

PART II

FROM THE OUTBREAK OF WAR, AUGUST 1642

TO THE SETTING UP OF THE COMMITTEE OF

BOTH KINGDOMS, JANUARY 1644

CHAPTER 6

THE COMMITTEE OF SAFETY1. ITS WORK

At the beginning of the English Civil War parliament, which had hitherto been absorbed in gaining support for the political struggle with the king, was suddenly faced with the problem of how to carry on executive government in the absence of the king.

Parliament's experiments at this time have been largely ignored by constitutional historians.¹ It is the present aim to examine the

antecedents and the work of the Committee of Safety, the first attempt by Parliament to cope with the exigencies of organizing a war in the absence of all previously constituted authority.

This discussion considers whether this first truly executive committee was evolutionary and showed no real departure from the precedents set by earlier committees,² such as those concerned with defence discussed in the previous section. The evidence indicates that no programme of work was planned for the committee before its inception, and that its duties grew as necessity demanded.

First I intend to examine the vaguely termed committees of Defence and Safety of the Realm which appeared during 1641 and the beginning of 1642, and to compare their work with that of the Committee of Safety in its early months. In this way it will be possible to estimate to what extent the formation of the Committee of Safety represented in fact or in intention a new method of government by central committee, combining both executive and policy-making functions.

It seems obvious from the earlier attempts to set up defence

committees that Pym and his helpers planned and connived at the formation of the eventual "Close Committee". It is clear that the schemes relating to the Covenant, Scottish aid, financial expedients, and various other plots - as also the setting up of these committees - were designed to bring parliament round to Pym's own ideas of policy and government procedure. The evidence strongly suggests that Pym tried at all times of real or imagined emergency to use the committee method to meet the challenge of taking over effective government from King and Council. This happened for example in May 1641, with the appointment of a committee of "Peace and Safety of the Kingdom"^{3.} as a result of a threatened French invasion. The strategy involved leaving the emergency to be dealt with at the discretion of the committee, but not specifying its functions in advance. Like the Committee of Safety, the group was composed of men whom Pym could trust implicitly, and an oath of secrecy bound both committees. The scheme collapsed however, when its reason for existence, the threat of French invasion, vanished. The same tactics were used on the occasion of the king's trip to Scotland in August 1641, when another Committee of Defence was set up.^{4.} Once again the functions were left very wide - "to consider anything else that may conduce to the defence of the Kingdom" - although some details of defence were specified. The very vagueness of the defence programme and of the financial arrangements^{5.} shows awareness of a need to have a powerful central executive in times of emergency. In January 1642 another sort of challenge produced a further Defence Committee, where the general invasion scare and the Irish Rebellion were used half-heartedly to create further tension.^{6.}

7.

Finally, on May 26th another Committee of Defence was named. The functions of this committee and those of the Committee of Safety not only overlapped, but, judging by the Commons Journals and D'Ewes' notes, it appears that there was a great confusion in dividing functions between them. It is virtually impossible to sort out the references made to either committee in the early period of their common existence, and the random use of the two names indicates that no clear picture existed in the minds of ordinary members. Therefore, I have taken all references after July 4th to pertain to the Committee of Safety. An additional reason for doing this is that for a short time orders were still referred to the Committee of Defence after the Committee of Safety was set up, and some or all of these orders may have been mistakenly reported as referred to the Committee of Defence.

8.

Initially the joint Committee of Lords and Commons for Defence was set up to raise money to counter the king's war-like actions. The Propositions on Money and Plate were the fruit of the committee's first labours, followed by the beginnings of pressure which later increased, on M.P.'s to subscribe patriotically. At the same time its powers were immediately widened to include all means for preserving peace and preventing civil war. When, six weeks later, the actual Committee of Safety came into being, it was perhaps felt that a new committee could more easily be an embryonic Privy Council with unspecified powers rather than the earlier committee, which had already reported on specific matters. Further, the Committee of Safety was obviously kept to a very small working party - of the 15 Commoners

10.

9 had been on the Committee of Defence. The rest, such as Crane, Sutton and the Cokes, who had also been on the latter committee, were probably omitted as politically unreliable as well as inessential. In addition their presence would have necessitated the inclusion of a larger number of peers, in order to keep the right proportion of members from both Houses, and these might well have been supporters of peace.

An attempt must now be made to give a general account of the work actually performed by the Committee of Safety. This is important for its own sake, and because there is no evidence of any specific functions being assigned to the committee at its inception. It is also relevant to an examination of the extent to which the committee's work centralized and incorporated the functions of the vast number of earlier committees. It will also help us to see how far its work overlapped, or made unnecessary, the functions of contemporaneous committees. These points will illuminate Hexter's ideas¹¹ on the origins of the committee, as they throw some light on its uniqueness and the purpose of its inception. Finally, they will be relevant to a comparison between the work of this committee and its successor, the Committee of Both Kingdoms, whose functions must have been determined, in part at least, by the lessons learnt from the work of the Committee of Safety.

The Committee of Safety had to meet an unprecedented challenge in the scope and extent of work with which it had to deal. As we shall see, the particular forms which the administration took were foreshadowed by previous committees set up to deal with the threat

of war, the Irish campaigns, and so on, but the extent and efficiency of the committee's work was quite new. No individual committee had ever had so many references made to it in the Journals - over 60 in 6 months. Also the committee's warrants indicate eloquently how frequent were its meetings and the great amount of paperwork involved, especially in the first six months of its existence - that is, until there was a working machinery of war administration which did not require constant reference to the central committee.

12.

By far the greatest amount of work performed by the committee was the organization of the army and the forming of a military policy. Related to these wider issues were matters both of local and general defence; the planning, not of campaigns, but of general safety measures - hence the committee's name. Besides army intelligence it also handled the liaison between the legislative, executive and administrative bodies, between the two Houses, and between Parliament and the army. Other matters falling under its jurisdiction were naval policy decisions, and even matters relating to Scotland and Ireland, for which there were also separate committees. The committee handled foreign affairs, such as they were, and organized some kind of contact with other countries in an attempt to replace the gap left by the absent Privy Council. Finally, the committee dealt with policy towards the king and the royalists, both as regards negotiation and war. It hardly touched however, on matters relating to religion or law, which were dealt with by a series of select committees or by the House as a whole.

The importance accorded to the committee at the outset is indicated by the fundamental issues of policy which were referred

to it. For example, on July 12th 1642,^{13.} it drafted the decision of the House to appoint a general and to raise an army, and the House agreed, despite D'Ewes protestations. The committee also put forward the names of the chief officers,^{14.} and laid down the procedure for their taking the Oath of Allegiance.^{15.} It saw to the printing and distribution of ordinances specifying the Lord General's powers,^{16.} as well as officially thanking him for his activities on behalf of parliament.^{17.} When the Oxford Treaty failed, the committee, representing the policy of the more militant Middle Party^{18.} at this same time, began at once to inform itself of the state of the army's readiness for an attack.^{19.} Towards the end of 1642, after the disastrous summer campaigns, it became obvious that something was needed to bolster up the falling prestige of Pym's protégé, Essex. The committee was given the task of reorganizing his army, which involved forming a policy for its constant recruitment and pay, and for the administration of both.^{20.} At the same time it ordered the regular payment of billets to make the army's presence more bearable to the population; it weeded out unsuitable elements in the ranks, and it organized aid from the Associated Counties for the Lord General.^{21.} When some difference of opinion and divergence of authority over all these matters arose between the committee and the Lord General,^{22.} the House backed the committee as the representative of its wishes.

It can be seen therefore that there was in fact a categorical difference between the activity of this committee and the various antecedent Committees of Defence. In the latter, whereas the powers allocated were often very wide and unspecific, the measures actually taken were always specific, conducive to immediate action. Formulation

of policy in principle was left to the House as a whole. In this most important respect the Committee of Safety differed from all previous committees - it not only assumed new powers to meet new situations, but also dealt with matters previously left to the initiative of the House itself. This tendency did not escape the enemies of the committee, such as D'Swes, for whom all its activities were too militant.^{23.} The only major limitation which was placed on the committee was the formation of the Council of War in August 1643 which coincided with the general eclipse of the Committee's influence. But the importance of this Council has perhaps been overrated in the past. Hexter, for instance, regards it as the logical forerunner of the Committee of Both Kingdoms.^{24.} Certainly, the Council of War infringed the powers of the committee in the very sphere in which it had always been unequalled, that is the formulation of, and advice on, military policy. If the Council had done more than merely infringe, it would have excluded the Committee of Safety entirely. The Council was not meant to be a policy-making body, but was chiefly advisory. Its chief work was to act as a consultative body with the Lord General, and it included outside military advisers, something the committee had lacked. Nor was the Council essentially more radical in composition than the Committee. It included no War Party men, though stocked with Middle Party adherents of the Lord General. In this way it was acceptable to the General, even though it was intended to keep an eye on his activities in the campaigns of the south-west. Its functions appear to have been restricted to the military supervision of the new army of recruits raised in London to fight under

25. Essex. As a result most of the Committee of Safety's functions and powers were left untouched.

The extent to which political and administrative functions were combined in the Committee of Safety is also illustrated by the way in which purely political attacks mounted by the radicals in the House against the Committee eventually reacted on the administration of the war, and led finally to the replacement of the committee by the more radical, but equally comprehensive, Committee of Both Kingdoms.

The political functions of the Committee of Safety forced it to become a partisan in the political war between the parties, and its work was sometimes supplemented or replaced by committees of the House, if the tenor of the House became more radical. This happened when the committee delayed in sending to the Lord General for Waller's commission and the War Party saw to it that a parliamentary committee was sent to get their scheme off to a quick start. Most of these committees attempted to put pressure on the Lord General in the broadest political sense, and were not directly concerned with forming an alternative war administration. However, as the progress of the war became more and more bogged down with Essex's inactivity, the War Party did take more active measures to interfere with its actual running, both by suggesting alternative schemes for increasing the army, and by attempting to establish a more workable liaison between the army and its needs, and consequently between Parliament and the City as the suppliers of those needs. The committee of July 15th, 26. dominated by War Party men, attempted seriously to by-pass the Committee of Safety in order to tighten the army's efficiency. Again

27.
 on August 18th they tried to bring the recruiting of men and provision of money for the army into their own hands, especially after the ignominious failure of the General Rising. In October other committees were set up to act as liaison between the Lord General's army, parliament and the City, all demonstrating an eagerness to get on with the war and to increase the efficiency of the machinery. Although these committees' main concern was with general policy they were forced, by the very nature of the Committee of Safety, to tamper with its supreme control over administration. These encroachments on the Committee's powers correspond in time with a period of War Party ascendancy over Pym, and represent a rising dissatisfaction with its efforts.

The most serious threat of all to the Committee of Safety would have been the new Council of War whose parliamentary members were to be selected by a Committee of October 16th. 29. This clearly indicates the efforts of the War Party to force the Lord General to action, if not to replace him, and to substitute a really radical executive machine in the form of the new Council by which the Committee of Safety could be by-passed. Vane, Waller, Haselrig, St. John, Pridesaux, Mildmay and Tate, the big names of the War Party, all appeared on the committee as well as Pym, who could count only Goodwyn as a real supporter from the remaining seven. This shows the increasing strength of the radicals and suggests that Pym may have been forced in the end to discard his military protégé, Essex. From this time on the writing on the wall for the Committee of Safety was more legible than ever.

The rising dissatisfaction of the majority in the Commons with the achievements of the committee can also be seen by the fact that some of these committees were open to all, indicating a fairly certain conviction on the part of the War Party that the House as a whole was radically disposed; also by the expedient at the end of 1645 to discuss supply and reorganization of the army in Committees of the Whole House - something which had not been used effectively for some time.³⁰ Yet it was by this method that the fixing of pay and recruiting of the army was finally achieved - by the House as a whole, not by the Committee of Safety.

To return from this foreshadowing of the decline of the Committee of Safety to its actual work; we may divide this into two sections. As administrator it dealt with local and national defence, the Navy and with finance; as policy-maker it controlled relations with the King and his supporters, with Scotland, Ireland and the counties, and made itself responsible for matters of public opinion and security.

Most of the actual work of the committee consisted not of spectacular policy-making, but of administering the time-consuming trivia of defence organisation. There was nothing theoretical about its activities on this front. It not only planned some of the military moves, but was kept constantly informed, through its own intelligence system,³¹ of the enemy's movements and its own army's position. Letters from all field commanders reached the House only through the committee, which sifted them for news before informing the House.³² Thus, the committee gave orders for the

35.
 defence of Hull in July 1642, including instructions for compensa-
 34.
 tion for those who were flooded out by Hotham's tactics. The
 committee reported to the House the contents of letters from various
 35. 36.
 commanders, for example from those at Stamford and at Cambridge,
 but only after it had dealt with them. It continually corresponded
 with Essex about the state of his army. Whenever able, it sent re-
 cruits, money, arms, clothes, ammunition, reinforcements, and advised
 37.
 him about keeping his army together and punishing deserters, all
 the time receiving replies and pleas about his movements, difficulties,
 38.
 shortages, and the discontents of his fellow officers.

In addition to the Lord General's army and those in the North
 and West, the committee had the final say over the disposition of the
 local militias as supplementary forces for the parliamentary generals. 39.
 The other armies too, especially Fairfax's in the North, 40.
 had to be partially maintained from London with men and supplies, and differences
 between the various commanders had to be straightened out. Often
 quite specific instructions had to be issued to lower officers directly,
 41.
 entailing an extremely detailed knowledge of the placement of troops.

The committee not only allocated men, money and supplies, but
 actually transacted some of the buying and delivery of war materials.
 42.
 It arranged for an arms purchase from France for £15,000, for payment
 43.
 of merchants and local tradesmen who supplied arms, for cartage of
 44.
 ammunition and the hiring of carts, for moving war materials from
 different parts of the country to where they were needed, a difficult
 45.
 and thankless task hindered by notorious parochialism. In its
 capacity as military organizer the committee was also the recipient

of proposed royalist "deals", such as the offer of Newcastle to betray Nottingham Castle,^{46.} and the tacticians had to deal with these extra problems. These activities concerned with the organization of an army were necessarily new and apposite for the Committee of Safety which was created partly in order to deal with unexpected exigencies. The only committees which foreshadowed this aspect of the committee's work were the three previous Defence committees; these however restricted themselves far more to questions of principle and were less concerned with the minutiae of administering a war.

One aspect of the relations between the Commons and the Committee of Safety cannot be neglected, indicating as it does an alarming gap in the activities of the committee, not obvious by studying the matters with which it did deal. This is the number of particular matters which should, it seems, have fallen to the care of the committee, but which were in fact handled by the House in select committees. These concerned such things as ordering officers and men to their colours;^{47.} raising enough horses for the army;^{48.} hearing complaints against commissaries whose task it was to seize horses;^{49.} formulating rules for better payment of the army;^{50.} listing horses in the City;^{51.} punishing neglectful men in the trainbands;^{52.} considering the state of old forts and their repair.^{53.} All these matters, one would think, should have been dealt with by the committee, and their actual treatment indicates that one cannot be too categorical about the committee's functions and the comprehensiveness of its work. None of these matters are even indirectly political, so that it seems unlikely that the House wanted to deal with them directly in order to avoid political

interference by the committee. The only thing that can be said about the omission to refer these matters to the committee is that neither the method of committal nor the influence of the committee were so automatic that all matters related to executive function came under the committee's surveillance.

There was also evidently very little central control of Fairfax's northern army; Such as there was, the Commons' committees carried out under pressure from the northern members whose interests were at stake. The Committee of Safety did occasionally make payments to Fairfax, but not regularly; and his movements do not seem greatly to have influenced their decisions.

The committee's work of organising national defence did not stop at the administration of the Parliamentary armies. A great deal of war organization, before the setting up of the New Model Army, was carried out at the local level and involved the use of old-established state functionaries, as well as the new and often-represented parliamentary county committees through which the Committee of Safety liked to act, regarding them as its executive arm.

The Committee of Safety was clearly in an omnipotent position vis-à-vis the county committees - at least technically. It took many months for the ad hoc local arrangements to become regular, and even when they did, the ultimate decisions were often made by the committee, as for instance in the case of the county of Essex and of the Eastern Association. Particularly during the early months, specific instructions were often sent direct to the local authorities. Later, as these became more organized, the committee interfered only at a higher level.

Thus, despite the elaborate machinery of county administration

developed at this very period, the Committee of Safety was also largely occupied with matters of local defence, partly as a co-ordinator of county and national policy and partly as the fountain of the newly acquired powers of the county committees and the Deputy Lieutenants. There were, first of all, the areas where parliament was never able to count upon an efficient administration because of the early existence of royalist pockets. The Committee of Safety considered what

local defences could be made in the north west, where there were still some parliamentary supporters. ^{54.} It tried to defend the vulnerable

north by sending up forces from predominantly parliamentary areas further south. ^{55.} It is not surprising that the Committee failed

in this because the county authorities were too parochial to co-operate in a scheme of national defence. Many local committees at first preferred to take their grievances and requests for supply direct to the Committee of Safety instead of to the parliamentary county committee. They considered, rightly, that this would yield action

more quickly, ^{56.} or at least that members of parliament would be dispatched to the trouble spots to give first-hand accounts of local affairs to the committee. ^{57.} In some areas where parliament could

not depend on Deputy Lieutenants, the committee appealed directly to the local JP's to arrest their superiors and seize their property, ^{58.} or else they sent down a loyal member to avert imminent trouble. ^{59.}

Where the committee's delegates were not successful, the matter was sometimes taken out of its hands by a more radical committee. ^{60.} The attempt to form a national policy probably rendered inevitable the overriding of locally constituted authority by the committee

during this early stage of war organization.

As regards London however, the committee had its hand forced
 61. by City proposals for defence, and by October it put forward a
 whole scheme of defence for the Home Counties and appointed a rendezvous
 62. for the militia. Despite the fairly autonomous Committee for the
 Militia of London, the Committee of Safety still issued orders con-
 63. cerning the City's defence either directly, or through the London
 64. Committee. This was because it kept general defence policy in
 its own hands, especially when a matter of parliamentary security
 was at stake. One example of this was during the time of indecision
 over Waller's command of the London army, when the committee won its
 point against the powerful London pressure group.

In cases of dispute among local claimants for military authority,
 the committee decided who was to be in charge. This happened over
 65. Hutchinson's quarrel with Gell and Lord Grey in Nottingham.
 Similarly, the committee in July 1643 set aside Manchester's claims
 66. to be in charge of the London army, and instead appointed Waller.
 It was also instrumental in removing Denbigh from his command after
 67. hearing evidence of his supposed collusion with the enemy.

The machinery for both national and local land defence was
 either entirely new, or, where it was based on previously constituted
 authorities, differently orientated and directed. By contrast the
 Navy was the only organ of defence which had been reasonably well
 organized before the outbreak of war; so the secession of the Privy
 Council brought no radical break with its previous administration.
 Nevertheless the Committee of Safety assumed an overriding authority

over the Admiralty and Navy Committees on major points; it ordered the Navy, for instance, to accept Warwick in the place of Northumberland as Admiral of the Fleet. 68. Giles Green, one of the chief parliamentary administrators of the Navy, kept the committee constantly informed of the fleet's movements and its state of supply. 69. No doubt on his recommendation the committee issued major directives, such as ordering the size of the winter guard and its disposition. 70. Green also recommended large-scale methods of increasing the power of the Navy by enlisting merchant support, and the committee endorsed his recommendations. 71. It was also frequently called in to help the Navy committee co-ordinate supplies, 72. and on occasion stepped in to borrow them for army purposes. 73.

Although the Committee of Safety was not responsible for shaping financial policy nor for the administration of machinery for collection, 74. it was, however, the chief disburser of money. To it went, in the early days, every claim for payment arising out of the pursuit of war. It then issued a warrant to the Treasurer to pay the recipient who signed the back of the warrant as a receipt. These warrants make up the bulk of the Committee of Safety papers amongst the Commonwealth Exchequer Papers. The claims for payment of the troops were usually certified by the paymasters, and claims for supplies were vouched for the provisioning agents. Despite this, there must have been a great deal of muddle and duplication of functions, for theoretically all troops should have been paid either by local committees or by the regimental paymasters. In fact large numbers of warrants authorize payments direct to army chiefs and

even to officers under them. It must have been difficult to work out who was owed pay by the State when officers and men, listed as being on the Lord General's payroll, had in many cases direct access to the committee. In addition issuing these warrants of pay took up a very large amount of the committee's time - certainly a most inefficient method of dealing with a routine matter. ^{75.} The number of warrants and their distribution do indicate that the system became more regular and self-sufficient. Their number drops sharply after the first six months, and so does the amount of the committee's paper work. ^{76.}

At the same time as direct payments to lower officers declined, the issuing of large grants to the generals or chiefs of special areas increased. ^{77.} The payments to Waller, ^{78.} Essex, and Fairfax ^{79.} enabling them to pay their armies, replaced the old direct payments, although the governors of garrisons, towns and fortifications were still paid separately, usually after desperate petitioning. ^{80.} Sometimes service in special areas was also paid directly. This happened ^{81.} with Sir Edward Littleton in Staffordshire, and with the Surrey ^{82.} committee and Deputy Lieutenants.

These larger payments continued especially in areas and under ^{83.} commanders not directly subject to the Lord General's administration. Another task was the payment of reformado officers who petitioned the committee in great numbers from October 1642 to January 1643. These reserve officers who had been called to active service found they had no men to serve under them. They were still entitled to pay, and in this period 170 warrants were issued to them. After

January 1643 very few payments of this sort occurred as they were presumably usefully placed in active service, and paid through normal channels.
84.

A large variety of other payments reflect the extent of the committee's authority and its thoroughness in small things. Not only did the committee order and pay for army supplies with the aid of several commissaries,
85. but it supervised their distribution. The buying of clothes, shoes, food and small arms occupied the committee until July 1643, with nearly 200 warrants throughout the year, including sums ranging from £25 to £15,000.
86. Other payments for occasional billeting, for surgeons and their equipment, and for clergy ministering to regiments also continued throughout. When the problem of prisoners-of-war arose, the committee paid for their removal to suitable places and maintained them, despite the special committee to deal with them.
87. Similarly, despite the existence of a committee for maimed soldiers, the Committee issued payments for their relief to its executive officers - M.P.'s Holland, Jenner and Jepson.
88. In addition there were sums for the provision and care of horses supplied by individual owners for the troops; the buying and hiring of carts for carrying provisions; the hire of boats for cartage and defence, the payment of post officers and supplies of post horses, as well as for individual repayments for saddles initially paid from the officers' own pockets.
89. The committee also issued warrants for its own expenses. It paid for the services of clerks,
90. secretaries, and informants; for the searching and questioning of prisoners;
91. for bringing in a suspicious Frenchman to

92.
 be questioned; for the provision of fires in the Commons and
 93.
 committee rooms; and for the expenses incurred by the Committee
 94.
 at Oxford negotiating the treaty.

