *The Media in Russia*, 60.

'keenly aware of the possibility of insurrection' and recognised the necessity of co-opting the elite if she was to retain power.[582] He further suggests that her concessions to the nobility were in the interests of 'self-preservation'.[583] Hosking likewise contends that, since Catherine acquired power through a coup, she needed to initiate changes that would legitimise her rule.[584] Speransky, a contemporary of Catherine's, argued that her commitment to liberal values was superficial. He wrote that 'our laws might sound like they were written in England, but our system of government is that of Turkey'.[585] This encapsulates the polarity of Russian politics, which is still apparent in the twenty-first century.

Alludes to the liminality of the Russian nation.

Another clear link to contemporary Russia which further consolidates Russia's identity in the text.

The latter years of Catherine's rule cast doubt on her commitment to Enlightenment thinking. Catherine became concerned at the prospect of losing power when confronted with popular discontent, and encountered pressure from the Commission for reforms increasing the power of the people.[586] Her experiences of the Pugachev Rebellion, although encountered early in her reign in 1773, perhaps tainted Catherine's idealism and sowed the seed of insecurity which proved insurmountable by her initially liberal policies. The rebellion was the most

Subjective. It casts doubt on it for the author. This is one example which highlights how historians connect the facts in a certain way project a particular representation of Catherine that fits into the broader story.

[582] Petro, The Rebirth of Russian Democracy, 36.
[583] Petro, *The Rebirth of Russian Democracy,* 36.
[584] Hosking, Russian History, 134.
[585] Cited in Sixsmith, *Russia: A 1000-Year Chronicle of the Wild East*, 103.
[586] Hosking, *Russian History,* 135-136.

significant of Catherine's reign, initiated by Pugachev, a Don Cossack, who was dissatisfied with her secularisation of Russia. During her last decade as Empress, Catherine apparently feared that the permeation of liberal ideas would spark an uprising in Russia on a scale similar to that of the revolution which was taking place at that time in France.[587] As Polunov encapsulates, the regime 'increasingly began to regard society with suspicion'.[588] Catherine eventually dissolved the Legislative Commission and scaled back her relatively liberal reform scheme, but not to the extent that Russia returned to its entirely autocratic norm. Despite her subsequent conservatism, Catherine introduced civic space into Russia, something which would prove detrimental to the Romanovs for the next century.

Differentiation between the regime and the population.

Foreshadowing.

Imprecise use of national language.

In an effort to suffocate the civic space introduced by his mother, Paul I, Catherine's successor, committed to restoring the unrestrained autocracy of the Emperor.[589] He reversed a number of Catherine's reforms, augmented the secret police, enshrined greater censorship in law, and re-introduced corporal punishment.[590] Paul greatly feared the Russian people, a fear which was perhaps not unfounded since he was murdered in 1801. Paul's

Emotive language: 'suffocate'.

Epitomises the genre of tragedy.

Homogenisation: 'the Russian people'.

[587] Sixsmith, *Russia: A 1000-Year Chronicle of the Wild East*, 99; J. Westwood, *Endurance and Endeavour: Russian History, 1812-2001* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 28.
[588] Polunov, *Russia in the Nineteenth Century*, 16.
[589] Bartlett, *A History of Russia*, 121.
[590] Note that Paul did give peasants the right to petition him concerning any ill treatment by their lords – Hosking, *Russian History*, 139.

replacement, Alexander I, had liberal inclinations, but, after several attempts on his life, opted for retaliation and repression.[591] He also lacked sufficient elite support necessary to effectively engineer substantive governance changes.[592] This highlights a key point of continuity throughout Russian history: even if the ruler sought to limit authoritarianism, they were nevertheless, despite having theoretically absolute power, agents of the system in which they existed. By Alexander's reign (r. 1801–1825), autocratic conditions had become entrenched in Russia's political system, and changing that would promote unrest. For example, Peter I and Catherine II's changes to tradition and norms provoked resistance from large sections of the populous and threatened to destabilise the regime, but also society more broadly.[593] By this time, autocracy was Russia's hereditary curse.

Another implied suggestion that autocracy is an inescapable part of the nation of Russia.

'entrenched' suggests difficult to change.

Tragic emplotment evident – 'Russia's hereditary curse'.

Emotive language.

Consolidating and Retracting Autocracy

Nicholas I (r. 1825-1855) encountered similar problems with resistance. However, he strove to repress rather than negotiate with the discontented masses. In 1825, the year he assumed power, a group of approximately 3,000 army liberals gathered in Senate Square and demanded an end to serfdom and the convocation of a constitutional

Theme: Repression

Mismatch between claim and evidence. Claim – the masses were discontented – and evidence – 3,000 army liberals protested.

[591] Sixsmith, *Russia: A 1000-Year Chronicle of the Wild East*, 111.
[592] See Polunov, *Russia in the Nineteenth Century*, 21-34; Bartlett, *A History of Russia*, 121.
[593] Similarly to today, a number of groups within society had interests in maintaining the status quo political system due to patron-client vertical socio-political structures.

monarchy.[594] The group, subsequently dubbed 'the Decembrists', left a 'legacy of inspiration for future generations of rebels against autocracy and repression'.[595] Nicholas ordered that the gathering be dissolved by force, and hundreds of the activists died. The surviving leaders were executed. Nicholas responded to the revolt 'with a retreat into the deepest, most repressive traditions of Russian autocracy'.[596] Nicholas heavily censored the press and waged the 'censorship terror' in response to the revolutions in Europe.[597] He created the secret 'Third Section' of the police force, strengthening Russia's already prolific spy culture. Apart from reporting on dissidents, the Third Section was tasked with surreptitiously shaping public opinion.[598] Nicholas' sweeping reforms reversed much of the liberal progress instigated by less authoritarian rulers. Despite this, a miniscule civic space remained. Perhaps Nicholas' assault on civil liberties increased its impetus for survival since a number of smaller-scale revolts, mainly by peasantry, occurred throughout his reign.[599]

'Russian autocracy' implies that there is a uniquely Russian form of autocracy. Again, the text alludes to an inseparability between Russian national identity and autocratic governance.

Foregrounding facts which support the plot of democracy-autocracy-democracy-autocracy.

Theme: Repression.

Note the use of language which has negative connotations.

The fluctuation between liberal reforms and autocratic consolidation continues. Here, Russia is represented as having another chance at becoming 'like us'.

When Alexander II (r. 1855 – 1881) became Tsar in 1855, he recognised that it was imperative for his

[594] Petro, *The Rebirth of Russian Democracy* 40; Polunov, *Russia in the Nineteenth Century*, 38.
[595] Sixsmith, *Russia: A 1000-Year Chronicle of the Wild East,* 113.
[596] Sixsmith, *Russia: A 1000-Year Chronicle of the Wild East*, 115.
[597] Aruntunyan, *The Media in Russia*, 61.
[598] Bartlett, *A History of Russia*, 123.
[599] Bartlett, *A History of Russia*, 139.

survival to implement liberal reforms. He reduced censorship, freed the serfs despite the danger of social upheaval, and re-introduced local government.[600] While it is difficult unequivocally to understand Alexander's motives, it is possible that he genuinely envisioned the creation of civil society.[601] Based on his efforts to liberalise Russian politics, perhaps Alexander's justification for his aversion to a constitution was not merely an excuse to prevent dilution of his power, but reflected an understanding of the system and what was required to retain stability.[602] He reportedly stated: 'I would be prepared to sign any constitution right now, at this desk, if I were convinced that it was useful for Russia. But I know that if I were to do so today, Russia would fall to pieces tomorrow.'[603] Alexander introduced fundamental features which advanced the rule of law such as a more transparent judicial system, complete with public trials and juries constituted by ordinary members of the public including peasants.[604] As Hosking observes, this was 'the first serious limitation on autocracy, since it implied that law, as determined by

Speculation. Evidence curated to suit the narrative.

Use of eminent historian to reinforce the interpretation.

[600] Bartlett, *A History of Russia*, 154.
[601] Hosking, *Russian History* 187.
[602] By 1881, Alexander had decided to sign a constitution, however was assassinated before he could do so.
[603] Cited in Polunov, *Russia in the Nineteenth Century*, 116.
[604] Bartlett, *A History of Russia*, 156.

courts, was the highest authority'.[605] However, decisions were not uniformly respected by the state.

Shift toward democracy strengthens.

In 1864, he created local government institutions called zemstva which the sectors of local populations elected for a fixed three-year term. Local zemstva then elected representatives to provincial zemstva.[606] Alexander was laying the foundation for a system capable of justly and peacefully restraining autocracy. These institutions had a significant degree of autonomy which extended to their authority to collect taxes. However, the zemstva eventually began to exceed their authority and thereby jeopardised the regime's power since they had adopted a stance of 'systematic opposition to the government'.[607] They became civil society centres, and began to pressure the government to introduce constitutional monarchy.[608] Student protests also erupted, pushing for greater academic freedom. Peasants likewise rebelled, and terrorist groups became increasingly active. Alexander provided the people with a measure of freedom and they used the newly available public sphere to pressure the government and demand more.[609] Accompanied by mounting societal discontent, Alexander II was assassinated by Narodnaya Volya

Theme: power.

