



Class, Culture and Structural Domination
in a Colonial Situation : Changing Community
Leadership on Cheung Chau Island, Hong Kong

Yao Souchou, B.Ec.

Department of Anthropology
The University of Adelaide

12th September, 1983

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Title Page		
Table of Contents		i
Brief Summary		ii
Disclaimer		v
Acknowledgements		vi
Chapter One	The Argument: Class, Cultural Reproduction and the Formation of Hegemony in a Colonial Situation	1
Chapter Two	Hong Kong: Class, Power Structure and the Development of Industrial Capitalism	42
Chapter Three	The New Territories and the Metropolitan Economy	93
Chapter Four	Cheung Chau Island: Class, Ethnicity and Cultural Reproduction	133
Chapter Five	The Wong Wai Tsak Tong: Community Leadership and Traditional Land Tenure Under Colonial Rule	201
Chapter Six	Capitalism and the Post-War Development of Cheung Chau: From the Residents' Association to the Rural Committee (1945-1960)	245
Chapter Seven	Culture, Bureaucracy and the Constitution of Power: The Politics of Land Administration in the New Territories	293
Chapter Eight	The Emergence of 'Patriotic Front' Associations: Peking, Left-wing Ideology and Political Control in Hong Kong	332
Chapter Nine	Conclusion and Future Prospects	385
Character List		423
Bibliography		425

BRIEF SUMMARY

This study is an examination of changing community leadership on Cheung Chau Island from the time of the British takeover until the late 1970's. The relationship between the community leaders and the island population is conceptualized in terms of class and the concomitant structural domination. Of particular importance is the way such domination is reproduced and articulated in the social, economic and ideological spheres of community life. In addition, the analysis gives emphasis to the wider structural changes taking place in the colonial society as a whole. The realignment of power and class relations in Cheung Chau is examined as a response to these changes.

The central argument and the main theoretical issues relating to class and ideological production are treated in Chapter 1. Class is conceptualized as a group of people structurally located in a set of social, economic and ideological relationships *vis-a-vis* other groups. The reproduction of class structure implies the process of class structuration: the way the structure of relationships based on class permeates all aspects of social life and institutions. Class structuration during the past decades is summarized. Chapter 2 outlines the development of the colonial economy and the structure of the ruling power in Hong Kong. Two aspects are given special attention: the development of industrial capitalism in the post-war years; and the normalization of the relationship with China in the 1970's. The overall process is to produce, on the one hand, close collaboration between European and Chinese capitalists and bourgeoisie in the maintenance of the

colonial order; and on the other, the effective political control of the working class with the tacit approval of the People's Republic of China. Chapter 3 and 4 describe the social organization of the New Territories and Cheung Chau against the background of the metropolitan economy. The system of government administration which incorporates the powerful merchant class is examined. On Cheung Chau class domination involves mobilization of ethnicity as well as the temples and festivals. It is through the temples and religious festivals that the cultural ideology relating to the family is reproduced. I begin in Chapter 5 the analysis of the leadership on Cheung Chau by looking at the Wong Wai Tsak Tong. The historical positions of the Tong in relation to both traditional land tenure and the imperial bureaucracy is discussed. Some of the traditional influence especially *vis-a-vis* the administration of land is continued under the colonial administration. This resulted in a significant contradiction in the structure of local leadership as the government began to integrate the emerging merchant class interests in the local administration.

The post-war years saw the culmination of the change in local economy from fishing to the development of a residential town for the provision of immigrant workers and tourists. This process, together with the related theoretical issues form the focus of discussion in Chapter 6. The demise of the Tong influence, and the emergence of the merchant class constituting the Chamber of Commerce and the Rural Committee stems from the dramatic changes following the war. While the Rural Committee enjoys a close relationship with the government, it is also placed under effective

political control by the administration. Chapter 7 looks at the nature of this relationship articulated in the complex issue of land administration. The Rural Committee leaders are actively involved in dealing and speculation in land and real estate. Such practices are made possible by their access to the offices of the government bureaucracy. I argue that the goodwill and obligations created by the government are critical in the constitution of power and political control by the District Office. Chapter 8 examines the emergence of the working-class based left-wing associations in the 1970's as part of the continuous transformation of the structure of class relations. The deradicalization of the left-wing ideology as well as the contradiction in the organizations themselves is vitally related to the development of China after the Cultural Revolution. On Cheung Chau this has produced a movement towards close co-operation between the left-wing leadership and those of the Rural Committee/Chamber of Commerce.

The colonial administrations plays a critical role in the restructuring of local leadership. Contradiction is located in the attempt to apply the broader principles of Indirect Rule. The concluding chapter discusses the formation of the District Advisory Board. The DAB represents part of the continuous attempt to restructure the local leadership in order to accommodate the emerging class interests. The marxist conceptions of fetishism and mystification are re-considered. The inculcation of ideological forms in social perception and consciousness necessarily incorporates the role of culture. It is operation through culture which characterizes the process of ideological production and the function of cultural ideology in the reproduction of social life.

DISCLAIMER

This thesis contains no material which has been accepted for the award of any degree or diploma in any university and, to the best of my knowledge, contains no material previously published or written by another person which has not been properly acknowledged and cited.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

When I arrived on Cheung Chau on a bright winter morning in December 1977, the suitability of the island community as a place for studying local politics seemed immediately apparent. Only an hour's ferry ride from Hong Kong, the market town was bustling with activities as the cargo ferry loaded and unloaded near the busy waterfront; tourists from Hong Kong laden with rucksacks and transistor radios disembarked from the Hong Kong-Cheung Chau ferry; meanwhile a funeral procession began its journey to the western hill. My first impression of Cheung Chau was that of a long established fishing settlement but one whose way of life was being transformed by - and becoming vitally dependent on - the wider economy of Hong Kong. Through the introduction of the District Office, I contacted the chairman of the Rural Committee and rented a small house - one of the several he owned - in the fishing village of Sai Wan. At the time, preparations for the coming Rural Committee election were well underway and there was much talk and gossip in the local teahouses. The connection with my landlord, who had established his second wife and their five children in Sai Wan, gave me some degree of access to the inner life of Cheung Chau leaders. But the disadvantages too were soon to become obvious. When I made my rounds of the town, trying to talk to the shopkeepers, many would say something like 'You are staying with the chairman, he should be able to tell you all you want to know'. The lesson in anthropological fieldwork was soon learned: that a close relationship with an influential person is likely to alienate others. Partly to maintain a more neutral

posture, I moved to a house on Peak Road (the owner, as it turned out, was one of the leaders of the left-wing Commercial and Trading Union) and from there I was able to make contact with informants of the left-wing and right-wing 'persuasions'.

The people in Cheung Chau seemed receptive enough to my presence, not least because I myself am a Chinese. But as a way of explaining myself, I had to engage in my own kind of 'ideological production'. I was a student who had fallen from grace by living in Australia, but who was trying to 're-learn the Chinese ways'. In many ways, I was treated with hostility and suspicion to the end of my fieldwork. Yet such inconveniences were more than compensated by the friendship and openness of many people, especially among the hawkers and the unemployed young people. The material of this thesis, and the inspiration of many of the ideas, I owe to the good humour and kindness of these people. I wish to thank in particular my main informant, Sam Tsak, who now lives in New York and runs a Chinese restaurant. His unfailing loyalty helped to get over many social blunders which I committed in my encounters with the local people.

For any anthropologist, doing fieldwork in the New Territories would be impossible without the generous assistance of the Hong Kong government. The Honourable David Akers-Jones, Secretary for the New Territories, gave time to discuss with me some of my findings. The District Office-Islands also made available to me the unclassified files; and my presence in the office was accepted by the staff with considerable magnanimity. I wish to extend my thanks to the District Office, Mr. Victor Yung, and the staff of

the land office who helped me to sort out some of the intricacies of the administration of land on Cheung Chau.

I owe many debts to others in Hong Kong who offered me friendship and support during my fieldwork. Firstly, the Centre for Asian Studies helped me to settle in by providing an office space and above all, letters of introduction to offices of the Hong Kong government. Dr. Majorie Topley and Miss Barbara Ward discussed with me some of the problems and puzzles I encountered. I would like to mention also many friends in Hong Kong whose kindness and tolerance helped to overcome much of the anxieties of fieldwork. I am especially grateful to Suzan Davies who shared with me the difficulties during the stay in Sai Wan and later in Peak Road. To Maria Jaschok and Merlyn Chesterman I owe them their sympathy and understanding.

Finally, I am grateful to the members of the Department of Anthropology, the University of Adelaide, who helped me to formulate many of the ideas in this study. To Drs. Adrian Peace and Kingsley Garbett I extend my thanks for their generous help and suggestions which guided me away from many theoretical mistakes. To the participants of the Graduate Students' Workshop, I am grateful for their criticism. To Professor Bruce Kapferer, I am indebted for his careful supervision during the latter stage of the writing of this thesis and for suggesting the field site in the first place. It was largely his own interest in colonialism and marxist-structuralist analysis which led me to the final shaping of my own ideas. My thanks also to Tom Earnst and Roy Fitzhenry for their intellectual stimulation during my years both as an

undergraduate and a Ph.D. student.

Note: The exchange rate of Hong Kong to US dollars averaged HK\$5.96 to US\$1 in November 1981 and HK\$4.63 to US\$1 in September 1977.



CHAPTER ONE
THE ARGUMENT: CLASS, CULTURAL REPRODUCTION AND THE
FORMATION OF HEGEMONY IN A COLONIAL SITUATION

Introduction

In the administration of Hong Kong, Cheung Chau island is included as part of the New Territories (hereafter referred to as NT), the outlying hinterland of the British Colony. It is therefore tempting to present the island as a self-enclosed community whose traditional customs and institutions have remained, by and large, unaffected by the dramatic changes of the wider metropolitan society. There is indeed a certain truth in this view. For one thing, as is evident to any casual visitor, religion and traditional worship play an important part in community life; people continue to observe and celebrate many seasonal rituals and festivals. Furthermore, many institutions such as the ethnically-based district associations and neighbourhood associations still maintain, as they did in the past, notable influence on local social life. However, within this 'cultural continuity' what is equally striking is the critical social, economic and political transformation which has taken place during the past decades since the British takeover in 1898. This transformation is an enduring, historically continuous process. For what is characteristic of Cheung Chau community today is not only that the social-economic life has been significantly shaped by events of the past, but also that the island is even now undergoing profound and complex changes.

This raises a key analytical problem, one which has to do with handling the complex issue of 'continuity' and 'change'. Or more precisely, how is culture affected by, and in what manner does it interact with social change. My principal argument in this study is that social and economic transformation is not necessarily accompanied by the destruction of the traditional cultural order. On the contrary, culture - its key values and institutions - provides the indispensable means for the struggle for political and ideological control. If for this reason alone, traditional cultural values and practices are actively reproduced and transformed in the course of daily life.

Overlaying the problem of cultural reproduction in my analysis is a more general point. This is that the pattern of leadership and hegemony has to be considered as involving a set of historically constituted relationships. The nature of the socio-political order which I observed during the ^{twelve} twelve months' fieldwork represents but a point in a continuous social, political and economic transformation. Consequently, in examining the nature of community leadership and the related structure of domination, it is necessary to bring into focus the wider processes emanating from and constitutive of the colonial society as a whole. Thus my main argument can be phrased simply. It is based on the thesis that the socio-economic order of Cheung Chau in each period which I consider ^{was} is constituted by the socio-economic circumstances surrounding the colony at the particular point of time. In addition I emphasize that such historical events as the Second World War, and the establishment of the Communist government in China introduced critical contradictions in the organization of

power and leadership in the community. It is the response to, and the working out of these contradictions by the community which provides the dynamics of the political processes I describe.

In this introductory chapter I present an outline of my argument. My next task is to deal with the issue of ideological production central to my analysis. In particular I hope to highlight what I see as the main problem connected with the analysis of class and class relations, and attempt to reformulate the key concepts for my examination of the political processes on Cheung Chau.

History and Class as Process

The emergence, demise and transformation of political leadership on Cheung Chau since the period of colonial takeover constitutes a history of 'class structuration'. The term, as used by Giddens (1973:110), refers to the processes whereby social, economic and political relations in a society are ordered (structured) in terms of class. As Giddens observes, what is critical in class analysis is not only the forces leading to the formation of class, but also at the level of social integration, the way class is established in relation to other class(es):

It should be evident that structuration is never an all-or-nothing matter. The problem of the existence of distinct 'class boundaries', therefore, is not one which can be settled in abstracto: one of the specific aims of class analysis in relation to empirical societies must necessarily be that of determining how strongly, in any given case, the 'class principle' has become established as a mode structuration (*ibid*).

The analysis of class structuration inevitably raises the difficult question of the definition of class.

The way I define class relies heavily on Poulantzas' approach to class and class power (1973, 1975). Essentially Poulantzas treats class as the structural order of relations in a social formation; that is class is determined by

certain objective places occupied by the social agents in the social division of labour... It may thus be said that a social class is defined by its place in the ensemble of social practices, i.e. by its place in the social division of labour as a whole (1975:14).

By this definition Poulantzas is emphatic that the structure of relations that underlines the concept of class must encompass the comprehensive levels of relations - the political, economic as well as the ideological. Out of this structure is generated the diversity of pattern of stratification - structure of authority, differences of wealth, status and prestige, etc.. Class when used to refer to sets of people simply means the different occupants in their respective positions in this structure, positions which Poulantzas calls 'class places':

Social classes are not empirical groups of individuals, social groups, that are 'composed' by simple addition; the relations of these agents among themselves are thus not interpersonal relations. The class membership of the various agents depends on the class places that they occupy ... (*op.cit.*:17)

It is important to note that Poulantzas' structural determination of class (and the concept of class places) is abstractly defined. His overall concern is to arrive at the intractable patterning of political, economic and ideological relations out of which class and class relations emerge.

However, the problem of how to handle the level of empirical analysis still remains¹. Once we begin to consider concrete situations, it is obvious that over time, both patterning of the structure and the occupants of class places will alter. This field of analysis Poulantzas terms 'conjuncture'. Conjuncture refers to the historical events of manoeuvres and making of alliances as 'social agents' attempt to consolidate their power and interests; in such empirical situations classes have 'positions' rather than 'places' (*op.cit.*: 14-15).

This concept, however, is never centrally incorporated in Poulantzas' formulation. What I suggest is that such a historical consideration is necessary to analyse the 'substantive content' of class structure at any given point of time. Class may be defined structurally, by the real material of class - class experience and consciousness, and the pattern of domination between classes - is constituted by history. This is implicit in Giddens' concept of class structuration referred to earlier. An historical analysis will bring into focus the empirical questions of how social agents have come to occupy their respective class places, and how the structure of class relations has emerged. Thus what is needed

¹ See Connell and Irving (1980:1-24). The authors are critical of Poulantzas's concept of 'structural determination of class' which tends to treat class in historical situations as "the mere shadow of a structural category" (*ibid*:6). They call for greater attention be paid to the empirical processes of class as articulations of structural relations.

is an approach which places 'structure' and 'event' in a dialectical or mutually interacting relationship. On the one hand, the structure of class relations will generate a wide range of relationships on the empirical level by structuring the social-economic life and institutions. On the other hand, historical events - the crucial social and economic transformations - contribute to the final making of structural inequality according to which class structure is made or radically transformed. Indeed, as my analysis will show, it is historical events which provide the impulse in the reproduction and restructuring of class and class relations.

History of Class Structuration on Cheung Chau

This concept of class has enabled me to interpret the history of Cheung Chau as a history of class structuration. More specifically, from the time of the early colonial period to the seventies, Cheung Chau like elsewhere in the NT, has seen the increasing solidification of the social and economic domination of the merchant class. Much of my attention is devoted to looking at the complex circumstances out of which the present structure of inequality has emerged. The rise of the merchant class in the community is examined in relation to the other classes. Thus my central argument also incorporates two subsidiary themes: the demise of the gentry-literati class in the post-colonial period; and the failure of the working class associations that generally emerged in the seventies. Essentially my argument runs as follows.

The main industry of Cheung Chau in the past was fishing. It was from this economic base that surpluses were extracted by the powerful gentry and merchant class. Though they collaborated in many areas in the exploitation of the fishing industry, the gentry and the merchant class were essentially placed in an antagonistic relationship by the nature of land tenure.

Traditionally the right to collect land tax on Cheung Chau was granted by the Ching government to the Wong Wai Tsak Tong, an organization of the Wong lineage in Kwangtung. As members of the powerful gentry-literati class, the Tong maintained a close connection with the Imperial bureaucracy. Briefly then, what is significant about the Imperial grant is that it created a situation on Cheung Chau in which political authority, economic power and property relations were intricately interwoven. Through the control of land tenure - and the associated political and economic relations - the Tong was to maintain a strong hold on the social life on Cheung Chau.

The colonial takeover in 1898 introduced important changes in the system of land tenure. The effect was to seriously undermine the position of the Tong. But more generally, the administrative reform inevitably altered the traditional basis of power and status of the gentry class. At the same time, the British takeover also enabled the merchant leaders to play a greater role in the administration of Cheung Chau. They attempted in various ways to appease the government. The political and economic dislocation of the gentry class paved the way for the

emergence of the merchant class leadership in the following decades.

The forces leading to the displacement of the community leadership by the merchant class culminated in the first years following the end of the Second World War. The early fifties were generally regarded as the beginning of the development of advanced industrial capitalism in Hong Kong. Among the events critical to the development are: the transfer of financial and physical capital from the Mainland following the Communist Revolution; influx of refugees and with them, technical skill and cheap labour; and the favourable capitalistic infrastructure provided by the government. These factors were to transform the economy of Hong Kong from one based on entrepôt[^] trade to one consisting of labour intensive, export-oriented industries.

Coupled with the economic development was the international political climate. The 'wind of change' which brought independence to many colonies of European Imperial powers, and the establishment of a communist regime in China demanded radical changes in the colonial ideology. As a result, the government introduced a series of administrative reform with the avowed aim of giving greater representation to the Chinese population. One of the results was the formation of the Rural Committee in the NT.

Generally speaking, the sponsorship of a new community leadership (the *kai-fong*) signified the beginning of a more sophisticated application of the principles of Indirect Rule. For example, the organization of the ethnic (district) associations was encouraged. And for the first time, government assistance given for the maintenance of temples, and for the organization

of seasonal festivals became a part of the formal policy. This policy has continued to the present day as the rubric of the 'preservation of the traditional way of life' is extended to other legislation regarding housing development, and improvements in social amenities. On the whole, the accent is on the development of the NT without radical disruption of the traditional customs and way of life.

The other aspect of the present administration is the implementation of greater political control of the NT communities. The local *kai fong* is placed under the direct supervision of the District Office. Thus, government keeps a close watch on the election of the Rural Committee and reserves the right to withdraw recognition from any elected representative disapproved of by the administration. In a very real sense, the Rural Committee is bound in a relationship of dependency with the District Office.

From the government's point of view, the sponsorship of the merchant class leadership in the Rural Committee helps to overcome the contradiction in the application of Indirect Rule. Briefly, contradiction arises from, on the one hand, the need to promote the traditional social-cultural order on which the local power structure depends; and on the other, the aim of political control often by radically transforming the order of local leadership. But above all, the government support of the merchant class has to be seen in the context of the merging class interest and official policy *vis-a-vis* the development of Cheung Chau.

Like elsewhere in the NT, the fishing industry on Cheung Chau underwent a dramatic decline after the Second World War. This has been brought about by the serious interruption during the Japanese occupation, and later, the competition from the Japanese and Taiwanese trawlers that operate in the South China Sea. The decline in fishing is concurrent with another development: the 'land boom' and the development of Cheung Chau as a residential town for the accommodation of workers from urban Hong Kong.

The housing development on Cheung Chau is highly significant for several reasons. It signifies, for one thing, the diversification of commercial interest into real estate by investing heavily in land, flats and shop buildings. On the whole, it is through investment in real estate and provision of daily necessities for immigrant workers and tourists that the merchant class is able to perpetuate their economic dominance in the community.

The reordering of property relations and the colonial government patronage are crucial factors that contribute to the powerful position of the merchant class. Equally important, the reproduction of the merchant class domination also involves complex ideological processes. I refer to the control of the temples and the organization of community festivals which, I argue, constitute the key centres for the production and reproduction of cultural ideology in Chinese society. Moreover these centres of religious life are provided with substantial financial support by the government. Ultimately, the control of the temples and the official involvement in the community religious life enhances the prestige and power of the merchant

class, contributing to the total conditions for the reproduction of class domination on Cheung Chau.

The nature of the relationship between the merchant class, the administration and the community is both subtle and complex. It is in the administration of land that the main difficulties are crystallized. I shall dwell on this issue in some detail in Chapter Seven. But the structuration of merchant class domination is also highlighted by the emergence of the left-wing associations in the seventies.

In the aftermath of the Cultural Revolution in the 1960's, China's deradicalization of her Hong Kong policy produces subtle changes in the left-wing associations in the colony. The current normalization of relations with Mainland China tends to legitimize these associations by mitigating much of their subversive and clandestine reputation. Yet, paradoxically perhaps, the tacit collaboration between Peking and Hong Kong also enables the colonial government to continue the various forms of political control without ^{or} due protests from China.

This basic contradiction between improved legitimacy and intensified political control naturally tends to influence the organization of left-wing associations on Cheung Chau. For one thing, it retards the development of a true working class consciousness. Indeed, there is a general failure among the working class - the displaced fishermen and the industrial workers settling in Cheung Chau - to perceive the opposition of interest with the merchant class and the colonial government as well as the nature of the Peking policy regarding the colony. This is

evident in the transformation of the left-wing ideology which essentially forseees the improvement of working class welfare within the context of the established colonial order.

The formation of the left-wing associations constitutes an important part of the process of class structuration of Cheung Chau today. Indeed social relations generally are being ~~ordered~~ ordered ⁱⁿ class terms such that local associations like the ethnic associations and professional organizations are polarized in left-wing and right-wing alignments. In short, the left-wing and right-wing dichotomy - and the related perception of status and power - have become an important means by which people talk about class and class relations. The emergence of the social perception about left-wing and right-wing politics represents the qualitative aspect of class structuration and is related to the wider changes of the colonial society.

Cultural Reproduction and the Formation of Hegemony

My conception of class and class structuration raises the complex question : the relationship between ideology and political power. The issue is the central concern of Althusser (1969, 1971), Poulantzas (*op.cit.*, 1978) and Godelier (1978), to name just a few. The origin of the problematic however can be traced back to Gramsci, especially his conception of hegemony².

Hegemony of a class, for Gramsci, refers to the imposition by a dominant class of its political authority, as well as its moral and cultural values on the subordinated class(es). He argues

² A most succinct discussion by Gramsci is found in his 'The Southern Question', in Gramsci (1957:28-51).

that the ruling class in the maintenance of its power and domination, had always involved the minimum of force; such as the case of the liberal regime of nineteenth century Europe:

The 'normal' exercise of hegemony in the area which has become classical, that of the parliamentary regime, is characterised by the combination of force and consensus which vary in their balance with each other, without force exceeding consensus too much. Thus it tries to achieve that force should appear to be supported by the agreement of the majority, expressed by the so-called organs of public opinion - newspapers and associations ... (Gramsci 1971: 207).

What is characteristic of the conception of hegemony is the emphasis on consensus and even common interest - within the overarching structure of domination - in the relations between classes³. Thus, in Gramsci's view, hegemony involves the organization of "spontaneous" consent which can be won, for example, by the ruling class making concessions that "yet do not touch its essential interests" (*ibid*: 161). Ultimately, this organization of consensus, when combined with other political and state apparatuses, is to foster forms of consciousness which accept the overall conditions of exploitation and subordination.

This central point is to appear throughout his writing. He emphasized, for example, that the achievement and reproduction of hegemony is largely a matter of cultural and ideological control:

³ There is a notable tendency in recent writers to reduce the concept of hegemony to the level of 'ideological domination'. Boggs (1976) for example, sees hegemony as ideological control in terms of the 'permeation of value systems'. It is important to recall that, for Gramsci, hegemony is located in the dialectics of class relations at various levels - economic, political as well as ideological/cultural.

"Every relationship of 'hegemony' is necessarily a pedagogic relationship" (*ibid*: 350). Gramsci persistently tried to grapple with the problems of how ideas are appropriated by individuals, and the relation between ideas and practice. On the whole, he tended to examine ideology not simply as a reflection of economic and political reality. Most importantly, ideology has its own specificity in the level of human consciousness - that is, it is inculcated in the form of "popular knowledges" and as means of dealing with daily reality, what he called "common sense".

Gramsci's formulation in fact presents a critical marxist analysis of culture. His emphasis on the primacy of superstructure, which is taken to be more than the phenomenal form of a simple, essential contradiction - the economic - has significant influence on modern marxism as a whole. The common theme that runs through the writings of the French structuralist-marxists, for example, is that political domination or state repression largely lies outside the exercise of physical coercion, but more critically operates in the areas of individual consciousness, values and worldview. As a way of exploration for my own analysis, let me concentrate on the work of Althusser, especially his seminal essay Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses (1971b).

In this essay on the classic issue about the nature of superstructure and state power Althusser confronts two major problems.

Firstly, he argues against the classic base/superstructure metaphor by insisting that the ^{way} to handle the problems regarding

the nature of superstructure is through the notion of reproduction. By the term he means more the repetition and maintenance of the structure of relations in the production relations. More precisely, he refers to the continuous reproduction of the economic, political and ideological conditions which are necessary for securing the continuity of exploitation and domination generally⁴.

Secondly, he expands the classic theory of the state. The power of the state is not restricted to the functioning of the repressive state apparatus (RSA), but also that of another kind with its own specificity: the ideological state apparatuses (ISAs). The distinction between the RSA and the ISAs is precisely that the latter operates predominantly, and on a massive scale, through ideology. In Althusser's words, echoing Gramsci, "no class can hold State power over a long period without at the same time exercising its hegemony over and in the State Ideological Apparatuses" (1971: 139). Hence, tying in with the previous problem, reproduction of the structure of domination must necessarily be concerned also with the installation and development of the specific ISAs in which ideology is realized (e.g. the church in feudalism, and the schools in modern capitalism).

One important feature of Althusser's problematic is the close linkage of state power with class domination. Indeed, it is through the control of the ISAs that the ideology of the

⁴ Althusser, of course, is well aware that relations of production are primarily reproduced by the structure of production, i.e. 'by the materiality of the processes of production and circulation' (1971: 141). But class struggle is fought both 'within production' and 'outside production' (1976: 65). The role of the RSA and ISAs is related to the processes in the latter sphere.

dominant class becomes the ruling ideology which subsumes and unifies the diversity of institutions and practices in a social formation. The struggle for the control of the ISAs, therefore, is a critical part of class struggle, and a central feature of the process of class structuration. For my own purpose, let me raise two critical issues.

Firstly, there is a tendency in Althusser to collapse all ideologies and institutions under the rubric of State Power and ISAs. The diversity of competing ideologies is resolved rather arbitrarily. In his argument, there is no consequence that some of these are directly coordinated by the State, and others not, since all of them function "beneath the ruling ideology ... of 'the ruling class'" (*ibid*: 139). However, I suggest that it is important to focus on the differences between these ideological forms. Indeed we need to ask such question as how subordinate ideologies and interests operate within the State, how are they articulated in the ruling ideology, and most crucial perhaps, what is the nature of contradiction (and resolution) between the diverse ideologies.

The second issue is relatively more complex. Althusser's definition implies a break from the traditional conceptualization as false consciousness: ideology

is a matter of the lived relation between men and their world. This relation ... is not a simple relation but a relation between relations, a second degree relation. In ideology men do indeed express, not the relation between them and their conditions of existence, but the way they live the relation between them and their conditions of existence: this presupposes both a real relation and an 'imaginary', 'lived' relation. (1969: 233, *emphases original*)

At the centre of the definition are two notions. On the one hand, ideology is expressed through and constituted by social practices. As 'lived relations' ideology involves social agents in concrete behaviour, in the ordering of social relations. On the other hand, following from the above, the representations of ideology (language, symbols, emotions, etc.) are as true as they are false. To put it another way, ideology dictates the way men lived their relation to their real conditions of existence, and this relation is necessarily an imaginary one. In this terrain of second-degree relations, to put it crudely perhaps, what is distorted is not so much the objective conditions of existence but rather people's relation - as experience and perception - to them.

The location of ideology (as lived relations) in the realm of human practice is a useful one as my analysis will illustrate. But a problem remains in the conception of 'ideological representation', that is, the nature of relationship between ideology and the objective social conditions.

It is important to recall that Althusser's formulation is essentially aimed at establishing the 'specificity' or 'relative autonomy' of ideology and superstructure as a whole. However it

is also evident that his concept of 'representation' ultimately ties ideology to the functional causality outside itself, i.e. in the politico-economic arena (Hirst 1976). Therefore, inspite of his attempt to break from economism, Althusser's conception nevertheless implies that the imaginary means of ideological representations (language, symbols, rituals etc.) are derived, and receive significations from that which is represented (objective reality). Or in reverse, "the 'represented' (object) exists as the source or measure of its (ideological) representations" (Hirst *op. cit.*: 408).

The issue of the specificity of ideology is paramount because it is directly related to the problem of ideology and practice. More seriously, it raises the questions of how is practice or experience constituted by ideology, and in a dialectical sense, how is ideology itself reproduced through social practice? Answers to these questions, however, cannot be totally located in the terrain of socio-political functions.

Contradictions, Transformation and the Constitution of Ideology

I have so far directed by criticism to two key issues in Althusser's formulation of ideology and political power: the notion of a single ruling ideology, and the problem of specificity or relative autonomy of ideology and superstructure in general. These two problems, I argue, are to a large extent related and can be resolved by introducing the concepts of contradiction and transformation.

The diversity of ideologies is central in Poulantzas' conception of capitalist formation:

The dominant ideology contains features from ideologies other than that of the dominant class, incorporated as 'elements' in its own structure; but we also find in capitalist formation true ideological sub-ensembles which function with a relative autonomy *vis-a-vis* the dominant ideology with a formation: e.g., feudal and petty-bourgeois sub-ensembles ... Furthermore these ideological sub-ensembles themselves contain elements stemming from ideologies other than those which dominate them, or other than the dominant ideology of a formation. (1975: 210; emphasis original).

In contrast with Althusser, Poulantzas presents a dynamic picture in which the production of ideology becomes a creative affair, incorporating elements from other ideologies and even from culture and history. In my analysis, for example, I demonstrate that the colonial ideology as practised in Hong Kong in fact operates through a mixture of ideas drawn from Confucianism, and the concept of European cultural superiority. Moreover, the commonality in this sense between the ruling ideology and the traditional Chinese cultural ideology is actively emphasized and demonstrated by the colonial government whenever the occasion arises: e.g. in government reports, during speech making by the District Officer in public ceremonies.

This *bricolage* in the production of ideology, I argue, is more than a matter of creative necessity. For the ruling class, the incorporation of elements from other ideologies, and the demonstration of the common elements between the ruling ideology and the ideological sub-ensembles, creates most crucially the 'mystification of consensus'. That is, resurrecting Gramsci here,

the ruling class is able to argue for the common interests - in culture, and in social and economic relations - between itself and the subordinated class(es) by appealing to "the ideal realities" which they share (ideas, taxonomies, language, cultural ideals, etc.) (Godelier 1978). Often it is this 'common ground' in the ideologies and ideological practices of the various classes which enables the ruling class to mask the structural inequality and the essentially antagonistic nature of the class relations. I shall return to this later when I discuss the problem of legitimacy.

The reverse of the common elements in ideology and ideological sub-ensembles is the possible contradiction(s)⁵ between them. Take for example, the colonial ideology that accompanies the practice of Indirect Rule. The aim of achieving efficient administration by integrating the key indigenous institutions is often mystified in terms of the official interest in 'the preservation of the traditional way of life'. Yet contradiction arises when local leadership, whose prestige and influence is significantly nurtured by the colonial government, develops interests of its own sometimes in opposition to those of the government. In other words, contradiction at the level of ideological principles always tends to articulate in the process of political struggle. In similar terms, Giddens has written: (ideological) contradiction "always entails an implicit or

⁵ A most sophisticated and seminal treatment of the question is of course, Mao Tse-tung's *On Contradiction* (1964).

acknowledged distribution of interests on the level of social integration" (1976: 125).

But the potential for contradiction is the more serious when we recall the tendency for, indeed, any ideology to draw elements from other (sometimes opposing) ideologies. The resolution of the internal contradiction is hence crucial. This is necessary because contradictions are expressive of conflicts of interest, and are ultimately grounded at the level of political relations. But more than that, as far as the ruling class is concerned, there is the need to present the ideology to the dominated as an internally consistent, logically coherent conceptual system. This requires some explanation.

Strictly speaking, it is not true that ideology presents a system of concepts that is paradigmatic and internally coherent, as Kapferer (1980) and Poulantzas (1968) have suggested. These qualities which often characterize ideology are not so much due to its inherent property but rather because of the way it is socially presented by the political interest concerned. This can be phrased another way. The fact that ideology often appears to the people and is accepted by them as logically consistent is the result of mystification: the masking of its internal contradiction and the political conflict such contradiction implies. This can be illustrated with an example from Chinese Society.

The cultural ideology⁶ which has been reproduced throughout Chinese history is that of filial piety. Essentially it constitutes a system of values and practices which aim at the maintaining of harmonious relationships within the family. In particular, the ideology of 'filial piety' rationalizes the differences of wealth and power between father and son(s) by emphasizing the moral basis of parental authority on such ground as 'for the good of the family', and 'for the continuity of the name', for example.

Thus, the most common cultural means of masking the differences in the positions of the father and the son(s) is the mystification of consensus. It is significant to note that in discussions with local informants, the foundation of patri-filial relationship is always argued in terms of an equal exchange. That is, as the argument goes, filial piety expressed through, for example, absolute compliance to parental authority and support of parents at the old age, represents the correct payment to the father for the pain of parenthood. When I pointed out the actual power of the father in the supposedly harmonious relationship, one

⁶ For a definition of culture it is sufficient to follow Kapferer: 'I understand culture to be that set of concepts, ideas, beliefs, value-representations, etc. in accordance with which human beings interpret their action, assign it 'meaning' in the world' (1980:5)

In contrast with Kapferer I tend not to make a distinction between ideology and cultural ideology. Since I argue that ideology is constituted by culture, both its production and mystificatory effects are by their very nature 'cultural'. This concurs with Barthes' notion of the 'political uses' of culture in *Mythologies* (1972a); see especially his essay *Myth Today* (1972b).

informant replied: 'It is really a kind of exchange of rights and obligations; no one is better off than the other'. But in real life, as I observed in Cheung Chau, the conflict between father and son often occurs, sometimes in a remarkably violent manner. In terms of the ideological principles, the conflict rises from the profound contradiction in the key structures of filial piety: social and economic paternalism extended by the father, on one hand, and political compliance of the son on the other. In other words, contradiction is revealed at the level where resources are provided for the son to assist his social and economic independence (by forming his own family), yet there is the continuing attempt to secure parental control within the bounds of the extended family.

To examine the resolution of such contradiction let me introduce the concept of transformation. By transformation I refer to the change of the ideological form in a specific way. More precisely, it is the transfiguration of the structural order of the ideological model by retaining some of its former elements, with the result that the original emphasis is either enhanced or radically altered. In short, transformation suggests both the ideas of 'change' and the reproduction of some of the original structures in an ideology.

Transformation in the resolution of structural contradiction in an ideology can proceed in at least two ways. To give an example, let me summarise from the most commonly presented argument by informants about filial piety.

Firstly, transformation as engaged by the father involves the 'over-emphasis' of the moral priority of the son to place

himself in submission to the father. The process in fact strategically presents parental authority as the dominant - and perhaps the sole - principle in the cultural ideology of filial piety. Depending on the father's effective power within the family, the transformation is often a significant way of achieving the internal consistency of the ideology. Correspondingly, the principle of social and economic paternalism is reduced (under-emphasized) to a subsidiary level such that parental duty is ideologized as benevolence which is dispensed only to the deserving son.

In the second form of transformation the father will place centrally at the ideological model the moral and ethical idea of *jen* or 'cosmic harmony'. The concept - as I shall explain later - forms the metaphysical basis of Confucian ideals of orderly relationships in society and, in this case, rationalizes both the importance of familial harmony and the moral necessity of parental authority. In other words, contradiction is resolved by elevating the basis of the ideology to a higher ethical level, by structuring within the dominant moral order underlying Chinese culture.

I single out these processes of transformation because they represent the most notable ways in which ideologies are produced by the different classes on Cheung Chau. It is important to emphasize that both processes essentially appeal to 'cultural consensus'; that is, the highly legitimate structural principles in Chinese culture. The question of legitimacy brings me back to the problem of 'specificity' or 'relative autonomy' of ideology discussed earlier.

Transformation as Ideological Production

Transformation then is quite simple the way ideology is produced as an internally consistent system of values and concepts. It is cultural structures which provide the means of production of ideology in this sense. In Chinese society the structural order through which all fields of social relationships are generated is located in the principles of the patri-filial relationship. In the transformation the internal logic of the father-son relationship is made to resemble the internal forms of other non-kin relationships; thus:

<u>Relationship - Level I</u>	<u>Relationship - Level II</u>
	Nation : Citizen
	Political leader : Supporter
Father : Son	Local government : Community
	Employer : Worker

The connection between the two levels of relationship, I emphasize, is not simply one of direct correspondence or even analogy, for example: 'father to son' is as 'government to community'. Rather the different principles underlying the corresponding fields of relationships - economic, political, etc. - in Level II are made to 'resemble' the internal structure of the 'father-son' relationship. The structural order which gives 'resemblance' to the "systems of differences" (Levi-Strauss 1969: 150) is the principle of filial piety I discussed earlier. What this suggests is that in Chinese society there is a tendency to structure

all non-kin relationships in patri-filial terms⁷. In other words, as in patri-filial relationship, the status and power differences in non-kin relationships are 'rationalized' on similar ground: they are the result of 'harmonious' exchanges of socio-economic paternalism for political compliance between the powerful and the weak.

Structural transformation is, of course, an unconscious process operating cognitively and linguistically according to the cultural paradigm and classification system. However, in the discussion earlier, I also presented transformational processes as conscious social-political acts. These processes, by contrast, take place within 'specific historical conjuncture' (cf. Poulantzas 1978: 14-15) in the constitution and reproduction of ideology. The two aspects of transformation⁸, I argue, are significantly connected.

What is unconscious in the transformational process, as I have suggested, is the taken-for-granted moral authority of the

⁷ More accurately, this applies to non-kin relationships of different status. In the case where relationships emphasize similar social status, e.g. relationship between friends, the tendency is to structure in 'male-sibling' (brothers) terms.

⁸ The unconscious aspect of ideological transformation is related to the fact that the operations of the key structures in a social formation often take place outside the conscious awareness of the people. For Marx, the problems of fetishism and mystification stem from the unconscious process in which the overall relationships between workers and capitalists are involved. I shall elaborate on this in the concluding chapter, especially in relation to the 'ahistoricity' in 'common sense' discussed by Gramsci. The 'unconscious acceptance' of Confucianism in Chinese society is the result of continuous reproduction, thus its inculcation, in Chinese communities in diverse contexts.

ideals and principles constituting the patri-filial relationship. Indeed it is the inculcation of these cultural principles which enables the articulation and structuring of the diverse practices and relationships in Chinese society. At the same time, a conscious aspect of transformation lies in the awareness of the powerful ethical and emotional force underlying Confucian values and principles. As I demonstrate in the context of Cheung Chau, ideological production critically involves the demonstration in public settings of the close resemblance of the central principles of the ideology to those underlying the patri-filial relationship. This thesis can be put in another way. In the reproduction of the conditions of domination, it is necessary for the ruling class to socially demonstrate that the dominant ideology is in fact structurally transformed from the cultural ideology of the patri-filial relationship.

The reason for this is crucially connected with the problem of legitimacy. By operating within, and drawing upon the taken-for-granted moral premise of the patri-filial relationship, the ruling class is able to conceal the exploitative nature of class relations. Above all, legitimacy is achieved because the conflict and contradictions within and between ideologies are masked by reference to the underlying structural order of culture. It is through the appeal to cultural principles that the mystification of consensus and common interests is primarily achieved.

Furthermore, I argue that the emotional and ethical force of the patri-filial relationship is precisely derived from its

feature of specificity or relative autonomy. In Chinese society, mystification of structural inequality is achieved through the transformation of the patri-familial ideology mainly because people do not see the basis of the patri-filial relationship as involving or expressive of differences in wealth and power. In turn this is due to the fact that the Chinese tend to perceive the Confucian ideals ordering all kin and non-kin relations as ahistorical and ethically binding for all. The moral authority of the patri-filial relationship, in a word, is to be accepted as the central ethical ideas because they have been handed down for generations in Chinese history since time immemorial.

The other way of putting it, of course, is that patri-filial relationship and its transformations possess a high degree of 'specificity'. In contrast with Althusser, I suggest that generally the status of ideology is not solely derived from, and subordinated to, the objective social relations. Indeed the 'relative autonomy' of ideology is achieved by constituting as its central elements the cultural structures the basis of which is social perceived to be independent from any existing social and economic inequalities. In other words, transformation in the production of ideology typically involves the process of cultural constitution. Indeed, it is the constitution of the key cultural structures at the centre of ideology which, I argue, accounts for its 'specificity', and consequently, the

legitimizing and mystifying character.

Cultural Ideology and Social Practice

In retrospect there are three principal dimensions in my argument about ideology. First, following Althusser, I emphasize ideology as 'lived relations' and a part of the necessary conditions for the reproduction of social life. Second is the constitution (production) of ideology as political process in the terrain of 'historical conjuncture'. Finally there is the issue of 'specificity' or 'autonomy' of ideology relative to the objective social relations. The overall approach, by bringing into focus ideology as 'lived experience', ultimately embraces a cultural and ideological theory of practice. The central aim of the theory is to analyse the propensity of ideology to motivate action, and to structure relations and practices in such a way that the underlying social and economic inequality is concealed.

To elaborate, we need, first of all, to conceptualize a dialectical relation between culture and practice. That is to say, they are mutually determining; or in Kapferer's words, "Cultural beliefs and ideas are constitutive of practical social relations and are in turn constituted by them" (*op. cit.*: 5). Turning to ideology itself, in its constitution by - and transformation from - culture, the production of ideology notably involves the specific 'uses' of particular structures of signification

in society⁹ (Barthes 1972). Ideology (or more accurately, cultural ideology) motivates action because groups and individuals, in the process of ideological transformation, actively appropriate key cultural symbols and ideals for their political ends.

The 'reciprocal determination' of cultural ideology and practice emphasizes, as is evident in Kapferer's statement, the continuous reproduction of the former in daily practices and relations. The implication is that the structuring property of ideology is related to and perhaps dependent on the continuous reproduction of the major ideological principles in different social situations. Indeed, while allowing for the character of 'specificity', the propensity of ideology to motivate action and emotions must derive from the successful inculcation¹⁰ - through generations and with a variety of means, such as arts, rituals etc. - of the key values and principles in the shaping of consciousness and perceptions. To account for both the 'specificity' and, in this sense, 'historicism' of ideology we require a concept such as Bourdieu's idea of habitus:

⁹ Barthes on the whole retains the concept of ideology as distinct from that of culture. The relationship between ideology and a system of signification is for Barthes seminal (1972).

¹⁰ This is the issue of Confucianization of Chinese society. Chiang for example, writes: 'These moral precepts came from the Confucian classics. Moral ideas were driven into the people by every possible means - temples, theatres, houses, toys, proverbs, schools, history and stories - until they became habits in daily life' (1957 (1947): 9). For the role of arts and literature in the reproduction of Confucianism see especially Ward 1977 and 1979.

The structures constitutive of a particular type of environment ... produces habitus, systems of durable, transposable dispositions, structured structures predisposed to function as structuring structures, that is, as principles of the generation and structuring of practices and representations (1977: 72; emphases original).

Habitus as cognitive and motivating structure is in many aspects similar to Levi-Strauss' 'deep structure'; but the main difference lies in its social constitution. In its function as ideological structure ('habitus as structuring structure') habitus is constituted by the very conditions of inequality in a society ('habitus as structured structure'). Bourdieu's conception, like my discussion of class earlier, posits a dialectic: the dialectic between the structural determination of practices and relations and the social and historical constitution of the 'structuring structure'. As we shall see, this dialectic between structure and empirical relationships will be a central feature in my analysis.

In the following discussion I take habitus to be the set of structural principles (relationships) underlying social relations in Chinese society. Furthermore, because of their structuring property the central structures of the habitus in Chinese culture become the critical means of ideological transformation. It is necessary therefore to construct in the concluding section what I define as the structural model - habitus - of Chinese society.

The Structure of Habitus in Chinese Society

The structural model which tends to order all social relationships in Chinese society consists of two essential features: Confucian social and moral ideals, and a strong patrilineal bias emphasizing the primacy of patri-filial and male sibling relationships. These features constitute in fact the key structures of the Chinese cultural ideology. Following the spirit of Bourdieu, I argue that these structures are socially constituted and inculcated among the Chinese through complex social-political processes. The first question which needs to be examined is the historical influence of Confucianism.

It has been argued that the central tenet of Confucianism is the moral vision of men living in a "stable and harmonious sociopolitical order" (Wright 1960:4). From the late T'ang onwards (*circa* 810 AD), with the development of an increasing centralized despotic monarchy, such moral criteria for individual realization had been interpreted as entailing unquestioned allegiance to the *status quo* and its values and practices (Mote 1960). Consequently, when Confucianism was applied in the course of daily life, compliance to the established ruling power became part of the wider ethical emphasis on the achievement of human welfare through clearly defined social relationships (Li 1968)

Accordingly Confucian concepts underpin five cardinal relationships among men: those between king and subject, father and son, husband and wife, elder and younger brother and among friends (Li *op.cit.*:69). The codified rules which prescribe the proper behaviour within each relational set are called *li*.

At the same time, though agnatic ties are classified as part of universal human relationships, in practice, however, the intimacy and normative obligations that exist in patri-kin relationships have become the moral standard on which all social relationships are to be modelled. Indeed, as we observe in Cheung Chau today, the ideals of patriliney represent the major metaphor in terms of which people frequently describe and order their social relationships.

The metaphysical basis of the Confucian ethics is the idea of *Jen* or 'cosmic harmony' which is ultimately founded on the level of social relations. That is to say, as suggested by the many writers already quoted, harmony in heaven and on earth is primarily achieved - and dependent upon - orderly intercourse between men : it is in the family which most clearly demonstrates the social realization of *Jen*. There is, in a word, a strong sense of pragmatism in Confucianism which renders it a powerful philosophy of social practice. There are, I suggest, important historical reasons for this.

First of all, from the reign of Shi Huang Ti (221BC - 206BC) onwards, after the first unification of China, Confucianism was actively promoted by the Imperial powers.¹¹ Indeed Confucianism became the basis of literati education and officially sponsored bureaucratic examination; successful candidates were rewarded with important posts in the Imperial administration. This, notably, is Weber's major argument in *The Religion of China*

¹¹ For an example of Confucianization by Ching state action in Taiwan, see Hisayuki Miyakawa 1960.

(1951). In particular he pointed out that the Confucian emphasis on harmonious social-political order and patrimonial descent provided, in fact, a critical means of legitimating imperial control of state power as well as the patrilineal inheritance of 'ruling estates'. Confucianism continued almost uninterrupted until the demise of the Ching Dynasty in the early twentieth century as the official ideology of the state.

Furthermore, the official sponsorship of bureaucratic examinations created the powerful gentry-literati class¹² which was made responsible for the administration of the State. Like the Imperial power itself, the gentry had a vested interest in the promotion of Confucianism, making it a philosophy of social practice for literati and non-literati alike.

The situation is ably summarised by one writer:

(The literati/bureaucrats) were simply the most successful of a much larger category of the population, all of whom shared a similiar education. ... The facts that the bureaucrats controlled real power, that the needs of administration required that there could be no district without at least some bureaucrats in it, secured the China-wide prestige of the literati and their ideas. The fact that examinations which they sat, and therefore the education which they underwent - often for more than twenty years of their lives - were almost exclusively concerned with the social ideas of Confucius on which they consciously modelled their own social norms, meant that in all times the literati held to what were essentially the same ideal patterns (Ward 1965: 115).

¹² A large literature has emerged on the subject of Chinese bureaucracy and the literati as a vital influence in the shaping of the social-cultural character of Chinese society. The conclusions of the various writers lend significant support to Weber's observation. See, for example, Kracke 1953, Chang 1955 and 1962, Ho 1962 and Marsh 1961.

Ward goes on to argue:

In other words, it is likely that the conscious model of their own social system held by the Chinese literati did in fact exhibit a very real continuity and uniformity, while at the same time the prestige was such that non-literati ... also aspired to follow it. Furthermore, all the actual sanctions of social order over literati and non-literati alike were in the last resort administered by bureaucrats, themselves literati, whose decisions and actions, inevitably guided by the Confucian norms of their conscious model, necessarily had a wide influence (*ibid*: 115-116).

In these passages Ward identifies several structures most crucially connected with the gentry-literati class: bureaucracy (political power), Confucian scholarship and education, and a model for status aspiration for non-literati. Like Weber, Ward explains the ideological force of Confucianism by emphasizing the vital connections with the political processes of the State. In particular it was the cultural and political domination of the literati which ultimately contributed to the inculcation of Confucian values - with the central emphasis on the ideals of patri-filial relationship - in Chinese society.

Turning to the current situation, the articulation and continuous reproduction of the key structures of the patri-familial model presents a complex issue, especially in relation to Overseas Chinese communities. To illustrate this, two observations in my analysis can be singled out for attention.

Firstly, patrilineal organization or *chia tsui* generally commands significant prestige in local communities in Hong Kong. The social, economic and political influence of lineage organizations in Chinese society has been amply studied by Freedman (1958, 1966

and 1970), among others. Here it is sufficient to point out that agnatic nucleation and the formation of homogeneous lineage-based communities is perfectly consistent with the logic of patriliney. These communities, which still exist in many parts of the NT today, are organized around the corporate ownership of land by members of the same patrilineal descent group. As a rule the political and economic control of the corporate lineage is in the hands of senior agnates. In any case, because of the social and economic influence and the mode of organization based on the common membership of a patrilineal descent group, a patrilineage crystallises, in the minds of Chinese, all the virtues of the patri-familial cultural principles.

Secondly, the colonial administration of the NT notably involves policies which reproduce in many ways the Chinese cultural structures. I have already discussed this in reference to the general principles of Indirect Rule. Indeed, the official emphasis on the 'preservation of the traditional customs and usages' is manifested in many areas of the local administration: for example, the system of land tenure, housing and development policy, and above all, the official sponsorship of temples and community festivals. Perhaps more than urban Hong Kong there is in the NT a subtly defined government cultural policy. One of my major concerns in this study is to examine such a policy in relation to the wider political processes in Cheung Chau.

Patrilineal organization and government administration are but two aspects of the diverse ways, both in interpersonal relationships and public places, in which traditional cultural values are reproduced. In addition I shall take a close look at

the organization of community religious life, particularly the Bun Festival for which Cheung Chau is famous throughout the Colony. Most critically, in relation to my argument about the structuring of class domination, the ritual activities in the community are notable for the involvement of the government, and for their major role in the process of ideological production.

Conclusion

The theoretical discussion in this chapter has been to a large extent dictated by the nature of my analysis. The approach is specifically historical. That is to say, I am concerned with the way power and class relations are constituted by the wider processes of the colonial society as a whole. In particular, I hope to demonstrate how major historical events such as the British takeover of Hong Kong, the Second World War and the current normalization of relations with Peking have important bearings on the social, economic and ideological processes in the community.

Consequently, in my conception of class and class relations I give considerable emphasis to their historical and structural properties. In this I draw heavily from the works of Giddens and Poulantzas. Giddens' notion of class structuration summarizes the complex manner in which class relations permeate social life and institutions, shaping in the process social perceptions about status and prestige. But beyond the articulations in empirical situations, Poulantzas argues, class is constituted

structurally. In other words, analytically we can identify the key structures of social, economic and ideological relations, out of which the inequalities in the relations between classes have emerged. These aspects of class relations locate empirical groups of people in what Poulantzas calls 'class places'. My analysis of the class relations on Cheung Chau hopes to examine the historical conditions which brought about the occupation by the different class groups in their respective 'class places'.

The structuring of class relations invariably brings into focus the question of ideology - its production and reproduction and its relation to social practices. The central issue can be traced back to Gramsci's notion of hegemony, and Althusser's formulation of the concept of Ideological State Apparatuses. In this context, I am particularly concerned with resolving the problem of 'specificity' of ideological superstructure; that is, the way ideology, while operating centrally in the constitution of structural domination, assumes an 'autonomy' relative to the objective social conditions. The nature of 'specificity' is an important issue in the conception of ideology because it is related to the process of mystification. Indeed the masking of the conditions of structural inequality is achieved because ideological structures are inculcated in human consciousness, producing perceptions and world view which accept ideology as legitimate and divorced from the realities of class domination.

The problem of specificity - and the corresponding issue of mystification and legitimation - can be resolved, I argue, by considering the role of culture in the constitution of ideology.

The production of ideology in Chinese society essentially involves the constitution of culture; that is, ideology is produced and reproduced by integrating the key structures of Chinese culture. It is through the process of cultural constitution that the specificity of ideology is achieved.

My conceptions of culture and cultural ideology are derived in order to avoid the structural-functionalist bias. On the one hand, in the Chinese society, there is a common sharing of the ethical and moral ideas of Confucianism regarding the importance of the family and harmonious social relationships. On the other, and essentially in a structuralist spirit, I put forward two qualifications. Firstly, I consider the Confucian patrilineal ideals as constituting a set of structures from which diverse relationships and practices are generated. Moreover, in the structuring of relationships and practices in accordance with the principles of 'patri-familial' cultural model, the process takes place unconsciously in the minds of the Chinese people.

In terms of the process of ideological production, the structures of the 'patri-familial' model represent the rules and resources for the generation of practices and relationships. Yet the acceptance and successful inculcation of the 'patri-familial' values in Chinese society remains to be explained. Here I evoke the argument of Weber, which highlights the political process of Imperial China in the promotion of Confucianism as the dominant state ideology. Consequently, what we need is a concept of ideology which takes account of both its historical constitution and structuring properties. Bourdieu's notion of

habitus, for example, is particularly relevant in the context of my analysis because it is concerned not only with the generation of practices but also the reproduction of the structural model (habitus) in a society.

The virtue of this approach is that it enables the examination of the 'specificity' of ideology while retaining the vital historical perspective. In fact, I tend to argue that while the issue of 'relative autonomy' of ideology is important in order to avoid the trappings of economism, it should still be a subject of historical analysis. Thus, I suggest that the inculcation of Confucian ideals and their propensity to shape social relationships and practices are derived from historical processes. Furthermore, in my analysis of ideological production on Cheung Chau, the strategic 'uses' of structures of 'patri-familial' cultural model represent in fact particular responses to wider changes in the colonial society. Ideological transformation is always, in a very complex sense, related to the historical circumstances in which class relations are located.

I have given considerable attention to the problems of ideology because, as I shall demonstrate, cultural control and ideological transformation have always been an important aspect of the political process on Cheung Chau. It is notable that changes in class relations and power structure are invariably accompanied by a shift in the control of the major temples and the organization of the Bun Festival. The significant involvement of local leadership in community religious life will be critical in my analysis. Indeed, I argue that the nature of community

worship and the organization of temples are vitally related to the overall process of reproduction of class relations and the pattern of domination.

CHAPTER TWO

HONG KONG: CLASS, POWER STRUCTURE AND THE DEVELOPMENT
OF INDUSTRIAL CAPITALISMIntroduction

The British colony of Hong Kong must represent surely one of the most interesting anomalies of the twentieth century. A highly profitable and politically repressive capitalist system, the colony nevertheless exists under the tacit approval of the world's most populous socialist nation. Indeed, throughout the colony's strange and tumultuous history, the development of the colonial economy and the relation with China have always been critical in the shaping of its social, economic and political life. This chapter will focus on these two crucial variables which, I argue, largely explain the class structure and the power of the ruling elite in present day Hong Kong. More generally, it examines the nature of colonial rule in the face of the wider structural and historical changes. The primary purpose of the chapter, however, is to delineate a broader framework in which to discuss the transformation of the New Territories (hereafter referred to as NT) since the Second World War. For it is my main argument that official policy as applied in the NT and the critical social, political and economic changes of communities like Cheung Chau are, in an important sense, significant aspects of the wider development of the colonial society.

Hence, the analysis brings into question the foundation of the industrial capitalism of Hong Kong. Briefly, from the end of the Second World War onwards, the colonial economy has

undergone two crucial stages of development. Firstly, there was, during the late forties, the transfer of Chinese capital (notably from Shanghai and Canton) to the colony because of the Sino-Japanese War and later, the Communist takeover of China. It was these sources of capital as well as the dramatic influx of refugees from the Mainland which provided the basis of the labour intensive industries still to a large extent dominating the economy today. Given the economic importance of the Chinese industrialists, the post-war years generally saw the integration of the Chinese capitalist interests in the structure of colonial rule. Indeed, the racial barrier which had tended to favour the British group was to a significant extent abandoned. Out of this has emerged a relatively homogeneous capitalist class. The overall changes were indicated by the post-war administrative reform which in effect granted the capitalist class, both British and Chinese, greater power and autonomy *vis-a-vis* the colonial administration and London.

The second crucial development of the colonial economy is the current investment and participation in the industrial modernization of China. The upshot is to place Hong Kong - with its technological expertise, and financial and trading facilities - in a crucial position in relation to the policy requirements of Peking. To assure the continuing confidence of the capitalists in Hong Kong, China is moved to closer cooperation with the British in the maintenance of the colonial order. This has serious implication in the structuring of class relations in Hong Kong. More specifically, one of the consequences of the merging of Chinese and British interests is the 'deradicalization'

of the working class associations in Hong Kong. In a word, the left-wing associations are ordered by Peking to tone down their 'revolutionary activities'. The current impotence of the left-wing trade unions, for example, is partly a response to directives from Peking aimed at maintaining industrial peace in the colony.

In the following discussion, I describe the general administrative and economic framework of Hong Kong within the structure of the argument I have outlined. But first, some geographical details.

Physical and Geographical Setting

Hong Kong is situated on the south-east coast of China, ninety miles south of Canton. It comprises three areas acquired from China throughout the late nineteenth century. They are: Hong Kong Island (32 sq. miles) acquired from China in 1841 as a result of the First Opium War (1839-42); the district of Kowloon which together with Stonecutters' Island (total area 3.75 sq. miles) was added to the colony by the First Convention of Peking (1860); and finally the NT, a total area of 365 sq. miles consisting of a mainland area adjoining Kowloon and 235 islands which was leased to the British on a 99 year term under the Second Convention of Peking in 1898¹. Thus, most of the colony is to revert to China in 1997, while Hong Kong Island and Kowloon are theoretically to remain British 'in perpetuity'.

¹ For background to the British cession of Hong Kong and the NT, see Endicott 1958 and 1964.

Hong Kong lies just within tropical South China. The climate is greatly influenced by the south-westerly monsoon which throughout the months of May to October brings severe heat and humidity, and most of the annual rainfall which averages eighty five inches. During the dry season, the north-easterlies blow steadily from October to May, and during the winter months of December, January and February, the northern wind from the land mass of North and Central Asia can bring severely cool conditions.

The average annual temperature is about 72 degrees F. with a mean monthly temperature of 59 degrees F. in February and 82 degrees F. in July. Temperatures of 95 degrees F. may be reached in the summer months of June, July and August and in the winter, temperature seldom falls below 40 degrees F. Humidity is high in the summer months, when it can reach an average of 80 per cent and is lowest in the winter season when it averages 70 per cent.

From July to October Hong Kong is liable to be affected by typhoons which bring torrential rain and strong winds of up to 50 knots. During the typhoon season, damage may occur to property, ships on the high sea and, especially, to rice crops and vegetable nurseries.

The tropical climate allows a growing season of twelve months a year. Traditionally the agricultural cycle in this region of South China consisted of two rice crops, grown from spring to autumn, with an additional winter harvest of sweet potatoes. Next to the growing of rice and vegetables, pig and fish farming were of major importance in the NT.

The scale of agriculture in Hong Kong has always been restricted by the geographical conditions. The landscape is

rocky and mountainous, and hills rise steeply up to nearly 2,000 feet on Hong Kong Island and just over 3,000 feet in the NT. Arable land amounts to 32,754 acres thus occupying only some 12.9 per cent of the total land surface. The arable land lies mainly in the northwest of the Yuen Long Plain and the Fanling-Sheung Shui Basin in the northern NT. For the rest, the land is barren and there are no mineral resources of commercial value. In any case, sharp ridges and granite erosion have limited the amount of land that can be gained by terracing - though in the narrow alluvial valleys near the mainland border small scale farming of rice and vegetable is found.

But the most valuable asset of the colony lies in its harbour and geographical position. Like the adjacent part of the mainland, the coastline of Hong Kong is heavily recessed thus providing excellent shelters for shipping. Landlocked between Hong Kong Island and the southern tip of the Kowloon Peninsula is the magnificent harbour which provides ideal anchorage throughout the year. Its geographical position has favoured the development of Hong Kong as an important trading centre. In the past, ships sailed from here up the Pearl River estuary to the great commercial centre of Canton, only seventy six miles away to the northwest. The fortune of Hong Kong has been crucially connected with its harbour, and shipping still remains one of its blood lines.

Historical Perspective: from Entrepôt to Industrial Capitalism

The occupation of Hong Kong was originally designed to assist the imperial plunder of China. It sought to defend the British

sea routes and in particular, the opium trade - Britain's main economic activity in the area. In 1839 the Chinese authority in Canton took stern measures against the British opium merchants. Refusing to yield to the Chinese demands, the British merchants successfully lobbied the British Parliament for a naval invasion of China which led to the first Opium War of 1840-42. As a result Hong Kong Island - then only a barren island inhabited by a few fishermen and pirates - was ceded to the British as part of the indemnity payments by the Chinese government.

The colony was expanded in 1860 and 1898 in the wake of the European scramble for territorial concessions in China. Consequently Kowloon and the NT were added to form the total area as it stands today. By the 1870's Hong Kong had established itself as a significant port for entrepôt trade, with banking facilities, warehouses and dockyards, and a naval base. In the twentieth century, an important development of colonial economy was the Ottawa Agreements of 1932 which granted Hong Kong imperial preference in Commonwealth markets. However, even by 1939, manufacturing remained limited². In that year when the population reached 1¼ million only 5967 were employed in the spinning and weaving industries while 16,280 were employed in ship-building and repairs (Endacott 1964: 293). The rest of the industries included food processing, knitted wear, rattan furniture, rubber shoes, and others.

² A description of the colonial economy before the war can be found in Szczepanik 1958 and Leeming 1975.

The Japanese occupation from 1941 to 1947⁵ brought the industries to a standstill. After the war, the important entrepôt trade with China, which accounted for 75 per cent of Hong Kong's total exports in 1951, was seriously interrupted by the restrictions introduced by the newly established communist government on the Mainland. In November 1950, China entered the Korean War and both the United States and the United Nations imposed an embargo on the export of strategic goods to China. The decline of the entrepôt trade with China set the beginning of export-oriented manufacturing industry in Hong Kong.

To explain the structure of industries today, we have to consider, first of all, the influx of refugees from China. During the Civil War of 1945-49 some 700,000 people entered the colony. This was followed by three waves of movement in 1951-2, 1957-8 and 1962 (Brown 1971: 2) which, adding to the high rate of natural increase, raised the population from the pre-war level of 1.6 million to 3.7 million by 1966. Such an influx of people naturally created enormous problems in housing, medical services and employment. But at the same time, the refugees also brought with them industrial skills and provided the colony with a cheap and disciplined labour force.

Concurrent with the movements of refugees, the Communist Revolution in China also drove Chinese capital into the colony. Ever since the end of the Second World War, capital in the forms of specie, title to assets held overseas and even machinery itself had been steadily transferred from Shanghai to the relative stability of Hong Kong. It was estimated that almost two-third of the investment in Hong Kong during the period 1948-50

came from such sources (Brown *Op. Cit.*: 7). Equally important, the flight of manufacturers from Shanghai also brought technical and entrepreneurial skill, and international contacts especially with South East Asia and the United States. In any case, it was the Shanghainese capitalists who expanded the textile industry which spearheaded the industrialization of Hong Kong. A wave of Cantonese industrialists followed, but they tended to dominate the lesser industries like metal works, plastics and clothing. Thus, as an indication of the enormous increase in manufacturing, the industrial output between 1950 to 1964 rose at the average rate of 30 per cent a year (Dwyer and Lai 1967: 12).

