

## PLAYING CHICKEN

Now that the Russians have been exploding "nuclear devices" again, there will be renewed interest in the thorny problem of the extent of the damage which the radiation from the fallout causes.

Though scientific knowledge here is far from complete, it seems likely that *any* radiation will, if it comes in contact with an organism, cause some damage, either to its genetic material or its metabolism. The latter variety seems most likely to be cancer.

The ethical considerations involved may seem less real, because it is not possible to point to any child born defective or to an adult who has developed leukemia and say that their condition is caused by radiation from the fallout from atomic testing. There are other sources of radiation, such as naturally occurring isotopes, and X-rays which contribute significantly to the total amount of radiation which the individual receives in his lifetime. All that can be said is that there will be an increase in genetic and metabolic damage to the population if there is an increase in radiation. In the nature of things who is affected individually by which type of radiation cannot be discovered. How much increase in this damage we ought to be prepared to put up with depends upon how useful the radiation is to the rest of mankind.

It is tempting to be indignant about the amount of radiation the Russians are now polluting the atmosphere with. It is probable, however, that the damage which their renewal of nuclear testing has caused is far greater in the political than in the biological sphere, even though it may be true that the radiation has gone up 35x over parts of the U.S.A. For what does it mean to say that the radiation has increased this much? The damage done depends not so much on the maximum level of the rise but upon the time which this level persists and the type of radiation which is produced. Some sorts of isotopes decay quickly and though they may for a few days cause a great increase in the amount of radiation, they are not as dangerous as those like Strontium-90 which decays to half its strength in twenty-eight years. This isotope is particularly dangerous because it may find its way into milk.

The difficulty of measuring accurately the amount of radiation produced by a series of explosions is made great by the fact that much of the fallout may remain in the upper atmosphere or be taken by winds to areas of the world where it is not measured. However, in 1957, it was estimated that the present abundance of Strontium-90 on the earth's surface would increase by a factor of five due to the testing which had taken place up till then. (Nuclear tests were stopped in 1958.) Strontium is incorporated into the skeleton when calcium is not present in sufficient amounts in the diet and this amount of increase in the amount of Strontium-90 could have significant effects in places where there is a deficiency of calcium.

The present series of Russian tests has probably not done any measurable damage, but if Russia and the U.S.A. decide to have a too prolonged display of their might by lighting cracker for cracker in their respective back yards, we will again have to worry about fallout.

Why do Russia and the U.S.A. have to go on testing? The U.S.A. can, she claims, destroy Russia



"After you"

five times over (although even a quintuplet victory in a nuclear war would be Pyrrhic). One would have thought that America's most pressing priority was the development of an I.C.B.M. After all, what would happen if a rocket with a warhead failed on the launching pad, as so many unarmed ones do. Would the Army or Navy, in a moment of hitherto unknown discretion, announce that Florida was now an island?

The truth of the matter appears to be that the Americans have begun again because the Russians have (though, to their credit, the Americans intend to explode their bombs underground).

The more interesting question is why the Russians have begun again. Is it because they have a genuine need to test their weapons? That seems rather unlikely. No amount of development of explosives will alter the present stalemate in the tactical position. The primary reason for the resumption of Russian tests is to terrorize the West out of Berlin. Berlin has been a sore point with the Communists since the beginning of the occupation of Germany. The flow of refugees from East to West was both politically and economically embarrassing. Though this has now stopped, the continued presence of the Americans is just as offensive to the Communists as the occupation of half of Port Moresby by Indonesia would be if the Indonesians already occupied West New Guinea. Legally the Americans have every right to be there and so the Russian tactic is to hand over control of the city to the East German Government with which the occupying powers of the West have no agree-

ment about rights of entry from West Germany to West Berlin and about movement between East and West Berlin.

Further to this plan, Russia wishes to sign separate peace treaties with the two Germanys while the West wishes to sign a single peace treaty with a unified, neutral and unoccupied Germany whose Government would be elected by free elections. The Russian proposal on Berlin is that it should become a free city, occupied only by the Germans themselves.

No doubt the East Germans would liberate it shortly after it became free in order to protect its freedom.

The West cannot abandon Berlin, no matter how much Khrushchev threatens. The West Berliners have the strongest possible desire to remain part of the West and the West, as their ally, are morally obliged to see that they do.

All things considered, it is now time to quote the "Manchester Guardian Weekly."

"The cynical brutality of the Soviet resumption of nuclear tests and of the manner in which the decision was announced, is ominous. The direct parallel in Soviet history is the Stalin-Hitler Pact. Usually the Kremlin tries to present its activities in a favourable light. On this occasion, as in 1939, it has shown a calculated contempt for world opinion."

But the difference is that in 1939 Russia's "cynical brutality" could not have led to the destruction of civilisation. The West and Russia are still on a collision course over Berlin; who is going to be the chicken?

# TIMES

Tuesday, September 26th—  
Anglican Society: Bible Study Series continued.

Wednesday, September 27th—  
Evangelical Union: 1.15, Lady Symon Library, Dr. E. J. Gibson. Bible Studies (continued), "The Trumpet of Warning."

Wednesday, October 4th—  
Evangelical Union: 1.15, Lady Symon Library, Dr. E. J. Gibson. Bible Studies (continued), "Ploughing in the Wild Oats."

Wednesday, October 11th—  
Evangelical Union: 1.15, Lady Symon Library, Dr. E. J. Gibson. Bible Studies (continued), "The Circle of Love."

Wednesday, October 18th—  
Evangelical Union: 1.15, Lady Symon Library, Dr. E. J. Gibson. Bible Studies (continued), "The Consumption of Love."

Friday, September 22nd—  
Seventh Day Adventist Students' Society: Meeting Anna Menz Room, 1.15 p.m., Pastor Judd.

Friday, October 6th—  
Seventh Day Adventist Students' Society: Meeting Anna Menz Room, 1.15 p.m., Ken Brown.

# TIDES

The Scholarships Section of the Education Department will be located on the second floor of the Mathematics Building at the University from Monday, 31st July.

The telephone number will still remain that of the Education Department, 8 0471. When the Education Department switchboard answers, it will be necessary to ask for the Scholarships Section, where a smaller switchboard will be located. The postal address will be the Scholarships Officer, Education Department, Box 406C, G.P.O., Adelaide.

## COLLEGE SCHOLARSHIPS

Applications are invited from current and intending full-time students of the University for a number of Scholarships to be provided by the University and tenable at St. Mark's, St. Ann's, Aquinas and Lincoln Colleges.

The value of each Scholarship will not exceed half the College fee for residence or £100, whichever is the less.

Tenure will be subject to annual renewal.

The object of the Scholarships is to enable students who could not otherwise afford to do so, to live in College.

To be eligible for a Scholarship, either the candidate must have had at least the last three years of his secondary education at South Australian Schools or his parents must be permanently resident in South Australia.

Applications from candidates already at the University may be lodged at any time until December 31, 1961. Applications from students who intend to enrol at the University in 1962 for the first time should be lodged not later than January 31, 1962.

# ON DIT

Editors for 1961: Will Baynes, Des Cooper and John Finnis.

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The following have contributed to the editorial columns during the year:

W. Baynes  
D. Cooper  
J. Finnis  
W. A. Cowan  
A. Hyslop  
T. McRae  
R. J. Blandy  
W. J. Skyvington  
Lyn Marshall  
R. Broinowski  
Boyce Gibson  
C. W. Nettelbeck  
R. J. Rechner  
Peter Rogers

The front page block is from a lithograph by Daumier.

# SEARCH FOR EFFICIENCY

by

Dean Campbell

The first "Ordinary" Council meeting of the National Union of Australian University Students was held in Melbourne from 25th August to 28th August. This August Council follows as part of the re-organisation of N.U.A.U.S. As previously explained in "On Dit," N.U.A.U.S. has re-organised its administration and has appointed a full-time Administrative Secretary who is in charge of the Secretariat. The Executive has been abandoned and the only Committee now existing is a Committee whose function is to supervise the work of the Secretariat.

As part of this re-organisation, two Councils will be held each year, the Annual Council in February and the other in August, both to be held in Melbourne.

Adelaide was represented by Gordon Bilney, the new President of the S.R.C. (Leader of the Delegation), Dean Campbell, Marian Quartly and Margaret Penny.

The meeting, which lasted four days, was a good one, with delegates quickly settling down and getting the business through.

Several major changes were made and many minor problems were successfully solved.

I will confine my remarks to three of the major changes.

## (1) International and Education Portfolios.

During the last six months, the President of N.U.A.U.S., Bob Wallace, has been administering the portfolio of International, while Kim Patterson has been the Union's Education Officer.

The plan for the future was that the Supervision Committee should manage International Affairs and a separate person, such as Mr. Patterson, should look after the Education portfolio. The plan for the Inter-

national portfolio looked vaguely inefficient. No particular person would be responsible for this work and anyway, this work was outside the scope of work planned for the Supervision Committee. Accordingly, Council decided that in the future, the President would be required to take either the International portfolio or the Education portfolio and, depending on his choice, the appropriate additional officer would be chosen.

This gives both these tasks, the most important in N.U.A.U.S., a firm foundation on which to be built.

## (2) Composition of the Supervision Committee.

The last Council held in Armidale in February of this year decided that the Supervision Committee would consist of "members or former members of the Union of not more than five years standing from the conclusion of their last degree."

Adelaide disagreed with this decision, taking the attitude that students, who are the current members of the Union, should comprise the Supervision Committee.

Accordingly, Adelaide moved the appropriate change at this Council and except for an amendment by Tasmania, Council accepted Adelaide's proposal.

The position now is that the President must be a student member, and the three other Supervisory Officers must be students or recent graduates, with the proviso that the Union may elect another person to the

Supervision Committee as a "wise Counsellor" if such a person is available.

Adelaide's consideration was based on the fact that only current students can think as students and, anyway, we are worrying about a National Union of Students. The natural conclusion is that students should administer the Union.

## (3) Education.

Dr. Martin Davey, in an article in the last edition of "On Dit," entitled "Our Problem Groups," mentioned the existence of the N.U.A.U.S. Education Research Officer, Mrs. Theobald. Unfortunately, Mrs. Theobald is leaving for overseas next year and so has resigned from the Union. As no suitably qualified person has applied for the position, Mr. Ernst (a former Faculty Bureau Director and a former International Vice-President of the Union) tabled a plan for giving projects to personnel in Education Departments in Australia and to pay these people to do education research for the Union.

I would quickly add, in case readers take my opening remarks on the E.R.O. as the reason for Mr. Ernst's suggestion, that Mr. Ernst (and many others) consider that the project method would be a more efficient method of education research for the Union.

A grant will be given for each project, the amount of the grant to be decided in consultation with the Head of the group concerned.

There are, of course, many other factors to be taken into account. If any student is interested, information can be obtained from the S.R.C. Office.

As stated above, other subjects were discussed and debated at the Meeting. In my opinion, the above three changes were the major decisions made by the Council.

by Wayne Anthony

## (self-styled local N.Z. Debating Tour Director)

The convoy of nurses was there, some debating society members were there, a few S.R.C. members were there, the Kiwis were there, a few other assorted people were there and I was there.

The following morning the two remaining members of the Band of Hope, namely, Mr. Badenoch and myself, waved ta-ta to the trio at the Airport and that was that.

Thanks are not due to the Debating Club executive on the S.R.C. for assistance with the trip. Although there had been correspondence between the Debating Club executive and the N.Z. tour director for some weeks, nobody in this rather nebulous organisation, with the exception of Mr. Detmold, was interested in helping any way. Nor was any member of the S.R.C., except Miss Quartly, Mr. Badenoch and Mr. Combe.

The result was a badly organised, uninspiring tour for which I do not apologise.

# I do not apologise

The three New Zealanders were met at the Airport by the University Branch of the Band of Hope, consisting of myself, Mr. Badenoch and Mr. Combe. We learned that the plane had arrived half an hour ahead of schedule and were therefore twenty-five minutes late, but nevertheless found the trio quite cheerfully eating Airport pasties, or something.

Having told them of our plans for the trip, we conveyed them to St. Mark's College, whereupon they were shown to their rooms.

There was a singular lack of life at St. Mark's, "le bon vie," and all that. In vacation time, St. Mark's is about as cheerful as the Ninety-Mile Desert.

On opening the door of his room Mr. Mack Hamilton discovered a cleaning woman making the bed, but I didn't hear him say anything rude to her.

Having deposited their luggage, two of the New Zealanders expressed a desire to become acquainted with the local hostelry, while the third expressed a desire for a haircut.

Mr. Badenoch took Mr. Hamilton and Mr. Moore to an adjacent pub, which stands resplendent under the name of the "Queen's Head," while I drove Mr. Power to the Union Buildings, conducted him through a short tour of them, then took him down and introduced him to Mr. Leo Maloney, the barber, or, as we say in the vernacular, the hairdresser.

I mentioned that I should be pleased to wait for Mr. Power and, after he had gotten his hair cut, show him more of the University, but he replied that it was very good of me ("No trouble in the world," I protested), but he was quite happy and would like to have a stroll round on his own afterwards, so I left him in Mr. Maloney's care, with a copy of *Time* open on his knee.

I am informed that the Kiwis had a quite pleasant evening, going to the Union Hall to see "The Mystery of a Hansom Cab," then carrying on somewhere, with some lady friends found for them by Mr. McRae, bless his heart, until quite late.

I had arranged to conduct them around the University on the following morning, but found that they preferred instead to spend the time working on their preparation for the evening's debate.

Mr. McRae informed me, in a telephone conversation, that they were all going to meet at the Richmond, another local ale-house, at one o'clock, and then he would have a vehicle there in which to conduct the Kiwis around the city and hills for a while, which seemed to me to be a plan most excellent.

However, in a chance meeting in the Refectory, I was informed that the New Zealanders were going to spend the afternoon on their debate, so I needn't bother.

So I didn't.

But lo and behold! On meeting the trio at the Portus Room that evening at six o'clock, what do I find but that they are all hurt and bewildered because they spent an hour and a half at St. Mark's waiting to be picked up, as arranged, and the driver didn't come!

Most curious.

Some thought that the driver had waited at the wrong place, others were sure he hadn't even gone. I suppose we'll never know.

Anyhow, the buffet dinner was quite successful, and then followed the climax of the whole dynamic tour, the Debate.

The subject was "That the Western Democracies should Repudiate their Alliances with Dictatorships," and Adelaide's team, consisting of Messrs. Hyslop, McRae and Finnis, took the positive side.

It seems to me obvious that the topic is a question purely of principle. However, the New Zealanders, considerably rattled because Adelaide refused to provide a definition for them to rip asunder, went to great lengths to prove that it is a practical impossibility, which is not the question at all—and won the debate.

It is worthy to note that, about half-way through the debate, a convoy of nurses entered, escorted by a solitary male, looking like the cat that got the canary.

Following the debate, which was, incidentally, adjudicated by Dr. K. Thompson (N.Z.), Mr. R. Reid, and Dr. T. Wilson (N.Z.), a booze-up was held at the House of Badenoch.

# Is bigger better?

by Sue Godwin

What will the grand new multi-storey building about to be commenced at Kintore Avenue do for the Adelaide Teachers' College "Way of Life"? Will added space involve added quality of teacher-training or will it merely, by creating problems of increased organisation and central direction of huge numbers, bring greater conformity and inner resistance to change than ever? This is a question which those hopeful of seeing reform in this department are inevitably asking themselves as the old, temporary prefabricated buildings are being bulldozed out of existence. No doubt this action has been the subject of wishful thinking by many past and present under-graduates.

I personally suspect that the increasing numbers this larger building will involve will tend to reduce the recognition of the importance of the individual as such. He will become hopelessly enmeshed in the great State Department Machinery, reduced to a mass-produced cog with mass-produced oversimplified ideas and his lecturers and tutors to supervisory "foremen" and managerial "bosses."

I am led to these suspicions because of the already extant machinery for running College Life and controlling student activities, modes of living, thinking and dressing in this way. An example of this is the refusal to allow women students to wear slacks in winter if they wish to, or to countenance their living in flats if receiving a boarding allowance. Another example is the threatening attitude taken if students are heard to express criticism of the College, the lecturing staff or student regulations. I fear that the student of the future college will be even less able to change these things through the doubtfully effective medium of Student Representation. The Principal too will no doubt become an even more mysterious, omnipotent and threatening Ultimate Authority.

How could these trends, already disturb-

ingly present, be modified or improved during, or as a result of the changeover? How could they possibly be prevented from engulfing the lives of future students in this establishment?

One such possible safeguard might be the provision of secretaries for the academic members of staff who could then take over the bureaucratic business of administration. Academic staff would then be freed to engage in personal research on study projects in Educational fields outside Australia. They would also be able to give more time and attention to the protests of the student who wished to change things. Another such provision might be that, because of better facilities (and salaries?) lecturers could be employed from interstate and overseas to refresh the intellectual atmosphere of what has often been termed a "too-narrow" institution. The familiar, restrictive pattern of Departmental High School to Departmental Training College to Departmental High School as teacher and back to Departmental Training College as tutor-lecturer is often held to be the cause of the insular and reactionary attitudes of some College Staff members.

Allowing for these possibilities it seems inevitable that some of the present benefits of individual contact, responsibility and freedom, must be lost in the change from a comparatively small community to a large-scale, super-organised and directed training system.

Will the power of the Department to dictate to its trainees be greater or lesser when the whole thing is on a bigger scale? Is freedom of choice and behaviour more valid for an employee of Woolworths or a small shop? Moreover one thing is certain, we must guard against the probably futile optimism of expecting that a bigger and better library will necessarily entail a broader or more discriminating selection and purchase of its contents. Equally optimistic is the anticipation that a higher and bigger College structure will induce a broader or more tolerant climate of opinion within its precincts.