Although the committee had no hand in the collection of money, it often arranged for short term finance to make payments possible. For example, if the ordinary means of collection for the armies' pay through the Weekly Pay and other local collections was too slow or unsuitable to satisfy urgent claims, the committee arranged short term loans. In November 1643 £5,000 was needed for Waller, of which only £800 was in hand, and the committee suggested borrowing the rest from the sequestrators in Kent who had collected enough for six weeks. It did this, despite an ordinance that sequestration money should all be paid to the Scots. The House, against opposition from the War Party, acted on the committee's suggestion and ordered the money to be repaid from Excise - in fact

95.
 a wholesale re-shuffle. It also arranged similar short-term loans from merchants for specific projects, and their repayment
 96.
 from similar sources. On other occasions it arranged for the

sequestration and assessment money to be used to pay the Windsor
 97.
 garrison.

Although nearly all its functions in the financial sphere decreased as finance became more regular, much of the time during its first year was spent on these issues, both great and small. Overall, the decline in the amount of money paid out by the committee reflects fairly accurately the growth and efficiency of specialised
 98.
 finance committees.

We do not know what form the necessary liaison between the agencies for income and those for expenditure took, but probably the committee clerks did their part in keeping the various bodies informed of the state of finance at any time. There is however much evidence that the money wanted for payment on warrants was often unavailable, and occasionally the Committee of Safety then undertook the raising of short-term loans. However, despite the time spent by the committee on its financial work, it was in this sphere that there first appeared inefficiency gross enough for Parliament to set up a controlling committee to see to the execution of the orders of payment made by the committee. It has been noted that the work of paying the armies passed to other hands as time went on, thus lessening automatically the committee's paper work, but at the same time its own efficiency in handling the remainder did not improve, and its issuing of warrants was at first restricted, and later almost withdrawn.

The financial side of the Committee of Safety's work could not have been directly anticipated by any previous committees as these functions arose directly out of the unique situation of civil war. Such previous experience as Parliament had had with financial administration of war was restricted to the Scottish and Irish campaigns, and these remained separately administered. There had been precedents for short-term borrowing from the City for specific expenses throughout the earlier months of the Long Parliament, and only in this respect could the committee's financial work at all be seen to rely on precedent.

Since the committee was active in formulating matters of high policy relating to the disposition of the army, it became immediately obvious that knowledge of the enemy's position and the planning of counter moves was essential for its competence. This aspect of relations with the king was largely military and not political. The exploitation of the king's declarations and utterances for political and propaganda purposes was left to influential special committees set up to deal with anti-royalist propaganda. The Committee of Safety itself concentrated on getting information about the king's moves, organizing its own correspondence and intercepting the king's, and preparing the agenda for the Houses.

The committee became the first recipient on the parliamentary side of his declarations and of news of his movements. Only after it had perused the communications, was reference made elsewhere on specific points. ^{99.} At first letters and declarations from the King were received by the Speaker of the House, and referred to the Committee only on a favourable vote; but later it received virtually all correspondence, so that the House only heard and re-committed a selected number of matters. For example, letters from the king were referred to the committee on July 5th, 1642, ^{100.} it was instructed to prepare a declaration on Charles' war-like acts, ^{101.} and later to answer a message from him. ^{102.} Gradually the committee began to act without specific instructions. For example, it drafted an order to declare all who fought against Parliament, traitors, and only subsequently brought the matter to the House's attention. ^{103.} It is evident that by October the committee sifted through correspondence

before the House had access to it. For example, Fyn presented to the House on October 6th the Queen's correspondence about aid from abroad, but it had first been through the committee's hands.^{104.}

Again, on its own initiative, the committee acted on the information from the Lord General that the king had refused to receive a petition of Parliament from his hands,^{105.} although its political implications were referred to other committees. The committee, needing to be well-informed in order to fulfil its policy-making function, rapidly gained cognisance of information from whatever source, be it letters from abroad, from spies or from intercepted royalist correspondence. For instance, information from the Parliament's factor in the Netherlands, Walter Strickland, about the connections of the royalists with foreign powers came straight to Fyn, to be presented to the committee. News of the attempts to pawn the Crown jewels in return for foreign aid,^{106.} information about royalist spies in London,^{107.} all were submitted to the Committee in this way.

Initially such information would have been used for propaganda purposes, but as the conflict deepened it became vital to Parliament's war-effort, and as such it had to be used by the Committee of Safety. Although the committee knew of all the king's moves before anyone else on the parliamentary side, it did not use this information to further negotiations with the royalists. The political battles over negotiations with the king were fought out in select committees of which there were an abundance, separate ones being set up, it seems, to deal with every aspect and changing phase of the negotiations. Although some sort of centralized

authority was sorely needed, the Committee of Safety did not provide it. Its main purpose in arrogating all information to itself in the first instance was for military defence. General policy-making in regard to the king was dealt with by the Houses, usually in select committees. This indicates that they were not prepared to abrogate the ultimate power of deciding on the future of the war and leave it to such an independent group as the Committee of Safety.

108.

In keeping with its dignified conciliar appearance the committee began early to attempt the grander aspects of executive government. Needless to say, setting up relations with foreign powers was a new experience for Parliament, and there was no established machinery in existence for coping with it. Parliament soon became concerned with developing a liaison with the Protestant powers, both in order to enhance its authority at home by getting its position recognised abroad, and to gain countervailing support in case of foreign aid to the king. The Strickland correspondence indicates how difficult it was to form this relationship even with countries in sympathy with the religious views of the parliamentarians.

109.

It was realized at the start that diplomacy would have to be carried on in a far more private and confidential way than could be done by Parliament as a whole, and the Committee of Safety became the obvious successor to the Privy Council in this regard as in others. As early as August 20th 1642 the committee drafted the Letter of Credit giving Strickland power to explain Parliament's position to the Netherlands, and in fact during this period all official parliamentary contact with the outside world was through him. Strickland

110.

arranged the approach to the Elector Palatine to sound him out as a possible successor to Charles. As usual, he wrote to the Committee of Safety ^{111.} via Pym. The news of the royal family's manoeuvres for foreign aid came through Strickland, ^{112.} and parliament's attempts to justify its position in the eyes of the continental monarchs was conveyed through the same channel. ^{113.} The committee also dealt with ~~the~~ attempts on the part of the French king to interfere in English affairs by sending secret delegations to each of the warring parties. ^{114.} The matters the Committee of Safety left in this field to the Houses and their committees were not related to policy but more to protocol, or outward show of courtesy to visiting potentates. In the field of foreign relations the committee, despite its efforts, never met with the social acceptance for which it had hoped. It remained for its successor, the Committee of both Kingdoms, to gain entré into royal circles abroad.

In dealings with Scotland and Ireland the committee was on the whole redundant and played a negligible part. The obvious reason for this was that in these fields a relatively efficient system of committees was already in operation, using a group of specialists who had been employed during 1641 and 1642 in dealing with the crises there. Despite this, on some issues the Committee of Safety did intervene. For example, it prepared a declaration to the Scottish National Assembly about the parliamentary position before the outbreak of hostilities, in much the same spirit as Strickland's mission. ^{115.} Similarly, it decided that the Scots should be asked for assistance in November 1642, - moral assistance only at this time, it is true. ^{116.} Both these matters were of high policy and the role of the committee

was quite clear and not in conflict with the specialist committees. Its relations with the Irish administration were purely financial and not advisory - when it conferred with the Irish Affairs committee, it was about raising funds for Ireland or negotiating a loan. 118.

On the whole then we can say about the Committee of Safety's work that although it appears from its own records to be very comprehensive, centralised, efficient and unbiased, in fact it was certainly not able to engross all aspects of military administration into its own hands. It often misrepresented facts to the House, and as a result of political bias failed to carry out its mandate. It is dangerous, as we have seen, to conclude anything about the committee's overall functions by taking instances of its work as representative of all related matters coming under its sway. It began early in 1643 to be limited by committees encroaching on its preserves. Gradually the amount of outside interference increased until there were few areas left which the committee could regard as rightfully its own. With the advent of these restrictive committees its work simultaneously declined, and its raison d'etre, the need for a strong centralised administration, was destroyed. The committee came under increasing fire from the enthusiasts who wanted the war to be fought with more efficiency and enthusiasm, and when the War Party won greater support in the House its attacks finally led to the committee's downfall.

As for Notestein's view of the Committee of Safety, it can be seen from all that has been said that the committee did represent a departure from the precedent set by earlier committees. It engrossed

under one command a great deal of work, military, financial, naval, that had ^{been} previously dealt with, when dealt with at all, by separately constituted committees with specific functions. This, it is true, would by itself make it only a more comprehensive organ, basically similar to its predecessor. But it is impossible to ignore the breadth of its activities which comprised such a range of not obviously related matters, from managing the relations with foreign powers to the payment of troops. Indeed, it would not be going too far to term it an embryo Privy Council. We do not know what functions, if any, were specifically ascribed to it at the beginning. In practice, it appears that the committee was envisaged as a potential administrator of all matters relating to the running of the war, and clearly it was not possible at the outset to predict what exigencies would arise. The evidence would seem to indicate that the very absence of a formal constitution for the committee made it, at any rate initially, a potentially adaptable centralized administration.

2. ITS DECLINE

The scope and power of the Committee of Safety has been described and it now remains to examine its relations with the Houses of Parliament. One of the major complaints against the king's government had been over its lack of responsibility to Parliament; now, faced with an executive of its own making, how were the problems of responsibility and control to be resolved? Once the men who made up the committee were given their corporate

existence several related questions arise; how was the committee elected? Did it reflect accurately the views of either or both Houses? Did its orientation change appropriately with changes of political mood in the Houses? Did members from one House predominate over those from the other? Was it able to maintain the confidence of members of both Houses? How did it react to differences of opinion between the Houses? Did it consider itself responsible to its parent bodies? Why did it fail to fulfil its initial promise?

The absence of any minutes of proceedings of the committee hampers the finding of complete answers. Apart from the infrequent references made by the Houses to the committee in their journals, the only consistent source of information is a collection of signed warrants issued by the committee covering probably most of its administrative functions. There is no record of any functions ascribed to the committee initially, nor is it known exactly how the members were nominated or elected, except that it was usual for every member of a committee to be approved of by the majority of the House. The only indication of political orientation of the committee at various stages, apart from the few known policy decisions for which it was responsible, is therefore the signatures on the warrants which provide us with a day-to-day tally of attendance, and it is from this tentative evidence that the answers to the questions about the committee's relations with the Houses of Parliament must be sought.

Assiduous attendance does not of course prove that great influence was exercised by the persons attending, but it can be taken as a sign of interest. It will be shown that the committee

came to be regarded by the more militant members of the Commons as increasingly reactionary; at the same time towards the end of its existence its functions were very specifically curtailed. These facts indicate an important change of orientation of the committee, or of the two Houses, or of both. Accordingly it becomes important to see not only who attended the committee's meetings most regularly, but also when they attended. In this way it should be possible to see if any changes occurred in the political balance of the Committee; whether, in fact, the radicals' accusations that the peace supporters were in the ascendant was justified.

119.

The names listed on July 4th 1642 as the original committee chosen from the Commons are only a fraction of the numbers who actually sat on the committee, as additions were frequently made - and the same is true of the contingent from the Lords. Some replacements were due to the death of original members; others were added because some of the original members were absent on military service. The only safe list of effective members has to be constructed from all the signatures on the warrants over the entire period.

120.

From these we can obtain a list of 22 names of Commons members and 23 Lords. Clearly, these 45 did not sit concurrently, for as we have seen, death, war-service, and substitutions made for a changing personnel. Originally there appear to have been about 10 from each House in regular attendance. The difficulty of knowing precisely who were the original members is increased by the fact that the list of attenders at meetings during the first month does not tally with the originally recorded names, although everyone of the latter had made an appearance by September.

Looking first at the Lords who attended the committee, it is perhaps advisable to exclude Suffolk, Lincoln, Rutland and Kent from a discussion of the relative party strengths, as these attended only once or twice, and cannot therefore have exerted much influence. If we take as a rule of thumb Hexter's division of the Lords into those who, in December 1642, on receiving the peace proposals drafted by the House of Commons, wanted to exclude several names to be exempted from pardon, and those who agreed with the Commons' proposed list of names, ^{121.} we get some sort of idea of who supported Pym's views on the peace settlement, and, on the other hand, those who were more in favour of peace at any price. On this analysis Bolingbroke, Brooke, Grey of Wark, Manchester, Peterborough, Say, Warwick, Wharton, Willoughby, and of course Essex, were supporters of Pym; Bedford, Holland, Clare (each of whom later deserted to the King), Fielding, Howard, Northumberland, Pembroke, Salisbury and probably Stamford were supporters of peace. Despite the effectively equal numbers, however, the Peace Lords between them signed 1455 warrants and attended on 637 occasions, while Pym's supporters signed 920 warrants and attended 420 times. Therefore 50% of the work of the Lords was done by the peace supporters, only 40% by Pym's men. Hexter's impression that the Committee of Safety was dominated by Peace Lords, is to this extent correct.

Using Hexter's analysis of the Commons' members, Haselrig, Marten, St. John, Vane and Waller were of the War Party; Barrington, Brown, Fiennes, Gerrard, Glyn, Hampden, Nicholls, Pym, Stapleton and Erle were of the Middle party; ^{122.} Holles and Grimston were of the

Peace Party; Pierrepont, Trenchard, Evelyn, Merrick and Vassall were most of them non-political ^{administrators} ~~"committee-men"~~, possibly ~~they~~ tending towards Pym's views. Analysis of attendances and signatures shows that there were 588 signatures and 238 attendances for the War Party, 1555 signatures and 624 attendances for the Middle Party, 255 signatures and 112 attendances for the Peace Party, and 169 signatures and 31 attendances for the doubtfuls. The Middle Party thus had at least 60% of attendances and signatures of the Commons.

Taking both Commons' and Lords' attendances together, Pym's supporters from both Houses had a large majority, making up at least 50% of all attendances and signatures, while the Peace Party had a little over 30%. This is, however, a misleading way of estimating the general influence of the parties, for several reasons. Firstly, all meetings had to have a member from both Houses present; therefore it fell to a few enthusiastic members to attend regularly to ensure a quorum. This resulted in the Peace Lords exercising a greater influence than the aggregate total for the Peace Party suggests, as they almost always had a member at every meeting. Looking at the Table of Attendances ^{125.} it can be seen that the Peace Lords were personally the most enthusiastic attenders among the Lords, providing, apart from Say, the five most frequent attenders. Secondly, the total number of attendances and signatures are almost exactly equal for the Lords and Commons. On the average, there must have been the same number from each House in attendance at each meeting. This usually made it impossible for meetings to be dominated at any time by the representatives of the smaller groups, especially the War Party. The Peace Party from the Lords

and the Middle Party from the Commons had their representation as-
sured. Thirdly, looking at the list of the most frequent attenders, 124.
6 of those who attended more than 50 times (18 members), were Peace
Lords, compared with 8 Middle Party men from both Lords and Commons.
Hollis, a Commons member of the Peace Party, brings its representation
among the most frequent attenders up to 7. The War Party had only
two, Marten and Vane, and in the absence of any detailed information
we must class Evelyn as a 'doubtful'. Once again we see that although
the numerical attendance of enthusiasts was more or less equal between
the two main parties, the Peace Lords had the advantage. One or more
of them was very likely to attend every meeting, whereas the Middle
Party supporters were spread over two Houses, making it less neces-
sary for the Middle Party Lords to attend. It will be seen later
that when Pym did exercise the whip to increase the representation
of his supporters, he had to rely more on Commons members than on the
Middle Party Lords. On the other hand it is true that the Middle
Party activists, if so we may term the frequent attenders, made up
50% of the attendances of all the activists, while the Peace Party
contributed only 37% of the attendances and signatures. The same
percentages of 50% and 37% attendances respectively for the two
parties apply to the total number of members who attended, and also,
more approximately, to the over-all number of signatures. Thus,
both the complete attendances and those of the most active members
were dominated by Pym's group.

These facts do not, however, invalidate the proposition that

the Committee of Safety represented a growing tendency towards conservatism. To show this, a closer month by month analysis of the relative strength of the groups and individuals is needed. Two graphs have been drawn ^{125.} showing simultaneously the number of attendances by each group month by month. Appendix 3 shows the activity of the very poorly represented House of Commons War Party, the House of Commons Middle Party and Peace Party, the House of Lords Middle Party and Peace Party, and Appendix 4 the combined strength of each party from the two Houses together. The unclassifiable commoners are not included, because on Hexter's analysis, it is not possible to place them consistently in any party. If anything, it can be assumed that as a rule they would have thrown their weight behind Fym. The number of signatures on warrants is shown on the chart, ^{126.} beside that of the number of daily attendances, but is not graphed separately, as these figures reflect the attendance figures very accurately.

The graphs show clearly the over-all predominance of Fym's supporters between July 1642 and September 1643, from which time the Peace combination took a slight lead. But at the same time it can be seen that the lead of the Middle Party decreases fairly constantly, especially after May. It will be shown later that these two periods, from May to September, and from September until the end of 1643 are the times when most dissatisfaction was shown with the committee's policies. It is also in this period from May to December 1643 that the executive control so firmly founded by the committee in 1642 was gradually being resumed by the Commons and recommitted to committees, which, though more radical, were

nevertheless more responsible to the Commons than the Committee of Safety had been. Nevertheless, it is obvious that if Fym's supporters had a majority almost throughout, then this must have curbed the activities of the Peace Lords. After all, the latter's policies were contrary to the predominant feelings of the House of Commons, especially after the failure of the Oxford Treaty in March, and even more after the Waller Plot, when Fym succeeded in more or less squashing the influence of the Peace Party in the Commons. The combined effect of a growing radicalism in the Commons and the narrowing margin between the active Middle Party and the Peace Party in the committee made the House increasingly wary of the committee's doings.

Analysis of the attendances of individual groups reveals moreover, that the Peace Lords on their own did form the most consistently active group when compared either with the Middle Party Lords or the Middle Party Commoners. This fact alone would account for the growing suspicion of their influence in the committee, smacking as it did of "party" in the abusive seventeenth century sense. The Peace Lords scored especially highly when compared to their counterparts, the Middle Party Lords, who consistently attended less by an average margin of 12 attendances per month throughout. Their relative inactivity was to some extent mitigated by the increasing attendance of the Commons' Middle Party from February onwards, when they occasionally appeared as often as the Peace Lords, in what was probably a conscious attempt by Fym to make the Committee of Safety an organ of more radical policy. As for the War Party, the frequency of attendance of its three most assiduous members -

Marten, Vane and Waller - gave it an influence out of proportion to its comparatively small representation on the committee.

We have looked at the general performance of the various groups in the committee. It now remains to give an account of the activities of the individuals who made up those groups. ^{127.} This would also help to account for any predominance of one group over the others. For example, the poor attendance of the Middle Party Lords was not due to any remissness, but rather to their military activities. Of the ten in this group, Manchester, Grey, Wharton, Warwick, Essex, Brooke and Willoughby were engaged in military affairs for long periods during the committee's life and therefore could not attend regularly. Peterborough appeared only at the end of the committee's existence. This left Say and Bolingbroke as the only regular attenders. Similarly, an account of the activities of the Peace Lords provides clear reasons for their predominance over their Middle Party counterparts. Among the Peace Lords, Bedford and Holland were fighting for Parliament, although they later deserted to the king. Fielding, Northumberland and Stamford saw some action, although not until later in 1645. This left Howard, Pembroke and Salisbury in constant attendance, but Fielding, Bedford, Holland and Northumberland were also able to be present a great deal of the time. So, the Peace Lords had a greater core of regular attenders than the Middle Party Lords.

The most frequent attenders among the Commons members were none of them militarily active for long. Although the War Party's representation was weakened by Haselrig's and Waller's absence, Marten and Vane attended assiduously, both no doubt anxious to affect

the committee's decisions wherever possible. After Marten's ignominious ejection from the House, Vane was alone left to represent the extreme radical view.

The Middle Party of the Commons had a large non-combative contingent on the committee. Only Fiennes, Hampden and Stapleton were really active in the fighting. Of the other commoners Holles fought only in the early stages - the Brentford slaughter altering his whole political outlook. Merrick was a soldier, but most of the others were not. Pym and his nephew Nicholls attended most frequently; between them their attendances made up one fifth of the total attendance of all the members. Their presence was so regular a feature that there were several months when both attended all but one session, so that between them they covered every day the committee met and in some months one of them was present at every session - for instance, Pym attended all sessions in March, April and May. Even in those months when neither of them could boast a record of unflinching personal attendance at each and every session, one or other of them was present every day. Pym's became less assiduous only when ill-health kept him away from his work from October on. His personal attendance is in itself an indication that the committee did not become quite discredited, and he must have hoped that by building up the Middle Party representation under his own leadership, the Peace Lords' influence would diminish. However, apart from Nicholls, his support from other associates was not great, probably due to their other commitments. Glyn, who was one of the more active, though not high up on the list, was a member of many other

128.

committees of the House, as well as being Recorder of London, both time-consuming activities. Gerrard was Treasurer for the army, a full-time job in itself: Hampden, Fiennes, and Stapleton were often absent in the field, Barrington was a key man in the county of Essex. Thus the boost noticeable in Middle Party attendance from February on must have been very much due to Pym encouraging the others with his own daily attendances.

One may conclude about Pym's intentions in regard to the Committee of Safety that it was a favourite scheme of his to centralize executive power in Parliament's hands in this way, and he was prepared to lend it all his support; but when the delegated body began to show that its temper was less active than that of the House of Commons, he tried to bring it more into line with parliamentary policies. He was also prepared to allow some diminution of the Committee's powers in order to prevent the Peace Party distorting the conduct of the war. For instance he saw to it that other, more radical, committees were delegated by the House to deal with specific matters, even if they encroached on the Committee's domain. His great concern with, and constant attendance at, the committee must not make one forget that his schemes were always multilateral, and that he was not the man to let his own technical expedient for the direction of the war interfere with the effective implementation of his policies. Had Pym lived, it is unlikely that he would have pulled the Committee of Safety through. It was well on the decline before his death despite his efforts to revitalize it, and it seems likely that a few months later a new and more radical executive would

have had to have been formed. The diminishing rapport with the Commons, together with the prospects of cooperation with the Scots on an executive level render this conclusion likely. Pym's genius lay in his ability to manipulate the dissident groups in the two Houses. His attempts to steer a middle course led him to discredit the Peace Party in the Commons and indirectly in the Lords, when it looked as though the latter would have liked to terminate the war without any concrete advantages gained; and later, in his attempts to vindicate Essex and the Middle Party he did his best to moderate the attitude of the War Party. The Committee of Safety he saw as a bastion of moderation against the more impulsive radicals. But when, despite his efforts, the committee became too sluggish to suit even the supporters of the middle way, he was tractable enough to help in its dismantling, returning, for the time being, to ad hoc committees for specific matters, until a more efficient executive could be established. One reason why Pym's experiment with the Committee of Safety failed, was not because he was out of touch with the feelings of the Commons, but because he was unable to control its membership from the Lords. The one aspect of the constitutional expedient for executive government which he could not manipulate was the part played in it by the other House.