The powerful injection of Chinese capital naturally demanded the reorganization of the British capitalists and the ruling class within the colony. British capital had always held, and still holds today, a predominant position in banking and commerce. British financial institutions soon entered manufacturing by providing loans to Chinese capitalists. Between 1957 to 1966, advances to industry rose by some \$1,000 million, a major proportion of which was offered by the Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank and the Chartered Bank - the two largest financial houses in the colony (Brown *op. cit.*: 10).

At the same time, the colonial government sought to assist industries by improving the infrastructure, and generally by establishing a favourable condition for capitalist enterprises. I shall return to this later. But the most significant official concern during the fifties was the restructuring of the ruling class itself. The aim was essentially twofold: to acquire the cooperation of the Chinese capitalists and bourgeoisie and to

reestablish colonial rule in the changing circumstances of the post-war years.

During the Japanese occupation of Hong Kong (1941-5), the military government brought many Chinese into the administration - far more than the British had. As a result, the position of the Chinese bourgeoisie was considerably strengthened during the absence of British rule. Equally important was the effect of collective internment of the British ruling group itself. Since Hong Kong's early establishment, there had been continuous conflict between the British business community and the colonial administration (Endacott 1958, 1964). Briefly, this was caused by the essential difference in interests of the two groups: the pursuit of profit without undue government restrictions, on the one hand; and on the other, the carrying out of broad administrative ends as defined by the British government in London. The pre-war conflict was brought to a head-on in the Japanese internment camp where all the commanding positions *vis-a-vis* the Japanese government were filled by the British merchant group. Symbolically, as Lethbridge (1969) has argued, this crucially signalled the beginning of the shift in power within the colonial ruling class. After the British return to power, the colonial government came to be increasingly dominated by the British capitalist interests in Hong Kong - as we shall see later.

The second major aspect of the structuring of the ruling power is the entry of the wealthy Chinese into the colonial bourgeoisie and capitalist class. Notably, after the reoccupation of Hong Kong, the British put forward the Chinese Collaborators (Surrender) Ordinance (1946) which effectively protected many

Chinese bourgeoisie-collaborators from government prosecution. More important were the various administrative reforms after the war which increased the number of Chinese members in the Legislative and Executive Councils (see below) of the Hong Kong government. In the Legislative Council, for example, among the government-appointed Unofficial Members (which usually make up to half of the total council members) the Chinese seats steadily increased from less than 50 per cent between 1945-50 to 62.5 percent in 1960-63, and 77 per cent in 1968-69 (King 1975).

In conclusion, the upshot of the Japanese occupation was the co-option of the Chinese capitalists and bourgeoisie into the colonial power base. Furthermore, the relatively homogeneous capitalist class came to enjoy greater power and autonomy *vis-a-vis* Whitehall and the colonial administration. This is evident in the government and administrative structures of Hong Kong today,

The Government and Administration of Hong Kong

In the constitution of Hong Kong³ the Crown is represented by the Governor who is assisted by the Legislative and Executive Councils over which he presides. The Legislative Council is the law making body. It is also responsible for the control of public expenditure through a Finance Committee which is headed by the

³ The structure of the Hong Kong constitution is summarised by Rear 1971 .

Colonial Secretary. The Governor reserves a casting vote in the Council which includes four ex-officio members - the Chief Secretary, the Attorney General, the Secretary for Home Affairs and the Financial Secretary. The remaining 45 members consist of 21 appointed from the government departments and 24 unofficial members nominated by the Governor from prominent local residents.

Bills initiated in the Legislative Council are submitted to the Executive Council for recommendation and approval. Therefore, the Executive Council is comparable with the Cabinet in Westminster, both of which are "the authoritative final decision-makers for the whole of the government machinery" (Miner 1975:69). The Executive Council has five ex-officio members - the Commander of British Forces, the Chief Secretary, the Attorney General, the Secretary for Home Affairs and the Financial Secretary. In addition one official member is nominated from the Civil Service and eight unofficial members from the business community. The function of the Council members is to advise the Governor in his capacity as Chief Executive.

Thus through the power to appoint and dismiss members the Governor holds control over the two Councils. However the Governor is bound by convention to refrain from interference with the judiciary. "Appointments to the judicial Bench are made by the Governor for the duration of Her Majesty's pleasure, and his right to remove the judges is severely limited" (Rear 1971:390).

Hong Kong has a large public service relative to the size of the colony. There are 36 government departments each responsible for specific duties and also for initiating legislation to be submitted to the Legislative Council. The departments of

the Civil Service are coordinated through the Colonial Secretariat which is directly accountable to the Governor. The main proportion of the Civil Service is recruited locally. But the senior levels are dominated by overseas or 'expatriate' staff⁴.

Lastly, the administration of metropolitan Hong Kong and Kowloon is partly invested in the Urban Council. The Council consists of members from government departments, 10 appointed ordinary members and most notably, equal numbers elected by the public. The franchise for the election, however, is limited to some 200,000 voters because of the stringent qualifications on education and professional status⁵. The Council has no staff of its own but delegates the executive duties to a government department, the Urban Services Department. The Urban Services Department is essentially responsible for maintaining public recreational amenities, the collection of refuse, and enforcing public health and sanitation regulations. Since 1979 the duties of the Department have been extended to the NT.

⁴ Perhaps indicative of the nature of Hong Kong politics today, the Chinese middle class professionals are arguing for a greater proportion of senior civil servants to be recruited locally; see Podmore, 1971.

⁵ Even less are registered as voters. In 1977, 37,174 persons were registered on the electoral roll; and out of these 7,308 persons, representing 19.7 per cent of the registered voters, actually casted votes in the election that year. See *Annual Report of the Commissioner of Registration of Persons* 1977.

Government and the Organization of Capitalist Interests

Thus, from what appears in terms of the legal framework, the Hong Kong government is under the absolute control of Whitehall through the power invested in the Governor. But the reality is somewhat more complicated.

Theoretically the colonial status of Hong Kong means that the United Kingdom has overriding power over foreign affairs and the appointment of the senior heads of the Civil Service: above all, the United Kingdom has the right to veto locally initiated legislation. But in practice, the colonial government enjoys some measure of autonomy, particularly in internal affairs. Firstly, because of the geographical distance and unfamiliarity with local conditions the Colonial Office is reluctant to interfere with the day to day administration of the Colony. This places the Governor in a unique position *vis-a-vis* the United Kingdom and Hong Kong. More specifically, his advice to the Colonial Office is highly respected and seldom overruled. At the same time, he is subject to enormous pressure from local business interests and even cultivates a significant loyalty towards the colony.

But the most significant factor which gives Hong Kong a degree of independence is its financial strength. Since 1958 the colony has been granted 'budget autonomy'. This means that the Hong Kong government now exercises total control over the raising of revenue, without having to report to the Secretary of State. Budget autonomy not only marks the measure of independence from Whitehall but also relates to the substantial financial contribution Hong Kong makes to the United Kingdom government.

For example, since 1971 the United Kingdom has been able to negotiate reimbursements from the colonial government for the cost of maintaining the British garrison in Hong Kong (total cost in 1976-7 estimated at HK\$450 million). In a new agreement concluded in December 1975 Hong Kong promised to pay for 50 per cent of the annual cost of the garrison in 1976, 62½ per cent in 1977-8 and 75 percent thereafter until the termination of the agreement in 1983 (South China Morning Post, 20 December 1975).

But above all, the negotiating power of Hong Kong is bound up with the large sterling balances which it maintains in London. For a long time, from 1941 to 1972, Hong Kong was obliged to keep all her foreign reserves in sterling under the order of the British Treasury. These were mainly invested in British government bonds and in short-term loans. In September 1973, Hong Kong's sterling balances amounted to £736 million, representing 12 per cent of Britain's total foreign liabilities and 27 per cent of the total assets of the Bank of England⁶.

By holding these reserves in the Bank, Britain in effect acquired a long-term loan from Hong Kong. But from the colonial government's point of view, the disadvantage of the system was that by tying all the foreign reserves in sterling, the total value fluctuated according to the value of the pound in relation

⁶ The figures are from The Times (London) 24 September 1973, quoted in Miners 1975: 9. The proportion of Hong Kong balances of the Bank's assets had been higher in the previous years. In March 1969 the proportion was about 35 per cent.

to other hard currencies. In November 1967, for example, Britain announced the devaluation of the pound, and as a result, Hong Kong whose sterling balances stood at £350 million, suffered a loss of some HK\$450 million (H.K. Hansard 1968: 56).

Consequently the whole issue regarding compulsory sterling deposits was to become a bone of contention between Hong Kong and Britain. In November 1974 the colonial government successfully negotiated for the right to diversify its foreign reserves away from the pound as it pleased. Since then, Hong Kong's sterling balances have never had the outstanding importance which they had in previous years. Nevertheless the proportion remains significant. In mid-1976 about US\$300 million or 30 per cent of Hong Kong's total reserves were held in sterling, representing 6 per cent of Britain's external balances at the time (Miners *op. cit.*: 12).

Finally, it should be mentioned that in addition to the sterling balances, Britain accrues substantial revenues from invisible transactions. These include such items as pensions for retired Hong Kong civil servants in Britain, dividends remitted to shareholders in Britain from British companies in Hong Kong, and the earnings from the provision of insurance, shipping and commercial services by firms in London. The amount of these invisible surpluses was estimated to be in the region of £300 million in 1975.

In retrospect, the struggle over the control of Hong Kong's financial affairs is highly significant in terms of the historical development of the colonial order. The whole issue of the compulsory sterling deposits was the culmination of contradictions

brought about by the changes in the post-war years. More precisely, the industrial expansion and the increasing financial strength of the colony necessarily produced serious conflict within the political order, the main policy of which was still determined by the government in London. What is crucial here is the historical continuity of the inherent contradiction within the colonial order; contradiction created by the political control by metropolitan government overseas, on the one hand, and on the other, the increasing economic viability of the colony creating its own demand for some measure of autonomy. Consequently, the granting of greater power to the colony administration is a logical outcome in the resolution of the contradiction. For one thing, it relieves Britain, faced with her many internal social and economic problems, from wider responsibilities in the administration of the colony without impairing the many financial benefits she derives from it.

Thus, we see in post-war Hong Kong a government that is essentially constituted by, and expressive of, the local capitalist interests. There is certain truth in the observation that "Power in Hong Kong resides in the Jockey Club, Jardine and Matheson, the Hongkong and Shanghai Bank, and the Governor: in that order" (Hughes 1978: 17). The fact is that though the Governor as head of the government enjoys absolute power within the constitution, he is nevertheless required to consult closely with the Legislative and Executive Councils. Significantly, the two Councils have over the years incorporated increasing numbers of members nominated outside the government. In the Legislative Council, for example the increase in the size as well as the

unofficial members is indicated by the following table:

Table 1: Membership Composition of the Legislative Council

	<u>Ex officio</u>	<u>Nominated officials</u>	<u>Nominated unofficials</u>	<u>Total</u>
1947	6	3	7	16
1951	6	4	8	18
1964	6	7	13	26
1966	5	8	13	26
1973	5	10	15	30
1976	5	15	22	42
1978	5	21	24	50

(Source: Miner *op. cit.*: 99, 114)

Furthermore, these unofficial members are recruited, as a rule, from the capitalist and professional classes. The professional composition of the 24 members for the 1978 term is given below:

Table 2: Professional Composition of the Unofficials in the Legislative Council

<u>Profession</u>	<u>Numbers</u>
managing director	10
banker	2
lawyer	4
doctor	1
educationalists	3
trade unionists	4
Total :	<u>24</u>

(Source: Hong Kong 1979: 291)

In spite of their consultative role, the unofficial members have to be seen as an important part of the structure of government. In the official parlance,

The task of the unofficial members is not to oppose, but to participate in the formulation of government policy, to improve proposals presented to them and to monitor their effective implementation (Hong Kong Hansard 1975: 6).

The point here is a rather simple one. Through the appointment of unofficial members in the council, the government is able to consult, and closely collaborate with the local capitalist and professional classes. As I have suggested, the pre-war conflict between the administration and the local commercial interests is now significantly resolved. Hence, within the relatively homogeneous ruling elite, there is sharing of a common concern by the government and the local capitalists and bourgeoisie in the maintenance and the reproduction of the colonial socio-economic order: the Councils become the crucial arena in which common interests can be discussed and worked out.

Let me now turn to the second aspect of the structuring of the colonial ruling power - the incorporation of the Chinese in the government and the administration. To facilitate the collaboration between the British and Chinese capitalist interests, the Legislative Council has steadily enlarged its proportion of Chinese members (see Table 3).

Table 3: Number of Nominated Unofficials in the
Legislative Council - by Race

	<u>Chinese</u>	<u>Indian</u>	<u>Portuguese</u>	<u>European</u>
1950	3	-	1	3
1952	4	-	1	3
1954	4	1	1	2
1959	4	-	1	3
1960	4	1	-	3
1966	9	1	-	3
1969	10	-	-	3
1971	11	-	-	2
1973	11	-	1	3
1976	17	-	1	4
1978	19	-	1	4

(Source: Miners 1975: 100,114)

As a rule, the Chinese members are nominated from the wealthy industrialists and professionals⁷ who have already occupied prominent positions in the influential organizations such as the Chinese Manufacturing Association, the Tung Wah Hospital Group, etc.. Generally in discussions and debates within the Council they give strong support to the Government and its

⁷ Rear writes: 'The nature of the composition of the councils provokes a number of comments. The first is that since the councillors are unpaid, wealth has in practice become the first criterion of selection. Secondly, they comprise a fairly tight-knit group. ... Appointments of Chinese to the principal councils tend to be made from a fairly small number of large families. Intermarriage among them is not uncommon'. (1971a: 72-73).

policies. For example, because of their concern for 'law and order' within the colony the Chinese members have moved for the reintroduction of capital punishment, and even preventive detention for habitual criminals, a method that had been tried but later abandoned in Britain (Hong Kong Hansard 1972:898).

What I would emphasize here is that the integration of the Chinese capitalists and bourgeoisie in the Councils reflects the overall ideological transformation of colonial rule. The new post-war political climate generally indicated to the administration that the continuation of the colonial order would be impossible without taking into account such factors as the economic interests of Chinese capitalists, the conditions of the workers, and above all, political developments in China. Consequently, the appointment of the Chinese members to the Legislative Council is ideologically presented as a means which facilitates the participation of the local people in the administration of Hong Kong. The purpose of government is not simply to serve the interests of the British masters overseas, but to strive for the welfare and prosperity of 'the people of Hong Kong'. In addition to the promotion of Chinese as the second official language⁸ and the 'localization' of recruitment for the Civil Service, a significant area in which such ideological transformation is most evident is the provision of housing for industrial workers. In spite of the minimum

⁸ In accordance with the Official Language Ordinance 1974, both English and Chinese are declared the official languages of Hong Kong, enjoying equal status in government usages. However, ordinances continue to be enacted in English, and proceedings in the higher courts are still conducted in English.

dormitory-type accommodation which the public housing estates provide, the settlement of workers is usually phrased in terms of social services offered by the government. Such a rhetoric significantly conceals the rational capitalist calculation relating to the wider problems of the reproduction of labour and the colonial socio-economic order as a whole. To elaborate this, we need to focus on the industrial and economic policy of Hong Kong in detail.

Government Policy and the Industrial Economy of Hong Kong

The *laissez faire* system of 'minimum regulation' is the most remarkable feature of the colonial economic policy. It allows, in effect, high rates of profit and capital accumulation unencumbered by undue state intervention. As an official report puts it,

Apart from providing the infrastructure ... the government's principal role in the economy is to ensure a stable framework in which commerce and industry can function efficiently with minimum interference. The government normally intervenes only in response to the pressure of economic and social needs, and neither protects nor subsidises manufacturers (Hong Kong 1979: 11).

This is indicated, first of all, by the colony's financial structure. Hong Kong has no central bank, and power to issue bank notes is given to two British commercial banks - the Hongkong and Shanghai Bank and the Chartered Bank. The issuing of Hong Kong dollars however, must be backed by a 100 per cent deposit of hard currencies (previously sterling) in the Government Exchange Fund. Thus the level of the money supply in the economy is directly tied in with the balance of foreign reserves.

Since the level of economic activity is to a large extent determined by the money supply, the colonial economy is able to increase its manufacturing by channelling foreign earnings into the system in the form of local currency. The arrangement is of special importance to an economy like Hong Kong because it provides a direct linkage between the level of export and the expansion of economic activities.

Hong Kong maintains a free port, with excise duties charged on four groups of items - tobacco, alcoholic liquor, hydrocarbon fuel and methyl alcohol. Taxation is low by present-day standards. Profits from business enterprise are charged at a flat percentage rather than in progressive rates as in most countries. Currently, business earnings are taxed at a standard rate of 17 per cent for corporations and 15 per cent for unincorporated businesses. Since Hong Kong operates a free foreign exchange market, profits from capital investments by foreign companies can be freely transferred to parent companies. It is estimated that by the end of 1978 some 386 factories were owned either wholly or partly by overseas interests, employing 78,330 workers or 10 per cent of the work force (Hong Kong 1979: 12). The total direct investment coming mainly from the United States, Japan, Britain, Netherland and Switzerland amounted to HK\$2,106 million (*ibid*).

Hong Kong's manufacturing is dominated by light, labour intensive industries. In 1978 about 68 per cent of the work force was employed in the manufacturing of textiles, clothing, electronics and plastics products, watches and clocks. These industries accounted for 73 per cent of Hong Kong's total domestic exports, providing an earning of HK\$30,000 million.

Table 4. Major Manufacturing Industries: Distribution of Work Force and Percentage of Export Earnings for Year 1978

Industry	Number of Establishment	Distribution of Work Force		Export Earnings	
		Numbers Employed	% of Work Force ¹	HK\$ in million	% of total ² Domestic export
Textiles & Clothing	12,685	363,460	44	18,727	46
Electrical Goods	793	73,736	10	4,741	12
Plastics	4,314	84,415	11	3,561	9
Watches & Clocks	475	20,296	3	2,983	6
Total	18,267	541,907	68	30,012	73

Note: 1 Total Work Force = 755,108 persons

2 Total domestic export = HK\$40,712 million

(Source: Hong Kong 1979: 13-14)

The details of the industries for 1978 is summarised in Table 4.

The Hong Kong economy depends entirely on external trade. The domestic exports in 1978 totalled HK\$40,712 million and re-exports were valued at HK\$13,197 million. Hong Kong's major customers together with the volume of trade are given in Table 5.

Table 5. Customers of Hong Kong Exports and Volume of Trade 1978

<u>Countries</u>	<u>\$HK million</u>	<u>% of Total Domestic Exports</u>
United States	15,125	37.2
Germany	4,426	10.9
Britain	3,871	9.5
Japan	1,856	4.6
Australia	1,494	3.7
Canada	1,271	3.1
Singapore	1,104	2.7
Netherlands	937	2.3
Switzerland & Liechtenstein	683	1.7
Nigeria	581	1.4
Others	9,364	23.0
Total :	<u>40,712</u>	<u>100.0</u>

(Source: Hong Kong 1979: 254 appendix 3)

Furthermore, practically all the raw materials and other requirements such as food, fuel and capital goods have to be imported. Japan is the major supplier and contributed 23 per cent of the total imports in 1978. China, the second source, in the same year, supplied 17 per cent of the total import, and about half of the

total imported foodstuffs. The other sources of imports are the United States, Taiwan, Switzerland, Britain, Israel and West Germany.

The reliance on external trade renders the economy of Hong Kong particularly vulnerable to changes in overseas markets. As a developing country, Hong Kong has been included in the 'generalized preference schemes' operating in most developed nations which provide duty-free or low tariff entry for products from the developing economies. In addition, fifteen Commonwealth countries continue to grant Commonwealth preferential duty rates to Hong Kong products. However, such trade concessions have been continuously revised in recent years. Faced with competitive exports from Korea, Taiwan and Singapore, and the internal problems of their own industries, many countries are now imposing import quotas on goods from Hong Kong. Norway and Finland, for example, have now withdrawn from the generalized preferential schemes for beneficiary developing nations.

The most important restraint on exports is imposed on textiles - the major industry of Hong Kong. Currently, bilateral agreements are in operation with the United States, the European Common Market (EEC) and Canada. With the general depression in the world economy, it is expected that trade restrictions are likely to cover an increasing range of goods. Partly in response to these changing conditions, the government set up in 1977 an Advisory Committee on Diversification. The aim of the Committee is to examine the impact of the present fiscal and industrial policy, and to investigate the feasibility of alternative industries. Of particular interests are two recommendation of

the ADC: upgrading the technology of Hong Kong's manufacturing by giving priority to scientific research and industrial training, and participation (investment) in China's industrialization. The latter, as we shall see, has already made significant progress. But the diversification to technologically intensive industries is problematic under the present government policy designed to assist the appropriation of cheap labour. The problem is how to maintain the profitable position of the colonial economy yet, at the same time, increase competitiveness in the international market.

What the whole structure of external trade points to is the critical importance of maintaining low cost parities *vis-a-vis* foreign goods in the markets overseas. Traditionally, Hong Kong has been able to achieve this, on the one hand, by employing a large pool of essentially unskilled immigrant labour from China; and on the other, by controlling, at the minimal level, both the 'direct' and 'indirect' wages (i.e. social welfare payments, worker's compensation, and cost of industrial training, etc.). In 1976, the total work force was 1,867,480 persons, comprising 1,209,590 males and 657,890 females. The distribution of the working population is given in Table 6.

I have already described the details of employment in the manufacturing industries for 1978.

There is no legal minimum wage in Hong Kong, and the prevailing level is determined by the supply of and demand for labour. In official estimates, the daily wages in manufacturing for 1978 varied from \$26.10^{to \$46.80} for skilled workers, \$19 to \$52.60 for semi-skilled workers, and \$18 to \$37.10 for unskilled workers (Hong Kong 1979: 40).

Table 6. Distribution of Hong Kong's Working Population 1976.

	<u>Actual Workforce</u>	<u>Total % of Work Force</u>
Agriculture, fishing	48,500	2.59
Mining, quarrying	1,020	0.05
Manufacturing	845,920	45.29
Electricity, gas & Water	9,710	0.51
Construction	104,040	5.57
Retail trade, hotel, Restaurants	361,680	19.36
Transport, Communication	136,180	7.29
Financing, Real Estates	62,090	3.15
Community & Social Services	284,970	15.25
Unclassified activities	13,370	0.71
Total :	<u>1,867,480</u>	<u>100.00</u>

(Source: Hong Kong 1979: 39).

Significantly, the government imposes no legal restrictions on the hours of work for males over 18. Men normally work an average of eight to ten hours a day. Under the Factories and Industrial Undertaking Ordinance, women and young children between 14 to 17 are allowed to work a maximum of eight hours a day and 48 hours a week. The limit of overtime employment for women is 200 hours a year. In January 1977, legislation was introduced to reduce overtime employment for children aged 14 to 17 gradually to 50 hours a year. After January 1980 such overtime for children under 18 will be prohibited.

Two important comments should be made in relation to the labour policy for Hong Kong. Firstly, most of the legislation which prescribes the working conditions of industrial labour was introduced quite recently, mostly in the seventies. For example, in addition to the restrictions on overtime employment for women and children, the Employment (Amendment) (No.3) Ordinance, which provides seven days of annual leave after 12 months' continuous employment, came into effect only in January, 1978. Currently, the social provisions for workers are still minimal - they lack paid maternity leave, sickness and unemployment benefits, old age and industrial injury pensions and guaranteed free medical services.

Secondly, legislation regulating working conditions is not always effectively enforced. This is in part due to the enormous number of industrial undertakings (there were 39,606 registered establishments in manufacturing in 1978) some of which are not registered with the government. Furthermore, relative to the task at hand, the number of officials engaged in the investigation of industrial offences is highly inadequate. Reliable statistics are difficult to obtain, but we can catch a glimpse of the situation from the official data. During 1978, 338 cases (involving 348 children) of employment of child labour under 14 were brought before the court. Leaving aside the actual number successfully prosecuted, the number of cases is insignificant in view of the actual work force of nearly two million. Similarly in the same year, the Labour Department dealt with 9,462 'reported problems' related to claims for wages in arrears, severance pay, annual leave, etc., (Hong Kong 1979: 42). But the more serious

cases of actual work stoppage investigated by the Department were only 59.

Ultimately, what determines the character of industrial and labour policy is the attitude of the government itself. On the one hand, the government is often reluctant to interfere with the capitalist enterprise. In the maintenance of low costs of labour at best the social provision for workers should be born by the workers if not the industries. Commenting on the inadequacy of the industrial training scheme run by the Hongkong Training Council (HKTC), the Far Eastern Economic Review wrote:

Money seems to be the main obstacle - the government feels that industry should pay for its own training schemes through individual industry levies. Industries have been less than enthusiastic about the idea and the HKTC proposed that a general levy on imports and exports be used to finance industrial training (March 21, 1980: 48).

On the other hand, there is the concern for the political control of the workers. Significantly, the Hong Kong government fails to provide means for the settlement of industrial disputes other than by appeal through the Labour Department. The effect is to impede collective bargaining and voluntary settlement between workers and employers. In other words, by placing the problems of industrial relations under government control, the administration is able to undermine the development of the labour movement as a whole. The lack of unified political aims, and the fact of official regulation have resulted in the formation of some 300 employee unions with an estimated membership of

407,400⁹. Most of these are affiliated with either the left-wing Hong Kong Federation of Trade Unions or the right-wing Hong Kong and Kowloon Trades Union Council. Most of these trade unions are organized as voluntary associations and do not directly engage in collective bargaining, except those affiliated with the left-wing Federation of Trade Unions. However, as we shall see, even in the latter cases, the more radical industrial actions have been curbed because of political developments in China. Ultimately, the weakness of the labour movement in Hong Kong must be seen as a product of the repressive legislation. A trade union must be registered with the government and is not allowed to affiliate with an organization outside the colony (except with official permission). Furthermore, it is illegal for a union to establish fund for 'political purposes' (England & Rear, 1975). Generally, the effect of these regulations is to deny to the working class organized international contact and support, and to restrict the political and financial resources of the trade unions (Halliday 1974).

China and British Colonial Rule

It is customary, when discussing the relation between China and Hong Kong, to emphasize the mutual economic benefits which

⁹ For fragmentation of Hong Kong's labour movement, see England and Rear 1975, especially chapter 5. Another reason is the complex government regulation controlling the amalgamation of trade unions. England and Rear write: 'Two principal factors which mitigate against amalgamation are, first, that the members of a single union, including one formed by amalgamation, must be drawn from the same trade, industry or occupation; and second, that a 50 per cent poll of union members is required, with a 20 per cent majority in favour' (*ibid*:228).

the position of the colony brings to the two countries¹⁰. While the economic argument is an important one, especially in the post-1960's, it nevertheless tends to oversimplify the historical and political complexities out of which the current 'diplomatic normalization' has emerged. It must be recalled that, inspite of the present development, the continuing status of Hong Kong has always presented some fundamental ideological contradictions to the Peking government. The colony is, after all, a Chinese territory ceded to the British in the days of the imperial plunder of China by Western powers. Furthermore, there is the fact that the existence of the colonial order must depend on the exploitation of the Chinese workers in Hong Kong. The resolution of these contradictions, I argue, is an equally important consideration that accompanies any economic rationale in the formation of China's Hong Kong policy.

Above all, for China, the complexity of the Hong Kong question is derived from the fact that, in order to exploit the capitalist environment of the colony, she must necessarily - if only tacitly - recognize and even support the colonial *status quo*. It is in this sense that I argue that China's relation with Hong Kong ultimately contributes to the making of the class structure and the ruling power in the colony.

¹⁰ For example, Miner 1975, Chapters 2 and 3; though he warns 'An insecure successor to Mao might seek to bolster his personal authority by taking over Hong Kong, no matter what damages this might do to China's wider interests' (*ibid*: 28).

The origin of China's Hong Kong policy can be traced back to the 1950's. It is important to note that at least in this period the Chinese intention *vis-a-vis* Hong Kong had significantly wider aims than the economic. To put it briefly, after the ending of the Korean War in 1952, China was anxious to avoid a direct military and political confrontation with the western powers. At the time, China was concerned with the possibilities that Britain would extend naval and air facilities to the United States and even the Kuomintang. Therefore, by resorting to diplomatic attacks, China's decision to leave Hong Kong alone was very much dictated by the fear of a real conflict. Equally significant, it was hoped that by allowing the British to retain Hong Kong, she would divide Britain (which was among the first western nations to recognise the Peking regime) from the United States on the China issue (Catron 1972).

From the economic point of view, before the trade increases in the 1960's the export earnings which China derived from the colony in the fifties were never conclusive. When China decided to allow Britain to retain the colony soon after the establishment of the government in Peking, there was in fact significant adverse trade balance with Hong Kong, causing a large drain on China's foreign reserve. The deficits in balance of payments *vis-a-vis* trade with Hong Kong were almost US\$105 million in 1950, and US\$143 million in 1951 (Eckstein 1966: 198). Later, with the trade embargo imposed by the United Nation during the Korean War, there was serious doubt about the colony's economic future and its usefulness to China as an outlet for Chinese goods. Anyhow, in a period which saw the diplomatic hard line

against the west, it would not have been rational for China to have put economic profit above political considerations. Constrained by broader political aims, the Chinese policy regarding Hong Kong was in some ways highly ambiguous.

This is best illustrated by the Taiwan Straits crisis of 1958. In September that year, Peking announced the claim for a 12 mile limit to its territorial waters. The object was to include Quemoy and Matsu, the two islands a few miles offshore from Kwangtung still under the Kuomintang occupation, within the Chinese legal boundary prior to a planned (but later aborted) invasion. This extension of territorial waters, however, was not recognized by the British. The year 1958 also saw the intensive drive in China for the collectivization of fishing communes, which caused a large number of fishermen to flee to Hong Kong. Consequently, there was a real danger that the Chinese patrol boats when chasing the escaping fishing vessels would clash with the Hong Kong naval patrols in water in which both governments claimed jurisdiction.

This was indeed what happened. When Hong Kong began to send armed patrols to protect its own fishing fleet, there were ugly incidents over the seizure of fishing boats by the Chinese in colonial waters. Significantly, in spite of the serious risk to open armed conflict, there was little official publicity of the whole affair on the Mainland (Catron *op. cit.*: 417). This raises the question of the extent to which Peking was prepared to enforce its claim for territorial waters *vis-a-vis* Hong Kong. For example, since China still occupied several islands around Hong Kong, the 12 mile limit would cover a large area under colonial

jurisdiction. However, China made no effort to interfere with these areas which were important routes of communication for the colony.

Instead, the consequence of the Taiwan Straits crisis was the launching of an unusually hostile campaign against the British. Official protests from Peking charged the colonial government with crimes ranging from political censorship to police brutality. But the most serious issue of contention was regarding the suppressing of communist-run schools. In one Ministry of Foreign Affairs protest, "the Hong Kong government was said to be systematically persecuting patriotic education and promoting a two-China plot by encouraging KMT schools, texts and agents" (Catron *op. cit.*: 418).

To put it crudely perhaps, what these diplomatic attacks indicated was in fact China's attempt to transform a possible Sino-Anglo conflict into the issue that most concerned her at the time - the issue of 'two Chinas'. In the voicing of official protests, China was exercising what she saw as her duty as protector and legal spokesman for the Chinese under foreign rule. The 'historical question' of Taiwan was then an especially crucial one for Peking. Because of the strong US military support for Taiwan, the existence of the Kuomintang government was regarded by China as symbolic of the western hostility towards the newly established People's Republic. The issue at stake was not only that of the 'sole' legitimate government representing China but also the possibility of an armed conflict with the United States following the Korean War.

It was this concern over the 'two-China' issue that had shaped the Chinese Hong Kong policy: a policy that alternated

between tacit approval and vehement ideological attacks. It is easy to see that the ambiguous nature of the policy emerged out of the ideological contradiction inherent in China's decision to allow the continuing existence of the British Colony. We have already seen the extent to which China was prepared to tolerate, if not openly support, the colonial ruling power. Let me now turn to the effect on the labour movement as a whole.

In the previous section I have argued that the impotence of the trade unions in Hong Kong is in part explained by the prevailing restrictive labour legislation. Another aspect of the problem is the nature of the political support provided by the Peking government. Considering the 1950's, from the discussion so far it should be clear that China's official protests over the treatment of the working class under British rule was essentially motivated by the broader considerations in the struggle against the United States and the Kuomintang. In other words, while China was ready to render moral and political support, the whole impetus of the workers' struggle in Hong Kong must be placed within the rationale of the wider policy requirements of Peking. This presented no special problem in the general political climate of the fifties as there was, within certain limits, an overlap between the aims of China's foreign policy and the promotion of working class radicalism in Hong Kong.

Nevertheless, from a broader perspective, the consequence of the China-British conflict was to 'decontextualize' the labour movement; that is, to remove it from the specific economic, political and ideological circumstances of colonial Hong Kong. This is in part the result of a deliberate policy of Peking. For

specific strategic reasons, China had never agreed to any move towards self-government or self-determination for Hong Kong. From the Chinese point of view, this could lead to the creation of a 'third China' on the door step of the Mainland border. Thus, internal developments in Hong Kong must be 'politically guided' so as not to be in conflict with the wider interests of Peking.

The most crucial outcome of this was to deny the working class in the colony an unifying force such as those which the labour movements in Africa and South-East Asia provided in the struggle for national independence. By subsuming their political aims under the ideological conflict of the 'two-China' issue, the labour unions in Hong Kong never did effectively define their own interests or develop a genuine political awareness in the specific conditions in Hong Kong. This was indicated by the extreme fragmentation of the trade unions, as already mentioned. Even as early as 1949, there were 180 labour unions, claiming in all some 100,000 members (England and Rear *op. cit.*: 85). Many of these unions had stemmed from the traditional craft and professional guilds and continued to exercise as their main function the controlling of entry into the trades. In addition they were organized mostly as voluntary associations without clearly defined political aims *vis-a-vis* the employers. Thus the origins and purposes of the unions were notably diverse. In addition to the criteria of industry and occupation, there were divisions based on ethnicity (place of origin and dialect), companies and government departments. Furthermore, cutting across these divisions was the split of the unions along left-wing/right-wing lines. That is, all the unions had formed loose 'pro-Peking' and

'pro-Taiwan' alliances; and in 1949 the Communist Federation of Trade Unions (F.T.U.) claimed 39 trade unions in membership and the Kuomintang Trade Union Council (T.U.C.) 105. From the present point of view, the significance of the left-wing/right-wing fission is that it placed the whole working class movement under the continuing influence of political developments in the Mainland. Given this particular form of unionism, the problem of political control and of isolating it from 'outside forces' became a vital concern of the colonial government. The effect of possible collusion between Peking and British interests will have far reaching consequences.

Power Structure and the Normalization of Relationship with China

The Nixon detente and the current normalization of China's relation with the western world is well known. Throughout the 1960's important developments took place in China which brought about critical changes not only in her foreign policy but also in her overall strategy of economic development. To begin with, we must single out the impact of the Great Leap Forward of 1958-9. After the Sino-Soviet quarrel in the later 1950's and the subsequent withdrawal of all Soviet assistance, China made a heroic but ultimately futile attempt at complete self-reliance. With its strong emphasis on heavy industry and centralized planning, the Second Five Year Plan (1958-60) ended in serious economic disaster and finally petered out in the crop failures of the early 1960's.

The failure of the Great Leap caused bitter disputes

within the Communist Party. The result was the 'struggle between the capitalist and socialist roads' to national growth, a debate which broke out in the eighth plenum of the Eighth Central Committee at Lushan in August 1959. Briefly the dispute represented a clash between two diametrically opposite views on how to organize the national economy and to sustain economic growth. On the one side, were Mao and his followers who argued for a radical line emphasizing collectivization, localized industry based on labour rather than capital, and socialist ideology to promote incentive for work. On the other side, were Liu Shao-chi, Teng Hsiao-ping and others who advocated more pragmatic measures. In contrast with the Maoists, they saw economic development in terms of technological improvement, high capital input and increasing productivity by the incentive of material reward. In September 1963 Mao launched the beginning of a series of attacks on the revisionist 'capitalist' policies of Liu Shao-chi. He called for a socialist education of the whole nation in order to eradicate the bourgeoisie economism that was taking root in the collective communes and to restore the revolutionary spirit among the rural cadres. It was this ideological attack that culminated in the stormy campaign of the Cultural Revolution of 1966-68.

The immediate goal of the Cultural Revolution was to 'purify' the Party of all those elements that followed the 'capitalist road'. But in the long run both Mao and the young Red Guards wanted to rekindle a revolutionary spirit that would put ideological struggle above material progress. The social, economic and political chaos brought about by the conflict of the Cultural Revolution has been well documented and I shall not

belabour the point here. By January 1967 the social and economic disruptions throughout the country were so wide spread that the Party began to issue a series of directives to curb the movement.

At the same time, there were also international factors which called for the suppression of the excess of the Cultural Revolution. These were the border conflicts and the generally worsening of diplomatic relation with the Soviet Union. In the late 1960's the possibility of an invasion from the North was seriously considered by Peking. The effect of the Sino-Soviet conflict was to sever the ties between China and the communist bloc under the Soviet influence, thus enhancing the diplomatic isolation that still characterized Chinese foreign relations in the 1960's.

Therefore, for both economic and strategic reasons, there was an urgen need for China to radically alter her ideological emphasis, and perhaps to give a greater weight to the pragmatism first advocated by Mao's opponents. In terms of overall policy, the aftermath of the Cultural Revolution produced two areas of development: to break away from diplomatic isolation by establishing closer political and economic ties with the West, and to give high priority to industrial modernization. The current official slogan is 'Agriculture as foundation and industry as leading factor', giving equal emphasis to the two economic sectors. Thus, the strategy of economic growth since the 1970's¹¹

¹¹ For an analysis of China's economy, policy, and production after the Cultural Revolution, see Yeh 1973.

inevitably creates, on the one hand, important demand for imports of western technology and investment; and on the other, the increasing need for foreign earnings through exports of raw industrial materials and cheap manufactured goods.

The changes in China's policy regarding Hong Kong is a direct consequence of these wider developments in the Mainland. To focus first of all on the economic aspects, the foreign earnings from the exports to the colony and the access to the trading facilities in Hong Kong are now more vital than ever. The extent of China's earnings from trade with Hong Kong is summarized in Table 7.

Table 7. China's Export Earnings from Hong Kong.

	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975
Visible trade surplus HK\$m	<u>3328</u>	<u>3847</u>	<u>5606</u>	<u>5919</u>	<u>6802</u>
Equals US\$m at ruling rates	555	680	1102	1163	1360

(Source: Miners 1975: 19)

Furthermore, there are sources of invisible earnings. For instance, Chinese exports to Hong Kong are sold directly by her own companies such as the China Products Company or through other

distributors and agents. The profits from these sales¹² adds at least 10 per cent to the export earnings. China also controls a wide range of banks, insurance companies, shipping firms, travel agents and real estates, all of which channel their profits to the Mainland. A total of these invisible earnings has been estimated at US\$300 million in 1974 (FEER 30 July, 1976: 44). Taking into account the earnings from both visible and invisible exports, the total amount from trade with Hong Kong probably reached US\$1,700 million in 1975. Given the total export earnings of nearly US\$6,000 million in the same year, this represented more than a quarter of China's total foreign earnings.

However, the export earnings from Hong Kong are growing at a much slower rate than China's trade with the rest of the world. This is partly due to the fact that Hong Kong demand for traditional exports - textile yarns, hydrocarbon oils, and food-stuffs - is highly inelastic, thus putting a limit to the potential increase of earnings from these items. To rectify this, China since the 1970's has begun expanding her activities in the colony in order to make fuller use of the facilities available there.

On the one hand, China is building up her own investment in the colony. For example, China is currently heavily involved in the development of Tsing Yi Island, one of the few remaining undeveloped areas in central Hong Kong. Earlier in 1975 Peking announced the plan to build a plant on the island at the cost of

¹² Food imports from China in 1975 were valued at HK\$3,240 million, about half of total foodstuffs imported. In addition to food, China supplies the colony with textile yarns, raw materials and water.

HK\$50 million for manufacturing machine tools. In addition, a ship building facility (total cost: HK\$100 million) is to be built on the west of the island, for which the purchase of 1.2 million square feet of land has already been finalized. At the same time, China is expanding her retail outlets for Chinese goods - there are now more than a hundred China Product departmental stores in Hong Kong. The total investment by China in the colony has been estimated at a conservative figure of US\$2 billion (The Times, January 31, 1978:19)

On the other hand, there is China's plan to utilize Hong Kong as a source of foreign capital to finance her industrial modernization. With the increase in imports of capital goods, it is estimated that China's trade deficits are to run at US\$4 billion a year from 1979 to 1985, and most of these will be financed by foreign loans (FEER July 9, 1979: 41). Thus, Hong Kong's banking facilities and international contacts with the western financial centres are critical for negotiating long and short term borrowings. Another significant role the colony is expected to play is in direct investment and industrial joint ventures in China, particularly in the adjacent Kwungtang Province. The most ambitious project of this kind is the planned development of Shen^zhen, a municipality across the Hong Kong-China border, into a 'foreign industrial and tourism zone' (FEER 20 April, 1979: 42-43). A major part of the plan calls for the construction of hotels, and the expansion of local agriculture in order to supply the Hong Kong market. In addition light processing industries employing some 100,000 workers are to be established. In May 1978, contracts for projects involving largely capital and

equipment from Hong Kong were signed, covering the production of items like clothing, wool yarns, shoes, toys and metal products, etc.

From Hong Kong's point of view, the Chinese policy of increasing economic ties with the colony has a special significance. It is happening at the time when there is an urgent need for Hong Kong to diversify its economic and industrial structure. Faced with increasing competition from Taiwan, Korea and Singapore and the tightening of the international textile market, Hong Kong is attempting to move out of the traditional light, labour intensive industries. In this respect there are some obvious benefits in these joint ventures with China ; such as the availability of Chinese labour and land at a relatively cheaper cost than Hong Kong, and a profitable outlet for overseas capital invested in Hong Kong banks. That is why the establishment of light manufacturing in China has not been viewed by Hong Kong capitalists as a serious potential threat to the colony. Rather, capital investment in China presents a viable economic alternative to the current industrial structure in an attempt at readjustment in the rapidly changing international market.

The convergence of economic interests between China and Hong Kong is a crucial factor when examining the current Chinese policy regarding the position of Hong Kong. If the Peking-Hong Kong relation of the fifties and sixties was characterized by a mixture of diplomatic hostility and tacit tolerance, the current Chinese policy is notable for its emphasis on close collaboration with the colonial government. There are two vital aspects to this policy.

Firstly, the communist (left-wing) associations are placed under stricter political control by the Chinese government. For example, the employees of the Chinese-run companies are 'ordered' not to be involved in the politics of Hong Kong. The communist trade unions too are deradicalized and since the late 1960's the Federation of Trade Unions has been conspicuously inert in the organization of industrial strikes and demonstrations. The inactivity of the left-wing organizations is, of course, part of the aftermath of the Cultural Revolution. During the height of the conflict in 1967 there was a spillover of the struggle into the colony resulting in anti-British riots that lasted throughout July to November (cf. Jarvie 1969, Cooper 1970). The demonstrations were started by the employees of the Bank of China and other Chinese agencies and eventually developed into violent street fightings causing the literal standstill of the normal social and economic life in the colony. What Peking had learned from the 1967 riots was the importance of putting the local left-wing movement under rein so that it might develop in accordance with her own wider interests and requirements. Implicit in this calculation is the possibility of a 'third force' emerging from the political context of Hong Kong itself. This so-called Third China problem is of crucial concern to Peking and has contributed to the weakness of the labour movement in Hong Kong. For China the issue now takes on a special relevance in view of the vital interest in the colony's social-political stability. This means that in practice Peking is prepared, in significant contrast to the 1950's, to turn a blind eye to such 'repressive actions' as the mass arrest of demonstrators, and the physical

removal of squatters from private and government land, etc.. Interestingly, in answering critics who suggested the urgency of democratic reform and the possibility of eventual self-rule for the colony, the Hong Kong government answered that all such moves would be construed by China as an "unfriendly act, diplomatically tantamount to open hostilities" (New Statesman, 12 December, 1980: 12).

Let me turn now to the second aspect of the Chinese Policy. This is the attempt to reconcile the ideological contradictions inherent in the continuing existence of Hong Kong as a British colony. The most cogent statement explaining Peking's position is that made by Huang Hua, China's permanent representative at the United Nations, on 10 March, 1972:

The questions of Hongkong and Macau belong to the category of questions resulting from the series of unequal treaties which the imperialists imposed on China. Hongkong and Macau are part of Chinese territory occupied by British and Portugese authorities. The settlement of the questions of Hong Kong and Macau is entirely within China's sovereign right and do not at all fall under the ordinary category of colonial territories. Consequently they should not be included in the list of colonial territories covered by the declaration on the granting of independence to the colonial countries and people. With regard to the questions of Hong Kong and Macau, the Chinese government has consistently held that they should be settled in an appropriate way when conditions are ripe ... (Miners *op. cit.*: 17).

The statement has several notable points. In the first place, it insists that the Hong Kong and Macau questions are the sole concern of China, and therefore should be removed from the agenda for discussion in the United Nations Committee on Colonialism. Moreover, it implies that China does not recognize the old

treaties signed between the Ching government and the western imperial powers. Consequently, the continuing British occupation of Hong Kong is the result of a temporary lease or permit which China can withdraw anytime. Taken to its extreme, this can be interpreted to mean that the year 1997, when the lease of the NT officially expires, has no specific significance for China.

Hence, China's position regarding Hong Kong is deliberately vague. But it is a vagueness that has a special meaning in view of the ideological contradictions I have mentioned. The idea of a 'temporary lease' rather than of a treaty which British continues to regard as valid reconciles the conflict between the socialist ideology of the communist regime and the decision to allow the British retention of a Chinese territory¹³. At the same time, such rhetoric gains 'face' for China in a situation which is a direct reminder of her past humiliations at the hands of western imperialism. In other words, the notion of a 'lease' or 'permit' places China in a position of strength by suggesting that the continuing presence of Hong Kong depends solely on the grace of the Chinese government.

But from the present point of view, the most important significance of this ideological presentation is that it transforms

¹³ Rude Provo, the Czechoslovak official newspaper pronounced on 6 June 1972: 'Peking's pseudo-revolutionary slogans are an alien element in its relations with rich American, British and Japanese industrialists. The blood and sweat of millions of the Chinese people living in Hong Kong and Macao and working in capitalist factories is being transformed into gold in the banks of Peking' (quoted in Miners *op. cit.*: 28).

what are in fact matters of economic and strategic calculation into notions which emphasize the goodwill and good intentions of the Peking government. The reason is a relatively simple one. Because of the increasing reliance on Hong Kong for her industrial modernization, it is necessary for China to assure the capitalists of the continuing future of the colony. For example, in April 1979, the Governor, Sir Murray MacLehose, made what has been described as 'the historic trip' to China (FEER *op. cit.*: 42). Though the visit did not resolve the legal problems surrounding the lease of the NT, the Governor nevertheless received strong "high-level assurance of Peking's interest in maintaining a healthy investment climate" in the colony (*ibid*). To put it another way, the notion of 'temporary lease' in a sense places a significant responsibility on Peking for the maintenance of Hong Kong's political stability. The relative calm of the labour unions in the recent years is taken as a direct indication of this. It is examples such as this, as well as the frequent diplomatic exchanges between the two governments, that illustrate China's commitment to the industrial peace and investment confidence in the colony.

Conclusion

It is useful to consider the structural changes of Hong Kong in terms of the concept of class structuration which I discussed in the previous chapter. Typically, the two phases of historical change - the post-war reform and the normalization of relation with China - involved structural adjustments of the key economic, political and ideological relations in the colonial

order. Furthermore, given the wider historical circumstances of the time, these processes are in fact crucial aspects of the wider problems of the reproduction of the colonial order. In this respect, it is worthwhile to point out that 'reproduction' as a historical process, never depends on maintaining or recreating through time all the existing structural components. More critically, as the case of Hong Kong amply illustrates, 'reproduction' takes place by allowing the realignment and transformations of the key relations in the structure of the socio-political order.

In my discussion I have identified two sets of relations that are fundamental in the reproduction of the colonial order. They are: those between the European capitalists and bourgeoisie and their Chinese counterparts, and the relations between Hong Kong and Peking. These are structural relations in the sense that it is from these that the social, economic and ideological configurations in Hong Kong are generated. In other words, the two sets of relations lie at the core of the structural order that is constitutive of the social relations in the colony.


Accordingly, the transformations of these key relations are, in the final analysis, historically produced. As I have demonstrated, the relative political stability of present day Hong Kong is the result of the resolution and transformation of the structural and ideological contradictions in the colonial order society. Indeed only in such terms can we make sense of the collaboration between the Chinese capitalists and their European counterparts, and the increasing economic and political ties with China. But these developments are not to

imply a static picture of 'functional inter-dependence' between workers and capitalists, the colonial regime and the Chinese government. Rather the current situation is only a point in a continuous historical transformation. In the spirit of Mao's conception, even in this period of industrial peace, contradictions never cease to exist. In this respect there are two areas of development worthy of note.

Firstly, the labour unions if they were to gain a momentum in the struggle for better working conditions would need to organize themselves independently from Peking. In other words, an effective unionism must necessarily confront both the British and Chinese political and ideological domination. There are at least two factors which may bring about potential conflict: the essentially antagonistic relation between the workers and the capitalists, and more specifically, the increasing impotence of the communist Federation of Trade Unions. A sign of new development is given by the formation in 1978 of the Christian Industrial Committee (CIC), a coalition of more than 40 unions representing 120,000 members. Significantly, both the left-wing Federation of Trade Unions and the right-wing Trade Union Council have withheld giving public support to the CIC. The Committee is active among lower income industrial workers many of whom are deserting their traditional union ties (FEER March 31, 1981: 64). Among its current activities was the demonstration against the government's negligence in enforcing industrial safety regulations. The CIC claimed a victory when in October 1980 the government formed an Industrial Safety Committee and raised the maximum fine for violations of safety regulations from HK\$10,000 to HK\$50,000 (*ibid*).

Secondly, there is the whole question of a constitutional shift towards self-determination. In spite of the adamant objections of both the Peking and Hong Kong government, it is nevertheless a political alternative that is of some interests to the broadening Chinese middle class. So far, such political aspiration is articulated - and dissipated - in such issues as the local recruitment of the Civil Service, consumers' protection, and the promotion of Chinese as the official language. The middle class Chinese are also active in the Urban Council elections. However, as already mentioned, because of the limited franchise and the lack of power of the Council, there is little possibility that the Urban Council elections could germinate the beginning of party politics in Hong Kong.

It is important to note that the two examples I have described have emerged out of the contradictions in the structural order of present day Hong Kong. These are contradictions that exist between local political aspirations and the wider requirements of colonial capitalism and Peking. Furthermore, the current development of Hong Kong would radically alter if the political and ideological struggle in China began to take on a different direction. Anyhow, the effects of these contradictions are still largely dormant in the sociological sense, and not likely to cause serious difficulties to the colonial order. This of course testifies to the successful political and ideological domination of the colonial regime in tacit cooperation with China: the pattern of this domination, and the problem of its reproduction, are subjects that require close investigation in the following discussion.



CHAPTER THREE

THE NEW TERRITORIES AND THE METROPOLITAN ECONOMY

Introduction

The rural hinterland which became the New Territories was originally acquired by the British to provide a strategic buffer against China (Freedman 1966b). By far the largest part of the 365 square miles is mountainous and barren. In the eastern part of the NT lies Tai Po and the Sai Kung Peninsula, which are extremely hilly, with village settlements found only in small valleys along the coast and on small inland plateaus. By contrast, Yuen Long Valley at the western portion of the NT is relatively flat with deep fertile soil and it is here that most of the traditional village settlements are found (Liang 1965).

The southern part of the NT (i.e., south of Hong Kong Island) consists of a group of islands the most important of which are Lantau, Lamma, Cheung Chau and Peng Chau. Together with the coastal villages around the Sai Kung Peninsula, these island settlements have established deep sea fishing as the main economic activity. Together with fishing, other maritime industries are found, such as manufacturing of salted fish, shrimp paste, ropes and net, and boat yards.

For the NT as a whole, as already indicated, because of the shortage of arable land, agriculture is confined mainly to the north-west of the Yuen Long Plain and Fanling-Sheung Shui Basin in the northern NT. Hence, farming is limited to a mere 12 per

cent of the total area¹, and currently employs less than two per cent of the working population. Produce is concentrated primarily on high value, perishable foods. The principal crops grown are vegetables, rice, flowers and fruits; the total crop production amounted to HK\$296 million in 1976, with vegetables accounting for 83 per cent. Since there is insufficient land for extensive grazing, pigs and poultry are the principal animals reared for food.

Fish is another important primary product. Main fishing centres in the NT are Castle Peak, Tai Po and Cheung Chau which together with Aberdeen and Shaukeiwan in Hong Kong Island, harbour a fishing fleet of 5,500, of which 93 per cent are mechanised. The total fishing population is estimated at 35,700. In 1978 the total volume of fish harvested was 87,731 tonnes valued at HK\$386 million. In addition, fish ponds totalling 1,777 hectares are located in the NT, principally in Yuen Long. Total pond fish production for 1978 was nearly 5,790 tonnes. (Hongkong 1979: 53).

Since the 1950's there has been rapid industrial development in the NT. By the end of 1976, according to government estimates, there were 6,354 factories in the NT, employing a labour force of some 183,000 persons. The established industries are mainly

¹ Economic data are, unless otherwise stated, from the Hong Kong Diary 1978 published by the Hong Kong Chamber of Commerce. The diary gives a good summary of statistical information from government reports.

light labour intensive manufactures, producing items like clothing, textiles, toys, metal goods and handbags. Most of these establishments are concentrated in the Tsuen Wan-Kwai Chung area immediately north of urban Kowloon.

In land-scarce Hong Kong, the government places high priority in the development of the NT. Currently an ambitious plan is underway to create three new towns, Tsuen Wan, Tuen Mun and Sha Tin, which will eventually accommodate more than two million people. Overall, the new town scheme has several objectives: "it will help solve the housing problem; attract industry to new areas; and alleviate Hong Kong's general problems of congestion by diffusing the pressures of urban development" (Hong Kong 1979: 2). At the same time, the government development plan also calls for the expansion of the old market towns of Tai Po, Fanling, Sheung Shui, Shek Wu Hui, Yuen Long and other rural townships further north, with the addition of amenities to meet industrial and other needs.

Hence, what is evident is that the NT is being rapidly opened up and transformed in accordance with the wider development of the metropolitan industrial economy². In the past, for instance, the

² This has so far been neglected by anthropologists studying the New Territories communities. The main preoccupation of research in the area is Chinese lineage organization, e.g., Baker 1968, Freeman 1958, 1966a, Potter 1968 and others. Potter's study entitled 'Capitalism and the Chinese Peasant. Social and economic change in a Hong Kong village' is based on fieldwork in Ping Shan, a lineage village in the NT. The study deals with major changes taking place in the village. But such events as the formation of the Rural Committee and post-war industrialization is mentioned in passing; and there is no attempt to account for any changes in class relations and the structure of domination.

nine 'dragon hills' of Kowloon more or less separated the rural hinterland from Hong Kong Island on each side of the Victoria Harbour. But now with the completion of the Cross Harbour Tunnel in 1972 and in 1978 the Lion Rock Tunnel which links Kowloon with Sha Tin, the NT has been made increasingly accessible from the urban area. Indeed, the overall development of the NT in recent years has literally transformed the physical as well as the social landscape of the area.

In the following discussion I try to locate the major social and economic processes which are direct results of the overall transformation. The development of housing and industrial estates naturally brings into question the issue of land use. More precisely, I suggest that the effect of the urban development of the NT is crystallized in the conflict over use of land between the government and the merchant class representing the vital land-owning interest in the area. However, within this ostensible conflict, the administration is also brought into close cooperation with the merchant class leadership which for its social and economic dominance, forms the local power structure in the NT.

The overarching theoretical issue is the contradiction in the nature of colonial rule as applied in the NT. More specifically, government sponsorship and support of the local power structure by incorporating it centrally in the administrative process is often made difficult by - or even incompatible with - the development of the critical economic interest of the local leadership. From the government's point of view, the problem is essentially one of cultivating a

leadership representative of the major class interest, while maintaining effective political control of the NT communities within the general principles of Indirect Rule. At the same time, it is worthwhile to emphasize that the government policy of sponsoring local leadership is made more complex by critical events such as the development of Mainland China, facing the colony as a whole. Indeed, as I demonstrate, the overall attempt to overcome the contradiction in the government-merchant class relationship has the dominant effect of shaping the major socio-political relations and the structure of local administration.

Social Organization of the New Territories I: Ethnic Groups

Historically, the nature of land use, either for agriculture or, especially in the coastal areas, for the building of market townships, had a critical influence on the social organization of the NT. This is reflected, first of all, in the relationship between ethnic groups.

By far the largest group consists of the Cantonese whose forefathers were the earliest settlers in the area. Cantonese farmers moved southwards as early as the tenth century and tended to occupy the rich agricultural land at the northern and western end of the NT (cf. Hayes 1977: 25). With the expansion of the agricultural settlements, it was the Cantonese who developed the many market towns scattered across the areas of Yuen Long, Ping Shan and Tai Po at the north, and Sha Tin at the south. Thus the Cantonese have always enjoyed significant economic and political influence in the NT. As an indication of this, the

Cantonese are often referred to in Hong Kong as *punti*, meaning literally 'locals' or 'indigenous dwellers'.

The most important of the non-*Punti* group are the Hakkas. In contrast to the Cantonese, the Hakkas³ are a strictly linguistic or dialect group who immigrated from various localities in the nearby provinces of Kwangtung, Kwangsi and Fukien. These so-called 'guest people' tended to settle in less arable marginal land; but many also became tenant farmers of *Punti* land owning families (Pratt 1960, Pasternak 1969). On the whole Hakka settlements are found in the Sai Kung Peninsula and in the areas around the market towns of Tai Po and Sha Tin.

In contrast to the land bound *Punti* and Hakka population, the Tanka and Hoklo are boat people whose mode of living depends on the sea. The origin of the Tanka is uncertain, but they were probably a non-Han people who had inhabited the South China coast long before the Chinese settlement more than a thousand years ago⁴. The Tanka speak a dialect resembling Cantonese, and live mainly afloat though some also dwell in huts erected on stilts or

³ For a discussion of the origin of the Hakka people see Cohen 1968.

⁴ There is much speculation on the origins of the Tanka people; see for example Barnett 1957. But a more sociological account of the non-Han (non-Chinese) reputation of the Tanka is offered by Ward in a series of articles (1954, 1959 and 1965). In this connection it is interesting to note Freedman's remark that 'Despite what has been often said about them, the Tanka are thoroughly Chinese in their culture, but their estrangement from land makes for a greater difference in their kinship structure' (1966a: 17n).

in boats drawn ashore, from which they go off to sea in fishing boats. The Hoklo people came from Fukien and border areas of north northeast Kwangtung. Compared with the Tanka, and the Hoklo fishermen tended to find settlement along the coastal areas, sometimes making it possible to combine agriculture with fishing as the main mode of existence.

Linguistically, the Hoklo people belong to the Min dialect group in eastern Kwangtung and Fukien, which also includes the Chiu Chow speakers. The Chiu Chow people originated in the border area between Kwangtung and Fukien, in areas around the port-city of Swatow. Compared with the other ethnic groups, the majority of the Chiu Chow people are recent arrivals many of whom entered the colony during the Sino-Japanese War, and later, the Civil War of 1945-49. Those who settled in the NT tended to be petty merchants with small capital. Over the years they have come to dominate the vital rice and grocery trade in the rapidly expanding market towns.

Leaving aside for the moment the more complex issues, the economic dominance of the Chiu Chow people in the NT can be attributed to several factors. Firstly, there is the vital connections with the rice merchants in Hong Kong. Traditionally, the wholesale trade in rice has always been in the hands of the major Chiu Chow trading houses which maintain close ties with fellow kinsmen operating as purchasing agents and exporters in the rice producing areas of Thailand, Burma and Indo-China. When the Chiu Chow shopkeepers began to establish businesses in the NT towns, they naturally came to depend on the wholesalers who were often prepared to assist their kinsmen by offering



favourable credits and even small loans of capital.

Furthermore, partly for economic reasons the Chiu Chow people exhibit, more so than any other ethnic groups, a strong sense of ethnic consciousness and solidarity. This is continuously reinforced through the organization of Chiu Chow Associations found both in Hong Kong and many parts of the NT. Significant too is their involvement in seasonal rituals- such as the Bun Festival on Cheung Chau - which not only accord prestige to the major sponsors but also help to enhance Chiu Chow identity *vis-a-vis* other ethnic groups.

Generally speaking, as Barth has pointed out (1969), the expression of ethnic identity is closely tied in with the problem of maintaining boundaries between ethnic groups. In Chinese society the problem of 'closure' arises chiefly because, in accordance with the way they are culturally defined, ethnic groups are by no means culturally and structurally distinct⁵. Normally, membership of an ethnic group is based on one of the two criteria: place of origin and common dialect. However, these two sources of definition are not mutually exclusive so that in practice,

⁵ It is sufficient to follow Cohen's definition: 'an ethnic group can be operationally defined as a collectivity of people who (a) share some pattern of normative behaviour and (b) form a part of a larger population, interacting with people from other collectivities within the framework of a social system (1974: ix). The point at issue is whether common dialect or place of origin may constitute the basis for a common ethnic identity. My argument is that while the Hakka, Punti, Hoklo and Tanka people do not exhibit significant differences in their mode of religious worship, structure of lineage organization (the Tanka have no lineages); nevertheless, speech or place of origin is sufficient for the cultivation of ethnic consciousness and solidarity.

it is common to find speakers of two or three dialects in a single locality or, correspondingly, a single dialect group (say, the Hakka) dispersed over many provinces in China.

Let us consider the Chiu Chow group as an example. In the Ching administration the district of Chiu Chow - Chiu Chow Fu - included the city of Swatow and the adjoining *hsien* or counties of Chiu Yeung, Hoi Fung, and Kit Yeung. Inhabiting these counties were other dialect speakers, namely the Hakka and Hoklo people. Thus, though Chiu Chow generally refers to the people originated from around the city of Swatow, it is theoretically possible for the Hakka and the Hoklo people to claim membership in and join the Chiu Chow Association, as I shall illustrate in the context of Cheung Chau.

There are similar problems in the definition of Punti as an ethnic group. As I have mentioned, the Punti is a dialect group consisting of Cantonese speakers. Since there is no other diacritica except the common speech, it has become quite common for Hakka farmers for reasons of prestige and status to 'become' Punti, by abandoning their dialect and adopting Cantonese speech in daily intercourse⁶.

The Punti: Non-Punti and Chiu Chow: Non-Chiu Chow categories have a significant implication in the ordering of social relationships in the NT communities. Over time complex

⁶ Hayes (1977) has reported the existence of a mixed Hakka-Punti language in the NT, known as *wai tau wa*. For an interesting study of the negotiation of ethnic symbols in a NT community, see Blake 1975.

connotations have evolved from these categories. Thus, the Hakka are considered uncouth in their peasant-like manners, the Chinese origin of the Tanka people is questioned, and the Cantonese are unimaginative in business compared with the Chiu Chow people, to give just a few examples. What is evident is that the structure of the two sets of relationships embraces, in fact, wider categories of differences - thus, land people: fishermen, land-owners: peasant farmers and merchants: labourers. Looking at it this way, I suggest that the Punti: Non-Punti and Chiu Chow: Punti categories represent structural relationships that have emerged from, and are closely related to the social and economic inequality in the NT. To put it quite simply, in the social organization of the NT communities there is a significant overlap overlapping of cleavages based on ethnicity and class. To elaborate this relationship between class and ethnicity we need to turn, first of all, to the nature of land tenure.

