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WALTER PATER:

ABSTRACTION AND ABSTRACTIONISM

by

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A U T H O R I Z A T I O N

I, William Rawson Mackenzie Converse, do authorize that my doctoral thesis WALTER PATER: ABSTRACTION AND ABSTRACTIONISM shall be available for lending as well as for photocopying.

Dated: Florence, Italy, 14 February 1969

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SUMMARY

The dissertation is the result of an investigation into the role of generalization and abstraction in aesthetics and of generalization and abstraction in art, especially sculpture, in the writings of Walter Horatio Pater (1839-1894). For the purposes of this dissertation all Pater's important papers reprinted in recension in the ten-volume Library Edition of the Works of Walter Pater (1910) have been collated with the original form in which they were printed in such periodicals as the _Westminster Review_, the _Fortnightly Review_, and _Macmillan's Magazine_, and the previously uncollected letters of Pater brought together in the unpublished 1961 Harvard Dissertation of Professor Lawrence Evans have been consulted on microfilm.

Part I of the dissertation deals with the question of Pater's alleged position of extreme subjectivism in philosophy and the consequent relativism in aesthetics. The widely accepted view (for example, that stated by Professor Graham Hough in _The Last Romantics_ [1947, 1961]) of Pater's subjectivism in philosophy, "impressionism" in aesthetics, and relativism in ethics is very largely based on the "Conclusion" to _Studies in the History of the Renaissance_ (1873). That view is hardly tenable when the "Conclusion" is placed in its original context, the article, "Poems by William Morris"

(1868) and becomes quite indefensible when Marius the Epicurean (1885) and Plato and Platonism (1893) are taken into account. Pater's description in Plato and Platonism (Ch. VII, Pt. 1) of "the naturalist who deals with things through ideas" describes Pater's own practice in "Winckelmann" where he deals with Greek art through the ideas of Hegel and also recalls that Pater commented there on Goethe's acknowledgment of the debt he had incurred to the philosophy of Kant in his appreciation of the sensuous and the concrete. Pater's frequent use of formulae for a writer like Prosper Mérimée, an artist like Raphael, or a philosopher like Plato suggest an attempt on his part to extend to literature, art, and philosophy the procedures of scientific investigation; in "Coleridge's Writings" Pater observed that relativism "has been fecundated in modern times by the influences of the sciences of observation." Pater's interest in modern science in its relation to literature and aesthetics may have arisen, as Anthony Ward suggests in Walter Pater: The Idea in Nature (1966) from his reading of Goethe and possibly also of the writings on Goethe and Comte of George Henry Lewes (1817-1878), but it is contended here that Pater considered the high degree of abstraction characteristic of modern scientific intellectual culture inimical to art and the life of artistic perfection.

Part II of the dissertation deals with the grounds which both Sir Herbert Read and Sir Kenneth Clark have used to postulate that Pater in "The School of Giorgione" (1877) foreshadowed the abstractionism of the twentieth

century. Pater's "delicate system of abstraction" was developed not in "The School of Giorgione" but in "Winckelmann" (1867); it was later reiterated in both "The Poetry of Michelangelo" (1871) and "Luca della Robbia" (1872). Pater's "system of abstraction" shows a marked affinity to the conception of _Allgemeinheit_ in Winckelmann, Lessing, Goethe and Hegel. The conclusions reached in Part II substantiate in detail and depth those arrived at by Professor Solomon Fishman in his treatment of Pater in _The Interpretation of Art_ (1963), though here the question of Pater's abstractionism is approached by way of neo-classical rather than romantic aesthetics.

Certain passages from the writings of Bernhard Berenson (1865-1959) are adduced throughout the dissertation to show his antipathy towards the excessive intellectualization which has led inevitably to twentieth century abstract art or, in the crisp phraseology of B.B. , _unkunst_, 'no-art'. The tacit assumption is made here that there exists between Pater and Berenson a singular affinity of both sensibility and intellect, and hence Berenson's antipathy towards twentieth century non-objective art may be said to be both the natural and the logical outcome of Pater's preoccupation with that tradition in art which dates from fifth century Athens, that tradition with which a number of twentieth century abstractionists has wilfully broken in order to begin a new tradition in art. An attempt is thus made to define Berenson's position on abstraction and

abstractionism in terms of Pater's conception of abstraction and of the eighteenth century academic abstractionism found in Winckelmann, Lessing, and Goethe in order that Pater's idea of abstract art may be set over against current theories of non-objective art. The procedure adopted here is to broach Pater's abstractionism by way of Berenson on the one hand and Hegel on the other hand, Winckelmann, Lessing and Goethe being subsumed under the German philosopher in whose writings we discover the immediate source not only of Pater's phraseology for his theory of abstraction but also of his abstractionism.

December 1967.

SIGNED STATEMENT

This thesis contains no material which has been accepted for the award of any other degree or diploma in any University and, to the best of the candidate's knowledge and belief, the thesis contains no material previously published or written by another person, except when due reference is made in the text of the thesis.

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PREFACE

This dissertation is the result of an investigation into the relation between abstraction and abstractionism in the writings of Walter Horatio Pater (1839-1894), taken from the standpoint of Winckelmann and Hegel on the one hand and Berenson on the other. While recent Pater scholarship has been taken into account, in particular, the constructive work of Professor Wolfgang Iser and Professor Germain d'Hangest, the interest in Pater shown here dates from the earlier work of Professor Mario Praz and Professor René Wellek. The dissertation itself will be seen to come closest to Professor Solomon Fishman's balanced chapter on Pater in The Interpretation of Art (1963).

This dissertation is based on Pater's published writings, with the exception of the yet unpublished letters collected by Professor Lawrence Evans in 1961. These have been consulted on microfilm through the kindness of Professor Evans who has taken a special interest in this study. It will be noted that the Winckelmann and Giorgione articles are cited throughout in their original versions rather than in their redactions.

This dissertation attempts to keep footnotes to a minimum by means of parenthetical documentation. Standard editions of the works of Pater, Goethe, Hegel,

Lessing, and Winckelmann are cited; in the case of Berenson, such editions of individual works as are readily available are quoted. No attempt has been made to modernize the orthography of German writers where nineteenth-century editions of their works (or reprints of these) are cited.

This dissertation represents the first stage of a somewhat more extensive study of Pater and Berenson which will be continued in Florence in 1968 through a grant from the Canada Council.

P A R T   O N E

Not only modern aesthetic theory, but
modern art itself has followed Pater's
prescription. He himself thought to
justify his analogy with music by the
curious example of Alphonse Legros; to
see it accurately fulfilled he would
have had to wait for the work of Braque
and Picasso, or even Nicolas de Staël.
This consummation might have displeased
him and it is indeed ironical that The
Renaissance, which begins and ends with
an attack on abstraction, should have
first put forward the theoretical
justifications of abstract art. He
might, however, have been consoled by the
influence he had on the theories, the
modes of perception and even the style of
two of the greatest aesthetes of the
twentieth century, Marcel Proust, and
Bernhard Berenson.

Sir Kenneth Clark, Introduction to the
Fontana Library edition of The Renaissance.

WALTER PATER AND ABSTRACTION

Pater derived from Hegel's Ästhetik the view that the high degree of intellectual abstraction characteristic of the intellectual culture of modern Europe was inimical to art and to the life of artistic perfection. In the 1867 Winckelmann article Pater had even admitted the possibility that it might after all be necessary to abandon metaphysics in the interests of art: "Again [he wrote], it is easy to indulge the common-place metaphysical instinct. But a taste for metaphysics may be one of those things which we must renounce if we mean to mould our lives to artistic perfection. Philosophy [Pater continued] serves culture not by the fancied gift of absolute or transcendental knowledge, but by suggesting questions which help one to detect the passion and strangeness and dramatic contrasts of life."[1] This statement was allowed to stand unchanged in the recension of the article which was reprinted in the ten-volume New Library Edition of the Works of Walter Pater (1910); apart from running together "commonplace" and adding commas after "renounce," "culture," "passion," and

[1] "Winckelmann," Westminster Review, XXXI new series (Jan. 1867), p. 109. Hereafter referred to in the text by date and page number.

"strangeness," no change was made in the wording of the passage.[2] This view was to be reiterated by Pater in the following year in his article on William Morris. Unlike the passage already adduced from the Winckelmann article, the passage we shall now bring forward for consideration from the 1868 Morris article underwent some change in the redaction; yet, the standpoint which it represents is none the less the one which Pater had adopted in the Winckelmann article. In the 1868 version of the article Pater had written: "With this sense of the splendour of our experience and of its awful brevity, gathering all we are into one desperate effort to see and touch, we shall hardly have time to make theories about the things we see and touch. What we have to do is to be for ever curiously testing opinion and courting new impressions, never acquiescing in a facile orthodoxy of Comte or of Hegel or of our own. Theories, religious or philosophical ideas, as points of view, instruments of criticism, may help us to gather up what might otherwise pass unregarded by us. '<u>La philosophie</u>,' says Victor Hugo, '<u>c'est le microscope de la pensée</u>.' The theory or idea or system which requires of us

[2] "Winckelmann," <u>The Renaissance</u>. <u>Studies in Art and Poetry</u>, New Library Edition of the Works of Walter Pater, 10 vols. (London 1910), pp. 229-230. All page references to Pater unless otherwise indicated are to this edition of his Works.

the sacrifice of any part of this experience, in consideration of some interest into which we cannot enter, or some abstract morality we have not identified with ourselves, or what is only conventional, has no real claim upon us."[3] This passage, as we have already remarked, was to undergo a number of changes in the two redactions which finally produced the more familiar form in which we come upon these sentences in the "Conclusion" to The Renaissance, pp. 237-238: "With this sense of the splendour of our experience and of its awful brevity, gathering all we are into one desperate effort to see and touch, we shall hardly have time to make theories about the things we see and touch. What we have to do is to be for ever curiously testing new opinions and courting new impressions, never acquiescing in a facile orthodoxy of Comte, or of Hegel, or of our own. Philosophical theories or ideas, as points of view, instruments of criticism, may help us to gather up what might otherwise pass unregarded by us. 'Philosophy is the microscope of thought.' The theory or idea or system which requires of us the sacrifice of any part of this experience, in consideration of some interest into which we cannot enter, or some abstract theory we have not identified with ourselves, or what is only conventional, has no

[3] "Poems by William Morris," Westminster Review XXXIV new series (Oct. 1868), p.312.

real claim upon us."

The changes in the two versions of the passage now before us are by no means confined to punctuation, as was the case with the two versions of the Winckelmann article. There Pater had confined himself to the provision of further punctuation, but had made no changes in the actual wording; here he has not only provided further punctuation, the commas, for example, after "Comte" and "Hegel" in the second sentence, but has also reworded three of the five sentences adduced. The first sentence Pater has allowed to stand. The second he has changed by inserting "new" between "testing" and "opinion" and by giving "opinion" the plural form. In the third sentence Pater has substituted "Philosophical theories or ideas" for the earlier "Theories, religious or philosophical ideas." In the fourth sentence Pater has translated the words of Hugo into English while at the same time he has suppressed their identification. In the fifth sentence Pater has substituted "theory" for "morality" and added "of" after the second "or". The overall effect produced by the redaction is to draw a clearly marked antithesis between the concrete and the abstract, between "the things we see and touch" and "The theory or idea or system which requires of us the sacrifice of any part of this experience, in consideration of some interest into which we cannot enter, or some abstract theory we have not identified with ourselves, or of what is only conventional."

It would be a mistake, however, to suppose that Pater is simply arguing here in favour of the concrete over the abstract; he is concerned with this of course but also with the life of artistic perfection. This the redaction makes quite clear: "Some spend this interval in listlissness, some in high passions, the wisest, at least among 'the children of this world,' in art and song" [the 1868 version simply read "the wisest in art and song"]; yet it is often forgotten that the famous "Conclusion" was originally but the final paragraphs of the Morris article and that in its original context it served as something of a parti pris.[4] In the paragraph which in the original version immediately preceded the opening sentence of what was subsequently to become the "Conclusion", Pater had anticipated the objection of the man of the nineteenth century to "aesthetic poetry": "The modern world [Pater represented the nineteenth century reader as objecting] is in possession of truths; what but a passing smile can it have for a kind of poetry which, assuming artistic beauty of form to be an end in itself, passes by those truths and the living interests which are connected with them, to spend a thousand cares in telling once more these pagan fables as if it had but to choose between a more and a less beautiful shadow?" Pater accepts the challenge, however, and in so doing takes the occasion to stress the abstractness of philosophy compared with the concreteness of poetry: "It is a

[4] Thus John Wordsworth (1843-1911) in his letter to Pater dated 17 March 1873 felt it necessary even then to point out that he was well aware of the fact that the "Conclusion" had been adapted from the anonymous

strange transition from the earthly paradise to the sad-coloured world of abstract philosophy. But let us accept the challenge; let us see what modern philosophy, when it is sincere, really does say about human life and the truth we can attain in it, and the relation of this to the desire of beauty" (1868, p. 309). The philosophic interest is there, it is true, but it is secondary. Pater's argument, his _parti pris_, we have called it, is designed to further the interests of art at the expense of those of philosophy and the modern scientific _Weltanschauung_ which Pater sought to subsume under art. It was the contention of Pater in those passages which we have adduced from both the Winckelmann and the Morris article that metaphysics as such might after all have to be abandoned in the interests of art and the basis for this contention will be found in Hegel's _Ästhetik_, a work to which Pater was considerably indebted in his writing of the 1867 article, a debt which the footnotes to the original version serve to document fully.[5]

1868 article. See Lawrence Evans, "Some Letters of Walter Pater," unpublished Harvard Diss., 1961, Letter 16, p. 17.

[5] See also Bernhard Fehr, "Pater und Hegel," _Englischen Studien_, L (1916-1917), pp. 300-308; Hans Proesler, _Walter Pater und sein Verhältnis zur deutschen Literatur_, Diss. Freiburg, 1917; Ruth Child, _The Aesthetic of Walter Pater_, New York 1940; Helen Hawthorne Young, _The Writings of Walter Pater: A Reflection of British Philosophical Opinion from 1860-1890_. Diss. Bryn Mawr (Lancaster 1933); Wolfgang Iser, _Walter Pater. Die Autonomie des Ästhetischen_, (Tübingen 1960); Germain d'Hangest, _Walter Pater:_

In the Introduction to the *Ästhetik* Hegel observed that art no longer enjoyed that singular position which, together with religion, it had held in classical times as well as in the Middle Ages. Unlike men of those times we no longer expect art to satisfy our highest spiritual needs; we no longer consider works of art as deserving of our worship. The reason for this marked change in attitude towards the art of the past no less than towards the art of the present Hegel thought lay not so much in any supposed decadence as in the Christian conception of truth on the one hand and the high degree of abstraction characteristic of our intellectual culture on the other hand. Both factors have contributed to putting the sensuous at a decided disadvantage when it comes to embodying our highest ideas about ourselves and the world in which we live.[6] On the one hand we tend to transfer art to our conceptual way of thinking, while on the other hand we may simply enjoy directly those sensuous qualities of a work of

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l'Homme et l'Oeuvre, 2 vols. (Paris 1961); R.V.Johnson, *Walter Pater: A Study of his Critical Outlook and Achievement*, Melbourne 1961; R.T.Lenaghan, "Pattern in Walter Pater's Fiction," *Studies in Philology*, LVIII, 1961, pp. 69-91; U.C.Knoepflmacher, *Religious Humanism and the Victorian Novel*, (Princeton 1965) Ch. V; Anthony Ward, *Walter Pater: The Idea in Nature* (London 1966), Ch.III; G.C.Monsman, *Pater's Portraits*, (Baltimore 1967).

[6] But compare Winckelmann in the *Geschichte der Kunst des Altertums*, 8. *Buch*, 2. *Kapitel*, 13, *Abschnitt*, Winckelmanns Werke, ed. Joseph Eiselein. 12 *Bde*.

art for their own sake, that immediate enjoyment which Hegel subordinated to the capacity of a work of art to arouse our judgement. Already it is possible to detect in Hegel at this point a foreshadowing of Bernhard Berenson's analysis of twentieth-century art. In Seeing and Knowing (1953) Berenson analyzed the breakup of that particular convention in the visual arts whereby the compromise which had been effected between what we see and what we know has given way to the imbalance in modern art: it has become either excessively intellectualized or excessively sensualized.[7] It is of course by no means evident that Hegel already foresaw this development in the art of the future; indeed, it seems rather unlikely that he envisaged it. That he did foresee the death of art, a prospect which he seems to have faced with equanimity, is not to be gainsaid; the desire to study art scientifically is after all an admission that a stage has been reached in the development of intellectual culture when a return to an earlier stage in the development of mankind, the stage of which art was characteristic, is no longer possible. It is considerations of this kind which arise from that passage of the Introduction to the Ästhetik which we now propose to adduce:

(Donaueschinger 1825; reprinted 1965), V, 216 ff. Subsequent references to Winckelmann are to the 1965 reprint of this edition unless otherwise indicated.

Compare Geschichte der Kunst des Altertums, ed. Wilhelm Senff (Weimar 1964), pp. 193-194 and p. 477, n.143

[7] Cf. Bernhard Berenson, Seeing and Knowing, (London 1953), p. 25.

Wenn wir nun aber der Kunst einerseits diese hohe Stellung geben, so ist andererseits ebensosehr daran zu erinnern, daß die Kunst dennoch weder dem Inhalte noch der Form nach die höchste und absolute Weise sei, dem Geiste seine wahrhaften Interessen zum Bewußtsein zu bringen. Denn eben ihrer Form wegen ist die Kunst auch auf einen bestimmten Inhalt beschränkt. Nur ein gewisser Kreis und Stufe der Wahrheit ist fähig, im Elemente des Kunstwerks dargestellt zu werden; es muß noch in ihrer eigenen Bestimmung liegen, zu dem Sinnlichen herauszugehen und in demselben sich adäquat sein zu können, um echter Inhalt für die Kunst zu sein, wie dies z. B. bei den griechischen Göttern der Fall ist. Dagegen gibt es eine tiefere Fassung der Wahrheit, in welcher sie nicht mehr dem Sinnlichen so verwandt und freundlich ist, um von diesem Material in angemessener Weise aufgenommen und ausgedrückt werden zu können. Von solcher Art ist die christliche Auffassung der Wahrheit, und vor allem erscheint der Geist unserer heutigen Welt, oder näher unserer Religion und unserer Vernunftbildung, als über die Stufe hinaus, auf welcher die Kunst die höchste Weise ausmacht, sich des Absoluten bewußt zu sein. Die eigentümliche Art der Kunstproduktion und ihrer Werke füllt unser höchstes Bedürfnis nicht mehr aus; wir sind darüber hinaus, Werke der Kunst göttlich verehren und sie anbeten zu können; der Eindruck, den sie machen, ist besonnenerer Art, und was durch sie in uns erregt wird, bedarf noch eines höheren Prüfsteins und anderweitiger Bewährung. Der Gedanke und die Reflexion hat die schöne Kunst überflügelt. Wenn man es liebt, sich in Klagen und Tadel zu gefallen, so kann man diese Erscheinung für ein Verderbnis halten und sie dem Übergewicht von Leidenschaften und eigennutzigen Interessen zuschreiben, welche den Ernst der Kunst wie ihre Heiterkeit verscheuchen; oder man kann die Not der Gegenwart, den verwickelten Zustand des bürgerlichen und politischen Lebens anklagen, welche dem in kleinen Interessen befangenen Gemüt sich zu den höheren Zwecken der Kunst nicht zu befreien vergönne, indem

> die Intelligenz selbst dieser Not und deren Interessen in Wissenschaften dienstbar sei, welche nur für solche Zwecke Nützlichkeit haben, und sich verführen lasse, sich in diese Trockenheit festzubannen (I, 21).

The passage which follows is especially noteworthy for its characterization of the art of the past in its relation to the modern world:

> Wie es sich nun auch immer hiermit verhalten mag so ist es einmal der Fall, daß die Kunst nicht mehr diejenige Befriedigung der geistigen Bedürfnisse gewährt, welche frühere Zeiten und Völker in ihr gesucht und nur in ihr gefunden haben; eine Befriedigung, welche wenigstens von seiten der Religion aufs innigste mit der Kunst verknüpft war. Die schönen Tage der griechischen Kunst wie die goldene Zeit des späteren Mittelalters sind vorüber. Die Reflexionsbildung unseres heutigen Lebens macht es uns, sowohl in Beziehung auf den Willen als auch auf das Urteil, zum Bedürfnis, allgemeine Gesichtspunkte festzuhalten und danach das Besondere zu regeln, so daß allgemeine Formen, Gesetze, Pflichten, Rechte, Maximen als Bestimmungsgründe gelten und das hauptsächlich Regierende sind. Für das Kunstinteresse aber wie für die Kunstproduktion fordemn wir im allgemeinen mehr eine Lebendigkeit, in welcher das Allgemeine nicht als Gesetz und Maxime vorhanden sei, sondern als mit dem Gemüte und der Empfindung identisch wirke, wie auch in der Phantasie das Allgemeine und Vernünftige als mit einer konkreten sinnlichen Erscheinung in Einheit gebracht enthalten ist. Deshalb ist unsere Gegenwart ihrem allgemeinen Zustande nach der Kunst nicht günstig. Selbst der ausübende Künstler ist nicht etwa nur durch die um ihn her laut werdende Reflexion, durch die allgemeine Gewohnheit des Meinens und Urteilens über die Kunst verleitet und angesteckt, in seine Arbeiten selbst mehr Gedanken hineinzubringen; sondern die ganze geistige Bildung ist von der Art; daß er selber innerhalb solcher reflektierendem Welt und ihrer Verhältnisse steht und nicht etwa durch Willen und

> Entschluß davon abstrahieren oder durch besondere Erziehung oder Entfernung von den Lebensverhältnissen sich eine besondere, das Verlorene wieder ersetzende Einsamkeit erkünsteln und zuwege bringen könnte. [8]

Pater himself nowhere reproduces the more striking phrases of the two paragraphs of Hegel just cited; nowhere, for instance, do we find Pater reiterating with approval the *dicta* of Hegel in the second passage adduced. Pater does not say in so many words that thought and reflection have outstripped fine art, that the beautiful days of Greek art and the golden time of the later Middle Ages are finished. Yet Pater both recognized and tacitly admitted that modern thought, what Hegel called *unserer Vernunftbildung*, 'our intellectual culture,' has outflanked art and that the art of Hellas and of medieval Europe now belong to the past, if in fact they are not actually done with. We find evidence for this especially in the 1867 Winckelmann article, though the evidence is by no means confined to that article. There Pater noticed that the Greeks were careful not to let reflection outstrip sense; the *Venus de Milo* is instanced to show that in Greek art there is no hint of anything beyond the commanding beauty of the masterpiece itself; our minds may be said not only to begin with the finite image but also to end with the finite image. The motif in Greek art Pater

[8] *Vorlesungen über die Ästhetik*, *Einleitung in die Ästhetik*, 1. *Kapitel*, 2. *Abschnitt*; in Friedrich Bassenge's edition, 2 vols. (Berlin/Weimar, 1965), I, 21-22. Subsequent references are to this edition.

conceived of as being co-extensive with the sensuous form, unlike allegory in which the sensuous form may be said to have only an accidental or conventional relation to the motif. Pater remarked in this connection that the Greeks were singularly fortunate in that their highest knowledge about themselves and their relation to the world allowed itself to be "thus turned into an object for the senses." This phrase recalls of course the definition in non-technical language of the Hegelian conception of the Ideal which in the original version only of the Winckelmann article Pater had given at the outset of the passage we are now considering: "Under what conditions does Greek religion thus transform itself into an artistic ideal? 'Ideal' is one of those terms which through a pretended culture have become tarnished and edgeless. How great, then, is the charm when in Hegel's writings we find it attached to a fresh, clear-cut conception! With him the ideal is a Versinnlichen of the idea -- the idea turned into an object of sense" (1867, p. 94). In the Ästhetik, 1. Teil, 1. Kapitel, 3. Abschnitt, Hegel had defined the Ideal thus: "Das Schöne bestimmt sich dadurch als das sinnliche Scheinen der Idee" (I, 117). Pater's discussion seems, however, to refer to a later chapter in the same part of the Ästhetik, for the footnote which in the 1867 version is appended to the passage just cited indicates 1. Teil, 3. Kapitel (I, 155 ff.). Pater is concerned of course to emphasize that for Hegel the idea is converted into an object

for the senses. It is characteristic of Pater's handling of Hegel that he puts the matter as succinctly as possible and indeed as concretely as possible.[9] He thus renders Hegel in non-technical language: "By the idea, stripped of its technical phraseology, he [Hegel] means man's knowledge about himself and his relation to the world, in its most rectified and concentrated form." This conception of the Ideal Pater then formulates as a criterion of art works: "This, then, is what we have to ask about a work of art -- Did it at the age in which it was produced express in terms of sense, did it present to the eye or ear, man's knowledge about himself and his relation to the world in its most rectified and concentrated form?" It was Pater's contention in this article that whereas the _Venus de Milo_ did satisfy this criterion, Fra Angelico's _Coronation of the Virgin_ did not, because unlike the Greek statue, its sensible form was not an adequate embodiment of Angelico's "highest knowledge about man and his relation to the world." In this respect Pater compared the art of the Middle Ages to the art of the East; what in the Middle Ages was the result of "an exaggerated inwardness," in the East was the outcome of "a vagueness, a want of definition in thought, the matter presented to art is unmanageable:

[9] Bernhard Fehr makes this point in "Walter Pater und Hegel," _Englische Studien_, L, _Heft_ 2 (1916), pp. 300-308.

forms of sense struggle vaguely with it" (1867, p. 95).[10]

We should do well to note here Pater's phrase "a want of definition in thought" because it foreshadows already his contention in Plato and Platonism (1893) that objects become real for us in proportion to the extent to which they are defined: "Objects, real objects, as we know, grow in reality towards us in proportion as we define their various qualities" (p. 34). It was this want of definition that characterized the painting of Angelico and the painters of his time; but Pater was also aware that it is necessary for the artist to set certain limits to the process of definition itself: "The Greek mind [Pater remarked in the 1867 Winckelmann article, p. 95] had advanced to a particular stage of self-reflection, but was careful not to pass beyond it." The reason for this conscious, if it was indeed conscious, delimitation may be found in Plato and Platonism, p. 34, where in the passage already adduced Pater went on to say: "And yet, from another point of view, definition, qualification, is a negative process; it is as if each added quality took from the object we are defining one or more potential qualities. The more definite things become as objects of sensible or other empirical apprehension, the more, it might be said from the logician's point of view, have we denied about them. It might seem that their

[10] Cf. Bernhard Berenson, The Italian Painters of the Renaissance, Phaidon edition (London 1959), Plate 132.

increasing reality as objects of sense was in direct proportion to the increase of their distance from that perfect Being which is everywhere and at all times in every possible mode of being." Or, again, p. 35: "Of the most concrete object, as of the most abstract, it might be said, that it more properly is not than is". It was the task which Pater had imposed upon himself in Plato and Platonism to record some of the early excesses of the Pre-Socratics: "Vain puerilities! you may exclaim:-- with justice. Yet such are the considerations which await the mind that suffers itself to dwell awhile on the abstract formula to which the "rational theology" of Xenophanes leads him" (p.35). Greek art, according to Pater in the 1867 Winckelmann article, pp. 95-96, had been more fortunate than Greek philosophy in this respect: "In Greek thought [Pater wrote] the 'lordship of the soul' is recognised; that lordship gives authority and divinity to human eyes and hands and feet; nature is thrown into the background. But there Greek thought finds its happy limit; it has not yet become too inward; the mind has not begun to boast of its independence of the flesh; the spirit has not yet absorbed everything with its emotions, nor reflected its own colour everywhere. It has indeed committed itself to a train of reflection which must end in a defiance of form, of all that is outward, in an exaggerated idealism. But that end is still distant; it has not yet plunged into the depths of Christian mysticism";

Berenson in The Study and Criticism of Italian Art, Third Series (London 1916), pp. 32-34, put the matter thus:

> Now it is this tactlessness, this recklessness, this blinkered way of pursuing an idea or formula or doctrine to its logical bitter end, never realizing the conflict with another idea, never seeing the absurdities, if not ferocities, it ultimately leads to, that we object to in intellectualism. With intellectual art in itself we have no quarrel, for it is the supremest form of art, the one from which all the others draw their inspiration, and without which there would be none deserving the name. Indeed, it was only when at last after myriads of years of manual and visual effort made by nameless precursors, the Greek mind, more immediately preceded by feeble Egyptian and Babylonian attempts, applied itself consciously and deliberately to problems of proportion, posture, rhythm, and composition, that the impulse to represent and counterfeit and adorn ceased to be mere handicraft, and became a clarified system of design worthy to be called art. For only then was it able to transcend the haphazard of the actual and to present us with an ideal, yet convincingly possible, humanity and humanized world. But at its best moments- those moments so brief, yet of everlasting consequence - Greek art never gave way to intellectualism, that is to say, it never allowed itself to lose sight of the aesthetic end by too great absorption in the scientific means. On the contrary, it not only carefully kept these out of sight, but unhesitatingly sacrificed them to that high tact and happy compromise without which art is no more to be attained than life is to be lived. Still less would Greek art before Pergamon have abandoned itself to the logic of any one principle, no matter how necessary and fruitful the principle itself might be when used as an ingredient. But logic has been the ruin of most of the more ambitious and more intellectual art movements of the last eight centuries, from Gothic architecture to Cubist

painting. For all we know, logic may reign supreme in a mechanical universe, but it enjoys a far less general obedience in the world of men, a world chiefly of rival desires, ideals, and dreams rather than of law. In this world every one and everything brings his or its own logic, and any system carried far enough is certain to cross another, if not to end in a blind alley or absurdity. Life is impoverished, not enriched by the fanatical adherence to one desire, one ideal, one dream fostered and permitted to hypnotize and mesmerize us into action. Few of the worst horrors of history are due to other causes, and it alone is responsible for the most monstrous horror of all which is being enacted now.

It was Pater's contention, then, that the Greek ideal was one "in which the idea does not outstrip or lie beyond its sensible embodiment" (1867 p. 96). The subsequent development of Christianity with its own conception of truth as well as the development of our modern intellectual culture have made the Greek ideal no longer viable in art because our highest knowledge about ourselves and our relation to the world no longer permits adequate sensuous embodiment. Berenson recognized that visual equivalents had failed both religious art as well as "representational art"; we find this for example in the entry in the diary for 17 November 1949 (Sunset and Twilight, pp. 151-152). In such terms had Hegel defined for Pater the predicament in which modern art found itself. With Hegel Pater concurred in his recognition that the Greek ideal belonged by its very nature to the past; with the German philosopher he also concurred in showing equanimity in the face of the conclusion that Greek art was of the past:

> The longer we contemplate that Hellenic ideal, in which man is at unity with himself, with his physical nature, with the outward, the more we may be inclined to regret that he should ever have passed beyond it, to contend for a perfection that makes the blood turbid, and frets the flesh, and discredits the actual world about us. But if he was to be saved from the *ennui* which ever attaches itself to realization, even the realization of perfection, it was necessary that a conflict should come, that some sharper note should grieve the perfect harmony, in order that the spirit, chafed by it, might beat out at last a broader and profounder music (1867, p. 104).

With the effect of Christianity, of the Christian conception of truth, upon the sensuous form of art we do not propose to deal here at any great length because we are primarily concerned in this part of the dissertation with the relation generally of abstract thought to art and to the life of artistic perfection in Pater's writings where the Christian conception of truth is subsumed under the broader consideration of whether abstract thought and art are compatible. Pater, it will be noted, devoted very little space to this question in the Winckelmann article. He was concerned with the question whether Christianity had in fact hastened the decline of classical art. His own answer to this question is characteristic of the strong anti-Christian bias at this stage in his intellectual development: "The worship of sorrow, the crucifixion of the senses, the expectation of the end of the world, are not in themselves principles of artistic rejuvenescence" (1867, p. 106). This sardonic remark is quite typical of Pater's neo-paganism

in the 1860s and bears out the contention of his biographer that he enjoyed shocking (Thomas Wright), I, 169.) Still, Pater was quite capable of framing the question in non-emotive terms; and he did just this immediately below the passage just adduced: "The sensuous expression of conceptions which unreservedly discredit the world of sense, was the delicate problem which Christian art had before it. If we think of mediaeval painting as it ranges from the early German schools, still with the air of a charnel-house about them, to the clear loveliness of Perugino, we shall see that the problem was met." It is evident that Pater had Hegel in mind when he wrote these words because in the next paragraph he observed: "Even in the worship of sorrow the native blitheness of art asserted itself; the religious spirit, as Hegel says, 'smiled through its tears'" (1867, p. 106). This is an allusion to Hegel's summary definition of romantic art:

> Dennoch kann auch in der romantischen Kunst, obgleich das Leiden und der Schmerz in ihr das Gemüt und subjektive Innere tiefer als bei den Alten trifft, eine geistige Innigkeit, eine Freudigkeit in der Ergebung, eine Seligkeit im Schmerz und Wonne im Leiden, ja eine Wollust selbst in der Marter zur Darstellung kommen. Selbst in der italienischen ernst-religiösen Musik durchdringt diese Lust und Verklärung des Schmerzes den Ausdruck der Klage. Dieser Ausdruck ist im Romantischen überhaupt das Lächeln durch Tränen. Die Träne gehört dem Schmerz, das Lächeln der Heiterkeit, und so bezeichnet das Lächeln im Weinen dies Beruhigtsein in sich bei Qual und Leiden (I, 160).

Earlier in the Winckelmann article Pater had observed in connection with Fra Angelico: "For him all that is outward or sensible in his work [the

Coronation of the Virgin]-- the hair like wool, the rosy nimbus, the crown of pearl-- is only the symbol or type of an inexpressible world to which he wishes to direct the thoughts; he would have shrunk from the notion that what the eye apprehended was all. Such forms of art [Pater added], then, are inadequate to the matter they clothe; they remain ever below its level" (1867, p. 95). But Pater's own position is quite clear; his ideal is Winckelmann's handling of the sensuous side of Greek art and this he recognized was adverse to abstract thought, though in Plato and Platonism (1893) he was later to contend that the process of abstraction actually enhanced our appreciation of the sensuous. This was of course very much later. Here, however, the sensuousness of Greek art is contrasted with the colourlessness of what is intellectualized and spiritualized:

> One result of this temperament is a serenity, a Heiterkeit, which characterizes Winckelmann's handling of the sensuous side of Greek art. This serenity is, perhaps, at bottom a negative quality, it is the absence of any sense of want, or corruption, or shame. With the sensuous of Greek art he deals in the pagan manner; and what is implied in that? It is sometimes said that art is a means of escape from "the tyranny of the senses." It may be so for the spectator; he may find that the spectacle of supreme works of art takes from the life of the senses something of its turbid fever. But this is possible for the spectator only because the artist in producing those works has gradually sunk his intellectual and spiritual ideas in sensuous from. He may live, as Keats lived, a pure life; but his soul, like that of Plato's false astronomer, becomes more and more immersed in sense, until nothing else

> has any interest for him. How could such an one ever again endure the greyness of the ideal or spiritual world? The spiritualist is satisfied in seeing the sensuous elements escape from his conceptions; his interest grows, as the dyed garment bleaches in the keener air. But the artist steeps his thought again and again into the fire of colour. To the Greek this immersion in the sensuous was indifferent. Greek sensuousness, therefore, does not fever the blood; it is shameless and childlike. But Christianity, with its uncompromising idealism, discrediting the slightest touch of sense, has lighted up for the artistic life, with its inevitable sensuousness, a background of flame. "I did but taste a little honey with the end of the rod that was in my hand, and lo, I must die." It is hard to pursue that life without something of conscious disavowal of a spiritual world; and this imparts to genuine artistic interests a kind of intoxication. From this intoxication Winckelmann is free; he fingers those pagan marbles with unsinged hands, with no sense of shame or loss. That is to deal with the sensuous side of art in the pagan manner (1867, pp. 103-104).

Pater's handling of the effect of the Christian ideal on the sensuousness of art is thus shown to be incidental to his neo-paganism. It is different, however, with the effect of modern intellectual culture on the sensuous form of art and the possibilities in modern life worthy of artistic treatment. It is to these considerations that Pater turned in the final pages of the Winckelmann article. The redaction of that article has excized a number of sentences which in the _Westminster Review_ version contributed something towards the understanding of Pater's own definition of the problem. Pater first defined Hellenic culture

in terms of "breadth, centrality, with blitheness and repose" and then asked whether this culture was a thing of the past: "Can we bring down that ideal into the gaudy, perplexed light of modern life?" ~~Pater asked.~~ His answer to this question at once admits the difficulty of the undertaking, while at the same time it admits the possibility. The way in which Pater has framed his answer recalls in its phraseology the passages from the Introduction to the Ästhetik in which Hegel had evaluated the art of Greece and of the Middle Age in terms of our modern intellectual culture. There are certain marked differences, however, which must be noted. Pater, unlike Hegel, did not feel that it devolved upon him to exhort his readers to turn to the "scientific" study of art in order to understand what the essence of art is. Characteristically Pater preferred to define the problem not in terms of modern abstractions but rather in terms of the greatest poet of the modern world, namely, Goethe, whom Pater held to be the prototype of the modern artist. To Goethe Winckelmann is subordinated because while his life offers certain marked similarities to that of the classical Greeks with whom he was for the most part preoccupied, Pater quite rightly recognized that Winckelmann's relation to the modern world was atypical: "The aim of a right criticism [wrote Pater] is to place Winckelmann in an intellectual perspective, of which Goethe is the foreground. For, after all,

he is infinitely less than Goethe; it is chiefly because at certain points he comes in contact with Goethe that criticism entertains consideration of him. His relation to modern culture is a peculiar one. He is not of the modern world; nor is he of the eighteenth century, although so much of his outer life is characteristic of it" (1867, pp. 107-108). It is as a precursor as well as a type that Pater saw Winckelmann in relation to Goethe. For this reason the article which was ostensibly about Winckelmann concludes as it began with Goethe at the forefront. In this way both Winckelmann and Hegel are subsumed by Pater under Goethe. The rationale of the concluding paragraphs of the Winckelmann article, like the article as a whole, is Hegel transposed and translated into non-dialectical terms; the ideas are subordinated to personalities in whose artistic creations are worked out in concrete terms the solution of the problem which Hegel had formulated in his Ästhetik. This may be seen first in the paragraph which approximates in certain respects the passage adduced from Hegel's Ästhetik at the outset of this section:

> Certainly, for us of the modern world, with its conflicting claims, its entangled interests, distracted by so many sorrows, so many preoccupations, so bewildering an experience, the problem of unity with ourselves in blitheness and repose, is far harder than it was for the Greek within the simple terms of antique life. Yet, no less than ever, the intellect demands completeness, centrality.

> It is this which Winckelmann prints on the imagination of Goethe, at the beginning of his culture in its original and simplest form, as in a fragment of Greek art itself stranded on that littered, indeterminate shore of Germany in the eighteenth century. In Winckelmann this type comes to him, not as in a book or a theory, but importunately in a passionate life and personality. For Goethe, possessing all modern interests, ready to be lost in the perplexed currents of modern thought, he defines in clearest outline the problem of culture, balance, unity with onesself, consummate Greek modelling (1867, p. 108).

Pater is next concerned to reiterate his thesis which, as we have already seen was first Hegel's, that there could be no question of reviving the past because the conditions for modern culture differed in kind from those of classical culture. He did not share Winckelmann's idea that if we could but understand classical art we should then as a matter of course be able to reproduce the sculpture of classical times. Yet Winckelmann himself at the end of the Geschichte der Kunst des Altertums, 12. Buch, 3. Kapitel, 13. Abschnitt (VI, 365-366), seems to have realized that it was perhaps better after all to posit this as a possibility rather than an actuality; Pater on the contrary maintained an appreciation of the differences between one age and another was the first condition of an historical revival: "In opposition to that classicism become a platitude, Winckelmann says, the Hellenic manner is the blossom of the Hellenic spirit and culture, that spirit and culture depend on certain

conditions, and those conditions are peculiar to a certain age. Reproduce those conditions, attain the actual root, and blossoms may again be produced of a triumphant colour" (1867, p. 107). The possibility is indeed admitted, but for Pater, it remains merely a possibility. The reasons for this very tentative position are made explicit in the last paragraph but one of the Winckelmann article and it will be noted especially that in this paragraph Pater allowed for the possibility that the preoccupation with metaphysical thought might have to be abandoned in the interests of art. Certainly philosophy is here subordinated to culture. While Pater's endeavour further recalls Hegel, it will be seen here that unlike Hegel Pater refused to allow the dominant interests of the age full rein; in this respect Pater was less realistic than the German philosopher who in this instance accepted the actual modern intellectual culture as the real culture of the age and quite logically proceeded to the cultivation of aesthetics. Pater was prevented from concurring in the conclusion of Hegel because he realized, quite rightly, that Goethe offered an alternative to Hegel's philosophical preoccupation and that alternative was an artistic rather than a philosophical solution to the problem of the right relation of modern abstract thought to art and the artistic life:

> It could no longer be solved, as in Phryne ascending naked out of the water, by perfection of bodily

form, or any joyful union with the world without; the shadows had grown too long, the light too solemn for that. It could hardly be solved as in Pericles or Phidias, by the direct exercise of any single talent; amid the manifold claims of modern culture that could only have ended in a thin, one-sided growth. Goethe's Hellenism was of another order, the _Allgemeinheit_ and _Heiterkeit_, the completeness and serenity of a watchful exigent intellectualism. _Im Ganzen, Guten, Wahren, resolut zu leben_, is Goethe's description of his own higher life; and what is meant by life in the whole, _im Ganzen_? It means the life of one for whom, over and over again, what was once precious has become indifferent. Every one who aims at the life of culture is met by many forms of it, arising out of the intense, laborious, one-sided development of some special talent. They are the brightest enthusiasms the world has to show. They do not care to weigh the claims which this or that alien form of culture makes upon them. But the pure instinct of self-culture cares not so much to reap all that these forms of culture can give, as to find in them its own strength. The demand of the intellect is to feel itself alive. It must see into the laws, the operation, the intellectual reward of every divided form of culture; but only that it may measure the relation between itself and them. It struggles with those forms till its secret is won from each, and then lets each fall back into its place in the supreme, artistic view of life. With a kind of passionate coldness such natures rejoice to be away from and past their former selves. Above all, they are jealous of that _abandon_ to one special gift which really limits their capabilities. It would have been easy for Goethe, with the gift of a sensuous nature, to let it overgrow him. But the utmost a sensuous gift can produce are the poems of Keats, or the paintings of Giorgione; and often in some stray line of Shakespeare, some fleeting tone of Raphael, the whole power of Keats or Giorgione strikes on one from its due place in a complete composite nature. It is easy with the other worldly

> gifts to be a schöne Seele; but to the large vision of Goethe that seemed to be a phase of life that a man might feel all around and leave behind him. Again, it is easy to indulge the common-place metaphysical instinct. But a taste for metaphysics may be one of those things which we must renounce if we mean to mould our lives to artistic perfection. Philosophy serves culture not by the fancied gift of absolute or transcendental knowledge, but by suggesting questions which help one to detect the passion and strangeness and dramatic contrasts of life (1867, pp. 108-109).

Pater found in Goethe, as Hegel before him had found in the German poet, both the formulation of this particular question and the endeavour to solve it in concrete terms of art. Goethe's culture did not remain latent; it always ended in the production of a work of art. Allowing for the fact that poetry is the art form which, together with music, corresponds to that stage in the development of the human mind to which the modern European has attained, then it will be in poetry that the ideal will find its adequate expression, its adequate sensuous embodiment: "Only in this varied literary form can art command that width, variety, delicacy of resources, which will enable it to deal with the conditions of modern life." By "poetry" Pater means what the Germans term Dichtung:[11] "Let us understand by poetry all literary production which attains the power of giving joy, by its form as distinct from its matter." Pater found an instance of this realization of the ideal in Goethe's Elective Affinities: "Goethe's Wahlverwandtschaften is a high instance of modern art dealing thus with modern life;

[11] Berenson thus uses the term in Aesthetics and

it regards that life as the modern mind must regard it, but reflects upon it blitheness and repose. Natural laws we shall never modify, embarrass us as they may; but there is still something in the nobler or less noble attitude with which we watch their fatal combinations. In _Wahlverwandtschaften_ [the redaction omits the first two words of this sentence] this entanglement, this network of law, becomes a tragic situation, in which a group of noble men and women work out a supreme _dénouement_. Who, if he foresaw all, would fret against circumstances which endow one at the end with so high an experience?" With these words Pater brought to an end the 1867 Winckelmann article. The three final paragraphs with which we have been concerned here were to be modified somewhat in the redaction of the article (Cf. 1867, pp. 108-110; _The Renaissance_, 1910, 227-232). We have therefore considered them here in their original form.

The final impression which the original form of the Winckelmann article conveys is that of modern writers Goethe fully actualized what was already latent within the conditions of modern life, but this conclusion was not Pater's final view of the matter. The ostensibly unique position which Goethe held in the Winckelmann article was subsequently modified; Victor Hugo was introduced and in fact placed above the German poet. To a certain extent this may be interpreted as

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History, Anchor Books edition (New York 1965), p. 54.

evidence of a change in Pater's literary tastes, a growing interest in French literature which to some extent superseded his youthful enthusiasm for German philosophy and literature. This may be admitted, provided that it is also conceded that this is by no means the full explanation, for there is in the redaction of the Winckelmann article the suggestion that Goethe was perhaps after all not so adequate as Pater had imagined in 1867: "In those romances of Goethe and Victor Hugo [Pater wrote in the redaction], in some excellent work done _after_ them, this entanglement, this network of law, becomes the tragic situation, in which certain groups of noble men and women work out for themselves a supreme _Dénouement_ [_sic_]. Who, if he saw through all, would fret against the chain of circumstances which endows one at the end with those great experiences?" Not only are the instances of modern writers dealing with the complex conditions of modern life increased but the achievements of the Germans now appear to be offset by those of the French. We have here of course an example of Pater's caution, his unwillingness to appear one-sided, to stand by one national literature against another. Yet there is another reason which is not immediately apparent to the reader of the Winckelmann article: Goethe, despite his undoubted success in dealing with the complexity of modern life in _Faust I_ and _Elective Affinities_, two works adduced in the 1867 article, was less successful in _Faust II_. This is made quite

explicit in the 1869 Leonardo article in the passage in which Pater compared da Vinci with Goethe:

> Sometimes this curiosity came in conflict with the desire of beauty; it tended to make him [Leonardo] go too far below that outside of things in which art begins and ends. This struggle between the reason and its ideas and the senses, the desire of beauty, is the key to Leonardo's life at Milan -- his restlessness, his endless retouchings, his odd experiments with colour. How much must he leave unfinished, how much recommence! His problem was the transmutation of ideas into images. What he had attained so far had been the mastery of that earlier Florentine style, with its naive and limited sensuousness. Now he was to entertain in this narrow medium those divinations of a humanity too wide for it -- that larger vision of the opening world which is only not too much for the great irregular art of Shakespeare; and everywhere the effort is visible in the work of his hands. This agitation, this perpetual delay, give him an air of weariness and ennui. To others he seems to be aiming at an impossible effect, to do something that art, that painting, can never do. Often the expression of physical beauty at this or that point seems strained and marred in the effort, as in those heavy German foreheads -- too heavy and German for perfect beauty.

Pater continues:

> There was a touch of Germany in that genius which, as Goethe said, had "müde sich gedacht," thought itself weary. What an anticipation of modern Germany, for instance, in that debate on the question whether sculpture or painting is the nobler art! But there is this difference between him and the German, that, with all that curious science, the German would have thought nothing more was needed; and the name of Goethe himself reminds one how great for the artist may be the danger of over-much science; how Goethe, who, in the *Elective Affinities* and the first part of Faust, does transmute ideas into

images, who wrought many such transmutations, did not invariably find the spell-word, and in the second part of Faust, presents us with a mass of science which has no artistic character at all. But Leonardo will never work till the happy moment comes -- that moment of bien-être, which to imaginative men is a moment of invention. On this moment he waits; other moments are but a preparation or after-taste of it. Few men distinguish between them as jealously as he did. Hence so many flaws even in the choicest work. But for Leonardo the distinction is absolute, and in the moment of bien-être the alchemy complete;the idea is stricken into colour and imagery; a cloudy mysticism is refined to a subdued and graceful mystery, and painting pleases the eye while it satisfies the soul.[12]

We are thus brought back again to Hegel's analysis of the dilemma which confronts the artist in the modern world: whether to turn his back on the intellectual culture of the present, which is virtually impossible for him to do, or, attempt to come to terms with modern "scientific", for Hegel, "philosophic," thinking, an undertaking which at best can only be conceived of as a qualified success because modern thought has out-stripped its visual equivalent. It is to Hegel's Ästhetik, then, rather than to Goethe's scientific activities or his proscription of Newton and the mathematicians that we must turn if we wish to understand aright Pater's remarks about "science" or "thought". Certainly the Winckelmann article provides the warrant for such an interpretation of the passage

[12] "Notes on Leonardo da Vinci," Fortnightly Review, VI new series,(November 1869), p. 501. Cf. The Renaissance, 1910, pp. 112-114.

just adduced. An examination of Pater's by no means infrequent allusions to Goethe would show that there is no awareness on the part of Pater of just how important to Goethe's character, his intellectual development, and his writings, especially his writing on art, were the scientific activities in which he engaged; when they are mentioned it is always with misgivings, as for example in "Coleridge's Writings":

> It is that flawless temperament in Wordsworth which keeps his conviction of a latent intelligence in nature within the limits of sentiment or instinct, and confines it to those delicate and subdued shades of expression which perfect art allows. In sadder dispositions, that is in the majority of cases, where such a conviction has existed, it has stiffened into a formula, it has frozen into a scientific or pseudo-scientific theory. For the perception of those affinities brings one so near the absorbing speculative problems of life -- optimism, the proportion of man to his place in nature, his prospects in relation to it -- that it ever tends to become theory through their contagion. Even in Göthe [sic], who has brilliantly handled the subject in his lyrics entitled "Gott und Welt," it becomes something stiffer than poetry; it is tempered by the "pale cast" of his technical knowledge of the nature of colours, of anatomy, of the metamorphosis of plants.[13]

Already here in the Coleridge article we detect the censure that Pater was subsequently to pass on Goethe's science in the Leonardo article. Goethe's scientific activities viewed in relation to his literary activities are held by Pater to have been

[13] Westminster Review, XXIX new series(January 1866), pp. 109-110.

detrimental to their artistic value, to be remarked upon in passing, certainly, but at the same time to be regretted because "the 'pale cast' of his technical knowledge" is considered to have been adverse to the artistic quality of the poet's work. There is in Pater not even that note of approbation for Goethe's contributions to science which Madame de Staël struck in the third part of De l'Allemagne, a work which Pater had certainly consulted as both the Winckelmann article and the postscript to Appreciations evidence.[14] Thus, in view of Pater's essentially negative attitude towards Goethe's scientific activities, we must seriously query Anthony Ward's gratuitous supposition in Walter Pater: The Idea in Nature (London 1966), pp. 27-28, that George Henry Lewes's two-volume Life and Works of Goethe (1855)[15] influenced Pater's appreciation of Goethe as a man of science because while Lewes was the first to deal at length with Goethe's "scientific" attitude towards the world, this aspect of Goethe is treated negatively by Pater.

[14] Cf. Mme. de Staël, De l'Allemagne, Les Grands Écrivains de la France, Nouvelles Éditions, publiées d'après les manuscrits et les éditions originales avec des variantes, une Introduction, des Notices et des Notes par la Comtesse Jean de Pange avec le concours de Mlle. Simone Balayé, Bibliothécaire à la Bibliothèque Nationale (Paris, Librairie Hachette, 1959), IV, p. 202 and n. 1; 250; 268. Pater mentions Mme. de Staël in "Coleridge's Writings" (1866, p. 113), and adduces De l'Allemagne in "Winckelmann," (1867, pp. 81, 87) and "Romanticism," Macmillan's Magazine, XXXV (Nov. 1876),

It may also be questioned whether Goethe as represented by Lewes influenced Pater's own notion of "the relative"; there is no necessary connection between "the relative" and the name of Goethe in the second paragraph of the 1866 Coleridge article. Certainly there exists "a similarity both of critical terms employed and in language and attitudes" between Pater and Lewes on the question of Goethe's preoccupation with the real rather than with the ideal and these similarities the reader of both authors should be pleased to be able to detect;[16] but here again severe qualifications are demanded if Ward's thesis is to be accepted. Certainly the antithesis which Lewes drew between the objective and the subjective, the real and the ideal, by way of delineating Goethe's mental characteristics is one which the student of Pater will note with interest in attempting to evaluate that writer's attitude towards Goethe. Thus in Book II, Chapter II, Lewes wrote:

> Frederick Schlegel (and after him Coleridge) aptly said that every man was born either a Platonist or an Aristotelian. This distinction is often expressed in the terms _subjective_ and _objective_ intellects. Perhaps we shall best define these

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66. Cf. _Appreciations_ (1910), pp. 248-249.

[15] The dates for the several editions of Lewes's _Life_ are: 1864, 1873 [abridged], 1875, 1882, 1890, 1906, 1908; references here are to the 1890 edition.

[16] This similarity obtains also between Pater and Jowett.

by calling the objective intellect one which is eminently <u>impersonal</u>, and the subjective intellect one which is eminently <u>personal</u>; the former disengaging itself as much as possible from its own prepossessions, striving to see and represent objects as they exist; the other viewing all objects in the light of its own feelings and preconceptions. It is needless to add that no mind can be exclusively objective, nor exclusively subjective; but every mind has a more or less dominant tendency in one of these directions. We see the contrast in Philosophy, as in Art. The realist argues from Nature upwards, starting from reality, and never long losing sight of it, but even in the adventurous flights of hypothesis and speculation striving to make his hypothesis correspond with realities. The idealist starts from the same conception, and seeks in realities only visible illustrations of a deeper existence. The achievements of modern Science, and the masterpieces of Art, prove that the grandest generalisations and the most elevated types can only be reached by the former method; and that what is called the "ideal school," so far from having the superiority which it claims, is only more lofty in its pretensions; the realist, with more modest pretensions, achieves loftier results. The Objective and Subjective, or, as they are also improperly called, the Real and the Ideal, are thus contrasted as the termini of two opposite lines of thought. In philosophy, in Morals, and in Art, we see a constant antagonism between these two tendencies. Thus in Morals the Platonists are those who seek the highest morality <u>out</u> of human nature, instead of in the healthy development of all human tendencies, and their due co-ordination; they hope, in the <u>suppression</u> of integral faculties, to attain some superhuman standard. They superpose <u>ab extra</u>, instead of trying to develope [<u>sic</u>] <u>ab intra</u>. They draw from their own minds, or from the dogmas handed to them by tradition, the notion of a mould, into which they attempt to fuse the activity of Nature (1890, pp. 51-52).