# RIGOURS OF A CRUEL WORLD

On the evening of Tuesday, 5th September, at 7.30 p.m., in the Lady Symon Library, the newly-elected 16th S.R.C. held its first meeting. Under the chairmanship of Mr. Bilney, the meeting was dominated by three factors—a complete ignorance of, or disregard to Standing Orders amongst many members, an acute absence of spirited debate, and (perhaps as a substitute?) Mr. Campbell, didactic in his new role as Immediate Past President.

The meeting opened in the usual manner with acceptance of the Minutes and apologies (it is interesting to note that apologies for absence were received only from the inimitable triarchy of Messrs. Baynes, Cooper and Finnis).

Correspondence produced one interesting debate. A letter had been received by the Secretary of the University of Queensland Union telling of the special session of the Union's Annual General Meeting to mark its Jubilee. It was requested that Adelaide despatch an observer to this Session which was to be held on Sunday, September 10. An amended Motion "That the S.R.C. send an observer to Brisbane and pay up to £20 for fares" produced such a close vote that the President called for a recount. He then declared the motion carried by one vote. At the insistence of Mr. Campbell, a further recount was taken, and the Chairman, compelled to preserve the status quo, declared the motion lost on his casting vote.

Next on the agenda came reports, and the President first delivered a short oration. He told of changes made in the S.R.C. Office, and of the Meeting to be held on September 15, for all Leaving Honours students intending to enter the University next year.

Several other reports were then read, the most interesting of which were those about Prosh and Prosh Rag, submitted by Messrs. Brooks and Slee respectively.

Then came the highlight of the meeting, an executive motion proposed by Mr. Combe and seconded by Mr. Porter, requesting "That the profits from the Prosh Hop be paid into S.R.C. Functions Account." The reasons for so doing are simple; the Executive believes that as more money is raised for Charity each year through Prosh, so expenses incurred by floats, etc., have increased proportionately. This year such expenses totalled a sum well in excess of

by  
the S.R.C.  
Executive

£100. There seems to be no reason why the Student body should pay this money in order to collect for a charity (i.e. War Veterans' Home which receives half the proceeds of the Collection) a sum three times as great as it would receive from a normal badge day. Furthermore, whereas prior to 1959 takings at Prosh Hop had merely covered expenses, in that year, a profit of £21/10/- was paid into Functions Account. In 1960, it would seem that the profits were added to the Collection total and therefore to the money distributed to the Charities.

When the motives behind the proposal had been put to Council, Mr. Campbell, in a fiery address, emphatically urged members to vote against the motion. His reasons were threefold. First, he claimed that Functions Account is already prosperous, and does not need this additional money to cover the Costs of the procession. Secondly, he believed that Prosh is an activity organised by the S.R.C. and is not a necessary adjunct of Collection. As a result, the S.R.C. should meet expenses incurred by Prosh. Thirdly, the Admission Charge to Prosh Hop had been raised in 1960 and again this year by the Procession Committee, in order to bolster the Collection Total, not the S.R.C. Functions Account. He stated that students attending the Hop did so to let off steam after Prosh, and paid their four shillings in the belief that it was going to Charity.

Mr. Haslam, supporting the motion, said that he believed it was intended to cover expenses incurred by Prosh, not to increase the S.R.C.'s bank account. When Mr. Campbell asked that certain of Mr. Haslam's remarks be ruled out of order, the Chairman refused this request, and a dissent motion was moved.

The Immediate Past President addressed the Council, explaining why he had dissented, then his successor told why he had

refused the request that Mr. Haslam be ruled out of order. Mr. Sando, who had taken over the Chair, counted the vote, and the dissent motion was crushingly defeated.

When debate to the motion was resumed, Mr. Badenoch, supporting Mr. Campbell, made the suggestion that Council pays float expenses from collection money and gives Prosh Hop profits to Charity (an illegal move).

A gag motion was submitted and Mr. Bilney, reinstated to the Chair, accepted it. When the original proposal was carried by a large majority, Messrs. Campbell, Badenoch and Zimmet expressed dissent and dissociation.

The Council then returned to more mundane matters; first, it carried unanimously a proposal of Mr. Sando "that Miss Quarty (it being her birthday) be congratulated on surviving 19 years the rigours of this cruel world and on attaining in this time a magnificent reputation." Supper was then taken.

On resumption, Mr. Horne presented a report of the Overseas Students' Meeting, after which it was moved by Mr. Upton that the S.R.C. approve a draft Constitution of an Overseas Students' Organisation, and pay £1 to become an Associate member body. Mr. Campbell, with keen perception, pointed out that it was ridiculous to join something which as yet, did not exist.

After this a report from Mr. Anthony was read stating that the New Zealander Debaters' Tour, during which nothing was done (well, not quite!) was a flop.

Elections of representatives to Union and S.R.C. Committees then followed. The committee in most cases consisted of a mixture of those desirable and those desirous.

The second relatively fiery debate followed when a motion, reconstituting the A.U.D.S. Management Committee with the same personnel as before, was submitted. A substantial A.U.D.S. bloc fought the remainder for half an hour. During this time, notions of recomittal, of suspension of Standing Orders and so forth were submitted and withdrawn, until at length, Mr. Campbell scored his coup d'etat, when he instilled some sober influence and logical reasoning to the discussion.

And so the battle raged . . . until 12.45 a.m.

## The money or the box?

I

by Dean Campbell

The motion was there. What could be done? For several days the new S.R.C. Executive, under the guiding hand of Mr. Bilney, grappled with this problem. To their disgust, the previous S.R.C. had seen fit to resolve that the S.R.C. would subsidise Procession floats up to the exorbitant sum of £7/10/- per float. Now the new administration after consideration of the position decided that this expense on the S.R.C. funds was not justified and this money should be taken out of the Prosh Collection. But this was taking money from Charity, so how could it be done without making the move blatantly obvious?

Like lambs, the 16th S.R.C. sat in the Lady Symon Library on the evening of September 5, not knowing the move that was carefully planned. And then it came. The keen Honorary Secretary, Mr. Combe, moved, and Mr. Porter, the bright young Honorary Treasurer, seconded the following motion: "That the proceeds from the Prosh Hop be paid into the S.R.C. Functions Account."

After little opposition, the motion was passed, with the three most experienced S.R.C. members present voicing their dissent and dissociation.

Let us then analyse this move. The Executive did not want to pay some £110 for the Prosh from the Functions Account, which contains approximately £840. They did not wish to make this fact obvious by attempting to change the decision of the previous S.R.C. The result was that in a round-about, underhand way, they found a means of putting into Functions Account, a sum exceeding that of the cost of the Procession, so that not only would the S.R.C. not have to pay for the Procession but would, in fact, show a profit on the Procession. Had the Executive been prepared to come into the open on this move, even the thought would have appalled many students. Using the method they did, however, not only appalled the opposition but attached a disgusting touch to the move. How long is it since an Executive has been so gutless?

Mr. Combe argued that the proceeds from the Hop are not part of the Collection money. Remembering that Mr. Combe is only a first year student, the writer turned to members of the Jazz Club, who run the Hop, for their opinion. Never before has Mr. Lewis reacted so quickly. His attitude leaves no doubt that the proceeds were meant to be part of the Collection.

The Prosh Director and Collection Director were also definite with their opinion.

For a final opinion, Mr. Lightburn was consulted (Mr. Lightburn was the first Collection Director ever appointed). He upheld the view of this year's organisers.

Finally, let us consider what the Executive has achieved. To put it bluntly, it has achieved nothing. The S.R.C. in passing the motion has decided to put into Functions Account a sum of money that was already there. The Executive should have worried itself about what would be paid out of Functions Account, but, as is often the case in underhand moves, the worry of pushing a subject through clouded the vision of what was really wanted. So, Mr. Brook, Mr. McNicol and the other members of the opposition, have no fears, no harm has been done. The S.R.C. will still have to pay for the Procession, which is as it should be.

II

by Gordon Bilney

At its last meeting, the S.R.C. decided by 23 votes to 3 to devote the profits of the Procession Hop to the S.R.C.'s Functions Account. In doing so, the 16th S.R.C. endorsed the decision of the wise and statesmanlike S.R.C. of Mr. Hyslop in 1959; the 14th S.R.C. also decided that the profits of the Prosh Hop were legitimately its own. One is therefore mildly amused that the informed and dutiful decision of a forward-looking S.R.C. should have become the occasion of such ill-bred name-calling as Mr. Campbell permits himself.

One must in fairness elaborate: Mr. Campbell does not allow that the decision made by such an overwhelming majority of the S.R.C. was either "informed" or "dutiful." It was patent that the first debate on the motion occupied some 30 minutes; speech followed fiery speech, points of order and dissent ensured the airing of informed and relevant views. Nor could the opposition have wished for more vocal or more dedicated speakers; your correspondent must have a perverted view of the workings of debate if he is to sell short the keen minds and polemic skills of a Campbell or a Badenoch. No, one cannot accept that it was an uninformed decision. And it was moreover a dutiful one. Be not, I pray, misled by red herrings of £840 and the like, and talk of "profit on the Procession"; for the Procession, say what your correspondent will, showed a loss of some £110, and only the Prosh Hop, a different coloured horse, a profit. That the Hop Profit was more than the Prosh Loss is interesting; or remarkable; or intolerable; or what you will; but it is always irrelevant. And so is the sum in Functions Account; if Mr. Campbell

wishes the S.R.C. to carry out to less than its ability its manifest trust to administer the students' own money (viz. Functions Account), it would be wise of him to say so a trifle less subtly.

It has not been difficult to confute the arguments of Mr. Campbell, if in fact there were any; and their lack accounts, one surmises, for the indelicate abuse with which he so plentifully fouls his accusations.

But it *did* seem strange that only three people voted against it . . .

## Trial and liaison

Dear Mr. Campbell,

Professor Karmel was able to attend the meeting of the University Council on Friday, 28th July, and the Council therefore proceeded to a fuller consideration of your proposal that the President of the S.R.C. should be in attendance as an observer at meetings of the Council and of its committees, when matters of concern to students were being considered.

At the close of the discussion, I was asked to draw your attention to the fact that since the Council made arrangements for Professor Karmel to act in liaison between the S.R.C. and itself, the extent to which the S.R.C. has used his offices is small. The Council does not make this statement of fact as a criticism of the President or members of the S.R.C.; on the contrary, it recognises that it may often be extremely difficult for regular meetings to be arranged with one as occupied as is Professor Karmel. It feels, however, that the system which has so recently been introduced should be given a better trial and suggests that the President of the S.R.C. should ascertain each month from the Registrar whether items of business on the Council notice papers include any of direct concern to students.

It suggests that by this means the President of the S.R.C. would be able to keep himself informed about such matters and could, when he thought fit, see that the views of students are placed before the Council either in the form of written submissions, or through Professor Karmel, as the President might prefer.

Yours sincerely,  
HENRY BASTEN,  
Vice-Chancellor.

## MORAL LETTERS

My dear Nephew,

Some have thought it an imposition to rely upon other people, even in only slight ways, lest in the sharing of responsibility they lose a little distinctiveness. I have never preached such a proud doctrine, and so I am employing (without regret) another hand to write this letter.

It was very kind of you to write so soon after you heard of my indisposition; and although I have moments when I suspect that I will never see you again, or write any more pretentious phrases, nevertheless my hope is that I may prove unexpected yet a while.

Death-bed conversions seem such a tedious thing—to many they imply that safety is better than sincerity. Think what you will, dear Boy, but this arch-figure has sought longingly for conviction, only to discover that the darkling spirit which transforms has been evident in every action seen, observed, contemplated, which has denied the malice of self-love. *Benedicite nobis.*

I have asked the nurse to raise the pillows so that I can see between the sheer whiteness of the bow window into the summer garden. All about me are the things I love so dearly—the richly bound volumes tumbling off the table, the heavy velvet curtains, the inlaid ceilings and all the while the soft incense and cool water—holy and clear. *Domine Deus.*

What remembrances of past days and dimming glories as the years convinced me of their limited span. But I am wandering from the point—a failing of a failing old woman. *atque eis tuis donis.*

Let me bandy about a word. "Truth". Now the truth seems to me that there is a Person who has so identified Himself with the loves, hopes, sorrows of mankind that in His death and life all are dead and alive. How can I or you (pressing enquirer) know? *quae de tua largitate sumus sumpturi.*

A most unique Man, you say—such an individual. Yet He always protested the will of the Father, the freedom of obedience. There is nothing novel about dying; but for each of us it will be a single experience. The promise, and hope, and desire of all ages has come, but the road and the intersection is the way of self-denial. How hard it is to lose oneself, even for so great a prize—each trifling failure calls us back, arguing, "What's the use." Only the Desolation of Israel speaks of final success.

Dear Nephew, my words, although for me they burn with a new hope, must seem strange to you, who have so often heard able missionaries and humble monks. Albeit I know that you are moving towards the Passion of Christ, for you have ceased to smartly side-step or play-off the demands of reasoned faith. You have seen "that hideous strength" and felt the effects of its ugliness. And you have heard "I lay down my life, that I may take it again."

I have become very tired dictating this letter and the shadows over my bed remind me of the call of evening, the hushing of the busy world's feverish life. It gives me pleasure at such times to join with the Holy Church, before I sleep, in the last Daily Office, that of Compline. Then I remember with great joy the ancient commendation in which I shall take my leave of you all.

"For Complyne betokeneth the ende of unannes life; and therefore eche persone oughte to dyspose hym to beddewarde," as yf hys bedde were hys graue."

Even so, Amen.

*yours sincerely*  
*Auntie Edith*

### POSTSCRIPT

*It was the custom of this distinguished lady after she had reached the age of eighty, to dress in black silk; only her head was permitted any ornament, and there she wore a pure white veil of fine linen embroidered with very small Tudor roses. Even during this, her last illness, she would not forebear the plain veil and her gently lined face, thin now, with the softness of years, brightened the sombre surroundings.*

*On the day upon which she dictated this letter to me she had a very great presentiment of death; nor was her expectation disappointed. She lay down in peace.*

*Her nephew has stated his intention of publishing her many prose and poetical works which used to provide her friends with great amusement and a large variety of subjects for discussion. A whole world of colour and variety sparkles from these papers, for she had learnt that "charity never faileth."*

# NOT THE AGNOSTIC'S PEROGATIVE

by

S. P. Burley

This article is intended to express a viewpoint on some of the discussions which took place in the course of the recent Mission to the University given by Fr. Gleeson on behalf of the Aquinas Society. I take the liberty of presenting what I thought to be the substance of the missionary's argument in what must be a highly condensed form, and only hope that I do not seriously misrepresent him. (I leave it to Mr. McNicol in the accompanying article to present the main counter arguments.)

Anyway, I thought that Father's argument went something like this—"If we reflect philosophically on some of our most important activities, such as realising the truth of some state of affairs, or judging the rightness or wrongness of certain actions, we get a picture of ourselves which fits in with Christ's teaching about ourselves, in fact it fits in very nicely.

"For example, let us see what is entailed in knowing something to be true. First of all we can observe that this knowing is a very special sort of business—it has no weight, size or particular location—i.e. it is not describable in the terms we use to describe material things. So that in being aware of knowing something, we become aware of an aspect of ourselves which differs quite radically from the material things around us, or even the material structure which goes to make up another aspect of ourselves (our bodies). So we are conscious of an immaterial (or spiritual) side of our being as well as a material side. Other aspects of our awareness such as ideals, ambitions, decisions, morals, theorising, etc., again lead us to see ourselves as acting in a non-material, non-mechanical way. What I want to emphasise is that we are aware that some of our intellectual activities are not made of any 'stuff,' be they atoms, or other particles, or what have you.

"These events lead me to a realisation that some part of me (which is the ultimate basis of my knowing and awareness) is not just material. I propose to call this part a soul.

"I see this soul as being intimately united to the body, giving a union which I call a living person. A useful analogy here is the combination of a telephone switchboard and an operator. The two together give a telephone exchange which works. If you take the operator away, the exchange is idle (cf. a dead person). If you damage the switchboard (by interfering with the circuitry) then, even with the best operator, you get a defective exchange (cf. an insane person, or the case of brain operations).

"But the analogy must not be pushed too far lest it become misleading. What I want to emphasise about the human case is its *knowing*, in the strong sense of knowing that it knows. I say this, because we have to counter the specious objection that we could have an automatic telephone exchange using purely mechanical computing elements without any person or 'soul'. But I deny the inference here, because it has not been shown that any mechanical exchange, or even the most complicated electronic computer *knows*. Certainly, it performs set logical transformations of data according to some set pattern, but I do not think that even the most avid materialist would really believe it to be aware, or to *know*, in the way that he himself *knows*.

"But there is a much deeper problem for the materialist to face if he still wants to hold that man is just some very complicated machine, and that his 'thinking' differs in no way from that of a computer. The problem is this: if he is just a machine, operating in accordance with set laws, then how could he know that he was thinking correctly, and so how could he know that he was just a machine?"

Now the argument begins to get quite

subtle, so in what follows, I merely express a tentative opinion. At this stage of the argument it was pointed out that the mechanist *could* be right, i.e. he could be a logical machine which happened to be programmed correctly. As a matter of fact I argued this with Fr. Gleeson myself (by the way, one of the interesting features of the Mission was the strict critical character of the Catholics present who provided much of the interesting discussion). However, I have since had second thoughts on this subject. I think now that maybe the mechanist could say that his thinking was purely mechanical (like a computer), and further such thinking could be quite correct, and so he could quite correctly perceive that he was just a machine, *but he could not be sure of it*, i.e. he could not *know* it. The only "certainty" he would have would then be hypothetical—that if he is programmed cor-

rectly, then his conclusions are certain (as a matter of fact, he could not even say that he was certain that he was uncertain, or that he was certain that he knew what he was saying when he said that he was uncertain—so he is not really a very formidable opponent!).

"So much for the implications of any significant and certain factual statements which we make.

