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FIELD INTELLIGENCE:

ITS PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE.

BY

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PREFACE.

THIS work is based on the practical experience of the Field Intelligence Department during the late South African War (1899-1902), and is approved as the text-book for the study of that important branch of the duties of the General Staff in the field.

N. G. LYTTTELTON,
Chief of the General Staff.

War Office,
29 April, 1904.



I.

GENERAL PRINCIPLES—PERSONNEL, ORGANIZATION.

The acquisition of information regarding an enemy is one of the most difficult and harassing duties which can fall to the lot of any officer. Yet the pursuit of information in war is of such engrossing interest, the opportunities for distinction and for the proof of skill, courage, and judgment are so many, and the importance of success in this service is so well recognised, that employment on Intelligence duties offers a field sufficient for the ambition of the most talented soldier.

Importance of
Intelligence.

The successful Intelligence Officer must be cool, courageous, and adroit, patient and imperturbable, discreet and trustworthy. He must understand the handling of troops, and have a knowledge of the art of war. He must be able to win the confidence of his General, and to inspire confidence in his subordinates. He must have resolution to continue unceasingly his search for information, even in the most disheartening circumstances and after repeated failures. He must have endurance to submit silently to criticism, much of which may be based on ignorance or jealousy. And he must be able to deal with men, to approach his source of information with tact and skill, whether such source be a patriotic gentleman or an abandoned traitor.

Qualifications
of officers and
subordinates.

These qualities, which are essential in an Intelligence officer, are also required in his subordinates. It is not to be expected that every subordinate can be qualified for every branch of intelligence service. Subordinates should be specialists: the two qualities which are absolutely necessary in all permanent Intelligence assistants are fidelity and discretion.

Even those essentials may be purposely avoided; an Intelligence Officer may temporarily engage an indiscreet babbler to spread inaccurate information, or a suspected traitor to sell concocted secrets. But the real assistants of an officer dealing with Intelligence should be of proved fidelity and unshakable discretion.

Expert
assistants.

The Intelligence Officer must, to some extent, depend on his assistants for expert knowledge of the various branches of his work. He looks to his interpreters for intimate knowledge of the language of the country; to his guides for that local information which can always supplement the best maps or guide books; to his trained scouts for definite information of the enemy within reach; and to his secret service agents for knowledge of the enemy's plans and hidden movements.

In the interpreter he requires knowledge and some conversational skill. In the guide he requires knowledge, accuracy, and an eye for ground. In his scouts he looks for personal courage and endurance, quick observation, and coolness in danger. In choosing his secret service agents, he must endeavour to find subtlety and adroitness; they should be plausible and (except to himself) convincing, and it is seldom a disadvantage that they should be avaricious. His police should be steady and highly disciplined soldiers. Thus shall he be well served.

Expert
advisers.

In choosing his assistants, or in his observation of assistants who have been detailed for him, an Intelligence Officer should endeavour to select one or two men who, from their education, experience, or judgment, are qualified to act as his local advisers in general Intelligence matters.

Information and advice are two different things, and although information from any source should be considered, only a few are qualified to give counsel. It is always a grave matter to ask advice from an irresponsible person, for it is first necessary to give him a knowledge of the actual state of the particular case; yet there are occasions, especially in dealing with the inhabitants of the country, when the opinion of a man with local experience is invaluable. Men who can be so trusted, however, are rare, and when such men are found, the influence which they exercise should be carefully concealed from them.

Local
knowledge in
officers not
indispensable.

Although it is an advantage for an Intelligence Officer to have some knowledge of the language, topography, and resources of the country in which operations are carried on, yet if he be able to obtain the right stamp of

assistant, such special knowledge is not indispensable. The most perfect linguistic attainments, the most thorough local knowledge, do not of themselves qualify an officer for a responsible Intelligence post, although such advantages are invaluable in a subordinate. An officer otherwise suitable for Intelligence will quickly make up any deficiencies in his local knowledge, and the difficulty of using an unknown language can be minimized. Interpreters are easily found; good Intelligence officers are rare.

In order to attain success in his work, it is necessary that an Intelligence Officer should have the confidence and support of his General, of his brother staff officers, of the heads of departments, and of the officers holding responsible commands in the force. To insure this, he should be always ready to give any assistance in his power; to meet, as far as possible, the wishes or preferences of those to whom he supplies interpreters and guides; to lose no opportunity of ascertaining such local details as may be useful in providing for the comfort and convenience of the troops, and he should take care that he and his subordinates, in their dealings with the troops, maintain always a correct and friendly attitude. He should let his outdoor work be observed; he, himself, and his scouts should show themselves freely in camp when starting for, or returning from, reconnaissance. The spectacle of an Intelligence man entering camp in the early morning on a tired horse tends to raise the Intelligence Corps in the esteem of the army, and there will always be occasions when the display of a little personal gallantry, or the cheerful endurance of exceptional fatigue or discomfort, on the part of the Intelligence Officers or men, will have a good effect in inspiring that confidence which is required.

The assumption of superior knowledge, which is sometimes difficult to avoid, is likely to react on Intelligence Officers who permit themselves to indulge in it. Every item of information offered, officially or privately, should be gratefully acknowledged. Even if the news be of the stalest, it should be accepted as if it were of urgent importance; for it is only by such encouragement

Relations with
other officers.

Encouraging
voluntary
efforts.

that the custom of conveying all information to the officers in search of it can be properly established. Individuals unconnected with the Intelligence often put themselves to considerable trouble and inconvenience to obtain and verify information which, in their opinion, may be useful, and such persons should on no account be disheartened by any admission that their exertions have been wasted. Not that an Intelligence Officer need pretend ignorance on matters with which he is well acquainted, but there are expressions such as "corroborative evidence" or "throwing more light on the subject"—by the use of which an informant may be led to understand that his efforts are appreciated. Every channel of information should be kept open; more than once a chance scrap of intelligence has turned a campaign.

Sifting
information.

Intelligence Officers should be careful to be on good terms with other officers for a special reason. If there should be any friction, there is an ever-present danger of unverified and perhaps erroneous information being brought to the notice of an officer in command of troops, and acted on without reference to the officer responsible for information. Amateur Intelligence is a fascinating, but in war a dangerous, pursuit, and an Intelligence Officer should be able so to impress his personality on all concerned that he shall be looked on as the proper recipient for information. He can then insure that all intelligence shall be sifted before it is irredeemably accepted.

The importance
of good
manners.

The success of Intelligence Officers and employés, and the smoothness of their relations with other branches of the army, are a good deal dependent on their manners. Soldiers, both officers and men, are apt to connect pomposness with inefficiency, and an air of secretive importance with an actuality of ignorance. In other staff officers such faults, however undesirable, do not directly affect their powers of usefulness. In an Intelligence officer their effects will hamper him at every turn, and may seriously depreciate his value.

Preparation for
a campaign.

Although some of the officers chosen for the General Staff in any campaign will probably be acquainted with the language and topography of the theatre of war, and

will have a knowledge of the hostile army, it is always desirable that officers detailed for Intelligence work should have an opportunity of acquiring, or refreshing their acquaintance with, such information concerning the enemy and the country as may be available. When the public mind is excited by the probability of hostilities, a certain amount of information can be obtained from the better class of newspapers, from new editions of maps, and from personal discussions with persons possessing special knowledge of the enemy or of the probable theatre of war. Such sources are available to all, and every soldier should utilize them, in order that he may not enter on active service hampered by complete ignorance of the conditions of the campaign. For those officers who are destined to occupy responsible posts, especially for those who are to perform General Staff duties, the store of information in possession of the General Staff at the War Office is also available. This information, which is persistently collected and compiled in peace time, should enable an Intelligence Officer to enter on a campaign with a practical knowledge of the strength and condition of the enemy's available forces, of the nature and capabilities of the country in which fighting is likely to take place, and of the disposition and temper of its inhabitants. The General Staff will be usually selected in anticipation of a campaign, and it is their duty and their interest to devote their best efforts to the study of the language, of the conditions under which the campaign will be fought, and of the problems of which they will have to find the solution. They should start fully equipped for their mission; although a knowledge of these subjects may be painfully acquired in the field, yet any admission of ignorance, in the early stages of a campaign, tells heavily against the prestige of an Intelligence Officer, and delays the establishment of that confidence which is necessary for the success of his work.

The history of previous campaigns in the theatre of war should be studied, and the course of operations followed with a good map. By such means the relative importance of different localities is emphasized, and the topography of the country impressed on the memory.

Previous
campaigns.

Language.

A knowledge of the language of the country is, of course, a great advantage, and although complete mastery of a foreign tongue can only be attained by years of study and practice, yet the smallest acquaintance with the language of the enemy, or of the country in which the operations take place, is useful in war. Intelligence Officers have excellent opportunities of picking up a colloquial knowledge of the language, but a great advantage will always rest with those who have been able to acquire even a smattering before entering on their duties.

The enemy's forces.