The Russian experience of freedom is also portrayed as an experience of violence. It reinforces the idea that attempts at liberalising are destined to backfire.

[605] Hosking, Russian History, 187.
[606] Petro, *The Rebirth of Russian Democracy* 42; Herbert McCloskey and Elliot Turner, *The Soviet Dictatorship* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1960), 34; Polunov, *Russia in the Nineteenth Century*, 112.
[607] Cited in Petro, *The Rebirth of Russian Democracy*, 43.
[608] Petro, *The Rebirth of Russian Democracy,* 43.
[609] Polunov, *Russia in the Nineteenth Century*, 143.

(People's Will) in 1881.[610]

The Kremlin, now headed by Alexander II's son, Alexander III (r. 1881 – 1894), strove to reduce the power of the zemstva and increased repression. His father's failed attempts at more liberal rule likely influenced Alexander III's staunch support for autocracy and commitment to 'counter-reforms'.[611] Reportedly influenced by Konstantin Pobedonostsev, a pro-autocracy advocate and leader of the Holy Synod of the Orthodox Church, Alexander implemented an array of reforms to solidify autocratic tradition.[612] He granted broader powers to the police which enabled them to suspend the courts, halt meetings and close newspapers.[613] Alexander III endeavoured to snuff out civil society, just as Paul I had done eight decades previously. Progress eluded Russia as history repeated itself. Civic action only prompted greater repression. Despite this, anti-establishment groups such as liberals, Marxists, and narodniki proliferated under Alexander's reign.[614]

Synecdoche – 'the Kremlin' means Alexander III's regime.

Return to autocracy.

Foregrounding pattern of repression in Russian history.

Strong normative comments and embeds Alexander III's action within the grand narrative of Russia.

Ambiguous use of national terminology.

Once Nicholas II (r. 1894 – 1917) came to power in 1894 he was inundated with zemstva petitions for a 'popularly elected national assembly'.[615] Local self-

[610] Hosking, *Russian History,* 187.
[611] Polunov, *Russia in the Nineteenth Century*, 174; Lee, *Russia and the USSR, 1855-1991,* 3.
[612] Polunov, *Russia in the Nineteenth Century*, 174-176; Lee, *Russia and the USSR, 1855-1991*, 3.
[613] Hosking, *Russian History,* 192.
[614] Robert Service, *A History of Modern Russia* (London: Penguin Books, 2003), 18.
[615] Petro, *The Rebirth of Russian Democracy* 44.

government showed society that it could participate in politics and that given a national institution, could also shape the national agenda. Clearly, this challenged autocratic ideals.[616] By the turn of the century, assassinations of the political elite, workers' strikes, and demonstrations against the Kremlin and for national representative government had become frequent in a context of increasing poverty.[617] Nicholas II, like many Russian rulers before him, struggled to balance repression and concessions.[618] Zemstva enabled various social classes to establish 'spheres of political influence distinct from, and often in opposition to, the government'.[619] Zemstva, schools, and unions provided environments for dissent and civil society development. Rather than complementing each other, the state and civil society developed a deeply antagonistic relationship and became opponents.[620]

The text is organised according to reign, which is typical of history texts on Russia.

Ambiguity in the term 'Russian'.

Differentiation – the state and civil society as distinct components of the nation of Russia.

Popular dissent became impossible to ignore by January 1905, when Nicholas II's forces massacred hundreds of participants in what began as a non-violent demonstration outside the Winter Palace in St Petersburg. 'Bloody Sunday' proved a significant turning point for the tsarist institution. In killing the people

Emotive language: 'massacred'.

[616] Petro, *The Rebirth of Russian Democracy* 44.
[617] Bartlett, *A History of Russia*, 160; Petro 1995: 45; Brown 2009: 40-47; Polunov, *Russia in the Nineteenth Century*,189-193.
[618] Bartlett, *A History of Russia*, 166.
[619] Petro, *The Rebirth of Russian Democracy,* 46.
[620] Hosking, *Russian History*, 191.

instead of listening to their concerns, the symbolic image of the tsar as the father to the people had been shattered.[621] As Hosking explains, 'its resonance was especially powerful because most Russians, whatever they thought of their local bosses, regarded the Tsar as a benign "little father"'.[622] This reaction stimulated fierce discontent among Russians. Any positive illusions about the autocracy dissolved.[623] Reportedly, the tsar's popularity declined significantly, uprisings increased, and 'soviets', workers' councils, emerged.[624] Large-scale strikes and demonstrations continued for the remainder of the year. By October, over one hundred million people were on strike across the country.[625] Once strikes halted industry, Nicholas decided to concede to the people's demands and prepared the 'October Manifesto' promising to increase civil liberties through a constitution and establish a popular national assembly to pass legislation.[626]

Imprecise use of national terminology. Homogenises Russians.

Imprecise use of language with unifying effect– 'the People'.

Homogenisation: 'the people'.

Adhering to his promises, Nicholas legalised political parties and introduced a parliament, the Duma, in 1905, which first assembled in 1906. The people had acquired a modicum of institutional power. Despite this,

'The people' as a homogenising expression. Imprecise.

[621] See Brown 2009: 42-43; Read 1996; Hosking 2012; Service 2003; Westwood, *Endurance and Endeavour: Russian History, 1812-2001,*
[622] Hosking, Russian History, 213.
[623] See also Service, *A History of Modern Russia*, 13.
[624] Bartlett, *A History of Russia*, 167.
[625] Polunov, *Russia in the Nineteenth Century*, 219-220.
[626] Bartlett, *A History of Russia*, 167; Archie Brown, *The Rise and Fall of Communism* (London: Vintage, 2009), 43.

Nicholas limited the Duma's powers by reserving in the tsar the power to override Duma decisions. Nicholas granted himself the ability to rule by emergency decree and the power to dissolve the Duma, which he used until he achieved a more pliable Duma.[627] Clearly this undermined the purpose of the Duma and ultimately, the institution became an instrument of the autocracy. It became a superficial symbol of the people's power in politics necessary merely to quell discontent and sustain the regime. As Lee describes, Nicholas' constitution created 'a parliament with parties' but without 'scope for party politics' since any attempts by parties to shape policy were blocked by the tsar.[628] While some scholars suggest that the Duma of 1906 was largely ineffective, others point out that the Duma exerted some pressure on the government.[629] Petro argues that the existence of the Duma 'bolstered the public's understanding of both civil and political rights', which paved the way for the future revolution against the autocracy.[630]

Theme: Power
Homogenisation: 'the people'

Differentiation: between regime and the people.

Frames events of this period as part of a larger story which the author knows the 'ending' to. Events are made to fit into the story.

Foreshadowing.

Nicholas' concessions to the public merely delayed the regime's expiration. Despite the reforms, the Okhrana, as the political police were now called, continued to supress political opposition, and discontent

Familiar pattern of the political police supressing opposition.

[627] Service, *A History of Modern Russia*, 1-15; Lee, *Russia and the USSR, 1855-1991*, 28; McCloskey & Turner, *The Soviet Dictatorship,* 37; Polunov, *Russia in the Nineteenth Century,* 226).
[628] Lee, *Russia and the USSR*, 52.
[629] Petro, *The Rebirth of Russian Democracy* 49; Service, *A History of Modern Russia* 2003.
[630] Petro, *The Rebirth of Russian Democracy,* 50.

with life under tsarism remained rampant. As McCloskey and Turner observe, '[i]mpressive though these concessions were in law, however, they were often denied in practice. When occasion required it, the regime continued to ban radical newspapers and to outlaw political associations'.[631] Once again, Russia's leader struggled to balance freedoms with oppression to prolong his rule and the autocratic institution.[632] The government reportedly ordered the shelling of rebellious towns.[633]

Homogenisation of Russia. Imprecise use of national terminology. Implicit meaning of Russia the state.

While Russia's initial involvement in the Great War bolstered patriotic loyalty to Nicholas, the Tsar's absence from the conflict, along with the detrimental economic effects of the War, exacerbated existing social tensions. Society as well as the Duma pressured Nicholas for change but he resisted. Mass strikes and 'bread riots' ensued, and revolutionary forces acquired the advantage.[634] Once it became apparent that he had lost the military's support, a death-sentence for any regime, Nicholas abdicated in March 1917.[635] After centuries as the epitome of autocracy, the tsarist institution had been abolished and three hundred years of Romanov rule was terminated by the tsar's own people. Although the

[631] McCloskey & Turner, *The Soviet Dictatorship*, 37.
[632] Petro, *The Rebirth of Russian Democracy,* 50.
[633] Christopher Read, *From Tsar to Soviets: The Russian People and Their Revolution* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 32.
[634] McCloskey & Turner, *The Soviet Dictatorship* 60-63; Brown, *The Rise and Fall of Communism*.
[635] See Service, *A History of Modern Russia*, 17-33.