Besides the attendance figures, one or two other indices may be used to gauge the significance of individuals on the committee. For example, many letters, especially confidential ones meant for the Committee of Safety, were addressed directly to Pym. Strickland, the parliamentary agent, addressed all his letters to Pym from the Netherlands, ^{129.} and Weckherlin, whose intelligence work for the

committee took the form of deciphering messages,^{130.} not only received the secret messages from Pym's hands, but returned them to him personally. These consisted both of intercepting royalist messages, and secret communications from commanders in the field.^{131.} Pym also received at various times other, uncoded, messages from Manchester, Cholmley and Essex, each of whom addressed to him personally news that was meant for the committee. In addition Pym's own annotations can frequently be seen on the committee's warrants, showing that many of them passed through his hands.

Another indication of the importance of individuals in the committee is the choice of reporters of the Committee's activities and votes to the House. Once again, as would be expected, Pym had pride of place in this liaison capacity and reported on the whole gamut of committee matters.^{132.} Occasionally, in the early days, Marten reported on military and financial affairs,^{133.} Holles on the petition to the King,^{134.} Stapleton on the disposition of parliamentary forces,^{135.} and Pierrepoint on letters from the Low Countries.^{136.} These examples are too sparse to enable one to draw any conclusions about the strengths of the parties adhered to by the reporters, and in fact they probably represented a special interest in a special subject, rather than a political slant. This can serve as a reminder that by far the greatest amount of the committee's work was purely administrative, calling for experts rather than politicians.

Despite this we have suggested that the political balance of the committee did, on occasion, determine its efficiency - the supporters of a quick peace were unlikely to be assiduous administrators of the war machine. As the Committee's views became more and more out of

line with those of the Commons, it was natural that the latter would attempt to interfere with its activities. One example of parliamentary politics impinging on the activities of the Committee of Safety is the setting up in March 1643 ^{137.} of a committee "to have power to peruse every order or warrant past or future, made by the House or by the Committee of Safety for the payment of money by the Treasurer at Wars or the Treasurers at Guildhall, and to appoint under their hand which are to be first paid". This clearly shows that at least one function of the committee was not being efficiently carried out. Part of the maladministration of payment through the committee's warrants was due to insufficient care in executing the orders, and to a lack of clear knowledge where the money to pay the warrants was to come from. ^{138.} The men appointed to tidy up the muddled administration were Fyn, Vane, Cage, Bond and Holland. Cage's name never appeared on the warrants, but Barrington appears to have been co-opted. This is a clear sign that the committee was an attempt by the radicals to see that the warrants issued by the Committee of Safety were executed, thus increasing the efficiency of the war machine. It also gave the War Party a much stronger measure of control over financial matters than they had with their meagre representation on the committee, as they now could decide the priorities among the payments to be made. Probably Fyn hoped that in the face of growing criticism of the Committee of Safety's methods this concession to the radicals would improve the committee's position, and by making this aspect of its work more efficient, raise its status in the eyes of the House as a whole.

A week or so after its establishment, the Committee to peruse warrants became very active, and signed every warrant issued by the Committee of Safety afterwards. But the new committee also worked its way through unpaid warrants dating right back to the beginning of the Committee of Safety's activities. A warrant to pay some Dover merchants for bringing in powder was dated January 17th 1643, the order for payment was made for September to November of that year, but the receipts show that the money was not actually paid until January to March 1644. ^{139.} The retrospectively signed warrants show that some form of influence must have been used to get priority for payment, as the names of members of Parliament appear on at least a third of these early warrants, either as lenders of arms and equipment, or as officers. The amounts for payment vary from £20 to £3,000, and the expenses range from supplies of holsters, lost horses, and the payment of troops, to reimbursing Governors of garrisons. The committee simply certified every unpaid warrant for payment, specifying not only that payment was to be made, but in what instalments, and over what periods. In this respect it had some control over financial policy, as it could determine which items had priority. In some instances as well, the committee made provisions for the source of payment. ^{140.} The committee's powers were officially brought to a close on December 20th 1643, ^{141.} the power of issuing warrants reverting back to the Committee of Safety, which was, however, unofficially moribund by this date. The winding up of the warrants committee was just part of the close of this chapter in the administrative history of the Commons.

It has been argued that the Committee of Safety was an

expedient of executive government. Its powers were probably purposely left undefined so that its scope could be expanded or contracted as the situation demanded. This resulted in a blurred demarcation of function between the committee and that of the House and its other committees. The amount and scope of its work led to serious inefficiencies which were noted by the House, especially by its more radical element. Also despite the strength of Fym's supporters from both Houses, the Peace Lords exerted a strong influence in the committee. This created further suspicion of its work and a questioning of its efficiency as an organ of administration for the war, especially at a time when the temper of the House was becoming increasingly militant. It now remains to be seen how far the House took these considerations into account in forming its views on the Committee.

The hostile elements to the committee's activities were present from the start. Its original detractors were the Peace Party, especially D'Ewes, whose views we have in abundance, and those who objected to the activities of the committee being secret.

142.

An order of September 8th indicated that the meetings of the committee were crowded with members from both Houses, and the Commons initiated the move to hold the committee's meetings in private. D'Ewes probably had two reasons for his criticism of the committee; firstly, that the amount of business it transacted interfered with the constitutional functions of the House; secondly, that the whole thing was a plot by the "fiery spirits" to acquire greater power in the running of affairs. He complained of lack

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of business in the House due to the daily meetings of the committee which dispatched "all the great business of the Kingdoms which concerned that wofull and fatal civill warre". He inveighed against the highhandedness of the committee's actions: "The House had little or nothing to doe till they came amongst us and communicated as much to us as they thought fitting for us to know and then commonlie they had power to carrie by voices whatsoever they pleased." He is bitter about the trust placed in the committee by the House. "Noe debate that ensued upon. . . (the letter relating to the pawning of the crown jewels) but we referred all particulars almost which concerned the safetie of the Kingdoms to the committee . . . by a kind of fatalitie

144.

and implicate faith." It is obvious from his comments that his fears about the yielding of powers by the Houses to the committee were partly constitutional and partly political. He was supremely suspicious of any substitution of delegated authority for the final authority of the House, and at the same time he feared that the gullibility of the members would lead them to fall victim to the smooth talk of the radicals, whom he held responsible for the emergence of the committee from the start.

145.

In view of the fact that, as has been shown, the Peace Lords were a powerful force in the committee, D'Ewes' antagonism to it seems strange. It reflects however what was noted earlier - that the Middle Party's attendance at the very beginning was stronger than later, and the Peace Party's representation was smaller at first than the graphs indicate, due to Helles' mercurial behaviour. D'Ewes was perhaps initially not conscious of the strength of the Peace Party, both from the Lords and

Commons in the committee; the salient fact for him would have been the sole inclusion of Grimston from the Commons to represent what seemed to him decent moderation, especially when he looked at the large numbers of "fiery spirits", by which name he designated a combined group of Middle and War Party men, whenever their behaviour irked him. His lack of discrimination can be seen in his inclusion of Holles, Fiennes and Strode in this same category. Constitutionally, his feeling was of course astute, in that it was obvious to him that a small and powerful committee was not only a more efficient machine for prosecuting the war he hated, but was an instrument for political control by Pym and his associates.

It was not long before the radicals joined D'Ewes in criticism of the Committee. D'Ewes' disparagements admittedly predominated in its earlier months, but continued into October, by which time the War Party had joined the anti-committee campaign. D'Ewes was at a loss to understand their motives, and in November 1642 he ascribed Marten's constant attacks on a Committee on which he himself sat to "some private ^{grudge} ~~grudge~~". ^{146.} In his confusion it is not clear whether D'Ewes would have supported his outright enemies in destroying the committee if the occasion had warranted it - as Edmund Waller the royalist and Marten the Republican did later on. He does however show, perhaps unwittingly, the real cause of the War Party's attacks, namely, the growing influence of the Peace Lords. This influence became obvious to the House, through the discovery of a grant made by some of the Lords at the committee of a licence to supply the Queen with wine and wheat. The committee was saved by the opinion

of the House that "they agreed that the Committee did some things amiss yet they said that the Kingdome was now in a desperate condition and that therefore it was not a fit time to discontent the Lords or to dissolve the Committee".^{147.}

Henceforth D'Ewes and his colleagues adhered to this view, and grew less apprehensive of the committee's radicalism as it became clear that the Peace Lords were gaining more influence and that Holles had become a supporter of peace. It was left to the radicals to mount the final, decisive attacks on the committee.

An important cause of the growing criticism was the gradual realisation by the Commons of the extent of the committee's work. Originally such criticism was based on constitutional grounds - that the committee was performing functions which belonged more properly to the House; but when instances of inefficiency, due perhaps to overwork, were discovered then criticism became at once more general and more pointed.^{148.} On 5 November 1642, the House ordered the committee to sit on Sunday, an event so unusual as to be explained only on the grounds of pressure of work. Whittaker notes a report to the House from Vane suggesting that the work of the committee was too heavy, and recommending the establishment of more committees, for example to receive letters from the county committees and to answer them, to consider the state of finance and its administration for the war, to hear all complaints from constables,^{149.} and to care for the City's fortifications. This report cannot have been due wholly to War Party influence on the committee, for they were never at any session in a majority. It seems possible however

that they did initiate the move, for the choice of Vane as reporter is significant. Even more significant is the fact that on the day preceding the presentation of the report to Parliament the signatures on the committee's warrants indicate a complete absence of Peace

150.

Lords. It may be therefore that the Middle Party supported the War Party proposals in the hope that an increase in the committee's efficiency would improve its reputation in the House. Discovery of a blunder, whereby the committee had recalled a troop of horse from the field without the Lord General's knowledge, brought on

151.

another attack on December 14. Cornelius Holland, a War Party supporter, suggested that the committee be relieved of financial

152.

administration, and Marten took the opportunity to point out that the committee was overworked - "a pint pott could not hold a pottle of liquor".

153.

This stream of criticism merged into the broader one of objection to the Peace Lords' influence in the committee as revealed by its actions late in 1642. On 28th November the question of the

154.

continuance of the committee was raised in the Commons. The issue was shelved, because, D'Ewes reports, the House had no wish to antagonize the Lords. By 10th December this attitude had changed.

155.

When it was found that the committee had granted protection to known royalist malignants a separate committee of Dispatches was set up to take control of such protection out of the Committee of Safety's

156.

hands. This was the first effective limitation of the committee's powers. In the debate on 14th December it was Holles, a Peace Party man, who defended the committee in the Commons, and in the meantime

the Lords, well satisfied with the influence their members wielded in the committee, voted to sit only in the afternoons so that those members who were on the committee would be free to attend its morning sessions without interruption. ^{157.}

On 20th December the issue of dissolution of the committee was raised again, ^{158.} to be postponed for the last time. The evidence of Peace Party ascendancy in the committee was growing too strong and in February 1643 came the first ^{159.} direct censure of the committee.

The ostensible issue was the discovery of yet another major ^{160.} indiscretion of the committee. Some royalists had received warrants signed by the committee enabling them to leave the kingdom; this was regarded as showing too great a leniency to the king's supporters, and too great a susceptibility to outside influence, ^{161.} possibly from secret friends on the other side. Marten, Rigby,

and Morley, a strong War Party contingent, immediately seized the opportunity to urge once again the dissolution of the committee.

Although this question was shelved it was put to the vote whether ^{162.} the membership of the Committee should be changed. It was

not specified whether this meant a reversion to the original membership. Mercurius Aulicus, a royalist publicist, suggested that the War Party really wanted the committee to return to its initial ^{163.} size and membership;

on this view their tactics would appear to have been very devious, as they always said they wanted the dissolution of the committee. ^{164.} Hexter suggests that this vote to

return to the original membership was intended to "cripple" the committee. ^{165.} He cites as evidence the coalition of the War Party

with the extreme right as exemplified by the joint tellers, Edmund Waller and Henry Marten. Presumably his implicit argument is that the smaller the committee, the more likely it was to be overwhelmed by the work it had to do. But it is doubtful whether the War Party meant this move to be a destructive one. They may well have thought that they would not gain enough support to bring about the abolition of the committee, and a return to its original membership appeared to be a reasonable compromise. As Mercurius Aulicus points out, this would have meant that the committee would be rid of those "suspected to be turned Malignants". Moreover, it would revert to being a proper "close committee" rather than an open forum of large membership, more susceptible to outside influence. In other words, Aulicus suggests that this vote meant for the War Party a blow to the Peace Lords' influence and a return to the early period when they saw the committee as an agent of successful war prosecution. The strange coalition of Waller and Marten seems to contradict the views both of Hexter and Mercurius Aulicus. Waller, a near-royalist, ought not to have approved of the reduction of the Peace Lords' influence which return to the original membership would have implied. One can only assume that he was no longer interested in "changes from within" - changing the committee's policies towards accommodation with the king. His actions imply that he was intent on destroying the only executive organ Parliament had, and in this way crippling its effectiveness in the field. His motives and Marten's need not have been the same even if they acted together. The former may have been bent on the committee's destruction, the latter on its salvation in a more purified form.

Despite this startling combined effort, the committee's survival was safeguarded by an unwillingness of the House in general, and of Pym in particular, to see it either destroyed or else cut to smaller size by this vote, which Hexter judges, from the small numbers present (85),^{168.} and from its absence from D'Ewes' record, to have taken place very early in the day. Although it was the ever-present Lords who refused to pass the vote through their House^{169.} the Commons never revived the Bill, which surely indicates no great support for the Marten-Waller victory in a sparsely attended session. Pym's own attitude must have been that he was not prepared to return to the early form of the committee because the increased numbers were needed to do the work; nor at that stage did he want to be closely associated with a War Party coalition. Pym, however, was sufficiently worried by the attack and its implications to take steps to preserve the committee by counteracting the Peace Lords' influence. He intensified his own attendances, and perhaps urged his supporters also to attend more regularly, hoping to match them within the committee, rather than openly defy them by cooperating in their exclusion.

After this crisis had been weathered further evidence emerged about the inefficiencies of the Peace-Lord-ridden committee. This probably added to Pym's determination to see that his own supporters were more active on the committee. A warrant dated 18th February 1645 was discovered, signed by the committee, to plunder the estates of malignants in Kent, by which "they abused many innocent parties".^{170.} The House reacted in the usual manner by curtailing the committee's power, having its warrants looked at by the Committee of Examinations - at just about the time that its financial warrants were ordered to

be put under the surveillance of the warrants committee.

From February on, the committee continued to arouse antagonism and jealousy. In May there ^{were} further indications of the laxness of the committee's discipline and the weakness of its grasp of affairs. The Essex Members of Parliament wrote to Barrington in the county on May 19th, ^{171.} "Wee have endeavoured what we can to informe outselves about that business of Cambridge. The Close Committee does not sitt this morning and sett very seldome see that wee have litel hope to receave satisfaction from thence". Although in fact the committee sat on at least 16 days in May, there is no doubt that the number of its sessions declined after February, especially when compared with the 27 sessions of November and 26 of October in 1642. The constant erosion of its powers was beginning not only to affect its scope of business but its reputation as well. It became steadily more obvious that the committee's activities needed more and more surveillance.

In late July and August the question of the dissolution of the committee was raised again, and again a compromise ensued. Three new committees were set up, each of which encroached on the power of the Committee of Safety. One was set up as a watchdog, it was "to take information of such things as shall be offered them regarding the Defence of the Kingdom and to determine the Committee's powers"; ^{172.} another was to consider the authority of any committee for receiving or disposing of money, ^{173.} and, arising from this, one was set up on 28th September to ensure a steady and continual supply of money and suggest which committees were best suited for this. ^{174.} Mercurius Aulicus ^{175.} suggests that this last committee was specifically intended to exclude the Committee of Safety from financial administra-

tion, but even if this was not so, these three committees drastically curtailed its autonomy.

Towards the end of its life things got no brighter for the committee, as its inconsistencies and incompetence in administration were further revealed. There was Waller's statement that despite urgent instructions from the House to go to the Lord General's aid in the West, he had been ordered by the committee to remain at Farnham.
176.

There was the handling of the Earl of Denbigh - himself a member of the committee - who, it was thought, had been given far too great indulgence in the face of evidence of his relations with Oxford; he had also failed to obey the committee's instructions
177.
despite their despatching the committee's secretary to him.

Finally, Hotham accused the committee of gross negligence.
178.

At the same time as its powers were being lessened and its reputation sapped, its meetings, and attendances at them, were falling off drastically. It was constantly receiving orders to sit regularly
179.
from November on, and by December 18th the Commons' patience had snapped.

There seems no doubt that Pym's expedient for an executive organ in the Committee of Safety failed, due to the inexperience and the incompetence both of its members, and of the Houses which referred such vast responsibilities to it. These were lessons from which it was possible to benefit later. But the uniqueness of the committee's difficulties lay in the political pressures with which it was surrounded. The failure of the Committee of Safety need not be seen as detracting from Pym's stature as politician and constitutionalist - if it is remembered that Pym was

an inveterate experimenter, and that he was faced with the urgent necessity of coping with entirely novel political and administrative conditions with necessarily new and untried tools. The committee was primarily Fym's idea; he was regarded - and rightly so - as "the director of the whole machine"; ^{180.} the committee in effect died when he did. But Fym was not irrevocably wedded to the committee. Essentially a pragmatist, he never allowed himself to be obsessed by any single idea. He was always willing to learn lessons from failure, and knew how to salvage what was worthwhile from a sinking boat. He did try to keep the committee working as long as possible, but even, while doing so, the scheme for Scottish intervention and for the setting up of a committee of both kingdoms as a co-ordinating body was ripening in his mind, fertilised by the growing necessity to recognise that the Committee of Safety was a failure. Had Fym lived, there can be little doubt that he would have dominated the Committee of Both Kingdoms as he did the Committee of Safety. ^{181.} Always adaptable, he was astute enough to follow the winds of political change when the weather-vanes showed them to be prevailing from a more radical quarter.

The problem of responsible government was at the heart of the committee's failure. Although Parliament wanted a comprehensive executive, it also wanted control over that executive. When a group, the Peace Party, that was out of harmony with the feeling in the Commons began to dominate the committee's activities its days were numbered. Government had not arrived at the degree of sophistication whereby party strength in the legislature determined the

composition of the executive. As more radical views gained ground in the Commons this change was not reflected in the outlook of the Committee; quite the contrary in fact. To meet this situation the politicians of the day saw no other solution than the destruction of the existing executive and its replacement. Even Fym was powerless to prevent this. He saw clearly enough that what was needed was a diminution of Peace Party influence, to be brought about by an increase in Middle Party activity. But the mechanics of the business were beyond him, for at the same time as he tried to redress the political balance in the committee he had to fight to win a war. The committee, as Fym intended, was in almost complete charge of this operation; but its growing Peace Party bias prevented effective implementation of its objective. So Fym was forced to connive at the replacement of the committee's overall control by the formation of a series of ad hoc committees to deal with specific aspects of the war effort. These committees, moreover, were representative of the majority feeling in the Commons. Thus the Committee of Safety ended its days out of touch with the legislature and stripped of many of its powers. Had 'party' been more openly acknowledged its history might have been different, but, as it was, the Committee of Safety's attempt to anticipate responsible government by a hundred years was a well-meaning failure.