The General Staff of a Field Army should endeavour to acquaint themselves, before the outbreak of hostilities, with the strength of the enemy's forces; their probable distribution; the composition of the hostile armies, army corps, divisions, and brigades; the names and peculiarities of high commanders; the distinctions in dress between different regiments and branches of the army; the probable tactics of the enemy as foreshadowed by instruction books and manœuvres, or gathered from his recent campaigns; and perhaps some inkling of his preliminary strategical moves, based either on information or deduction. These details will, as far as possible, be supplied by the General Staff at the War Office, and the sooner an Intelligence Officer has them by heart, the better.

Allies.

Should our forces be destined to form part of an allied army, the military organization of our allies should also be studied.

Organization of Intelligence in the field.

All persons, except staff officers and secret service agents, permanently engaged on Intelligence duties in a campaign, should be formed into an Intelligence Corps. The advantages of such an organization are many; subordinates are more directly under control, and know to whom they are responsible; their accounts, and the care of their horses and equipment, can be more easily dealt with; and there is the probability of the growth of an *esprit-de-corps* which may be invaluable.

Intelligence Corps.

The composition of the Intelligence Corps is likely to vary considerably in different campaigns, according to the nature of the warfare and of the enemy. In most of our small wars against savage or semi-civilized nations, the

Intelligence Corps would consist largely of native guides, interpreters, and scouts, and only a few European superiors would be required. In civilized warfare the case is quite different; interpreters, and possibly guides, would be for the most part educated men, and in many cases it would be necessary to put them on the footing of officers. To fulfil the conditions of modern customs of war, it is also necessary that, in civilized warfare, Intelligence subordinates should be properly commissioned or enlisted soldiers, and should wear uniform, otherwise they may, if captured, be dealt with as unlicensed partisans. The grades of rank which are necessary to carry on the chain of command in ordinary corps are, however, not required for the Intelligence Corps. The most suitable system of organization would seem to be an official enlistment of all employés, and the subsequent grant of honorary rank, commissioned, warrant, or non-commissioned, according to the social and educational status of the men, on such scale as may seem suitable.

The Intelligence Corps should be administered by an officer attached to Headquarters, and taking his instructions from the Director of Military Intelligence on the Headquarters Staff. Rank, to carry command, in the Intelligence Corps, should only be granted sparingly, and in most cases it should be commissioned rank. It is better that there should be no intermediate authority between the officer and the individual subordinate. Command.

The Intelligence Corps should be in itself sufficient to carry out all ordinary Intelligence duties, but it is not desirable that it should include any specialists who could be only occasionally utilized. It is better that these should be obtained, when required, from other corps or departments. Telegraph operators to tap or use the enemy's wires, signallers to accompany special reconnaissances or to intercept the enemy's communications, can always be borrowed, and would be out of place as permanent members of the Intelligence Corps. Occasional technical assistance.

II.

THE ACQUISITION OF INFORMATION IN THE FIELD—RECONNAISSANCE.

Methods of
acquiring
information.

Information is acquired in the field principally by reconnaissance, by examination of inhabitants, prisoners, and deserters, and by secret service. Of these, reconnaissance is the method of most vital importance; the safety of an army is not immediately jeopardized by an inefficient secret service, a sulky population, or a lack of prisoners, but any failing in reconnaissance is almost necessarily fatal.

Reconnaissance
generally.

In a properly organized army, a large part of the reconnaissance is performed automatically, without special instructions. The main object of the advanced cavalry which should cover an army, is the acquisition of information regarding the enemy; their secondary object is the prevention of the enemy's attempts to gain information by reconnaissance. The possession of correct information is the surest guard against surprise, and one of the most important factors of success; the search for information has therefore been placed high on the list of duties of cavalry in war.

Advanced
cavalry.

The reconnaissance carried out by the advanced cavalry is, or should be, unceasing. At every point of the long line, the enemy is seen or he is not seen; either may be a fact of the first importance. A cavalry commander should be, subject to the delays and difficulties of communication, aware at every moment of the day of the visible dispositions of the enemy, or of his assured absence from the zone of possible reconnaissance. This knowledge, acquired from the constant reports of each link in the chain forming the cavalry front line, is one of the few certainties in the way of information on which the commander of an army can rely. Its value may vary much in degree, according to the skill, the vigour, and the moral or material superiority of the cavalry; but, such as it is, positive or negative, it is information on which every General places reliance, and frames his immediate dispositions.

The officers of the General Staff assigned to the Cavalry Generals are responsible for the collection, consideration, and transmission of this information, and will record, classify, and investigate each item; they must deduce from information received the probable trend of events, and must suggest to their Generals the points which will best repay further investigation. They must keep subordinate cavalry commanders informed of any useful intelligence gleaned by any part of the line, and must supplement this with any information from other sources likely to be of use, especially with regard to the topography of the country and the probable strength of the opposition to be expected.

Responsibility
of General
Staff.

The General Staff allotted to a cavalry force should always bear in mind that the value of advanced cavalry depends chiefly on the rapid transmission of accurate intelligence to Army Head-quarters. Skilful deployment, harmonious co-operation, intrepid leading and scouting, and even successful encounters on a large scale; are, for advanced cavalry, but means to an end. The end to be attained is the enlightenment of the General in chief command on the conditions of the problem which he has to solve, and although at the outset it may be necessary for cavalry leaders to confine their attention chiefly to such information as immediately concerns their own endeavours to obtain an ascendancy over the hostile cavalry, yet the main purpose must never be lost sight of.

Transmission
of information.

The reconnaissance performed by the outposts of an army is of a more passive nature and of limited extent. Nevertheless, Intelligence Officers of forces providing outposts must also endeavour to insure the rapid transmission of any information gathered by those on outpost duty.

Outpost
reconnaissance.

In addition to the continuous reconnaissance performed by the cavalry, and apart from "reconnaissances in force," special reconnaissances, undertaken with the view of supplementing or verifying certain items of information, are always necessary.

Special re-
connaissances.

It cannot be expected that the efforts of the advanced cavalry to obtain information will result in uniform success. The difficulties to be encountered, due to such

the circumstances of each case, and no more men should be sent than are absolutely required.

Scouting party.

If a long and dangerous reconnaissance is to be undertaken, it may, in some cases, be advisable to attach a few picked scouts to the observing party to act as flankers, and guard against interception. In other cases the necessity may be imposed on the observer of proceeding absolutely alone, and trusting to his skill in concealment. In fairly open ground, with a well mounted adversary, the former method would probably be chosen. In wooded or mountainous country the solitary observer has the better chance.

Notice of movements to outposts.

A special reconnaissance, or any patrol or scouting party, proceeding beyond the outermost observation or outpost line, should always in passing communicate its probable direction, movements, and time of return.

Reconnaissance by night.

When reconnoitring in the immediate vicinity of the enemy, the safest principle to follow is, when possible, to choose an observation point either from the map or from description, and, travelling by night, to reach the chosen spot at dawn. That such movements are extremely difficult to execute accurately should only recommend them the more to Intelligence Officers. In such operations the superiority of the trained man is enhanced; he should have but little difficulty in avoiding any ordinary night patrols of the enemy. The main advantage of night movements, however, is that the observer, who has reached his farthest point by dawn, has probably anticipated the enemy's day patrols. If his spot be well chosen he need have no anxiety about his retreat; he should be able to note the approach of the enemy's scouts, and, should he desire to continue his investigations, may be able to hold them off.

Practice in night movements.

The art of moving by night with silence and certainty is one that can be learned only by practice. The practice must be independent; one may learn to move silently, although blindly following a guide, but the certainty is the outcome of unaided efforts, the result of mistakes made and noted, the fruit of constant and close observation. Intelligence Officers should make every effort to

perfect themselves and their men in night movements by practising under conditions in which mistakes are not irredeemable. The trouble and possible hardship will be well repaid, even from a selfish point of view, for the scout who is skilled in night work has an assurance of safety which is entirely wanting in him who is dependent on daylight. Confidence in darkness doubles a scout's value.

The means of locomotion best fitted for reconnaissance depend entirely on the local circumstances. By far the greater number of reconnaissances have been, and will still be, performed partly on horseback and partly on foot. The bicycle and the motor car are likely to be used freely in future. An Intelligence Officer must choose his conveyance for each enterprise. In the varied wars of our country some circumstances might impose the use of a reindeer sleigh; the conditions of another case might suggest a dug-out canoe. Similarly with regard to escorts and assistants: at one time an armoured train may be required, at another a peasant boy as guide may be sufficient. The point is that the officer, or scout, on reconnaissance duty has to get to his objective, make his observations, and send back his information. Any means that will help him in these objects he should employ. He will be judged by results, not by methods.

Method of
travelling

III.

THE ACQUISITION OF INFORMATION —
 EXAMINATION OF PERSONS AND
 DOCUMENTS.

Importance of
 examinations.

Although good reconnoissance is indispensable for the security and success of an army, yet it is not seldom that the best information is acquired by other methods. A single prisoner or deserter, a garrulous inhabitant, a scrap of neglected paper, or an intercepted love letter, may any of them afford a clue to the strength, the position, the designs, or the condition of the enemy. A copy of a despatch, carelessly thrown away, was the undoing of the great Confederate effort at Antietam; a parish priest guided the French troops at Jena; a peasant showed the ford at Creçy; in almost every war great events have hung on scraps of information gained, it would seem, by chance. But it is seldom chance, or if it be, it is the kind of chance that favours those who work for it. The Intelligence Officer who is tireless, watchful, and adroit in examining prisoners and deserters, in questioning inhabitants, in poring over uninteresting letters, or deciphering unintelligible scraps of waste paper, will surely find his reward. Not only once or twice, but constantly, will he find information of value. He may find it clear and plain, he may light only on a clue, but the work is never wasted, and should never be neglected.