Russian Revolution seemingly banished autocracy as an official institution, authoritarian features remained prominent throughout the Soviet period, embedded into Russia itself.

Playing into the tragedy that Russia cannot escape its fate since autocracy is a part of its essence.

The End of Autocracy?

The question mark in the sub-title implies scepticism.

Following the overthrow of tsarism, the Duma instituted a provisional government to temporarily administer Russia. The provisional government rapidly implemented a plethora of liberal reforms which encompassed free speech, free press, and the right to strike.[636] They demolished the Okhrana headquarters and abolished the political police as an institution, which the provisional government regarded as a fundamental symbol of 'Tsarist repression'.[637] Despite the fact that they provided the people with a degree of political freedom previously unmatched in Russia, the provisional government nevertheless struggled to maintain widespread popular support. The government failed to alleviate society's primary concerns for their basic needs of food and land, and its decision for Russia to remain in the Great War was immensely unpopular.[638] Advocating 'peace, bread, and land', the Bolsheviks had ousted the

Note the shift in terminology from 'regime' to 'government'.

Continued use of homogenising expressions such as 'the people', and ambiguous use of national terminology.

[636] Service, *A History of Modern Russia*, 34; Westwood, *Endurance and Endeavour: Russian History,* 225.
[637] Lee, *Russia and the USSR,* 72-73.
[638] Brown, *The Rise and Fall of Communism*, 49-51; McCloskey & Turner, *The Soviet Dictatorship* 63.

provisional government by November 1917.

The Bolsheviks held elections in December. However, they lost to the Socialist Revolutionary Party. Nonetheless, the Bolsheviks remained in power and dissolved the elected Constituent Assembly.[639] Not for the first time in Russia's history, a representative body was destroyed by the regime. Under Vladimir Lenin's leadership, the Bolsheviks first withdrew from the Assembly criticising it as representative of, and a product of, the pre-revolutionary bourgeoisie order. Lacking a majority in the Assembly, the Bolsheviks would struggle to shape the political agenda. They therefore regarded the Assembly as an obstacle to Lenin's preferred approach to socialist reform.[640] Without the Bolsheviks, Lenin asserted, 'the remaining part of the Constituent Assembly could only serve as a screen for the struggle of the counter-revolutionaries to overthrow Soviet power'.[641] Although the Bolsheviks opposed tsarism, they shared with tsarist regimes the tenacious pursuit of retaining political power. While their motivations for this may have been different, the means used to augment and consolidate their rule nevertheless refashioned authoritarianism.

Embeds the Bolshevik's dissolution of the Constituent Assembly as part of a larger narrative.

To borrow from Hayden White, the description of refashioning authoritarianism exemplifies 'the eternal return of the Same in the Different'.[642] It indulges the tragic mode of emplotment.

[639] Brown, *The Rise and Fall of Communism*, 51-53.
[640] Vladimir Lenin, *Collected Works*, vol. 26 (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1918/1972), 429-436.
[641] Vladimir Lenin, *Collected Works*, vol. 26 (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1972), 436; see also 434-436.
[642] White, *Metahistory*, 10.

The Bolsheviks encountered significant opposition from anti-Bolshevik forces, which led to civil war and famine. In a similar fashion to previous tsarist regimes, the Bolsheviks exploited the context of war to justify departure from their original liberal ideas and implement more authoritarian policies to promote order, but clearly also to consolidate their rule. McCloskey and Turner explain that the Party 'abandoned one by one the ideas enumerated in the Party program – government by a freely elected popular assembly; abolition of police and army; unlimited freedom of speech, press, and assembly; and other basic freedoms'.[643] Liberal democratic practices vanished for the remainder of Russia's time as part of the USSR.

Familiar pattern.

Imprecise use of national terminology.

Authoritarianism in Another Guise

Another sub-heading which reinforces the focus of the narrative.

While Bolshevik ideology stemmed from the Marxist tradition of eliminating class and promoting collective ownership, the Bolsheviks endorsed dictatorship as a necessary stage of achieving socialism.[644] Lenin's 'dictatorship of the proletariat' notion enshrined the principle of working-class society governing Russia.[645] However, in practice, the Bolsheviks replaced tsarist autocracy with a new form of autocracy.[646] The

[643] McCloskey & Turner, *The Soviet Dictatorship,* 73.
[644] Service, *A History of Modern Russia,* 48; Hosking, *Russian History,* 37; Brown, *The Rise and Fall of Communism*, 52-53.
[645] See Lenin, *Collected Works*, vol. 24.
[646] See Service, *A History of Modern Russia,* 37.

Bolsheviks manipulated the democratic ideals of popular government to sustain authoritarian traditions through a paradoxical process. As Hosking describes, the Bolshevik regime appeared to be 'a truly popular government', yet abolished 'civil society and intermediate institutions, so that nothing remained between the regime and the people' and created a system within which 'extreme democratism was accompanied by extreme authoritarianism'.[647] Russia's contradictory attributes are once again apparent. The Bolsheviks strove to consolidate and maintain their power. Similarly to the tsarist regimes before it, and like subsequent regimes leading to the Putin regime today, they pursued a strategy of societal manipulation which balanced co-optation with repression.

Nothing has really changed. Perhaps Russia cannot change?

Foregrounding: Russia's dichotomous nature.

Connecting the past to the present in a continuous narrative.

Part of this balancing strategy involved reinstating the political police, recast as the Cheka. Thus despite a new regime and a new system of governance, regime and system survival remained entrenched within Russian strategic culture, which derived from a political system infused with authoritarianism. Lenin's attitude toward resistance was unequivocally firm. His correspondence with Molotov exemplifies his stance on oppositionist views, within which he wrote that the regime must 'put down all resistance with such brutality

Political police as a part of Russian culture. Implicit connection to Russia's identity as a nation.

Use of the term 'recast' also signals the tragic emplotment. It suggests that the details might have changed, but in substance, the Cheka was the same as it always had been under its different names. It is a case of

[647] Service, *A History of Modern Russia,* 37.

that they will not forget it for several decades'.[648] Clearly, for Lenin, the bourgeoisie constituted not only a threat to the regime but also to the realisation of his ideological vision. Although the Cheka was intended to reduce counter-revolutionary activity, it became a means of eliminating political opposition altogether and thereby a mechanism through which the regime preserved its position and power. The Cheka operated similarly to the imperial Okhrana. Although dissolved in 1921, its functions effectively continued through a new body, the GPU.[649] Accordingly, the Russian tradition of a strong political police continued. It reinforced authoritarianism and also demonstrated the primacy of regime survival for Russian governments irrespective of their ideologies.

a new actor for the same role.

Theme: repression.

Linking Russia in time.

'Russian tradition' reinforces the idea that the political police is a part of what makes Russia, Russia.

While the Bolsheviks, who renamed themselves the Communist Party, employed terror and repression to remain in power, they also pursued co-optation as a method of consolidating their rule. The Party attempted to co-opt society to gain popular support by establishing new traditions and symbols, and through negatively re-framing historical memories of the tsarist period.[650] From the 1920s, the Soviet Union undoubtedly became a propaganda state. In Berkhoff's words, it was a system

Frequent use of differentiation.

Recurring theme: repression.

Strong and subjective language: 'undoubtedly'.

Use of expert's words

[648] "Letter from Lenin," Library of Congress, Accessed June 9, 2019, http://www.loc.gov/exhibits/archives/ae2bkhun.html.
[649] See Lee, *Russia and the USSR, 1855-1991*, 73; Westwood, *Endurance and Endeavour: Russian History, 1812-2001*, 250; Brown, *The Rise and Fall of Communism*, 54-55.
[650] See for example, Hosking, *Russian History,* 65.

that 'subjugated mass culture, education, and the media for the purposes of popular indoctrination'.[651] The purpose of most media was to promote the Party's ideology and agenda. Media contradicting the Party line was prohibited. Despite Lenin's willingness to use force to quell resistance, he regarded co-optation as the preferred method of consolidating Soviet rule and implementing Communism, explaining that, 'we must convince first and keep force in reserve'.[652] The Party reportedly regarded propaganda as a means of education rather than insidious manipulation. It was nevertheless a mechanism for popular control.[653] Political pluralism in Russia consequently became virtually non-existent by the late 1930s.

to confirm author's positon.

Theme: power

Imprecise use of Russia. Synonymous with Soviet Union? Or does the text really mean the RSFSR?

The Party leadership completely distorted civil society by subjugating formerly independent institutions such as the Soviets and Unions to their control. They outlawed opposition political parties, contending that the multi-party system was inconsistent with Marxism-Leninism.[654] The Party also regarded the Church as a threat, and accordingly seized Church property and prohibited religious groups. Aside from targeting such

Emotive use of language: 'subjugating' and 'distorted'.

Theme: power

Theme: repression

Differentiation between regime and society.