This broad division between the "subjective" and the "objective" intellects is one which Pater preserves (better say, observes): it obtains, for example, in the first part of Chapter VII of Plato and Platonism in which Pater treats of Plato's so-called "theory of ideas." It will be observed that Pater here judiciously observes Lewes's proviso that no intellect may be classified rigidly as either "subjective" or "objective":

> "Two things," says Aristotle, "might rightly be attributed to Socrates: inductive reasoning, and universal definitions." Now when Aristotle says this of Socrates, he is recording the institution of a method, which might be applied in the way just indicated [Pater is alluding here to conchological analogy, pp. 157-158], to natural objects, to such a substance as carbon, or to such natural processes as heat or motion; but which, by Socrates himself, as by Plato after him, was applied almost exclusively to moral phenomena, to the generalisation of aesthetic, political, ethical ideas, of the laws of operation (for the essence of every true conception, or definition, or idea, is a law of operation) of the feelings and the will. To get a notion, a definition, or idea, of motion, for example, which shall not exclude the subtler forms of it, heat for instance -- to get a notion of carbon, which shall include not common charcoal only, but the diamond, a thing superficially so unlike it, and which shall also exclude, perhaps, some other substance, superficially almost indistinguishable from it: such is the business of physical science, in obedience to rules, outlined by Bacon in the first book of the Novum Organum, for securing those acts of "inclusion" and "exclusion," inclusiones, exclusiones, naturae, debitae, as he says, "which the nature of things requires," if our thoughts are not to misrepresent

> them.
>
> It was a parallel process, a process of inclusion, that one's resultant idea should be adequate, of rejection or exclusion, that this idea should be not redundant, which Socrates applied to practice; exercising, as we see in the Platonic Dialogues, the two opposed functions of συναγωγή, and διαίρεσις, for the formation of just ideas of Temperance, Wisdom, Bravery, Justice itself — a classification of the phenomena of the entire world of feeling and action. Ideas, if they fulfil their proper purpose, represent to the mind such phenomena, for its convenience, but it may easily also misrepresent them. In the transition from the particulars to the general, and again in the transition from the general idea, the mental word, to the spoken or written word, to what we call the definition, a door lies open, both for the adulteration and the diminution of the proper content, of our conception, our definition. The first growth of the Platonic "ideas," as we see it in Socrates, according to the report of Aristotle, provided against this twofold misrepresentation. Its aim is to secure, in the terms of our discourse with others and with ourselves, precise equivalence to what they denote. It was a "mission" to go about Athens and challenge people to guard the inlets of error, in the passage from facts to their thoughts about them, in the passage from thoughts to words. It was an intellectual gymnastic, to test, more exactly than they were in the habit of doing, the equivalence of words they used so constantly as Just, Brave, Beautiful, to the thoughts they had; of those thoughts to the facts of experience, which it was the business of those thoughts precisely to represent; to clear the mental air; to arrange the littered work-chamber of the mind (1910, pp. 159-162).

Pater hastens however to point out that the objective intellect is not to be found unadulterated in the Platonic Dialogues; the subjective or idealist

intellect is also there, although, as he observes, Aristotle claimed that Socrates had stopped short of realism, not of course in Lewes's use of the term but in Pater's use of the term in opposition to nominalsim and conceptualism at the outset of the first part of the chapter: "Realism, which supposes the abstraction, Animal for instance, or The Just, to be not a mere name nomen, as with the nominalists, nor a mere subjective thought as with the conceptualists, but to be res, a thing in itself, independent of the particular instances which come into and pass out of it, as also of the particular mind which entertains it:-- that is one of the fixed and formal answers to this question; and Plato is the father of all realists" (p. 151):

> In many of Plato's Dialogues we see no more than the ordered reflex of this process, informal as it was in the actual practice of Socrates. Out of the accidents of a conversation, as from the confused currents of life and action, the typical forms of the vices and virtues emerge in definite outline. The first contention of The Republic, for instance, is to establish in regard to the nature of Justice, terms as exactly conterminous with thoughts, thoughts as exactly conterminous with moral facts, as the notion of carbon is for the naturalist, when it has come to include both charcoal and the diamond, on the basis of the essential law of their operation as experience reveals it. Show us, not merely accidental truths about it; but, by the doing of what (τί ποιοῦσα) in the very soul of its possessor, itself by itself, Justice is a good, and Injustice a bad thing. That illustrates exactly what is meant by "an idea", the force of "knowledge through ideas," in the particular instance of Justice.

It will include perhaps, on the one hand, forms of Justice so remote from the Justice of our every-day experience as to seem inversions of it; it will clearly exclude, on the other hand, acts and thoughts, not it, yet, phenomenally, so like it, as to deceive the very gods; and its area will be expanded sufficiently to include, not the individual only, but the state. And you, the philosophic student, were to do that, not for one virtue only, but for Piety, and Beauty, and the State itself, and Knowledge, and Opinion, and the Good. Nay, you might go on and do the same thing for the physical, when you came to the end of the moral,world, were life long enough, and if you had the humour for it:-- for Motion, Number, Colour, Sound. That, then, was the first growth of the Platonic ideas, as derived immediately from Socrates, whose formal contribution to philosophy had been "universal definitions," developed "inductively," by the twofold method of "inclusion" and "exclusion."

Aristotle adds, however, that Socrates had stopped at the point here indicated: he had not gone on, like some others, to make those universal notions or definitions "separable" -- separable, that is to say, from the particular and concrete instances, from which he had gathered them. Separable: χωριστός (famous word!) that is precisely what general notions become in what is specially called "the Platonic Theory of Ideas." The "Ideas" of Plato are, in truth, neither more nor less than those universal definitions, those universal conceptions, as they look, as they could not but look, amid the peculiar lights and shadows, in the singularly constituted atmosphere, under the strange laws of refraction, and in the proper perspective, of Plato's house of thought. By its peculiarities, subsequent thought-- philosophic, poetic, theological -- has been greatly influenced; by the intense subjectivities, the accidents, so to speak, of Plato's genius, of Plato himself; the ways constitutional with him, the magic or trick of his personality, in regarding the intellectual material he was occupied with -- by

> Plato's psychology. And it is characteristic of him, again, that those pecularities of his mental attitude are evidenced informally; by a tendency, as we said, by the mere general tone in which he speaks of Beauty, for instance, "as it really is," of all that "really is," under its various forms; a manner of speaking, not explicit, but veiled, in various degrees, under figures, as at the end of the sixth book of The Republic, or under mythological fantasies, like those of the Phaedrus. He seems to have no inclination for the responsibilities of definite theory; for a system such as that of the Neo-Platonists for instance, his own later followers, who, in a kind of prosaic and cold-blooded transcendentalism, developed as definite philosophic dogma, hard enough in more senses than one, what in Plato is to the last rather poetry than metaphysical reasoning -- the irrepressible because almost unconscious poetry, which never deserts him, even when treating of what is neither more nor less than a chapter in the rudiments of logic(pp. 162-164).

Similarly in Pater's review of William Samuel Lilly's A Century of Revolution, in The Nineteenth Century Pater makes no rigid distinction between the two types of intellect; the third paragraph of that review is characteristic of Pater's way of handling the question as well as of his attitude towards the concrete on the one hand and the abstract on the other:

> But Mr. Lilly is not only a critic of the Revolution, of the tree and its supposed fruits. His exceptions come by way of the assertion of a counter-principle, an abstract ideal of his own; and effectiveness in asserting an abstract ideal can, for the most part, be attained only at the cost of those very qualifications in which at times Mr. Lilly shows himself so expert, and in which what we may call the 'aesthetic' spirit, driving always at the concrete, at the precise differentiation of the concrete, event or person,

finds its opportunity. It is the spirit which in dealing with the Revolution, for instance, or with Catholicism Mr. Lilly here so ably upholds against it, does justice to the irregularities, the inconsistencies, the 'faults,' as the geologist calls them, which traverse and set at nought our abstract or ideal assumptions of this nature or that 'tendency' in human affairs. One thing, certainly, the Revolution left to the century which followed it -- a large stock, not merely of questionable abstract propositions, but also of abstract terms of very doubtful serviceableness in the study of history. Abstract terms like _Liberty_, _Democracy_, _Atheism_ -- abstract propositions about them in whatever interest, make one think sometimes of those worn old screws which turn either way with equal facility, and compact nothing. What we mean might be illustrated by Mr. Lilly's chapter on 'The Revolution and Art;' telling as it really is as an attack on the 'naturalism' which he holds to be the fruit of the Revolution, especially in literature. But was 'naturalism,' even as he understands it, finding it at its height in M. Zola's _Nana_, really born in 1789? did it not exist, like the revolutionary temper itself, from of old? Is not a certain kind of naturalism an element in all living art? And then _Nana_ is very far from being characteristic of the whole scope of M. Zola's work. Was not the Revolution, after all, a kind of vicious running to seed of that principle of Individualism so nobly vindicated by Mr. Lilly himself as a discovery of Christianity or Catholicism?" (LXVI [December 1899], pp. 992-993).

We have said that Pater observes the broad distinction between the "objective" and the "subjective" intellect and illustrated how in the case of Plato and the Platonic Socrates, corrected by Aristotle, these two attitudes towards the phenomena of nature and the phenomena of the mind subsist. Nowhere does Pater conceive of Goethe in this way, though it is

possible to show that he would have represented him in these terms very much as he did Plato; in the Winckelmann article Pater conceived of Goethe as embodying both the classical and the romantic elements: "Goethe illustrates that union of the Romantic, its adventure, its variety, its deep subjectivity, with Hellenism, its transparency, its rationality, its desire of beauty -- that marriage of Faust and Helena, of which the art of the nineteenth century is the child, the beautiful lad Euphorion, as Goethe conceives him, on the crags in the "splendour of battle," "in harness as for victory," his brows bound with light [Faust, Pt. 2, Act 3. Pater's note]. Goethe illustrates, too, the preponderance in this marriage of the Hellenic element; and that element, in its true essence, was made known to him by Winckelmann" (1867, p. 108); similarly, in "Romanticism" Pater had remarked in the last sentence of the article: "But explain the terms ["classical" and "romantic"] as we will, in application to particular epochs, there are these two elements always recognisable; united in perfect art, in Sophocles, in Dante, in the highest work of Goethe, though not always absolutely balanced there; and these two elements may be not inappropriately termed the classical and romantic tendencies" (1876, p. 70). As we have already seen in the Winckelmann article these terms are equated with "rationality" and "subjectivity" respectively. Thus, Pater may be said

in practice to conform to Lewes's broad division into "objective" and "subjective" intellect in treating of Goethe. Indeed, it might even be said that Lewes himself had anticipated Pater if in fact he did not supply the precedent for treating Goethe neither as a realist nor an idealist but something of both, for in Book VI, Chapter I Lewes thus compared Goethe and Schiller:

> But while the contrast between these two is the contrast of real and ideal, of objective and subjective tendencies, apparent when we consider the men in their totality, this is only true of them relatively to each other. To speak of Goethe as a realist, pure and simple, is erroneous; and to speak of Schiller as an Idealist, pure and simple, is not less so. Gervinus strikingly remarks that, compared with Nicolai or Lichtenberg, Goethe appears as an Idealist; compared with Kant and his followers, Schiller appears as a Realist. If Schiller, in comparison with Goethe, must be called a self-conscious poet, in comparison with the Romanticists he is naïve and instinctive. Indeed all such classifications are necessarily imperfect, and must only be used as artifices of language, by which certain general and predominant characteristics may be briefly indicated. Goethe and Schiller were certainly different natures; but had they been so fundamentally opposed, as it is the fashion to consider them, they could never have become so intimately united. They were opposite and allied, with somewhat of the same differences and resemblances as are traceable in the Greek and Roman Mars. In the Greek Mythology the God of War had not the prominent place he attained in Rome; and the Greek sculptors, when they represented him, represented him as the victor returning, after conflict, to repose: holding in his hand the olive branch, while at his feet sate [sic] Eros. The Roman sculptors, or those who

> worked for Rome, represented Mars as the God of War in all his terrors, in the very act of leading on to victory. But different as these two conceptions were, they were both conceptions of the God of War; Goethe may be likened to the one, and Schiller to the other: both were kindred spirits united by a common purpose (pp. 386-387).

The affinity between Pater and Lewes in their concurrence in the judgement that Goethe's intellect was of the "objective" type is certainly marked. Pater conforms to Lewes's view that Goethe's penchant was for what is concrete and individual, the German poet being, after the distinction made by Friedrich Schlegel, and after him by Coleridge and Lewes, a born Aristotelian rather than a born Platonist. Pater does not make this distinction in the 1866 Coleridge article (though it is made tacitly in Plato and Platonism) but he was obviously thinking along the same lines as Lewes because in the second paragraph he compared Goethe with Plato in showing the kind of knowledge that the modern world required. Lewes in the second chapter of the second book, wrote in connection with the mental characteristics of the German poet:

> Not to extend this [the passage cited previously] to a dissertation, let me at once say that Goethe belonged to the objective class. "Everywhere in Goethe," said Franz Horn, "you are on the firm land or island; nowhere the infinite sea." A better characterisation was never written in one sentence. In every page of his works may be read a strong feeling for the real, the concrete, the living; and a repugnance as strong for the vague, the abstract, or the supersensuous. His constant striving was to study Nature, so as to see her directly, and not through the mists of fancy, or through the distortions

of prejudice -- to look at men, and into them -- to apprehend things as they were. In his conception of the universe he could not separate God from it, placing God above it, beyond it, as the philosophers did who represented God whirling the universe round his finger, "seeing it go." Such a conception revolted him. He animated the universe with God; he animated fact with divine life; he saw in Reality the incarnation of the Ideal; he saw in Morality the high and harmonious action of all human tendencies; he saw in Art the highest representation of Life. Nature, Nature, Nature, is everywhere the burden of his striving. It was to him an inexhaustible mystery and delight; its commonest details were of divine significance. To overlook the facts of Nature, and to fix attention on the fleeting personal impressions, or purely individual fancies, was a sign of decadence at every period of history. "No one merits the name of a poet, nor of a philosopher, unless he can assimilate Nature, and paint it or explain it." He boasted that, unlike so many of his contemporaries, he had "never thought about thinking;" and had carefully avoided mingling his personality with the great impersonality of Nature. His vision was all directed outwards. If we look through his works with critical attention, we shall observe the objective tendency determining -- first, his choice of subjects; secondly, his handling of character; and, thirdly, his style. Intimately connected with his concreteness is another characteristic of his genius. His imagination was not, like that of many poets, incessantly at work in the combination and recombination of images which could be accepted for their own sake. It demanded the confrontation with fact; it moved with ease only on the secure ground of Reality. In science there are men whose active imaginations carry them into hypothesis and speculation, all the more easily because they do not bring hypothesis to the stern test of fact. There mere delight in combining ideas suffices them: provided the deductions are logical, they seem almost indifferent to their truth. There are poets of this order; indeed most poets are

> of this order. Goethe was of a quite opposite tendency. In him an imperious desire for reality controlled the errant facility of imagination. "The first and last thing demanded of Genius," he says, "is love of truth." (4th ed., 1890, pp. 52-53).

It may be seen that Pater's own view of Goethe does not conform to the objective bias of Lewes; for Pater what is individual and definite, concrete and particular, is ever the correlate of "intense subjectivities." This characteristic of Pater's way of thinking may be noted especially in "Prosper Mérimée" (1890) and the Introduction to _The Purgatory of Dante Alighieri_ (_Purgatorio I-XXVII_) _An Experiment in Literal Verse Translation_ of Charles Lancelot Shadwell (1892). In the first Pater briefly, though deftly, sketched the intellectual _milieu_ of nineteenth century Europe, noting that the breakdown of an objective order in politics, religion, and morality had led the literary artist to concentrate on what is empirical and sensuous:

> Deprived of that exhilarating yet pacific outlook [the Thomistic Synthesis], imprisoned now in the narrow cell of its own subjective experience, the action of the powerful nature will be intense, but exclusive and peculiar. It will come to art, or science, to the experience of life itself, not as to portions of human nature's daily food, but as to something that must be, by the circumstances of the case, exceptional; almost as men turn in despair to gambling or narcotics, and in a little while the narcotic, the game of chance or skill, is valued for its own sake. The vocation of the artist, of the student of life or books [continued Pater], will be realised with something -- say! of fanaticism, as an end in itself, unrelated, unassociated. The science he turns to will be a science of crudest fact; the

passion extravagant, a passionate love of passion, varied through all the exotic phases of French fiction as inaugurated by Balzac; the art exaggerated, in matter or form, or both, as in Hugo or Baudelaire."

The broad correlation between the subjectivism in philosophy which Pater traced to Kant and the obsession with "naturalism" in French literature which Pater observed began with Balzac is very different indeed from the correlation which Lewes posited between the objective intellect and its correlative in the literary output of Goethe (for Pater's full description of "the mental story of the nineteenth century, especially as exemplified in France" see _Miscellaneous Studies_, pp. 11-13). This conclusion is borne out by Pater's subsequent treatment of Dante in terms of the nineteenth century's interest in the Italian poet:

In Dante's minuteness of touch there was in fact something of that art of miniature painting,

Ch' alluminare è chiamata in Parisi.

Our own delight in it, the welcome we give to minute detail of that kind, uncompromising "realists" as we must needs be, connects itself with the empirical character of our science, our philosophic faith in the concrete, the particular. To the age of Johnson abstraction, generalisation, seemed to be of the essence of art and poetry, a principle which the taste of the nineteenth century has inverted in favour of that circumstantial manner of which every Canto of the _Divina Commedia_ would afford illustration.

But the modern artist, the modern student of art, of Dante's art, while he demands it in any record of the external world, will value this minuteness, this minute perfection, even more perhaps in the treatment of mental phenomena, when the intelligence

> which touched so finely the niceties of visible colour and outline turns to the invisible world, noting there also with a like subtlety the intimacies of the soul. The modern, as such, is undeniably a somewhat skilfull psychologist. -- We have lived so long with ourselves! And just here surely we find another link between the peculiarities of Dante's genius and the "subjectivities" of the characteristic student of to-day. Amid the larger outlooks of the Divina Commedia we are again and again reminded that its author is also the poet of the Vita Nuova. His own sensibility, already so strongly in evidence there, makes him now an equally delicate interpreter of the mental or spiritual ways of others.

Pater then cites in translation the Purgatorio IX, 13-19. Pater then continues:

> And in accordance with what we might have expected, the sensibility, the fineness of touch, there indicated, is at its height in the placid and temperate regions of the Purgatorio -- a realm of gray but clear light:-- it is there that the delicacies, alike of the visible and the invisible world, really tell (1892, xviii-xx).

There are grounds for positing, therefore, that Pater's own preoccupation with the concrete, no less than with irony, was the result of that particular type of reaction against intense subjectivism which Hegel described in the Introduction to the Ästhetik. Hegel of course was concerned with the views of Schlegel (Friedrich), Solger and Tieck and with the phenomenon of Die Ironie in German literature; Pater's interest in the subject appears to have derived from Heine on the one hand and Mérimée on the other (we recall that Mérimée's "formula" according to Pater was "Irony surely, habitual irony" [Miscellaneous Studies, 1910, p. 14]).

Hegel's full discussion of the question in the <u>Einleitung in die Ästhetik</u> (3. <u>Kapitel</u>) should pf course be consulted; here space allows only for one paragraph of that discussion. This paragraph may be said to provide a ready-made "formula" for Pater:

> Die nächste Form dieser Negativität der Ironie ist nun einerseits die <u>Eitelkeit</u> alles Sachlichen, Sittlichen und in sich <u>Gehaltvollen</u>, die Nichtigkeit alles Objektiven und an und für sich Geltenden. Bleibt das Ich auf diesem Standpunkte stehen, so erscheint ihm alles als nichtig und eitel--die eigene Subjektivität ausgenommen, die dadurch hohl und leer und die selber <u>eitle</u> wird. Umgekehrt aber kann sich auf der anderen Seite das Ich in diesem Selbstgenuß auch nicht befriedigt finden, sondern sich selber mangelhaft werden, so daß es nun den Durst nach Festem und Substantiellem, nach bestimmten und wesentlichen Interessen empfindet. Dadurch kommt dann das Ungluck und der Widerspruch hervor, daß das Subjekt einerseits wohl in die Wahrheit hinein will und nach Objektivität Verlangen trägt, aber sich andererseits dieser Einsamkeit und Zurückgezogenheit in sich nicht zu entschlagen, dieser unbefriedigten abstrakten Innigkeit nicht zu entwinden vermag und nun von der Sehnsüchtigkeit befallen wird, die wir ebenfalls aus der Fichteschen Philosophie haben hervorgehen sehen. Die Befriedigungslosigkeit dieser Stille und Unkräftigkeit--die nicht handeln und nichts berühren mag, um nicht die innere Harmonie aufzugeben, und mit dem Verlangen nach Realitat und Absolutem dennoch unwirklich und leer, wenn auch in sich rein bleibt--läßt die krankhafte Schönseeligkeit und Sehnsüchtigkeit entstehen. Denn eine wahrhaft schöne Seele handelt und ist wirklich. Jenes Sehnen aber ist nur des Gefühl der Nichtigkeit des leeren eitlen Subjekts, dem es an Kraft gebricht, dieser Eitelkeit entrinnen und mit substantiellem Inhalt sich erfüllen zu können (I, 74).

We may compare Pater in the Winckelmann article: "It is easy with the other worldly gifts to be a <u>schöne Seele</u>; but to the large vision of Goethe that seemed to be a phase of life that a man might feel all round and leave behind him" (1867, p. 109). This sentence occurs immediately before Pater's statement that it might be necessary to renounce the predilection for metaphysics in the interests of moulding our lives to artistic perfection. Hegel is almost certainly thinking of Goethe's notion. In the case of Pater we assume familiarity with both Goethe and Hegel on this matter. Intense subjectivism leading to an ironic pose was a characteristic of modern life (perhaps we should say, "modern" German literature) which obviously impressed itself firmly on Pater's mind. Without trying to show that a given passage from Pater's fiction is autobiographical, "semi-autobiographical," or even "transposed autobiography," it is still possible to show that Pater was preoccupied with "<u>Die Ironie</u>" as the correlative of intense subjectivism or idealism. Certain passages of <u>Marius the Epicurean</u> may be adduced here by way of substantiating this thesis; thus, towards the end of Chapter II:

> Thus the boyhood of Marius passed; on the whole, more given to contemplation than to action. Less prosperous in fortune than at an earlier day there had been reason to expect, and animating his solitude, as he read eagerly and intelligently, with the traditions of the past, already he lived much in the realm of the imagination, and became betimes, as he was to continue all through life, something of an idealist, constructing the world for himself in great measure from within, by the exercise of meditative power.

A vein of subjective philosophy, with the individual for its standard of all things, there would be always in his intellectual scheme of the world and of conduct, with a certain incapacity wholly to accept other men's valuations. And the generation of this peculiar element in his temper he could trace up to the days when his life had been so like the reading of a romance to him (I, 24-25).

Chapter VIII of Marius contains a passage which is especially pertinent here:

And as it had been with his [Heraclitus is understood] original followers in Greece, so it happened now with the later Roman disciple. He, too, paused at the apprehension of that constant motion of things -- the drift of flowers, of little or great souls, of ambitious systems, in the stream around him, the first source, the ultimate issue, of which, in regions out of sight, must count with him as but a dim problem. The bold mental flight of the old Greek master from the fleeting, competing objects of experience to that one universal life, in which the whole sphere of physical change might be reckoned as but a single pulsation, remained by him as hypothesis only -- the hypothesis he actually preferred, as in itself most credible, however scantily realisable even by the imagination -- yet still as but one unverified hypothesis, among many others, concerning the first principle of things. He might reserve it as a fine, high, visionary consideration, very remote upon the intellectual ladder, just at the point, indeed, where that ladder seemed to pass into the clouds, but for which there was certainly no time left just now by his eager interest in the real objects so close to him, on the lowlier earthly steps nearest the ground. And those childish days of reverie, when he played at priests, played in many another day-dream, working his way from the actual present, as far as he might, with a delightful sense of escape in replacing the outer world of other people by an inward world as himself really cared to have it, had made

> him a kind of "idealist." He was become aware of the possibility of a large dissidence between an inward and somewhat exclusive world of vivid personal apprehension, and the unimproved, unheightened reality of the life of those about him. As a consequence, he was ready now to concede, somewhat more easily than others, the first point of his new lesson, that the individual is to himself the measure of all things, and to rely on the exclusive certainty to himself of his own impressions. To move afterwards in that outer world of other people, as though taking it at their estimate, would be impossible henceforth only as a kind of irony. And as with the _Vicaire Savoyard_, after reflecting on the variations of philosophy, "the first fruit he drew from that reflection was the lesson of a limitation of his researches to what immediately interested him; to rest peacefully in a profound ignorance as to all beside; to disquiet himself only concerning those things which it was of import for him to know." At least he would entertain no theory of conduct which did not allow its due weight to this primary element of incertitude or negation, in the conditions of man's life (I, 132-133).

One final passage may be cited from _Marius_; it occurs in the final paragraph of Chapter XIII:

> The eyes of the 'golden youth' of Rome were upon him [Marius] as the chosen friend of Cornelius, and the destined servant of the emperor; but not jealously. In spite of, perhaps partly because of, his habitual reserve of manner, he had become 'the fashion,' even amongst those who felt instinctively the irony which lay beneath that remarkable self-possession, as one taking all things with a difference from other people, perceptible in voice, in expression, and even in dress. It was, in truth, the air of one who, entering vividly into life, and relishing to the full the delicacies of its intercourse, yet feels all the while, from the point of view of an ideal philosophy, that he is but conceding reality to suppositions,

> choosing of his own will to walk in a day-dream, of the illusiveness of which he at least is aware (I, 212-213).

Irony was a subject which preoccupied Pater also in criticism: we see this, for example, in the article "Shakespeare's English Kings," originally published in _Scribner's Magazine_, V (April 1889), pp. 506-512, in which he dealt with "that irony of kingship, the sense that it is in its happiness child's play, in its sorrows, after all, but children's grief, which gives its finer accent to all the changeful feeling of these wonderful speeches" (_Appreciations_, p. 200). Again, in Pater's writings on philosophy we encounter irony, this time "Socratic irony," and it is significant that Pater should relate the question to the want of an objective sanction or standard (_Plato and Platonism_, pp. 188-192).

It is unnecessary therefore to invoke Lewes in the way in which Ward does to show how Pater moved from being an idealist to become a realist, "realist" in the sense in which he uses the word in the Introduction to Shadwell's Dante. Pater himself has traced a similar development in the first of the series of imaginary portraits, namely "The Child in the House," _Macmillan's Magazine_, XXXVIII (August 1878), reprinted in the posthumous volume, _Miscellaneous Studies_ (1895); the passage in question occurs on pp. 186-188 of the New Library Edition:

> In later years he came upon philosophies which occupied him much in the estimate of the proportion of the sensuous and the ideal elements in human knowledge,

the relative parts they bear in it; and, in his intellectual scheme, was led to assign very little to the abstract thought, and much to its sensible vehicle or occasion. Such metaphysical speculation did but reinforce what was instinctive in his way of receiving the world, and for him, everywhere, that sensible vehicle or occasion became, perhaps only too surely, the necessary concomitant of any perception of things, real enough to be of any weight or reckoning, in his house of thought. There were times when he could think of the necessity he was under of associating all thoughts to touch and sight, as a sympathetic link between himself and actual, feeling, living objects; a protest in favour of real men and women against mere grey, unreal abstractions; and he remembered gratefully how the Christian religion, hardly less than the religion of the ancient Greeks, translating so much of its spiritual verity into things that may be seen, condescends in part to sanction this infirmity, if so it be, of our human existence, wherein the world of sense is so much with us, and welcomed this thought as a kind of keeper and sentinel over his soul therein. But certainly, he came more and more to be unable to care for, or think of soul but as in an actual body, or of any world but that wherein are water and trees, and where men and women look, so or so, and press actual hands. It was the trick even his pity learned, fastening those who suffered in anywise to his affections by a kind of sensible attachments. He would think of Julian, fallen into incurable sickness, as spoiled in the sweet blossom of his skin like pale amber, and his honey-like hair; of Cecil, early dead, as cut off from the lilies, from golden summer days, from women's voices; and then what comforted him a little was the thought of the turning of the child's flesh to violets in the turf above him. And thinking of the very poor, it was not the things which most men care most for that he yearned to give them; but fairer roses, perhaps, and the power to taste quite as they will, at their ease and not task-burdened, a certain desirable, clear light in the new morning, through which sometimes he had noticed them, quite unconscious of it, on their way to their early toil.

We certainly do not deny, then, that there is a marked similarity both in terminology and phraseology between Lewes and Pater, but we do question Ward's contention that Lewes's chapter on Goethe as a man of science was effective in shaping Pater's attitude towards the German poet. The weakness of Ward's case lies in the fact that Pater's preoccupation with what is sensuous and concrete following hard upon his youthful Hegelianism can be accounted for without the good offices of Lewes's work. Such a reaction had been duly noted by Hegel in connection with Friedrich von Schlegel, Tieck, and Solger, and even Jowett had observed that in periods of scepticism there is a tendency to cling to the concrete as to firm ground.[17] It is probably unnecessary to go to the lengths that Ward has gone to establish Pater's undoubted familiarity with the work of Lewes; the fact that Pater's sister (Ward does not indicate which sister) borrowed the book from the Taylorian in Oxford (p.27) is not in itself significant for our understanding of Pater's debt to Lewes, if indeed he ever incurred one and we believe this to be a reasonable assumption in view of what Thomas Wright (II, 179-180) has to say about Pater's having drawn a mental parallel between himself and Lewes, when Madame de Staël had said much the same sort of thing which Lewes was at such pains to say only she had said it much more succinctly. This included her remarks on the real and the ideal in Goethe: "Klopstock s'égare dans l'idéal:

[17] Cf. Jowett's Introduction to the Theatetus: "Yet, in spite of Plato and his followers, mankind

Goethe ne perd jamais terre, tout en atteignant aux

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have again and again returned to a sensational philosophy. As to some of the early thinkers, amid the fleetings of sensible objects, ideas alone seemed to be fixed, so to a later generation amid the fluctuation of philosophical opinions the only fixed points appeared to be outward objects. Any pretence of knowledge which went beyond them implied logical processes, of the correctness of which they had no assurance and which at best were only probable. The mind, tired of wandering, sought to rest on firm ground; when the idols of philosophy and language were stripped off, the perception of outward objects alone remained. The ancient Epicureans never asked whether the comparison of these with one another did not involve principles of another kind which were above and beyond them. In like manner the modern inductive philosophy forgot to enquire into the meaning of experience, and did not attempt to form a conception of outward objects apart from the mind, or of the mind apart from them. Soon objects of sense were merged in sensations and feelings, but feelings and sensations were still unanalysed" (The Dialogues of Plato, translated into English with analyses and introductions by Benjamin Jowett. 5 vols., 2nd. edition [Oxford 1875] IV, 268-269. Subsequent references are to this edition).

Ward cites this passage (1966,p.32) but unfortunately cuts it short at "The mind, tired of wandering, sought to rest on firm ground; when the idols of philosophy and language were stripped off, the perception of outward objects alone remained." It is not clear the extent to which Pater was indebted to the actual published Introductions of Jowett to the Dialogues. A published letter of Pater to Jowett's biographer Lewis Campbell points to the fact that much (but evidently not all) of the material later included in the published Introductions had originally been worked up in lecture form and as lecture notes circulated throughout the University. From his letter, Pater appears unsure whether all the material thus communicated was gathered up by Jowett in his edition of the Dialogues. The implication seems to be that Pater referred to Jowett in the preparation of his own lecture course on Plato,

conceptions les plus sublimes" (II, 77); "son imagination

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a reasonable enough thing to do and quite likely since Pater's standpoint was sufficiently similar to Jowett to gain his approbation after many years of estrangement (cf. Thomas Wright, The Life of Walter Pater, 2 vols. [London 1907], II, 165). It is clear from Pater's letter that the lectures which Jowett gave on Plato had impressed him very much, and the interest aroused as a student lingered late into life because Pater was still waiting for the publication of something of Jowett's along the lines of a "New Cratylus." To what extent Jowett influenced Pater's early readings and study of Hegel the letter does not say. It is not without interest to note, however, that the dates which Pater gives for the period in which he was very much indebted to Jowett, namely 1860-1862 "and afterwards" coincide with the period of his perfervid Hegelianism, for Ingram Bywater in a letter to Dr. Hermann Diels in Berlin, not dated, stated that he distinctly remembered Pater's having read Hegel's Phänomologie [sic] des Geistes during the Long Vacation of 1862 (Bywater does not appear to have been absolutely certain that it was 1862). The implication of the letter is that Pater learned German specifically to read Hegel in the original. The text of Pater's letter will be found in The Life and Letters of Benjamin Jowett, M.A., Master of Balliol College, Oxford by Evelyn Abbott and Lewis Campbell, 2nd. ed., 2 vols. (London 1897), I, 329-330. The draft of the letter of Ingram Bywater to Hermann Diels is printed in William Walrond Jackson, Ingram Bywater: The Memoir of an Oxford Scholar 1840-1914 (Oxford 1917), pp. 78-80.

Jowett of course as a young man had studied Hegel. In the period 1846-1850 Jowett is described by Abbott and Campbell as having, together with his junior colleague Temple, "made a close and serious study of Hegel." Together they managed to translate a good part of Hegel's Wissenschaft der Logik, a task which was never completed. The philosophy of Hegel had a great attraction for Jowett. The following passage of the biography is characteristic and indeed prophetic of Pater: "But

<u>est frappée par les objets extérieurs, comme l'étoit</u>

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however strongly impressed, his mind was too elastic and too onward-moving to be long absorbed in any system. He 'could not be holden of it'. In speaking, as he sometimes did, of the educational value of metaphysics, especially of German metaphysics, he would add, 'The philosophical movement in Greece was far more important.' He would sometimes dissuade a pupil from the study of Kant, 'because it takes so long to see what these fellows would be at!' And even in these earlier years he was fond of observing that no old man had ever been a metaphysician. 'Hegel is a great book,' he would say, 'if you can only get it out of its dialectical form.' That is heresy, I imagine, in the ears of a true Hegelian" (2nd. ed., I, 129-130). Yet this is exactly what Pater does in the Winckelmann article: in dealing with the Hegelian Ideal, for example, he gets it out of Hegel's technical language.

Jowett's intimate acquaintance with "the posthumous influence of Hegel in Germany" (Hegel had died in Berlin of cholera on 14 November 1831) dates from his tour of Germany with Stanley in the summer of 1844. At this time Jowett was already familiar with German because he was corresponding at some length in that language with Arthur Stanley (1844-1846). The tour culminated at the Philological Congress in Dresden where Jowett and Stanley appear to have consulted J.E.Erdmann of Halle, himself a disciple of Hegel, on how best to approach the writings of the German philosopher (the 18 volume ed. of Hegel's works begun in 1831 was completed in 1840, and the second ed. begun; Karl Rosenkranz's <u>Kritische Erlauterungen des Hegel'schen Systems</u> was published at Konigsberg in 1840; his <u>Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel's Leben</u>, in Berlin 1844). All this had its due effect on Jowett's intellectual development; Jowett told the story of how he had stood on a bridge at Mainz absorbed in the Preface to Hegel's <u>Encyclopädie</u>. Jowett's more intimate acquaintance with the theological phase of Hegelian influence in Germany dates, however, from 1845 when he revisited Germany. In the biography Jowett is represented even in the period

celle des artistes chez les anciens; et néanmoins sa

1840-1846 as being already an ardent but independent student of Hegel. The letter of Jowett to Stanley dated 20 August 1846 certainly substantiates this view: "Hegel [Jowett wrote to Stanley] is untrue, I sometimes fancy, not in the sense of being erroneous, but practically, because it is a consciousness of truth, becoming thereby error. It is very difficult to express what I mean, for it is something which does not make me value Hegel the less as a philosophy. The problem of ἀλήθεια πρακτική, Truth idealized and yet in action, he does not seem to me to have solved; the Gospel of St. John does. Hegel seems to me, not the perfect philosophy, but the perfect self-consciousness of philosophy" (2nd. ed., I, 92. Cf. 89-92). This is substantially the view that Jowett was to take in his Introduction to the *Sophist* which will be noted below. Here I shall confine myself to a few observations on Jowett and Hegel which take us up to the time of Pater's first publications.

Thus in the period 1854-1860 we find Jowett still acknowledging his debt as a thinker to German philosophy in general and to Hegel in particular. Hegel he held had cleared away the problems which Kant had raised but had failed to solve. To Hegel, also, he was indebted for his method: "The study of Hegel has given me a method." The biographers hasten to add that he refused to be bound by that method however: "he refused to be bound within the limits of any system, making fact the final test of theory." This statement of the biographers of Jowett finds its parallel in Jowett's own words in the Introduction to the *Sophist* where he observed that Hegel himself had claimed that his system was amenable to fact: in characterising the Hegelian philosophy, Jowett included there as the fourth aspect, "This vast ideal system is supposed to be based upon experience. At each step it professes to carry with it the 'witness of eyes and ears' and of common sense, as well as the internal evidence of its own consistency; it has a place for every science, and affirms that no philosophy of a narrower type is capable of comprehending

raison n'a que trop la maturité de notre temps" (II, 79);

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all true facts" (The Dialogues of Plato, 2nd. ed. [1875], IV, 405). In the period 1854-1860 we are told also that Jowett still persisted in encouraging his best students to study Hegel, although he himself valued Plato even more for his qualities of originality and suggestiveness (2nd.ed., I, 261).

The correspondence in the second volume of the Life and Letters of Benjamin Jowett, M.A. relating to the gift of Lord Arthur Russell to the Library of Balliol of the busts of Hegel and Kant need not detain us. It is interesting to note, however, that even in 1884 when Pater was busily engaged with the writing of Marius, Jowett was recalling in his letter of 2 December 1884 that it was now over forty years since he first began to read Hegel and admitted that he thought he had received his greatest intellectual stimulus from Hegel. He still retained a great reverence for his "old teacher and master" even though he realized that Hegelianism as such was ephemeral. He noted that since that time the light of Hegelianism had been kept burning in Oxford "though I must confess an adapted Hegelianism" and mentioned that both Professor Green and Professor Caird, two men who exercized considerable influence over Pater's intellectual development, had become its votaries. In the letter to Lord Russell dated 26 January 1885 also relating to the busts he mentioned that Hegel's works in "twenty-one volumes have been well worn and have inspired some generations of Englishmen." The edition referred to is presumably the Werke: Vollständige Ausgabe durch einen Verein von Freunden des Verewigten in 18 volumes, actually 21 volumes because the Encyclopädie was printed in vols. VI,VII.1 and VII.2, while the Ästhetik appeared in vols. X.1, X.2, and X.3 (Berlin 1832-1845; 2nd. ed. 1840-1847). See Walter Kaufmann, Hegel. Reinterpretation, Texts, and Commentary (New York 1965), p. 470. In the last letter in this series, 19 July 1885, Jowett noted that Hegel and Kant had been most read at Balliol; it concludes: "Though not an Hegelian I think that I have gained more from Hegel than from any other philosopher" (Cf. II, 249-250). The general conclusions offered by the

"Quand il s'agit de penser, rien ne l'arrête, ni son

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biographers in this second volume are that Jowett deplored the neglect into which Hegel had fallen in Germany; that he placed Hegel in the first rank as an exponent of Greek philosophy because he understood Plato better than his predecessors had "though now and then he did get drunk with metaphysics" (Jowett). Abbott and Campbell conclude by giving Jowett's judgement of Hegel in the Introduction to the Sophist: Hegel if not the greatest philosopher, is certainly the greatest critic of philosophy (2nd. ed., II, 249-250).

The supplementary volume Letters of Benjamin Jowett, M.A. (1899) contains some further information on Jowett and Hegel which may be noted briefly here. Thus, in his submission to the Committee of the House of Lords on University Tests (the Report was published in 1871) Jowett in answer to the Earl of Morley's query whether there was not much German philosophy taught at Oxford observed that there was too little rather than too much German taught and expressed his opinion that it would be regrettable were there not some knowledge of German philosophy at the University. Hegel he represented as the German philosopher in whose writings most interest had been shown at Oxford but with the popular misconception that Hegel was a radical he could not concur: "but it would be a great mistake to look upon the philosophy of Hegel as a mere infidel philosophy. He was, or believed himself to be, a Conservative both in religion and politics. There are all sorts of persons, from the most extreme of orthodoxy to the most extreme of the opposite view, who have professed themselves disciples of Hegel. And it does not at all follow that because persons read Hegel they share all his opinions, even supposing him to be of a different character from what I am describing. They read the book as a valuable work on Logic, in fact" (p. 22). A letter to Professor Caird, dated 5 January 1875, contains Jowett's observation apropos of Green that Kant and Hegel were as guilty of inconsistency as Locke (pp. 190-191), while the letter to J.A.Symonds dated 12 September 1882 drew a firm distinction between history and the history of philosophy: "The ideas or

siècle, ni ses habitudes, ni ses relations; il fait tomber à plomb son regard d'aigle sur les objets qu'il observe: s'il avoit eu une carrière politique, si son âme s'étiot développée par les actions, son caractère seroit plus décidé, plus ferme, plus patriote; mais son esprit ne planeroit pas si librement sur toutes les manières de voir; les passions ou les intérêts lui traceroient une route positive" (II, 82). Certainly, then, while Pater may be counted on to have read Mme. de Stael, the book on German literature, he cannot be counted on to have read the book on Goethe any more than he can be counted on to have read the book on Winckelmann; we can find no internal evidence that he consulted Lewes any more than that he consulted Justi. This is not said in any way to be categorical, because the possibility always remains that evidence may be forthcoming to establish beyond doubt that Pater had consulted Lewes on Goethe; it is safe to say, however, that that evidence will be found to be external rather than internal evidence.[18] It is always salutary for

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categories under which history may be finally summed up by Herder, or Hegel, or Comte, are quite distinct from the motives which animated great changes" (p. 211). This note is based on the three volumes by Abbott and Campbell cited, supplemented by Walter Kaufmann, Hegel. Reinterpretation, Texts, and Commentary (New York 1965).

[18] Letters excepted of course. Thus Professor Lawrence Evans inadvertently brought to light the fact that Pater was familiar with Karl Julius Schnaase's Geschichte der Bildenden Kunste, 7 bde., 1843-1864, because in a letter to Alexander Macmilian, dated 31 March [1877] Pater recommended one of his sisters (which sister is not specified) as a possible translator

the student of Pater to recall that while Pater definitely read Otto Jahn's Biographische Aufsätze (1866), a fact which internal evidence puts beyond doubt, he at no time consulted Carl Justi's Winckelmann und seine Zeitgenossen, the first edition of which appeared in the same year as Otto Jahn's Winckelmann essay.[19]

Ward's contention that Lewes's work gave rise to a new appreciation of Goethe as a man of science is to be questioned in any case, even if only because Lewes himself found it necessary in the Preface to the second edition of the work (1863) to explain why he had devoted so much space to Goethe's scientific writings: "The scientific writings [Lewes wrote] have been treated with what proportionately may seem great length; and this, partly because Science filled a large proportion of Goethe's life; partly because, even in Germany, there was nothing like a full exposition of his aims and

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for the English translation of the seven-volume work which Macmillan appears to have projected at the time. Pater added in the same letter that he would be able to give his sister "some real assistance" in the work of translation. The tone of the letter suggests that Pater was already quite familiar with the German work at that date, hence Karl Julius Schnaase may be adduced as yet another Paterian source. See Lawrence Evans, "Some Letters of Walter Pater," Diss. Harvard 1961, especially p. 29 (Letter 26).

19 Here I wish to establish this debt beyond doubt for reasons which will be made explicit in Part II. In the original version of the Winckelmann article published in the Westminster Review of January 1867 Pater enumerated Otto Jahn's Biographische Aufsätze, Leipzig 1866, after G.H.Lodge's 1850 English translation of Winckelmann's Geschichte. Of the sources for information about Winckelmann, Jahn appears to have

achievements in this direction" (cf. 4th ed., 1890, p. xii). It may be remarked here apropos of Ward that a full appreciation of how integral a part of Goechte's life and work were his scientific activities had to wait to a later student of Goethe.[20]

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supplied more than Goethe's 1805 essay on Winckelmann. From Otto Jahn comes, for example, Pater's observation: "'Homo vagus et inconstans,' one of them [Winckelmann's "appointed teachers"] pedantically reports of the future pilgrim to Rome, unaware on which side his irony was whetted" (1867, p. 81). In a footnote to S.9 Jahn recorded: "Im Album der Schüler findet sich neben Winckelmann's [sic] Namen von der Hand des Rectors die Bemerkung: Homo vagus et inconstans", on p. 59 of the same essay is recorded Hegel's judgement of Winckelmann cited by Pater (1867, p. 81) though Jahn does not identify the quotation which suggests that Pater was familiar with the remark at first-hand; Pater's allusion to Winckelmann's early plan "of begging his way to Rome, from cloister to cloister, under the pretense of a disposition to change his faith" (1867, p. 84) also finds its parallel in Jahn (S. 22); Pater's mention of "A German biographer of Winckelmann has compared him to Columbus" (1867, p. 88) is almost certainly an oblique reference to Otto Jahn's "denn Columbus ähnlich" (S. 6), though of course Goethe introduces Columbus's name in his essay also (HA, 12, 110) "als ein neuer Kolumbus"; Justi never makes this particular analogy. It is unlikely, however, that Pater would have styled Goethe as "A German biographer of Winckelmann." Otto Jahn and Jowett were collaborators in classical philology (cf. Abbott and Campbell, I, 250).

[20] Cf. Carl Friedrich von Weizacker's Critical Introduction to Goethe's scientific writings in Goethes Werke, Hamburger Ausgabe, 13, 537 ff., as well as Heinrich Henel's article "Goethe und die Naturwissenschaft," Journal of English and Germanic Philology, XLVIII (1949), pp. 507-532. For further bibliographical information reference may be made to G.Schmid,

Had Pater's own thinking about the significance of Goethe's scientific methods been conditioned by reading Lewes we might at least have expected Pater to have remarked upon Goethe's antipathy towards the reduction of natural phenomena to a series of mathematical symbols (Farbenlehre, 175. Abschnitt). Goethe's distaste for mathematical notation of the physical sciences was something upon which Lewes had commented:

> This point of Method, if properly examined, will help to elucidate the whole question of Goethe's aptitude for dealing with physical science. The native direction of his mind is visible in his optical studies as decisively as in his poetry; that direction was towards the concrete phenomenon, not towards abstractions. He desired to explain the phenomena of colour, and in Mathematics these phenomena disappear; that is to say, the very thing to be studied is hurried out of sight and masked by abstractions. This was utterly repugnant to his mode of conceiving Nature. The marvellous phenomena of polarised light in the hands of mathematicians excited his boundless scorn. "One knows mot," he says, whether a body or a mere ruin lies buried under those formulas" [Werke, XL, 473. (Lewes)]. The name of Biot threw him into a rage; and he was continually laughing at the Newtonians about their Prisms, and Spectra, as if Newtonians were pedants who preferred their dusky rooms to the free breath of heaven. He always spoke of observations made in his garden, or with a simple prism in the sunlight, as if the natural and simple Method were much more certain than the artificial Method of Science. In this he betrayed his misapprehension of Method. He thought that

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Goethe und die Naturwissenschaften: Eine Bibliographie (Halle 1940). Pater nowhere shows any awareness of the importance for Goethe himself, for his writings or even his outlook of his scientific studies. It is difficult even to conjecture what he would have

Nature revealed herself to the patient observer --

> Und was sie deinem Geist nicht offenbaren mag,
> Das zwingst du ihr nicht ab mit Hebeln und mit
> Schrauben.

"And what she does not reveal to the Mind will not be extorted from her by Levers and Screws." Hence his failure; hence also his success; for we must not forget that if as a contribution to Optics his Farbenlehre be questionable, as a contribution to the knowledge of colour demanded by Artists it is very valuable. Painters have repeatedly acknowledged the advantage they have derived from it; and I remember hearing Riedel, at Rome, express the most unbounded enthusiasm for it; averring that, as a colourist, he had learned more from the Farbenlehre than from all the other teachers and books he had ever known. To artists and physiologists -- i.e. to those who are mainly concerned with the phenomenon of colour as perceptions, and who demand qualitative rather than quantitative knowledge -- his labours have a high value; and even physicists must admit, that however erroneous the theory and imperfect the method he has adopted, still the immense accumulation and systematisation of facts, and the ingenuity with which he explains them, deserve serious respect. As Bacon felicitously says, a tortoise on the right path will beat a racer on the wrong path;

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made of Goethe's statement to Eckermann regarding the Farbenlehre: "'Auf alles, was ich als Poet geleistet habe,' pflegte er wiederholt zu sagen, 'bilde ich mir gar nichts ein. Es haben treffliche Dichter mit mir gelebt, es lebten noch trefflichere vor mir, und es werden ihrer nach mir sein. Daß ich aber in meinem Jahrhundert in der schwierigen Wissenschaft der Farbenlehre der einzige bin, der das Rechte weiß, darauf tue ich mir etwas zugute, und ich habe daher ein Bewußtsein der Superiorität über viele'" (Goethe, Gedenkausgabe der Werk, Briefe, und Gespräche, ed. Ernst Beutler, 24 vols. (Zürich 1948-1954), XXIV, 328; II. Teil: 1828-1832). The view here expressed by Goethe is so alien to the impression of the German poet that we gain from Pater's scattered remarks that we doubt that he was

> and if it be true that Goethe was on the wrong path, it is not less true that he shows the thews and sinews of a racer (4th. ed. [1890], pp. 343-344).

Of this characteristic of Goethe's mind we find not a word in Pater, or for that matter even Madame de Staël. Indeed, Madame de Staël's editor has found it necessary to fill up this lacuna in her account of Goethe's contribution to science (IV, 202, n. 1), for Madame de Staël appears to have had no conception of the German poet's antipathy towards mathematical abstractions; Pater, quite typically, in the redaction of the

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familiar with this work of Lewes. Lewes, it may be noted, cites these words of Goethe in translation (4th. ed. [1890], p. 336): "In this matter of colour he showed himself morally weak, as well as intellectually weak. 'As for what I have done as a poet,' said the old man once, 'I take no pride in it whatever. Excellent poets have lived at the same time with myself; more excellent poets have lived before me, and will come after me. But that in my century I am the only person who knows the truth in the difficult science of colours -- of that, I say, I am not a little proud.'"

More marked is the affinity between Pater's handling of Goethe and Goethe's science and that of de Staël; in both the preoccupation is with what is literary. Indeed, the note which the editor of De l'Allemagne has found necessary to add to IV, 202 (n. 1) may be said to be applicable in Pater's case as well. Ward for all his glibness and allusiveness is curiously silent about de Staël and De l'Allemagne, a weakness in his study which may be conveniently pointed out here.

1866 article represented Goethe as the very antithesis of that kind of mind which a "vague scholastic abstraction" will satisfy; the original version gives for this: "A transcendentalism that makes what is abstract more excellent than what is concrete has nothing akin to the leading philosophies of the world" (1866, p. 108). Of mathematical abstractions and Goethe's view of them we hear not so much as a word. Thus, while, say, Hegel's letter to Goethe dated 24 February 1821,[21] is germane to any discussion of this aspect of Goethe's work or any treatment of this aspect, it is not germane to this investigation because Pater gives us no occasion to bring it forward for consideration. It is surely a paradox that Pater, the supposed inveterate enemy of any kind of abstraction, failed to tax the mathematicians after so heavily belabouring the ontologists and metaphysicians, especially when Goethe had set him so excellent an example in the _Farbenlehre_, 175. _Abschnitt_ (H A XIII, 367 f.). Instead, Pater notes, it can hardly be said with disapprobation, that Winckelmann gave up mathematics to devote himself entirely to art: "Here Winckelmann made a step forward in culture. He multiplied his intellectual force by detaching from it all flaccid interests. He renounced mathematics and law, in which his reading had been considerable, all but the literature of the arts. Nothing was to enter into his life unpenetrated by its central enthusiasm" (1867, p. 82). There is no mention even here

[21] Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel's _Werke_, Vollständige Ausgabe (1887), 19/2, 33-39.

of mathematical abstractions, except by implication and then it is that mathematics is inimical to the life of artistic perfection. Still, Pater would not have been unaware that Winckelmann himself in the Geschichte seems to complain that beauty does not lend itself to mathematical procedures for purposes of definition (IV, 58; 4. Buch, 2. Kapitel, 20. Abschnitt).

Ward notwithstanding, surely, the thing which strikes anyone reading the Coleridge article either in its original form or in the redaction is that in 1866, three years after the second edition of Lewes's work had appeared, the older view of Goethe and his relation to nature which Ward assigned to "the first period of his popularity [when] Goethe is thought of as an exponent of the power of will and of the life of mind, rather than an exemplar of the scientific attitude" (1966, p. 27) is still to be found in Pater. It is just this older view of Goethe that Pater gives us in the Coleridge article, while in Plato and Platonism (1893) he persists in speaking of Goethe's "pantheism" (p. 169). But it is to Pater's statement in the 1866 article that we wish to call attention here: "Wordsworth [wrote Pater] was to be distinguished [from Coleridge] by a joyful and penetrative conviction of the existence of certain latent affinities between nature and the human mind, which reciprocally gild the mind and nature with a kind of 'heavenly alchemy'" (1866, p. 108). This statement precedes Pater's joining of the name of Wordsworth and Goethe in the passage already adduced:

> It is that flawless temperament in Wordsworth which keeps his conviction of a latent intelligence in nature within the limits of sentiment or instinct, and confines it to those delicate and subdued shades of expression which perfect art allows. In sadder dispositions, that is in the majority of cases, where such a conviction has existed, it has stiffened into a formula, it has frozen into a scientific or pseudo-scientific theory. For the perception of those affinities brings one so near the absorbing speculative problems of life -- optimism, the proportion of man to his place in nature, his prospects in relation to it -- that it ever tends to become theory through their contagion. Even in Göthe [sic], who has brilliantly handled the subject in his lyrics entitled "Gott und Welt," it becomes something stiffer than poetry; it is tempered by the "pale cast" of his technical knowledge of the nature of colours, of anatomy, of the metamorphosis of plants (1866, pp. 109-110).

Again, Ward's interpretation fails to take adequately into account the fact that Pater's interest in science was never more than a secondary interest, if "interest" it can be called. Science, Pater seems to have thought, may provide the writer with themes which demand all his energies as an artist if he is to deal with them adequately, or, science may simply have the effect of stimulating the intellect by quickening and sharpening the artist's powers of observation: "The truth of these relations experience gives us; not the truth of eternal outlines effected once for all, but of a world of fine gradations and subtly linked conditions, shifting intricately as we ourselves change; and bids us by the constant clearing of the organs of observation and perfecting of analysis to make what we

can of these. To the intellect, to the critical spirit, these subtleties of effect are more precious than anything else. What is lost in precision of form is gained in intricacy of expression" (1866, p. 108). Experience rather than science is what is advocated; the antithesis which follows makes this quite clear:

> To suppose that what is called "ontology" is what the speculative instinct seeks is the misconception of a backward school of logicians. Who would change the colour or curve of a roseleaf for that οὐσία ἀσχρώματος, ἀ χημάτιστος, ἀναφής A transcendentalism that makes what is abstract more excellent than what is concrete has nothing akin to the leading philosophies of the world. The true illustration of the speculative temper is not the Hindoo [sic], lost to sense, understanding, individuality; but such an one as Göthe, to whom every moment of life brought its share of experimental, individual knowledge, by whom no touch of the world of form, colour, and passion was disregarded (1866, p. 108).

The redaction gives for this:

> It is no vague scholastic abstraction that will satisfy the speculative instinct in our modern minds, Who would change the colour or curve of a roseleaf for that οὐσία ἀχρώματος, ἀσχημάτιστος, ἀναφής—that colourless, formless, intangible, being—Plato put so high? For the true illustration of the speculative temper is not the Hindoo [sic] mystic, lost to sense, understanding, individuality, but one such as Goethe, to whom every moment of life brought its contribution of experimental, individual knowledge; by whom no touch of the world of form, colour, and passion was disregarded. (Appreciations, p. 68).