Social Organization of the New Territories^(II): Land Tenure and the Chinese Lineage

An important aspect of the early settlement of the NT is the formation of *chia tsui*. These were corporate patrilineages whose members were bound in the collective ownership of partrimonial estates. For present purposes, two aspects of the Chinese lineage can be singled out.

The first concerns the nature of land tenure. Normally lineage land was cultivated collectively by a set of agnates and their families. However, among large lineages with extensive

holdings the cultivation of common land was often carried out by rotation on a yearly basis among the various lineage segments (cf. Freedman 1958). While patrimonial estates provided the material focus of the lineage, there was also a propensity for each segment to acquire additional land to be shared among its own members. The result, as Freedman (1966a) has pointed out, was a significant differentiation within a lineage in terms of economic power and social status. After a while, some of the wealthier segments might move away; their descendants now came 'to constitute a new local lineage of their own, forming a higher order lineage along with those in the original settlement' (*op. cit.*: 37). The process of segmentation created complex situations in the Chinese lineage. Thus, the sharing of a corporate estate often existed along side significant internal social and economic differences between the various segments. Moreover, lineage settlements might be dispersed over several localities - but held together by the ritual focus of ancestral hall and collective worship.

I draw attention to the internal differentiation of Chinese Lineages because it is related to the making of class relations in the NT. More specifically, it was a common practice among members of wealthy lineages to rent out lineage land to Hakka peasant farmers and, significantly, to members of the poorer segments of the same lineage. The overall result, as I elaborate later, was to create a significant degree of economic subservience among both the Hakka as well as Punti tenant farmers. Freedman summarizes the situation:

... the general picture in the contemporary New Territories suggests how date of first settlement, agricultural advantage, and size of local lineage are connected in such a manner as to distribute the great Punti local lineages on the rice plains and the smaller local lineages, both Punti and Hakka, by and large on poorer land (*op. cit.*: 36).

The second aspect of Chinese lineages is their connection with the gentry-literati class. In the first place, some members of the lineages might themselves have held important posts in the Imperial bureaucracy. But more generally, as landowners with crucial economic and political interests in the area, lineage leaders were drawn into close relationship with local officials during their tours of duty in the NT. Indeed it was their personal connections with local administrators which made possible - in exchange for bribe and personal favours - malpractices such as the under-reporting of land holdings in order to avoid the payment of high land taxes. In any case, the overall position of the land-owning lineages tended to be self-perpetuating as they were able to provide for the education of the promising kinsmen in preparation for the bureaucratic examination to enter government services.

Thus, it is clear that the social-economic dominance of the lineages was most crucially tied in with the nature of land tenure in the NT, and ultimately derived from a set of relations based on class. It is from the structure of class relations that categorical relationships such as Punti: Hakka, to return to the previous point, were evolved.

The 'mutual animosity' in the Punti-Hakka relations has been suggested by historians; one writer has put it, "the line

of demarcation between the *punti* (natives) and the Hakka - the *k'e chia* (stranger-family) - that lived in some parts of Kwangtung, Kwangsi, and Kiangsi, was particularly rigid" (Hsiao 1960: 421). I should like to suggest that such animosity - and the low social status of the Hakka - had emerged out of the class relations between landlords and tenant farmers - expressed in ethnic terms. It is worth recalling that the social definition of the low status of the Hakka people was primarily based on their economic position: they were peasant tenant farmers and, when they did form corporate lineages the settlements were found in poor marginal land. However, in general, similiar definitions of social and cultural inferiority were rarely ascribed to the *Punti* peasant farmers. In the latter cases, the structural dependency on the landlords was severe enough, sometimes developing into a form of semi-slave (*hsi min*) relationship which demanded the performance of tenurial services for the landlords (Watson 1977). Hence, the significance of the *Punti*-Hakka structural relationship can be simply stated. As part of the wider ideological process in the NT, the emergence of the *Punti*: Hakka structural category mystified the exploitation taking place within the *Punti* people themselves, and tended to mask the structural inequality between the landowners and tenant farmers generally.

Finally the landlord-tenant relationship has to be seen in connection with the shopkeepers in a three tiered class structure. In the traditional NT economy the function of the shopkeepers-merchants was twofold. They supplied the local market towns with daily necessities like food, textiles, and fuel; moreover, the wealthier ones also acted as purchasing

agents for local produce such as fish and rice which were then delivered to wholesalers elsewhere. Generally, before the British arrived, the shopkeepers would operate under the leadership of the powerful local gentry. On Cheung Chau for instance, the organization of community affairs, such as the maintenance of temples and roads, lighting of streets, etc. was in the hands of the lineage leaders, though such activities were strongly supported by the shopkeepers who contributed both money and efforts.

However, with the expansion of the market towns and the surrounding rural areas, the shopkeepers were brought into significant conflict with the gentry class composed essentially of the leaders of powerful lineages. Since the lineages also owned most of the land and to a lesser extent, shophouses, the nature of the conflict was often centred around the issue of 'just rent' and terms of tenancy - as we shall see in the context of Cheung Chau. Indeed, as the market towns prospered, the conflict over land became part of the wider struggle for political power in the local communities. Stated in more theoretical terms, the contradiction of class relations is located in the social organization which exhibited a widening disparity between, on the one hand, the political control of the gentry, and on the other, the increasing economic influence of the merchant class. Generally, the contradiction contributed to the significant tension between the shopkeepers and the local gentry, a situation which was not resolved until the establishment of British rule.

The Merchant Class and The Transformation of The New Territories

The event of the colonial rule introduced serious difficulties in the positions of the land-owning gentry class. More particularly, the reform in land tenure and the overall changes in the administration effectively undermined the social and economic influence of the powerful lineages. At the same time, the new administration was concerned with its own interest in the securing revenue from land in the form of land tax and income from the sale of Crown Leases. From the view of the administration of the local communities, there was also the need to sponsor a local leadership expressive of the emergent class interest at the time.

Therefore, the rise of the merchant class can be traced to a series of factors: its increasing social and economic influence, the demise and transformation of the gentry, and the sponsorship of the colonial government. Throughout the early decades of the 1900's transformations were taking place in the NT, which significantly reinforced the overall positions of the merchant class.

Firstly, there was the gradual expansion of trade in the traditional market towns. This had been brought about by the growth both in population and in the main economic activities in the area. Fishing and the cultivation of rice, vegetables and sugar cane were becoming increasingly important; at the same time, subsidiary industries like salted fish, boat building, salt pans and stone quarries were established. In addition to supplying daily necessities to the market towns, merchants also played a vital role in the manufacturing and the export of these

products to markets in Hong Kong and the nearby Kwangtung Province.

Secondly, and in a more complex sense, the merchants were slowly diversifying their economic interests by buying land. Land was acquired by direct purchases of Crown Leases from the government. In addition, merchants were able to obtain holdings from many landowners who were eager to sell in order to take advantage of the inflation in land prices. In the NT communities the transfer of land holdings from many of the small holders as well as the lineages suggests a crucial transformation of property relations. For the wealthy merchants, generally, the purchase of land provided a viable investment of surpluses gained from commerce and, in a more theoretical vein, contributed to the perpetuation of their socio-economic positions. While some purchases were land and shop premises, others, more significantly, were real estate and landed property accumulated for speculation. By the time of the Second World War, the merchant class had, in addition to the control of the local trade, extensive land holdings in the NT, particularly in the market towns and the surrounding areas.

The emerging dominance of the merchant class thus represented a continuous process which reached its culmination in the post-war years. I have discussed in the previous chapter the complex circumstances relating to the development of industrial capitalism in Hong Kong after the Second World War. With the increasing population and the expansion of manufacturing industries in the colony, it was expected that the NT would play a vital role in the colonial economy. Consequently, from the late

1950's onwards there have been dramatic changes in the area north of metropolitan Kowloon transforming the small townships of Kwai Chung and Tsuen Wan into important industrial new towns. Further north, in the market towns of Yuen Long, Fanling and Sha Tin, massive housing estates for industrial workers have been established. As I have pointed out earlier, continuous developments are taking place to provide the infrastructure and social amenities for both industrial and residential settlement in the area.

The overall development of the NT, as my central discussion will demonstrate, involves critical social and economic transformations of the local communities. Moreover, from the government's point of view, the increasingly complex processes of administration means that it is necessary to work closely with the merchant class as a whole which represents the dominant commercial and landed interests in the region.

The first major concern of the government, not surprisingly, is over the administration of land. More specifically, problems arise because of the government's own demand for land to provide for public works projects and for sale to the public. Furthermore, there is the need to impose what are in many ways, highly restrictive building regulations, to ensure orderly development of the NT. Consequently, from the administration of government land policy two issues have emerged which significantly colour the relationship between the government and the merchant class: they are, first, the system of compensation for land officially resumed for public use; and second, the restriction over 'the right to build'. As we shall see, the government attempt to

resolve the difficulties relating to 'the politics of land' has a significant effect in the administration of the NT generally.

Furthermore, for the government the administration of land presents a vital issue because of the immense social implications it has for the NT communities. Massive land alienation, for example, would bring about serious disruption in the social structure as a whole. From a wider perspective, therefore, land policy represents part of the administrative process which emphasizes 'the preservation of the traditional social order' in the NT. As I shall argue, there are complex ideological reasons for what may be called 'the cultural policy' of the NT, which is essentially related to the reproduction of the structure of domination in the local communities. This policy is more clearly articulated in the government sponsorship of the local temples and ritual life in general. Consequently, other than in the matter of land, there is close cooperation between the government and local leadership in the organization of major institutions such as the district associations and temple committees responsible for the maintenance of the temples and other tasks in the celebration of seasonal festivals.

The integration of the merchant class in government administration is currently made possible by the formation of the Rural Committee. The Committee is a government sponsored body whose members are elected by the local people, and which acts as a representative of the community *vis-a-vis* the administration. Under the sponsorship of the government, the Rural Committee enjoys considerable prestige and social influence; yet in many aspects, it is also effectively controlled by the government. To elaborate,

we need to examine it in the context of the wider principles of government rule and above all, the structure of administration in the NT.

The Government Administration of the New Territories

The nature of the colonial rule of the NT is best expressed by the proclamation of Sir Henry Blake, the Governor at the time of the British occupation in 1898: "Your commercial and landed interests will be safeguarded and your usages and good customs will not in any way be interfered with".⁷

As I have suggested, the hinterland of the NT was originally acquired to form a strategic buffer between the colony and the Mainland. Consequently the British had never intended to develop the region along the lines of other Asian colonies, such as the Malay Peninsula where plantation economy was established with indentured labour from China and India. Instead, the early administration was mainly concerned with maintaining law and order, and the collection of Crown rent. Thus one of the first duties of the new government was to declare all land in the NT Crown property. After the completion of the survey in 1906 all former landowners were converted into leaseholders of Crown land for 75 years on payment of a fixed annual rental to the government. The rentals were calculated at the same amount as the land tax formerly paid

⁷ Supplement to the Hong Kong Government Gazette 1900: page xxx, Appendix IX.

to the Ching government. All the remaining unallocated Crown land was auctioned to the public; these leases are known as New Grant Lots. In 1969 all leases in the NT were extended to the full 99 years of the term of Convention of Peking (1898), until 1997, without any increase in rent.⁸

Between the wars the administration of this isolated area remained relatively simple. The two District Officers, North and South, also served as magistrates for criminal and civil matters. Generally they were mainly concerned with the collection of Crown rents and the allocation of land; and they worked closely with the Police and the Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry Departments in carrying out the various administrative tasks.

The situation was dramatically altered after the Second World War with the influx of refugees and the economic development of the NT. The District Officers were burdened with additional duties both in the administration of land, and in such areas as public health, squatter control and the settlement of interpersonal disputes. After the early 1950's the more complex functions were gradually transferred to the departments of the Civil Service. For example, a magistrate was appointed in 1954 to take over the criminal offences; and civil jurisdiction was transferred to the

⁸ The original leases included provisions for rent review after ten years, but no increase was then made. As a rule Crown rents are increased when agricultural land is converted for other uses (mainly building); and a premium is charged when a building is erected.

District Court in 1961. In 1959 the Social Welfare Department began to operate in the NT and, in 1980, the Urban Services Department became responsible for sanitation, public health and refuse removal in the area.

Due to the increasing responsibilities the District Offices were expanded by the division of the NT. In 1958 five Districts were created which were further divided in 1974 into the current seven Districts. The estimated population of the seven Districts in 1976 was as follows:

Table 8: Population of the New Territories by Districts.

<u>District</u>	<u>Population</u>
Tai Po	125,000
Yuen Long	141,000
Tsuen Wan	470,000
Sai Kung	30,000
Tuen Mun	62,000
Islands	45,000
Sha Tin	41,000
	<hr/>
Total	914,000
	<hr/>

(Source: Miners *op.cit*:157)

Each District is administered by a District Office and a staff of a hundred or more. Generally speaking, the main duties of the District Officer are three-fold.

Firstly, because of the social and economic importance to the rural communities, the administration of land still remains in the hands of the District Office. Under the NT Ordinance (cap. 97), District Officers are made ex-officio Assistant Land Officers. Working in conjunction with the Lands Division of the NT Administration (see below), the District Officer is responsible for the granting of new leases, the altering of the terms of old leases, and for approving new constructions in villages. When private land is required for public purposes the District Officer will attempt to negotiate for compensation in cash or arrange for a regrant of an alternative lease in exchange. Finally, it is the duty of the District Officer to approve the succession of land under Chinese customs, by giving official recognition to managers of lineage land and by the appointment of trustees for minors.

Secondly, the executive duties of the District Office involve the coordination of government activities in the villages. The Office provides assistance to the Public Works Department in assessing the feasibility of public utility projects, such as the construction of roads, dams and bridges. New government measures such as methods of sanitation recommended by the Medical and Health Department, or livestock inoculation by the Department of Agriculture, are explained to the villagers through the Liaison Officers of the District Office. The District Office is also involved in the organization of relief in the event of typhoon, fire or flood. In remote areas the District Office acts as agent for the Social Welfare Department in distributing various aid funds.

Thirdly, there are what I term 'political duties' which are relatively complex. They include, first of all, the gathering of political intelligence in the broadest sense. Through the cooperation with the Royal Hong Kong Police, the District Office keeps a close watch on criminal elements, especially the organized Triad secret societies which often deal in drugs (heroin) in the NT towns. Another major concern of the District Office is the pro-Chinese left-wing associations. In the fifties and sixties - reaching their height during the Cultural Revolution in China - these associations were active in organizing political discussion groups, putting up anti-British posters and even organizing industrial strikes. Though the pro-Chinese associations are now significantly deradicalized, the District Office is still anxious to keep a rein on them as they often represent the only means for organization of anti-government interests in the NT. Finally, there is the general exercise of social and political influence in the local communities. On the one hand, the District Office is frequently involved in the settlement of personal disputes over the succession of land, payment of debts, etc.. On the other hand, the District Office participates in local social life; the District Officer, for example, attends - as a rule - important social occasions such as the celebration of Chinese New Year in the community. In particular, the District Office in conjunction with other government bodies such as the Public Works Department and the Police, also provides material assistance for the organization of temples and the major seasonal festivals.

In carrying out its many functions the District Office

works closely with local leaders who provide information and generally act as go-betweens for the government and the community. In this there is a sense of continuity from the traditional practice of Chinese administration in the maintenance of local peace through cooperation with the village elders. Indeed 'local cooperation' becomes the dominant feature of the system of administration in the NT, as we shall see.

Currently the most significant development in the functions of the District Office is the additional responsibilities connected with the development of the NT. In each of the three new towns (Sha Tin, Tuen Mun and Tsuen Wan), for example, there is a new post of P.W.D. (Public Works Department) project manager who is the chairman of the Progressive Committee. The latter is mainly concerned with the planning of the various phases of construction in the area. Also, there is a Management Committee, headed by the District Officer but including representatives of all the government departments operating in the new towns. In Tsuen Wan, the largest of the new towns, the District Officer carries the further title of Town Manager who is assisted by two District Officers responsible for Development and Town Management respectively.

Finally, it is necessary to discuss the NT Administration (NTA): the highest authority which coordinates the activities of the District Offices. It is headed by the Secretary for the NT who is accountable to the Governor via the Colonial Secretary. He is assisted by two deputy secretaries one of whom is made responsible for supervising the various stages of the development of the NT. The NTA is the authority of highest appeal regarding

the different aspects of land administration. Thus, the Secretary for the NT and his deputies have the power to execute land leases, to approve exchanges of land and to modify the conditions of land leases. But the most important function of the NTA is to initiate and formulate the many policies that are to be implemented by the District Offices and the various departments of the Civil Service operating in the NT. In other words, the NTA provides a direct link between the NT and the Hong Kong government. The Secretary for the NT, for example, sits in the Legislative Council and also the various boards and committees of the Civil Service, such as the Town Planning Board, the Housing Authority and the Transport Advisory Committee. Through these bodies the Secretary is able to offer his views and recommendations regarding government policies vitally affecting the communities in the NT.

System of Local Representation: Merchant Class Interests and The Administration

In order to maintain a channel of communication between the government and the local communities, an elaborate system of representation has been devised for the NT.

The lowest tier of the system is the 27 Rural Committees representing the 600 odd villages in the NT. Each Committee is made up of a number of Village Representatives (VRs) who are elected by the heads of households. A VR normally represents fifty households and there are more than 900 such Representatives in all. The VR's in each district form an electoral college (the

general assembly) from which the executive committee is elected once in two years. The Executive Committee - consisting of a chairman, two vice-chairmen and members of various portfolios - enjoys considerable prestige in the community because it is connected with the higher reaches of the government bureaucracy. The Committee holds regular meetings with the District Office and the NTA; its members also act as spokesmen for the community and as mediators in local disputes. The obverse of the prestige and official patronage of the Rural Committee is the effective political control by the administration. The election of the Committee is closely supervised at every stage by the District Office. All candidates as well as the elected Representatives must be subject to the approval of the Secretary for the NT. In 1967, for example, some forty-one village representatives were ordered by the Secretary to be withdrawn from the Committees because of their alleged involvement in the anti-government riots ⁹. Furthermore, he is empowered to withhold recognition from any Rural Committee, in which case the Committee would be resolved as an unlawful society under the Societies Ordinance ¹⁰.

At the apex of the system of local representation is the

⁹ See District Commissioner, New Territories, Annual Departmental Report 1967-68: 3.

¹⁰ Societies Ordinance (Cap. 151). This power, however, has never yet been exercised.

Heung Yee Kuk¹¹ or the Rural Consultative Committee. The Full Council of the Kuk is made up of the Chairmen and Vice-chairmen of the 27 Rural Committee, the Justices of Peace in the NT and 21 Special Councillors. The Special Councillors are elected, once in two years, from among the residents of the NT by the Chairmen and Vice-Chairmen of the Rural Committees and the Justices of Peace sitting as an electoral college. The Councillors, like the Village Representatives, are subject to the power of veto of the Secretary for the NT.

The Full Council of the Kuk meets once every six months. It elects its own Executive Committee which consists of a Chairman, two Vice-Chairmen and fifteen ordinary members. These men then sit with the Chairmen of the twenty-seven Rural Committees and the Justices of Peace to form the Executive Committee of the Kuk.

While the Rural Committee deals with the District Office at the local level, the Heung Yee Kuk counsults directly with the NTA. The Executive Committee of the Kuk meets once each month to discuss various matters affecting the NT generally. By 1976, twenty-one sub-committees had been set up by the Kuk specialising in such areas as public health, education, public relations, commerce and agriculture, etc.. In addition there

¹¹ The Heung Yee Kuk was originally set up in 1926 as a body of local consultation, consisting of government appointed village elders. The present Kuk, with its elaborate system of elections and government was first organized in 1959 following the passing of the Heung Yee Kuk Ordinance. See Endicott 1964: 134.

are two special committees: the NT Political Reform Committee and the Working Group for Land Administration (sic).

Again, like the Rural Committee, the Heung Yee Kuk has no executive power. According to the Heung Yee Kuk Ordinance (1959) (cap 1097), its main functions are to promote mutual cooperation between the NT and the government, to advise the government on the problems of NT development and 'to encourage the observance of all such customs and traditional usages of the people of the NT'. Quite simply then, the Heung Yee Kuk through a series of indirect elections (the villages representatives elect the Rural Committee chairmen, who in turn elect the Full Council of the Kuk, whose members in turn elect the Kuk Executive Committee) forms a structure linking the dominant interests in the NT and the administration. I have already given much attention to the collaboration between the merchant class and the government *vis-a-vis* the social-economic development of the NT. What needs to be emphasized is that within the area of consensus there is also significant contention. The administrative reform introduced after the war - which gave rise to the Rural Committee - has been designed to resolve the problems in the relationship between the government and the dominant interests in the NT. I refer in particular to the difficulties arising from the government control of land use.

From the official point of view, the present land policy has been devised to serve important purposes. Other than the collection of Crown rents, one major aim of the policy is to provide a workable method of resuming private land for public work purposes. The official land resumption policy also includes

details of compensation - either in cash or in the form of an alternative regrant of land. Finally, the land policy hopes to ensure 'orderly development' of the NT by providing elaborate building regulations restricting construction by local land owners and private developers.

To put it another way, the effect of the government land policy is to limit the rate of exploitation of land (through building) by the landowners and the revenue accruable from it. Not surprisingly, the issue of land use has become the bone of contention between the Heung Yee Kuk and the government. This will be discussed in details in chapter VII; let me consider here some of the main points.

First of all, there is the matter of Crown rent. Briefly, under the present policy Crown rents are increased when land is converted from agricultural to other use, or when a building is erected on the premise; in addition, a premium is charged for such conversions. All these charges, argues the Heung Yee Kuk, are against the spirit of the Convention of Peking which stipulated the protection of the traditional interests in the NT¹² (Heung Yee Kuk 1975, 1977). Furthermore, the Kuk is dissatisfied with the government restriction on 'the right to build'. This is enforced by the Small House Policy which in effect limits the size of the

¹² According to Chinese common law, though land officially belonged to the State, tenancy-rights were held in perpetuity. The issuing of Block Crown Leases in 1906 in effect enforced conversion of all land to leasehold tenure. The misunderstanding of the British concept of leasehold is essentially the issue here.

'village^g type' house to a covered area of 700 square feet and a height of 25 feet and 3 storeys.

But perhaps the most serious source of conflict is regarding the problems of compensation paid to landowners for land which has been resumed by the government. The major complaint of the Kuk is essentially this: the current rates of compensation are highly insufficient because they are not adjusted to take into account expected rises in the market values of land, thus making it impossible to replace the resumed land with an alternative plot at the ruling market price. Other than the upward adjustment of cash compensations, one compromise that has been worked out is 'compensation in kind' by the government. This is the Letter B Entitlement Scheme which provides a certificate of credit to the owner whose land has been officially resumed, enabling him to apply for a piece of government land in the future. However, from the Kuk's point of view, the Letter B Scheme is by no means satisfactory, mainly because of the necessary premium payable to the government when a Letter B holder applies for a regrant of land. In any case, the whole issue of 'just compensation' for officially resumed private land continues to rankle, adding further difficulties to the already complicated administration of land in the NT.

China and the Political Process in the New Territories

As in Hong Kong society generally, political developments in the People's Republic of China have critical implications for the political process of the NT. This is due to the fact that

the connection of the local communities with Mainland China is significantly expressed in social, political, as well as cultural terms. To phrase it another way, while the Communist regime in China has always provided^d the ideological inspiration for the left-wing organizations, there is also, more generally, a prevailing cultural sentiment towards the 'ancestral country' of which the people in the NT consider themselves a part. Indeed it is the juxtaposition of cultural with economic and political factors which renders incredibly subtle the nature of left-wing politics and definition of pro-Chinese associations in Hong Kong. I reserve a detailed discussion of this issue until Chapter 8. What is evident, however, is that the cultural appeal of China - with its implicit notions of patriotism and Chinese racialism - often provides a powerful ideological resource for the political pursuits of diverse political interests. I consider, first of all, the Heung Yee Kuk.

In arguing for greater freedom from the many restrictions of the land policy the Heung Yee Kuk has stated: "Colonialism is absolutely unwelcome to the NT people" (Heung Yee Kuk 1977: 6). What is significant here is that the Small House Policy and the system of compensation for land resumption are presented as examples of the denial of democratic rights, and economic exploitation of the Chinese people in the NT. Thus the sentiment of 'anti-colonialism', in its diffuse sense, embraces a crucial ideological transformation. By appealing to the 'political rights of the NT inhabitants', such rhetoric conceals the Kuk's own interest in the exploitation of land and the overall support of the colonial regime on which its influence and social status ultimately depends.

At other times the Kuk is wont to point out the unique position of the NT *vis-a-vis* China under the Convention of Peking. The NT, argues the Kuk, is on temporary lease from China; consequently Peking and the "NT people possess entire territorial rights over the NT" (Heung Yee Kuk 1975: 12). In other words, the condition of the Convention of Peking is presented as an argument for special concession in the administration of the NT in contrast to Hong Kong Island. No doubt because of its highly sensitive nature, appeal to Peking for arbitration has been mentioned as a real possibility. In 1972 one Rural Committee, dissatisfied with the rate of compensation for land resumed by the government, asked the Kuk to make direct representation to Peking (*ibid*: 12-14; South China Morning Post, April 7, 1972). However, the delegation was never sent; in any case, it was unlikely that the Chinese government would make any move in support of the Kuk's petition.

By comparison a more dramatic effect of the influence of Mainland China is the transformation of the left-wing associations. Briefly, left-wing associations are those local organizations which, 'under the guidance of *tsu kuo* (ancestral country) strive to improve the welfare of workers in Hong Kong' - as one informant puts it. Thus these associations are recognisable in the local communities by their ostensible pro-Peking ideology and symbolism; and they are active in organising visiting tours to China and celebration of the October-First national day of the People's Republic. Significantly, the normalization of China's foreign policy in relation to Hong Kong and the west has radically

transformed the social reputation and organization of these associations. Compared with the fifties and sixties, when pro-Chinese institutions were generally considered to be connected with anti-government activities and industrial strikes, there is currently a crucial 'deradicalization' of the left-wing ideology. Central to the new left-wing ideology, as I have mentioned, is the emphasis that the improvement of the workers' conditions in Hong Kong must take account of the policy requirements of China, and in particular, her relationship with the colony.

The deradicalization and legitimation of the left-wing associations in the NT is evident in many ways. The most significant is the fact that left-wing supporters - workers, fishermen and hawkers - have in a sense come out in the open and organize themselves in the form of district associations, cooperative societies and neighbourhood associations, etc.. Furthermore, these organizations are allowed to sponsor candidates in the local Rural Committee election; generally there is greater participation of left-wing leaders in community affairs such as distribution of charities and financial contributions to community projects. The position of the pro-Chinese associations is significantly complex in the social-political context of the NT; it is sufficient here to mention the main points.

What is obvious from the discussion above is that there is a significant bridging of differences - both in terms of the aims and organizational form - between left-wing local organizations and their more traditional counterparts. Nevertheless, other than the pro-Peking ideology in the sense already mentioned, two important features can be noted which clearly distinguish these institutions

in the eyes of the local people.

Firstly, unlike the long established local associations the left-wing organizations never receive the same attention and patronage from the District Office. To give an example, during Chinese New Year the District Officer would normally attend the feasts given in his honour by the major associations such as the Chamber of Commerce; such official grace is never extended to the left-wing associations. In fact, all communal activities officially organized by the District Office and the Rural Committee notably exclude the pro-Chinese organizations.

Secondly, and a related issue, the left-wing associations receive strong support from the workers, fishermen and labourers, often under the leadership of the petty traders. I argue that given the developments in China, the lack of official sponsorship - and the ambiguous status in the eyes of the government - of these institutions provides a principal means of organizing working class interests in the local communities. This is so because the left-wing associations essentially see themselves in opposition to the merchant class leadership in the Rural Committee so carefully nurtured by the government. In any case, the emergence of the working class-based institutions has produced in the NT communities a significant polarization of the local associations and social relations in terms of a left-wing/right-wing dichotomy. On Cheung Chau Island, for example, all the district associations, fishermen's cooperative societies, neighbourhood associations etc., are centrally divided by their respective affiliations, forming in effect

left-wing and right-wing political blocs for competition for political influence in the community.

In the NT today, the most influential left-wing organization is the NT Commercial and Trading Union (sic). It is the local branches of this Union which provide the leadership for organizing the left-wing associations in the NT communities. Significantly the Union - constituting mainly of petty traders and hawkers - has been set up as a left-wing counterpart to the powerful NT General Chamber of Commerce. The latter is the federated body of all the Chambers of Commerce in the NT. It enjoys a close relationship with government, and particularly with the NT Administration, with which it deals directly through regular monthly meetings. Like the NT General Chamber of Commerce, the Union has extensive connections with the local townships through many branch offices established in the early seventies. Possessing relative wealth and resources, the Union becomes the centre for organising the workers and fishermen. In the local Rural Committee election, the Union is active in sponsoring candidates and gathering support among the working class members; frequently it offers the only viable opposition against the merchant class whose leaders normally dominate the event.

Conclusion

In this Chapter I have tried to trace the complex historical circumstances leading to the current domination of the merchant class in the NT. In particular I have demonstrated how the colonial takeover altered the traditional basis of power of the

gentry, and thus the structure of community leadership. But the ultimate impetus for the emerging influence of the merchant class was provided by the industrial development of the colonial economy in the post-war years. Putting it simply, the requirements of industrial space and the settlement of workers meant that NT communities - and the local leadership - had to be organized in accordance with the wider development of the metropolitan economy as a whole.

In this context I draw attention to the role of the merchant class leadership in the process of administration. The Heung Yee Kuk and later the Rural Committee, for instance are designed to provide a means of local consultation in the carrying out of the official development plan as well as the day to day business of the government. For its part, because of the commercial interests and equally significant, extensive land holding in the NT, the merchant class is brought into close cooperation with the government in the development of the local communities.

However, I emphasize that despite this overall cooperation, the relationship between the merchant class and the government is also characterized by a serious conflict of interest. Though the problem of land use - as I have explained - is critical here, the issue nevertheless has to be examined within a wider theoretical context; namely, in terms of the contradiction in the nature of colonial rule. Briefly, as suggested in Chapter One, contradiction can be located in the propensity of community leadership, under the support and sponsorship of the government, to develop political and economic interests of its own - often

in direct opposition to those of the government. Thus, we have seen that the social status and influence of the Heung Yee Kuk and the Rural Committee is primarily derived from, and dependent upon the connections with the various branches of the government bureaucracy. Yet it is these bureaucratic connections which provide merchant class leadership with the political confidence and negotiating skill in the attempt to realise its own goals *vis-a-vis* the colonial government. Indeed the difficulties in the administration of land, crystallized in the problem of land use and compensation for official land resumption, is a significant articulation of the contradiction.


For the government, one way to overcome the apparent difficulties is to integrate effective political control within a policy which at the same time emphasizes the official sponsorship and support of local leaders. Thus, the discretionary power of the District Office - and the NT Administration - is centrally featured in the various Ordinances which define the limits of authority of the Kuk and the Rural Committee. Nevertheless, given the circumstance in which the colonial government operates particularly in reference to the political and cultural influence of Mainland China, contradiction in administrative rule is by no means easily resolved and the political process in the NT often develops a degree of complexity quite unforeseen by government.

One important point that emerges, therefore, is the critical role of the government in the shaping of power structures in the NT communities. Putting it another way, official patronage contributes to the structuring of social life and

institutions as well as the order of class relations. In this the function of the District Office is notably complex. In Cheung Chau, for example, formal and informal connections with the District Office provide the major source of prestige and political influence for local institutions like the Rural Committee and the Chamber of Commerce. In the same context, an even more important factor in the structuring of merchant class domination is the official involvement in the local religious life. Since temples and festivals are critical centres of cultural reproduction in Chinese society - as I demonstrate in the following chapter - government support of these institutions ultimately facilitates the exercise of power and influence by the community leadership.

The role of the government in the process of class structuration in the NT is a major part of my argument in this study. Nevertheless, the process has to be examined in the context of the changing property relations and economic transformation of which government sponsorship of the merchant class is but one of the consequences. That is why I have drawn attention to the nature of land tenure, the diversification into land and real estate by the merchant class and the current industrial development. In terms of class relations, these events are invariably accompanied by changes in the ideological emphasis and the social perception about prestige and status. Thus I argue that Punti:Hakka category of relationships, the social reputation of the Chiu Chow people and the division of the left-wing and right-wing organizations are originated in, and have become an intrinsic aspect of, the

political process of the NT. The notion of class structuration offers a meaningful framework which brings together the apparently disparate issues for analysis.



CHAPTER FOUR

CHEUNG CHAU ISLAND¹: CLASS, ETHNICITY AND CULTURAL REPRODUCTIONIntroduction

My main purpose in this chapter is to outline the historical and geographical features, as well as the socio-economic organization of Cheung Chau. Analytically my major concern is to illustrate the complex fashion in which social relations and institutions are shaped by the social and economic processes out of which the structure of class relations emerges. The overall discussion falls into two parts.

Firstly, I examine the way the nature of class relations is articulated in, and thus transformative of the social organization of Cheung Chau. Traditionally ethnicity (*t'ung hsiang*) has always been the key principle for the organization of local associations as well as in the ordering of interpersonal relationships. However, in the context of the rapid social changes taking place in the community, class tends to cut across ethnicity in essentially two ways.

On the one hand, within the local associations ethnicity provides the crucial means for mobilizing political support

¹ The only study of Cheung Chau has been by an historian (Hayes 1963, 1977 chapter two). Hayes served as the District Officer - South in the NT from 1957 to 1962. Arlington (1931) who was in charge of the Imperial Customs station on Cheung Chau, 1893-99, also gave a brief description of the island community in the pre-colonial years.

among the members. In these associations - particularly the ethnically - based district associations - there is a strong emphasis of *hsiang ching* or 'native place sentiment' based on the sharing of a common place of origin in China (Young 1974). Given the merchant class domination of the local associations in general, such ideological appeal of 'common ancestral origin' significantly rationalizes the powerful position of the leadership.

On the other hand, looking across the ethnic groups one sees that there exist substantial differences in social influence and economic power. Such ranking of the ethnic groups as I have suggested in the previous chapter, means that there is a significant overlapping of the structural cleavages based on class and ethnicity. Thus ethnic associations like all local organizations generally are distinguishable by their respective class affiliations and origins. There are various terms with which people in Cheung Chau describe such polarization: *tso p'ai*, *yu p'ai*, i.e. left-wing and right-wing factions; and more frequently, *ai kuo p'ai* and *yuan lao p'ai*, or literally Patriotic Front and Elders' Party.

The intricate connection between class and ethnicity provides the central theme of my discussion: that the organization of class domination on Cheung Chau crucially involves mobilization through the principle of ethnicity. I draw attention especially to the structural domination of the Chiu Chow merchants.

The most influential district association on Cheung Chau is the Wai Chiu Fu. It is organized by the people of Chiu Chow, Hoklo and Hakka origins. Historically the Hoklo people, who made

up most of the fishing population, were the earliest settlers on Cheung Chau. The long traditional connections of the Wai Chiu people with the community is given recognition by the custom which appoints the Wai Chiu Fu as the formal organizers of the most important community festival in Cheung Chau - the Bun Festival.

The decline of the fishing industry after the war, and the subsequent development of Cheung Chau as a market and residential town have brought about major changes not only in the community as a whole, but also in the organization of the Wai Chiu Fu. Putting it briefly, there have been attempts by the powerful Chiu Chow merchants who arrived following the Communist takeover of China, to control the Wai Chiu Fu. In terms of my central analysis, the manoeuvre of the Chiu Chow merchants serves to maintain the power relations *vis-a-vis* the Hoklo and Hakka people who are now employed mostly as labourers and general hands in the construction industry.

At the same time, mobilization through the Wai Chiu Fu has had the effect of reproducing the structural domination of the Wai Chiu merchants in the community. Critical in this process is the organization of the Bun Festival. As the Festival is important for ensuring the spiritual welfare of the community generally, the undertaking enables the Chiu Chow merchants to engage in a crucial ideological transformation, and to exercise influence beyond the Wai Chiu Group.

In short, focusing on the structure of domination, power relations based on class are superimposed on and transformed by the principle of ethnicity. But turning to the organization of

power itself, wider political circumstances are also involved contributing to the total processes of class structuration. In particular, I emphasize the major influence of District Office patronage in the definition of prestige and power in the community. Above all, the official sponsorship of merchant class leadership has to be seen as an intricate aspect of the administrative rule of the NT. Generally the policy emphasizes the goodwill of the government, and encourages the cooperation between the local leadership and the administration in the social and economic development of the community.

The community power structure on Cheung Chau is crystallized in the Rural Committee. Other than the crucial connections with the official bureaucracy, one feature of the Committee has to be mentioned. This is that the merchant class leaders dominating the Committee are also those men who occupy important positions in the local district associations. Indeed, under the leadership of the Chiu Chow merchants, the Committee maintains, through a set of complex relationships, major connections with the Cheung Chau Chamber of Commerce, the Wai Chiu Fu and the main local association. Discussion of the organization of power on Cheung Chau leads me to the major theme in the second part of the chapter: the cultural reproduction of the structure of domination.

The analysis here is an extension of the theoretical discussion of the production of ideology and the dialectics of culture and practice presented in the first chapter. Consequently I give strong emphasis to the government involvement - in conjunction with the merchant class leadership - in the

organization of the major temples and the Bun Festival. My argument is that it is through these means of cultural reproduction that class conflict, and the principal contradiction in the nature of colonial rule are reconciled.

Hence, I focus first of all on the architecture of the Chinese temple. In Chinese society the layout of the temple is made to resemble that of the domestic household: in theoretical terms, there is a significant correspondence between the 'structure' of the temple and the order of relationships in the family. I shall discuss in this connection the layout of the Pak Tai temple and the cultural conception of Pak Tai - the most important deity in the community - as the 'patriarch of Cheung Chau'.

The theme of the temple as the centre for the reproduction of the patri-familial ideology is further illustrated by the discussion on the symbolic organization of the Bun Festival.

The so-called 'ghost placating festival' is held to give ritual offerings to the wandering ghosts in order to assist them in their journey to the underworld. To the gods, especially the patron deity, Pak Tai, the festival demonstrates the spirit of communal solidarity in the undertaking to improve the social harmony and welfare of Cheung Chau. Therefore, in relation to my central argument, the significance of the Bun Festival can be briefly stated.

In the first place, the idea of the promotion of the spiritual welfare of the Cheung Chau people enables the merchant class as well as the government to engage in the reproduction of the ideology of 'official paternalism'. Furthermore by emphasizing the social and spiritual collectivity of Cheung Chau,

the festival serves to gloss over the existing structural inequality. In other words, in the communal celebration of the festival there tends to be an underplay of the powerful positions of the Chamber of Commerce, the Wai Chiu Fu and the Rural Committee which are recognized as the centres of socio-economic influence. Instead the dominance of the Chiu Chow group is subtly expressed through the symbolic organization of the festival. Indeed, putting it more accurately, the significance of the Bun Festival as a centre of ideological production is precisely that the ritual processes involved conceal and yet symbolically emphasize the nature of class domination in the community.

In retrospect, it is interesting to note that on Cheung Chau, the struggle for political power has always involved the attempts by the local leaders to control the organization of the major temple and Bun Festival. In the local people's view, the sponsorship of temples and community rituals is but a means of 'buying face' for men who have already achieved positions of economic wealth and social influence. However, I suggest that the issue can be more crucially related to the wider problems of the marxist analysis of culture and the reproduction of structural domination. This central theme provides the overarching unity to my discussion.

Geographical and Historical Perspective

The island of Cheung Chau lies just about five miles off Hong Kong Island. With a population of nearly 28,000, it is the most prosperous of the island communities at the southern part

of the NT. The island covers an area of 0.934 square mile or about 592 acres. The form of the landscape takes the form of an inverted letter T with three arms radiating out about a mile each way from the low beach area at the centre on which the township is situated. The longest extent of the island running from north to southwest is 2.25 miles. The northern arm of the island is rocky, attaining a height of 300 feet. The other two arms are relatively fertile and contain most of the original agricultural land.

Cheung Chau provides one of the best harbours in Hong Kong. From May to September when the easterlies sweep across the China Sea the Cheung Chau Bay gives shelter to hundreds of fishing junks. Not surprisingly, Cheung Chau had been until quite recently one of the most important fishing communities in the colony. Indeed, archaeological remains show that the waters around Cheung Chau have been a fishing station for over 2,000 years; by the thirteenth century fishermen began to settle permanently on Cheung Chau (So 1964: 142). The importance of the fishing population in the early years of colonial rule is indicated by the census of 1911 which listed 3244 persons on land but 4442 living on board fishing boats². One contemporary report mentioned that in the 1890s there were "no less than 900 junks in the harbour at one of the festival times" (Arlington 1931: 159).

Those living on land were mostly shopkeepers and manufacturers who catered for the needs for the fishermen. The

² Hong Kong Sessional Papers 1911: 103(26) and 103(38).

activities on the island at the end of the nineteenth century are vividly described by Arlington (*op. cit.*: 158):

The island contained a population of some 5,000 Chinese, most of whom were engaged in manufacturing of shrimp sauce, the vile stench of which nearly drove us frantic. Added to this there were hundreds of salt-fish drying establishments which spread their fish all over the island and on every available rock and tree. Hundreds of junk loads of fresh or rotten fish were landed daily, and after being sorted were set in the sun to dry; this, combined with the odious stench of the shrimp sauce, may be better imagined than described.

Besides the establishments for the manufacturing of fish products there were services connected with the repair and construction of fishing junks. The Hong Kong Blue Book of 1906 (vol. 2: 11) listed 5 boat-building yards, 3 oar-making works, 2 rope and sail works, and 3 blacksmiths' premises. Lastly, there were a small number of farmers growing mainly rice and vegetables. Agriculture on Cheung Chau had always been limited due to the lack of arable land; by the time of the British takeover only 91.07 acres were surveyed and registered as agricultural land.

Both the fishermen and land settlers came from the various parts of Kwangtung and Fukien. The 1911 census - which included the neighbouring Peng Chau and Nei Kwu Chau - gave populations of the dialect groups, thus: Punti, 2,443; Hoklo, 957; and Hakka, 564. As in other NT communities generally, one feature of ethnic relations on Cheung Chau can be discerned. This is the general low status of the Hakka farmers and, more significantly, the cultural disrepute of the Hoklo fishermen who were regarded as uncouth and distinctively unChinese for adopting their way of life on the fishing junks. In more theoretical terms, the symbolic opposition

of land/water; civilised/vulgar categories had emerged directly from, and became the ideological expression of the power (exploitative) relations between the Punti shopkeepers and farmers/fishermen.

The relative socio-political importance of the Punti speakers is indicated by the many district associations or *tung hsiang hui* formed among the Cantonese group. As voluntary associations, the ostensible purpose of the *tung hsiang hui* is two-fold: "to provide community services not rendered by government, and to look after the interests of members within the settlement in which they exist" (Hayes 1977: 62). The main ones were organised by people from the Cantonese countries of *Hsin-an* (of which Hong Kong was a part before the British occupation), *Tung-kuan* and *Ssu-i*. As these associations are still in existence today, I shall leave the description until later.

In contrast, the non-Punti Hoklo and Hakka people were organized around a single *tung hsiang hui*, the Wai Chiu Fu. The Wai Chiu Fu is the oldest district association on Cheung Chau, having been established in the 1780's. However, despite its long history, the Wai Chiu Fu never attained important influence until the post-colonial period. There are several reasons for this, such as the seasonal mobility of the Hoklo fishermen, the high illiteracy rate among the Wai Chiu people as well as the cultural conception regarding the water-bred people. Nevertheless the Wai Chiu people were active supporters of community life, particularly in the organization of the temples and seasonal festivals. Indeed, the Wai Chiu Fu, because of its long historical connection with the settlement of Cheung Chau, was

traditionally made responsible for the organization of the important Bun Festival. It is this connection with the community ritual which later enables the powerful Chiu Chow merchants to play a vital part in the festival.

Therefore, it is evident that the structure of Punti-Wai Chiu relationship is tied in with crucial economic and cultural factors. More specifically, the nature of ethnic relations has to be seen against the appropriation of surpluses from the dominant mode of production, fishing and the cultural - ideological manifestations that accompanied such as process. At the same time, the political domination of the Punti (Cantonese) shopkeepers was further enhanced by the nature of local administration under the Ching Dynasty.

To begin with, the geographical isolation of the island community from the district headquarters in Nam Tau, Kwangtung, meant that many of the day to day affairs, such as road repairs, the lighting of streets and even the organization of local militia, were left largely in the hands of the community leaders. Government functions were confined on the whole to the collection of taxes and custom duties. This has been the main argument of Hayes (1963, 1977) who emphasizes the significant degree of "self-help" which characterized the administration of Cheung Chau during the Ching period. In any case, stating it briefly, a situation was created on the island in which local leaders could exercise a considerable measure of power without undue intervention from the district authorities.

Here we have to return to the nature of land tenure which I have mentioned in the first chapter. Obviously the position

of the Wong Wai Tsak Tong, with its imperial grant of tax rights on Cheung Chau and crucial connections with the official bureaucracy, would have given its leaders important power and influence in the community.

The issue of 'local autonomy' and the position of the land-owning Wong Wai Tsak Tong will be taken up again in the following chapter. It is sufficient here to emphasize, speaking of the pre-British years generally, that the nucleus of community power structure would be dominated by the Tong, and to a lesser extent, the Punti shopkeepers. The relationship between these men was by no means always amicable and they later came into serious conflict under colonial administration. But on the whole, it was the respective leaders from the district associations, the merchant and craft guilds and the Wong Wai Tsak Tong who took on the main tasks of maintaining the key facilities in the community. Regular meetings were held at the Pak Tai temple (see below) and over time a formal community organization called *kai fong* or 'street association' emerged which became the focus of local influence and prestige. As an indication of its significant power within the community, the *kai fong* was able to collect monthly subscriptions from all the shops, and to solicit donation for the temples and emergency relief for fire and typhoon victims. After the British occupation the *kai fong* naturally became the centre of government attention and was made to serve an important part in the administration. Furthermore it is from the *kai fong* that the subsequent community organizations, namely, the Cheung Chau Residents' Association and the Rural Committee, were evolved.

The Economy: From Fishing to the Development of a Residential
Town

Fishing, with its supporting industries, remained the main basis of the Cheung Chau economy until the Second World War. During the Japanese occupation, restrictions were imposed on the movements of fishing junks, limiting fishing to the waters around the outer islands of Hong Kong. As a result fishing on Cheung Chau came to a virtual standstill, and the fishing population, according to local estimates fell from about 6,000 in the late 1930's to less than 2,500 during the war³.

After the war, the return of the fishermen - who were dispersed over the fishing ports in southern Kwangtung during the war - brought the floating population to nearly 6,500 in 1951. However, the fishing industry never regained the economic importance of the pre-war years. In the first place, in subsequent years the fishermen on Cheung Chau, like others in the colony generally, were faced with increasing competition from the Japanese and Taiwanese trawlers. Highly mechanised and efficient, these deep sea vessels operate in the traditional fishing grounds near the South China coast and part of the catch

³ No reliable social and economic statistics are available. The data presented in the following are compiled from interviews and the reports of the local associations. I wish to thank the Cheung Chau Post Office, Cheung Chau Rural Committee, and Cheung Chau Chamber of Commerce for their assistance. The Rural Committee held an 'Understanding Cheung Chau Exhibition' in May 1977; the many charts and materials containing useful information on the local social and economic life had been made available to me.

is sold in the lucrative Hong Kong market. This has the consequence of pushing the productive fishing grounds further south and westerly to the waters around Indo-China.

In addition, the industry was seriously affected by the removal, in 1956, of the government fish wholesale market on Cheung Chau to Cheung Sha Wan in Kowloon. Originally the whole sale market on the island offered much convenience to the fishermen who sought anchor there; they were able to unload the catch, replenish supplies and to attend to any repairs of the junks and nettings. However, with the removal of the market elsewhere, many fishermen now prefer to find anchor in less remote stations like Aberdeen in Hong Kong Island, and Shakeiwan in Kowloon.

Speaking of the current period, the second major restructuring of the local economy has been brought about by the crucial industrial development of the colony from the early 1960's onwards. The changes in the wider metropolitan economy are articulated in the community of Cheung Chau in a way that is highly visible. The structural adjustment takes the form of the development of a residential town for industrial workers from Hong Kong. Instead of reliance on fishing as the main economic base, the town now derives its source of income essentially through the provision of necessities - food, accommodation, for example - for immigrant workers settling there and to a lesser extent, for tourists who crowd the island in the weekends and during the holidays. This is reflected in the main features of the current economic organization of Cheung Chau.

Fishing

There are now some 2,500 fishermen on Cheung Chau; many of them still live on the 150 odd fishing junks that anchor in Cheung Chau Bay. About half of these are deep sea vessels fitted with diesel engines and for these, the operation is often highly capitalised. A sixty-four footer plus a 230 horse power marine engine require a substantial investment of about \$200,000. Furthermore, it is a common practice among the larger boats to employ two or three wage workers to supplement the labour provided by the family of the operator/owner.

In recent years there has been a significant diversification into fish farming. This is done by immersing a large metal net enclosure into the sea; the fish inside - usually the expensive types like garoupa - are fed each day with small prawns and squids. Currently there are about 160 of such fish farms, involving some 70 fishermen households.

Since the early 1960's, there has been a gradual movement of fishermen to settle on land. The wealthier ones have brought houses notably in the Tai Tsoi Yuen Kui area (see map). Throughout the fishing season from October to April, they leave their children and elders on shore during the long voyage which may last from five to seven weeks.

By far the largest fishing settlement is Sai Wan, at the western end of the island. A total of 191 households consisting of a little under a thousand people occupy the three villages. These are CARE villages, completed in 1972 with finance from a variety of sources: CARE (Cooperative for American Relief

Everywhere) - a US and Canadian based charity organization, the District Office and the Cheung Chau Rural Committee.

The settlers in these villagers are mainly of two types. First are the fishermen engaging in small scale fishing around the coastal waters of Cheung Chau, bring in small harvests of kettle fish and prawns. But a larger number of the villagers are those who have abandoned fishing and who are currently employed in the small factories on the island or, as labourers on the waterfront and on construction sites.

Except for the operators of mechanized trawlers, the majority of the remaining fishermen on Cheung Chau generally present a distressing picture of high illiteracy and economic poverty. The present 'construction boom' provides the only employment for the older ones still living on Cheung Chau, while young men in the families have mostly moved to find work in the factories in Hong Kong. As we shall see, it is through the support of these labourers on Cheung Chau that working class-based left-wing associations are formed.

Commerce and Industries⁴

All the shops and trading stores are concentrated in the town centre. The 210 shops provide a variety of goods and services as Table 9 illustrates.

⁴ Compiled from the membership list of the Cheung Chau Chamber of Commerce.

Table 9. Main Enterprises on Cheung Chau*

<u>Types</u>	<u>Numbers</u>
Restaurants	21
Fish Dealers	16
Chinese Herbal Medicine	19
Cigarette and Spirit Dealers	12
Grocery	35
Butcher	12
Fruit and Vegetable Seller	7
Joss Sticks and Ritual Items	15
Electrical Supplies	17
Furniture Fitter	8
Baker	9
Textile Retailers	13
Jeweller	6
Funeral Service	2
Barber	2
Pawn Shop	1
Hotel	4
Cargo Ferry	2
Marine Engine Repair	5
Miscellaneous	5
	<hr/>
Total :	211
	<hr/>

*Excluding manufacturings, ship repairs and constructions.

Source: Cheung Chau Chamber of Commerce:
Membership List 1978 (unpublished).

A large number of the shops, notably the general stores and those specializing in fish products and nettings, were established long before the war. Following the successful Communist Revolution in China, many Chiu Chow merchants - mainly from the city of Swatow in Southern Kwungtang - arrived and opened shops on Cheung Chau. On the whole, they tend to monopolize the grocery trade, selling rice, cooking oil, preserved vegetables and canned food. The other main businesses are distributed among the Punti group. The ethnic origins of the businesses on Cheung Chau are shown in Table 10.

Table 10. Ethnic Origins of Business Ownership

<u>Ethnic Origin</u>	<u>Actual Number</u>	<u>Percentage</u>
Wai Chin-Chin Chow	47	22
Tung Kwan	38	18
Po On	41	20
Sei Yip	28	13
Chung Shan	24	11
Shu Teck	21	10
Miscellaneous	12	6
Total:	211	100

Source: Cheung Chau Chamber of Commerce: Membership List 1978 (unpublished).

In addition, the community is served by four banks, four substandard hotels - and a multi-storey international hotel is being planned for the beach on Tung Wan.

Turning now to the industries, there are, first of all, those specializing in providing for the needs of the fishermen. Before the war there was a flourishing business supplying dry ice and in the building and repairing of fishing junks. But only one shipyard now remains on Cheung Chau. Then there are the more traditional types of enterprise engaging in the manufacturing of rice noodles, preserved fruits and vegetables; these are small scale factories each employing some 15 to 20 workers mostly women. The situation is summarised in Table 11.

Table 11. Types of Manufacturing on Cheung Chau

<u>Types</u>	<u>Numbers</u>
Dry Noodles	1
Bean Sauce	3
Fish Products	5
Preserved Fruits & Vegetables	4
Playing Cards	1
Rope & Oar	2
Leather Works	1
Shipyards	1
Sampans	4
	<hr/>
Total:	22
	<hr/>

Source: Cheung Chau Chamber of Commerce:
Membership List 1978 (unpublished).

By contrast other enterprises are recently established, mostly during the mid-1960's. They consist of labour intensive, light manufacturings. The factories are usually housed in the

ground floor of small shops, each employs some 40 to 50 workers. The types of goods manufactured and other details are given in Table 12.

Table 12. Types of Newer Industries on Cheung Chau

<u>Industries</u>	<u>Numbers</u>
Knitting	11
Plastic Goods	6
Ceramic Painting	3
Jade Polishing	3
	<hr/>
Total:	23
	<hr/>

Source: Cheung Chau Chamber of Commerce:
Membership List 1978 (unpublished)

In spite of the high electricity charges compared with other parts of Hong Kong, these enterprises enjoy the advantage of relatively cheap wages (about 15% lower than the rates in similar industries in urban Hong Kong) and cheap rent. Again, in contrast with the more traditional industries on Cheung Chau, these manufacturings require only unskilled labour to work, for example, the knitting machines and the machines for plastic moulding. Consequently, they are able to attract many female workers, notably from among the housewives and early school leavers.

The Land and Construction Boom

Lastly, the economic transformation of Cheung Chau encompasses what amounts to a 'construction boom' in the 1970's. Generally the high rents and shortage of accommodation in the colony as a whole have a direct effect on the demand for housing on Cheung Chau. However, the dramatic inflation of rent and land prices on the island is in part brought about by the speculation in real estate by the wealthy merchants, notably the leaders of the Rural Committee. The effects of the 'boom' are highly visible as old houses are pulled down and once agricultural areas like Tai Tsoi Yuen Kui and Pak She now contain close clusters of small flats.

The rents and land prices on Cheung Chau can be differentiated into three distributions according to the locations: the commercial town centre, the prestigious Peak Road area and the rest where the more standard type of housing is built. The situation in November 1978 can be summarised in this way.

1. Town Centre: Land prices vary between \$800 to \$1,000 per square foot. High prices are offered for land sites facing the water front with easy access to the ferry.

The normal rent for a shop-front, covering a floor area of 500 to 700 square feet, lies within the range of \$2,000 to \$2,500 per month. However, for many pre-war buildings, rentals are frozen under the Rent Control regulation; in these cases - which include many belonging to the Tong - rentals charged range between \$150 to \$500 per month.

2. Peak Road Area: Under the Peak Road (Cheung Chau) Ordinance of 1919, Peak Road was established as an exclusively European residential area until the repeal of the Ordinance in 1946.

Generally the best types of housing on Cheung Chau are found here. They are either European type bungalows built before the war, or modern two or three storey flats. These flats and bungalows are large by local standards, usually of 750 to 1200 square feet in floor area, and tenants are paying from \$750 to \$2,000 a month for rent.

Prices of land and houses are increasing at a faster rate than even in the town centre. This is mostly due to the high demand by people from Hong Kong who seek these flats on Cheung Chau as weekend and holiday resorts. It is not unusual for land to fetch \$1,500 per square foot at an auction; and a modest flat of 700 square feet in size now costs at least \$270,000.

3. Other Areas: These include Tai Tsoi Yuen Kui, Lung Tsai Tsuen and Pak She San Tsuen, which are residential neighbourhoods built up from what were formerly agricultural or waste lands. The houses constructed are mostly the standard 'village house' type defined by the NT Building Regulations; they are usually 3 storey and 25 feet in height, and each unit (i.e. each floor) covers a floor area of 350 to 500 square feet.

Rentals and land prices in these areas generally reflect the quality of housing. Monthly rent is usually within the range of \$300 to \$500, generally calculated on the basis of one dollar per square foot of the size of the unit. Land prices are low compared with other areas of the island; in late 1978 they stood at \$120 to \$150 per square foot. But they showed similiar rapid inflation; the average value at the end of 1977 was \$70 per square foot. Thus, there has been an overall increase of 100% per year.

Turning to the economic transformation of Cheung Chau as a whole, I suggest that the issue has to be seen as part of the wider processes taking place in the community and in the colonial society generally. Above all, the shift in the economic base from fishing to the provision for the immigrant workers and residents from Hong Kong is central in the structuring of the merchant class domination in the community. But more of this later.

The process of class structuration necessarily involves the reordering of socio-economic relations *vis-a-vis* the labourers and fishermen. The working class on Cheung Chau are organized in a group of 'patriotic' or left-wing associations. The complex organization and ideological transformation of these associations is best taken up in a separate chapter (Chapter Eight); I shall confine myself here to some general statements.

One of the immediate effects of the current 'construction boom' is to create a demand for building labourers. Most significantly, these labourers are recruited from among the displaced Hoklo fishermen. Work is hard: building materials like sand, cement and steel bars are ferried to the island and then have to be carried by work gangs to the building sites (there are no motor vehicles on Cheung Chau). There are about 450 people thus employed, at one time or another, throughout the year.

The building labourers are mostly men and women past their early forties, who for various reasons - age, commitment to the family on Cheung Chau - cannot leave to find work in Hong Kong. Daily wage averages \$25 to \$50 for a nine hour work day. Furthermore, work is usually offered on a contractual basis; because of the hardship involved a person is rarely able to work continuously for more than a month at a stretch. If only because of the conditions of work, there is a considerable working class consciousness among the Hoklo labourers who, together with the workers from Hong Kong provide the major support for the left-wing associations.

The second impact of the economic transformation concerns the reorganization of the craftsmen and skilled labour

traditionally employed in the shipyards. To a large extent, the present activity in the construction of shops and flats is able to absorb the many workers who left the shipyards following the decline of the fishing industry. Most significant of these are the carpenters, though a large number have also found employment in Aberdeen in Hong Kong and Saukeiwan, Kowloon, where most of the fishing junks in Hong Kong are still being built.

Compared with the general labourers, skilled workers like carpenters, scaffold builders and plasterers command relatively high wages, usually up to \$70 a day. Partly because of this, these men - a group which includes some of the earliest settlers on Cheung Chau - are beginning to enjoy a greater social standing in the community. Above all, they have developed an impressive consciousness of their socio-economic positions in relation to the powerful merchants who are centrally involved in the real estate development on Cheung Chau.

One manifestation of this is the emergence, and the reorganization of the craft associations in the form of a Cheung Chau Building Labourers' Guild. Through the Guild some of the traditional practices such as the recruitment of apprentices, ritual offerings to the patron deity of the building profession, are being revived. Interestingly, the return to these practices is accompanied by an open allegiance to a pro-Peking left-wing ideology. As we shall see, with the emergence of left-wing associations in the late 1960's, the Building Labourers' Guild is to play a leading role in the formation of the *ai kuo p'ai* or Patriotic Front in the ideological struggle against the merchant class domination.

Class and Ethnicity: The District Associations and The Chiu
Chow Merchants

The legitimate power structure is made up of influential men from two types of local organizations: the district associations and the merchant association - the Cheung Chau Chamber of Commerce. It is legitimate in the sense that the leadership so formed receives District Office patronage and occupies a dominant position in the Rural Committee. This organization of community leadership is referred to by the local people as *yuan lao p'ai*, literally, Elders' Party, indicating its considerable prestige and influence. *Yuan Lao* meaning 'elders', is a term only given to describe men of social and cultural achievement.

I deal first of all with the district associations the presence of which naturally reflects the ethnic composition of the community. The list of the main associations is given in Table 13.

Table 13. Principal District Associations on Cheung Chau

<u>Associations</u>	<u>When formed</u>
Punti Group	
Tung Kwun Association	Circa 1801
Sei Yip (Four District) Assn	Circa 1860
later formed the	
Ng Yip (Five District) Assn	1959
Po On Association	Circa 1800
Chung Shan Association	1947
Non-Punti Group	
Wai Chiu Fu	Circa 1783
Chiu Chow Association	1963
Hui Luk-fung (Hoklo) Association	1978

District associations are, I suggest, principal reproductions of the most enduring institutional form in Chinese society: the voluntary association, or *shê t'uan*. In fact, the key structures of the *shê t'uan* are articulated (reproduced) in all local organizations, either neighbourhood associations, professional associations or craft guilds. Thus, common with other traditional institutions in the community, district associations emphasize as the main organizational aim, the dispensing of charities and other forms of assistance among the members. Membership is based on households; so that on the payment of the subscription fee (usually a low one or two dollars a month) all members in each member-household are entitled to a variety of benefits such as scholarships for school children, funeral expenses and gifts of food during festivals.

At the same time, the expenses for the running of the associations are dependent on the subsidies provided by the leaders who are as a rule men of considerable wealth and influence. Hence, the distribution of charities and the financial patronage of the leaders has the effect of creating significant social obligation for these men. These central features, combined with the emotionally powerful *hsiang ching* or 'native place sentiment' underlying the relations within the same ethnic group, serve to mobilize political support among the members of the district association.

I turn now to the principal district associations on Cheung Chau.

The Po On Association is organized by the natives of the

County of San On (San On Hsien) of which Hong Kong was a part under the Ching administration. Notably, the leadership was, and still is, dominated by members of the Wong Wai Tsak Tong. Through the connections with the Tong, the Association enjoyed significant influence in the past. In the 1850's it maintained the Chan On She or Security Bureau which was the headquarters for the local militia on Cheung Chau. The function of the Security Bureau, other than the maintenance of law and order generally, was to negotiate with the Imperial Government for the raising of arms for local defence against, for instance, pirate attacks (Hayes 1963: 92).

Perhaps more than other ethnic groups, the Po On people tended to control the *yu lan* or fish wholesale business. In the heyday of the fishing industry, the Po On fish merchants were among some of the wealthiest men on Cheung Chau. Now most of them have diversified into other business, selling textiles and herbal medicine; those with capital, like all other wealthy merchants, are also involved in the construction and buying and selling of real estate.

Perhaps under the influence of the Tong leaders who have always placed high values on education, the Association provides elaborate schemes - compared with other district associations on Cheung Chau - for assisting the young school children of its members. Subsidies take the form of money for school fees, text books and stationary; prizes are given to promising pupils. Currently all Po On children attending school are paid \$150 each at the end of the year. These expenses, plus those for other charities for the members, are derived from the financial

contributions of the leaders, as well as from the regular income from several shop-houses. These are ancestral properties purchased by the Association in the past, such as the premises in Tai San Street which used to house the Security Bureau.

The Cantonese-speaking Tung Kwun people were among the earliest settlers on Cheung Chau. By the early 19th century, they were firmly established in the community, as an historian comments:

... at the time of the British lease, (the Tung Kwun) association provided a community office, and school for its members. It supplied free medicine and coffins for poor natives of the district, and had established a charity grave for paupers (Hayes 1977: 63).

Compared with the Po On group, the Tung Kwun people are engage in a wide range of professions. They are found in such businesses as manufacturing of incense and other objects of religious worship, restaurants and coffee shops, and stores selling textiles and other sundry goods. The Association organizes annual worship and ritual offerings for the 'hungary ghosts' of the kinsmen. In 1954 it opened its own Tung Kwun Primary School in Tung Wan, a short distance from the town centre; the School was latter combined with the Po On and Wai Chiu Schools to form the Kwok Mun Primary School, one of the largest schools on Cheung Chau with nearly a thousand pupils. To finance its many activities, the Association has accumulated considerable property over the years which includes five shop-houses and two office premises.