APPENDIX 1

ATTENDANCE AT THE COMMITTEE OF SAFETYHouse of Commons

<u>War Party</u>		<u>Middle Party</u>		<u>Peace Party</u>		<u>Others</u>					
<u>Sign. Atts.</u>		<u>Sign. Atts.</u>		<u>Sign. Atts.</u>		<u>Sign. Atts.</u>					
Haselrig	5	5	Barring-		Kolles	145	81	Pierre-			
Marten	278	96	ton	229	53	Grimston	80	31	pont	13	13
St. John	2	2	Brown	1	1				Vassall	9	8
Wane	220	104	Fiennes	9	7	225	112		Trenchard	1	1
Waller	85	35	Gerrard	4	4				Evelyn	142	51
			Glyn	111	76				Merrick	4	3
	588	258	Hampden	13	9						
			Nicholls	552	213					169	76
			Pym	597	227						
			Stapleton	57	31						
			Erle	2	2						
				1555	623						
Total Signatures				2537							
Total Attendances				1049							

House of Lords

<u>Middle Party</u>			<u>Peace Party</u>		
	<u>Sign.</u>	<u>Atts.</u>		<u>Sign.</u>	<u>Atts.</u>
Bolingbroke	226	85	Bedford	58	39
Brooke	31	14	Fielding	154	93
Essex	22	12	Holland	304	92
Grey	137	67	Howard	180	98
Manchester	110	63	Northumberland	289	80
Say	235	112	Pembroke	325	153
Warwick	79	44	Salisbury	120	65
Wharton	34	20	Clare	1	1
Willoughby	9	4	Stamford	22	16
Peterborough	1	1			
	884	420		1453	637
Total Signatures			2537		
Total Attendances			1057		

For Both Houses: Total Signatures 4874
Attendances Total 2106


APPENDIX 2

MOST FREQUENT ATTENDERS AT COMMITTEE OF SAFETY


<u>Commons</u>		<u>Lords</u>		<u>Both Houses</u>
Pym	227	Pembroke	153	Pym
Nicholls	213	Say	112	Nicholls
Vane	104	Howard	98	Pembroke
Marten	96	Fielding	93	Say
Holles	81	Holland	92	Vane
Glyn	76	Bolingbroke	83	Howard
Barrington	53	Northumberland	80	Marten
Evelyn	51	Grey	67	Fielding
		Salisbury	65	Holland
		Manchester	<u>63</u>	Bolingbroke
				Holles
	<u>901</u>		906	Northumberland
				Glyn
				Grey
				Salisbury
				Manchester
				Barrington
				Evelyn

LORDS AND COMMONS ATTENDANCES
AT COMMITTEE OF SAFETY

AUGUST 1642 - DECEMBER 1643



LORDS AND COMMONS ATTENDANCES
 AT COMMITTEE OF SAFETY
 AUGUST 1642 - DECEMBER 1643



MONTHLY ATTENDANCES AT THE COMMITTEE OF SAFETY

<u>House of Commons</u>		<u>WAR PARTY</u>					<u>MIDDLE PARTY</u>					<u>PEACE PARTY</u>					<u>DOUBTFUL</u>						
<u>Month</u>	<u>Haselrig</u>	<u>Marten</u>	<u>St. John</u>	<u>Vane Jr.</u>	<u>Waller</u>	<u>Berrington</u>	<u>Fiennes</u>	<u>Gerrard</u>	<u>Glyn</u>	<u>Hampden</u>	<u>Micholls.</u>	<u>Pym.</u>	<u>Stapleton.</u>	<u>Erle</u>	<u>Waller</u>	<u>Grimston</u>	<u>Merrick</u>	<u>Evelyn</u>	<u>Trenchard</u>	<u>Pierrepoint</u>	<u>Vassall</u>	<u>War</u>	<u>War</u>
		3 3				2 2	2 2	1 1		3 2	10 6	15 8	9 4		6 3		4 3					3 3	
		57 16	2 2	82 17	54 14	106 16			25 9	5 3	114 19	89 18	2 2	1 1	49 10	62 14			1 1	1 1	2 2	195 49	
		24 10		7 5		56 15			11 8		78 23	51 18				1 1	6 3	5 5				31 15	
		85 17		31 12	4 3	51 8			14 8	3 2	80 26	122 26			16 10	1 1	81 18			3 3	3 2	120 32	
		66 18		21 12	7 2	2 2			10 8	1 1	85 23	86 21	2 2		12 6	1 1	31 12			2 2	3 3	93 32	
1	1	8 7		3 3	6 5	1 1			5 5			50 19	1 1		7 6	2 2		3 3			1 1	18 16	
		10 8		5 5	9 5	2 2		1 1	3 3	1 1	29 16	27 16	4 4		3 2			5 3				24 18	
		8 6		5 4		2 2			6 5		11 9	19 13			6 6						1 1	13 10	
		12 6		7 5	1 1				7 5		18 10	24 11			2 2			1 1				20 12	
		1 1		19 10		3 2			9 7		4 2	27 16			2 2	1 1		2 2				20 11	
		3 3		10 6		3 2			5 5		14 8	28 13			12 8	3 3	13 9					13 9	
				14 10				1 1	6 5		27 14	29 15	4 4			5 4						14 10	
		1 1		6 6			2 1	1 1	3 1		19 12	11 17	5 5		10 8							7 7	
				2 2	2 2		4 4		2 2		13 9	10 8	1 1		4 4							4 4	
				3 2	2 1				1 1		9 6	7 6	2 2		5 5	1 1						5 3	
2	2			1 1					2 2		4 3	1 1	2 1		2 1	1 1					1 1	3 3	
				1 1					1 1		2 2											1 1	
											10 8		3 3	1 1	7 6	2 2						3 3	
				3 3					1 1														
													2 2		1 1								
3	3	278 96	2 2	220 104	85 33	228 52	8 7	4 4	111 76	15 9	527 196	596 226	38 32	2 2	144 80	80 51	4 3	142 51	6 6	8 8	9 9	587 238	

MONTHLY ATTENDANCES AT THE COMMITTEE OF SAFETY

MIDDLE PARTY					PEACE PARTY					DOUBTFULS					TOTALS																					
ones	Gerrard	Glyn	Hampden		Nicholls.	Fyn.	Stapleton.	Erie		Waller	Grinston	Merrick	Evelyn	Trenchard	Pierrepoint	Vassall	War	Middle	Peace	Doubtfuls																
2	1	1			10	6	15	8	9	4		6	3				3	3	42	25	6	3	4	3												
					114	19	89	18	2	2	1	1		1	1	2	2	195	49	342	68	111	24	4	4											
					78	23	51	18					1	1				31	15	196	64	1	1	11	8											
					80	26	122	26					81	18				120	32	270	70	17	11	87	23											
					85	23	86	21	2	2			31	12				93	32	186	57	13	7	36	17											
							50	19	1	1								18	16	57	26	9	8	4	4											
	1	1			29	16	27	16	4	4								24	18	67	43	3	2	5	3											
					11	9	19	13										13	10	38	29	6	6	1	1											
					18	10	24	11										20	12	49	26	2	2	1	1											
					4	2	27	16						1	1			20	11	43	27	3	3	2	2											
					14	8	28	13										13	9	50	28	15	11	13	9											
					27	14	29	15	4	4								14	10	67	39	5	4													
1					19	12	11	17	5	5								7	7	41	37	10	8													
4					13	9	10	8	1	1								4	4	30	24	4	4													
					9	6	7	6	2	2								5	3	19	15	6	6	1	1											
					4	3	1	1	2	1								3	3	9	7	3	2													
					2	2			1	1								1	1	4	4															
					10	8			3	3	1	1						3	3	16	14	9	8													
							2	2												2	2	1	1													
7	4	4	111	76	15	9	527	196	596	226	38	32	2	2	144	80	80	31	4	3	142	51	6	6	8	8	9	9	587	238	1528	665	224	111	169	76

APPENDIX VI

<u>Date</u>	<u>No. Days</u>	<u>No. Signatures in Month.</u>	<u>House of Lords.</u>		<u>PEACE PARTY</u>										<u>MIDDLE PARTY</u>										<u>TOTALS</u>																	
					<u>Bed-</u> <u>ford</u>	<u>Fielding</u>	<u>Holland</u>	<u>Howard</u>	<u>North-</u> <u>umberland</u>		<u>Pem-</u> <u>broke</u>		<u>Salis-</u> <u>bury</u>	<u>Stan-</u> <u>ford</u>	<u>Boling-</u> <u>broke</u>	<u>Brooke</u>	<u>Essex</u>	<u>Grey</u>	<u>Manch-</u> <u>ester</u>	<u>Peter-</u> <u>borough</u>	<u>Say</u>	<u>Warwick</u>	<u>Whart-</u> <u>on</u>	<u>Willou-</u> <u>ghby</u>	<u>Peace</u>	<u>Middle</u>																
1642.	<u>Sat.</u>																																									
Aug.	9	18	4	4	4	3	1	1	2	2	1	1			1	1	9	7						12	11	26	16															
Sep.	19	224	3	3	26	5	130	17	18	5	115	18			14	4	108	15	20	7	5	3	72	15	1	1	3	1	9	3	9	4	306	52	227	49						
Oct.	25	117	1	1			75	21	48	15	90	18			42	15	52	16					33	13	2	2	8	5	14	7	9	5	273	76	118	48						
Nov.	27	159	18	8	15	6	19	13	22	11	21	11			56	22	16	11					1	1	15	10	19	7	95	21	20	12	7	4	182	84	173	66				
Dec.	24	119	14	7	11	6	28	10	11	9	34	8			79	21	9	5	2	2	1	1	25	8	14	10			33	13	7	5			199	68	91	44				
1643																																										
Jan.	22	57	5	5	16	10	28	8	21	6	7	7			17	10	4	4	8	4			14	9	17	3			12	9	22	6			97	49	77	35				
Feb.	17	36	1	1	19	11	5	5	7	7	1	1			19	9							7	7	2	2			3	2	12	11			59	41	24	22				
Mar.	13	21			8	7	3	3	7	6					7	6	3	3							2	1	5	4	7	7			1	1	28	25	18	16				
Apr.	11	27	2	2	5	3	3	3							11	7	1	1	1	1					1	1	9	5	19	10			1	1	26	20	31	19				
May	16	31	5	4	12	11	3	3	7	5	1	1			16	9	5	4							13	10			11	7	1	1	2	1	49	37	32	23				
Jun.	14	33	2	1	12	9	1	1	4	4	3	2			17	10	5	5							13	7			7	5			2	2	39	27	27	19				
Jul.	16	36	2	2	14	10	5	5	8	5	4	3			27	15	3	3							10	8			8	7					67	47	21	18				
Aug.	14	24	1	1	7	4			9	8					14	11	4	2							3	2			10	8			1	1	34	27	18	13				
Sep.	10	14			3	3			6	6					8	7	4	4							2	1			3	3	3	2			17	16	12	10				
Oct.	8	11			2	2			5	5	3	3			5	5	6	4							1	1			3	3					27	23	10	8				
Nov.	3	4			1	1					2	1													1	1							1	1	5	4	2	2				
Dec.	2	2							1	1					1	1																	2	2	3	3	2	2				
1644																																										
Feb./																																										
Sep.	11	13			2	2			6	5	5	4			5	4	5	5							1	1			4	4					24	20	10	10				
1645																																										
Jan./																																										
Oct.	2	2			1	1					1	1			1	1																							3	3		
263		948	58	39	154	91	304	92	181	98	289	80	325	153	120	65	20	15	226	83	31	14	22	12	173	67	110	63	1	1	235	112	79	44	34	20	9	4	1450	633	919	420

The first column of figures under each name indicates the number of days present every week.

The second column indicates the number of warrant signatures for the month.

CHAPTER 7POLICY, DEFENCE AND INTERNAL POLITICS

The Committee of Safety, ideally, should have dispelled the need for any other parliamentary organs to consider the problems of defence and policy. But its conservative orientation, its "sit tight" attitude and its inexperienced lack of comprehensiveness made whole battalions of additional committees necessary. The work of these political and administrative committees may be weighed against the specific functions of the Committee of Safety and also against the scope of comparable committees before the outbreak of war. To highlight the development of specific policies various strands have been picked out which best illustrate the problems confronting Parliament at the outset of war and how they were resolved.

Problems of Liaison

Apart from the military difficulties which faced Parliament at the outset of the war it had to learn how to conduct the varied functions of centralized government. One important aspect of this was the establishment of an efficient liaison between the army, the two Houses, the City and the public. The Committee of Safety left some of this coordination to select committees and to conferences between the Houses. These conferences took on a somewhat different guise after the split with the king. Because of the volume of business and the width of scope, the Houses now held large "port-manteau" meetings embracing many urgent topics. A "good correspondence" had to be kept between the Houses due to their ambivalent

attitudes to some of the new situations arising each day and frequent meetings were needed to iron out common policy. These meetings might have taken up endless time if each separate matter were raised at a new conference. With the new method, a small team of managers from the Commons put their views on a large variety of topics to the Lords at every meeting.

Another clumsy method was to set up a committee in order to inform the Lords of particulars relating to the war. This cumbersome method soon died out. However, in addition to merely informing the Lords of affairs known to the Commons, there was often the need to speed them along when they held up matters which the Commons considered vital. Soon it was realized that the only workable method of keeping both Houses reasonably well informed was through the new joint committee which had been set up to deal with the administration of the war - the Committee of Safety. The members of that committee reported back to their own Houses on things they felt should have a wider airing. In this way the soundest connection between the Houses themselves as well as between them and the theatres of war was at once established.

But a more complex web of intelligence and liaison was soon needed to keep all groups connected with the war-effort reasonably informed. A committee was appointed to consult with the London Militia committee, which was at the same time to receive intelligence from the army and to supply it with necessities. In this way it connected Parliament with London, London with the army, and the army with its source of supply. Though admirable in intention, this committee did not fulfil its complex mandate,

but it did form an important link with the City. At the same time a committee was to go to the Lord General's army and to keep Parliament informed of what was needed there.^{5.} It was not given a free

hand to negotiate, but had strict instructions drawn up for it by yet another committee.^{6.} In this way Parliament was trying to ensure that its various agencies kept their place and did not overstep the functions prescribed for them. These committees differed from those of the earlier period in that they were quite small - two for the Army, four for London. All the members were politically active; Corbett and Purefoy were military men, whilst Vassall had London interests to suit their delegated positions.

A new problem for liaison arose in January 1643^{7.} when a committee to consider the relative authority of commanders in adjacent areas was established, to deal with incipient friction between the Fairfaxes and the Hothams. Their relative positions had never been formally defined. It was this ad hoc situation which, as in so many other cases, forced Parliament to clear up the vague mandates to both commanders.

The problems of communications and liaison were not settled until the properly centralized Committee of Both Kingdoms annexed them totally. This is illustrated by the bungled reception of the news of the Bristol Plot. Individual Members of both Houses heard of it independently, and numerous time-consuming conferences were held, before any orders were finally issued by Parliament.^{8.}

Legalizing the Executive

At the beginning of the war Parliament was faced not only with the problem of deciding what form the new executive government was to take, but with gaining the maximum recognition and authority for it if it were to be effective. Just as previously a committee had been set up to decide what powers to delegate to the temporary executive during the king's absence in Scotland, so a year later, an ambiguously named committee "to take information of such things as shall be offered to them for the defence of the Kingdom" was to prepare for a possible adjournment of the Houses, and to decide what powers were to be left with the Committee of Safety and with other committees which were to remain in action. ^{9.} Unfortunately there is no record of the committee's reports, although it was evidently very active, judging from the frequent additions to its membership. ^{10.} It is interesting that the House should have appointed a committee to decide what powers it should delegate to the more permanent executive committee. It had, of course, a clear precedent for this. The membership of such an important group, which had a strong hand in deciding on the form of the new executive Committee of Safety is worth looking at in detail. Four of the eight original members were War Party men, ^{11.} one was from the Middle Party, ^{12.} while the other three were specialists and ^{administrators} "Committeemen". ^{13.} Six more out of the ^{14.} seventeen later additions were War Party figures, the rest being ^{15.} composed more of lawyers and specialists than Middle Party men. It is clear that the War Party, which had poor representation on the Committee of Safety, was nevertheless instrumental in voting it great powers, which reflects their early optimism and the importance

they attached to this form of executive government as an efficient means of prosecuting the war. A clear statement of the powers to be exercised by the organs of the new government was a necessary preliminary for claiming its legality.

The embarrassments of illegality of the parliamentary position were reflected in a committee which was to issue a warrant enabling the Committee of Defence (or Safety) to give orders for payment of officers and for the disposal of arms. - essential functions of that committee.^{16.} The responsibility of "legalizing" the Committee of Safety's actions was taken by Pym, Glyn, Gerrard (all of the Middle Party) and Vane Jr. (Pym's eventual War Party heir). The fact that Pym and his supporters found it more important to lend their weight to the legal side of the committee's existence rather than to the delegated powers it was to receive, indicates that they considered the importance of the former logically prior. On the other hand no matter what decisions were made in advance about the Committee of Safety's powers, it was likely to impinge fairly generally on most matters which came before Parliament as a whole.

Internal Security

The measures Parliament took to maintain a reasonable amount of security on its own side were far more realistic than during the "scare" about Papists a year or so earlier. But the suppressive measures taken came to have more significance for finance than for security.

Already before the outbreak of war guards were taken against Parliament's insecure legal position by suppressing seditious literature and watching the printing licences.^{17.} Measures regarding the "ill-affected" were fairly liberal; there was a committee to see that no outrages occurred while their houses were being searched,^{18.} and later

all general warrants of search were withdrawn because of the abuses
 committed through them.^{19.} Frequent complaints from the counties
 about wrongful fining and searches were made to the Committee of Safety.
 It was of course in Parliament's interests to keep good relations with
 the fickle public, by seeing that justice was done in most cases. An
 act was framed to safeguard the "liberty of the subject in their own
 persons", to avoid arbitrary interference or wrongful imprisonment.^{20.}

On the other hand, the anti-papist measures taken nominally in
 the name of internal security were still a good weapon to stir up flagging
 enthusiasm, and a constant source of propaganda for unconvinced neutrals.^{21.}
 Positive moves were made to try to convert the "enemy within"^{22.} when an
 oath of abjuration was drawn up to identify the papists. This committee
 was also to look into the education of the king's children, and to begin
 the work of seeing that delinquents' estates were partly used to supply
 money for the war.^{23.} To safeguard Parliament's reputation at home and
 abroad, a committee was appointed to stop the spreading of "false rumours"
 about its activities^{24.} (of which there must have been many). On the
 other hand the wickedness of the royalist tactics was stressed on occasions
 like the Waller Plot where Parliament could be made to appear quite
 innocent.^{25.} To stop contact between the "disaffected" and the outside
 world and to ensure that their wealth did not leave the country, Parliament
 delegated such functions as issuing licences to all who leave the
 country,^{26.} searching all trunks and mail,^{27.} and so on, to select
 committees as well as to the Committee of Safety. The East India Company^{28.}
 was ordered to ensure that it did not export any delinquents' goods.
 Only by January 1644 however were the more positive moves for bringing
 delinquents to trial initiated.^{29.}

All these committees acted in a very ad hoc manner, and their appointment was evidently unplanned and capricious. The business they transacted was both too diverse and spread out too widely among the membership of the House as a whole so that it was the responsibility of no special group to see to security measures. As the Committee of Safety effectively put most real security measures into operation, these specific committees acted redundantly, and were probably only useful as propaganda to make a show of parliamentary sternness and leniency towards its enemies according to their desserts. No clear distinction between the work of these committees and that of the real executive can be drawn and the clumsiness of the combination probably helped toward the establishment of the far more embracing Committee of Both Kingdoms.

Paper Warfare

The complicated communications which were carried on with the king after the outbreak of war were almost all dealt with by select committees and not by the Committee of Safety. The evident propaganda value of offering peace proposals on the one hand, and indicting the enemy whenever the occasion arose, was exploited by the militant leaders in order to spur on the less enthusiastic majority, especially outside the House. Both sides tried to stir up as much ^{le}passionate self-righteousness as possible, perhaps to inflate their courage, but also to give the greatest appearance of legality to their stand. Orders and counter-orders were issued by both sides bidding for the obedience of the subjects in general and the militia in particular. Parli^{le}ament was especially careful to propagate the myth of defending "King and Parliament", presumably feeling that this rather preposterous piece of "double-think" needed a good deal of indoctrination before it would be accepted. The

preponderance of leading figures in the Commons indicates the importance which they attached to this enterprise.

30.

On August 11th a committee was named to prepare a covenant to bind together all supporters of Parliament in support of the Earl of Essex, and at the same time to prepare a declaration against the king's advisers, who called any support of the Lord General "rebellion". This idea of binding all the faithful together under a Covenant was to become a favourite theme of Pym's and will be discussed later, but it is obvious that its intention was to try to force the lukewarm to become active supporters, or else to declare their unwillingness to take up the parliamentary cause. The Peace Party against whom it was intended, was always trying

31.

to avoid this manoeuvre. Of the nineteen on this committee ten were

32.

radicals. As a result of its deliberations it was voted that all Members of both Houses should individually declare their support of Essex, which indicates success in weeding out the unenthusiastic.

33.

Throughout the paper battles, Parliament upheld the double theme of indicting the King's attempts to recruit his army, and vindicating the legality of Parliament's position. The former took the form of outlawing

34.

the Commissions of Array, declaring all who were recruited under Lord

35.

Strange traitors, investigating the erstwhile Members of Parliament

36.

who "advised" the king to issue the Commissions, indicting the king's

37.

38.

counsellors as papists and recusants, straight intimidation of

39.

those who accepted civic office from the king (such as sheriffs and wardens of companies), publishing useful intercepted letters which

40.

41.

made good publicity against the king, and eventually taking the ultimate

42.

step of impeaching the Queen. Most political capital was made out of the king's declaration that Parliament at Westminster was non-existent

once the Oxford Parliament had met. This led to a flurry of conferences and declarations decrying the rival Parliament as a disloyal upstart.^{45.} It was the obvious threat to the legality of its position which made Parliament especially vociferous on this issue.

The other side of the paper war was Parliament's vindication of its own position and its attempts to safeguard its employees. First, it indemnified them,^{44.} and enabled them "to use hostile acts in the service of King and Parliament"; secondly, it was indignant at the King's refusal to treat with committees of Parliament if they contained "traitors" - which was both an infringement of privilege and indicated a lack of willingness to reach a compromise;^{45.} thirdly, its point of view was stressed in answering the flood of royalist pamphlets;^{46.} and finally,^{47.} it extolled the achievements of the parliamentary military leaders.

While this theoretical battle for the last word was exploiting the propaganda value inherent in it, the more down-to-earth matters of getting together an army, supplying it with necessities and setting up communications and fortifications was also underway.

Politics and the Army

An important and unprecedented section of the work done by Parliament during the first months of war was establishing a method of coping with the day-to-day problems of engaging in a civil war. The need for a stable central executive was met by the formation of the Committee of Safety. But an amazing variety of functions, all related to the affairs of the army, was left outside the scope of that committee. As there is no record of its constitution nor of the powers delegated to it, it is possible only to gauge them empirically from what we know of its work. This can only be meaningful in a comparison with matters

not covered by the committee. The work on army administration which was referred by the Commons to other committees of the House will be looked at here, partly for comparative purposes and partly for its own sake.

The committees relating to supply and administration form a very good background to the major political battles which took place within Parliament, between Parliament and its commanders, between London and the War Party versus the Middle Party, between Essex and Waller and their respective supporters, and between the Middle Party and the Peace Party.

(a) The War Party's Struggles

Our first real insight into the political battle which the radicals tried to fight in the Commons comes on September 12th from Rigby's conflict with the Committee of Safety. Rigby spoke in the House about the need to send troops to Lancashire and Newport, as Newcastle was massing troops there for the King. He told the House that some London citizens were prepared to send 1,000 soldiers to the North at their own charge. Some Members interrupted him and said that this was a matter for the Committee of Safety to consider, but Rigby replied that although he had told the committee about the Londoners' offer, nothing had been done about it, and so he was forced to address himself to the House. Nicholls, speaking for the Committee of Safety, said that the Committee knew of the matter, "but had thought fit to lay aside all further care therein, in respect that they did conceive that there could not any force be so soon made ready to send from thence, as from the Lord general, who was himselfe now marching that way". As a result, Rigby's notion was laid aside.

Here we see that the Committee of Safety, with its majority of

Middle Party supporters and its large minority of Peace Party Lords, snubbed the offer of the London merchants to send a separate contingent to fight the king. This is indicative of Pym, when it suited him, acting in the early days in conjunction with the Peace Party. The idea of a separate London army, financed and controlled by a radical London group, outside the Lord General's authority persisted with the War Party.

Pym, always seeking to bolster up Essex's prestige and authority as supreme commander of the parliamentary forces, strenuously opposed all such moves. It was obvious that Rigby's scheme could easily lead to dissidence among the commanders as well as appearing disrespectful to Essex, especially as it seemed likely that there would be strong differences of opinion on tactics between the Lord General and the London commander. The radicals, who could get no satisfaction from the Committee of Safety, aired their political discontents in the House, and dealt with them largely through other committees where it was possible for them to play a greater role.