[651] Karel Berkhoff, *Motherland in Danger: Soviet Propaganda During World War II* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2012), 4.
[652] Cited in David Brandenberger, *Propaganda State in Crisis: Soviet Ideology, Indoctrination, and Terror under Stalin* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2011), 11.
[653] Berkhoff, *Motherland in Danger,* 4.
[654] See McCloskey & Turner, *The Soviet Dictatorship*, 77-80; Lee, *Russia and the USSR, 1855-1991*, 73.

obvious political threats, the Party abolished non-Party run apolitical social organisations such as sporting clubs and choirs. This reduced connections members of society could develop with one another separate from the state, thereby encouraging a patron-client system of dependence and incentives for retaining a strong regime. The 'cult of personality' which developed around Joseph Stalin further contributed to this, and Stalin encouraged representations of himself as the father of the Motherland.[655] Through propaganda, the regime strove to enhance patriotism and allegiance to the Party but also to Stalin personally.

Differentiation continues and is an important mechanism for framing the narrative.

Centralised governance and repression strengthened under Stalin's leadership. Stalin effectively subjugated the Party to his personal authority, ridding the Party of members advocating alternative views.[656] He augmented the political police's powers and rebranded the institution the NKVD in 1934 prior to implementing a campaign of mass terror. The 'Great Purges' he instigated in 1934 were initially directed toward eradicating disloyal Party members, but expanded to encompass the persecution of anyone Stalin or his delegates perceived as threatening.[657] Despite various motives for the purges, they were likely, 'inspired partly

Differentiation. Here, Stalin is not conflated with Russia or the Soviet Union.

[655] See Lee, *Russia and the USSR, 1855-1991;* McCloskey & Turner, *The Soviet Dictatorship* 134.
[656] Lee, *Russia and the USSR, 1855-1991*,55; McCloskey & Turner, *The Soviet Dictatorship,* 127-129; Brown, *The Rise and Fall of Communism*, 72-73.
[657] McCloskey & Turner, *The Soviet Dictatorship,* 134-135.

by Stalin's fear that his regime was somehow endangered and partly by his desire to be rid of all former rivals and opponents'.[658] The NKVD executed thousands of people, and sentenced hundreds of thousands to labour camps and prison.[659] While this was perhaps only evidence of one leader's paranoia, in many ways, Stalin's actions represent the obsession with regime survival characteristic of Russia's political system throughout history. Stalin himself was a product of the authoritarian system as much as an engineer of it.

Allusion to the idea that Russia cannot escape this, but also that Russia will be an eternal victim to power-seeking individuals.

Despite Stalin's repressive tactics to control the people, some groups within society, notably the peasants, rebelled. Peasants resisted Stalin's collectivisation policy by killing livestock, refusing to yield produce, and sabotaging their farming equipment.[660] Similarly to the imperial regimes, Stalin encouraged denunciation, and vigorously persecuted resisters. To the regime's benefit, such policies facilitated suspicion and distrust among society creating greater dependence on the Party and decreased the likelihood of mass uprisings.

Differentiation.

Although power became more distributed among Party elites following Stalin's death in 1953, authoritarianism remained pervasive. Political power became further concentrated in a small group of Party

Again, the familiar pattern of liberalising only to return to the default.

Recurring themes of power and repression.

[658] McCloskey & Turner, *The Soviet Dictatorship,* 140.
[659] McCloskey & Turner, *The Soviet Dictatorship*, 136.
[660] McCloskey & Turner, *The Soviet Dictatorship*, 130.

elites within the policy-making institution, the Politburo. As McCloskey & Turner observe, oligarchy was 'greatly encouraged by the authoritarian tradition'.[661] The Soviet system also reciprocally sustained authoritarian traditions through normalising oligarchic rule and elite self-enrichment. Such tendencies for concentration of power are apparent throughout Russia's history, and continue today and create disincentives for elite-sanctioned liberal reform.

Use of experts to provide epistemic authority to claim.

Tone indicates that the lack of liberal reform is bad.

Nikita Khrushchev, General Secretary until 1964, criticised Stalin's harsh brand of repression, and initially promoted greater creative and labour freedom before returning to stricter censorship.[662] The Party created the infamous political police organisation, the KGB in 1954, which reportedly borrowed its modus operandi from the Okhrana.[663] The KGB remained a prominent political institution within the USSR for the remainder of its existence. Like most of the leaders before him, 'Khrushchev was concerned both with ensuring that the communist system…was sustained, as well as with advancing and consolidating his own power within that system'.[664] The Party, led by Khrushchev and then his successors maintained high levels of censorship and propaganda until Mikhail Gorbachev assumed the

Emphasis on characteristics that are opposite to liberalism and 'our' ways.

Emphasis is on the political elite and high politics.

[661] McCloskey & Turner, *The Soviet Dictatorship*, 235.
[662] McCloskey & Turner, *The Soviet Dictatorship*, 192.
[663] Lee, *Russia and the USSR, 1855-1991*, 77.
[664] Brown, *The Rise and Fall of Communism*, 239.

position of General Secretary in 1985. Despite this, small-scale 'everyday resistance' against the regime and acts of sedition were common.

Hope for Democracy

Normative overtones in the title.

After the 'era of stagnation' which characterised most of the post-Khrushchev period of the Soviet Union, Gorbachev facilitated a number of reforms initially designed to reinvigorate the declining economy and industry.[665] However, his ideas expanded to encompass sweeping socio-political reforms. Under Gorbachev's vision of perestroika and glasnost, many of the key authoritarian features of the Soviet Union were relaxed. Censorship was scaled back, allowing for unprecedented creative freedom in the USSR, along with enabling independent journalism. Gorbachev promoted the dispersal of power among local soviets with the aim that they would become, '[a]ssertive, energetic, businesslike defenders of the interests of citizens'.[666] In effect, Gorbachev reinvigorated the public sphere and created the space for political pluralism to develop. As he advocated, 'Glasnost is an integral part of a socialist democracy. Frank information is evidence of confidence in the people and respect for their intelligence and

Imprecise use of Russia.

[665] Brown, *The Rise and Fall of Communism*, 398.
[666] Mikhail Gorbachev, "Speech to the Supreme Soviet," *Current Digest of the Soviet Press* Vol. XL, No. 39 (1988): 5-6.

feelings, and for their ability to understand events for themselves'. Freedom of speech and information had arrived in Russia. In undertaking such reforms, Gorbachev unintentionally paved the way for a complete overhaul of the USSR and a brief departure from the authoritarianism characteristic of Russia since the pre-imperial era.[667]

Foregrounds centrality of authoritarianism to the Russian nation.

Optimistic tone. Russia becomes more 'like us'.

Following the fall of the Soviet Union, Russia became the 'Russian Federation' in 1991, and under Boris Yeltsin's presidency strove to liberalise and democratise. It accordingly represents a brief reprieve from the authoritarian narrative and perhaps the closest Russia has come to becoming Western. However, despite efforts to retreat from authoritarianism, patron-client traditions and oligarchic power structures remained entrenched in Russian society. This undermined democratisation efforts and, in conjunction with severe economic problems and security issues, ultimately led to the restoration of more apparent authoritarianism by the start of the new millennium. Russia, it seems, cannot escape her authoritarian fate.

Continuity and linearity.

Imprecise use of Western.

Reification of 'Western'.

Imprecise use of Russia.

Use of gendered language.

Obvious tragic emplotment.

This short history of Russian authoritarianism is written in a way which emphasises the tragic emplotment which is characteristic of Anglophone histories of Russia. Like

[667] Cited in Brandon Toropov, *Encyclopedia of Cold War Politics* (New York: Facts on File, 2000), 68.

the idea of Russia which emerges from the history texts analysed in this thesis, the Russia of my text is also a nation which will always be Other. Despite its struggle to liberalise and democratise, Russia (according to the story) will never be Western. Authoritarianism is not only an affliction for Russia, but also its defining trait.

CONCLUSION

Literary Russia is an idea. It is an idea that is given form by language and discourse. Through their words, historians contribute toward constructing Russia. They bring Russia to 'life' and render it 'real' for the Anglosphere. To adapt a phrase from Edward Said, Western knowledge of Russia is Russia for the West.[668] The texts which are analysed throughout this thesis contribute to the cultural knowledge-bank on Russia, simultaneously funded by, and financing, discursive representations of Russia. In this concluding chapter, I revisit the purposes of the project. I reflect on how Western historians construct a Russian nation for the Anglosphere, and summarise what the case studies revealed about the geo-cultural paradigm in the West. I conclude by considering whether discordus as a concept has wider applicability beyond analyses of Russia, and identify some avenues for further research on this topic.

How Western Historians Construct a Russian Nation

As my analysis has shown, historians construct Russia in a discordic manner. Russia's Othering is the result of tensions and nuances in its representation. It is not the same kind of Othering seen in *Orientalism*. The story of Russia revolves around Russia's pivot toward or away from the West.