From the present point of view, the most interesting district association is the Wai Chiu Fu, the most significant non-Punti

organization on Cheung Chau. The association was established in the middle of the 18th century by the early settlers from the neighbouring counties (*Fu*) of Wai Yeung and Chiu Chow in Southern Kwangtung. Unlike other district associations whose members share a common dialect, the Wai Chiu Fu consists of speakers of three non-Cantonese dialects: Hakka, Chiu Chow and Hoklo. Generally speaking, the Hoklo group constituted most of the early fishermen who settled on Cheung Chau; the Hakka and some of the Hoklo people were vegetable farmers making a living from the rugged hillsides, mainly at the western end of the island. The wealthiest of the Wai Chiu people were shopkeepers and fish dealers. The historical importance of the Wai Chiu Fu is best indicated by its construction of the Pak Tai temple in 1783, by which time the Wai Chiu people "were already a distinct, numerous, and flourishing group on the island" (Hayes *op. cit.*: 62). The issue of the vital connection of the Fu with the organization of the Pak Tai temple, and the annual Bun Festival, will be discussed in a later context.

Let me instead focus on the recent transformation on the Fu. The critical event was the arrival of the Chiu Chow merchants from China, as part of the mass influx of people into the colony at the eve of the communist takeover. Coming from Southern Kwangtung, particularly the city of Swatow, these men brought with them capital, and above all, business connections with their kinsmen in Hong Kong as well as other parts of Asia (especially Thailand where Chiu Chow people dominate the important rice trade). Consequently, with the increasing population and the expansion of Cheung Chau as a market town

after the war, the Chiu Chow merchants were able to establish various businesses to cater for the expanding needs of the community. As in other parts of the NT, these new arrivals tend to deal in the wholesale or retailing of groceries; mainly rice, cooking oil, preserved vegetables and canned food.

With impressive economic resources and social connections with the wider Hong Kong society, it was not difficult for the Chiu Chow merchants ^{to} gain control of what is essentially an ethnic association of fishermen, labourers and small shopkeepers. What is significant is the way such control is achieved. Ostensibly, from what appears as the formal leadership structure, the Wai Chiu Fu is still dominated by the older settlers engaging in a variety of professions, as the details of the 1978 executive committee indicate (see Table 14).

Table 14. Leadership of Wai Chiu Fu, 1978

	<u>Profession</u>
<u>Chairman</u>	
Fong Ping	Preserved Vegetable Manufacturer
<u>Vice-Chairman</u>	
Lo Tin-Yin	Building Contractor
Yee Yok-Tin	Vegetable Wholesaler
<u>Executive Members</u>	
Lah Yok-Chu	Playing cards Manufacturing
Fung Yoke-Shee	Herbalist, Building Contractor
Fung Pak-Tai	Real Estates Dealer
Lin Tse-Shin	Rice Retailer
Lim Tse-Lian	Rice Retailer
Siew Chee-Mum	Fish dealer
Wong Lai-King	Fish sauce Manufacturer
Hui Kuan-King	Real Estates Dealer
Fung Chung-Chou	Restruant Owner
Wong Kwong-Shong	Herbal Doctor
Chan Chee-Chai	Rice Retailer

Source: Wai Chiu Fu: List of Executive members 1978
(unpublished)

But in reality the control of the Wai Chiu Fu is subtly accomplished through providing vital support and financial subsidies to the association. For example, most of the Chiu Chow merchants maintain membership in both the Fu and their own Chiu Chow Association (see below); they make a point of attending the meetings and social gatherings organized by the Fu. In addition, the Chiu Chow members contribute significantly towards the expenses of the Fu, and especially the substantial budget of the Bun Festival, as I explain later. Indeed, the organization of the annual Festival would be impossible without the crucial involvement of the Chiu Chow group. They assist in the various stages of the organization, such as the construction of the bun towers and the stage for the opera performance; they are also responsible for collecting a major proportion of the funds to cover the expenses by soliciting donations from merchant houses in Hong Kong.

Thus, the nature of the Chiu Chow control involves much 'giving face to the Wai Chiu elders long associated with the Fu', as one informant put it. Nevertheless, though the Chiu Chow merchants do not occupy formal positions in the Fu leadership they are able to exercise significant influence in determining the development of the Wai Chiu Fu. For example, because of the dominant position of the Chiu Chow group close co-operation between the Fu and the powerful Cheung Chau Chamber of Commerce is made possible, as I shall illustrate. In any case, there is considerable goodwill between the Fu and the Chiu Chow group; Fu informants often praise the Chiu Chow members for their many contributions to the organization. Yet the nature of the

Chiu Chow group's relationship with the Fu is in reality more complex than informants have suggested.

From the view of the Chiu Chow merchants, the close connection with the Wai Chiu Fu invariably places them in a difficult position. Because of the long historical connection with the settlement of Cheung Chau and the major responsibility for the organization of the Bun Festival, the Wai Chiu Fu provides the crucial means of exercising influence not only among the Hoklo fishermen and labourers but also among the community as a whole. The control of the Fu is therefore crucial in the mobilization of political and ideological support on Cheung Chau. However, the connection with the Wai Chiu Fu also brings the Wai Chiu group in association with the Hoklo and Hakka members who, together with the immigrant workers from Hong Kong, constitute the working class in the community. In other words, the Chiu Chow group is faced with a significant dilemma: how to maintain control of the Wai Chiu Fu, while retaining its ethnic distinctiveness apart from the other Wai Chiu members of low social-economic status. The nature of the control of the Fu - through financial support and goodwill - directly stems from the concern to overcome this difficult. Another obvious solution is, of course, the formation of an independent Chiu Chow Association.

The Chiu Chow Association on Cheung Chau was established in 1963. During that year the Chiu Chow group launched a campaign to collect donations towards a building fund; some \$136,000 was eventually accumulated. With the money, an imposing three-storey building was constructed on the water-

front, a block away from the ferry. On the top floor is a worshipping hall. For \$10 a month, members are allowed to place ancestral tablets there which are attended by an old man who lights the incense and oil lamps each day. The emphasis on religious worship is also expressed by the organization of ritual offering to the ancestral spirits normally held during the Chinese New Year. The ceremony is performed in the association building, an important event attended by all the members and their families and which is followed by a large feast. Another activity, other than the involvement in the Bun Festival, should be mentioned. This is the organizing of tours to Taiwan during the Double-Ten (October the Tenth) national day of the Republic of China. More than any other local associations, the Chiu Chow Association is most open in their alleged support of the Kuomintang regime. In a way, the Taiwan trip expresses an anti-communist (right-wing) ideological position. Equally significant, it also provides an opportunity to maintain close ties with other Chiu Chow businessmen in Taiwan, as well as with those from other parts of South East Asia, who gather there for the occasion.

The Chiu Chow Association has some 600 members consisting of prominent shopkeepers and their families. Most of the leaders also hold key positions in the Rural Committee and the Chamber of Commerce. Indeed the holding of dominant positions by the

Chiu Chow leaders⁵ in Cheung Chau illustrates the complex way in which class and ethnicity become the key principles for the organization of power in the community. Through the control of the Wai Chiu Fu the Chiu Chow group comes to command the critical resources for the production of ideology on Cheung Chau: namely the Pak Tai Temple and the Bun Festival. Before I come to that, let me focus attention on the structure of community leadership itself.

The Organization of Power I: The Rural Committee and the Cheung Chau Chamber of Commerce

The Cheung Chau Rural Committee was formed in 1960 as part of the overall reforms of the system of local representation introduced by the government following the Second World War. There were important historical and political processes leading to the emergence of the Rural Committee: they are dealt with separately in chapter six. Here I shall concentrate on some of the salient features of the Committee, particularly the

⁵ My point is that the Chiu Chow people are the only ethnic group which is socially and economically organized. In contrast, the Punti (Cantonese) are fragmented into Po On, Tung Kuan, Ssu-i groups etc; and it is these sub-groups rather than the Punti collectively that are organized in the various district associations. That is why inspite of the large number of Punti representative in the Rural Committee, it is the Chiu Chow leaders - via their connections with the Wai Chiu Fu - who are able to exercise a dominant influence in the Committee.

relationship with the powerful merchant class.

As in other parts of the NT, the Rural Committee on Cheung Chau consists of a General Assembly of village representatives elected by the local people. From the Assembly, elected among the village representatives themselves, the executive committee of seventeen members is formed. The executive committee, because of its vital connections with the District Office, represents the centre of power and influence in the community. For any man of ambition, an executive position on the Rural Committee is the goal of highest personal achievement.

A prominent feature of the Rural Committee is that its leadership is made up of men who have already occupied key positions in the local associations. This is in part due to government policy which aims at sponsoring a group of community leaders who can effectively exercise influence among the local people. I refer first of all to the district associations. On Cheung Chau the Rural Committee elections are heavily contested among the district associations as each candidate tries to seek sponsorship and support from members of his ethnic group. In this respect, the particular advantage of candidates with Wai Chu Fu and Chiu Chow Association backing is obvious. More than any other groups, the Chiu Chow people often display a significant solidarity, reinforced by the common business interest in Cheung Chau. In addition they are able to extend influence outside the Chiu Chow group in the seeking of favourable votes for their candidates. This is made possible by the significant prestige and social obligations created by the many community activities undertaken by the Wai Chiu Fu.

Secondly, the Rural Committee is dominated by the wealthy merchants from the Cheung Chau Chamber of Commerce. Consequently there is a critical linkage between the Rural Committee, the district associations and the Chamber of Commerce in the constitution of community power and leadership. This is clearly illustrated by the composition of the executive committee of the Rural Committee shown in Table 15.

Table 15. Leadership of the Cheung Chau Rural Committee 1978

<u>Chairman</u>	<u>Ethnic Origin</u>	<u>Executive Position in Local Associations</u>
Kwong Pin-Yau	Punti (Ng Yip)	CCCC* - Chairman
<u>Vice-Chairman</u>		
Fung Pak-Tai	Wai Chiu	CCCC - Vice-Chairman, WCF**, Chiu Chow Assn.
<u>Executive Members</u>		
Fung Yoke-Shee	Wai Chiu	CCCC - Treasurer, WCF
Ho Pin-Chiu	Punti (Ng Yip)	CCCC - Treasurer, Ng Yip Assn.
Ho Win-Lam	Punti (Po On)	CCCC - Vice-Chairman
Chan Chek-Wah	Punti (Shu Tuck)	CCCC, Shu Tuck Assn.
Fong Pin	Wai Chiu	WCF - Chairman
Chan Kwong-Yin	Punti (Tung Kwan)	CCCC, Tung Kwan Assn.
Wong Lai-King	Wai Chiu	CCCC, WCF
Hui Kuan-King	Wai Chiu	WCF
Ho Yuan-Lam	Punti (Tung Kwan)	CCCC - Secretary, Tung Kwan Assn.
Lan Lin	Punti (Ng Yip)	CCCC
Yee Mum	Punti (Po On)	NT Commercial and Trading Union, Po On Assn., CCCC
Yee Shin	Wai Chiu	CCCC
Yip Shou	Wai Chiu	CCCC
Wong Chung-Hoi	Punti (Po On)	Wong Wai Tsak Tong - Manager, Po On Assn.

* Cheung Chau Chamber of Commerce

** Wai Chiu Fu

The first observation that needs to be made is that, while the Rural Committee leadership is composed of men of many district associations, it is largely dominated by those from the Wai Chiu Fu. Secondly, there is considerable overlapping of ethnic and merchant leadership in the sense that those who control the district associations also tend to occupy prominent positions in the Chamber of Commerce. The congruence of ethnic group and merchant class leadership in the same group of men testifies to the effects of class structuration which tends to cut across social relationships and institutions, structuring them increasingly in the same terms as class relations are ordered.

Finally let me consider briefly the Cheung Chau Chamber of Commerce. The Chamber, as I shall elaborate (in Chapter Six), was established in 1942 by a prominent Wai Chiu merchant⁶ who later became the first chairman of the Rural Committee. The Chamber is made up of the 200 odd shops keepers on Cheung Chau. Leadership is organised in the executive committee which consists of twenty-nine positions: a chairman, two vice-chairman and twenty six ordinary members. Leaving the more detailed description, the Chamber of Commerce essentially derives its influence from its sponsorship by the District Office. Through the organization

⁶ Fung Pak-Choy, born 1909, was the first chairman of the Cheung Chau Chamber of Commerce from 1946 until his death in 1972. His various business interests included: the Cheung Lee Ferry Company (of which the Wong Wai Tsak Tong is another major shareholder), Kung Lee Store which provided roast pig as well as ritual specialists for funerals, etc.. He was also executive member of the Rural Committee and the Cheung Chau Residents' Association during his life time.

of the Rural Committee, the Chamber is in fact made a part of the local administration. In many ways, the bureaucratic connections of the Chamber is highly visible. The election of the executive committee, for example, is supervised by the District Office. The District Officer also attends, as a rule, the subsequent inauguration ceremony of the newly elected leadership. Through its control of the Rural Committee and the undertaking of communal activities like the organization of the Bun Festival, the Chamber is generally recognized as the centre of power and influence in the community. But more of that later.

Organization of Power II: The District Office, the New Territories Administration and the Outside World

Cheung Chau is administered, together with the neighbouring islands of Lantao, Lamma and Peng Chau, by the District Office - Islands. The office is situated, for the convenience of the islanders, just opposite the Outer Islands ferry pier in Central District, Hong Kong. The whole department is divided into three major sections which are made responsible for the main administrative duties of the District Office. These divisions are: the Secretarial and General Section, responsible for liaison with the local communities and the administration of permits and licenses; the Work Office staffed by building inspectors and inspectors of works for supervising the building regulations; and finally the Land Division. The last is by far the largest section of the District Office; it looks after the important

duties of the administration of land, namely, the allocation of Crown land, maintenance of land records and registration of all land transfers, and assessment of Crown rent. Because of its vital functions the Land Division is headed by two assistant district officers who have under them a squatter control section, a land registry office, and some eleven land executives who make regular tours of the islands.

Through the administrative processes the District Office with its staff of about 150 maintains a strong hold on the social life on Cheung Chau.

First of all, there are the more formal aspects of administration and control. For example, officials make daily inspections of the island to oversee the regulations relating to building and land use. Though the chief responsibilities of health care, sanitation and maintenance of roads and harbour are now in the hands of the various department of the civil service, it is the duty of the District Office to make recommendations to the proper authorities regarding possible improvements of the local facilities. In the recent years the Hong Kong government announced a series of plans for the development of Cheung Chau. The most ambitious one is that announced in May 1978, which included projects for the construction of a typhoon shelter in Cheung Chau Bay and a housing estate⁷ to accommodate 17,000 people.

⁷ This marks a significant change in the government development policy. So far, housing estates have been developed on a small scale by local builders; and clusters of flats were erected over the years in many localities on the island. The government plan called for the flattening of the hills of Pak She at the northern side of Cheung Chau for the construction of housing estates. For details of the plan, see Wah Kiu Yat Po 19 May 1978.

In the planning of these development projects, the District Office holds regular consultation with the NT Administration and other government departments before making final recommendations to the NT Development Office of the Public Works Department.

The District Office also maintains close contact with the police on the island. The Cheung Chau police station has a total of 32 detectives and uniformed policemen. In the recent years, with the influx of people from Hong Kong, there has been increasing incidence of drug trafficking, burglary and theft. Other than attending to the solving of these offenses (in 1977 seventy-five cases related to such crimes were prosecuted)⁸, the police keep a close watch on the criminal triad societies, and the pro-Peking left-wing associations. For the District Office intelligence on the 'subversive elements' is important because of their potential threat to law and order, as demonstrated by the event of the 1967 riots.

However, efficient administration on the whole is more principally achieved through formal and informal consultations with the Rural Committee. To facilitate communication with the local leaders the District Office includes among the staff three senior liaison officers and a Chinese language officer; since 1968 it has become a practice to give the post of District Officer to a Chinese person. The Office has ^{its} ~~the~~ own motorised launch which carries the DO and his staff to attend the monthly general meeting

⁸ From the files of the Cheung Chau Police Station.

of the Rural Committee. The DO is also present as a rule for the celebration of the major seasonal festivals, such as the Bun Festival and the Chinese New Year; and, as I have mentioned, he presides over the annual elections of the influential local associations, such as the Chamber of Commerce and the Wai Chiu Fu.

The less formal connections between the District Office and the local community have been emphasized on several occasions in the discussion so far. Analytically, I argue that consultations and informal relationships are central to the process of administrative control and consequently, have vital implications for the organization of the power of community leadership. The issue will be the focus of discussion in chapter seven in relation to the question of land transactions on Cheung Chau.

Briefly, I suggest that District Office patronage confers upon the Rural Committee men important social prestige, as well as other benefits, such as access to the government bureaucracy. It is this special position which enables the Committee leadership to undertake many businesses on behalf of the local people, e.g., the application of licenses to build, and the conversion of land status. However, ultimately official sponsorship - on which the influence of the Rural Committee depends - represents a form of political control because such privilege can be potentially withdrawn or transferred to others, as is indicated by the many provisions restricting the powers of the Committee.

In other words, official patronage together with other forms of administrative control create, in the relationship between the community leadership and the District Office, a

situation of structural dependency. This has several implications.

In the first place, it means that the social definition of power and prestige in the community comes to rely principally upon the idea of connections with the higher reaches of the Hong Kong government. As I have mentioned, the chairmen and vice-chairmen of all Rural Committees in the NT constitute the executive committee of the Heung Yee Kuk which directly negotiates with the NT Administration. This, and other forms of bureaucratic connection, are crucial to the ideological production of the community leadership. In a period which has seen increasing structuring of the local community in the wider colonial economy, the idea of 'bringing prosperity to Cheung Chau' necessarily provides wide ideological appeal. Indeed, the current influence of the merchant class's leadership is significantly dependent on the claim that they are responsible for negotiating with the government and for recommending the many improvements in social amenities on the island.

Secondly, the creation of structural dependency as a central feature of government administration is reflected in the so-called 'self-help' scheme. Under such a scheme the Rural Committee is encouraged to initiate community projects which, after study and approval by the District Office, eventually receive government subsidies in the form of material help and technical advice. A good example of this is the construction of the tourist shelter on Peak Road in 1959; the total costs were distributed among government and private sources as the following shows:

District Office Subsidy:

cement	165 bags
sand	22 bags
iron bars	2,212 katis ⁹

Donation from Hong Kong:

cash	\$1,500
------	---------

Donation from Cheung Chau:

cash	\$2,229.50
------	------------

Official subsidies to community projects are often presented by the District Office as illustrations of government goodwill. As an intrinsic aspect of administrative rule, the 'self-help' scheme expresses such ideas as 'encouraging local initiative' and 'respecting the decision of the community', ideas central in the ideology of official paternalism. In recent years, government assistance has become indispensable in all community undertakings: under the policy of government and community cooperation many projects were completed, notably the Cheung Chau Youth Centre in Tung Wan, the playground in front of the Pak Tai Temple and the football field on Peak Road. In short, to return to the previous point, government policy tends to create significant goodwill and social obligation among the Rural Committee men. In any case, the 'self-help' scheme has, on the whole, the effect of further structuring the dependency - in both

⁹ One kati or kan is 604.79 grams.

the political and financial sense - of the community leadership.


Temples, Community Festivals and Cultural Reproduction

Rituals and religious worship are prominent features of social life on Cheung Chau. Major festivals and birthdays of important deities are celebrated by individual households as well as collectively by the community. The temples on Cheung Chau are among some of the oldest in Hong Kong; their dates of construction and related deities are given in Table 16.

Table 16. Temples of Cheung Chau

<u>Temples</u>	<u>Approximate date of construction</u>
Tin Hau Goddess of Heaven	
Chung Hin Street	1772
Pak She	1767-78
Sai Wan	1775
Chik Lap Kok	1824-25
Hung Shin God of the Southern Sea	1813
Kuan Yin Goddess of Mercy	1840
Pak Tai Dark Spirit of the North & Patriarch of Cheung Chau	1784
Kuan Tai God of Loyalty, War and Agriculture	1973

(Source: Hayes 1967.)



Worship in the temples and ritual offerings to the gods ensure protection against the vicissitudes and misfortunes of daily life. People also visit temples to ask for propitious dates and times for important events such as marriage, house moving and the launching of a new fishing junk. Because of their mode of livelihood in the open sea, the fishermen have always been keen supporters of temples and community festivals. The long association with fishing has resulted in the founding of a large number of temples devoted to deities connected with the sea, principally Pak Tai, the patron god of Cheung Chau, and Tin Hau, Goddess of Heaven and Protector of Seafarers. But like all others deities, Pak Tai and Tin Hau bestow beneficial influence on fishermen and land people alike. Thus, the deities are worshipped by all members of the community. In addition, during the major festivals such as the Tin Hau Festival and the Bun Festival, people from Hong Kong arrive in droves to join in worship.

The maintenance of local temples has always been one of the chief responsibilities of the community leadership. At the entrance of each temple is the commemorative tablet which gives the dates of reconstruction, the names of individuals and organizations and the amount each had contributed towards the expenses of the restoration. I shall return to this later.

The government also takes a vital interest in the organization and upkeep of the local temples. Since 1928, with the introduction of the Chinese Temple Ordinance, all temples in the colony are required to be registered with the Chinese Temple Committee formed by the Home Affairs Department. The

registration ensures the government supervision of the temples. Accordingly the administration of the temples on Cheung Chau falls into two categories. First, with the exception of Pak Tai and Hung Shing, the administration of all the temples is delegated to the Rural Committee. In this case the upkeep of each temple is in the hands of the respective 'temple committees' consisting of prominent leaders of the Chamber of Commerce, the district associations and representatives from the immediate neighbourhood. The Chinese Temple Committee makes regular inspection of these temples but, on the whole, the running expenses and costs of renovation are dependent on donations from the community.

Secondly, temples are directly managed by the Chinese Temple Committee itself. This is applied in the administration of the two most important temples on Cheung Chau: the Pak Tai and Hung Shing. Normally a temple can accrue substantial revenue - the so-called 'oil money' - from the sale of the joss sticks, incense and candles as well as by providing services such as fortune telling. Consequently, the 'management rights' of the two temples are put out to annual tender. The successful bidder for each temple pays an annual sum of about \$15,000 and, in return, receives the whole of the oil money as a financial right of the temple-keeper. Under such a scheme, the renovation of the temples is legally the responsibility of the Chinese Temple Committee which finances the project with a fund accumulated from the tenders. When restoration or extension of the temples is necessary, the Committee consults with the District Office and the Rural Committee, and perhaps asks from

them additional contributions towards the total costs.

Official and community cooperation is typical of the way in which temples and community festivals are organized on Cheung Chau. Indeed, I suggest that active government participation in religious life on the island constitutes a critical aspect of what may be called the official cultural policy. Briefly, my argument is this. The significance of the temples and festivals¹⁰ is precisely that they are key centres for the reproduction of the values and principles constituting the 'patri-familial' structural model in Chinese society. Furthermore, Chinese culture prescribes important prestige to those who are responsible for the organization of these institutions. The control of the centres of ritual life in the community provides, therefore, the primary means for the ideological transformation for both the government and the merchant class.

To illustrate I shall direct attention to two institutions for which Cheung Chau is known throughout the colony: the Pak Tai Temple and the Bun Festival. I deal, first of all, with the symbolic organization.

¹⁰ There are numerous works on the Chinese religious system. The seminal work is De Groot's six volume study (1892, 1894 and 1897). A recent study of Chinese worship in a socio-political context is the anthology by Wolf (1974) which includes an extensive bibliography.


Pak Tai Temple and The Reproduction of 'The Family'

The Pak Tai Temple, or *Yu Hsu Kung*, the Palace of Jade Vacuity, as it is properly called, is situated at the north of the island, below the Pak She Village. According to legend, Pak Tai or Dark Spirit of the North was a reincarnation of a prince renowned for his courage and enlightenment. After becoming deified he was ordered to do battle with the Demon King who was infesting the earth with plague and pestilence. For this valiant deed he was awarded the title of Supreme Spirit of the North and was worshipped as protector against all evil spirits. To the fishermen he is also the god of the sea.

The temple has a long history of association with the Wai Chiu people on Cheung Chau. Informants relate that in 1777 plague broke out on the island. In order to ward off the epidemic a status of Pak Tai was brought here from Kwang^uta^{ng} by the Hoklo fishermen. After the ending of the plague, to ensure continuous protection by the powerful diety, the Wai Chiu settlers built - in 1783 - the present temple to house the god permanently on Cheung Chau. The temple has since been renovated several times: in 1822, 1838, 1958 and 1975. I shall return to the management of the temple later. Now I turn to my central argument by focusing on the architecture of the temple.

The Pak Tai, like all traditional Chinese temples, consists of three halls, with each of the side halls further extended by a courtyard and a living qu^rater. Thus the essential layout constitutes a U-shaped set of halls and rooms. The open end of the U is the main entrance facing south, overlooking the Cheung Chau Bay.

LAYOUT OF
PAK TAI TEMPLE, CHEUNG CHAU



The ground immediately outside the entrance is raised into a platform, at the centre of which is a large urn, flanked by two stones statues of lions: symbols of prosperity and benevolent forces. To enter the temple, one crosses the threshold and is faced with the offering table and a few feet further on, the main altar. On the table are the usual candles, incense and also fruits, cakes and cooked meat brought by the worshippers. The main altar is the place of honour for Pak Tai who is represented by a wooden figure about three feet in height, wearing a crown of gold and pearls. He is surrounded by other small statues of himself, forming an impressive central shrine with bright red curtains of silk and numerous candles and oil lamps.

Thus, looking at the structure of architectural space, it has the effect of bringing the vision of the worshipper inevitably towards the dominant focus of the central altar. This - as it were - dramatizing of the main shrine is also enhanced by the placing of Pak Tai and the minor deities. The two wings of the temple, consisting of side courtyards and rooms used for storage and as living quarters for the temple keepers, form the flanks of the Main Hall, thus providing spatial support for the shrine. In the olden days the two side halls at the end of the courtyards (see diagram) were used to house the minor deities before they were moved to the two side altars next to the shrine of Pak Tai. To the left¹¹ of Pak Tai is the small altar which

¹¹ In Chinese usage, the right and left sides of a building are taken from the perspective of a man standing with his back to the front of the house instead of that of a man facing the house. I have here adopted the usage in denoting the positions of the altars, etc..

of Pak Tai as the central meeting point of the two axes. In fact, what the structure of the temple emphasizes is not so much man's supplication to Pak Tai, but rather man's acknowledgement of the moral order inherent in the relationship of gods to the natural world. Embodied in this order is the cultural idea of the divine influence of gods in punishing the wrong and rewarding others with prosperity and long life.


Worship in the temple, therefore, is a culturally significant act which reproduces the structure of the relationship between god and man and the related moral ideas. It is in this sense that, in accordance with Chinese religious belief¹², the ritual offerings and the maintenance of the temple ensure communal harmony and prosperity.

Now, as we recall, the notion of communal welfare as dependent upon the reproduction of a culturally ordered set of relationships lies at the core of the 'patri-familial' cultural model in Chinese society. Indeed, I argue that the layout of the Chinese temple is itself structured by the central principles of the 'patri-familial' model.

¹² Feuchtwang in an interesting study of communal worship in Taiwan has suggested that "gods are metaphor for the system of authority, the state. The metaphor is one of gods as rulers and judges and the mass of kui (ghosts) as beggars and supplicants being judged and saved by the gods" (1974: 127). Indeed the Pak Tai temple is made to resemble a judicial court, as is evident from the statues of guards outside at the entrance to the main altar. But my argument is that the 'judicial metaphor' is itself an articulation of the structural order of 'patri-filial' relationship: I elaborate this notion in Chapter 7.

On Cheung Chau, Pak Tai is regarded as the patron deity looking over the welfare of the community. The phrase 'Patriarch of Cheung Chau' in Chinese, for example, is inscribed on the marble incense burner at the entrance of the temple. Thus, he is referred to by the local people as *Pak Tai Yieh*, or literally, Northern-Emperor-Grandfather and never by his formal title. The kinship metaphor quite simply makes the relationship between Pak Tai and the community as resembling that between father (or male ancestors) and family. But the structural congruity between the temple and the 'family' can be more aptly illustrated by examining the architecture of a traditional Chinese household.

The traditional Chinese domestic architecture consists of a U-shaped compound.



Entering by the way of the open end of the U, through the compound, one finds a large room, the *cheng-t'ing* or main hall. The *cheng-t'ing* is the social and ritual centre of the house, for it is here

that the family receives guests, and it is here that they worship their ancestors and the gods enshrined on their domestic altar. Images of the gods and the ancestral tablets are located on a high table facing the door and open end of the U, the gods at stage left in position of honour, the ancestors on their right (Wang 1974: 184).

On either side of the *cheng-t'ing* are rooms or *fang*; the first room on the left is the *ta-fang* 'the first *fang*'. This is the parents' bedroom until the eldest son marries, at which point it is taken over by him and his wife and the parents move over to the *erh-fang*, 'the second *fang*', directly to the right of the *cheng-t'ing*. The kitchen is normally located at the left end of the house, giving easy access for the housewife (the mother or the first daughter-in-law) who lives in the *ta-fang*. The other rooms at the other end of the house - i.e. further right of the *erh-fang* - serves as a bedroom for the unmarried children, a guest room or as a store-room. After the death of the parents, the *ta-fang* and the original kitchen next to it are inherited by the eldest son; while the *erh-fang* and the other room go to the second son. If there are more than two sons, the house will be expanded by the addition of wings. Again in accordance with the principle of seniority, the left wing will be given to the third son and the right to the fourth son.

Thus, the layout of the Chinese household has a basic structure formed by five rooms. First of all, it is obvious that the distribution of rooms or *fang* significantly reflects the structure of relationship within the family:

Right Side		Left Side		
Tail-room	<i>Erh-fang</i>	<i>Cheng-t'ing</i>	<i>Ta-fang</i>	Kitchen
Second Son (or unmarried children)	First Son & his family	(Ancestors)	(Parents)	

In other words, the differences in authority between the father, the eldest son and the younger son(s) is expressed in architectural terms by the relative positions of rooms, running in order of precedence from the left to right.

Secondly, throughout the changes taking place in the family, the *cheng-t'ing* remains the common property. In a sense, symbolically the *t'ing* represents the opposite to the *fang*: the timeless continuity of the family or lineage under the benevolent eyes of the ancestors.

On the whole, I suggest, the *fang* and the *t'ing* can be regarded as constituting a category of architectural space, which reproduces the key relationships in the patri-familial cultural model. To put it simply, the male sibling relationship in accordance with the principle of seniority is articulated in the allocation of the *fang*. In addition, in a more complex sense, the authority of the father in the patri-filial relationship is constantly reminded by the dominant focus of the *t'ing* which, as the centre of ancestral shrine and family worship, provides the crucial ideological support.

It is now time to return to the Pak Tai temple. It can be demonstrated that the basic layout is essentially reproduced from the structure of the domestic household. I have already mentioned the conception of Pak Tai as 'the patriarch of

Cheung Chau'. But architecturally, other than the similarity in their u-shaped structures, there is a crucial structural correspondence in the representations of the *cheng-t'ing*, *fang* and the various altars.

In the first place, the structural congruity between the main altar and the *cheng-t'ing* can be noted. They are both dominant foci of the architecture, and each provides the respective ritual centres which reproduce the key principles of a Chinese religious belief and the family.

Secondly, since Chinese culture designates the left¹³ as a position of honour, similar importance is given to the space at the left: in the temple context, next to the main altar and in the domestic context, next to the *cheng-t'ing*. Like the *ta-fang*, the shrine left of the main altar - which was previously placed in the left side hall - is devoted to the most important figures in the hierarchy; in this case, Pak Tai and the God of the City. On the right, the allocations of the secondary altars and in the domestic context, the position of the *erh-fang* (and the tail room) similarly give expression to the structures of relationship under the domination of the patron deity and father (and male ancestors) respectively.

I have discussed at length the structural similarity of the Pak Tai temple and the Chinese domestic household in order to illustrate a central point. This is that the spiritual benevolence of Pak Tai is conditional on man's demonstration of

¹³ See footnotes 11.

subservience to, and positive acknowledgement of the moral force underlying the relationship between Pak Tai and the community. Significantly, it is the metaphor of the 'family' which provides the necessary ideological basis. The structure of the temple space ultimately gives expression to the moral and spiritual foundation of Cheung Chau as a social collectivity. It is in this sense that the organization of the temple and of the festivals become critical for the prosperity of the community.

The Bun Festival: Class Relations and Symbolic Organization

The Bun Festival or *ta chiu*¹⁴, the Pacification of Departed Spirits, is a religious ritual commonly found in the coastal communities of South-East China. The principal aim of the festival is to feed and pacify the wandering spirits of the dead, which if unattended will bring disease and misfortune to a community. The festival features ritual services and offerings of food, especially the small rice buns from which the name 'bun festival' is derived.

The occasion normally falls at the beginning of the fourth lunar month, about the middle of May each year. The festival on Cheung Chau involves a series of elaborate ritual

¹⁴ A general description of the *ta chiu* festival is given in Echo, January 1974: 28-44. See also Hayes, 1977: 72-73 for *ta chiu* on Cheung Chau.

events which occur over three days. I summarize from my field notes:

First day: installation of the major deities.

In the compound outside the Pak Tai temple, the major deities involved in the festival are mounted on pedestals under a large palm thatched hut. The deities, represented by huge papier-mache figures include: *Shan Shaang*, the god of earth and mountain; *To Te Kung*, god of the household, who reports good and evil to Heaven; and *Dai Sze Wong*, god of the underworld. Between the horns of *Dai Sze Wong* is seated *Kwan Yin*, the goddess of mercy, symbolizing the subjugation of evil to the forces of charity and goodness.

At the same time, small shrines are erected on the paths leading to the main shrine which houses the deities. Thrice a day during the festival, a priest visits these shrines offering prayers and food so as to guide the wandering ghosts to the main feasting ground next to the main shrine.

By this time, the three bun towers are completed. Each measures about 26 feet in circumference at the base, and 50 to 60 feet in height. On the bamboo structures are affixed hundreds of small rice buns especially baked for the festival.

Second day: religious services and the grand parade.

At eleven o'clock in the morning, the ritual of *Tsau Ng Chi*, or literally 'run five times' is held. Five tables are set in front of the main shrine forming a square with the fifth table at the centre. On these tables women place children's clothing together with some sweetbread. Priests collect the items and execute elaborate running movements around and between the tables. At the end of the two hour ritual the articles are stamped with a special mark and returned to the women. It is believed that the wearer of the garment will be protected against all misfortunes; the pudding once eaten prevents illnesses.

In the afternoon the grand parade takes place. At the end of the parade is the throned statue of Pak Tai, followed by the deities of all the temples on Cheung Chau. Colourful banners and piercing music accompany

the deities.

Then come the tableaux, each carried on two long poles by coolies. They are all sponsored by the various neighbourhoods, and depict the traditional tales of good versus evil. There is a strong sense of friendly competition among the presentations of the tableaux, as each neighbourhood in its design tries to outdo that of the other in ingenuity and dramatic effects.

The parade starts at the Pak Tai temple, winds through the streets and the waterfront - on which a spectators' stand has been constructed for the distinguished guests from the government, the foreign embassies and the press - and ends again at the temple compound.

Third day: ritual offerings and the scrambling of the bun towers.

The parade of the tableaux is repeated in the morning.

In the afternoon feast-tables are placed in front of *Dai Sze Wong* and his lieutenants and soldiers. Worshippers put boiled porked, puddings, cups of tea and papier-mache representations of houses, cars and money on the tables as offerings to the dead. They will be taken by *Dai Sze Wong* to the dwellers of the underworld. More tables are added as people arrive throughout the day with offerings; at the end of the day there are about 30 tables covering a large area of the temple compound.

Just before midnight a large crowd gathers in the compound, moving ceaselessly about the place. Then the priests give a signal for the removal of the fences around the bun towers. People rush in to scale the towers. Hundreds of youngsters struggle with each other on the way up to the bamboo structures in order to get at the buns. They stuff some into their pockets and toss the rest to those waiting below. The buns are taken home to be dried and kept in air-tight jars. In the event of minor illness like a headache or a cold, a small piece is broken off and given to the sick.

A detailed analysis of the festival is not possible here. But essentially its central theme is the calling upon Pak Tai and the other deities to ward off diseases, natural calamities and any causes of social disharmony in the community. As these

are brought about by the unattended 'hungry ghosts', the sequence of rituals is ultimately concerned with restoring the proper order of relationships between deities, demons and man¹⁵, in accordance with the Chinese cultural belief. In short, the purpose of the festival is to re-establish the supremacy of the deities over the malign spirits, thereby bringing peace and harmony to the island.

At the same time, at the centre of the symbolic theme is the crucial idea of the community as a social collectivity. This is most elegantly expressed by an informant:

Hungry ghosts wander about attacking people by making them sick and cause bad feelings. The ghosts are spirits of the dead forgotten by their relatives, and they show that we in the community have neglected our duties to our dead kinsmen. In organizing the festival we show Pak Tai, who is like a father to Cheung Chau, that we cooperate like members of the same family. Like in a family, we must respect those above us, and not forget those who have gone to the underworld.

Hence we see the dominant features of the festival: the observation of vegetarian diets throughout the island during the three days; the creativity and friendly competition in the presentations of the tableaux and floats in the grand parade; and of courses, the offering of the buns. The parade, opera

¹⁵ The order of relationship is really: gods:ancestral spirits: ghosts(*kui*). *Kui* are simply spirits of ancestors neglected and unattended by the descendants so that "Forgotten/remembered is a code by which the mass of undifferentiated dead is broken up" (Feuchtwang *op. cit.*: 117).

performance, and the scrambling of the bun towers express the idea of *je nao* or literally 'heat and noise', an atmosphere of joyful human activities which pleases the gods and removes the 'solitary air' in which ghosts inhabit. In a sense, *je nao* creates a 'sacred reality' to facilitate the descent of the gods from the spiritual world, and to provide immunity against demonic attacks.

Yet, in spite of the emphasis on 'collective spirit', the organization of the festival typically reflects, on another level, the major role of the powerful local groups; namely, the Chiu Chow Association, the Chamber of Commerce, the Rural Committee as well as the government. This can be examined in two ways.

First is in terms of the actual contributions towards the festival. Each year, on the 16th of the first lunar month (around late February) the Wai Chiu Fu appoints men from among its leaders to form the organizing committee. The function of the committee is to oversee all aspects of the festival, e.g., to employ ritual specialists, and to coordinate the parade. Above all, it is the duty of the committee to collect, door to door, donations from all the shops and neighbourhoods, as well as soliciting from business communities outside Cheung Chau. For the 1977 festival, the amount collected by the Wai Chiu Fu totalled \$107,399 which came from the following sources:

Table 16:

Sources of Finance of Bun Festival 1977

<u>Source</u>	<u>Amount</u>
Shops in Cheung Chau	\$ 37,969
Various streets	14,740
Donations from Hong Kong business communities	43,841
Balance carried over from 1976	10,849
Total :	<u>\$107,399</u>

Most of the money went as payments to the ritual specialists, and as a subsidies for the poorer neighbourhoods for the expenses of the tableaux and ritual offerings, and party towards the construction of the bun towers.

The collection by the Wai Chiu Fu, however, does not represent the total expenses of the festival. In addition, the three bun towers, each costing \$5,000 or more for the rice buns alone, are donated by three Chiu Chow groups: the Chiu Chow Association, and two voluntary associations of Chiu Chow businessmen from Hong Kong: the Eternal Peace Club and the Fame Across the Sea Club. But the most substantial amount is carried by the Chamber of Commerce and the Rural Committee. First of all, the Chamber is soley responsible for organizing the operatic performances. The total costs for three days, which include those for the construction of the stage, the seating for the audience and for employing the threatre company, may come to \$15,000. The Chamber and the Rural Committee are also responsible for supervising the construction of the bun towers, to ensure their safety. They would bear the major portion of the \$20,000 cost for the bamboo structures, the remainder is provided by the Wai Chiu Fu and the individual

sponsors mentioned earlier.

It is difficult to obtain an accurate figure for the total costs because of the diversity of sources; but they are estimated to be about \$270,000 for the three day event. Other forms of contribution cannot be valued. This applies especially in the case of the government which provides, among other things, a military band from the army garrison, and anti-riot police of the Hong Kong Police Tactical Unit. As in all community-organized undertakings, both the District Office and the New Territories Administration provide some form of financial support at the request of the Rural Committee. This usually ranges from \$20,000 to \$50,000 for the festival.

The financial contribution is only one indication of the merchant class's and the government's involvement in the festival. Equally important is the actual organization of the festival itself. Indeed many aspects of the festival subtly give expression to the influential positions of the Wai Chiu group in the community. For instance, the opera performed outside the Pak Tai temple is as a rule Hoklo opera and the Chiu Chow Association is the only district association which is allowed the privilege of sponsoring the bun tower. Above all, for local people, the Wai Chiu and Chiu Chow presence in the festival is most dramatically noticeable in the grand parade. The order of the procession - which with minor variations, remains the same each year - is given below:

1. Shrine of Pak Tai
2. Parade of Eternal Peace Club

3. Fame Across the Ocean Club
4. Shrines of other local deities:
 Hung Shing, Tin Hau, Kwan Yin and Kwan Tai.
5. Treasure Sword of Pak Tai Temple
6. Cheung Chau Chiu Chow Association
7. Tableaux of the major streets committees
8. Cheung Chau Kwok Man Primary School
9. Cheung Chau Sports Associations
10. Others.

Certain features of the procession can be noted. Firstly, there is the notable absence of the left-wing associations which are deliberately excluded from participating in the festival. In addition, the two Chiu Chow voluntary associations from Hong Kong are always given the leading places after the shrine of Pak Tai in the parade. This is in recognition for their major contributions towards the expenses of the festival as mentioned earlier. Finally, as in the sponsorship of the bun towers, the Chiu Chow Association is the only district association taking part in the grand parade. The Chiu Chow team is by far the most spectacular part of the procession. It usually features a dance troupe of school girls, dressed in Chinese traditional costumes in bright red and yellow, followed by martial arts demonstrations, and a lion dance performed by tough looking young men in black silk pajama suits and sun glasses.

Conclusion

In this chapter I have tried to bring out some of the complexities in which power and the structure of community leadership is organized in Cheung Chau. The nature of political domination, I argue, is one essentially based on class. For what defines the relationship between the shopkeepers (merchants) and the rest of the community is a series of processes which is constitutive of the structure of class relations in the community. Thus I draw attention to the nature of economic relations, that is, the control by the merchants of the major economic activities: commerce and real estate development. Of course, as I have emphasized, class relations must not be seen as originating from economic relations alone. Instead there are critical ideological processes which are emergent from, and represent, intrinsic aspects of the making of class relations.

More specifically, I relate the discussion of ideological production to the theoretical issues presented in the first chapter. In the analysis of the symbolic organizations of the Pak Tai Temple and the Bun Festival I have focused on what may be suggested to be their contradictory features. While the ritual centres both express the major theme of the social and moral unity of Cheung Chau; dominant features are also noticeable which subtly emphasize the powerful positions of the merchant class leadership. I argue that both of these features are critical in the process of ideological production and reproduction. For, on the whole, ritual activities not only tend to express the power relations in a social formation

but are also significantly effective in achieving the mystification of such relations by presenting them in terms of 'consensus'.

This point notably recalls Gramsci's idea of 'mystification of consensus' which I have discussed in chapter one. The key question here is: how is a religious ritual like the Bun Festival able to achieve an ideological enterprise? Let me consider this in the context of the key contradictions - and their resolutions - of the class relations on Cheung Chau.

In my discussion I have singled out the important contradictions in the nature of political relations on Cheung Chau. From the perspective of the colonial government, there is the problem of reconciling the dual aims of political control and official sponsorship of the traditional structure of local leadership. Furthermore, for the Chiu Chow merchants, contradiction exists in the recruiting of the political support of the Hoklo and Hakka labourers and fishermen while maintaining the boundary and exclusiveness of Chiu Chow ethnic identity. Now the significance of the temple and the festival is precisely that they provide the crucial means through which these contradictions can be worked out. As I have noted, the symbolic theme of these ritual centres is the moral priority of the orderly relationship between god and men, and between men themselves. Given the cultural context in which religious activities take place, the Bun Festival gives emphasis to, and thus legitimizes, the structure of relations at the level of community life. Again, since community welfare is vitally dependent upon the observance of the festival, the annual event provides an occasion for a display of 'official paternalism': the concern

of the government and community leadership for the well being of the community.

Thus, quite simply, the involvement of the District Office and the ostentatious displays of the Chiu Chow group in the festival is significantly ideologized. The public demonstration of power and social status becomes subsumed under the rubric of goodwill and responsibility towards the community.

There is another aspect in which ritual activities reproduce the domination of the community leadership. I refer to the significant prestige or 'face' given to those who play an important role in the organization of community affairs such as the maintenance of temples, distribution of charities, etc.. Face or *mien tze*, I suggest, can be more accurately conceptualized as a form of symbolic capital, to use a term of Bourdieu; that is, as an accumulated fund of political influence which a person can draw upon over time in the exercise of power. Particularly important in the Chinese cultural conception is the sense of dialectics between the 'fund of influence' and the exercise of power. Strictly speaking, it is not true to say that the involvement in community festivals - by financial contribution, for example - provides one with 'face' or source of status and influence. For what is evident, as is noticeable in the social life of Cheung Chau, is that such a prestigious and politically highly significant task is only given to those already possessing considerable political and economic power, e.g. the Chiu Chow merchants. The key word here, of course, is reproduction. For the sponsorship of temples and community festival does not, in a direct sense, create prestige and

social influence for the Chiu Chow merchants. More importantly it reproduces the existing class positions and the structure of domination as a whole.

CHAPTER FIVE

THE WONG WAI TSAK TONG: COMMUNITY LEADERSHIP AND
TRADITIONAL LAND TENURE UNDER COLONIAL RULEIntroduction

We must begin the examination of local leadership on Cheung Chau by looking at the Wong Wai Tsak Tong (*sic*) which occupied a dominant position of power and influence in the community from the late Ching period (1850's) until the establishment of British rule.

The Tong was the management council of a Wong lineage which received an imperial grant from the Ching government to collect land tax on Cheung Chau and the nearby islands. Over time, for all practical purposes, the Tong became the *de facto* owners of all usable land on Cheung Chau. As would be expected, such a system of land tenure naturally placed the Tong in a special position *vis-a-vis* the official bureaucracy. It is this structural position - as landlord and members of the gentry-literati class - which I argue, provided the Tong leaders with such an effective political and economic power in the community.

The British takeover was to introduce significant ambiguity in the position of the Tong. I argue that the current position of the Tong in the administration of land on Cheung Chau has emerged out of the contradictory aspects of colonial rule. More specifically, under the wider principles of Indirect Rule, it was the policy of the new administration to allow many of the traditional institutions to persist. At the same time, however,

crucial administrative reforms were introduced in order to provide for the government a greater degree of political control of the local communities. Significantly, with reference to the community of Cheung Chau, it was in the changes in the system of land tenure that the nature of colonial policy was most evident. Thus, under the British administration the Tong was permitted to retain its holdings and landlord status, and as a result enjoyed certain legal powers in the administration of land on Cheung Chau. Yet the overall administrative changes also had the effect of seriously undermining both the influence and resources of the Tong.

In discussing the nature of colonial rule my analysis essentially focuses on two related themes. Firstly, I am concerned with the restructuring of community leadership under the complex circumstances created by the colonial takeover. Equally important is the process of political realignment taking place in the context of the changes in the local economy. I refer to the increasing development of Cheung Chau, during the late 1800's, as a market town, serving as a trading centre for the coastal villages of the nearby islands. The commercial activities dealing with a large variety of goods and services supplemented the traditional fishing and its supporting industries.

In terms of my central analysis, what is crucial about the economic diversification is that it signals the emergence of the powerful merchant class on Cheung Chau. Indeed, I suggest that the ensuing struggle between the shopkeepers and the Tong constitutes a struggle based on class, involving critical social, economic as well as ideological processes. I shall deal with

this conflict in considerable detail. Briefly the realignment of the merchant interests had been made possible by the new circumstances created by colonial rule. Yet, at the same time, the struggle of the merchants against the traditional domination of the Tong was seriously affected by the latter's continuing influence in the system of land tenure in Cheung Chau.

The second theme of this chapter is the manoeuvres and reorganization of the Tong under colonial administration. First of all, there were attempts by the Tong leaders to regroup and to reorganize the Tong, so as to deal more effectively with the new government. The result was a shift in the emphasis from the traditional connections with the Tong headquarters in Kwantung to a greater political control by Tong leaders living in the colony. In this regard, two aspects of the organizational changes can be singled out.

Firstly, there was the division within the Tong - and indeed, the Wong lineage itself - between those members still living in Kwangtung and others dispersed over the colony. Over time, it was the Tong leaders in Cheung Chau and other parts of Hong Kong who made decisions regarding the management of Tong land, and negotiated with the administration.

At the same time, within the Tong leadership, there was an increasing distillation of power in the hands of the two managers who dealt directly with the government. Notably this had come about because of the present system of land tenure which, as I shall explain, vested in them important legal power relating to the transaction of land on Cheung Chau.

The second area of the manoeuvres of the Tong is concerned with the critical process of ideological transformation. In the midst of the wider structural changes and the rising influence of the shopkeepers, the Tong leaders tried to reassert their traditional influence and prestige as members of the gentry-literati class. In the course of daily life, this was evident in the ostentatious display of their literary skills, and above all, historical connections with the once powerful patrilineal organization. In more theoretical terms, such exercise involves the promotion of what I call the '*de facto* patrilineal' ideological model. The significance of the model is precisely that it prescribes status and prestige exclusively to those whose family and kinsmen are organized in the form of a patrilineal descent group.

The outcome of the ideological struggle, however, was significantly influenced by the government's own need for political control of the community. I shall discuss in this context the changes in the organization of the Pak Tai Temple and the Bun Festival. In particular, the period also saw the formation of the Chinese Temple Committee which was, generally speaking, designed to facilitate greater official involvement in the religious life in the local communities. In any case, as a result, the traditional influence of the Tong in the organization of temples and festivals was undermined and the responsibility was gradually transferred to the powerful shopkeepers.

The shift in the control of the ritual centres was, in an important sense, indicative of the changing class relations

in Cheung Chau. Given the nature of economic transformation in the local community, political processes were taking place by the turn of century which gradually removed the Tong from the centre of power structure and replaced it by the shopkeepers. This, as we shall see, has important consequences for the structuring of community leadership in the subsequent decades.

Historical Perspective: The Wong Wai Tsak Tong and the Ching Administration

To reward those who had rendered meritorious services to the imperial bureaucracy, it was a practice of the Ching administration (1644-1911) to offer these men and their families grants of tax rights in certain localities (cf. Chu 1962). As a condition of the grant, the recipients were required to pay to the government a fixed annual sum out of the total revenue of land tax collected. Normally such tax rights were granted in remote communities far from the provincial magistrate, thus relieving the government of a cumbersome bureaucracy otherwise necessary for the collection of land tax. Consequently these grants were rarely revoked and became the patrimonial estates of the recipient families. In addition, as the recipients were responsible for the direct payment of land tax - which the annual sum paid to the government constituted - they became in accordance with the Chinese law and customs,

de jure owners of the land in question¹. For these reasons, over time, the recipients of such (land) tax rights were for all purposes regarded as *de facto* landlords.

In the middle of the fifteenth century, a licence was granted to a Wong lineage in Nam Tau, Kwungtung, to collect taxes on land and fishing rights on Cheung Chau and the nearby islands (Hayes 1963: 91). To manage these estates, a branch of the Wong Wai Tsak Tong - the council which looked after the lineage affairs in Nam Tau - was set up on Cheung Chau. It is probable that the initial grant provided a substantial holding of the land on Cheung Chau. But over the generations, the Tong might have purchased more land, or acquired further imperial grants, resulting in the ownership of most of the land on Cheung Chau. At all events, by the time of the British occupation of the NT².

(all) building and agricultural lots were leased from (the Tong), and the Tong's managers also collected dues from the fishing stations and let out the local beaches to fishermen for beaming boats and drying nets. The house leases applied to the land only; the superstructures were the property of their lessees (Hayes 1977: 60).

¹ The traditional system of dual ownership included two categories of land rights. First the tenancy was hereditary in the sense that usufruct passed patrilineally from father to son in perpetuity, and second was the actual title to the land remaining in the hands of the landowner who had the obligation to pay imperial land tax. This so-called 'one field two (or sometimes three) lord' system has been discussed by Rawski 1972; see also Fei 1939, Elvin 1973: 153-4, Tadashi Fukutake 1967: 83.

² A government land officer reported in 1903, 'I find there, all houses are held under one landlord, the tenants holding varying leases from one year to perpetuity' (Colonial Secretary's Office Hong Kong Government 1903 Ext/3690: minutes of 18 August).

Partly to ensure effective control of the estates on Cheung Chau, the Tong developed strong political interests in the affairs of the community. Thus the members of the Tong maintained close contact with the parent body in Nam Tau, and with other members occupying important positions in the imperial bureaucracy. In addition, the regular movements of lineage members between Hong Kong and the Mainland meant that rentals collected from the land on Cheung Chau could be distributed, and reinvested in both Nam Tau and Hong Kong. Part of the returns from the lineage estates were used to finance seasonal rituals and worship, and for the maintenance of the ancestral hall. Therefore, in a very real sense, the Tong (or the lineage itself) was an economically viable and ideologically vital form of corporate organization.

Hence, in the period before the arrival of colonial rule, the position of economic and political dominance of the Tong is clear. But the exercise of power and influence of the Tong was further enhanced by the degree of administrative autonomy which a remote community like Cheung Chau traditionally enjoyed - as I have pointed out. As Hayes suggests,

While the district government might take an interest in local schemes, it could not be expected to do much more; partly because of poor or inconvenient communications, but principally because there was very little money available to assist deserving projects (1963: 94).

In short, what this means is that important matters relating to the community were inevitably given into the control of powerful interest groups like the Tong.

Counterpoised against the power of the Tong were the shopkeepers and the leaders of the district associations. Vital duties like the lighting of streets, road maintenance, and the management of temples etc., would be shared by the men from these groups (Hayes, 1977, Chapter 3). Ultimately, however, the influence of the Tong must bear strongly on these matters as well on other crucial issues such as the raising of arms for local defence and negotiations with the district magistrate. What is obvious, therefore, is that the exercise of power by the Tong was critically dependent on its position as landlord, and equally important, on its vital connections with the higher reaches of the Imperial bureaucracy. The overall situation before the British takeover is best summarised again by a quote from Hayes:

The Tong owned all the land; its parent branch at Nam Tau must undoubtedly have included senior graduates and possibly retired officials; and ... some members of the Cheung Chau branch were junior graduates by examination or purchase. This group must have been able to exert a considerable pressure on the district magistrate and his secretaries regarding Cheung Chau affairs, and during their short three-year tour most magistrates must have felt that the Tong and Cheung Chau people were capable of looking after themselves on what was, after all, a small and remote island, with a population less than that of many of the larger villages in the district (1963: 95).

The Tong and The Administration of Land under Colonial Rule

After the occupation of the NT in 1898, one of the immediate tasks of the British administration was to remove or modify those traditional institutions and practices repugnant to European

ideas of good government (Freedman 1966b). Among these were the corruption of the government bureaucrats, the mistreatment of criminals and significantly, the prevailing absentee landlordism in the countryside. The reform of the traditional system of land tenure presented for the new administration a particularly urgent problem because it carried crucial implications for the social organization of the rural communities. In addition, the administration was concerned with the complex task of the collection of land tax which was to be the main source of revenue accruable from the NT at the time.

But more generally, British rule introduced a system of bureaucracy that was - at least theoretically - based on European ideals of 'objectivity, impartiality and calculability', to invoke Weber's (1947) classic formulation. Staffed by a new class of bureaucrats recruited on entirely different principles, the new administration was to alter the traditional basis of prestige and political power. More specifically, as far as the gentry-literati class was concerned, the traditional means of social mobility through literati education and bureaucratic examination was to be broken once and for all.

Nevertheless, it is important to note that the introduction of the colonial administration did not result in an eradication or total transformation of the local power structure. What is relevant here is the principle of Indirect Rule, a dynamic system of local government which was widely established in British colonies in Asia and Africa. Under such a system, in Crowder's words, "(the) indigenous political institution, under the guidance of the resident European political officer, would be continually

developed into more efficient units of administration, responding to and adapting themselves to the new situation created by colonial rule" (1968: 169).

The central aim of Indirect Rule³ was to secure effective political control and economic exploitation of the colonized society. As I have pointed out in the first chapter, a contradiction can be located on the one hand, at the level of securing political control, and on the other, in relation to the sponsorship of indigenous institutions and leadership. This is so because of the tendency of local leadership - fostered by the power and prestige derived from government patronage - to solidify its own position and even develop its own interests in opposition to that of the government.

The attempt by the government to overcome such contradiction in the nature of colonial rule, I argue, explains much of the dynamics of changing community leadership and power structure in my analysis. A theoretical elaboration of this theme is given in the concluding chapter. But here it is sufficient to emphasize that one of the most significant ways of resolving the contradiction is to reform the traditional institutions, while retaining some of their original (and more useful) features.

³ For a detailed discussion, see Symposium on Principles and Methods of Colonial Administration, University of Bristol, 1950 and The Colonial Problem 1937.

The nature of colonial rule, I suggest, provides an explanation for the current position of the Tong in the administration of land on Cheung Chau. Notably, in contrast to what happened in other parts of the NT⁴, the Tong in Cheung Chau had successfully negotiated to retain their landlord/taxlord status *vis-a-vis* the colonial government. On the whole, government recognition of the status of landlords who claimed ownership by Imperial grants was relatively common in the island communities at the southern part of the leased territories. In these less fertile and at that time, still remote areas, the newly established Land Court sometimes decided in favour of the landlords who could ensure the continuous utilization of land by the tenants or by the landlords themselves. Landlord status was granted where, as an official report puts it, "such an arrangement would benefit the government as the land will be prevented from going out of cultivation".⁵

In any case, the Tong's position in the administration of land is laid down by the NT Ordinance (Cap. 97). Under the Ordinance, the Tong pays half of the total annual rental to the

⁴ As the Ching government relied on the old Ming land records there was a massive evasion of land tax as many landlords simply failed to register the whole of their holdings. In fact, by the time of the British takeover, only fourteen landlords were compensated for their lost property to the Crown as they were able to provide evidence for actually having paid imperial taxes. See G.N. Orme, Report on the NT, 1899-1912, in HongKong Sessional Papers 1909-1912: 46.

⁵ Colonial Secretary's Office, Hong Kong Government 1904 Ext/3420: 26 April, in reply to application by a Wong Kwok Shi to retain his taxlord status on Yi O, Lantau Island.

District Office in the form of Crown Rent. Furthermore, according to Section 28 of the Ordinance, all transactions involving Tong land - or more accurately, all transfers of tenancy rights - require the written consent of the Tong managers. The final agreement between the new tenant and the Tong is to be registered on a prescribed form which is kept as a record in the District Office.

Another area where Tong consent is required is the conversion of land status as entered in the Old Schedule Lots of 1898. The status registered, either as agricultural or building land, restricts the ways in which the plot in question can be put to use. In the years following the British takeover, with the development of the NT, there has been an enormous increase in the application for the conversion of land status as farmers and other owners of agricultural land try to take advantage of the inflation of land prices. As a rule, such owners of land on Cheung Chau need to obtain permission from the District Office as well as the Tong before construction of shops or houses can begin.

Therefore, from what appears in the NT Ordinance the role of the Tong is vital in the administration of land on Cheung Chau. In practice, however, the situation is considerably more ambiguous. More specifically, there are major qualifications in the Ordinance which in effect reduce the formal powers of the Tong to the level of mere legal formalities.

One of the key provisions prescribes that the Tong is not permitted to prevent any land transaction approved by the District Office. Nor are they allowed to increase rentals

without official permission (which is rarely granted anyway because of the rent control regulations). Finally, as prescribed by section 28 of the Ordinance, leases of land from the Tong are subject to automatic renewal once in every five years 'on the same terms until the termination of the Crown Lease'.

The last is particularly significant for at least two reasons. In the first place, all leases of Tong land - because of the right for automatic renewal - become in effect perpetual leases; these leases of tenancy rights can be bought and sold freely without the interference of the Tong. On the other hand, the provision legally defines the Tong as a leasee of the Crown. Consequently, the Crown reserves the right to 'terminate' Tong ownership (and the right of the sub-tenants) when a particular plot of land is required for public works purposes.

Hence, the ambiguous position and the critical changes of the Tong under the colonial administration can be more clearly stated. While the traditional powers associated with the landlord/taxlord status have been curbed under the present system of land tenure, the Tong's historical position as 'landowners of Cheung Chau' is formally recognized by the NT Ordinance. The legal requirement of Tong approval in land transactions naturally gives the Tong leaders an undeniable leeway in exercising influence not only in matters relating to land but also in the course of social life generally.

At the same time the reform in land tenure also significantly reduces the Tong's actual control of the estate. Furthermore, accompanying the loss of control of land to the government is an even more serious decline of revenue from the property on Cheung

Chau. In short, from the Tong's point of view, what is at stake is not only traditional influence and political power, but economic resources as well. All these changes have had a profound effect on the organization of the Tong. But first let me concentrate on a broader issue.

I have suggested that the reform in land tenure has to be seen in the wider context of the nature of Indirect Rule. And there is an inherent contradiction in the overall aims of fostering the indigenous institutions, and at the same time, curbing the powers of these institutions by placing them under effective political control. The ambiguous position of the Tong, as is perhaps obvious, has emerged out of the attempt of the government to reconcile such a contradiction. But more than that, the policy of government administration must set in train further conflicts and oppositions at the local level as political interests are relocated in a new set of economic and political relations. I refer specifically to the regrouping of the shopkeepers whose role in the community was historically subsumed under the Tong leadership.

Merchant Class and The Restructuring of Local Leadership

The dominance of the shopkeepers in the social and economic life on Cheung Chau has been mentioned on several occasions. In summary I regard shopkeepers constituting the merchant class as those engaging in three kinds of economic activities.

Firstly, there were the operators of boat-yards for the

building and repairs of fishing junks, and manufacturers of rope, oar and other accessories for fishing. Second were the owners of *yu' lan*, or purchasing agents of fish. Finally I refer to the keepers of stores which supplied a wide array of goods such as food, medicine, clothes, incense and other articles of religious worship.

By the turn of the century, at the time of the British occupation, it was already evident that manufacturing and marketing had come to be established on Cheung Chau as activities of major economic importance. Actual data are difficult to come by; but a historian offers a lucid description of the situation:

The Cheung Chau shops were numerous (more than a hundred). They provided goods and marketing facilities for the island's own land and boat people, and also served a considerable number of villages and boat population on adjacent Lantau and other offshore islands, some of which were not included in the territory leased to Britain. Together this scattered population and the local fishing grounds provided the basis for what was, in 1899, a very flourishing coastal market centre (Hayes 1977: 59).

Historically these activities were developed as supporting industries to fishing. However, at the same time, it should be emphasized that the development of Cheung Chau as a market town - and to a lesser extent, a manufacturing centre - represented an important economic diversification from the traditional fishing industry. Though much of the manufacturing and marketing activities were related to fishing; more generally, the expansion of the market was stimulated by the needs of increasing population on Cheung Chau and the nearby islands.

The consequence of this development cannot be over-estimated; it has in a sense the effect of 'opening up' the community - both socially and economically. To phrase it another way, the restructuring of the local economy in the context of the wider communities necessarily located the island in a new and complex set of social and economic relations. These relations, extending beyond the immediate community, produced a critical ideological shift in the definition of status and community leadership. Indeed, the change in ideological emphasis set the beginning, as we shall see, of the claim for prestige or 'face' based on a person's social connections with the wider society in Hong Kong - both with the business world and with the government bureaucracy.