The relationship of Parliament with the City was complicated by the fact that frequent appeals had to be made to it to supply money for the Lord General's army. It was Pym's policy to combine the citizens' scheme for an army of their own with the needs of the Lord General by making sure that any regiment financed by them would be under Essex's control. Rigby's motion finally got a hearing on November 12th^{49.} when a committee to treat with a delegation of citizens was appointed.^{50.}

^{51.} Eight of the fifteen members were War Party men. On the following day another committee was named to treat with the citizens about their offer of men and horses, to ask their terms and under what command they

would agree to send this aid. ^{52.} The apparent duplication of committees -
^{53.} five of the members were the same - perhaps ensured an even more
radical composition. ^{54.} Five of its nine members were War Party while
the two earlier Peace Party members Grimston and Maynard were excluded.
It may have been felt that the more sympathetic the parliamentary commit-
tee was to the Londoners' views both politically and perhaps religiously, ^{55.}
the better the terms to be negotiated. At the same time another committee
was sent off to the Militia Committee in London, ^{56.} to ask them for more
troops to be sent to Essex. This was of course a quite separate request,
as the sponsors of the London Petition were an independent group, and the
aid they were proffering was entirely additional to the London contingent
from the Militia Committee. Strong reasons must have been put to the
London dignitaries of both groups to work for a combined war effort under
the Lord General's guidance, despite his unpopularity with most Londoners.
No matter how enthusiastic the War Party was for a speedy execution of
war on all fronts, nothing would be gained by dissent and disobedience
among the officers. So the ruse to set up an alternative and more radical
segment of the army failed, and the London contingent was put under
Skippon's command. The only concession to the citizens and radicals
was to ensure that Skippon's command was to be directly under the Lord
General "with the advice of both Houses". ^{57.} This was a poor substitute
for the hoped for independence of the London contingent. The splits
which had developed in the City itself about the pursuit of the war and
the attitude to the peace negotiations and the leadership of the army
have been fully discussed by Mrs. Pearl. ^{58.} Chute and his group were
evidently far closer in sympathy to the radicals, and it was his City
supporters who cooperated with Marten and his allies in the House in

repeatedly calling for a London volunteer army. The Militia Committee was of a more moderate hue and followed Pym's line more closely.

This episode was not the end of the attempts of the radicals to spur on the war effort by their own means. In January, a committee was set up to consider a proposal for raising an army of volunteers.

This scheme was dear to the War Party's hearts, and later a more concentrated effort took the form of an attempt for a General Rising.

On July 20th the House was presented with another London Petition. This presumed, in the interests of a speedy execution of the war, to name some members of both Houses to be invested with the powers proposed in the petition. The House was at first riled by this evident breach of privilege, but finally agreed to do just as it was asked because of the urgent necessity to get Essex going after months of gloom and inactivity. The committee was to enlist the petitioners into companies, to consider appointing a commander who was to have authority from the Lord General, and to receive all contributions to finance the enterprise. The committee appointed by the House consisted of Pennington, Morley, Blackiston, Baynton, Strode, Bond, Curdon, Marten, Hoyle, Rigby and Hayman of the War Party, with Waller added later, when it was mooted that he should command the forces raised. Only two others, both moderates, Masham and Asherst, completed the committee, making this one of the most highly organized and highlighted actions of the War Party. Their purpose was quite obvious. The scheme was to produce an army of enthusiastic volunteers with radical aims, and under the command of someone who could be trusted to pursue a policy of uncompromising effort to win the war. One might go even further and see in this scheme a method by which the War Party could gain more executive power in the House, by being the party

in closest touch with the most militant part of the army. This conjecture probably occurred to Pym and affected his actions. Certainly a parallel bid for power was made by the revolutionary Volunteers' Committee - a sub-committee of the moderate Committee of the London Militia. It was they who propounded that the volunteer army should be under the command of a London-appointed commander and be independent of other authorities. The eventual subsuming of Waller's authority under the command of the Militia Committee generally marks the eclipse of the scheme and the power of the sub-committee.

65.

64.

C. M. Williams discusses the relations of the War Party with the London Militia and the City radicals, and suggests that the petition was really a spontaneous move by the Londoners. It did however, fit the ideas of the radicals in the Commons perfectly, and was carried through on the floor of the House by every means at their disposal. The Committee of July 20th which they dominated so thoroughly, was to sit constantly at the Merchant Taylors' Hall, to look after the details and see to the collection of money. They proposed Waller for the army command and they began to proceed by nominating and drawing up instructions for a Council of War to act as liaison between army and Parliament. They were assured of the co-operation of the Common Council through the Lord Mayor who was on the committee.

At the same time as this radical scheme was afoot, hurried attempts were being made to get Essex's army into shape and to infuse it with more enthusiasm. The views of Pym's circle were echoed in the "Parliamentary Scout" - a licensed spokesman for Parliament. He commended the City's affection and valour but assessed realistically the king's

65.

present strength and pointed out that the weaker side should not take the offensive. This was implicit support for Essex, skilfully accompanied by cautions on the loss of trading involved in the Londoners' scheme. There was in any case no suggestion that it was a matter of alternatives - Waller's army or Essex's. On the committee to consider the defects of the Lord General's army and ways of improving it ^{66.} four of the nine men were War Party men. Evidently they were not motivated by the pure desire for political power, but rather they were genuinely concerned to try every available method of fighting the war efficiently by the handiest methods available, including polishing up the old army and using the threat of independent command for Waller as an incentive for Essex to become more active himself. In this they were supported by the general dissatisfaction of the Council of Essex's army. It was in response to the complaints of the Lord General's military advisers that this committee was established. At the same time it provided an answer to the political threat of the General Rising Committee. The recommendations of the committee to improve the Lord General's army were all sensible and administrative, such as guaranteeing pay, arranging for free quarter, and securing the cooperation of the Deputy Lieutenants to get recruits. At the same time the Ordinance ^{67.} for the provision of horses was hurried through the Lords. Essex himself then wrote to the two Houses saying that if there was not enough money to supply his army, the formation of another would only make his position more difficult. He also hinted at the disloyalty of some of his aides in misrepresenting his attitude to the war, and that any new recruits should be enlisted first in his army. Both Houses agreed to ^{68.} these rather pathetic demands on the part of the supreme commander.

Thus the Ordinance to Levy men "in a compulsory ~~was~~^{way}" to be drawn up by
69.

a committee of August 1st was in direct contrast to the volunteer
army, and was meant to get recruits for Essex. Once again, this was
not meant to be an exclusive alternative to the War Party's plan.

Fym, bound as he was to support Essex, clearly associated himself with
recruiting for him, and spoke for the compulsory method, while writing
more distantly of the General Rising: "The comon people seem very
hasty and earnest to rise in a body and to shutt up all theire shoppes". 70.

He was far more concerned to get the City to declare its faith in Essex,
and was instrumental in getting a deputation to do so. The more
radical scheme he evidently distrusted as ill-judged. Nicholls,
writing of the City's move to propitiate the Lord General, "I have
great hopes we shall bee all united together agayns" 71.
- presumably
meant the factional War Party to rally round Fym. In the meantime,
the radicals' plans were allowed to continue uninterrupted.

72.
On the following day, the Council of War was appointed.

The rabidly radical committee of the General Rising, appointed Fym,
Gerrard, Crew and Clotworthy as the political centre of the Council,
with Popham and Jephson as experienced soldiers, and some extra-
parliamentary men to represent different parts of the parliamentary
army. Nexter presents this triumph of the Middle Party as an early
defeat of the radicals, because he took it that the Council was appointed
by the House, which in this way voted its affirmation of Fym's views.
But if it was left to the General Rising committee to nominate the
Council, then the fact that Waller was the only radical amid the avowed
friends of Essex, indicates that they considered it to be an executive
for Essex's army, and not one, primarily, for the unborn volunteer army.

Hence the appropriateness of men whom the Lord General trusted, but who were nevertheless Middle Party men with positive attitudes to the war.

The fact that the volunteer army did not eventuate was not due to Pym's wiles, but to the fundamentally woolly-headed notion that potential soldiers could be lured by the prospect of pay by voluntary contribution rather than by reasonably assured and guaranteed pay. The enthusiasm of the parliamentary and London leaders of the War Party far outstripped that of the potential recruits, who failed to turn up in anything but laughable proportions. Pym doubtless breathed a sigh of relief after this fiasco, for there is no doubt that if the London volunteer army had eventuated in the terms in which it had been planned, then the War Party's importance in the Commons could have outflanked that of Pym and his associates, whose moderate policy and unenthusiastic General may have been swept aside in a rush of action and enthusiasm.

73.

The royalist pamphleteer Mercurius Aulicus suggested that the power of the Rising Committee would soon have been so great as to "quickly ease the close Committee of all further trouble", and made the telling comparison between the authority which the two committees would have had over the respective armies in their control.

The War Party were therefore not defeated by Pym, but rather by their own inexperience and idealism, as well as by the split in the City itself, between the London Petition sub-committee and the Militia Committee proper. It is doubtless the latter's propositions which Glyn presented to the House on July 29th and which in the end resulted in

74.

Waller's appointment as chief of the London forces, but under the Militia Committee's subordination. This was not a case of Pym defeating

75.

the War Party. Their aims for a well-oiled and efficient war effort were being thwarted by Essex on one side, and by the parochialism of the London troops on the other, for the Militia Committee was primarily concerned with the defence of London and not with a national policy. The appointment of their man Waller and the guarantee of 4,000 men meant that their aims were substantially implemented.

On the other hand, there is no doubt that Pym did work the whole situation to his own advantage, with the help of outside circumstances. It suited him to keep Essex in supreme control, ^{76.} and the appointment of an independent commander more under the sway of the militants in Parliament hardly fitted into his scheme. Although he did not appear to be openly against the General Rising, there is no doubt that the parallel moves to spruce up the Lord General's army, and to support the Militia Committee's stand (as reported by Glyn) were his inspiration. It is also evident that delaying tactics were used to bring the scheme for an independent army to nothing. Marten complained that matters could not progress because no commission had arrived from Essex for Waller. ^{77.} The House then asked Anthony Nicholls from the Committee of Safety to account for what had been done about seeing the Lord General; he replied that he had only been appointed to draw up the letter but not to procure the answer. This episode is curiously reminiscent of an earlier one, when Nicholls as spokesman for the Committee of Safety showed the committee stalling on Rigby's proposal for an independent army for the City. Once again the committee acted in accord with Pym's current line and the Peace Party's perpetual equivocations.

In view of Nicholls' delays, a committee was appointed to go to the Lord General instead. Their instructions were to tell him that

the Houses had agreed to settle his army with money, supplies, and new recruits, and to assure him that there were no aspersions cast on him. Only finally were they to ask him for a commission for Waller. ^{78.} The sugar-coating did not disguise the fact that a rival, albeit in an inferior position, had been enstated. The committee to take this medicine to Essex comprised of St. John, Strode, Crew and Pym. There was a division on whether Pym should join the committee, in which Reynolds and Glyn were tellers for Pym, and Dacres and Wingate against him. This makes it appear as though the Peace Party thought that Pym was the major hazard in the struggle over how the war should be conducted. In fact, as we have seen, Pym wanted Essex to prosecute the war more vigorously. But of those sent, it was St. John and Strode who represented the intransigents who wanted to see Waller pursuing a vigorous policy, if necessary outside Essex's authority, whereas Crew and Pym were presumably mainly interested in the other votes concerning the streamlining of Essex's army. ^{79.} D'Ewes' comments on this are therefore revealing. He says that St. John and some others were to get a commission from Essex for Waller. Some wanted him to be subordinate to the Committee of the Militia in London ^{80.} but the House did not take this up. "This was the publique pretence for which these men were sent to the Lord General, but the secret end, they being most of them very violent spirits, was, to draw off my Lord General if they could from his good inclinations to peace, but the Earl of Holland went out of towne before them to settle and confirme the said Lord General in that good resolution." In effect this was indeed Pym's aim, but what D'Ewes did not realize was that what he calls the ostensible reason was really the covert one, for Pym's aims were far less radical than the aims of those who wanted the

commission for Waller. D'Ewes thus shared with the other Peace Party men in the House the delusion that Pym was one of the fiery spirits, at a time when he was trying to curb the latter to his own more moderate designs.
81.

As we have seen the final rout of the War Party's schemes came when the expected volunteer force did not eventuate because no one was prepared to join when the pay was not guaranteed. On the other hand, the citizens were also not prepared to pay out without an assurance of an army to defend them, and on August 8th Marten reported^{82.} that the citizens insisted on conscription. This was at least partly due to the jealousy of the town tradesmen who were already conscripted, for the business left to the others. So the cry of "One and All" issuing from the Common Council stemmed not only from enthusiasm but also from mutual distrust.

When the House finally passed the vote to declare for a General Rising of volunteers on August 3rd^{83.} it was no longer a feasible idea. On the other hand the compulsory conscription mooted on August 1st with the recruitment of Essex's army in mind, and discussed as part of the proposals to persuade him to commission Waller, was passed in the House on August 4th,^{84.} but delayed by the Lords. In the end, although this London army eventuated, it did so as an adjunct to Essex under Waller -
85.
a clear victory for Pym.

(b) Essex and Waller

Now that Waller's position was no longer that of head of an independent army, his interest for the War Party became only technical, that is, they supported him as a known man of action, as distinct from Essex. But the battle between the two commanders continued after

Waller's position under the Lord General's authority was firmly established. Although it took place outside Parliament, it was reflected at every stage by committees in the House constantly seeking to keep a semblance of unity.

87.

A conciliating committee, consisting of a mixed body of men was sent to visit Essex and ask him to forget and forgive all the trouble arising out of the difficulties of command. The trouble of course arose partly from

the ambiguity of Waller's commission, which left him in subordination to Essex and the two Houses. In practice it was impossible to endorse every order, and Essex in any case was very resentful of action which might be construed as independent on Waller's side. The acceptance of some horses

assigned to him direct from the Earl of Manchester through the Committee of Safety was enough to get Essex started again on his incipient persecu-

88.

89.

tion mania. On October 5th a committee was sent to explain the situation to Essex, but evidently further trouble ensued, as on the 7th two more committees were dispatched. On the committee of the 5th the radicals

90.

predominated. Perhaps Essex was further incensed by the presence of such radicals as Naselrig who together with Waller was a recipient of the trouble-making horses. On the 7th the committee sent significantly

91.

contained no radicals, but at least seven Middle Party men. The conciliating nature of this group is shown by their assurances to the jealous Essex that Waller was fully under his command, that he was most willing to obey his chief, and that, if necessary, he was ready to hand in his commission, if this was what Essex wanted. On the same day

92.

another committee set out with a selection of Lords, to see Essex and to confirm that the Houses would waive their own authority over Waller so that no further doubt would arise from where his orders were to come. It was also evidently regarded more as a consultative

committee, being from both Houses, so that it was possible to discuss the matter sensibly instead of just bearing messages back and forth. (Essex had said that he had to communicate through the Lords only).^{93.}

This committee also was very moderate, including only Frideaux from the War Party, perhaps because the Commons did not want to have Waller's interests completely swamped.

The well-known temporary solution was for Waller to be sent off to the West. The committee which was sent to inform Essex of Waller's surrender of his commission must have pleaded with him to let the latter go off to a different theatre of war which would get him out of the way for the time being, while still nominally being under Essex's authority. At the same time he would be removing the other source of embarrassment to Essex, namely his own London army, which it was felt, was never happy under the ultimate leadership of Essex. Again we find one radical among three Middle Party men as the negotiators.^{94.} The similarity of the composition of this committee indicates a similar reason - to soothe Essex's suspicion, without quite forgetting Waller's interests.

It was of course the major aim of the Middle Party to work for the success of the reconciliation, or at least to produce a working compromise, and as we have seen, the War Party had nothing to gain from creating differences between the two commanders. Nicholls probably spoke for all the parliamentary leaders interested in a successful campaign. "We have been forced to spend some howres in the reconciling of our friends: when itt had ben better spent in the reducinge of our enemies The composinge of this business bee a knotty worke. Yet I doubt not but we shall doe it to the contentment of all."^{95.} On the

other hand no one was apparently deceived that the trouble between the two commanders was finally solved.^{96.}

(c) Essex and the Parties

On Essex's side it must be said that he also faced insuperable difficulties. He had continually to be asking for supplies and recruits from London through Parliament, and his natural inclination not to fight a winning war was certainly enhanced by the difficulties, irregularities and incompetence of obtaining money. It is evident from the committee which took his letter to the City on April 25th^{97.} that the War Party believed that the urgent supplies needed by Essex should be provided to enable him to go into action. In other words before the independent scheme of a volunteer army arose, the radicals certainly supported moves by Essex himself to equip his army, never having regarded their volunteer scheme as an alternative one to the Lord General's army. At the same time the War Party cooperated with the scheme to use sequestered estates for the war effort. The Lords had to be persuaded^{98.} by St. John and Pym to turn Capell's estate over for Essex to use. The jockeying to get the Lords to pass the various ordinances enabling supply to flow more freely was done by Pym, St. John and Vane.^{99.} On May 11th^{100.} when a committee went on the Lord General's behalf to get volunteers and conscripts from the Militia Committee in London, five War Party men^{101.} joined three others with London connections.^{102.} The War Party's own sympathizers in the City, as the later General Rising scheme showed, were susceptible to a plea for volunteers.

^{105.} On May 12th Essex himself spoke at a conference of the two Houses about his greatest needs. Apart from implicit obedience which

was missing among his subordinates, he most wanted "some certain spring of money and not to go, from time to time, upon Hopes". This, quite apart from Essex's vacillations, was a most genuine plea. No permanent fixed revenue for the armies had been established, and the constant appeals to London meant not only that the burden of payment was undistributed, but also that it gave the City too great a say in the policy of the war. Essex thus put his finger on one of the greatest faults of the war machine to date.

Despite this, on the following day another committee was sent off to get money from the Common Council. As a contrast to the radical one which went for men, this comprised Fyn and three supporters, Soame and Lumley with City connections, and only Mildmay of the radicals. We know that some of the men who held the purse-strings were not as radically disposed as the Lord Mayor, but supported the middle-of-the-road policy of the Militia Committee.

Another fact of the troubles with the Lord General arose in July. Essex made a specific demand to the Lords, for constant recruiting of horses. Both the managers of the conference and the committee to join the Lords in seeing him were moderates. It is interesting that whenever the Lords acted in conjunction with a Commons' committee the ^{War} Party appeared less active. Here the Middle Party supported the Lords in a measure which provided no danger to the status quo and which would only palliate the distresses of the army. But a few days later it was apparently decided in the Commons that something more drastic and fundamental must be done to make the army efficient. On July 11th a committee was dispatched, this time without any Lords, consisting

of four War Party men with Glyn and Pym. On the 13th a larger committee was set up to consider what could be done to prevent the troubles afflicting the army, which Essex said he could not prevent alone. 108. This committee was also to see to the safety of the City, and to discuss it with the Militia Committee. At last then, this was a committee which needed to employ no piecemeal methods but could do some fundamental reassessing. As we might by now expect, it consisted of at least eleven War Party men out of twentytwo with only three definite supporters of Pym. The outcome of its meetings (which were unrecorded) was interrupted by the unexpected London Petition, which as we have seen probably surprised the War Party as well. Until the more appealing scheme for a volunteer army arose, the radicals took part in any policy to promote effective action on the part of the army, and to this extent they certainly backed the Lord General.

At the same time Pym won a decisive victory over the Peace Party in the House following the final collapse of the Oxford peace negotiations in April and the subsequent discreditable Waller plot. He demolished opposition on the other side of the House through his victory over the radicals' scheme for a volunteer army. As a result it became necessary to make sure that the man whose interests he had protected should justify the faith put in him. On August 15th Pym, Glyn and Vane went to Essex to tell him that he was expected to be ready to march, and to assure him of the City's backing. The collaboration between Pym and his more radical colleagues now became firmer for several reasons. The Peace Party was demoralized; Bedford and Holland began a series of defections among the Peace Lords; the radicals' own separate scheme

for military victory had failed; and finally, Pym had revenged himself upon Marten whom he regarded as the most intransigent, unpliant and dangerously republican of the War Party leaders, and had managed to dispatch him to the Tower. This cooperative spirit is illustrated by the combined efforts of Pym, Glyn and Gerrard of the Middle Party, Vane, Mildmay and St. John of the radicals, and Vassall with City interests to hurry the citizens along in sending supplies to the Lord General. 110.

Much had happened since the committee of July 13th to consider what the army needed to make it a workable and efficient force, and the committee had sunk into oblivion. But on August 18th a similar coordinating committee was set up to correlate the needs of the army with the collection of men and money from the City. This committee also was composed of fairly equal numbers from both main groups - seven War Party men, six supporters of Pym, and Reynolds, Cage and Wilde as the administrators. Organizing an effective army now became a joint enterprise, rather than the special concern of the radicals. In order to obtain immediate action the House did not wait for the recommendations from this committee but dispatched another to London to urge the City for immediate supplies to relieve the Lord General's army at Gloucester. This committee comprised of two radicals and Pym with two supporters, apart from Members from those counties which were to send men. By contrast, a committee sent by the planning committee of August 18th with some of the Lords to discuss with Essex the state of the army and to see it in action, consisted entirely of Middle Party men apart from St. John, and some chosen for their military background. This indicated further the Commons' policy not to be represented by radicals in joint committees with the Lords, more especially as there was now no 111. 112. 113. 114.

point of policy to be decided on, but purely administrative detail. The composition of these committees reflects what Hexter calls Pym's last and greatest work - the restoration of unity, and the organization of effective military action in September. ^{115.} The cooperation lasted until Pym's death when the Middle Group lost most of its influence, and the ascendancy of the radicals was established. But in September the balance was well kept. The committee to arrange the final details with the City for their well-equipped troops to march on Gloucester consisted of Pym and three supporters, two radicals, and others of specific interests, such as Long, for his knowledge of naval needs, and Ashe, Lisle and Wilde because of their London connections. ^{116.}

After the events at Gloucester and the joyful return of the citizen army, it became obvious that the Lord General's army could not continue its hand-to-mouth existence. No matter how the Londoners felt about leaving their occupations to defend other parts of the country, the loss of Reading probably helped to drive home the need for some more settled method of carrying on the war, not for the protection of distant borders, but in the interests of London itself. As a result we find a spate of committees oscillating between Parliament, the City and the Lord General to get some machinery in working order.

^{117.}

On October 12th a committee to look after the supplies of the army and to act as liaison with the City was established. This was to see that horses were requisitioned equitably from all the counties, and it was also to look into the re-employment of the Scottish reformed officers. ^{118.} Another, on the same day, was also to deal with supply, and although evidently appointed as a standing committee, there are no reports to indicate in what way it differed from the previous one. This

was followed by yet another to join the Militia Committee to see to the re-employment of the men who had returned from the last affray. On 119.
 120.
 October 17th a committee was sent off to the Lord General to inform him of what measures had been taken to get his army ready, and "to prevent inconveniences to the counties which contribute to support the army", presumably to avoid creating enemies in friendly territory by collecting Assessment Money and taking free quarter at the same time. All this concerted activity does indicate that the problem of the army was at last being considered as a whole, and that some attempts were being made to create a more than ad hoc expedient to keep the fighting forces supplied and in good order. This thorough reorganization was shared equally between the two parties and is a manifestation of Pym's 121.
 successful bid for cooperation.