It is characteristic of Pater's own attitude towards science that in the very same article he should have represented modern relativism as a by-product of

modern science; it is made quite explicit here, however, that science is by no means the sine qua non for relativism. The 1866 version of the article puts this more clearly than the recension published in Appreciations (1889):

> To the modern spirit nothing is or can be rightly known except relatively under conditions. An ancient philosopher indeed started a philosphy of the relative, but only as an enigma. So the germs of almost all philosophical ideas were enfolded in after ages by the external influences of art, religion, culture in the natural sciences, belonging to a particular generation, which suddenly becomes pre-occupied by a formula or theory, not so much new as penetrated by a new meaning and expressiveness. So the idea of 'the relative' has been fecundated in modern times by the influence of the sciences of observation. These sciences reveal types of life evanescing into each other by inexpressible refinements of change. Things pass into their opposites by accumulation of undefinable quantities. The growth of those sciences consists in a continual analysis of facts of rough and general observation into groups of facts more precise and minute. A faculty for truth is a power of distinguishing and fixing delicate and fugitive details." (1866, p. 107).

In the redaction the allusion to "An ancient philosopher indeed started a philosophy of the relative, but only as an enigma" was suppressed (1910, p. 66), and this suggests perhaps that the natural sciences were the prerequisite of modern relativism. This was obviously not Pater's own view of the matter, a thesis which gains some support from the fact that in the first chapter of Plato and Platonism (1893) Pater reproduced verbatim certain phrases of the Coleridge article in

its original version and understandably apropos of Heraclitus: "The theory of the perpetual flux was indeed an apprehension of which the full scope was only to be realised by a later age, in alliance with a larger knowledge of the natural world, a closer observation of the phenomena of mind, than was possible, even for Heraclitus, at that early day. So, the seeds of almost all scientific ideas might seem to have been dimly enfolded in the mind of antiquity; but fecundated, admitted to their full working prerogative, one by one, in after ages, by the favour of the special intellectual conditions belonging to a particular generation, which, on a sudden, finds itself pre-occupied by a formula, not so much new, as renovated by new application" (pp. 18-19).

We have already noted in connection with both the Winckelmann article and the Leonardo article how Pater conceived that the modern artist for whom Goethe is to be the prototype might be expected to handle the subjects suggested by "modern" science. In the redaction of the 1876 article "Romanticism" for the "Postscript" to Appreciations (1889) Pater reiterated his position with which we are already familiar from the 1867 and 1869 articles:

> Material for the artist, motives of inspiration, are not yet exhausted: our curious, complex, aspiring age still abounds in subjects for aesthetic manipulation by the literary as well as by other forms of art. For the literary art, at all events, the problem just now is, to induce order upon the contorted, proportionless accumulation of our knowledge and experience, our science and history, our hopes

> and disillusion, and, in effecting this, to do consciously what has been done hitherto for the most part too unconsciously, to write our English language as the Latins wrote theirs, as the French write, as scholars should write. Appealing, as he may, to precedent in this matter, the scholar will still remember that if "the style is the man" it is also the age: that the nineteenth century too will be found to have had its style, justified by necessity -- a style very different, alike from the baldness of an impossible "Queen Anne" revival, and an incorrect, incondite exuberance, after the mode of Elizabeth: that we can only return to either at the price of an impoverishment of form or matter, or both, although, an intellectually rich age such as ours being necessarily an eclectic one, we may well cultivate some of the excellences of literary types so different as those: that in literature as in other matters it is well to unite as many diverse elements as may be: that the individual writer or artist, certainly, is to be estimated by the number of graces he combines, and his power of interpenetrating them in a given work. To discriminate schools, of art, of literature, is, of course, part of the obvious business of literary criticism: but, in the work of literary production, it is easy to be overmuch occupied concerning them. For, in truth, the legitimate contention is, not of one age or school of literary art against another, but of all successive schools alike, against the stupidity which is dead to the substance, and the vulgarity which is dead to form.[22]

The literary artist, then, is expected to come to terms with the complex conditions of the age in which he lives and to embody in his art the idea of the age, man's highest knowledge about himself and the world in which he lives. That this requirement of the artist of the nineteenth century was an exacting one Pater would hardly have wished to deny. It is

22 Appreciations, pp. 260-261. The article

significant, however, that even when he had taken into account the highly abstract intellectual culture of the Victorian age, Pater was still able to entertain some prospects for the future of art; the achievement of Goethe on the one hand and Victor Hugo on the other hand in the immediate past were enough for Pater to posit a future at least for Dichtung, 'poetry,' in the sense in which Pater defines the word in the last paragraph of the Winckelmann article.[23] It is undoubtedly to Pater's credit that he failed to concur with Hegel about the inevitability of the death of art and did not simply by-pass moribund art for burgeoning aesthetics. In retrospect, of course, Hegel might well be considered the more clear-sighted of the two; but this is a moot point. Berenson seems to confirm this view.[24] Certainly Pater remained to the end of his life highly sceptical of the use by poets of "science" for the ends of art; in a letter dated 28 January [1892] to William Canton (1845-1926), Pater indicated that he

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"Romanticism" ended with what is now the last paragraph but one of the "Postscript" (Macmillan's Magazine, XXXV, November 1876, p. 70).

[23] Pater of course nowhere used this highly serviceable German term; Berenson, however, did. See Aesthetics and History (1948), Anchor Books ed., 1965, 31, 54, and Rumour and Reflection (1942) Icon Books ed., 1963, 101.

[24] Cf. Aesthetics and History: "'The day for art is over,' thought Hegel; and unhappily he may be right — right, at all events, till another day dawns, following on the cataclysm and ensuing night in which we already may be plunging. The more reason why we

was well aware of the fact that there were those who posited that the poetry of the future would draw upon unverified hypotheses about the origins of life as well as the verified hypotheses of scientific research, yet he shows little enthusiasm at the prospect and, significantly, in praising the poems submitted to him by Canton concentrated on the non-scientific, non-biological or cosmological, poems. Canton had gained the approbation of Huxley for his achievements in the direction which Pater chose to ignore or at least pass over.[25] The position which Pater adopted in the 1866, 1867, and 1868 articles was thus maintained consistently throughout his literary career. Pater's interest in science is only secondary; literature he conceived of as a synthetic activity which might complement the analytical activities of the sciences. The literature of the future would certainly have to take into account the activities of the scientists in order that it might fully embody the idea of the age in sensuous form; it must not, however, burden itself with the subject-matter of science because in effect this would be but

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should cherish, preserve, and try to understand what human genius has created down to our own so unhappy day." This passage occurs on p. 41 of the Anchor Books edition.

[25] Lawrence Evans, "Some Letters of Walter Pater," unpublished Dissertation, Harvard 1961, Letter 111. To William Canton, 28 January [1892], pp. 115-116. Cf. Evan's footnote, p. 115, n. 1.

to subordinate art to "sciance," to abstraction and intellectualization which as Goethe in the second part of Faust had shown detracted from the artistic value of the work. Pater's directive to the budding literary artist of the late nineteenth century was that he must scrupulously observe the proper limitations of his art without necessarily becoming preoccupied with literature to the exclusion of "science" or philosophy. These he must use for the ends of literary art in so far as they heighten his appreciation of man and the world in which he lives. At the same time the literary artist should recognize that abstract thought, if overdeveloped, will become inimical to his art; there is a delicate balance to be preserved and its due preservation will require that the literary artist ever discriminate nicely. Edmund Wilson in Axel's Castle (1931) remarked: "It is probably true, as Pater has suggested, that there is something akin to the scientific instinct in the efforts of modern literature to render the transitory phases of "a world of fine gradations and subtly linked conditions, shifting intricately as we ourselves change" (1959, p. 295). Wilson was thinking of course of Joyce, whereas Pater was thinking of Flaubert. The affinity between Pater and Mallarmé in the role which each played in their respective countries was one which Edmund Wilson was pleased to note (1959, pp. 32; 269). In the review of the second series of Flaubert's correspondence (1850-1854) Pater had occasion to remark upon

the great French writer's view of the relations which might in the future be expected to obtain between literature and science. The following paragraph of the review which appeared in The Athenaeum of 3 August 1889 is characteristic of Pater's own position on the matter:

> 'Madame Bovary,' of course, was a tribute to science; and Flaubert had no dread, great hopes rather, of the service of science in imaginative literature, though the combat between scientific truth -- mental physiology and the like -- and that perfectly finished academic style he preferred, might prove a hard one. We might be all of us, since Sophocles -- well, "tattooed savages!" but still, there was "something else in art besides rectitude of line and the well-polished surface." The difficulty lay in the limitations of language, which it would be the literary artist's true contention to enlarge. "We have too many things, too few words. 'Tis from that comes the torture of the fine literary conscience." But it was one's duty, none the less, to accept all, "imprint all, and, above all, fix one's point d'appui in the present." Literature, he held, would take more and more the modes of action which now seem to belong exclusively to science. It would be, above all, exposante -- by way of exposition; by which, he was careful to point out, he by no means intended didactic. One must make pictures, by way of showing nature as she really is; only, the pictures must be complete ones. We must paint both sides, the upper and under. Style -- what it might be, if writers faithfully cherished it -- that was the subject of his perpetual consideration (p. 155).

Of the obiter dicta of Flaubert which Pater adduced towards the end of the review the following is germane to our investigation: "In proportion as it advances, art will be more and more scientific, even as science will become artistic. The two will rejoin each other

at the summit, after separating at the base" (p. 156). We must not suppose that this <u>obiter dictum</u> necessarily represents Pater's own position; yet his choice of it to translate here suggests that it was a point of view that was by no means alien to his own way of thinking, just as his earlier adduction of Flaubert's statement that the prose style of the future would be "precise as the language of science" must be construed as not antipathetic to Pater's mind (p. 155).[26] If these passages just cited are then collated with the 1888 article "Style," it may be seen at once that Pater no more regretted the prospect for the immediate future of English assimilating the language of science than he regretted that English in the immediate past had been assimilating the language of art as well as that of German idealism and mystical theology: "English, for a quarter of a century past, has been assimilating the phraseology of pictorial art; for half a century, the phraseology of the great German metaphysical movement of eighty years ago; in part also the language of mystical theology: and none but pedants will regret a great consequent increase of its resources. For many years to come its enterprise may well lie in the naturalisation of the vocabulary of science, so only it be under the eye of a sensitive scholarship: in a liberal naturalisation of the ideas of science too,

[26] Compare also Flaubert's statement, cited in the same place, that poetry is dead because all the possible metrical forms have been exhausted.

for after all the chief stimulus of good style is to possess a full, rich, complex matter to grapple with. The literary artist therefore will be well aware of physical science; science too attaining, in its turn, its true literary ideal." [27]

The negative aspect of Pater's attitude towards the abstractions of metaphysics and ontology is thus to be accounted for partly in terms of the inimicalness of modern intellectual culture to art and the life of artistic perfection, partly, too, in terms of Pater's own reaction against the intense subjectivity of his own youthful idealism. This view the Winckelmann article, together with the Morris and Leonardo articles,

[27] *Fortnightly Review*, vol. XLIV new series (Dec. 1888), pp. 732-733. The version of the article reprinted in *Appreciations* (1889) differs only slightly from the 1888 version: "English, for a quarter of a century past, has been assimilating the phraseology of pictorial art; for half a century, the phraseology of the great German metaphysical movement of eighty years ago; in part also the language of mystical theology: and none but pedants will regret a great consequent increase of its resources. For many years to come its enterprise may well lie in the naturalisation of the vocabulary of science, so only it be under the eye of a sensitive scholarship -- in a liberal naturalisation of the ideas of science too, for after all the chief stimulus of good style is to possess a full, rich, complex matter to grapple with. The literary artist, therefore, will be well aware of physical science; science also attaining, in its turn, its true literary ideal" (p. 16).

corroborates. It is our contention here that Pater's own thinking about the matter derives from Hegel's discussion of the question in the Introduction to the _Ästhetik_. Unlike Hegel, however, Pater does not appear to have seen the imminent death of art and he certainly did not see the necessity of aesthetics replacing art as Hegel had held. Of course Pater's culture was primarily literary and hence he was more impressed by the literary achievements of a Goethe in Germany or a Victor Hugo in France, while, significantly, he doubted the possibility of ever realizing that degree of impersonality which was the ideal of Flaubert in literature no less than of the scientist in research. He appears, however, to have concurred with Hegel's view that sculpture belonged to Greece, painting to the Middle Ages, and music and poetry to the modern world (1867, p. 110). There is in this standpoint, so essentially Hegelian, the tacit assumption that the plastic arts belong to the past. Pater conceived of the modern sciences as providing material with which the artist may grapple; he does not appear to have foreseen that the excessive abstraction characteristic of modern science, the ever increasing reliance upon mathematical notation and statistics against which Goethe had protested in his time, might one day revolutionize the classical conception of painting as "imitation" and lead to abstractionism, the wholesale intellectualization of art. Pater's preoccupations were essentially literary and hence these considerations were not of paramount

importance to him. He remained sceptical, however, of the literary artist taking as the subject-matter of the poetry of the future "those half-proved, half-imagined, truths of scientific research into 'origins'" (Letter to William Canton, 28 January [1892]), presumably because he still entertained the view put forward in the Leonardo article of "how great for the artist may be the danger of over-much science," the second part of Faust being an illustration of the fact that not even Goethe himself was immune to the danger. Again, Pater saw the future of Dichtung to lie in prose rather than in poetry; it was for this reason that he instructed Arthur Symons in a letter dated 8 January [1888] to make prose his métier as a man of letters, writing poetry only for his intimate friends (Evans, p. 86; Letter 76). The forte of the literature of the future would be its realization of a style which, possessed among other characteristics, the precision of the language of science. This prospect had been opened up for Pater by the writings of Flaubert whom Pater adduced on this question in the 1889 review of the second series of the French writer's correspondence. The conclusion to which we are thus led is, then, that Pater's supposed emnity towards metaphysics, ontology, "science," and abstraction generally, his alleged antipathy towards metaphysical, ontological, and scientific abstractions, was the outcome of his preoccupation with art, especially Dichtung, and the life of artistic perfection

to which Pater recognized, after Hegel, that the intellectual culture of the modern world with its all-embracing intellectualization and ever increasing capacity for abstraction and abstract notation was inimical. But if Pater may be said to conform to the point of ~~mind~~ view of Hegel that modern thought had outstripped its ability to embody fully in sensuous form its abstract formulations, he cannot be said to concur with the conclusion of Hegel that art as such belongs to a past stage in the development of the human mind and that therefore aesthetics belongs to the present as well as to the future. Pater with his usual caution would undoubtedly have admitted that sculpture and painting were the proper art forms of Greece and medieval Europe, respectively, while poetry and music are the proper arts of the nineteenth century; this in fact is what he does say towards the end of the Winckelmann article: "We have seen that the development of the various forms of art has corresponded to the development of the thoughts of man concerning himself, to the growing relation of the mind to itself. Sculpture corresponds to the unperplexed, emphatic outlines of Hellenic humanism; painting to the mystic depth and intricacy of the Middle Age; music and poetry have their fortune in the modern world" (1867, p. 110). Pater does not appear to have thought that the death of art was a foregone conclusion; he did not underestimate, however, the very great difficulties which lie in the path of the modern literary artist. These he hoped would be faced up to

squarely in the future as they had been in the past by Goethe and Victor Hugo. Again, Pater did not opt for the delusive prospects of irrationalism and anti-intellectualism;[28] the Pater Letters should serve to safeguard Pater's reputation against any accusations of this kind, for here Pater is shown to have demanded of poetry "an intellectual cast" no less than "concrete definition." The letter to Arthur Symons, dated 8 January 1888, put forward the view that the poet should possess a precise intellectual hold of his subject-matter; the same letter complained of the fact that so much contemporary poetry was deficient in intellectual conception; true imaginative power was in the possession of close logic no less than of firmness and tangibility (Evans, pp. 83-86; Letter 76). Again, in the letter to William Canton, dated 28 January [1892], already adduced, Pater further evidenced his delight in "an intellectual cast in poetry" (Evans, p. 116; Letter 111). In this respect Pater may be considered to have endorsed Hegel's view that abstraction was no less necessary to art than it was to science (Bassenge, II, 89-90; 3. _Teil_, 2. _Abschnitt_); but of course there are limits to be rigidly observed if artistic perfection is to be attained, if the idea is not to outstrip its sensuous embodiment, if the sensuous form is to be adequate to the idea. For Pater, then, the abstractions

[28] Yet the underlying irrationalism of Winckelmann is not to be gainsaid. Cf. Friedrich Heer, _The Intellectual History of Europe_, trans. Jonathan Steinberg, (London 1966), pp. 428 and 541, n. 67. Cf. "Winckelmann" (1867, p. 108).

of philosophy and "science" seen in their relation to art are necessary but at the same time fraught with certain danger because a purely abstract culture is adverse for the survival of art, "over-much science" being a very great danger for the artist, even so great an artist as Goethe; in their relation to the sensible world the abstractions of philosophy and "science" are for Pater good servants but bad masters, good in so far as they enable us to apprehend the idea while at the same time enhancing our appreciation of sensuous particularity, of form and colour, bad in so far as they obliterate through the subsumption of concrete particulars under general ideas what is definite and individual. Pater thus shows himself quite aware of both the negative and the positive roles of abstractions and abstract thought generally in the intellectual culture of the modern world: he realized on the one hand that abstractions could prove and in fact often did prove harmful to art; he grasped clearly on the other hand that none the less very real advantages accrued to the development of abstractions subsequent to the Ionian philosophers. In respect to the level of abstract thought characteristic of Homeric Greece on the one hand and Victorian England on the other hand, Pater stated quite frankly that the advantage lay with the modern European rather than with the ancient Greek. This "apology for general ideas" occurs in the first part of Chapter VII of _Plato and Platonism_ (1893);

the statement which Pater made there thus represents his mature position on the question of the role of abstraction and abstract thought generally in relation to our appreciation of the sensible world; as such it should be set over against what at first sight appears to be inveterate anti-intellectualism of the 1866, 1867, and 1868 articles.

II

So far we have been concerned for the most part with Pater's attitude towards abstraction, towards abstract thought, in so far as it affects art and the life of artistic perfection. This preoccupation with the negative role of abstract thought may seem to imply that Pater's attitude towards intellectual abstraction was thus entirely negative, if not quite hostile. Sir Kenneth Clark appears in the Introduction to the Fontana Library Edition of _The Renaissance_ in the passage cited at the beginning of this dissertation to have thus understood Pater. But Pater's interpretation of the role of abstraction in relation to art was, as we have consistently stressed throughout, conditioned on the one hand by Hegel's handling of the question and on the other hand by Goethe's uneven performance in Faust II in which "the idea is [not consistently] stricken into colour and imagery." It is good, therefore, to find passages of some length in the later writings of Pater in which the positive role of abstraction is presented, in which the abstractions of philosophy no less than the abstractions of "science" are dealt with within the philosophic context of Platonism on the one hand and the abstractions of science within the context of the biological sciences on the other hand. Of metaphysical

abstractions Pater wrote in the first part of Chapter VII of Plato and Platonism:

> The Platonic doctrine of "the Many and the One" -- the problem with which we are brought face to face in this choice specimen of the humour as well as of the metaphysical power of Plato -- is not precisely the question with which the speculative young man of our own day is likely to puzzle himself, or exercise the patience of his neighbour in a railway carriage, of his dog, or even of a Chinese; though the questions we are apt to tear to pieces, organism and environment, or protoplasm perhaps, or evolution, or the Zeitgeist and its doings, may, in their turn, come to seem quite as lifeless and unendurable. As the theological heresy of one age sometimes becomes the mere commonplace of the next, so, in matters of philosophic enquiry, it might appear that the all-absorbing novelty of one generation becomes nothing less than the standard of what is uninteresting, as such, to its successor. Still in the discussion of abstract truths it is not so much what he thinks as the person who is thinking, that after all really tells. Plato and Platonism we shall never understand unless we are patient with him in what he has to tell us about "the Many and the One."
>
> Plato's peculiar view of the matter, then, passes with him into a phase of poetic thought; as indeed all that Plato's genius touched came in contact with poetry. Of course we are not naturally formed to love, or to be interested in, or attracted towards, the abstract as such; to notions, we might think, carefully deprived of all the incident, the colour and variety, which fits things -- this or that -- to the constitution and natural habit of our minds, fits them for attachment to what we really are. We cannot love or live upon genus and species, accident or substance, but for our minds, as for our bodies, need an orchard or a garden, with fruit and roses. Take a seed from the garden. What interest it has for us all lies in our sense of potential differentiation to come: the leaves, leaf upon leaf, the

> flowers, a thousand new seeds in turn. It is so with animal seed; and with humanity, individually, or as a whole, its expansion into a detailed, ever-changing, parti-coloured history of particular facts and persons. Abstraction, the introduction of general ideas, seems to close it up again; to reduce flower and fruit, odour and savour, back again into the dry and worthless seed. We might as well be colour-blind at once, and there is not a proper name left! We may contrast generally the mental world we actually live in, where classification, the reduction of all things to common types, has come so far, and where the particular, to a great extent, is known only as the member of a class, with that other world, on the other side of the generalising movement to which Plato and his master so largely contributed -- a world we might describe as being under Homeric conditions, such we picture to ourselves with regret, for which experience was intuition, and life a continuous surprise, and every object unique, where all knowledge was still of the concrete and the particular, face to face delightfully (pp. 154-156).

In this last sentence Pater recalls, as it were, the contrast which he very effectively drew in the 1866 Coleridge article when he spoke of Goethe as one "to whom every moment of life brought its share of experimental, individual knowledge, by whom no touch of the world of form, colour, and passion was disregarded" (p. 108). Pater, in short, here reproduces that insatiable craving for what is concrete and tangible which Hegel described as one form of reaction to that intense subjectivity which also manifests itself in irony.

Pater, as we have seen, exhibited his reaction to his youthful philosophical idealism in both irony and the craving for what is sensuous and concrete.

The second found its expression in Pater's exchange of Hegel for Goethe, the German poet providing what the German philosopher promised but did not deliver. In the passage which immediately follows the one just cited from Chapter VII of Plato and Platonism we have, however, the result of Pater's mature thought about the role of abstraction in our apprehension of the sensible world and its consequent enhancement as a result of the development of a high level of abstraction in nineteenth-century science:

> To that gaudy tangle of what gardens, after all, are meant to produce, in the decay of time, as we may think at first sight, the systematic, logical gardener put his meddlesome hand, and straightway all ran to seed; to genus and species and differentia, into formal classes, under general notions, and with--yes! with written labels fluttering on the stalks, instead of blossoms--a botanic or "physic" garden, as they used to say, instead of our flower-garden and orchard. And yet (it must be confessed on the other hand) what we actually see, see and hear, is more interesting than ever; the nineteenth century as compared with the first, with Plato's days or Homer's; the faces, the persons behind those masks which yet express so much, the flowers, or whatever it may happen to be they carry or touch. The concrete, and that even as a visible thing, has gained immeasurably in richness and compass, in fineness, and interest towards us, by the process, of which those acts of generalisation, of reduction to class and generic type, have certainly been a part. And holding still to the concrete, the particular, to the visible or sensuous, if you will, last as first, thinking of that as essentially the one vital and lively thing, really worth our while in a short life, we may recognise sincerely what generalisation and abstraction have done or may do, are defensible as

> doing, just for that -- for the particular gem or flower -- what its proper service is to a mind in search, precisely, of a concrete and intuitive knowledge such as that (pp. 156-157).

Pater then proceeded to give a conchological analogy:

> Think, for a moment, of the difference, as regards mental attitude, between the naturalist who deals with things through ideas, and the layman (so to call him) in picking up a shell on the sea-shore; what it is that the subsumption of the individual into the species, its subsequent alliance to and co-ordination with other species, really does for the furnishing of the mind of the former. The layman, though we need not suppose him inattentive, or unapt to retain impressions, is in fact still but a child; and the shell, its colours and convolution, no more than a dainty, very easily destructible toy to him. Let him become a schoolboy about it, so to speak. The toy he puts aside; his mind is drilled perforce, to learn <u>about</u> it; and thereby is exercised, he may think, with everything except just the thing itself, as he cares for it; with other shells, with some general laws of life, and for a while it might seem that, turning away his eyes from the "vanity" of the particular, he has been made to sacrifice the concrete, the real and living product of nature, to a mere dry and abstract product of the mind. But when he comes out of school, and on the sea-shore again finds a fellow to his toy, perhaps a finer specimen of it, he may see what the service of that converse with the general has really been towards the concrete, towards what he sees -- in regard to the particular thing he actually sees. By its juxtaposition and co-ordination with what is ever more and more not <u>it</u>, by the contrast of its very imperfection, at this point or that, with its own proper and perfect type, this concrete and particular thing has, in fact, been enriched by the whole colour and expression of the whole circumjacent world, concentrated upon, or as it were at focus in, it. By a kind of short-hand now, and as if in a single moment of vision, all that, which only a long experience, moving patiently

> from part to part, could exhaust, its manifold alliance with the entire world of nature, is legible upon it, as it lies there in one's hand (pp. 157-158).

Pater's summing up of the matter confirms while at the same time it reiterates his view already advanced that the advantages of abstraction and generalization are momentous for the simple reason that far from obliterating concrete phenomena, the process of abstraction and generalization intensifies them. This judgement, it will be observed, Pater held obtained not only for the phenomena of nature, the phenomena observed and measured by the physical sciences, but also for the phenomena of the mind. It is to be noted here especially that Pater dissociates himself from the particular standpoint of Plato on the question of abstraction and generalization, Pater's own standpoint having been taken "somewhere between the realist and the conceptualist" (p. 151):

> So it is with the shell, the gem, with a glance of the eye; so it may be with the moral act, with a condition of the mind, or a feeling. You maydraw, by use of this coinage (it is Hobbes's figure) this coinage of representative words and thoughts, at your pleasure, upon the accumulative capital of the whole experience of humanity. Generalisation, whatever Platonists, or Plato himself at mistaken moments, may have to say about it, is a method, not of obliterating the concrete phenomenon, but of enriching, with the joint perspective, the significance, the expressiveness, of all other things beside. What broad-cast light he enjoys! -- that scholar, confronted with the sea-shell, for instance, or with some enigma of heredity in himself or another, with some condition of a particular soul, in circumstances which may never precisely so occur again; in the contemplation of that single phenomenon, or object, or situation. He not only sees, but understands

> (thereby only seeing the more) and will, therefore, also remember. The significance of the particular object he will retain, by use of his intellectual apparatus of notion and general law, as, to use Plato's own figure, fluid matter may be retained in vessels, not indeed of unbaked clay, but of alabaster or bronze. So much by way of apology for general ideas-- abstruse, or intangible, or dry and seedy and wooden, as we may sometimes think them (pp. 158-159).

We have already noticed that Pater's allegedly negative attitude towards abstraction and generalization, towards abstract thought, was by no means wholly negative. That Pater was very much concerned with the growth of abstract ideas and the ever increasing hold of abstraction over modern intellectual culture as it affected art and the life of artistic perfection the Coleridge, Winckelmann, and Morris articles have been adduced to show. It has been our contention that while Pater shared with Hegel the view that "over-much science" is inimical to art, he did not concur with Hegel's view that art as such belonged to the past, while the future lay with aesthetics. Pater, it is true, conceived of certain arts as especially attuned to past stages in the development of the human mind -- sculpture to Greece, painting to the Middle Ages -- and hence in a sense as finished with, but he also held that poetry and music had their fortunes in the modern world whose intellectualism Hegel had remarked upon. Pater does not appear ever to have entertained the German philosopher's idea of the death of art, possibly because Pater was

concerned primarily with literary culture, devoting comparatively little space in the canon of his writings to the formal description and formal analysis of the plastic arts, especially sculpture and painting. For Pater the plastic arts are ever subordinate to literary preoccupations. Again, Pater does not appear to have shared the German philosopher's view of the inevitability of aesthetics assuming in the future the role which art had held in the past. Pater himself never developed or formulated an aesthetic; thus, to speak of Pater's "aesthetics," let alone to treat of it as Ruth C. Child has done in The Aesthetics of Walter Pater (1940) is really quite misleading to those who do not possess an intimate knowledge of Pater's writings or an acquaintance with his peculiar penchant for non-scientific, non-formulated truth, arrived at unmethodically by a non-analytical, non-synthetic approach. In this respect Pater may be compared to Amiel whose Journal Intime in the English translation of Mrs. Humphrey Ward he reviewed for The Guardian of 17 March 1886. Berenson in recording in Rumour and Reflection (1952) his own affinity in this respect to Amiel has put the matter so well that it may be extended to Pater by accommodation. In the entry in the journal dated 5 January 1942 Berenson first cited Heinrich Homberger's Selbstgespräche (1886) to provide as it were the occasion for his own remarks on the subject:

'There are talents made for scientific, formulated

truth, reached methodically by analysis and synthesis. There are others for whom this truth is too abstract, too bald, besides being unswerving as well as devitalized —talents in short whom truth can reach only when it is presented through life. Emotionally, Amiel belongs to the second; by his mental schooling and habits to the first category. His wavering personal feelings, mounting from the fathomless depths of his nature, were too strong to allow him to attain the 'objectivity' of the philosophical thinker or the scientific investigator. Yet he longed for the objectivity to be able to exchange the irrational that was his private affair, for the rational entertained universally. But this again did not satisfy him: the universal is the nought; the sentient subject only is alive.

'Against this contradiction, both his creative powers and his intellect broke down. In an age when criticism and creation were unusually opposed, because critical scientific reasoning, which should only accompany, check and collect, claimed to govern creation; in such an age one has to be overwhelmingly one-sided to remain in the realm of genuine creativeness. Amiel, however, was nothing if not many-sided, centripetal, protean. He hovered, his life long, between the two contrasted activities, between science and art, between analysis and presentation.' (Heinrich Homberger, Selbstgespräche, pp. 134-135, written in 1886).

Berenson then added by way of comment on this passage:

Excellent as the above is as descriptions [sic] of Amiel's mental constitution, it fails to realize that he nevertheless was creative. He succeeded in analysing and recording a character and situation alike, on terms so accessible to less gifted individuals of his own kind, that it helps them to understand their own souls as they never would have otherwise. That surely is one of the principal functions of literature as an art.

I am as split up a nature as Amiel. I am perhaps as cultured, perhaps even as intellectual, but I have nothing of his art. Wherefore I have scarcely attempted, and certainly not succeeded in writing about myself in a way that could manifest to even the most kindred spirits, visions of themselves that lay

> hidden too well to be perceived more than dimly, if at all (Icon Book edition, 1963, pp. 75-76).

Homburger's judgement may be taken to apply to Pater no less than to Amiel; Berenson's proviso is not wholly applicable in the case before us. Pater writing in the same year as Homburger put the matter thus:

> And if we take Amiel at his own word, we must suppose that but for causes, the chief of which were bad health and a not long life, he too would have produced monumental work, whose scope and character he would wish us to conjecture from his "Thoughts." Such indications there certainly are in them. He was meant --- we see it in the variety, the high level both of matter and style, the animation, the gravity, of one after another of these thoughts -- on religion, on poetry, om politics in the highest sense; on their most abstract principles, and on the authors who have given them a personal colour; on the genious of those authors, as well as on their concrete works; on out-lying isolated subjects, such as music, and special musical composers -- he was meant, if people ever are meant for special lines of activity, for the best sort of criticism, the imaginative criticism; that criticism which is itself a kind of construction, or creation, as it penetrates, through the given literary or artistic product, into the mental and inner constitution of the producer, shaping his work. Of such critical skill, cultivated with all the resources of Geneva in the nineteenth century, he has given in this Journal abundant proofs. Corneille, Cherbuliez; Rousseau, Sismondi; Victor Hugo, and Joubert; Mozart and Wagner -- all who are interested in these men will find a value in what Amiel has to say of them. Often, as for instance in his excellent criticism of Quinet, he has to make large exceptions; limitations, skilfully effected by the way, in the course of a really appreciative estimate. Still, through all, what we feel is that we have to do with one who criticises in this fearlessly equitable manner only because

he is convinced that his subject is of real literary importance. A powerful, intellectual analysis of some well-marked subject, in such form as makes literature enduring, is indeed what the world might have looked for from him: those institutes of aesthetics, for instance, which might exist, after Lessing and Hegel, but which certainly do not exist yet. "Construction," he says -- artistic or literary construction -- "rests upon feeling, instinct, and ," alas! also, "upon will." The instinct, at all events, was certainly his. And over and above that he had possessed himself of the art of expressing, in quite natural language, very difficult thoughts; those abstract and metaphysical conceptions especially, in which German mind has been rich, which are bad masters, but very useful ministers towards the understanding, towards an analytical survey, of all that the intellect has produced.

But [continues Pater] something held him back: not so much a reluctancy of temperament, or of physical constitution (common enough cause why men of undeniable gifts fail of commensurate production) but a cause purely intellectual -- the presence in him, namely, of a certain vein of opinion; that other, constituent but contending, person, in his complex nature. "The relation of thought to action," he writes, "filled my mind on waking, and I found myself carried towards a bizarre formula, which seems to have something of the night still clinging about it. Action is but coarsened thought." That is but an ingenious metaphysical point, as he goes on to show. But, including in "action" that literary production in which the line of his own proper activity lay, he followed -- followed often -- that fastidious utterance to a cynical and pessimistic conclusion. Maia, as he calls it, the empty "Absolute" of the Buddhist, the "Infinite," the "All," of which those German metaphysicians he loved only too well have had so much to say: this was for ever to give the go-by to all positive, finite, limited interests whatever. The vague pretensions of an abstract expression acted

> on him with all the force of a prejudice. "The ideal," he admits, "poisons for me all imperfect possession"; and again, "The Buddhist tendency in me blunts the faculty of free self-government, and weakens the power of action. I feel a terror of action and am only at ease in the impersonal, disinterested, and objective line of thought." But then, again, with him "action" meant chiefly literary production. He quotes with approval those admirable words from Goethe, "In der Beschränkung zeigt sich erst der Meister"; yet still always finds himself wavering between "frittering myself away on the infinitely little, and longing after what is unknown and distant." There is, doubtless, over and above the physical consumptive tendency, an instinctive turn of sentiment in this touching confession. Still, what strengthened both tendencies was that metaphysical prejudice for the "absolute," the false intellectual conscience. "I have always avoided what attracted me, and turned my back upon the point where secretly I desired to be"; and, of course, that is not the way to a free and generous productivity, in literature, or in anything else; though in literature, with Amiel at all events, it means the fastidiousness which is incompatible with any but the very best sort of production (Essays from 'The Guardian', pp. 28-33).

The passage here cited at length may be taken to serve the purpose of a scholium upon the passage already adduced from the Coleridge article in which Pater instanced Goethe as the type of the many-sided modern intellect and opposed the German poet to the one-sided "metaphysical prejudice" which shrinks from the concrete because it is afraid of the actual. The type of mind which Amiel evidenced was one in which Pater showed a considerable interest; it is hardly fortuitous that Pater should have published in the same month his

"imaginary portrait," "Sebastian van Storck" in which this peculiar penchant for the Absolute in which Pater appears to have indulged himself to the full in the early 1860s is treated in fiction. Certain parallels between the Amiel review and the van Storck "portrait" may be observed: for example, "the constitutional shrinking through a kind of metaphysical prejudice, from the concrete--that fear of the actual--in this case, of the Church of history" (Essays from 'The Guardian,' p. 33) is characteristic of Sebastian as well as Amiel: "But what he could not away with in the Catholic religion was its unfailing drift towards the concrete--the positive imageries of a faith, so richly beset with persons, things, historical incidents" (Imaginary Portraits, p. 98). There is no evidence that Berenson ever read Pater's 1886 review.

To abstract systems of aesthetics no less than to abstract systems of metaphysics Pater preferred the concrete solutions of Winckelmann to the abstract solutions of Lessing or of Hegel. This preference of Pater for solutions in concrete rather than abstract terms to the problems of aesthetics is put succinctly by Pater in the 1867 version of his Winckelmann article:

> Penetrating into the antique world by his passion, his temperament, he [Winckelmann] enunciates no formal principles, always hard and one-sided; it remained for Hegel to formulate what in Winckelmann is everywhere individualized and concrete. Minute and anxious as his culture was, he never became one-sidedly self-analytical. Occupied ever with himself, perfecting himself and cultivating his genius, he was not content, as so often happens with such natures, that the

> atmosphere between him and other minds should be thick and clouded; he was ever jealously refining his meaning into a form, express, clear, objective (1867, p. 103).

The redaction of this passage excized the references to Hegel as well as made other slight changes:

> Penetrating into the antique world by his passion, his temperament, he [Winckelmann] enunciated no formal principles, always hard and one-sided. Minute and anxious as his culture was, he never became one-sidedly self-analytical. Occupied ever with himself, perfecting himself and developing his genius, he was not content, as so often happens with such natures, that the atmosphere between him and other minds should be thick and clouded; he was ever jealously refining his meaning into a form, express, clear, objective (The Renaissance , p. 220).

This passage of course recalls the earlier:

> There, is an instance of Winckelmann's tendency to escape from abstract theory to intuition, to the exercise of sight and touch. Lessing in the Laocoon, has finely theorized on the relation of poetry to plastic art; and Hegel can give us theoretical reasons why not poetry but sculpture should be the most sincere and exact expression of the Greek ideal. By a happy, unperplexed dexterity, Winckelmann solves the question in the concrete. It is what Goethe calls his Gewahrwerden der Griechischen [sic] Kunst, his *finding* of Greek art (1867, pp. 83-84).

Similarly in the redaction of the article this passage also underwent certain changes:

> Here, then, in vivid realisation we see the native tendency of Winckelmann to escape from abstract theory to intuition, to the exercise of sight and touch. Lessing, in the Laocoon, has theorised finely on the relation of poetry to sculpture; and philosophy may give us theoretical reasons why not poetry but sculpture should be the most sincere and exact expression

> of the Greek ideal. By a happy, unperplexed dexterity, Winckelmann solves the question in the concrete. It is what Goethe calls his Gewahrwerden der griechischen Kunst, his finding of Greek art (The Renaissance, 1910, p. 184).

It is conceivable, therefore, that Pater might have objected on similar grounds to Berenson's contention in The Study and Criticism of Italian Art: First Series (1901) that art history should be studied much more abstractly than had been the practice in the past; though Berenson's Lorenzo Lotto (1901) may be said to solve its particular set of problems in the concrete, to use Pater's criterion, no less than Winckelmann's Geschichte der Kunst des Altertums or the earlier and seminal Gedanken über die Nachahmung der griechischen Werke in der Malerei und Bildhauerkunst (1755) to which the last passage adduced must be understood to allude (this is made evident from Goethe's"Winckelmann" in which the phrase "Gewahrwerden griechischer Kunst" heads the section in which Goethe treats of the Gedanken (H A, XII, 106 f.). Certainly Berenson himself considered Lorenzo Lotto an exercize in the concrete; yet, in Aesthetics and History (1948) he allowed not only for the possibility that he had departed from the ideal of concreteness in writing about art but also stated quite baldly that any attempt to write about art must run the risk of so doing:

> The trouble with some art writings, and most so-called aesthetics and treatises on art in the abstract, is that they seldom if ever betray that the author has 'lived' the work of art. They are the outcome

> of reading and cogitation. They remind one of those voluminous and tangled bills of fare presented in Paris restaurants for greenhorns to puzzle over until in despair they cry out, 'Give me something to eat, any darned thing.' The authors of the numerous discourses now appearing on theories of beauty seem to forget the purpose of their deep delving. Their interest is not in the individual work of art, but in the metaphysical system of which aesthetics is but a _coda_ to which it is attached, I sometimes think, as a tin can to a cat's tail.
>
> Although neither philosopher nor theologian, I am by no means sure that I have not fallen into the same ditch, and that some of my more abstract statements are not merely the rattle of the dangling tin can. It is so hard to say anything that amounts to more than verbalism or even verbiage, the moment one leaves the concrete and abandons the attempt to analyse and to interpret. It is not only to ordinary life and to politics that Talleyrand's famous observation applies: _Si nous nous expliquons nous cesserons de nous entendre_--If we go on explaining we shall cease to understand one another. It is so easy to launch into the void of philosophizing about art as a dialectical postulate that even my sixty years of living in the closest intimacy with architecture, painting, and sculpture may not have made me immune.
>
> Every real work of art is already a simplification and interpretation. To simplify it yet further, and to interpret it more penetratingly or subtly, may reduce it to a concept. It is that concept which the critic imposes on his readers, whereas he ought to help them to 'live' the work of art (1965, pp. 28-29).

Alas, Pater with all his praise for concreteness in dealing with the problems of art and aesthetics shows himself to have been one of those "whose interest in art is more abstract than concrete," by which Berenson understood "people who in their secret minds

prefer reading about the work of art to exposing themselves to its direct action," a thesis which the absence of plates and engravings in Pater's own work tends to corroborate. Berenson in The Study and Criticism of Italian Art: Third Series observed that the only illustration to be found in Pater's works is the frontispiece to The Renaissance (1916, p. 20), while Thomas Wright was at some pains to impress upon his readers that Pater's familiarity with actual works of art was to say the least somewhat restricted: "Most critics of Pater -- we may say, indeed, all other critics [than Mrs. Mark Pattison], have assumed that Pater had a wide and deep knowledge of art and the other subjects which he discussed; but the evidence that we have been able to collect does not warrant this assumption. The truth is that Pater, who was of an indolent nature, never would take the trouble to go to the roots of things." This statement occurs in the final paragraph of Ch. XXVIII (I, 254); it is by no means an isolated statement in the biography, for in Ch. XXXIX Wright reiterated what he had said in the earlier chapter: "It will scarcely be believed, but of the more important examples of Greek and Italian sculpture and of ancient gems Pater knew hardly anything, and whenever he required information it was his custom, as he himself expressed it, 'to apply to Marius' [R.C.Jackson]. It was Mr. Jackson who first drew his attention to the Belvedere Apollo, and the famous bust of Marius in the Vatican" (II, 128-129). Presumably

by this Wright meant that Jackson had drawn Pater's attention to photographs or engravings of the statues specified; a photograph is mentioned in the case of the _Marius_ (Vatican) and the _Narcissus_ (Naples), because Pater would at least have been familiar with Winckelmann's verbal description of the _Apollo Belvedere_ in the _Geschichte der Kunst_ (1825/1965, VI, 219-224; 11. _Buch_, 3. _Kapitel_; cf. X, 147-149).

That the verbal equivalent was not without its effect upon the reader must be admitted. Madame de Staël, who appears to have read Winckelmann in a French translation,[29] has this to say of the German Hellenist's style:

> Quelle éloquence contemplative dans ce qu'il écrit sur l'Apollon du Belvédère, sur le Laocoon! Son style est calme et majestueux comme l'objet qu'il considère. Il donne à l'art d'écrire l'imposante dignité des monuments, et sa description produit la même sensation que la statue. Nul avant lui n'avoit réuni des observations exactes et profondes à une admiration si pleine de vie; c'est ainsi seulement qu'on peut comprendre les beaux-arts. Il faut que l'attention qu'ils excitent vienne de l'amour, et qu'on découvre dans les chefs-d'oeuvre du talent, comme dans les traits d'un être chéri, mille charmes révélés par les sentiments qu'ils inspirent (II, 67).

Whether Pater was similarly impressed by the German is a moot point; it is probably correct to say, however, that Pater's enthusiasm for Winckelmann was a result of the sympathetic handling of the eighteenth-century

[29] Mme. de Staël's editor notes that she possessed at Coppet a French translation of the _Geschichte_, _Histoire de l'art chez les Anciens_ (Paris, 1790). See II, 67, n.1. This of course was Winckelmann's intention. Cf. _Geschichte_, 5. _Buch_, 3. _Kapitel_, 14. _Abschnitt_ and 10 _Buch_, 1. _Kapitel_, 16 _Abschnitt_ (IV, 206; VI, 22-23).

figure in the pages of Goethe, Otto Jahn, and de Staël. That Winckelmann's style had impressed Pater very much is suggested by the account which William Sharp, Papers Critical and Reminiscent (London, 1912), pp. 203-204, has left to the effect that Pater was wont to translate daily from "Goethe or Lessing or Winckelmann" among German writers. Still, to expect of a verbal description the immediateness of the visual apprehension of a concrete work of art is to make a serious error. The verbal description must needs be abstract and for that very reason perhaps be prized more than the concrete work of art itself. How well in The Study and Criticism of Italian Art. Third Series (London, 1916) has Berenson expressed for us the disparity between the verbal description of the object and the object itself in the case of Pater's now somewhat embarrassing description of La Gioconda in the 1869 da Vinci article:

> My next meeting with Leonardo took place in the Louvre, but it was years later, and I was no longer the child reacting to a sensation as a bell to its knocker, but a youthful aspirant for artificial paradises, full of elaborately prepared anticipations, determined to feel and understand whatever had thrilled and transported others. I would not be left behind or shut out. So I gave myself long exposures before the works of the Florentine genius, and particularly before his supreme creation, as I was taught to regard it, the "Mona Lisa." Standing on the slippery floor of the Salon Carré, breathing its lifeless air, with the nasty smell of fresh paint in my nostrils, occasionally stealing a moment's rest on the high stool of an absent copyist, I would spend the hours of long summer days trying to match what I really was seeing and feeling with the famous passage of Walter Pater, that, like so many of my contemporaries, I had learned by heart.
>
> I wonder even now how far I succeeded, for brought up almost exclusively on words, I easily yielded to

incantations and talismanic phrases. They put me into states of body and mind not very different from those produced by hypnotic suggestion, and I should have stayed under the spell, if only I had been kept away from the object. But the presence of the object disturbed coma and prevented acquiescence. Its appeals grew and grew until finally it dared come into conflict with the powers of a shaman so potent even as Walter Pater. My eyes were unglamoured and I began to look. What an enchanted adept died in me when I ceased listening and reading and began to see and taste!

What I really saw in the figure of "Mona Lisa" was the estranging image of a woman beyond the reach of my sympathies or the ken of my interests, distastefully unlike the women I had hitherto known or dreamt of, a foreigner with a look I could not fathom, watchful, sly, secure, with a smile of anticipated satisfaction and a pervading air of hostile superiority. And against this testimony of my instincts nothing could prevail. I argued with myself many scores of times that the landscape was mysterious and fascinating, that the conscious art of the painter was marvellous, for it was at once bold and large in conception and delicate and subtle in execution. Then the mass of the figure was imposing yet simple, the modelling persuasive, the existence convincing. I learned to revel in these qualities, to enjoy analysing them, and to dwell lovingly upon each point. I was soothed by the collectedness and fullness of her pose, delighted with the simple yet unobvious device by which her sloping shoulder is given a monumental breadth, and amused by the wary intricacies in the hair and folds. And besides, were not four centuries unanimous in repeating that "Mona Lisa" was one of the very greatest, if not absolutely the greatest achievement of artistic genius?

So I hoped that my doubts would die of inanition, and that my resentment, convinced of rebellious plebeianism, would burn itself out of sheer shame. But neither happened, although in the meantime I too had become a prophet and joined my voice to the secular chorus of praise.

One evening of a summer day in the high Alps the first rumour reached me of "Mona Lisa's" disappearance

from the Louvre. It was so incredible that I thought it could only be a practical joke perpetrated by the satellites of a shrill wit who had expressed a whimsical animosity toward a new frame into which the picture had recently been put. To my own amazement I nevertheless found myself saying softly: "If only it were true!" And when the news was confirmed, I heaved a sigh of relief. I could not help it. The disappearance of such a masterpiece gave me no feelings of regret, but on the contrary a sense of a long-desired emancipation. Then I realised that the efforts of many years to suppress my instinctive feelings about "Mona Lisa" had been vain. She had simply become an incubus, and I was glad to be rid of her.

> But I did not dare even then. Who was I to lift up my feeble voice against the organ resonances of the centuries (pp. 2-4)?

Goethe in the Einleitung to the Propylaean contended that we can treat effectively of works of art only when the object is actually before us; it was Goethe's intention to supply his readers whenever possible with information about where copies or casts of ancient works of art might readily be procured. The reason for this was that Goethe in the Propyläen wished to test theory by practice. Goethe thus foreshadowed Berenson just as both Goethe and Berenson reproduced the methods of Winckelmann who in turn foreshadowed both:

> Wenn wir nun künftig solche Maximen, die wie für die rechten halten, aussprechen werden, wünschten wir, daß sie, wie sie aus den Kunstwerken gezogen sind, von dem Künstler praktisch geprüft werden. Wie selten kann man mit dem andern über einen Grundsatz theoretisch einig werden! Hingegen was anwendbar, was brauchbar sei, ist viel geschwinder entschieden. Wie oft sieht man Künstler bei der Wahl

> ihrer Gegenstände, bei der für ihre Kunst passenden Zusammensetzung im allgemeinen, bei der Anordnung im besondern sowie den Maler bei der Wahl der Farben in Verlegenheit. Dann ist es Zeit, einen Grundsatz zu prüfen, dann wird die Frage leichter zu entscheiden sein: ob wir durch ihn den großen Mustern und allem, was wir an ihnen schätzen und lieben, näher kommen, oder ob er uns in der empirischen Verwirrung einer nicht genug durchdachten Erfahrung stecken läßt.
>
> Gelten nun dergleichen Maximen zur Bildung des Künstlers, zur Leitung desselben in mancher Verlegenheit , so werden sie auch bei Entwicklung, Schätzung und Beurteilung alter und neuer Kunstwerke dienen und wieder wechselsweise aus der Betrachtung derselben entstehen. Ja, es ist um so nötiger, sich auch hier daran zu halten, weil, unerachtet der allgemein gepriesnen Vorzuge des Altertums, dennoch unter den Neuern sowohl einzelne Menschen als ganze Nationen oft eben das verkennen, worin der höchste Vorzug jener Werke liegt.

Goethe proceeds to describe the usual approach to classical art:

> Eine genaue Prüfung derselben wird uns am meisten vor diesem Übel bewahren. Deshalb sei hier nur ein Beispiel aufgestellt, wie es dem Liebhaber in der plastischen Kunst zu gehen pflegt, damit etwa deutlich werde, wie notwendig eine genaue Kritik der ältern sowohl als der neuern Kunstwerke sei, wenn sie einigerma en Nutzen bringen soll.
>
> Auf jeden, der ein zwar ungeübtes, aber für das Schöne empfängliches Auge hat, wird ein stumpfer, unvollkommner Gipsabguß eines trefflichen alten Werks noch immer eine große Wirkung tun; denn in einer solchen Nachbildung bleibt doch immer die Idee, die Einfalt und Große der Form, genug, das Allgemeinste noch übrig, so viel, als man mit schlechten Augen allenfalls in der Ferne gewahr werden könnte.
>
> Man kann bemerken, daß oft eine lebhafte Neigung zur Kunst durch solche ganz unvollkommene Nachbildungen entzündet wird. Allein die Wirkung ist dem Gegenstande gleich: es wird mehr ein dunkles, unbestimmtes Gefühl erregt, als daß eigentlich der Gegenstand, in seinem

Wert und in seiner Würde, solchen angehenden Kunstfreunden erscheinen sollte. Solche sind es, die gewöhnlich den Grundsatz äußern, daß eine allzu genaue kritische Untersuchung den Genuß zerstöre, solche sind es, die sich gegen eine Würdigung des Einzelnen zu sträuben und zu wehren pflegen.
Wenn ihnen aber nach und nach, bei weiterer Erfahrung und Übung, ein scharfer Abguß statt eines stumpfen, ein Original statt eines Abgusses vorgelegt wird, dann wächst mit der Einsicht auch das Vergnügen, und so streigt es, wenn Originale selbst, wenn vollkommene Originale ihnen endlich bekannt werden.
Gern laßt man sich in die Labyrinthe genauer Betrachtungen ein, wenn das Einzelne so wie das Ganze vollkommen ist, ja man lernt einsehen, daß man des Vortreffliche nur in dem Maße kennen lernt, insofern man das Mangelhafte einzusehen imstande ist. Die Restauration von den ursprünglichen Teilen, die Kopie von dem Original zu unterscheiden, in dem kleinsten Fragmente noch die zerstörte Herrlichkeit des Ganzen zu schauen, wird der Genuß des vollendeten Kenners; und es ist ein großer Unterschied, ein stumpfes Ganze mit dunklem Sinne oder ein vollendetes mit hellem Sinne zu beschauen und zu fassen.

For Goethe it was a sine qua non that the connoisseur should subordinate himself to the object he is studying and furthermore that the connoisseur should carry out his research in the immediate presence of the object because all writing about art has significance only in so far as it obviously relates to the object being discussed. Goethe said that his policy in the Propyläen would be to provide information to enable ready access to any work of art he happened to discuss: in this way the study of art might be said to be carried out in the presence of the objects under discussion:

Wer sich mit irgendeiner Kenntnis abgibt, soll nach dem Höchsten streben! Es ist mit der Einsicht viel anders als mit der Ausübung: denn im Praktischen muß sich jeder bald bescheiden, daß ihm nur ein gewisses Maß von Kräften zugeteilt sei; zur Kenntnis, zur Einsicht aber sind weit mehrere Menschen fähig, ja man kann wohl sagen, ein jeder, der sich selbst verleugnen, sich den Gegenständen unterordnen kann, der nicht mit einem starren, beschränkten Eigensinn sich und seine kleinliche Einseitigkeit in die höchsten Werke der Natur und Kunst überzutragen strebt.

Um von Kunstwerken eigentlich und mit wahrem Nutzen für sich und andere zu sprechen, sollte es freilich nur in Gegenwart derselben geschehen. Alles kommt aufs Anschauen an, es kommt darauf an daß bei dem Wort, wodurch man ein Kunstwerk zu erläutern hofft, das Bestimmteste gedacht werde, weil sonst gar nichts gedacht wird.

Daher geschient es so oft, daß derjenige, der über Kunstwerke schreibt, bloß im Allgemeinen verweilt, wodurch wohl Ideen und Empfindungen erregt werden, ja allen Lesern, nur demjenigen nicht genuggetan wird, der mit dem Buche in der Hand vor das Kunstwerk hintritt.

Aber eben deswegen werden wir in mehrern Abhandlungen vielleicht in dem Falle sein, das Verlangen der Leser mehr zu reizen als zu befriedigen; denn es ist nichts natürlicher, als daß sie ein vortreffliches Kunstwerk, das genau zergliedert wird, sogleich vor Augen zu haben wünschen, um das Ganze, von dem die Rede ist, zu genießen und, was die Teile betrefft, die Meinung, die sie vernehmen, ihrem Urteil zu unterwerfen.

Indem nun aber die Verfasser für diejenigen zu arbeiten denken, welche die Werke teils gesehen haben, teils künftig sehen werden, so hoffen sie für solche, die sich in keinem der beiden Fälle befinden, dennoch das Mögliche zu tun. Wir werden die Nachbildungen erwähnen, anzeigen, wo Abgüsse von alten Kunstwerken, alte Kunstwerke selbst besonders den Deutschen sich näher befinden, und so echter Liebhaberei und Kunstkenntnis, soviel an uns liegt, zu begegnen suchen.