In the eyes of the colonial government, the diversification of the Cheung Chau economy represented a highly significant development: the general prosperity would mean greater revenue from the sources of taxation, charges on Crown rent and sales of Crown leases. But the economic changes also necessitated the restructuring of political relations in the community. The overall aim, in short, was to foster a different local leadership more representative of the emergent interest. Guided by the broader principles of Indirect Rule, to return to the earlier point, the government policy was to retain the traditional structure of the community leadership, particularly its role and functions *vis-a-vis* the administration. Transformation took place, instead, in the form of shifting sponsorship to the new interest group - i.e. the shopkeepers - which was to occupy the core of the community power structure.

Instead of the
scholar class

Let me now return to my central analysis. I argue that the changing economic structure and the revision in government policy - both in relation to land tenure and the sponsorship of local leadership - are key factors which explain the current position of the Tong. What is crucial is the development of new structural circumstances which enabled the emergent shopkeepers to appease the new government and to directly engage in the struggle for power and influence in the community.

In 1899, a year after the British lease of the NT, the government introduced, as part of the administrative reform, the Local Communities Ordinance⁶. The Ordinance No.11 prescribed the formation of Committees (*sic*), and circulars were issued directing villagers to nominate candidates for the Committeemen. For the purpose the whole of the NT was divided into districts and sub-districts; each village from 50 to 100 persons was allowed to nominate one Committeeman. From the view of the administration, the Committeemen were to offer a useful link between the government and the rural communities. In the words of Steward Lockhart, Colonial Secretary of Hong Kong at the time, "The Committeemen as a rule are those who possess influence in their own neighbourhood. whose advice is listened to, and whose lead is generally followed" (HK Sessional Paper 1900: 265).

⁶ Details of the Ordinance are found in the Hong Kong Government Gazette 15 July 1899: 1,117. Sir Henry Blake, the first Governor of Hong Kong explained the legislation to the Legislature; see Hansard 1903:52.

For the appointment of Committeemen, Cheung Chau was classified as a sub-district consisting of a single village. In all, fourteen Committeemen were nominated, who were later accepted by the government; their names and other details are given in Table 17.

Table 17. The Committeemen of Cheung Chau in 1899

Name	Origin	Occupation
Lo Tsun-pong*	Wai Chiu	Scaffolder
Man Tat-fu	...	Fish dealer
Chu Man-in*	Wai Chiu	Fish dealer
Fung Shun*	Wai Chiu	Fish dealer
Chong Tat-ming	San On	Boat builder
Fong Hip Ts'un*	Hakka (Wai Chau)	Tea house owner
Ts'o Ts'ing	Tung Kwun	Miscellaneous trader and distiller
Ts'oi Kai	Tung Kwun	Miscellaneous trader and pig slaughterer
Lo U-t'ong*	Nam Hoi	Silk and cloth store proprietor
Man Tat-ming	...	Fish dealer
Kwan Pak-yau*	Wai Chiu	Fisherman
Hung Muk-kwai	Wai Chiu	Fish dealer
Kwan Lun-hing
Lam Tai

Source: Hong Kong Government Gazette 1899 July 15: 1117 reproduced in Hayes 1977: 80.

* Signatories of petition for the payment of ground rent directly to the government rather than to the Wong Wai Tsak Tong; see later.

Several features of the composition of the Committeemen can be singled out. First of all, inspite of the traditional influence of the Wong Wai Tsak Tong none of the names included a member of the lineage organization. Secondly, almost half of the Committeemen were listed as fish dealers, illustrating the importance of fishing at the time. The occupation of the others was distributed over manufacturing and trading in sundry goods. Finally, the Committeemen were predominantely of Wai Chiu and Tung Kwun origin, indicating the similiar distribution of these ethnic groups on Cheung Chau - these men were probably drawn from among the leaders of the respective district associations.

It is not clear from government papers how these men were nominated nor in terms of what criteria they were finally accepted by the administration. But analytically, the appointment of the Committeemen is highly significant in view of the social and economic transformation described earlier. It represented in fact the first of a series of official attempts to reorganize the community leadership into a more efficient institutional form. The overall aim of the government policy was to place the local power structure under more effective official control, by making it more accountable to both the community and the administration.

With this in mind, it is perhaps not surprising that the land-owning Wong Wai Tsak Tong were excluded from the membership of the Committeemen. As the government saw it, the Tong whose prestige and influence was based on the traditional literati examination and land ownership on Cheung Chau, was no longer

representative of the dominant interest of the community. By contrast government sponsorship of the merchants and shopkeepers would serve an important purpose: it paved the way for greater cooperation between the government and the emergent local leadership in matters relating to the development of Cheung Chau and administration generally.

Thus the significance of the formation of the Committeemen can be simply stated. Among other things, it provided for the shopkeepers a crucial connection with the colonial bureaucracy, which facilitated the struggle against the traditional domination of the Tong. The problem, in a way, took on a particular urgency in view of the economic transformation that was taking place: transformation which demanded major commitments in the social and economic life on Cheung Chau.

It is of considerable interest, in this connection, to take note of a petition sent to the government from Cheung Chau on 31 July 1905. The petition dealt with two major issues. Firstly, it expressed dissatisfaction with the present system of land tenure. The signatories argued that instead of payment of rent to the Tong, Crown rent should be paid directly to the government so that the tenants could be made legal lessees of Crown land.

In addition, the petition pointed to various malpractices of the Tong regarding the collection of rent and in the social relations in the community generally. The petitioners complained:

that the amount payable to the (Hong Kong)
government are small while the amount they
(the Tong) collect are several times larger;

and

that in case where one's business prospers and where there is any ill feeling between any one and the Wongs, the latter always endeavour to raise the land tax ... etc. that the said Tong does not concern itself with the welfare of the inhabitants and that therefore there is no reason why the inhabitants should pay tax to the Tong and submit to its interference (Colonial Secretary's Office, 1905 Ext/5914, cited in Hayes 1977: 60).

In support of the first point, the petition reported that in the previous year the Tong collected over \$1,000 from the tenants but paid only \$550.65 to the government in the form of Crown rent.

In retrospect let me draw attention to two aspects of the petition. To begin with, it is notable that practically all the signatories identified themselves as shopkeepers or merchants. Of further significance is the fact that, of the total of seven persons who signed the petition the names of five also appeared in the list of Committeemen mentioned earlier.

It is not clear if the petition was organized by the Committeemen themselves as a group. Nevertheless it can be speculated that the Local Committee formed by the Committeemen must have provided a useful forum to work out the major issues vital to the interests of the shopkeepers and the merchants on the whole. As officially sponsored community leaders these men would have enjoyed, to a degree, easy access to the government bureaucracy, especially the District Office responsible for the administration of Cheung Chau. In any case, the connection between the Committeemen and the merchant class interests, and the petition against the practices of the Tong offer an interesting insight to the process of political realignment at the time.

A second feature of the petition is the nature of the ideological argument. The complaint that the system of land tenure was cumbersome, for example, expressed a more general resentment against the political domination of the Tong. Indeed, the malpractices of the Tong involved not only, in a sense, 'cheating on the government' by under paying the proper amount of Crown rent but also the abuse of power in the relationship with the shopkeepers. What lies behind the argument, however, is the economic and political commitment of the shopkeepers to the development of Cheung Chau. The tenor of the petition expresses, in fact, the willingness of the merchants to appease, and collaborate with, the colonial administration which they hoped - quite rightly - would act in their interest. Above all, the reference to the 'injustice' of the land tenure system and the difficulties the inhabitants suffered under the Tong gave expression to what they saw as the main factors undermining the continuous expansion of Cheung Chau as a market town.

The Reorganization of the Wong Wai Tsak Tong

It is time to consider the organizational changes of the Tong in the face of the wider changes which were seriously affecting its social and economic positions in the community. On the whole there was a need to tighten control of the Tong estates under the complex circumstance created by colonial rule. What was at stake, however, was not only the traditional influence on Cheung Chau but also the corporate

unity of the Tong (and the Wong lineage) as an ideologically viable organization. The causes for these changes are arguably complex and can be traced to such important factors as the dispersal of lineage members over the colony and China, and in particular, the nature of land tenure under British administration.

The Tong, as I have mentioned, was set up as a management council for the administration of the ancestral estates. According to a Tong informant, the council was formed around the middle of the fifteenth century, at the time of the Hung-chih reign (1492-3) of the Ming dynasty, by an ancestor who was a scholar of *Chin-shih* degree. He bore six sons, thus giving the lineage six *fang*, or formal segments the most senior members of which constituted, according to the lineage regulation, the full membership of the council. In the performance of its duties the Tong was responsible for compiling the annual financial accounts, distribution of surpluses from the yearly revenue, organizing ancestral worship, and making decisions regarding transaction of lineage estate.

Therefore, the considerable power of the Tong in determining the affairs of the lineage is obvious. Nevertheless it is significant to note that provision was given by custom which placed such power under some form of collective control by the lineage members as a whole. This was the regulation that more important business affecting the lineage - e.g. the alienation of corporate property - as well as any organizational changes of the Tong must be subject to the approval of the full assembly of lineage members. In the pre-British days such an

assembly was held during the annual gathering for the Chinese New Year at the lineage headquarters in Nam Tau. The 'gathering of the clan' was, of course, an important occasion. Ritual offerings to the ancestors were performed; newly borns were introduced to the elders and names entered in the lineage record. The event also provided the opportunity for the Tong councillors to report to the members the activities for the year, and to place before them the more important business for discussion and approval.

In analytical terms, this provision probably originated from the fact that lineage members were dispersed over the areas of Kwangtung, Cheung Chau and elsewhere in Hong Kong. Historically, according to Tong informants, the emigration of lineage members had been a continuous process since the receiving of the imperial grant of tax rights on Cheung Chau. With the establishment of a branch of the Tong on the island, others soon followed attracted by the wealth and influence of their more powerful kinsmen already living there. It is difficult to reconstruct in any detail the activities of the Tong members on Cheung Chau in pre-British days. Nevertheless from interviews and examination of Tong records one point can be inferred. This is that very few of them were engaged in commerce; instead the majority either occupied positions as minor government officials or made their living as teachers of *shu kuan*, a kind of academy for private students, and even as 'feng shui doctors' or specialists in Chinese geomancy. The influential leaders of the *fangs* would more likely to be living on private incomes. The significance of this will be

discussed later. At all events, by the time of the British occupation, suggested an informant, the total of 450 lineage members were distributed roughly in the order of: 200 in Nam Tau, 150 in Cheung Chau, and 100 in the rest of Hong Kong.

Hence, to return to the central discussion, there are probably two reasons for the development of the provision for collective approval of key decisions of the Tong.

Firstly, because of the wide dispersal of lineage members, there was the need to maintain the unity of the lineage both ideologically and as an economically viable organization. Indeed, as illustrated earlier, the significance of the annual assembly is precisely that it provided the occasion which facilitated the reproduction of the key structures - the ancestral hall, the corporate estates and the social relations - of the patrilineage.

Secondly, the regulation allowed the lineage as a whole to place corporate estates in remote areas of Cheung Chau under some form of control. This was especially important for the leaders of the respective *'fang'* the members of which were mostly residing in Kwangtung. As Freedman (1958, 1974) has argued, each formal segment or *'fang'* in a Chinese lineage often functioned as a political unit *vis-a-vis* other segments in the struggle for power and especially for control over the ancestral land. Therefore, to put it more precisely, the holding of an annual assembly enabled the *'fang'* leaders to appoint officials in the Tong council who would represent their respective interests in the administration of lineage properties on Cheung Chau.

In summary, it is necessary to see the Tong in the pre-

British years as enjoying significant political and ideological support from the lineage members. I emphasize the continuous movement of lineage members between the headquarters in Nam Tau and Hong Kong, which in a critical sense, reproduced the key structures of the patrilineal organization: it is this aspect of the Tong organization in which the effects of colonial rule were most dramatically felt.

One of the early tasks of colonial administration was to introduce some measures which would regulate the movement of people between the adjacent province of Kwangtung and the colony. Military check-points were set up along the border and customary inspections were made in the pursuit of criminals and smugglers. In any case, though strict immigration control was not imposed well until the 1950's, it was evident that with the British takeover the crossing between the two territories at will was no longer possible.

From the Tong's point of view, this would not have produced special difficulties had it not been for the fact that many lineage members were gradually developing important commitments and interests in the colony. On Cheung Chau, for instance, many kinsmen had settled in the community, making a livelihood by employing their education and gentry background - as I have suggested. Indeed, more generally speaking, it was the increasing social and economic commitments to life on Cheung Chau which, in a sense, turned the Tong leaders from their traditional connections with Nam Tau and engaged them in a continuous struggle for power and influence in the community. But more of that later.

The most immediate effect of these changes is perhaps obvious. The increasing difficulties for the lineage members dispersed over the colony to make the annual return journey to Nam Tau meant that the organization of ancestral worship and the maintenance of ancestral shrines became complex tasks indeed. With the undermining of the key structures of the patrilineage, ultimately what was at stake was the continuity of the Wong lineage itself. In any case, coupled with other changes produced by the British take-over of Hong Kong, the failure to maintain the custom of annual assembly marked the beginning of the demise of the lineage as a corporate community.

The Structure of the Tong and the Role of the Managers

By the turn of the twentieth century, informants have suggested, the annual assembly of lineage members in Nam Tau was becoming increasingly difficult. Nevertheless, the custom of the appointment of Tong officials by the assembly was continued; the annual gathering when it could be held became an important occasion to attend to many matters affecting the lineage as a whole. Consequently there were overall attempts to formalize the regulations regarding the practices of the Tong. Such regulations were not to be altered until the following general meeting of the lineage.

In 1905 the formal structure of the Tong organization was established and this has remained the same until today. It became formally separated from the parent council in Nam Tau and permanently stationed in Cheung Chau. The full council

of the Tong was to be elected by the assembly of lineage members in Nam Tau. The membership of the Tong council consisted of two managers, one secretary, the *tsui chan* or head of the lineage - or his representative in Hong Kong - and five ordinary councillors.

The duties of the managers were to collect rent, and to initiate decisions regarding the reinvestment of Tong income, among others. Most importantly, they would negotiate directly with the administration as they were - and still are - recognized under the Section 15 of the NT Ordinance, as legal representatives of the Tong⁷. Consequently their formal consent was required for all transactions involving Tong land under the present system of land tenure, as pointed out.

To a degree the power of the managers was counter-checked by other positions in the council. The *tsui chan* represented the authority of the head of the lineage. In this case, he was the eldest member of the most senior *fang* living in Hong Kong.

⁷ In practice the government policy is by no means clear. Where the managers of lineage organization were to apply for the sale of corporate estates, the government would be prompted to act in protection of the interests of the average lineage members. In October 1978 some leaders of a lineage organization in Ping Shan, NT, negotiated the sale to a developer of its ancestral property of over two million square feet of agricultural land. Other members tried to block the sale by bringing the case before the High Court which finally ruled against the disposal of the estates. "The judge's ruling in effect means that the land (held in trust by the three managers) could only be sold if it were in the interest of all the beneficiaries, and the agreement made ... to sell (the property) is no longer of any value" (South China Morning Post, 19 October 1978).

The managers were required to bring all vital matters for consultation with the *tsui chan* and the councillors before final decisions were made. This was particularly urgent in the matter of the alienation of Tong land either by sale or through exchange with the government for an alternative grant of Crown land. The councillors also helped with the keeping and auditing of the annual accounts, and the maintaining of a lineage record of members living in the colony.

In retrospect it is clear that the formal organization of the Tong council had been devised with the aim of maintaining the traditional control of the estates on Cheung Chau, the administration of which had come to rely increasingly on the managers. However, the failure to hold regular meetings of lineage members rendered ineffectual the overall purpose of the reorganization. For one thing, it meant that Tong leaders once elected into the council could legitimately hang on to the tenure of the positions 'by custom'⁸. That is, having been formally elected, they could by right occupy indefinitely their positions until the next general assembly which might not be held in the

⁸ There had been two manager, Wong Siu Kan and Wong Chung Hoi until the Japanese occupation when Siu Kan died. In 1950 a general meeting was held in Cheung Chau to elect a replacement for the second manager. However, since only less than a hundred - with about thirty from China - members could attend, no decision was made. A second meeting was held in 6 December 1959; again no appointment was made. Meanwhile Chong Hoi was approaching his late seventies and the Tong was anxious that if he died the council would be left without any manager elected according to the traditional rules. Since it is impossible to hold a general assembly of all lineage members, other council leaders have asked the District Office to permit the formation of a special committee to take over the duties from the ailing Chung Hoi. But so far, no decision has been reached by the District Office.

foreseeable future. It is necessary to examine the implications of this in detail.

What the discussion is leading towards is the gradual political isolation of the Tong in Cheung Chau from the parent council in Nam Tau and from the lineage members as a whole. In the first place, I suggest that the circumstances created by colonial rule resulted in a shift in the political control of the Tong. More specifically, with the increasing entrenchment of the Tong leaders on Cheung Chau, it was these men who gradually took on the main responsibilities for the administration of the lineage estates. The diminishing influence of the dominant interests in Nam Tau was inevitable. Indeed, deprived of their traditional means of control, the lineage leaders on the Mainland had to relinquish the overall regulation of Tong activities on Cheung Chau, and to relegate to the council many duties vital to the fortune of the lineage generally.

In practical terms, this meant that the ordinary lineage members living in Hong Kong were able to receive their share of the annual income without having to go through the *fang* leaders in Nam Tau. It was easy too for each member to enter the names of the newly born sons in the lineage record and to apply for additional shares of the distribution. Within the same context it is significant to note that from 1920 onwards, as Tong records have shown, the remittance of revenues from Cheung Chau to the parent council in China became highly irregular - and totally ceased by the end of the 1930's. A Tong informant suggested that the undistributed surpluses were mostly reinvested in Cheung Chay either in the form of maintenance of existing properties,

or purchases of shop-houses. The exact nature of the expenditure is difficult to ascertain; but it is perhaps no accident that a few Tong leaders have emerged since the Second World War as some of the wealthiest men on Cheung Chau.

Generally, what characterized the situation was a process of internal differentiation within the structure of the lineage itself. On the one hand, fission took place dividing the whole membership into those localized in Kwungtang and others dispersed over Cheung Chau and Hong Kong. On the other, in terms of the organization of the Tong, there was a split between the parent council and the branch in Cheung Chau. Consequently, speaking of the Tong leadership generally, it was evident that while the power of some was diminishing, others were beginning to enjoy an impressive degree of influence and economic wealth. Among the Tong leaders on Cheung Chau, it was in the role of managers that their increasing power and affluence was most evident.

The influence of the managers, relative to other Tong leaders, was derived from the nature of the administration of land under colonial rule - as I have explained earlier. My argument can be stated simply. Though the powers of the Tong managers were severely limited under the NT Ordinance, nevertheless, the legal requirement of their formal approval in all land transactions gave them a certain influence in determining the outcome of such matters. More specifically, they could in practice give prior attention to one transaction in preference to another. For land deals involving tens of thousands of dollars, a delay of this kind could cause serious inconvenience and even financial loss. Hence, in order to ensure a speedy signing of

papers 'tea money' (*cha chien*) ranging from tens to hundreds of dollars was sometimes offered to the managers. The situation is aptly summarized by a District Office file:

The money (from Tong estates), in fact, sticks to the Manager's fingers and not to the Tong's. He signs all the leases and gives written agreements, and we can be sure that he does not do it for nothing, though his exact scale of fees and yearly income are unknown to us.⁹

The comment expresses the very dilemma facing the government. Such a dilemma, speaking generally, is a direct result of the contradiction in the application of colonial rule. For once a decision had been made which gave recognition to the traditional status of the Tong, the role and functions of the managers had to be given some degree of official support¹⁰. Bound by the land policy it has itself devised, the government recognizes that any problem occurring in the appointment of the managers will bring about serious interruptions in the administration of land. That is why for the sake of efficient administration, the government often needs to turn a blind eye to any malpractices of the Tong - inspite of the official attempts to

⁹ File no. 56/7/01 - 15/85/58 held in the District Officer-Islands. Emphases added. The increasing power in the hands of the sole manager results in significant jealousy among other Tong leaders. The various calls in for a meeting to elect the second manager and to replace Wong Chung Hoi is vitally related to the struggle for control of the Tong.

¹⁰ Section 15 of the NT Ordinance states: 'Every instrument relating to land held by a clan, family or t'ong, which is executed for signed by the registered manager thereof, in the presence of the Land Office and is attested to him, shall be as effectual for all purposes as if it had been executed or signed by all the members of the said clan, family or t'ong'. But see footnote 7.

restructure and undermine its influences in other areas.

Control of the Temples and Ideological Transformation of the Tong

Lastly I turn to the issue of the ideological aspect of the Tong. Again we need to consider the problem within the wider context of colonial administration. It is important to recall that other than the collection of Crown Rent, the overall aim of administrative reform in the early years of the colony was also concerned with the more general problems of political and cultural control of the NT communities. Consequently government measures were introduced which set the beginning of the official cultural policy. I refer in particular to the changes in the administration of the local temples and the organization of the festivals, which culminated in the formation of the Chinese Temple Committee in 1928. To elaborate this point, I consider first of all, the role of the Tong in the ritual life of Cheung Chau.

As I have described previously, the management of the major temples and the organization of the seasonal festivals typically involved complex arrangements between the local associations. Important duties like the maintenance of the Pak Tai temple and the annual celebration of the Bun Festival were - and still are today - largely in the hands of the Wai Chiu Fu. However, I emphasize that powerful local groups like the Tong also enjoyed significant influence in these undertakings through substantial financial contributions. Focusing on the early years of Cheung Chau, informants have described

the involvement of the Tong:

By custom the Tong men cannot become the manager of the Bun Festival. It has to go to a person of Wai Chiu origin. But throughout the years the Tong leaders had always sat in management committee with other influential men like the shopkeepers. The committee looked after important businesses like selecting the date and time for the (Bun) Festival, collecting donations from Cheung Chau and Hong Kong, and making sure that the temple is in good order.

From the government's point of view, the system which depended upon the financial subsidies from the Tong and other local groups was satisfactory as far as it went. However, given the crucial implications for community life and political processes in general, the management of the local temples had to be brought under some form of administrative control. In 1928 the colonial government introduced the Chinese Temple Ordinance which formalized the control which government had exercised through the years. A major purpose of the Ordinance was to make provisions for the formation of a Chinese Temple Committee under the jurisdiction of the Secretary for Chinese Affairs. The function of the Committee, as I have mentioned, was to place the important temples in the colony under government supervision. In carrying out its many duties, the Committee worked closely with local leaders regarding the appointment of temple-keepers, and the need for renovation of the temples, etc.. In addition, the Chinese Temple Ordinance called for the establishment of a General Chinese Charities

Fund.¹¹ The source of the Fund mainly came from the tenders for the 'management-rights' of temples (see chapter three) and, in the case of temples directly administered by the Committee, from the 'oil money' donated by the worshippers. The Chinese Temple Committee was made responsible for the administration of the Fund. The money was mainly used for the reconstruction and maintenance of temples; but local communities were encouraged to apply for financial grants from the Fund for use in holding religious celebrations and for improvements in social amenities.

The formation of the Chinese Temple Committee had a significant effect on the local control of temples and religious life generally. For the first time, a government body was set up armed with stringent regulations regarding the upkeep of the temples and provided with an accumulated fund specifically for use in the promotion of religious activities in the local communities. Though th^e policy was presented by the government as relying on official and local cooperation, it was nevertheless evident that the government had the final

¹¹ Sections 8 and 9 of the Chinese Temple Ordinance 1928:
 "... revenue from all Chinese temples must be applied in the first instance to the observance of the customary ceremonies and maintenance of the temple buildings and surpluses may be transferred to the General Chinese Charities Fund. This fund may in the discretion of the Chinese Temple Committee be applied (a) to the payment for the necessary staff and other expenses incurred by the Committee ... and (b) for the purpose of Chinese charity in the colony" (Correspondence of the Secretary of Chinese Affairs to the Colonial Secretary 19 February 1947, General Registry file no. 14/3511/47 held in the Hong Kong Government Public Record Office.)

say in all important matters, especially relating to the allocation of the Chinese Charities Fund. The issue was of particular importance as many people considered the establishment of the Fund both cumbersome and unnecessary. The predominant view, as one informant put it, was that 'the money belonged to the community anyway; why should'nt we use it as we please rather than having to go through the government'¹². In any case, from the view of the local leadership like the Tong the system of regrant had the effect of undermining the control of not only an important source of finance but also the management of the temples as a whole.

To return to the central discussion, from the 1930's onwards there were visible changes in the nature of Tong support for local temples and community projects. One type of evidence can be found in the inscriptions on the commemorative tablets outside the major temples. Notably, following the first decades of the colonial rule, the Tong appeared less and less frequently on the tablets and it was the names of the managers which were inscribed as donors of the expenses towards the renovation. The significance here, I suggest, is not so much withdrawal from, but rather a new emphasis in, the Tong involvement in community affairs. To put it more concisely, the changes took the form

¹² Local communities often tried to extract as much as they could from the fund when asking for government assistance. In 1947 the Cheung Chau Residents' Association applied to the Chinese Temple Committee for a grant of \$15,500. The Secretary for Chinese Affairs commented: 'This was the exact amount of the anticipated revenues from the Pak Tai Temple (for the year)' (*ibid*).

of underplaying the collective presence of the Tong and at the same time, promoting the influence of the individual leaders, particularly the managers. This of course is even more obvious in the immediate post-war years. For example, in the annual reports of the Cheung Chau Residents' Association - the first community organization formed after the Second World War (see next chapter) - the Tong was hardly mentioned even though Tong leaders had always held important positions in the executive committee until the demise of the Association in 1955.

The phenomenon, I would like to suggest, is more than incidental and is related to the ideological process engaged by the lineage organization. Part of the explanation evidently lies in the increasing concentration of power in the hands of managers for carrying out the many businesses vital to the Tong. Nevertheless, it is significant to note that in the undertaking of community affairs the Tong leaders did not act as individuals separated from the organization. Rather, while emphasizing the attachment to the Tong, the leaders also attempted to transform some of the structures which constituted their ideological and historical position in the community.

In more analytical terms, the nature of the ideological enterprise can be stated this way. It is important to recall that the ideological position of the Tong was essentially constituted by two key structures: the role of 'big landl^{ord}rod' or *ta ti chu* and the social status derived from its organization as of corporate patrilineage (*ta chia tsui*). The nature of the ideological transformation involves the emphasis of the latter structure as the sole principle for the basis of the Tong's

influence and prestige in the community.

In a sense the denial of the traditional status of *ta ti chu* is perhaps obvious from the discussion so far. In the context of the colonial administration which introduced significant reforms in the system of land tenure, traditional landlordism in the NT naturally took on quite different meanings. More specifically, it tended to acquire and carry pejorative connotations of 'economic exploitation' and even 'abuse of power'. In Cheung Chau, as we have seen, the social disrepute of the Tong as landlords was crystallized in, and, indeed, enhanced by, the petition of the shopkeepers asking the government to curb some of the traditional influence of the Tong in the community. An informant remarked, "In the British days the Tong men tended to feel 'ashamed' of their positions as landowners, which they tried to cover up".

The other aspect of the transformation is equally crucial. By promoting its position as *ta chia tsui*, patrilineage organization, the Tong appealed to one of the most enduring cultural structures in Chinese society. In other words, and putting it crudely perhaps, the continuing influence of the Tong men was rationalized on the ground that they were leaders of the highly prestigious patrilineage organization which had long historical connections with Cheung Chau. Associated with men with such status, as I have explained in some detail, were their literati skills and cultural knowledge which gave them the distinctions of 'honour' and 'moral cultivation' apart from ordinary men.

It was these skills and knowledge which, I argue,

provided the basis for the production and reproduction of ideology by the Tong. As part of the ideological enterprise, it was necessary for the Tong leaders to engage in occasional displays of their literati background. I quote from an informant:

At the time, the Tong men were often the only educated people on Cheung Chau. Their skill in calligraphy was in high demand, for example, by shopkeepers for putting up the shop signs. They were asked to help and advise how to conduct of ceremonies especially in important events like the Bun Festival and sometimes in funeral services as they seemed to have the knowledge of how to do these things properly.

Yet another area where the prestige of the Tong leaders was put to service was the witnessing of financial transactions between fishermen and the *yü lan* or fish purchasing agents. As I have mentioned, loans from the fish merchants, often charged at an interest rate of 10 to 15 per cent a month, were the major source of finance for the fishermen to tie them over difficult times. As mortgages were based on future harvests, the witnessing of contracts by the Tong men was necessary to ensure the goodwill of both parties and to formalize the transaction.

The ideological emphasis of the Tong constitutes what I call a '*de facto* patrilineal' ideological model. The significance of the model, putting it simply, is that it prescribes prestige and social status only to those whose immediate family and fellow patri-kin are organized in the form of a corporate patrilineage. The sense of exclusiveness in the definition of status is critical here. Given the tremendous prestige of lineage organization in Chinese society, there was a tendency - as is still noticeable today - for local people

to talk about 'the ancestral past', of how they were descendants of a powerful patrilineage with extensive ownership of land in China. Some families even maintained lineage records and ancestral tablets at home, though there was no collective ownership of property and fellow kinsmen living on Cheung Chau were no more than ten or twenty. But by contrast, the position of the Tong was recognisably distinctive : its practices and organizational form were undeniably structured in accordance with the general principles of a corporate patrilineage. The ideological model thus separates the Tong from other fictitious claims of, or metaphorical reference to, connections with patrilineage organization. The nature of the ideological transformation significantly lies in the glossing over of the Tong's status of landlord and all its economic and political implications. At the same time the central emphasis invariably places the Tong's prestige and influence at the centre of a cultural structure which has a long history of reproduction in Chinese society.

Conclusion

My analysis of the Wong Wai Tsak Tong under the colonial administration embraces in essence a wider issue: the effect of colonial rule on the traditional power structure in a community like Cheung Chau. Theoretically the analysis can be phrased in terms of a series of contradictions in socio-political relations. That is to say, in a complex sense, the colonial takeover had the effect of crucially transforming

the allocation of economic resources and the basis for power and social influence. In Cheung Chau one major contradiction is located in the structure of class relations between the Tong and the shopkeepers. This arises from the fact that while the gentry-literati class maintained the control of land - a critical resource even in a market town - its political influence was in many ways deliberately undermined by the colonial government. Correspondingly looking at the shopkeepers, the government was actively promoting their political role *vis-a-vis* the new administration, yet their emerging political influence was not given expression in the system of land tenure. The processes involved were highly dynamic. The development of Cheung Chau as a market town and the expansion of commercial activities meant that the position of the merchant class was becoming even more important in the local economy. For the shopkeepers, therefore, the control of land and the command of wider political influence were critical.

Contradiction exists, in a word, in the form of structural cleavages between the socio-economic power of the Tong, on the one hand, and the emerging political influence of the shopkeepers on the other. I have pointed out that the government had tended to favour the shopkeepers in the reorganization of community leadership. Nevertheless members of the Tong still enjoyed considerable influence in the early years of colonial rule. Such influence was derived from a number of factors: their historical position as landlords, the social status of their patrilineage organization and above all, their recognition by the colonial government formalized in the system of land tenure. Thus, the order of relationships

created by the administrative reforms proved to be particularly cumbersome if only from the view of practical administration. This brings me to the second point.

The contradiction in the structure of class relations is related to, and emergent from, primary contradiction: that which is located in the nature of colonial rule. Efficient administration, putting it briefly, necessitated the preservation of the traditional structures of influence and power. In Cheung Chau, the granting of the historical landlord-taxlord status to the Tong was no doubt aimed at preventing a radical interruption of the complicated system of landownership and tenancy. Once the government decision was made, certain consequences seemed unavoidable. In particular, there were the problems of how to handle the malpractices of the Tong and how to ensure the cooperation of the Tong in the administration of land. In addition, the community leadership needed to be restructured in order to give the merchant class a greater voice in administration yet without seriously interrupting the traditional relations and social order in the community.

The two levels of contradiction are critical in the ethnographic analysis in this chapter. It is through these contradictions that the major political processes can be understood. Indeed, many of the administrative reforms were introduced in an attempt to overcome the inherent difficulties emergent from the wider principles of colonial rule. In this context, I have drawn attention to the formation of the Committeemen among the shopkeepers, and the many provisions in the system of land tenure restricting the legal powers of the Tong.

These, together with other official measures, were really concerned with the reallocation of political and ideological resources the distribution of which was in part created by the government action in the first place.

Several issues can be raised in this connection. In the first place, there is the role of the colonial government in the restructuring of class relations. The socio-economic transformation brought about by the colonial takeover involved not only the alteration of the definition of power and status but also the changes in property relations. But government policy, as it is important to recall, was always enforced in accordance with the cultural principles in which traditional social relationships relationships were constituted. It is in this sense that we must view the contribution of the administration towards the constituting of ^{class relations} ~~structural inequality~~ in the community. X

At the same time, the government policy and actions I have described were vitally related to the socio-economic processes taking place in the NT as a whole. More specifically there was the need to develop the local community in the best economic interest of the colonial government. Indeed, it was the continuing development of Cheung Chau as a market town to serve the local fishing industry and the nearby islands which crystallized the nature of government administration in this period. The sponsorship of the merchant class was in a sense introduced to facilitate the overall development. My central point here ought to be emphasized. This is that colonial policy regarding the structuring of community leadership was located within a specific stage of the socio-economic

transformation of Cheung Chau. In other words, speaking generally, colonial policy and existing class relations are historically situated. Critical events such as the Second World War, for example, would inevitably bring about critical changes in the nature of administrative rule as well as the restructuring of social and economic relationships in general.

CHAPTER SIX

CAPITALISM AND THE POST-WAR DEVELOPMENT OF CHEUNG CHAU :
FROM THE RESIDENTS' ASSOCIATION TO THE RURAL COMMITTEE
(1945-1960)Introduction

In the previous discussion I emphasized the key features of the local economy which underlay the structure of class relations in the early years of colonial rule. I mentioned in particular the importance of the fishing industry and, equally significant, the expansion of the commercial trade of the market town on Cheung Chau. The economy was, in short, undergoing gradual transformation which was to reach its highest point in the Second World War. The post-war development of an advanced industrial economy in Hong Kong has been described in considerable detail in Chapter Two. The changes in the metropolitan economy meant that, in the NT, the rural communities and the market towns began to take on an unprecedented place in the social and economic development of Hong Kong. This leads me to the central focus of this chapter: the position of an island community like Cheung Chau in the colonial capitalist economy. More precisely, the analysis addresses itself to two related questions. Firstly, with the intrusion of the capitalist mode of production, what is the nature of social, economic and political transformation of the community of Cheung Chau? Secondly, and in the same context, what is the position of Cheung Chau in the capitalist production of the metropolitan economy?

The answer to the first question highlights the significance of the social and administrative reform in post-war Hong Kong.

On one level, the government policy was introduced in response to political climate of the immediate post-war years which saw the independence of many colonies under the European imperial powers. But in the NT there was, from the government's point of view, the urgent need to reorganize the structure of local leadership. Given the rapid social and economic transformation, the aim of the reform was to provide more effective representation by the increasingly important merchant class interest. The result was the formation of the Rural Committee.

From the beginning, it was clear that the Rural Committee on Cheung Chau was to become centre of power and influence under the domination of the Chamber of Commerce, the merchant association on the island. The restructuring of the local leadership, in short, significantly undermined the traditional influence of the gentry class constituted by the land-owning Wong Wai Tsak Tong. The formation of the Rural Committee brought to an end the struggle between the shopkeepers and the Tong, and finally signified the beginning of the structural domination of the merchant class as it stands today.

Another feature of the Rural Committee is also crucial. Compared with the previous decades, there was a significantly closer collaboration between the District Office and the community leadership. Indeed, local and government cooperation is evident not only in the undertaking of many community projects but also in the organization of the temples and religious life. Ideologically, the District Office - in conjunction with the Rural Committee - increasingly came to present itself as being responsible for

the social and economic welfare of the community. There are two key aspects to this what I call the ideology of 'official paternalism'. Firstly, it emphasizes the role of the government in bringing to the community many social and economic benefits connected with the prosperity of urban Hong Kong. Secondly, official ideology also expresses government concern with the spiritual welfare of Cheung Chau people by being actively involved in the maintenance of temples and in the celebration of seasonal festivals. Indeed, the government cultural policy, the beginning of which was crystallized in the formation of the Chinese Temple Committee in 1928, became in many ways highly formalized in the post-war years.

Analytically, what is significant about the administrative reform is that it coincided with the beginning of the development of industrial capitalism in Hong Kong. I argue that the formation of the Rural Committee, together with the local and government cooperation, has to be seen as an important part of the government policy which aimed at fostering the expansion of the wider metropolitan economy. On Cheung Chau Island, response to the changes in the colonial economy took the form of the development of a residential town for the accommodation of industrial workers from Hong Kong. The 'construction boom' brought new prosperity to Cheung Chau: the provision of flats and houses as well as daily necessities for workers from Hong Kong has indeed come to replace fishing as the main economic base of the market town.

This development is in many ways typical of the changes in the island communities south of the NT, where the rugged^d landscape makes^d it impossible for the establishment of large

industrial plants. The development of accommodation towns is the best way these communities can serve the metropolitan economy. At the same time, it is obvious that from the government's point of view, these market towns must provide accommodation and social amenities like schools and hospitals for the workers. More than that, traditional institutions and practices such as temples and religious worship must be preserved and encouraged so as to provide a stable social and cultural environment for these workers and their families. It is in this sense that I argue that following the formation of the Rural Committee, a well-formulated cultural policy has become an important part of the government administration of the NT.

Several theoretical issues can be raised in this connection. The preservation of traditional institutions and cultural values is obviously consistent with the broader principles of Indirect Rule. The ideological emphasis of government concern over the spiritual welfare of the community also tends to mystify and at the same time, legitimizes the political and cultural control by the colonial administration. But what is particularly cogent in the context of the post-war years is the function of the cultural policy in the capitalist production of the metropolitan economy. In fact, I argue that the reproduction of Chinese cultural values regarding the family and obligations for mutual assistance between kinsmen enables these traditional norms to continue to operate as production relations in the capitalist mode of production. This is articulated not so much in the actual organization of capitalist production but in the final

distribution of the worker's earnings among his family and close kinsmen. That kinship can function both as an element of the superstructure and that of the infrastructure in a mode of production is the insight of Godelier in his analysis of traditional economies (cf. 1972, 1977). Here I attempt to extend the argument in the context of the Hong Kong capitalist economy. The central issue is the reproduction of labour power. The continuous reproduction of the traditional cultural values in Cheung Chau creates conditions in which necessary social securities at time of sickness and unemployment are provided by the workers and their kinsmen. In other words, these 'indirect wages' are in fact carried by the workers themselves rather than by the state - in contrast to what happens in the advanced industrialized countries. The effect, as it is perhaps obvious, is to lower the cost of wage labour in Hong Kong and is closely related to the overall policy of maintaining low cost parities relative to western industrial economies.

The official sponsorship of the Rural Committee in the complex circumstances of the post-war years has, therefore, an intricate connection with the development of the industrial capitalism in Hong Kong. To begin the discussion, I have to return first of all to the Wong Wai Tsak Tong.

Changes of the Wong Wai Tsak Tong

In the last chapter, I have argued that the power and influence of the Tong was essentially based on its connection

with China's past: the heritage of the landlord-taxlord position and as part of the gentry-literati class. The British takeover of Hong Kong, however, resulted in significant ambiguity in the position of the Tong under the new administration. I have also emphasized that the restricted movement of lineage members between China and the colony ultimately weakened the corporate unity of the lineage as a whole.

These effects on the Tong organization were dramatically enhanced in the post-war years. Most critical perhaps is the political transformation of China as well as the land reform following the successful communist revolution. The result was, among other things, the removal of the traditional bases of power such as the land-owning lineages. The Tong's lineage headquarters in Nam Tau now exists in name only. Furthermore, the gradual tightening of emigration to Hong Kong by the government has made the annual assembly of lineage members an event of the past.

The decline in the annual income of the Tong over the years also requires further comment. This is caused in the first place, by the government policy of freezing all land dues and rentals of all pre-war tenures. More precisely, for those holdings that are entered in the Old Schedule Lots of 1898 - that is, land registered at the time of the British takeover - both the Crown Rent and the rental charged are fixed at the level determined at the time of the registration. Furthermore, as Tong holdings are all rented out on perpetual leases, profit from a transaction (sale) of tenancy right is accruable only by the lessee who has offered it for sale. Subsequently the new

tenant who takes over the lease now pays rent to the Tong. The rentals the Tong receives from these perpetual leases are absurdly low in terms of current values. Thus, the amount payable on one-tenth of an acre of agricultural land as entered in the Old Schedule Lots ranges from 50 cents to \$3. Building lands are assessed at a higher rate, at the average of \$10 per thousand square feet¹.

The other source of income is the rentals from temporary leases on the shops and houses which the Tong had purchased before the Second World War. The pre-war structures are again subject to elaborate rent control by the government. On Cheung Chau, a newly constructed shop-front was likely to fetch more than \$1500 per month in 1978, while a pre-war tenure of a similar structure only received a rental ranging from \$30 to \$700 a month. For the landlords, the only way to increase rent charges is to renovate the old building or to demolish it for reconstruction. However, under the current regulation, the tenants and subtenants evicted from the old buildings are to be compensated for removal expenses and for the loss of goodwill in the case of commercial premises. Especially in the latter case, the compensation can run up to tens of thousands of dollars. Coupled with the high cost of construction, the Tong, like other landlords who lack capital, is prevented from rebuilding and sometimes forced into selling the shops and houses.

¹ See Block Crown Lease held in the District Office land department.

The weakening of the corporate ideology of the Wong lineage and the decline in the income of the Tong offer an interesting contrast to another feature: the legal power of the Tong managers in the system of land administration. On the whole, in spite of the declining fortune of the Tong and the Wong lineage, the managers and other leaders in the Tong council continued to maintain some measures of influence in the community before the war. In any case, if only for the sake of the efficiency in administration of land, the government was prepared to give certain recognition to the position of the Tong, and to incorporate its leaders in the structure of community leadership. The continuing influence of the Tong was brought into serious difficulties by the event of the Second World War.

The Tong and The Cheung Chau Residents' Association

Since the Japanese occupation of Cheung Chau at the end of 1942, the *kai fong* or community organization had gone through the usual changes along with the War. A Cheung Chau Prosperity Council (my translation) was established by the Japanese, consisting of Tong leaders and other men, and headed by two Taiwanese agents of the *kempeitai* secret police. The Council had little independent authority. Its main duties were to assist the military police in the maintaining of law and order and in the rationing of rice, kerosene and other essential commodities.

On the eve of the Japanese surrender on 20th August 1945, the Prosperity Council was dissolved to form the short-lived Cheung Chau Liberated Populace Provisional Administrative

Committee (sic). Headed by Wong Chung-hoi, the presiding manager of the Wong Wai Tsak Tong, the Committee negotiated for the arrival of a British commando force to take over the duties of patrolling the island. From the present point of view, the significance of both the Council and the Committee is not only that they were dominated by the Tong leaders, but also that their office holders were transferred (elected) *in toto* to form the first 'progressive' *kai fong* - the Cheung Chau Residents' Association. This, as we shall see later, partly explains the disfavour of the District Office which tended to see the Association as a remnant of the days of Japanese collaboration.

The Residents' Association was formally established on 24th September 1945. It was the first 'progressive' *kai fong* in the sense that it had a written constitution and its executive committee of seven was directly elected by the community. It collected monthly subscriptions from all the shops and managed the various assets accumulated by previous *kai fongs* over the years. The Association was responsible for the lighting of street and road repairs and for the maintenance of other social amenities which included the Cheung Chau Free School and the Fong Pin Hospital. In addition, a part of the annual budget was set aside for the Bun Festival and for the ritual offerings to the unattended graves. The main sources of income were rentals which the Association was able to charge on the many trading stalls in the streets and subsidies received from the District Office and the Chinese Temple Committee. The situation in 1953 is summarised in Table 18:

Table 18 Revenue of the Cheung Chau Residents' Association 1953

<u>Sources</u>	<u>Amount</u>
Rentals from properties and street stalls	\$27,071
Sales of nightsoil	1,320
Subsidy for Free School	44,197
Chinese Temple Committee	3,500
Donation to Free School	575
Subscriptions for street lamps, and road repairs	3,991
	<hr/>
TOTAL	\$80,654 =====

Source: Cheung Chau Residents' Association, Annual Report 1953.

A most notable innovation of the Residents' Association was to devise some method of public accountability. Thus, a selective franchise was introduced together with the new constitution. The right to vote was given to male head - father or eldest son - of each household: there was no literacy test so that franchise was extended to the working class families and the fishermen. Each voter, however, must provide evidence of at least seven years' residence on Cheung Chau. Before the completion of the electoral roll in 1952, people were asked to produce their identity cards or rice ration cards when they registered with the District Office.

The 'progressive reform' was in a sense a reflection of the new political sensibility that emerged out of the experience of the Sino-Japanese War (1937-1945). The question of national

survival evoked an unprecedented sense of patriotism and unity among the Chinese on the mainland and overseas. As part of the war effort, the Nationalist Government was quick to promote such official slogans as 'democratic rights', 'political reform' etc. Consequently there was a great awareness of these notions after the war, which became part of the vocabulary of daily life.

Therefore the organizational reform undertaken under the leadership of the Tong Managers did not escape the notice of the people on Cheung Chau. The most subtle example of this is the annual reports and occasional pamphlets published by the Association². These reports gave details of the annual account and main activities of the years, and are interspersed with terms like 'Chinese brotherhood', 'community spirit' and 'welfare of the people'. In addition, the reports were written in the colloquial 'plain speech' or *pei hua*³, rather than the archaic and formalistic 'literary speech' or *wen yuan* as was custom of *kai fongs* before the war in the making of public notices.

² The Residents' Association published annual reports from 1947 to 1954 to be distributed on Cheung Chau. The reports gave details of the activities as well as the financial statement for the year.

³ The use of *pei hua* can be traced back to the May Fourth Movement of 1919 which sought to reshape, through mass literacy and education, China's traditional political system from one based on elitism to one dependent on mass participation. See, for example, Chen 1971 and Gray 1969.

What is significant about these reforms is that they demonstrated - both to the community and the District Office - the awareness by the Tong leaders dominating the Residents' Association of the ideological shift and critical changes brought about by the war. Consequently, there was in the social life on Cheung Chau an underplaying of their gentry background by these men. Under the new social-economic circumstances, it was realized that the idea of 'cultural competence' acquired additional meanings. The basis of power and influence was, in a sense, dependent upon the ability to connect the local community to the opportunities of the wider colonial society.

There were, however, significant difficulties in the overall enterprise of the Tong. Particularly important is the failure of the Tong leaders to exploit the commercial opportunities. In a way the Tong leaders were critically constrained by their gentry ideology which tended to view unfavourably commerce and shopkeeping as a means of livelihood. In the fifties, there were attempts to diversify into these activities, but because of the lack of experience, they were generally unsuccessful.

Thus, speaking of today, most of the Tong leaders primarily depend on their private income for living. One manager of the Tong, Wong Chung-hoi, is one of the main shareholders of the Cheung Lee Cargo Ferry Company on Cheung Chau. In addition, he would have derived considerable income from his role in the land

transfers. The younger Wong Shing-yip, the other Tong manager⁴ invested in various businesses; in the fifties he owned the Sun Hin Rice Store, the Cheung Chau Hotel and the Yin Long Grocery Store. However, he never actively involved himself in the running of these shops but employed others for the task. The difficulty was to find the right person to look after the businesses: facing keen local competition, he was - in his own words - 'squeezed out of business by the Chiu Chow people'. Only the Cheung Chau Hotel now stands which enjoys a reasonable trade during the weekends and at festival times.

Consequently the Tong leaders tend to find a niche outside the commercial world of Cheung Chau. Here their gentry-literati background stands them in good stead. Instead of putting money in businesses, the Tong leaders invest in the education of their children. Of course, scholarly attainment was always high in the scale of values of the literati class. However, with the declining Tong income, education is recognized as providing a viable alternative. Therefore, after completing primary schools on Cheung Chau, the children are usually sent to secondary schools in Hong Kong to prepare them for better employment. In any case, the Tong children are among the best educated on Cheung Chau. Most of the sons are working as professionals and in white collar jobs: school teachers, bank clerks and public servants. Of the three

⁴ Wong Shing-yip is not elected by the Tong general assembly: see footnote 8 chapter 5. He has persistently tried to argue for a second manager to be appointed by the council itself. He is the most active of the Tong leaders and is normally considered to be the representative of the Tong, though it is Wong Chung-hoi who is the legal manager in the matters of land administration.

sons of Wong Chung-hoi, for instance, one has become a school teacher, the other a clerk in a law firm in Hong Kong and the eldest is a headmaster in a high school in Kowloon.

Thus, to return to my central discussion, the situation in the immediate post-war years presented a critical contradiction in the dominant economic and political relations in the community. The contradiction arose from the structural cleavages that had gradually emerged since the turn of the century: that between the rising economic power of the merchant class and the traditional influence of the land-owning lineage organization. Given the changes taking place in the local economy, it was imperative for the merchant class to develop a crucial commitment to the affairs of the community and, in particular, to gain control of the community leadership represented by the Resident Association.

The Emergence of The Merchant Class and the Cheung Chau Chamber of Commerce

The rising social and economic dominance of the merchant class has been discussed in the previous chapter. I mentioned in that context critical factors such as the expansion of the market town, and government sponsorship in the formation of the Committeemen. In the beginning, the merchants were organized in various associations in accordance with their respective trades. It was not until 1942 that a Cheung Chau Chamber of Commerce was formed. The apparent purpose of the Chamber at that time was to form a representative body of all the local shopkeepers in

order to deal with the Japanese authorities concerning the import and rationing of essential commodities like rice, kerosene and textiles. Over the years there was significant consolidation of financial resources and political influence. By 1960, the time of the formation of the Rural Committee, the Chamber had close to 200 members, including about 90 per cent of all the shopkeepers on Cheung Chau.

Ever since its formation the Chamber has maintained a close association with the Wai Chiu Fu. The founding chairman of the Chamber, Fung Pak-choi, was a Chiu Chow merchant of considerable wealth and influence, who retained his chairmanship until his death in 1972. Throughout his life Fung was also one of the key leaders of the Wai Chiu Fu; he became its executive chairman in 1945. Under his leadership there was close cooperation between the two organizations, setting a pattern for later years. For instance, the Wai Chiu Fu founded a primary school in 1950 - the Kwok Mun Primary School - for children of its members, and the costs were met by a substantial donation from the Chamber⁵. Similarly, the Chamber offered its assistance in the celebration of the annual Bun Festival - which was a traditional duty of the Wai Chiu people - by collecting money and by negotiating with the government for various kinds of help. In turn, the Wai

⁵ The school like others started by the local associations is now run by the Education Department. But the Wai Chiu Fu and the Chamber of Commerce leaders sit on the board of directors; and the organizations continue to give donations in the form of scholarships, building funds, etc.

Chiu Fu provided the Chamber with political support for the many community projects it undertook.

In the beginning, the Chamber worked closely with the Residents' Association. Seeing the many 'progressive reforms' of the Association, the shopkeepers had hoped that it would provide the organizational means for realizing their overall goals. Indeed, with the cooperation of the Tong, Chow Li-ping, the vice-chairman of the Chamber and a protégé of Fung, successfully competed for the chairmanship of the Association for two terms in 1950 and 1952. However, the cooperation between the Residents' Association and the Chamber was short-lived, and there are arguably complex reasons for this.

In the first place, the Chamber was soon to realise its own strength especially in terms of financial resources. In carrying ^{out} community projects, it was determined to establish a separate standing in the eyes of the District Office and the community independent of the Residents' Association.

But in more analytical terms, the action of the merchant leaders has to be seen in connection with the contradiction in the structure in class relations mentioned earlier. For the shopkeepers, the decline of the fishing industry meant that the commercial and perhaps industrial development of Cheung Chau became an issue of some urgency. To ensure the achievement of the overall goal, it was necessary to gain more effective social and economic control of the community.

In many ways, the rising influence of the merchant class was made possible by the changing conditions and ideological shift

of the post-war years. Indeed the idea of community leadership was beginning to take on a new meaning. Quality of leadership was seen in terms of the ability to bring the community in line with the development of the wider economy. A community leader must be able to work with the government and wealthy merchants in Hong Kong in order to 'bring prosperity to Cheung Chau'. Implicit in this definition is a strong emphasis on organizational skill. Compared with the pre-war years, community projects like road construction, and the resettlement of fishermen, now took on a relatively complex scale and involved large finance. It was the duty of community leaders to seek sponsorship and additional financial support from outside, notably the District Office, the business communities in Hong Kong, and private charity organizations.

Given the nature of their social and economic commitments, the merchants began to move away from the Residents' Association. They found the Chamber of Commerce, with its increasing membership and financial resources, a less cumbersome means of organizing community works. The difficulties between the merchants and the Tong leaders were precipitated in an event in 1955. Until that year, Fung and Chow, chairman and vice-chairman of the Chamber of Commerce, held, respectively, the portfolios of Finance and Education in the Residents' Association. Part of Chow's duty was to collect donations and subscriptions for the Cheung Chau Free School run by the Association. In 1952 a Building Committee was established to oversee the renovation of the school and Chow was named the chairman. After the completion of the work in April 1954, Chow gave a report to the Association. However, most

of the leaders in the Association found the report unsatisfactory: they demanded that Chow provide a full list of subscribers who had donated to the School and a financial account of the project. This, however, Chow failed to do, thus giving rise to accusations by the chairman of the Association, Wong Shing-yip (manager of the Tong), of corruption and the pocketing of public funds. Wong eventually took the matter to the District Office for further investigation but it was never satisfactorily resolved. In any case, after the event, both Fung and Chow withdrew from the Association and the Chamber of Commerce ceased altogether to take part or to sponsor candidates in the biennial election of the Residents' Association.

The District Office and Changing Official Sponsorship

I have so far been looking at the changing pattern of community leadership in the social and economic circumstances of the post-war years. The role of the government has been occasionally referred to; it is time to bring it to the centre of the discussion.

First of all, I draw attention to the government disenchantment with the Residents' Association. For one thing, the government - not without justification, as I demonstrated earlier - was influenced by the opinion that the old *kai fong* was "a sad remnant of the Greater Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere" of the Japanese occupation (Coates 1955: 115), as one District Officer has remarked.

But more significantly, the Residents' Association was found to be extremely inefficient in carrying out the many community projects in conjunction with the District Office. As generally in the NT, the post-war years saw a great involvement of government in the improvement of the local infrastructure. In the early fifties, before the formation of the Rural Committee, services such as street lightning and garbage collection were the responsibility of the Residents' Association. But community leaders were encouraged to initiate 'self help' projects. A good example of this is the construction of Peak Road on Cheung Chau, running from the ascent in the town centre to Sai Wan in the west. The construction began in February 1954, with a donation of more than \$2,000 collected from the community. However, because of the bad weather as well as the limited fund, the project came almost to a standstill. Eventually the District Office stepped in by offering technical assistance and providing most of the material; and the road was completed in August that year.

But on the whole such large scale projects were relatively rare during the days of the Residents' Association. From the government's point of view, the organization of public works of this kind was often hampered by the many problems of community leadership. Of major importance, as was becoming obvious, was the lack of representation in the Association of the dominant interest in the community, namely the shopkeepers. At the same time the government also recognized that the continuing influence of the Tong was highly undesirable in the context of the post-war years.

In 1952 the District Office introduced various reforms of the constitution of the Residents' Association. All eligible voters - i.e. male heads of households who had lived for more than ten years⁶ on Cheung Chau - were asked to enter their names in an electoral roll maintained by the District Office. Election was then held annually. Furthermore, instead of the previous system of 'direct election', the public now elected a college of 55 members from which an executive committee of seven was formed. Yet another feature of the new constitution was the ruling that a member of the executive committee, having served for more than three consecutive terms, must step down for a year before he could be re-elected.

The last provision deserves some comment. It was recognizably designed to prevent a continuing domination of community leadership by the Wong Wai Tsak Tong. But more than that, like the overall reforms of the Residents' Association the provision represented part of the attempt to resolve the contradiction in the structure of power relations in the community. Concurrent with the undermining of the traditional domination of the Tong was the policy which aimed at sponsoring the merchant class with the hope that the merchant organization might eventually replace the cumbersome Residents' Association as the new *kai fong*.

⁶ Previously, eligible voters and candidates for the election required only seven years' residence on Cheung Chau.

In any case, what was evident throughout the early fifties was the many malpractices by the Tong in an attempt to hold on to the control of the Residents' Association. First of all, the Tong leaders often turned to the practice of 'purchasing votes' by paying the fishermen to vote for them in the election. In addition, there were reports of tampering with the constitution formalized by the government.

In December 1954, an incident took place which was to have important consequences. About a week before the annual election, the Residents' Association held a general meeting. Under the guidance of its chairman, Wong Shing-yip of the Wong Wai Tsak Tong, the constitution was amended so that Wong and some of the executive members who had served for more than three terms could take part in the election. Quite intentionally, Wong did not inform the District Office of the alteration as it was his duty as chairman to submit all such changes for government approval. By the time the District Office knew of this, the election was well under way. The election resulted in a significant victory for the Wong faction; both Wong and three of his supporters (who would otherwise have been disqualified under the old constitution) were re-elected. The outcome of the election evoked strong protest from the community and a petition was signed by more than 200 persons objecting to the constitutional amendment. In January the following year, the District Office announced the election invalid. At the same time, with increasing difficulties

between the Association leadership and the government⁷, the incident provided a pretext for terminating all District Office connections with the *kai fong*. As from that date, official sponsorship and government subsidies were transferred from the Association to the Chamber of Commerce.

For the many reasons discussed earlier, government patronage of the Chamber is perhaps a logical outcome. From the merchants' point of view, the formal connection with the District Office allowed them to voice directly the urgent need for the development of the local economy. It must be mentioned that since its withdrawal from the Residents' Association in 1955, the Chamber of Commerce had been acting, as it were, as an alternative *kai fong*. The organization initiated and completed, with donations from the members, some community projects of impressive scale. According to the Chamber's annual report, 11,510 feet of road were constructed between 1955 to 1960, mostly with government assistance. During the same period, the children's playground near Tung Wan beach was also completed. In 1959, the Chamber started planning for the construction, in front of the Pak Tai Temple, of a large compound (about 16,000 square feet) which was to be used for the performance

⁷ The government's disenchantment with the Residents' Association is closely connected with the malpractices of the Tong. In the early 1950's several activities of the Tong came to the notice of the District Office. The Tong was accused of charging the fishermen for the use of the well in Sai Wan. Wong Shing-yip, then the chairman of the Residents' Association was imprisoned briefly in 1950 for extorting fees from junks passing between British and Chinese waters near Cheung Chau. The District Officer commented, 'Had he not been able to prove that he was born in the NT he would have been deported. He has since then been behaving himself; ... although he is not a good organizer and therefore in some ways an inefficient chairman, often failing to consult his fellow members' (Coates 1955: 118-9).

of opera and rituals during the Bun Festival - though it was not completed until 1964.

As for the government, the shift in official sponsorship was to fulfill an important purpose. Essentially, it was to achieve the greater collaboration between the government and the dominant class interest, thus facilitating the many social and economic reforms which were being introduced throughout the fifties. The government sponsorship of the Chamber of Commerce culminated in the formation of the Rural Committee.

Post-War Reforms and The Development of The New Territories

With the ending of the Pacific War in 1946, the question regarding the status of Hong Kong was imbued with great delicacy. The war not only significantly undermined Britain's economic power and imperial influence, but also produced a surge of nationalism among the colonized peoples of Asia. The demand for independence was no doubt also encouraged by the attitude of the United States which promoted throughout the war a 'Pacific Charter', on the lines of the Atlantic Charter, to "guarantee freedom after the war to the non-self-governing countries in the Pacific" (Kit-Ching 1973: 58). Consequently, when colonial authority was restored in Hong Kong, the British government was faced with strong criticism from the Allies, especially the United States⁸, which favoured

⁸ The difference between Britain and the United States in the Pacific Theatre of war was reflected in the rift between the South East Asia Command dominated by the British, and the American command in the Far East. The British were particularly bitter about the American effort in belittling the role of the British, 'sowing seeds of suspicion as to her post-war intentions' (Kit-Ching 1973: 69).

the return of the Colony to the Nationalist Government of China (Kig-Ching *op.cit.*, Endicott 1964: 180-181).

The constitutional reform of post-war Hong Kong was introduced partly in response to these international pressures. In May 1946, the governor, Sir Mark Young announced the Young Plan which aimed to give the British and non-British inhabitants 'a fuller and more responsible share in the management of their affairs'. The plan⁹ called for the formation of a municipal council consisting of a mayor and thirty councillors half of whom were to represent the Chinese community and half the non-Chinese population. Two-thirds of the total council (that is, twenty councillors) were to be directly elected and one-third nominated by the various commercial and professional bodies. Though the plan was never carried out, the general spirit was retained by the subsequent governors and resulted in significant reforms in the Legislative and Executive Councils in the following decades (see Chapter Two).

Further impetus for political reform was given by the establishment of the Chinese People's Republic in Peking on 1 October 1949. The effects of the successful communist revolution across the border were profound. Apart from the interruption of the course of trade with the Mainland, the colony was faced with a flood of refugees. Significantly the settlement of these

⁹ For a full account of the Young Plan see Endicott 1964: 182-95, and Miners 1975: 190-91. The plan was abandoned in 1952, see Grantham 1965: 112 and the Hong Kong Hansard 1952: 252.

people not only put incredible pressure on housing, public hygiene and the water supply, etc., but also created serious political problems in the colony. As one writer remarked, the influx of refugees

... brought a dangerous factionalism into the life of the colony and created special problems such as preventing clashes between refugees and communist sympathizers; maintaining order on their respective national days and keeping schools free from the struggle between the rival parties for control of education for propagandist purposes (Endicott *op. cit.*: 197).

Apart from the political considerations, there is also economic rationale underlying the administrative reforms. The establishment of a labour intensive, industrial economy in Hong Kong in the fifties has been closely examined in Chapter two; I shall not repeat that discussion here. Instead, let me turn to the development of the NT and in particular, the economic transformation of Cheung Chau, in the face of the dramatic changes in the colonial economy.

Until the Second World War, the government policy regarding the NT was to encourage existing agricultural and cottage industries while providing infrastructural improvement in transport, market and public health. In the period of 'post-war reconstruction', elaborate schemes were devised by various government agencies such as the Agricultural and Forestry Department and the Department of Co-operatives to improve the quality and output of vegetables, poultry, pigs and other produce as well as to provide better marketing and credit facilities for the farmers

(Topley 1964). On Cheung Chau, for example, to take advantage of the many forms of government assistance, large pig farms were established in Sai Wan. In the rugged northern hillside, hardy crops like pineapple and Indian corn were planted. However, in spite of the evident increase in output, it was never intended that the NT should provide for the increasing needs of the colony which were instead mainly met by imports.

Hence, we need to examine the nature of the economic transformation of the NT with caution. It is tempting to conclude that the economic 'take-off' of the rural areas and market towns has been brought about by the industrial and infrastructural investment, according to Rostow's model of economic development (1960). Indeed, this is evident in the dramatic expansion of the areas north of urbanized Kowloon, resulting in the establishment of the industrial new towns of Tsuen Wan, Kwai Chung and Shai Tin. But in significant contrast, in the island communities south of the Hong Kong Island the spin-off of the metropolitan economy takes on another form, namely, in the development of private housing estates. This is manifested in the changing pattern of land use as agricultural lands are converted to building houses and flats to meet the demand of the immigrant workers from urban Hong Kong. There are complex reasons why industrialization has not taken place in the outlying islands. First is the relative geographical distance from the urban centre of Hong Kong - Kowloon. Furthermore, and especially for the island communities like Cheung Chau and Lamma, the rugged landscape renders unsuitable the establishment of large industrial plants. Consequently, the development of

these areas has taken a different direction. In short, it is the transformation from agriculture (and fishing) to 'accommodation market towns' that crystallizes the major socio-economic changes in these island communities.