(d) Splits in the Coalition

Most of these committees were open to "all who come", a method of procedure not tried since the early days of the Committee of Safety, and dispensed with at that time because it lowered the efficiency of the committee's work as well as allowing outside pressure to form too easily. At the same time, on December 9th another old practice was revived - 122.
 dealing with important matters in a Committee of the Whole House. The House spent whole days almost exclusively considering means of supplying and recruiting the Lord General's army. This method too had previously been rejected as too cumbersome and time-consuming, especially as the noted wind-bags in the House could speak as often as they wished without anyone to stop them. Its revival at this stage appears to be linked with the slow extinction of the Committee of Safety, which

was grinding to a standstill at this very time. No doubt, having proved so unsatisfactory, the immediate reaction was to return to the methods in use before its inception. The War Party especially had felt excluded and had fought against the committee almost from the very beginning. They probably felt by contrast that completely open meetings were bound to be healthier in promoting their own ideas than the stifled atmosphere of the committee with its strong Peace contingent and secret manoeuvrings. The War Party had by now almost for the first time the support of the majority in the House through the cooperation of the powerful Middle Party, and this too would have inclined them to favour for the moment the methods of open committees and Committees of the Whole. By the time they began to feel really sure of their support, they reverted back to the system of close committees in the form of the Committee of Both Kingdoms.

123.

D'Ewes suggested that much of the cause of the muddle and lack of a consistent policy was a factional split about which theatre of war, and therefore which army leader, should be preferred. This division followed naturally on a system of different armies under commanders with only a nominal central command, and very little overall planning or strategy. Pym's hand, too, was missing now, to give coherence and balance

124.

to the proceedings. To some extent, the confusions and splits were inherited from his policy. Thus Vane was said to have been lobbying for the Scots and the diversion of most of the effort and money to the North. His support came from the northern members who had had their estates confiscated and were anxious to have them freed. The collaboration with the Scots and their ultimate re-entry into England had of course been plotted by Pym, and Vane's interests were not entirely

financial as D'Ewes suggested. He was one of the prime movers behind setting up the Committee of Both Kingdoms. Then there was said to be a group supporting Waller's campaigns in the West and the several associations of counties which were outside Essex's command. Trenchard and Prideaux, both west-countrymen, were the leaders of this group. And finally there were the supporters of the Lord General himself, led by his old friend Stapleton and others who held command under him. This group according to D'Ewes was by far the largest. These local interests of the members cut across the political divisions and the group which had acted fairly consistently under Pym and had supported Essex, now split according to which Association their county belonged to. Until the formation of the New Model these sectional interests were bound to interfere with a truly national outlook toward the prosecution of the war.

This interpretation of D'Ewes of the division among the ranks of the "fiery spirits", emerges out of the blue in his narrative. It indicates a very early split in the alliance of the Middle and War Parties which had only become effective from about September on, and was based on quite different issues than their previous dissensions. The new contention was not how vigorously the war should be prosecuted - the alliance was based on agreement that it should be a total war - but where it could be most effectively fought, and under whose command. Over the latter point, some divisions have already been noted. With Pym's frequent absences followed by his death, support for Essex was no longer an essential issue keeping the Middle Party together, and it is quite conceivable that in the political vacuum immediately following, local pressures and sectional interests crept in to cause divisions even among Essex's former supporters. However, his supporters were still

the largest group, and we can assume that the majority of the Middle Party remained faithful to him for the time being. It was among the smaller core of the War Party that the division seemed more obvious, with Vane and the Northerners ^{125.} and Prideaux leading the west-countrymen. ^{126.}

Yet another contender for power emerges from a later comment of D'Ewes. ^{127.} Glyn, speaking as he had in the past, on behalf of some merchants and the London Militia Committee with which his interests as Recorder were no doubt enmeshed, ^{128.} suggested that a London militia-man Colonel Browne (whom D'Ewes designates as "the woodmonger") should lead a force into the surrounding counties, to fine and imprison malignants. Mildmay, also speaking for the Militia Committee, said that they felt taxation on London ^{was} ~~was~~ disproportionate, and that they wanted to see whether the local Deputy Lieutenants and county committees did not under-assess their counties' contributions. Vane Senior spoke against this novel idea. He thought it would ruin Waller's authority in the Associated Counties, and feared that it would lead to uprisings against what might be regarded as robbing and spoilation by the Londoners. Strode supported him by "speaking sensibly" against the Ordinance, which was rejected. No doubt such partisan action on the part of the London Militia would indeed have led to further strife and created many enemies out of the uncommitted. But it is interesting that there was at this time a "London lobby" which was not identified with Waller's supporters. We have seen that the London Militia was not noted for its national outlook, and here too it was acting in a destructively parochial manner, whatever the justice of its claims to be overassessed. It cannot therefore be identified with the radical supporters of Marten during the General Rising scheme, and Glyn, its spokesman as in the past,

was never a supporter of radical action. Vane Snr. is too shifty a political character to be used as a yard-stick of orientation. But two staunch War Party men, Mildmay and Strode, appeared here on different sides, indicating yet another split in the old allegiances.

Despite these differences however, the Committee of the Whole did finally lay down some rules about recruiting and pay, fixing the monthly assessments for the counties, and the distribution of spending. This indicates that the immediate problems of the Lord General's army were still prior to the preferences of groups for favoured treatment in special areas.

The Oath of Association

The political battles of this period did not all centre about the personality of Essex, nor about the struggles between the Middle and War parties. Throughout 1642 to 1643 one theme recurred, inspired by Pym and reflected in the activities of the committees - namely, the idea of an oath of association. Pym's aims in this regard were simple and understandable. Firstly, he wanted to make the Peace Party declare themselves unequivocally on Parliament's side, or else to leave at once for Oxford. Secondly, he wanted to distribute any guilt or responsibility for the actual hostilities among all his supporters equally. And thirdly, he wanted to tie the City and Parliament together as firmly as he could in order to be sure of the centre of strategical and fiscal power. The idea of an oath to be taken by the faithful was obviously inspired by Scottish covenanting principles. Indeed, it was often referred to as the Covenant, though quite distinct from the religious one linking the two countries, which Pym had certainly been planning to achieve throughout his life, but which he did not live to see.

The idea was first mooted by Pym as early as October 1642 on the occasion of Charles' refusal to accept a petition of peace from Essex's hands. ^{131.} The occasion had no real relevance to the idea of a covenant except that it seemed a useful time, when the maximum number of members were likely to be worked up about the king's intransigence and his infringement of parliamentary privilege. It also coincided with the time when all kinds of measures to legalize Parliament's actions were being thought up. ^{132.} Pym hoped to bolster up Essex's insecurity in his command of what he half felt was a mob of mutineers, and to provide him with the comfort of safety in numbers.

The group which went with a committee of Lords to the Common Hall to discuss the necessity of an Oath of Association ^{133.} was a mixed one. Of Pym's immediate supporters there were, apart from himself, only Onslow, Darley, Ayscough and John Wray; the radicals consisted of Ludlow, Holland, Wallop, Mildmay, Marten and Rigby; then there were three who soon left Parliament for the king - Herbert, Eversfield and Verney; and there were confirmed Presbyterians who may have seen this as a healthy move in the direction of a religious Covenant - Evelyn, Jervoise, Darley, Lord Ruthyn and Wheeler; others again had London connections useful in a scheme to bind the City to Parliament - Middleton, Wheeler, Lytton and Pye. The Peace Party proper, who interestingly enough were not represented, were averse to this kind of Covenant. ^{134.} Yet it is understandable ^{that} even some eventual royalists should have seen the necessity for providing some safeguards for Essex. Anyone who had any doubts about the legality or wisdom of his stand would prefer to be bound to as large a group as possible so as to diffuse the guilt. ^{135.}

^{136.} In March 1643 the Oath of Association came up again, this

time prompted by London. A committee was despatched to the City to get supplies for the Lord General's army, and ^{was} made up of Fym and his associates some of whom had London connections. They reported back that the City was unwilling to send supplies until it was satisfied that certain radical demands were fulfilled - that malignants' estates should be far more rigorously sought out and taxed, and that a way should be found to force men to contribute their fair share to the cause. At the same time as proffering these lessons to Parliament in how to run its affairs, the City suggested that an oath of association should be taken by all parliamentary supporters in order to set an example to the country, and encourage the tardy to lend. By March, then, Fym evidently felt that there was no need for the support of the radicals in the House to get his scheme across - indeed he may have hoped that with fewer "fiery spirits" to stigmatize it the appeal of the idea might be wider, especially as all realized the crucial nature of the City's support. But of course to the orthodox Peace Party the dissociation from his radical friends meant nothing. They regarded Fym as the leader of the "fiery spirits" by this time - "That insolent, proud, fieriespirit Mr. Fym (whome I once much esteemed for that pietie I conceived had been in him)"; ^{137.} and did not differentiate between what Hexter has termed the Middle and War Parties. They rightly saw this as a scheme to break up the peace negotiations, and to get rid of the unreliable elements in ^{138.} the House. Fym may have realized that the failure of the scheme at this stage, when it was introduced through the inappositeness of the City radicals, would only prejudice the chances of bringing it up more successfully later. He was astute enough to see that the City's outrageous tone in telling Parliament what to do would antagonize the

moderates and lead automatically to the defeat of the Oath. He therefore voted against the motion. The Peace Party, convinced of his cunning, merely took this as a sign of his Machiavellianism, rather than as an attempt to appease them.

139.

On April 10th the Oath was raised again. A committee was set up to consider the desires of the citizens for a covenant and oath of association. The composition of this committee was again a curious mixture; Fyn, Glyn, Rous, Gerrard and Browne, all Middle Party and Presbyterian; Marten, Wentworth, Millington, St. John, Ludlow, Strode, Bond, Venn and Pennington of the War Party; Maynard, Selden, Grimston and Holles of the Peace Party and mostly Presbyterian; Wilde, Reynolds and Cage, all active Puritans and committee-men; and the other London burgesses Vassall and Spurstoe. This was perhaps the only committee of the period which included the leading men of the three major political groups, and, if we are to believe D'Ewes, it must, for once, have represented a membership not united in bringing in the matter in hand. He

140.

says of his colleague Selden that he "abhorred their (the radicals') course", but that he was nominated and appointed to the committee, despite the fact that the commitment of the issue was carried by "the violent spirit in the majority". It was most unusual for members who were against the whole purpose of a matter to be named as members of a committee dealing with it, as we have seen. There is no doubt that at a time of peace negotiations this measure to pinpoint friends and enemies was a radical move calculated to upset the negotiations. So we can only conclude that Selden and his friends were on the committee to hinder its work. This seems confirmed by the absence of any member of the

141.

Peace Party from the committee of June 9th. The Waller Plot

which preceded it, worked miraculously in removing the wind from the sails of those who still hoped for accommodation with the king, and Fyn used the well-timed desertion to excellent political advantage. The Peace Party to a man agreed to taking the oath against which they had stood out for so long, presumably seeing at last the justice in trying to identify the vipers in the bosom of Parliament, as well as being anxious to remove any stigma attaching to themselves possibly being of Waller's persuasion. The instructions for taking the covenant were drafted by five of Fyn's associates and three radicals, but no-one from the Peace Party. On July 19th however, a committee to consider how to vindicate the oath and covenant included Selden and Whittaker of the Peace Party, as well as Tate and Marten of the War Party, and a variety of others in between. It is certainly unlikely that anyone in opposition to the oath would have served on a committee to think up reasons for justifying it. In any case, D'Ewes, who was as pacific as anyone, was already on paper as supporting the oath on June 6th, right after the discovery of the plot, pretending that the oath was now phrased in more moderate terms than in the past. In fact, no doubt the victory of the Middle Party over Marten's more radical demands was a relief to the Peace Party at a time when they felt forced to associate with the supporters of the oath. Their absence on the committee of June 9th was most likely due to uneasiness in changing their tack, whereas a month later they felt safe to support the measure openly. Another reason too, may be put forward. It was noted that the curious mixture of political groups in the committee of April 10th contained a large number of active Presbyterians who were all members of the Middle Party and the Peace Party, although there were none among the War Party. Their common

religious affiliations had not prevented a split on the issue of the oath of association at the stage when it was politically advantageous to wait for the outcome of the peace negotiations. But it could well have played a part in cementing the agreement later, when the political hopes had been dashed. The religious parallels of the covenant could hardly have escaped the Presbyterian Peace Party members.

In addition, there is evidence that not all Peace Party proponents were happy about the position which Charles took at the negotiations, and even D'Ewes would hardly have accepted the terms the king offered to Parliament in April. To dishearten the Peace supporters further, Cholmley, who had been one of their leading spirits, deserted to the king in what appeared to be a traitorous manner, and Lord Holland told D'Ewes that the king was being unreasonably intransigent. Admittedly if the majority of the Peace Party had been in favour of the Covenant there is no reason why it should not have been passed in April. But it is possible that there was a split in the ranks of the moderates and the Peace Party about the timing and advisability of the measure, and despite D'Ewes' own antagonistic comments, it is possible that the leading Peace Party men actually thought that Charles had already betrayed them. Selden need not have been specifically against the Covenant, as D'Ewes merely records his abhorrence of "their course" which could have meant the general policies of the fiery spirits.

Another occasion indicates that there were some splits on the issue of the Oath of Association - this time when Essex was asked to see it administered to the army. ^{144.} On June 29th a letter sent by Pym and Strode asked him to administer the oath to the army and mentioned the

supplies that had been sent. Essex was evidently unwilling to aggravate the situation with the king any further at this stage, and had failed to acknowledge Parliament's previous nudges about the oath. ^{145.} D'Ewes comments that the letter to him "was penned in soe low unworthy and submissive a way" - using "his Excellency" twelve times, that most voted against it and blamed Pym for mismanagement. Marten actually said the letter was demeaning to parliamentary dignity, as Essex had completely ignored the last occasion when he was asked. In the end the letter was sent. Obviously Strode and Pym thought that if obsequiousness could get the oath accepted it was worth trying, whereas Marten spoke against his War Party colleague with the evident tacit support of D'Ewes. This adds to the impression that the oath of association was not a clear issue of party division, although broadly it did serve to push the Peace Party into line.

The final stroke in achieving the entire if unenthusiastic support of the Peace Party came on August 23rd ^{146.} when a committee was set up to consider which M.P.'s had violated the covenant by leaving Parliament altogether or by non-attendance and equivocation. ^{147.} This was the logical outcome of D'Ewes' interpretation of the purpose of the oath - to leave no effective opposition in the House. It was obviously meant to clear out once and for all the extreme "right" in the two Houses. By now Pym must have been so confident of the universal acceptance of his brain-child, that there were only two of his immediate associates on the committee, together with three War Party men, an assortment of lawyers and Puritans of undefined political persuasion, Rudyerd, a leading Peace Party man, and even Herbert who soon broke the covenant himself and deserted.

Fairfax's Army and the Northern Lobby

Apart from the difficulties posed by the Lord General Parliament had to consider the North - independent, difficult to defend, of great strategic importance and with different problems. The political struggles of Fairfax consisted less of worries about his command (although some strife with the rival Mothams had to be cleared up), but more in getting a lobby to support the charges and claims of his army which was more remote from Parliament and the City, and of less interest to the parliamentary strongholds. His own continual absence from Westminster too, hindered his case, whereas Essex returned often enough to harangue the Houses.

The theory was that Fairfax's army was to be entirely supported by the northern counties themselves, which was not only unfair but impractical. The north was far poorer; it had ^{been} suffered far more from the Scots in payments and free quarter; armies kept marching across its boundaries; and finally, unlike the southern counties, it could rarely count on substantial help sent by the City of London. A committee of February 27th 1643 ^{148.} to consider how the northern army was to be paid drew up orders which entailed close cooperation between the local treasurers and Parliament. Although an apparently sensible administrative move, this kind of order left out of consideration the attitude of the local population. Because of its remoteness from the centre of administration, and its traditional vulnerability from across the border, the populace and its civic officers ~~was~~ ^{were} even more parochial in the north than elsewhere. The north began the war by declaring itself neutral territory and forbidding both armies entry. Financially its parochialism was

149.
probably even greater. Another suggestion of the committee was that any money left in the Court of Wards could be used in the north, together with all that was left of the king's revenue in any of the courts. The membership of this committee was typical of the committees dealing with Fairfax's affairs - it included all the northern M.P.'s en masse, but specified a carefully selected group of politicians, Vane and Blakiston of the War Party, and Armine, Wray, Owfield and Hatcher, all supporters of Pym. All these men could have been in the "faction" mentioned by D'Ewes at the end of 1643, who supported the northern army's interests because of their personal concerns there.

Other expedients than those of this committee, which turned out to be unrealistic, uncertain and difficult to organize, had to be found.

150.
On May 8th a committee suggested Fairfax should be paid with money levied from those who had not contributed proportionately to their incomes, as well as some ad hoc borrowing from the Brewers' Company. Again,

151.
neither of these were more than temporary expedients. The membership consisted of all the northern M.P.'s with Hoyle, Blakiston and Strickland of the radicals, and Darley and Asherst, Middle Party supporters, named specifically.

All the suggestions made by these committees of northerners were too theoretical and out-of-the-way to provide ready cash in constant supply. Most of the ready money was immediately channeled off to the Lord General's army for which the more lucrative methods were initiated.

Only after the Fairfaxes, unpaid and unsupplied, were pitifully beaten at Adwalton did the Commons finally get down to considering constant monthly payment of the armies of the north and west. Unfortunately

152.
this committee did not report its decisions, but its membership was

interesting. It was skilfully made up almost entirely of men from the areas under consideration - of the twentytwo members ten were Westcountrymen and nine Northerners. Overlapping these categories, there were eight War Party men ^{153.} and eight Middle Party men, ^{154.} and several, overlapping ^{155.} again, who had London interests as well as local ones. The northern members may give us an insight into the later northern lobby, named by D'Ewes at the end of the year. But it was unlikely that a regional interest would emerge yet. The strong and equal representation from the major political groups indicates that at this stage the major issues were still centred around the general attitude towards the enthusiastic prosecution of the war. Although the almost exclusive choice of local M.P.'s indicates that local interests were bound to play a part in financing the armies in the remoter areas, the battle against Essex's lack of enthusiasm had still not been won, and provided the major concern. ^{156.}

A committee on July 19th to consider Fairfax's need for arms contained, apart from thirteen northern M.P.'s a fair sprinkling of men from the Home Counties and London, whence the proposed arms were to come. They also included, across these divisions, five War Party men (three of whom were Northerners) ^{157.} and four Middle Party men (two of whom were Northerners). ^{158.}

But none of this provided a settled solution to Fairfax's problems. By December he was still writing that despite all the foregoing, his army was ~~still~~ living from hand to mouth. None of the permanent problems had been settled. ^{159.} A standing committee was finally set up to propose some more lasting measures for supplying his army. This committee did fix definite sums to be paid out to the officers and men for arrears and future pay, and at the same time ^{160.} made attempts to determine the source of income. The membership of this committee

is probably a closer indication of who participated in D'Ewes's "northern faction" as it was set up at the very time at which he talked of the pressure the group exerted. The composition of the committee is characteristically different from some of the foregoing ones, in that the numbers of northerners are in a minority when compared with other well-known political figures. It is noteworthy that Vane headed the list, and Millington and Wray were especially recommended. These three were northerners, together with seven others. Of these, five were War Party men and three Middle Party men. In addition there were eight other War Party men, two from the Middle Party, with six active administrators. If D'Ewes was correct in attributing a split among the "fiery spirits" to this period, we can see from this committee and from some others that the "northern faction" was probably composed of a mixture of War Party and Middle Party politicians, supported by the bulk of the northern back-benchers. The exceptionally strong representation of the War Party on this committee might indicate that the bulk of its strength was now devoted to the interests of the north, for other than parochial reasons. The War Party had always been more national-minded than the other groups because of their concern with a successful war fought on all fronts, so their support of the campaign in the north was directed towards the policy of aid from the Scots, rather than mere safeguarding of northern properties. The decision to support the claims of Fairfax even at the cost of support for Waller in the west was quite consistent with their war aims. A strong army in the north supplementing the Scots, could well have been regarded as a better strategic move for threatening royalist positions than isolated action in the south-west. Waller had only received the War Party's backing because he was regarded

as a relentless pursuer of victory, but after the failure of the General Rising, and the lack of success of his subsequent campaigns he held no special attraction for the radicals, except as an alternative leader to Essex, whose position he could not at this time seriously threaten. The Fairfaxes on the other hand, had an unfailing reputation for hardy and difficult fighting, and could be relied upon as active Puritans especially if shown some much-needed encouragement and support from London and Westminster.

In trying to establish the personalities involved in D'Ewes' "faction" we are left with a picture of a northern interest led by Vane in his capacity of radical northerner, and supported on the one hand by the bulk of his political allies of the War Party, who saw in the North the most likely opportunity to put into action their ideal of Scottish intervention, and on the other by the remaining northern back-benchers, who supported him mainly for the safety of their properties. At the same time Vane was backed by strong figures from the Middle Party, such as Wray, Irby and Ayscough, partly because they too were northerners, but also because they were pursuing Pym's aim in supporting the Scottish scheme. The factions of December 1643 were therefore composed of a mixture of the earlier political groups. The Middle Party however were on the whole still behind the Lord General (as his group was said to be the largest), while the War Party was generally in the northern faction. Waller's supporters in the West were probably spread over the parties too, and it is significant that Prideaux - the leading western figure, was absent from the committees for the north, despite their solid radical backing.

Administrative Details

Despite the formation of what was supposed to be an efficient and embracing executive to carry on the detailed administrative duties so necessary in fighting a civil war, a large number of particular matters fell to the lot of Parliament, and were dealt with outside of the Committee of Safety, by specific committees. A sample of such details will help to fill in the picture of the kind of work the Houses were forced to do due to lack of experience in war-time administration. Committees were set up to discuss ways of getting soldiers to return to their colours, 167. how to raise enough horses for the cavalry, 168. (which gave rise to petitions to the Houses for redress for wrongful seizure) how to organize the incoming and outgoing accounts, 169. how to establish rules for ordering the payment of the armies, 170. how to punish neglect of duty by officers, 171. how to ensure the execution of orders, 172. whether the fortifications could be paid for out of the king's revenue, 173. to get soldiers who had returned from Ireland to join the parliamentary troops, 174. and how to ensure that regular musters were taken, and that money was available for army pay. 175.

All these issues should have been integrated with general defence policy carried out by the Committee of Safety. But the Committee was at first overworked due to too much delegated responsibility, and later declined due to political inactivity. As a result many matters were left out of its scope and were dealt with by the old clumsy method of naming particular committees for ad hoc occasions.