In Chapter II, 'Othering Russia in Historical Accounts of the Mongol Conquest', my analysis revealed that the historians tend to Other Russia in their writing on Mongol-era Russia. Russia is categorised as non-Western, and the non-West is represented as inferior. The dominant narrative concerns Russia's relatively

[668] Edward W. Said, *Orientalism: Western Conceptions of the Orient* (New Delhi: Penguin Books, 1995), 32.

backward development in comparison to Western Europe. Sixsmith's descriptions of the Mongol conquest as 'setting back [Russia's] development as a European state' and his observation that it 'would never fully catch up with Western Europe's cultural and social values' encapsulate that narrative.[669] In the Mongol case study, I also introduced a key point of distinction between Russia and the West – political culture. According to the texts, the Mongol experience instilled in Russia the authoritarianism which would come to define it throughout history. Because of its autocratic character, Russia cannot be categorised as Western. It must be Othered on the premise that the West is an imagined community defined and bound together by liberal democracy. In texts on the Mongol era, Russia is portrayed as moving away from the West.

In Chapter III, 'Romancing Russia and Questioning the Applicability of the Oriental Paradigm', my analysis of histories of the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries challenged the applicability of the Oriental paradigm to Russia. In that chapter, I found that Russia is not always Othered as straightforwardly as it is in accounts of the Mongol conquest. Instead, Russia during the eras of Peter the Great and Catherine the Great is romanticised. Russia is portrayed as a liminal nation, in-between East and West, as it transitions to becoming Western. Othering therefore did not work as an analytical lens or as a means of describing how Russia is represented during that period. I introduced discordus as a way of making sense of Russia's liminal construction. Discordus shed light on how Russia's liminality is reconciled through romantic emplotment and the techniques of foregrounding and silencing. Russia is not portrayed as permanently occupying an in-between category, but is instead represented as evolving and symbolically moving from East to West. During the Petrine period, Russia is depicted as moving closer to the West.

[669] Sixsmith, *Russia: A 1000-Year Chronicle of the Wild East*, 29.

Chapter IV, 'The Language of Nationality in Histories of World War II', further demonstrated the way in which historians smooth over inconsistencies which arise from the facts. In this case study, I determined that tensions between Russia as Other and Russia as Self are resolved through using the language of nationality in an ambiguous manner. Thus, Russia in World War II is represented as mostly Other, but only because of the way that national terminology creates an image of Russia as a homogenous and totalised nation. Discordus is at play again, as it drives the propensity to Other when there are conflicting aspects of the nation which displays traits of the Self and the Other. In that chapter, I highlighted the continuity of the idea that political culture is the primary marker of difference between Russia and the West. This confirmed the notion that political culture is used as the key marker of distinction because it is the most salient aspect of Western identity. It became clearer in that chapter that the part of Russia which is most problematic for the Western metanarrative is its regime. In histories of Russia's experience of World War II, Russia is portrayed as non-Western.

In Chapter V, 'The Historicisation and Securitisation of Putin's Russia', I argued that Putin's Russia is historicised, but that Putin, and not the nation of Russia, is securitised. I found that the use of differentiation outweighed the use of homogenisation to produce a representation of Putin as a threat, and Russia as a victim. Again, Russia under Putin is depicted as moving away from the West.

I explored Russia's liminality most directly in the final case study, 'A Discordic Narrativisation of the Russian Nation and the Necessity of Tragic Emplotment'. Analysis of the prefaces and introductions of the general histories of Russia clearly demonstrated discordus. Findings in that chapter verified that liminality is at the core of the story of Russia, and that it is Russia's curse. As such, that chapter brought the various discursive elements together to show how the story

of Russia is a written as a tragedy. The nation of Russia is represented as a tragic villain, but also as a victim of its own politics. It has the potential to become like the West, but has not, hence the tragic emplotment.

In Chapter VII, I brought the various discursive patterns together by providing a short history of Russia. I emphasised the narratives and tropes which the case studies revealed, to demonstrate the way in which the literary techniques work in synergy to produce a representation of Russia.

The texts construct a discordic literary Russia. To reiterate, discordus refers to historians' attempts to smooth over tensions in historical facts and events that conflict with, and do not easily fit into, the three-tiered geo-cultural paradigm. As outlined in my introduction, the three main assumptions of discordus are:

1. That the dominant Western paradigm for understanding the past and present is a three-tiered ideational division of humanity into cultural-geographic categories.
2. That discordus occurs when particular facts and events reveal inconsistencies and contradictions which resist easy classification within this taxonomy.
3. When faced with these contradictions, historians often (consciously or unconsciously) deploy a range of literary techniques to smooth over the contradictions.

Russia must therefore be Othered because its liminality challenges the Western metanarrative. Russia cannot be classed as part of the Self, because to do so would jeopardise the ideological underpinnings of the West as an imagined community predicated on liberal democracy.

What the Case Studies Revealed about the Geo-Cultural Paradigm

One of the main findings of the project in regard to the geo-cultural paradigm is that it is profoundly problematic. It is problematic largely because it promotes division between peoples by relying on categorisation. The imprecise use of the language of nationality has significant implications for the representation of nations. Conflating various national components through ambiguous terms of nationality enables inclusion and exclusion, and thus can perpetuate Othering. Use of various terms of nationality, and the practise of categorising nations into civilisational groupings such as East and West, also reifies the geo-cultural paradigm in its current form as a means of facilitating narratives of 'us' and 'them'. Macro-categories of civilisations are entrenched in Anglophone structures of knowledge and language. Nations, nationality, and civilisations are currently dominant concepts for viewing, describing, and structuring the world. Discordus infuses the contemporary Western cultural context because of the prevalence of the geo-cultural paradigm – it mandates fitting nations into Self or Other compartments. It is in the West's interests to maintain the geo-cultural paradigm as it is, and to Other what is liminal, in order to preserve not only its global hegemony, but to preserve its existence.

Limitations of the study and future research

To conduct this type of textual analysis would be impossible without using the dominant concepts and terminology used in contemporary discourse about nations and civilisations. I am therefore obliged to use the very terms that I critique. However, drawing attention to the ways that the geo-cultural paradigm functions brings scholarship a step closer to moving beyond what ultimately may be an unhelpful paradigm for comprehending and structuring the world.

Whether discordus as a concept has wider applicability remains to be investigated. Is it a phenomenon or a concept which might have utility beyond analysis of texts concerning Russia? Can similar patterns be observed in the Anglophone histories of other nations? Turkey, for example, appears to share similar geographical and political liminality as Russia. Debates in mainstream Western media surrounding Turkey's pursuit of European Union membership emphasise this liminality. If discordus is reflected and part of the production of the histories of nations other than Russia, does it have the same effect or produce the same representation of those nations? Are there broader discursive patterns in how nations are constructed from the outside? Is there evidence of discordus beyond history texts? What is the relationship between literary representations of nations and their 'real' counterparts? Confirming the operation of discordus at a broader level would enable the practical side of discordus to be explored, such as its implications for diplomacy and foreign policy.

Clearly, there are several possible avenues for additional research on this topic which could strengthen understandings of the workings of the geo-cultural paradigm in the West. However, despite the potential for further development, this thesis has laid the necessary foundation for such development through identifying how literary Russia is discursively constructed as a nation by Western historians. It has shed additional light on how the geo-cultural paradigm functions in that it depends on the formation of categories of difference which extend beyond the national to the civilisational. Since national and civilisational concepts are apparently embedded within structures of knowledge to a great extent, transforming the ideational landscape by moving beyond polarising ideas of 'us' and 'them' remains a challenge.

Final Remarks

In writing histories of Russia, Anglophone historians narrativise the past in a way which constructs a literary rendition of Russia in the Western discourse-historical space. Analysis of several sweeping history texts through the prisms of nationalism, post-colonialism, and literary criticism, suggests that histories of Russia construct Russia in a 'discordic' manner. The term 'discordus' is used here to describe the tension that exists in the texts of Anglophone historians and the process of reconciling such tension. Depending on the context, the same author can portray Russia as Western or non-Western, European or non-European, homogenous or heterogeneous. As a result, the Russia that is constructed by these historians cannot easily be slotted into a discursive paradigm that is based on the dichotomies between East and West, Europe and non-Europe, nation and region. Historians employ a range of literary tactics to smooth over the contradictions in their narratives of Russia, which in turn allows them to maintain the integrity of their master narrative. This thesis explored these tactics in detail by analysing how different authors portray four key episodes in Russian history: the Mongol invasions, the reign of Peter the Great, World War II, and the Putin period.

The history texts represent Russia as Other, yet an Other which possesses some traits of the Self. Because of this hybridity, Russia is Othered in order to maintain the integrity of the grand narrative of the West. In turn, this serves to sustain the imagined civilisational community built on that narrative. Historians are not just writing Russia, but are also writing 'the West'.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Alker, Hayward. "If Not Huntington's 'Civilizations,' Then Whose?" *Review* 18, no. 4 (1995): 533-562.