Manner to be
 adopted.

It is not possible for any Intelligence officer to conduct, personally, all the examinations required. Nevertheless, he should lose no opportunity of doing so. Skill in eliciting information grows rapidly with practice. The questioner naturally imbibes something of the subject's point of view, and learns to use the tone which elicits the readiest response. Sympathy with inhabitants, camaraderie with prisoners, affected suspicion of deserters, are often successful. Gentleness will sometimes melt reserve, harshness may break it down. Ridicule of the enemy may start a patriot on a justifying and enlightening argument; gratitude for small favours may lead to admissions. A bottle of brandy is a powerful weapon against a

physically exhausted man. A method frequently found effective in important cases is to bring an unwilling witness first before an officer who will question him harshly and threaten him, and then hand him over to the care of a sympathetic underling. Sometimes an unfounded accusation adds to the effect of this treatment; even a bogus death sentence has been used with effect.

The questioning of women is a very difficult matter, and requires much diplomacy. The man is always at a disadvantage. It is, however, not difficult to tell when a woman is in possession of important information. The innate desire to make a personal good impression forbids that assumption of stupidity which is one of the most difficult barriers to the penetration of a secret. The attitude of heroism is always suspicious; even more so is that of blandishment. If ordinary methods of questioning fail, the combination already alluded to of harshness and sympathy is often effective. The method is simple enough. One officer is suspicious, suggests espionage or communication with the enemy. The Provost Marshal is called in and is harsh. A guard in the house, a hint of trial or removal may cause the required perturbation. The sympathetic subordinate then appears, intervenes in the lady's favour, and obtains some mitigation of martial severity. A measure of confidence once established, the information is likely enough to come out, willingly or unconsciously.

Questioning
women.

A woman will seldom speak from personal fear, but anxiety for others will often lead to truthful admissions. If very nervous or very confident, she is likely to invent a tale.

In interrogating any woman, whether a countess or a rag-picker, she must be treated with every respect. No emergency can be grave enough to justify the possibility of a woman being made doubtful whether she will receive honorable treatment.

When operating in a country where the inhabitants, or a section of them, are friendly, there should be no difficulty in eliciting all the information in their possession. It is rather the other way; a friendly inhabitant almost invariably tells more than he knows. Gossip, rumours,

Friendly
inhabitants.

surmises, are detailed as information personally acquired, and there are frequently some military criticisms and strategical advice thrown in. Cross-examination is usually necessary, but must be delicately conducted; a sharp manner may dry up the sources of information. It is usually a good policy for the Intelligence Officer to assume denseness and stupidity; his questions are thus less likely to arouse any suspicion of incredulity, and it is seldom advisable to show an apparently friendly man that he is not believed, unless a punishment for giving false information is to follow.

Should a friendly inhabitant give any uncorroborated and unexpected information of urgent importance, his personal character must to some extent be the test of his good faith and accuracy; his neighbours and acquaintances should be examined immediately as to his reputation.

Hostile
inhabitants.

In questioning a hostile inhabitant, more skill and less delicacy are required. The person under examination will always be ill at ease, however confident his manner may be, and this state of mind is favorable for the operations of a skilled cross-examiner, bent on eliciting the truth. An unwilling witness has no refuge save absolute silence; if a man can be made to talk, he should be made to tell. Any endeavour to prevaricate or mislead should be fatal. It is no crime under the customs of war to refuse to give information to an enemy, but it has always been considered a crime to give false information, and a reminder of the penalties for this offence, after a doubtful answer has been extracted, is often effective.

When there is a suspicion that an inhabitant has been wilfully giving false information, he should be informed that he will be detained until the truth is known. At the same time, he should be given a last chance of correcting his statements. In many cases this procedure will alone be sufficient to elicit a confession and a more accurate statement.

It is always a sound thing to frame the first questions on a subject with which the inquirer is already well acquainted. The correctness of the replies will be a guide to the accuracy of other answers.

In conducting any examination for a special purpose, the Intelligence Officer must always be careful to conceal, as far as possible, the real object of his inquiries, and the relative importance he attaches to the replies. Especially is this needful in making topographical inquiries; the objective of many a promising enterprise has leaked out prematurely through injudicious questioning about roads. If information about a particular road is required, information about five or six roads should be asked for; if it is important to know the enemy's force in a certain place, inquiries about that place should be secondary, and every interest should be shown in some other locality. It is generally advisable, even when no particular information is required, to institute urgent inquiries as to certain routes or districts, in order to mislead the enemy.

Concealment of object.

The special points on which it is necessary to elicit information vary in relative importance according to the nature of the campaign and the local circumstances. Intelligence Officers must select their own questions to meet their own requirements and to suit the character of their informants. Questions about roads in the Soudan, or in Holland about water supply, would not, as a rule, be necessary. As to suiting questions to the type of informant, a man should be asked what he is most likely to know. It would seldom be useful to question a draper's assistant about supply of horses, or ask a ferryman to show a mountain pass. It is a waste of time to take a batch of all sorts and conditions of men and ask each the same questions.

Form of questions.

These few principles, which are intended to apply chiefly to the detailed examinations conducted by an Intelligence Officer in his own camp or quarters, without hurry, are also generally applicable to the rapid interrogation of persons casually met by patrols or small reconnaissances. Naturally, in the latter case the questioner has seldom time to spare; on the other hand, the points on which he wishes at the moment to be enlightened are probably not many. To decide between the truth and falsehood of statements made to him he must rely more on judgment than on cross-examination. He must remember that the proximity of the enemy gives confidence to a

Interrogation on reconnaissance.

hostile inhabitant, and beware of being led into a trap by designedly false information.

An officer on patrol or reconnaissance has usually some special object for his investigations. Should no special instructions have been given him, his questions will naturally turn on the enemy in his vicinity, and the topography of the adjacent country. If he comes to the conclusion that he is not being wilfully deceived, he may usually put confidence in statements as to the position and movements of the enemy, and as to the physical features of the immediate neighbourhood. But in most countries no estimate of numbers over a dozen can be accepted from a civilian without careful cross-examination. In a friendly country possibly an old soldier could be found whose estimate might be trusted, but among a hostile population the old soldier is exactly the man who would not tell. Very often, however, the names of the generals or high officers can be ascertained, perhaps some of the numbers of the battalions, brigades, or divisions, the uniforms of the different troops, the size of the camp, or the time taken in passing, and from these some idea of the strength may be deduced.

Precautions.

If an officer has strong suspicion that he is being deceived as to the position of the enemy, he should, if possible, take his informant along with him for a time. The patriotism of a non-combatant will seldom stand the strain of accompanying his dupe into an ambush.

Prisoners.

If a prisoner be captured, he should be at once questioned, while his nerves are still likely to be shaken. His name, rank, and regiment should be taken as if for official purposes, and if he shows no hesitation the questions should rapidly go on to brigade, division, general, number of other troops, place where he spent last night. If a sufficiently official manner be adopted, the prisoner will not improbably consider himself bound to answer these, and even more important questions.

When a large number of prisoners are captured, they should be questioned separately in the same way. By comparing their statements, the strength and composition of the enemy's forces may be estimated.

Prisoners captured on reconnaissance should be searched at once, if possible. Persons professing to be deserters should be disarmed and sent to the rear, their immediate interrogation being confined to matters of urgent importance. The examination of a deserter should be careful and detailed, and this can be carried out more efficiently in camp or quarters. Deserters should always be looked upon with suspicion; the rôle is frequently adopted by spies.

Deserters.

In any campaign, the General Staff ought to endeavour as early as possible, to discover the leading characteristics of the inhabitants of the theatre of war and of the enemy. National distinctions of character are frequently well marked, and different methods are required in dealing with different types. In the South African war, for example, the country Boer was patriotic, brave, and cunning, but was susceptible to flattery, boastful, and frequently venal. Those Europeans whose sympathies were with the enemy were mostly of a low class, and could be bought or intimidated. The Bantu native almost invariably coloured his narrative to suit the supposed taste of his hearer. A different method was required for each type.

Characteristics of inhabitants.

The examination of documents captured or discovered is a laborious but not difficult task. Single documents require, of course, no special system, but in dealing with a large quantity of material it is necessary to make a rough classification. A suitable method is to set a number of assistants, and, if necessary, interpreters, to work with instructions to look rapidly over the papers and select those containing information which appears at first sight to be of immediate importance. These, as selected, should be examined by the officer in charge, who will decide what is to be done. Each paper, as it passes through his hands, should be marked and registered. A note should be made at the same time of any particular branch or department of the army to whom the information is likely to be useful, and if considered necessary, the information should be communicated at once.

Examination of documents.

The urgent papers having been dealt with, each assistant should again go through his bundle, this time discarding everything of no value.