Another matter with which the Committee of Safety only dealt sketchily was the problem of prisoners. This is an excellent example of unpremeditated measures used to meet unexpected situations. Presumably

no one had seriously thought of the fate of royalist prisoners, and the first scheme to be considered by a committee was whether they could be sent as slaves to the Indies. ^{176.} Finally a less exotic method was put forward - to send them to the Lord General for exchange. Another committee was set up to examine all prisoners for information, a cumbersome method of interrogation which should have been carried out on the spot by army officers. ^{177.}

Standing committees were set up to deal with matters of welfare - the payment of maimed soldiers and widows, to look into the maladministration of hospitals, ^{178.} and so on. However, no proper working machinery was set up and throughout the war Parliament was flooded by complaints and petitions for aid by the unfortunate victims of the war. New petitions often evoked yet further committees to deal with their cases. ^{179.}

Finally, a committee to compound with prisoners anticipated the Committee for Compounding, and significantly enough consisted mainly of people with ^{180.} City connections.

Political Quarrels of Members

A final aspect of the Commons' use of committees is relevant to the discussion of the relative strengths of the parties and their interests. That is the numerous quarrels and misunderstandings which arose concerning some of the Members. There is no need to tell the involved stories of injury and slight which brighten up the pages of Gardiner and Clarendon. Our concern is with their political potential and with the treatment they received in committees.

When Henry Marten was rash enough to raid a royal stable, in April 1643, the Lords protested vehemently and treated the matter as a breach of privileges when he refused to return ~~them~~ ^{the horses} on their order. He was

vindicated by the Commons, ^{181.} although later the general principle was set down that civilian horse-owners were to be protected. ^{182.} This uneasy vindication of a leading radical was effected by the cooperation of the War Party with the Middle Party, with four members each on the initial committee, ^{183.} although it is significant that on the later one ^{184.} there were only three War Party men out of twenty, ^{185.} including six Middle Party men, ^{186.} and a number of military experts. The membership of the committee reflects the attitude of the Commons to these matters. The Middle Party agreed that a united front had to be put up against the pacific Lords who were always worried by impolite actions against the royal family, even at the expense of defending their bête noire, Marten. But the War Party, which did not concern itself with the inequities of such small matters as encroachments of civil rights during war-time, did not cooperate in the establishment of the principle put forward by the second committee.

On matters of personal differences between Members, where Parliament thought it its duty to interfere, both parties were represented about equally - for example the quarrel between Bainton and Hungerford. ^{187.}

We need not go into the well-known details of the Waller Plot. We have seen Pym's skilful use of the "traitorous" desertion of a leading and trusted member of the Peace Party to bring the pacific group into line with the prevailing thought of the other parties. The committees which dealt with the plot confirmed the joint action of the leaders of the Middle and War Parties on this matter. The "security" committee set up to examine and commit anyone it thought fit in relation to the safety of Parliament was not significant in a wider context, as its powers

188.
 related purely to the plot. Here Pym, Gerrard and Glyn acted with St. John and Vane to exploit a situation which affected the unity of the House and was therefore to their mutual interest. A committee to communicate the plot to the Lords, also had two War Party men among
 189.
 four Middle Party supporters, while the conference with the Lords was managed by the joint leaders. 190.
 A committee to tell the Lords of the implication of two of their members in the plot was composed of equal numbers from the two parties, both no doubt revelling at the discredit
 191.
 brought to the Peace Lords.

Sir John Evelyn's case brought out the War Party at their most vindictive. Evelyn had had a rather unpredictable history in the House. He had been an associate of Pym; he had been one of those whom the king would not receive at the end of 1642; and he had been very active on committees before the war. But later he attended less and less, until he was actually suspected of establishing relations with the royalists. D'Ewes stressed the malice of the fiery spirits towards the flagging members of the Peace Party at this time. Millington's motion to order
 192.
 absent members to return he says, was meant to be a malicious act against Holles, Lewes and Evelyn. They were evidently all considered likely prospects for defection. Pym certainly would have approved of forcing the issue of loyalty, though his treatment of prodigals tended to be less than ruthless.

The War Party's intransigence on an issue of this sort can be implied from their anxiety to have two extra members added to the committee to examine Evelyn, which at first comprised only of four Middle Party
 193.
 men and Wentworth. After several months of imprisonment, the

issue of his release, too, seemed to be a party matter, with Pierrepont and Lewes, (both firm Peace Party men) in his favour, and Strode and Frideaux in the minority, against him. ^{194,} It is interesting that there was no Middle Party man as teller in his favour, and in the additions to the original committee which were made at this time, two men were added from each of the parties. ^{195.} On the whole, the erstwhile supporters of Pym evidently kept out of Evelyn's subsequent ~~p~~^{ro}secution, which seems to have been fought out mainly between his actual supporters and his committed enemies.

Sir Edward Bainton, a most unreliable political performer, who acted sometimes like a quasi-deserter and at other times like the wildest radical, repeatedly quarrelled with his colleagues. On one occasion he charged Pym and Lord Say with betraying the country for keeping him in prison "who only was able to maintain and preserve (his) County, until that County was quite lost". ^{197.} He was taken to task by a committee of five Middle Party men, ^{198.} presumably to defend their leaders, together with Frideaux and Hayman of the War Party and Lewes of the Peace Party. Although he was saved from the Tower, his backing remains obscure, as the tellers in his favour were Long and Wheeler, who had no known political affiliations, while those against him were Rous and Haselrig.

The attitudes towards recalcitrant Members changed with the times, as can be seen from the cooperation on the Ordinance to tax by 1/20 part the estates of all who deserted their places in Parliament. Here four Middle Party men acted together with Strode from the War Party, and Maynard and D'Ewes from the Peace Party. ^{199.} The latter must have decided that their absent colleagues did not have the interests of peace in mind by their desertion, and agreed that they should pay their part

of the war-effort despite their defection.

Mildmay's accusation that Lord Wharton had made his peace with Oxford became a hot party issue. While it appeared that the accusation was being made by Lord Murray only minor political figures acted in the examination, ^{200.} but when Mildmay became involved, and Fym himself was ^{201.} to be examined under oath five Middle Party men and seven War Party men considered the whole matter with others including Maynard. The honour of the Middle Party was to some extent at stake, when a member of the militants accused one of their most fervent supporters from the Lords of having dealings with the enemy, and when their dying leader himself ^{202.} was involved, however peripherally.

The affiliations were fairly clear on the largely radical committee to deal with the Earl of Holland's desertion, which voted that he should be impeached for High Treason. Holles, as the leading Peace Party counterpart of the Earl in the Commons, naturally supported him in the division on whether he should be classed as a deserter, acting with Holland's old friend Stapleton, and against Vane and Haselrig who obviously ^{203.} represented a united War Party front against the Earl. Despite Stapleton's defence, however, the Middle Party must have voted solidly against him, as the strength of the resolution against him shows.

The War Party actively put pressure on the Earl of Denbigh to ^{204.} stop hedging about the Covenant. There were six of them on the ^{205.} committee to meet the Lords to discuss the Earl, together with three ^{206.} Middle Party men ^{207.} and several concurring Presbyterians. Again, the War Party turned out in strength against Sir William Iynton when he ^{208.} was caught in a minor tangle with delinquent estates. Here too

there were five of them, with five Middle Party men, and two
 211.
 from the Peace Party.

On all these issues involving the suspicious actions of individual M.P.'s the War Party was strikingly active and sometimes succeeded in getting the unfortunate in question dealt with in a summary fashion, although to do so they needed some aid from the Middle Party, which on these issues tended to be split more by personal allegiances and outside factors. The War Party ~~was~~^{was} in many ways a far more devoted band, acting with greater consistency and motivation. Pym's name is noticeably absent from these committees dealing with the personal animosities and suspicions against M.P.'s. In all, he only appeared twice in this series of committees - on the Waller Plot, and on Evelyn's committee. Yet his party had a stake in many of the issues. This seems to indicate that he kept himself distant from particular causes and did not wish to appear to be anti-radical, just at a time when he was trying to establish harmonious relations with them. In any case he was busy with the administrative work of the Committee of Safety as well as in most other groups of committees, so that to some extent the lead in the House fell to his associates, even in political matters of this nature. It is perhaps significant that in Pym's absence the War Party, which acted in this group of committees out of all proportion to their real strength, took over the initiative. They did so partly because of the hiatus left by Pym's dissociation with these particulars, and partly because they felt themselves deeply touched by the controversies. We may see in this the comparative political inexperience of the radicals, in spending so much effort on matters which could not vitally affect the

war. It had been very largely Fyn's work to produce the internal situation of political compromise and cooperation at the end of 1643. As we have seen his whole efforts were bent towards reaching a modus vivendi with people of very different views on quite basic matters. He minimized or kept out of anything conducive to discord, hence his unwonted inactivity on these trouble-making personal issues. It was a fitting tribute to the spirit of cooperation which he had worked so hard to engender that the committee to consider a suitable monument to the parliamentary leader on his death consisted of five of his closest associates and relatives (Houss, Gerrard, Nicholls, Browne, Clotworthy), four of his erstwhile opponents but latter-day allies (St. John, Strode, Bond and Burdon) and even some who had bitterly opposed his pursuit of a definite victory against the king but who acquiesced in the need of a real parliamentary opposition (Hollez and Ruyerd).
212.

Analysis of Committee Membership

This discussion has been divided for convenience into topics which would not have stood out separately at the time. The delegation of members does not therefore reflect conscious policy in all cases, but rather personal interest in the work of the specific committees. For example, the committees under headings like "liaison" or "security" did not form a coherent body in the same way as those where the coherence and importance of the subject was obvious to the members themselves, such as the political wrangles of Essex. Nevertheless, in more administrative matters such as Prisoners, Security, Liaison, Legalizing the Executive, Army Administration, there was a very strong War Party membership. Of the 45 activists in these groups, the War Party contributed 16 as compared to the Middle Party's 12. This is an indication of how the War Party

leadership began to take over from Pym the management of committees, preliminary to taking over control of the House.

213.

The Tables of Activists throw some light on the activities of the parties in all these subjects. The committees for prisoners and casualties, which were purely administrative, were dominated, apart from the political preponderance of War Party figures, by the more significant fact that all names on the list were people with London connections. This may indicate an interest in prisoners' estates, but also shows willingness to organize help for the unfortunate victims of the war from the already strained London coffers. In the group of committees dealing with details of army administration, which included disparate matters which ought to have fallen to the Committee of Safety, the War Party were also fairly active, contributing one third of the activist membership. But it is also significant that in this administrative group the non-political administrators come into their own. Caga, Wheeler, Reynolds, Long and Vassall all come within this group. Their work on these committees as in other spheres was mainly non-political but necessary to make the committee-system a possible alternative administration to the Privy Council.

The other three groups, liaison, legalizing the executive and security, all contained leading political figures from the two main parties in fairly equal balance. Although the work on these committees was not directly concerned with political matters, they were essential in setting up the system of administration which began at the outbreak of the war. Pym, Glyn, Vane, St. John and so on, were mainly responsible for the machinery of executive government which arose as a result of the

work of these groups of committees.

The paper war was conducted by members from both parties. While the War Party contributed more members, the most active roles were taken up by Glyn, Pym and Rous. It is not surprising that there was close cooperation between the two parties here, as both regarded the propaganda value of the declarations against the royalists as essential to the fundamentally insecure position of Parliament. Glyn, as the leading lawyer of Pym's faction, was obviously the man to deal with this aspect of the parliamentary cause.

The committees dealing with the inter-party struggles for supremacy clearly reflect the interests at play in each by the various parties. On the committees dealing with the War Party's struggle to gain supremacy over the House, centred around the scheme for the General Rising, the War Party members dominated to the exclusion of all except Pym and Wilde. Wilde, who was an active political Independent, may have acted with the War Party here, although we have no evidence as to the line he took. Pym's presence of course was due to his anxious surveillance of the activities of the wilder elements in the House, who at this time stood an open chance of replacing his own moderate policy with a far more radical one. The presence of all the leading War Party figures among the activists needs no explanation.

The committees concerned with the reconciliation of Essex and Waller were obviously dominated by the Middle Party, with the exception of Reynolds, a leading administrator. Glyn and Nicholls were both friendly to Essex. The cooperation between the War and Middle Parties to promote an efficient and active army under Essex, failing a more radical commander, is reflected in the activist list. There were more

War Party men, but the Middle Party, especially the ubiquitous Pym and Glyn, dominated the field. Pym's favourite scheme, the Oath of Association, orientated as it was against the Peace Party, was suitably defended by two leading figures from each of the Middle and War Parties, who naturally cooperated on this radical move to rid Parliament of unreliable elements.

It is not surprising that the committees relating to Fairfax's army had a strong representation of War Party leaders, with only Wray and Irby from the Middle Party. The first eight of the list were all northerners, including Ellis who was not an active War Party man. The presence of St. John and Corbett round off the picture of the "northern faction" which comprised of a radical and northern leadership, supported by other northerners from the Middle Party and from non-political members, as well as by the majority of radicals from other areas.

The group of committees relating to the affairs of individual M.P.'s may appear to have been put together rather arbitrarily, as there was no prima facie common factor between the various misunderstandings which arose between Members. But the fact that some Members were active on so many of the 23 committees considered in this section, indicates that there must have been a general policy pursued in dealing with the seemingly disparate cases. Pym's absence has already been accounted for, and the activity of the War Party in the various cases noted. The activist list indicates once again that the work on these committees was shared fairly equally between the Middle and War Parties, with more radical members, but with the largest attendances by two Middle Party men. Admittedly the War Party were probably more anxious to vindicate their own members who were implicated in any intrigues, and they were certainly more than willing to use any opportunity of weeding out unreliable elements on

the "right wing" of the House. But in the long run the Middle Party evidently equalled the radicals' efforts partly because they shared their views on ridding Parliament of prospective deserters, but also for the opposite reason of defending M.P.'s whose inactivity was attacked by the War Party as a potential threat to Parliament's security. In this they acted as expediency and personal influence demanded. Thus the Waller Plot was exploited, whereas Evelyn's offences were exonerated.

214.

The list of the most active people on committees, in the whole section of policy, defence and internal politics, gives us some idea of the parts played by the parties as well as of the importance of individuals. Considering that those identified by Hexter as clearly War Party supporters were only 22 compared to the Middle Party men of whom he names 37, the War Party's representation on these committees is startlingly strong. Among those who sat on six or more committees the War Party contributed 21, and the Middle Party 19, the Peace Party 5, out of a total of 66. Of those who sat on 15 or more committees, the War Party had 14 compared to the Middle Party's 9. The non-political administrators were usually men of special training and experience which made them suitable for the heavy administrative duties which constant committee-work called for. Reynolds, one of the most active of the administrators, had London connections and probably had had administrative experience in the Court. Cage was a lawyer with knowledge of fiscal matters. Vassall was a prominent London merchant and burgess for the City. Wilde was a prominent lawyer with firm Puritan^a background. Wheeler was a lawyer with good London connections and administrative experience from the Court. Lisle was another town lawyer with a Puritan

background, as was Hill. Harley was a prominent Presbyterian with London connections, and a great deal of previous fiscal and administrative experience from the Court. Eye too was of London extraction, with trading and administration from offices in his background. Trenchard had fiscal and administrative training. Long was experienced both in local affairs as well as in the ways of the Court and was a leading Presbyterian. The same is true of Ellis and Curzon, both of whom were northerners. These men made up nine of the thirtyfour who were on fifteen or more committees, and equalled the Middle Party in strength. On the entire list, those who could be called ^{administrators} "~~committee-men~~" make up eighteen of the total, again equalling the Middle Party. Although the political behaviour of these men is not known, in that they did not consistently act in any known way on issues where the Journals indicate political support, they must nevertheless have supported the lead of one side or the other. We can only assume that they formed the backbone of the support on which Pym had to count in order to implement his policies, for, as we have seen, the political balance on committees tended to be towards the War Party members, who attended with prodigious tenacity. Despite their massive efforts, however, the vast majority of issues which arose at the period under discussion here were decided in favour of the Middle Party, both in the House and in the committees which played such a large part in formulating the policies of the Commons. This could only have been possible with the support of the group of administrators.

We also get some idea of the importance of some of the political figures by the activist list. Everyone identified by Hexter with the War Party, bar Wallop, appeared on the list, their numbers being led,

fittingly, by the two future leaders of the House, Vane and St. John. The list generally reflects their importance within the group with the exception of Marten who was more active than his place here indicates, due to his early expulsion from the House, so that this attendance at 27 committees was more concentrated than that of other members. The same is not true of the Middle Party activists, although Pym and Glyn appeared to lead the field in most committee activities. But because of the relatively larger numbers of the Middle Group, a greater tendency to specialize in particular matters could be detected, as will be seen in a later comparison of the committee activities ranging over all subjects in this period.

Conferences between the Houses on Policy, Defence and Internal Politics

It is not the intention here to go into details about the particular conferences which were held with the Lords during this period. It is only considered relevant to compare the activity on the management of conferences with that of the management of committees generally. The purpose of conferences is of course quite different from that of committees, but in all the major political decisions which had to be made, as well as in many administrative ones, the Lords not only had to be consulted, but often fought with in order to gain acceptance of the Commons' viewpoint. This meant careful preparation of the Commons' case, and the management of conferences formed an important political function in the relationship of the two Houses, especially if the supremacy of the lower House was to remain absolute in matters of major policy.

In the 50 odd conferences relating to matters discussed in the

above section Pym was on the management of 33, Glyn 18, Holles 13, Vane Jr. 13, Reynolds 9, St. John 8, Stapleton 6 and Armine 5. Pym thus evidently considered that his presence in putting the case of the Middle Party in the Commons to the Lords was more important than his attendance at committees, where his views could well be put forward by his adherents who agreed with them. Of the 44 conferences before his death which have been considered here, Pym and Glyn attended 40 between them. Immediately following his death, the leadership of Vane becomes obvious through his frequent management of the remaining conferences. Glyn, after an early attachment to the pacific section before the failure of the Oxford Treaty, agreed with Pym on almost everything, and his vast work on committees probably did more to gain Middle Party ascendancy during this period than any other single person except Pym himself. The less important role he played in the management of conferences merely indicates the importance Pym attached to personal diplomacy with the Lords. Holles on the other hand appeared to act always in opposition to the Middle Party on conferences, and must have been there specifically to put the views of the Peace Party, as those on which he acted were all issues on which he would have taken a conciliating line. ^{215.} In this way his presence must have made for a feeling of greater sympathy between the pacific attitudes of the majority of the Lords and a small section of the Commons.

Vane and St. John as the War Party leaders were not very active, except at the end of the period, when the whole balance of political leadership changed. Their relative inactivity is due probably to the general unwillingness of the Commons to let the radicals come too closely in contact with the conservative Lords, a tendency which has been noted

in committees set up for various purposes in conjunction with a delegation from the Upper House. The leadership of conferences thus indicates the general diplomacy used by the Commons towards the Lords, which tended to keep the more radical elements from unduly antagonizing the majority of the Lords.

TABLE I

MOST ACTIVE MEMBERS ON COMMITTEES IN SUBJECTS COVERED BY
POLICY, DEFENCE AND INTERNAL POLITICS

Essex and the Parties
23 committees

No. of ctees.	Name	Party
14	Glyn	MP
12	Pym	MP
11	Vane Jr.	WP
7	St. John	WP
6	Mildmay	WP
6	Reynolds	Admin.
5	Vassall	Admin.
5	Strode	WP
5	Lisle	Admin.
5	Gerrard	MP
5	Holland C.	WP
4	Wilde	Admin.
4	Stapleton	MP
4	Goodwyn	MP
4	Haselrig	WP
3	Venn	WP
3	Foole	MP
3	Erle	MP
3	Onslow	MP
3	Wentworth	WP
3	Long	Admin.
3	Curzon	Admin.
3	Cage	Admin.
3	Hayman	WP
3	Bond	WP
3	Vane Sr.	WP ?

Prisoners and Casualties
7 committees

No. of ctees.	Name	Party
4	Vassall	Admin.
4	Whittaker	PP
3	Venn	WP
3	Pye	Admin.
3	Corbett	WP
3	Bond	WP
3	Glyn	MP

Fairfax Army
6 committees

No. of ctees.	Name	Party
5	Blakiston	WP
4	Krey	MP
4	Strickland	WP
3	Irby	MP
3	Ellis	WP
3	Vane Jr.	WP
3	Millington	WP
3	Hoyle	WP
3	Corbett M.	WP
3	Curzon	WP
3	St. John	WP

Oath of Association
6 committees

No. of ctees.	Name	Party
4	Pym	MP
3	Holland C.	WP
3	Marten	WP
3	Rous	MP

MP = Middle Party
WP = War Party
PP = Peace Party

TABLE I

MOST ACTIVE MEMBERS ON COMMITTEES IN SUBJECTS COVERED BY
POLICY, DEFENCE AND INTERNAL POLITICS

Details of Administration
13 committees

No. of ctees.	Name	Party
8	Vane Jr.	WP
8	Holles	MP
8	Glyn	MP
6	Mildmay	WP
6	Cage	Admin.
5	Haselrig	WP
5	Gerrard	MP
5	Wheeler	Admin.
4	St. John	WP
4	Holland C.	WP
4	Pym	MP
4	Bond	WP
4	Reynolds	Admin.
4	Rolle J.	Admin.
4	Rigny	WP
4	Goodwyn	MP
4	Crimston	PP
4	Moore R.	Admin.
4	Corbett J.	MP
4	Long	Admin.
3	Seawen	
3	Hippisley	
3	Pierrepoint	PP
3	Vassall	Admin.

M.P.'s Quarrels
25 committees

No. of ctees.	Name	Party
11	Glyn	MP
10	Browne S.	MP
9	Vane Jr.	WP
8	Keynolds	Admin.
8	Wentworth	WP
7	Holland C.	WP
7	Gerrard	MP
6	Clotworthy	MP
6	Strode	WP
6	St. John	WP
6	Harley	Admin.
6	Erie	MP
6	Prideaux	WP
5	Strickland	WP
5	Haselrig	WP
5	Holles	PP
5	Armine	MP
5	Rous	MP
4	Cage	Admin.
4	Waynard	PP
4	Blakiston	WP
4	Bond	WP
4	Poole	MP
4	Goodwyn	MP

MP = Middle Party
WP = War Party
PP = Peace Party

TABLE II

LIST OF MOST ACTIVE COMMITTEE MEN ON
POLICY, DEFENCE AND INTERNAL POLITICS

Total: 159 committees

Name	No. of tees.	Party	Name	No. of tees	Party
Clyn	61	MP	Gurdon	14	WP
Vane Jr.	56	WP	Asherst	14	
Fym	44	MP	Rolle J.	14	Admin.
St. John	40	WP	Moore R.	14	Admin.
Reynolds	39	Admin.	Poole	13	MP
Holland C.	34	WP	Curzon	13	
Mildmay	32	WP	Ellis	12	
Browne S.	32	MP	Long	12	Admin.
Prideaux	31	WP	Blakiston	12	WP
Gerrard	28	MP	Clotworthy	12	MP
Strode	27	WP	Hayman	12	WP
Rous	27	MP	Selden	12	PP
Marten	27	WP	White	12	Admin.
Wentworth	27	WP	Barrington	12	MP
Cage	26	Admin.	Onslow	12	MP
Goodwyn R.	24	MP	Venn	11	WP
Bond	24	WP	Stapleton	11	MP
Vassall	23	Admin.	Bainton	11	WP ?
Holles	23	PP	Trenchard	11	Admin.
Haselrig	22	WP	Nicholls	10	MP
Wilde	20	Admin.	Pierrepoint	10	PP
Corbett M.	20	WP	Wray	10	MP
Erle	20	MP	Hoyle	10	WP
Wheeler	20	Admin.	Irby	9	MP
Armine	20	MP	Hatcher	9	MP
Lisle	18	Admin.	Grimston	9	PP
Millington	18	WP	Dacres	8	
Whitlock	18	MP	Waller	8	WP ?
Rigby	17	WP	Scawen	7	
Hill	17	Admin.	Vane Sr.	6	WP?
Maynard	16	PP	Corbett J.	6	MP
Harley	16	Admin.	Middleton	5	
Strickland	15	WP	Fury	5	
Pye	15	Admin.	Hippisley	5	
Whittaker	15	PP			

CHAPTER 8

NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE KING

"The Sense of the House, or the Opinion of some Lords and Commons concerning the Londoners petition for Peace:

"Give care beloved Londoners,
ffie, ffile, you shame us all
Your Rising up for peace will make
the close Committee fall.
I wonder you should aske for that
Which they must needs deny,
Heres 30 sweares theyle have no peace,
And bid me tell you why.