The 'construction boom' and the continuing expansion of the market town are the most important, and in many ways, the most highly visible features of Cheung Chau today. With the decline of the fishing industry, the local economy has come to be dependent upon providing for the needs of immigrant workers and tourists from Hong Kong as the main source of income. Ordinary workers are attracted by the relatively cheap rent - which is about 25 per cent lower than urban Hong Kong for a flat of comparable size. Another important consideration is the cheap and efficient ferry service. The Hong Kong Yaumati Ferry Company runs an hourly service between the Central District, Hong Kong, and Cheung Chau; the early runs starts at five in the morning and the last finishes at twelve-thirty past midnight. The prompt services (which take sixty minutes for the five mile journey) enable the workers to arrive on time for the morning shift and return home long before dark. Because of the limited space in the local schools, many children leave each day to attend schools in Hong Kong and Kowloon. The womenfolk and grandparents who stay at home are able to purchase all the necessities on the island, and some even find employment in the local factories.

It is important to recall that the current development in Cheung Chau represents, for both the government and the merchant class, a highly significant economic alternative to the traditional

fishing industry. In the government's view the establishment of the accommodation town - in a context in which traditional values continue to exert their influence - is the best way in which a community like Cheung Chau can be developed in accordance with the requirements of the metropolitan economy. There are certain economic (capitalistic) calculations in the government plan regarding the local development; I shall go into this later. For the merchant class the involvement in construction and real estate provides a most profitable venue of diversification from commerce. Indeed, it is through the investment in land and housing that the merchants are able to perpetuate their economic dominance in the community.

At the same time, it is perhaps obvious that the continuing development of Cheung Chau requires close collaboration between the government and the merchant class. Indeed the merchant class leadership must be brought to play an increasing role in carrying out the government policy. To elaborate I need to return to the Rural Committee.

The Merchant Class and The Cheung Chau Rural Committee

Though elections of rural committees had been held in the NT since 1946, the Committee on Cheung Chau was among the last to be formed. In particular, the District Office was faced with serious difficulties in overcoming the factionalism involving the Residents' Association and the Chamber of Commerce. While official patronage had been transferred to the latter, neverthe-

less the government found it necessary to give certain recognition to the older Residents' Association and to encourage it to enter the coming Rural Committee election.

The first rural committee election was held on 9th November 1960. It was contested heavily between the fifty-eight candidates sponsored by the Chamber and the twenty-nine from the Residents' Association. A serious dispute arose regarding the proper procedure for voting by illiterate persons. To assist the 900 odd illiterate voters, photographs of the candidates were displayed above the eighty-seven ballot boxes in the election hall. Each of the 1,628 voters had to cast thirty-nine counters¹⁰ into the boxes of his chosen candidates. Not surprisingly, the Chamber leaders feared that the voters might become confused and unable to remember the faces of the candidates they had been asked to vote for. Therefore, the merchant group made the request to the District Office that the illiterate voters should be allowed to bring with them into the election hall photographs of the candidates they had chosen. When the District Office agreed to this, the Residents' Association spokesmen protested against the unfair manoeuvre of the Chamber and threatened to withdraw from the election. At the same time, the Chamber group insisted that its candidates would not participate unless these photographs

¹⁰ They represented the number of seats in the general assembly constituted by thirty-nine village representatives.

were allowed. Finally, a compromise was made whereby the rival groups were allowed to display on the walls of the hall the photographs of the candidates they each had sponsored. In any case, the election resulted in a major victory for the Chamber of Commerce. Of the thirty-nine members of the General Assembly twenty-six representatives were elected from the Chamber group and thirteen from the Association. The executive committee was made up of the men from the Chamber of Commerce; Chow Li-ping and Fung Pak-choi, prominent leaders of the Chamber, became the first chairman and vice-chairman of the Rural Committee.

The present structure of the Cheung Chau Rural Committee consists of a General Assembly of thirty-nine village representatives elected by the secret ballot under the District Office supervision. Franchise is based on heads of households; that is, married persons over twenty-one, male or female, who have resided for more than ten years in Cheung Chau. A candidate for the General Assembly has to be nominated by at least twenty voters and be approved by the District Office. The Assembly forms a college from which the executive committee is further elected. The executive committee consists of a chairman, two vice-chairman and fourteen ordinary members. A village representative serves for life or until retirement while the executive committee is re-elected biennially. A by-election for the General Assembly is held when the members fall below thirty-six representatives.

Thus, the central feature of the Rural Committee presents a mixture of administrative control and official patronage, a feature which has emerged out of the very principle of colonial

rule. This has been mentioned on several occasions in the previous discussion, and will be taken up again in the following chapter. Here I would like to highlight the collaboration between the merchant class and the District Office through the formation of the Rural Committee.

One main issue that emerges from the analysis in Chapter Three, is that Rural Committee has become the focus for the organization of power in the NT communities. In Cheung Chau, the dominant class and ethnic interests, namely the Chiu Chow Associations, the Wai Chiu Fu and the Chamber of Commerce, are centrally structured in the Rural Committee which provides the critical means for the perpetuation of their socio-economic positions. Unlike in the days of the Residents' Association, the *kai fong* and the merchant class leadership are now constituted in a single body under the direct sponsorship of the District Office. Consequently the shopkeepers as a whole are able to make direct representation to the government regarding improvements in social amenities and other matters affecting the community. With the continuing expansion of the metropolitan economy, the development of Cheung Chau has proceeded at a rapid rate. In May 1978 the NT Administration announced a most ambitious government project. It called for the construction of, among other things, a wind breaker extending from Sai Wan to Cheung Chau Bay, and a housing estate to accommodate 5,000 people.

The completion of the government plan¹¹ will have significant effect on the landscape as well as the social organization of Cheung Chau.

Another area of local-government cooperation made possible by the Rural Committee is the maintenance of temples and the organization of the Bun Festival. I have argued that government involvement constitutes an essential ideological enterprise. The collaboration between the government and the Rural Committee is vitally related to the reproduction of ideology which legitimizes colonial rule while supporting the position of the powerful merchant class. The central argument has been explored in some detail in Chapter Four. Here I propose to examine the structure of ideas constituting the ideological enterprise of the District Office and the Rural Committee.

Cultural Reproduction and The Ideological Model of 'Official Paternalism'

There are notable, and in many ways, unique features in the ideological emphases of the colonial government in the years following the Second World War. These emphases and associated ideas can be conceptualized in the form of what I call the ideological model of 'official paternalism'. Essentially the model gives expression to the importance of government solicitude in the improvement of social and material welfare of the people

¹¹ The details of the government plan were reported by Wah Kiu Yat Po, 19 May, 1978.

in Hong Kong. I have used the term 'official paternalism' because it best summarizes the general ideological shift in the colonial society after the war. Commenting on the government policy of the immediate post-war years, Endicott writes,

It was realized that besides the Victorian ideal of law and order, government action was demanded in many fields previously left to private enterprise, the cost of which could only be met from increasing economic development (1964: 183).

Consequently, the emphasis on the greater role of the government in social and economic development is primarily concerned with the maintenance of the colonial order. The sense of urgency was no doubt motivated by the immediate problems brought about by the influx of refugees and the establishment of the Communist Regime across the border. But the ideological expression of 'official paternalism' receives a special significance in the background of the British decision to retain the colony after the war. In a sense, constitutional reform and the policy for the improvements of social welfare were part of an effort to meet the charges of the continuing colonial exploitation of the Hong Kong people. The official ideology that accompanied these measures hoped to justify and legitimize the British rule in a world that was becoming increasingly hostile towards colonialism as a whole.

This ideological shift is inevitably reflected in the political processes in a NT community like Cheung Chau. I have already examined the emergence of the merchant class and the

District Office policy in this context. For example, the Rural Committee now places critical importance on negotiation with the government for improvements in social amenities. In festival times the Rural Committee leaders are active in seeking donations from the business communities in other parts of the colony. In short, the notion of 'bringing prosperity to Cheung Chau' becomes very much the centre of the ideology of the merchant class.

The argument becomes more forceful as we begin to consider the ideology of 'official paternalism' as structurally transformed from the key principles in the Chinese cultural model. But first of all, it is necessary to mention that there were in Chinese Society complex historical reasons which had produced a cultural expectation of paternalistic bureaucratic rule: that is, the notion that administrative authority, besides its normal bureaucratic functions, is also responsible for the social and material welfare of the community. I shall deal with this important issue - as articulated in the area of land administration - in the following chapter.

Let me focus instead on the nature of ideological production by the government. One indication of this is perhaps the fact that in the NT, District Officer is often referred to by the local people as *fu ma kuan* or literally, 'father-mother-official'. What I wish to argue is that the model of 'official paternalism' is structurally transformed from the 'patri-familial' cultural model in Chinese society. Most critically, in this transformation the relationship between officialdom and local community is made

approximating that between father and son. We can illuminate the ideological significance by considering the central ideas structuring the norm of patri-filial relationship.

At one level, patri-filial relationship is normally conceptualized by the Chinese as essentially based on an exchange of rights and obligations. As I have explained in Chapter One, ideally the father is expected to be kind and to offer economic patronage - through the inheritance of patrimonial property - to the sons. In turn the sons reciprocate by personal obedience, respect and other behaviour summarized by the notion of 'filial piety'. Speaking outside the metaphysical idea (i.e. *Jen*) which prescribes the harmonious order of all social relationships, it is easy to see that conflict of interest exists which reflects the different ideological positions of father and sons. For example, in order to ensure the loyalty and control of his sons, the father will emphasize the moral authority of the principle of 'filial piety' - while understating the necessity of fulfilling his own duties. The dilemma facing the sons in such a situation is well described by Mao Tse-tung from his own experience:

When I was thirteen I discovered a powerful argument of my own for debating with my father on his own ground, by quoting the Classics. My father's favourite accusations against me were unfilial conduct and laziness. I quoted in exchange, passage from the Classics saying that the elders must be kind and affectionate (Snow 1968: 132).

Thus the ideological struggle between father and son(s) significantly involves different - and selective - emphases of the central ideas constituting the patri-filial relationship.

From the father's perspective, parental duties are to be ideologized as the basis of his authority and the obedience of his children. In other words, when conflict occurs parental affection and economic support for the sons are presented by the father, not so much as a part of the duties of parenthood, but as a reasons for his power within the family.

Significantly the ideology of 'official paternalism' mystifies the relationship between government administration and local community in similar terms. The aim of the colonial government, speaking generally, is to ensure political and economic control of the population and resources in the NT. What is evident in the administration of Cheung Chau is that official policy regarding housing development, for example, is presented by the government as conforming to cultural rules and expectations about the benevolent functions of the government bureaucracy. Indeed, both the District Office and the Rural Committee derive considerable prestige and perhaps support from the community because they are seen as being responsible for initiating and carrying out the many community projects in the 1960's. While such government schemes as the construction of typhoon shelters and housing estates are critical for the continuing economic development of the island, these public works projects are typically put forward by the District Office as evidence of government concern for the social and material welfare of the community¹². By emphasizing 'official solicitude' rather than

¹² See, for example, the speech by the District Office on the occasion of the inauguration of the 12th executive committee of the Cheung Chau Chamber of Commerce, reported in Report and Yearbook 1960, Cheung Chau Chamber of Commerce.

inherent functions and responsibilities, the economic aims and the wider political considerations of the government development policy are significantly concealed.

Culture and The Reproduction of Labour Power

The ideological transformation by the government and the collaboration between the District Office and the merchant class are thus a culmination of the socio-economic changes of Cheung Chau in the complex circumstances of the post-war years. Through the development of housing and other social amenities, Cheung Chau is able to, in government's view, play a part in serving the needs of the wider metropolitan economy. However, it is also evident that government plan has always forseen more than the physical accommodation of workers in the provision for housing. The increasing official involvement in the sponsorship of temples and religious festival points to the serious government intention in 'keeping alive' traditional cultural values and institutions in the community. There are, of course, many perspectives from which the government cultural policy can be examined - as I have demonstrated throughout this study. What is particularly significant in the context of the expansion of the industrial economy of Hong Kong is the increasing pace in which the cultural policy is carried out in the post-war years. Compared with the previous decades, official support of temples and festivals has become a central feature of the administration of Cheung Chau. On a superficial level, the government is

concerned with avoiding the social and cultural alienation normally associated with urban malaise from affecting the Cheung Chau community. This often finds strong support by the elders in the Rural Committee who are interested in 'educating the young men and outsiders of the traditional Chinese ways'. Looking at the official policy as a whole, it is clearly the government's aim, in the development of Cheung Chau, to foster a stable social and cultural environment in which industrial workers settling on the island can live and raise their families. This emphasis on maintaining the traditional social relationships in the settlement of industrial workers inevitably brings into focus a certain economic rationale - underlying the government cultural policy. The central issue, I suggest, is one of the maintenance of the low costs of the reproduction of labour power.

To explain, it is necessary to recall that one of the key features of the 'patri-familial' structural model in Chinese society is the strong moral prescription for loyalty towards ones immediate patri-kin. The principle is articulated not only in the many practices revolving around the worship of ancestors; but also in the course of daily life, the provision of mutual (emotional and material) support between members of the same kin group. The Confucian ideal of 'filial piety', for example, has always placed strong emphasis on the duty of the sons to care for the ageing parents. However, in Chinese culture the term 'family' or '*chia*' can often suggest an extended family of three or four generations, or in the broadest sense, a patrilineage as in *chia tsui*. Consequently the moral precepts of 'filial piety' are, in practice, widely applied outside the context of

the immediate family: they perscribe the moral obligations of a young man to provide for the livelihood of the elder patri-kin. Coupled with the norm of parental support of the sons in the establishment of their own families, there results in the family, or wider kin group, a strong sense of moral bond, and obligation for mutual assistance in times of need. It is in this sense that we should interpret a comment such as this:

The basic and most characteristic Chinese institution has been the family. ... The members of a family were supposed to stand by one another. The indigent and the aged were expected to be cared for by their more prosperous and younger relatives. To a greater or less extent the family performs the functions which in the modern Occident are associated with sickness and unemployment insurance, old age pensions, and life insurance (Latourette 1964: 566).

The ethics of kinship obligations in Chinese society has a special significance when we examine it in relation to the industrial policy of Hong Kong. As in all Third World countries, Hong Kong has little or highly inadequate provisions for the social security of workers. Economists have referred to the benefits of unemployment insurance, worker's compensation, pension schemes and assistance for job training etc. as 'indirect wages'. Theoretically 'indirect wages' represent part of the total wages, and are in the advanced economies, primarily provided by the state. Hence, the significance of the morality of kinship in Hong Kong society is precisely that the continuing relevance of the cultural norm ensures that 'indirect wages' are provided for the workers by their immediate

kin. In Meillassoux's view, this situation in the developing economies constitutes a form of 'super-exploitation':

The agricultural self-sustaining communities, because of their comprehensiveness and their *raison d'etre* are able to fulfill functions that capitalism prefers not to assume in the under-developed countries: the functions of social security. The cheap cost of labour in these countries comes from the super-exploitation, not only of the labour from the wage-earner himself but also of the labour of his kin group (1972: 102).

Thus the concept points to a comprehensive form of exploitation that is dependent on the social relationships within a kinship group. In the context of my argument, what is critical about the process of 'super-exploitation' is that it has the effect of reducing the costs of the reproduction of labour power in the capitalist mode of production in Hong Kong. More precisely, by allocating the provision of indirect wages to the responsibilities of the worker's immediate kin, the total costs normally carried by the capitalists in the reproduction of productive labour power is considerably lowered.

In an economy like Hong Kong this is particularly vital in view of the predominance of labour intensive industries. The aim of the labour and industrial policy, as I have mentioned, is crucially connected with the maintenance of low labour costs, and subsequently, favourable cost parities *vis-a-vis* the advanced industrialized economies. Significantly, such economic consideration is articulated in the current development of the NT. In reference to the changes in Cheung Chau community, the nature of the economic transformation in relation to the metropolitan industrial economy can be rephrased in more economic terms.

The establishment of the residential town for wage workers from Hong Kong serves an important part in the appropriation of surplus labour. There are essentially two aspects to the way in which this is achieved. In the first place, the merchant class through the provision of housing and other goods and services participate in the extraction of surpluses by selling these goods at a profit. Of course, in marxian economics the activities of the local merchants are essentially non-productive as they do not contribute to the total labour values of the products they sell¹³. Consequently the present development of Cheung Chau - so carefully nurtured by the government - facilitates, and constitutes a part of, the overall exploitation of wage labour by the metropolitan economy.

Furthermore government policy regarding the social and economic development of Cheung Chau ensures the reproduction of the very conditions under which 'super-exploitation' can take place. That is why 'the preservation of the traditional customs and values' is always emphasized, and integrated in the government plan in the continuing development of the island. Indeed, in the provision of housing more than the physical accommodation of workers is required. The social and cultural alienation normally associated with urban malaise must be avoided. By keeping alive the traditional values and sentiments of kinship the workers and their immediate families are able to, in a sense, provide for

¹³ For a discussion of the function of commercial capital in the capitalist mode of production, see Larmarch 1976: 88-90. Marx gave his own view on the non-productive nature of commercial workers in *Capital*, volume three, chapter 7 (1971).

themselves, thus relieving the government of a burden and economic cost which it might otherwise have to bear.

Conclusion

In examining the emergence of the current community leadership - the Rural Committee - the analysis invariably brings into focus a series of issues relating to the changes in the wider colonial society. Important factors such as the industrialization of the metropolitan economy, and the general political climate of the post-war years are critical in explaining the pattern of class relations on Cheung Chau. Indeed, it is only by examining the economic transformation and the structure of class relations as a response to these wider changes that nature of the political leadership can be understood.

The overarching emphasis of my analysis, therefore, is really on what is recognizably one of the dominant features of Hong Kong society today: the integration of the NT in the metropolitan industrial economy. The restructuring of community leadership on Cheung Chau is essentially concerned with the way in which the island community can be best developed in accordance with the needs of the colonial economy. In terms of my central analysis, it is notable that the economic development - in the form of establishing housing estates for immigrant workers from urban Hong Kong - is accompanied by a crucial ideological shift in the community. I have illustrated, for example, the emphasis by the powerful shopkeepers on such notions as 'bringing prosperity

to Cheung Chau' and 'welfare of the Cheung Chau people'. There is, in a sense, an eagerness among the shopkeepers to demonstrate their ability to respond to the dramatic changes brought about by the war, changes which have given new meanings to the idea of community leadership.

Thus, there have been critical social, economic and ideological changes in the transformation of the Cheung Chau society. The dislocation of the land-owning Wong Wai Tsak Tong and the emergence of the merchant class represents, in fact, a point in the restructuring of class relations since the British takeover. As to be expected, government played an important part in this process. Since the formation of the Committeemen in the early years of the colonial rule, the government has been concerned with the development of the community especially regarding the nature of local leadership. The significance of the Rural Committee is precisely that it provides a vital means for cooperation between the District Office and merchant class. The relationship between the government and the shopkeepers is not without its difficulties as I shall demonstrate in the following chapter. But at least in the early 1960's, there were sufficient common interests between the government and local leadership, making the Rural Committee a centre of political and economic influence. Compared with the previous *kai fong*, the Residents' Association, what is in a sense unique about the Rural Committee is the direct official sponsorship from the government, namely the District Office and the NT Administration. Indeed, the Rural Committee is an intrinsic part of the government administration - and is perceived by the local people to be so.

The structural domination of the merchant class through the Rural Committee is evident in many ways. Economically shopkeepers control the commercial trade; they are also the major owners of land and real estate. Equally important, through the powerful Wai Chiu Fu and the Rural Committee, shopkeepers are made solely responsible for the organization of Bun Festival and the maintenance of the main temples. As I have argued, it is through these centre of cultural reproduction that the merchant class is able to engage in ideological production which contributes to their powerful position in the community.

The control of the Bun Festival and the major temples like the Pak Tai Temple by the shopkeepers is more than incidental. In the post-war years, because of the greater government involvement in the religious life on Cheung Chau, major responsibilities in carrying out important festivals are officially delegated to the Rural Committee. Such responsibilities as I have mentioned in Chapter 4, are part of the 'prizes' of receiving District Office sponsorship. The close collaboration between the District Office and community leadership in cultural reproduction in fact typifies the nature of government administration in post-war Cheung Chau. What is clear is that, in government's view economic development must be achieved in the context of a stable social environment in which traditional cultural values continue to operate in daily life. Of course, 'preservation of traditional values and way of life' has always been an important part of the application of colonial rule. However, the critical importance which the government has given

to its cultural policy in the post-war years really suggests a set of wider issues. My argument is that official policy regarding the reproduction of traditional cultural values and ideas is consistent with the development of the metropolitan capitalist economy. Given the aim of maintaining low cost of wage labour in Hong Kong, the reproduction of cultural values regarding the family and kinship ensures that workers will continue to rely on their immediate kin in times of sickness and unemployment etc.¹⁴. It is in this sense that I have argued that government policy is intricately related to the maintenance of low cost of reproduction of labour power.

In retrospect, the transition of the community leadership from the Residents' Association to the Rural Committee suggests the more rational organization of power and influence in the post-war years. The government-supervised constitutional reform of the Residents' Association, for example, sets the beginning of direct official sponsorship and control of the local *kai fong*.

¹⁴ This points to the situation in which kinship operates as product relations (in the distributive sphere) in the capitalist mode of production. Historically, kinship was the major principle which defined access to ancestral land and distribution of harvest in lineage-based agricultural communities. Therefore there is a residual effect in which production relations in the previous mode of production continue to function in that of the current period. Godelier has described this kind of situation by the concept of 'social and economic formation' which constitutes a

combination of different modes of production found in a hierarchical relationship (one in relation to another) when one of the modes of production dominates the other, obliges them in some way to adapt to the needs and logic of its own functioning system and integrate them more or less into the mechanism of its own reproduction; ... (1977: 63).

The complex changes following the Second World War necessitated, in many ways, subtle transformations of the application of colonial rule. There are essentially two aspects of the nature of local administration, as I have illustrated. First is the increasing pace of public works projects. The scale and importance of these development projects quite simply means that the dominant class interest - the shopkeepers - must be consulted and integrated in the system of administration. Secondly, it is also evident that compared with the pre-war years, government policies are being increasingly 'ideologized'. That is, both the District Office and the NT Administration place significant emphasis on 'explaining' to the community and its leaders the nature and above all, benefits of government decisions especially regarding large scale community projects. In the monthly meeting with the Rural Committee, the District Officer would take the opportunity to elaborate on the details and rationale of any government policy vitally affecting the community. In short, the public speeches and official visits by the District Officer while giving face to Rural Committee leaders, are also important occasions for the government to impress on the community its concern for the welfare of the local people. The production of the ideology of 'official paternalism', we recall, is crucially related to this process of what government has called 'administration by consultation'.

The organization of power is more rational also in the sense that, from the view of local leaders, there is a clearly defined route to influence and political prominence. Compared

with the pre-war years, this route is well structured within the system of government administration. In describing the career that must be followed by a man of ambition, the most commonly used expression in Cheung Chau is *kua san kuan*. The expression literally means 'passing through three gates': it refers to the three stages a person must pass in the system of local representation before reaching the highest position of power and influence. First he must obtain sponsorship as a Village Representative, then he has to be elected in the executive committee of the Rural Committee, and finally, at the summit of prestige and influence in the NT, he has to occupy a seat in the executive council of the Heung Yee Kuk. Of course, the traditional definitions of prestige and status still operate. Chairmanship in the ethnic-based district associations and contribution to charities, for examples, are still important means of 'buying face' as they were in the past. However, currently these processes of achieving 'face' derive a special character because they are actively nurtured by the government and integrated in the local administration. Indeed, putting it crudely perhaps, to command influence in the community requires not only respect from the community but also recognition of the government, particularly the District Office.

District Office sponsorship is obviously a vital issue in the examination of changing community leadership. Government recognition and support are critical in the restructuring of class relations because they transform the order of social, economic and ideological relations in the community. On one

level, as I shall elaborate in the next chapter, a position in the Rural Committee allows the powerful merchants to consolidate their economic power by engaging in land transactions. More generally, District Office sponsorship has come to represent critical resources on which legitimate political influence in the community ultimately depends. This, as we shall see, has an important impact in the politics of the following decade which saw the emergence of left-wing associations.

CHAPTER SEVEN

CULTURE, BUREAUCRACY AND THE CONSTITUTION OF POWER:
THE POLITICS OF LAND ADMINISTRATION IN THE NEW TERRITORIESIntroduction

In the previous discussion, because of my emphasis on the social and economic development of Cheung Chau, I have largely focused on the cooperation between the District Office and the Rural Committee. But the nature of their relationship is arguably more complex than I have presented it. Indeed the role of the Rural Committee manifests a significant contradiction under the system of government administration. In terms of my central analysis, the contradiction in the overall position of the Rural Committee is critical because it is constitutive of the structure of relationship between the merchant class leadership and the District Office. It is the purpose of this chapter to bring this question under close examination.

It is important to recall that the formation of the Rural Committee in the complex circumstances of the post-war years was consistent with the broader principles of colonial rule. Thus, the official sponsorship of the Rural Committee gives recognition and strong political support to not only the dominant class interests, but also culturally significant institutions like the district associations, and above all, the temples and seasonal festivals. At the same time, the Committee and the major local institutions are brought under effective administrative control as part of government policy.

The mode of government control, evidently transformed from the principle of Indirect Rule, is to produce a notable contradiction in the position of a community organization like the Rural Committee. My central argument can be briefly stated. While the policy of official sponsorship, with its elaborate system of government supervision, is introduced essentially to ensure effective political control of the local leadership, it also provides the main source of prestige and influence of the Rural Committee. Consequently and perhaps ironically, it is the 'bureaucratic connection' in this sense, which both allows the Rural Committee men to have significant access to the government bureaucracy and simultaneously to engage in illicit practices detrimental to the interests of the administration.

A consideration of the difficulties in the relationship between the District Office and the Rural Committee provides an important starting point for the examination of one of the most intricate issues in the NT today: the administration of land. I argue that the current features of the government land policy have emerged out of the very contradiction in administrative rule. The two issues are vitally connected: as I shall demonstrate, it is through the processes of land administration that contradiction in the official policy regarding local leadership is essentially resolved.

Hence I begin the discussion with an outline of the historical development of government land policy. Of particular relevance is the official resumption of private land ownership in order to provide land for use in government housing

and industrial development projects. In order to overcome the difficulties in arriving at a 'just' compensation of land resumed, the Letter B Entitlement Scheme has been devised. Under the scheme, as an alternative to cash payment, an Entitlement is issued to the land-owner who then has the right to apply for a regrant of government land in the future.

Among other features, the Letter B Entitlement is transferable and can be openly bought and sold. This, coupled with the nature of the land policy which I shall elaborate, has the consequence of encouraging the hoarding of Entitlements for price speculation. The development of an informal market for Letter B Entitlements - and real estate in general - has crucial implications for my analysis.

First of all, I argue that Rural Committee leaders are in the best position to act as brokers for the transactions of land and Letter B Entitlements. Because of their positions in both the community and the government administration, these men enjoy extensive social connections, and are thus well-informed of the conditions of supply and demand. More specifically, land brokerage by the Rural Committee leaders critically depends on access to the bureaucratic resources of the District Office which are crucial for providing information regarding revisions in land policy and the availability of government land for sale. However, in view of the formal duties of the Rural Committee, land transactions by these men inevitably carry connotations of 'illicit practices'. From the government's perspective, the enterprise of the Committee men is undesirable

for several reasons. For one thing, it encourages speculation in land, which inevitably aggravates the inflation of land prices and rentals in general. More critically, the hoarding of Letter B Entitlements and the delay in the application for a regrant of Crown land makes it very difficult for the government to predict the overall demand for land from year to year. This has important implications in the administration of land policy, particularly regarding the planning for the provision of land for government and private use.

In the discussion of land brokerage by Rural Committee men, I evoke Gouldner's concept of 'indulgency pattern' (1954). By 'indulgency pattern', Gouldner refers to the kind of behaviour in which superiors in a bureaucracy tolerate certain rule infringement by subordinates. Such leniency in his view, creates goodwill and improves morale among subordinates, and ultimately contributes to the controlling power of superiors.

In many ways, I suggest, the official tolerance of land brokerage activities by the Rural Committee men - in spite of the apparent difficulties brought about in land administration - constitutes a form of 'indulgency pattern'. My analysis, however, extends the concept beyond the original usage by Gouldner. Essentially, I suggest that the practices of the colonial bureaucracy have to be examined in the historical and political context from which the colonial order has evolved. My major argument is that there is in the NT a significant continuity of the traditional notion regarding the accruing of personal (pecuniary) gains from ones bureaucratic office. The

'official indulgence' of the illicit practices of the Rural Committee constitutes, in fact, a transformation of the key cultural ideas defining the nature of relationship between the government bureaucracy and local officials.

What is significant about the District Office's indulgence is that it complements the many legal powers of control. In other words, the land brokerage activities are understood by the Rural Committee men as privileges which can be withdrawn at will by the government. Analytically, while an 'indulgency pattern' in the administration of land creates goodwill for the government, it also structures the Rural Committee in a relationship of dependency. In the context of the Chinese cultural ideology, I argue, an 'indulgence pattern' facilitates the political and ideological control of the local leadership and the informal exercise of power by the District Office.

Land Administration in The New Territories

After the British takeover of the NT in 1898, one of the first tasks of the new administration was to rationalize the system of land tenure system under the Ching government¹. Surveys were carried out and a special Land Court was formed in 1901 to settle claim disputes. The British attempt to

¹ For early administrative reforms see G.N. Orme 1909-1912 and Lockhart 1900.

settle legal entitlements of ownership aroused considerable opposition from the powerful landed interests. With the introduction of the NT Land Court Ordinance in 1900, all land in the NT was declared to be the property of the Crown during the 99 year term of the Convention of Peking. The British claim for Crown land did not in itself cause any special difficulties as the former landowners were simply given new leaseholds on the payment of an annual Crown rent roughly equivalent to the land tax paid to the previous Ching Imperial government. But disputes arose in the cases of tenancy under absentee landlords, where the Land Court often decided in favour of the cultivating tenants by granting them legal entitlement to ownership. Furthermore, all marginal land claimed, but uncultivated by the owners, was proclaimed by the government as *de jure* Crown land.

Hence, deprivation of some of the landlords was a logical outcome of the reforms in the administration of land. In addition, landowners could no longer retain their entitlements as was possible under the Ching administration, and yet resort to such practices as under-reporting of the actual holdings or failing to register altogether with the land office in order to evade payments of land tax². For its part, the colonial

² Commenting on the land tenure of the newly annexed territory, Lockhart observed, 'The (Imperial Chinese) land registers of the district ... are worse than useless, as they contained not more than half of the land under cultivation' (1899: 540).

government was anxious to establish a formal tenure system not only to facilitate the collection of Crown rent but also to bring some of the marginal land under cultivation. In any case, given the effective power of the new authority, disputes over actual ownership were quickly settled.

Generally speaking, the government administration of land in the NT today is achieved through the provision of Crown Leases - there is no *de jure* freehold ownership. These fall into three categories:

- 1) Block Crown Leases: all land occupied and registered at the time of British occupation; these original holdings are known as Old Schedule Lots.
- 2) New Leases: the remaining land other than Old Schedule Lots and such holdings (called the New Grant Lots) are sold to the public by auction.
- 3) Crown Permits: these are permits granted for temporary occupancy and are renewable yearly. After occupation for more than ten years the land in question can be purchased by the occupier without having to apply for the purchase in public auction.

Entered as conditions of the lease or permit are details regarding the amount of annual Crown Rent, the size of the plot and the purpose of land use - be it agricultural, building, temple site, etc.. Change of land status is strictly controlled and an owner who wishes to convert land for any usage other than originally intended must seek permission of the District

Office. Crown rent is increased when land is converted from agricultural to building uses and a premium is also charged for such conversion.

Originally the system of status of land use was devised in order to determine the amount of appropriate Crown rent. Lower rates for example, were payable on agricultural land to encourage cultivation. Generally, in the early years of the colonial rule, conversion of agricultural land into building land presented no special difficulties. On principle, when such a conversion was permitted, the land in question was charged a higher amount of Crown rent as the new usage presented a more profitable return to the owner. Since the mid-fifties, because of the pressure of demand caused by industrial expansion and increased residential use, there has been a dramatic inflation of the price of land and real estate. Consequently this has brought about an enormous increase in the number of applications for conversion of agricultural land into building land. Many small farmer-leaseholders attracted by the profits from land sale as well as the opportunities for wage employment, have abandoned cultivation. In the face of these changes, the government control of land status becomes critical. More specifically, as most of the land in the Old Schedule Lots is agricultural land, the current market value of each lot is dependent, in part, upon its convertibility into building land. From the government's point of view, the restriction in the conversion of land use is an effective means of preventing mass land alienation into the hands of private financier-speculators,

notably those from urban Hong Kong. Through such a policy, the administration hopes to repress the continuous upward trend of land prices even though it cannot prevent the outright sale of leaseholds.

To recall the discussion of the previous chapter, the overall aim of the land policy is to bring about an orderly development of the NT in accordance with the wider requirements of the colonial economy. In this context, let me refer again to the Small House Policy which limits the building of 'village type' houses to a size not exceeding 700 square feet in area and 25 feet in height. Also, the number of such houses that can be built is restricted to one per male person who can trace descent through a male ancestor residing in the NT during 1898 and beyond.

The control of land status and the Village House Policy³ are two of the most disputed issues in the NT today (cf. Heung Yee Kuk 1977). The landed and commercial interests dominating the Heung Yee Kuk and the Rural Committees naturally resent what they regard as restrictions on the right to the full utilization of land. The many petitions of the Heung Yee Kuk, usually clothed in such rhetoric as 'democratic rights of the NT people'

³ The government has argued that the Village House Policy presents an important concession to the NT land users. When the Building Ordinance was extended to the NT in 1961, it was recognized by the government that its provisions could not be enforced in full. A subsequent regulation introduced in 1967, exempted 'village type' houses from part of the Building Ordinance. It was following this regulation that the Village House or Small House Policy was devised.

and 'repression of the British colonial government', essentially argue for greater freedom from these regulations. In the petitions for the 'right to build' and the construction of buildings to urban standards, the Heung Yee Kuk hopes to accrue greater profits from the current increase in land prices and rentals of shops and houses.

Therefore, what ultimately complicates the relationship between the government and local leadership is the competitive aims in the exploitation of land. Speaking of the government, it is motivated, first of all, by its own requirement for the construction of public works. Equally significant, there is also the interest in accruing revenue from land in the form of Crown Rent and charges on the conversion of land status as well as on the sale of Crown Leases. But the problems in the competing interests between the administration and the local landowners are further exacerbated by the fact that, given the shortage of land in the NT, land for government purposes can only be acquired by reclaiming some of the Crown Leases. The method of compensation for official land resumption consequently carries important implications for the formulation of government land policy.

Official Land Resumption and The Letter B Entitlement Scheme

Under the Crown Land Resumption Ordinance (cap. 124) the Hong Kong government reserves the right for compulsory acquisition of private land under Crown Leases. The Ordinance also provides

details regarding the means of such resumption and compensation. In particular, Section 12 (c) of the Resumption Ordinance stipulates that "no compensation shall be given in respect of any expectancy or probability of the grant or renewal or continuance, by the Crown or by any person, of any licence, permission, lease or permit whatsoever ...". What the provision means in effect is this. For an owner whose land has been reclaimed by government, he is paid as compensation the amount assessed at the 'open market rate' excluding any expected future rise in value brought about either by increase in market demand or by any physical improvement of the land in question. In October 1978 - the time of my field work - the official compensation rates stood at \$39 per square foot for agricultural land and \$79 per square foot for building land. Ostensibly the government insistence on 'current market values' rather than 'future values' is aimed at arriving at an objective scheme of compensation rates. As long as the official rates for compensation are periodically adjusted - as is the case since the fifties - to bring them in line with the 'market values', special difficulties do not arise.

However, an immediate problem is that, especially for the remote areas of the NT, what is regarded as 'fair going market rate' is difficult to determine precisely. In the case of building land, because of the greater demand, an informal market exists which gives some measures of 'the current market value'. But for agricultural land the value in the open markets is tied in with a series of factors. Among these are the possibility

of it being converted into building land, and significantly, the prospect of resumption by government which usually offers building land in exchange. As the government is only prepared to interpret the 'current value' of agricultural land as 'value from cultivation', the compensation paid to the owner is usually much lower than he can get by selling it in the open market. Consequently there is much resentment among local landowners who regard the official compensation rates as arbitrary and unfair.

Furthermore, though officially the land resumed by the government is intended to be used for 'public purposes', in fact such land is often subsequently sold by public auction at considerable profit to the government. It is the contention of the Heung Yee Kuk that former landowners should be able to share in the profits derived from such sales. The situation is summarized by the Working Group on NT Urban Land Acquisitions - a semi-official committee sponsored by the government to look into the present land resumption policy :

Generally speaking, even before administrative measures were taken in 1973 to increase the levels of compensation payable on resumption, resumptions outside urban layouts for roads and other clearly demonstrable public purposes were not seriously opposed. However, right from the early fifties, where land was required by Government for urban development, strong opposition was encountered, because the lessees objected to parting with land for compensations based on agricultural values only to see them resold by Government to others as building land at higher prices (1978:57)

Partly to meet public criticism and to counter some of the problems in arriving at a fair scheme of 'compensation rates', the Letter B Entitlement Exchange Policy was formulated

in 1961. Under this policy, an owner notified by the government that his land is to be "resumed" is given the option of a cash payment or promissory regrant of land at a future date. In the latter case, a Letter B Entitlement is issued to the owner stating the date of resumption and the type and the area of land for which he is entitled to apply in exchange. In short, as the administration sees it, the Entitlement Scheme offers a reasonable concession to the land owners by offering compensations in kind.

Thus the Letter B Entitlement Scheme, as an alternative to cash compensation, has two major features:

- 1) an exchange of agricultural land anywhere in the NT, on a foot for foot basis without the payment of premium; or
- 2) the right to receive a future regrant of building land in the NT with the payment of a premium. The premium represents the difference between the value of the building land granted as valued by the government and the value of the resumed land at the time of surrendering. The rate of the regrant is that for every 5 sq. ft. of agricultural land resumed, 2 sq. ft. of building land will be offered (i.e., a ratio of 5:2 for the exchange of agricultural land for building land). When the land surrendered is for building, the new building land is offered on a foot for foot basis.

Hence, exchange entitlements represent, much like government bonds, ^{official} debts or obligations of the government owing to the entitlement holders who are in a position to demand

future repayments. From the official point of view, compensation in the form of promissory future regrant enables the government to acquire land for public projects and for resale to private developers without it having to make immediate cash payments. Furthermore, to recall an earlier point, in the context of the political dispute over the official acquisition of land, it is hoped that the alternative of compensation in kind will satisfy those landowners whose interests are most affected. In official parlance, the Letter B Entitlement Scheme allows the indigenous landowners 'to share in the development of the NT by obtaining at premium, development land' (Working Group on NT Urban Land Acquisition *op. cit.*: 95).

However, the Letter B Entitlement Scheme never completely resolves the difficulties inherent in the calculation of 'future values' on which fair compensation for land resumption is based. The continuing conflict of interests between the government and land owners produces significant consequences in the administration of the Entitlement of Scheme and the land policy as a whole.

An important feature of the Letter B Entitlement is that it is transferable and can be readily bought and sold. This inevitably brings about the question of the 'market value' of an Entitlement relative to the actual value of the government regrant as specified in the document. Essentially, the market value of an Entitlement is determined by its 'age'. Let me elaborate.

Since 1974 the allocation of an entitlement regrant is based on competitive tender between Letter B holders, with

the award given to the tenderer who has offered the earliest dating entitlement. In other words, when the government makes land available by inviting applications for regrant, priority of claim is given to the holder of the 'oldest' entitlement. Consequently, for entitlements credited with equal sizes of government regrant plots, their relative value in the open market is determined exclusively by their age as specified by the dates on the respective documents.

There is an additional significance in the age of a Letter B Entitlement. This is that the premium payable for a regrant of building land is valued at the date of the surrender of the original plot. These premium rates are applied to different parts of the NT to take account of the variations in land values in different localities. Most importantly, premium rates are adjusted half-yearly to bring them in line with the rise in the market value of land. Thus, on Cheung Chau, for example, when applying for a regrant of building land, the premium payable in the second half of 1978 by owners of Letter B Entitlements issued at January 1960 was \$2 per square foot; while for entitlements issued after January 1978 the premium ranged from \$60 to \$105 per square foot.

Therefore, given these considerations, it is not surprising that there is a strong incentive for a land-owner, once issued with an Entitlement, to withhold and delay the application for a regrant of government land. In any case, though it is difficult to arrive at the current comparative values of an Entitlement and the actual regrant designated,

the Entitlement certificate is on the whole preferred to land as a more convenient form of investment. Compared with land, Letter B certificate is more flexible: a holder can use it to apply for tender of a particular plot of land he needs which government has made available. In addition when applying for a regrant there are special difficulties for holders of Entitlements who have only surrendered small lots of agricultural land. Such difficulties arise because, in most cases, when building land is offered by the government for exchange, it is in very large plots. Given the unfavourable exchange ratio 5 square feet of agricultural land for 2 square feet of building land, it is impossible for those who have not surrendered sufficient agricultural land to apply for exchange. For these entitlement owners, the alternative is either to hold on to the certificate for a suitable regrant at a later date or, as is more usually the case, to sell the entitlement to developers who are able to consolidate their various holdings of Letter B Entitlements in order to acquire government land of reasonable size.

As a result of this tendency for owners to hold on to Entitlement certificates, over the years, a large government indebtedness of Letter B Entitlements has been accumulated, amounting to 30 million square feet of HK\$300 million in November 1978 (Wah Kiau Yat Pao, November 3, 1978). For the government, this accumulation of liability has important disadvantages. First of all, the government is naturally anxious about the feasibility of completely fulfilling the outstanding Entitlements. As the government endeavours to provide

an additional supply of land, there are rumours and speculations that the amount of land promised under the Entitlement Exchange Scheme is greater than the amount of land actually available⁴. Furthermore, with the increasing development taking place in the NT, large areas of land need to be provided each year for such purposes. The delaying of application of regrant by Entitlement holders renders very problematic the government projection of the demand for land needed for development from year to year. In any case, the sale of exchange entitlements to private developers and speculators, in the government's view, defeats the original purpose of 'sharing out the development of the NT with the indigenous land-owners'.

The administrative difficulties in the land policy as a whole are serious enough to warrant its periodic revision. The most obvious corrective measure for the accumulation of Letter B Entitlements is to provide higher cash compensation payments, hoping that more will be encouraged to accept this alternative. Hence, in October 1978, the government announced new rates of compensation⁵ for resumption: \$39 per square foot for agricultural

⁴ The Heung Yee Kuk, speaking of the accumulation of government obligations, remarks, '... there are at present more than 14 million sq. ft. of agricultural land and 250,000 sq. ft. of building land under the land exchange scheme for which the Government has not yet made available any land for exchange. The effect is that owners whose land has been resumed by the Crown have received 'paper-rights' (only)' (Heung Yee Kuk 1977: 17).

On government's own anxiety at the accumulation of Letter B regrants yet to be applied for regrants, see the announcement by the NT Administration reported in Wah Kiu Yat Po, 23 August 1978.

⁵ The details can be found in Wah Kiu Yat Po, 1 October 1978.

land, an increase of 45% from \$27, and \$79 per square foot for building land, an increase of 43% from \$55. The new rates were expected to relieve some of the pressures on further accumulation of outstanding exchange entitlements.

The Rural Committee and Land Brokerage

The Letter B Entitlement Exchange Scheme, and the unintended consequences of 'hoarding' of Entitlements by owners for price speculation, have emerged out of a long history of dispute between the administration and local land-owners over the government restrictions on land use. The development exemplifies, for one thing, the continuous attempts of the merchant class to exploit the opportunities brought about by the increasing demand for land. In this connection, it is significant to note that the hoarding of Letter B Entitlements is concurrent with the development of an informal market for Entitlements and real estate in the NT. Indeed, the 'malpractices' in the administration of land are intricately related to the activities of Rural Committee leaders who act as brokers in these transactions.

As in any form of market, a land broker in the NT must be well connected so as to be informed of the conditions of supply and demand. But in this case, what is also crucial is an intimate knowledge of the complex and continuously revised land policy, and above all, access to the various levels of the District Office. In the absence of established real estate

agencies in the NT, it is easy to see how the function of land brokerage is best served by the Rural Committee leaders.

When the government announces that land is made available for Entitlement holders, it attracts the interests of many - even those not in possession of Entitlement certificates. In the latter cases, it is normal practice for a person who wishes to purchase a specific plot to apply for exchange with a suitable Letter B Entitlement. The first task of a broker is to check the land records and to consult with officials in the District Office about the status of the plot in question, the annual Crown Rent and its convertability if it is agricultural land. After this is completed, he next negotiates with other brokers to look for an appropriate Entitlement. The regrant certificate must be of the right 'age' to ensure a reasonable level of premium payable for such a regrant, and that it has fair priority in the application for exchange. In addition, the Entitlement must be of a suitable size in relation to the original land surrendered. More often than not, several Entitlements have to be acquired to accumulate sufficient 'size' in order to exchange for the government land which, as I have pointed out, is usually offered in large lots.

All of these functions are complicated and time consuming. But what facilitates the undertaking by Rural Committee leaders is their 'structural location' in the government bureaucracy and in the NT communities as a whole.

Through their various dealings with the District Office, Rural Committee men have become personally familiar with the

administrative staff who through their official duties are also in touch with Rural Committee leaders elsewhere in the NT. This familiarity enables tacit co-operation between the Committee leaders and the official staff. They assist each other by providing information regarding the availability of land and Letter B Entitlements, and by locating the prospective buyers. On the completion of a deal, part of the commission is given to those in the District Office who have been particularly helpful. Through their formal connections with the District Office, Rural Committee men also cultivate confidence and skill in dealing with the various levels of officialdom. Such competence is essential not only in soliciting help from the bureaucratic staff in the District Office but also in keeping in touch with the periodic revisions of the land policy. For the average villagers, the Rural Committee men are naturally the most suitable persons to whom complicated matters relating to land can be delegated.

Furthermore, as already mentioned, the Rural Committee is connected with those of other districts in the NT through the Heung Yee Kuk and the New Territories General Chamber of Commerce. For their common dealings with the NT Administration, and the sharing of the crucial commercial and landed interests, leaders of the various Rural Committees have cultivated strong social ties. As members of the powerful elite in the area, they provide each other with significant support by, for example, attending the rituals and seasonal festivals held in other communities. Co-operation in land brokerage thus represents

a part of the mutual assistance in business transactions and social life generally.

As land brokers, the Rural Committee men are active not only in functioning as intermediaries between buyers and sellers. They are also engaged in the speculation of real estate and Letter B Entitlements, and in the construction of shops and flats for sale or rent. Investment in real estate offers substantial marginal returns relative to shopkeeping. The significance is perhaps indicated by the fact that, though the positions in the Rural Committee carry no wages, most of the members on the executive committee (notably the Chairman and the Vice-Chairman) work full time at their duties, having delegated close kinsmen to look after the shops and businesses. The degree of profitability and the complexity in real estate transactions can be illustrated by an example.

Old Man Lam, a prominent Chiew Chow merchant who started the first self-service grocery (small supermarket) on Cheung Chau, heard from his contact in the District Office that the government was making available a block of land adjacent to his house for Letter B Entitlement holders. Having arrived in Hong Kong in 1948 from Amoy City, Fukien, where he was an Intelligence Officer of the Nationalist Army, he is still in close touch with his former associates who have settled in Taiwan. He was asked to 'look out for investment opportunities in Hong Kong'; and the construction of flats, he thought, would allow his friends to invest on Cheung Chau. Furthermore, his own house was getting congested with his four sons - two

of whom were married with children - living with him. After the buildings were completed, he planned to move the youngest married son and his family into one of the flats, thus keeping all his sons and grandchildren together near him.

The block was building land of slightly more than 2,000 sq. ft. On June that year (1978), Lam's eldest son met his contact in the District Office to look for suitable Letter B Entitlements for exchange. After months of negotiation, the man was able to bring together three offers of Entitlements originated from Sha Tin in Northern NT, all dated January 1978, amounting to the size of a regrant of more than 5,000 sq. ft.. In September, Lam's two Taiwanese associates arrived to inspect the project. They decided that the construction was too small for the size of the capital they had at hand; so an arrangement was made which provided Old Lam a loan at an interest of 11% per annum. Soon after that, Lam wrote to the District Office applying for permission to start building, and asking the Land Office to begin a survey of the block in order to draw up demarcation lines. These matters took a long time to be approved. Early in October, Old Lam asked the Chairman of the Rural Committee to check with the District Office to hurry things up. The Chairman had various conversations with the Senior Land Officer; in any case, all the formalities were finalized in mid-December and Lam hoped to begin construction in the early part of the following year. His estimated costs are tabled below:

<u>Items</u>	<u>Amount in \$</u>
Letter B Entitlements	172,500
Premium for (2,100 ft. @ \$50 per sq. ft)	105,000
Construction costs	870,000
Interests at 11% for 6 months	63,113
	<u>1,210,613</u>

On the land of 2,100 sq. ft., Old Lam planned to build three blocks of two storey flats each covering a floor space of 700 sq. ft. in accordance with the Small House Policy. Given the current market value of such size at \$260,000 each, he would be able to sell the six flats at a total price of \$1,560,000. This would give a profit of \$349,387: a return of 28.8% from the total cost.

Talking to other Rural Committee leaders, I gather that the returns from investment in buildings are usually higher, at about 32%. One of the reasons for cost saving is the high demand for accommodation so that flats can usually be sold even before completion, thus reducing the interest payable on capital loans. The price of flats is rapidly increasing: a flat of 700 sq. ft. in floor area with two bedrooms was sold in early 1977 for \$120,000 but was valued at \$270,000 in January 1979. To an extent, profitability is affected by the increase in the premia payable when exchanging Entitlements for Crown land, as well as the increase in land prices from \$70 per sq. ft. for building land in January 1978 to \$150 per sq. ft. at the end of the same year. However, these increases are

sufficiently offset by the rise in real estate prices and rentals on the whole.

Land Brokerage, and Indulgency Pattern as Cultural Transformation

So far I have been looking at the land administration of the NT, and the inherent difficulties which give rise to the withholding of Letter B Entitlements for price speculation. I further argue that such practice is closely related to - and made possible by - the land brokerage activities of the Rural Committee leaders. In view of the consequences in the administration of land, land brokerage and speculation by the Rural Committee men constitute significant dysfunctions in bureaucratic process. This is so because such activities deviate from the officially pronounced duties of the Rural Committee. As land transactions are undertaken solely for personal gains, they are considered as illicit practices and are regarded as a form of infringement of government rules regulations.

For this reason, land brokerage by the Rural Committee leaders can be regarded as a type of 'indulgency pattern' (Gouldner 1954: 45-56) existing between the District Office and community leadership. In Gouldner's formulation the concept rests on his criticism of Weber's discussion of modern bureaucracy as characterized by objective and highly formalized rules in the routine of administration. On the contrary,

Gouldner argues, bureaucratic efficiency depends to a large degree on the application of informal rules and the deliberate relaxation of formally established ones. The relaxation of formal bureaucratic rules, which suggests the kind of behaviour in which superiors tolerate certain rule infringements by subordinates, is termed 'indulgency pattern'. In Gouldner's view, such 'bureaucratic leniency' creates goodwill, improves morale among subordinates, and ultimately contributes to the fulfilment of administrative goals.

The concept of 'indulgency pattern' has an important place in my analysis. It offers an explanation, for one thing, why inspite of the enormous power of the colonial administration the malpractices of the Rural Committee are allowed to persist. Indeed to conceptualize land brokerage as an 'indulgency pattern' enables me to focus on the structure of the relationship between the District Office and the community leadership. However, in order to give the concept a greater analytical force I suggest that it is necessary to extend the original usage by examining the cultural and political context in which 'indulgency pattern' is granted. The first aspect of my argument can be briefly stated. This is that the 'indulgency pattern' in connection with land administration constitutes an ideological transformation by the District Office. There is, in other words, a notable continuity⁶ in the

⁶ For a comparison of Ching bureaucratic practice and the pre-war Colonial Service of Hong Kong, see Lethbridge 1970 and Wilkinson 1964: 125-76.

practices of the colonial administration and the granting of 'indulgence' or 'personal gains' by traditional bureaucracy in Chinese society. Let me explain.

Confucian philosophy traditionally put forward a 'descending theory of government' (Harris 1975). According to this thesis, political power could not "emerge from a popular groundswell" and officials were "appointed 'from above'" (*ibid* 183-4): the apex of power was located in the monocratic and highly paternalistic authority of the Emperor. The legitimacy of the Imperial power was based on the idea that the king, whom the bureaucrats represented, was the embodiment of the highest moral and political authority. The purpose of government was to bring Great Peace (*t'ai-p'ing*) and with it, prosperity and well-being to the realm.

Turning to the government bureaucracy, the Imperial Civil Service was staffed by men steeped in the dominant Confucian ideology. In addition to officials recruited through the examinations, other entered government service through the ranks of the military, and through the hereditary privilege which permitted the entrance of official's sons without examination (cf. Kracke 1947, Ho 1962, Chang 1955). Hence, by and large, officials were members of the literati who had gone through a general Classical education and men not originally associated with the more technical aspects of civil and judicial duties. This contradiction between the requirements of technical competence in administration and the Confucian ideal of promoting 'men of virtue' into bureaucratic

office was much debated in traditional China from the Han Dynasty (206 B.C. - 221 A.D.) onwards (cf. Yang 1959). As a result there was a lacuna between idea and practice in a civil service built upon a system of 'recruitment by talent'. In particular, a situation was created in which officials had to acquire the necessary skills through the day to day routine of administration. What this meant was that senior officials became significantly dependent on the advice and guidance of lower ranked staff. For example, while an official might have been anxious to pass judgement without interference or to collect the amount of taxes officially credited to his area, the fulfilment of his duties and the ability to exercise power was considerably hindered.

Let me direct attention to the bureaucratic processes at the *hsien* (district) level. Theoretically the office of the *hsien* magistrate or *yamen* represented the authority of the Imperial administration at the lowest level; and in the NT the *yamen* in the *hsien* headquarters of Nam Tau, Kwangtung, had jurisdiction over all the villages in the area. Compared with the higher levels of the Civil Service, the post of *hsien* magistrate was in most cases filled locally by members of the gentry who either held the lower *chu jen* degrees, or had made good in the lower ranks of the service (Yang *op. cit.*). The existence of established social ties of *hsien* officials in the communities under their jurisdiction is highly significant. It meant that, for one thing, they were invariably subjected to the demands of local groups, especially their patri-kin.

Such demands took the form of "claiming privileges from a member who had achieved official ranks by appealing to the sense of obligation recognised among members of such groups" (Yang *op. cit.*: 157). Furthermore, as office in the government bureaucracy carried no guarantee of life-time tenure or provisions for a pension after retirement, *hsien* officials had to rely on the support of their kinsmen and members of other primary groups. This gave further incentive to yield to local pressures.

Another source of demands came from the lower ranks of the *yamen*. The junior staff of clerks, deputy police (*pao chia*) etc. represented the more enduring structure of the local administration. They were as a rule recruited locally and most likely had served with the previous magistrate as well. Their experience and familiarity with the affairs of the community, rendered them indispensable in the day to day functions of the *yamen*. It was on these men, as mentioned earlier, that the magistrate had become dependent for advice, local intelligence and the more detailed aspects of administration. But the importance of the junior staff was derived from the fact they were the intermediary between the community and the government bureaucracy : for the ordinary people, they opened the door to the inner world of officialdom. As part of their duties, they would advise which of the cases were to be dealt with first; and for a sum, they would bring a particular case to the attention of the magistrate and perhaps 'ensure' a favourable outcome in the judgement.

I have thus far been focusing on certain contradictory features underlying the ideas and practices of the civil service in traditional China. In particular I have drawn attention to the Confucian ideal of 'paternalistic authority' and above all the manipulation of officials by local interests: it was these structures which constituted the Chinese cultural conception of the formal duties of the government bureaucracy. There are various transformations of this central idea. At one end of the spectrum is the general acknowledgement of the moral and political authority of officialdom; and at the other, the frequently voiced belief that 'the primary reason for becoming a government official is to make money'.

Returning now to the Rural Committee leadership, there is a tacit assumption among the people on Cheung Chau that what motivates a person to compete in the Committee election is the 'buying of face' and, more fundamentally, the opportunity to engage in land transactions. Informants often comment that 'a seat in the Rural Committee is a golden rice bowl'. From the government's point of view, the process of administration must invariably take account of such cultural expectations. The government attitude is best summarised by a District Office report:

It is an honour to be a Chairman and at certain times there are perquisites to be made. On this matter, however, it should be added that there is considerable expenditure on entertainment, and if the Chairman makes a little on the side, provided it is not too much, it is well to turn a blind eye, because he probably needs it (Coates 1955: 115).

In short, there is always a tension in the colonial administration between allowing what are regarded as customary practices and the possible dysfunctions they may bring about. To phrase it yet another way, contradiction is inherent in the government policy which emphasizes, on the one hand, political control of community leadership, and on the other, official sponsorship of traditional cultural practices and institutions. The significance of the indulgency pattern in the administration of land is precisely that it offers a means whereby such a contradiction can be resolved.

In terms of my central analysis, what is notable about 'bureaucratic leniency' in allowing the malpractices of the Rural Committee is that it constitutes a crucial transformation of Chinese cultural conceptions of the role of government bureaucracy. In the first place, and evoking Gouldner, land brokerage by the Rural Committee men creates for the District Office important goodwill and social obligations. This is so because such activities are viewed by local people as evidence of government's willingness to acknowledge the traditional ideas of personal gains accruing from one's political office. However, the creation of goodwill only presents a part of the processes involved. The key issue here is really the constitution of power. I argue that the dispensing of 'bureaucratic indulgence' ultimately structures the Rural Committee in a relationship of dependency *vis-a-vis* the District Office. The complex nature of political control instituted in the relationship between community leadership and the administration will be the focus of the remaining discussion.

Contradiction and the Structuring of Power Relations

I have suggested so far that land brokerage by the Rural Committee men emerged out of the inherent contradiction in the nature of administrative rule. It is necessary to bring this issue to the forefront of discussion. From the view of the administration, one of the major implications is that the official policy which provides prestige and support to local leadership must be accompanied by equally significant measures of political control. This, as we have seen, lies at the centre of the structure of relationship between the Rural Committee and the District Office. Nevertheless, given the social and cultural context in which such a policy is applied, major difficulties remain.

To begin with it is important to note that in many ways the role of the Rural Committee can be likened to that of locally recruited junior staff in the traditional *hsien* magistracy. For the average villagers, dealings with government offices often appear to be exceedingly complicated. Hence Rural Committee men are the most logical persons they can approach and to whom they can delegate the many matters relating to land and the application for building licences, for example. For such undertakings 'tea money' is paid to the Committee men on the completion of a particular task. The attitude of the local people is understandably ambiguous when they come to discuss such practices. Some are adamant about the corruption of the community leader. But more generally, people tend to consider the personal gains of the Committee men as a just and necessary reward for their time and trouble in the performance of their

many official duties.

The same argument is used to explain the profitable business of land transactions by the Committee men. As one informant explained:

Positions in the Rural Committee carry no wages. They must be paid for their work somehow. People have always made money from their connections with the government. In any case the District Office has to 'give face' to these men whose position in the community is created by the government itself.

There are several notable points in this statement. In the first place, it emphasizes the making of personal gains by the community leaders as consistent with traditional cultural practices. In a way, the rewards from land transactions substantiates the symbolic values of honour and prestige given to the positions in the Rural Committee. Also, there is the suggestion that the District Office, having 'created' the Rural Committee, is compelled to support the influence of the local leadership even to the extent of making certain allowance for the malpractices of these men.

The cultural and political context in which the relationship between the District Office and community leadership is invariably defined brings me back to the earlier point. In formulating the concept of indulgency pattern Gouldner has discussed the fulfilment of bureaucratic goals in terms of the creation of goodwill and the improvement of morale among subordinates. While such factors are undoubtedly crucial, I suggest that Gouldner's formulation can be given a greater

force by incorporating the notion of power. Consequently, I would rephrase the central premise this way: bureaucratic aims are realized more essentially because the toleration of illicit practices actually enhances the controlling power of superiors, paradoxical as this may seem.

What we need to re-examine is the very nature of goodwill and social obligation created by the practice of 'bureaucratic indulgence'. Indeed I suggest that the creation of goodwill has to be located in the structure of the relationship between superiors and subordinates. In other words, the relaxation of formal rules is always undertaken together with the potential exercise of power by superiors; goodwill and possible sanction are never far removed from each other. To put it more accurately, goodwill is primarily achieved because it is recognized that formal rules exist but are not enforced.

To return to my main discussion, land brokerage by the Rural Committee men is normally interpreted as the result of the government's relinquishing some of its prerogatives in the exercise of administrative control. It is understood that the many privileges of the Rural Committee depend on the 'grace' of the District Office, and can be withdrawn any time by government. In Hong Kong the threat to discontinue and persecute 'illicit practice' both in government and private enterprise is sometimes made real by new legislation. The most dramatic example in recent years is the formation, in 1975, of the Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC). It has brought before the court many cases of corruption ranging from the unaccountable incomes of senior public servants to 'irregularities' in the

public auctioning of Crown land. In relation to my central discussion, it is significant to note that because of the enormous backlog of Letter B Entitlement certificates, the Secretary for the NT was prompted to announce that all Entitlements which remained to be used to apply for regrants by March 1978 might be declared invalid in March 1981⁷. Leaving aside the actual difficulties⁴ implementing such a procedure, the pronouncement was a sufficient reminder of the power of the government to stop practices which are deemed detrimental to official interests.

Therefore, the reverse aspect of the goodwill created by District Office patronage is the vulnerability of the position of the Rural Committee leadership. The increasing economic commitment to invest in real estate, as I have pointed out, means that local merchants have become vitally dependent on bureaucratic connections not only for prestige and status but also for the maintenance of their economic power. It is no exaggeration to say that if District Office sponsorship were to be withdrawn from local leaders the economic fortune of many would be substantially ruined.

Goodwill and negative sanction thus operate dialectically, re-enforcing each other in the structuring of the controlling power of the District Office. In the first place, the idea of 'official grace' in allowing certain malpractices of the Rural Committee mystifies and conceals the formal powers of the

⁷ The Secretary for the NT made the announcement in the Legislative Council on 15 November 1978; see Wah Kiu Yat Po 16 November 1978.

District Office and the colonial government. In a way, the public understanding of the role of the Rural Committee men in land transactions is - if only implicitly - nurtured by the District Office. Operating in the political and cultural context of the NT, the government is compelled to recognize the practices of the community leadership, practices which have a long historical continuity in Chinese society.

Conclusion

In many ways, it is the issue of land which characterizes the nature of politics in the NT today. The government's own requirements of land for development necessarily creates a delicate situation in the relationship between the administration and local communities. Due to the system of land tenure established in the early years of the colonial rule, a variety of Crown leases granting holdings of land ranging from less than an acre to thousands of square feet are in the hands of the villagers. The government resumption of land is one policy which affects many people. In Cheung Chau for example, land is a much talked-about subject; any revision of land policy and announcement of new rates of compensation for official resumption of land is received with interest by the local people.

One result of this is that dealings in land matters with the District Office have become an important duty of the local leadership in the NT. For instance, it is necessary for the Rural Committee men - or anyone with political

ambition - to keep themselves informed of the latest land policy, and to make their services available to the villagers. Indeed, assistance in these matters, particularly in relation to the negotiation of compensation for land resumed by the government, constitutes a significant ideological presentation of 'services to the people'. This is true even for those men from the pro-Peking left-wing association in the mobilization of political support, as we shall see.

Therefore the discussion of land policy invariably touches upon a set of wider issues. In terms of my central analysis, the significance of the administration of land is precisely that it is intricately connected with the processes constitutive of class domination on Cheung Chau. Of major importance is the perpetuation of the economic position of the merchant class, and the nature of government control of the Rural Committee. In other words, what renders the issue particularly cogent is the vital economic interest and the political position of the merchant class itself. Dealings in land and real estate have become, for the Rural Committee leaders, major economic activities which, together with commerce, are critical for their overall position in the community. At the same time, from the government's point of view, problems arise which are related to overcoming the malpractices of these men and instituting effective political control of the Committee.