The remainder should then be numbered and registered, the subject and the apparent relative importance of the document being noted. On the register the officer in charge should mark the order in which the papers should be examined, and whether a written translation or a *précis* is required.

In cases where a large proportion of the documents are obviously of no importance, as in the case of a mail captured in a post office, the examination may be conducted more speedily by dividing the assistants; one party rapidly go through the documents, dividing them into "useful" and "useless"; the other party examine those noted as useful, and refer those of special value to the officer in charge.

Censorship.

Military censorship of letters and telegrams should be carried out on some similar principle, but in this case the proportion of documents likely to be useful is much smaller. In exceptional cases, of course, every letter must be examined; letters intended to be smuggled out of a besieged town require strict censorship. If a great operation, in which secrecy is important, be in contemplation, then every letter which would reach its destination before the date when the plan would necessarily be exposed to the enemy must be stopped or carefully censored. In such a case the safest plan is for the commander to stop all communications until the necessity for secrecy is over.

In ordinary times of war a censor has many guides in the appearance of letters. Unless he has special instructions as to political censorship, he has to consider only the military situation. In an over-sea campaign, letters from the army addressed to England can hardly do harm. In fact, the military home or outward mail may, as a rule, be practically disregarded. Local letters addressed to officers or soldiers may be passed with safety. Letters addressed to distant countries are, in most campaigns, harmless. In a friendly country, few letters, except those addressed to or coming from the immediate vicinity of the enemy, are likely to be either dangerous or valuable. It is when operating in the midst of a hostile or semi-hostile population that the censorship becomes important. It is necessary, not only because the enemy's agents may quite



probably use the post as a means of communication, but also because the private letters of the inhabitants may, and usually do, contain valuable information which would never be imparted directly. In an enemy's country a good postal service, efficiently censored, is of great value.

Telegrams must invariably be examined, and no codes permitted unless under exceptional circumstances and proper precautions. When a code is allowed, the sender of the telegram should be made to produce his code book, that the message may be translated.

IV.

THE ACQUISITION OF INFORMATION—
SECRET SERVICE.

Discretion of
officers dealing
with secret
service.

To maintain an efficient secret service in war, continual vigilance and precaution are necessary. Good agents will not serve a careless employer; they know that a chance word, a misdirected letter, a foolish confidence, any small stupidity on the part of the employer may be the agent's death warrant. The agent accepts with his eyes open the other risks of his trade; they are his own business, and must be evaded by the use of his own wits. But he cannot guard against the carelessness of his employer, and therefore a skilled agent will seldom enter, and will never remain in, the service of any person of whose discretion he is not assured. An agent may accept employment from a man of whom he has had no good opportunity of judging, but if the agent be a person who is likely to be useful he will not take long to form an opinion.

Necessary
reticence in
secret service.

An Intelligence Officer who desires to gain information of value by means of secret service should first look to his own qualifications. Discretion is absolutely essential, and this is best insured by absolute blank silence on the subject of secret service, save to those few whose enlightenment is necessary. The general progress, the results, and the cost of secret service must be reported to the superior by whose authority the service is being carried out, and the expense incurred. No further details should be volunteered, but of course details must be given if required. An Intelligence Officer should divulge also to one chosen person, preferably an officer of his own branch, full details of his secret service work, and should keep him informed of its progress, in order that there may be no break in case of any mishap to himself. No other person should have any knowledge of the secret service organization; it should not even be known for certain whether such an organization exists or not.

Publishing
ordinary
information.

The rule of absolute reticence applies only, of course, to secret service, and the information gained by its means.

There is usually a certain amount of information acquired by ordinary methods, which may, with advantage, be circulated. An army is always eager for information, and is likely to take more interest in its work, to be more contented and less critical, if officers and soldiers have some idea of the state of affairs. When information regarding the enemy is entirely withheld from the troops, subject for gossip, usually of a somewhat alarming type, is soon invented. An Intelligence Officer of discretion is in a position to select the items of information which can do no harm, and are likely to be of interest. But any information acquired by secret service should be rigidly withheld. Its source may be guessed, even traced. The enemy may discover that certain information is in our possession, and by that knowledge alone may detect the agent who supplied it. Even if the personality of the agent remain unknown, there is the probability of increased precaution on the part of the enemy and increased difficulty in the work of secret service. It is better in the end that the troops and the press should be firmly convinced of the inefficiency of the secret service. The opinion will spread, and will encourage slackness in the enemy's precautions and temerity, probably carelessness, in the enemy's agents. The Intelligence Officer will find no difficulty in convincing either the troops or the press of his failure. His silence alone will secure this end, and he may bear the ensuing criticism with a cheerful heart and be thankful for its assistance in smoothing his path.

An officer engaged on secret service will find his stiffest problem in the arrangement of communication with his agents. Dangers, difficulties, and obstacles crop up at every turn. There is no system which can be made generally applicable. Either the officer or the agent must have the wit to devise means, the caution to minimise risks, the foresight to anticipate difficulties, and the ingenuity to evade obstacles. The details of every separate enterprise must be worked out according to the conditions of the special case, and arrangements must be made for alternative action in case of altered circumstances. Certainty of speedy communication is of extreme importance; the agent is of no use until he has reported. And yet communication of any kind is seldom easy. It is, however, seldom

Communication
with agents.

impossible, if the problem be attacked with proper ingenuity.

Difficulties.

The difficulties to be overcome in arranging communication are so dependent on the special conditions of each case that they cannot even be generally enumerated. In the ordinary case of an agent who has penetrated the enemy's lines, they are of two kinds—those connected with getting the information away from the hostile lines, and those met with in getting it secretly to its destination in ours. Whether the information be carried personally, or sent by messenger, post, pigeon, or any other means, these two sets of difficulties must always be considered. Difficulties of the first type must be dealt with by the agent; they are the more important, for if they are not overcome the information will be lost. The difficulties of the second type must be met by the Intelligence Officer. If he fail, the information may again be lost, and, in any case, there will be delay, and possible exposure of the agent.

Various systems.

Personal communication is usually best, when possible. The correctness of the information can be more accurately judged in a personal interview, and the special points of value can be brought out. What the man knows can be distinguished from what the man has heard; this is seldom possible when information is transmitted on paper, or verbally through a third party. In some cases there may be more danger, in others more safety, in the method of personal report. It is this consideration which will usually decide the question of its feasibility.

The system of employing a messenger, or go-between, is probably the simplest, and that least likely to lead to exposure. The real difficulty lies in finding a man who can be trusted equally by the officer and the agent.

In many cases, even in war, the ordinary post has been used to transmit information in cipher and code, but there is in this case probability of delay and no certainty of delivery. Pigeons are easily watched if suspicion be aroused, and are almost certain to locate their user. The telegraph may be used with success for a single message (it is seldom safe for more), in a pre-arranged, apparently innocent code, addressed to and retransmitted by a

second agent in a neutral country. Other methods have been used with success, trained dogs, signals, exchanged prisoners, any means that ingenuity could suggest, but with each method the difficulties to be encountered are of the same types, the difficulty of despatch and the difficulty of delivery. They are entirely distinct in character, and should be considered separately.

A grave responsibility rests on Intelligence Officers in that they must guard against the possibility of an untrustworthy agent giving valuable information to the enemy. There will always be untrustworthy agents; there is, therefore, only one method of security—no agent should ever be given or be allowed to acquire any information which would be of use to the enemy. The discussion of movements or operations of our own troops with an agent is a most dangerous proceeding, unless it should be proposed to employ him as guide or in some similar capacity. In the latter case he must be guarded carefully until the operation is completed. A knowledge of the strength or composition of our forces, or of their condition, is quite unnecessary for the agent's work, and every care should be taken to guard such information from him. Rules must be strict. If it should be necessary for an agent to come within our lines, he should be practically a prisoner. Regard for his own safety in concealing his identity is a sufficient excuse for this treatment. He should be permitted to talk to no person except the subordinates of the Intelligence of proved discretion. In some cases, scraps of such information as may be suitably supplied to the enemy may be let fall in the agent's hearing; it is well to anticipate a possible traitor.

Untrustworthy
agents.

An Intelligence Officer should never show distrust of any agent whom he may employ. However suspicious the man's actions or statements may be, it is well to let him believe that he is thoroughly trusted. Every precaution should be taken to prevent treachery, and every effort made to prove guilt, but so long as the man remains in service he should not be warned by any indication of loss of confidence. When an officer is convinced that an agent is not trustworthy, and yet has no proof of treachery, the man should be dismissed, and if possible removed

Concealment
of distrust.

from the country. If treachery can be proved, no mercy should be shown. Death is the only penalty. Any other punishment is insufficient as a deterrent; treachery cannot be put down by mild measures, and an army in which the full penalty is not inflicted will inevitably be infested with spies.

Value of
secret service
information.