"We consider now the implications of any significant moral judgements that we also make.

"I suggest that we really do make at least some moral judgments that are not just expressions of opinion, e.g. that the Nazis should not have behaved as they did. A little thought then, suffices to show that such judgements entail the notions of responsibility and free-will in some human ac-

tions. Further, I suggest that significant moral judgements are based on what is good, or bad for man as man, i.e. they depend on the sort of being that man is, that is, *the nature of man*.

"An intelligent discussion of morality then, can be based on an analysis of the nature of man. Such discussion has the practical value that it gives us a basis of protest against unjust laws, which, are still prolific in the world today."

But I must stop now, hoping that I have made some contribution to clarity, and not departed too far from the spirit of fairness and charity which made for an enjoyable mission. I suggest we could do with more of this sort of thing—it might seem tedious and dull to some Christians, but I submit that it has the merit of showing that philosophy is not the agnostic's prerogative.

## Enough of souls

by

Don McNicol

The Aquinas Mission has run its course. If the talks and discussions did not convince the Ungodly that there were entities over and above what can be kicked, seen and measured, such as immortal souls, freewill and Natural Law, they did show that some people still take their philosophy seriously, a point that might be noted by some Christians who have a tendency to protect their point of view by keeping it within the somewhat inaccessible realms of faith and revelation. In retrospect there seem a few points made by Fr. Gleeson that are well worth examining again. This is most probably a little unfair to Fr. Gleeson who is rather far removed to make a rejoinder (though not as far removed as Dr. Martin, I admit).

Immortal souls are always of interest to both the agnostic and the Christian. They provoke such questions as "Have we got them?" and "If so, where did they come from?" which are nicely empirical in kind, or "Where do they go afterwards?" which seems somewhat less empirical, and more concerned with matters of future personal comfort. Fr. Gleeson restricted himself to the first question, and so shall I, not that I might not be interested in question three if answers can be found to one and two.

The defence of the soul seems to hinge on the fact that there are a lot of things human beings do that do not seem explainable purely in materialistic terms. Now what do we mean by "materialistic"? The following example should make the distinction clear between material and immaterial things.

We might be able to explain how light waves from an object are picked up by the eye, and transmitted along nerve pathways into the brain. But once this has happened, some incredibly complex events occur. I may decide to pick up the object and throw it out of the window, because I find it objectionable, or on the other hand, because I don't find it objectionable I may decide to do something entirely different. Willing, judging, valuing, deciding, etc., don't seem to be able to be explained away as purely material things or events. They are mental properties. If they are mental properties and can't be explained as the behaviour of nerve cells in the cerebral cortex, then we must have somewhere for them to belong and what better place than the mind or the soul.

As Fr. Gleeson pointed out, even an eminent neurologist such as Penfield feels that human behaviour cannot be explained purely in terms of brain events, but that we have to admit the existence of some entity, mind, soul or whatever, which controls the brain processes, and has the final say in what we do. Fr. Gleeson quoted Penfield's example of the neurosurgeon who is pushing electrodes into his subject's cortex, and by doing so, manages to cause the subject's arm to move. The subject takes rather a dim view of being told that *he* moved the arm. He re-

ports that he had no control over the action at all, but it was the neurosurgeon's unwarranted fiddling that was responsible. From this, concludes Penfield, we know that it was a brain event that caused the arm to move. However, seeing that the subject was independently aware that he hadn't willed the arm to move, then there must have been a mind which can stand off from the brain and make independent judgements.

Now I am not altogether convinced that minds follow necessarily from people realising what neurosurgeons are doing inside their craniums. Let us have a closer look at Penfield's subject. He is not fooled by the neurosurgeon when the arm is moved, and the reason that he is not fooled is because he didn't *decide* to move his arm. "Not deciding" might just mean that certain brain processes didn't occur, e.g., when I decide to move my arms processes  $A_1 \dots A_2 \dots A_3 \dots$  etc. may occur in my brain. The moving of my arm may be directly determined by processes  $B_1 \dots B_2 \dots B_3 \dots$  etc. When the neurosurgeon makes my arm move by using electrodes,  $B_1 \dots B_2 \dots B_3 \dots$  etc. occur *by themselves*. When asked if I moved my arm voluntarily, I say no. *I would only say yes if  $A_1 \dots A_2 \dots A_3 \dots$  etc. (processes of deciding), had occurred as well.*

Of course things aren't really as simple as this. The processes of deciding and doing are inextricably linked up, and it would be impossible to point to certain areas of the brain and say "When those go into action, a decision is being made," or "When these are working, an action will occur." But let us realise that there is no good reason why we could not explain deciding, willing and judging purely in terms of brain-processes, and without any reference to minds or souls which control the brains. Penfield may not like doing this, but a large number of

present-day psychologists are working on the assumption that it can be done, and with some good reasons too.

Now if the discussion so far is valid, souls may be starting to look rather unnecessary, but I suppose that we could still have them. The soul may still lurk behind the brain-processes, but any soul-type decision or judgement would have to be expressed *via* the brain. To illustrate how this might work, let me appeal to your childhood memories. Remember the little syringe device that your mother used to write "Happy Birthday" on the cake? You put the icing inside the syringe, and screwed a little nozzle on to the end of it. The nozzle determined what shape the icing would be when it came out. If we think of the soul as the icing and the nozzle as the brain, we can see that the soul will determine whether anything is capable of being done or not—no icing, no pattern (the syringe is empty)—no soul, no action (you happen to be dead), and the brain will determine what is done, i.e. the pattern.

The peculiar difficulty of such an interpretation is this. There is certainly no mystery in saying that "I have a soul" means "I am alive". The brain of course will determine how my "aliveness" is expressed. Then it follows that just as it doesn't matter what sort of icing I have in the syringe, because it is the nozzle which determines what the pattern will be, neither does it matter what "sort" of soul I have, because it is the brain which determines my actions. I could in fact swap souls with you and we would be no different. I could have one soul, twenty, or ten thousand, but this would not affect my overt behaviour or my thinking one scrap.

However, enough of souls. It would be doing Fr. Gleeson an injustice not to mention that he did speak on other things equally worthy of a more detailed examination than they received in the Lady Symon. It is a pity indeed that I have had the last word in this discussion. Even more frustrating is the fact that should this argument against immortal souls be valid, it immediately excludes me from the possibility at some future time of smugly informing my Christian colleagues that I was right. However should they be right they will indeed have the last word.

## The answer

She asked a boy beneath the light  
What corner this could be.  
He had no sight; he could not see.

She asked a woman passing near  
Which was the road to try.  
She could not hear; she passed her by.

She asked a man in whose eyes showed  
The sadness of his pain.  
He said no word, did not explain.  
A.S.M.

## Caustic words

I strove with none, for none was worth the strife;  
I strove with none, for none would strive with me;  
I strove with one, and will for all my life.  
But here's an end to war; quite seriously  
Look well before you leap—there's treason rife.  
It's good that you resign so soon. There'll be  
No bullet in your aged back from me.  
Debility from such as you  
Merits no merciful rescue.  
I have seen all the trees for the wood that they are,  
Cut down to make pulp which still yields even more  
Editorial matter for borers to gnaw.

A.U.M.



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## "THE ADVERTISER"

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"Religious Belief," a recent book by a Senior Lecturer in Philosophy at this university, discusses essential features of those forms of Christianity which the author has "lived through or lived close to," ranging from Protestant fundamentalism to Catholic Thomism.


The author, Dr. C. B. Martin, claims that belief in any God worthy of religious awe involves the believer in either self-contradiction or vacuity, and that even to hope for a resolution of this difficulty, by human or other means, is irrational.

Last term, in the course of a discussion of the case for teaching theology at this university, "On Dit" remarked on the inadequacies of Dr. Martin's book, as indicative both of an interest in theology among members of the University, and of the need for such interest to be pursued in a scholarly manner.

In the succeeding issue of "On Dit," Mr. F. H. Mares, of the English Department, accused "On Dit" of theological illiteracy, and challenged "On Dit" to state its criticisms of "Religious Belief" in full. Since such bold claims as those made by Dr. Martin are not without general interest, and since contemporary philosophical method is of some moment in any university, "On Dit" has sketched the outlines of a critique of "Religious Belief" on pages five to eight.

Publication of our comments has been held over until this issue to enable Dr. Martin, who is at present overseas, to reply in the same issue. The relevant portions of his telegram in reply read as follows:

"Returned vacation to receive article too late for reply . . . Scholarship and philosophy . . . worthy of academic journal. Debating technique worthy of present high debating club standards of 'On Dit.'—C. Martin."



# Theology and Criticism

It is important that everyone who can possibly spare the time should read "Religious Belief" (Cornell University Press, 1959), by Dr. C. B. Martin, Senior Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of Adelaide. For it is important that educated people should know something of the character of much contemporary Anglo-Saxon philosophy. People know that this philosophy is, broadly, a philosophy of analysis and criticism; what is not so widely recognised is that it is in outlook and technique indifferent or opposed to the demands of scholarship. And what is scholarship if not a certain zeal to learn, to understand, and not to misrepresent, the views that one is subjecting to analysis and criticism?

It may be thought bold of us to make the accusations we shall, against academics widely respected and currently holding the philosophical field. We can only ask that our particular criticisms of Dr. Martin's book be examined on their own merits. The indispensable prerequisite is a reading of the book, particularly since, because of limitations of space, our criticisms can only be presented in outline. Full references to pages (p.) and lines (l.) are given—the reader can do the rest. It is fair to point out (and it is relevant to our general conclusions about the nature of contemporary philosophy), that "Religious Belief" was "most painstakingly read" by seven Australian and American philosophers, including no less than four professors.

## 1.

The argument of "Religious Belief" is largely directed against men of straw. By that we mean that most of the positions alleged or implied as being held by theologians are in fact inventions of Dr. Martin's or at least wholly foreign to the mainstream of philosophical theology in any age. Usually Dr. Martin fails to identify any theologians who have, or might, make the statement he holds up for examination: see, for example, p. 18, l. 4; p. 28, l. 4; p. 58, l. 1; p. 58, l. 7 ff.; p. 62, l. 24; p. 117, l. 6; p. 117, l. 15 ff.; p. 118, l. 6; p. 118, l. 32; p. 121, l. 1; p. 95, l. 1; p. 127, l. 12; p. 127, l. 17; p. 132, l. 29; p. 133, l. 26; p. 142, l. 25; p. 161, n. 9; p. 141, l. 12. The above are all cases of thoroughly unorthodox and implausible views being advanced as if they were part of theological currency. They constitute only the first platoon of the straw-men. Another platoon is made up of theologians' statements which Dr. Martin misunderstands and, usually, mis-paraphrases: see, for example, p. 30, l. 12 ff. and p. 30, l. 27 and p. 31, l. 20; p. 33, l. 4 ff. and p. 56, l. 32; p. 117, l. 1 and l. 4 ff.; p. 118, l. 8 ff.; p. 136, l. 11 ff. and l. 8; p. 137, l. 8 ff. and l. 18 ff. and p. 139, l. 16. A third platoon consists of theological statements by modern philosophers which are incompatible with orthodox theology and to which Dr. Martin gives consequently unjustifiable emphasis: see, for example, p. 59, p. 155. These three platoons together constitute a great part of the subject-matter of Dr. Martin's analysis; of the remainder, and of some of the above, we shall have more to say.

## 2.

When Dr. Martin examines a Christian doctrine he normally states it in a heretical form and fails to state the orthodox view. There are surprisingly few references to

Christian doctrine; the Beatific Vision is referred to and mis-understood (p. 117, l. 4); the Trinity is referred to, and Christ is heretically supposed to be an instantiation of the will of God (p. 25, l. 28); the Incarnation is introduced several times (p. 3, l. 2; p. 25; pp. 62-63); the doctrine of the hypostatic union is said to be a theological device (whereas it is in fact a formal statement of the revelation, "the Word was made flesh") and then stated in a heretical form involving the addition of the perfectly good divine nature to a human nature assumed to be good. Of "hoc est corpus meum" Dr. Martin casually remarks (p. 130, l. 1), as if it were beyond dispute, "People have confused themselves when they have thought that this must be taken literally or metaphorically or symbolically. Literally, it is false, metaphorically, it is ridiculous. Symbolically, it loses force." *Ipsa dixit!* Chapter Six just assumes the heretical doctrine that, as regards resurrection from the dead, men are not "in the same position as Christ", and will not be raised in the body, since their "bodies shall be turned to dust" (p. 107, n. 10). On p. 132 "Catholics" are wrongly alleged to "affirm that each celebration of Mass . . . is identical with the historical self-sacrifice of the Cross" (italics added). As far as we can discover, every one of Dr. Martin's incursions into revealed and dogmatic theology begins and ends in parody.

## 3.

More often than not Dr. Martin uses his theological sources in unscholarly manner. For example, he introduces an important discussion on p. 26 by saying "According to the *Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics* . . ."; a footnote fails to state the relevant volume or the title of the article, and it is only after some detective work in a library that a reader can discover that the cited passage is really "according to" the Professor of Philosophy and Psychology at the University of Minnesota in 1913. On p. 27 the Report "Doctrines in the Church of England", is given a weight it does not properly possess. On p. 28 we find another encyclopaedia being used to provide the sole statement of the theory of natural law. The author is unidentified; the work was published in 1910. The quotation from Aquinas on p. 30 gives no indication that it is incomplete; complete quotation would have enabled the reader to discover that Dr. Martin has, on pp. 30-31, wholly misinterpreted the passage. The passage from Aquinas on p. 33, taken out of the context of its Objection, reads (and is taken by Dr. Martin) as if it were a proof of God's sinlessness, whereas it is in fact a proof that inability to sin is consistent with omnipotence. Furthermore, Dr. Martin appears to be unaware of the latest translation of the passage (Gilby, T., "St. Thomas Aquinas Philosophical Texts," O.U.P. 1950, p. 120), which renders the phrase "contradiction in terms," on which formula Dr. Martin places much reliance (see p. 28, l. 3; p. 43, l. 31; p. 63, l. 2; and Ch. 4 *passim*), in a very different form of words. Dr. Martin ignores the fact that in the original Latin the phrase "quaecumque contradictionem non implicat" is to be understood as meaning "quidquid potest habere rationem entis" (S.T.I., 25 3, Resp.). The quotation from Gilson on p. 151 is from the 1944 edition of a work that was virtually rewritten in 1948; Dr. Martin's translation from the French is by no means as clear as the authorised translation of 1957.

In "Religious Belief" there is reference to only one work written by any theologian capable of being even loosely called orthodox and published after 1945. The solitary exception is a work by Baillie upholding a view held, as Dr. Martin recognises (p. 94, l. 7), by "no Catholic theologian and few Protestant theologians".

## 4.

The mechanics of Dr. Martin's scholarship are defective. For example, the *Summa Theologica* is Dr. Martin's main primary source, yet three of the four footnote references to that work are quite inadequate. Since the inadequacy is immediately evident to anyone who has once looked at the *Summa*, even unopened in the shelves of a library, or at any other Thomist work, it is interesting to speculate on the familiarity with Thomist thought of all the philosophers who "most painstakingly read the manuscript". The pains can hardly have extended to checking the context of even the crucial quotation on p. 33. Likewise with the references to the *Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics* and *The Catholic Encyclopedia*; one reference is wholly inadequate, and the other is incomplete, so that it is again difficult to believe that anyone took the elementary precaution of glancing at the articles cited to see whether the quotations really mean what they appear to mean in isolation. The never-identified quotation on p. 2, l. 5; p. 4, l. 21; and p. 5, l. 9, is in fact from John 4:24 and almost certainly does not mean what Dr. Martin would have it mean. Throughout the book there are cross-references in the "this will be discussed later" form: see, for example, p. 147, p. 138, p. 68, p. 67, p. 43, p. 38. Trite and wholly uncontroversial Christian axioms are solemnly given a reference (see, for example, p. 24, n. 1; p. 27, n. 9) while longer and more interesting statements by named theologians go without any reference (see, for example p. 137, l. 27). Dr. Martin might profitably read Romans 14:1 in context or in the Greek or in any modern translation before attributing his own absurd use of it to S. Paul (p. 128, l. 24; p. 134, l. 28).

## 5.

Dr. Martin ignores the fundamental claim of theology to be, inter alia, a science employing both deductive and inductive method. Not once does Dr. Martin recognise that theologians argue to the nature of God, and claim to deduce His existence and nature from the induced concepts and principles of being. Instead, he gratuitously equates "the use of the name 'God'" with "being taught the use of name 'God'" by description" (see p. 51, l. 16 ff. and p. 18, l. 7), and with "learning to apply the word 'God' . . . by means of . . . descriptions" (p. 55, l. 8 and p. 56, l. 5), and with "definition in terms of what is allowable within the theological system" (p. 61, l. 1), and with hypotheses (p. 146, l. 2), and with suppositions (p. 156, l. 15), but never with its most important use in natural theology as the conclusion of a train of reasoning founded on alleged insight into the structure of being. Since Dr. Martin understands "concept" to mean roughly "the use to which a word may be put whatever the word may be" (p. 54, n. 12; cf. p. 53,

l. 23) it follows that his whole book fails on his own criterion even to mention the most important philosophical concept of God. Dr. Martin so scrupulously ignores theological arguments in order to concentrate on an analysis of the "meaning" of isolated affirmations that he forgets his own dogma that meaning is inextricably bound up with usage (unhappily, no more precise statement of Dr. Martin's "criteria for determining what is meaningful" is possible, since he never makes any attempt to state them: cf. p. 138, l. 4, and l. 17 and n. 3, p. 139, l. 25 ff., p. 140, l. 19 and l. 24; p. 141, l. 23 ff.; p. 142, l. 1; p. 144, l. 23; p. 6, l. 11; p. 8, l. 4; p. 145, l. 10.) Since he simply ignores the primary theological usage, Dr. Martin's attempt to impugn "religious statements", as a class, fails *ab initio*.