This passage from Goethe's Einleitung in die Propyläen (W A, XII, 50-52) has been cited here at length, neither because it is original with Goethe (Winckelmann says very much the same sort of thing in the Vorrede to his Geschichte) nor because Pater alluded to it ("Goethe's fragments of art criticism," the words with which the Winckelmann article opens, may be taken to suggest that Pater was familiar with more than Goethe's own Winckelmann essay); but rather because it indicates so clearly and unmistakably what we understand by "concrete definition." "Concrete definition" is a phrase which Pater himself uses in Appreciations (1889) in his study of Dante Gabriel Rossetti: "For Rossetti, as for Dante, without question on his part, the first condition of the poetic way of seeing and presenting things is particularisation"; "And this delight in concrete definition is allied with another of his conformities to Dante, the really imaginative vividness, namely, of his personifications" (p. 208). It is characteristic of Pater that he found poetry and painting to be more concrete than sculpture which he held to be more abstract than either. This thesis he put forward originally in the Winckelmann article when he wrote: "at first sight sculpture, with its solidity of form, seems more real and full than the faint abstract manner of poetry or painting. Still the fact is the reverse" (1867, p. 98; the redaction gives here: "at first sight sculpture, with its solidity of form, seems a thing more real and full than the faint,

abstract world of poetry or painting." [p.211]). It is hardly surprizing then when we find Pater treating at length Browning's Dramatis Personae because this work for Pater was an instance of what he understood by contemporary artistic brilliance. Nowhere in Pater do we find, as we detect so often in the writings on art of Winckelmann and Goethe, that delight in form and colour which, significantly, Pater detected only in classical literature where he was probably following Jowett rather than either Winckelmann or Goethe. Thus Jowett in his Introduction to Plato's Lysis noted that that Dialogue and the Charmides showed a marked affinity in their youthfulness and sense of beauty. Both dialogues Jowett held to be "rich in their description of Greek life" (The Dialogues of Plato, 2nd. ed. [1875], I, 41). So Pater in the Winckelmann article wrote: "The modern most often meets Plato on that side which seems to pass beyond Plato into a world no longer pagan, based on the conception of a spiritual life. But the element of affinity which he presents to Winckelmann is that which is wholly Greek and alien from the Christian world, represented by that group of brilliant youths in the Lysis, still uninfected by any spiritual sickness, finding the end of all endeavour in the aspects of the human form, the continual stir and motion of a comely human life" (1867, p. 82). The recognition of colour and form in the Dialogues of Plato is something which especially marks Pater's

handling of the Greek philosopher in Plato and Platonism (1893). Compare pages 46-47, 97, and especially pages 133-137, 138-141, and 142-146, where the Charmides is considered.

The notable exception to Pater's literary and philological considerations in the study of classical art is of course his endeavour in both parts of "The Beginnings of Greek Sculpture" (1880) and "The Marbles of Ægina" (1880) to redress the imbalance in criticism which Pater dated from Lessing (1729-1781) whereby the abstract or ideal qualities of classical sculpture were emphasised at the expense of the concrete and sensuous qualities (Greek Studies, p. 215). This limited critical aim Pater made quite explicit in the three papers named. The following passage from the first part of "The Beginnings of Greek Sculpture" is characteristic:

> And the circumstance that Greek sculpture is presented to us in such falsifying isolation from the work of the weaver, the carpenter, and the goldsmith, has encouraged a manner of regarding it too little sensuous. Approaching it with full information concerning what may be called the inner life of the Greeks, their modes of thought and sentiment amply recorded in the writings of the Greek poets and philosophers, but with no lively impressions of the mere craftsman's world of which so little has remained, students of antiquity have for the most part interpreted the creations of Greek sculpture, rather as elements in a sequence of abstract ideas, as embodiments, in a sort of petrified language, of pure thoughts, and as interesting mainly in connexion with the development of Greek intellect, than as elements of a sequence in the material order, as results of a designed and skilful dealing of accomplished fingers

with precious forms of matter for the delight of the eyes. Greek sculpture has come to be regarded as the product of a peculiarly limited art, dealing with a specially abstracted range of subjects; and the Greek sculptor as a workman almost exclusively intellectual, having only a sort of accidental connexion with the material in which his thought was expressed. He is fancied to have been disdainful of such matters as the mere tone, the fibre or texture, of his marble or cedar-wood, of that just perceptible yellowness, for instance, in the ivory-like surface of the Venus of Melos; as being occupied only with forms as abstract almost as the conceptions of philosophy, and translateable it might be supposed into any material--a habit of regarding him still further encouraged by the modern sculptor's usage of employing merely mechanical labour in the actual working of the stone (<u>Greek Studies</u>, pp. 188-190).

Further, in the same place:

The works of the highest Greek sculpture are indeed <u>intellectualised</u>, if we may say so, to the utmost degree; the human figures which they present to us seem actually to conceive thoughts; in them, that profoundly reasonable spirit of design which is traceable in Greek art, continuously and increasingly, upwards from its simplest products, the oil-vessel or the urn, reaches its perfection. Yet, though the most abstract and intellectualised of sensuous objects, they are still sensuous and material, addressing themselves, in the first instance, not to the purely reflective faculty, but to the eye; and a complete criticism must have approached them from both sides--from the side of the intelligence indeed, towards which they rank as great thoughts come down into the stone; but from the sensuous side also, towards which they rank as the most perfect results of the pure skill of hand, of which the Venus of Melos, we may say, is the highest example, and the little polished pitcher or lamp, also perfect in its way, perhaps the lowest.

To pass by the purely visible side of these things, then, is not only to miss a refining pleasure, but to mistake altogether the medium in which the most

> intellectual of the creations of Greek art, the Æginetan or the Elgin marbles, for instance, were actually produced; even these having, in their origin, depended for much of their charm on the mere material in which they were executed; and the whole black and grey world of extant antique sculpture needing to be translated back into ivory and gold, if we would feel the excitement which the Greek seems to have felt in the presence of these objects. To have this really Greek sense of Greek sculpture, it is necessary to connect it, indeed, with the inner life of the Greek world, its thought and sentiment, on the one hand; but on the other hand to connect it, also, with the minor works of price, intaglios, coins, vases; with that whole system of material refinement and beauty in the outer Greek life, which these minor works represent to us; and it is with these, as far as possible, that we must seek to relieve the air of our galleries and museums of their too intellectual greyness. Greek sculpture could not have been precisely a cold thing; and, whatever a colour-blind school may say, pure thoughts have their coldness, a coldness which has sometimes repelled from Greek sculpture, with its unsuspected fund of passion and energy in material form, those who cared much, and with much insight, for a similar passion and energy in the coloured world of Italian painting (pp. 190-191).

All this is, to say the least, praiseworthy and hardly liable to objections on the grounds of want of concreteness, but what follows? "Theoretically, then, we need that world of the minor arts as a complementary background for the higher and more austere Greek sculpture" (p.191). The minor arts of Greek civilization (Pater uses the term tectonics to cover these, [p. 192]) are not being appreciated for their own sake any more than is Greek sculpture; both are being subordinated to classical philology, for Pater proceeds to reconstruct

Greek art of the Heroic Age on the basis of documents, the Illiad and the Odyssey, a procedure for which the introductory paragraphs did not prepare us. This task of reconstruction is sketched on pp. 192 and 193, while the discussion begins on p. 193. It is difficult not to escape the conclusion that Pater, like the classical philologers and the classical archaeologists, is really interested in the concrete works of Greek art only because they happen to illustrate classical literature. We do not detect in Pater what is so evident in Winckelmann and Berenson, that works of art are "the only primary documents for art history. In that field written documents are ancillary and hence have no meaning except in connection with surviving works of art." This was certainly Berenson's view in Aesthetics and History, p. 53. Berenson never tired of censuring those who, whether consciously or unconsciously, interested themselves in the actual works of classical art with ulterior, philological, motives: "As for the pundits who approach art through texts, inscriptions, archives, and the written word only, I cannot recall many whose publications betray that they have experienced the movement, quality, or style of line" (p. 82). Again: "Illustration, I repeat, is an independent art and not a visual gloss upon a poem or the visual accompaniment of a narrative. It should be complete in itself, and in no way dependent for its artistic merits on outside support whether by way of information or interpretation. Much of what is objectionable in the German-minded way of studying art is that it is pursued either by philologers, with methods forged in the study of texts, inscriptions, and documents,

or by historians who use the work of art only as a help to reconstruct the past."

Berenson went on in the same place to remark that philological procedures were somewhat _de trop_ when used for, say, the art of the Italian Renaissance for which adequate documentation is extant: "These methods are out of place in the study of works of art created in times about which we have abundant information, and that still exist in the original. Like all things in a wrong place, these methods are a nuisance. They succeed only in burying the work of art under heaps of rubbish, and before long it will need rescue parties to bring it to light again, so that it may serve the primary purpose of any work of art, which is to give life-enhancement" (p. 114). A very important passage in which Berenson treats at length of the philological approach to classical art (pp. 49-51) is held over until the second part of the dissertation because we believe that it is more germane to the discussion of Pater's abstractionism. Here we might also collate Berenson and Winckelmann on the question of the paramount importance of the work of art itself in the study of art, for Winckelmann ostensibly upheld the position which Berenson was to take up, namely, that the work of art is ever to be preferred before any number of books about it. Winckelmann in paragraphs 3, 4, 15, 16, and 17 of the _Vorrede_ to the _Geschichte_ (III, 10-12, 25-27) seems to foreshadow the methodology formulated by Berenson in _The Study and Criticism of Italian Art_ (reiterated in _Aesthetics and History_), though first worked out in _Lorenzo Lotto_ (1895), but then in the case of Winckelmann (if not of Berenson himself) we are to presuppose a philological bias.

By the criteria of Berenson and Winckelmann some of Pater's most mature work measures up rather badly. But, then, nowhere in Pater do we detect that sudden realization of actually seeing an object or group of objects for the first time. Pater, it is true, was very sensitive to the effects of light (we see this, for example, in his papers on Lamb and Amiel),[30] but nowhere do we find in him that clear and indisputable mark of personal experience which Goethe has given us in *Dichtung und Wahrheit*, for example, in that description of an actual scene which Goethe saw as if it had been painted by van Ostade; the passage is adduced by Hegel in the *Ästhetik* (II, 223). And the mention of *Dichtung und Wahrheit* in this connection recalls also that the dicta of the 1873 Preface were first Goethe's:

> "To see the object as in itself it really is," has been justly said to be the aim of all true criticism whatever; and in aesthetic criticism the first step towards seeing one's object as it really is, is to know one's own impression as it really is, to discriminate it, to realise it distinctly. The objects with which aesthetic criticism deals -- music, poetry, artistic and accomplished forms of human life -- are indeed receptacles of so many powers or forces: they possess, like the products of nature, so many virtues or qualities. What is this song or picture, this engaging personality presented in life or in a book, to *me*? What effect does it really produce on me? Does it give me pleasure? and if so, what sort or degree of pleasure? How is my nature modified by its presence, and under its influence? The

[30] *Appreciations*, pp. 122-123, and *Essays from the Guardian*, p.26.

> answers to those questions are the original facts with which the aesthetic critic has to do; and, as in the study of light, of morals, of number, one must realise such primary data for one's self, or not at all. And he who experiences these impressions strongly, and drives directly at the discrimination and analysis of them, has no need to trouble himself with the abstract question what beauty is in itself, or what its exact relation to truth or experience--metaphysical questions, as unprofitable as metaphysical questions elsewhere. He may pass them all by as being, answerable or not, of no interest to him (viii-ix).

This the much-maligned Thomas Wright traced to Goethe's *Dichtung und Wahrheit*: "All which remarks [noted Wright] are none the less valuable because they are not original, being lifted almost bodily, and without acknowledgment from Goethe's Autobiography." In a footnote to this sentence Wright translated Goethe thus: "Goethe's words are: 'It is everybody's duty to seek out for what is internal and peculiar in a book which particularly interests him, and at the same time, above all things, to weigh in what relation it stands to his own inner nature, and how far, by that vitality, his own is excited and rendered faithful'" (I, 245 and n. 1). Wright identifies the source as Book 12; Goethe's actual words in *Dichtung und Wahrheit* were:

> Das Innere, Eigentliche einer Schrift, die uns besonders zusagt, zu erforschen, sei daher eines jeden Sache, und dabei vor allen Dingen zu erwägen, wie sie sich zu unserm eignen Innern verhalte, und inwiefern durch jene Lebenskraft die unsrige erregt und befruchtet werde; alles Äußere hingegen, was auf uns unwirksam, oder einem Zweifel unterworfen sei, habe man der Kritik zu überlassen, welche, wenn sie auch imstande sein sollte, das Ganze zu zerstückeln und zu zersplittern, dennoch niemals dahin gelangen würde, uns den eigentlichen Grund, an dem wir

> festhalten, zu rauben, ja uns nicht einen Augenblick an der einmal gefaßten Zuversicht irre zu machen (H A , IX, 510).

We have thus succeeded in showing that Pater's much-bruited concreteness, his supposed antipathy towards abstractions of any kind, is subject to some qualification. Indeed, it is highly pertinent to this stage in our investigation to point out that, Pater's dismissal of metaphysical questions notwithstanding, the distinction which in the 1873 Preface is drawn between abstract and concrete is in itself a metaphysical question to whose full implications Pater was by no means eager to commit himself.[31] In the last paragraph but one of the 1876 article "Romanticism" Pater observed that no exercize could be more profitable for the analyst of the romantic principle in art than to visit the collection of classical antiquities in the Louvre or the British Museum or to examine a representative collection of Greek coins in order to discriminate incipient romanticism within a classical design. This observation will be found in <u>Macmillan's</u> <u>Magazine</u>, XXXV (November 1876), p. 70. Such directives of Pater (another occurs in <u>Greek</u> <u>Studies</u>, p. 288) should not mislead us as to the true direction of his criticism which is ever away from the object to discussing or writing about it in the abstract. Pater may well be described then according to Berenson's distinction as one of those whose interest in art was

[31] Cf. Jowett's Introduction to the <u>Charmides</u>. <u>The</u> <u>Dialogues</u> <u>of</u> <u>Plato</u>, 2nd ed., 1875, I, 5.

more abstract than concrete, as one who preferred to read about works of art instead of subordinating himself to the object; Pater is thus the very antithesis of Winckelmann on the one hand and of Berenson on the other. The absence in Pater's works of plates and engravings for purposes of documentation may be added as further proof that his interest was more literary than visual, more abstract than concrete. Internal evidence thus bears out the testimony of Pater's biographer who stated that Pater's familiarity with actual works of art was somewhat more limited than the reader of Studies in the History of the Renaissance might be led to expect, though, as Wright also pointed out, in his later years the author of The Renaissance came to appreciate objects more than books. It is hardly fortuitous, then, that Pater in his 1867 Winckelmann article made no mention of the German Hellenist's insistence that classical art be studied in Rome or even of Goethe's allusion to this dictum (Goethe's allusion occurs in a letter dated Rome, 13 December 1786 [H A , XI, 148-149]). It cannot but count against Pater, even allowing for the exigencies of his subject-matter, that in his references to the Italiänische Reise he never refers to those passages in which Goethe showed his singular awareness of whatever object he happened to be considering.[32] Pater's awareness of the importance of the object in art criticism which he owed to Goethe remained theoretical; it

[32] Cf. H A, XI, 40-41, 59-61; Pater singles out only the entries for Bologna, 19 October 1786 (1867, p. 106 and n.) and Perugia, 25 October 1786 (Introduction to Shadwell's Dante [1892], pp. xiii-xiv, xiv n.). Otto Jahn, p. 31-32 n., adduced Goethe's letter of 13 Dec. 1786.

was never put into practice in the way in which, for example, Berenson put into practice the suggestions of Winckelmann, Goethe, or even those of Pater himself.

For Pater art is still inextricably bound up with documentation whereas Berenson envisaged that art study in the future would become divorced from biographical preoccupations as well as from "parascholarship" (Berenson does not use this word) of petty documentation; we find this view expressed, for example, in The Study and Criticism of Italian Art. First Series (London, 1930), pp. vi-vii. In his preference for solutions in the most concrete rather than in the most abstract terms possible to the problems of aesthetics, a principle put forward formally first in the Preface to Studies in the History of the Renaissance (1873), though foreshadowed in the 1867 Winckelmann article, Pater was by no means being as inconsistent as he might at first appear in view of his own considerable debt to both Lessing's Laokoon and Hegel's Ästhetik; after all, had not Lessing charged Winckelmann with being too philosophical in the account he gave of the Laokoon Group in his Gedanken über die Nachahmung der griechischen Werke in der Malerei und Bildhauerkunst? Again, Hegel may likewise have impressed Pater with his pretensions to being concrete and objective; but "concrete" and "abstract," no less than "classical" and "romantic," are relative terms, the relativity of all critical terminology being asserted in the article "Romanticism," Macmillan's Magazine, XXXV (November 1876), p. 70;

Cf. Appreciations, p. 258. ~~would readily have admitted in the case before us.~~ Certainly Winckelmann and Goethe appear to have replaced Lessing and Hegel in Pater's estimation, though his debt to the former he never sought to disguise. It is this change in allegiance which impresses itself upon the reader of Pater's early articles. This change, as we have already noted, is to be accounted for in part by Pater's reaction against German idealism, his turning to Goethe and Winckelmann because in their writings on art were offered concrete solutions to the abstract problems posed by Lessing and Hegel. Still Hegel provided the rationale for the Winckelmann article and in the recognition of the German philosopher of the necessity of abstraction for both art and science (II, 89-90; 3. Teil, 2. Abschnitt) there is an anticipation of the passages already adduced from Plato and Platonism (1893). Pater no less than Hegel was well aware of the decided advantages which the modern world enjoyed over antiquity in its capacity for abstraction and hence fuller appreciation of what is concrete and sensible; but unlike the German philosopher, Pater was not committed to an abstract formulation which obliterated concrete particulars by their subsumption under abstractions. Pater's procedure was quite the reverse; as Bernhard Fehr has pointed out and as we have already noted, Pater's tendency is ever to concretize what is abstract and dialectical in Hegel. Indeed, Pater follows Jowett in trying to get Hegel out

of his dialectical form. For this reason we conclude that Pater was not the inveterate enemy of abstractions but rather of abstract formulations and systems of metaphysics, ontology, and aesthetics. What appears in the early articles to be an attack on abstract thought turns out to be an attack on abstract formulations and systems which obliterate concrete particulars by their subsumption under general ideas, while the reason for this attack is shown to be Pater's fear that "over-much science" is inimical to art, Goethe being adduced to show the dangers inherent in the attempt to embody in the second part of Faust his technical knowledge. It is thus artistic considerations which dictate Pater's terms for philosophy and "science" in their relation to art, especially Dichtung. Because Pater was not committed to the Hegelian system, he was able to avoid Hegel's embarrassing conclusions about the place of art in modern culture; for Pater aesthetics never became a substitute for art. We have contended that the way which Pater took out of the dilemma which confronted Hegel was made possible by his discovery of Goethe and subsequently, through Otto Jahn, of Winckelmann. We have made it quite clear, however, that Pater's apparent censure of abstractions whether of metaphysics or ontology was a censure of theories and systems rather than of abstractions themselves; we can find no evidence to suggest that Goethe's anti-Newtonian bias, for example, influenced Pater's attitude towards science.

Mathematical abstractions, as we have seen, are one type of abstraction which Pater did not see fit to attack. On the contrary, he was well aware of how great an advantage men of the nineteenth century enjoyed over earlier ages because they possessed a highly abstract and intellectual culture which enabled them to appreciate the sensible world in all its variety and detail. While Pater's appreciation of sensuous particularity does of course show a marked affinity to Goethe's and passages might be adduced to show that Goethe had "influenced" Pater in this respect, it is our contention that Pater's own understanding of the matter conforms more readily to Jowett's interpretation of Plato on the one hand and of Hegel on the other. Pater's view of both philosophers in Plato and Platonism finds frequent parallels in Jowett's published Introductions to the Dialogues,[33] though we must suppose on the basis of Pater's letter to Jowett's biographer that the influence of the Master of Balliol over the young Pater is to be assigned to lectures and personal contacts through which he became familiar with Jowett's position on both philosophers. The fact that Jowett's views were substantially, though apparently not wholly, reproduced in the published Introductions to the Dialogues warrants the procedure we have adopted here of collating Pater and Jowett on Hegel. In a long note to the first section of the first part of this dissertation (n. 17, pp. 55-62) it will be recalled that we traced at some length the course of Jowett'

[33] Cf. Jowett's use of "centripetal" and

peculiar Hegelianism; here, in conclusion, we now wish to adduce certain passages from Jowett's Introduction to Plato's Sophist by means of which Pater's position in relation to abstraction and system in philosophy in general and Hegelian philosophy in particular may be definitively stated.

In the Introduction to the Sophist, to which we shall confine our remarks here, Jowett dates the subsequent development and progress of human thought from the initial discovery by the Greeks of abstractions; he was careful to point out at the same time, however, the dangers inherent in that discovery: "The discovery of abstractions was the great source of all mental improvement in after ages. But each one of this company of abstractions, if we may speak in the metaphorical language of Plato, became in turn the tyrant of the mind, the dominant idea, which would allow no other to have a share in the throne. This is especially true of the Eleatic philosophy: while the absoluteness of being was asserted in every form of language, the sensible world and all the phenomena of experience were comprehended under not-being" (2nd ed., 1875, IV, 382).

"centrifugal" in the sentence: "We may be reminded that in nature there is a centripetal as well as a centrifugal force, a regulator as well as a spring, a law of attraction as well as of repulsion" (The Dialogues of Plato, 2nd ed., 1875, IV, 408) and Pater in Plato and Platonism, pp. 23, 24, 103-105, 238, 255, and 273.

Later in the same Introduction Jowett observed that it was easy for the intellect to become enmeshed in abstractions and thus lose its grasp of particulars; of Hegel Jowett says this: "Nor can we deny that he [Hegel] is unnecessarily difficult, or that his own mind, like that of all metaphysicians, was too much under the dominion of his system and unable to see beyond." Jowett fully recognized that the whole-hearted pursuit of philosophy could not be without "grave results to the mind and life of the student. For it may encumber him without enlightening his path; and it may weaken his natural faculties of thought and expression without increasing his philosophical power. The mind easily becomes entangled among abstractions, and loses hold of facts. The glass which is adapted to distant objects takes away the vision of what is near and present to us" (1875, IV, 407). Jowett of course was well aware of Hegel's pretensions to "objectivity," for in his characterization of the Hegelian system he enumerated as the fourth aspect of that philosophy its amenability to fact: "This vast ideal system is supposed to be based upon experience. At each step it professes to carry with it the 'witness of eyes and ears' and of common sense, as well as the internal evidence of his own consistency; it has a place for every science, and affirms that no philosophy of a narrower type is capable of comprehending all true facts" (1875, IV, 405). These

pretensions Jowett taxed severely; it was his contention that Hegel had failed to bridge the gap between appearance and reality: "In forms of thought which by most of us are regarded as mere categories, he saw or thought he saw a gradual revelation of the Divine Being. He would have been said by his opponents to have confused God with the history of philosophy, and to have been incapable of distinguishing ideas from facts. And certainly we can scarcely understand how a deep thinker like Hegel could have hoped to revive or supplant the old traditional faith by an unintelligible abstraction: or how he could have imagined that philosophy consisted only or chiefly in the categories of logic. For abstractions, though combined by him in the notion, seem to be never really concrete; they are a metaphysical anatomy, not a living and thinking substance. Though we are reminded by him again and again that we are gathering up the world in ideas, we feel after all that we have not really spanned the gulf which separates φαινόμενα from ὄντα " (1875, IV, 407-408).

Still, Jowett was awake to the advantages which might accrue even to what he obviously considered a weakness in the system of Hegel: the Hegelian system alone could free the mind of the young student of philosophy from the tyranny of systems and abstractions: "The system of Hegel [wrote Jowett] frees the mind from the dominion of abstract ideas." Again, in the same place, he tells us: "He [Hegel] has lightened the burden of thought because he has shown us that the chains which we wear are of our own forging. To

be able to place ourselves not only above the opinion of men but above their modes of thinking, is a great height of philosophy" (1875, IV, 413).

Two passages in particular may be singled out to be cited at length as showing Jowett's position in relation to the system of Hegel on the one hand and philosophical systems in general on the other. The first passage drew the approbation of Berenson who readily applied Jowett's dicta to Croce and the Croceans:[34]

> Hegel would have insisted that his philosophy should be accepted as a whole or not at all. He would have urged that the parts derived their meaning from one another and from the whole. He thought that he had supplied an outline large enough to contain all future knowledge, and a method to which all future philosophies must conform. His metaphysical genius is especially shown in the construction of the categories--a work which was only begun by Kant, and elaborated to the utmost by himself. But is it really true that the part has no meaning when separated from the whole, or that knowledge to be knowledge at all must be universal? Do all abstractions shine only by the reflected light of other abstractions? May they not also find a nearer explanation in their relation to phenomena? If many of them are correlatives they are not all so, and the relations which subsist between them, vary from a mere association up to a necessary connection. Nor is it easy to determine how far the unknown element affects the known, whether, for example, new discoveries may not one day supersede our most elementary notions about nature. To a certain extent all our knowledge is conditional upon what may be known in future ages of the world. We must admit this hypothetical element which we cannot get rid of by an assumption that we have already discovered

[34] Cf. Bernhard Berenson, One Year's Reading for Fun [1942] (London, 1960), pp. 134-135.

> the method to which all philosophy must conform. Hegel is right in preferring the concrete to the abstract, in setting actuality before possibility, in excluding from the philosopher's vocabulary the word 'inconceivable.' But he is too well satisfied with his own system ever to consider the effect of what is unknown on the element which is known. To the Hegelian all things are plain and clear, while he who is outside the charmed circle is in the mire of ignorance and 'logical impurity': he who is within is omniscient, or at least has all the elements of knowledge under his hand (1875, IV, 414-415).

The key-stone to the conclusion of Jowett's critique of the Hegelian system and his summing up of the ways in which, after making that critique, it is still possible to admire Hegel as a philosopher is indicative of Jowett's own life-long acquaintance with the writings of the German philosopher:

> These are some of the doubts and suspicions which arise in the mind of a student of Hegel, when, after living for a time within the charmed circle, he removes to a little distance and looks back upon what he has learnt, from the vantage ground of history and experience. The enthusiasm of his youth has passed away, the authority of the master no longer retains a hold upon him. But he does not regret the time spent in the study of him. He finds that he has received from him a real enlargement of mind, and much of the true spirit of philosophy, even when he has ceased to believe in him. He returns again and again to his writings as to the recollections of a first love, not undeserving of his admiration still (1875, IV, 422-423).

Of the three ways in which Jowett held that it might still be possible to admire Hegel without believing in him, undoubtedly the second is the most apposite to our investigation, although it should be noted also that such statements as "He [Hegel] will not allow men

to defend themselves by an appeal to one-sided or abstract principles" (1) and "We see the advantage of viewing in the concrete what mankind regard only in the abstract" (3) are not exactly inapposite either:

> Hegel, if not the greatest philosopher, is certainly the greatest critic of philosophy who ever lived. No one else has equally mastered the opinions of his predecessors or traced the connection of them in the same manner. No one has equally raised the human mind above the trivialities of the common logic and the unmeaningness of 'mere' abstractions, and above imaginary possibilities, which, as he truly says, have no place in philosophy. No one has won so much for the kingdom of ideas. Whatever may be thought of his own system it will hardly be denied that he has overthrown Locke, Kant, Hume, and the so-called philosophy of common sense. He shows us that only by the study of metaphysics can we get rid of metaphysics, and that those who are in theory most opposed to them are in fact most entirely and hopelessly enslaved by them: '_die reine Physiker sind nur die thieren._' The disciple of Hegel will hardly become the slave of any other system-maker. What Bacon seems to promise him he will find realized in the great German thinker, a complete emancipation from the influences of the scholastic logic (1875, IV, 423-424).

There are exceptions of course, not least among them George Henry Lewes who turned from Hegel to Comte, a transition which Jowett found incomprehensible: "Speaking of G.H.Lewes's _History of Philosophy_, he [Jowett] said he thought it a poor thing to have studied all philosophies and to end in adopting that of Auguste Comte" (_The Life and Letters of Benjamin Jowett_, 2nd ed., 1897, I, 261).

It is our contention, then, that Pater on the role and importance of abstractions, on the limitations of

systems, on the advantages of considering in the concrete what is generally considered only in the abstract, and on the immersion in metaphysics as the best means of escaping from the chains of metaphysical thought Pater conforms to the standpoint of Jowett in the Introduction to the _Sophist_. Of course there can be no question of that Introduction _as it stands_ having influenced Pater in writing the 1867 Winckelmann article because _The Dialogues of Plato. Translated into English, with Analyses and Introductions_ in four volumes did not appear until 1871. To determine Jowett's exact influence over Pater at that time we would have to resort to conjecture, a procedure which is not required since we wish here to use Jowett in order to elucidate Pater's own attitude towards abstract thought, towards systems, metaphysical or otherwise, and towards the concrete. These aspects are gathered up conveniently under the name of Hegel and of Hegelian philosophy as professed by Jowett. With _Plato and Platonism_ (1893) we are admittedly in a somewhat different position because Jowett's _Dialogues of Plato_ had by then gone through a second edition; yet, Pater's letter to Lewis Campbell (6 May 1894) does not point to the conclusion that he was intimately acquainted with the _published_ Introductions, though he was certainly familiar with the _ideas_ put forward in them (_The Life and Letters of Benjamin Jowett_, 2nd ed., 1897, I, 329-330). Hence we may well be in the same position as regards the 1893 volume

that we were in as regards the 1867 article. Two points of similarity should be noted none the less: the first is that Pater, after Jowett, made a practice of paralleling ancient and modern philosophers, Plato and Hegel, the best instance of which in Jowett is undoubtedly the long comparison between the two which occurs in the Introduction to the *Sophist* (2nd ed., 1875, IV, 401-410), *Plato and Platonism* offers numerous instances (compare for example pp. 9, 12, 19, 72, 91-92, 102, 126, 154, 192, 193, 194.). The second is the way in which both Pater and Jowett trace the idea of "the relative" to ancient philosophy. Thus, Jowett in the Introduction to the *Sophist* remarked that the origin of the modern notion of "the relative," the idea that knowledge consists of relations, is to be found in the Platonic unity of differences or opposites (1875, IV, 402). Similarly Pater in *Plato and Platonism* (1893) saw an anticipation of Darwin on the one hand and Hegel on the other in Heraclitus under whose influence of course Plato came (p. 19); this attribution of the notion of "the relative" to Heraclitus is to be noted in the second paragraph of the 1867 Coleridge article which contains an oblique reference to the "weeping philosopher"; this allusion was suppressed in the redaction of the article. We may safely discount, therefore, Ward's suggestion "It is clear that Pater's notion of the 'relative' spirit owes a lot to Lewes's description of Goethe's way of working" (*Walter Pater*:

the Idea in Nature, p. 28); it is more reasonable to suppose instead that Pater owes his notion of "the relative" to Jowett to whose conception of the role of abstraction and metaphysics in the life of the mind Pater's own view approximates. We may say with some justice that Pater tacitly accepted the position of Jowett on Hegel and Hegelianism as stated in the Introduction to Plato's Sophist. This is not to say, however, that Jowett's Introduction to the Sophist influenced Pater directly, for any direct influence must be ascribed to a date earlier than the first edition of The Dialogues of Plato (1871) and to an oral rather than a written source. It is enough for our purpose to establish, as we have done here, that Pater tacitly accepted Jowett's estimate of Hegel in the Introduction to the Sophist and that with Jowett's estimate of the German philosopher Berenson concurred. We are thus led to the conclusion that for Pater, no less than for Jowett and Berenson, abstractions are good servants but bad masters and further that the Hegelian system both as a critique of philosophy and metaphysics and as an intellectual discipline may be said to contribute much to the mastery of abstract ideas, that is, if Hegel be rightly understood, if Hegelianism be conceived as a means rather than an end. For Pater, no less than for Jowett and Berenson, the amenability of abstractions to facts, to experience, was a desideratum in philosophy which Hegel supplied more in theory than in practice; the fact that the German philosopher had fallen short in supplying this desideratum was something which neither

Jowett nor Berenson failed to note, while Pater appears to have somewhat oversimplified the matter in his polarization of Winckelmann and Hegel; Pater sought in writings on art and aesthetics concrete particularization rather than abstract generalization, hence his polarization in the 1867 article of Winckelmann's Geschichte and Hegel's Ästhetik. What holds for philosophy with Pater obtains a fortiori for art with both Pater and Berenson. Of the sensuous embodiment of abstract thought in art which Pater conceived in terms of the Hegelian Ideal translated into non-technical language, Berenson thought in terms of a compromise between seeing and knowing which had become a convention in the figure arts.

We have been concerned in the first part of this dissertation to show that Pater followed Hegel in the view that modern intellectual culture had outstripped its capacity for being rendered in sensuous form in the plastic arts. Hegel's conclusion had been that aesthetics rather than art was the proper business of those in the modern world who still entertained some interest in art. But if Pater did not concur with this conclusion of the German philosopher (Pater held that music and Dichtung still offered real, though admittedly, limited, possibilities for the future of art), he did agree with Hegel in looking back to the Greek ideal as realized in classical sculpture. Like Hegel, therefore, Pater may be compared to a Janus (Wellek's figure) in so far as he looks back to the classical ideal as realized in Greek sculpture, but

not in so far as he looks forward because, unlike Hegel, Pater did not conceive of the future of art as an arid waste.

It is with these conclusions in mind and with the necessary provisoes made that we now turn to the second part of the dissertation in which we propose to treat at some length of the organic relationship between Pater's thought and that of Berenson on the role of intellectualization in art, especially sculpture and painting. Pater saw clearly that intellectualization led to one-sidedness not only in art and the criticism of art but also in the attempt to realize a life of artistic perfection. Berenson lived to see fully realized in practice what Pater could only have envisaged in theory, that the intellectualization of art must needs lead to <u>unkunst</u> 'no-art,' twentieth-century abstract or non-objective art. It will be part of our task in the second part of this dissertation to account for Berenson's intransigence in the face of the modern tradition in art in terms of Pater's Winckelmannian-Hegelian standpoint on the relation which should subsist in art between the idea and its sensuous form. Both Pater and Berenson possessed an idea of abstraction in art which did not necessitate a divorce between subject-matter on the one hand and sensuous form on the other. This conception of abstraction comes close to the eighteenth-century academic abstractionism that we find in Winckelmann, Lessing, and Goethe, reiterated by Hegel in the <u>Ästhetik</u>

which on the basis of internal evidence provided by the 1867 Winckelmann article was the immediate source of Pater's own "system of abstraction," at least, for sculpture. Of the so-called "abstractionism" of the Giorgione article (in the current sense of "non-representationalism"), we have found it most convenient to treat in terms of Pater's "system of abstraction" for sculpture. This is not exactly an act of gross reductionism because the conception of abstraction in art originally put forward in the 1867 Winckelmann article includes not only sculpture but also painting and Dichtung. We have found it necessary to play down deliberately that side of Pater's "aesthetics" which appears to be so very modern, namely, the emphasis upon sensuous form as the primary aspect of a work of art; this aspect of Pater's thinking because of its ostensible similarity to twentieth-century preoccupations and interests is especially misleading to those who do not possess first-hand knowledge of Pater's literary and intellectual antecedents. Berenson, we believe, helps to secure the necessary frame of reference as well as the required historical perspective in this discussion of the intellectualization of sculpture and painting as conceived by Pater.

P A R T T W O

Art is the development of the building
constructing impulses in all animals,
bees, wasps, termit es, birds, seals.
In man this instinct ends by becoming
conscious and reflective and ultimately
intellectualized as is the case with all
of man's activities. To-day we no longer
know whither away. Once the almost phy-
siological call for <u>otherness</u> gets the
upper hand as it does in man, art under-
goes changes ending ultimately in <u>Unkunst</u>.

Bernhard Berenson to Axel Boethius,
I Tatti, 29 December 1956.

WALTER PATER AND ABSTRACTIONISM

In the second part of this dissertation an attempt will be made to define in terms of Berenson's professed antipathy towards the modern tradition in art Pater's own peculiar position in relation to twentieth-century abstractionism, the theory of abstract or non-objective art. The reason for treating the question of Pater's alleged germinal abstractionism in terms of Berenson's anti-abstractionism can be readily explained: there is a view, sometimes voiced, sometimes tacitly assumed, that Pater in the nineteenth century first put forward in England the theoretical justifications of twentieth-century abstract art. This view appears to have originated in 1934 with Sir Herbert Read; in 1961 Sir Kenneth Clark came out in favour of it. In both instances different passages of the Giorgione article were adduced to support the thesis; thus, while there appears to be no readily agreed upon <u>locus classicus</u> for Pater's incipient abstractionism, there is some agreement as to where the germs of the modern theory of abstract art are to be found in Pater's writings, namely, the Giorgione article and in that paper the theoretical section at the beginning. This view is by no means confined to Sir Herbert and Sir Kenneth,

though undoubtedly they are its most distinguished exponents; it is to be found also in the writings on Pater of, for example, Sir Maurice Bowra. The Giorgione article was one piece of writing of Pater which impressed itself especially on the mind of the young Bernhard Berenson; the debt which he incurred to that paper is fully acknowledged, the acknowledgement itself, well documented. Berenson was the first serious student of Pater, in a way his only true successor in so far as he carried on into the twentieth century Pater's peculiar way of seeing things. Like Pater of course he was also heir to the classicism of Greece and Rome as well as the classicism of eighteenth-century Germany. With Pater he owed a special debt to Winckelmann and Goethe. For Berenson the classical tradition in art and literature was still normative as it had been for Pater. He was from the beginning and remained until his death in 1959 the inveterate enemy of the modern, that is to say, the twentieth-century, tradition in art and literature, a bastard tradition which he consistently and insistently maintained had usurped the place of the classical tradition in the life and thought of twentieth-century Europe to the great misfortune of those benighted souls who had had the bad luck to be born under the new dispensation. A *prima facie* case might be made out of the consideration

that Berenson is unlikely to have acknowledged so openly and unreservedly his by no means inconsiderable debt to Pater had he been made quite aware of the fact that Pater himself had unwittingly contributed to the overthrow of the classical tradition in art and literature. After all, Berenson was by no means an uncritical admirer of Pater: in Aesthetics and History (1948), undoubtedly his definitive statement of his own position, Berenson showed himself to be very much awake to Pater's shortcomings and the passages of criticism of Pater contained in that book could easily be paralleled by similar passages scattered throughout Berenson's published books and articles; yet, it is of the nineteenth-century German classical philologers that he is most censorious in the 1948 volume because of their particular culpability for the malediction under which the twentieth century lives, not only in art but also in politics and religion. Pater is never mentioned among these. Indeed, it is safe to say that Berenson never mentions Pater in connection with the twentieth century which for Berenson began after the 1914-1918 War; Pater is always spoken of in a pre-1914 context. Berenson does not appear to have considered Pater relevant to that new society into which Berenson found himself, almost despite himself, living on.

But if Berenson did not conceive of Pater as being applicable to the contemporary, post-First-World-War society, he did consider Plato quite

applicable. Berenson was quite prepared to admit that Plato, or at least the Platonic Socrates, in the *Philebus* (51 C, D) admitted of a modern application; the exigencies of twentieth-century technology, if not contemporary art, would accommodate Plato's peculiar idea of "beauty of form"; it is characteristic of Berenson, however, that he offers as an alternative what was surely to him a more palatable interpretation, yet without denying that the passage in question admitted of a contemporary application. It is to be remarked, however, that Berenson, again, characteristically, deftly turns that application to the disadvantage of the modern tradition in art, while at the same time turning it to his own advantage:

> I am tempted at this point to ask whether Plato in the *Philebus* could possibly have thought of line in movement when he says that by beauty of form he means straight lines and circles and the plain and solid figures which are shaped by turning lathes and rulers and measures [*sic*] of angles. He affirms that these are not only relatively beautiful like ordinary things but eternally and absolutely beautiful. It is to be feared that Plato had in mind exactly what 'abstract' and 'non-objective' painters are producing now. But if he returned to us at present he would find his wish fulfilled not so much by the 'abstract' and 'non-objective' paintings that are momentarily the fashion, as by our machinery and our weapons. Their dialectic, their realization, their geometrical perfection would surpass anything he could have imagined or conceived.[1]

[1] Bernard Berenson, *Aesthetics and History*, Anchor Books edition (New York, 1965), p. 83. Berenson

Berenson was thus aware that within the classical tradition Plato admitted of a modern application; he or the Platonic Socrates might be accommodated to the exigencies of that particular type of twentieth-century abstract art which has a geometrical bias. Yet, typically, Berenson suggests that Plato

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is obviously following Jowett's translation of Plato, though not exactly, hence the "*sic.*" Jowett gives the words of the Platonic Socrates thus: "My meaning is certainly not obvious, and I will endeavour to be plainer. I do not mean by the beauty of form such beauty as that of animals or pictures, which the many would suppose to be my meaning; but, says the argument, understand me to mean straight lines and circles, and the plane or solid figures which are formed out of them by turning-lathes and rulers and measurers of angles; for these I affirm to be not only relatively beautiful, like other things, but they are eternally and absolutely beautiful, and they have peculiar pleasures, quite unlike the pleasures of scratching. And there are colours which are of the same character, and have similar pleasures; now do you understand my meaning?" Benjamin Jowett, trans. *The Dialogues of Plato, Translated into English, with Analyses and Introductions*, 2nd ed., 5 vols. (Oxford, 1875), IV, 98-99. Pater, while he cites the *Philebus* (15) in *Plato and Platonism* (cf. pp. 153-154) nowhere adduces the *Philebus* (51).

Berenson obviously found both Pater and Jowett most congenial to his own way of thinking. On 12 September 1942 he wrote: "Rereading Pater, and reading Jowett's comments on the various dialogues of Plato makes me realize, although always aware of it, how much I am an earth-and-time bubble of my generation. Both seem so intimately to say what I go on feeling so many years after their works were published, while the things of today are at best outside and at worst either unintelligible or repellent. Yet I am more open than most to newness, to otherness,

would have found his idea realized in twentieth-century technology rather than in contemporary abstract art, presumably of the geometrical variety. Of even the possibility that Pater's Giorgione article might likewise admit of a contemporary application to meet the requirements of twentieth-century non-objective art Berenson has nothing to say. It is simply gratuitous supposition to say that Berenson was either so preoccupied with the classical tradition on the one hand and so prejudiced against the modern tradition in art on the other hand that he was blind to the true direction of Pater's thought or that he was wilfully maintaining a conspiracy of silence about the presence in Pater's writings

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to wrenching my neck so as to free my head to look around." On 22 October 1942 Berenson noted that he had now finished reading all Jowett's introductions and analyses which he found both illuminating and suggestive as well as ever reasonable. He regretted that they were now as good as forgotten. Bernhard Berenson, One Year's Reading for Fun (1942), Introduction by John Walker (London, 1960), pp. 118, 137.

In the first part of this dissertation attention has already been drawn to Berenson's comments on Jowett's estimate of Hegel, an evaluation which he in turn applied to Croce. The entry is for the 16 October 1942 (cf. pp. 134-135). There are several other references to Jowett throughout the book (cf. pp. 116, 132, 137, 145).

David Wolfe Biller in a footnote to the entry for 27 August 1942 gives as the date of the edition of The Dialogues of Plato used by Berenson 1892 (cf. p. 110, n. 1).

of ideas which if brought to light might prove both inconvenient and perhaps even embarrassing to his own position. What Berenson actually has to say about the Botticelli and Giorgione articles precludes, as we shall see, conjectures of this kind: in the first chapter of Aesthetics and History (1948) Berenson stated that he could not sufficiently acknowledge his debt to Pater for what he had written about Botticelli and Giorgione, while in Essays in Appreciation (1958) he recalled how sixty-four years before (he was writing in April 1951) he had first looked with delight at the Sacra Conversazione in the Louvre, then attributed to Giorgione: "To-day [1951] it may not be easy to realize what it meant to a young American with Walter Pater's siren music singing in his heart to see this magic name 'Giorgione' under a picture. It was sheer ecstasy." [2] For Berenson there was a definite correlation between the classical tradition in art and the possession of "aesthetic convictions"; of a former Director of the Museum of Modern Art in New York Berenson wrote in a letter to Philip Hofer, dated Settignano, 23 January 1947: "Alfred Barr I do not know. Surely he can

[2] Bernard Berenson, Aesthetics and History, Anchor Books edition (New York, 1965), p. 115; Essays in Appreciation (London, 1958), p. 44. It is possible to estimate the importance of the Paterian Giorgione for Berenson on the basis of the evidence supplied by the entries in the Diary which he kept up to 1958. Cf. Bernard Berenson, Sunset and Twilight: From the Diaries of 1947-1958, ed. with an Epilogue by Nicky Mariano, Introduction by Iris Origo (London, 1964), pp. 65, 122,

have no aesthetic convictions or he would not have written encyclopedically about 'Abstract Art' & [sic] directed an Institoosh'n [sic] whose activity is so effectively anti-humanistic."[3] It is considerations of this kind which have led the present writer to conclude that Berenson shared with Pater a singular affinity of sensibility, of vision, which entitles him to be recognized as the true, perhaps also, the only, successor that Pater has had in this century as well as a student of the humanistic tradition in painting whose point of departure was the Paterian standpoint. On this basic assumption rests the second part of this dissertation.

Berenson of course considered Pater his mentor.[4] So far as we have been able to determine, he was quite unaware that the twentieth-century conception of non-objective art was to be found in the Giorgione article. To put this another way, Berenson does not appear to have been aware that Pater unwittingly had sown the seeds of anti-humanistic movements in art which the twentieth century was subsequently to germinate. We

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444. The dates of these entries are as follows: 3 March 1948, I Tatti; 6 March 1949, I Tatti; 10 August 1956, Vallombrosa.

3 Bernard Berenson, The Selected Letters of Bernard Berenson, ed. A.K. McComb (London, 1965), p. 242. Cf. p. 242, n. 1.

4 Without doubt Berenson's most impassioned acknowledgement of his debt to Pater occurs in Sketch for a Self-Portrait: "The genius who revealed

query, therefore, whether Berenson would have allowed the construction which Sir Kenneth Clark put on the second paragraph of the Giorgione article in the Introduction to the Fontana Library edition of Pater's Renaissance (1961). Berenson of course died two years before Sir Kenneth made public his views; yet, it is safe to say that he would have rejected outright this particular construction because he neither understood nor sympathized with Sir Kenneth's interest in abstract art.[5] The 1961 Introduction would have struck him as but an extension of that interest into the immediate past. Berenson was ever and remained to the end of his life an inveterate enemy of abstract

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to me what from childhood I had been instinctively tending toward--was Walter Pater in his Marius, his Imaginary Portraits, his Child in the House, his Emerald Uthwart, his Demeter. It is for that I have loved him since youth and shall be grateful to him even to the House of Hades where, in the words of Nausicaa to Odysseus, I shall hail him as god. It was he who encouraged me to extract from the chaotic succession of events in the common day what was wholesome and sweet, what fed and sustained the spirit, what could soar and take Pisgah sights of promised lands and yet be happy to return to the 'kindred points of heaven and home'." Bernard Berenson, Sketch for a Self-Portrait (London, 1949), p. 129.

This passage is unique in Berenson's published writings in so far as he never acknowledges his debts singly. The passage in Aesthetics and History already referred to is more characteristic

or non-objective art, what he chose to call "no-art"

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of Berenson's way of going about the matter. We now cite that passage in full:

> Antecedent preparation helps one to appreciate a work of art, and there have been writers who helped in the only way that anyone can help a spectator, by putting him into a state of eager and zestful anticipation. There is the risk of disappointment; and authors of the romantic period, imbued with all they had read about the keepsake Middle Ages, or a coloured vignette Renaissance, or a brazen Baroque, authors like Mrs. Jameson, Rio, Lindsay, and Ruskin, do not always (not even Ruskin) furnish the vintage for which they make our mouths water. Yet I cannot sufficiently acknowledge my debt to Pater for what he wrote about Botticelli and Giorgione, to Burckhardt for his unforgettable and irreplaceable 'Cicerone', to Wolfflin for his masterpiece on classical art, to Bode for his handbook on Italian sculpture, to Fromentin for his famous _Maîtres d'Autrefois_, to Baudelaire for all he said about his Parisian contemporaries, to Jacques Blanche for articles on nineteenth-century French painters worthy of Vasari at his best, to Foucher for his clarifying and constructive work on Greco-Buddhistic art, to Blochet for his essays on Near and Far Eastern art, and to von Falke for his invaluable history of silk-weaving. Nor have I anything but the highest praise for philologers like Matsulevich and Kalgren, who in recent years have been able to prove: the first, how late most surviving Byzantine silverware is, and the second, how early are many of the Chinese bronzes, thus contributing by their researches not only to the history of art but to the history of civilization in general.
>
> Before leaving these masters of humanistic appreciation and scholarship, let me mention Emile Mâle, whose studies on the iconography of Christian art from the twelfth to the eighteenth century offer the information and interpretation best calculated

or "unkunst." 6 Berenson with his antipathy towards

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to give one a keen appetite for the enjoyment of the works of art he is discussing.

This passage occurs in the second chapter of Berenson's Aesthetics and History; in the Anchor Books edition (New York, 1965), pp. 114-115. Generally speaking, however, Berenson's catalogues are shorter than the catalogue just cited; Pater's place is none the less always unique among the names of authorities enumerated. We notice this especially in the diaries. Thus, in the 1947 diary the entry for 25 June, I Tatti, would suggest that Berenson until he was about thirty was almost solely dependent on Pater for writing about art:

> Wölfflin's Prolegomena zu einer Psychologie der Architektur, presented for doctor's thesis in 1886 (a year before my graduation), contains in essence and more than in essence my entire philosophy of art. Strange that it was never published in his lifetime, nor does its spirit animate his future writings to anything like its expression here! He was only twenty-two and I groped my way till I was nearly thirty before seeing clearly a similar approach to art problems. He, however, had Burckhardt and Volkelt as teachers and generations of German thinkers, while I had what? Only Pater. For I had not read anybody else who wrote of art, and Norton's interest was only historical and illustrative (Sunset and Twilight, pp. 22-23).

The entry in the 1956 diary for 2 October, I Tatti, helps to put Pater in perspective, though here again it will be noted that Pater's position is different from that of the other "influences" named:

> S.S. [Sylvia Sprigge] a couple of days ago had never heard of Prato, yet she insists on writing my "official life." She has not the remotest notion of what a person like me has read and seen and "contacted." Little of human concern that has not interested me, history, all literatures, all phases of art, no end of contacts with interesting

the modern tradition in art because of his own

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individuals. Impossible for her to conceive of my life except as a vulgar success story, the high lights of which are Mrs. Gardener, and "Lord" Duveen, a personage who affected me negatively, if at all. She has no curiosity about those who really influenced me and contributed to my formation. While at college besides William James there was Barrett Wendell, Professor Toy, the Tom Perrys. Later on Sedgwick and Henry Adams---and all my reading since my eleventh year at latest. The Old Testament, much of which I knew by heart before my fifteenth year, and from my sixteenth year at latest Goethe and Heine and German Romantics, later Burckhardt and Nietzsche, and French Classics, and contemporaries. Profound the influence of writers like Matthew Arnold, Wordsworth, and above all of Walter Pater. How can she who has never heard of Prato write of me as interpreter, appreciator, and historian of Italian art, and what has been my speciality, namely to see it, and feel it, in an ever present sense of universal art?" (Sunset and Twilight, pp. 451-452)

Between these two entries occurs the entry in the 1954 diary for 5 June, Venice; this entry taken by itself might suggest that Pater was only one among a number of "influences" on Berenson:

I learn that Kenneth Clark is preparing to write about me as a product of my American "contacts," as well as of contacts with Vernon Lee, Janet Ross, Edith Wharton, and the like, abroad, i.e., in Europe. What will come out I shall not see, nor do I greatly care. He proposed to write about me as the "New Winckelmann." That might have proved interesting. As a matter of fact, apart from what one owes impersonally to one's education, the influences on my formation have been William James personally and as professor, Matthew Arnold and Pater as writers, Burckhardt and Morelli in my profession as attributor and critic. My career has followed from my being regarded (even by my worst

preoccupation with the classical tradition in art

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enemies) as the safest attributor of Italian paintings. Social "contacts" have had little or nothing to do with either my formation or my career, no matter what (and not so much as believed) they may have done with my life. At all events they have had next to no influence on my work, on my thought, my writing" (Sunset and Twilight, pp. 348-349).

It is hardly surprizing, then, to read in the diaries that Berenson's actual meeting with Pater was very disappointing to himself. Berenson alludes to that meeting in the entry for 15 April, I Tatti, in the diary for 1954: "So Walter Pater when I met him remembered that I, utterly unknown and only twenty-one, had once written to him" (Sunset and Twilight, p. 343). The second allusion to the meeting of Berenson with Pater occurs in the 1958 diary, in the entry for 13 April; like the first, it is headed "I Tatti": "I did meet Pater, although against my will, and it was very disappointing" (Sunset and Twilight, p. 526).

[5] Cf. the entry for 28 May, I Tatti, in the diary for 1948:

> Henry Moore lunched here, still provincial in clothes and accent, but one of the most appreciative persons I ever took through the house. We looked at sculpture chiefly, and he dashed forward without prompting to what best deserved attending to. He talked understandingly about everything. Then how account for the fact that his own sculpture is so revoltingly remote from what I feel to be art? Is it due to the obstruction of the channels through which the creative spirit of the last six thousand years has worked? Why does this so sensitive, so honest-minded man produce such horrors of distortion, misformation, and abstraction? More

to the exclusion of all other kinds of art, with the possible exception of that of Japan and China, was in agreement essentially with Pater's position as regards non-European art. For Berenson, as for Pater, the classical tradition in art is normative. The art of Japan may be admitted tacitly by way of analogy (we see this in Pater, for example, in the second paragraph of the Giorgione article and the last paragraph but one of the first part of "The Beginnings of Greek Sculpture"), but as yet there is not that thoroughgoing relativism which accords the same value to the art of Greece that it assigns to the art of the South Pacific. [7] There is thus something ironic as well as anomalous in the fact that Sir Kenneth Clark, himself an early student of

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incomprehensible still are his ardent admirers, Kenneth Clark for instance. With them it may be a still further exoticism, along with Negro and Polynesian art (Sunset and Twilight, p. 81).

[6] Cf. the diary for 1949, the entry for 18 June, Venice: "That man can get on without art is as foolish a thought as that he does not need religion. 'Pitch it out of the window, it comes back through the door.' Take art away from him, and either he becomes a dreary puritan who really tries to get on without it, or an addict of all the absurdities of the no-art of today. Man emerges as a Phidias, and unfortunately has ended as a Ford" (Sunset and Twilight, p. 133).

Cf. Berenson's letter to Hugh Trevor-Roper, dated 25 June 1954: "The 'Biennale' is an encyclopedia give-away of Unkunst. Sheer infantilism or impudent bluff. All the exploiters of that heavy industry have been here from every part of this

Berenson, should have detected in the writings of the

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shrunken little earth" (The Selected Letters of Bernard Berenson, p. 279).

7 Cf. the diary for 1947, the entry for 24 March, I Tatti:

> I hear from New York that there is no sale for my Italian Painters. The other day I happened to reread parts of it first published in 1897. Sufficient time has elapsed so that I could read "Central Italian Painters" as if I had nothing to do with it. To my surprise I discovered that all I said there expressed all I should want to say now, but I said it better, then, than I could say now. Full of thought, clarity, courage, and ideas. And now in America as well as in England nobody wants to read me. I no longer appeal to a public supposed to take an interest in what hitherto has been regarded as art. Now that people with no mustard seed of native feeling for art constitute the overwhelming majority of the public, they can be bamboozled into taking for art cubism, surrealism, abstract art, and put it on the same level with the artists of the Renaissance, or even of ancient Hellas. For them, what can I mean? I who defend certain relative absolutes or canons in art, and exclude most of what is done today as mere artifact and not art at all; what can I mean to the public of today! So all my efforts of fifty years have served to what purpose? They have amused me at least" (Sunset and Twilight, pp. 10-11).