Allan, William. *Classical Literature: A Very Short Introduction.* Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014.

Anderson, Benedict. *Imagined Communities*. London: Verso, 2006.

Ankersmit, Frank. *Meaning, Truth, and Reference in Historical Representation*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2012.

Ankersmit, Frank. "Truth in History and Literature." *Narrative* 18, no.1 (2010): 30-50.

Arenas, Enrique Camara. "Villains in Our Mind: A Psychological Approach to Literary and Filmic Villainy." In *Villains and Villainy: Embodiments of Evil in Literature, Popular Culture and Media*, edited by Anna Fahraeus and Dikmen Yakah Camoglu, 3-29. Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2011.

Aruntunyan, Anna. *The Media in Russia*. London: McGraw-Hill, 2009.

Ascher, Abraham. *Russia: A Short History*. London: Oneworld Publications, 2017.

Azhgikhina, Nadezhda. "The Struggle for Press Freedom in Russia: Reflections of a Russian Journalist." *Europe-Asia Studies* 59, no. 8 (2007): 1245-1262.

Barber, John and Mark Harrison. "Patriotic War." In *The Cambridge History of Russia*, edited by Ronald Grigor Suny, 217-242. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008.

Barnes, Ian. *Restless Empire: A Historical Atlas of Russia*. Cambridge MA: Belknap Press, 2015.

Barrington, Lowell W. "Nation and Nationalism: The Misuse of Key Concepts in Political Science." *Political Science and Politics* 30, no. 4 (1997): 712-716.

Bartlett, Roger, P. *A History of Russia.* New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005.

Bawarshi, Anis and Mary Jo Reiff. *Genre: An Introduction to History Theory, Research, and Pedagogy.* West Lafayette: Parlor Press, 2010.

Beer, Gillian. *The Romance*. Oxon: Routledge, 2018.

Bennetts, Marc. *I'm Going to Ruin Their Lives*. London: Oneworld, 2016.

Berger, Stefan and Christoph Conrad. *The Past as History: National Identity and Historical Consciousness in Modern Europe.* Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015.

Berger, Stefan and Chris Lorenz. *Nationalizing the Past: Historians as National Builders in Modern Europe*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010.

Berger, Stefan, Mark Donovan, and Kevin Passmore. *Writing National Histories: Western Europe Since 1800.* London: Routledge, 2002.

Berkhoff, Karel. *Motherland in Danger: Soviet Propaganda During World War II*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2012.

Berman, Sheri. *Democracy and Dictatorship in Europe: From the Ancien Regime to the Present Day*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2019.

Bhabha, Homi K. *The Location of Culture*. Oxon: Routledge, 1994.

Bhabha, Homi K. *Nation and Narration*. Oxon: Routledge, 1990.

Billig, Michael. *Banal Nationalism*. London: SAGE, 1995.

Blommaert, Jan. *Discourse: A Critical Introduction*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009.

Blommaert, Jan and Chris Bulcaen. "Critical Discourse Analysis." *Annual Review of Anthropology* 29 (2000): 447-466.

Booth, Ken. *Strategy and Ethnocentrism.* Oxon: Routledge Revivals, 1979/2014.

Boterbloem, Kees. *A History of Russia and Its Empire: From Mikhail Romanov to Vladimir Putin*. Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 2013.

Brandenberger, David. *Propaganda State in Crisis: Soviet Ideology, Indoctrination, and Terror under Stalin*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2011.

Brown, Archie. *The Rise and Fall of Communism*. London: Vintage, 2009.

Bushkovitch, Paul. *A Concise History of Russia*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011.

Buzan, Barry, Ole Wæver, and Jaap de Wilde. *Security: A New Framework for Analysis.* London: Lynne Rienner, 1998.

Carr, E. H. *What is History*. London: Penguin Press, 2008.

Clunan, Anne L."Historical Aspirations and the Domestic Politics of Russia's Pursuit of International Status." *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 47 (2014): 281-290.

Cohen, Sande. *History Out of Joint: Essays on the Use and Abuse of History*. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 2006.

Collingwood, R. G. "The Limits of Historical Knowledge." *Journal of Philosophical Studies* 3, no. 10 (1928): 213-222.

Connor, Walker. "A Nation is a Nation, is a State, is an Ethnic Group is a …" *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 1, no. 4 (1978): 377-400.

Cooper, Robert. "The Mystery of Development." *Prospect Magazine*. <https://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/magazine/themysteryofdevelopment>. 2006. Accessed 14 December 2017.

Coskun, Bezen Balamir."History Writing and Securitization of the Other: The construction and reconstruction of Palestinian and Israeli discourses." *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 23, no. 2 (2010): 281-298.

Cox, Robert, W. "Civilizations: Encounters and Transformations." *Studies in Political Economy* 47, no. 3 (1995): 7-31.

Culler, Johnathan. *Literary Theory: A Very Short Introduction*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011.

Curtis, Glenn. *Russia: A Country Study*. Washington: Library of Congress, 1998.

Daddow, Oliver. *International Relations Theory*. London: SAGE, 2013.

Danto, Arthur C. "Narration and Knowledge." *Philosophy and Literature* 6 (1982): 17-32.

Donnelly, Mark and Claire Norton. *Doing History*. Oxon: Routledge, 2011.

Doran, Robert in Neil Genzlinger, "Hayden White, Who Explored How History is Made, Dies at 89." *New York Times*. March 9, 2018. <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/09/obituaries/hayden-white-who-explored-how-history-is-made-dies-at-89.html>. Accessed 12 March 2018.

Douglas, Mary. *Purity and Danger: An Analysis of Concepts of Pollution and Taboo*. London: Routledge, 1966/2002.

Dukes, Paul. *A History of Russia: 882-1996.* 3rd ed. Durham: Duke University Press, 1997.

Duranti, Alessandro and Charles Goodwin. *Rethinking Context: Language as an Interactive Phenomenon*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992.

Edele, Mark. *How Red Army Soldiers Became Hitler's Collaborators*. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2017.

Eitelhuber, Norbert. "The Russian Bear: Russian Strategic Culture and What it Implies for the West." *Connections: The Quarterly Journal* 9, no. 1 (2009): 1-29.

Ermarth, Elizabeth. *History in the Discursive Condition: Reconsidering the Tools of Thought*. Oxon: Routledge, 2011.

Enache, Bogdan C. "What is the West?" *The Independent Review* 14, no. 3 (2010): 450-453.

Fairclough, Norman, Jane Mulderrig, and Ruth Wodak. "Critical Discourse Analysis." In *Discourse Studies: A Multidisciplinary Introduction*, edited by Teun A. van Dijk, 357-378. London: SAGE, 2009.

Fairclough, Norman. *Analysing Discourse: Textual Analysis for Social Research*. London: Routledge, 2003.

Fairclough, Norman. *Media Discourse*. London: Edward Arnold, 1995.

Fairclough, Norman. *Critical Discourse Analysis: The Critical Study of Language.* London: Longman, 1995.

Fairclough, Norman. "Critical Discourse Analysis and the Marketization of Public Discourse: The Universities." *Discourse & Society* 4 no.2 (1993): 133-168.

Fairclough, Norman. *Discourse and Social Change*. London: Polity, 1992.

Feklyunina, Valentina. "Constructing Russophobia." In *Russia's Identity in International Relations: Images, Perceptions, Misperceptions*, edited by Ray Taras, 91-109. Oxon: Routledge, 2013.

Ferguson, Niall. *Civilization: The West and the Rest*. London: Penguin, 2011.

Figes, Orlando. *Revolutionary Russia 1891-1991.* London: Penguin, 2014.

Follath, Eric. "Interview with Garry Kasparov." *Spiegel Online.* November 10, 2015. <http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/garry-kasparov-interview-putin-needs-wars-a-1061942.html>. Accessed 17 September 2018.

Foucault, Michel. *Language, Counter-memory, Practice: Selected Essays and Interviews*, edited by Donald Bouchard and translated by Donald Bouchard and Sherry Simon. Oxford: Blackwell, 1977.

Franklin, Simon and Emma Widdis. *National Identity in Russian Culture: An Introduction.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006.

Frye, Northrop. *Anatomy of Criticism: Four Essays*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957/2000.

Fuglestad, Finn. *The Ambiguities of History*: *The Problem of Ethnocentrism in Historical Writing.* Oslo: Akademika Publishing, 2005.

Gabriel, Yiannis. *Organizing Words: A Critical Thesaurus for Social and Organizational Studies*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008.

Gellner, Ernest. *Nations and Nationalism*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983.

Gerrits, Andre and Max Bader. "Russian Patronage over Abkhazia and South Ossetia: Implications for Conflict Resolution." *East European Politics* 32, no. 3 (2016): 297-313.

Gessen, Masha. *The Man Without a Face: The Unlikely Rise of Vladimir Putin*. London: Granta Publications, 2014.

Gill, Graeme. *Building an Authoritarian Polity: Russia in Post-Soviet Times*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015.