From beginning to end of his book, Dr. Martin displays his contempt for "the theologian", whom he ignores, mis-states, mis-cites and misunderstands. "Evasion and obscurity are present from the beginning." (p. 2, l. 12, italics added.) With repelling sanctimony (and inaccuracy—see 7, and H. *infra*) he accuses "the theologian", as a class, of being "something of a figure of fun as he steps outside the faith to explain and defend the faith against argument and, speaking of 'analogies' or 'the limitation of human reason', jumps back inside" in order to gain "sanctuary from the probings of philosophical debate." (P. 134, l. 23 and l. 8.) We shall have cause to notice the evasions and obscurities by which Dr. Martin seeks to gain sanctuary from the theologian's theory of analogy (see 6, *infra*). The passage about "the theologian" on pp. 117-118 is insulting, unsubstantiated and almost certainly incapable of substantiation. The only writer on theology for whom Dr. Martin has a word of praise is Hume, whose work is described as a "masterpiece", "subtle and ingenious", "artfully conceived" and "sublime". (P. 12, l. 17 ff.) This unique effusion gives a clue to the concealed dogmas on which "Religious Belief" is founded, as we shall see later. (C., D., and H. *infra*.)

## 6.

The argument of "Religious Belief" is marked at crucial points by a slackness, vagueness and ambiguity foreign to good academic theology. Dr. Martin's claim to have shown "religious forms of argument and assertion" (all or some?) "in a clear light" (p. V, l. 9; p. VI, l. 3) is just bluster. Take the vital question of "meaning". Dr. Martin defines his task as the examination of the meaning of Christian utterances and "key theological concepts". (P. 6.) Religious language is not "nonsense" or "meaningless", he says (p. 7, l. 2), but it is never clear just what he thinks it is. Anything "beyond human understanding plays no part in the assertions of human beings" (p. 143, l. 26), which is equated with saying that one cannot "delegate . . . the responsibility for the meaning of one's statements". (P. 136, l. 6.) Dr. Martin gives no exegesis of what he understands by the loose phrase "beyond human understanding", and, moreover, sets out no example of a theological statement he thinks "exceeds human understanding". He gives no indication of being aware of the Thomist distinction between "perfections signified" and "mode of signification" or of the theory

(Continued on page six)

of remoteness or negative differences or analogical predication or proportionate being: the distinction and the theory expose the radical ambiguity of "beyond human understanding". And if we fall back on Dr. Martin's proposed equivalent, "meaningless" (as minutely and obscurely qualified on p. 140, l. 24 and in "Australian Letters," Vol. 3, No. 1, (1960), p. 52, col. 1, l. 27 ff.), we find nothing but vagueness: "religious statements mean in many very different ways" (p. 8, l. 4); "bare conceivability or meaningfulness" (p. 35, l. 9); "to assert a deficiency meaningfully one must be able to say something about a possible state of affairs that would remove this deficiency. When this is not done, the man merely employs a form of words—but 'this is too harsh and stringent a demand', for 'making a meaningful assertion is a complicated kind of behaviour' and the man is giving 'expression to a feeling of uncertainty and uneasiness about the world', though 'his statement has no further meaning' than that (p. 138, l. 17 and n. 3; p. 140, l. 20 and l. 24; p. 141, l. 1); 'if anything is meant in such case there must be some implicit reference to one particular state of affairs . . . for the description of which our language and experience is unfortunately unprepared' (p. 141, l. 5); 'whether or not [a person] makes or comes close to making an assertion depends upon what he . . . can do with the words . . . no appeal can be made to revelation or external authority . . . [until] the question of meaning is settled. . . ." (p. 142, l. 1 ff.); "the significance and meaning of . . . literature often seem well nigh inexhaustible . . . they uniquely evoke [emotional responses] . . . the meaning lies somehow in the words, partly exposed and partly buried." (P. 144, l. 9 and l. 16 and l. 23.) It is from these passages that one is expected to gather Dr. Martin's theory of meaning; it is evident that to try to understand, evaluate and

of "theoretical explanation" on p. 154 leaves the status of the forms of explanation on pp. 161-163 quite unclear.

The nature of the Beatific Vision is stated with such extreme vagueness on pp. 117-118 that Dr. Martin eventually simply assumes that it means the same as "the feeling of a controlling higher power . . . not a feeling like pain but a feeling like distrust that is assertive of the world. . . ." (p. 118, l. 33 ff.) and equates it with both the Second Coming and the Last Judgement, a multiple heresy flowing directly from his own imprecision of language. (Notice the slide from p. 117, l. 1 to l. 31 to p. 118, l. 1 to l. 33.)

Or take the sentence "faith can be profoundly justified as well as blind", which, in or out of context, may refer to justification by reason on the basis of past or present, or to eventual justification by future events (cf. p. 122, l. 18 with l. 28 and p. 123, l. 2, and the vagueness of p. 122 *passim*). Or take the assertion on p. 124, l. 27: "Some of the stories are of overwhelming obscurity, such as that of the incarnation. These are totally beyond our conception." What is it that "overwhelms" Dr. Martin? A contradiction? Words used in a novel sense? Inability to visualise God and man in one person? Ungrammatical sentences? Or some novel "obscurity"? He does not say.

Or take pp. 18 ff., which are so vague and slack that it is impossible to decide whether or not Dr. Martin thinks God's goodness is necessarily bound up with His title "Heavenly Father", or to discern just why the (ambiguous) notion "will of God" was injected by Dr. Martin into a discussion of God's goodness as analogous to the goodness of earthly fathers. (Cf. p. 118, l. 7 ff. with p. 119, l. 19.)

Or take all the undefined concepts Dr. Martin employs to discuss the question "Why is there anything at all?", viz. "forms

language." This makes p. 134 and the whole conclusion of Chapter Seven largely *brutum fulmen*.

Notice the slide whereby the theological "claim that theological assertions may exceed human understanding" (p. 137, l. 5) becomes "the metaphysical theological doctrine of assertion exceeding understanding and meaning." (P. 139, l. 16, *itals. added.*)

## 8.

"Religious Belief" contains a number of mere loose ends. Sometimes quite important theological arguments are introduced only to be subsequently ignored: see, for example, p. 27, l. 20 ff. Sometimes less important arguments are introduced (even at some length) for no evident reason, and are subsequently ignored: see, for example, p. 53, l. 7 ff. It is likely that the reason for the apparent contradiction, between the opinion that Calvin's account of God's goodness is not conceptually confused (p. 57, l. 12 ff.) and the opinion that the statement "God is perfectly good" is "logically incoherent" (p. 17, l. 17, and p. 18, l. 3), lies in Dr. Martin's failure to examine the meaning of "God is perfectly good" otherwise than as "God is necessarily good"; it is the assertion on pp. 17-18 that he does not follow up. The reference alleged, on p. 40, l. 27, to have been made to Anselm is non-existent.



What we have so far said still fails to convey a full and accurate impression of the form of "Religious Belief". Such an impression can only be gained by reading the book and observing how the argument moves haltingly from paradigm case to paradigm case, its principal analytic tools ("meaning", "logically incoherent", "understanding", "conceivable") blunted by ambiguity and its subject-matter ("key theological concepts" or "religious statements of the sort . . . that deserve the very general classification 'Christian'") distorted almost beyond recognition by omission, misstatement and mis-understanding.

We propose now to examine the matter of "Religious Belief". This is important, because some philosophers are proud of their notion that they are "philosophers, not scholars". In our view, that is a false anti-thesis, of a kind that academic theologians, in general, are not prone to accept.

We shall examine the eight primary contentions made in "Religious Belief".

## A.

It is difficult to state Dr. Martin's first main contention clearly; he announces that he is going to show that both "God is perfectly good" and "God is the source of all moral value" are "logically incoherent" statements (pp. 17-18). But his discussion wanders over more than forty pages, becoming confused with collateral discussions about God's will and the "necessity" of God's goodness; premises have to be ferreted out forty pages after the reasonings that depend on them; the whole is afflicted with an imprecision of thought and expression of which the rhetoric on the concluding page (p. 63) is only a sample. The point of the argument can probably best be shortly indicated as: attempts to found morality on God, and to make God's qualities different in kind from human qualities, must end in vacuity and contradiction. (Cf. p. 17, l. 6; p. 18, l. 10; p. 63, l. 10; p. 25, l. 6.) We shall have to try and state in clear (if not essentially unambiguous) propositions the arguments which Dr. Martin expresses so unclearly.

- (i) In any conceptual system (e.g. the notion of God), any part which cannot be "scrapped" without "scrapping" the whole must be a definition. (P. 61, l. 2 ff., cf. p. 21, l. 24 and p. 26, l. 4.)
- (ii) Theologians say that God is wholly and invariably good. [At this stage of the argument it need not be decided whether this means the same as "God is necessarily good".]
- (iii) Therefore God is defined as good. (P. 21, l. 24; pp. 25-26 *passim*.)
- (iv) But theologians say that all moral judgements require justification in terms of the will of God. (P. 21, l. 12 ff; p. 24, l. 3.)
- (v) Thus good is defined in terms of God's will. (P. 25, l. 1 ff.)
- (vi) Theologians are thus involved in circularity and vacuity. (P. 25, l. 6.)
- (vii) Theologians try to break the circle by saying "Read the Bible, pray, and learn of Christ." (P. 25, l. 18 ff.)
- (viii) But Christ, too, can only be judged to be God if He is first judged to be good. (P. 25, l. 27; p. 26, l. 8.)

This argument founders because its premise ((i)) is ambiguous and, in the sense that Dr. Martin takes it, false. There is a distinction between nominal and explanatory definitions. A definition of a circle might be "a perfectly round plane curve"; this reveals the proper use of the name "circle". But one can also affirm that in any circle all radii are exactly equal; but now one is no

longer talking merely of names—one is making assertions about the objects which names denote. The inclusion of such an assertion transforms a nominal definition into an explanatory definition. In the conceptual system (explanatory definition) of the circle the equality of the radii cannot be "scrapped" without "scrapping" the whole system; but the equality of the radii is no part of the nominal definition; it does not relate simply to the use of the name "circle", but is descriptive of the object denoted by the name. There is no absolute distinction, such as Dr. Martin assumes (p. 26, l. 4), between "definition" in general and "description" (and see his definition of "description" on p. 40, n. 3). If proposition (vi) is to be true, "defined" in (iii) and (v) must mean "nominally defined". But no orthodox theologian gives "God is (perfect) good" as a nominal definition of God. "God is (perfect) good" is, if anything, an explanatory definition containing an assertion (claimed to be justified by reason) *over and above* the nominal definition of "God" (e.g. as self-subsistent being). That is why, for example, in the *Summa Contra Gentiles* there are twenty-five chapters between the nominal definition of God and the assertion that "God is goodness itself". After making that assertion, Aquinas uses "God is good(ness)" as an explanatory definition. Similarly with proposition (v); it is very doubtful whether many theologians use "Goodness is what God wills" as a nominal definition of goodness. Thus, to attack "the perfect goodness of God" Dr. Martin would have to attack the assertions about the nature of an existing being which an explanatory definition includes over and above the nominal definition of that being. But that would involve Dr. Martin in an examination of the reasons people have for making assertions, which is something he never undertakes (even in Chapter Nine). Dr. Martin, in fact, seems content to assume that the reasons people have for making statements, and the logic behind statements, are irrelevant to the status of those statements as "meaningful" or "meaningless". He appears to think that, if he knows that a statement has been made ("God is perfectly good") and, further, that that statement is such an important part of a complex concept that its denial means "scrapping" the whole concept, then that is all he needs to know in order to be able to fit the statement into his exclusive and univocal notion of "definition" and to pronounce authoritatively on its "meaning". Such a view is contradicted by common-sense and by his own doctrine, which he applies when convenient, that meaning is related above all to what the speaker *does* with and *intends by* his words (cf. pp. 141-142). More important is the fact that his view is also contradicted by the metaphysicians whose other notions he is purporting to refute, a fact which makes his (disguised) assumption unwarrantable and un-scholarly.

Proposition (viii) falls with proposition (vi).

It is worthy of notice that proposition (iv) should properly read "But a few theologians . . ." It is doubtful whether proposition (vii) is true of any reputable theologian, for it manifests a very cavalier attitude towards the separate (though not wholly independent) disciplines of natural and revealed theology.

## B.

This contention is closely related to A. *supra*. It is that God cannot be the ground or source of all moral value. (Cf. p. 17, l. 17; p. 24, l. 3; p. 26, l. 12 ff.) This vague contention is not clarified by the scanty citations on pp. 26-27, and is otherwise rendered as ethics and theology must be independent (cf. p. 27, l. 2) and "the objectivity of moral values" is not "somehow dependent upon the existence of God". (P. 32, l. 2.) How does Dr. Martin argue this contention?

- (i) By "source of moral value" theologians mean:
  - (a) source of the means of living a good life; rewarder of good and punisher of evil (p. 28, l. 5 ff.); and/or
  - (b) creator of the human needs and capacities on which right and wrong depend (p. 28, l. 28 ff.; p. 29, l. 11 ff.); and/or
  - (c) lawgiver (p. 29, l. 28 ff.); and
  - (d) creditor (as creator) with absolute rights founded on indebtedness. (P. 30, l. 27 ff.; p. 31, l. 20 ff.)
- (ii) But theologians want to mean more than (i) (a) (p. 28, l. 15).
- (iii) And theologians want to mean more than (i) (b) (p. 29, l. 25).
- (iv) In any case (i) (b) is compatible with a non-theistic moral system, since the moral law could always read, "Given nature X, then A is the right action, and given nature Y, B is the right action", in which law God "does not figure". (P. 29, l. 14 ff.)
- (v) As to (i) (c), any moral law-giver would have to be judged as good by laws we already accept before men could accept his law. (P. 31, l. 30.)
- (vi) If (i) (d) is relevant, then at least one moral principle (viz., debtors have obligations to creditors) is not dependent for its validity on the divine will.

Let us first take proposition (vi). The truth is that (i) (d) is not relevant, being

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## "like trying to wrestle with a ball of fairy floss . . ."

criticise this "theory" is rather like trying to wrestle with a ball of fairy-floss.

Or take Dr. Martin on the theory of analogical predication, the crux of natural theology. If the theory of analogical predication is right, even in outline, the greater part of Dr. Martin's book is wrong. Yet all we find is vagueness: "Theologians tell us that it is necessary to speak of God 'analogically' and that we must not take the analogies to hold strictly. Unfortunately they are not altogether helpful in telling us just where the analogies are to hold and where they are not" (p. 4, l. 15); "if . . . God's goodness is not ultimately like that of an earthly father, how does our understanding of the latter help us to grasp the goodness of God?" (p. 18, l. 13); "the trouble with the objection is that it takes the analogies with dead unimaginative seriousness. . . . By demanding to know just where the analogies are to hold, the objectors . . . to the Christian concept of God try to impose what could only be an over simplification. Also, they force the analogies to the point of ridicule . . . theologians . . . give a great many examples that are relevant to the analogies. Looking at the analogies and not the examples can blind one to the real light they shed." (P. 119, l. 2 ff.) "We are warned that [Divine Wrath] is only by analogy like the anger of men, and we are never told where the analogy holds . . . we are warned that [Divine Love] is only by analogy like the love of men, and we are never told where the analogy holds." (P. 127, l. 12 ff.) It is from these passages that one is expected to gather Dr. Martin's views on analogical predication, a theory on which millions of words have been written since Aristotle. Against the rigour and precision of half a dozen notable works by English philosophers and theologians since 1943, Dr. Martin offers us only inconsistency (cf. p. 4 and p. 127 with p. 119), and naive metaphors and ambiguities like "hold strictly", "ultimately like", "dead unimaginative seriousness", "impose an over simplification", "point of ridicule", "real light". He doesn't even recognise that anger is never predicated analogically of God, as is love, but only metaphorically (cf. p. 127, and see, generally, Farrer, A. M., "Finite and Infinite" (1943), Pontifex, M., "The Existence of God" (1947), Mascal, E. L., "Existence and Analogy" (1949)).

Or take the discussion on pp. 24-25, which fails because Dr. Martin ignores the ambiguity of the phrase "God's will" and so confuses "what is willed by God" with "an infinitely perfect intellectual appetency." (Cf. also p. 19, l. 19.)

Or take the discussion on p. 111, l. 18, which is stultified by its vagueness as to who is doing the identifying and locating, man or God. Or the slack use of "ultimately pointless" on p. 107, l. 3; does this term connote "false", "necessarily false", "tautological", or "not necessary"? The "idea" of living after death is said to be one "of overpowering difficulty" (p. 123, l. 20, and cf. p. 27, l. 14); what does a phrase like that, in that context, mean in the mouth of a professional philosopher?

"It will be of help to sort out three sorts of explanations," says Dr. Martin on p. 152, l. 7; it never becomes clear whether these are "the three sorts", or whether there are others. The semi-quasi-ostensive definition

of explanation, "causal", "historical", "theoretical", "basic law", "will of God", and compare their radical imprecision with the rigour and acuteness of reputable metaphysics.

We cannot believe that bulls, for all that they succeed in breaking things, are worth more than the potters of fine china.

## 7.

The argument of "Religious Belief" is marred by gratuitous assumptions and logical slides. For example, take the second paragraph on p. 18, which presents an important argument. Notice how, by the surreptitious introduction in l. 16 and l. 19 of a demand that the theory of analogy (crudely represented by what is really a metaphor rather than an analogy) should enable man to "grasp the goodness of God" and not "[fall] short of the divine perfection", Dr. Martin is enabled to conclude that the theory "does not seem satisfactory", which means that it leaves only an "impression that we still have something in our hands", which means that it is in "conceptual disorder", which means that it is nothing but "confusion and evasion". All this because the theory will not do what it does not purport to do.