The information given by secret agents naturally varies in accuracy, and the gauging of its value is one of the tasks of the Intelligence Officer. Much depends on the personality of the agent. Men whose information has on previous occasions been confirmed obtain a ready credence. The statements of others who may be known as exaggerative or credulous must be accepted with hesitation, unless in some way corroborated by independent information or by deduction. The officer will find it convenient to group all information, but especially that obtained by secret service, under three heads: First, that which he believes himself and proposes to report forthwith. Secondly, that of which he is doubtful, which he proposes to take measures to verify. In this case, if the information is of such extreme importance or urgency that he is bound to make his superior acquainted with it, he should report it as a possibility. The third class comprises the information which may or may not be true, but does not call for any special effort to obtain verification. Such items are simply stored up to await confirmation or denial. They may acquire importance owing to a change in the situation, and can then be brought forward and dealt with.

Types of
agents.

There are many different types of secret service agent, and the only possible differentiation is by the motives which caused them to adopt such a calling. Some are influenced by patriotism or political bias. Some have a natural taste for intrigue, and like the excitement and possible importance of their work. A large number simply gamble with their lives for high stakes. Some of the best have begun as assistant to a personal friend, and having acquired some skill, have become ambitious to excel; others are trained detectives who have been attracted by the pay. It is always desirable to know the motive which originally influenced an agent. The different types require different treatment, and although it is

impossible to guess which will produce the most valuable information, some indications of the trustworthiness of the man may be obtained.

A high moral character is not, unfortunately, one of the necessary qualifications of a successful secret service agent. It is, of course, an inestimable advantage to an Intelligence Officer to deal with a man whom he can trust and respect, but in the actual quality of the services rendered there is nothing to choose between saint and scoundrel. Very often none but unscrupulous agents are to be had, and practically always some men of bad character will have to be taken. An officer has no right to reject the most abandoned ruffian if he is likely to prove a suitable instrument for the work. Such men, however, must be managed with every precaution, and the restrictions imposed on secret service agents when within our lines must, for them, be specially enforced.

Personal character.

When there is any suspicion that an agent is giving false information, either owing to treachery or owing to preference for inventing a tale in safety rather than seeking truth in danger, his information must be carefully checked and the results observed. He should be frequently tried by being asked for information already in our possession, that his accuracy may at once be tested; or, if possible, another man, unknown to him, should be sent on the same errand, and this, indeed, is a useful general measure of precaution whenever agents can be spared.

Precautions

It is occasionally necessary to supply an agent with a certain amount of correct, but unimportant, information regarding our own troops, in order that he may make approaches to the enemy's confidence. Such items should be selected by the Intelligence Officer, who must not forget to invent plausible circumstances under which the information might have come into the man's possession. A document referring to a small unit, such as a field state soiled and torn, or an unimportant march order, may serve as a letter of introduction. Verbal information of a more important type, with which the enemy cannot fail to be already acquainted, may also help to inspire confidence.

Useless information for enemy.

Possibilities of
success.

Officers embarking on secret service must be prepared for a very large proportion of failures in their enterprises. This will always be the case; the inherent difficulties are so great that continual success cannot be expected. Nevertheless, the occasional information derived from this source is, as a rule, so valuable that an Intelligence Officer should never allow the most depressing succession of failures to discourage his efforts. Agents improve with practice, weak spots in the enemy's screen become apparent, channels of communication are found; one day some small piece of the right kind of information will arrive, a repayment in full for the trouble and expense and worry, and an encouragement to further efforts.

Women as
agents.

When women are employed as secret service agents, the probability of success and the difficulty of administration are alike increased. Women are frequently very skilful in eliciting information; they require no disguise; if attractive they are likely to be welcome everywhere, and may be able to seduce from their loyalty those whose assistance or indiscretion may be of use. On the other hand, they are variable, easily offended, seldom sufficiently reticent, and apt to be reckless. Their treatment requires the most watchful discretion. Usually they will work more consistently for a person than for a principle, and a lover in the Intelligence Corps makes a useful intermediary.

V.

THE VALUE OF INCOMPLETE INFORMATION.

In war, information regarding the enemy is never complete. The best that can be hoped for is the acquisition of certain isolated facts about the enemy's strength, position, and movements, and perhaps some general idea of intentions which are, or have been, in the mind of the opposing commander. From these the situation must be deduced by the General Commanding, and he will certainly look to his General Staff to assist him in this doubtful and difficult task.

Amount of information to be expected in war.

The factors which necessarily dominate any speculations as to the military situation and hidden intentions of the enemy are brought prominently before Intelligence Officers by the nature of their work. It is impossible to go on eliciting and comparing scraps of information without habitually endeavouring to penetrate their bearing on, and their proportionate importance in, the general problem. Each isolated item of information is automatically considered as a possible link in a chain of circumstantial evidence which may finally recommend, or even morally prove, a certain theory. It is the duty of Intelligence Officers to keep the problem always before them; to marshal the corroborative or contradictory facts; to search for supplementary information on doubtful points; to clear away the mist caused by rumour or by the enemy's artfulness. They should always be ready to lay before their superiors a clear exposition of the facts which may be accepted as bases for speculation, giving reasons for their belief or incredulity in the sources from which information has been derived. And they should be prepared to give, if required, a personal opinion on the enemy's situation, either political, strategic, or tactical, and its bearing on the campaign.

Theories based on available information.

When considered from this point of view, there is the possibility that much information which at first sight may appear irrelevant or unimportant may, when considered in relation to other facts, acquire great value. The separate

Preservation of apparently unimportant information.

reports become indications of possible intention. The presence of patrols in certain directions ; the collection of supplies in particular districts ; the stoppage of communication, or the excitement of the inhabitants in some locality ; the withdrawal or destruction of stores, or the legislation of the enemy's Government ; any of these may supply the desired clue, may show the motive or necessity in the light of which all other information fits in naturally, the separate items indicating the separate operations of a combined and intelligible scheme. For this reason, all information which is believed to be true should be recorded for possible use.

Interpretation
of indications
by Intelligence
officer.

The Intelligence Officer who has laboured to make himself acquainted with the physical conformation and social conditions of the country in which he is campaigning ; who has studied the strategic situation of the campaign and of previous campaigns in the same, or similar, countries ; who has been able to form an opinion on the political state and military condition of the enemy, finds his reward when he has to interpret the meaning of the slender indications he may be able to observe in the field. It may be said that it is the General's business to know these things, and to draw his own conclusions. So it is, but he has many other things to do, whereas, the Intelligence Officer's whole work bears on the problem of the enemy's plans. He must "devil" for his General, relieve him of all detail, refresh his memory, and try to assist in every way.

Practice of
war games.

The difficulty of fathoming the enemy's intentions from insufficient information can be practically appreciated by observing the course of any War Game. This exercise also affords great facilities for developing habits of sound deduction on military operations.

VI.

CLASSIFICATION AND DISTRIBUTION OF INFORMATION—MAPS AND INTELLIGENCE REPORTS.

Next to the acquisition of information, its distribution, Classification. to those who may be able to utilize it, is the most important duty of the Intelligence branch. Except in urgent cases, however, it is frequently necessary before distribution for the Intelligence Officer to refer to his records, and the keeping of these records entails a certain amount of classification of information received.

The contents of nearly every report will fall naturally Classes. under a few headings: topography, operations, and politics will suffice for most, and miscellaneous may well cover the rest. A report may deal with matters pertaining to all of these, and if reference to any particular items should be necessary later, then unless the subject-matter has been classified, the original reports must be brought out and searched.

All information of any value except that dealing with Register and record. the most ephemeral events should of course be registered, and a register, with index, will in many cases serve as a sufficient classification of items of information. There are always some subjects, however, which are better and more conveniently dealt with if special extracts from all reports which deal with them are made and collected. Such subjects would be, for example, the strength of the enemy's forces; the local supplies available at certain places; the records of suspicious characters, or of prominent inhabitants. All information regarding topography should be separately recorded, preferably by making the necessary alterations on maps or route books. The position and movements of that force of the enemy to which the army is immediately opposed is, of course, the first objective of Intelligence, and will not usually require separate record, but anything relating to the movements of other hostile forces should be extracted and chronologically recorded.

Advantage of grouping subjects.

This method of grouping the items of information relating to different subjects is in no way laborious, and is certain to conduce to accuracy and to save time when future reference is required. The isolation of the separate subjects which have to be considered assists the Intelligence Officer to refresh his memory on previous details, and to concentrate his mind on fresh information relating to the particular subject in hand, free from the distraction caused by the perusal of irrelevant matter.

Selection of subjects.

An officer must use his own discretion in selecting the subjects which he will record separately. It is, as a rule, advisable to record in this way only matters of importance which change either not at all or very slowly. For the rapidly changing details of the enemy's positions and movements, and for local variations of strength, the Intelligence report is a sufficiently clear record.

Distribution.

The proper distribution of information is almost as important to an army as its acquisition, but it is no way so difficult. With care and method, accurate distribution may be reduced to a certainty. Nevertheless, it will always happen that unless special measures are taken and definite arrangements are made, a very large proportion of available information will disappear or be delayed in transit. If there is no Intelligence Officer with a force, the loss of information is incredible; it is a long journey from the scout to the Commander-in-Chief, and every piece of news requires help on its way. The fresh start is given by the Intelligence Officer; the acquisition of information ends in him, the distribution begins from him.

Recipients.

The information distributed by an Intelligence Officer divides itself naturally into two main channels. The more important is that which goes to executive officers, and may influence their immediate action; the less important is intended for other Intelligence Officers, and may influence their deliberate judgment. It is understood that all important information is first communicated to the immediate Commander of the recipient.