The position which Berenson here describes as his own should be compared to that of Pater on p. 91 of the 1867 Winckelmann article:

> Again, individual genius works ever under conditions of time and place; its products are coloured by the varying aspects of nature and type of human form and outward manners of life. There is thus an element of change in art; criticism must never for a moment forget that 'the artist is the child of

mentor of his teacher the germs of the very kind of

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his time.' But besides these conditions of time and place, and independent of them, there is also an element of permanence, a standard of taste which genius confesses. This standard is maintained in a purely intellectual tradition; it acts upon the artist, not as one of the influences of his own age, but by means of the artistic products of the previous generation, which in youth have excited, and at the same time directed into a particular channel, his sense of beauty. The supreme artistic products of each generation thus form a series of elevated points, taking each from each the reflection of a strange light, the source of which is not in the atmosphere around and above them, but in a stage of society remote from ours. This standard takes its rise in Greece at a definite historical period. A tradition for all succeeding generations, it originates in a spontaneous growth out of the influences of Greek society. What were the conditions under which this ideal, this standard of artistic orthodoxy, was generated? How was Greece enabled to force its thought upon Europe?"

This paragraph is reprinted in <u>The Renaissance</u> on pp. 199-200, but there are certain minor changes. Thus: "This standard is maintained in a purely intellectual tradition. It acts upon the artist, not as one of the influences of his own age, but through those artistic products of the previous generation which first excited, while they directed into a particular channel, his sense of beauty. The supreme artistic products of succeeding generations thus form a series of elevated points, taking each from each the reflection of a strange light, the source of which is not in the atmosphere around and above them, but in a stage of society remote from ours."

Pater speaks of Japanese flower-painting in both <u>The Renaissance</u>, p. 133, and <u>Greek Studies</u>, p. 221. Cf. <u>The Selected Letters of Bernard Berenson</u>, pp. 195, 258-259.

art which Berenson with his Paterian antecedents had come to deplore.[8] Needless to say, the irony devolves upon Clark rather than upon either Pater or Berenson. The theoretical section of "The School of Giorgione," like the article as a whole, must be understood in the light of subsequent articles of Pater, in particular, both parts of "The Beginnings of Greek Sculpture," "The Marbles of Aegina," both originally published in 1880, and the very late article, "The Age of Athletic Prizemen," first published in 1894, the year of Pater's death.[9] These articles point in turn to Pater's early Winckelmann article (1867), as well as to the Michelangelo article (1871), and the della Robbia essay (dated 1872). So much, then, for the basic assumption which underlies the second part of this dissertation. Let us now proceed to deal with the *Problematik* of the second part of the thesis.

The *Problematik* of the second part of the dissertation is threefold. First, there is an attempt to define the exact relation of Berenson to Pater on the question of twentieth-century

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[8] Sir Kenneth Clark studied for two years with Berenson. See *The Selected Letters of Bernard Berenson*, p. 121. Cf. *Sunset and Twilight*, pp. 359, 490, 526.

[9] "The School of Giorgione" was included in the third edition of *The Renaissance* (1888) by

abstract or non-objective art in order thereby to determine Pater's relation (if any) to twentieth-century abstractionism, the theory of abstract or non-objective art. With the preliminary consideration of Berenson's peculiar debt to Pater we have already dealt in the exposition of the basic assumption on which the second part of the dissertation rests.[10]

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default. See Pater's letter to Alexander Macmillan, dated 1 October [1878] in Lawrence Evans's unpublished dissertation, "Some Letters of Walter Pater" (Harvard, 1961), pp. 44-45, Letter 45. Pater had projected a volume of some three hundred pages which was to correspond in its physical features (type, etc.) to his earlier published volume. Like The Renaissance, "The School of Giorgione," and other studies was to contain papers on art and literature, the literary interest being predominant. The contents of the projected collection are enumerated in the letter already referred to, p. 45 of Evans's text. For Professor Evans's discussion of the significance of this particular letter and of related letters, see pp. xviii-xix of his dissertation.

In a letter to William Sharp, dated 5 November 1882, there is an allusion to the projected volume: "As to the paper on Giorgione which I read to you in manuscript, I find I have by me a second copy of the proof, which I have revised and sent by this post, and hope you will kindly accept. It was reprinted some time ago, when I thought of collecting that and other papers into a volume." See William Sharp, "Personal Reminiscences of Walter Pater," Selected Writings of William Sharp, Uniform edition arranged by Mrs. William Sharp (London, 1912), III, 210.

[10] Reference may also be made to the third chapter of Sylvia Sprigge's Berenson. A Biography (London, 1960), pp. 43-56. Sprigge's pretensions

Secondly, there is an attempt to define Pater's abstractionism, especially in sculpture, in terms of the Winckelmann and Michelangelo articles and the della Robbia essay in relation generally to the eighteenth-century abstractionism, *mutatis mutandis*, of Winckelmann (1717-1768), Lessing (1729-1781), Goethe (1749-1832), and Hegel (1770-1831), in relation specifically to certain passages of Winckelmann's *Gedanken über die Nachahmung der griechischen Werke in der Malerei und Bildhauerkunst* (1755) and the *Geschichte der Kunst des Altertums* (1764), of Lessing's *Laokoon* (1766), of Goethe's "*Über Laokoon*" (1798), and of Hegel's *Vorlesungen über die Ästhetik* (1835, 1842). To these four German writers on the fine arts Pater incurred no inconsiderable intellectual debt, a debt which the footnotes to the original form in which the Winckelmann article was first published in the *Westminster Review* of January 1867 serve to document.[11]

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to being, or at least trying to become, Berenson's "official" biographer were met by resignation rather than rebuff. See the entry (already adduced) for 2 October, I Tatti, in the diary for 1956, pp. 451-452 in *Sunset and Twilight*. Cf. Nicky Mariano, *Forty Years with Berenson*, with an Introduction by Sir Kenneth Clark (London, 1966), p. 183.

[11] For further references to Lessing in Pater's writings, see *The Renaissance*, p. 131; *Plato and Platonism*, pp. 186-187; and *Greek Studies*, p. 251. Cf. William Sharp, "Personal Reminiscences of Walter Pater": "I [Pater] have great faith in scrupulous and sympathetic translation as a training in English composition. At one time I was in the

It is our contention that the abstractionism of Pater approximates that of Winckelmann, Lessing, and Goethe in their treatment of the Laokoon Group, though both the terminology and phraseology of Pater point to Hegel in his lectures on aesthetics.[12]

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habit of translating a page from some ancient or modern prose writer every day: Tacitus or Livy, Plato or Aristotle, Goethe or Lessing or Winckelmann, and once, month after month, Flaubert and Sainte-Beuve." Selected Writings of William Sharp, III, 203-204.

[12] It is necessary at this point to forestall a possible objection: "But what of Herbart and Fiedler?" it might be objected. If this thesis purported to be a study in comparative aesthetics, a claim which it does not make, it would certainly be appropriate to include some consideration of Johann Friedrich Herbart (1776-1841) and Konrad Fiedler (1841-1895). As it is, Pater nowhere mentions either Herbart or Fiedler; it has been thought best, therefore, to carry out this investigation in connection with the writers specifically mentioned by Pater. We submit that while both Clive Bell and Roger Fry are the undoubted heirs of Fiedler, any correlation between Pater and Fiedler on the "segregation of non-artistic elements from pure form" (Gilbert and Kuhn, A History of Esthetics, revised and enlarged edition, p. 545) presupposes that Pater in fact achieved such a separation of this kind; this presupposition we categorically deny on the grounds that Pater's limited critical programme sought to correct the imbalance in criticism which dated from the time of Lessing (cf. Greek Studies, p. 251). If Pater did in fact verge on this distinction in the second paragraph of the Giorgione article, it is necessary to account for the fact that he did not in subsequent articles proceed to isolate the "non-

Thirdly, there is an attempt to define Pater's

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artistic element from pure form." Here we may recall Bosanquet's apposite comment on Herbart: "Let any reader compare with Herbart or Zimmermann on symmetry, repetition and curvature, either Hegel's treatment of the same subjects in the section on the beauty of nature, or Ruskin's in the last chapter of Elements of Drawing, and he will see the difference between formalism within idealism, which has plenty of room for it, and formalism which pretends to exclude all idealism. Yet Ruskin himself finds elements in beauty which he can make no attempt to explain, and it is well that there should be exact analysts who urge us to state or describe those given ultimate elements, and in every case to begin research by definitely enumerating the most direct and tangible cases of the phenomenon to be explored" (A History of Æsthetic, p. 373).

Pater's formalism is given expression in the first chapter of Plato and Platonism, p. 8, when he writes: "In other words, the form is new. But then, in the creation of philosophical literature, as in all other products of art, form, in the full signification of that word, is everything, and the mere matter is nothing" (Pater's italics). In the Winckelmann article Pater had spoken of "pure form" (1867, p. 99) in connection with sculpture, but these isolated statements must not mislead us into supposing that Pater was a formalist in the sense in which Herbart or Fiedler may be said to be formalists. More characteristic of Pater is that distinction which he makes at the outset of the last paragraph of "Style" (1888) between "Good art, but not necessarily great art; the distinction between great art and good art depending immediately, as regards literature at all events, not on its form, but on the matter" (Appreciations, p. 38). In the last paragraph but one of the same article Pater recalled the famous dictum of the Giorgione article,

use of the terms "abstract," "abstracted," and

"All art constantly aspires towards the condition of music" (The Renaissance, p. 135): "Music and prose literature are, in one sense, the very opposite terms of art; the art of literature presenting to the imagination, through the intelligence, a range of interests, as free and various as those which music presents to it through sense. And certainly the tendency of what has been here said is to bring literature too under those conditions, by conformity to which music takes rank as the typically perfect art. If music be the ideal of all art whatever, precisely because in music it is impossible to distinguish the form from the substance or matter, the subject from the expression, then, literature, by finding its specific excellence in the absolute correspondence of the term to its import, will be but fulfilling the condition of all artistic quality in things everywhere, of all good art" (Appreciations, pp. 37-38).

The passage just cited should be compared to two paragraphs in particular of the Giorgione article:

> Art, then, is thus always striving to be independent of the mere intelligence, to become a matter of pure perception, to get rid of its responsibilities to its subject or material; the ideal examples of poetry and painting being those in which the constituent elements of the composition are so welded together, that the material or subject no longer strikes the intellect only; nor the form, the eye or the ear only; but form and matter, in their union or identity, present one single effect to the "imaginative reason," that complex faculty for which every thought and feeling is twin-born with its sensible analogue or symbol.
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> It is the art of music [continued Pater in 1877] which most completely realises this artistic ideal, this perfect identification of matter and form. In

"abstraction," as well as Allgemeinheit, in relation to the phraseology of Winckelmann, Lessing, Goethe, and Hegel in their writings on art. While Pater appears to have derived his idea of abstraction in art from Winckelmann, his terminology, including Abstraktion and Allgemeinheit, seem to come from Hegel. If Lessing may be said to be the immediate source of Pater's idea of abstraction, Hegel may be said to be the immediate source of his terminology, though Winckelmann will be shown to be the ultimate source of both. Pater shows himself, especially in the Winckelmann article, to be singularly attuned to the nuances of Hegel's technical language; we have an instance of this in the fact that in the 1867 Winckelmann article Pater received with approbation Hegel's definition of the Ideal in art. Pater's

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its consummate moments, the end is not distinct from the means, the form from the matter, the subject from the expression; they inhere in and completely saturate each other; and to it, therefore, to the condition of its perfect moments, all the arts may be supposed constantly to tend and aspire. In music, then, rather than in poetry, is to be found the true type or measure of perfected art. Therefore, although each art has its incommunicable element, its untranslatable order of impressions, its unique mode of reaching the "imaginative reason," yet the arts may be represented as continually struggling after the law or principle of music, to a condition which music alone completely realises; and one of the chief functions of aesthetic criticism, dealing with the products of art, new or old, is to estimate the degree in which each of these products approaches, in this sense, to musical law (The

admiration for the language of German criticism was of course by no means confined to his appreciation of the technical language of Hegel, but for the purposes of this investigation this may appear to be the case.[13] We shall have occasion later in this second part of the dissertation to show that Pater not only preferred the language of Hegel to that of Winckelmann when it came to treating the Ideal in art, he also preferred Hegel's conception of the Ideal to that of Winckelmann. It is perhaps desirable, if not necessary, to point out here that of the terms mentioned so far, Pater's use of "abstract" before 1880 has already attracted the attention of Professor Germain d'Hangest who in his published two-volume dissertation Walter Pater: l' Homme et l'Œuvre (Paris, 1961); Professor d'Hangest has remarked upon the comparatively early date for Pater's use of the phrases "abstract painting" and "abstract colour," the first occurring in the 1870 article "A Fragment on Sandro Botticelli," the second, in the 1877 article "The School of Giorgione." Professor d'Hangest allows for the possibility that Pater may well have been a neologist (I, 350, n. 19),

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Renaissance, pp. 138-139.

[13] Cf. the opening paragraph of Pater's article on Lamb (1878):

> Those English critics who at the beginning of the present century introduced from Germany, together with some other subtleties of thought transplanted

although, as he hastens to point out, the ideas, if not the expressions themselves, are to be found already in Baudelaire (cf. I, 349, n. 8).

It is our contention here that Pater's use of the terms "abstract," "abstracted," and "abstraction," like his use of the twin terms Allgemeinheit and Heiterkeit, are to be attributed to his German masters of which Hegel is almost certainly the immediate source, if Pater's adoption of "Ideal" be taken as being indicative of his source. This attribution to Hegel is somewhat strengthened by the fact that Vernon Lee (Violet Paget) (1856-1935), herself in youth a perfervid Hegelian, [14] made similar use of "abstract" in her writings on art and the philosophy of art; if we

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hither not without advantage, the distinction between the Fancy and the Imagination, made much also of the cognate distinction between Wit and Humour, between that unreal and transitory mirth, which is as the crackling of thorns under the pot, and the laughter which blends with tears and even with the sublimities of the imagination, and which, in its most exquisite motives, is one with pity--the laughter of the comedies of Shakespeare, hardly less expressive than his moods of seriousness or solemnity, of that deeply stirred soul of sympathy in him, as flowing from which both tears and laughter are alike genuine and contagious (Appreciations, p. 105).

[14] Cf. Peter Gunn, Vernon Lee: Violet Paget, 1856-1935 (London, 1964), p. 59: "Hegel's Aesthetik either 'enlightened' or 'addled' her youthful mind--later she could not be sure which."

were to single out one paper in particular by way of substantiating this view, then, we might choose her article "Taine's Philosophy of Art," published in the British Quarterly Review of 1 July 1878 (Article I), that is, a year after Pater had first published "The School of Giorgione" in the Fortnightly Review of October 1877. Vernon Lee was closely associated with the Paters and shared with Pater his Hegelian sympathies. Her intellectual interests, though considerably broader than those of Pater and certainly more varied than his, did not prevent her from appreciating his merits nor he,hers. [15] The phraseology of her 1878 article recalls Pater's in the Winckelmann article; common to both is Hegel. We shall fully document this assertion in due course. Berenson of course owed little, if anything to Hegel; unlike either Pater or Vernon Lee he forged for himself a language to meet the exigencies of his own aesthetics. When, however, he does make use of the word "abstraction" in connection with painting, as for example in the third series of The Study and Criticism of Italian Art (London, 1916), p. 83, to express his own ideas about a painting, it is used as Pater employed the

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15 Cf. Gunn, pp. 144-145. Cf. also The Renaissance, p. 16, n. 1.

term in both the Winckelmann and Michelangelo articles and the della Robbia essay. In view of the fact that Berenson modelled himself on Pater as a writer on art, it does seem reasonable to suppose that he may well have taken over from The Renaissance Pater's peculiar use of the term. Certainly it is essential that we distinguish clearly between Berenson's use of "abstraction" to express his own ideas about the role of abstraction or intellectualization in art and his use of the same term as a byword for certain twentieth-century anti-humanistic movements in art. As we might infer, the first is characteristic of Berenson's early writings on art; the second, of his later writings on art.

The set of problems with which we are concerned, then, is threefold. First, there is the problem of Pater's abstractionism viewed in relation to twentieth-century abstractionism but treated here in terms of Berenson's standpoint on modern non-objective art. Secondly, there is the problem of Pater's abstractionism in relation to the eighteenth-century academic abstractionism of Winckelmann, Lessing, and Goethe. Thirdly, there is the problem of Pater's terminology in relation to that of Hegel. The procedure followed here is first to establish that Pater's terminology relating to abstraction in art derives immediately from Hegel and only then to show that there is a marked affinity between the abstractionism of Pater and the eighteenth-century academic abstractionism of Winckelmann, Lessing, and Goethe. In this way is obviated the necessity of entering into the polemics of twentieth-century abstractionists and their propagandists. When we have established that Pater's abstractionism conforms to that of the eighteenth century, we proceed to argue on the basis

of the anti-humanistic bias characteristic of much twentieth-century abstractionism that there is a difference of kind rather than of degree between the abstractionism of Pater and Berenson on the one hand and the abstractionism of Worringer and T.E.Hulme on the other hand. The attempt of Sir Kenneth Clark to up-date Pater is thus shown to be not only unwarranted but also unnecessary. If Pater's abstractionism can be accounted for quite satisfactorily in terms of eighteenth-century abstractionism, Sir Kenneth's contention that Pater would have had to wait until the work of Braque, Picasso, and Nicolas de Staël to find his ideas realized appears at best somewhat superfluous. We do not hesitate, therefore, to apply Occam's razor, but at the same time we do not wish to convey the impression that the task before us is simply an exercise in reductionism: Pater's abstractionism is not just the abstractionism of Winckelmann, Lessing, and Goethe; there is Hegel to be reckoned with too. "Since all progress of mind consists for the most part in differentiation, in the resolution of an obscure and complex object into its component aspects, it is surely the stupidest of losses to confuse things which right reason has put asunder, to lose the sense of achieved distinctions," is the criterion which Pater establishes at the outset of "Style"; it is this criterion of Pater which we wish to set up at the outset of the second part of this dissertation.

II

In Seeing and Knowing (1953) Bernhard Berenson stated that representation in art was a compromise between seeing and knowing. What initially began as a compromise had been prolonged and had eventually become a convention that was not seriously challenged until after the First World War when the classical tradition generally came under attack and the Winckelmann canons of beauty were finally demolished. According to Berenson, the wilful subversion of the classical tradition in art might be accounted for in terms of two principal factors. First there was the predictable and understandable reaction against the cultural values of pre-1914 European society. Secondly, there was the sudden appearance in Europe of examples of the primitive art of the South Seas and Central America, what Berenson described in Essays in Appreciation (1958) as "the infantile, emergent, incunabulistic products, from the most barbarous and most savage parts of the world" (p. 90). The Arch of Constantine or the Decline of Form (1954) might also be adduced to show that the statement of antipathy towards non-European art which we have just cited was no momentary outburst of Berenson. In The Arch of Constantine Berenson had remarked that both the artists and their

public had had their visual convictions upset and confused by the sudden confrontation "with originals and reproductions of every kind of representational artifacts" collected by explorers and archaeologists, purveyed by art dealers whom Berenson believed were especially culpable of the malediction which subsequently descended upon the art world, and of course duly written up by art critics who were prepared to equate these primitive artifacts with the best products of European art from the fifth century B.C. to the present.[16] It is this explanation of much twentieth-century art that we find in Berenson's 1954 paper "Exhibitionitis" in _Essays in Appreciation_ (1958), pp. 90-92. This paper we have already adduced. In _Aesthetics and History_ (1948) Berenson had even attempted to account for the break-up of the classical tradition in art in terms of the crisis which broke out within the Winckelmann canons of plastic art as a result of impact of non-European art and artifacts upon that canon which proved inadequate to the need to classify and categorize these newly discovered works. Berenson in fact speaks as if the Winckelmann tradition and classical philology as applied to classical art contained within themselves the germs of their own destruction. Here we find Berenson putting back

[16] Bernard Berenson, _The Bernard Berenson Treasury. A Selection from the works, unpublished writings, letters, diaries, and journals: 1887-1958_, selected and edited by Hanna Kiel, Introduction by Harold Acton, Preface by Nicky Mariano (London, 1964),

well into the nineteenth century the beginnings of the break-up of the classical tradition in art. The passage in question occurs in the first chapter of Aesthetics and History, Anchor Books edition (New York, 1965), pp. 47-57. Here we wish to cite at length pp. 49-52:

> In our domain, in the field of visual representation, those philologers known as 'classical archaeologists' attempted to avoid this Polish anarchy, this liberum veto, by estimating a work of art according to the quantity of light it shed upon a text, a problem in ancient history, or on how much it served as an illustration to myth, fable, and history. A Winckelmann came to judgement in the middle of the eighteenth century. From materials already collected and even then being excavated not only in and near Rome but in recently rediscovered Herculaneum and Pompeii, Winckelmann tried to pick out certain shapes, profiles, and proportions, and to standardize them as canons of plastic beauty. We are all acquainted with his ideal embodied in the 'Apollo Belvedere', the 'Laocoön' [sic], the Ludovisi 'Juno', Goethe's favourite, etc.
>
> In Winckelmann these standards had much that was artistic. But for most archaeologists these shapes and patterns derived their authority rather from ancient writers, Pliny and Pausanias chiefly. The direct appeal of the object as an experience in art and taste was ignored. For example, an Apollo at Munich used to be admired because it was supposed to be a statue mentioned by Horace. When this identification was disproved philologers and archaeologists lost no time in deserting their former idol.
>
> Happily, few writers to-day are such archaeologists,

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p. 198, hereafter referred to by title and page number. In order to facilitate verification of passages cited or alluded to in Berenson's scattered writings, references have been given whenever possible to this excellent compendium.

> but their authority and dictatorship used to influence us all. Just as the most free and easy politician or journalist may talk Plato or Hegel without having read a word of either, so the most frivolous, irresponsible art critic may talk Winckelmann or Mengs, and remain as unaware of what he is doing as Monsieur Jourdain was that he was speaking prose.

Berenson proceeds to note the beginnings of the break-up of the Winckelmann canon of plastic beauty in France and to a lesser extent in England, passing rapidly from the incipient anti-classicism of the nineteenth century to the catastrophic disruption of the classical tradition between 1900 and 1910:

> With the triumph of the Romantic movement a certain tendency appeared among the most advanced French painters to emancipate themselves from the Winckelmannian and archaeological canons of art, but it made no great headway, even in France. Feebler still was the Pre-Raphaelite and Ruskinian movement. After 1870 'Philologia', goddess of the victorious Germans, inspired and domineered over archaeology wherever classical studies were pursued.
>
> How the revolt against this tyranny started and how quickly it carried every position so long held by archaeologists, would make as interesting reading as the story of the recent disappearance of Orthodoxy from Holy Russia. Somewhere between 1900 and 1910 the classical archaeologist himself lost faith in his standards and systems. He discovered that he was being overwhelmed by wave upon wave of art objects which could not be appraised by reference to Winckelmannian shapes and proportions. These objects were brought from the Far East and the isles of the sea, from the hearts of inner and of nearer Asia, from darkest Africa and Central America, from regions in short, hitherto without a place in art studies, also from periods absent in art books, the Aurignacian, the Capsian, the neolithic, the early dynasties of Egypt, the Byzantine, the Latin Middle Ages, not to speak of such revelations in the Greek world itself as the Minoan, the Mycenean. Finally

in the holy of holies of more recent classical archaeology formerly restricted to the later fifth century, there came the rediscovery and revaluation of archaic marbles from Delphi, from the Acropolis, and from the Attic plain.
The archaeologist dared not deny, as in my youth he still used to, that these were works of art, but he could not find a way to subsume them under a common denominator. The only one he had was that of Winckelmann, and that did not work. As we have seen, his whole training had been in philology and not in art appreciation. There was nothing left for him to do but to give up appraisal and join the merry rout for whom there were no standards, who ignored or refused to recognize the existence of means for judging the work of art. All was reduced to the same level. Everything was equally interesting intrinsically, or as a link in a chain of events. There were to be no more invidious distinctions. A bronze mass product--say, buckles from Minnusinsk--was put on a level both historically and aesthetically with the Theseus of the Parthenon, and scrawls at Dura-Europos with the frescoes at the Villa dei Misteri or the Casa di Menandro at Pompeii. And as the archaeologist, although he deserted his own ship, still enjoys, or until the other day did enjoy, the authority of a pilot, his negation of value chimed in only too well with the absence of standards among the financially and sartorially higher but intellectually lower society, for whom the work of art is never more than mere news, and trivial news at that. Thus I have seen and heard solemn professors join fashionable museum directors and those incarnations of conspicuous waste, smart society women, in exalting the humble artifacts of Fuzzy-Wuzzyland.
The folk just referred to would be far from ridiculous if they could feel and appreciate the positive qualities of these outlandish products. For the up-to-daters I have in mind, these products have a merely negative merit, the one of not being objects raved about yesterday.

This statement, together with the book in which it occurs,must be considered definitive for Berenson's

standpoint in relation to the modern tradition in art, for until his death in 1959 he continued to reiterate in both his published writings and in the diaries and letters now published posthumously his marked distaste for the modern tradition in art, a tradition which he saw as having been set up both consciously and indeed quite wilfully in opposition to the classical tradition in art.[17] The displacement of humanistic art by twentieth-century anti-humanistic art he deplored, holding, as he did, that the direction of the modern tradition in art was essentially negative. Of twentieth-century abstractionism, the rationale of modern abstract or non-objective art, he was even more critical. Berenson was from the beginning of the new art movement and remained to the end of his life the inveterate enemy of twentieth-century abstract art no less than of twentieth-century abstractionism. Seldom did he miss an opportunity to castigate the new art, "anti-art," as either "no-art" or _unkunst_, while he belaboured mercilessly the expressions "non-representational art" and "abstract art." "Non-representational art" he held to be a misnomer; in a note dated 21 May 1950 published in _The Bernard Berenson Treasury_, p. 302, he wrote:

[17] Cf. _Sunset and Twilight_, pp. 72, 76-77, 81, 84, 102, 109, 126, 133, 151-152, 152-153, 162, 190-191, 222, 273-274.

> As said earlier Art is a compromise between seeing and knowing, between what one knows and what one sees, and between what one sees and can reproduce for others. I admit of innumerable approaches, conventions any and every, not only in our Europe but everywhere else in all time and place. Provided of course that the object is not distorted beyond possible recognition or besmirched and even befouled so that it raises displeasure, or even disgust. Provided still more that the object for compromise can be recognized instantly, as is no longer the case with nonrepresentational art, or abstract art. Surrealist art can be absurd and disturbing and deal in monsters, but it does remain art of sorts provided it has vitality of detail; but nonrepresentational art is a contradiction in terms, because except for architecture, and even that not entirely, the term visual art means representational.

This statement of Berenson may be considered dispassionate compared with the caustic statements we find in the following passage of <u>Seeing and Knowing</u> (London, 1956), pp. 25-27:

> As yet [1953], however, no reaction against the chopping and juggling, distorting and fooling with shapes! No leader, no guide has appeared. When a small boy of seven or eight, at an age when for fear of being laughed at one dare not ask questions, I gave up trying to draw a table, because I despaired of showing the underside as well as the upper one. <u>On a changé tout cela</u>. Nowadays it is only what cannot be represented visibly that interests the "artist" of the day. Visceral, intestinal and meaningless cerebral activities, with no conceivable visual shape, or even concept of a shape, but known to exist, absorb the limner to the severe exclusion of the sensible , sensuous, sensual world of the eye. And thus "knowing" is now revelling in a victory, a "knock-out"--a short one, let us hope--over "seeing".

Worse still: in despair of finding a way back to art, to what is now called "representational art" --as if there could be visual art that is not representational or based on what has been represented--in cowardly despair, painters and sculptors, painters more particularly, have deserted the world of concrete shapes with all that the craftsman seeing and conventionalizing could make of them, and have taken to geometrizing, to abstracting, to "non-representational art".

The term "abstract art", like such contradictions in terms as a wet dryness, an icy heat, or a soft hardness, may be conceivable to the mind but scarcely to the senses. For many thousands of years visual art has been based on ideated sensations, on a compromise between what one knows and what one sees and between what one sees and what one can reproduce for others. It therefore would seem to correspond to a continuous need or desire or demand of human nature, of man who is matter and spirit, body as well as mind. It is not likely that he will be henceforth satisfied with the store of geometrical squares, lozenges, diagonals, circles, globes, trapezoids, parallelepipedons when he asks for the bread of art. No perfection in smearing canvas or wood or paper with faint colours, guaranteed to represent nothing, no skill in buttering surfaces with pigments, as a good and faithful nursemaid or Werther's Charlotte buttered bread, will replace pictures; no segments of globes in wood or stone, no matter how caressingly polished and put together so as to suggest broad-bottomed, deep-breasted females, will replace multimillennial sculpture.

Neolithic artists had their reasons for doing women with colossal buttocks and huge breasts. They were interested only in the reproductive functions of females and reproduced these only with scarcely a thought of face and features. Have sculptors and painters of to-day the same magical purpose?

What enjoyment this kind of designing procures with chalks, inks, paint, and even clay, marble, bronze, is

> not seriously aesthetic but frivolously intellectualistic, like cross-word puzzles and similar caricatures of noble games like chess.

Of course Berenson was by no means the first to point out the inadequacies of the terminology of modern art. That discussion had already begun in 1930 when Van Doesburg put forward "concrete" instead of "abstract" which up to that time had been deemed satisfactory. Van Doesburg was supported for a time by Hans Arp and later by Kandinsky, while the adoption of "concrete" in Italy and South America is to be attributed to Max Bill. Michel Seuphor in *A Dictionary of Abstract Painting* (London, 1958), p. 85, n. 1, has traced the fortunes of this pursuit of an adequate terminology for non-objective art, but abstract discussions of this kind not infrequently prove otiose and this particular discussion has proved no exception. It would be a serious error to suppose that Berenson himself ever wished to become embroiled in this dispute about terminology. Berenson's own sallies into this field are ever but preliminaries to his attacks on excessive intellectualization of art because for him the work of art in itself was the important thing and "art" ever took precedence over the qualifying "abstract," "impressionistic," "surrealist," or "expressionistic." In a letter to Philip Hofer, dated 31 January 1948, published in *The Selected Letters of Bernard Berenson*, p. 250, Berenson wrote:

"I am all agog to know who will be the new Foggocrat. 'A Youngster' you say. I hope no passionate surrealist, abstractist [sic], iconologist, pseudo-psychiatrist, or any other ist. I hope it will be somebody who takes an interest in the work of art as DING AN SICH, & not all the subtile, whopping, profound, shallow, toothsome, tasteless things that can be said about it. In short I hope & PRAY that it will be neither a Picassinière nor a German-minded person." This letter serves to explain his impatience with those who sought to subjugate art to either semantics or "creative criticism" such as Pater's now notorious description of La Gioconda.[18] It is thus not perversity but rather a recognition of "the exquisite economy of the perfect adaptation of means to ends" which led Berenson to admire the geometrizing of twentieth-century technology to the geometrizing of twentieth-century abstract art with a geometrical bias. In Aesthetics and History, p. 83, he had posited that if Plato were to return to the modern world he would find the dictum of the Philebus realized "not so much by the 'abstract' and 'non-objective' paintings that are momentarily the fashion, as by our machinery and our weapons. Their dialectic, their realization, their geometrical perfection would surpass anything he could have

[18] Cf. Aesthetics and History, pp. 116-117: "I would not deprive an author of the right to get what he can out of a work of art or literature or of any other thing in the universe. If he is a poet,

imagined or conceived." Similarly in Seeing and Knowing, pp. 27-28, he was again to assert his preference for geometrized machinery over geometrized abstract art:

> If by "abstract art" is meant geometrical shapes as distinct from those the average man thinks he sees in what he calls "nature," then surely that art exists nowadays in great abundance and with fascinating elegance of its own in our machinery and in what this machinery turns out.
>
> From the elegant instruments of destruction to well-shaped vehicles, from the intricate devices for precision to toys and writing-table gadgets and delicate toilet articles, I suck delight from shapes that enjoy the exquisite economy of the perfect adaptation of means to ends. And that is a beauty in its own way, as the beauty of genre or, on another level, the beauty of Holiness.
>
> If that be so, why try to juggle with disembodied lines and curves that can have none but a strictly incapsulated private meaning?
>
> So there is but one way out of the brambly maze in which we are blindly beating about: follow the tenuous beam of reason that will lead us back to the compromise between "seeing" and "knowing", between retinal vision and conceptual looking, on which rests visual art as an eternal function of human nature. Purely conceptual patterns, if seriously pursued, can end in pure mathematics only. An eminent pioneer of that sublime pursuit [Lord Russell is meant] assured me that its practice gave him visions and ecstasies beyond belief. Unfortunately the highest mathematics is beyond the understanding of those who have not learned its language, a language given to few to master. With little effort, and some training,

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he will tell us that the heavens declare the glory of the Lord, or that they display 'huge cloudy symbols of a high romance'. As an interpreter he will give us Pater's famous tirade about Mona Lisa, or Gundolf's

visual art is communicable and intelligible universally.

Berenson's treatment of the terminology of modern abstract art thus subserves his handling of the whole question of the excessive intellectualization of art in the twentieth century. We have already had occasion, in the first part of this dissertation, to observe in connection with Pater and Hegel that Berenson was by no means averse to intellectualization in art in itself; we have now occasion, in the second part of this dissertation, to remark in connection with Pater and Winckelmann that Berenson was by no means wholly averse to abstraction in art, again, in itself. Thus, we find in the 1916 paper "A Madonna by Antonello da Messina," published in the third series of The Study and Criticism of Italian Art (London, 1916), pp. 82-84:

> Not only is Mr. Benson's "Madonna" of a quality worthy of Antonello, but this quality happens to be peculiarly his own. In the first place we have seen that it displays a tendency to keep the geometrical figure most aptly containing the object to be represented. This tendency, as already pointed out by Signor Lionello Venturi, in his noteworthy article on

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penetrating analysis of Shakespeare, or Romano Guardini's of Dostoevski. All is well so long as we do not take the author literally and provided that he sticks to what he sees and feels, and does not foist upon the work of art what exists only in his philosophical imagination or his psychoanalytical dream."

our painter, is marked in all of Antonello's works where there is the slightest chance for its prevalence. Even his portraits, so convincingly individualized, display this tendency as far as subject permits. It is manifest in his completest masterpiece, the Dresden "St. Sebastian," and it is a pleasure to see how he has painted a purely geometrical form when he got the chance, as in the cylindrical column in his "Annunciation." (A curious display of this geometrical tendency in our Madonna may be noted in the conical fingers of her right hand. [Berenson's note])

For the present purpose the best terms of comparison are furnished by two other half-length figures seen behind parapets, namely, one "Virgin Annunciate" at Munich and another at Palermo. Unfortunately, as neither of these has a landscape background, they do not rise impressively like pyramids from the ground, as our Madonna does, yet they are so severely geometrical, and consequently so plastic, that they suggest busts by Laurana or the elder Gagini. (Both these sculptors may have influenced Antonello, and perhaps in turn have been influenced by him. [Berenson's note]) Both, moreover, are draped with the same search for the simplest lines and curves that will convey the fullest sense of the substance underneath them. The abstraction thus attained is at once liberative and creative, in each picture in slightly different ways. It is most obvious at Palermo, most complete at Munich, and most genial in our "Madonna."

Such simple planes and enveloping contours as we find here, we discover everywhere in Antonello, but most of all in his heads. Almost all his portraits will manifest it, but perhaps the most suitable for us just here is the one in the Giovanelli Collection at Venice.

Here, then, we have an instance of Berenson's own use of "abstraction" to denote representational art

with a geometrical bias. Berenson was writing at a time when it was still possible to speak of "abstraction" in art without precluding representation. We shall find that Pater similarly used the word "abstraction" and its variants, "abstract" and "abstracted," to denote what is today styled "representational art." The distinction between "concrete" and "abstract" art is itself, of course, earlier than either Berenson or Pater; we find it already in Winckelmann's late Versuch einer Allegorie, besonders für die Kunst (1766). In 1. Kapitel, 42. Abschnitt, Winckelmann wrote:

> Alles, was von alten Allegorien in Figuren erscheinet, ist von z w o Gattungen, und diese Bilder können theils als a b st r a c t e, theils als c o n c r e t e Bilder betrachtet werden. A b st r a c t e Bilder nenne ich diejenigen, die ausser der Sache, auf welche sie sich beziehen, angebracht sind, so daß sie nicht als mitwirkende Bilder zu Bedeutung eines anderen Bildes dienen, sondern, obgleich allezeit in Beziehung und Anspielung auf etwas ausser demselben, dennoch vor sich bestehen, und diese wären im engen Verstande S i n̄ b i l d e r zu nennen, und sind dasjenige, was man sonst E m b l e m a t a nennet. C o n c r e t e Bilder hingegen würden diejenigen heissen, die theils in Figuren, theils in anderen Zeichen mit denjenigen Bildern verbunden sind, auf welche jene eine Beziehung haben (Werke, IX, 45).

Winckelmann thus distinguished between "concrete" and "abstract" pictures in allegorical painting; in so doing he was, according to Hans Schulz, Deutsches Fremdwörterbuch (Strasbourg, 1913), I, 4, the first

German writer to use "abstract" in connection with painting. Needless to say the modern connotations of "abstract" in this context did not obtain; Winckelmann did not have in mind what a modern German understands by abstrakte Kunst, though, as we shall see in due course, Winckelmann possessed an idea of abstract art but his abstractionism did not preclude representation.

In his criticism of art Pater, like Winckelmann before him and Berenson after him, makes frequent use of the substantive "abstraction," the verb "abstract," and the adjectives "abstract" and "abstracted." These terms he applied readily to both sculpture and painting. A few examples from The Renaissance will show how he used these words. In "Sandro Botticelli" he speaks of "the medium of abstract painting": Botticelli, he writes on p. 52, "is before all things a poetical painter, blending the charm of story and sentiment, the medium of the art of poetry, with the charm of line and colour, the medium of abstract painting." Of the Madonnas of Botticelli he remarks in the same article, p. 56, that "the abstract lines of the face have little nobleness, and the colour is wan." In "Luca della Robbia" Pater spoke, p. 66, of "a system of abstraction which aimed always at the broad and general type, at the purging away from the individual of what belonged only to him, and of the mere accidents of a particular time and place, imposed upon the range of effects open to the Greek sculptor limits

somewhat narrowly defined." In the final paragraph of the same study, p. 72, Pater spoke of "the abstract art of sculpture." "The Poetry of Michelangelo" appears to reiterate "Luca della Robbia" when Pater observes, p. 76, "As I have already pointed out, he [Michelangelo] secures that ideality of expression which in Greek sculpture depends on a delicate system of abstraction, and in early Italian sculpture on lowness of relief, by an incompleteness, which is surely not always undesigned, and which, as I think, no one regrets, and trusts to the spectator to complete the half-emergent form," though in actual date of publication "The Poetry of Michelangelo" antedates "Luca della Robbia." In the same study he refers, p. 87, to "that abstract form of beauty, about which the Platonists reason: "For Dante, the amiable and devout materialism of the middle age sanctifies all that is presented by hand and eye; while Michelangelo is always pressing forward from the outward beauty--*il bel del fuor che agli occhi piace*, to apprehend the unseen beauty; *trascenda nella forma universale*--that abstract form of beauty, about which the Platonists reason." Further in Pater's study of Michelangelo we come upon the following passage:

> After the execution of the Pazzi conspirators, Botticelli is employed to paint their portraits. This preoccupation with serious thoughts and sad images might easily have resulted, as it did, for instance, in the gloomy villages of the Rhine, or in the overcrowded parts of medieval Paris, as it

> still does in many a village of the Alps, in something merely morbid or grotesque, in the <u>Danse Macabre</u> of many French and German painters, or the grim inventions of Dürer. From such a result the Florentine masters of the fifteenth century were saved by the nobility of their Italian culture, and still more by their tender pity for the thing itself. They must often have leaned over the lifeless body, when all was at length quiet and smoothed out. After death, it is said, the traces of slighter and more superficial dispositions disappear; the lines become more simple and dignified; only the abstract lines remain, in a great indifference. They came thus to see death in its distinction. Then following it perhaps one stage further, dwelling for a moment on the point where all this transitory dignity must break up, and discerning with no clearness a new body, they paused just in time, and abstained, with a sentiment of profound pity.

This passage occurs in the last paragraph but two of the study, pp. 93-94.

In ~~Pater's~~ his study of Leonardo ~~he~~ Pater writes, p. 114, of "This curious beauty is seen above all in his [da Vinci's] drawings, and in these chiefly in the abstract grace of the bounding lines." In "The School of Giorgione" Pater notices, p. 133, that in Japanese fan-painting we get "only abstract colour." Then he describes how the Venetian school treats its peculiar landscape: "The Venetian landscape, on the other hand, has in its material conditions much which is hard, or harshly definite; but [Pater continues, p. 136] the masters of the Venetian school have shown themselves little burdened by them. Of its Alpine background they retain certain abstracted elements only, of cool colour and tranquillising line; and they use its actual details, the brown windy turrets, the straw-

coloured fields, the forest arabesques, but as the notes of a music which duly accompanies the presence of their men and women, presenting us with the spirit or essence only of a certain sort of landscape--a country of the pure reason or half-imaginative memory." Finally, there is "Winckelmann" in which Pater describes, p. 223, the eighteenth-century German Hellenist as "Living in a world of exquisite but abstract and colourless form," and subsequently attributes, p. 224, the aspect of repose in the statues of the Greek gods, "those abstracted gods," to "the supreme and colourless abstraction of those divine forms." Here we have been content to adduce in the order in which they occur in the New Library edition of The Renaissance examples of Pater's use of "abstraction" as well as "abstract" and "abstracted." The order in which these examples have been cited follows the sequence of articles and essays in the third edition of The Renaissance (1888). The order is therefore not chronological because "The Poetry of Michelangelo" was published before "Luca della Robbia" was dated, while in date of publication "Winckelmann" precedes both "Leonardo da Vinci," "Sandro Botticelli," "Pico della Mirandola," and "The Poetry of Michelangelo." In date of publication, "The School of Giorgione" is actually the latest piece of writing represented in the third edition. The chronological order, by date of original and separate

publication, will be rigidly observed when we come to trace the development of Pater's abstractionism because for that purpose we shall employ the original versions rather than the redactions of the pertinent articles.

In his art criticism Pater thus makes frequent use of the substantive "abstraction" and the adjective "abstract" in connection with both sculpture and painting. We have also found an instance of his use of the verb "abstract" in connection with painting, and in due course we shall have occasion to draw attention to his use of this verb in connection with sculpture. Pater's use of the participle "abstracted" has been duly noticed in connection with both painting and sculpture. It is especially noteworthy that Pater's use of these words does not carry any of the present-day connotations of non-representational or abstract art. The artist, be he painter or sculptor, is conceived by Pater as one who "abstracts" or "extracts" from nature or from the individual what is accidental and contingent. Professor Germain d'Hangest in Walter Pater. L'Homme et l'Œuvre (Paris, 1961), I, 350, n. 19, has drawn attention to Pater's comparatively early use in the 1870 article "A Fragment on Sandro Botticelli," of the expression "the medium of abstract painting" by

which he appears to be saying in other words that Botticelli is "before all things a poetical painter, blending the charm of story and sentiment, the medium of the art of poetry, with the charm of line and colour." This is "the medium of abstract painting" as Pater understands it and it is hardly what the twentieth-century abstractionist would understand by the expression. Again, this time in the 1877 article "The School of Giorgione" Pater uses the expression "abstract colour" of which Japanese fan-painting is given as an example. In the same article, as we have seen, Pater described how the Venetian school treated its natural landscape: "Of its Alpine background they [the Venetian masters] retain certain abstracted elements only, of cool colour and tranquillising line." Thus does Pater use the terms "abstract" and "abstracted" of painting, and these terms appear to be used consistently throughout the second article as synonyms to denote what is "abstracted" in the sense of "extracted" from nature; there is no question as yet of abstract in the sense of non-objective art. Pater is concerned rather with idealization on the one hand and ideation on the other hand: "He [Giorgione] is the inventor of <u>genre</u>, of those easily movable pictures which serve neither for uses of devotion, nor of allegorical or historic teaching--little groups of real men and women, amid congruous furniture or landscape--morsels of actual life, conversation or music or play, but

refined upon or idealised, till they come to seem like glimpses of life from afar." This description in The Renaissance, p. 141, of Giorgione's singular innovation should be compared to Pater's description of the "system of abstraction" employed by Michelangelo and della Robbia. The Michelangelo article (1871) and the della Robbia essay (dated 1872) fall between the Botticelli article (1870) on the one hand and the Giorgione article (1877) on the other hand; that there is a marked affinity in both Pater's thought and his expression will be observed among the four studies enumerated here.

Professor d'Hangest's note seems to imply that Pater's use of "abstract" dates from 1870, but as we have already noticed, further investigation shows that Pater's use of both "abstract" and "abstracted" must be dated prior to 1870: Pater's mention in the Michelangelo article of "that ideality of expression which in Greek sculpture depends on a delicate system of abstraction, and in early Italian sculpture on lowness of relief," like the allusion in the della Robbia essay to "a system of abstraction" by means of which both the Greek and the Italian sculptor produced "the broad and general type," in effect reiterates "the supreme and colour abstraction of those divine forms" or the "world of exquisite but abstract and colourless form" of the 1867 Winckelmann article. That article was originally published in the Westminster Review of January 1867,

though it is now possible on the evidence of a letter brought to light by Professor Lawrence Evans in his unpublished dissertation, "Some Letters of Walter Pater" (Harvard, 1961), pp. 4-5 (No. 5, Pater to John Chapman, 12 November [1866]) to show that by November 1866 Pater had already completed a final draft of the Winckelmann article which he then sought Chapman to return to him on the grounds that there were further emendations to be made. The Winckelmann article thus serves to date not only Pater's use of "abstract" in connection with painting and sculpture, but also the beginnings of his abstractionism. It is our contention that both the Michelangelo article and the della Robbia essay substantially reproduce the ideas and phraseology of the 1867 article, and furthermore that both the Botticelli and the Giorgione articles derive from the Winckelmann paper; at least, they are not incompatible with the ideas originally developed in 1866. That these ideas had been formulated by November 1866 the letter of Pater to Chapman confirms because in that correspondence it is of "a good many minute corrections" rather than of radical changes that Pater speaks. It may be posited, further, that there is also an organic relationship between the Michelangelo article and the della Robbia essay; Sir Kenneth Clark in the Introduction to the Fontana Library edition of

The Renaissance, p. 18, even suggests that that part of the della Robbia essay which contains a criticism of Michelangelo's sculpture may well have been worked up in note form originally for the 1871 article. If this was indeed the case (and it seems reasonable to suppose that it was or how else are we to account for the presence of this extraneous matter in the essay?), the ties connecting the 1867 article with both the 1871 article and the essay dated 1872 are strengthened.

Similarly, it is possible to argue that the 1870 and the 1877 articles represent a development of the position which Pater first outlined in the 1867 article. In the Winckelmann article Pater remarked after Hegel (the Westminster Review version contains a footnote, p. 99, n. 2, to Hegel's Ästhetik [3. Teil, 2. Abschnitt]), p. 98, "at first sight sculpture, with its solidity of form, seems more real and full than the faint abstract manner of poetry or painting. Still the fact is the reverse." The recension of the article in The Renaissance gives for the redaction of this passage, p. 211, "at first sight sculpture, with its solidity of form, seems a thing more real and full than the faint, abstract world of poetry or painting. Still the fact is the reverse." This statement of Pater should be compared to the statement of Hegel, II, 88-90:

> Vergleichen wir nun ferner die Skulptur mit den ubrigen Kunsten, so sind es besonders Poesie und Malerei, die in Betracht kommen. Sowohl

einzelne Statuen als Gruppen geben uns die geistige Gestalt in vollständiger Leiblichkeit, den Menschen, wie er ist. Die Skulptur scheint daher die der Natur getreuste Weise für die Darstellung des Geistigen zu haben und die Malerei wie die Poesie dagegen unnaturlich zu sein, weil die Malerei statt der sinnlichen Totalität des Raums, welche die menschliche Gestalt und die sonstigen Naturdinge wirklich einnehmen, sich nur der Ebene bedient und die Rede noch weniger das Leibliche ausdruckt, sondern nur die Vorstellungen von demselben durch den Ton mitzuteilen vermag.

Dennoch verhalt sich die Sache gerade umgekehrt. Wenn das Skulpturbild wohl die Naturlichkeit für sich vorauszuhaben scheint, so ist doch gerade diese durch die schwere Materie dargestellte leibliche Äußerlichkeit und Naturlichkeit nicht die Natur des Geistes als Geistes. Als solcher ist im Gegenteil seine eigentümliche Existenz die Äußerung in Reden, Taten, Handlungen, die sein Inneres entwickeln und ihn zeigen, wie er ist.

In dieser Rücksicht wird die Skulptur hauptsächlich gegen die Poesie zurücktreten müssen. Zwar überwiegt in der bildenden Kunst die plastische Deutlichkeit, in der das Leibliche vor unseren Augen steht, aber auch die Poesie kann die äußere Figur des Menschen beschreiben, sein Haar, Stirne, Wange, Wuchs, Kleidung, Stellung usf. --freilich nicht mit der Präzision und Genauigkeit der Skulptur; doch was ihr hierin abgeht, ergänzt die Phantasie, die außerdem für die bloße Vorstellung nicht solcher festen und ausgeführten Bestimmtheit bedarf und uns den Menschen vor allem handelnd, mit allen seinen Motiven, Verwicklungen des Schicksals, der Umstände, mit allen seinen Empfindungen, Reden, Aufdeckungen seines Inneren und äußeren Begebenheiten vorführt. Dies vermag die Skulptur entweder gar nicht oder nur in sehr unvollkommener Weise, da sie weder das subjektive Innere in seiner partikularen Innigkeit und Leidenschaft noch wie die Poesie eine Folge von Äußerungen darstellen kann, sondern nur das Allgemeine der Individualität, soweit der Körper es ausdrückt, und etwas Sukzessionsloses in einem bestimmten Moment und dieses bewegungslos ohne lebendige fortschreitende Handlung gibt.

Sie steht in diesen Beziehungen auch der Malerei

nach. Denn der Ausdruck des Geistes erhält in der Malerei durch die Farbe des Gesichts und dessen Licht und Schatten nicht nur im natürlichen Sinne der materiellen Genauigkeit überhaupt, sondern vornehmlich der physiognomischen und pathognomischen Erscheinung eine überwiegende, bestimmtere Richtigkeit und Lebendigkeit. Man könnte daher zunächst wohl meinen, die Skulptur brauche, um vollkommener zu werden, ja nur mit dem Vorteil ihrer räumlichen Totalität noch die übrigen Vorteile der Malerei zu verbinden, und es sei eine Willkürlichkeit, sich zu dem Weglassen der malerischen Färbung entschlossen zu haben, oder eine Dürftigkeit und ein Ungeschick der Exekution, sich nur auf die eine Seite der Wirklichkeit, auf die materielle Form nämlich, zu beschränken und von der anderen zu abstrahieren--wie etwa die Silhouette und der Kupferstich ein bloßer Notbehelf sind. Von solch einer Willkür darf jedoch in der wahren Kunst nicht gesprochen werden. Die Gestalt, wie sie Gegenstand der Skulptur ist, bleibt in der Tat nur eine abstrakte Seite der konkreten menschlichen Leiblichkeit; ihre Formen erhalten keine Mannigfaltigkeit von partikularisierten Farben und Bewegungen. Dies ist aber kein zufälliger Mangel, sondern eine durch den Begriff der Kunst selbst gesetzte Beschränkung des Materials und der Darstellungsweise. Denn die Kunst ist ein Produkt des Geistes, und zwar des höheren, denkenden Geistes, und solch ein Werk macht sich einen bestimmten Inhalt und deshalb auch eine von anderen Seiten abstrahierende Weise der künstlerischen Realisierung zu ihrem Vorwurf. Es geht hier mit der Kunst wie mit den verschiedenen Wissenschaften, von denen die Geometrie nur den Raum, die Rechtswissenschaft nur das Recht, die Philosophie nur die Explikation der ewigen Idee und deren Dasein und Fürsichsein in den Dingen zum Objekt hat und diese Gegenstände nach ihrer Verschiedenheit auch verschiedenartig entwickelt--ohne daß eine der angeführten Wissenschaften das vollständig zu Vorstellung bringt, was man das konkrete wirkliche Dasein im Sinne des gewöhnlichen Bewußtseins nennt.

The student of Pater will find in this passage of

Hegel not only the source of Pater's comparison in the Winckelmann article of the relative degrees of concreteness and abstractness in sculpture, painting, and poetry; but also the source of some of Pater's phraseology in the 1867 article. Pater's language in this article is for the most part more concrete than that of Hegel in the passage adduced from the Ästhetik. Pater has succeeded in rendering his discussion more concrete than Hegel's by the use, for purposes of illustration in the paragraphs subsequent to the one quoted, of Browning's "Le Byron de nos Jours" from Dramatis Personâe and, in the original version only, Holman Hunt's Claudio and Isabella.[19] The difference in the level of abstraction at which the two discussions are carried on should not distract us from the marked similarities in terminology of the two passages. Especially noteworthy in the passage adduced is Hegel's use of abstrahieren, abstrakt, and abstrahierend, while his complementary use of beschränken and abstrahieren in a parallel construction is also worthy of note. Certainly in his use of "abstract" Pater may be said to approximate Hegel in the passage brought forward for consideration, while his employment of "limit" in the question, 1867, p. 98, "But why should sculpture

[19] Cf. Marcel Brion, Art of the Romantic Era: Romanticism, Classicism, Realism (London, 1966), Plate 78.

thus limit itself to pure form?" and "limitation" in the next sentence which answers that question: "Because by this limitation it becomes a perfect medium of expression for one particular motive of the imaginative intellect" may be taken to correspond to Hegel's use of <u>beschränken</u> and <u>Beschränkung</u>. <u>In der Beschränkung zeigt sich erst der Meister</u> is a dictum iterated by both Pater and Berenson: Pater remarks (<u>Essays from the Guardian</u>, p. 32) that Amiel "quotes with approval those admirable words from Goethe, 'In der Beschränkung zeigt sich erst der Meister'" [<u>sic</u>]; Berenson in a note dated 31 October 1949, I Tatti, applies this dictum to himself (the note will be found in <u>The Bernard Berenson Treasury</u>, p. 284). Pater of course applied the dictum to art as well as to the artist: "'The artist,' says Schiller, 'may be known by what he <u>omits</u>'; and in literature, too, the true artist may be best recognised by his tact of omission." In the same part of "Style" (<u>Appreciations</u>, pp. 18-20) Pater also remarks: "For in truth all art does but consist in the removal of surplusage, from the last finish of the gem-engraver blowing away the last particle of individual dust, back to the earliest divination of the finished work to be, lying somewhere, according to Michelangelo's fancy, in the rough-hewn block of stone." But here it is perhaps as well to collate with the passage of the Winckelmann article the following passage of the della Robbia essay in which "limitation," Hegel's

<u>Beschränkung</u>, is treated of at some length; the della Robbia essay is, as we have already noticed, related to the Michelangelo article in which Pater had explained how Michelangelo "secures that ideality of expression which in Greek sculpture depends on a delicate system of abstraction, and in early Italian sculpture on lowness of relief, by an incompleteness, which is surely not always undesigned, and which, as I think, no one regrets, and trusts to the spectator to complete the half-emergent form." This passage in <u>The Renaissance</u>, p. 76, should now be compared to the following passage in the same volume, pp. 64-66:

> These Tuscan sculptors of the fifteenth century worked for the most part in low relief, giving even to their monumental effigies, something of its depression of surface, getting into them by this means a pathetic suggestion of the wasting and etherealisation of death. They are haters of all heaviness and emphasis, of strongly-opposed light and shade, and seek their means of delineation among those last refinements of shadow, which are almost invisible except in a strong light, and which the finest pencil can hardly follow. The whole essence of their work is <u>expression</u>, the passing of a smile over the face of a child, the ripple of the air on a still day over the curtain of a window ajar.
>
> What is the precise value of this system of sculpture, this low relief? Luca della Robbia, and the other sculptors of the school to which he belongs, have before them the universal problem of their art; and this system of low relief is the means by which they meet and overcome the special limitation of sculpture.
>
> That limitation results from the material and other necessary conditions of all sculptured work, and consists in the tendency of such work to a hard realism, a one-sided presentment of mere form, that solid material frame which only motion can relieve, a thing of heavy shadows, and an individuality of

> expression pushed to caricature. Against this tendency to the hard presentment of mere form trying vainly to compete with the reality of nature itself, all noble sculpture constantly struggles; each great system of sculpture resisting it in its own way, etherealising, spiritualising, relieving its stiffness, its heaviness, and death. The use of colour in sculpture is but an unskilful contrivance to effect, by borrowing from another art, what the nobler sculpture effects by strictly appropriate means. To get no colour, but the equivalent of colour; to secure the expression and the play of life; to expand the too firmly fixed individuality of pure, unrelieved, uncoloured form:--this is the problem which the three great styles in sculpture have solved in three different ways.