Or take the slide from "logical certainty", to "logical vacuity" on p. 36, l. 29 and p. 37, l. 17; this is a slide because, though the equation is doubtless a dogma of Dr. Martin's school of philosophers, it is in fact highly controversial and rejected by all Thomists (and Chapter Four is largely aimed at Thomists). What kind of philosopher is it who, when attempting to confute an opponent, just assumes that the central doctrines of his opponent are false? Later we shall see that Dr. Martin does this again and again. (See A., B., C., E., G., and H. *infra*.)

By a remarkable slide, on p. 125, the historical and other testimony to the Incarnation, the Virgin Birth and the crossing of the Red Sea is equated with "an incredible tale" told by a friend "about something that happened of which he was the only witness" and which the friend ascribes to "some indescribable agent". (*Itals. added.*)

Chapter Seven eventually finds itself on a distinction (probably meant to be exhaustive) between "statements in the faith" and "statements outside the faith". (P. 128.) "When a man speaks outside the faith . . . he cannot employ the authority of God for what he says." (P. 128, l. 29.) This must mean that all revealed theology is "in the faith". But to speak "in the faith", according to Dr. Martin, is to speak "ritualistically", to refuse to debate, to decline to explain what is meant or to give arguments for what is asserted. (P. 128, l. 29 ff.) But this is absurd, as a glance at any work of revealed theology will disclose, and as the history of theological dispute and debate makes manifest. It follows that Dr. Martin is confused about appeal to the authority of God, and has given conflicting criteria for his distinction. It further follows that his distinction cannot be exhaustive of the "kinds of statements employed in religious

wholly founded on an inexplicably perverse interpretation of the cited passage of the *Summa Theologica*. The oddity of Dr. Martin's interpretation may be seen by following up the cross-reference which Dr. Martin omits to mention. (S.T. I, 105, 6, ad 1.) We believe Dr. Martin's interpretation to be unprecedented and indefensible.

Propositions (iv) and (v) should be dealt with together, since it seems impossible, in the Thomist scheme (with which Dr. Martin is here concerned), to separate (i) (b) from (i) (c)—indeed, Dr. Martin makes not the slightest attempt to justify the distinction he draws between them. Nor does he try to say what he means by "moral law," beyond that it "does not imply a lawgiver." (Need not? Cannot?) (P. 31, l. 27.) Thomist moral theory arrives at the following notion of moral virtue: "That which makes the man who has it good, and makes the thing he does good, by making him act according to his nature, i.e., according to reason." (S.T. I-II, 71, 2, Resp.) This makes no mention of God; but since natures are natures because God made them so, to deviate from them is the same thing as to contravene the rule laid down by God in the creative act. The rectitude of the human will (of which "good" is the object) is thus measured *at once* by its accord with the divine will *and* by its accord with reason. Dr. Martin may disagree with the Thomist view, but if so he ought to state it and give reasons for his dissent. As it is, proposition (iv) begs the question "Why is man's nature as it is?" and ignores the fact that the Thomist assertion that God is the ground of moral value is an answer to Dr. Martin's question "How does God figure in [Thomist moral theory, which can be roughly stated in the X : A, Y : B form]?"—an answer which goes behind Dr. Martin's easy "Given nature X . . ." Certainly Dr. Martin's hypothetical moral formula is non-theistic in form (so are Thomist formulae); but Thomists go one step further. The Thomist (explanatory) definition of moral value in terms of God's will (or God's reason or the eternal law) is certainly *compatible with* (cf. p. 29, l. 15) a system of non-theistic moral statements—but to prove his point Dr. Martin has to show that that definition is either false or contradictory. Since he does not even attempt to do this, he fails both to convict the Thomist assertion that "God is the ground of all moral value" of logical incoherency *and* to substantiate his own view that God *cannot* be the ground of all value. And proposition (v) has no plausibility apart from Dr. Martin's lamentable obscurity about the word "law." (See p. 31, l. 25 ff.) Law, as Dr. Martin's opponents use the term, is a rule of activity. God is the author of all activity, and thus the ultimate law-giver. Human nature has its own rule, its own peculiar inclinations, and it is this law that "we already accept", by means of a study of *man's* nature. God's nature is quite another matter, and our judgment that God is good is founded on quite other considerations, viz., on the goodness of being *qua* being. Since Dr. Martin ignores *all* these contentions, proposition (v) collapses.

Proposition (ii) is true. Proposition (iii) is unsubstantiated and probably founded on the incorrect distinction Dr. Martin makes between propositions (i) (b) and (i) (c).

The supplementary argument on p. 31, l. 12-19, for what it is worth apart from the futile proposition (i) (d), hardly needs comment. In the first place, it just evades the point of S. Thomas' argument in S.T. I, 94, 5 and I, 105, 6 ad 1, which is to the effect that a divine action which, in a human being would be Satanic, must, by the necessity of God's nature, be perfect for the very reason that it is God who is acting, rather than Satan or a man. No theologian ever denied that apparently direct operations of God's will *might* seem evil to us (at least in the sense that we might seem to be, in some way, injured by them): S. Thomas' contention is that objectively such operations cannot be evil—and in order to confute S. Thomas Dr. Martin has no right to *assume* just what S. Thomas has argued to be impossible. Nor, in the second place, has praise any necessary connection with praiseworthiness: he who praises is expressing his appreciation, rather than making a judgment, of some manifestation of goodness or rightness. The judgment that "God is good" (praiseworthy) is not an empirical hypothesis like "Hitler was bad", and cannot be divorced from the theological reasons which lead to its formation. The assumption that God's will is uninformed by His reason, and the allegation that Aquinas speaks as if this goodness were compatible with doing "a vicious thing" (see p. 143, l. 21 ff.) are nothing short of absurd.

## C.

Chapter Four is almost the longest in the book, and looks profound and complex. It is concerned to show that "God is necessarily good" is logically incoherent, and the argument, in its essentials, is simple.

- (i) In S.T. I, 25, 3, Aquinas may mean either:
  - (a) God is not at all likely to sin (p. 34, l. 23; p. 35, l. 5 ff.); or
  - (b) God cannot be conceived of as sinning (p. 35, l. 7).
- (ii) But (i) (a) is insufficient to establish the necessity of God's goodness.
- (iii) In (i) (b) Aquinas may use "God":
  - (a) as a descriptive term with "God is all-good" as part of the meaning-instruction, in which case "God is good" is true by logical necessity (or by defini-

tion), but the necessity relates only to the use of the terms "God" and "good" (p. 40, l. 23; pp. 41-43); or

- (b) as a proper name, in the sense of a naming-instruction (as defined on p. 54, l. 16 ff.; p. 44, l. 15 and, ostensibly, on pp. 44-54 *passim*), in which case "God is good" may be in a sense necessarily true. But the necessity in no way applies to the *being* (if any) named "God" (p. 56, l. 29 ff.); or
- (c) as a proper name in the sense of p. 54, l. 10-15 (and p. 40, l. 24; p. 43, l. 27 ff.), in which case "God is good" states a matter of fact and [so] can be denied without contradiction. (P. 43, l. 27 ff.; p. 44, l. 4.) In this case (i) (b) is false.

- (iv) In fact Aquinas attempts to use "God" in all three ways at once, which results in confusion and contradiction. (P. 44, l. 6; p. 40, l. 25.)

It is immediately evident, when the argument of the chapter is stated clearly, that everything depends on (iii) (c). If proposition (iii) (c) is right, then Aquinas is reduced to vacuity; if (iii) (c) is wrong, then (iv) is wrong, and (i) (b) survives unscathed. It is worth noting that Dr. Martin's arguments for (iii) (a) and (iii) (b) (which are both, broadly, true and trite) and (iv) occupy him for twenty-four pages. There is no argument on behalf of (iii) (c). Not one word, (iii) (c) is stated as an axiom, as a self-evident truth. "Religious Belief", which purports to be an analysis of meaning, proves itself to be little more than an essay in empiricist dogmatics. For in order to confound the Thomists Dr. Martin *just assumes* the truth of a proposition which (as any metaphysician since at least the time of Hume would be the first to admit) brings metaphysics (all metaphysics, not just the question of God's attributes) to an abrupt end. "There are no necessarily true existential propositions," says Dr. Martin, as if he were saying  $1 + 1 = 2$ . All the thousands of words in Chapter Four amount to little more than smokescreen for the bluster, "any matter of fact can be denied without contradiction". That assertion may be popular in the Philosophy I class in the University of Adelaide, but does Dr. Martin think that theologians and philosophers who have written hundreds of thousands of words contesting the assertion need take even the slightest notice of a book that is founded, without amplification or apology, on that assertion as a dogma? On p. 18 Dr. Martin says: "In the course of my argument I shall try to present a possible positive account of God's unique goodness that is not in conceptual disorder. Those theologians who will reject it will have the task of adding to it or replacing it with something other than confusion or evasion." In truth, those theologians need not raise their eyes from their own work to answer this amateur; all they need say is "Go away and read our books, and if you disagree with them *tell us why*."

How hollow the words on p. 62 now sound: "In the face of our argument [the theologians] will give not an answer but a mystery, and we are supposed to feel somehow, in some way answered,"—which might almost serve as an epitaph for "Religious Belief".

Perhaps we should say something about the Incarnation (bearing in mind that Dr. Martin's introduction of the question into a discussion of natural theology is highly inappropriate—most theologians simply do not do what he says they do). Dr. Martin discerns here "a contradiction of an irresolvable sort . . . Christ can be *conceived* to have been other (that is, not good) than he was, yet as God it should be not just false but *inconceivable* that he should have been not good". (P. 40, l. 16 and, *verbatim*, p. 62, l. 19.) This is really nothing more than a play on that ambiguity in the use of proper names which Dr. Martin himself explores on p. 54. The argument for the Incarnation could be stated as follows:

- (i) It is conceivable that there might have been only (not-good) men in Palestine in A.D. 30.
- (ii) But a coincidence of historical claims, prophecies, promises, miracles and virtues, coincident in one being, lead us to believe that, in fact, God was in Palestine in A.D. 30, as a divine person with a human nature.
- (iii) It is inconceivable that that one being, Christ, should have been otherwise than he was in general moral character, for he *was* God.

Thus, although it is conceivable that every man in Palestine in A.D. 30, including any man named Jesus, might have been examined and pronounced not-good, nevertheless that conceivability has nothing to do with the person of the Christ who was in fact there. "We can conceive to have been different from what in fact it was every individual thought, word, action, capacity and disposition" (p. 63, l. 5) of *every* being in Palestine in A.D. 30—but only if we have already rejected the judgment of fact in proposition (ii) above. Presumably Dr. Martin rejects that judgment, but he does not discuss it, and we need hardly listen to him until he tells us what is wrong with it. (The "clear analogy" on p. 40, l. 7. is thus not shown to be any analogy.)

Much more, of interest peripheral to the main argument, could be said about Chapter Four. The "hidden ambiguity" which Aquinas is alleged to "play upon" (p. 34, l. 25) is nothing if not a product of Dr. Martin's imagination—S.T. I, 25, 3 could hardly be less equivocal. That passage, which Dr. Mar-

tin quotes on p. 33, is, furthermore, in no sense Aquinas' "description" of "the nature of God's goodness" as Dr. Martin alleges it to be. (P. 56, l. 32; p. 33, l. 5.) But if he had referred to Aquinas' real answer to the question "What is the nature of the difference between God's qualities and the qualities of men?" (p. 33, l. 2), Dr. Martin would have had to evaluate both the *via remotionis* and the *principia per se nota*, and that he always avoids. And if we had space, we would comment further on the anthropomorphic notions of God which Dr. Martin entertains on p. 43, l. 12 ff. and p. 56, l. 11 ff., and on the easy assertion on p. 46, l. 6-9, which should have been accompanied by some contention about the status of Exodus 3: 6, 13-15 and 6: 2-3.

## D.

Chapter Five begins with the words: "Religious people may feel impatient with the harshness of argument in the last chapter. . . . They may claim that religious experience is a way of knowing God's existence. This claim must now be examined." (P. 64, l. 1.) The chapter ends with the words: "In the previous chapter difficulties were found in typical notions of the qualities of God. No Catholic theologian and few Protestant theologians would claim that religious experience could resolve problems of this conceptual sort." (P. 94, l. 6, emphasis added.) Chapter Five is, nevertheless, the longest in the book.

## E.

Chapter Six begins with the slack sentence, "People sometimes look forward to life after death as a means of settling questions concerning the existence and nature of God." (P. 95, l. 1.) "Settling questions" when? now? or after death? Dr. Martin goes on with further ambiguity: "Theists who look to the life to come must . . . establish, in the first place, that survival is at least conceivable. Secondly, they must show that it actually takes place, and, thirdly, they must show that survival, if it takes place, proves the existence of God." (P. 95, l. 6 ff.) Thus the scheme of Chapter Six is confused as between people who "look forward to" their own life after death to justify their religious beliefs after their death (the vast majority of Christians), and people who cite the alleged survival of other people to justify their own religious beliefs here and now (and who and where are such people?). Life after death is used as an apologetic far less frequently than Dr. Martin would have us believe.

But is survival of an identifiable being logically conceivable? Dr. Martin, though he never says so, appears to think not:

- (i) Personal identity may be founded on
  - (a) the continuity of the body (p. 96, l. 9 ff.), and/or
  - (b) "memory and the capacities of mind or heart" (p. 97, l. 20).

## "dogmatism and assumption at the heart of the problem . . ."

- (ii) But (i) (a) is not true, for a change of body need not affect memory, hopes, loves and sensitivity, and thus does not change one person into another. (P. 96, l. 16 ff.)
- (iii) Thus, since an individual is observable, he cannot be identified in a disembodied state. (P. 111, l. 26 ff.)
- (iv) Disembodied existence is not "mental life without a body". (P. 112, l. 5 ff.)
- (v) Disembodied existence is not "a series of experiences and intellectual processes without a body". (P. 112, l. 31 to p. 116, l. 29.)
- (vi) The concept "soul" has not, and cannot be given, any content. (P. 116, l. 30.)

Theologians agree with propositions (i), (iv) and (v), which are all given a good deal of discussion by Dr. Martin. Proposition (iii) plays on the ambiguity of the term "an individual"; it *assumes* that there is no such thing as a subsistent soul as the form of every "individual", and becomes tautologous. It assumes, too, that God, like man, *cannot* directly know immaterial substance. Proposition (ii), too, *just assumes* a psychological theory that people in fact think and judge by means of "inner speech" (whatever that is) or "overt action" (which doesn't explain much) and *not* by means of a rational substantial soul. By the time we come to proposition (vi) we have been waiting for twenty-two pages for Dr. Martin even to notice the theological concept of "soul" as an immanent principle, not to be identified with the whole "person" or "individual". How is he going to deal with this "key theological concept", which he promised us he would examine? (Cf. p. 6, l. 13.) It is worthwhile quoting every word Dr. Martin says on the matter: "The suggestion that the concept 'soul' may be employed to provide a principle of individuation requires that this concept be given content. I do not see any way of doing this."

(Continued on page eight)

The rest of the chapter, discussing "the relevance of survival to knowledge of God" need not receive extended comment. Briefly, it hangs on the following grave heresies, alleged (with no attempt at substantiation) to be held by "theologians" (all? or most? or some? or just Dr. Martin?):

- (i) God will be known "by means of a kind of introduction". (P. 117, l. 5.)
- (ii) God is hidden behind a veil or closed door. (P. 117, l. 6.)
- (iii) God will be known by signs. (P. 117, l. 28.)
- (iv) Men will feel "in the grip of a higher power". (P. 118, l. 2, l. 33.)

The only sentence in these pages (pp. 117-120) that is even *prima facie* significant is p. 117, l. 10-11. But even this cannot be applied to knowledge of God without a prior examination, which Dr. Martin does not attempt, of the nature and potentialities of the human intellect, and of God's participation in the intelligible being of creatures. The phrase "no idea what it would be like to . . ." is one of the foundations of Dr. Martin's theory of meaning and of logical possibility (p. 151, l. 28 ff.), and is just vague—does he want a picture? Or something ostensive ("like knowing an old friend")? Why? (and cf. G. *infra*.)

## F.

Chapter Seven begins with a quadruple ambiguity which Dr. Martin never appears to recognise: "Sometimes religious people speak as if a man might have faith as a substitute for his statements having meaning. It is thought that the act of faith is a source and even a definitive source of knowledge. This claim must now be examined." (P. 121, l. 1.) But "this claim" is really four quite separate claims: (i) "what I believe gives meaning to what I say"; (ii) "the fact that I believe gives meaning to what I say"; (iii) "my believing gives me further knowledge"; (iv) "my believing gives me all my knowledge". It never becomes clear which, if any, of these claims Dr. Martin is discussing.

The most exact statement that can be made of Dr. Martin's main argument runs as follows:

- (i) The stories believed by religious people are of "overwhelming obscurity" (p. 124, l. 27 ff.);
- (ii) The stories "have weight only" because of the authority of the "story-teller", God (p. 125, l. 6 ff.);
- (iii) We often believe what we can only obscurely understand, by appealing to authority (p. 125, l. 25 ff.);
- (iv) In the case of appeal to human authority it is always clear "what sorts of things" would discredit the authority (p. 126, l. 5 ff.);
- (v) But in the case of [divine faith]
  - (a) the stories believed are "past the understanding of all creatures" (p. 126, l. 21), and
  - (b) we have "no criteria for what would be or would not be its justification" (p. 126, l. 23);
- (vi) Therefore religious faith is "peculiar" (p. 124, l. 23);
- (vii) Therefore religious faith is "difficult" (p. 126, l. 24) and "intellectually suspect" (p. 135, l. 1).