Gorbachev, Mikhail. "Speech to the Supreme Soviet." *Current Digest of the Soviet Press* Vol. XL, No. 39 (1988).

Gumperz, John J. *Discourse Strategies*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

Guney, Aylin and Nazif Mandaci. "The Meta-Geography of the Middle East and North Africa in Turkey's New Geopolitical Imagination." *Security Dialogue* 44 (2013): 431-448.

Hall, Stuart. *Representation: Cultural Representations and Signifying Practices.* London: SAGE, 1997.

Hall, Stuart. "Ethnicity: identity and difference." In *Becoming National: A Reader,* edited by Geoff Eley and Ronald Grigor Suny, 339-351. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996.

Hall, Stuart. "The Question of National Identity." In *Modernity: An Introduction to Modern Societies*, edited by Stuart Hall, David Held, Don Hubert, and Kenneth Thompson, 596-632. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1996.

Halperin, Charles, J. *Russia and the Golden Horde: The Mongol Impact on Medieval Russian History*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1985.

Harris, Erika. *Nationalism: Theories and Cases*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2009.

Hazell, Dinah. “The Medieval Peasant.” In *Misconceptions about the Middle Ages*, edited by Stephen Harris and Bryon Grigsby, 213-217. New York: Routledge, 2008.

Herman, David. *Basic Elements of Narrative*. Malden: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009.

Hobsbawm, Eric. “Ethnicity and Nationalism in Europe Today.” *Anthropology Today* 8, no.1 (1992): 3-8.

Hosking, Geoffrey. *Russia and the Russians.* Cambridge MA: Belknap Press, 2012.

Hosking, Geoffrey. *Russian History: A Very Short Introduction*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012.

Huntington, Samuel P. “The Clash of Civilizations?” *Foreign Affairs* 72, no.3 (1993): 22-49.

Hudson, Valerie. “Foreign Policy Analysis: Actor-Specific Theory and the Ground of International Relations.” *Foreign Policy Analysis* 1 (2005): 1-30.

Hyvarinen, Matti.“Analyzing Narrative Genres.” in *The Handbook of Narrative Analysis*, edited by Anna De Fina and Alexandra Georgakopoulou (Hoboken: John Wiley & Sons, 2015.

Jahedi, Maryam, Faiz Sathi Abdullah, and Jayakaran Mukundan. “An Overview of Focal Approaches of Critical Discourse Analysis.” *International Journal of Education and Literacy Studies* 2 no.4 (2014): 28-35.

Jenkins, Keith. *At the Limits of History*. Oxon: Routledge, 2013.

Jenkins, Keith. *Refiguring History: New Thoughts on an Old Discipline*. London: Routledge, 2003.

Jenkins, Keith. *On ‘What is History’? From Carr and Elton to Rorty and White.* London: Routledge, 1995.

Jetten, Jolanda and Russell Spears. “The Divisive Potential of Differences and Similarities: The role of intergroup distinctiveness in intergroup differentiation.” *European Review of Social Psychology* 14 (2003): 203-241.

Johnstone, Barbara. *Discourse Analysis*. Oxford: Wiley Blackwell, 2018.

Kasparov, Garry. *Winter is Coming: Why Vladimir Putin and the Enemies of the Free World Must Be Stopped*. London: Atlantic Books, 2015.

Kharbe, Ambreen. *English Language and Literary Criticism*. New Delhi: Discovery Publishing, 2009.

KhosraviNik, Majid. “Actors Descriptions, Action Attributions, and Argumentation: Towards a Systematization of CDA Analytical Categories in the Representation of Social Groups.” *Critical Discourse Studies* 7 no. 1 (2010): 55-72.

Kort, Michael. *A Brief History of Russia*. New York: Facts on File, 2008.

Klarer, Mario. *An Introduction to Literary Studies.* London: Routledge, 2004.

Kramer, Lloyd S. *Nationalism in Europe and America: Politics, Cultures, and Identities Since 1775*. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2011.

Kramer, Lloyd S. “Historical Narratives and the Meaning of Nationalism.” *Journal of the History of Ideas* 58, no. 3 (1997): 525-545.

Kumar, Krishnan. “Nationalism and the Historians.” in *The SAGE Handbook of Nations and Nationalism*, edited by Gerard Delanty and Krishan Kumar. London: SAGE, 2006.

Laqueur, Walter. *Putinism: Russia and Its Future In the West*. New York: Thomas Dunne Books, 2015.

Laqueur, Walter. “From Russia with Hate.” *New Republic*. February, 1990. <https://newrepublic.com/article/98364/russia-hate>. Accessed 10 January 2018.

Lawrence, Paul. “Nationalism and Historical Writing.” in *The Oxford Handbook of the History of Nationalism*, edited by John Breuilly, 715-717. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013.

Lawrence, Paul. *Nationalism: History and Theory*. London: Routledge, 2005.

Le, Theo, Quynh Le, and Megan Short. *Critical Discourse Analysis: An Interdisciplinary Perspective*. New York: Nova Science Publishers, 2009.

Lee, Stephen J. *Russia and the USSR, 1855-1991: Autocracy and Dictatorship*. Oxon: Routledge, 2006.

Legvold, Robert. *Return to Cold War*. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2016.

Létourneau, Jocelyn. “Teaching National History to Young People Today.” in the *Palgrave Handbook of Research in Historical Culture and Education*, edited by Mario Carretero, Stefan Berger, Maria Grever. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017.

Lewis, Martin W and Kären E. Wigen. *The Myth of Continents: A Critique of Metageography.* Berkley: University of California Press, 1997.

Macagno, Fabrizio and Douglas Walton. *Emotive Language in Argumentation*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014.

Macdonald, Matt. “Securitization and the Construction of Security.” *European Journal of International Relations* 14, no. 4 (2008): 563-587.

Macgilchrist, Felicitas. *Journalism and the Political: Discursive Tensions in News Coverage of Russia*. Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing Company, 2011.

Malia, Martin. *Russia under Western Eyes*. London: Belknap Press, 1999.

Maw, Janet. “Ethnocentrism, History Textbooks and Teaching Strategies: Presenting the USSR.” *Research Papers in Education* 6, no.3 (1991): 153-169.

McArthur, Tom, ed. *Concise Oxford Companion to the English Language*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003.

McGraw, Kathleen M and Thomas M. Dolan. “Personifying the State: Consequences for Attitude Formation.” *Political Psychology* 28, no. 3 (2007): 299-327.

McCloskey, Herbert and Elliot Turner. *The Soviet Dictatorship*. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1960.

McNeil, William H. “What we Mean by the West.” *Orbis* Fall (1997): 513-524.

McNeil, William H. *The Rise of the West: A History of the Human Community*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963/1991.

Mendras, Marie. *Russian Politics: The Paradox of a Weak State*. London: Hurst & Company, 2012.

Mills, Sara. *Discourse*. London: Routledge, 1997.

Mink, Louis. “Narrative Form as a Cognitive Instrument.” In *The History and Narrative Reader*, edited by Geoffrey Roberts, 211-220. London: Routledge, 2001.

Mink, Louis. “Interpretation and Narrative Understanding.” *The Journal of Philosophy* 69, no. 20 (1972): 735-737.

Mink, Louis. “History and Fiction as Modes of Comprehension.” *New Literary History* 1, no. 3 (1970): 541-558.

Moon, Brian. *Literary Terms: A Practical Glossary*. Cottesloe: Chalkface Press, 2009.

Moskowitz, Gordon B. *Social Cognition: Understanding Self and Others*. New York: The Guilford Press, 2005.

Munslow, Alun. *The New History*. New York and London: Routledge, 2016.

Munslow, Alun. “Thoughts on Authoring the Past as History.” *Rethinking History* 20, no. 4 (2016): 556-585.

Munslow, Alun. “Rethinking Metahistory: The Historical Imagination in Nineteenth Century Europe.” *Rethinking History* 19, no. 3 (2015): 324-336.

Myers, Steven Lee. *The New Tsar: The Rise and Reign of Vladimir Putin*. London: Simon & Schuster, 2015.

Norton, Claire and Mark Donnelly. *Liberating Histories*. Oxon: Routledge, 2019.

Norton, Claire. *Nationalism, Historiography and the (Re)Construction of the Past*. Washington, DC: New Academia Publishing, 2007.

Ó Tuathail, Gearoid and John Agnew. “Geopolitics and Discourse: Practical geopolitical reasoning in American foreign policy.” *Political Geography* 11, no.2 (1992): 190-204.

Perrie, Maureen. *The Cambridge History of Russia*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006.

Petro, Nicolai. *The Rebirth of Russian Democracy*. Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1995.

Pihlainen, Kalle. *The Work of History: Constructivism and a Politics of the Past*. Oxon: Routledge, 2017.

Pipes, Richard. *Russia Under the Old Regime*. New York: Scribner, 1974.

Preiswerk, Roy and Dominique Perrot. *Ethnocentrism and History: Africa, Asia, and Indian America in Western Textbooks*. New Work: NOK Publishers International, 1978.