We have already noticed that by his use of "abstraction" in the Winckelmann article Pater anticipates the usage of both the 1871 Michelangelo article and the 1872 della Robbia essay because by accounting for the aspect of serenity in the statues of the Greek gods in terms of"the supreme and colourless abstraction of those divine forms" and by his description in the same place of these plastic figures as "those abstracted gods" he posited, as it were, "a system of abstraction" in sculpture. This construction is warranted by the fact that on p. 100 of the 1867 Winckelmann article Pater stated: "Sculpture finds the secret of its power in presenting these types [the "select number of types intrinsically interesting" to which sculpture restricts itself because of "the limitations of its material"] in their broad, central, incisive lines. This it effects not by accumulation

of detail, but by abstracting from it. All that is accidental, that distracts the simple effect of the supreme types of humanity, all traces in them of the commonness of the world, it gradually purges away." This passage in turn recalls our discussion of Hegel's abstrahieren and beschranken in connection with Pater's explanation, 1867, pp. 98-99, of why Greek sculpture should have limited itself to pure form:

> But why should sculpture thus limit itself to pure form? Because by this limitation it becomes a perfect medium of expression for one peculiar motive of the imaginative intellect. It therefore renounces all those attributes of its material which do not help that motive. It has had, indeed, from the beginning an unfixed claim to colour; but this colour has always been more or less conventional, with no melting or modulation of tones, never admitting more than a very limited realism. It was maintained chiefly as a religious tradition. In proportion as sculpture ceased to be merely decorative and subordinate to architecture it threw itself upon pure form. It renounces the power of expression by sinking or heightening tones. In it no member of the human form is more significant than the rest; the eye is wide, and without pupil; the lips and brow are not more precious than hands, and breasts, and feet. The very slightness of its material is part of its pride: it has no backgrounds, no sky or atmosphere, to suggest and interpret a train of feeling; a little of suggested motion, and much of pure light on its gleaming surfaces, with pure form --only these. And it gains more than it loses by this limitation to its own distinguishing motives; it unveils man in the repose of his unchanging characteristics. Its white light, purged from the angry blood-like stains of action and passion, reveals not what is accidental in man, but the god, as opposed to man's restless movement. It records the first naive, unperplexed recognition of man by himself; and

> it is a proof of the high artistic capacity of the Greeks that they apprehended and remained true to these exquisite limitations, yet in spite of them gave to their creations a vital, mobile individuality.

The footnote which in the 1867 version of the article follows "mobile individuality," p. 99, n. 2, is to 3. Teil, 2. Abschnitt of Hegel's Ästhetik with which we have already dealt. The passage of the 1867 Winckelmann article which we shall now adduce, pp. 104-105, is likewise followed by a footnote to Hegel's Ästhetik but this time to 2. Teil, 3. Abschnitt, 2. Kapitel. We will therefore, again, collate Pater with Hegel. Pater writes in the passage just indicated:

> Into this stage of Greek achievement Winckelmann did not enter. Supreme as he is where his true interest lay, his insight into the typical unity and repose of the sculpturesque seems to have involved limitation in another direction. His conception of art excludes that bolder type of it which deals confidently and serenely with life, conflict, evil. Living in a world of exquisite but abstract and colourless form, he could hardly have conceived of the subtle and penetrative, but somewhat grotesque art of the modern world. What would he have thought of Gilliatt, or of the bleeding mouth of Fantine in that first part of Les Misérables, penetrated as it is with a sense of beauty as lively and transparent as that of a Greek? He failed even to see, what Hegel has so cunningly detected, a sort of preparation for the romantic within the limits of the Greek ideal itself. Greek art has not merely its mournful mysteries of Adonis, of Hyacinthus, of Ceres, but it is conscious also of the fall of earlier divine dynasties. Hyperion gives way to Apollo, Oceanus to Poseidon. Around the feet of that tranquil Olympian family still crowd the weary

shadows of an earlier, more formless, divine world. Even their still minds are troubled with thoughts of a limit to duration, of inevitable decay, of dispossession. Again, the supreme and colourless abstraction of those divine forms, which is the secret of their repose, is also a premonition of the fleshless, consumptive refinements of the pale mediaeval artists. That high indifference to the outward, that impassivity, has already a touch of the corpse in it; we see already Angelico and the "Master of the Passion" in the artist future. The crushing of the sensuous, the shutting of the door upon it, the flesh-outstripping interest, is already traceable. Those abstracted gods,"ready to melt out their essence fine into the winds" [cf. Keats, Endymion, I, 99-100], who can fold up their flesh as a garment, and remain themselves, seem already to feel that bleak air in which, like Helen of Troy herself, they wander as the spectres of the Middle Age.

Here is Hegel at the outset of 2. Teil, 3. Abschnitt, 3. Kapitel:

Den Keim ihres Untergangs haben die klassischen Götter in sich selbst und führen daher, wenn das Mangelhafte, das in ihnen liegt, durch die Ausbildung der Kunst selber ins Bewußtsein kommt, auch die Auflösung des klassischen Ideals nach sich. Als das Prinzip desselben, wie es hier hervortritt, stellten wir die geistige Individualität auf, welche in dem unmittelbaren leiblichen und äußeren Dasein ihren schlechthin adäquaten Ausdruck findet. Diese Individualität nun aber zerfiel zu einem Kreise von Götterindividuen, deren Bestimmtheit nicht an und für sich notwendig und somit von Hause aus der Zufälligkeit preisgegeben ist, an welcher die ewig waltenden Götter für das innere Bewußtsein wie für die Kunstdarstellung die Seite ihrer Auflösbarkeit erhalten.

Hegel continues thus:

Die Skulptur zwar in ihrer vollen Gediegenheit nimmt die Götter als substantielle Mächte auf und gibt ihnen eine Gestalt, in deren Schönheit sie zunächst sicher in sich beruhen, da die zufällige Äußlichkeit an ihr

am wenigsten zur Erscheinung kommt. Ihre Vielheit und Verschiedenheit aber ist ihre Zufälligkeit, und der Gedanke löst sie in die Bestimmung einer Göttlichkeit auf, durch deren Macht der Notwendigkeit sie sich gegenseitig bekämpfen und herabsetzen. Denn wie allgemein auch die Gewalt jedes besonderen Gottes gefaßt werde, als besondere Individualität ist sie doch immer nur von beschränktem Umfange. Außerdem verharren die Götter nicht in ihrer ewigen Ruhe; sie setzen sich mit besonderen Zwecken in Bewegung, indem sie von den vorgefundenen Zuständen und Kollisionen der konkreten Wirklichkeit hierhin und dorthin gezogen werden, um bald hier zu helfen, bald drüben zu verhindern oder zu stören. Diese einzelnen Beziehungen nun, in welche die Götter als handelnde Individuen treten, behalten eine Seite der Zufälligkeit, welche die Substantialität des Göttlichen, wie sehr dieselbe auch die herrschende Grundlage bleiben mag, trübt und die Götter in die Gegensätze und Kämpfe der beschränkten Endlichkeit hineinlockt. Durch diese den Göttern selber immanente Endlichkeit geraten sie in den Widerspruch ihrer Hoheit, Würde und der Schönheit ihres Daseins, durch welche sie auch in das Willkürliche und Zufällige herabgebracht werden. Dem vollständigen Hervortreten dieses Widerspruchs entgeht das eigentliche Ideal nur dadurch, daß, wie es in der echten Skulptur und deren einzelnen Tempelbildern der Fall ist, die göttlichen Individuen für sich einsam in seliger Ruhe dargestellt sind, doch nun etwas Lebloses, der Empfindung Entrücktes, und jenen stillen Zug der Trauer erhalten, den wir bereits oben berührt haben. Diese Trauer schon ist es, welche ihr Schicksal ausmacht, indem sie anzeigt, daß etwas Höheres über ihnen steht und der Übergang von den Besonderheiten zu ihrer allgemeinen Einheit notwendig ist. Sehen wir uns aber nach der Art und Gestalt dieser höheren Einheit um, so ist sie, der Individualität und relativen Bestimmtheit der Götter gegenüber, das in sich Abstrakte und Gestaltlose, die Notwendigkeit, das Schicksal, welches in dieser Abstraktion nur das Höhere überhaupt ist, das Götter und Menschen bezwingt, für sich aber unverstanden und begrifflos bleibt. Das Schicksal ist noch nicht absoluter fürsichseiender Zweck und dadurch zugleich subjektiver, persönlicher, göttlicher

> Ratschluß, sondern nur die eine, allgemeine Macht, welche die Besonderheit der einzelnen Götter überragt und deshalb nicht selber wieder sich als Individuum darstellen kann, weil es sonst nur als eine unter den vielen Individualitäten auftreten, nicht aber über ihnen stehen würde. Deshalb bleibt es ohne Gestaltung und Individualität und ist in dieser Abstraktion nur die Notwendigkeit als solche, welcher die Götter sowohl als die Menschen, wenn sie als besondere sich voneinander abscheiden, sich bekämpfen, ihre individuelle Kraft einseitig geltend machen und über ihre Grenze und Befugnis sich erheben wollen, als dem Schicksal unterliegen und gehorchen müssen, das sie unabänderlich trifft (I, 483-484).

Pater thus makes use of the words "abstraction," "abstract," and "abstracted" in dealing with classical sculpture within a Hegelian frame of reference. In general it may be said that we are not without grounds when we submit that Pater's peculiar use of "abstraction" and its variants in the Winckelmann article derives from Hegel's _Ästhetik_. We submit, however, that there are grounds for asserting that Pater derived immediately from Hegel not only _Abstraktion_ and _Abstrahieren_ but also _Allgemeinheit_ and a term which is closely associated with _Allgemeinheit_ in the Winckelmann article, namely, _Heiterkeit_. These three terms were instrumental to Pater in putting forward in the Winckelmann and Michelangelo articles as well as the della Robbia essay his abstractionism. Pater's statement in _The Renaissance_ in the 1872 essay, p. 66, that "_Allgemeinheit_--breadth, generality, universality,--is the word chosen by Winckelmann, and after him by Goethe and many German critics, to express that law of the most excellent Greek sculptors, of Pheidias and his pupils, which prompted them

constantly to seek the type in the individual, to abstract and express only what is structural and permanent, to purge from the individual all that belongs only to him, all the accidents, the feelings and actions of the special moment, all that (because in its own nature it endures but for a moment) is apt to look like a frozen thing if one arrests it" notwithstanding, his own terminology appears on the basis of the documentation with which the 1867 Winckelmann article is supplied to derive immediately, if not ultimately, from Hegel rather than either Winckelmann or Goethe. An instance of Hegel's use of _Abstraktion_ and _Abstrahieren_, together with _Allgemeinheit_ and _Heiterkeit_, is provided by a passage of the _Ästhetik_ not specifically documented by Pater, namely, 2. _Teil_, 2. _Abschnitt_, 2. _Kapitel_, which in terms of Pater's actual documentation comes between 2. _Teil_, 2. _Abschnitt_, 3. _Kapitel_ and 2. _Teil_, 3. _Abschnitt_, 2. _Kapitel_, the references contained in the footnotes to pp. 104, 105, respectively; an instance of Hegel's abstractionism which on the one hand recalls that of Winckelmann and Goethe, while on the other hand it foreshadows that of Pater in the Winckelmann and Michelangelo articles as well as the della Robbia essay is supplied by the same passage:

> γ. Da nun aber die Götter aus ihrer Bestimmtheit des Charakters zugleich in die Allgemeinheit zurückgebogen sind, so hat sich auch in ihrer Erscheinung zugleich das Selbstsein des Geistes als das Beruhen in sich und als die Sicherheit seiner in seinem

Äußeren darzustellen

αα. Darum sehen wir in der konkreten Individualität der Götter bei dem eigentlich klassischen Ideal ebensosehr diesen Adel und diese Hoheit des Geistes, in welcher sich, trotz seinem gänzlichen Hineingehen in die leibliche und sinnliche Gestalt, das Entferntsein von aller Bedürftigkeit des Endlichen kundgibt. Das reine Insichsein und die abstrakte Befreiung von jeder Art der Bestimmtheit würde zur Erhabenheit führen; indem das klassische Ideal aber zum Dasein, das nur das seinige, das Dasein des Geistes selber ist, heraustritt, so zeigt sich auch die Erhabenheit desselben in die Schönheit verschmolzen und in sie gleichsam unmittelbar übergegangen. Dies macht für die Göttergestalten den Ausdruck der Hoheit, der klassisch schönen Erhabenheit notwendig. Ein ewiger Ernst, eine unwandelbare Ruhe thront auf der Stirn der Götter und ist ausgegossen über ihre ganze Gestalt.

ββ. In ihrer Schönheit erscheinen sie deshalb über die eigene Leiblichkeit erhoben, und es entsteht dadurch ein Widerstreit zwischen ihrer seligen Hoheit, die ein geistiges Insichsein, und zwischen ihrer Schönheit, die äußerlich und leiblich ist. Der Geist erscheint ganz in seine Außengestalt versenkt und doch zugleich aus ihr heraus nur in sich versunken. Es ist wie das Wandeln eines unsterblichen Gottes unter sterblichen Menschen.

In dieser Beziehung bringen die griechischen Götter einen Eindruck hervor, bei aller Verschiedenheit ähnlich dem, welchen Goethes Büste von Rauch, als ich sie das erstemal sah, auf mich machte. Sie haben sie gleichfalls gesehen, diese hohe Stirn, diese gewaltige, herrschende Nase, das freie Auge, das runde Kinn, die gesprächigen, vielgebildeten Lippen, die geistreiche Stellung des Kopfes, auf die Seite und etwas in die Höhe den Blick weggewendet; und zugleich die ganze Fülle der sinnenden, freundlichen Menschlichkeit, dabei diese ausgearbeiteten Muskeln der Stirn, der Mienen, der Empfindungen, Leidenschaften und in aller Lebendigkeit die Ruhe, Stille, Hoheit im Alter; und nun daneben das Welke der Lippen, die in den zahnlosen Mund zurückfallen, das Schlaffe des Halses, der Wangen, wodurch der Turm der Nase noch

größer, die Mauer der Stirn noch höher heraustritt. —Die Gewalt dieser festen Gestalt, die vornehmlich auf das Unwandelbare reduziert ist, erscheint in ihrer losen, hangenden Umgebung wie der erhabene Kopf und die Gestalt der Orientalen in ihrem weiten Turban, aber schlotterndem Oberkleid und schleppenden Pantoffeln; es ist der feste, gewaltige, zeitlose Geist, der, in der Maske der umherhängenden Sterblichkeit, diese Hülle herabfallen zu lassen im Begriff steht und sie nur noch lose um sich frei herumschlendern läßt.
In der ähnlichen Weise erscheinen auch die Götter von seiten dieser hohen Freiheit und geistigen Ruhe über ihre Leiblichkeit erhoben, so daß sie ihre Gestalt, ihre Glieder bei aller Schönheit und Vollendung gleichsam als einen überflüssigen Anhang empfinden. Und dennoch ist die ganze Gestalt lebendig beseelt, identisch mit dem geistigen Sein, trennungslos, ohne jenes Auseinander des in sich Festen und der weicheren Teile, der Geist nicht dem Leib entgehend und entstiegen, sondern beide ein gediegenes Ganzes, aus welchem das Insichsein des Geistes nur in der wunderbaren Sicherheit seiner selbst still herausblickt (I, 466-467).

Pater in his explanation of the aspect of repose in the statues of the Greek gods attributes it to abstraction; in this he approximates the view of Hegel that the blessed tranquility of the Greek gods reflected in their Leiblichkeit, their 'bodiliness,' is essentially an abstraction from particulars. Pater also follows Hegel in his view that the form or configuration of these divinities reveals their destiny, their eventual downfall:

Indem nun aber jener angedeutete Widerstreit vorhanden ist, ohne jedoch als Unterschied und Trennung der inneren Geistigkeit und ihres Äußeren

herauszutreten, so ist das Negative, das darin liegt, ebendeswegen diesem ungetrennten Ganzen immanent und an ihm selber ausgedrückt. Dies ist innerhalb der geistigen Hoheit der Hauch und Duft der Trauer, den geistreiche Männer in den Götterbildern der Alten selbst bei der bis zur Lieblichkeit vollendeten Schönheit empfunden haben. Die Ruhe göttlicher Heiterkeit darf sich nicht zu Freude, Vergnügen, Zufriedenheit besondern, und der Frieden der Ewigkeit muß nicht zum Lächeln des Selbstgenügens und gemütlichen Behagens herunterkommen. Zufriedenheit ist das Gefühl der Übereinstimmung unserer einzelnen Subjektivität mit dem Zustande unseres bestimmten, uns gegebenen oder durch uns hervorgebrachten Zustandes. Napoleon z. B. hat nie grundlicher seine Zufriedenheit ausgedrückt, als wenn ihm etwas gelungen war, womit alle Welt sich unzufrieden bezeigte. Denn Zufriedenheit ist nur die Billigung meines eigenen Seins, Tuns und Treibens, und das Extrem derselben gibt sich in jener Philisterempfindung zu erkennen, zu der es jeder fertige Mensch bringen muß . Diese Empfindung und ihr Ausdruck ist aber nicht der Ausdruck der plastischen ewigen Götter. Die freie, vollendete Schönheit vermag sich nicht in der Zustimmung zu einem bestimmten endlichen Dasein zu genügen, sondern ihre Individualität, nach seiten des Geistes wie der Gestalt, obschon sie charakteristisch und in sich bestimmt ist, geht doch nur mit sich als zugleich freier Allgemeinheit und in sich ruhender Geistigkeit zusammen. --Diese Allgemeinheit ist es, welche man bei den griechischen Göttern auch als Kälte hat ansprechen wollen. Kalt jedoch sind sie nur fur die moderne Innigkeit im Endlichen; für sich selbst betrachtet, haben sie Wärme und Leben; der selige Frieden, der sich in ihrer Leiblichkeit abspiegelt, ist wesentlich ein Abstrahieren von Besonderem, ein Gleichgultigsein gegen Vergangliches, ein Aufgeben des Äußerlichen, ein nicht kummervolles und peinliches--doch ein Entsagen dem Irdischen und Fluchtigen, wie die geistige Heiterkeit tief über

> Tod, Grab, Verlust, Zeitlichkeit hinwegblickt und, eben weil sie tief ist, dies Negative in sich selber enthält. Je mehr nun aber an den Göttergestalten der Ernst und die geistige Freiheit heraustritt, desto mehr läßt sich ein Kontrast dieser Hoheit mit der Bestimmtheit und Körperlichkeit empfinden. Die seligen Götter trauern gleichsam über ihre Seligkeit oder Leiblichkeit; man liest in ihrer Gestaltung das Schicksal, das ihnen bevorsteht und dessen Entwicklung, als wirkliches Hervortreten jenes Widerspruchs der Hoheit und Besonderheit, der Geistigkeit und des sinnlichen Daseins, die klassische Kunst selber ihrem Untergange entgegenführt (I, 467-468).

Pater in both the language of the Winckelmann article and the idea of abstraction in classical art advanced in that article thus approximates Hegel in the passages adduced from the Ästhetik; we submit that Pater derived both immediately from Hegel. This submission is based not only on the phraseology of the Winckelmann article but also on the documentation of the 1867 version of that article. This evidence, we believe, is conclusive; Pater did in fact take over from Hegel both his phraseology and his notion of abstraction in classical art. That this procedure was by no means peculiar to Pater is shown by the fact that Vernon Lee (Violet Paget) in her article "Taine's Philosophy of Art," published in the British Quarterly Review of 1 July 1878, likewise made use of "abstract" and "abstraction" in connection with art and with reference to Hegel. Vernon Lee's Taine article is thus germane to our investigation.

Vernon Lee considered Taine's conception of abstraction in art to be but a development of Hegel's conception; Winckelmann, though his name occurs in the last paragraph of the article, p. 30, is not mentioned specifically in connection with the conception of abstraction in classical art that we find in either Hegel or Taine, despite the fact that that particular conception of abstraction dates ultimately from his conception of ideal beauty. Vernon Lee restricted herself to Hegel:

> M. Taine's definition of the aim of art is the utmost development of one of the many and rather contradictory suggestions of Hegel on the subject. 'The aim of art,' wrote the German metaphysician more than fifty years ago,' is to give to that which is already important, an adequate, sensible shape' (das in sich selbst Gehaltvolle zu adequäter, sinnlicher Gegenwart herauszustellen). This 'adequate, sensible shape,' can mean only a type; the embodying of a conception due to a process of mental abstraction, and the creation of such a type is declared by M. Taine to be the aim of art. 'The work of art,' he writes, 'aims at manifesting some essential or salient character, some important idea, more clearly and completely than do really existing objects. Art fulfils this mission by means of a whole consisting of parts whose relative proportions have been wilfully altered' (p. 2).

Vernon Lee held that Taine's definition of art was "merely Hegel's idea amplified and defined" but she also stated that Hegel himself would not have accepted this definition as adequate: "we feel persuaded that Hegel would have refused to accept such a definition of art, for beauty always remained

his ideal, although he explained beauty to mean a great variety of things, ugliness not excepted" (p. 2). The following passage recalls Pater in both the Winckelmann and the Giorgione articles:

> The artist must indeed possess some of the qualities of the man of science, of the copyist, and of the handicraftsman, but only to be all the more distinctly an artist. He cannot create the beautiful unless he can copy what he sees, abstract and combine certain qualities, and work and put together physical materials; but he does all this merely for the sake of producing the beautiful. And from a misconception of this fact partly arises M. Taine's proposition that the creation of types is the mission of art: he clearly perceives that every great artistic work is more or less a type, that every great artist attains to his ideal by means of the combination of the qualities which are common to many individuals of the same kind, and of the elimination of the qualities which distinguish each as a single individual; but he does not remark, as Reynolds did, that the creation of types is merely a means for obtaining beauty, and not an aim which can be substituted for it. M. Taine, therefore, entirely overlooks the fact that the creation of types, being a means and not an end, is artistically valuable according to the manner in which it is used; that if, as long as the general qualities are good, and the individual characteristics are bad, we decidedly gain by retaining the former and rejecting the latter, the case is just the reverse when what we keep is bad and what we eliminate is good. In short, that if a beautiful type is more beautiful than a beautiful individual, an ugly type, on the other hand, is infinitely more hideous than an ugly individual. M. Taine has, on the contrary, declared that the mere type is the highest aim of art, and consequently can refuse his sanction to no kind of art, however low, providing it display a type; and he has to praise as

> splendid artistic productions disgusting studies of morbid psychology like those of Balzac, and coarse scenes of low life like those of Teniers (pp. 3-4).

Vernon Lee's article on Taine is comprehensive in so far as it takes into account the _Philosophie de l'Art_ (1865), _Philosophie de l'Art en Italie_ (1866), _De l'Idéal dans l'Art_ (1867), _Philosophie de l'Art dans les Pays-Bas_ (1868), and _Philosophie de l'Art en Grèce_ (1869). Of these it seems very likely that Pater had consulted Taine's _Philosophie de l'Art en Italie_ (1866) because in the review of volume two of John Addington Symonds's _Renaissance in Italy_, published in _The Academy_ of 31 July 1875, Pater spoke of "all those highly-coloured pieces of humanity [which] are displayed before us, those stories which have made Italian history the fountain-head of tragic motives, all the hard, bright, fiery things, the colour of which M. Taine has in some degree caught in his writings on the philosophy of Italian art, and still more completely Stendhal, in his essay on Italian art and his _Chroniques Italiennes_" (p. 105). Professor d'Hangest in drawing attention to this allusion to Taine by Pater posits the _Philosophie de l'Art en Italie_ (1866) as an extremely probable source of his 1873 volume (I, 354, n. 15). In this suggestion of Professor d'Hangest we concur; we do, however, query his suggestion that the opening paragraph of the sixth chapter of _Plato and Platonism_, pp. 124-125, should be compared to certain passages

of Taine (II, 366, n. 6), especially when the second paragraph of the same chapter specifically mentions Hegel (p. 126). We have thought it better, therefore, to confine our remarks on Pater's abstractionism to Hegel rather than to Hegel and Taine; in Hegel, to the German philosopher's phraseology, to his use in certain passages of the _Ästhetik_ of _Abstraktion_ or _Abstrahieren_ (the infinitive used as a verbal noun), together with _Allgemeinheit_ and _Heiterkeit_. It was the marked similarity in phraseology between Pater's Winckelmann article and Vernon Lee's Taine article that led us in the first place to mention Taine at all. In so doing, however, we have been able to obviate a possible difficulty, namely, the objection to our way of proceeding in this investigation into Pater's abstractionism that Pater could just as well have got his notion of abstraction from Taine as from Hegel. Let us but put aside for the moment the well-documented indebtedness of both Pater and Vernon Lee to Hegel, we are then faced with the fact that Taine also was indebted no less than they to the German philosopher. Again, all the evidence of the Winckelmann article points unmistakably to Hegel as the immediate source not only of Pater's phraseology but also of his notion of abstraction in classical art. Pater's della Robbia article, it is true, points beyond Hegel to Goethe, and before him, to Winckelmann for the beginning of that usage whereby

Allgemeinheit is employed to denote the type produced in classical sculpture by means of "a system of abstraction"; and this consideration requires that we, too, go beyond Hegel to the abstractionism of Goethe and, even before Goethe, of Lessing and Winckelmann, even though Hegel's discussion of Rauch's bust of Goethe may be said to exemplify, as we have already seen in the passage cited above from the Ästhetik, the very qualities of classical sculpture which Pater conceived it was the proper end of the process of abstraction to produce.

Goethe in Über Laokoon, first published in the Propyläen, I/1 (1798), has provided us with a good example of what we understand here by the academic abstractionism of the eighteenth century.[20] In

[20] The expression "the academic abstractionism of the eighteenth century" may be objected to on the grounds that the term "abstractionism" is generally understood to denote twentieth-century non-objective art and hence its connotations are those of "non-representational" rather than "representational" art. Thus, the application of "abstractionism" to eighteenth-century "generalization" in art may be held not only to be misleading but also to introduce connotations which are alien to the eighteenth-century idea of "generalized" art. We admit that there is some justice in these strictures; "abstractionism" is certainly neither the most exact nor the most felicitous term in this context. A precedent, however, is supplied by Professor Wellek in the first volume of A History of Modern Criticism: 1750-1950 (London, 1955), p. 210: "In his taste in the plastic arts [writes Professor Wellek], Goethe leans to the academic abstractionism of the time. He considers it a reason for special praise that Laokoon, in the famous sculpture, is not represented as a priest

speaking of the sculptor's handling of the subject of Laokoon and his two sons, Goethe remarked that the sculptor had rendered his subject in its universal rather than in its particular form. Everything that may be counted accidental to the subject has been removed and only what is essential to the subject has been retained. We have, in short, in the father with his two sons, not a Trojan and a priest but simply a father and his two sons in mortal danger.

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or a Trojan but simply as a father who defends his two sons against the attack of two dangerous animals." Yet if Goethe himself does not use the German substantive Abstraktion in this place, he does at least use the German verb abstrahieren in the sense of das Wesentliche aus dem Zufälligen herausheben (cf. Wahrig, DAS GROSSE DEUTSCHE WÖRTERBUCH [1967], p. 286). Thus Goethe writes: Die Sorgfalt der Künstler, mannigfaltige Massen gegeneinander zu stellen, besonders die Extremitäten der Körper bei Gruppen gegeneinander in eine regelmäßige Lage zu bringen, war äußerst überlegt und glücklich, so daß eine jedes Kunstwerk, wenn man auch von dem Inhalt abstrahiert, wenn man in der Entfernung auch nur die allgemeinsten Umrisse sieht, noch immer dem Auge als ein Zierat erscheint (H A, XII, 58). We can find no evidence that Pater was familiar with this place in Goethe's writings on art, unless of course his allusion at the outset of the 1867 Winckelmann article to Goethe's "fragments of art criticism" (p. 80) may be construed to suggest that he was generally familiar with Goethe's writings on art. While this is by no means impossible, it is highly improbable. We have been content, therefore, to cite Goethe's Über Laokoon simply to illustrate what we understand by the academic abstractionism of the eighteenth century rather than to posit that itwas a source of Pater's abstractionism. We hold that it was Hegel, rather than Goethe or Lessing or Winckelmann, who was the immediate source of Pater's abstractionism as well as of the terminology in which it was formulated in 1867, 1871, and 1872. This conclusion we have arrived at on the basis of the internal evidence supplied by the 1867 article, corroborated by Pater's documentation in that place.

The Trojan nationality and the Trojan priesthood are both conceived as having been accidental to the subject in its universal aspect, hence these accidents were rectified by the sculptor. Goethe puts the matter thus:

> Die Bildhauerkunst wird mit Recht so hoch gehalten, weil sie die Darstellung auf ihren höchsten Gipfel bringen kann und muß, weil sie den Menschen von allem, was ihm nicht wesentlich ist, entblößt. So ist auch bei dieser Gruppe Laokoon ein bloßer Name; von seiner Priesterschaft, von seinem trojanisch-nationellen, von allem poetischen und mythologischen Beiwesen haben ihn die Künstler entkleidet; er ist nichts von allem, wozu ihn die Fabel macht: es ist ein Vater mit zwei Söhnen, in Gefahr, zwei gefährlichen Tieren unterzuliegen. So sind auch hier keine göttergesandte, sondern bloß natürliche Schlangen, mächtig genug, einige Menschen zu überwältigen, aber keineswegs, weder in ihrer Gestalt noch Handlung, außerordentliche, rächende, strafende Wesen. Ihrer Natur gemäß schleichen sie heran, umschlingen, schnüren zusammen, und die eine beißt erst gereizt. Sollte ich diese Gruppe, wenn wir keine weitere Deutung derselben bekannt wäre, erklären, so würde ich sie eine tragische Idylle nennen. Ein Vater schlief neben seinen beiden Söhnen, sie wurden von Schlangen umwunden und streben nun, erwachend, sich aus dem lebendigen Netze loszureißen (H A , XII, 59).

Now Winckelmann's characterization of the Laokoon Group in the <u>Gedanken über die Nachahmung der griechischen Werke in der Malerei und Bildhauerkunst</u> (1755) certainly proved seminal for Lessing's <u>Laokoon</u> (1766) and presumably also for Goethe's <u>Über Laokoon</u> (1798) already cited, although Goethe does not mention Winckelmann by name in the course of his essay. This is a second reason why it is necessary to press our inquiry further back than Hegel and Goethe to Lessing and ultimately Winckelmann. Pater speaks of Winckelmann's <u>Gedanken</u>

<u>über die Nachahmung der griechischen Werke in der Malerei und Bildhauerkunst</u> but once and that in the 1867 Winckelmann article (pp. 85-86) but in such a general way that we are hardly warranted in assuming that he had actually read the work himself. What little Pater does have to say about the 1755 treatise appears to be derivative, information gleaned from secondary sources, from Goethe and Otto Jahn. Pater does speak, however, of Lessing's <u>Laokoon</u> in much more definite phrases. The work is specifically mentioned in both the 1867 Winckelmann article (p. 83) and the 1877 Giorgione article (p. 526). We have every confidence in the fact that Pater not only recognized the importance of this work as a contribution to modern European criticism but also that he had read the work for himself. It was a book that would have commended itself to Pater, if only because it had influenced Goethe, for, as Lewes observed in his Life of Goethe: "Instruction in the theory of Art he [Goethe] gained from Oeser, from Winckelmann, and from <u>Laokoon</u>, the incomparable little book which Lessing at this period carelessly flung upon the world. Its effect upon Goethe can only be appreciated by those who early in life have met with this work, and risen from it with minds widened, strengthened, and inspired. It opened a pathway amid confusion, throwing light upon many of the obscurest problems which torment the artist. It awakened in Goethe an intense yearning to see the works of ancient masters; and these beckoned from Dresden. To Dresden he went." In a footnote to this passage (4th ed., 1890, p. 58), Lewes added: "Lord Macaulay told me that the reading of this little book formed an

epoch in his mental history; and that he learned more from it than he had ever learned elsewhere." This germinal effect of Lessing's work Pater seems to confirm. If in the 1867 Winckelmann article he wrote: "Lessing in the Laocoon, has finely theorized [the redaction reads "theorised finely"] on the relation of poetry to plastic art [the redaction reads "sculpture"]; and Hegel [the redaction gives "philosophy"] can give us theoretical reasons why not poetry but sculpture should be the most sincere and exact expression of the Greek ideal," in the 1877 Giorgione article he also wrote: "To such a philosophy of the variations of the beautiful, Lessing's analysis of the spheres of sculpture and poetry in the 'Laocoon' [italicized in the redaction] was a rememberable [the redaction reads "an important"] contribution." The differences between the original versions and the redactions of these passages are indeed slight but hardly without some significance for our understanding of the relative positions occupied by Lessing and Hegel in Pater's hierarchy of critics and philosophers. That Pater considered Lessing's Laokoon as both "a rememberable" and "an important contribution" to "a philosophy of the variations of the beautiful" is in itself noteworthy; in so far, then, as Lessing's Laokoon may throw some light on Pater's abstractionism, it demands our full attention because for Pater, as for Hegel, Goethe, Lessing, and Winckelmann, the question of abstraction is inextricably bound up with the question of beauty.

Where we speak of abstract art, they spoke of abstract or ideal beauty.

Lessing in the first section of the Laokoon reproduced from the Gedanken über die Nachahmung der griechischen Werke in der Malerei und Bildhauerkunst a passage of some length in which Winckelmann had characterized the masterpieces of classical painting and sculpture in terms of "noble simplicity" and "still greatness." This is how Lessing reproduces Winckelmann within the context of his own discussion:

> Das allgemeine vorzügliche Kennzeichen der griechischen Meisterstücke in der Malerei und Bildhauerkunst, setzet Herr Winkelmann in eine edele Einfalt und stille Große, sowohl in der Stellung als im Ausdrucke. „So wie die Tiefe des Meeres," sagt er, „allezeit ruhig bleibt, die Oberfläche mag auch noch so wüten, eben so zeiget der Ausdruck in den Figuren der Griechen bei allen Leidenschaften eine große und gesetzte Seele."
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> „Diese Seele schildert sich in dem Gesichte des Laokoons, und nicht in dem Gesichte allein, bei dem heftigsten Leiden. Der Schmerz, welcher sich in allen Muskeln und Sehnen des Körpers entdecket, und den man ganz allein, ohne das Gesicht und andere Teile zu betrachten, an dem schmerzlich eingezogenen Unterleibe beinahe selbst zu empfinden glaubt; dieser Schmerz, sage ich, äußert sich dennoch mit keiner Wut in dem Gesichte und in der ganzen Stellung. Er erhebt kein schreckliches Geschrei, wie Virgil von seinem Laokoon singet; die Öffnung des Mundes gestattet es nicht; es ist vielmehr ein ängstliches und beklemmtes Seufzen, wie es Sadolet beschreibet. Der Schmerz Körpers und die Große der Seele sind durch den ganzen Bau der Figur mit gleicher Stärke ausgeteilet, und gleichsam abgewogen. Laokoon leidet, aber er leidet wie des Sophokles Philoktet: sein Elend gehet uns bis an die Seele; aber wir wünschten, wie dieser große Mann das Elend ertragen zu können."
>
> „Der Ausdruck einer so großen Seele geht weit über die Bildung des schönen Natur. Der Künstler mußte die Stärke des Geistes in sich selbst fühlen, welche

er seinem Marmor einprägte. Griechenland hatte Künstler und Weltweise in einer Person, und mehr als einen Metrodor. Die Weisheit reichte der Kunst die Hand, und blies den Figuren derselben mehr als gemeine Seelen ein u. s. w." (Lessings Werke, IX/1, 6-7).

It is our contention that if Pater was not familiar with this particular passage of Winckelmann in its original context (Winckelmanns Werke, I, 30-31), he was at least familiar with it from the first section of Lessing's Laokoon. With Winckelmann's general treatment of the Laokoon Group in his Geschichte der Kunst des Altertums (Winckelmanns Werke, IV, 205-206; V, 224; VI, 18-21; VII, 123) we may assume that Pater was not unfamiliar. Here of course the point at issue is not Winckelmann's characterization of the Laokoon Group but his characterization of the masterpieces of Greek art in terms of "noble simplicity" and "still greatness." For this reason it is Winckelmann's characterization of the Laokoon Group in the Gedanken (Winckelmanns Werke, I, 30-31) with its formulation of the individuating characteristics of the best works of classical art that is especially relevant to our present investigation whereas his characterization of the Laokoon Group in the Geschichte (IV, 205-206) is not. Lessing paid careful attention to the first but evidently not to the second: he notices the appearance of Winckelmann's Geschichte (Lessings Werke, IX/1, 154; XXVI. Abschnitt), but his critical estimate of the characterization of the Laokoon Group remains based on Winckelmann's Gedanken (IX/1, 169-170; XXIX. Abschnitt). The importance, then, of the passage from the Gedanken should now be quite evident.

With Winckelmann's characterization of classical sculpture in terms of a noble simplicity and a calm greatness Pater would certainly have been acquainted also in any case from Otto Jahn's biographical essay where it is reproduced (cf. Jahn, p. 30). Pater's statement in the 1867 Winckelmann article that classical sculpture "deals almost exclusively with youth, where the moulding of the bodily organs is still as if suspended between growth and completion, indicated but not emphasized; when, the transition from curve to curve is so delicate and elusive that Winckelmann compares it to a quiet sea, which, although we understand it to be in motion, we nevertheless regard as an image of repose; where, therefore, the exact degree of development is so hard to apprehend" (pp. 101-102) suggests the _Geschichte_ rather than the _Gedanken_; we think, for example, of 5. _Buch_, 3. _Kapitel_, 3. _Abschnitt_ (Winckelmanns Werke, IV, 192-193) where Winckelmann treats of _Die Ruhe und Stille_ in Greek art. The analogy between sculpture and the sea, like the analogy between beauty and the purest water, was one which Winckelmann (and Pater after him) favoured especially; as Professor Hatfield has remarked in _Aesthetic Paganism in German Literature from Winckelmann to the Death of Goethe_ (Cambridge, Mass., 1964): "The image of the sea, calm in its depths 'no matter how the surface may rage,' recurs again and again in his writings. Rarely is a 'raging surface' mentioned in these images, but the sea is not presented as absolutely calm: Winckelmann's classicism aims at the control not the extirpation of emotion" (pp. 11-12). Professor Hatfield made this observation in connection with Winckelmann's description

of the Laokoon Group in the Gedanken. Pater in the Winckelmann article, however, seems already to be thinking of Andersstreben rather than Abstraktion when he does mention the Laokoon: "The Laocoon, with all that patient science through which it has triumphed over an almost unimaginable subject, marks a period in which sculpture has begun to aim at effects legitimate only in painting" (1867, p. 101). The connection between Winckelmann's description of the Laokoon Group and eighteenth-century abstractionism may seem momentarily lost until we recall that the image of the sea is inextricably bound up with that description and that Winckelmann's beloved "repose and stillness" are themselves the result of abstraction; this, at least, is the inference which may be drawn from the Geschichte, 5. Buch, 3. Kapitel, 4. Abschnitt (Winckelmanns Werke, IV, 193). And did not Pater in the 1867 Winckelmann article explain the secret of the repose of the divine forms in classical sculpture in terms of their "supreme and colourless abstraction" (p. 105)?

Similarly in connection with Winckelmann's abstractionism as we find it in Pater, there is no mention whatsoever of the German Hellenist's favourite symbol of crystal-clear water by means of which Wölfflin, after Justi, characterized a mind so markedly keyed to the classical ideal and the classical tradition (Renaissance und Barock, 2. Abschnitt, 10: 'Renaissance und Antike im Gegensatz zum Barock,' 6th ed., p. 73). In this favourite symbol of Winckelmann Professor Tatarkiewicz has detected an instance of the eighteenth-century conception of abstractionism. Professor Tatarkiewicz first put forward this thesis in an article "Moderne Kunst und Philosophie," first published in the Jahrbuch für Ästhetik und allgemeine Kunstwissenschaft,

VI (1961), p. 60; it was reiterated in an English version, "Abstract Art and Philosophy," printed in the British Journal of Aesthetics, II (1962), pp. 233-234, in which the brief allusion to Pater in the original German version (p. 59 and n. 23) is not found. The Polish Academician cited as being authoritative for Winckelmann's abstractionism the Geschichte, 4. Buch, 2. Kapitel, 23. Abschnitt (Winckelmanns Werke, IV, 61) adduced by Otto Jahn in 1866 (p. 55). Pater would have been familiar with this passage from both sources because, while he nowhere refers to it, the part of the Geschichte in which it occurs occupied him to the extent that he translated a passage from the German of Winckelmann (collation shows clearly that the translation was not Lodge's, despite the fact that his partial translation of the work [the title is quite misleading] was enumerated by Pater at the outset of the article) which the first footnote on p. 97 serves to document. Pater thus presents us with a paradox: the very vocal upholder of Winckelmann's concrete solutions to the problems of aesthetics has in fact bypassed the concrete formulation of eighteenth-century academic abstractionism in Winckelmann's Geschichte for the abstract formulation of Hegel's Ästhetik. The Hermaphrodite is the exception: Pater's handling of this motif of Greek sculpture as an instance of abstract or ideal form suggests Winckelmann rather than Hegel.[21]

[21] We can find no evidence that Pater was concerned with the intellectual antecedents of Winckelmann's abstractionism, with the ideas of Giovanni Pietro Bellori (1615-1696) or, even earlier, Leon Battista Alberti (1404-1472), though he may well have been familiar with Bellori's views from Dryden's Parallel of Poetry and Painting (1695). The neo-classical conception of ideal beauty is stated in the third of Sir Joshua's Discourses, but Dryden marks the coming to England of the neo-classical theories of Bellori.

There is a third reason why it is necessary for us to go beyond Hegel to Winckelmann. Pater's allusions in both "Diaphaneitè" (1864) and the original version only of the Winckelmann article (1867) to the popularity of the Hermaphrodite as a motif in classical sculpture points beyond Hegel, who treats of this aspect of classical art only very briefly in the _Ästhetik_, 3. _Teil_, 2. _Abschnitt_. 2. _Kapitel_ (II, 139), to Winckelmann who was very much preoccupied with this peculiar type of abstracted beauty. "_Die Kunst ging noch weiter_ [wrote Winckelmann in 4. _Buch_, 2. _Kapitel_, of the _Geschichte_], _und vereinigte die Schönheiten und Eigenschaften beiderlei Geschlechter in den Bildern der H e r m a p h r o d i t e n. Die vielen H e r m a p h r o d i t e n in verschiedener Größe und Stellung zeigen, daß die Künstler in der aus beiden Geschlechtern vermischeten Natur ein Bild hoher Schönheit auszudrücken gesuchet haben, und dieses Bild war i d e a l i s ch_" (IV, 76). The lengthy note which appears in the 1825 edition (n. 2, pp. 76-79) suggests that this interest was perhaps after all not so unusual at the time.None the less the interest which Pater shared with Winckelmann in the Hermaphrodite is part of that affinity of peculiar sensibility between the two men which Mario Praz has analyzed in terms of the motifs of European romantic literature. The Hermaphrodite as a literary motif had been used by Swinburne; as a motif in painting, by Simeon Solomon. It is as a motif in the plastic arts that Pater speaks of the Hermaphrodite; the allusion in "Poems by William Morris" to "people of a remote and unaccustomed beauty, somnambulistic, frail, androgynous" [22] is not typical.

[22] _Westminster Review_, XXXIV, new series (October 1868), p. 302.

Thus in the _Westminster Review_ version of the Winckelmann article Pater remarked: "In dealing with youth, Greek art betrays a tendency even to merge distinctions of sex. The Hermaphrodite was a favourite subject from early times. It was wrought out over and over again, with passionate care, from the mystic terminal Hermaphrodite of the British Museum, to the perfect blending of male and female beauty in the Hermaphrodite of the Louvre" (p. 102). While this passage was retained in the reprint of the 1867 article for _Studies in the History of the Renaissance_ (1873), it was suppressed during the redaction of the reprint. It is by no means certain that Pater's motive in suppressing the passage was the desire to remove something which might be considered perverse; the "face of doubtful sex, set in the shadow of its own hair, the cheek-line in high light against it, with something voluptuous and full in the eye-lids and the lips" of "Notes on Leonardo da Vinci" was not suppressed in the reprint of the 1869 article for _The Renaissance: Studies in Art and Poetry_ (cf. p. 115). Again, in the first part of "A Study of Dionysus: The Spiritual Form of Fire and Dew" (1876), reprinted in the posthumous volume _Greek Studies_ (1895), Pater drew attention to Simeon Solomon's _Bacchus_, an epicene

figure which appears to have impressed Pater very much: [23]

> The artists of the Italian Renaissance have treated Dionysus many times, and with great effect, but always in his joy, as an embodiment of that glory of nature to which the Renaissance was a return. But in an early engraving of Mocetto there is for once a Dionysus treated differently. The cold light of the background displays a barren hill, the bridge and towers of an Italian town, and quiet water. In the foreground, at the root of a vine, Dionysus is sitting, in a posture of statuesque weariness; the leaves of the vine are grandly drawn, and wreathing heavily round the head of the god, suggest the notion of his incorporation into it. The right hand, holding a great vessel languidly and indifferently, lets the stream of wine flow along the earth; while the left supports the forehead, shadowing heavily a face, comely, but full of an expression of painful brooding. One knows not how far one may really be from the mind of the old Italian engraver, in gathering from his design this impression of a melancholy and sorrowing Dionysus. But modern motives are clearer; and in a _Bacchus_ by a young Hebrew painter, in the exhibition of the Royal Academy of 1868, there was a complete and very fascinating realisation of such a motive; the god of the bitterness of wine, "of things too sweet"; the sea-water of the Lesbian grape become somewhat brackish in the cup. Touched by the sentiment of this subtler, melancholy Dionysus, we may ask whether anything similar in feeling is to be actually found in the range of Greek ideas;--had some antitype of this fascinating figure any place in Greek religion? Yes; in a

[23] See Bernard Falk, _Five Years Dead. A Postscript to "He Laughed in Fleet Street"_ (London, 1937), plate inserted between pp. 320-321. The _Bacchus_ is discussed in the same work on p. 323. Cf. p. 327.

> certain darker side of the double god of nature, obscured behind the brighter episodes of Thebes and Naxos, but never quite forgotten, something corresponding to this deeper, more refined idea, really existed--the conception of Dionysus Zagreus; an image, which has left, indeed, but little effect in Greek art and poetry, which criticism has to put patiently together, out of late, scattered hints in various writers; but which is yet discernible, clearly enough to show that it really visited certain Greek minds here and there; and discernible, not as a late afterthought, but as a tradition really primitive, and harmonious with the original motive of the idea of Dionysus. In its potential, though unrealised scope, it is perhaps the subtlest dream in Greek religious poetry, and is, at least, part of the complete physiognomy of Dionysus, as it actually reveals itself to the modern student, after a complete survey (pp. 41-43).

In the 1876 Dionysus article as in the 1868 Morris article, the Hermaphrodite is discussed as a motif of classical and modern poetry; the engraving of Mocetto and the painting of Solomon are both subordinated to literary considerations. Pater's interest in the Hermaphrodite as a motif in literature we unhesitatingly assign to Théophile Gautier's Madamoiselle de Maupin; his interest in the Hermaphrodite as a motif in classical sculpture, to Winckelmann's Geschichte der Kunst des Altertums. The description in the 1894 article "The Age of Athletic Prizemen," reprinted in Greek Studies, "The face of the young man, as you see him in the British Museum for instance, with fittingly inexpressive expression, (look into, look at the curves of, the blossomlike cavity of the

opened mouth) is beautiful, but not altogether virile" (p. 238) we place in the second category because it is an instance of Pater's predilection for a type of beauty approximating that of the Hermaphrodite; it is a predilection which Pater shares with Winckelmann. The Hermaphrodite itself we assume under the type of classical sculpture, that abstract, perhaps it is better to say, that abstracted, beauty which the Greek sculptors produced by means of "a system of abstraction." Indeed, the Hermaphrodite may be said to be an abstraction from an abstraction because it represents a mean between the conventional types of male and female beauty in classical sculpture. Pater, we hold, conceived of the Hermaphrodite in this way, though we do not suppose that the theoretical principles governing the production of the Hermaphrodite preponderated in his case any more than they did in the case of Winckelmann. Thus Pater in the 1864 essay "Diaphaneitè," printed in the posthumous volume _Miscellaneous Studies_ remarked upon the sexless beauty of the classical statues of the Greek gods: "The beauty of the Greek statues was a sexless beauty; the statues of the gods had the least traces of sex" (p. 253). This sentence was transposed to the 1867 Winckelmann article: "The beauty of the Greek statues was a sexless beauty; the statues of the gods had the least traces of sex" (p. 103). In both cases this sentence forms part of

the analogy which Pater draws between the character of the divine beauty of the Greek gods and the character of the diaphanous type on the one hand and between the character of the abstract beauty of these classical sculptures and the character of Winckelmann on the other hand. The immediate context in each case need not preoccupy us here because the statues of the Greek divinities no less than the statues of the Hermaphrodite in classical sculpture are particular types, and it is with the type itself in classical sculpture that we are primarily concerned here. To be exact, it is with Pater's understanding of the principles governing the production of the type in classical sculpture that we are preoccupied; it is upon the antecedents in the 1867 Winckelmann article of Pater's "system of abstraction" in classical sculpture in the 1871 Michelangelo article and the 1872 della Robbia essay that we wish to concentrate here.

Now in both the 1867 article and the 1872 essay Pater dealt at some length with the rationale of classical sculpture. His treatment of the subject was highly derivative: the criteria had been worked out by Winckelmann, Lessing, and Hegel to whom Pater was very much indebted. It is part of our task, then, to indicate the points at which Pater in the course of his exposition of the principles governing Greek sculpture incurred his particular debts to Lessing

and Hegel; this we do by collating Pater with Lessing and Hegel, thereby firmly placing Pater in that tradition of abstractionism which dates, in Germany at least, from Winckelmann and is subsequently transmitted through the writings on classical sculpture of Lessing, Goethe, and Hegel. The scope for conjecture here is fortunately severely limited because Pater in the 1867 version of the Winckelmann article provided adequate documentation for Hegel, while his specific debt to Lessing may be readily established without documentation. In reproducing from the 1867 article what we believe to be the _locus classicus_ for Pater's abstractionism we have not hesitated to cite Pater at length or to collate certain passages with Lessing's _Laokoon_ and Hegel's _Ästhetik_; we unhesitatingly and unashamedly adopt this procedure in dealing with Pater's abstractionism because we deem it to be the best way of handling the subject. Pater's documentation is here reproduced in square brackets at the points in the text of the 1867 version at which symbols occur for the footnotes there appended. The first passage that we shall now bring forward for consideration occurs in the 1867 version on pp. 97, 98, and 99. There Pater wrote as follows:

> It followed that the Greek ideal expressed itself pre-eminently in sculpture. All art has a sensuous element, colour, form, sound--in poetry a dexterous recalling of these together with the profound, joyful sensuousness of motion; each of these may be a medium for the ideal; it is partly accident which in any individual case makes the born artist poet or painter rather than sculptor. But as the mind itself

has had an historical development, one form of art, by the very limitations of its material, may be more adequate than another for the expression of any one phase of its experience. Different attitudes of the imagination have a native affinity with different types of sensuous form, so that they combine easily and entirely. The arts may thus be ranged in a series which corresponds to the series of developments in the human mind itself [Hegel: _AEsthetik_. 2 _Theil_. _Einleitung_.]. Architecture, which begins in a practical need, can only express by vague hint or symbol the spirit or mind of the artist. He closes his sadness over him, or wanders in the perplexed intricacies of things, or projects his purpose from him clean-cut and sincere, or bares himself to the sunlight. But these spiritualities, felt rather than seen, can but lurk about architectural form as volatile effects, to be gathered from it by reflection; their expression is not really sensuous at all. As human form is not the subject with which it deals: architecture is the mode in which the artistic effort centres when the thoughts of man concerning himself are still indistinct, when he is still little preoccupied with those harmonies, storms, victories of the unseen intellectual world, which wrought out into the bodily form, give it an interest and significance communicable to it alone. The art of Egypt, with its supreme architectural effects, is, according to Hegel's beautiful comparison, a Memnon waiting for the day, the day of the Greek spirit, the humanistic spirit, with its power of speech. Again, painting, music, poetry, with their endless powers of complexity, are the special arts of the romantic and modern ages. Into these, with the utmost attenuation of detail, may be translated every delicacy of thought and feeling incidental to a consciousness brooding with delight over itself. Through their gradations of shade, their exquisite intervals, they project in an external form that which is most inward in humour, passion, sentiment. Between architecture and the romantic arts of painting, music, and poetry, is sculpture, which, unlike architecture, deals immediately with man, while it contrasts with the romantic arts, because it is not self-analytical.

It deals more exclusively than any other art with the human form, itself one entire medium of spiritual expression, trembling, blushing, melting into dew with inward excitement. That spirituality which only lurks about architecture as a volatile effect, in sculpture takes up the whole given material, and penetrates it with an imaginative motive; and at first sight sculpture, with its solidity of form, seems more real and full than the faint abstract manner of poetry or painting. Still the fact is the reverse. Discourse and action show man as he is more directly than the springing of the muscles and the moulding of the flesh; and these poetry commands. Painting, by the flushing of colour in the face, and dilation of light in the eye, and music by its subtle range of tones, can refine most delicately upon a single moment of passion, unravelling its finest threads.