Proposition (i) is slack (though more tightly expressed than Dr. Martin's p. 124, l. 28 to p. 125, l. 2); what "obscurity" there is in the stories cited relates not to the events recounted but to the *ultimate* (not the apparent) character of divine intervention in nature. Proposition (ii) is false as regards the stories cited, and, contrary to Dr. Martin's implication, would be advanced by no reputable theologian. However, in order to keep the argument afloat a little longer, it may be taken as applicable to "matters of divine faith", such as the nature of the Trinity. Propositions (iii) and (iv) are true. Proposition (v) (a) is slack; if it means "wholly past the understanding", it is false; if it means "obscure" in the same sense as in (iii), no "peculiar" about religious belief is demonstrated, for in the case of each particular obscurely understood person it is a matter of indifference whether or not any other human persons understand (since *ex hypothesi* the motive of his belief is authority). Proposition (v) (b) is slack; justification may relate either to the motives of credibility (reasons for, in this case, putting faith in the authority in the first place), or to some *future* justifying or "unjustifying" event. If Dr. Martin intends to refer to motives of credibility, then (v) (b) is false, since the original reasons for putting faith in the authority of God are all open to the normal rational tests and can be shown to be good or bad; that is what apologetics is about. If (as seems likely in the light of the examples given in support of proposition (iv)), Dr. Martin intends to refer to some *future* justifying or "unjustifying" event, then the onus is on him to show that the possibility of some such event is necessary to the reasonableness of any belief based on authority. Since he makes no attempt to discharge this onus, he cannot be allowed to play on the ambiguity of proposition (vi); he has succeeded only in showing that (divine) faith is "peculiar" in the sense of "not like faith in human authority" (which everyone knew before he started), and he has wholly failed to establish that such faith is "peculiar" in the sense of "queer" or "difficult" or "intellectually suspect". This is yet another case of much cloudy talk at the peripheries, disguising dogmatism and assumption at the heart of the problem.

The latter part of Chapter Seven is given over to Dr. Martin's "sympathetic" attempt to give faith some respectability, as a form of purposive ritualism. (Cf. p. 128, l. 7 ff., p. 129, l. 6 ff., p. 130, l. 11, p. 132, l. 27.) Since, as we have shown, he failed in his attempt to prove that faith is not truly respectable, there is little need to examine his sympathy for what stands in no need of sympathy. We have already commented briefly on this part of Chapter Seven. (See 7. *supra*.) There is no absolute distinction, such as Dr. Martin postulates, between statements "in" and statements "outside the faith"; the appeal to God's authority is not shown to be unjustified or to be analogous to the dogmatism of politicians and moralists who will not rationally consider arguments brought against their position (cf. p. 134, l. 10); "the challenge" (p. 134, l. 31) has been answered, and the assertion on p. 135, l. 4 is shown, on reflection, to be indeed the insult it seems at first glance.

## G.

The important part of the argument in Chapter Eight runs as follows:

- (i) In the mouth of a cave-dweller who has never known anything but shadows [and who has no reason to believe in the existence of anything but those shadows], the sentence "We mistake shadow for reality" is meaningless because he cannot say "what it would be like to apprehend reality". (P. 138, l. 6 ff.)
- (ii) In the mouth of an Englishman "Ips consupst mebow" is meaningless, even though an eaves-dropping Martian *could* give it meaning. (P. 138, l. 30.)
- (iii) In (i) it is thus irrelevant that an eaves-dropper who knew both shadow and reality could give the sentence meaning. (P. 138, l. 28.)
- (iv) In the mouth of someone [who has no relevant rational reason for believing what he says], the sentence "we continuously mistake appearance for reality" is meaningless because he cannot say "what apprehending reality would be like". (P. 139, l. 3 ff.)
- (v) Thus no collection of words is a "statement or assertion" unless it "makes sense" to the speaker, and the fact that someone else *could* "give it sense" is irrelevant. The words must be "used in such a way that they have sense". (P. 139, l. 23 ff.; p. 142, l. 2.)
- (vi) "No contrast, no meaning." (P. 139, l. 12, l. 33; p. 140, l. 20.)
- (vii) Thus "when the meaning of utterances is in question, no appeal can be made to revelation or external authority", and nothing can be asserted that "exceeds human understanding". (P. 142, l. 3; p. 143, l. 27.)

The passages in square brackets in propositions (i) and (iv) have been inserted by us to indicate a feature about Dr. Martin's paradigm cases which he omits to mention when he is drawing his conclusions from them. This common feature (arbitrariness, or want of rational reason) means that Dr. Martin's argument is really in the following form: [where X is "inability to say what P would be like" and Y is "lack of reason for asserting P", and Z is "meaninglessness", then

X + Y leads to Z

therefore X leads to Z]

which is false. In other words the exclusive reason that Dr. Martin gives for the meaningfulness of (i), (ii) and (iv) is not really exclusive, and he fails to consider what effect a rational reason (good or bad) for making them has on the meaningfulness of assertions. He fails to show that there is an absolute gap between the meaningfulness of one's statements and the reasons one has for making them. He fails to meet the point made by F. C. Copleston in his paper, "The Possibility of Metaphysics" in [1950] *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* (but then, Dr. Martin does not mention works by orthodox theologians after 1949). Thus, also, proposition (iii) and the first part of proposition (vii) lose their point. Proposition (v) becomes wholly ambiguous, since it assumes that the meaning of "makes sense" has been already decided, which is not so. What "gives sense" to an assertion? Dr. Martin's answer, "ability to say what it would be like if the assertion were true", is not the only answer. (Proposition (vi) is included in our exposition of his argument because the history of contemporary Anglo-Saxon philosophy makes it *a priori* likely that Dr. Martin's talk about "No contrast, no meaning" is meant as a general statement applicable to all "assertions". But that is by no means certain; there is complete ambiguity on this point because Dr. Martin has selected a hypothetical sentence which itself contains an assertion that there is a contrast, viz., between "appearance" and "reality".) Quite another answer to the question "What gives sense?" is given by modern theologians whom Dr. Martin should have considered—see, for example, Copleston, F. C., "Contemporary Philosophy" (1956) pp. 87-102. And if it is *just asserted* that something *cannot* be referred to unless one is able to say "what that something is like", even when there appears to be a good reason for referring to that something to the exclusion of something else (cf. "no contrast, no meaning"), then one is entitled to ask "Why not?" Dr. Martin does not say why not; he ignores the most significant theological studies of his subject-matter, and he ignores the fairly obvious

consideration that the reason one has for uttering a proposition by means of certain words has a great deal to do with "what one is doing with those same words"—which is his own test of meaningfulness (see p. 141, l. 30). If there are reasons advanced for saying "God exists", it is a little hasty just to reply "You cannot say *what it would be like* for something to exist necessarily, and you have *therefore* failed to make any assertion; your words must be either an 'obedient mouthing' (p. 141, l. 32) or just giving 'expression to a whole complex of feelings and ways of looking at the world' (p. 140, l. 26) or a 'hunch' (p. 142, l. 25)."

Thus, since the explanations in (i) and (iv) are not shown to be exhaustive, it follows that (v) begs the question "What does 'make sense' mean?", (vi) is ambiguous, (iii) does not arise (for it presupposes that, for the reasons offered in (i) and (iv), the speaker does not know what he means), and (vii) is consequently unproven (in so far as it is relevant, and in so far as the unanalysed phrase "appeal to revelation" has any one clear meaning) in its first part and begs the question ("Can reference be truly or falsely made to anything of which the nature is not understood?") in its second part.

The vagueness and superficiality of Dr. Martin's treatment of heuristic scientific solutions (on p. 142, l. 25 to p. 143, l. 11) can be observed by comparison with B. J. F. Lonergan's "Insight" (1957), at, especially, pp. 33-69, 103-139 and 696 ff.

## H.

Chapter Nine attacks Thomism, as follows:

- (i) It is meaningful to say
  - (a) "There are just five stars", and
  - (b) "they are passing out of existence", and
  - (c) "when the last has ceased to exist there is nothing at all." (P. 147, l. 28.)
- (ii) It is thus possible to conceive what it would be like for nothing to exist, and it is not logically impossible that there was a time before which there was nothing. (P. 148, l. 1 ff., p. 151, l. 31 ff.)
- (iii) Aquinas' Third Way asserts: "If a thing is possible to be and not to be, then at some time that thing is not." (P. 151, l. 7.)
- (iv) But at any particular time it is possible that, e.g., someone should stand and also that he should remain seated. (P. 151, l. 18.)
- (v) Therefore not every possibility need be actualised. (P. 151, l. 17.)
- (vi) Therefore the Third Way is untrue and muddled in its premises. (P. 151, l. 3, l. 27.)
- (vii) The only trouble with the principle of causality is that it is not a demonstrable truth. (P. 151, l. 24.)
- (viii) Since we can conceive what it would be like for nothing to exist, God's existence is not logically necessary. (P. 151, l. 28 ff.)

Proposition (i), on which this argument against Aquinas is founded, *just assumes* that the first principles of Thomism are false. The basic contention of Thomism, exhaustively argued in the first chapters of Thomist works on ontology and theodicy, is that it is no more meaningful to say "when the last [star] has ceased to exist there is nothing at all" ((i) (c)) than it is to say "this circle is square"—for Thomists argue that both assertions contradict the first principles of reason, language and being, viz., here, the principles of Sufficient Reason and of Contradiction, respectively. As Dr. Martin obscurely recognises (p. 147, l. 27) this is not a question of visualising, and Thomists go on to argue that the meaningfulness of "a square circle" and "something becoming nothing" is in both cases founded on violation of an ontological and logical *principium per se notum*. Dr. Martin doubtless does not accept these *principia* (as a philosopher, at least) but what does he think he is achieving by assuming that they are false before launching his attack on S. Thomas, whose whole work rests upon them? Dr. Martin, on p. 147, twice uses the phrase "it seems meaningful", and immediately concludes to "it is meaningful", which just evades the dispute between his view and the view of the people he is trying to refute. Proposition (ii) is thus a wholly arbitrary assumption, and proposition (viii) is unproven.

The confusions of propositions (iv) and (v) might have been avoided if (iii) (which is *not* a direct transcription of the Dominican Fathers' translation) had been more accurately worded as "When the non-being of a thing is possible, there is a time when it does not exist" or "that which is capable of not existing at some time does not exist" or "what is able not to be may be reckoned as once a non-being" (cf. Gilson, E., "Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas" (1957), p. 69; Copleston, F. C., "Aquinas" (1955), p. 119; Gilby, T., *op. cit.*, p. 56.) For proposition (iv) is nothing more than a play on the equivocality of (iii) (taken in Dr. Martin's paraphrase and in isolation from all Thomist thought) as between the capacity of a "thing" to do an act and the capacity of a thing to be (in-act-of-being). Aquinas' assertion in (iii) refers, to use scholastic terminology, to "objective potency" (the capacity of a mere possible to exist or be in-act-of-being), whereas, in (iv), Dr. Martin assumes that the reference is to "subjective potency" (a capacity to act, in a subject that is already existing). In the original Latin Dr. Martin's mistakes are

obvious; he takes "esse" to mean "fieri"; he reads "quod" as if it meant more, here, than "ens quod", and he reads "omnia" as if it meant more, here, than "omnia entia". Proposition (v) is thus true, but does not meet Aquinas' point. And indeed (a) as far as individuals are concerned, a possible action may or may not be realised, but (b) what is possible for a species of infinite duration must inevitably come to pass, otherwise the word "possibility" is vain as applied to that species. Therefore, if non-existence were possible for all beings, considered as forming one sole species, all beings (i.e., the species) would at some time cease to exist. Dr. Martin may disagree with (b), but he deals only with (a), and (b) is the point Aquinas is making. (See Gilson, E., *op. cit.* p. 69 and Pt. I, Ch. III, n. 46.)

It is difficult to know what to make of proposition (vii). No Thomist ever asserted that the principle of causality was a "demonstrable truth"—it is a principle alleged to be known *per se*, to be self-evident once the meaning of its terms is made clear. By simply saying that the principle is not "demonstrable", Dr. Martin cannot claim to have shown that there is any "trouble with" it.

Thus, by ignoring the fundamentals of Thomism, Dr. Martin fails to show that "the kind of necessity that could be proper to God" (p. 152, l. 2) is not logical and metaphysical. It becomes unnecessary to consider pp. 152-158, in which Dr. Martin tries to give some other sorts of "necessity" to God's existence. Contrary to the clear (but unargued) implication of p. 146, l. 2 and p. 154, l. 26, theism is not *just* a hypothesis in answer to the (vague) question "What are our most ultimate explanations of how the world is as it is?", and "the urge to say we must stop somewhere" is not *just* "what cosmological forms of argument feed upon". The last part of the chapter (pp. 159-163) is almost too vague to be sensibly discussed. The scholastic divisions of "cause" into "material", "formal", "efficient" and "final" causes, and the further categorisations of "efficient cause", were not made for fun—yet Dr. Martin, quite without argument, replaces them all with "explanation", by which "in irreducible and various ways we organise and order features of the world's activity". (P. 163, l. 8.) The "theistic form of explanation" is, throughout, wrongly assumed to be in terms of "God's will" or "God's command" (p. 162, l. 30, p. 159, l. 17 ff.; p. 160, l. 13). This "explanation" has always been denied by Thomists (cf. Mercier, D. Card., "A Manual of Modern Scholastic Philosophy" (1916), pp. 422-426). The "points" on pp. 161-162, far from being "of the greatest importance to theistic forms of explanation", are thus redundant and irrelevant: that God's will is always effective is not a "law of nature" or "just a fact about how things happen" or "just the way things are" (itals. added)—rather it is an inference from a consideration of the logically and metaphysically necessary nature of a necessary being whose existence is inferred from the fact that things are; it is not founded on a consideration of, or an attempt to explain, "how things happen" or "the way things are".



We thus conclude that those *lacunae* in the formal scholarship of "Religious Belief" which we noticed briefly in the first part of this article (see 1. to 8. *supra*) were not mere quibbles but have their counterparts at the heart of every argument Dr. Martin advances. Scholarship and philosophy are not antithetical, and the book is seen to be an eloquent if unintended testimony to the grievous consequences of any attempt to discuss theology without knowing much about it. "Religious Belief" is a book which might have proved more of a credit to this university if there had been, in the University, an academic theologian to let the author, as a professional colleague, know when he was attacking a real theologian and when he was merely routing an impotent man of straw.

—J.M.F.

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# Death and guilt

by

Robert Parsons

Although little is known of the complex causes precipitating suicides, some interesting data on the relative propensity of various social and racial groups for suicide has come to light.

For instance, with respect to religious society (in Western civilisation) the suicide rate is lowest among Catholics. The French sociologist Durkheim believes that this is because Catholicism closely integrates the individual into the collective life. "Catholic sentiments and beliefs seek to relieve the individual of guilt, make all sins expiable, establish an intricate hierarchial system of father substitutes and an ingenious poetic image of the mother."

Protestantism's rate is high and is correlated with the high state of individualism there. In Germanic countries the suicide rates are high—this may be a result of religion. Lutheranism and Calvinism throw guilt feelings back on the individual and make frustration general with no compensating belief in the religious sanctity of such things as poverty, humility and celibacy.

While the sociologist tends to regard suicide potential in terms of lack of integration of the individual into society, the psychoanalyst thinks in terms of the fears, anxieties, frustrations, loves and hatreds engendered in the individual in childhood by the family environment. For example, where through excessive mother-love, father rejection, inferiority induced by siblings, the individual is not readied for responsible adulthood according to the mores of the society he is to participate in, the suicide potential of the individual may be very high.

The more widely accepted view today in psycho-analysis is that suicide is most often a form of "displacement"; that is, the desire to kill someone who has thwarted the individual is turned back on the individual himself.

However, most sources now believe that suicidal behaviour is a combination of the individual emotion-structure laid down in infancy and the degree of social integration.

The search for material security is such an overwhelming obsession for much of mankind at the present that it seems interesting to enquire if its fulfilment produces the peace of mind imagined by the searchers.

In 1958 the suicide rate in Sweden was 1 to every 4,460 of the population, in Denmark 1 to every 4,431. These two countries have very high standards of living—Denmark is probably the most highly organised welfare state in the world—yet these suicide rates are very high ones—more than twice as high as the English rate.

Similarly, it has been observed in the United States that suicide rates are relatively high among the highest income groups; and that the rate of Negroes is very low compared to whites. There is obviously no correlation between Negro underprivilege and suicide—rather the stresses placed on the Negroes seem to have strengthened their will to live.

Allied to this is the fact that the national suicide rate decreases in times of crisis—e.g. war and revolutions; and in religious groups in times of religious persecution.

This weakening of the will to live under conditions of material well-being and peace seems in accord with the following passage from Dostoevsky's "Notes from Underground."

"Does not man perhaps love something besides well-being? Perhaps he is just as fond of suffering? Perhaps suffering is just as great a benefit to him as well-being? . . . I think man will never renounce real suffering, that is, destruction and chaos."

He then suggests that although man is a creative animal, he wants incessantly to indulge in the creative process, without regard to the result.

Dostoevsky concludes: "May it not be that he loves chaos and destruction because he is instinctively afraid of attaining his object and completing the edifice he is constructing?"

## World premiere

The Adelaide University Theatre Guild is proud to announce that it has obtained the world premiere rights for Patrick White's play "The Ham Funeral", which will be produced at the Union Hall from 15th-25th November. Inspired by William Dobell's painting "The Dead Landlord", "The Ham Funeral" is Patrick White's first excursion into the field of drama.

Students will be entitled to seats for "The Ham Funeral" at half-price. They may now also obtain applications for Guild membership in 1962 (available from Miss Beryl Pearce, at the Vice-Chancellor's office) at the student concession rate (which works out to only 2/6 per play).

Guild membership for 1962 will also entitle students to preferential seats at a reduced rate for the 1962 Festival of Arts production of Bernard Shaw's "St. Joan" in the Bonython Hall.

# to be read in ten and one half minutes

by Colin Howard

This is the news from the A.B.C. read by (inaudible).

Here are the headlines.