Examples.

To state a case:—A cavalry division of two brigades is acting as screen. The General Staff receive information that a hostile cavalry brigade and infantry brigade

are five miles on the right flank. This information should be sent at once to their own (the Divisional) General, and to the General Commanding the Cavalry Brigade on the right, and to the G.O.C. in Chief. It should be forwarded on the first convenient opportunity to the G.O.C. or the General Staff Officer of the Cavalry Brigade on the left.

Or :—A prisoner is brought in, from whose uniform, or statements, it is suspected that reinforcements have reached the enemy. This information, marked "unverified," would be sent to the G.O.C. in Chief at once, and, as opportunity offered, to certain Intelligence Officers, that they might endeavour to verify it.

Information intended for the immediate use of executive officers should be sent through the official channel, from General to General. It is the duty of an Intelligence Officer to obtain his General's sanction for the despatch by this channel of such information as he considers necessary. In addition to this, Intelligence Officers have the privilege of corresponding direct with one another, and by this route, from Intelligence to Intelligence, all supplementary information should be sent.

Channels of
distribution.

An Intelligence Officer should, for the distribution of information, make use of all the ordinary means of communication—telegraphs, signallers, orderlies—available for the General Staff. He should also, when possible, keep in reserve one or two men of the Intelligence Corps for employment in emergency as despatch riders.

Means of
communication.

Information which may be of use to other branches of the staff, or departments of the army, should be communicated directly to the officers concerned. Reconnaissance reports usually contain information which may be of great use to technical experts, and it is the duty of the General Staff to extract and forward such items. For example :—If in a road report it were mentioned that a certain district was extensively fenced with wire, this fact should be notified to the Engineers. The existence of supplies in any form is important information for the Supply branch; abundance or deficiency of wagons or draught animals is equally important for the Transport.

Technical
information.

The regular transmission of such information does not relieve the Intelligence Officer of the responsibility of recording it on his own account, but it enables the officers concerned to frame their plans, at any time, on the best available information affecting their special duties. An Intelligence Officer's care in such matters is never wasted; any consideration shown to other branches is nearly always well received and well repaid.

Discretion in distributing information.

In communicating information affecting the military situation, a General Staff Officer must always remember that his first responsibility is to the General on whose staff he is serving, and that, except in cases of extreme urgency, the sanction or general approval of that officer should be obtained before important news is divulged. In many cases a General will have sufficient confidence in his Intelligence Officer to trust to his discretion; if so, the subordinate must be doubly careful that nothing is made public which might in any way interfere with the General's plans or wishes.

Maps.

Topographical information is in the first place distributed by means of the issue of such maps as are available. Fair maps for a campaign in a civilized country will probably be issued in sufficient quantity before the outbreak of hostilities, by the General Staff at the War Office, and this issue will be made through the General Staff of the field army. If operations are to take place in a savage or semi-civilized country, it may be taken for granted that the maps at first provided will not be of a satisfactory nature. In all campaigns, a considerable part of the duty of provision of maps and the chief responsibility for their revision are bound to fall on the General Staff in the field; it is therefore desirable that they should make arrangements for accepting, as soon as possible, the entire responsibility for the preparation, improvement, and distribution of such maps as are necessary for military purposes. In certain contingencies, the General Staff at the War Office will be able to render valuable assistance, but the Staff in the field, if properly equipped, should be capable of adequately performing these duties.

Responsibility with regard to maps falls mainly on the Director of Military Intelligence. Attached to him, under an officer skilled in survey work, is a topographical section, which should be capable of compiling and reproducing such maps as may be required, and of assisting and checking, by accurate survey, the rough sketches or traverses executed by officers on the march or reconnaissance.

Topography
section.

All topographical information which is acquired throughout the army should be sent through the General Staff to this topographical section. Every Intelligence Officer should see that instructions are issued to all ranks, to bring to notice any errors they may find on existing maps, and when existing maps are unsatisfactory, they should arrange for such rough surveys and sketches as may be possible, with a view to the compilation of a new map. Intelligence Officers should always keep an existing map under revision and should periodically forward a copy to Head-quarters, together with any sketches or reports on which the corrections are based. If an opportunity occurs of executing a combined survey of a piece of unknown country, the topographical section should be asked to supply skilled assistance, in order that at least at base may be measured, and a few prominent points accurately fixed.

Topographical
information.

The strength and composition of the topography section is dependent on the circumstances of the campaign. The standard of excellence of existing maps is the chief consideration. On this all calculations of the nature and extent of necessary compilations and reproductions must be based. The matter is, however, a highly technical one.

Establishment
of topography
section.

The distribution of maps to the troops must be carried out entirely by Intelligence Officers. The D.M.I. at Head-quarters issues to the General Staff of subordinate Commanders such maps as are considered necessary, and informs each officer what number of maps, if any, he should keep in reserve. A convenient plan is to nominate certain Intelligence Officers to form small depôts of maps and to instruct the others to apply to the nearest map depôt should their stock become exhausted.

Distribution
of maps.

System.

One of the General Staff at Head-quarters should be put in general control of map distribution. He must be informed as to the probable movements of the different forces comprising the army, in order that he may be able to furnish each force with the maps which may be required. He should regulate the proportion of maps issued according to the number available, and should estimate the number which from time to time must be ordered or reproduced to keep up the supply. It should be his endeavour to keep the supply ahead of the demand, and to foresee the wants of every unit.

Intelligence reports.

There are various methods by which an Intelligence Officer may report to the General Officer on whose staff he is serving. Urgent or very important information is naturally communicated at once, either verbally or supported by an original document, extract, or *précis*. But it is necessary also to have a system by which all information can be brought to the superior's notice at specified intervals. At least every day a report on paper should be prepared and submitted. Except for operations of great extent and under conditions in which information is voluminous, the best system appears to be that of a daily summary, with such appendices as may be required for a more particular study of any portion. Appendices may consist of original documents, reports, extracts, maps or sketches. The whole report should be compiled with the single view of bringing everything that is necessary before the superior in the manner most convenient for him. Summaries should be concise and pointed—dull treatises will not secure the attention of a busy man—the appendices should be clearly referred to, and should be relevant, the important parts being marked. The summary should, except in so far as it is necessary to preserve continuity, contain nothing that has appeared in a previous summary, and should contain everything of importance or interest that has not.

Reports in map form.

When an army is distributed into a number of detached forces, or is operating under such other conditions as enable the General Staff to collect a very large amount of good information, it is necessary either to cut down the daily report to a bare statement of facts, or to devise some

means of bringing the day's information in more graphic form to the attention of the Commander. For the convenient presentation of the purely military situation, that is, the strength, position, and movements of the enemy, an illustrated map is perhaps the best method. Index or skeleton maps of the country should be provided, and on these the enemy's operations should be graphically shown. Continuity is secured in this way: the position and strength of the enemy are conveniently shown on the first map according to the information received on the first day. The map is then shown to the Commander, but is retained by the Intelligence Officer until next day. The situation according to the second day's intelligence is then marked, in a different colour, on the same map, and, when possible, the conventional signs representing the two situations are joined up by directing lines showing the routes by which the various forces have moved to their new positions. The map now shows strength, position, and movements, so far as they are known. The new positions are then copied on to a second map, and the first map is again put before the Commander, and remains with him until, on the third day, the second map, brought up to date in the same way, replaces the first. By this means a complete record of all available information regarding the enemy's forces is obtained in a form convenient both for the Intelligence Officer and for the Commander.

When such maps are used a daily written report may be dispensed with. The map should be supported by such documents as will enable the General to judge of the accuracy of the information on which it is compiled. Such other documents as are necessary to keep the General informed on other matters of Intelligence, which cannot be shown graphically, should also be presented every day. Separate *précis* or summaries on these subjects (such as the intentions of the enemy or the feeling of the inhabitants) should be prepared at intervals. A continuous summary of the whole should be rendered to the General, and, if possible, distributed to the troops every week.

Supporting
documents.

In addition to the information sent officially to Army Head-quarters through subordinate Generals, the General Staff Officer of any force should send to the D.M.I. on the

Supplementary
information.

Head-quarters Staff such supplementary information as is likely to be useful. It is the duty of the D.M.I. to inform all other General Staff Officers of the system on which such reports should be rendered, how often they should be sent, and whether by telegraph, letters, or verbal report. A system cannot well be laid down beforehand; the circumstances of the campaign must always be considered.

Reports for
War Office.

The duty of preparing reports on Intelligence matters for the War Office falls on the D.M.I. The weekly summary will usually form the basis of such reports, and should be accompanied by such copies, *précis*, or extracts of other reports as may be required. It is sometimes desirable that an explanatory letter, either official or semi-official, should accompany the summary. Appendix III. of the King's Regulations 1901 gives further details as to the preparation of these reports.

VII.

THE GUIDING OF TROOPS.

In every movement of troops in war, whether strategic or tactical, the forces must either be directed or guided to their destination. Within the range of vision troops can be directed; in known country, or when travelling by rail, river, or an unmistakable road, directions may possibly be sufficient. In all other cases a guide should be provided. Direction and guiding.