At this point, one comment is necessary. While I have argued that the administration of land policy ultimately

contributes to the controlling power of the District Office, the final outcome has emerged not so much out of any official calculations. Rather, I emphasize, it is in the contradiction in the nature of administrative rule that the dynamics of the processes I have described lies. Indeed both the government and the local leadership are bound and constrained by the very contradiction in the structure of their relationship. For the government, the consequences are felt in the problem of how to nurture the administrative role of the merchant class as the centre of community power structure, while simultaneously placing the leadership under some form of political control. Similarly it is more appropriate to see the malpractices of the Rural Committee men as being made possible by the bureaucratic connections created in the first place by the government. It is in this sense that I have argued that the various - perhaps cumbersome - revisions in the land policy are the results of responses to local pressures from the demands of the Heung Yee Kuk, from the need for orderly development of the NT, and from the system of local representation in the government administration.

Finally, the constitution of the political control of the Rural Committee brings me to the notion of power critical in my argument. In sociological analysis, the distinction of formal and informal power rests on the separation of the formal exercise of authority and the manifestation of ... control 'outside positions of authority ... formally defined

as legitimate within a specific office' (Kapferer 1980: 46). However, in the actual practice such a distinction between the formal and informal aspects of power and control is difficult to maintain. And I rather concur with Kapferer when he writes that power 'is beyond definition' and is constituted in the structure of social relationships (*ibid*: 47). For instance, in the present case, is the compliance of the Rural Committee to be explained by formal control (official supervision of the Committee election, the possible withdrawal of government recognition) or informal power (goodwill and obligation)?

Power is multi-faceted; it becomes real when it is manifested in social intercourse. In fact, formal exercise of authority always has its informal aspects. Correspondingly, informal control is often achieved because it is accompanied by the real - and yet disguised - power of the superior. Godelier (1978) for example, has argued that physical coercion is the more effective when it is not exercised, and lies dormant in the background of social life. Following the insight of Godelier, I stress that it is not strictly correct to suggest that an indulgency pattern enhances the informal control of the superior, as Gouldner implies. What lies behind the goodwill and morale of the Rural Committee created by the 'indulgence' of the District Office is always the threat of withdrawal of official sponsorship, and further still, the legal powers of the administration on which the existence of the Committee ultimately depends. In a words, there are vital ideological and political processes relating to the creation of an indulgency pattern. What I have

attempted in the chapter is to locate the achievement of the controlling power of the government in the political and cultural context of the NT.

CHAPTER EIGHT

THE EMERGENCE OF 'PATRIOTIC FRONT' ASSOCIATIONS: PEKING,
LEFT-WING IDEOLOGY AND POLITICAL CONTROL IN HONG KONGIntroduction

In the discussion so far I have analysed the current dominance of the merchant class in terms of its structural location in the principal social, economic and political relations on Cheung Chau. More particularly, I have emphasized the importance of such factors as the control over the organization of temples and festivals, the monopoly of the opportunities in land brokerage and above all, the District Office sponsorship: all of which are critical for the reproduction of the merchant class domination.

In the overall conditions of the post-war years, these factors have come to represent the key resources for economic wealth as well as for the production of ideology. Hence, an importance^e question must be raised regarding the way such resources are distributed at the level of class relations. Indeed, a crucial aspect of my argument is precisely that there are wider processes emanating from the colonial society as a whole which, in a complex fashion, produce the pattern of allocation of these resources. It is this consideration which brings me to examine the implications of the most significant development in Hong Kong society in the 1970's: the normalization of the relations with China.

The nature of Peking's current policy *vis-a-vis* the colony has been discussed in some detail in Chapter II. One of my main concerns here is to bring into focus its effects on the ideology and organization of the left-wing institutions in Hong Kong. To put it briefly, the deradicalization of China's policy has had the consequence of putting to an end the many anti-British 'revolutionary activities' so characteristic of the pro-Peking associations in the 1960's. Mainly as a result of this, the 1970's generally saw the increasing legitimacy of these associations - in both the eyes of government and local people.

At the same, however, it is important to note that the left-wing associations never totally shed their reputation of being "subversive" and "anti-government". Indeed, in spite of the critical ideological changes, these associations are still placed under effective political control by the government. But in contrast with the past two decades, there is an extra dimension to the nature of government control. This is that the many restrictive measures which prohibit political demonstrations and industrial strikes, for example, are enforced with the tacit approval of Peking. In many ways the suppression of the left-wing associations is, in fact, intensified under the present circumstances.

Therefore, it is important to see the positions of the pro-Peking associations in Hong Kong today as presenting a profound ambiguity. Indeed, in the community of Cheung Chau, their improved legitimacy on the one hand, and the continuing restrictive official control over them on the other, produces

significant contradiction in the left-wing associations. In terms of the left-wing ideology, there is the problem of rationalizing the organization of working class interests in a political situation in which left-wing activities are being deradicalized.

One consequence is that undertakings of the left-wing associations on Cheung Chau tend to be 'ideologized' in a certain way. Indeed, changes in the political climate of the 1970's have produced a specific transformation of the left-wing ideology. This transformation involves the production of an ideological model which I call the model of 'new patriotism'. Essentially the model emphasizes the need for greater understanding of the achievements and international prestige of the 'ancestral country'. Challenge to the colonial *status quo*, the new left-wing ideology tends to stress, is no longer the primary purpose of working class associations in Hong Kong. Significantly, the ideology of 'new patriotism' mystifies the failure of the pro-Peking associations to dislocate the merchant class leaders from their powerful position in the community.

Secondly, in line with the overall political changes in Hong Kong, the left-wing associations are now allowed to participate in community affairs, notably the Rural Committee election. What is significant about this development is that it enables the regrouping of interest groups subsumed under the merchant class domination. I refer, firstly, to the labourers and fishermen; and secondly, the leaders of the Cheung Chau Residents' Association.

The fact that a political alliance, whatever its inherent difficulties, could be formed uniting such diverse interests is an indication of the dramatic changes the left-wing associations have undergone. For the working class on Cheung Chau, political developments in China provide, for the first time, a favourable environment and appropriate ideology for the organization of voluntary associations more expressive of their political interests. I examine in this context the leadership of the left-wing associations, and the activities which hope to 'bring benefits to the working people on Cheung Chau'. In any case, working class control of the left-wing associations in the early years of their formation was evident, for example, in the predominance of hawkers, labourers and housewives in the leadership and membership of these organizations.

At the same time, the increasingly legitimate left-wing associations also provide a means for the regrouping of other interest groups. Principal of these are the leaders of the Residents' Association, and more significantly, powerful men who are known as 'left-wing merchants' in the community. The latter are wealthy merchants who deal in Chinese goods and are renowned^{ed} in Cheung Chau for their cargo ferry business and the distribution of live pigs. For their economic resources and political support of the left-wing associations, these men compete - with some success - against the Chamber of Commerce leaders in the Rural Committee election. Not surprisingly, it is the 'left-wing' merchants who come to dominate the left-wing associations.

The internal development of the left-wing associations since their formation in the early 1970's is the major concern of this

chapter. What emerges from the discussion is a series of processes which finally brought about fission within the organization of the left-wing associations as a whole. Briefly, fission took place in the leadership which tended to be divided into those of working class origin and the prominent 'left-wing merchants' who, following shopkeepers generally have been diversifying their interests into real estate on Cheung Chau. Mostly importantly, this has the effect of undermining the aims of the left-wing associations, the activities of which have provided - within the limits imposed by the District Office - an expression of working class aspiration.

In terms of my central argument, I suggest that the emergence and subsequent development of the left-wing associations are related to the overall positions of such organizations in Hong Kong today. It is their improved legitimacy, for example, which allows the working class and later, the 'left-wing merchants' to organize the associations for their respective political ends in the context created by the colonial government. Yet, the political influence of the pro-Chinese associations is severely limited by the restrictions imposed by the District Office. This contradiction tends to order and indeed, undermine the activities of the left-wing associations. In a complex sense, as I hope to make clear, the pro-Peking ideology made possible by the current developments in Hong Kong and China both enhances and yet hinders the emergence of a genuinely working class organization on Cheung Chau.

China and The Left-wing Associations in Hong Kong

The term *tso p'ai shé tu'an*, "left-wing associations", is used in Hong Kong to refer to a range of organizations which with varying degrees of intimacy, are directly or indirectly connected with the People's Republic of China. They include firstly, financial institutions and trading agencies directly staffed by the Chinese government; secondly, locally organized trade unions and craft guilds¹, the more important of which maintain direct liaisons with China; and finally, various ethnically-based district associations and friendship societies which proclaim ostensible pro-Peking ideologies.

These left-wing associations differ dramatically in their socio-political importance and organizational resources. On the whole, the Bank of China, China Resources Corporation and China Travel Service are considered to be at the top of the hierarchy. As a rule, all private dealings with the Chinese government, such as trade negotiations and applications for entry visas have to go through these channels before being referred to the proper authorities in the People's Republic. Of special significance too are the left-wing trade unions some of which are funded and controlled by China. The largest communist trade union, as I have pointed out, is the Federation of Trade Unions which claims a total membership of 155,000 drawn from the ranks of some 70 left-wing unions in Hong Kong.

¹ For the history of Communist involvement in trade unions in Hong Kong, see England and Rear 1975 chapter five.

Other than in terms of these formal connections, the ideological allegiance to Peking is expressed through various symbolic gestures, e.g. the raising of Chinese flags during the October-First National Day of the People's Republic, and especially important for the district associations, visiting tours to China during the Chinese New Year and other major festivals. But more than anything else, a voice for the left-wing presence in Hong Kong is provided by the numerous communist newspapers and journals published locally. The more important of these, like the *Ta Kung Pao* are owned and run by the Chinese government, providing extensive coverage of events on the Mainland and Peking pronouncements on policy regarding the colony.

Therefore the connections between China and the left-wing associations in Hong Kong are notably complex. Part of the reasons lies in the fact that Peking does not maintain consular services in the colony. Consequently, the major Chinese agencies have to take on the role of *de facto* representatives of the Peking government. Most important is the Bank of China which is "Peking's party and diplomatic headquarters, as well as its financial heart in Hong Kong" (Hughes 1968: 36). But more generally, China's relationship with the left-wing associations is evident in Peking's traditional (ideological and moral) support for 'revolutionary activities' in Hong Kong². Indeed,

² China would discourage anti-government activities which are in conflict with her ideological and political requirements. In September 1974 some student radicals in Hong Kong organized demonstrations against inflation and unemployment. Local communists urged the people not to participate; and left-wing press described the students as 'Trotskyists' and 'anti-revolutionaries against communism and China' engaged in 'destroying workers' unity'; see *South China Morning Post*, 9 September 1974.

as I have already suggested, because of China's vital interests in political developments in the colony any serious anti-government strikes and demonstrations could only be undertaken with the tacit approval and encouragement from Peking.

Thus, it is from the fact of these political ties that the social perception of the left-wing associations in Hong Kong has emerged. For what is central to the current contradictions of the pro-Chinese institutions is not only their apparent connections with China but also the government attitude towards the nature of their political activities in Hong Kong. In fact, the social understanding and the continuing definition of the 'subversive' role of the associations today are produced more essentially by the exercise of government control over any political group deemed to be acting detrimentally to official interests. But more of that later.

Other than the idea of their connection with Peking, another key notion relating to the left-wing associations is that of 'political subversion'. Historically, China has been continuously preoccupied with the problem of the colonial status of Hong Kong ever since the establishment of the Communist regime in 1949. Peking's political and moral commitment to the 'revolutionary struggle' in Hong Kong is amply illustrated by its involvement in the political riots of 1956 and 1967, and the industrial strikes of the 1960's generally. At all events, in contrast with other criminal elements such as the powerful triad

societies³, it is only the left-wing association which are defined as 'politically subversive' in the sense of threatening the socio-political order of Hong Kong. From this an even more ill-defined social reputation is developed which conceptualizes these associations as anti-British and socialist-oriented, whose activities tend to reflect the policies of Peking.

Though I have considered in some detail the complex circumstances in which the left-wing associations operate, what is crucial about their social reputation, however, is not so much its degree of 'historical accuracy'. In fact, during the course of daily life, new connotations are continuously being derived from the central notions regarding the nature of their activities. More particularly, in general usage the term 'left-wing' has come to mean, somewhat diffusely, 'anti-government' and 'subversive', and carries a strong connotation of illegality. On Cheung Chau, for example, when I try to explore with the informants the reasons for the demise of the Tong and the Residents' Association in political life, they have answered: "Ah, they have been 'playing with left-wing politics'". What is implied in the remark, as it is significant to note, is not that the leaders of these groups have, in any sense of the phrase, maintained political connections with China. Rather, it

³ Triad societies were originally secret societies which emerged at various times in China's history. The members were bound by oaths of blood brotherhood in the common goal of organized rebellion against foreign conquerors of China. Today there are numerous gangs and secret societies in Chinese communities, usually engaged in criminal activities; their only connections with the triad societies of the past is in the use of the name, and some of the original rituals. For triad societies in Hong Kong, see Morgan 1960.

suggests that these men have operated against the government or incurred the official displeasure which is given as the true reason for their downfall.

In fact, what I suggest is that the wider connotations of the term 'left-wing' have emerged essentially from the processes of political control in Hong Kong. To elaborate, there is a notable tendency among officials of the colonial government - especially among the Royal Hong Kong Police - to label the more organized industrial strikes and political demonstrations as 'communist' and 'subversive'. Indeed 'left-wing involvement' is often used to describe any activities expressly critical of government policy, e.g. the protest against forceful removal of squatters on government and private land. The reason behind this is perhaps obvious. Given China's historical connections with the 'revolutionary struggle' in Hong Kong, the use of the label, 'left-wing subversion' provides a convenient, yet highly effective rationale, for government to suppress any political interests which are regarded unfavourable to the stability of the colonial order. It is such a pretext which has been offered as an explanation for the police arrests of workers on strike which sparked off the riots of 1967⁴; and in the NT, the removal of some forty-one ^{be-s}members from their positions in the Rural Committee during the same event⁵.

⁴ See Cooper 1968 and Kowloon Disturbances 1966, Report of the Commission of Enquiry 1967.

⁵ New Territories Annual Report, 1967-68: 3.

Let me now turn to the effects of the current normalization of Peking's foreign relations with Hong Kong. To reiterate, given her own requirements for economic development Peking is now committed to the maintenance of the socio-political order of Hong Kong. What this means in practice is that China will exercise, whenever possible, her influence to tone down the political demands of the left-wing associations. This is especially evident in the case of arbitration by the communist-controlled Federation of Trade Unions on behalf of its constituent member unions:

It is probably that when an affiliated union decides to make a wage demand, it must clear with the Federation, which means that the demand is evaluated not only in terms of the workers immediate needs, such as coping with a rising cost of living but also in terms of any effects might have on the political situation *vis-a-vis* the British and *vis-a-vis* the Peking government and its relations with the British (Cooper n.d.:10)

In other words, the changes in Chinese policy regarding Hong Kong have resulted in a deradicalization of the left-wing associations generally. Consequently it is tempting to conclude that there is an overall improvement in the political legitimacy of these organizations which are all but free from subsersive connotations. Indeed, there is ample evidence in the social life of Hong Kong today to support this. Thus, many of the left-wing voluntary associations are formally recognised

by the government through registration⁶ with the Registry of Societies or the Societies Registration branch of the Royal Hong Kong Police. In the NT, candidates sponsored by left-wing associations now participate in the Rural Committee election. Generally there is an understanding that Chinese institutions such as the Bank of China - the involvement of its officials in the 1967 riots is still in people's memory - are no longer concerned with the overthrow of the colonial power in Hong Kong.

However, these facts need to be seen in connection with other transformations of the pro-Chinese associations. As part of the wider political changes, the deradicalization of left-wing organizations has in a sense brought about greater official tolerance and recognition. Yet, at the same time, it is also evident that the scaling down of political demands - in response to the policy requirements of Peking - enhances government control. The current legitimacy of the left-wing associations operates as it were like a double-edged sword: social reputation is achieved at the expense of political independence from the administration. Registration with the government, for example, establishes the left-wing associations as legal societies under the law, but invariably places them under official supervision.

⁶ Any organized group is by law required to be registered with the Registrar of Societies within fourteen days of its formation. This does not apply to commercial companies, trade unions and cooperative societies which are covered by other ordinances. Societies founded for religious, charitable or recreational purposes may be exempted from registration. Most of the local associations in Cheung Chau are registered as commercial limited companies to avoid police supervision.

However, compared with the political contexts of the fifties and sixties one difference has to be noted. This is that the structuring of government control involves the tacit approval of Peking. The main reason for this, as I have suggested, is not only the need to maintain the *status quo* in Hong Kong whose economic facilities are vital to China's economic development, but also the necessity to bring the 'revolutionary movement' in the colony in line with developments on the Mainland.

The contradiction in the structure of relations constituted by the left-wing associations in the current political context can now be stated. While there is a significant improvement in the legitimacy of these institutions, they are at the same time subject to even more stringent government regulations regarding rights to strike and to hold public demonstrations, for example. Contradiction can be located also at another level. One of the ironies of the current development *vis-a-vis* Peking is that the Hong Kong government is able to continually label as 'left-wing' and as 'communist subversion' - quite liberally as we shall see in the context of Cheung Chau - the activities of any political group which are considered to be detrimental to official interests. In terms of the social perception of an association which proclaims a pro-Chinese ideology, its improved reputation and social acceptance is counterpoised by a serious disrepute of 'opposing the colonial administration'. This ambiguity (contradiction) has a way of playing itself out in the political relations in NT communities like Cheung Chau.

The Organization of The 'Patriotic Front' on Cheung Chau

In the years following the Cultural Revolution and the 1967 riots in Hong Kong a series of local associations was established on Cheung Chau. These, because of their organization in terms of an ostensible pro-Peking ideology and symbolism, are commonly understood to be 'left-wing' and in some way 'connected with China'. Before I come to consider them in detail, some preliminary comments are necessary.

Firstly, I emphasize that my grouping of these association into a single 'left-wing' category follows the practice of the local people. The sharing of a common political stance is acknowledged not only by the District Office and the community at large, but also by the associations themselves who agree that 'they all share the same aspirations'. However, because of the persistent negative connotations connected with the term 'left-wing', these institutions as a rule describe themselves as the *'ai kuo p'ai'*; literally 'patriotic party' or 'patriotic front'. Needless to say, when referring to these associations, 'left-wing' is still the usual term used by the District Office and the leaders of the Chamber of Commerce.

Secondly, both the organization and the ideology of the 'patriotic front' associations are developed in direct relationship to the Chamber of Commerce and the Rural Committee with their well known 'pro-Taiwan', 'pro-British' political stance. Indeed, many of the pro-Chinese organizations are formed with the purpose of presenting a left-wing counterpart of the respective merchants' association, and district associations etc. As a result, one of the main outcome of the formation of the 'patriotic front'

is to divide, on the whole, the local associations into a left-wing and a right-wing 'bloc' each with its own structure of leadership. I shall return to this point later.

Turning now to the associations themselves, the following are generally acknowledged to constitute the core membership of the 'patriotic front':

1. Cheung Chau Inhabitants Mutual Improvement Association
2. New Territories Commercial and Trading Union - Cheung Chau Branch
3. Cheung Chau Marine Hawkers' Union
4. Cheung Chau Fishermen's Cooperative Society*
5. Cheung Chau Building Labourers' Guild*
6. Hoi Luk Fung (Hoklo) Mutual Improvement Association*

(* My translation)

There are significant differences in the influence and resources among the associations; the order of the list above indicates roughly the ranking in these terms. Thus, the membership and leaders of the groups of lower rank are drawn mainly from working class members of the community. I shall deal with these first.

The Marine Hawkers' Union (*sic*) has a long history in Cheung Chau, having been established in the 1920's. The so-called 'marine hawkers' were peddlers of sundry goods to the numerous fishing junks which anchored in Cheung Chau Bay in the fifties and the preceding decades. Following the decline of the fishing industry in the late fifties, and with the expansion of the market town on Cheung Chau, the marine hawkers have all moved

their businesses on land. Since the early sixties they have established various stalls and small shops selling mainly textiles, meat and vegetables and prepared food along the narrow lanes of Tai Sun Back Street, a working class neighbourhood west of the island.

The Union is now housed on the ground floor of a modest three-storey building next to the Tai Sun Street market. It has a membership⁷ of some 200 ex-marine hawkers and their families, and provides a variety of services for its members, such as assistance in funeral expenses, scholarship for school children and the organizing of collective worship during the major festivals. Like all the local associations, the Union features a written constitution; election is held in January each year to select the eight members of the executive committee.

Like the Marine Hawkers' Union, the Building Labourers' Guild is one of the earliest associations on Cheung Chau. Established in the 1930's it includes in its membership workers of the three traditional professions of the building trade: carpentry, cement works (plastering) and scaffolding. Like all traditional craft guilds in Chinese society, its original purpose was primarily concerned with the recruitment of apprentices into the trade, and generally with ensuring the continuity of the crafts associated with the profession. In the early years the Guild also included many craftsmen from the shipbuilding industry before they moved to shipyards outside Cheung Chau.

⁷ As in all local associations membership is based on the family as a unit rather than individuals. Each head of a family unit has a voting right. But benefits and distribution of charities are extended to all in the family members.

With the present 'building boom' on Cheung Chau the Guild has become increasingly important by attracting many of the tradesmen and labourers employed at the building sites. Among the traditional services provided for its members, one can perhaps be singled out. It is the organizing of annual offerings to Pak Tai and other deities in order to ensure the prosperity of the trade and the safety of the workers. Not unimportantly, collective worship operates to reinforce the solidarity existing among members through the sharing of the same profession. It is perhaps this which accounts for the active involvement of the Guild in 'left-wing politics' on Cheung Chau. More than any other associations in the 'patriotic front', the Guild is most expressive of its pro-Chinese political stance, as is indicated by the erecting of the huge commemorative banner over the waterfront facing the ferry each year during the October-First People's Republic national day. The 170 odd members also keep in close touch with others of the same professional associations in the nearby islands of Lantao, Lamma and Peng Chau by holding occasional feasts and visiting tours.

The Marine Hawkers' Union and the Building Labourers' Guild are perhaps the most outspoken of the left-wing associations on Cheung Chau. During interviews, the leaders of the Guild were highly articulate about the hardship building labourers are facing because of low wages and poor working conditions. Similarly, informants in the Union complain of the lack of economic security due to the poor returns from petty trade. Central to these complaints is the frequent references to the 'quick profits'

of the wealthy merchants on the Rural Committee and the 'injustice of the *kweilo* ('foreign devil') government in Hong Kong'. In short, I suggest that there is an impressive degree of class consciousness among the workers in these associations. Possessing a keen awareness of their own economic positions *vis-a-vis* the dominance of the merchant class and of the colonial government, it is not surprising that both the Union and the Guild leadership have played a major role in the organization of other 'patriotic front' associations. Indeed, they persistently try to shape the development of the left-wing associations in accordance with what they see as working class interests on Cheung Chau. I take up this theme again in the latter part of the discussion.

The Hoi Luk Fong (Hoklo) District Association is the most recent member of the Patriotic Front, having been established only in August 1978, the time of my fieldwork. The Hoklo people, as I have commented, were among the earliest settlers on Cheung Chau, engaging mostly in fishing. With the present decline in the fishing industry, many of the Hoklo fishermen have become labourers on the construction sites or found work on the cargo ferry dock. Significantly, the Association has been formed, according to an informant, to provide a 'workers' association' on Cheung Chau apart from the traditional Wai Chiu Fu to which many of the improvised Hoklo people still belong. The Association is set up as a branch of the powerful Hoi Luk Fong District Association of Hong Kong with its headquarters in Wanchai District, in Hong Kong Island. The reputation of the Hong Kong office, which enjoys a large following among the Hoklo

fishermen and hawkers, is derived from its reputed involvement in the 1967 political riots. In any case, it helped the Cheung Chau branch in its early stages by providing money for the renting of a small office, and by collecting donations from friends and supporters in Hong Kong. The newly formed Association is currently undergoing a membership drive with the assistance of other left-wing associations, especially the influential Commercial and Trading Union (see below).

Among all the left-wing associations, it is the Cheung Chau Fishermen's Cooperative Society which, in a very special sense, maintains direct contact with China through the fishermen who operate in Chinese waters. The Society, established in 1975, is run by a young man recently immigrated from Canton, who, according to local informants, has been sent by the Chinese government to organize the fishermen here. While this is difficult to confirm, the Cooperative Society nevertheless bears much evidence of his energetic leadership. For the younger fishermen he runs evening reading classes in a large room above the Society office, helping them to acquire the necessary degree of literacy in order to apply for the Marine Engineer's Licence for operating deep sea trawlers. The Society also helps fishermen with the filling of forms and payment of fees for the renewal of fishing licence^s issued by the Chinese coastal authorities. This enables the fishermen to fish in Chinese waters. In recent years many fishermen have found themselves in trouble with the Hong Kong Marine Police who suspect them of smuggling. It is the Society to which they

often turn for assistance in arranging release from arrest. On the whole, the Society gives strong allegiance to the 'patriotic front' on Cheung Chau. Its leaders attend the monthly meeting of all the left-wing associations, and are active in organizing the annual feast for celebrating the People's Republic national day.

I now come to perhaps the most important of the left-wing associations on Cheung Chau: The Cheung Chau Inhabitants' Improvement Association (sic).

Unlike others in the 'patriotic front' whose membership is based on a common profession or ethnic origin, the Improvement Association is organized as a *kai fong* or neighbourhood association. Perhaps for this reason, the Association has become the central body which coordinates the activities undertaken by the 'patriotic front' as a whole. This is done, first of all, through the monthly meeting of all the leaders of the left-wing associations held in the Association building which is located near the waterfront. Such meetings are festive occasions, with much gaiety and joking between the serious discussions, and is followed by a supper prepared by the women-folk in the downstairs kitchen. At these gatherings issues regarding the positions of the workers *vis-a-vis* the shopkeepers and the District Office, and the development of events in China are raised and discussed.

In addition, the role of the Association is assisted by its leadership which is composed of those who play an important part in other left-wing associations. When the Association was formed in January 1971, the Board of Directors consisted of seventeen persons who had organized the Association.

The diversity of occupations of the directors are given below:

Table 19. Occupations of the Leadership of the Cheung Chau Mutual Improvement Association.

<u>Occupation</u>	
Carpenter	4
Construction Labourer	3
Plumber	2
Factory Worker	1
Shopkeeper	4
Hawker	2
Housewife	1
Total :	<u>17</u> ==

Furthermore, it is notable that the nine persons in the first three categories were all leading members of the Building Labourers' Guild; while of the six shopkeepers and hawkers, four belonged to the executive committee of the Marine Hawkers' Union, including its chairman. Thus, the leadership structure of the early years clearly indicates the essentially working origin of the Association. The stated aims of the constitution are:

1. To promote the welfare, charity, rights and privileges of Cheung Chau residents.
2. To translate and explain the laws of HK and NT for members, and to petition to government.
3. To provide financial and medical services and other services as approved,
4. To work for the arbitration and settlement of

disputes between members .

5. To publish leaflets of current interests.

As the constitution is made for the public, particularly the District Office and the Registry General Office (in which details of the Association were entered for record on 5 January 1971), the main purposes of the organization are presented in a highly conventional form. In order to examine the ideological enterprise of the Association, I need to focus on the activities of the 'patriotic front' in greater detail.

X Left-wing Enterprise and The Ideological Model of 'New Patriotism'

In retrospect two central characteristics of the organization of the left-wing associations ought to be emphasized. First of all, inspite of the ideological presentation as 'progressive' institutions the left-wing associations nevertheless exhibit important features common to all local organizations. It is significant that despite all their ostensible political aims, public charities still remain the most basic of their activities. Thus, like other local associations in the community, the 'patriotic front' organizations emphasize the various forms of assistance for ordinary members: financial help for needy families, school fees for children of members, distribution of food after the occasional feasts, and above all, the provision of the of the traditional *pei chin* (literally, "white gold") or funeral expenses. Furthermore, there is the patronage of leaders of the associations. As in the more traditional associations, it is the duty as well as the

privilege of the leaders to subsidize the running expenses and to donate towards any emergency fund such as after a fire or other natural disaster. The leaders are also approached by the members asking for help to look for employment or to arbitrate in interpersonal disputes.

What is evident, therefore, is that the left-wing associations in the way they are constituted represent in fact an important articulation of the essential cultural form of *shé tu'an*. However, the structural features have to be seen together with other characteristics. In Cheung Chau, as in other parts of the colony, the left-wing affiliations of a group or an individual are expressed through subtle symbolic displays that are immediately recognizable by members of the public. To begin with, there is the common usage of the term *wu tsu hui* or cooperative society for professional associations; and *lien yü hui*, the so-called 'mutual improvement association', for district associations in preference to the traditional *t'ung hsiang hui*. In addition, the left-wing associations emphasize the holding of what are regarded as 'progressive activities': the conducting of reading classes and discussion groups, the maintenance of small libraries in which are kept the current journals and newspapers from China. The office club rooms also prohibit the playing of mahjong - the most popular recreation for the poor next to watching television - and, indeed, any gambling games. Finally, the left-wing associations tend to underplay the conducting of religious worship. While the 'traditional superstitious activities' are still undertaken by the individual associations, the Mutual Improvement Association does not hold public worship

and religious services even during the major festivals. Similarly, the 'patriotic front' as a whole has refused as a rule to participate in the annual Bun Festival on Cheung Chau; the implications for this will be dealt with later.

The juxtaposition in the left-wing association of conventional cultural form and left-wing symbolism is crucial for several reasons. In a sense, the situation has been created by current political developments affecting the nature of left-wing politics in Hong Kong. The emphasis on public charities as well as on left-wing displays is, I suggest, related to the major contradiction inherent in the pro-Chinese Associations. Indeed, these organizational features are tied in with the very nature of the left-wing ideology itself. Let me illustrate this with a case from my fieldwork.

Electricity on Cheung Chau is supplied by a small private company - the Cheung Chau Electrical Company - which maintains a generator on the small hill in Tai Sek Hau, south-west of the town centre. The plant is more than thirty years old and highly inefficient. This factor, plus the need to use quality diesel for less air pollution - the plant is situated in the midst of an old settlement - has resulted in Cheung Chau having the highest electricity charges in the colony.

The problems associated with the electricity monopoly have been discussed at various times by both the government and the community since 1947. One proposal was to extend an underwater cable from a major plant on the nearby island of Lantau but this,

like other schemes suggested, was never carried through. In any case, the situation produces significant hardship especially for the poorer section of the community, as well as for local industries such as restaurants (many of which are air-conditioned) and knitting factories which are heavy consumers of electricity. In May 1974 the Cheung Chau Inhabitants' Mutual Improvement Association organized a community wide petition against the high electricity rates. For the local people, the petition struck them as an unconventional approach. While previous negotiations were carried out between the Rural Committee and the electricity company under the supervision of the District Office, the Mutual Improvement Association officials made their rounds door to door, from the shops in the town to the squatter huts, collecting signatures and explaining to the residents the nature of the petition. To organize the event a working committee was formed which included as chairman the Improvement Association, all the 'patriotic front' associations and two representatives from the NT Commercial and Trading Union headquarters in Shatin (see later). For a whole month there was much talk and at times, heated debates in the tea houses; posters denouncing the injustice of the Cheung Chau Electricity Company also appeared on the lamp posts and temple walls.

Meanwhile the Rural Committee and the Chamber of Commerce were notably silent on the whole affair. They were prepared to go along with what was evidently a 'patriotic front' undertaking because of the wide publicity and community support. Four months later in September the results of the petition were collated

and were ready to be handed over to the District Office which had assumed the main responsibility for negotiating with the electricity company. However, when the delegation was appointed from the original working committee in order to meet with the government the Rural Committee stepped in and advised the District Office not to receive the delegation. It argued that since the petition was a community wide affair it was the Rural Committee, as the official body representing Cheung Chau Island, which should directly deal with the government on this matter. As a result details of the petition were handed over to the Rural Committee which, together with the District Office, carried out the negotiations with the electricity company in the following months.

At all events, the result of the whole affair was the agreement by the company to a reduction of one cent per kilowatt-hour and a five cents per month concession in the rentals of electric meters. The achievement was perhaps insignificant in strict monetary terms. But for my analysis, this episode which involved the left-wing associations, as well as the Rural Committee and the District Office clearly offers an indication of the nature of political relations on the island. Let me pursue the issue in relation to the transformation of the left-wing ideology.

As a philanthropic exercise, there was nothing very remarkable about the petition organized by the 'patriotic front'. Other community organizations like the Rural Committee and the Residents' Association had previously appealed to the community for donations, as for example, after typhoon disasters which

frequently affect this part of Hong Kong. However, what was noticeable to people in the community was the particular 'style' in which the petition had been organized. More specifically, the house-to-house collection of signatures, and the putting up of posters which included liberal uses of phrases like 'the injustice of the big company' and 'the democratic rights of the Cheung Chau people', were recognized as the 'progressive ways' of going about the business. They were, as one informant put it, 'the left-wing way of doing things'.

In short, I argue that inherent in the 'patriotic front' enterprise is an expression of the left-wing ideology. As I have suggested, since the early 1970's a set of significant symbols has emerged which serves, for one thing, as diacritica marking off the position of the left-wing associations from their right-wing pro-Taiwan counterparts. But more than that, the emphasis on literacy class, for example, rather than open political protests, directly reflects the deradicalization of the pro-Chinese associations in response to the political development in China. This can be phrased in terms of the structural contradiction I have discussed earlier. Given the ambiguity in the position as socially legitimate organizations yet subject to continuing political control by the colonial government, the left-wing associations develop an ideology which serves to resolve and transform such a contradiction. Inevitably, the ideology feeds back on - and in the process, structures - the practices of all left-wing organizations.

This ideology I conceptualize in the form of what I call the model of 'new patriotism'. Two of the key structures constituting

the model are perhaps obvious: the emphasis on the dispensing of public charities, and acceptance of the *status quo* in the colonial order. Under-pinning these structures is a more fundamental one connected with the complex idea regarding the relationship between China and the left-wing associations in Hong Kong. This is that the activities of the pro-Chinese associations are undertaken the aim of improving the welfare of the local people and helping them to regain a sense of ethnic pride at the current achievements of China. In other words, economic security together with an awareness of what is happening on the Mainland is to become the basis of a new sense of Chinese nationalism. Following the vicissitudes of the tumultuous events in China after the Second World War, and given the present international prestige of the Peking government, the possible wide appeal of 'new patriotism' in this sense is understandable. Nevertheless the structure of ideas constituting the model of 'new patriotism' remains, in the final analysis, a product of ideological enterprise. In this regard two comments are necessary.

In the first place, I argue that the ideological model mystifies the complex position of the left-wing associations in Hong Kong today. Indeed, the central structures of 'new patriotism' generate a set of meanings which rationalizes the current deradicalization and tacit compliance - if not active co-operation - with the colonial government. What the ideological model ultimately seeks to explain is the intricate historical connections of the left-wing associations with China. In the context of improved relationship between Hong Kong and the Mainland, the constraints on the political demands of the labour

unions, for example, must be somehow made sense of in the eyes of the local people, particularly the union members themselves.

In a word, the emphasis on 'new patriotism' rather than 'revolutionary activities' is vitally connected with the current contradiction of the pro-Chinese associations. Notably, the nature of left-wing activities in response to the policy requirements of Peking is significantly concealed in the guise of conventional public charities and voluntary services. But what must be noted is the way these undertakings are coloured by the appropriate left-wing symbolism, thus providing in turn the crucial context for further ideological production. Let me recall some of the earlier examples. The promoting of 'patriotic awareness' through the reading classes and discussion groups, and the petition for reduction in electricity charges are significant transformation of the contradiction precisely because they signify the character of left-wing political aims within the bounds of District Office control. On the one hand, the continuing disrepute of 'anti-government subversion' - as I have explained - derived from ideological association with Peking is in part overcome by the rationale of 'promoting a greater understanding of the events in the ancestral-country'. On the other hand, social legitimacy is enhanced by the removing of any revolutionary rhetoric from these activities, as part of the total ideological presentation in the community.

The second comment to be made is regarding the cultural specificity of the ideological model. I argue that the structures constituting the Chinese notion of 'patriotism' are structurally transformed from the core ideas underlying the 'patri-familial'

cultural model. This can be illustrated by examining the notion of 'nationality' and 'race' in Chinese society. Because of the long historical continuity of China as a nation-state and the reproduction of the key structures of its culture, the concept of *tsu*, i.e. extended family or lineage, has become the basic lexical unit for the formation of other terms denoting the meanings of race and people. For example, in Chinese the word for 'race' or 'people' is *min tsu*: which is made up of two lexical units meaning literally 'people' and 'lineage' respectively. To give the word 'race' a greater biological or genetic connotation, the term *chun tsu* is used which literally means 'seed-lineage'.

Hence, it is clear that in the Chinese language the concept for 'race' is metaphorically constituted from the primary meaning of 'lineage' through the term *tsu*. To put it in simpler terms, it means that family and patri-kin relationships are important means through which people talk about race and nationality. For example, when a person is accused of neglecting his parents, or not remembering his ancestral place in China, he is described as *wu chun* or literally 'lacking-seed' (*chun* here is the abbreviation for *chun tsu* mentioned earlier). More generally the same term is used as a call of insult for someone behaving in what may be considered as 'an unChinese manner' (e.g. in displaying excessive western mannerisms and habits).

From the concept of race is transformed the further notion of Chinese nationality, or *'kuo chia*, literally 'nation-family'. Underlying the idea of 'nation as family' is the notion that the Chinese people constitute a single race sharing the same culture

and descended from a common ancestor in the mythological past. The whole issue can be made clearer when we consider the generation of meanings from the primary concept of *tsu* (lineage) or *chia* (family) in terms of a series of structural transformations. In other words, what we have is the articulation of the primary relationship underlying the patri-familial' cultural model in other structures of relationship outside the family:

<u>Transformation of structural relationships</u>	<u>Cultural Concepts</u>
Senior patri-kin and Ego	family and lineage
Chinese race and Ego	race and ethnicity
Chinese nation and Ego	nationality

Through these transformations Chinese culture poses a connection between the ways people think about the family and about China. Thus, significantly, to Chinese everywhere Mainland China is always *tsu kuo* or literally 'ancestral country'. The implication of this is crucial. It means that the cultural rules governing the relationships within the family are transposed to structure people's conception about the proper relationship between the Chinese and their nation. Indeed, the Chinese conception of patriotism or nationalism extends beyond the usual sense of the 'championship or loving of one's country'. Because of the underlying notion of ethnicity any expression about loyalty to China becomes a highly emotional issue, underpinning the central idea of the Mainland as being the place of ancestral origin. Furthermore, from the average person's perspective, there is a similar cultural expectation regarding the function

of one's country as in the relationships in a family. Hence, just as it is the privilege and honour of the senior kinsmen (the father, etc.) to dispense 'patrimonial benevolence' to junior members of the family, it is part of the duty of one's country (the government) to be responsible for the material and social welfare of its people.

Speaking of the colonial society of Hong Kong, what is noticeable about the transformation of the left-wing ideology is precisely that it involves these complex cultural conceptions. In the first place, the appeal to greater understanding of events in 'the ancestral country' rationalizes the apparent connections - however remote - of the leftwing associations with Mainland China. Indeed, the idea of 'new patriotism' diverts the key ideas surrounding the left-wing associations away from that of 'anti-British subversion', highlighting instead the more conventional and culturally significant activities like dispensing of public charities, etc.

In addition, the model of 'new patriotism' tends to mask the deradicalization of the left-wing associations as a whole. In a way, the current ideology gives an entirely new emphasis to the nature of left-wing politics in the 1970's. The culturally powerful notion of 'Chinese patriotism' naturally poses a major demand, for example, on the individual unions, by placing their more immediate interests under the wider policy requirements of Peking. Indeed, the ideological emphasis on national loyalty and cultural pride in the achievement of Mainland China serves to conceal the complex origin behind both

the current lack of 'revolutionary activities' in the colony, and more broadly, the common interests between Peking and the colonial regime.

Emergence of the Left-Wing Merchants

In the discussion so far, I have suggested that until the mid-1970's, the Patriotic Front on Cheng Chau remained essentially a working class based political alliance, organized in the form of a political bloc *vis-a-vis* the right-wing Chamber of Commerce. This is indicated by the structure of the leadership which is recruited mainly from among the prominent men from the Marine Hawkers Union and the Building Labourers' Guild. Within the limits imposed by the government administration, the Patriotic Front had tried to organize community-wide activities which brought benefits to all sections of the local population.

The watershed which marks the beginning of a gradual restructuring of the Patriotic Front is the formation in 1975 of the Cheung Chau branch of the NT Commercial and Trading Union. The Union is the largest and the most prestigious left-wing merchant organization in the NT. Organized in 1973 with headquarters in Sha Tin, it has been set up as a viable alternative to the right-wing NT General Chamber of Commerce which is sponsored by the NT Administration. According to the Union spokesman, the main goals of the organization are: to facilitate

trading with the People's Republic of China, to organize visiting tours to the Mainland and to negotiate with the Hong Kong government on various matters on behalf of its members. The last is mainly concerned with the application for building permits, and, above all, with official compensation for land resumed by the government for the construction of public works.

The Cheung Chau branch of the Union has a membership of a little over 50 shopkeepers. It maintains a small office on the second floor of a shop building just a block away from the ferry; the same office, incidently, is shared with the Mutual Improvement Association and the Cheung Chau Tai Chung Transportation Company (*sic*) (see later). Though membership consists mostly of hawkers and other petty traders, the leaders of the Union, however, are mainly wealthy shopkeepers. These 'leftist merchants' own a variety of businesses, ranging from those which repair marine engines to those which supply fishing nets and baits. But more particularly, they are involved in major commercial enterprises which are well-known on Cheung Chau as forming a kind of left-wing monopoly. I refer first of all, to the highly successful collective venture of the left-wing merchants in the cargo ferry business. This is the Tai Chung Transportation Company formed in 1976 with a capital of \$100,000. In all, one thousand shares were issued to the investors: over 45 per cent of these are owned by Leung and Chan Chee, two of the most prominent leaders of the Commercial and Trading Union (see table 20). As one of the two private cargo ferry companies maintaining services between Cheung Chau and othe seaport towns in the colony, the venture has been highly successful since the beginning. The Company

has two cargo junks, both fitted with carrying cranes and they make two runs each day one in the morning and the other in the late afternoon. For the past two years, the enterprise has been earning an annual profit of about \$200,000. According to its manager, the Company donates to public charity through the Mutual Improvement Association; about twenty percent of its annual profit are allocated for this purpose.

But the ~~most famous economic~~ cooperation of the left-wing merchants is undoubtedly the distribution of live pigs on Cheung Chau. As the enterprise provides the sole source of fresh pork on the island, it is this which is more properly referred to as 'a left-wing monopoly' by local people. Compared with the cargo ferry business, this involves a remarkably complex organization.

On Cheung Chau pigs have always been slaughtered in the backyards of the premises of the twenty odd butchers on the island. Though the practice is strictly speaking illegal, the government is prepared to turn a blind eye because of the lack of a public abattoir on Cheung Chau. The alternative is, of course, to bring in pig carcasses from one of the government abattoirs in Hong Kong. However, because of the fastidious demand for freshly killed meat by the Chinese, this is obviously unsatisfactory. Even if the pig carcasses were slaughtered in the late evening shifts in the public abattoirs in Hong Kong and refrigerated overnight before being loaded on the earliest ferry, they would arrive too late for the morning market which starts at 4 a.m..

Consequently, a system of distribution has been worked out among the local butchers. To ensure a reliable supply of live

pigs, a prominent merchant, Chan Chee, mentioned earlier, maintains a regular account with the Ng Foong Hong, the largest wholesale agent of Chinese livestock in Hong Kong. As the sole supplier/distributor on Cheung Chau, Chan makes all the arrangements for daily delivery and is required to extend a thirty-day credit to all his clients. Under the present system, pigs are brought in during the late afternoon, and then distributed among the butchers who slaughter them in the early dawn in time for the morning market.

The highly profitable position of Chan is made possible by his own financial resources. When additional finance is required, Chan borrows from the Chinese government-owned South Sea Bank on Cheung Chau, or seeks help from other merchants in the Tai Chung Transportation Company. Therefore, though the distribution of pigs is very much a monopoly of Chan, nevertheless it is also evident that the enterprise encompasses a set of social and economic relations involving the butchers and other left-wing merchants. For example, as the Ng Foong Hong only deals with regular clients and in sizable quantities far beyond the two or three pigs per day required by individual butchers, the local pork sellers often praised Chan during interviews and remarked that their business would be impossible without his help. It is not surprising that the butchers are strong supporters of the Mutual Improvement Association and the Commercial and Trading Union; they attend the monthly meetings and often make donations to defray administrative expenses.

To return to the left-wing merchant association, the Commercial and Trading Union is essentially dominated by the wealthy merchant

of the 'left-wing enterprises' which I have described. We can examine this by looking at the leadership structure of the Union.

Table 20. Leadership Structure of the Commercial and Trading Union, Cheung Chau Branch

<u>Chairman</u>	<u>Profession</u>	<u>Group Affiliations</u>
Leung Hin-chee	builder/merchant shareholder in Tai Chung Transportation Company	Rural Committee, Inhabitants' Mutual Improvement Association
<u>Vice-Chairman</u>		
Chu Pak-seng	merchant/property owner	Rural Committee, Residents' Association
<u>Executive Members</u>		
Chien Gan-chew	manager - cargo ferry	Inhabitants' Mutual Improvement Association
Kok Dai-fuk	merchant - fishing net and bait	Rural Committee, Inhabitants' Mutual Improvement Association
Yee Man	coffee shop owner/builder	Tung Kuan District Association Rural Committee Cheung Chau Chamber of Commerce
Chan Chee	part owner - cargo ferry/pork distributor	Inhabitants' Mutual Improvement Association

Other than co-operation in ventures like the cargo ferry company and the distribution of live pigs, the diverse group affiliations of the Union leaders must be noted. Some are elected village representatives in the Rural Committee,

though they are excluded from the Executive Committee which is, as I have suggested, controlled by the Chamber of Commerce. The present Vice-Chairmen of the Union, Chu Pak-Seng, is in fact the chairman of the now defunct Cheung Chau Residents' Association.

Chu's case is particularly interesting one. After their failure to gain control of the Rural Committee leadership in the first election in 1960, Chu and his supporters in the Residents' Association have been attempting to regroup. When, in 1975, permission was given by the District Office to the 'patriotic front' associations to enter the Rural Committee election, there was a transference *en masse* of the merchant leaders of the Residents' Association into the left-wing political bloc. In subsequent elections they were known as 'left-wing candidates' sponsored by the Mutual Improvement Association.

The nature of the left-wing merchant leadership poses some serious analytical questions. I have so far used the term 'left-wing merchants' almost unproblematically to distinguish them from the leaders in the Chamber of Commerce. However, given the ambiguity of the left-wing ideology - with its complex transformations - and the vital economic interests of the Union leaders in the community, the distinction between left-wing and right-wing merchants may indeed appear as theoretically superficial. Furthermore, there is the question of the relationship between the Union leaders and the men from the predominantly working class associations like the Marine Hawkers' Union and the Building Labourers' Guild. These issues are important ones because they have major implications for my conception of class and class relations. To resolve such

problems we need to focus on the development of the 'patriotic front' following the formation of the Commercial and Trading Union on Cheung Chau.

Class Relations and The Internal Fission of The 'Patriotic Front'

In February 1975 (a month after the formation of the Commercial and Trading Union) on the occasion of the Chinese new year, the Mutual Improvement Association held a small feast in the second floor reading room. Attended by all the important leaders of the left-wing associations, the gathering provided an opportunity to discuss various matters of common interest. During the meeting merchant leaders like Leung and Chan offered to contribute towards the monthly expenses of the Mutual Improvement Association and wanted the Union to play a greater role in the activities of the 'patriotic front'. The other major topic raised concerned the coming Rural Committee election in February of the following year. The Union proposed to present eight candidates under the sponsorship of the Mutual Improvement Association; their names were to be submitted to the District Office for approval. It was hoped that the leaders of various left-wing associations would exercise influence on their members to ensure the casting of appropriate votes.

Most of the proposals of the Union were accepted with much goodwill by all. There was a general feeling that the role of the Union would greatly enhance both the prestige and the organizational resources of the 'patriotic front'. However, some leaders raised certain objections to participation in the Rural

Committee election. The chairman of the Marine Hawkers' Union explained the situation during an interview :

I felt that we should not compete in the Rural Committee because it has never worked for the poor people of Cheung Chau. The Committee and the Chamber of Commerce only serve to carry face for the wealthy people; they are only interested in making money by selling and buying land. The Mutual Improvement Association has been formed to provide a *kai fong* for the working people. If we enter the election and join the Rural Committee, we will end up just as they (the right-wing merchants) are.

Nevertheless, inspite of the lengthy discussion, it was apparent that the prestige and economic success of leaders like Leung and Chan were making a strong impression on all present at the meeting.

At all events, the decision to sponsor left-wing candidates in the election was accepted without too many difficulties. As one informant related:

We did not want to cause too much conflict among our comrades. Without unity our work will be impossible. Uncle Leung is more educated and knowledgeable than us; so we trust him and are prepared to accept his suggestion.

This episode has considerable significance in terms of the process of political alignment on Cheung Chau. In the first place, it marks the beginning of the entry of the left-wing associations in the competition for legitimate political power under the approval and supervision of the District Office. In fact, just as in the previous decades candidates from the Chamber of Commerce and Residents' Associations competed against each other in the Rural Committee elections; nowadays competitions mainly occurs between representatives from the left-wing and

right-wing associations. With the support of the Mutual Improvement Association and other left-wing associations, Leung and others were successfully elected. In all, five left-wing village representative won seats in the general assembly, which they maintain until today. In addition, Leung was made a member of the executive committee holding the portfolio of trade and commerce though he lost the position in a subsequent election in February 1978.

Secondly, the emergence of the Commercial and Trading Union signaled the eventual shift in the control of the 'patriotic front' from working class leaders to left-wing merchants. Given the financial sponsorship by Leung and others and their influence and prestige as members of the powerful Rural Committee, the development is in a sense predictable. Following the success in the 1976 election there was increasing evidence that the left-wing merchants were - if only by necessity - moving in closer co-operation with the leaders of the Chamber of Commerce, particularly in the business of land prokerage, as I shall elaborate. It was this fact which, more than anything else, eventually alienated the working class leaders of the Marine Hawkers' Union and the Building Labourers' Guild from the 'patriotic front' as a whole. The disenchantment was brought about, as indicated by the statement quoted earlier, by the feeling that by entering the competition for prestige and influence with the Rural Committee, the 'patriotic front' could no longer truly respond to working class needs.

On April 1977 nine of the seventeen directors resigned from the Mutual Improvement Association. Ostensibly the

move was, in the words of the chairman of the Marine Hawkers' Union, 'to make way for the more educated people from the Commercial and Trading Union'. In a subsequent election for the Association leadership in December that year, Leung - who was one of the first directors - became the chairman; and the majority of the seats in the executive committee were occupied, as it is today, by men from the Commercial and Trading Union. Currently, at least at a superficial level, the working class-based associations, such as the Building Labourers' Guild and the Hoi Luk Fong District Association, continue to support the 'patriotic front'. They attend, as they did in the past, the monthly meeting of the Mutual Improvement Association, and contribute towards the occasional expenses of the Association. But more seriously, the withdrawing of the working class leaders from the Association executive committee has produced, in effect, a structural cleavage within the 'patriotic front' as a whole. Indeed, the emergent domination by the left-wing merchants centrally divides the constituting associations into, on the one side, the influential Commercial and Trading Union and the Mutual Improvement Association, and, on the other, the working class-based associations. Nevertheless, the relationship between the associations is best described as characterized by internal differences within a broader ideological unity. For what is evident is that the 'patriotic front' under the leadership of the Mutual Improvement Association continues to engage in the production of left-wing ideology. Yet, through the concurrence in the promotion of left-wing ideology, there is, at the same time, a gradual shift in the central emphasis of the activities of the 'patriotic front'.

I shall return to this shortly.

Analytically, I suggest that the internal fission of the 'patriotic front' has to be seen in the wider context of the apparent social and economic differences between the leaders and rank-and-file members of the left-wing associations. There are several aspects to this question.

Firstly, the structure of relations within the 'patriotic front' is inevitably shaped by economic interests of the left-wing merchants in the community. In fact, in certain areas the leaders of the Commercial and Trading Union stand in definite employer-employee relationship to the members of the left-wing associations. For example, many Hoklo labourers of the Hoi Luk Fong District Association are employed by the Tai Chung Transportation Company on the ferry dock, and others work in the construction business owned by the left-wing merchants.

Furthermore, in the meat trade on Cheung Chau, because of the powerful position of Chan as supplier there is a significant degree of patron-client relationship in his dealings with the local butchers. Relevant here also is the influence of the Union leaders in terms of their prestige and substantial contribution towards the finance and organization of the 'patriotic front'. Thus, it is clear that the nature of the economic relations must play an important part in the structuring of the domination of the 'patriotic front' by the left-wing merchants.

Thirdly, the social and economic differentiation among the leaders and members of the left-wing associations was enhanced by the development following the entry of the Union leaders to the Rural Committee. I refer to their increasing involvement

in the highly profitable land and real estate business. In a way, investment in shops and houses has always been an important part of the financial interests of the left-wing merchants; it provides a diversification of high economic return. By the time the Commercial and Trading Union was formed in 1965, leaders like Leung and Chan already owned, among other properties, flats on the prestigious Peak Road area and shop-houses in the town centre. In this context, the success of these men in the Rural Committee election is highly significant. On the one hand, their positions in the Rural Committee enable the left-wing leaders to further their activities in the business of land brokerage. On the other hand, and more generally, because of the need to attend to the various matters connected with the Rural Committee as well as that relating to land transactions, close co-operation and social interaction develops between the left-wing merchants and their counterparts in the pro-Taiwan Chamber of Commerce. In short, putting it simply, in spite of the ostensible ideological differences of these men, the Rural Committee provides an arena in which some of their common interests^s can be worked out.

To sum up, what I have described in fact is a situation among the leadership of the Rural Committee as a whole, of an overarching economic interest which contains an apparent division into left-wing and right-wing ideologies. This brings me back to the analytical questions I raised earlier. I suggest that it is through the concept of class or class relations, and above all, the contradiction in the left-wing associations that answers may be sought.

Class Relations and The Structural Contradiction of The 'Patriotic Front'

I emphasize that in using the term 'left-wing merchants' or *tso p'ai sheung jen*, I have followed the general usage on Cheung Chau. However, in addition to their expression of 'left-wing' ideology, another characteristic of the left-wing merchants can be noted. This is that some of the leaders of the Commercial and Trading Union are drawn from the defunct Cheung Chau Residents' Association. Most interesting of these men is probably Chu Pak-seng, vice-chairman of the Commercial and Trading Union. At the time of the first Rural Committee election in 1960, Chu was the Chairman of the Residents' Association, who had led the contest in opposition to the Chamber of Commerce. Unlike many of the leaders of the Association, Chu won a seat in the Rural Committee as village representative in the general assembly - a position he maintains to this day. As a wholesaler of the popular Dairy Lane ice-cream on Cheung Chau, and having inherited substantial property from his father, he is a man of considerable wealth and influence. For merchants like Chu, the emergence of the left-wing associations provides an opportunity to continue in the struggle for power in the community. To put it another way, because of the current political changes in Hong Kong, the involvement in the left-wing associations enables these men to accrue influence and political support without necessarily incurring a reputation for being subversive or anti-government.

This has major implication^s for my analysis. I argue that the division between the left-wing and right-wing merchants is best conceptualized as structural cleavage occurring within the merchant class itself. Indeed, from the discussion so far, it is clear that, in theoretical terms, the leaders of the two major merchant associations are structurally located within the same set of social, economic and political relations *vis-a-vis* the working class members on Cheung Chau. In other words, on the level of the socio-economic relations in the community, there is significant similarity in the positions of the left-wing and right-wing merchants. Let me elaborate.

I have already pointed out the involvement of the Commercial and Trading Union leaders in the lucrative real estate business and other commercial enterprises. If only because of these economic commitments, there is much concern over the continuing development of Cheung Chau. However, unlike the Chamber of Commerce which is in a position to deal directly with the District Office over matters regarding infrastructural improvements of the island, the Union leaders typically transform such concern within the framework of the left-wing ideology. Thus, as I have illustrated, there are major emphases on the promotion of trade with China, and more generally, the improvement of the welfare of the working class in the community. All these are relatively straight-forward.

More complex, however, is the issue of the ideological position of the left-wing merchants. In the earlier discussion,

I suggested that many of the Union leaders stand as employer - and in the case of the butchering trade, as financial capitalist - in relation to the workers and petty traders on Cheung Chau. These economic relations must be seen in conjunction with the wider structural inequality within the organization of the 'patriotic front' itself. Hence, the economic positions of the left-wing merchants in relation to the average members of the left-wing associations significantly shape - and are in the turn structured by - the ideological relations underlying the 'patriotic front' as a whole. In this connection, the dispensing of charities and the general emphasis on 'helping the poor' by the left-wing associations becomes rather critical.

In Chinese society the distribution of public charity has always been a major means of 'buying face', and of accruing status and political support for community leaders. Within the 'patriotic front' associations the financial patronage of merchant leaders like Chan and Chu is obviously significant in terms of the principles of Chinese cultural ideology. As in all local associations, the relationship between political leadership and community is often made to resemble that of a patri-filial relationship in accordance with the major principles of the 'patri-familial' cultural model. Just as economic paternalism of the parents contributes towards the structuring of parental control, the financial contributions of powerful leaders towards the expenses of these associations creates a similar relationship of dependency. What is involved, I suggest, is more than simply the the creation of social obligations among the ordinary

members, but more importantly, particular ideological relations within the 'patriotic front'. Again, emerging from the same cultural structures, the productions of ideology within the left-wing associations and by their right-wing counterparts essentially involve the same principles.

Thus my main point is a simple one. There are critical social, economic and ideological relations which result in a major structural cleavage within the 'patriotic front' associations. The entrance and increasing dominance of the 'leftist merchants' tends to deepen the cleavages not only within the leadership structure but also between the leadership and ordinary members. The withdrawal of the working class leadership constituted by the Marine Hawkers' Union and the Building Labourers' Guild has been directly brought about by the ensuing difficulties in defining the overall aims of the left-wing associations.

Hence, by looking at the nature of relations within the left-wing associations, it is possible to conceptualize the left-wing and right-wing leadership as structurally located within the same class. The question here is really the division within the merchant class itself. A class is never a homogeneous group of people. One of the insights of Poulantzas' class analysis in the area of 'conjuncture' is precisely that members of a class, because of the diverse socio-economic processes in which they are involved, will come to occupy different positions in the structure of relationship within the same class. In Cheung Chau we have seen the complex circumstances leading to the withdrawal of official sponsorship from the

Residents' Association. Furthermore, the realignment of the Association leadership and other merchants within the left-wing associations is made possible by the current transformation of the left-wing ideology in Hong Kong. Putting it simply, the deradicalization of left-wing politics obscures on the empirical level the clear distinction in the organizational aims of the left-wing and right-wing associations. Nevertheless, in Cheung Chau society major differences between the leadership of the 'patriotic front' and the powerful men of the Chamber of Commerce and the Rural Committee persist. Other than the denial of District Office sponsorship and the control of the temples and festivals, the left-wing leadership is imbued with significant ambiguities emerging from the contradiction in the pro-Chinese associations generally. More precisely, in spite of the increasing involvement in community affairs these men are still socially perceived as 'anti-government', a connotation which is not totally removed from the reputation of left-wing leadership. Indeed, as is evident from the discussion earlier, the continuing definition of the left-wing associations as 'anti-government' constitutes an effective ideological and political control by the District Office. No doubt the changes in the left-wing associations and the official policy in allowing their entry in the Rural Committee election are result of the response to the current developments in Hong Kong *vis-a-vis* the Mainland. Yet contradiction remains, instituted by government concern for for efficient administrative rule. The complex position of the left-wing associations and leadership, characterized by

improved legitimacy as well as effective official control, is a logical outcome.

Conclusion

Two central themes have run through the analysis in this chapter. The first concerned current developments in the colonial society *vis-a-vis* changes in Mainland China, bringing about crucial transformation of the pro-Peking left-wing associations in Hong Kong. The second concerned the impact on the realignment of community leadership in Cheung Chau of the formation of 'patriotic front' associations. Because of the significant involvement of labourers and fishermen in both the leadership and day-to-day activities, the associations offer, in a sense, an expression of working class interests in the community. The emergence of the essentially working class organizations in the context of colonial administration is an indication of the deradicalization of left-wing politics in the colony today.

The improvement in the legitimacy of the left-wing associations is evident in many ways. In contrast with the fifties and sixties, they not only participate in community affairs such as the distribution of charity but also take part in the competition for political influence by sponsoring candidates in the Rural Committee elections. However, the open involvement in community activities has to be seen together with the restrictive regulations which place the associations under effective government control. It is this juxtaposition of legitimacy and official restriction which produces a significant

contradiction in the ideology and organization of the pro-Chinese associations. But rather than labouring this point let me draw attention to the complex way in which official control is achieved.

Registration with the Registrar General and the supervision of the District Office are, of course, highly significant as means of formal control. However, as is the case with most aspects of government administration, the exercise of power by the government is more often disguised in the day-to-day relations in the community. I refer, in particular, to the shaping of the social definition of the nature of left-wing political aims and activities. In previous decades the industrial strikes and anti-government activities culminating in the riots of 1967, were sufficient to give the pro-Chinese organizations their 'clandestine' and 'subversive' reputations. By comparison, I suggest that the currently persisting 'anti-government' connotation of these organizations is more essentially the result of the attitude of the government. More precisely, it is the practice of labelling any organization as "detrimental" - however vaguely defined - to government interests, which explains the continuing disrepute of the left-wing associations.

In Cheung Chau this is played out in political relations in the community. In fact, the left-wing/right-wing distinction is socially perceived as corresponding to the category of favoured/disfavoured by the District Office. More concisely, the distinction is dependent upon whether an association receives or is denied of District Office sponsorship. It is this fact which enabled

informants to suggest, quite unproblematically, that the Chamber of Commerce, Wai Chiu Fu and the Rural Committee are "right-wing"; and the Commercial and Trading Union, Mutual Improvement Association and other organizations of the 'patriotic front' are "left-wing". The central issues here is the critical role of District Office in the structuring of community power and leadership. The granting of official patronage is always selective, so that status and influence is achieved by one group only at the expense of another. That is why the ambiguous position of the 'patriotic front' associations is invariably viewed by the local people by comparing them with the prestige and status of the government supported organizations like the Chamber of Commerce, the Rural Committee, and the Wai Chiu Fu.

In the process of political control, District Office sponsorship in effect determines the access to the key resources for the attainment of influence and even economic wealth in the community. Of major importance are : the control of the temples and festivals, opportunities in land brokerage and the social prestige of bureaucratic connections. Indeed, it is the denial of access to these resources which ultimately explains the impotence of the 'patriotic front' in dislocating the domination of community leadership constituted by the Chamber of Commerce.

The nature of administrative control - in this sense - is significant because it contributes to the major contradiction in the left-wing associations. It is this contradiction which has brought about the fission and internal difficulties of the 'patriotic front'. Within the wider context created by the policy

requirements of China, the left-wing associations have provided, to an extent, an expression of working class interests on Cheung Chau. However, nascent working class consciousness among the fishermen, labourers and industrial workers settling on the island, is significantly thwarted by government policy. The withdrawal of the working class leadership from the 'patriotic front' in effect makes possible the closer co-operation between the leaders of the Rural Committee and those of the left-wing associations. In a complex sense, the development of the 'patriotic front' further contributes to the making of class relations on Cheung Chau.

CHAPTER NINE

CONCLUSION AND FUTURE PROSPECTS

Introduction

In this study of the changing pattern of community leadership on Cheung Chau, I have focused on three historical periods of major structural change in the colonial society. These are: the 1890's i.e. the early years of colonial rule, the years following the Second World War and the 1970's which saw the normalization of relations with China.

For my analysis the historical approach has important advantages. For one thing, it enables me to demonstrate the complex fashion in which social and economic life in the island community has responded to, and is continuously being structured by, the wider changes of the colonial society. Furthermore, since the processes involved typically encompass the reordering of social, economic and ideological relationships, the approach makes it possible for me to draw some conclusions about class and class relations.