Australia may join the Common Market. This was disclosed by the Prime Minister (Mr. Menzies) in a speech in Canberra today. What is thought to be a world record for an air disaster was set up today in America when thirteen aeroplanes collided simultaneously over New York. No Australians were among the injured but press reports disclose that an airliner which narrowly avoided being involved in the accident may have carried a passenger bound for Sydney. Oil has been discovered near Birdsville in south-western Queensland. The commercial future of the strike is reliably described as "interesting." Australia generally has had the coldest day for three weeks, temperatures being as much as two degrees below the seasonal average in some places. From Tasmania comes a moving story of dramatic rescue.

Australia may join the Common Market. This was disclosed by the Prime Minister (Mr. Menzies) in a speech to the Australian Capital Territory Branch of the Primary and Secondary Industries Association of Australia in Canberra today. The Prime Minister (Mr. Menzies) was the guest of honour at the inaugural dinner of the Canberra Branch of the Association. Speaking to those present he said that Australia might join the Common Market. The future economic and political development of Australia could depend on world trends and world trends could depend on Australia, said Mr. Menzies (the Prime Minister). Mr. Menzies (the Prime Minister) went on to disclose that although much concern had been caused by the recent proposal that Great Britain should enter the Common Market, he (Mr. Menzies) did not share these doubts. Australia, he (the Prime Minister) said, always had and always would take an independent line on matters affecting her own vital interests. The present situation was no exception. Great Britain having given the lead, Australia should follow. There was no reason in principle why the concept of a British Commonwealth of Nations should not be expanded to meet the changing needs of the day and come to include an economic union of non-English-speaking peoples. "After all," asked the Minister for External Affairs (Mr. Menzies), "how many of the inhabitants of India, Pakistan

or New Guinea speak English?" Such a Common Market of Nations would be above sectional rivalries and he (the Prime Minister) (the Minister for External Affairs) would hope to see South Africa early admitted to membership. Asked if he had any comment to make, Mr. Calwell (the Leader of the Opposition) is understood to have expressed the view that the United Nations Organisation should be invited to join the British Commonwealth.

What is thought to be a world record for an air disaster was set up today in America when thirteen aeroplanes collided simultaneously over New York. The cause of the coincidence is unknown. No civil aircraft were known to be in the area at the time. No military aircraft were known to be in the area at the time either, but a spokesman for the Pentagon pointed out that military aircraft travel so fast nowadays that it is not easy to say where they are at any particular moment. Inquiries are proceedings. According to eye-witnesses there was a terrific crash. The number of dead and injured is reliably reported to be enormous, certainly a new American and world record for the number of dead and injured in a single air disaster. No Australians were among the casualties but press reports disclose that an airliner which narrowly avoided being involved in the accident may have carried a passenger bound for Sydney. The airliner, a B.O.A.C. Comet, passed through the fatal area an hour before the crash occurred carrying a Mr. Rawicki Dimitripoulos who gave his destination as Newcastle. Informed sources disclose that Mr. Dimitripoulos may have been referring to Newcastle, New South Wales, in which case he is confidently expected to pass through Sydney at some future time.

This news comes to you from the A.B.C.

Oil has been discovered near Birdsville in south-western Queensland. This was disclosed today by the Premier of South Australia (Sir Thomas Playford) in a speech to the South Australian Branch of the Primary and Secondary Industries Association of Australia in Adelaide today. Speaking to those listening he said that oil had been discovered near Birdsville in south-western Queensland. When asked if the Queensland Premier (Mr. Nicklin) knew of the discovery, Sir Thomas Playford (the Premier of South Australia) said he thought not. Birds-

ville is a well-known tourist resort, particularly famous for its track and its dependable climate. Sir Thomas assured his audience that care would be taken to preserve these local amenities if it proved feasible to exploit the oil strike on a commercial scale. Informed sources disclose that in Brisbane the general feeling is that if oil has been found at Birdsville it indicates nothing but the nearby presence of a jeep with a seized-up engine. The extent of the strike is unknown but is believed at present to consist of a large patch of oily sand. The implications of the discovery are described in commercial circles as "interesting."

Australia generally has had the coldest day for three weeks, temperatures in some places being as much as two degrees below the seasonal average. This was the case in Sydney, where several passers-by in the main shopping areas were interviewed by special correspondents for the A.B.C. Several people expressed the view that it was quite chilly for the time of year, but others disagreed. Reports from other urban centres were similar, although a note of light relief was provided by a Melbourne man who said that for the temperature to get within two degrees of average was regarded locally as a miracle.

This news comes to you from the A.B.C.

A moving story of dramatic rescue comes from Tasmania today. Early this afternoon the Hobart police were telephoned by the wife of a local fisherman who said that her husband had left his home after breakfast to go fishing, promising to return for lunch, and had not come back. Units of the Army, the Royal Australian Navy and the R.A.A.F. in the area were alerted and public authorities and many local inhabitants joined in the search. Passengers on T.A.A. and Ansett-A.N.A. air services were asked to scan the sea as they passed overhead and to point out to the captain of their aircraft anything which looked like a fishing vessel in distress. After an exhaustive search lasting many hours the missing boat was eventually discovered moored in its usual place in Hobart harbour. The owner was drinking beer in a nearby public house listening to A.B.C. accounts of the progress of the search. By tea-time this evening the happy couple were reunited, and so, as the old saying has it, "All's well that ends well."

## The entertainer

by

Desmond Roman

The University Theatre Guild turned once more to a modern playwright for their penultimate production for 1961: John Osborne, whose well-known play, "The Entertainer," will continue at the Union Hall until Saturday, 16th September.

This is a curious play; one must not be misled by Osborne's satiric asides on the beliefs of the three generations portrayed, for he really gives a most penetrating picture of the miserable existence, made endurable by gin, eked out by the low comedian Archie Rice, and his menage. There is very little action throughout, except for the interludes at the music hall itself, which provide some splendid comic relief. In his depressing digs, Archie's deliberate spiritual isolation and callousness, to protect himself from the world, bring him into conflict with his more sensitive children, who have not their grandfather's pride with which to cover

themselves. This conflict leads to endless petty squabbling and argument, which is pitilessly observed. The difficulty is to make interesting for 3 acts such pettiness, because of its very reality and correspondence to life. At times the play rises to glorious heights of incoherence (this is not paradoxical; the impossibility of adequate communication is endemic in the situation presented). On the other hand, there are too many long passages of fruitless argument in alcoholic haze. The moral is there to be picked up, but one needs to wade through a lot of verbiage to find it; the interesting possibilities of the situation are only hinted at, not realised.

The vital character is, of course, Archie, and fortunately Peter Goerecke excelled in the part; his synthetic smile and revolting bonhomie in the music hall scenes really made one squirm. As Billy Rice, the old "has been" with nostalgic memories, John Edmund (who also produced) successfully substituted at the last minute for John Hammond. However, Tina O'Brien's portrayal of Jean Rice lacked conviction; she just looked too nice a girl to have been drinking steadily already on the way home from London. The interesting and imaginative set (by Lewis Stenson) showed up weaknesses in miming technique in several of the actors. Pleasant music hall tunes by Donald Gray, played by an orchestra under his direction, added an authentic touch, and helped round out the production.

## To G.N.B.

Each man is alone in the scethe of the tide,  
The curve of a child's warm cheek  
The palm of a woman's hand  
The soft, sad note of night  
Keening  
The brittle gleam of a long-dead star.

Alone with the snap of the dead dry stick,  
The crisp of the dead dry leaf  
In a spring of lushness,  
The death of dull dry faces  
Everywhere  
The slight cold rain in slivers.

But the dead dry stick can blossom  
With fires of red and gold  
And the crisp pale leaves break  
From the death of their compassing husk  
And eyes of strangers kindle  
Warm  
With the pool of love at their feet.

Each man in his soul is alone,  
Dead, with no hope of light  
Till a quickening spill of laughter,  
Love's light bright searching fingers  
Soft.  
Wake the life of the pulsing heart.

Quick, young and bright are you,  
Quick with the mellow sun  
In flashes on your hair.  
You, easy to hurt as a warm shelled thing  
Cradled.  
To you, Love comes and stays.

—J.F.

# Original singst

The programme for the Film Society for the rest of this term is as follows:—

- Sept. 20-21—*Les Miserables*.  
 Oct. 4-5—*One Summer of Happiness*.  
 11-12—*Horsefeathers*.  
 18-19—*12 Angry Men*.  
 25-26—*Sound and the Fury*.

All the performances are in the Union Hall starting at 12.5 p.m. and finishing before 2 p.m.

The film "*Les Miserables*" is on 16 mm. and because of the reduced cost of presenting it there will be no charge for admission.

"*One Summer of Happiness*" is one of the many great films made by the Swedish director, Ingmar Bergman.

"*Horsefeathers*" is a classic Marx Brothers film of the 1930's when that great comedy team were at their peak.


"*12 Angry Men*" is directed by Sidney Lumet.

A jury adjourns on a murder case about which there seems little doubt. To everyone's surprise one vote of "not guilty" is entered on the count. The dissenter explains that while he is not convinced of the man's innocence, he is equally unsure of his guilt. The others are generally reluctant

to re-examine the issues but the dissenter persists. The subsequent discussions bring to the surface issues which throw doubts on the prisoner's guilt. The knife is not the unique weapon it has been assumed to be; the evidence is shown to be inadequate. One by one the jury men admit to doubts. Among the last to change their opinions we find a man with a deep racial prejudice and a perverted sadist. Finally everyone's conviction is shaken and the accused is acquitted.

The film is taken from the original television singst and has some highly convincing naturalistic characterisations, a fresh look at some vivid and real life situations and settings. The whole action takes place in the jury room and the emphasis is on character and the interplay of personalities. From their indifference to true moral responsibility (one is anxious to get to a ball game; most have digested only the prosecutor's analysis of the facts), they are one by one drawn into a tighter involvement, a quickened interest to discuss the truth. The general tension and slow breakdown of the circumstantial evidence is excellently contrived, and with the exception of the sadist, the acting is easy and concise.

The "*Sound and the Fury*," with which we conclude the year, is a fairly recent film (U.S.A. 1959) of the deep South. It is based on the novel by Faulkner.



"look, with a spot we damn him."  
 (Julius Caesar, Act IV, Sc. I).

## CORRESPONDENCE

Dear Sirs,

With a good deal of effort, I managed to wade through the article entitled "Lov Ark . . . Aah . . ." by Mr. Sobolewski which you, Sirs, saw fit to print in the last edition of "*On Dit*." The only reason that I can think of for your printing the article is that you have promised to print all the material given to you.

I say, with careful thought, that I managed to wade through the article because never before have I read so much irrelevant rubbish in a student newspaper, let alone "*On Dit*."

I also read, with great interest, the article, referred to by Mr. Sobolewski, by Miss Godwin in the previous edition of "*On Dit*." My impression after reading Miss Godwin's article was that in the short time she had with the visitors, her impressions were the same as my own (I'm going gaa gaa, Mr. Sobolewski!) and I spent many more hours with them than did Miss Godwin—I should say that I was privileged to spend many more hours with them.

Mr. Sobolewski's article is concerned with defending the "bombastic" and "rude" questions asked of our "guests." He has written many words about these questions, about his impressions of the situations contained in these questions and above all has shown his knowledge of Communist writings by telling us, for example, who paraphrased who and where these words originally came from.

Nearing the end of Mr. Sobolewski's dissertation, I came, at last, upon the paragraph in which he gives his reasons for "pricking the balloon of courtesy and good manners."

He says, and I quote, "Not merely to acquaint the Russian students with the embarrassing truth . . ." I doubt whether it was necessary to do this. The sentence would have been more accurate if the word "merely" had been left out. (If Mr. Sobolewski disagrees with this, he is sadly misinformed.) Even students would know the truths. Mr. Sobolewski then goes on to say that the balloon was pricked to remind the Miss Godwin type of the facts.

It is obvious that Mr. Sobolewski is the typical, lazy type of student who waits for someone else to arrange a meeting of this type and then rises and voices his opinion of Communism, etc. If Mr. Sobolewski is so interested in informing the masses of the disaster of Communism, then he has every opportunity. No-one is stopping him arranging such a meeting. In fact, I would be the first to encourage him. This University could do with a few more "thinking undergraduates," and meetings of this type are the best means of achieving this.

What I do object to is the fact that so many people walk around with the mistaken opinion that any person from Russia wants to, or is able to, defend every move that Mr. Krushchev has made and every ideal that Communism holds. How many Australians would be prepared to support every move made by the Commonwealth Government, White Australia, for instance, or, on the other hand, how many Russians would be prepared to endorse the latest decision of Mr. Krushchev to continue nuclear tests, when they know that their lives are endangered by fallout? Mr. Sobolewski would

do well to think along these lines for a change.

The questions asked of our guests were not embarrassing to them, but they were embarrassing to the Miss Godwin type, and I am glad they were. For, it was only the Miss Godwin type who knew the guests and knew that they were not interested in politics, etc, but were in Australia to learn of Australia, to meet the people of Australia and to go home with good impressions of the people they met. If Mr. Sobolewski (or his colleagues) doubt this, then I strongly suggest that they talk with the students who looked after the Russians during their brief stay in Adelaide.

Of course there is the possibility that we are all wrong and Mr. Sobolewski is right.

Yours, etc.,

R. D. CAMPBELL.

## Creative

Dear Sirs,

For the first time, next year, the Australian Arts Faculty hopes to produce its own magazine and has entrusted the conception of the child to Adelaide University's Arts Faculty.

This, I assure you, is a great honour which merits a large number of contributions (essays, poetry, articles and short stories on any subject) from the many (so we are led to believe) intelligent and creative students in this University.

Surely, they will find no trouble in dashing off some graceful trifles which will compare favourably with those from other creeper-covered halls of learning. By the end of December, please!

Aspiring artists, too, are notified that they may gain everlasting fame by designing a cover for the magazine which should have a large circulation.

All contributions and cover designs are to be submitted to the Editor, Jan Finch, whose address is 190 Cross Road, Malvern (ph. 7 5633) no later than December 27 and much earlier if possible.

Yours etc.,

JAN FINCH.

UNIVERSITY OF ADELAIDE

## UNION DIARY 1962

Late copy for this publication will be accepted until Friday, 22nd September, at S.R.C. office.

Copy submitted later than this date will not be included in the Diary.

Editor: John R. Slee, Esq.

Business Manager: Miss J. P. Pearson.

THE PUBLIC SERVICE OF

Papua and New Guinea

## CADETSHIPS

career opportunities for young men and women

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At 18 "	£859	£1,222	£791
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" 21 "	£1,110	£1,260	£930
" 22 "	£1,160	£1,310	£980
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### FURTHER INFORMATION

Full details of eligibility, training and opportunities for advancement are set out in a special "Careers with a Challenge" handbook, while information about Papua and New Guinea and its Public Service is given in a Public Service Information Handbook, available from:—

- The Department of Territories, Canberra or Sydney;
- The Commonwealth Public Service Inspector in your capital city;
- Any Commonwealth Employment Office;
- University Appointments Board.

Other enquiries to the Department of Territories, Canberra (phone 7 0411, extension 29A).

### APPLICATIONS

Submit on special cadetship application form available from offices mentioned under "Further Information", quoting—

to ADVERTISEMENT No. 20  
 The Secretary, Department of Territories,  
 Canberra, A.C.T.,  
 by 26th August, 1961.

# AS THAT SPORTSMAN POLONIUS SAID

The Women's Basketball Club had a fairly successful year, as three of its five teams reached the final four, whilst a fourth was put out on percentage. All three lost in the preliminary finals. The "B" team, with only six players owing to the vacation, fought to draw their match, and lost only after a fifth quarter.

A successful innovation this year was to have a night practice for the "A" and "B" teams, and it was found that the practices were much better than last year. In the last part of the year we were fortunate in having Mrs. Buckingham to coach the top two teams. This made a great difference to their play, and was especially useful in preparing for Intersarsity.

The Intersarsity Carnival was held in Brisbane during the last week of the August vacation. As Perth, Canberra and New England teams were unfortunately unable to come, there were only five universities competing. Adelaide finished second to Melbourne, followed by Sydney, Hobart and Brisbane teams in that order. The standard of play was much higher than last year, and most of the matches were very close, although Melbourne, which has won the cup for the last three years, was never close to losing.

Two of the Adelaide team, Joan Allister and Rosalind Lawton, were chosen for the combined team, and Diana Brookman was a reserve. Joan was named as the outstanding goalscorer of the Carnival, while the Sydney defence goal, Margaret Rankin, was the best player. The combined team, which included five players from Melbourne, two from Hobart and one from Sydney, defeated the Queensland State team, 13 goals to 6.

The Brisbane Intersarsity was one of the most enjoyable ever, and we are grateful to our Captain, Alison Golley, for making it so. Next year the Carnival will be held in Melbourne, and we hope that this time Adelaide will defeat Melbourne and win the cup once again.

## Rugby

With the end of the season drawing nigh, it is perhaps time for an interim report on the state of affairs in the Rugby Club.

Johnny Rosewell has been Club Captain this season and has led the "A" team into top position in the final four. On Saturday, September 2, the "A's" soundly plastered their old rivals, Woodville, 19-6 and so they seem highly likely this year to repeat their 1960 effort of becoming Premiers. It is in part the aim of these notes to urge people to become spectators for the grand final round of the competition. Rugby benefits greatly from having spectators on the sidelines—it takes very little effort to get there and is a most rewarding afternoon's entertainment. So, how about turning out next Saturday to see the "A's" in the last match before the grand final. As well as an exciting line-up of 15 University stars, Johnny O'Keefe will be there.

Two other University teams, Lincoln and Aquinas, reached the final four, but we cannot, unfortunately, report this of the "B's", "C's" or St. Mark's.

The "C's" suffered greatly this year through not having the same team in any two consecutive matches. They had little chance to develop team work through having their numbers depleted continually in order that the higher teams might be filled.