A guide may be chosen for his acquaintance with the country to be traversed, for his ability to interpret a map, to use a compass, or to read the stars, for his skill in tracking or in observing natural signs, or even for his possession of the simple faculty of assimilating second-hand topographical information. There have been occasions when a guide's sole equipment for his task was an ability to ask his way, and under certain circumstances this may be sufficient. A guide is simply the person responsible for leading troops by the correct route to the assigned destination. The guide.

The responsibility for providing guides rests on the General Staff. The responsibility is not a light one; Commanders of troops are difficult to satisfy in this respect, and the excuse of unskilful guiding is a tempting one to adopt in the case of unsuccessful operations. When the campaign is in a country of which good maps exist, the problem is much simplified; every officer should be able to read a map, and it is to everybody's advantage that the troops should learn independence in the matter of finding their own way. When maps are not available, or are inaccurate, the difficulties are great. Intelligence Officers must then endeavour to evolve from the materials at their disposal some system of guiding suited to the requirements of the troops. Provision of guides.

Guides who are personally acquainted with the country in which operations are taking place should be divided into two classes, permanent and temporary. A permanent guide is one whose general knowledge of the country is such that, Permanent guides.

while qualified to act personally as a guide on occasions, he is also able to give such information as to the general nature of the country, the roads, obstacles, towns, and inhabitants, as will justify his retention as a kind of topographical adviser. Usually such men will, in addition, be able to act as interpreters, and their presence with the army, even in districts with which they may have only a limited acquaintance, is of the greatest value. An Intelligence Officer should be always on the look out for such men to enrol in the Intelligence Corps.

Their disposal. These permanent guides belonging to the Intelligence Corps are at the disposal of the D.M.I. They are attached to the General Staff of the subordinate Generals, according to the requirements of the different forces, for such periods as may seem advisable. The special qualifications of the men and the operations for which the different troops are detailed should govern the distribution of the permanent guides.

Temporary guides.

Temporary guides are those who are engaged, or pressed, to guide troops for a limited time, usually for a single movement. In an unknown country it may frequently be necessary to employ them, but, unless the inhabitants are friendly, the greatest caution must be exercised. When the population is hostile, it is but natural that they should object to assist their enemies, and unless inhabitants can be secretly bribed to act as guides (a negotiation which rather falls under the head of secret service) it becomes necessary to impress an unwilling man either directly or through the local authorities. A man directly impressed is likely to be sullen; there is no guarantee, as a rule, that he is actually acquainted with the country to be traversed, and there is the possibility that he may be plucky enough to lead the troops astray wilfully, and risk the consequences. On the other hand, if the local authorities are constrained to provide a guide, the Intelligence Officer will probably find himself encumbered with the village idiot or any scoundrel who will not be missed.

Reward and punishment.

When a temporary guide is satisfactory he should be liberally paid. When unsatisfactory, he, and possibly

those who supplied him, should be severely punished. By instilling into a hostile population the fear of punishment and the lust of reward, there is some hope of establishing a general relationship which will be satisfactory to the Intelligence branch.

When in a friendly country, the permanent guides are likely to be largely recruited from those who are tried as temporary guides. But in these circumstances there is usually no difficulty at all about guides.

Friendly guides.

When the guiding of troops has to be intrusted to a person who has no actual knowledge of the ground to be traversed, the responsible Intelligence Officer should, when possible, undertake the duty himself. If he is fit for his appointment he ought to be better qualified than most others for the task. Nor is the task usually a very difficult one, if only the directions are clear.

Guiding without local assistance.

The directions, or orders for the movement of troops, are drawn up for the General by his Staff, and one of the reasons why Intelligence Officers form part of the General Staff, rather than a separate department, is that they should be in a position to check the topographical accuracy of the movement orders issued by the Chief of the General Staff, and to insure that these orders give sufficient details of route and destination to enable the persons appointed to guide the troops to carry out the intentions of the General issuing the orders. Errors of movement, due to inaccuracy or insufficient detail in orders, are frequent, and even with the skilled assistance of the best Intelligence Officer are likely to occur occasionally. The most probable case is that in which troops are directed to move on a place which does not exist, or of which there are two or three of the same name. Such orders are actually not uncommon; errors in maps, mispronunciation of foreign words, ignorance of foreign idiom, may any of them cause a mistake of this kind. Usually, of course, there is some indication other than the name by which a guide or Commander can guess the locality that is meant, but if the Intelligence Officer himself is guiding there can be no doubt. He is, or should be, acquainted with the

Responsibility of Intelligence.

General's design, and responsible for any error in direction, and if he is himself carrying out the instructions, no difficulty will arise. If he has delegated the duty to one who is unacquainted with the intentions of the Commander issuing the order, there may be much delay and confusion. If there are several bodies of troops to guide, the Intelligence Officer should reserve the most difficult task for himself.

Guiding in
unknown
country.

The sense of locality, the faculty which enables a man to find his way in unknown country, is generally supposed to be a natural gift; but, however that may be, it is undoubtedly a sense that can be appreciably developed. Certain helpful principles can be taught, but the highest development of the sense is only attained by those who continually, of their own will, endeavour to cultivate it. Practice in surveying or sketching and the use of compass and astronomical instruments are certainly useful; the necessity for finding the way when hunting, driving, or bicycling has a certain effect; even the society of others for whose business or pleasure the sense of locality is necessary may direct attention to some principle, usually of a strictly local significance. If, however, the observation be unconscious, involuntary, the development of the sense is but meagre. It is only by conscious observation and reflection, by continual practice, undertaken from the desire for improvement, that the best results can be obtained. There is no difficulty in practising; practice of this sense becomes entirely a matter of habit, yet never loses its interest.

Practice in
using compass
and stars.

Certain subjects for observation will occur to every one. One of the most important is the reference of the direction of every point to a compass bearing. The use of the compass is only the first stage in this study. A conscious endeavour to refer one's own movements to the cardinal points, checking the results by consulting the compass, will before long give a facility which will render the compass almost unnecessary. The habit of watching the sun and stars, and from their position guessing the points of the compass, and the time, will lead to an almost unconscious orientation of the observer—the map of his observation, or his memory, will at all times be naturally "set."

When the habit is properly acquired, temporary ignorance of true direction becomes a positive discomfort, and the first opportunity of recovering orientation is welcomed.

The faculty of being able to estimate distance with some accuracy should also be developed. This should be practised not only by eye, but by relation of time and pace, and by night as well as by day. Every soldier has unlimited opportunities of attaining accuracy in estimating distance, time, and pace. A sufficient desire to be able to do so is the one factor necessary for success.

Estimating
distance.

Not least in importance is the necessity for always observing what is called "the lie of the country." A memory for landmarks, a gift for observing the general shape of hills and the trend of valleys, an ability to recognise the same country from a different point of view; all these may be developed easily enough if the observer will only keep his interest and attention sufficiently on the alert. If, in addition, the aspirant has had opportunities of studying or making maps, and of copying them from memory, he will be able, without much difficulty, to transfer any visible stretch of country to an imaginary map, and if necessary, to make a fairly accurate copy of his mental picture. And not only that; from the general configuration of the country, he will be able to enlarge his map beyond the range of vision, not with accuracy, but with sound expectation. He will be able to guess in a general way what lies round the corner; he may be able to deduce the direction of some point which he is trying to recognise from description only.

Knowledge of
ground.

This knowledge of ground, of the lie of the country, is with some people almost an instinct, but it is sometimes a dangerous gift, for it can never be absolutely trusted. Nine times out of ten the success may almost appear supernatural; the tenth time the gift fails, and there is no possibility of correction. But if combined with the faculty of naturally referring to an absolute direction, to a cardinal point, there is no danger. If the line chosen is not the correct one, it will at least approach the objective. There will be no losing the way.

Combination
of methods.

Guiding by night.

The guiding of troops by night requires special care and precaution. When not in immediate contact with the enemy, the attention of the Intelligence Officer should be principally directed to the measures necessary to insure the avoidance of delay and the cohesion of the body of troops intrusted to his leading. In an unknown country the same difficulties will present themselves by night as by day, but in a greater degree, but night marches in absolutely unknown country, without a local guide, are not likely to be of frequent occurrence. In the desert, where, if there are no maps, there are at least no obstacles; along a well defined track towards an objective whose compass direction is known; or for a limited tactical movement, night marches over unknown ground may be justifiable, and, of course, if necessity drives, they may have to be undertaken under any circumstances. The guiding by night, however, for which an Intelligence Officer should prepare himself, is of a nature which allows of more certainty of achievement than can be expected in such problematic enterprises.

Out of contact with enemy.

For night marches at a distance from the enemy, the Intelligence Officer should, when possible, himself traverse by day the route to be followed. Otherwise if local guides are available, they should be carefully rehearsed beforehand, with a map, if one exists, to make sure that they have sufficient knowledge of the country to find their way by night. For night marching it is always better to have more than one guide; all those available should be concentrated under the Intelligence Officer. The route to be followed should be marked on the map with luminous paint, and the compass bearings of certain parts of the route should be taken from the map, that they may be checked on the ground.