But why should sculpture thus limit itself to pure form? Because by this limitation it becomes a perfect medium of expression for one peculiar motive of the imaginative intellect. It therefore renounces all those attributes of its material which do not help that motive. It has had, indeed, from the beginning an unfixed claim to colour; but this colour has always been more or less conventional, with no melting or modulation of tones, never admitting more than a very limited realism. It was maintained chiefly as a religious tradition. In proportion as sculpture ceased to be merely decorative and subordinate to architecture it threw itself upon pure form. It renounces the power of expression by sinking or heightening tones. In it no member of the human form is more significant than the rest; the eye is wide, and without pupil; the lips and brow are not more precious than hands, and breasts, and feet. The very slightness of its material is part of its pride: it has no backgrounds, no sky or atmosphere, to suggest and interpret a train of feeling; a little of suggested motion, and much of pure light on its gleaming surfaces, with pure form--only these [The reader may see this subject treated with great delicacy in Mr. F.T. Palgrave's Essays on Art. Essay on Sculpture and Painting]. And it gains more than it loses by this limitation to its

> own distinguishing motives; it unveils man in the repose of his unchanging characteristics. Its white light, purged from the angry blood-like stains of action and passion, reveals not what is accidental in man, but the god, as opposed to man's restless movement. It records the first naive, unperplexed recognition of man by himself; and it is a proof of the high artistic capacity of the Greeks that they apprehended and remained true to these exquisite limitations, yet in spite of them gave to their creations a vital, mobile individuality [Hegel: _AEsthetik_, _Th._ 3, _Abschnitt_ 2].

In the second paragraph of the passage just cited Pater may be said to have first broached the idea of abstraction in sculpture. In so doing, however, he was largely reiterating what Hegel had already said in the _Ästhetik_. Collation of Pater and Hegel shows unmistakably that this is the case. Here we simply wish to call attention to the following passage of the _Ästhetik_, 3. _Teil_, 2. _Abschnitt_, 1. _Kapitel_, in connection with the latter part of the second paragraph of the passage just cited from the 1867 version of the Winckelmann article:

> Das Geistige in dieser vollendet selbständigen Beschlossenheit des in sich selber Substantiellen und Wahren, dies störungslose unpartikularisierte Sein des Geistes ist das, was wir die Göttlichkeit nennen, im Gegensatz gegen die Endlichkeit, als das Auseinandergehen in das zufällige Dasein, in die Unterscheidung und veränderliche Bewegung. Die Skulptur hat nach dieser Seite hin das Göttliche als solches darzustellen in seiner unendlichen Ruhe und Erhabenheit, zeitlos, bewegungslos, ohne schlechthin subjektive Persönlichkeit und Zwiespalt der Handlung oder Situation. Und geht sie nun auch zur näheren Bestimmtheit des Menschlichen in Gestalt und Charakter fort, so muß sie auch hierin nur das Unveränderliche und Bleibende, die Substanz dieser

> Bestimmtheit auffassen und nur diese, nicht aber das Zufällige und Vorübereilende sich zum Inhalt wählen; den zu dieser wechselnden, flüchtigen Besonderheit, welche durch die als Einzelheit sich fassende Subjektivität hereinkommt, geht die objektive Geistigkeit noch nicht fort. In einer Lebensbeschreibung z. B., welche die bunten Zufälle, Begebenheiten und Taten eines Individuums erzählt, wird dieser Verlauf mannigfaltiger Verwicklungen und Willkürlichkeiten gewöhnlich mit einer Charakterschilderung geschlossen, die dies breite Detail in allgemeine Eigenschaften, wie „gütig, gerecht, tapfer, von großem Verstande" usw., zusammenfaßt. Dergleichen Prädikate sind das Bleibende eines Individuums, während die anderweitigen Partikularitäten nur seiner akzidentellen Erscheinung angehören. Dieses Beständige nun ist es, was auch die Skulptur, als das alleinige Sein und Dasein der Individualität, darzustellen hat. Doch macht sie nicht etwa aus solchen allgemeinen Qualitäten bloße Allegorien, sondern bildet Individuen, die sie in ihrer objektiven Geistigkeit als in sich fertig und beschlossen, in selbständiger Ruhe, dem Verhalten gegen anderes entnommen, auffaßt und gestaltet. Bei jeder Individualität ist in der Skulptur immer das Substantielle die wesentliche Grundlage, und weder das subjektive Sichwissen und -empfinden noch die oberflächliche und veränderliche Besonderheit darf irgendwie die Oberhand gewinnen, sondern das Ewige in den Göttern und Menschen, der Willkür und zufälligen Selbstischkeit entrückt, muß seiner ungetrübten Klarheit nach zur Vorstellung gebracht werden (II, 97-98).

In such terms did Hegel define for Pater the rationale of classical sculpture which "unveils man in the repose of his unchanging characteristics. Its white light, purged from the angry blood-like stains of action and passion, reveals not what is accidental in man, but the god, as opposed to man's restless movement."

This consideration leads us naturally to Pater's handling of the German term Allgemeinheit 'generality,'

'universality.' This term Pater took up in both the 1867 Winckelmann article and the 1872 della Robbia essay, the earlier discussion being by far the longer of the two. Pater's understanding of the term <u>Allgemeinheit</u> as applied to classical sculpture points directly to Hegel, though the passage in question is by no means unadulterated Hegel; there is something here, too, of both Winckelmann and Lessing. The passage now to be adduced occurs on pp. 99-102 of the 1867 article:

> <u>Heiterkeit</u>, blitheness or repose, and <u>Allgemeinheit</u>, generality or breadth, are, then, the supreme characteristics of the Hellenic ideal. But that generality or breadth has nothing in common with the lax observation, the unlearned thought, the flaccid execution which have sometimes claimed superiority in art on the plea of being "broad" or "general." Hellenic breadth and generality come of a culture minute, severe, constantly renewed, rectifying and concentrating its impressions into certain pregnant types. The base of all artistic genius is the power of conceiving humanity in a new, striking, rejoicing way, of putting a happy world of its own creation in place of the meaner world of common days, of generating around itself an atmosphere with a novel power of refraction, selecting, transforming, recombining the images it transmits, according to the choice of the imaginative intellect. In exercising this power, painting and poetry have a choice of subject almost unlimited. The range of characters or persons open to them is as various as life itself; no character, however trivial, misshapen, or unlovely, can resist their magic. This is because those arts can accomplish their function in the choice and development of some special situation, which lifts or glorifies a character in itself not poetical. To realize this situation, to define in a chill and empty

atmosphere the focus where rays, in themselves pale and impotent, unite and begin to burn, the artist has to employ the most cunning detail, to complicate and refine upon thought and passion a thousandfold. The poems of Robert Browning supply brilliant examples of this. His poetry is pre-eminently the poetry of situations. The characters themselves are always of secondary importance; often they are characters in themselves of little interest; they seem to come to him by strange accidents from the ends of the world. His gift is shown by the way in which he accepts such a character and throws it into some situation, apprehends it in some delicate pause of life in which for a moment it becomes ideal. Take an instance from Dramatis Personae. In the poem entitled "Le Byron de nos Jours" we have a single moment of passion thrown into relief in this exquisite way. Those two jaded Parisians are not intrinsically interesting; they only begin to interest us when thrown into a choice situation. But to discriminate that moment, to make it appreciable by us, that we may "find it," what a cobweb of allusions, what double and treble reflections of the mind upon itself, what an artificial light is constructed and broken over the chosen situation--on how fine a needle's point that little world of passion is balanced! Yet, in spite of this intricacy, the poem has the clear ring of a central motive; we receive from it the impression of one imaginative tone, of a single creative act.

To produce such effects at all requires the resources of painting, with its power of indirect expression, of subordinate but significant detail, its atmosphere, its foregrounds and backgrounds. Mr. Hunt's 'Claudio and Isabella' is an instance. To produce them in a pre-eminent degree requires all the resources of poetry, language in its most purged form, its remote associations and suggestions, its double and treble lights. These appliances sculpture cannot command. In it, therefore, not the special situation, but the type, the general character of the subject to be delineated, is all-important.

> In poetry and painting, the situation predominates over the character; in sculpture, the character over the situation. Excluded by the limitations of its material from the development of exquisite situations, it has to choose from a select number of types intrinsically interesting--that is, independently of any special situation into which they may be thrown. Sculpture finds the secret of its power in presenting these types in their broad, central, incisive lines. This it effects not by accumulation of detail, but by abstracting from it. All that is accidental, that distracts the simple effect of the supreme types of humanity, all traces in them of the commonness of the world, it gradually purges away.

Up to this point in the passage under consideration Pater has succeeded in defining what he understands by abstraction in art. It may be seen that for him abstraction was the <u>sine qua non</u> for artistic production generally; it was involved in the writing of poetry no less than in painting and sculpting. Abstraction in this context is an intellectual process whereby the artist's material is intellectualized, rectified (in its chemical sense), and concentrated; there is as yet no hint here of abstractionism as we have come to understand it. It is significant that Pater here gives priority to <u>Dichtung</u>; painting and sculpture are secondary. The Browning passage may be compared in respect of abstraction to the opening paragraph of the 1868 Morris article:

> This poetry is neither a mere reproduction of Greek or mediaeval life or poetry, nor a disguised reflex of modern sentiment. The atmosphere on which its effect depends belongs to no actual form of life or simple form of poetry. Greek poetry, mediaeval or modern poetry, projects above the realities of its

> time a world in which the forms of things are transfigured. Of that world this new poetry takes possession, and sublimates beyond it another still fainter and more spectral, which is literally an artificial or "earthly paradise." It is a finer ideal, extracted from what in relation to any actual world is already an ideal. Like some strange second flowering after date, it renews on a more delicate type the poetry of a past age, but must not be confounded with it. The secret of the enjoyment of it is that inversion of home-sickness known to some, that incurable thirst for the sense of escape, which no actual form of life satisfies, no poetry even, if it be merely simple and spontaneous. It is this which in these poems defines the temperament or personality of the workman (pp. 300-301).

This,of course,is an extreme case of what Pater understood by abstraction in poetry; it is,perhaps,comparable to the Hermaphrodite as an extreme case of what Pater understood by abstraction in classical sculpture. In both cases,we are presented with an abstraction from an abstraction. Yet, it is in the perspective of Pater's conception of abstraction as inherent to all artistic production that we must place his remarks in the Winckelmann article on abstraction in sculpture and for this purpose extreme cases serve to throw into relief his basic idea of abstraction in art. We see this especially in the remaining part of the Winckelmann passage with which we have been preoccupied: Pater passes from the classical conception of the gods in Greek sculpture to the Laokoon and finally the Hermaphrodite as motifs of classical sculpture. Pater continues thus on p. 100 of the 1867 article:

> Works of art produced under this law [i.e., abstraction],

and only these, are really characterized by Hellenic generality or breadth. In every direction it is a law of limitation; it keeps passion always below that degree of intensity at which it is necessarily transitory, never winding up the features to one note of anger, or desire, or surprise. In the allegorical designs of the middle ages, we find isolated qualities portrayed as by so many masks; its religious art has familiarized us with faces fixed obdurately into blank types of religious sentiment; and men and women, in the hurry of life, often wear the sharp impress of one absorbing motive, from which it is said death sets their features free. All such instances may be ranged under the "grotesque;" and the Hellenic ideal has nothing in common with the "grotesque." It lets passion play lightly over the surface of the individual form, which loses by it nothing of its central impassivity, its depth and repose. To all but the highest culture, the reserved faces of the gods will ever have something of insipidity. Again, in the best Greek sculpture, the archaic immobility has been thawed, its forms are in motion; but it is a motion ever kept in reserve, which is very seldom committed to any definite action. Endless as are the attitudes of Greek sculpture, exquisite as is the invention of the Greeks in this direction, the actions or situations it permits are simple and few. There is no Greek Madonna; the goddesses are always childless. The actions selected are those which would be without significance, except in a divine person, binding on a sandal or preparing for the bath. When a more complex and significant action is permitted, it is most often represented as just finished, so that eager expectancy is excluded, as Apollo just after the slaughter of the Python, or Venus with the apple of Paris already in her hand. The Laocoon, with all that patient science through which it has triumphed over an almost unmanageable subject, marks a period in which sculpture has begun to aim at effects legitimate only in painting. The hair, so rich a source of expression in painting and, as we have lately seen, in poetry, because relatively to the eye or to the lips it is mere drapery, is withdrawn from attention; its texture, as well as its colour, is lost, its arrangement faintly and severely indicated, with no enmeshed or broken light. The eyes are wide and directionless, not fixing anything

with their gaze, nor riveting the brain to any special external object; the brows without hair. It deals almost exclusively with youth, where the moulding of the bodily organs is still as if suspended between growth and completion, indicated but not emphasized; when the transition from curve to curve is so delicate and elusive that Winckelmann compares it to a quiet sea, which, although we understand it to be in motion, we nevertheless regard as an image of repose; where, therefore, the exact degree of development is so hard to apprehend. If one had to choose a single product of Hellenic art, to save in the wreck of all the rest, one would choose from the "beautiful multitude" of the Panathenaic frieze that line of youths on horses, with their level glances, their proud patient lips, their chastened reins, their whole bodies in exquisite service. This colourless, unclassified purity of life, with its blending and interpenetration of intellectual, spiritual, and physical elements, still folded together, pregnant with the possibilities of a whole world closed within it, is the highest expression of that indifference which is beyond all that is relative or partial. Everywhere there is the effect of an awaking, of a child's sleep just disturbed. All these effects are united in a single instance--the Adorante of the Museum of Berlin, a youth who has gained the wrestler's prize, with hands lifted and open in praise for the victory. Naive, unperplexed, it is the image of man as he springs first from the sleep of nature; his white light taking no colour from any one-sided experience, characterless so far as character involves subjection to the accidental influences of life. In dealing with youth, Greek art betrays a tendency even to merge distinctions of sex. The Hermaphrodite was a favourite subject from early times. It was wrought out over and over again, with passionate care, from the mystic terminal Hermaphrodite of the British Museum, to the perfect blending of male and female beauty in the Hermaphrodite of the Louvre [Hegel: AEsth., Th. 3, Absch. 2, Kap. 1]. (pp. 100-102)

Pater's abstractionism here might be shown to conform to that of Goethe in Über Laokoon (H A, XII, 59); but it

is quite evident from the documentation of the 1867 version as well as from internal evidence that it was Hegel and Lessing rather than Goethe that Pater had primarily in mind. Here we shall confine ourselves to collating the passage of Pater just cited with two passages from Hegel's _Ästhetik_, 3. _Teil_, 2. _Abschnitt_, 1. _Kapitel_, and the passage cited from Lessing's _Laokoon_, 1. _Abschnitt_. This we propose to do in a summary fashion. The first passage of Hegel is the following:

> Für die Skulptur nun müßte, dem Gehalte nach, den sie darzustellen berufen ist, nur dazu fortgeschritten werden, zu untersuchen, wie die ebenso substantielle als in dieser Allgemeinheit zugleich individuelle Geistigkeit sich ins Leibliche einlebt und darin Dasein und Gestalt gewinnt. Durch den der echten Skulptur adäquaten Inhalt nämlich ist einerseits, wie im Geistigen so auch im Körperlichen, die zufällige _Partikularität der äußeren Erscheinung_ ausgeschlossen. Nur das Bleibende, Allgemeine, Gesetzmäßige in der menschlichen Körperform hat das Skulpturwerk darzustellen, wenn auch die Forderung eintritt, dies Allgemeine so zu individualisieren, daß uns nicht nur das abstrakte Gesetz, sondern eine aufs engste damit verschmolzene individuelle Form vor Augen gestellt werde.
>
> Nach der anderen Seite hin muß sich, wie wir sahen, die Skulptur von der zufälligen _Subjektivität_ und vom Ausdruck derselben in ihrem fürsichseienden Inneren freihalten. Dadurch ist es dem Kunstler verboten, in betreff auf das Physiognomische zum _Mienenhaften_ fortgehen zu wollen. Denn Miene ist nichts anderes als eben das Sichtbarwerden der subjektiven inneren Eigentümlichkeit und deren Partikularität des Empfindens, Vorstellens und Wollens. In seinen Mienen drückt der Mensch nur aus, wie er sich in sich, gerade als dieses zufällige Subjekt, empfindet, sei es, daß er es sich nur mit sich zu tun macht oder sich in Beziehung gegen äußere Gegenstande oder andere Subjekte in sich reflektiert. So sieht man es z. B. auf der Straße,

in kleinen Städten besonders, vielen, ja den meisten Menschen in ihren Gebärden und Mienen an, daß sie nur mit sich selbst ihrem Putz und Kleidung, überhaupt mit ihrer subjektiven Besonderheit oder aber mit den anderen Vorbeigehenden und deren etwaigen Seltsamkeiten und Auffälligkeiten beschäftigt sind. Die Mienen des Hochmutes, Neides, der Selbstzufriedenheit, Geringschätzung usf. gehören z. B. hieher. Weiter kann dann aber den Mienen auch die Empfindung und Vergleichung des substantiellen Seins mit meiner Besonderheit zugrunde liegen. Demut, Trotz, Drohung, Furcht sind Mienen dieser Art. Bei solcher Vergleichung tritt schon eine Trennung des Subjekts als solchen und des Allgemeinen ein, und die Reflexion auf das Substantielle biegt sich immer zur Einkehr ins Subjekt zurück, so daß dieses und nicht die Substanz der überwiegende Inhalt bleibt. Weder aber jene Trennung noch dies Überwiegen des Subjektiven darf die dem Prinzip der Skulptur in strenger Weise treu bleibende Gestalt ausdrücken.

Außer den eigentlichen Mienen endlich enthält der physiognomische Ausdruck noch vieles, was bloß flüchtig über das Gesicht und die Stellung des Menschen hinspielt: ein augenblickliches Lächeln, ein plötzlich aufloderndes Augenrollen des Zorns, ein schnell verwischter Zug des Spottes usf. Besonders haben Mund und Auge in dieser Rücksicht die meiste Beweglichkeit und Fähigkeit, jede Nuance der Gemütsstimmung in sich aufzunehmen und erscheinen zu machen. Solche Veränderlichkeit, welche einen gemäßen Gegenstand der Malerei abgibt, hat die Skulpturgestalt von sich abzulehnen; sie muß sich im Gegenteil auf die bleibenden Züge des geistigen Ausdrucks hinrichten und diese sowohl im Antlitz als auch in Stellung und Körperformen festhalten und wiedergeben.

So besteht denn also die Aufgabe der Skulpturgestalt im wesentlichen darin, daß sie das substantiell Geistige in seiner noch nicht in sich subjektiv partikularisierten Individualität in eine menschliche Gestalt einsenkt und mit derselben in einen solchen Einklang setzt, an welchem nun auch nur das Allgemeine und Bleibende der dem Geistigen entsprechenden Körperformen herausgehoben,

> das Zufällige aber und Wechselnde abgestreift erscheint, obschon es auch der Gestalt an Individualität nicht fehlen darf.
>
> Ein so vollständiges Zusammenstimmen des Inneren und Äußeren, wie die Skulptur es zu erreichen hat führt uns nun zu dem dritten Punkt herüber, der noch zu berühren ist (II, 101-103).

Hegel's third point is the second passage which we wish to adduce in this place; it will be observed that the second paragraph of the passage was translated by Pater in the 1867 article, p. 102:

> Das nächste, was aus den bisherigen Betrachtungen folgt, ist, daß die Skulptur mehr wie jede andere Kunst eigentümlich an das Ideale gewiesen bleibt. Einerseits nämlich ist sie aus dem Symbolischen sowohl in Rücksicht auf die Klarheit ihres sich selbst als Geist erfassenden Inhalts heraus als auch in betreff auf die vollkommene Gemäßheit ihrer Darstellung mit diesem Gehalte; andererseits geht sie in die Subjektivität des Innerlichen, für welche die Außengestalt gleichgültig wird, noch nicht über. Sie bildet deswegen den Mittelpunkt der klassischen Kunst. Zwar zeigte sich auch das Symbolische und Romantische der Architektur und Malerei für die klassische Idealität geeignet; doch ist das Ideal in seiner eigentlichen Sphäre nicht das höchste Gesetz dieser Kunstformen und Künste, insofern sie nicht, wie die Skulptur, die anundfürsichseiende Individualität, den ganz objektiven Charakter, die schöne freie Notwendigkeit zu ihrem Gegenstande haben. Die Gestalt der Skulptur aber muß durchweg aus dem reinen Geiste der von aller Zufälligkeit der geistigen Subjektivität und Körperform abstrahierenden denkenden Einbildungskraft hervorgehen, ohne subjektive Vorliebe für Eigentümlichkeiten, ohne die Empfindung, Lust, Mannigfaltigkeit der Regungen und Witzigkeit der Einfälle. Denn was dem Künstler zu Gebote steht, ist, wie wir sahen, für seine höchsten Gebilde nur die Körperlichkeit des Geistigen in den selbst nur allgemeinen Formen des Baues und Organismus der menschlichen Gestalt; und seine Erfindung beschränkt sich teils auf die ebenso allgemeine Übereinstimmung des Inneren und Äußeren, teils auf die nur leise an

das Substantielle sich anschmiegende und sich damit verwebende Individualität der Erscheinung. Die Skulptur muß gestalten, wie die Götter in ihrem eigenen Bereich nach ewigen Ideen schaffen, in der sonstigen Wirklichkeit aber das übrige der Freiheit und Selbstischkeit des Geschöpfes überlassen. Die Theologen machen gleichfalls einen Unterschied zwischen dem, was Gott tue, und dem, was der Mensch in seinem Wahn und seiner Willkür vollbringt; das plastische Ideal jedoch ist erhaben über solche Fragen, indem es in der Mitte dieser Seligkeit und freien Notwendigkeit steht, für welche weder die Abstraktion des Allgemeinen noch die Willkür des Besonderen Gültigkeit und Bedeutung behält.

Dieser Sinn für die vollendete Plastik des Göttlichen und Menschlichen war vornehmlich in Griechenland heimisch. In seinen Dichtern und Rednern, Geschichtsschreibern und Philosophen ist Griechenland noch nicht in seinem Mittelpunkte gefaßt, wenn man nicht als Schlüssel zum Verständnis die Einsicht in die Ideale der Skulptur mitbringt und von diesem Standpunkt der Plastik aus sowohl die Gestalten der epischen und dramatischen Helden als auch der wirklichen Staatsmänner und Philosophen betrachtet. Denn auch die handelnden Charaktere, wie die dichtenden und denkenden, haben in Griechenlands schönen Tagen diesen plastischen, allgemeinen und doch individuellen, nach außen wie nach innen gleichen Charakter. Sie sind groß und frei, selbständig auf dem Boden ihrer in sich selber substantiellen Besonderheit erwachsen, sich aus sich erzeugend und zu dem bildend, was sie waren und sein wollten. Besonders die Zeit des Perikles war reich an solchen Charakteren: Perikles selber, Phidias, Plato und vornehmlich Sophokles, so auch Thukydides, Xenophon, Sokrates--jeder in seiner Art, ohne daß der eine durch die Art des anderen geringer wurde; sondern all schlechthin sind diese hohen Künstlernaturen ideale Künstler ihrer selbst, Individuen aus einem Guß, Kunstwerke, die wie unsterbliche todlose Götterbilder dastehen, an welchen nichts Zeitliches und Todeswürdiges ist. Von gleicher Plastik sind die körperlichen Kunstwerke der Sieger in der olympischen Spielen, ja selbst die Erscheinung der Phryne, die als das schönste Weib vor ganz Griechen-

land nackt aus dem Wasser emporstieg (II, 103-104).

All this, as we have already observed in connection with the phraseology of the Winckelmann and Michelangelo articles and the della Robbia essay, Pater confirms by reiteration on the one hand and by concretization on the other. It would be a mistake, however, to suppose that Pater's abstractionism was but the aftermath of his youthful Hegelianism, something confined to the early articles and essays. "The Age of Athletic Prizemen," originally published in the Contemporary Review of February 1894 and subsequently reprinted in the posthumous volume Greek Studies (1895), shows quite clearly that this was not the case. Pater's abstractionism, first broached in the 1867 article, reiterated in the 1871 article and the 1872 essay, reappeared finally in the 1894 article. It is hardly fortuitous, then, that we should find in this very late paper two allusions to Winckelmann, a mention of the Adorante of the Berlin Museum, and even a verbal tie with the earlier writings in the phrase "the type, the rectified essence," a phrase which like the mention of the Adorante, recalls specifically the Winckelmann article.[24] The following passage is characteristic of the 1894 article no less than of the 1867 article:

> The face of the young man, as you see him in the British Museum for instance, with fittingly inexpressive

[24] Cf. Gerhart Rodenwaldt, Die Kunst der Antike (Hellas und Rom), 2nd ed. (Berlin, 1927), Plates on pp. 412-413. In the course of the article Pater mentions twice that the Adorante in Berlin was Winckelmann's favourite. Cf. Greek Studies, pp. 295, 297.

expression, (look into, look at the curves of, the blossomlike cavity of the opened mouth) is beautiful, but not altogether virile. The eyes, the facial lines which they gather into one, seem ready to follow the coming motion of the discus as those of an onlooker might be; but that head does not really belong to the discobolus. To be assured of this you have but to compare with that version in the British Museum the most authentic of all derivations from the original, preserved till lately at the Palazzo Massimi in Rome. Here, the vigorous head also, with the face, smooth enough, but spare, and tightly drawn over muscle and bone, is sympathetic with, yields itself to, the concentration, in the most literal sense, of all beside;--is itself, in very truth, the steady centre of the discus, which begins to spin; as the source of will, the source of the motion with which the discus is already on the wing,--that, and the entire form. The Discobolus of the Massimi Palace presents, moreover, in the hair, for instance, those survivals of primitive manner which would mark legitimately Myron's actual pre-Pheidiac standpoint; as they are congruous also with a certain archaic, a more than merely athletic, spareness of form generally--delightful touches of unreality in this realist of a great time, and of a sort of conventionalism that has an attraction in itself.

Was it a portrait? That one can so much as ask the question is a proof how far the master, in spite of his lingering archaism, is come already from the antique marbles of Ægina. Was it the portrait of one much-admired youth, or rather the type, the rectified essence, of many such, at the most pregnant, the essential, moment, of the exercise of their natural powers, of what they really were? Have we here, in short, the sculptor Myron's reasoned memory of many a quoit-player, of a long flight of quoit-players; as, were he here, he might have given us the cricketer, the passing generation of cricketers, sub specie eternitatis, under the eternal form of art?

(Greek Studies, pp. 288-290)

We find here, then, a reiteration of the abstractionism of 1866-1872. This time, however, only Winckelmann's name recurs; there is no mention of Lessing or Goethe.

III

It is not to Pater's studies of Winckelmann, Michelangelo, and della Robbia, however, with their formulation of the eighteenth-century academic abstractionism for sculpture that the main interest in Pater's idea of abstract art has been directed. With the notable exception of Professor Solomon Fishman, it is to certain passages of the Giorgione article with its supposed incipient abstractionism in the current sense of non-objective art that interest has been directed. Professor Fishman, however, in _The Interpretation of Art: Essays on the Art Criticism of John Ruskin, Walter Pater, Clive Bell, Roger Fry and Herbert Read_ (Berkeley/Los Angeles, 1963) has observed that for Pater the idealized human figure of classical sculpture is the norm of beauty as it was for the eighteenth century. Professor Fishman has also detected in Pater's discussion of Renaissance sculpture in the della Robbia essay a hint of the future abstractionism: "The discussion of Renaissance sculpture in 'Luca della Robbia' points, in a most tentative manner, toward the notion of abstract art" (p.61). With Professor Fishman's estimate of the della Robbia essay we fully concur; the second part of this dissertation fully bears out his contention.

So far as we have been able to determine, Sir Herbert Read was the first to notice the germinal abstractionism, in the sense of non-representationalism, of the Giorgione article. In "Pablo Picasso" (1934)

he transposed the passage of the 1877 article in which Pater observed that art was always trying to get free of "the mere intelligence, to become a matter of pure perception" to meet the exigencies of twentieth-century art. The passage in question occurs in The Renaissance, p. 138. Sir Herbert appears to have entertained certain doubts about whether Pater himself would have approved the application that was being made of his theory. Of its applicability to modern art, however, Read never seems to have doubted. Theories have a way of getting out of the hands of their originators, and this is probably not such a bad thing in the long run. So argues Sir Herbert in the essay which has been reprinted in The Philosophy of Modern Art (London, 1964), p. 156. While certainly not wishing to prevent Pater's being accommodated to the exigencies of either eighteenth-century or nineteenth-century art, we do think that it devolves upon the student of Pater to question the view of both Read and Clark that Pater had actually entertained the possibility that art might become "a matter of pure perception" in the way in which it has subsequently been understood to have become "a matter of pure perception" in the twentieth century. That this is the view of both Read and Clark is accepted; that this was the view of Pater is queried. The updating of a writer or a theorist is always a hazardous business; the Hegelian or Marxist eschews it, but we will not invoke the dialectics of either for purposes

of refuting this misrepresentation of Pater's standpoint. There are internal considerations which might be adduced to show that the constructions now placed on certain passages of the Giorgione article are quite unwarranted.

Pater's culture, like that of the public for which he wrote, was primarily literary: "His idea of expressiveness [remarks Professor Fishman] is primarily a product of his literary experience, his idea of form that of his visual sensibility." It is Professor Fishman's contention that Pater failed to achieve a synthesis of the two (p. 72). Fishman sees Pater as having only partially solved the problem of how to disengage line and colour from the literary subject-matter of painting. Pater's partial solution is held by him to be imperfect (p. 76). This is to assume, of course, that Pater's preoccupation with form was the outcome of his own visual sensibility rather than the result of his literary experience. The possibility that it was wholly the latter receives some support from Thomas Wright, not the most reliable of authorities, it is true, but an important source for Pater's _obiter dicta_ none the less, who records that when asked what was the most remarkable passage in George Eliot, Pater replied that it was the words which she put into the mouth of Piero di Cosimo in _Romola_ (Ch. VIII): "The only passionate life is in form and colour" (II, 180). "Form and colour" is a formula which might be applied to much of Pater's writing on art: Botticelli, we recall, was for Pater

"before all things a poetical painter, blending the charm of story and sentiment, the medium of the art of poetry, with the charm of line and colour, the medium of abstract painting." And Pater adds, significantly we believe: "So he [Botticelli] becomes the illustrator of Dante." We demur, therefore, to Professor Fishman's view. Pater's preoccupation with "form and colour" is essentially a literary or abstract preoccupation; there is little in it of Berenson's "seeing" as opposed to "knowing." We readily concede, however, that in later life the author of Studies in the History of the Renaissance came to appreciate works of art more than verbal descriptions of them; certainly Wright's descriptions of Pater's initial reactions to various photographs shown to him by Richard Jackson suggest the freshness of a long awaited discovery, but by then Pater's visual habits were fixed even more firmly than were Winckelmann's by the time he reached Dresden or Rome. It is to be regretted, however, that the MSS. of "The School of Phidias" and "The Age of Sappho" have not survived if only for purposes of collation with earlier published papers of Pater because Wright was of the opinion that Pater was collecting photographs for the purpose of writing these papers. As it is, then, we must assume that Pater's culture remained to the end principally literary. Any consideration of Berenson's early writings on art and the methodology of art studies would bear out this view.

Today we tend to underestimate too readily how great was the obstacle which the literary preoccupations of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries put in the way of those who sought to appreciate in themselves the formal qualities of the plastic arts, especially sculpture and painting. It is only too easy to misjudge the purport of Pater's writing on art when we are accustomed to his continual insistence upon the concreteness of Winckelmann's procedures no less than upon the concreteness of the eighteenth-century German's formulations:

> This key to the understanding of the Greek spirit [Pater wrote in the 1867 Winckelmann article], Winckelmann possessed in his own nature--itself like a relic of classical antiquity laid open by accident to our alien modern atmosphere. To the criticism of that consummate Greek modelling he brought not only his culture, but his temperament. We have seen how definite was the leading motive of his culture; how, like some central root-fibre, it maintained the well-rounded unity of his life through a thousand distractions. Interests not his, nor meant for him--political, moral, religious--never disturbed him. In morals, as in criticism, he followed the clue of an unerring instinct. Penetrating into the antique world by his passion, his temperament, he enunciates no formal principles, always hard and one-sided; it remained for Hegel to formulate what in Winckelmann is everywhere individualized and concrete. Minute and anxious as his culture was, he never became one-sidedly self-analytical. Occupied ever with himself, perfecting himself and cultivating his genius, he was not content, as so often happens with such natures, that the atmosphere between him and other minds should be thick and clouded; he was ever jealously refining his meaning into a form,

> express, clear, objective. This temperament he nutured and invigorated by friendships which kept him ever in direct contact with the spirit of youth. The beauty of the Greek statues was a sexless beauty; the statues of the gods had the least traces of sex. Here, there is a moral sexlessness, a kind of impotence, an ineffectual wholeness of nature, yet with a divine beauty and significance of its own (p. 103)

But Pater has momentarily forgotten the opening paragraph to "Von der Gratie in Werken der Kunst" (I, 217) in which, as Professor Henry Hatfield has remarked in Winckelmann and his German Critics 1755-1781 (New York, 1943), p. 10, Winckelmann, contrary to his usual style, began with an abstract definition. Further, Pater has probably been misled by Otto Jahn's insistence (p. 41) that Winckelmann possessed knowledge which does not come of books. It is salutary to recall here Hatfield's remarks on this aspect of Winckelmann in Aesthetic Paganism in German Literature. From Winckelmann to the Death of Goethe (Cambridge, Mass., 1964), p. 9. There Professor Hatfield observed that Winckelmann's undoubted success in reinterpreting classical sculpture was very likely the outcome of his intimate knowledge of classical philology. Pater, of course, recognized that Winckelmann was well acquainted with classical literature, but never seems to have made the inference that Hatfield has in fact drawn. Winckelmann, says Hatfield, "read in the Laokoon and other renowned statues" the ideals which he had first derived from his favourite Greek authors. As we know from Pater (p. 80) these were Herodotus and Homer. Goethe in his Winckelmann essay has stated that Winckelmann succeeded in making the transition from philology to plastic art. This notice we find in the opening paragraphs of the section

headed "Gewahrwerden griechischer Kunst" in these words:

> „Von allem Literarischen, ja selbst von dem Höchsten, was sich mit Wort und Sprache beschäftigt, von Poesie und Rhetorik, zu den bildenden Künsten überzugehen, ist schwer, ja fast unmöglich: denn es liegt eine ungeheure Kluft dazwischen, über welche uns nur ein besonders geeignetes Naturell hinüberhebt. Um zu beurteilen, inwiefern dieses Winckelmann gelungen, liegen der Dokumente nunmehr genugsam vor uns.
>
> Durch die Freude des Genusses ward er zuerst zu den Kunstschätzen hingezogen; allein zu Benutzung, zu Beurteilung derselben bedurfte er noch der Künstler als Mittelspersonen, deren mehr oder weniger gültige Meinungen er aufzufassen, zu redigieren und aufzustellen wußte, woraus denn seine noch in Dresden herausgegebene Schrift Über die Nachahmung der griechischen Werke in der Malerei und Bildhauerkunst, nebst zwei Anhängen, entstanden ist (H A , XII, 106).

Goethe's expression "Gewahrwerden griechischer Kunst" was one which impressed itself readily upon Pater's mind; he reiterated it in his own paper on Winckelmann, for Pater seems to have singularly appreciated that transition which Winckelmann had made successfully, of which Goethe had spoken so highly. It is as if Pater had found himself on the edge ofachasm and yet had been unable to bridge it. In the 1867 article Pater wrote:

> Soon after we find Winckelmann in the library at Nöthenitz. Thence he made many visits to the collection of antiques at Dresden. He became acquainted with many artists, above all with Oeser, Goethe's future friend and master, who,

uniting a high culture with a practical command of art, was fitted to minister to Winckelmann's culture. And now there opened for him a new way of communion with the Greek life. Hitherto he had handled the words only of Greek poetry, stirred indeed and roused by them, yet divining beyond the words an unexpressed pulsation of sensuous life. Suddenly he is in contact with that life still fervent in the relics of plastic art. Filled as our culture is with the classical spirit, we can hardly imagine how deeply the human mind was moved when at the Renaissance, in the midst of a frozen world, the buried fire of ancient art rose up from under the soil. Winckelmann here reproduces for us the earlier Renaissance sentiment. On a sudden the imagination feels itself free. How facile and direct, it seems to say, is this life of the senses and the understanding when once we apprehend it! That is the more liberal life we have been seeking so long, so near to us all the while. How mistaken and roundabout have been our efforts to reach it by mystic passion and religious reverie; how they have deflowered the flesh; how little they have emancipated us! Hermione melts from her stony posture, and the lost proportions of life right themselves. There is an instance of Winckelmann's tendency to escape from abstract theory to intuition, to the exercise of sight and touch. Lessing in the <u>Laocoon</u>, has finely theorized on the relation of poetry to plastic art; and Hegel can give us theoretical reasons why not poetry but sculpture should be the most sincere and exact expression of the Greek ideal. By a happy, unperplexed dexterity, Winckelmann solves the question in the concrete. It is what Goethe calls his Gewahrwerden der Griechischen Kunst, his <u>finding</u> of Greek art [<u>sic</u>]. (pp. 83-84)

It would be a rash researcher indeed who was prepared to admit this passage as adequate documentation for Pater's own "exercize of sight and touch." Without wishing to indulge in a gross act of reductionism, we

yet submit that Pater's interest in Winckelmann's concreteness is second-hand; it is an interest derived from his reading of Goethe's 1805 <u>Winckelmann und sein Jahrhundert</u>. Certainly Goethe's phrase <u>Gewahrwerden griechischer Kunst</u> was one which impressed itself on Pater's mind when he was writing his own Winckelmann article.

Such considerations may do little to remove the obstacles in Pater's path upon which Professor Fishman has so incisively remarked; they do, however, go a long way towards discrediting the type of construction which Read and Clark have endeavoured to place upon the Giorgione article. When we stop to think that Berenson, living in the twentieth century, found modern art in which both subject-matter and representation are separated from aesthetic experience quite incomprehensible, we may well stop to ponder whether Pater had he lived into say the second decade of the twentieth century would have found modern abstract art any less incomprehensible. The matter is well put by Professor Fishman:

> Isolated on the whole from contemporary art, Pater perceived in traditional painting precisely that which the revolutionary art of the following century has made into its leading principle--that subject matter is invariably subordinate to the artists' [<u>sic</u>] other interests. Pater never actually confronted the crucial questions involving the aesthetic status of representation in the visual arts and the relationship of representation and form, but he is extremely perceptive concerning Giorgione's musicalization of painting, arrived at by a subtle matching of decorative and expressive means. Giorgione achieves equilibrium by choice of a subject which is, so to speak, recessive; it is subservient to the aesthetic appeal of the work. By inference, an excessively assertive subject matter

> would be in opposition to its formal constitution. Pater, however, stops short of Bell's unqualified assertion that not only literary subject matter, but indeed representation itself, is irrelevant to aesthetic experience (pp. 76-77).

In Professor Fishman's conclusion that Pater stopped short of actually postulating the abandonment of both subject matter and representation we doubt that Sir Kenneth Clark would concur. Other critics who have treated this aspect of Pater's aesthetics have tended for the most part to see in the Giorgione article a foreshadow of subsequent art. Thus Richard Aldington in the delightful Introduction which he wrote to Walter Pater: Selected Works (London, 1948) took up the question of Pater's incipient abstractionism in the modern sense of the rationale of non-objective art and treated it with well deserved levity. Unlike Read, Aldington confined his remarks for the most part to the second paragraph of the Giorgione article in which Pater had said that the primary aspect of any great painting is "an accidental play of sunlight and shadow for a few moments on the wall or floor: is itself, in truth, a space of such fallen light, caught as the colours are in an Eastern carpet, but refined upon, and dealt with more subtly and exquisitely than by nature itself." This statement occurs on p. 133 of The Renaissance. It was Aldington's contention that we have already had quite enough of this sort of painting. He also remarked that Pater's formulation "All art constantly aspires towards the condition of music" (p. 135) fore-

shadowed certain forms of twentieth-century abstract art. This interpretation of the famous Paterian formulation was subsequently upheld, *mutatis mutandis*, by both Sir Maurice Bowra in his article on Pater originally published in the *Sewanee Review*(September 1949)and reprinted in *Inspiration and Poetry* (London, 1955), pp. 207-208, and by Academician Władysław Tatarkiewicz in the paper already adduced, "Moderne Kunst und Philosophie," *Jahrbuch für Ästhetik und allgemeine Kunstwissenschaft*, VI (1961), p. 59. In the very year in which the paper of the Polish Academician appeared, Sir Kenneth Clark in the Introduction to the Fontana Library Edition of *The Renaissance* came out strongly in favour of the view that *The Renaissance* "first put forward the theoretical justifications of abstract art" (p. 23). Concerned mainly with the second paragraph of the Giorgione article but without Aldington's levity, Sir Kenneth submitted that Pater had gone beyond even the "ideated sensations" of Bernhard Berenson. Like Read, however, Clark felt the need to qualify his position on this matter: "We ask if Pater, with his keen sense of tradition, could really have invented such a revolutionary doctrine; and the answer is, I think, that he did" (p. 22). This qualification should be sufficient reason to cause us to ponder the feasibility of such a view.

With this view of Sir Kenneth Clark we cannot concur. The reasons are threefold and will be found in Berenson's *Aesthetics and History* (1948):

First, it is incorrect to say, as Sir Kenneth Clark has done, that Pater in the Giorgione article had already passed beyond Berenson's "ideated sensations." This is very much an inversion of the true order of development which begins with Ruskin, is continued by Pater, and culminates in Berenson. The stages in this development might be measured in terms of the particular way in which Pater superseded Ruskin, or Berenson, Pater and Ruskin. Between Berenson and Pater on the one hand and Ruskin on the other the development is considerably more marked than between Pater and Ruskin. There is a number of reasons for this marked difference. Leaving aside Berenson's continental influences, especially Burckhardt, Wölfflin, and Morelli, it may be said generally that Berenson, unlike either Pater or Ruskin, attempted to base his views whenever possible solely on the works of art themselves rather than, as had been the case previously, on biographical, moralistic, or philological considerations. Berenson, it is true to say, substituted morphological for philological and biographical considerations. In so doing he put into practice the principles which Pater had originally put forward in the 1873 Preface to Studies in the History of the Renaissance but with a difference; the literary interest is kept well in the background. Thus, in Aesthetics and History, for example, Berenson stated that the "à peu près of the 'near Giorgione' or the 'near Botticelli'" which we get in the writings on art of both Pater and Ruskin is good enough for men of letters but will never do

for the professional and scientific critic or student of art who demands and indeed of whom is demanded exactness and precision (p. 214).

But difference implies similarity and we must not allow the marked differences between Berenson and Pater to blind us to the significant affinity of thought and sensibility which exists between the two men. Berenson's relation to Pater is in some ways reminiscent of Pater's characterization of the relation which obtained between Hegel and Winckelmann: "Penetrating into the antique world by his passion, his temperament, he enunciates no formal principles, always hard and one-sided; it remained for Hegel to formulate what in Winckelmann is everywhere individualized and concrete." Of course Hegel made pretensions to concreteness and Berenson in _Lorenzo Lotto_ succeeded in being so concrete that many readers missed the point that the whole purpose of the exercise was to illustrate a new methodology; Berenson appears to have been quite perturbed that his pretensions to concreteness had been missed because the very concreteness of the "essay" precluded many from taking away with them the formulations which underlay it; with Hegel, however, the disparity between the claims to concreteness and their realization is sufficiently marked to provoke censure. Berenson's "ideated sensations" are, however, Sir Kenneth notwithstanding, a formulation of what Pater had put forward concretely in the original version of the Giorgione article, that is to say, the version published in the _Fortnightly Review_ of October 1877. Collation of

Berenson and Pater shows this. Here we shall focus attention on two passages in particular of Berenson. The first occurs in the essay "The Central Italian Painters" in the Phaidon edition of Berenson's The Italian Painters of the Renaissance (London, 1959); the passage in question recapitulates a discussion in the earlier essay "The Florentine Painters" which is too long to be quoted at length here:

> I have attempted elsewhere in this volume to explain what is this viaticum, this quality so essential to the figure arts that, for want of it, when scarcely born, they dwindle away; and to Book II, Florentine Painters (pp. 40-43), wherein the question is discussed, I must refer the reader. Here I shall limit myself to saying that, by means of their more subtle Decorative elements, the arts must be life-enhancing--not by their material charm alone, still less by their attractiveness as Illustrations. This particular life-communicating quality is in the figure arts to be attained by the rendering of form and movement, I prefer to the word 'form' to use the expression 'tactile values,' for form in the figure arts gives us pleasure because it has extracted and presented to us the corporeal and structural significance of objects more quickly and more completely than we--unless, indeed, we also be great artists, or see as they see--could have grasped them by ourselves. This intimate realization of an object comes to us only when we unconsciously translate our retinal impressions of it into ideated sensations of touch, pressure, and grasp--hence the phrase 'tactile values'. Correct drawing, fine modelling, subtle light and shade, are not final goods. In themselves they have no value whatever, and it does not in the least explain the excellence of a picture to say it is well modelled, well lighted, and well drawn. We esteem these qualities because with them the artist succeeds in conveying tactile values and movement, but to suppose that we love pictures merely because they are well painted, is as if we said that we like a dinner because it is well

cooked, whereas, in fact, we like it only because it tastes good. To speak of the drawing, the modelling, the chiaroscuro, as to speak of cookery in the instance of a dinner, is the business of the persons who paint and cook; but we whose privilege it is to enjoy what has been cooked or painted for us--we, I say, must either talk of it in terms of enjoyment and the psychology thereof, or--talk nonsense!

Tactile values and movement, then, are the essential qualities in the figure arts, and no figure-painting is real--has a value of its own apart from the story it has to tell, the ideal it has to present--unless it conveys ideated sensations of touch and movement. If I may be pardoned a very childish parable, it is like someone who comes to us with a message. He tells us something we are very eager to know. No matter how we have been rejoiced by his news, no matter how attractive he seems, if he is merely a messenger, it is only of his message that we think. But let him be a man of character and a gentleman, let him be sympathetic, and his message will have been but the happy accident that has initiated a lifelong friendship. And so with a picture; long after, years after we have exhausted its message, if it have tactile values and movement, we are more in love with it than ever, because these qualities, like the attractions in a friend, have the power of directly enhancing life.
(pp. 94-95)

These words were first published in 1897. The second passage occurs in Aesthetics and History, first published in 1948, from which we now cite at length:

I must now explain what I mean by the phrase which I have just used, 'realm of ideated sensations.'

To begin with, ideated sensations are not the sensations psychophysically experienced at the moment of perceiving and contemplating the representation of an object or event (whether the object is of the world without or of the mind within). Ideated sensations, in our field, are the images of sensations that the representations offer when they are works of art and not mere artifacts.

Thus in the presence of a painting we may have all sorts of actual bodily sensations, as of good or bad

air, heat or cold, nervous visceral and muscular comfort or discomfort, that have nothing to do with the painting, although they may dispose or indispose us towards enjoying it. We also receive retinal sensations of contrasted spots of light and dark with or without colour, and these, as I shall try to explain later, may be used as instruments in the orchestra of art.

Ideated sensations, on the contrary, are those that exist only in imagination, and are produced by the capacity of the object to make us realize its entity and live its life. In the visual arts this capacity is manifested primarily and fundamentally through varieties of imagined sensations of contact and their multiple implications; and through the equally imagined sensations of barometric, thermometric, visceral, and above all muscular alterations, supposed to be taking place in the objects represented. Needless to say, these chiefly concern animate, and most of all human, figures, although they also may include the entire vegetable kingdom, plants of every kind, flowers, shrubs, and trees, and inanimate shapes as well, such as streams and other liquid expanses, rocks, cliffs, and all landscape features which we animate to such a degree that we instinctively speak of rivers running, trees waving, bending, drooping, or reaching out of their branches, and of mountains rising. We go so far as to use a phrase like the 'lie of the land', thereby taking advantage of the utmost elasticity of the idea.

Ordinarily we have no occasion for admitting these imagined sensations, images of sensations, 'ideated sensations' as I prefer to call them, within the threshold of consciousness. They are perhaps of no immediate use, and besides they are not insistent, and still less clamorous. People who are not self-conscious, not awake to what goes on under their skin, will seldom become aware of their shy presence, and even those who do study their own clockwork will encounter them only when properly introduced. That task is left to the artist: a task which he accomplishes not (as he himself is apt to think, and as the culture snobs who listen to him think they think) by the technical proceedings of the draughtsman, the painter, the sculptor, the engraver, or whatever the particular craft may be. The artist does not use his craft, and exploit his particular technique to reproduce an object

as through a reflecting mirror. If he did he would only <u>duplicate</u> the outer aspect of the object, without getting nearer to creating a work of art. No, he imagines all the sensations felt or supposed to be felt by an object which the limitations and advantages of his craft permit him to organize and harmonize into an equivalent of what he feels the object to be intrinsically, and what at the same time it says and means to us. The man of letters will do it with words, the sculptor with his plastic materials, the painter or engraver or etcher with light, and shade, and pigments. Leaving the man of letters out of the inquiry, as being not a visual but a verbal craftsman, we may say that what the artist has to do is to oblige the spectator to feel as if he were the object represented, and to imagine its functional processes to the extent required by the representation. To what extent must be decided by the artist, if indeed one may speak of deciding in the case of an activity probably so unconscious and certainly so undeliberate as is that of the artist behind the ever conscious and highly purposeful craftsman. I am speaking of real artists and real craftsmen, and not of their imitators, and I am thinking of the relation between the artist and craftsman in the case of a Leonardo, the most self-conscious artist excepting perhaps Delacroix, who has left a record of himself. And yet how little Leonardo seems to have thought seriously about art and how earnestly about matters of technique!

The artist has only one way of making the spectator put himself into the place of the object he wishes to represent. It is by drawing attention to the muscular changes, the tensions and relaxations that accompany every action no matter how slight. He succeeds in fact by accentuating these alterations where it is easiest to feel them and where they are most marked, namely at the joints and other articulations. He will also somewhat exaggerate the manifestations of anatomical structure so as to make us more aware than we usually are of the stresses and counter-stresses, of the resistances and yieldings, and above all of the relaxations. For it is obvious that any failure of tissue and muscle to reach repose, after exercising their functions, would be life-diminishing,

> and to that extent anti-artistic. Even when the object represented is inanimate, like a mountain range or a building, it has to be dealt with as if organic and alive (pp. 73-76).

Berenson then proceeds to make a number of provisoes to what he has just said by way of definition and exposition of the expression "ideated sensations." These provisoes in so far as they affect both primitive non-European art and modern European non-objective art are to be noted especially:

> These manifestations must never be exaggerated, as is done by mannerists to facilitate their task. Even the best of them, says the Florentine Pontormo, attempt to interest us in acrobatic displays rather than in the normal actions of normal people; while the cubists of yesterday went so far as to reduce shapes to their geometrical hypothenuses, human beings to skeletons (as the Florentines Rosso and Salviati had already done in the sixteenth century), and any combination of figures to a dance of death.
>
> On the other hand, vital primitive arts tend to concentrate on communicating energy. This is manifested in representations of man and beast in violent action that adorn capitals of Romanesque buildings; for most Romanesque sculpture and many products of barbarian art the world over, the so-called 'animal style' in particular, are exasperated expressions of vitality and animal energy.
>
> Not all ideated sensations are artistic, but only those that are life-enhancing. Thus representations that communicate feelings of dejection or nausea would be the less artistic, the more skillfully and successfully they were done. On the other hand, they must not incite to action, not immediately at least, although in the long run they cannot help influencing conduct. They must remain intransitive, inspiring no definable desire, stimulating no appetite, rousing no lust for sensual enjoyment. We must not glide or slip, or still less leap from ideated to real sensations, from art to actuality. The verses that stir to battle like a trumpet or a drum are not poetry. The visual representations that produce excitement in the normal

> adult may be exquisite artifacts but they are not works of art. For the ideated sensations that constitute the work of art belong to a realm apart, a realm beyond actuality where the ideal is the only reality, a realm of contemplation, of 'emotion recollected in tranquillity,' a realm where nothing can happen except to the soul of the spectator, and nothing that is not tempering and refining.
>
> Possibly such a realm of ideated sensations is the one where our first parents lived, before the itch for action took hold of them and threw them out of the Paradise where Deity meant them to exist in everlasting ecstasy. Conceivably it may anticipate a heaven in which (with the sensations and experiences of earthly life employed as late antique architects used marbles and hard and precious stones) we shall ideate the ideal Athens, the City of Man (pp. 76-78).

In such terms did Berenson define for his readers what he understood by "ideated sensations." It will be seen at once that this conception approximates the idea of abstraction in art which we have been at some pains to point out in Pater. So far our discussion has been confined to classical and Italian Renaissance sculpture; it is now time, however, to illustrate Pater's abstractionism in painting. Pater's conception of abstractionism in Renaissance painting is best illustrated by his 1877 Giorgione article, especially the original version which is to be cited here. It will be seen that Pater in the passage to be adduced already had foreshadowed Berenson's "ideated sensations." It is doubtful whether Berenson himself was familiar with the original version of the article as it first appeared in the _Fortnightly Review_, vol. XXII new series (October 1877), pp. 526-538; the redaction dropped the third paragraph of the passage to be cited and also slightly modified the last sentence of the first paragraph of the same passage. Still, whether considered in the

original version or in the redaction, "The School of Giorgione" clearly foreshadows Berenson's discussion of "ideated sensations" in both _The Italian Painters of the Renaissance_ and _Aesthetics and History_. It will be recalled that the four essays collected in _The Italian Painters of the Renaissance_ were originally published between 1894 and 1907; _Aesthetics and History_ was originally published in 1948. In 1877 Pater wrote:

> And now, finally, let me illustrate some of the characteristics of this _school of Giorgione_, as we may say, which for most of us, notwithstanding all that negative criticism of the "new Vasari" [Crowe and Cavalcaselle], will still identify itself with those famous pictures at Florence, Dresden, and Paris; and in which there defines itself for us a certain artistic ideal, the conception of a peculiar aim and procedure in art, which we may understand as the _Giorgionesque_, wherever we find it--in Venetian work generally, or in work of our own time, and of which the _Concert_, that undoubted work of Giorgione in the _Pitti Palace_, is the typical instance, and a pledge which authenticates the connexion of the school with the master.
>
> I have spoken of a certain interpenetration of the matter or subject of a work of art with the form of it, a condition realised absolutely only in music, as the condition to which every form of art is perpetually aspiring. In the art of painting, the attainment of this ideal condition, this perfect interpenetration of the subject with colour and design, depends, of course, in great measure, on dexterous choice of that subject, or phase of subject; and such choice is one of the secrets of Giorgione's school. It is the school of _genre_, and employs itself mainly with "painted idylls," _but_, in the production of this pictorial poetry, exercises a wonderful _finesse_ in the selecting of such matter as lends itself most readily and entirely to pictorial form, to entire expression by drawing and colour, to what I may call again the musical treatment. For although

its productions are painted poems they belong to a sort of poetry which tells itself without an articulated story. The master is pre-eminent for the resolution, the ease, the quickness with which he reproduces instantaneous motion--the lacing on of armour, with the head bent back so stately; the fainting lady; the embrace rapid as the kiss caught with death itself from dying lips; the momentary conjunction of mirrors and polished armour and still water, by which all the sides of a solid image are presented together, solving that casuistical question whether painting can present an object as completely as sculpture. The sudden act, the rapid transition of thought, the passing expression--this he arrests with that vivacity which Vasari has attributed to him, the _fuoco Giorgionesco_, as he terms it. Now it is part of the ideality of the highest sort of poetry that it presents us with a kind of profoundly significant and animated instants, a mere gesture, a look, a smile, perhaps, a brief and entirely concrete moment, into which, however, all the abstract motives, all the interest and efficacy of a long history, have condensed themselves, and which seem to absorb past and future in an intense consciousness of the present. Such ideal instants the school of Giorgione selects with admirable _finesse_ from that feverish, tumultuously coloured existence of the old citizens of Venice; phases of subject in themselves already volatilised almost to the vanishing point, exquisite pauses in time, in which, arrested thus, we seem to be spectators of all the fulness of things for ever, and which are like an extract, or elixir, or consummate fifth part of life.