Putin, Vladimir. Address by the President of the Russian Federation. March 18, 2014, <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/20603> (September 15 2018).

Read, Christopher. *From Tsar to Soviets: The Russian People and Their Revolution*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1996.

Reisigl, Martin and Ruth Wodak. "The Discourse-Historical Approach." In *Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis*, edited by Ruth Wodak and Michael Meyer. London: SAGE, 2009.

Riasanovsky, Nicholas V. and Mark D.Steinberg. *A History of Russia.* 8th ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011.

Riasanovsky, Nicholas V. and Mark D.Steinberg. *A History of Russia*. 7th ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005.

Richmond, Anthony H. "Ethnic Nationalism: Social Science Paradigms." *International Social Science Journal* 11 (1987): 141-165.

Ringmar, Erik. "Introduction: The International Politics of Recognition." In *The International Politics of Recognition*, edited by Thomas Lindemann and Erik Ringmar, 3-25. London: Routledge, 2016.

Roth, Paul, A. "Philosophy of History." In *The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Social Sciences*, edited by Lee McIntyre and Alex Rosenberg. London: Routledge, 2017.

Roth, Paul. "Analytic Philosophy of History: Origins, Eclipse, and Revival." *Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal* 37, no. 2 (2016): 1-25.

Sahlins, Peter. *Boundaries: The Making of France and Spain in the Pyrenees*. Berkeley: California University Press, 1989.

Said, Edward. "The Clash of Ignorance." *The Nation* October (2001).

Said, Edward W. *Orientalism: Western Conceptions of the Orient*. New Delhi: Penguin Books, 1995.

Sakwa, Richard. "The Dual State in Russia." *Post-Soviet Affairs* 26. no. 3 (2010): 185-206.

Satter, David. *The Less You Know the Better You Sleep: Russia's Road to Terror and Dictatorship Under Yeltsin and Putin.* New Haven: Yale University Press, 2016.

Schirato, Tony and Susan Yell. *Communication and Cultural Literacy*. St Leonards: Allen & Unwin, 1996.

Schwartz, Elias. "The Problem of Literary Genres." *Criticism* 13, no.2 (1971): 113-130.

Sen, Amartya. *Identity and Violence: The Illusion of Destiny*. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2006.

Service, Robert. *The Penguin History of Modern Russia: From Tsarism to the Twenty-First Century.* London: Penguin Books, 2015.

Simmons, Anne M. "Chess Grandmaster Garry Kasparov warns of a Russia increasingly devoid of Freedoms." Los Angeles Times, March 20, 2018, < http://www.latimes.com/world/global-development/la-fg-global-garry-kasparov-qa-20180319-story.html>, Accessed 17 September 2018.

Singer, Nicky. “Children’s Books 2015: Market Commodities or Meaningful Stories? A Writer’s Tale.” *Children’s Literature in Education* 47, no. 1 (2016): 66-76.

Sixsmith, Martin. *Russia: A 1000-Year Chronicle of the Wild East*. London: Ebury Press, 2012.

Spargo, Tamsin, ed. *Reading the Past: Literature and History*. Hampshire: Palgrave, 2000.

Stephens, John and Robyn McCallum. *Retelling Stories, Framing Culture: Traditional Story and Metanarratives in Children’s Literature.* New York: Garland Publishing, 1998.

Storm, Eric. “A New Dawn in Nationalism Studies? Some Fresh Incentives to Overcome Historiographical Nationalism.” *European History Quarterly* 48, no.1 (2018): 113-129.

Stubbs, Michael. *Discourse Analysis*. Oxford: Blackwell, 1983.

TASS. “Crimea issue closed for Russia, says envoy to UN.” *TASS Russian News Agency*. August 7 2018. <http://tass.com/politics/1014934> Accessed 10 August 2018.

TASS. “Putin says he expressed disagreement with Trump’s position on Crimea in Helsinki.” *TASS Russian News Agency*. July 17 2018. <http://tass.com/politics/1013588>. Accessed August 7 2018.

TASS. “Putin signs law commemorating Crimea’s accession to Russian Empire.” *TASS Russian News Agency*. August 3 2018. <http://tass.com/politics/1015999>. Accessed 15 September 2018.

Taylor, Stephanie. “Locating and Conducting Discourse Analytic Research.” In *Discourse as Data: A Guide for Analysis*, edited by Margaret Wetherell, Stephanie Taylor, & Simeon J. Yates, 5-49. London: SAGE Publications, 2001.

Taylor, P.J. “A Metageographical Argument on Modernities and Social Science.” *GaWC Research Bulletin* 29, 2000. <http://www.lboro.ac.uk/gawc/rb/rb29.html>. Accessed 9 February 2018.

Thompson, John M. and Christopher J. Ward. *Russia: A Historical Introduction from Kievan Rus’ to the Present.* 8th ed. New York: Westview Press, 2018.

Thompson, John M. *Russia and the Soviet Union: An Historical Introduction from the Kievan State to the Present*. 6th ed. Boulder: Westview Press, 2009.

Toropov, Brandon. *Encyclopedia of Cold War Politics*. New York: Facts on File, 2000.

Tsygankov, Andrei. “Finding a Civilisational Idea: ‘West,’ ‘Eurasia,’ and ‘Euro-East’ in Russia’s Foreign Policy.” *Geopolitics* 12, no. 3 (2007): 375-399.

Van Dijk, Teun A. *Discourse and Power*. New York: Palgrave MacMilllan, 2008.

Van Dijk, Teun A. “Principles of Critical Discourse Analysis.” *Discourse & Society* 4 no.2 (1993): 249–283.

Van Dijk, Teun A. *Racism and the Press*. London: Routledge, 1991.

Vernadsky, George. *A History of Russia*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961.

Vitello, Paul. “Nicholas V. Riasanovsky Dies at 87; Set Standard for Russian History.” *New York Times* [online]. May 28 2011. <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/29/world/europe/29riasanovsky.html>. Accessed 7 September 2017.

VOA. “Putin Hails Crimea Annexation in Speech Ahead of Vote.” *VOA News*. March 14, 2018. <https://www.voanews.com/a/putin-hails-crimea-annexation-speech-ahead-vote/4299055.html> Accessed 15 September 2018.

Westwood, J.N. *Endurance and Endeavour: Russian History, 1812-2001*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005.

White, Hayden. *Metahistory: The Historical Imagination in Nineteenth Century Europe.* Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973/2014.

White, Hayden. *The Fiction of Narrative.* Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2010.

White, Hayden. “The Historical Event.” *differences: A Journal of Feminist Cultural Studies* 19, no. 2 (2008): 9-34.

White, Hayden. “Response to Arthur Marwick.” *Journal of Contemporary History* 30 (1995): 233-246.

White, Hayden. “Historical Emplotment and the Problem of Truth.” In *Probing the Limits of Representation: Nazism and the 'Final Solution'*, edited by Saul Friedlander, 37- 53. London: Harvard University Press, 1992.

White, Hayden. “The Question of Narrative in Contemporary Historical Theory.” *History and Theory*, 23, no. 1 (1984): 1-33.

White, Hayden. “The Value of Narrativity in the Representation of Reality.” *Critical Inquiry* 7, no.1 (1980): 5-27.

White, Hayden. “The Historical Text as Literary Artifact.” *Clio* 3, no. 3 (1974): 277-303.

Williams, Michael. “Words, Images, Enemies: Securitization in International Politics.” *International Studies Quarterly* 47, no.4 (2003): 511-531.

Wodak, Ruth, Rudolf de Cillia, Martin Reisigl, and Karen Liebhart. *The Discursive Construction of National Identity.* Translated by Angelika Hirsch, Richard Mitten, and J. W Unger. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2009.

Wodak, Ruth and Michael Meyer. “Critical Discourse Analysis: History, Agenda, Theory, and Methodology.” In *Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis*, edited by Ruth Wodak and Michael Meyer, 1-33. London: SAGE, 2009.

Wodak, Ruth. “The Discourse-historical Approach.” In *Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis*, edited by Ruth Wodak and Michael Meyer, 63-94. London: SAGE, 2001.

Wodak, Ruth. “What CDA is About.” In *Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis*, edited by Ruth Wodak and Michael Meyer, 1-13. London: SAGE, 2001.

Wodak, Ruth. “Critical Discourse Analysis at the End of the 20th Century.” *Research on Language and Social Interaction* 32 (1999): 185-193.

Wodak, Ruth and Christoph Ludwig. *Challenges in a Changing World: Issues in Critical Discourse Analysis*. Vienna: Passagen, 1999.

Wodak, Ruth, ed. *Language, Power and Ideology: Studies in Political Discourse*. Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing Company, 1989.

Wolff, Larry. *Inventing Eastern Europe: The Map of Civilization on the Mind of Enlightenment*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994.

Ziegler, Charles E. *The History of Russia*. 2nd ed. Santa Barbara: Greenwood Press, 2009.