Above all, the mode of analysis has the virtue of focusing on the relations between the social groups or class as dynamic processes of transformation. For what is evident in changing class relations is not only the redistribution of economic resources, but also qualitative changes in the perception and definition of social prestige and power. A sufficient time-span is necessary in order to discuss the development of the socio-cultural characteristics between class groups. By taking

variables over time, I am able to test the general thesis about class and the nature of colonial rule.

What complicates the question of class, however, is the interconnectedness of economic and political, with cultural factors. Indeed, in Cheung Chau society cultural principles relating to kinship and ethnicity exert primary influence often above economic considerations in the ordering of social relationships. Furthermore, there is the salient fact that the struggle for power and influence in the community has always entailed the shifting control of the major temples and seasonal festivals. Consequently it is necessary, at one level, to locate the activities and behaviour under traditional cultural influence centrally in the analysis of class structuration. But, in the same context, an even more primary question has to be raised: in what sense is it possible to maintain that the community constitutes a social order based on class ?

Another important emphasis in this study is the critical role of the colonial administration in the making of power and class relations. I have identified the inherent contradiction in the policy of official sponsorship of community leadership. I have demonstrated also how the attempt to resolve such contradiction has produced - over the past decades - the changing pattern of local leadership from the Wong Wai Tsak Tong to the Residents' Association and the current Chamber of Commerce/Rural Committee.

My major point, of course, is that major administrative decision in the sponsorship of community leadership is itself influenced by the changes of the wider colonial society. In the

light of my central argument I shall attempt to make certain observations concerning possible future development in community leadership on Cheung Chau. I examine in particular the formation of the District Advisory Board. Still in its earliest stage of development, the DAB was introduced by the Hong Kong government in November 1977 to provide for a greater representation of the emerging class interests of the industrialists and white collar workers in the NT. The establishment of industrial and housing estates has had a significant impact on the social structure of the NT. The formation of the DAB is essentially designed to take account of the changing class structure brought about by the settlement of industrialists and professionals in the industrial new towns. Above all, the government is concerned with incorporating the new class interests in the local administration, especially with regard to the carrying out of vital development plans. Notably, the emergence of the DAB constitutes a part of the continuous process in the transformation of local leadership *vis-a-vis* broader economic changes. Not surprisingly, as I point out, there is considerable resentment among the Heung Yee Kuk and the Rural Committees against the government move to provide the DAB with increasing influence and financial support.

Finally, on a more theoretical note, I attempt to extend general marxist notions about ideology; in particular, that of mystification and fetishism. Essentially, following Althusser, I argue that ideology cannot be conceptualized as a mere reflection of objective socio-economic realities. Instead, it is necessary to see ideology - its central values

and institutions - as serving a crucial political function, thus constituting part of the vital conditions for the reproduction of structural domination.

In other words, the formation of 'fetished appearances' and its consequences, are central aspects of the overall political processes. An important question that needs to be considered is how does ideology achieve its effects of mystification. The masking of the 'real' nature of social relations is never a simple process; but operates in the very constitution of social relationships. Hence, it seems inevitable that we need to examine the role of ideology in the shaping of human consciousness. Without venturing into the area of psychology, the concept of culture offers some of the solutions to the problem. In the way I define it, culture is first of all a set of resources (rules) for the production and reproduction of ideology. Nevertheless, since culture operates structurally in the shaping of human behaviour and practices, ideological production also involves an unconscious process in the particular 'uses' of culture. Like Barthes (1972) and Giddens (1979) I tend to see an intricate connection between culture and the reproduction of ideology. The approach, as I hope to make clear, not only resolves some of the major problems relating to the legitimacy of ideology, but also highlights the complex fashion in which mystification and fetishism are achieved, and operate in social life.

Class and Class Consciouness

In its orthodox conception class is primarily defined and understood by the structure of economic relationship^s. Throughout this study however I have examined the close connection between economic relationships and the articulation of non-economic structures. This being the case, when discussing the relationship between the shopkeepers, the leaders of the Wong Wai Tsak Tong, the fishermen and labourers, in what sense can I call them classes?

The first difficulty that comes to mind is the significance of ethnicity and kinship in the social life of Cheung Chau. Take the case of the Chiu Chow merchants, for example. It is doubtful if they can be called a class when their prestige, and their authority over the Hoklo fishermen is primarily derived from the political allegiance based on a common ethnic bond. Even for the fishermen who have joined the 'patriotic front' associations, many still maintain their membership in the Wai Chiu Fu and the Chiu Chow Association; and they certainly do not necessarily see their relationship with the Chiu Chow leaders as one of conflict or hostility.

The second difficulty in assigning class positions to any group of people is due to the fact that economic and non-economic institutions on Cheung Chau are often clearly separated¹. With

¹ Obviously the local *shê t'uan* or associations are tied in with certain 'economic processes' in the mode of organization, e.g. the distribution of charities, financial patronage of the prominent leaders. But they are not economic institutions in that they are not directly engaged in production and circulation of goods and services.

the exception of the land-owning Wong Wai Tsak Tong, important local institutions such as district associations, the temple committees and the Rural Committee are primarily political and cultural in origin and function. Hence it is possible, when discussing the structure of relations in the community, to make the sociological distinction between class and status.

The central issue here is really the resilience of culture in the context of social and economic change. Or putting the point more strongly, cultural perceptions about status and prestige are capable of being transformed, and continue to operate in a situation in which social relations are increasingly being structured in class terms. What is critical is the vital connection between the changing emphasis in the definition of status and the nature of economic relations, particularly in reference to the accumulation and uses of wealth. In short, we need to examine the way in which social status and influence stems from, and is related to, the shift in property relations and the control of key economic resources in the community. This, as we have seen, has been the central focus of my analysis. Indeed, the specialization of roles in local institutions is to a large extent related to the historical development of Cheung Chau.

In describing the impact of colonialism of African tribal society, especially those with centralized political authority, Fallers (1964)² emphasizes the increasing differentiation of

² Faller's main argument is that in centralized African tribal societies, the structure of stratification and sources and evaluation of prestige and status were politically rather than economically based.

roles, and the separation of the economic from other social and political institutions. In a sense similar processes have taken place on Cheung Chau with the arrival of British rule. The most dramatic example is notably the case of the land-owning Wong Wai Tsak Tong. The significance of the traditional dominance of the lineage organization is precisely that it was based on a series of economic and socio-cultural factors. The basis of the influence of the Tong was built upon economic control (through the system of land tenure), as well as upon connections with the powerful gentry-literati class. The colonial takeover and the subsequent reforms in land tenure had the effect of disrupting the traditional foundation of the community power structure. Instead, in the overall reorganization, local leadership became a specialized institution with a clearly defined role and responsibilities in the system of government administration.

The structural differentiation and creation of new roles culminated in the development of capitalist economic relations on which the social order of Cheung Chau is now ultimately based. The structure of relations in the community today can be described as capitalist for at least two reasons.

In the first place, the current construction boom has transformed the displaced fishermen into wage labourers, putting them in a worker/employer relationship with merchant land-holders. With the high demand for construction labourers, the recruitment of such a work force has become a developed 'factor market'. As a consequence, workers are able to operate outside the normal influence of personal and kinship ties in bidding for the

most favourable wages between the offers of the alternative construction sites.

Secondly, there is the structure of the relationship between the immigrant workers and the merchant class. Looking at the colonial economy as a whole, the role of the merchant class is twofold. The merchants serve as distributors of goods produced by the metropolitan economy; and they organize the provision of housing and other social amenities for the industrial workers who have settled on the island. Now, in marxian terms³, as both of these activities do not involve further injections of labour in the final products - be they consumer goods or housing - the undertakings of the merchant class are basically unproductive, and constitute an important aspect of the overall appropriation of surpluses (exploitation) in the capitalist mode of production.

In Cheung Chau society today capitalist economic relations have produced a structure of inequality that has little counterpart in the pre-colonial society. Moreover, this is achieved in the context of the continuing relevance of traditional values and practices in Chinese culture. Therefore, to return to my earlier discussion, the key question about class and class relations is not so much the intervening cultural conceptions about prestige status. More critically, it is that of the perpetuation of class structure; the complex question of the reproduction of class

³ The activities of the merchant class, in terms of marxian economics, involve the sphere of circulation rather than production. Following from the labour theory of value, only capital in the sphere of production is capable of being increased in value. The circulation sphere only increases the value of goods in monetary terms through the exchange of money for labour power, raw material and after production, for the sale of final products. A good discussion of the distinction between productive and unproductive labour can be found in Gough 1972.

domination. That is, we have to see how the control of key economic resources and the means of cultural-ideological domination is reproduced through time, and the role of culture in this process.

Thus, as I have illustrated, the economic power of the merchant class is maintained through the accumulation of capital and diversification from commercial enterprise. Given the current development of Cheung Chau, the chief means open to the merchants is the real estate business. It enables them to reinvest surpluses from commerce and to attain a degree of wealth far above the majority of the population⁴.

Turning to the sphere of culture, it is perhaps obvious that economic success and social status are mutually related. On the one hand, accumulated property confers prestige on its owners. Indeed, as I have argued throughout, property and economic control are transmuted into means of perpetuating the very positions of the merchant class - through contributions towards charity, financial sponsorship of district associations and above all, support of the temples and community festivals. On the other hand, in Chinese society there are important cultural concepts which legitimize the economic benefits accruing from ones social and political position. The land brokerage activities of

⁴ Other than investment in real estate, another means of reproducing the positions of the merchant class is through education. In fact investment in children's education transmits both the status and economic resources (in the form of earning power) to the later generations. There is much concern among the prominent merchants on Cheung Chau to enroll their children in better schools in Hong Kong and Kowloon after the primary level. Some have made it to the universities.

the Rural Committee men for example, have risen out of the political and cultural context in which colonial administration must invariably operate.

Hence, the major theme I have taken up in this study is that capitalist relations of production have left largely intact the traditional conceptions of social status. But my emphasis is stronger than that. I argue that the perpetuation of class relations and the concomitant structural inequality is vitally dependent upon the reproduction of traditional values regarding ethnicity and the family, for example. In fact, it is the key cultural concepts operating in the social relationships in the community which produce, in a sense, the congruence between economic class and status groups.

Finally, there is the issue of class consciousness. Obviously one cannot discuss the structure of inequality based on class without considering the development of class consciousness. Yet my emphasis on cultural reproduction seems to point the analysis in the opposite direction: how culture mystifies the conflict in class relations and helps to nullify the emergence of class consciousness among the working class. A solution to the problem, I suggest, is to see class consciousness in terms of relative degree of clarity and development in the way class interests are perceived by people. Following Giddens, it is necessary to draw a distinction between 'class awareness' and 'class consciousness':

We may say that, in so far as class is a structured phenomenon, there will tend to exist a common awareness and acceptance of similar attitudes and beliefs, linked to a common style of life, among the members of the class. 'Class awareness',

as I use the term here, does not involve a recognition that these attitudes and beliefs signify a particular class affiliation, or the recognition that there exist other classes, characterised by different attitudes, beliefs, and styles of life; 'class consciousness', by contrast, as I shall use the notion, does imply both of these (1973: 111).

In other words, it is possible to think of class consciousness as forming a continuum of levels of development: from the elementary 'class awareness'⁵ to the radical 'revolutionary class consciousness':

The most undeveloped form of class consciousness is that which simply involves a conception of class identity and therefore class differentiation. This can be distinguished from a level of consciousness which involves a conception of class conflict: where perception of class unity is linked to a recognition of opposition of interest with another class (*ibid*: 112).

The virtue of Giddens' formulation is that it enables one to identify the level or type of class consciousness arising from given conditions of class relations, produced by a particular mode of class structuration. In Cheung Chau society, for example, the structuring of class domination involves complex ideological enterprises; such processes typically entail the mobilization of the key structures of Chinese culture. Cultural reproduction of ideology, in this sense, has the effect of creating the 'mystification of consensus' among the local population. The sponsorship of ritual life by the community leaders consequently glosses over the social and economic differences existing within the various

⁵ As the most undeveloped form of class consciousness, class awareness "may take the form of a denial of the existence or reality of class. Thus the class awareness of the middle class, in so far as it involves beliefs which place a premium upon individual responsibility and achievement, is of this order" (Giddens 1973: 111).

segments of the community. Indeed, it is this 'mystification' which undermines emerging consciousness of 'class unity' among the fishermen and labourers, and correspondingly, the recognition of the opposition of interests against the merchant class and perhaps the colonial government. The failure of the Patriotic Front is more essentially the failure of the evolvement of 'class awareness' into true 'class consciousness'. At any rate, the limitation of radical consciousness among the working class on Cheung Chau testifies to the history of elaborate government control and regulations, processes that receive significant impetus from the current development in China.

The Nature of Colonial Administration: Contradiction and The Sponsorship of The Local Power Structure

The process of class structuration has always featured the predominant role of the colonial government. To put it simply, the District Office effectively determines the structure of local power and influence by upholding the prestige of local leadership, making it an integral part of the administration. Essentially, the official policy, which emphasizes the preservation of the traditional social order and institutions, represents a significant transformation of the wider principles of Indirect Rule. However, the policy of sponsoring local institutions and leadership is never applied *in abstracto*, but takes into account the prevailing socio-economic circumstances. As a result, it comes to constitute a highly dynamic process in the selective granting of

official patronage, and the transferring of government support from one interest group to another.

The method of Indirect Rule, laid down by Lord Lugard, was later modified under Sir Donald Cameron during his tenure of governorship in Nigeria. He pronounced:

There must be a native authority genuinely accepted by the people, who are ready to obey it because its practice is in accord with their traditions and customs. The prestige and influence of the native authorities can be best upheld by letting the peasantry see that the Government itself treats them as an integral part of the machinery of the Administration (*The Colonial Problem* 1937: 260-1).

The integration of local power structure within the system of administration quite simply meant that such leadership was guided and at times radically transformed in accordance with the needs of the colonial government. From the government's point of view, the 'native authority' must be placed under some form of political control and above all, had to be continuously restructured so as to provide for the representation of emerging class interests. Thus, in the case of the Native Authorities established in British Africa, for example, as one study concludes,

Unless administration is in the hands of educated chiefs, the pace of advance will be slow, and the younger educated natives will rebel against a system which provides insufficient scope for their newly acquired knowledge and compels their conformity with a custom they hold to be obsolete (*ibid*:259).

In the context of Cheung Chau, the difficulties in the government policy of local sponsorship can be conceptualized in terms of a contradiction. Stating it briefly, contradiction can

be located at the level where local leadership, nurtured under District Office support, tends to develop new sources of influence and politico-economic interests which may not coincide with those of the government. The withdrawal of official recognition from the Cheung Chau Residents' Association, for instance, was in part due to significant malpractices unacceptable to the colonial administration. More particularly, there was a need to curb the continuing influence of the Wong Wai Tsak Tong dominating the Association leadership and to reorganize the *kai fong* in order to accommodate the rising merchant class interests. However, difficulties in local leadership are by no means easily overcome, so that the restructuring of the community leadership by the District Office becomes a continuous process which exhibits a recognizable pattern. More recently, the land brokerage activities of the Rural Committee men have been made possible through their connections with the District Office and other levels of the government bureaucracy. The consequence is to create significant problems in the administration of land. What is particularly important in this context is the socio-economic transformation taking place in the NT today, which requires the reordering of the influence of the Heung Yee Kuk and the Rural Committees. I shall return to this shortly.

These difficulties essentially arise from what may be called the 'entrenchment' of local leadership. By 'entrenchment' I refer to the increasing structuring (solidification) of community leadership in the order of power relations, both in terms of ideological production and the actual exercise of political influence. The deepening of local influence is made

possible by a series of factors. Firstly, there is the existing social and political dominance further enhanced by government patronage; secondly, the concomitant prestige and social status which is often convertible into opportunities to acquire personal economic gains; and finally, as part of the 'prizes' of official sponsorship, the control of temples and festivals critical for the production of ideology. At the same time, it needs to be emphasized that 'entrenchment' in this sense takes place in the wider context in which local leadership already commands significant social and economic control based on its position in the structure of class relations. The process therefore constitutes a central aspect of class structuration in the overall reproduction of the structure of inequality.

At the same time, it is essential to draw attention to the particular time-span in which the 'entrenchment' of the local power structure and leadership is achieved. In other words, in the context of continuous social and economic transformation the process of 'entrenchment' will over time reach a point at which it comes in direct conflict with the emerging structure of class relations. This was precisely the situation in Cheung Chau society in the post-war years. The enduring influence of the Wong Wai Tsak Tong, constituted by its gentry-literati origin, created a major structural ^a cleavage in the community between the continuing political domination of the traditional sources of power and prestige, and the emerging economic power of the merchant class. This lacuna in the linkage between political power and economic influence invariably produced a serious contradiction in the structure of class relations on the island. It was the response

to this contradiction which resulted in the transfer of District Office sponsorship from the Residents' Association to the Chamber of Commerce and later to the Rural Committee.

The transfer of government sponsorship is the most obvious means of reordering the power of local leadership. On the one hand, suppression of the older power structure is achieved by the withdrawal of official support on which local influence ultimately depends. At the same time, a new set of relationships and bureaucratic connections is created with the rising class interests. Thus, the shifting District Office sponsorship of local leaders during the past decades on Cheung Chau really suggests a series of wider issues : the contradiction in the principle of colonial rule, the changing structure of class relations, and the transformation of the colonial society. It is in this sense that I have argued that the changing pattern of community leadership is historically constituted. With this in mind, it is especially interesting to have a look at the District Advisory Board recently established in the NT.

Class Structure and the Formation of the District Advisory Board

The establishment of the District Advisory Board⁶ in each of the seven districts of the NT was first announced by the Governor in October, 1977. The functions of the Board as pronounced by the government are remarkably similar to those of the Rural Committee:

The role of the boards ... is to advise the government on matters affecting the well-being of the communities. Each board is allocated funds by the government to enable it to make minor environmental improvements and to promote recreational and cultural activities on a local basis. The boards also give advice to the government on the public works programme as it affects each district (Hong Kong 1979: 244)

Thus the DAB is, like the Rural Committee, a body of local consultation which assists in the government administration of the NT. Nevertheless there are notable differences between the two bodies. Compared with the Rural Committee which receives a small sum each month to cover clerical expenses, the Board is

⁶ The DAB is the culmination of the government's attempt to apply the system of local consultation operating in the NT to the metropolitan area. Following the riots of 1966 and 1967, government findings suggested the lack of communication between the people and the administration as the main cause of confrontation. In order to set up a form of liaison which would explain government policy to the public, the City District Office Scheme was established. According to a government report, the major purpose of the scheme was to find a 'regionalised, approachable local manifestation of the central government' in the form of the 'political functions' of the District Officers in the NT. See The City District Officer Scheme, A Report by the Secretary for Chinese Affairs, January 1969.

subsidized in the form of an annual grant; for the DAB of the Islands District this amounted to \$300,000 in 1978. Some of the grant is to be spent on sports events and other communal activities. But by far the largest portion is allocated for small scale development projects, such as the building of roads, bridges and the maintenance of existing facilities. The DAB is empowered to approve and directly finance such projects costing under \$100,000 without referring to the NT Administration. Involvement in the planning and carrying out of public works projects is probably the most important role of the DAB. Other than offering suggestions regarding possible improvements in local facilities, the DAB works closely with the District Office in supervising minor construction projects that fall outside the undertakings of the Public Works and the Urban Services Departments.

Unlike the Rural Committee, members of the DAB are not elected but consist of three categories of people: government officials, chairmen of the Rural Committees, and those appointed by the government from the communities. The DAB of the Islands District, for example, has a membership of twenty-five constituted by the following:-

Table 21. Membership of the District Advisory Board-Islands District

<u>Official members</u>	<u>Numbers</u>
From the District Office:	
a) District Officer - as Chairman	1
b) Secretary	1
Appointed from government departments	6
Education Department	2
Department of Social Works	1
Urban Services Department	1
	<hr/>
Total :	12
	--
 <u>Unofficial members</u>	
Chairmen of the Rural Committees	8
Justices of Peace	3
Cheung Chau Youth Service Group	1
Peng Chau Chamber of Commerce	1
	<hr/>
Total :	13
	--

As indicated by its composition, two major aspects of the DAB are worthy of emphasis. Firstly, the District Officer, as Chairman, has the final say in adopting any resolution or proposal emerging from the DAB meeting. Indeed, together with other official members, the District Officer exercises major influence in the DAB in the district under his jurisdiction. This is especially important in the allocation of fund for community projects. For constructions costing more than \$100,000, it is the duty of the District Officer to refer the case to the NT Administration and to offer suggestions regarding their ultimate

feasibility relating to the overall development of the area.

At the same time, the fact of government control has to be seen concurrently with the stipulation that the number of unofficial members must exceed that of the official members. In the spirit of 'official and community co-operation', it is hoped that the presence of non-official members will give greater weight to local representation. But is never intended that they will be able to veto the final decisions of the government.

The last feature concerns the origins of the unofficial members themselves. Other than the chairmen of the Rural Committees, they consist of teachers, doctors, lawyers and above all, industrialists who have established factories in the area. In other words, the composition of the unofficial members tends to reflect the class structure - and the nature of economic and industrial development - of the district. In the Islands District, because of the emphasis on housing rather than industrial establishments, Rural Committee chairmen and professionals predominate. But, by contrast, the DAB's in highly urbanized industrial areas have proportionally larger numbers of unofficial members. There are, for example, 20 unofficial members in the Tsuen Wan DAB⁷; those in the Yuen Long and Tai Po Districts each

⁷ The case of Tsuen Wan is especially notable. The government encourages the many civic activities organized by the local leaders. In 1973 there was the Fight Crime Campaign, and by 1976 more than a hundred Mutual Aid Committees had been formed. It is from these bodies that the membership of the DAB is mainly recruited. One of the two Assistant District Officers is occupied with liaison with these organizations.

has 15 unofficial members. In these districts the large numbers of appointees among the industrialists and professional class are likely to outrank the representatives of the Rural Committees.

The significance of the DAB can now be stated. What is evident is that the formation of the DAB has stemmed from the need to widen the basis of local representation in the government administration. The industrialization and settlement of workers means that in the NT communities social structures are rapidly changing such that an increasing number of people fall outside the established scope of influence of the Rural Committees. This development invariably suggests the need to incorporate the emerging class interests - of the industrial capitalists and of the white-collar workers - in the system of administration. Thus, in a sense, the formation of the DAB is partly designed to curb some of the traditional influence of the Rural Committee. In this connection, it is interesting to note that the government has repeatedly given the assurance that the "boards are not intended to dispense with long established channels of communication with rural people, but to broaden the consultative process at a time of rapid urbanization" (Hong Kong 1979: 244). For its part, the merchant class dominating the Heung Yee Kuk and the Rural Committees is viewing the government support of the DAB with some degrees of anxiety⁸.

⁸ Even before the formation of the DAB, some of the traditional responsibilities of the Rural Committee were being taken over by such organizations as the District Advisory Committee which advises the Town Manager. The Heung Yee Kuk had argued at times that the decisions taken by the District Advisory Committee should be passed over to the Kuk for consideration before implementation.

The danger is simply one of being replaced and perhaps made redundant by the DAB, as the Heung Yee Kuk explains:

... there is at present no conflict between the boards and the Kuk.

They represent different areas. The board's existence is owed to the public housing estates and Government projects while the Kuk's purpose is to represent villagers.

But in the future, when the people we represent have diminished in number because of development, who will we represent? (South China Morning Post July 13, 1978)

The establishment of the DAB is, in short, vitally connected with the rapid transformation of the NT today. The continuing influence of the Rural Committees in the context of increasing industrial development inevitably produces major contradictions in the structure of social and economic relationships. Inevitably, such contradictions will result in significant difficulties in the government administration of the NT. . . . Evoking my earlier argument, the 'entrenchment' of the merchant class is evident in many ways: the control of the temples and festivals, the domination of the local associations', and the control of commerce and real estate. For the government, the problem of the 'entrenchment' of the Rural Committee is one of particular urgency in view of the realignment of the major class interests in the NT today. Inevitably, the views of the industrialists and professionals, whose social and economic commitment in the NT new towns like Tsuen Wan and Shatin is increasingly evident, must be consulted in the planning and execution of government development plans. The formation of the DAB represents, in short, an attempt - still at the beginning of a continuous process - to resolve the inherent difficulties in the policy of official sponsorship of the local power structure.

Theoretical Note: Fetishism, Mystification and The Role of Ideology
in Capitalism

The idea of fetishism is crucial in Marx's scientific analysis of the source of value, and the process of exploitation in the capitalist mode of production. The key passage is, of course, the section in Chapter I of *Capital*, volume I, entitled 'The Fetishism of Commodities'⁹. Here Marx argues that fetishism reveals itself in essentially two ways. Firstly, it is manifested in the division of surplus value into profit, rent and interest, which gives rise to the 'Trinity Formula' of liberal economics. According to this formula, there are three sources of value : land, labour and capital, from which are derived the respective forms of income - rent, wages (profit is defined as 'wages of management') and interest. Thus, in a kind of intellectual trick of confidence, the real source of value - labour - is concealed.

Secondly, and in a broader sense, fetishism refers to the masking of the appearance of commodities as they are, the product of social labour. Instead they appear as things whose origin and function is dependent, not upon the social relations of production, but on the mutual interrelationships between capitalists and workers as agents of production.

In essence, therefore, fetishism in the capitalist market world involves the constitution of 'the appearance of value' which displays to the agents of production precisely the opposite of its real nature. In other words, the fetishistic or illusionary appearance constitutes a representation independent of the real

⁹ See Marx 1970: 71-84; also Marx 1971: 81 ff.

social and economic relations. When capital is fetishised in the consciousness of the agents of production, Marx explains:

The value here is like an automatic substance endowed with its own life. ... In short, the value seems to have acquired the occult quality of being able to add value to itself ... (1970: 154).

It is Marx's formulation of fetishism which gave rise to the most important notion in the modern conception of ideology. This is the approach which views ideology as basically concealing and masking real relationships in a social formation. Moreover, because of the fetishistic nature of ideology it is therefore possible to make the distinction between the essence of a structure of relations and the illusionary phenomenal form in which it appears.

There are considerable difficulties, as I have argued, in the essence/phenomenon distinction underlying the sociological conception of ideology. A most elaborate re-examination of the whole question is given by Althusser in his *Reading Capital* (Althusser and Balibar 1968). For Althusser, the problem is first and foremost one of epistemology. Essentially he attacks the classical conception in which a phenomenon is regarded as a subjective veil of illusion that can be separated from reality. In social science, he points out, the essence/phenomenon distinction becomes the basis of the empiricist approach according to which the hidden essence can be immediately understood by the 'informed gaze' through the subjective illusion.

Althusser's rejection of the treatment of ideology as a

veil of illusion leads him to consider the objective role ideological forms play in a social formation¹⁰:

An ideology is a system (with its own logic and rigour) of representations (images, myths, ideas or conceptions, depending on the case) endowed with a historical existence and role within a given society (1965: 231).

In other words, its historicity and function in the constitution of social relations represent the critical features of an ideology. Operating through, and constituted by the complex symbolic and cultural representations, ideology no longer simply conceals the structure of social relations. More importantly, by articulating relations in diverse aspects of social and economic life, ideological forms become a part of the necessary conditions for the reproduction of the mode of production (Geras 1971).

This has major implications for the conception of mystification. More particularly, we have to direct attention not only to the way mystification is pervasively structured in social perceptions and practices, but also to the shaping of the very processes in which social-economic relations are constituted. Since the masking effect is necessary for the reproduction of a social formation, mystification must, in a sense, create conditions in which the real structure of relations is both presented and concealed at the same time. Thus, the mystified character of social relations emerges from something far more complex than the manipulation of the capitalists in fooling the workers, for example. As Godelier has suggested, echoing Marx,

¹⁰ In this Althusser is in agreement with other marxist writers like Lukacs 1971 and Korsch 1970.

It is not man who deceives himself, it is reality which is deceiving him, by inevitably appearing in a concealed form in the spontaneous awareness of people living in the market world (1977:159).

On the whole, Althusser emphasizes both the mystified and mystifying features of ideology, and relates these to the problem of reproduction. The formulation presents a significant contribution to the conception of ideology. But certain problems remain. In order to further refine Althusser's approach, we need to consider, first of all, the exact location of ideology in the system of cultural signification. Furthermore, there is the question of the mystifying character of ideology: the way ideology achieves its effects of mystification. To these questions I shall now turn.

Culture and the Mystification of Consensus

To argue that ideology operates as a necessary condition for the reproduction of social relations is to suggest the role of ideology in the constitution of power and domination. Mystification in this context no longer refers to the operation as a metaphor disguising class relations, nor it is merely reflecting objective social conditions. In emphasizing the political functions of ideological forms and their relation to power and domination, it is important to avoid the reductionist pitfall of collapsing all symbolic field^s into the field of social relations. It is for this reason that the idea of relative

autonomy or specificity of ideology is immediately critical. My overall approach has been to analyse the internal relations of the classifications of ideological form or model. Yet, in my argument the rules of classification - their transformation and combination - are not significant in themselves except in the way they are historically located.

Rather, I argue that the creation of mystification and of fetishistic forms must be analysed in terms of two fields of synthesis : the structural and the historical. The problem as I see it is to bridge the study of symbolic systems of culture and that of their political functions. The central spirit of my analysis is that of Bourdieu and Barthes. For Bourdieu it is as 'structured and structuring structures' that symbolic systems fulfil their ideological rôle as instruments of political domination (1977). For Barthes 'fragments of ideology' like linguistic systems are but one articulating form of the wider field of sign systems in a culture¹¹. His *Mythologies* (1972) is a seminal treatment of the relationship between cultural signification and ideology. Like Barthes, and in contrast with Kapferer (1980), I tend not to draw distinctions between ideology and cultural ideology. Since ideology is as a rule constituted by cultural structures it is by its very nature 'cultural' in

¹¹ Barthes inverts the proposition of Saussure who see signi-systems as a part of the science of linguistics. Barthes' semiotics provides a scheme by which the symbolic or signifying systems of a culture can be systematically analysed. His approach is outstanding in that he is interested in mapping the various forms or articulations of culture, rather than merely discovering the rules by which signification takes place. *Myth Today* (1972b), in spite of its tentative exploration, remains one of the few studies which examine the relationship between cultural signification and ideology.

both its form and its structuring of (mystified) social relations. The production of ideological models and the constitution of social practices through particular 'uses' of culture, as we have seen, has been critical in my concept of ideological transformation. These two aspects of the ideological enterprise are worthy of elaboration, especially in relation to the process of mystification.

The key question is how culture is able to achieve fetishist social relations: the mystified yet 'lived' relations in social life. The answer lies, first of all, in the creation of 'voluntary and spontaneous consent', as Gramsci would have put it.

Gramsci gives considerable attention to the formation of ideology at the 'lowest level': the accumulation of popular 'knowledges' as means of dealing with everyday life, what he calls 'common sense' (1971). Common-sense thinking, he argues, is typically eclectic, building up from earlier ideologies and the contradictory ideas from different social classes without the awareness of the social agents¹². It is this lack of a 'consciousness of historicity' and hence of a self-knowledge which explains the parochialism ('subversivism') of the masses¹³:

¹² Gramsci wrote: '(Common sense) ... is strangely composite; it contains elements from the Stone Age and principles of a more advanced science, prejudices from all past phases of history at the local level and intuitions of a future philosophy which will be that of the human race united the world over' (1972: 324).

¹³ Gramsci gave such examples as the popular notion of 'human nature' which discounts the feasibility of change, and 'naturalises' the given social order (*ibid*: 355).

Not only does that people have no precise consciousness of its own historical identity it is not even conscious of the ... exact limits of its adversary. There is a dislike of officialdom - the only form in which the State is perceived (*ibid*272-3)

Most importantly, the absence of 'historical awareness' in 'common sense' is expressed in the emergence of corporate consciousness (an aspect of corporativism) between the ruling bloc and the masses (*ibid*:325). This as we have seen is central in his conception of hegemony. By that term he implies not only the lack of 'historical consciousness' in 'common sense', but also - and related to it of course - the perception of common interests between the ruling power and the dominated in the organization of 'spontaneous consent' (*ibid*: 161).

These two aspects of the formation of 'mystified' common sense are vital features in my analysis of the ideological production on Cheung Chau. Following the insight of Gramsci (not to speak of Althusser, Barthes and Bourdieu), I place cultural and religious activities critically at the centre of the structuring of class relations. Why, for example, do ideological transformations engaged in by the colonial government as well as by the various social classes typically involve the key structures of Chinese culture? Perhaps among all ideological forms, the principles of the patri-familial cultural model - the idea of filial piety, and the moral priority of parental authorities, etc. - are regarded as the very foundation of Chinese culture. Indeed, compliance to these ethical rules comes to be defined as fundamental for 'being Chinese' itself. A notable outcome is that cultural ideas and practices relating to the patri-filial relationship are perceived as beyond

sectional interests and social and economic differences, and come to constitute the sacred symbolic order on which the continuity of Chinese society depends.

In the creation of mystified relations, the effects of cultural reproduction of ideology - in this sense - are notably powerful. More precisely, it produces a 'fetishist common ground' between the government and the community, and between the difference classes. What is notable is the complexity in which the idea of 'common interest' is being argued and presented as the rationalization of the structural inequality in Cheung Chau society. Thus, the nature of colonial rule which depends on the fostering of local institutions is mystified as the official concern over the 'preservation of the traditional customs and way of life'. The dispensing of charities by local leaders and government public projects is invariably accompanied by such ideological emphases as 'promoting community welfare', and 'for the interest of the Cheung Chau people'.

The appeal to common interest, as Gramsci has stressed, is a crucial means of achieving the 'mystification of consensus'. However, there is an added dimension to my argument. This is that the ideological emphases of the colonial government and the local leadership constitute structural transformations of the patri-familial principle in Chinese culture. In this way, the ideological 'usages' of cultural structures create a form of 'fetishist' relations that not only highlights 'consensus' between the classes, but also has a highly legitimating force.

The issue of legitimation, I argue, is critical in the

cultural analysis of the mystification of 'spontaneous consent'.

As Giddens puts it,

To analyse the ideological aspects of symbolic orders ... is to examine how structures of significations are mobilised to legitimate the sectional interests of hegemonic groups (1979: 188).

To put it crudely perhaps, mystification must entail creating an ideological understanding which perceives the persisting structure of inequality as 'lawful, proper and regular'. It is cultural structures in the production of ideology which achieve this - a point implicit in Barthes discussed earlier. Culture is able to do this by providing ideology with a degree of specificity; so that ideological forms are perceived as transcending social and economic differences. Indeed, in Cheung Chau society, for example, the key principles of patri-familial relations are regarded as cultural and moral values binding on the poor and rich alike, connecting the community with the history of the Chinese people as a country and a race.

Culture Ideology and Social Practices: The Conscious and The Unconscious

The second issue relating to the problems of fetishism and mystification is the effect of ideology in the constitution of social practice.

The dialectics of cultural signification and social practices - central in the marxist analysis of praxis - recently

received a treatment of considerable sophistication by Giddens (*op. cit.*). Briefly, he tries to arrive at a sociological theory which accounts for both the structural qualities of practices operating through time, and the intentional 'calculative' human action in the mobilization of structures of cultural signification. The analysis therefore incorporates the 'structural constancies' underlying all practices in a social system as well as social change as structured process. The theory of structuration, he explains,

... involves that of the duality of structure, which relates to the fundamentally recursive character of social life, and expresses the mutual dependence of structure and agency. By the duality of structure I mean that the structural properties of social systems are both the medium and the outcome of practices that constitute those systems. The theory of structuration, thus formulated, rejects any differentiation of synchrony and diachrony or statics and dynamics. ... (Structure) is both enabling and constraining (*op. cit.*: 69).

Another way of examining the process of structuration, as Giddens points out, is to see it as involving both a conscious and an unconscious element. The conscious refers to "the reflective monitoring and rationalization of conduct, grounded in practical consciousness" (*ibid*: 58) or quite simply, the intentional 'strategic' act of social agents. In my analysis, the operation of cultural ideology in this respect is fairly straight forward. To a large extent the Cheung Chau people are able to rationalize their compliance with the ethical principles (e.g. filial piety) by referring to the historic-mythical origins of Chinese cultural ideas, or to the idea of common good

for all those involved. Furthermore, cultural principles are regarded as social rules in the ordering of relations and practices; rules which are applied with different degrees of competence and skill by individuals. In analytical terms, the structuring of practices and behaviour taking place on this level is relatively simple.

By comparison, the unconscious relates "to the unacknowledged conditions of social action: in respect of unconscious motives, operating 'outside' the range of the self-understanding of the agent" (*ibid*: 59). Critical here of course, is the conception of ideology as 'lived relations and experience' constituted in social perception and practice. In a way, the unconscious operation of ideology is itself both the cause and consequence of mystification in the creation of 'fetishist relations'. In Chinese society, for example, it is the unconscious acceptance of the major tenets of Confucianism underlying patri-familial cultural model which accounts for their use as key resources for the production of ideology. I stress in this context that the wide acknowledgement of the moral authority of Confucianism is itself produced by history, an outcome of continuous reproduction of Confucian values and principles in Chinese society. The unconscious aspect of the ideological process therefore refers, in the mode of structuralist analysis of Levi-Strauss and his followers, to the generation of diverse practices and institutional forms from the 'structures' of Chinese culture. Again, like Weber via Bourdieu, I argue that the structural articulation of practices has to be analysed in a historical

context. To evoke Gramsci here, the 'unconscious structuring' of practices by Confucian principles can be explained by looking at the way such ethical ideas and values are constituted in the 'common sense' and 'popular knowledges' of the Chinese people.

The two aspects of the structuring process of cultural ideology really highlight the complex fashion in which social practices are constituted. Two further points must be mentioned. Firstly, the 'structuring property' as 'enabling' in the way Giddens conceives it, has to be seen as operating as praxis. That is to say, in the very constitution of practices the structures of cultural signification are themselves in the process reproduced. In Giddens' words, structure "is not to be conceptualised as a barrier to action, but as essentially involved in its production" (*ibid*: 70). Secondly, there is the issue of power. On the whole Giddens tends to integrate the concept of power into his theory of structuration. In other words, power is treated as a form of 'capability' structured within the very process in which social relations are constituted, rather than as any empirically observable entity. The conception of the informal and pervasive qualities of power parallels, as we have seen, that of Kapferer and Godelier and clearly brings us back to Gramsci's notion of 'hegemony'. Power is an essential issue because it ties in the cultural and ideological constitution of practices with the reproduction of structural domination. Indeed, the structuring of relations is important in so far as it takes place in a certain way. Operating through the system of cultural signification, cultural ideology significantly

shapes and transforms practices and social perceptions that mystify the objective social relations yet function centrally in the everyday life of the masses. Ideologies *qua* ideologies, as Gramsci emphasizes, are neither true nor false but hold together the structure of domination underlying class relations.

Conclusion

The history of Cheung Chau is a history of class structuration. It is the major purpose of this study to demonstrate the complexity in which this has taken place not only in the structure of class relations but also in the day to day life of the people of Cheung Chau. While I have gone into considerable detail in examining the theoretical problems in the marxist analysis of class and domination, my guiding principle has been how this exercise would clarify what I observed during my stay on the island. Classes on Cheung Chau may be conceptualized structurally in their respective location in the dominant economic and ideological relations. But in my mind's eye there are also real groups of people engaged in struggle with their own destinies. My exploration of some of the key issues of marxism *via* Althusser and Gramsci is really concerned with how, in spite of their highly abstract nature, they can be used to illuminate the way the people of the island community have lived and tried to change their lives.

That is why, in my analysis, conceptual terms like contradiction, ideological transformation and reproduction are

immanently linked with the empirical processes in daily life. The response of Cheung Chau society to wider changes is both highly visible and yet imperceptibly subtle. Too often, among writers on village communities in the NT, religious worship and the source of prestige or 'face' of the elders - not to speak of the role of the District Officer - are treated as somewhat incidental to the analysis. At best, the influence of the local leadership is explained by their involvement in community services like the dispensing of public charities. In contrast, I tend to argue that the processes relating to the 'buying of face' is essentially problematic. In other words, the cultural idea of 'face' and the struggle over the control of the temples and festivals are central in achieving social and political influence in daily life. More than the anthropologist, local people realize this. They are aware, for example, that Confucian principles in Chinese culture can be manipulated and transformed for specific political and ideological purposes; they are not the universal values of 'unchanging China' portrayed by popular writers like Lin Yutang and Pearl S. Buck. The conservatism of culture, if that is the right phrase, lies not in the absolute binding of human action and behaviour according to the values and ideas handed down from the past. Rather it rests in determining change in human practices in a definite way. In a sense it is not filial-piety and other values of the patri-familial cultural model that ensure the continuity of Chinese society; but the persistent transformation - which in the very process reproduces them - of these cultural principles that produces the particular pattern and characteristics of Chinese communities in diverse

social and economic circumstances.

The 'structuring property' of the patri-familial principles also receives the attention of the colonial administration. To quote, for example, the high police/population in Hong Kong as evidence of political repression is to say the least contentious. The success of the British in maintaining the colonial order is more essentially due to a combination of military presence and ideology control, and particularly through transforming the delicate historical relationship with Mainland China. It is in the NT communities like Cheung Chau that we see the spirit of colonial rule being more subtly applied. Again, linking with the theoretical analysis of class structuration, the official sponsorship of local associations and leadership can be seen as an intricate aspect of the formation of class relations and domination. The political process in Cheung Chau demonstrates the complex way in which structural domination based on class takes place within the context of the exercise of State power ; an issue of great concern for Poulantzas (1973). Indeed, the changing community leadership during the past decades is closely connected with the colonial government's own requirements in shaping the social and economic relations in the community. On the whole, the administration has been remarkably successful in achieving its aims: in political control, in accruing revenues from land, and in the development of Cheung Chau *vis-a-vis* the wider colonial economy. A major reason for this success surely lies in the fact that the exercise of government power is invariably disguised, presented in culturally significant forms which reveals other

than what it is.

It seems appropriate to end the discussion by quoting again the proclamation of the Governor of Hong Kong, Sir Henry Blake, at the time of the British occupation of the NT: 'Your commercial and landed interests will be safeguarded and your usages and good customs will not in any way be interfered with'. What is perhaps remarkable when looking at the history of Cheung Chau over the past decades, is the consistent way with which these principles have been applied inspite of the dramatic changes that have taken place. Indeed, it is the government policy as well as the changing class relations which provide the pattern and continuity of the political and historical processes on Cheung Chau. The past is articulated in the present; and the present is invariably linked with the past. 'Structure' and 'event', cultural consensus and political conflict have a way of working out their contradictions and inconsistencies, producing complex relations and yet certain intractable pattern^s in social life.

CHARACTER LIST

Chinese names and terms are given in either Mandarin (M) or Cantonese (C) romanization. Names of localities in Hong Kong are excluded as they can be found in the *Gazetteer of Place Names in Hong Kong, Kowloon and the New Territories*. 1978. Hong Kong: Government Printer.

- | | | | |
|------------------|-----|------------------|-----|
| ai kuo p'ai (M) | 愛國派 | je nao (M) | 熱鬧 |
| ch'a ch'ien (M) | 茶錢 | jen (M) | 仁 |
| Chan On She (C) | 鎮安社 | kaifong (C) | 街坊 |
| cheng t'ing (M) | 正廳 | Kit Yeung (C) | 揭陽 |
| chia tsu (M) | 方族 | Kweilo (C) | 鬼佬 |
| Chiu Chow (C) | 潮州 | Kwan Yam (C) | 觀音 |
| Chiu Yeung (C) | 潮陽 | kui (M) | 鬼 |
| chu jen (M) | 華人 | kuo chia (M) | 國家 |
| chung tsu (M) | 種族 | kuo san kuan (M) | 過三关 |
| Dai Sze Wong (C) | 大師王 | li (M) | 礼 |
| erh fang (M) | 二房 | lien yu hui (M) | 緝誼會 |
| feng shui (M) | 風水 | mien tze (M) | 面子 |
| fu ma kuan (C) | 文媽官 | min tsu (M) | 民族 |
| Hakka (C) | 客家 | Pak Tai Yieh (C) | 北帝爺 |
| Hoi Fung (C) | 海丰 | pai hua (M) | 白話 |
| Hoklo (C) | 學佬 | pao chia (M) | 保甲 |
| hsi min (M) | 細民 | pei chin (M) | 白金 |
| hsiang ching (M) | 鄉親 | punti (C) | 本地 |
| Hsien (M) | 縣 | Shan Shaang (C) | 山神 |
| Hsin-an (M) | 新安 | Shê T'uan (M) | 社團 |

shu kuan (M)	書館	t'ung hsiang hui (M)	同鄉會
Ssu-i (C)	四邑	Tung-kuan (C)	東莞
ta chia tsu (M)	大家族	Wai Chiu Fu (C)	惠潮府
ta chiu (C)	打醮	wai tau wa (C)	圍頭話
ta fang (M)	大房	Wai Yeung (C)	惠陽
Ta Te Kung (C)	大地公	wen yuan (M)	文言
Ta Ti Chu (M)	大地主	Wong Wai Tsak Tong (C)	黃維則堂
t'ai p'ing (M)	太平	wu chung (M)	無種
Tanka (C)	蛋家	wu tsu hui (M)	互助會
tsau ng chi (C)	走五次	yamen (M)	衙門
tso p'ai (M)	左派	Yu Hsu Kung (M)	玉虛宮
tso p'ai hsiang jen (M)	左派商人	yuan lao p'ai (M)	元老派
tsu (M)	族	yu p'ai (M)	右派
tsu kuo (M)	祖國	yü lan (M)	魚欄
t'ung hsiang	同鄉		

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Books and Articles

- Althusser, L.
 1969 *For Marx*, London: Allen Lane The Penguin Press.
 1971a *Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays*, London: NLB.
 1971b "Ideology and Ideological State Apparatus: Notes towards an Investigation", in *Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays*, London: NLB.
 1976 *Positions*, Paris: Hachette.
- Althusser, L. and Balibar, E.
 1968 *Reading Capital*, London: NLB.
- Arlington, L.C.
 1931 *Through the Dragon's Eyes: Fifty Years' Experiences of a Foreigner in the Chinese Government Service*, London: Constable.
- Baker, H.D.R.
 1968 *A Chinese Lineage: Sheung Shui*, London: Frank Cass.
- Barnett, K.M.A.
 1957 "The People of the New Territories", in J.M. Braga (ed.) : *Hongkong Business Symposium*, Hongkong: South China Morning Post, 261-65.
- Barth, Fredrik
 1969 *Ethnic Groups and Boundaries*, Boston: Little, Brown.
- Barthes, Roland
 1967 *Elements of Semiology*, London: Cape.
 1972a *Mythologies*, St. Albans, England: Paladin.
 1972b "Myth Today", in Barthes 1972a.
- Blake, C.F.
 1975 *Negotiating Ethnolinguistic Symbols in a Chinese Market Town*, Ph.D. Thesis (Anthropology), University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.
- Boggs, C.
 1976 *Gramsci's Marxism*, London: Pluto.
- Bourdieu, Pierre
 1977 *Outline of A Theory of Practice*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Brown, P.E.
 1971 "The Hong Kong Economy", in Keith Hopkins 1971.
- Carchedi, G.
 1975 "Reproduction of Social Class at the Level of Production Relations", *Economy and Society*, 4: 361-417.

- Catron, Gary
 1972 "Hong Kong and Chinese Foreign Policy, 1955-60".
The Chinese Quarterly, Vol.50 April/June 1972.
- Chang, Chung-li
 1955 *The Chinese Gentry*, Seattle: Washington University Press.
 1962 *The Income of Chinese Gentry*, Seattle: Washington University Press.
- Chen, Joseph T.
 1971 *The May Fourth Movement in Shanghai*, Leiden: Brill.
- Chiang, M.
 1957 (1947)
Tides From The West, Reprint of Yale University Press 1947. Taiwan: China Cultural Publishing Foundation.
- Chu, T'ung-tsu
 1962 *Local Government in China Under the Ch'ing*, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
- Cohen, Abner
 1974 *Urban Ethnicity*, London: Tavistock.
- Cohen, Myron
 1968 "The Hakka or Guest People: Dialect as a Socio-Cultural Variable in Southeastern China",
Ethnohistory, 15: 237-292.
- The Colonial Problem*
 1937 A Report by a Study Group of Members of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, London: OUP.
- Connell, R.W.
 1977 *Ruling Class, Ruling Culture: Studies of Conflict, Power and Hegemony in Australian Life*, London: OUP.
- Connell, R.W. and Irving, T.H.
 1980 *Class Structure in Australian History: Documents, Narrative and Argument*, Melbourne: Longman Cheshire.
- Cooper, J.
 1968 *Colony in Conflict: The Hong Kong Disturbance May 1967-January 1968*, Hong Kong: Swindon.
- Crowder, M.
 1968 *West Africa Under Colonial Rule*, London: Hutchinson.
- DeGroot, J.J.M.
 1892-1910
The Religious System of China, Vols I-VI, Leiden: Brill.
- Dwyer, D.J. and Lai, C.Y.
 1967 *The Small Industrial Unit in Hong Kong: Patterns and Policies*, Hull: Hull University Press.

Echo of Things Chinese

- 1971 Taipei: Echo Magazine Company monthly, 1971-
- Eckstein, Alexander
1966 *Communist China's Economic Growth and Foreign Trade*, NY: McGraw-Hill.
- Elvin, Mark
1973 *The Pattern of the Chinese Past*, London: Eyre Methuen.
- Endicott, G.B.
1958 *A History of Hong Kong*, London: OUP.
1964 *Government and People of Hong Kong 1841-1962: A Constitutional History*, Hong Kong: OUP.
- England, J. and Rear, J.
1975 *Chinese Labour Under British Rule*, Hong Kong: OUP.
- Evans, E.W.
1950 "Principles and Methods of Administration on the British Colonial Empire", in *Symposium on Principles and Methods of Colonial Administration*, University of Bristol 1950.
- Fallers, L.A.
1964 "Social Stratification and Economic Processes in Africa", in M.J. Herskovits and M. Horwitz (ed.): *Economic Transition in Africa*, Evanston: Northwestern University Press.
- Fei Hsiao-t'ung
1939 *Peasant Life in China: A Field Study of Country Life in Yangtze Valley*, London: Routledge & Keagan Paul.
- Freedman, M.
1958 *Lineage Organization in Southeastern China*, London: Athlone Press.
1966a *Chinese Lineage and Society: Fukien and Kwangtung*, London: Athlone Press.
1966b "Shift in Power in Hong Kong New Territories", *Journal of Asian and African Studies*, 1(1).
1970 *Family and Kinship in Chinese Society*, Stanford: Stanford University Press.
1974 "The Politics of an Old State: A view from the Chinese Lineage", in John H.R. Davis (ed.): *Choice and Change: Essays in Honour of Lucy Mair*, London: Athlone Press.
- Fukutake, Tadashi
1967 *Asian Rural Society*, Seattle: University of Washington Press.

- Geras, N.
1971 "Essence and Appearance: Aspects of Fetishism in Marx's 'Capital'", *New Left Review*, 65, Jan-Feb. 1971.
- Giddens, A.
1973 *The Class Structure of the Advanced Societies*, London: Hutchinson.
1979 *Central Problems in Social Theory*, London: MacMillan.
- Godelier, M.
1967 "System, Structure and Contradiction in Capital", in *Social Register* 1967.
1977a *Perspectives in Marxist Anthropology*, Cambridge: OUP.
1977b "The Concept of 'Social and Economic Formation': the Inca Example", in Godelier 1977a.
1978 "Infrastructure, Societies and History", *Current Anthropology*, 19(4): 763-768.
- Gough, I.
1972 "Marx's Theory of Productive and Unproductive Labour", *New Left Review*, 76: 47-72.
- Gouldner, A.W.
1954 *Patterns of Industrial Bureaucracy*, NY: Free Press.
- Gramsci, A.
1957a *The Modern Prince and Other Writings*, NY: International Press.
1957b "The Southern Question", in Gramsci 1957a.
1971 *Selections from the Prison Notebooks*, edited by Hoare and Nowell Smith, London: Lawrence and Wishart.
- Grantham, Sir Alexander
1965 *Via Ports, from Hong Kong to Hong Kong*, Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press.
- Gray, Jack
1969 *Modern China's Search for a Political Form*, London: OUP.
- Halliday, J.
1974 "Hong Kong: Britain's Chinese Colony", *New Left Review*, 87/88 (Sep/Dec 1974) : 91-112.
- Harris, M.
1959 "Labour Emigration Among the Mozambique Thonga: Cultural and Political Factors", *Africa*, 29(1).
- Harris, P.B.
1975 "Representative Politics in a British Dependency: Some Reflections on Problems of Representation in Hong Kong", *Parliamentary Affairs*, 28: 180-198.

- Hayes, J.W.
 1963 "Cheung Chan, 1850-1898: Information from Commemorative Tablets", *Journal of the Hong Kong Branch Royal Asiatic Society*, 3: 88-99.
- 1967 "A List of Temples in the Southern District of the New Territories and New Kowloon, 1899-1967", in Marjorie Topley (ed.): *Traditional Chinese Ideas and Conceptions in Hong Kong Social Life Today*, Hong Kong: Hong Kong Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society.
- 1977 *The Hong Kong Region, 1850-1911*, Hamden, USA: Shoe String Press.
- Hirst, Paul
 1976 "Althusser and the Theory of Ideology", *Economy and Society*, 5(4): 385-412.
- Ho, P.T.
 1962 *The Ladder of Success in Imperial China*, NY: Columbia University Press.
- The Hong Kong Diary 1970*
 1970 Hong Kong: Hong Kong Chamber of Commerce.
- Hopkins, Keith
 1971 *Hong Kong: The Industrial Colony*, Hong Kong: OUP.
- Hsiao, Kung-chuan
 1960 *Rural China, Imperial Control in the Nineteenth Century*, Seattle: University of Washington Press.
- Hughes, Richard
 1978 *Hong Kong: Borrowed Place, Borrowed Time*, 2nd edition, London: Deutsch.
- Kapferer, B.
 1980 "The Colonialism of Management and the Management of Colonialism: The Cultural and Structural Constitution of Power in an Industrial Organization under Colonial Rule", paper presented to the Burg Wartenstein Symposium No. 84, The Exercise of Power in Complex Organizations, July 19-27 1980.
- King, Yeo-chi Ambrose
 1975 "The Administrative Absorption of Politics in Hong Kong", *Asian Survey*, Vol.10.
- Kit-Ching, Chan Lan
 1973 "The Hong Kong Question During the Pacific War (1941-45)", *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*, 2(1).
- Kracke, E.A.
 1953 *Civil Service in Early Sung China*, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

- Lamarche, Françoise
 1976 "Property Development and the Urban Question",
 in R.C.G. Pickvance (ed.): *Urban Sociology*,
 London: Tavistock.
- Latourette, K.S.
 1964 *The Chinese: Their History and Culture*, New York:
 MacMillan.
- Leeming, F.
 1975 "Earlier Industrialization of Hong Kong", *Modern
 Asian Studies*, 9(July): 337-342.
- Lethbridge, H.J.
 1969 "Hong Kong under Japanese occupation: Changes in
 Social Structure", in I.C. Jarvie and J. Agassi
 (ed.): *Hong Kong: A Society in Transition*, London:
 Routledge.
 1970 "Hong Kong cadets, 1862-1941", *Journal of the Hong
 Kong Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society*, 10, 1970.
- Levi-Strauss, C.
 1969 *Totemism*, Harmondsworth: Penguin.
- Lewis, W.A.
 1960 *The Theory of Economic Growth*, London: Allen and
 Unwin.
- Li, D.J.
 1968 *The Ageless Chinese*, London: Dent & Son.
- Liang, C.S.
 1965 *Hong Kong: A Physical, Economic and Human Geography*,
 Hong Kong: China Geographical Model Manufactory.
- Lukacs, G.
 1971 *History and Class Consciousness*, London: Merlin Press.
- Mao, Tse-tung
 1964 *On Contradiction*, 4th Edition, Peking: Foreign
 Languages Press.
- Marsh, R.E.
 1961 *The Mandarins*, Glencoe: Free Press.
- Marx, Karl
 1970 *Capital*, Volume 1, Moscow: Foreign Language Press.
 1971 *Capital*, Volume 3, Moscow: Progress Publishers.
 1973 "The British Rule in India", in *Survey from Exile.
 Political Writings*, Volume 2, Harmondsworth: Penguin.
- Meillassoux, C.
 1972 From Reproduction to Production, *Economy and
 Society*, 1(1).
- Miner, N.
 1975 *The Government and Politics of Hong Kong*, Hong Kong:
 OUP

- Miyakawa, Hisayuki
1960 "The Confucianization of South China", in Wright
1960: 21-46.
- Morgan, W.P.
1960 *Triad Societies in Hong Kong*, Hong Kong: Swindon
Book Company.
- Mote, F.W.
1960 "Confucian Eremitism in the Yüan Period", in
Wright 1960: 202-240.
- Owen, D.E.
1968 *British Opium Policy in China and India*, NY: Archon
Books.
- Pasternark, B.
1969 "Role of Frontier in Chinese Lineage Development",
Journal of Asian Studies, 2815.
- Podmore, D.
1971 "Localization in the Hong Kong Government Service",
Journal of Commonwealth Political Studies, IX: 36-51.
- Potter, Jack M.
1968 *Capitalism and the Chinese Peasant: Social and Economic
Change in a Hong Kong Village*, Berkeley and Los Angeles:
University of California Press.
- Poulantzas, Nicos
1973 *Political Power and Social Classes*, London: NLB and
Sheed and Ward.
1975 *Class in Contemporary Capitalism*, London: NLB
1978 *State, Power, Socialism*, London: NLB.
- Pratt, J.A.
1960 "Emigration and Unilineal Descent Group: A Study of
Marriage in a Hakka Village in the New Territories",
The Eastern Anthropologist, XIII (4), June-August.
- Rawski, E.S.
1972 *Agricultural Change and the Peasant Economy of South
China*, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
- Rear, John
1971 "The Law of the Constitution", in Hopkins (1971).
1971a "One brand of Politics", in Hopkins (1971). 55-125.
- Rostow, W.W.
1960 *The Stages of Economic Growth*, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
- Sczczepanik, E.
1958 *The Economic Growth of Hong Kong*, London: OUP.
- Snow, E.P.
1968 *Red Star Over China*, NY: Grove Press.

- So, C.L.
1964 "The Fishing Industry of Cheung Chau", in S.G. Davis (ed.): *Symposium on Land Use and Mineral Deposits in Hong Kong, Southern China and South-East Asia*, Hong Kong: HKUP.
- Symposium on Principles and Methods of Colonial Administration, University of Bristol.
1950 *Principles and Methods of Colonial Administration*, London: Butterworth.
- Topley, Marjorie
1964 "Capital, Saving and Credit Among Indigenous Rice Farmers in Hong Kong", in Raymond Firth and B.S. Yamey (ed.): *Capital, Saving and Credit in Peasant Societies from Asia, Oceania, the Carribbean and Middle America*, London: George Allen and Unwin.
- Wang, Sun-hsing
1974 "Taiwanese Architecture and the Supernatural", in Arthur P. Wolf (ed.): *Religion and Ritual in Chinese Society*, Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Ward, Barbara E.
1954 "A Hong Kong Fishing Village", *Journal of Oriental Studies*, 1(1).
1959 "Floating Villages: Chinese Fishermen in Hong Kong", *Man*, LIX
1965 "Varieties of the Conscious Model: The Fishermen of South China", in M. Banton (ed.): *The Relevance of Models for Social Anthropology*, London: Tavistock.
1977 "Readers and Audience: An Exploration of the Spread of Traditional Chinese Culture", in R.K. Jain (ed.): *Text and Context: The Social Anthropology of Tradition*, Philadelphia: Institute for the Study of Human Issues.
1979 "Not Merely Players: Drama, Art and Ritual in Traditional China", *Man* n.s.14(1): 18-39.
- Watson, James L.
1977 "Hereditary Tenancy and Corporate Landlordism in Traditional China: A Case Study", *Modern Asian Studies*, II(2): 161-182.
- Weber, Max
1947 *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization*, translated by A.M. Henderson and Talcott Parson Glencoe: Free Press.
1951 *The Religion of China, Confucianism and Taoism*, translated and edited by Hans H. Gerth, New York: Macmillan.

- Wilkinson, R.
1964 *The Prefects*, London: OUP.
- Wolf, Arthur P.
1974 *Religion and Ritual in Chinese Society*, Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Wright, A.F.
1960 *The Confucian Persuasion*, Stanford, Stanford University Press.
- Yang, C.K.
1959 "Some Characteristics of the Chinese Bureaucracy", in David D. Nivison and Arthur F. Wright (ed.): *Confucianism in Action*, Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Yeh, K.C.
1973 "Agricultural Policies and Performance", in Wu, Yuan-li (ed.): *China: A Handbook*, London: Encyclopaedia Britannica.
- Young, J.A.
1974 *Business and Sentiment in a Chinese Market Town*, Taipei: The Orient Cultural Service.

Hong Kong Government Documents and Publications

a) Serials

Annual Report : *Hong Kong 1978, Hong Kong 1979.*

Blue Books: These are annual reports produced as supplements to the Colonial Annual Report presented by the Colonial Secretary. 1906:V2-11.

The Annual Report of the Commissioner of Registration of Persons. 1977.

District Commissioner, New Territories (later Secretary for the New Territories). *Annual Report.* 1946 Onwards.

Hong Kong Government Gazette. 1853 Onwards.

Hong Kong Government Hansard, Reports of the Sittings of the Legislative Council of Hong Kong. 1894 Onwards.

Sessional Papers: These are papers presented to the Legislative Council of Hong Kong by government departments. At the library of the Colonial Secretariat, Hong Kong.

b) Special Official Reports

The City District Officer Scheme, A Report by the Secretary for Chinese Affairs, January 1969.

Coates, Austin

1955 *A Summary Memorandum on the Southern District of the New Territories, Spring, 1955.* New Territories Administration, Hong Kong Government.

A Gazetteer of Place Names in Hong Kong, Kowloon and the New Territories. 1978. Hong Kong: Government Printer.

Kowloon Disturbances 1966, Report of Commission of Enquiry. 1967.

Lockhart, Stewart

1899 "Extracts from a Report by Mr. S. Lockhart on Extension of the Colony of Hong Kong", in *Hong Kong Government Gazette*. Vol.45, 1899.

1900 "Report on the New Territories at Hong Kong, 1900; Appendix III, Memorandum on Land", in *Hong Kong Sessional Papers*. 1900.

Orme, G.N.

1909-12 "Report on the New Territories, 1899-12", in *Hong Kong Sessional Papers*. 1909-12: 46.

Report of the Working Group on New Territories Urban Land Acquisition. 1978.

c) Official Papers (manuscripts)

Land files of the Colonial Secretary's Office: Papers and correspondence relating to the land survey, settlement of titles to land, and administration of land in the New Territories 1898-1907. Held in the Public Record Office of Hong Kong, as *Hong Kong Record Series 58*.

Newspapers and Weeklies

Far East Economic Review (FEER)

New Statesman

South China Morning Post (SCMP)

The Times (London)

Wah Kiu Yat Po (in Chinese)

Papers and Publications by local organizations in Cheung Chau
and the New Territories

In English and Chinese

Heung Yee Kuk

1975 *Striving for Justifiable Rights for the People of
the New Territories, Vol.1* Hong Kong: Heung Yee Kuk.

1977 *The New Territories Community of Hong Kong Under
Colonial Administration, Hong Kong: Heung Yee Kuk.*

n.d. *Social Conditions of the New Territories, Hong Kong,
and the Work of Heung Yee Kuk, Hong Kong: Heung Yee
Kuk.*

In Chinese


Cheung Chau Chinese Chamber of Commerce *長洲華商會*
Report and Year Book 1960 *一九六〇年 年刊*

Cheung Chau Residents' Association *長洲居民協會*
Annual Report. 1947-1953 *年報*

Wong Lineage (of Nam Tou and Cheung Chau) *南頭長洲黃族*
Huang-shih Tsu-p'u *黃氏族譜*
Woodblock edition of the T'ung Chih Period. Privately owned.

Wong Wai Tsak Tong (of Cheung Chau)

Directory and Record for 1958 *黃維則堂徵信錄 戊戌年十二月*
Privately printed. *結日*



MAP NO. 1 HONG KONG AND SURROUNDING