Who, in some such perfect moment, when the harmony of things inward and outward beat itself out so truly, and with a sense of receptivity, as if in that deep accord, with entire inaction on our part, some messenger from the real soul of things must be on his way to one, has not felt the desire to perpetuate all that, just so, to suspend it in every particular circumstance, with the portrait of just that one spray of leaves lifted just so high against the sky, above the well for ever?--a desire how bewildering

> with the question whether there be indeed any place wherein these desirable elements take permanent refuge. Well! in the school of Giorgione you drink water, perfume, music, lie in a receptive humour thus for ever, and the satisfying moment is assured (pp. 535-536).

The redaction with which the reader will be more familiar from The Renaissance, pp. 148-150, offers a number of variant readings to the 1877 version and these variants may be noted briefly in passing. Of course the most noticeable difference between the two versions is the suppression in the redaction of the passage cited of the third paragraph. There are also obvious differences: ~~like~~, for example, the substitution in the second paragraph of "tact" for *finesse* and *il* for "the." Collation brings to light other changes: in the second sentence in the redaction of the second paragraph "the elements" has been inserted between "with" and "colour" in "this perfect interpenetration of the subject with colour and design"; in the third sentence of the same paragraph the words "to what I may call again the musical treatment" have been suppressed and "complete" substituted for "entire"; in the fifth sentence "are exhibited at once" replaces "are presented together"; in the seventh sentence "dramatic" is added to qualify "poetry," "wholly" is substituted for "entirely," "some" for "a," and "abstract" qualifying "motives" is omitted, while "all the interest and efficacy of a long history" becomes "all the interests and effects of a long history." The eighth sentence has undergone a sufficient number of

changes to require reproduction here: "Such ideal instants the school of Giorgione selects, with its admirable tact, from that feverish, tumultuously coloured world of the old citizens of Venice--exquisite pauses in time, in which, arrested thus, we seem to be spectators of all the fulness of existence, and which are like some consummate extract or quintessence of life." This replaces the earlier "Such ideal instants the school of Giorgione selects with admirable _finesse_ from that feverish, tumultuously coloured existence of the old citizens of Venice; phases of subject in themselves already volatilised almost to the vanishing point, exquisite pauses in time, in which, arrested thus, we seem to be spectators of all the fulness of things for ever, and which are like an extract, or elixer, or consummate fifth part of life." These changes leave Pater's meaning unchanged, though we hold that the earlier version is the clearer of the two. Whether or not Berenson read the 1877 version, there is no doubt whatsoever that its peculiar standpoint impressed itself upon the mind of the young American; in _Aesthetics and History_ Berenson was to express his inability to acknowledge fully his debt to Pater for both the Botticelli and the Giorgione articles (p. 115). We submit that Berenson's standpoint on "ideated sensations" is substantially Pater's standpoint on the Giorgionesque; we can find no substantial reason for holding, as Sir Kenneth Clark did, that either in the passage just cited from the Giorgione article or in the second paragraph of the same paper Pater had in effect passed well beyond Berenson's "ideated sensations."

On the contrary, we believe that Berenson's "ideated sensations" had already been put forward by Pater in the very concrete terms of the Giorgione article so that Berenson is in this respect in relation to Pater what Hegel was in relation to Winckelmann, namely, a formulator. This is the first reason, then, why we hesitate to accept Sir Kenneth Clark's interpretation of the Giorgione article.

The second reason follows from the first: ~~Berenson~~ in stating his singular debt to both the Botticelli and the Giorgione articles of Pater, Berenson nowhere so much as hinted at the possibility that either paper contained an incipient, let alone a full-blown, abstractionism in the sense of a theoretical defense of non-objective art. Berenson's silence must be reckoned with; to posit that he was maintaining a conspiracy of silence is to say the least unflattering to not only Berenson but also anyone with the temerity to put forward such a view. It is to be regretted that Berenson himself did not live to see Sir Kenneth's Introduction to the Fontana Library edition of _The Renaissance_. Berenson of course died in 1959 and so we can only conjecture what his reaction might have been. Probably he would have simply found the viewpoint expressed by Sir Kenneth more revealing about the editor than the author edited. Again, he might have greeted Clark's interpretation as simply "incomprehensible," like his interest in the work of Henry Moore. The entries in the diaries collected in _Sunset and Twilight_ provide some idea of what Berenson might have said on the

subject; compare, for example, the statements to be found on pp. 81, 359, 490, or 526 of Sunset and Twilight. Professor Mario Praz, with his intimate knowledge of Pater's writings on art (he translated The Renaissance into Italian at the same time undertaking textual criticism of Winckelmann article) as well as of Berenson's (he translated Aesthetics and History into Italian) has assured us in a letter dated 4 March 1966 that Pater would have been "horrified" by what passes for "abstract art" today; he does allow, however, that the possibility of non-objective art may have "dawned" upon Pater. Praz who was a guest at I Tatti (cf. Berenson's letter to Miss Beryl de Zoete, I Tatti, 9 April 1947; The Selected Letters of Bernard Berenson, p. 247) could hardly have been unaware of Berenson's own antipathy towards abstract art; it may be significant of Praz's own position that he deemed Berenson "a real art critic" (cf. The Romantic Agony, 2nd edition, p. 471 f.). It is at least to the credit of T.S. Eliot, who considered Berenson a professional aesthete, that he nowhere blamed Pater for having sown the seeds of modern art.

Actually Pater was very much better equipped than Berenson who seems to have lacked Pater's philosophical propensities to understand twentieth-century non-objective art or at least to rationalize it. With his intimate knowledge of Hegel's Ästhetik, Pater might well have invoked the Einleitung where Hegel remarks: "Der Gedabke und die Reflexion hat die schöne Kunst überflügelt" or, again, in the same place: "Die schönen

Tage der griechischen Kunst wie die goldene Zeit des späteren Mittelalters sind vorüber" (I, 21, 22). Indeed, for Pater this appears to have been a foregone conclusion if we are to judge from the passages already adduced from the 1867 Winckelmann article and the 1869 da Vinci article. Not every one will agree with Croce when he describes the idea of the death of art as the aesthetic error of Hegel; this judgment occurs in _What is living and what is dead in the philosophy of Hegel_, translated from the Italian of the 3rd edition by Douglas Ainslie (London, 1915), p. 129. What René Wellek has said of Hegel may with some justice be said of Pater: "Hegel thus presents a curious double face, a Janus head: one side looking back into the past, yearning for the Greek ideal of serenity and ideal art, the complete fusion of form and content that he saw in Greek sculpture, in Homer and Sophocles; and the other side turned toward the future, looking with unconcern and even satisfaction at the death of art as a past stage of humanity. It is fitting to think of him and his work as a summit, an end--indeed a dead end" (_A History of Modern Criticism_, II, 333-334).

In one respect Pater's position is identical with that of Hegel, the inimicalness of over-intellectualization to art; but Pater does not appear, however, to have anticipated the death of art, at least, not in the immediate future. He was none the less acutely conscious of the very great difficulties which lay in the path of the modern artist of whom he considered Goethe in Germany and Victor Hugo in France to be the

prototypes. With both Hegel and Pater Berenson certainly concurred on the inimicalness of over-intellectualization to art and the life of artistic perfection; for Berenson there was a definite correlation between intellectualization of culture and unkunst. And if Pater nowhere cited Hegel to the effect that the beautiful days of Greek art as the golden time of the later Middle Ages are over, Berenson curiously enough does. The passage occurs in Aesthetics and History: "'The day for art is over,' thought Hegel; and unhappily he may be right--right, at all events, till another day dawns, following on the cataclysm and ensuing night in which we already may be plunging. The more reason why we should cherish, preserve, and try to understand what human genius has created down to our own so unhappy day" (p. 41). It is perhaps well to mention here that Aesthetics and History was completed in the autumn of 1941 and not given its final revision until the summer of 1947; it was first published in 1948 and translated into Italian the same year by Professor Praz. Hence we must allow for the effect of the war on Berenson's pessimism about the future of art. Yet the idea of the death of art was one which occurred to him not infrequently, though not in the Hegelian sense so much as in the sense of a dead-end having been reached in contemporary art, a dead-end which did not preclude the possibility of art in the future provided that the present procedures be abandoned at once. We find this idea expressed in the entry for

17 November of the Diary for 1949: "It is an instance of a dead end that was reached centuries ago, in fact around 1700 at latest, a dead end for Christian art as complete as the end of all visual representation that has taken place in the last thirty years. Visual equivalents failed both, and the attempts at renewal of liturgical art will fail more completely than the renewal of the figure arts as a whole. They must return, but Christian iconography not. Christianity is no longer creative in the arts." This statement occurs in Sunset and Twilight, p. 152, in connection with the Vatican's total indifference to art.

The third reason for not concurring with Clark's interpretation of the historical and aesthetic significance of "The School of Giorgione" is that Sir Kenneth has too readily associated the Giorgione article with Pater's standpoint in Studies in the History of the Renaissance (1873). "The School of Giorgione" is a late article; it was first published in the Fortnightly Review of October 1877, the very year in which the second edition of the 1873 volume appeared as The Renaissance. Studies in Art and Poetry; it was not included in this collection, however, until the third edition of 1888. Its incorporation, then, was by default: as Professor Evans has shown in his unpublished 1961 Harvard dissertation, "Some Letters of Walter Pater," Pater had projected a volume along the lines of Studies in the History of the Renaissance which was to be entitled The School of Giorgione and Other Studies; like its predecessor it was to beahighly

literary work in its bias. Pater's letter to Alexander Macmillan, dated 10 October [1878] contains a prpposed list of contents for the projected volume. The date of the Giorgione article and the consideration that Pater had in view another volume suggest the wisdom of taking that paper together with, say, the three papers published in the Fortnightly Review in February, March, and April of 1880, namely, the two parts of "The Beginnings of Greek Sculpture" and "The Marbles of AEgina" rather than with, say, the 1870 Botticelli article. If this procedure be adopted, it may be seen at once that the three papers published in 1880 share a common critical aim with the Giorgione article published in 1877. That critical aim is to correct the imbalance in the criticism of Greek sculpture whereby undue stress was placed on the abstract or ideal qualities of Greek art at the expense of the concrete or sensuous qualities. This tendency in the criticism of classical sculpture Pater dated from the time of Lessing, and it was with Lessing in mind that he set out to restore the balance between the sensuous and the ideal in the criticism of classical art; the early recognition that this was the critical programme Pater had undertaken is to be attributed to Greenslet (1903). It is indeed ironic that Pater should have come to appear to Sir Kenneth as one who wished to have nothing to do with what is abstract and ideal; the irony which Clark found in the fact that The Renaissance "which begins and ends with an attack on abstraction, should have first put forward the theoretical justifications of abstract art" is of course the result

of hindsight as well as of insufficient attention paid to the general direction of Pater's subsequent criticism which attempted to restore the balance between the sensuous and the ideal elements not only in art but also in literature and philosophy. The opening paragraph of "The Marbles of AEgina" conveniently sums up this mature critical programme: "I have dwelt the more emphatically upon the purely sensuous aspects of early Greek art, on the beauty and charm of its mere material and workmanship, the grace of hand in it, its chryselephantine character, because the direction of all the more general criticism since Lessing has been, somewhat one-sidedly, towards the ideal or abstract elements in Greek art, towards what we may call its philosophical aspect." This statement occurs on p. 251 of Greek Studies. In "The Marbles of AEgina" no less than in "The School of Giorgione" Lessing is Pater's point of departure: "To such a philosophy of the variations of the beautiful [Pater had written at the beginning of the second paragraph of the 1877 article], Lessing's analysis of the spheres of sculpture and poetry, in the Laocoon, was an important contribution. But [he added significantly] a true appreciation of these things is possible only in the light of a whole system of such art-casuistries."

For Pater the solution of questions of aesthetics in concrete terms was ever preferable, at least in theory, to any solution in purely abstract terms. Thus, in the 1867 Winckelmann article Pater wrote: "Lessing in the Laocoon, has finely theorized on the relation of poetry to plastic art; and Hegel can give

us theoretical reasons why not poetry but sculpture should be the most sincere and exact expression of the Greek ideal. By a happy, unperplexed dexterity, Winckelmann solves the question in the concrete. It is what Goethe calls his Gewahrwerden der Griechischen Kunst, his finding of Greek art" (pp. 83-84). It is always well to remember that if Pater, after Goethe, admired Winckelmann for his empirical approach to classical art, he admired Hegel even more as the formulator of Winckelmann's data. This complementing of Winckelmann by Hegel we have already noted in the 1867 version of the article: "Penetrating into the antique world by his passion, his temperament, he [Winckelmann] enunciates no formal principles, always hard and one-sided; it remained for Hegel to formulate what in Winckelmann is everywhere individualized and concrete" (p. 103). In the recension the complementary role of Hegel is no longer evident because the words after the semicolon have been suppressed. There is thus no contradiction, then, when in the 1867 version only of the Winckelmann article we find that Pater comes down heavily in favour of the Hegelian rather than the Winckelmannian conception of the ideal: "Under what conditions does Greek religion thus transform itself into an artistic ideal? 'Ideal' is one of those terms which through a pretended culture have become tarnished and edgeless. How great, then, is the charm when in Hegel's writings we find it attached to a fresh, clear-cut conception! With him the ideal is a Versinnlichen of the idea--the idea turned into an object of sense."

Pater obviously has in mind Hegel's _Ästhetik_, 1. _Teil_, 3. _Kapitel_ since in the original version there is documentation to that effect (p. 94, n. 3). Pater of course hastened to render the Hegelian ideal in non-technical language: "By the idea, stripped of its technical phraseology, he means man's knowledge about himself and his relation to the world, in its most rectified and concentrated form. This, then, is what we have to ask about a work of art--Did it at the age in which it was produced express in terms of sense, did it present to the eye or ear, man's knowledge about himself and his relation to the world in its most rectified and concentrated form?" For Pater the _Venus de Milo_ satisfies the criterion of the Hegelian ideal; Angelico's _Coronation of the Virgin_, however, does not. The _Venus de Milo_ "is in no sense a symbol, a suggestion of anything beyond its own victorious fairness. The mind begins and ends with the finite image, yet loses no part of the spiritual motive. That motive is not lightly and loosely attached to the sensuous form, as the meaning to the allegory, but saturates and is identical with it. For the highest knowledge of the Greek about himself and his relation to the world was in the happiest readiness for being thus turned into an object for the senses. The Greek mind had advanced to a particular stage of self-reflection, but was careful not to pass beyond it" (pp. 94-95). Pater's use of "rectified" in this context thus provides a verbal tie not only with the della Robbia essay but also with the very late article on "The Age of Athletic Prizemen." On this ground

alone it may rightly be supposed that the Hegelian conception of the ideal was operative in the 1872 essay no less than in the 1894 article.

There is every reason to suppose that the Hegelian conception of the ideal remained operative in Pater's writing in the period between 1872 and 1894; Winckelmann's name does of course recur in the 1894 article but then only in passing. It is true to say that while there existed between Pater and Winckelmann an unconfessed affinity of peculiar (perverse) sensibility, there was by no means an intellectual affinity between the two men. Certainly the effect of Goethe upon Pater was very much more marked than that of Winckelmann ever was, and what is more, Pater came to Goethe and Winckelmann by way of Hegel and Lessing. Hegel thus enjoyed the pre-eminence of time as well as of influence in Pater's intellectual development, the German philosopher being conceived after the mind of Jowett as one who made pretensions to being concrete, to testing theory by the ultimate criterion of fact. To suppose, then, that Hegel's critique of Winckelmann's conception of ideal beauty proved definitive for Pater is to overlook the chronological order in which Pater came upon his German sources. While it may be said that Hegel's conception of the ideal in the plastic arts, especially classical sculpture, supersedes that of Winckelmann, in the case of Pater it would be more accurate to say that Hegel's conception of the ideal obviated the necessity for his considering Winckelmann's non-metaphysical conception

of ideal beauty. This construction receives some support from the fact that Pater in the opening paragraph of the 1867 article adduced Hegel's singular judgement of the significance of the eighteenth-century German Hellenist's peculiar achievement: "Hegel [wrote Pater], in his Lectures on the Philosophy of Art, estimating the work of his predecessors, has also passed a remarkable judgment on Winckelmann's writings." That judgement Pater then translates: "Winckelmann by contemplation of the ideal works of the ancients received a sort of inspiration through which he opened a new sense for the study of art. He is to be regarded as one of those who in the sphere of art have known how to initiate a new organ for the human spirit" (p. 80). The original context of Hegel's judgement of Winckelmann is to be found in the Einleitung in der Ästhetik, 3. Kapitel:

> Diese Einheit nun des Allgemeinen und Besonderen, der Freiheit und Notwendigkeit, der Geistigkeit und des Natürlichen, welche Schiller als Prinzip und Wesen der Kunst wissenschaftlich erfaßte und durch Kunst und ästhetische Bildung ins wirkliche Leben zu rufen unablässig bemüht war, ist sodann als Idee selbst zum Prinzip der Erkenntnis und des Daseins gemacht und die Idee als das allein Wahrhafte und Wirkliche erkannt worden. Dadurch erstieg mit Schelling die Wissenschaft ihren absoluten Standpunkt; und wenn die Kunst bereits ihre eigentümliche Natur und Würde in Beziehung auf die höchsten Interessen des Menschen zu behaupten angefangen hatte, so ward jetzt auch der Begriff und die wissenschaftliche Stelle der Kunst gefunden und sie, wenn auch nach einer Seite hin noch in schiefer Weise (was hier zu erörtern nicht der Ort ist), dennoch in ihrer hohen und wahrhaften Bestimmung aufgenommen. Ohnehin war

> früher schon Winckelmann durch die Anschauung der Ideale der Alten in einer Weise begeistert, durch welche er einen neuen Sinn für die Kunstbetrachtung aufgetan, sie den Gesichtspunkten gemeiner Zwecke und bloßen Naturnachahmung entrissen und in den Kunstwerken und der Kunstgeschichte die Kunstidee zu finden mächtig aufgefordert hat. Denn Winckelmann ist als einer der Menschen anzusehen, welche im Felde der Kunst für den Geist ein neues Organ und ganz neue Betrachtungsweisen zu erschließen wußten. Doch auf die Theorie und wissenschaftliche Erkenntnis der Kunst hat seine Ansicht weniger Einfluß gehabt (I, 71).

To this passage of the Ästhetik should also be compared the following passage which occurs in 1. Teil, 2. Kapitel of the same work, a passage not adduced by Pater himself but none the less germane to this discussion:

> In neuerer Zeit ist der Gegensatz von Ideal und Natur vornehmlich durch Winckelmann wieder angeregt und von Wichtigkeit geworden. Winckelmanns Begeisterung hat sich, wie ich früher bereits andeutete [the passage already adduced], an den Werken der Alten und ihrer idealen Formen entzündet, und er ruhte nicht eher, bis er die Einsicht in deren Vortrefflichkeit gewonnen und die Anerkennung und das Studium dieser Meisterwerke der Kunst wieder in die Welt eingeführt hatte. Aus dieser Anerkennung nun aber ist eine Sucht nach idealischer Darstellung hervorgegangen, in der man die Schönheit gefunden zu haben glaubte, doch in Fadheit, Unlebendigkeit und charakterlose Oberflächlichkeit verfiel (I, 162).

It was Hegel's contention "daß die Skulptur mehr wie jede andere Kunst eigentümlich an das Ideale gewiesen bleibt" (II, 103), and Pater, as we have seen, concurred with Hegel; it was in connection with classical sculpture, too, that he worked out his own tentative "system of abstraction" in classical sculpture. For Pater, as for Hegel, the Greeks realized the idea fully in plastic form: Hegel's statement

"Dieser Sinn für die vollendete Platik des Gottlichen und Menschlichen war vornehmlich in Griechenland heimisch" (II, 104) was one which Pater deemed worthy of translation in the 1867 Winckelmann article (p. 102). For Pater, as for Hegel, the idea does not outstrip its capacity for concrete embodiment; abstraction does not preclude representation but rather demands it. In the phraseology of Berenson, intellectualization has not in classical sculpture reached the stage where unkunst becomes the inevitable result. "The Greek mind [remarked Pater in the 1867 Winckelmann article] had advanced to a particular stage of self-reflection, but was careful not to pass beyond it" (p. 95). Pater likewise had advanced to a particular stage of intellectualization in art but was careful not to pass beyond it to what Berenson would have described as unkunst. It may be argued that Pater's position in the della Robbia essay no less than in the Giorgione article points logically in the direction of unkunst, of the type of art in which abstraction is divorced from representation, in which knowing triumphs over seeing. This may be admitted; yet, the fact that Pater himself refrained from pushing on towards this culmination must also be admitted. His critical aim was ever to restore the balance between the sensuous and the ideal in art, between what Berenson called seeing and knowing. In this endeavour he belongs with Winckelmann, Lessing, Goethe, and Hegel rather than with Worringer, T.E. Hulme, Sir Herbert Read, and Sir Kenneth Clark, with the eighteenth-century abstractionists rather than with the twentieth-century abstractionists. Whether this be deemed a difference

of kind rather than degree will depend on what the reader's standpoint is in relation to the modern tradition in art. In a general way it might be said that Winckelmann, Lessing, Goethe, Hegel, and Pater (but not Berenson be it noted!) point towards an inevitable and final divorce between the sensuous and the ideal in art. Pater certainly recognized the feasibility of such a view; but if he wrote in the first part of "The Beginnings of Greek Sculpture":

> And the circumstance that Greek sculpture is presented to us in such falsifying isolation from the work of the weaver, the carpenter, and the goldsmith, has encouraged a manner of regarding it too little sensuous. Approaching it with full information concerning what may be called the inner life of the Greeks, their modes of thought and sentiment amply recorded in the writings of the Greek poets and philosophers, but with no lively impressions of that mere craftsman's world of which so little has remained, students of antiquity have for the most part interpreted the creations of Greek sculpture, rather as elements in a sequence of abstract ideas, as embodiments, in a sort of petrified language, of pure thoughts, and as interesting mainly in connexion with the development of Greek intellect, than as elements of a sequence in the material order, as results of a designed and skilful dealing of accomplished fingers with precious forms of matter for the delight of the eyes. Greek sculpture has come to be regarded as the product of a peculiarly limited art, dealing with a specially abstracted range of subjects; and the Greek sculptor as a workman almost exclusively intellectual, having only a sort of accidental connexion with the material in which his thought was expressed. He is fancied to have been disdainful of such matters as the mere tone, the fibre or texture, of his marble or cedar-wood, of that just perceptible yellowness, for instance, in the ivory-like surface of the Venus of Melos; as being occupied only with forms as abstract

> almost as the conceptions of philosophy, and translateable it might be supposed into any material--a habit of regarding him still further encouraged by the modern sculptor's usage of employing merely mechanical labour in the actual working of the stone.

he also hastened to add:

> The works of the highest Greek sculpture are indeed _intellectualised_, if we may say so, to the utmost degree; the human figures which they present to us seem actually to conceive thoughts; in them, that profoundly reasonable spirit of design which is traceable in Greek art, continuously and increasingly, upwards from its simplest products, the oil-vessel or the urn, reaches its perfection. Yet, though the most abstract and intellectualised of sensuous objects, they are still sensuous and material, addressing themselves, in the first instance, not to the purely reflective faculty, but to the eye; and a complete criticism must have approached them from both sides--from the side of the intelligence indeed, towards which they rank as great thoughts come down into the stone; but from the sensuous side also, towards which they rank as the most perfect results of that pure skill of hand, of which the Venus of Melos, we may say, is the highest example, and the little polished pitcher or lamp, also perfect in its way, perhaps the lowest (_Greek Studies_, pp. 188-190).

It is considerations of this kind which have led us to reject outright the construction which Sir Kenneth Clark has placed on the second paragraph of "The School of Giorgione." The Giorgione article considered together with the Winckelmann and Michelangelo articles and the della Robbia essay on the one hand and with both parts of "The Beginnings of Greek Sculpture" and "The Marbles of AEgina" (to which might be added "The Age of Athletic Prizemen") on the other precludes such an interpretation.

In the writings on art of Pater we do not detect even in theory the beginnings of the break-down in that compromise between seeing and knowing which Berenson held to be the basis of representation in the classical tradition in art. While it is possible of course to apply certain passages of the Giorgione article to the exigencies of certain types of twentieth-century non-objective art, this can only be done satisfactorily as well as legitimately by means either of accommodation or by taking Pater out of context; Sir Herbert Read has provided us with an instance in which both measures have been adopted, namely, in his 1934 essay on Picasso. To this procedure there can be no objection when the proper provisoes have been made; these Sir Herbert made. To the procedure adopted by Sir Kenneth Clark in the Introduction to the Fontana Library edition of _The Renaissance_ there can be nothing but objection. The canon of Pater's art criticism provides no grounds for positing that the author of _Studies in the History of the Renaissance_ possessed a germinal theory of non-objective art. That Pater did possess a fully-worked-out theory of abstraction for sculpture we have been at some pains to show; that it approximated the eighteenth-century academic abstractionism of Winckelmann, Lessing, and Goethe we trust has been sufficiently established. The question whether it differs in kind or degree from twentieth-century abstractionism is not a question which we have sought to answer categorically. The answer to this question will depend on one's particular standpoint. We who have the advantage of hindsight will be prepared to admit it a difference

of degree rather than kind; Berenson at rare moments seems to have been able to admit as much, but then, significantly, in dealing with Plato as a possible precursor of that type of modern art which possesses a geometrical bias he adamantly refused to allow that the Greek philosopher would have found his idea of the beauty of form realized in modern non-objective art of the geometrized variety; instead, he stated the opinion that Plato would have found his conception of beauty of form fully realized in modern technology. For Berenson, and _a fortiori_ for Pater, the geometrization no less than the musicalization of art (as we understand these things today) must needs have appeared things one-sided and excessively intellectualized compared with the Greek ideal in classical sculpture as formulated by Hegel. And indeed it is in the very foreignness to the classical ideal in Greek art of modern geometrization and musicalization in art no less than in the strangeness to the classical spirit which the attitudes thus expressed signify that the difference in kind rather than degree between the eighteenth-century abstractionism of Pater and Berenson and the twentieth-century abstractionism of Worringer and Hulme will ultimately be found to lie. Insensitivity helped out by procrustean methods may well succeed in up-dating Pater, thereby inadvertently dating him all the more, but never Berenson, and there's the rub. The fundamental assumption underlying the second part of this dissertation has been that Berenson, because of the organic relationship which existed between his thinking about art and his

writing about art and those of Pater, continued to occupy, *mutatis mutandis*, in the twentieth century the position which Pater had adopted in the nineteenth century. If this assumption has been allowed, then it follows as a matter of course that such an attempt as that of Sir Kenneth Clark to up-date Pater is precluded by the standpoint of Berenson. For we have in Berenson, Pater's *alter ego*, an instance of a man of the nineteenth century, nurtured within the classical tradition in art and literature (German classical literature being understood here as well as Greek and Latin literature) who had the misfortune to live far enough into the twentieth century to see the Winckelmannian canon of taste in the plastic arts completely disrupted. The fact (and it is a fact) that neither the Botticelli nor the Giorgione article of Pater provided Berenson with a *point d'appui* for "acculturating" himself to the modern tradition in art must count heavily against those who like Sir Kenneth Clark endeavour to convert Pater to their own ends by making him into a precursor of twentieth-century abstractionism. It is thus both appropriate and legitimate to conclude the second part of this dissertation by subsuming the problematical second paragraph of the Giorgione article under the last paragraph but one of the first part of "The Beginnings of Greek Sculpture" and thereby bringing it finally into line with the critical programme which Pater undertook in the 1880 articles, namely, that of restoring the balance in the criticism of art between

the sensuous and the ideal. In the last paragraph but one of the first part of the 1880 article, "The Beginnings of Greek Sculpture," 'The Heroic Age of Greek Art,' Pater wrote:

> The ideal aim of Greek sculpture, as of all other art, is to deal, indeed, with the deepest elements of man's nature and destiny, to command and express these, but to deal with them in a manner, and with a kind of expression, as clear and graceful and simple, if it may be, as that of the Japanese flower-painter. And what the student of Greek sculpture has to cultivate generally in himself is the capacity for appreciating the expression of thought in outward form, the constant habit of associating sense with soul, of tracing what we call expression to its sources. But, concurrently with this, he must also cultivate, all along, a not less equally constant appreciation of intelligent *workmanship* in work, and of *design* in things designed, of the rational control of matter everywhere. From many sources he may feed this sense of intelligence and design in the productions of the minor crafts, above all in the various and exquisite art of Japan. Carrying a delicacy like that of nature itself into every form of imitation, reproduction, and combination--leaf and flower, fish and bird, reed and water--and failing only when it touches the sacred human form, that art of Japan is not so unlike the earliest stages of Greek art as might at first sight be supposed. We have here, and in no mere fragments, the spectacle of a universal application to the instruments of daily life of fitness and beauty, in a temper still unsophisticated, as also unelevated, by the divination of the spirit of man. And at least the student must always remember that Greek art was throughout a much richer and warmer thing, at once with more shadows, and more of a dim magnificence in its surroundings, than the illustrations of a classical dictionary might induce him to think. Some of the ancient temples of Greece were as rich in aesthetic curiosities as a famous modern museum. The Asiatic ποικιλία, that spirit of minute and curious loveliness, follows the bolder imaginative efforts of Greek art all through

> its history, and one can hardly be too careful in keeping up the sense of this daintiness of execution through the entire course of its development. It is not only that the minute object of art, the tiny vase-painting, intaglio, coin, or cameo, often reduces into the palm of the hand lines grander than those of many a life-sized or colossal figure; but there is also a sense in which it may be said that the Venus of Melos, for instance, is but a supremely well-executed object of vertu, in the most limited sense of the term. Those solemn images of the temple of Theseus are a perfect embodiment of the human ideal, of the reasonable soul and of a spiritual world; they are also the best made things of their kind, as an urn or a cup is well made (Greek Studies, pp. 221-223).

This passage, we contend, is foreshadowed by the second paragraph of the 1877 Giorgione article in which Pater was also concerned with "the capacity for appreciating the expression of thought in outward form, the constant habit of associating sense with soul, of tracing what we call expression to its sources." The fact that in the 1880 article he discusses this problem in connection with classical sculpture, while in the 1877 article he treated it in connection with painting, should not prevent us from grasping that the problem of fully embodying the ideal in sense is fundamental to both articles. In the second paragraph of the 1877 article, "The School of Giorgione," Pater had written:

> To such a philosophy of the variations of the beautiful, Lessing's analysis of the spheres of sculpture and poetry in the "Laocoon" [the title is italicized in the redaction] was a rememberable [the redaction reads "important"] contribution. But a true appreciation of these things is possible only in the light of a whole system of such art-casuistries. And it is in the criticism of painting [the redaction reads: "Now painting is the art in the criticism of which"] that

this truth most needs enforcing, for it is in popular judgments on pictures that that [the redaction gives "the"] false generalisation of all art into forms of poetry is most prevalent. To suppose that all is mere technical acquirement in delineation or touch, working through and addressing itself to the intelligence [the redaction puts a comma here] on the one side, or a merely poetical [the redaction puts a comma here] or what may be called literary interest, addressed also to the pure intelligence, on the other [the redaction gives a colon]--this is the way of most spectators, and [the redaction adds "of"] many critics, who have never caught sight all the time of that true pictorial quality which lies between, the [the redaction substitutes "unique" for "the"] pledge [the redaction adds "as it is" set off by commas] of the pictorial gift [the redaction reads: " of the possession of the pictorial gift"], the [the redaction gives "that"] inventive or creative handling of [the redaction adds "pure"] line and colour only [the redaction suppresses "only"], which, as almost always in Dutch painting, as often also in the works of Titian or Veronese, is quite independent of anything definitely poetical in the subject it accompanies. It is the drawing--the design projected from that peculiar pictorial temperament or constitution [the redaction places a comma here] in which, while it may possibly be ignorant of true anatomical proportions, all things whatever, all poetry, every idea [the redaction reads "all ideas"] however abstract or obscure, floats [the redaction reads "float"] up as a [the redaction suppresses "a"] visible scene or image; [the redaction gives a colon] it is the colouring--that weaving of imperceptible gold threads of light [the redaction reads: "that weaving of light, as of just perceptible gold threads,"] through the dress, the flesh, the atmosphere, in Titian's Lace-girl, the [the redaction gives "that"] staining of the whole fabric of the thing with a new, delightful physical quality. This drawing, then--the arabesque traced in the air by Tintoret's flying figures, by Titian's forest branches; this colouring--the magic conditions of light and hue in the atmosphere of Titian's Lace-girl, or Rubens's Descent from the Cross [the redaction gives a colon at this point]--these essential pictorial qualities, [the redaction

drops the comma] must first of all delight the sense, delight it as directly and sensuously as a fragment of Venetian glass, [the redaction gives a semi-colon instead of a comma] and by [the redaction reads "through"] this delight only [the redaction gives "alone"] be [the redaction gives "become"] the medium [the redaction reads "vehicle"] of whatever poetry or science may lie beyond it [the redaction reads "them"] in the intention of the composer. In its primary aspect, a great picture has no more definite message for us than an accidental play of sunlight and shadow for a [the redaction adds here "few"] moment [s], [the redaction has dropped the comma] on one's [the redaction gives "the"] wall or floor, [the redaction has a colon instead of a comma] is itself indeed [the redaction gives "in truth" set off by commas] a space of such falling [the redaction reads "fallen"] light, caught as the colours are caught [the redaction omits the second "caught"] in an Eastern carpet, but refined upon, and dealt with more subtly and exquisitely than by nature itself. And this primary and essential condition fulfilled, we may trace the coming of poetry into painting [the redaction puts a comma here] by fine gradations upwards; from Japanese fan-painting, for instance; [the redaction gives a comma instead of a semi-colon] where we get, first, only abstracted colour; then [the redaction supplies a comma] just a little interfused sense of the poetry of flowers; then, sometimes, consummate [the redaction substitutes "perfect"] flower-painting; and so [the redaction puts a comma here] onwards, until in Titian we have, as his poetry in the _Ariadne_, so actually a touch of true child-like humour ["child-like" is not hyphenated in the redaction] in the diminutive, quaint figure with its silk gown, which ascends the temple stairs, in his picture of the _Presentation of the Virgin_, at Venice (_Fortnightly Review_, XXII new series [October 1877], pp. 526-527; _The Renaissance_, pp. 131-133).

Pater having thus discoursed upon the peculiar limitations of the several arts and, in particular, of painting, proceeded in the Giorgione article to note how each art is capable of "a partial alienation from

its own limitations," and it is thus in the same context as the passage we have just adduced that he broaches the question of music's unique place among the arts as "the typical, or ideally consummate art, the object of the great <u>Anders-streben</u> of all art, of all that is artistic, or partakes of artistic qualities." There is no discussion here of "abstractionism" as such either in the sense in which we have applied the term to eighteenth-century ideas about generalization or in the sense in which the term is currently applied to twentieth-century ideas about the role of intellectualization in art. This should be quite obvious to anyone who stops to recall the earlier occasions on which Pater does speak of abstraction in art, for example, those passages of the Winckelmann, Michelangelo, and della Robbia studies to which we have already called particular attention. There Pater used the substantive "abstraction," the verb "abstract," and of course the adjective "abstract" as well as the participle "abstracted." When, however, in the second paragraph of the Giorgione article Pater speaks of "abstract colour," it must be admitted, that it is incidental to his discussion of the limitations peculiar to the several arts and, in particular, to painting, and the ways in which these limitations are at times overstepped in the several stages of artistic development. Pater is preoccupied here with questions that busied the minds of Lessing (who is specifically mentioned) and Hegel (who is not specifically mentioned). We have already shown how limitation, especially in

sculpture, is requisite for abstraction in art as Pater understood the process; we are thus on the periphery of our earlier discussion; but wilfully to ignore the purport of Pater's argument here and cavalierly to override the import of the second paragraph of the Giorgione article in order to attain an end of which neither Pater nor Berenson could be expected to approve are things which the student of Pater must needs disallow. And if this obtains for the second paragraph of the Giorgione article, it holds even more so for the paragraphs that follow:

> But although each art has thus its own specific order of impressions, and an untranslateable charm, and [the redaction gives "while"] a just apprehension of the ultimate differences of the arts is the beginning of aesthetic criticism; yet it is noticeable that, in its special mode of handling its given material, each art may be observed to pass into the condition of some other art, by what German critics term an Anders-streben, a partial alienation from its own limitations, by [the redaction reads "through"] which the arts are able, not indeed to supply the place of each other, but reciprocally to lend each other new forces.
>
> Thus, [the redaction drops the comma] some of the most delightful music seems to be always approaching to figure, to pictorial definition. Architecture, again, though it has its own laws--laws esoteric enough, as the true architect knows only too well--yet sometimes aims at fulfilling the conditions of a picture, as in the Arena chapel; or of sculpture, as in the flawless, ringing ["ringing" does not appear in the redaction] unity of Giotto's tower at Florence; and often finds a true poetry, as in those strangely twisted staircases of the chateaux of the country of the Loire, as if it were intended that among their odd turnings the actors in a wild life [the redaction reads "in a theatrical mode of life"] might pass each other unseen; there being a poetry also of memory and mere effect of time, by which it [the redaction reads

"architecture" for "it"] often profits much [the redaction reads "greatly"]. Thus, again, sculpture aspires out of the hard limitation of pure form towards colour, or its equivalent; poetry also in many ways ["in many ways" is set off by commas in the redaction] finding guidance from the other arts, the analogy between a Greek tragedy and a work of Greek sculpture, between a sonnet and a relief, of French poetry generally with the art of engraving, being more than mere figures of speech; and all the arts in common aspiring towards the principle of music, [the redaction has a semi-colon instead of a comma] music being the typical, or ideally consummate art, the object of the great Anders-streben of all art, of all that is artistic, or partakes of artistic qualities.

All art constantly aspires towards the condition of music. For while in all other works [the redaction reads "kinds"] of art it is possible to distinguish the matter from the form, and the understanding can always make this distinction, yet it is the constant effort of art to obliterate it. That the mere matter of a poem, for instance, its subject, [the redaction adds here "namely,"] its given incidents or situation; [the redaction gives a dash instead of a semi-colon] that the mere matter of a picture, the actual circumstances of an event, the actual topography of a landscape, [the redaction gives a second dash instead of the comma] should be nothing without the form, the spirit [the redaction has a comma here] of the handling; that this form, this mode of handling, should become an end in itself, should penetrate every part of the matter;--[the redaction substitutes a colon for the semi-colon and dash] this is what all art constantly strives after, and achieves in different degrees (1877, pp. 527-528; The Renaissance, pp. 133-135).

We are thus able to show that the problematical passages from the theoretical section of the Giorgione article are amenable to the critical programme which Pater outlined in the first part of the 1880 article "The Beginnings of Greek Sculpture" and carried out

in the second part of that article and in the subsequent article "The Marbles of Aegina." These three papers all appeared in 1880, but the critical programme they undertook had really been foreshadowed by the theoretical section at the beginning of the 1877 Giorgione article, which in turn took up ideas which Pater had first put forward ten years before in the Winckelmann article, where the limitations of the several arts, especially sculpture, were treated in Hegelian terms. The name of Lessing and the critical aims of Lessing's Laokoon underlie all Pater's efforts in this direction. The attempt by Pater to restore the balance between the sensuous and the ideal in the criticism of Greek sculpture is inextricably bound up with the type of criticism inaugurated by Lessing; Pater saw himself as counteracting the tendency towards an exclusive preoccupation with the ideal in classical sculpture which had characterized criticism of Greek art since the time of Lessing. Pater's abstractionism is thus incidental to these overriding critical considerations. This explains, in part, why Pater did not work out his idea of abstraction for painting even to the very limited extent that he did for sculpture. His idea of abstraction in art are, as Professor Fishman has observed, at best tentative even for sculpture, hence a fortiori for painting. The divorce between seeing and knowing which Pater, significantly, detected in the criticism of classical art and "modern" painting was effected in art only after his death, but the underlying causes, namely, ever-increasing intellectualization and ever-growing use of mechanical

means in the production of works of art, Pater, with the help of Hegel, had clearly recognized; it remained for Berenson to explain twentieth-century abstract art in terms of a temporary triumph in art of intellectualization over sensualization, a triumph which Berenson hoped would prove ephemeral, and to castigate the practitioners as well as the propagandists of <u>unkunst</u> 'no-art.' For Berenson there was a direct correlation between excessive intellectualization and <u>unkunst</u> just as there was a direct correlation between abstraction and dehumanization. The twentieth-century dilemma in art between over-sensualized art on the one hand and over-intellectualized (geometrized) art on the other hand Berenson held could only be resolved by a return to the compromise between seeing and knowing, the compromise out of which had developed in the past the convention of so-called "representational art," the compromise from whose breakdown in the twentieth century dates the modern tradition in art. But the overriding preoccupation of both Pater and Berenson is not with abstraction in art in either the eighteenth- or twentieth-century understanding of abstraction; it is rather with intellectualization as it affects art and the life of artistic perfection. For Berenson no less than for Pater intellectualization is inimical to both art and the life of artistic perfection. The ultimate concern of both is with human values in art and life; intellectualization and abstraction threaten these very values. Berenson may be said to represent Pater when in <u>Rumour and Reflection</u>

he reflects upon the effect of geometrization upon artistic values and the effect of abstraction upon human values. It will be readily seen that for Berenson both geometrization and abstraction result in the dehumanization not only of art but of life itself:

> My retreat has terraces concentric with the horizon, which is just far enough away to seem on a level with the eye. I command a full view of the sky southward and westward. I can watch all that goes on under its dome. The clouds are endlessly varied, from the most delicately evanescent vapours lit up with rose tints, to massive layers of slate with a curious tendency to stretching out in long horizontal strips. I could wish I had Ruskin's Modern Painters, to read his treatise on clouds, which I now should study with an interest it never inspired me with before. I wish I had his vocabulary to narrate what goes on in the sky. As it is, I am reduced to comparing effects with the way the great Italian painters reproduced them. The brightest and gayest skies are like Titian's in his middle years. When covered, milky, and pearly, they remind me of the late Bellini. The cold watery dawn could be painted in grey and green by Bassano, a damp and shivering day by the harsh lapis colours of Paris Bordone. As for sunsets, more often than not, they call up the late Titian and above all Tintoretto and one more enchanting than either, their English descendant Turner.
>
> As I looked down over Florence, the cathedral, Giotto's campanile, the tower of the Palazzo Vecchio, appear romantically silhouetted, and at times startlingly near. The foreground is the usual suburban higgledy-piggledy of houses, churches, gardens straggling at my feet in rags and tatters. Its mass does not disturb, and would not annoy but for two cylinder-like gasometers, only taller and slimmer.
>
> I may not speak for the admirers of 'abstract art' who no doubt prefer gasometers to other edifices, as they generally are the most geometrical objects in a landscape. My kind of person is distressed by them and one may ask why.

I suspect that the reason is something like this: not alone because of sordid association and evil odours, nor on the other hand because of the circular shape. We are not offended by the tomb of Cecilia Metella and similar structures all over the ancient world.

We can identify ourselves only with things that have weight and can carry, and need adequate support. We can feel ourselves into a block of stone, or marble, or wood, and realize what is above us, to our sides, to our back. We cannot assimilate a shape which seems to have walls so thin that they scarcely suggest having a third dimension.

That is, I take it, the chief reason, apart from associations, why we dislike gasometers and why we cannot enjoy a structure like the Eiffel Tower. We can admire this edifice only as engineering, as a geometrical design. It remains as much a mere drawing on the sky as if done on paper of ordinary size.

For the same reason I cannot abandon myself wholeheartedly to the enjoyment of certain Gothic masterpieces like Saint-Ouen at Rouen. The pillars are relatively so light that I remain unconvinced of their ability to carry a roof of masonry; and I am led to question whether the elements concerned are of solid stone, with which I can identify myself, and not of some light metal. So Saint-Ouen has always impressed me as an architectural design rather than a real building.

The effect may have been different when it had its glass and its furniture. Indeed, Gothic building, as it advanced, found its justification more and more as a framework for glass, as a sort of cabinet work, or as a huge metallic casket rather than as architecture.

Probably our pleasure in good masonry, where each individual block fits into the other, is based on the ease with which we can live ourselves into it. Better still, when it is bossed as in many Renaissance and some Antique buildings and substructures. It almost certainly accounts as well for the way I enjoy the huge bevelled blocks at Baalbek, at Hebron, at the 'Wailing Wall' in Jerusalem.

Architecture, as an art, deals with appearances, and not with the actualities of engineering. I approve, therefore, of the American sky-scraper which, as structure, is of the same nature as the Eiffel Tower, but is so masked with stone, or what looks like stone, that we get the impression of

masonry that satisfies our demands for weight and support.
I mention our sky-scrapers because they furnish a supreme instance of how necessary it is that a building, as a work of art, no matter how engineered, how constructed, should appeal through the eye to the senses and not to the mind alone.

This, the first of the two passages to be cited, is the entry for 4 December 1943; it occurs in the Icon Book edition of Rumour and Reflection (London, 1963) on pp. 156-158. The second passage is from the entry for 25 December 1943 and will be found on pp. 178-179 of the edition cited:

I recall how in the first World War I discovered that abstraction can dehumanize us. I kept wondering whether that was not the reason why Germans for the great part, and as individuals so kind-hearted and so ready to feel with others, can turn into mechanized executioners, as impersonal as a guillotine, the moment the Fatherland, the State, the Army orders them to go against abstractions labelled French, English, Russian, etc., etc.

I have been tempted at times to ask whether this unusual readiness of Germans to submit to abstractions in every field, not of action alone but of thought as well, was not in part at least due to their indulging too much in symphonic, relatively timeless, music. Such music easily puts one into moods whence the concrete disappears almost entirely; where the mind is filled with exhalations that cannot be condensed into verbally statable concepts. It cannot remain unsatisfied; yet the vaguest abstractions suffice.

Wagner must have felt something of this danger, for he furnishes a verbal basis for the symphonic and undramatic intervals of his operas that keep the listeners tied down to the words of the libretto. Pious Wagnerians attend to it as closely as to the score. There is nothing of the sort to keep one from opiatic vagueness in the symphonies of a Beethoven, a Brahms, a Bruckner and their foreign followers Cesar Franck or Sibelius.

Beware of indulging in feelings you cannot put into words.

We find in these passages of Berenson the re-affirmation of Pater's dicta that the idea must not outstrip its capacity for sensuous embodiment in art, that the idea must always be made amenable to the senses as well as to the intellect, and that classical art should be conceived of as having been sensualized as well as intellectualized. In modern Germany, both Pater and Berenson found instances where thought had outstripped sense: Pater instanced certain works of Goethe; Berenson, Beethoven. It is hardly ironic that it was a German who stated baldly that modern European intellectual culture had even in his time reached such an advanced degree of abstraction that thought had lost its ability to be expressed in terms of sense. We have noticed how Pater concurred with this view of Hegel, without, however, accepting the German philosopher's conclusion that aesthetics must inevitably replace art. Yet, for Pater and Berenson, no less than for Winckelmann and Hegel, the Greek ideal as embodied in classical sculpture remained normative; to the defence of this "relative absolute" both Pater and Berenson were committed. In Berenson we have Pater come to judgement in the twentieth century; the spectacle of Berenson's intransigence in the face of twentieth-century abstract art offers a concrete instance of Pater's Winckelmannian-Hegelian canon of taste made amenable to the modern tradition in art. The outcome of that confrontation was traumatic for Berenson and, we submit, would have been no less traumatic for Pater had he lived to the age of Berenson.

CONCLUSIONS

In the first part of this dissertation we have attempted to show that Pater held metaphysical and ontological abstractions to be inimical to art and to the life of artistic perfection. The idea that the one-sided development of the powers of intellectual abstraction is adverse to art and the life of artistic perfection Pater derived from the Ästhetik of Hegel, though without accepting the logical consequences of the Hegelian standpoint, namely, that art as such belongs to the past and will in the future be superseded by aesthetics or "art-science." Pater nowhere evidences familiarity with Goethe's attack on the mathematical and statistical abstractions of Newton and the Newtonians; nowhere does he so much as mention the German poet's distaste for mathematical abstractions. His own attack is launched against the bastions of the absolute, against metaphysical and ontological abstractions, and only then in so far as they affect art and the life of artistic perfection. Pater's preoccupation with the concrete is, however, the outcome of his recognition that abstractions rightly used can enhance our appreciation of the physical world. Far from being the result of his reading Lewes (Ward), Pater's preoccupation with the concrete is to be accounted for in terms of a predictable reaction against the intense subjectivism of his youthful idealism, comparable in many points to Hegel's description of

Die Ironie in German literature. Pater's reaction may be said to conform to Hegel's account of the matter, intense subjectivity leading to a craving for what is substantial and concrete, on the one hand, and irony, on the other. Certain passages of Marius were adduced to show that Pater's treatment of the subject of irony recalls Hegel's. "Science" as such was of minor interest to Pater: we see this in his treatment of Goethe in the Leonardo article in which Goethe's "scientific" preoccupations are treated as something alien and inimical to his natural artistic bent. Pater, following Madame de Stäel, was, however, able to appreciate Goethe's interest in the sensuous no less than in the ideal. As for Pater's own "objectivity," we have seen that the 1873 Preface owed something to Goethe; hence it is of more literary than autobiographical interest, for Pater its dicta ever remained an ideal rather than a reality. Pater by the criteria of, say, Goethe's Einleitung in die Propyläen was seen to fall far short of the concreteness of Winckelmann on the one hand and Berenson on the other. Ironically Pater's want of concreteness was shown to be due to his not having been sufficiently abstract in his treatment of art. While he fully recognized that intellectual abstractions, metaphysical and ontological aims aside, were invaluable to a full, even an adequate, appreciation of the sensible world in all its concrete particularity and that

abstraction was essential to art no less than science, he did not realize, as Berenson subsequently did, that the study of art would have to become much more abstract before it could become truly "scientific" and "objective." Pater's failure to realize this point is partly to be explained by the fact that he shared the dilemma of Amiel, a creative or imaginative rather than a scientific or systematic temperament, thwarted by the education and the highly literary culture to which he was subjected, yet ever struggling to realize his artistic penchant. Yet Pater's mature position with regard to the role of abstraction in philosophy and art criticism may be said to approximate that of Jowett; we have also shown that Pater in this respect may be said to have come closer to Berenson than to Amiel. Thus, Pater's estimate of Hegel is in many points compatible with that of Jowett in the Introduction to the Sophist, and we have also had occasion to notice that Berenson concurred with Jowett's estimate of Hegel. The general conclusion of the first part of the dissertation was thus that Pater realized that abstraction was necessary to science no less than to art but at the same time he ~~demurred~~ was unwilling to give abstraction free rein, realizing that unchecked intellectualization must prove fatal to art and the life of artistic perfection, a position which Hegel had already defined for Pater but from which Pater departed in so far as he refused to accept the necessity of aesthetics replacing art.

The second part of the dissertation treated of the effect of intellectualization on modern art as seen by Berenson, between Pater and whom we have sought to establish an affinity of peculiar sensibility as well as of intellect. Pater in his time had seriously attempted to correct the imbalance in criticism between the sensuous and the ideal which, he held, dated from the time of Lessing. In articles published between 1877 and 1880 especially Pater tried to bring before his readers the importance of seeing that classical art was not something wholly abstract and intellectualized. This view had already been expressed in his discussion of _Allgemeinheit_ in 1867 and again in 1871 and 1872. Pater's endeavours in this period grow naturally out of the standpoint he adopted in the 1867 Winckelmann article in which he treated not only of the limitations of the several arts but also of _Andersstreben_, their capacity to become partially alienated from their proper sphere (Pater does not employ the term until 1877). Pater's discussion of abstractionism in the eighteenth- rather than the twentieth-century understanding of intellectualization (generalization) of art thus proves incidental to his overall critical programme, hence the tentativeness of Pater's abstractionism on which Professor Fishman has remarked. The attempt of certain twentieth-century critics, especially Sir Kenneth Clark, to up-date Pater was shown to be somewhat cavalier and, indeed, wrong-headed.

Pater never attained the position arrived at on the Continent by Johann Friedrich Herbart and Konrad Fiedler; his own position does not develop much beyond that of Hegel to whose terminology and rationale of art he remained heavily indebted on this as on other questions. We have shown that there is a historical affinity between Pater's abstractionism and that of Winckelmann, Lessing, and Goethe, but we have contended that the immediate source of Pater's abstractionism, like that of his phraseology, was Hegel, not Winckelmann, or Winckelmann as reiterated and followed up by Lessing and Goethe. In Berenson we have detected a twentieth-century Pater come to judgement, the Winckelmannian-Hegelian canon of taste being made amenable to the exigencies of twentieth-century art. In Berenson's intransigence in the face of the modern tradition in art we have detected the impasse arrived at by the heir of Pater's "relative absolute," namely, the artistic possibilities latent in the classical tradition in art fully worked out and brought to a dead end. For Berenson there was a direct correlation between intellectualization and <u>unkunst</u> or 'no-art'; for Pater no such correlation existed. What for Pater had been a venial sin, to stress what is intellectualized at the expense of what is sensualized in Greek art, became for Berenson a mortal sin. Berenson held that the present impasse in representational art could only be by-passed by a return to the conventional compromise

between seeing and knowing, a compromise which Pater, in effect, upheld in so far as he demanded of art that it appeal directly to the senses as well as to the intellect, and that the idea not outstrip its capacity for sensuous embodiment; he required of art criticism that it give due recognition to the sensuous as well as to the abstract side of the art work. While Pater stated these desiderata mainly for classical art, Berenson re-affirmed them for the art of the Italian Renaissance. Both Pater and Berenson, then, were committed to mimesis and both were concerned that intellectualization should not result in the de-humanization of art.

This dissertation purports to make an original contribution to scholarship in so far as it treats at length for the first time (so far as we have been able to ascertain, Sprigge notwithstanding) the intellectual and sensible affinity between Pater and Berenson in relation to Winckelmann, Lessing, Goethe, and Hegel in terms of the interrelated problems of abstraction and abstractionism, the interrelated problems of the intellectualization of culture in general and the consequent intellectualization of art in particular, together with the inevitable dehumanization of life and art. Pater and Berenson are seen to represent

two stages in the course of that development which Hegel had already charted in his time. It is in these terms, then, rather than in terms of the polemics of the twentieth-century practitioners of and propagandists for <u>unkunst</u>, Berenson's 'no-art,' that we have treated of abstraction and abstractionism in the art writings of Pater and Berenson.

There is a second original contribution to Pater research which has resulted from this investigation. In the course of research for this dissertation we have come upon three references to Baudelaire in Pater's article "Romanticism," first published in <u>Macmillan's Magazine</u>, XXXV (November 1876), pp. 67, 68. These references were later suppressed in the recension of the article for the "Postscript" to <u>Appreciations</u> (1889). So far as we have been able to determine this is the first time that these three allusions have been noted. Thus the date for Pater's first mention of Baudelaire can safely be put back from the usual November/December 1890 to November 1876. This finding corroborates the view of Professor d'Hangest (I, 349, n.8) that Pater's familiarity with the great French romantic poet and critic antedates his first allusions to him in "Style" (1888), though Pater's "There were 'flowers of evil,' among the rest" in <u>Gaston de Latour</u>, Ch. III, <u>Macmillan's Magazine</u> (August 1888) can hardly be fortuitous (<u>Gaston de Latour</u>, p. 71). We do not necessarily concur with d'Hangest either when he contends that internal evidence of the Winckelmann article points to so early a date as 1867 or when he maintains that Baudelaire, after Hegel, is the second major influence affecting Pater.

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