The "B's" also suffered considerably from this disease.

However, both teams have had a good season, with matches on the whole being pretty even, and after all, the great thing is not to have won but to have fought, and fought well, as the bard would have it.

The turn-out to practice has not been good this season and we have suffered, no doubt, from lack of coaches—perhaps the former problem arose because of the latter—but anyhow, it is Grand Final now, so in ending let me just reiterate my appeal for plenty of enthusiasm on the sidelines, and good luck to the "A's".

## Women's Hockey

After rather an erratic season at home in which we just managed to scrape into the semi-finals, we surprised ourselves and absolutely flabbergasted Melbourne (who thought they had it in the bag) by winning the Inter-varsity hockey in Brisbane.

The matches, played on the fast, even University fields, were, on the whole good, sometimes even inspired. It was noticeable that the Adelaide side played an unconvincing, patchy game against weaker teams, but combined well when faced with stronger opposition. Whereas throughout the season we had been relying too much on the defence, in this series the forwards came good and played an attacking game.

Our scores were:—

- Adelaide defeated W.A., 4-1.
- Melbourne defeated Adelaide, 5-2.
- Adelaide defeated Tasmania, 5-1.
- Adelaide defeated New England, 4-2.
- Adelaide defeated N.S.W., 2-1.
- Adelaide defeated Sydney, 1-0.
- New Zealand defeated Adelaide, 3-1.
- Adelaide defeated Queensland, 5-0.

The last two days were crucial for us. W.A., bribed and encouraged from the sidelines by Adelaide, beat Melbourne, which gave us a one-point advantage. In the deciding match on the final day we defeated Queensland, thereby winning the cup from Sydney, the 1960 holders.

The story of the cup is quite interesting. It was used by us before the official presentation to drink the champagne of victory. There its tale becomes a little disconnected. It arrived at the dinner in three pieces, was formally presented in one piece and thereafter mysteriously disintegrated again. The dinner itself was a success: the food, etc., was good, the speeches were good and the songs were good. We can't think why, but in spite of our raucous voices they called us the team "with the delicate air." But our crowning glory came with the announcement of the all-Australia side to play the Queensland State team and New Zealand. Adelaide was represented by Mary Chapman and Phyl Clarkson, and the selectors' choice of our captain, Marg. Jude, as captain of the combined side—a fitting tribute to her fine leadership, enthusiasm and outstanding ability—delighted not only us, but all the other teams as well. The team lost to Queensland, but held the hitherto undefeated New Zealanders to a draw (1-1).

In spite of the accommodation—Yungaba Migrant Hostel was not exactly commodious—we managed to store up some pleasant memories of Brisbane: visits to "The Oasis" and Mt. Coutha, pineapples (one pineapple in particular), the inevitable Surfer's Paradise, the novelty of getting sunburnt in the middle of winter and finally, the friendliness of the people who obligingly supplemented the scanty bus service from the University, and who often insisted on taking us right out of their way to show us the sights. All things considered, a successful trip.

## Football

What a mighty effort, Blacks—all four sides in the four and the finals starting on September 16th!

For many years the "A's" have been a power-house in Amateur League Football, but it is many moons since all teams have fronted up to the finals (A's top of their grade; B's second; C's fourth; D's second). Given full sides, a spot of self-discipline from each individual, and an even share of the breaks, all stand a good chance of notching their respective premiership flags. Congratulations to all hundred-odd on the training list!

Many of the bouquets must, of course, be thrown in the direction of Coach Alan Greer—a mighty bloke, whose pleasant and encouraging ways continue to endear him to one and all—but the unprecedented rise in the club fortunes can be attributed to the new, fiery order in the lower sides: it looks as if Dave, Godfrey and Ken are "best" after all!

But the fight is not "o'er," nor is "the battle won." Only in four weeks will we know whether we can do justice to the "victor's song." Until then each player must take a stand with himself for the good of University football, since it is only by effort that results are achieved. You must drive yourselves at practice, chaps, and if you feel any weak desire to ease up, remember that the "chain" of your Saturday side "is only as strong as its weakest link" . . . we would all hate to let our mates down, I know.

While on the subject, thanks are due to Robin George, "Centaur" Oaten, Murray Byrne, and all the others who have made the effort to come out of retirement to fill the gaps in the club line-up.

To anyone with a free Saturday afternoon in the next month, I would enjoin them to come out and support one of the University footy teams. In their manner on the field they are a credit to the University community, and following them makes for a most pleasant Saturday afternoon. Several league players have watched the Varsity play this season, and, in complimenting us on our performances, have commented that the more open Amateur League game, with its high marking, long-kicking and more decisive characteristics, is, if anything, a better spectacle than League matches. Enthusiastic spectators lift the players' efforts and the standard of the game—someone, please take a hint, as it would be a great thing for the Club to do really well in these finals.

A final word in something of an imploring vein to the players! Let's not have the spineless approach to finals that one or two Uni. sides have shown in the past. As that sportsman, Polonius, would say, "To your own self be true"—hop in and make that ball yours!

This year, let us be better than good losers: let's be good winners!

## INTER-V. HOCKEY TEAM

BRISBANE  
AUG., 1961.



Back: Misses Hodge, Lucas, Francis, McKay, Phillips, Warhurst, Niehus. Front: Misses Just, Chapman, Jude, Schubert, Clarkson (Jo), Clarkson (Phyl).

## Canoeing

The University Kayak Club, the first of its kind in South Australia, was founded in March, 1961. A small number of Spartans have been in training throughout the winter, learning the difficult art of "sitting-up" highly unstable racing craft, prior to serious summer training for the Australian Canoeing Championships to be held in New South Wales in February, 1962.

The Club played a leading role in the organisation of South Australia's first Canoeing Regatta held on the Torrens on Saturday, September 2. Four of its members, Robert Wight, Malcolm Hale, and the John Lawton-Graeme Correll combination gained first places respectively in the three miles singles, the "Slalom" singles, and the three miles pairs events.

The Club has its headquarters in the University Boat House by kind permission of the Boat Club. At present membership is necessarily small owing to shortage of racing craft.

Plans for the future include the establishment of a women's section, a touring group, and the organisation of a marathon race on the Murray in conjunction with the South Australian Amateur Canoe Association.

This sport is new to South Australia at the competition level, and it is hoped that the University Club will provide a spearhead for its progress in this State.


## Rugby

A notice to the flannelled fools in our midst that spring is here and practices start on the turf wickets at University Oval on Tuesday, September 19, and thereafter, on each Tuesday, Wednesday and Thursday of the season.

L. G. (Jack) Giles, our popular and entertaining coach, will once again be on the track bringing his "keen hawk-eye for talent" with him.

He has directed me to make the point that, as far as he is concerned, "reputations and past performances count for nothing." Realist that he is, he lives in the present and is only too willing to give the new player every opportunity to prove himself.

There is not much time between the start of practice and the first match of the 1961-62 season, so all intending players are asked to shake a leg and get their creams out of moth-balls. To any new players—practice of a night usually begins at about 4.30 p.m. Just come out and introduce yourself around: you will find a very ready welcome.



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# OPINION

The National Heart Campaign has now been relegated to a small column on page 6 of "The Advertiser." This article announces that 169 applications have been received for grants totalling £500,000.

The successful applicants will be informed late next month.

In these pages we have previously called in question the wisdom of conducting this campaign. We objected that it was not a priority, that enough was already being done about the matter both here and, more particularly, in America and that the people who were organising it did not have any obvious qualifications for doing so.

But the chief objection is to the manner in which it was carried out. A large group of affluent, influential and so-respectable people band together and announce that they intend to collect £1,500,000 from the public, mainly for the purpose of research into heart disease. Some fifteen per cent. is to be spent upon educating the public about heart disease and another fifteen per cent. on setting up heart clinics in each State. These plans and their great worth are incessantly trumpeted to the public by press, radio and pamphlet, the list of subscribers and organisers seems to include everybody and everything of any eminence in the community and the whole campaign ends with collectors extracting hundreds of thousands on the door step on the psychologically well-timed Sunday evening.

It is ultimately a case of moral blackmail. Who could object to such an appeal when such a weight of respectable and monied individuals is for it?

In the event no one has.

It is a moot question whether any criticism could be made public at all. And so the controllers of this money are in an impregnable position to do as they wish.

Having succeeded once, it is likely that further campaigns like it will be organised and will be successful; organised, moreover, by public relations men who are concerned more with the success of their campaigning than the taste and morality of the methods with which it is done.

Before any such campaign to support research is carried out it is necessary not only to ask whether it is desirable to carry out the research but also whether or not there are competent research workers in this field whose research is suffering from a lack of funds. Will not the National Heart Foundation merely be giving money to research workers who could obtain money elsewhere?

## The inevitable and us

The current lull in events prior to the commencement of full-scale negotiations by Great Britain to join the European Economic Community seems to afford a convenient opportunity to review some of the far-reaching economic and political implications of this proposed move.

The Treaty of Rome, which brought the European Economic Community into being on January 1, 1958, was concluded in Rome on March 25, 1957. The Community thereby formed incorporated a European Coal and Steel Community (which was already in existence), and a European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom).

The Treaty sets up the European Economic Community (the "Common Market") by providing for the gradual elimination of internal tariffs between member countries and the setting up of a common external tariff and the adoption of common economic policies on such matters as the employment and migration of labour, investment and transport.

The day-to-day administration of the Community is in the hands of a nine-member commission, which carries out policy determined by a Council of Ministers from member-countries. Provision is also made for a European Parliament, and a Court with seven judges. Member countries retain control over defence and foreign affairs.

The Coal and Steel Community has its own nine-man commission, and the European Atomic Energy Community has a commission of five members.

A twelve-year "transition" period was fixed by the Six in 1958, so that the complete operation of the Common Market was envisaged by 1970. The beginning of the second four-year stage of this period, on January 1 next, is regarded as somewhat of a deadline for Great Britain to "join the express".

The degree of integration proposed by the Treaty must certainly imply the surrender, by member countries, of at least some measure of their national sovereignty and political autonomy. The measure to be surrendered is likely to be very considerable, amounting, possibly, to an almost complete surrender, with the formation of a federation, or at least a confederation, of states in Europe. This aim has been expressed on numerous occasions by Ministers of the Six. The formation of such a vast political unit is favoured by the U.S.A.

Even without the conscious support which this aim of confederation is receiving, it is clear that at least some sovereignty must change hands through such a transmission of economic powers. The principle seen at work in English history where sovereignty has been wrested from the person of the

Crown as the growing economic power of the Parliament forced it to make concessions to them surely has application in the present context. The central control of the economic factors proposed must eventually lead to a uniform commercial law and a partial surrender of the peculiarly national identity of the customary legal systems of Europe. The degree of political autonomy left in each member-nation after such a process would be small indeed.

A common currency for member-countries may well follow from such a development. The free migration of labour is already provided for, so that Continental workers would have all the rights of citizenship in England except the right to vote. Not even Australians in Great Britain would enjoy all the privileges of these migratory workers.

The one difficulty seen in the way of such a confederation is the inability of each nation, especially one such as Britain, to adjust itself sentimentally to the arrangement. Allegiance to the Crown is traditional and hard to replace. The "Spectator" in the Sydney Morning Herald (25/7/61) finds the translation a little difficult:

"Send it victorious,  
Happy and glorious,  
Long to reign over us,  
God save our Common Market.

Confound other Common Markets' politics,  
Frustrate their knavish tricks,  
On us our hope we fix,  
God save us all."

The views within Britain on her proposed entry into the Market have not been on a Party basis. Some Members of Parliament have determined not to surrender any sovereignty. The extreme Left wing has insisted that the whole union is only a move to intensify the "cold war"; that it is Britain's function to conciliate between East and West, and not to join with "reactionaries" like Adenauer. Others deplore the abandonment of tested traditional links with the Commonwealth. On the other hand the pro-Market side foresees long term economic advantages for Britain by having full access to the largest market in the world.

The argument that Britain's entry would mean the eventual breaking of the Commonwealth gained special significance in the joint communique issued by Mr. Menzies and Mr. Sandys, where disagreement on this point was expressed. British and Australian newspapers have been divided on the issue. Sir John Crawford (former Secretary of the Department of Trade) has expressed his view that the Commonwealth, being a "forum" of nations linked by common political traditions, yet pursuing their own interests individually cannot be written off as yet, since Britain, in joining, would be only following her own interests, as does each other Commonwealth nation.

Other observers, however, have expressed the view that the Commonwealth is nothing more than a "crowned shadow" of the former Empire, consisting of countries many of which are politically at odds and all of which are independently protectionist economically. As a "unit" to set up against the Soviet-bloc, or the Common Market, this institution is not worth protecting.

The United States has seen, in the joining of Great Britain with the Six, the formation of a strong force in Europe against the spread of Communism. It is felt that a strong economic counterpart of NATO is needed. For Britain to yield to such pressures in joining would mean the abandonment of her traditional policy of maintaining a balance of power within Europe. But such an abandonment would be in favour of a united European State which would achieve the same objective on a world level.

Support for Britain's entry is fairly general within the Six, although there are some trouble spots and anxieties. France has been only lukewarm to the proposal; she sees in Britain a potential threat to her eventual leadership of the Six, and also the additional threat of damage to her protected agriculture if Britain secures special privileges in favour of her Commonwealth. In fact, some tension has existed within the Six over difficulties in settling on a common agricultural policy.

But in spite of difficulties, the Common Market has worked well. The Six are already 80 per cent. self-sufficient in primary production, and since 1953 industrial output of the Six has increased by 80 per cent., compared with a rise of 30 per cent. in Britain. The danger for Britain is that by staying out she will tend to stagnate behind her own tariff wall.

These very figures indicating a trend towards self-sufficiency in Europe are interesting from the point of view of the trade structure of the Free World as a whole. The Minister for Trade (Mr. McEwen) has expressed his concern that the formation of the European Economic Community has not been of assistance in mending some flaws which have appeared in this trade structure.

Chief among these flaws has been the continuing trade deficit (amounting to £A7,000m. since the war) of the underdeveloped countries of the world, a deficit caused by lower prices for primary produce and higher prices for manufactured goods obtained in the artificial market set up by the industrial countries in recent years. It is in the interests of the West to see to the development of these countries. For development they need ready markets for their goods and their capital-raising, not aid in the form of handouts, by which they are subjected to a kind of dependence. The Western countries must adopt a more outward looking policy; the European Economic Community is seen, in some quarters, rather as a step in the opposite direction.

Britain's entry into the C.M. will not be without its legal involvements either. Article 234 of the Rome Treaty would require Britain to cancel her commercial treaties with non-member countries. Since much of Australia's tariff structure is based on these treaties, a great deal of re-negotiation of reciprocal trade rights will be necessary for us too. However, much of this would be found necessary anyway, in the establishment of alternative markets for our produce.

The attitude of Commonwealth countries to Britain's joining the Market was gauged fairly clearly from the recent tours by British Ministers. It was not favourable. Most Commonwealth countries are highly concerned at the adverse effects which their export marketing would suffer. India is particularly concerned that aid for its current five-year development plan would be restricted. A possible motive of Mr. Menzies in expressing his anxieties so firmly on behalf of the Commonwealth would have been to emphasize or even exaggerate for the benefit of France and the Six the difficulties which face Britain in the forthcoming negotiations in view of commitments to her Commonwealth.

New Zealand would be the worst affected if Britain was to join the Six without securing special concessions for Commonwealth trade. In the case of Australia the effect would be considerable too. Of our exports annually to Britain and Western Europe (worth about £420m.) approximately one quarter (£115m) is likely to be seriously affected if Britain joins. The flow of finance from Britain for investment in Australia must also be affected.

The chief problem for negotiation with the Six as far as Australia is concerned is the question of special privileges for the Commonwealth countries. Some suggestions have been forthcoming that Associate membership of the Community should be sought for Australia and the other Commonwealth countries. Many overseas territories of the present Six have been associated in this way. By such an arrangement they are obliged to lower tariffs against the Common Market countries to the level of those formerly affecting their own mother countries, but they do not have to maintain a common tariff against non-members. In return they have all the advantages of trade within the Common Market which full members have.

However, the provisions in the Treaty relating to Associate membership expire next year, and may not be renewed. In these circumstances, even if Australia was to seek Associate membership, special negotiation would have to take place, and such special negotiation may as well be directed towards obtaining special privileges for her and other Commonwealth countries as to securing a new arrangement covering Associate membership generally of such countries as Australia.

As an alternative market to Britain and Western Europe, Australia must look to the countries of Asia. In the decade from 1950 to 1960 the proportion of Australian exports going to Asia rose from 12 per cent. to 25 per cent. of total exports. Japan is the chief market in this new area. In the last financial year alone exports to Japan rose from 14 per cent. to 17 per cent. of our total, while imports from Japan rose by 392 per cent. to account for 6 per cent. of our total imports from 1956-7 to 1960-61. These mutual increases in trade must continue. If Japan is to buy more of our raw materials she must find markets for her manufactured goods. The nearer countries of Asia account for a much smaller volume of our exports, but these, too, are markets which are certain not to shrink, while Japan's plan to double her national income by 1970 is an encouraging factor from the point of view of Australian exporters.

There have even been suggestions for the formation of a "common market" in South East Asia and the Pacific. Such a proposal cannot be entertained seriously. The extreme diversity of economic conditions and problems in this area distinguishes it altogether from the European zone. To envisage any form of political federation in this area would be naive indeed.

If any general conclusion can be drawn, it is this: that the economic interests of Britain probably call for her entry into the Common Market—outside it she would be condemned to economic stagnation. Unfortunately, though, some disadvantages will follow, not directly to Britain, but chiefly to her Commonwealth countries. If all this is seen as the inevitable event of history, the equally inevitable answer for Australia is to develop her relations with Asia.

A. BROWNE