Posting guides

If there is no particular reason for secrecy, the most convenient method of bringing the troops along is to post men by day at intervals along the route to be followed, instructing them to report as the head of the column reaches them. If it be necessary to make no sign of movement by daylight, the same course can be followed by employing mounted men, cyclists, or picked infantry to precede the column, dropping men as required. The

fast moving advanced party can afford to delay a little at doubtful plaecs to make certain of the road ; the important point is that the main column should not be checked.

Two officers should be instructed to pace, independently, the distance covered, reporting every thousand yards. By marking off these distances on his map, the Intelligence Officer can at any time be certain of his position. If there is no map, he can at least tell whether the pace of the column is such that the required distance can be covered in the available time.

Pacing
distances.

When a night march has to be undertaken within striking distance of the enemy, the method of guiding the troops will depend entirely on the circumstances of the particular case. It will sometimes be possible to employ an advanced party leaving a trail of guiding men along the route, and this system gives more certainty than any other. But in very close contact with the enemy, the necessity for secrecy generally overrides every other consideration, and in such case any detachment is dangerous. The guide must accompany the troops. In tactical operations by night, local guides, or officers and men who know the ground, should be, to some extent, distributed among the troops, in order that Commanders may know where they are in case of sudden emergency. The exact objective of the march should, however, be made known only to those guides selected to lead the column. Tactical or other reasons may lead the Intelligence Officer to diverge from the direct route, and any such divergence may lead to doubt and apprehension of error in the mind of a guide who is following in rear, unless he is kept in ignorance of the exact destination of the column.

In contact
with enemy.

When marching by night, off a road, a party of a dozen active men should be at the head of the column to explore rapidly any obstacles, and to choose the best routes for the troops. These men should carry fixed bayonets to enable them to deal with any stray enemy who might give the alarm.

Precautions.

In so far as the guide is concerned, the best formation for troops marching at night is in column of fours, file, or single file. A broad front adds to the guide's difficulties.

Formation of
troops.

VIII.

FRUSTRATION OF THE ENEMY'S
ENDEAVOURS TO GAIN INFORMATION.

The enemy's
efforts.

It is safe to estimate that the efforts of the enemy to gain information will be at least as energetic as our own, and that he will neglect none of the various methods which are usually followed. If reasonable precautions are taken, the enemy should, other things being equal, find it as difficult to penetrate our secrets as we do to penetrate his. The difficulties we meet with should be studied, in order that we may organize similar, but greater, obstacles against the enemy; we should even go farther, and garnish our obstacles with attractive but deceitful pitfalls in the way of false information and misleading appearances. To make the enemy believe in a tale is quite an effective method of preventing him from finding out the truth.

Prevention of
open attempts.

The duty of obstructing the enemy's overt attempts to acquire information falls primarily on the cavalry screen and on the outposts of the army. Theoretically these lines should be, except by stratagem, impenetrable. As a matter of fact, they never are impenetrable to resolute and skilful men, but their passage may be made so dangerous that not only will successful penetration be rare, but repeated failures will effectively discourage any regular system. The importance of keeping the enemy's observers at a distance is, however, impressed on all soldiers by their ordinary training, and it is not a matter in which the Intelligence Officer need interfere, unless it be to notice some slackness, or dereliction of duty.

Exclusion of
spies.

In the endeavours of the outposts to bar the passage of the enemy's disguised observers, the Intelligence Officer is directly interested. In an inhabited country this is a most difficult matter. Except with a very small force it is only on special occasions, such as the eve of a battle, that the ground within the outposts can be absolutely cleared of inhabitants. Numbers of non-combatants, women and children, will frequently be in the vicinity of the lines, in a position to see something of what is going

on, and any one of these may be a spy of the enemy. The only effective safeguard is the stoppage of communication, and this is not always easy.

When the army is moving, in the vicinity of the enemy, no person unprovided with a specific and official pass, except a soldier on duty, should be allowed to pass in the direction of the enemy through any outpost or scouting line. When the army is halted no person should be allowed to pass either way. Those who are enclosed must stay in; those who are out must stay out. The only exceptions should be those persons who can satisfy the examining guards that their passage is properly authorized. If the examining officer is of opinion that the admission of any unauthorized person is likely to be of advantage to the army (as in the case of a flag of truce, or of a man professing to be a deserter, or to have important information), he should report, and obtain the necessary authority.

Stoppage of communication

In cases where it is considered advisable to encourage the inhabitants to bring produce for the use of the army, it is seldom necessary to admit them within the outpost line. Markets should be established clear of the camp or position, and the supplies purchased either through the medium of the supply branch or by purchasing parties representing the different units. The establishment of a market within the outpost lines is equivalent to sending a field state to the enemy.

Markets.

All Intelligence Officers should endeavour to have these rules strictly observed. The granting of passes through the outpost line and the authorization to admit persons unprovided with credentials is entirely a matter to be dealt with by the General Staff. Intelligence Officers will be held responsible if it should be proved that the enemy's espionage has been successful, and it is to their interest to protest strongly against the extension, to any officer whatsoever, of the right to grant passes, or authorize admittance, without General Staff sanction. The blocking of communication is the first, simple, obvious precaution against espionage, and an Intelligence Officer who cannot get it enforced had better resign at once.

Authority to grant passes.

The detection
of spies.

The actual detection of the enemy's spies when they are within our lines is a matter in which every man in the army takes an interest. It is seldom necessary to encourage efforts in this direction. Suspicions in war times are easily aroused, and the spy has a difficult game to play. Detection is usually the result of betrayal, of accident, or of momentary indiscretion; the most efficient detective is not much more likely to mark down a spy than is the average private soldier, unless he has an opportunity of subjecting every civilian and camp follower to a detailed cross-examination. The best protection against espionage lies in the alertness of all ranks to note any suspicious action or question, and it does no harm to encourage this alertness by the occasional announcement, whether based on fact or not, that a spy is believed to be in the lines. General statements about the success of the enemy's espionage should however be carefully avoided, and if made by others should be denied; they only lead to spy fever, a most pernicious affection of the nerves which sometimes attacks all ranks, and may paralyze an army. The idea that every movement, every intention indeed, is known to the enemy, however improbable and impossible such knowledge may be, sometimes permeates a whole army, reducing it to a condition of hysterical despair, ripe for panic. The desired alertness of the troops in looking out for suspicious persons is too dearly bought at this price. Intelligence Officers, therefore, must use discretion in their endeavours to encourage spy hunting.

Special
watchers.

Although it is mainly to the watchfulness of the army in general that the General Staff should look for the detection of spies, yet it is well to have a few acute and observant men constantly on the look out. The Provost Marshal's police, the men of the Intelligence Corps when not otherwise employed, the officers and non-commissioned officers of the Engineers and Army Service Corps, who frequently employ civilians, all these have special opportunities of watching and judging those who might be employed by the enemy, and they should be specially asked to assist.

Evidence
against spies.

The expression "detection of spies" has been used broadly to convey the meaning which would be more

accurately expressed by the term "arrest of persons suspected to be spies." It is not always that a spy can be actually convicted on the evidence which justified his arrest. It is the business of the Intelligence Officer to extract the truth, to prove or disprove the accused man's statements, to trap him in cross-examination, or to enable him to prove his innocence. With ordinary care, a guilty man is almost certain to be convicted. The most skilful spy can hardly survive the search of his person and baggage and the thorough investigation of his tale. And on conviction, the General Staff must press for the extreme penalty. War is no child's game; men's lives are at stake, and, unless the spy can purchase his life by giving information of sufficient value, there should be no mitigation.

A precaution which should never be neglected is the continual dissemination among the troops of false ideas as to the intentions of the General, and the condition and movements of other parts of the army. These tales must be carefully considered; haphazard fictions, given out merely because they are not true, may do as much harm as good. The endeavour should be to make the troops believe what it is desired the enemy should believe; then the better his secret service, the more misinformation he should get. Secrecy is not quite a sufficient safeguard. If no information as to our own movements or intentions is given, then conjecture will be rife, and it is probable enough that the real plan will be guessed and discussed. It is much better to put a plausible fiction in circulation, and let everybody talk it over as much as they please.

False
information.

It seldom pays to disseminate concocted information officially; it can only be done once with success, and the inevitable exposure leaves unpleasant feelings. Trustworthy soldiers may be employed to chatter; conversations may be arranged with a view to their being overheard; a hundred methods of petty deceit may be used to give a wrong impression. A rumour once started gains importance on its course, and if credible, will soon find many believers.

Methods of
spreading.

Precaution.

Generally it is a sound rule to tell the truth about the movements and intentions of the enemy, and to be consistently deceitful about our own. A false rumour, which it is proposed to start, should have the approval of the General, and all persons in the General's confidence should be warned, lest they should inadvertently expose the inaccuracy of the report.

Agents exposing hostile agents.

Hostile spies are sometimes detected by the efforts of our own secret service. A skilful agent in the enemy's lines may be able to give a description, or to ascertain the name or residence of a hostile spy, or to find out in what capacity he is able to carry out his work. But it must be remembered that the evidence of a secret agent on such a matter is the better of some corroboration; such an accusation would not always justify an immediate arrest, although it would certainly be ground for grave suspicion.