First Ile no peace says Essex
ffor my Chaplain says tis sinne
To loose £100 a day
Just when my wife lyes in.
They cry, God bless your Excellence,
But if I loose my place
Theyle call me Rebell, popular Asse,
And Cuckold to my face.

Ye citizens fooles said Warwick,
Doe yee talks to me of Peace
Who not onely stole his Majestys shippes
But robd him of his Seas?
No, no Ile keepe the water still
And have my shippes well mannd
For I have leasd and sold so much
I knowe not where to land.

Doe Brother, doe says Holland then
ffor Peace breeds us no quiet
Besides my places both are lost
With sixteen dishes dyet.
I played the Judas with the King
Which makes the world detest mee
Way should his Majesty pardon mee
An hundred would arrest mee.

Kimbelton says those Londoners
Deserve to loose their eares
For now they all obey the king
Like citizen Cavaliers,
Lets vote the peace a dangerous plot
And send them a denyall
ffor if they save the kingdome then
Theyle give us a legall tryall.

The Welshmen rage, quoth Stamford,
and call me villanous goate
ffor I plundered Hereford Aldermens
gownes
To make my Bess a coate.
Tis true the towne did feed mee well
ffrom which I tooke good fleeces
But if Peace comes they'll teare
both mee
And all my whores to peices.

Ffright, ffright, quoth Say, now, now
hold up,
Theire jealousies and feares
The worke will thrive, I plotted it
Above these seaventeene yeares
Tis I that am your Engineere
But if for Peace you Vote
Oh then they'll make me come to
Church
Or els will cut my throat.

My father Goodwin, quoth Wharton
Calls me a silly lad
And wonders you'le aske Peace of me
Who have been lately mad.
Ye chose me Irish generall,
But I chose to stay heere
ffor should I fight among the bogs
There's neere a Sawpit there.

These heathen Prentices quoth Brook
Did make my coachman stay
Bid me be bare, although I spake
But 13 Bulls that day.
If peace knock of my learned skull
Then at my house you'll see
The Sword of Guy, the Dun Cows rife
The Asses tooth and me.

I made the speech, quoth Roberts,
When his Excellence first began
ffor which he swore by a pottle
of sack
To make me a Gentleman.

But if the King get to Whitehall
Then all my hopes are past
I am the first Lord of my house
And would not be the last.

Keepe silence quoth the Speaker
But doe not holde your peace
Lets sit and vote and hold them toget
ffor Ile doe what you please.
I have but poore 6000 poundes
Besides some spoones and bowles
May grant a Peace, and how shall I
Bee master of the Roles.

Then spake five members all at once,
And for an Army cry'd
Last yeare, they say, they rescued us
Or else we had been tryed
What though wee are almost undone
Ye shall contribute still
Wee will convey our Trunks away
And then doe what you will.

My venom swells, quoth Hollis
And that his Majesty knows,
And I quoth Hampden fetchd the Scotts
Whence all this mischeife growes
I am an Asse quoth Haselrigge
And yet I'me deep in'th plott.
And I quoth Strode, can ly as fast
As Mr. Pym can scott.

But I quoth Pym, your hackney am
And all your drudgery doe
Have made good speeches for my selfe
And priviledges for you.
I sit and can looke downe on men
Whilst others bleed and fight
I eate their Lordshippes meate by day
And give it their wives by night.

Then Vane grew black ith face and
swears
There is none so deepe as I
The staffe and signet slipt my hand
My sonne can tell you why
The name of peace men say is sweet
But oh it makas me stinke
ffor Strafford's ghost doth haunt me so
I cannot sleepe a winke.

Were Strafford living, Mildmay said
He would doe me noe ill
ffor I hid my selfe ith Privy,
When the house did passe his Bill
But oh my gold and silver threads
That Gregory calls his owne
Though in a shipp I made my will
I was not borne todrowne.

You found me, quoth Sir Robert Fye
I have been long a Knave
And promise I should be so still
So you my vote should have.
And I quoth Lawrence Whitaker
Agree to doe see too
And if you leave old Courtiers thus
They'll doe as much for you.

This peace, quoth Michael Oldsworth
Will bringe noe Fee to mee
And my Lord hath sworne for it
And will not follow mee.
Fie, down with Bishops, Wheeler said
ffor I have robd the church
Oh base, will you conclude of peace
And leave us in the lurch.

Who talks of peace quoth Ludlowe
Hath neither sense nor reason
ffor I ne're spoke ith House but
once
And then I spoke high Treason.
Your meaning is as bad as mine
You must defend my speech
Or else you'll make my mouth as fam'd
As was my father's breech.

Ile plunder him, quoth Bainton
That mentions peace to me
The last Bishop would not grant
my lease
But now I have it free.
A Gunpowder monopoly
Quoth Eveling raised my father
And if you let the peace goe on
They'll call me powder traitor.

Ffeh, said Sir John Hotham
Is this a time to treate
When Newcastle and Cumberland
We to the walls have beate

Yee base obedient citizens
Doe you thinke to save your lives
My sonne and I will serve you all
As I have served five wives.

Damme it, said Miles Corbett
Or wee are all confounded
And cavaliers will cuckold mee
As well as did the Roundhead.

Indeed quoth Sir Hugh Cholmley
Sir John you say most true
ffor I have scould and mortgaged
Even all my land to you
My brother would have served the King
But was forbiidd to stay
The king foresaw at Keinton field
Sir Harry would runne away.

Zounds said Henry Marten
Wee'le have no accomodation
D'ye know twas I that tore
His maiesties proclamation
In the house I spake hightreason
I've sold both land and lease
Nay, I shall then but have 3
whores
A pox upon this peace.

I went downe, quoth Sir Stapleton
With Musket, Pike and Drum
To fetch Sir Francis Wortley up,
But truely he will not come.
Oh Lord Sir Robert Harlow said,
How does our foes increase
I wonder who the Devill it was,
Who first invented peace.

Yee see beloved Londoners
Your peace is out of season
ffor which you have the sense of
the House
And every Members reason.
Oh doe not stand for peace then
ffor trust if you doe
Each county of the kingdome will
Rise up and doe see toe." 1.

Treason treason treason
Sir Walter Erle cry'd out
ffar worse than blowing up the Thames
the dagger and the cloak.

We have been looking at the way in which Parliament began
organizing its policy and administration at the outbreak of war through
the medium of committees. In a similar way it is possible to view the
complex manoeuvres arising from the various attempts to come to terms
with the king. For, once again, policy was initiated and executed by a
series of select committees.

When the Civil War broke out in 1642 the king and Parliament
did not wait until a serious battle had been fought in order to begin
negotiations for peace. The king continued to hope that Parliament
would not take up arms against him. The "rebels" did not see what could
be won without the eventual agreement or acquiescence of the king. As
no-one on the parliamentary side had any clear idea what a victory over

the king would entail there appeared to be nothing for it but to negotiate. This is not to say that the leaders in Parliament did not intend to fight a serious war if necessary, or that they were afraid to make the first move, if forced to do so. But it does mean that bargaining, coming to a compromise, negotiating, was never out of their minds.

Pym, as the parliamentary leader, was, of course affected by this. His job, both within Parliament and in the country as a whole was to keep a balance between the average citizen's unwillingness to go to war, and the utopian dreams of the religious and political radicals. Pym's activities in the Commons reflected these two facets throughout his career. On the one hand he went ahead organizing a war machine and building a prefabricated legal structure to support his actions. On the other he was quite prepared to listen to offers from the king and to continue to send proposals to him.

It is not my intention here to re-tell the story, already so well expounded by Gardiner,² of the actual negotiations that took place during the first eighteen months' fighting between Parliament and the king. I intend only to examine the methods and machinery used by the House of Commons to deal with the peace negotiations proposed by either side. The questions arising here deal with the management and manipulation of the Members which produced a clear line on the peace proposals. By looking at the membership of committees, the managers of conferences and the tellers of divisions on the negotiations, some assessment can be made of the prevailing strength of the political groups in the House and their changing attitudes to the king and the hopes for peace. The role of committees as determinants of the Commons' policies will be stressed in particular.

Most of the political battles between the parties were fought in the committees and the ultimate failure of the negotiations was due more to the predominance of the radicals on committees than to their strength in the House as a whole.

The communications between Parliament and the king during the first few months following the setting up of the king's standard are difficult to classify. Some fit easily into the heading of "paper warfare"; others were more honestly propitiatory. War and peace might appear like a matter where one would easily feel the sway of the parties - the pressures from the radicals and the Peace Party alternatively. But the membership of the committees dealing with the negotiations shows that it was not as simple as that. First of all, it is difficult to divide all the committees in these matters into categories of predominantly provocative or propitiatory attitudes. Any negotiations with the king naturally took the form of bargaining; it was the terms on which the parties disagreed. When the king was intransigent, the parliamentary terms hardened. When an opening appeared, the Peace Party presumably sought to fill it.

August to November, 1642

The first move from the king after the formal opening of hostilities illustrates this constant flux in Parliament. The king was under immediate pressure from his own supporters to come to terms with the Houses, especially after a slight set-back at Coventry.^{3.} When Sir John Culpepper wanted to come to the Commons as an M.P. bearing a message from the king,^{4.} there was a division on whether he should be received or not, as some said he was a delinquent. The War Party were

5. heavily defeated on this. Nevertheless the House voted not to accept the message until the king's proclamation declaring the Earl of Essex and the Members of the Commons traitors was withdrawn; this represented a middle course. At the same time there was a conference with the Lords to direct the Lord General to advance his forces, in order to make sure that strength was behind any negotiations. 6.

Apparently undeterred by the outcome of his August attempt, the king sent Falkland to Westminster to suggest that if both parties were to withdraw their accusations of treason against each other's supporters he would take down his standard. D'Ewes writes that Falkland also secretly came to tell Parliament that the king was now ready for a complete religious revision. 7. D'Ewes classified the committee of September 13th, set up to answer Charles' message, as an outright War Party organ, because it asked for his unconditional return. But at the same time he modified this by saying that the committee suggested distinguishing between different people's offences, and not lumping together as delinquents all who assisted the king. The moderate temper of the House was further stressed by its rejection of a radical speech by the elder Vane. This ex-Privy Councillor now put forward that the king should not even be offered supply in return for his virtual capitulation, and D'Ewes suggests that the Commons could not stomach this hypocrisy. In other words, the committee's recommendations although not extreme, were still fairly uncompromising. It is therefore surprising to find that four days later the committee to prepare a petition to the king should include six of the same men as the former committee, and have a very similar general balance of members. 8. As we shall see, this membership is fairly

typical of the committees relating to this subject. We find a pre-dominance of War Party men, a solid core of Middle Groupers with supporters, and a sprinkling of Peace Party men, even on committees framing aggressively warlike proclamations.

From October 3rd to the 7th the Commons tried to make the king accept their petition from their own delegates, especially including Essex, ^{10.} whereas Charles had declared that he would not receive any "traitors" after the failure of Falkland's mission. The War Party and Middle Group were fairly evenly represented, on the two conferences and on the committee which the Commons named to try to persuade the Lords of their views, although this was, after all, a move towards peace. ^{11.}

When this manoeuvre failed, putting an end for the time being to any negotiations with the king, Pym used the opportunity to bring up his idea of a covenant to be signed by the faithful, a move regarded by D'Ewes as a typical "fiery" warlike one, which indeed it was. It is significant that he was supported at the conference with the Lords by Glyn, Evelyn (himself declared a traitor by the king) and Marten. ^{12.}

The next move was a specifically peaceful one, initiated by the Committee of Safety under the agis of the Peace Party Lords who dominated it, and especially Northumberland. ^{13.} In the Commons the case for the proposals was put by Waller, later a deserter to the king. Essex was only too willing to give his support to them with his army threatened and the king nearing London. ^{14.} Once again however, as Gardiner points out, there were safeguards built in so that specific preparations for the campaign to come were continued. These included an invitation to the Scots to join in the struggle. This indicates where Pym and his colleagues placed their sympathies.

The managers of the conferences between the Houses on this
 15.
 proposal were very carefully middle of the road, although they included
 the hapless Evelyn, who, though it was not realized, was one of the people
 whom the king would refuse to see. However, the current mood of the
 Commons swung temporarily against accommodation when Charles refused the
 preferred peace proposals from the parliamentary committee. His refusal
 was seen not only as a betrayal of the cause of peace, but as an infringement
 of parliamentary privilege. Despite this change of mood, the House
 reacted by nominating a strangely mixed assortment of people to the
 committees appointed to publicize the king's intransigence to the City
 and the nation^{at} large. One would have expected this stage to be

dominated by the War Party, as there was every indication of Charles'
 lack of interest in coming to terms with Parliament. But the committee
 which was sent to the City to spur them on to enthusiasm for the war,
 included Holles, now a leading Peace Party member.

17.
 The committee to
 write to Charles on the subject, incidentally publicizing the parliamentary
 grievance, contained Rudyard and Pierrepoint.
 18.
 Even more surprisingly,
 Holles the leader of the Commons' Peace Party, was one of the managers of

19.
 a conference on November 9th at which it was decided that Evelyn, in
 defiance of the king's declaration, was to go with the others to meet him.
 The conference, confirmed simultaneously that the soldiers were to be got
 ready to fight should the treaty fail, which under the circumstances, it
 was bound to do. There was no War Party member on the committee to bear
 this information to the City, and it comprised mainly of uncommitted
 20.
 members with strong London connections.

Maynard and Pierrepoint too,
 21.
 were reporters for a conference on the same subject. Thus, in these
 negotiations the War Party played an insignificant part. Prominent

Peace Party men and supporters of peace from the Middle Group such as Glyn and Pierrepoint acted side by side with their more radical colleagues. We can assume that they were on these committees for one of several reasons. They may have been there out of sheer opposition; they may have tried to frame the radical pronouncements of the committees in less extreme terms (although it was unusual for anyone wholly against some matter to be named to a committee dealing with it); they may have agreed that the king had behaved unreasonably, and thought this ought to be pointed out to him in the interests of peace (in which case their role on the committees might have been that of constructive critics); they may have considered themselves specialists on the matter of peace negotiations and thus been on the committees out of a sense of continuity (an unlikely alternative, as their political orientation was bound to affect their attitude to the subject-matter committed). These various possibilities will be discussed again later, when all the relevant material on the committee structure relating to the peace negotiations has been assembled.

During these days of parliamentary wrangling about the form of the negotiations, the royal army had approached London and been checked only at its very outskirts. In fact Charles' cause lost some support due to his actual execution of the attack upon Brentford while the negotiations were being carried on. ^{22.} But even his possible treachery to the cause of peace could hardly shake the pacific party, who had no choice but to trust that Charles felt similarly to themselves.

When the king sent a message on November 19th suggesting another meeting with parliamentary delegates ^{23.} the conference at which it was

read was reported by Fym, Holles, Glyn and Whitelock. The last three had been named by D'Ewes as being recent converts to the peace faction after witnessing the initial horror of bloodshed. ^{24.} As one might expect therefore, the new move was fostered by those hopeful for peace, despite the subsequent order of the House for the continuance of hostilities

in the meantime. ^{25.} There was a very even balance in the Commons at this time between those who were prepared to try trusting Charles and those who were convinced of his faithlessness, and the scales were easily tipped by a fluctuating opinion between these extremes. The War Party must have found enough support to pass the above vote to continue preparations for the war during the negotiation, but they were defeated by a small

margin of votes, ^{26.} in a division on whether the House should hear the proposals from the king in committee of the Whole House. There was an even closer vote on whether to resume discussion of the point in committee. ^{27.} later, additional moderate support enabled the vote for Parliament's sole control of religion, laws and liberty of the subject, to be passed as a condition of the king's return.

It is evident here, as Hexter has argued about the later peace negotiations, ^{28.} that small points determined the voting strength of the parties. The War Party (according to D'Ewes - therefore really the War Party and its moderate support) ^{29.} won on a division that there should be

no vote on disbanding or stopping plunder. ^{30.} This does not entail any essential inconsistency on the part of members, nor does it show any undue influence by the leaders of the more extreme opinions. It is true that some Middle Group opinion swung in favour of moves to stop the war after experience of serious fighting, but it was still quite conceivable for

Glyn, or even Pym himself to speak in favour of accommodation with the king, and at the same time not wish to begin dismantling the machinery of war. Even D'Ewes, himself a most confirmed advocate of peace stood
31.
for punishment of delinquents.

Oxford Treaty, December 1642 - April 1645.

During December, the Lords supported by the pacific element on London's Common Council and by riots in the City, began another round
32.
of negotiations. There was news of royalist advances in the West and
33.
the North, and fears of foreign aid to be brought in by the queen.
34.
But the Lords' proposals recommended by a committee of their House were so rigid that the absurdity of the Peace Party's position was further highlighted. They included royal assent for all future parliamentary legislation, interference and veto on membership of the Privy Council, and ministerial responsibility. Yet, with the cries for "Peace!" ringing in members' ears from the crowds gathered outside Westminster, the Commons were bound at least to pay lip service to the notion of once again going through the motions of opening negotiations. These, which began in December and ended with the failure of the Oxford Treaty, have been examined in detail by Hexter for the inconsistent-seeming behaviour of the Middle Group who changed their minds on a myriad of small points. In this examination I would like only to gauge the strengths of the opposing sides by the committees appointed to deal with the negotiations - to see whether the membership of the committees reflected the temper of the House and the committee resolutions and to try to establish the affiliation of some of the members whose political behaviour was not directly attributable to any party.

There is of course no doubt about where the War Party stood on any attempt at accommodation. D'Ewes reported Vane Jr.'s stand that if Parliament had wanted this sort of accommodation, all the blood lost would

35.

have flown in vain. Nevertheless the other "fiery spirits" did not heckle D'Ewes in his peace speech following this declaration, which he took to be a sign of weakness of the party. At the same time, Vane appeared on the conference management relating to the propositions on

36.

December 20th with Pierrepont, who was probably in favour of the treaty, with Holles, who was certainly so, and with Pym. A similar phenomenon occurred on the committees dealing with the details of the propositions. The War Party were active participants despite their great unwillingness to treat with the king at all. This situation is very similar to the reverse one of a few weeks earlier when the Peace Party members regularly attended committees and conferences at which anti-royalist propaganda was being made out of the king's intransigence, although their role clearly should have been to exonerate the king completely.

37.

Presumably the explanation of the two phenomena is similar also. In the former case the Peace Party probably acted as constructive critics both of the king's position, and of the more extreme handling of the situation. In the latter case the War Party did not try to subvert proceedings so much as to influence the balance of decisions towards a

38.

more radical form. Thus, the committee of December 26th to draw up the causes of taking up arms against the king can be seen as a platform of the War Party, yet another appeal to the nation for the justice of fighting against the king, especially in view of the cries for peace echoing in the halls. Infact the committee drew up a list of delinquents against whom Parliament was to take proceedings. D'Ewes identified

this as a delaying, as well as an antagonizing, tactic, to put off any constructive proposals for peace by "whipping up old sores" ^{39.} and prejudicing the chances of getting the proposals accepted by Charles. Despite this, however, Holles and Edmund Waller were both on this committee, as were Pierrepont and Sir John Holland, who, judging from their positions as teller at this stage, were both for peace. They were in the company of St. John, Vane Jr., and Strode of the War Party, and Pym, Browne, Rous, Glyn, Stapleton and Evelyn of the Middle Group. From the mixed Peace and War Party membership it is hard to tell whether the purpose of the committee was a subversive one from the start, or whether the preamble with the exonerating first clauses stating Parliament's position was a bona fide first stage of the parliamentary negotiations. From what D'Ewes said it can be argued that the purpose of the committee was not predetermined by the War Party, and that the supporters of peace could well have considered it to be merely the first stage of serious negotiations. ^{40.} After all, initially the purpose of the committee certainly did not include the naming of delinquents. This part of its business was probably introduced by the radical members quite unexpectedly, and was certainly meant to sabotage the cause of peace.

On the other hand, the War Party's tactics were on this occasion successful in the House, as they led to the vote in the Commons to have the names of the principal delinquents tabled, thus causing a rift with the Lords, who were prepared to name only Newcastle and Digby. ^{41.} The Middle Group must have swung behind the lead given by the radicals, as Strode and Miles Corbett, tellers for naming the delinquents, counted ^{42.} 76 in the division, while Pierrepont and Waller on the other side had 59.

It is interesting that after the question was put, the War Party's strength did not hold and in fact no more delinquents were named. The fact that on the following day the subject of particular delinquents was raised again, and that the radicals carried it, shows not only the risks of attendance but the variable nature of the voting habits of the uncommitted group.

The proposals, accepted with little argument in the Commons, included an extension of the list of the king's supporters to be impeached, the disbanding of both armies before the opening of negotiations (as we shall see, this was a Middle Group and War Party stand in order to render the king powerless and remove the possibility of treachery on his part), and the abolition of Episcopacy. As some of the staunchest peace supporters were also Erastian (such as Whitelock and Selden) or leading Presbyterians (such as D'Ewes, Maynard and almost all the others), the inclusion of such an obvious barrier to successful negotiations, though self-defeating, is understandable. It also helps to explain why the committees appointed to consider specific propositions for the treaty were composed of people with very opposing ideas about settling the peace at this time. On the first committee, Marten, Wentworth, Rigby, Strode and Hayman were obviously uncompromising War Party men, while Holles, Waller and Maynard were the leaders of the Peace Party, supported at this stage, judging from their position as tellers, by Whitelock, Glyn, Pierrepont and Sir John Holland. Piennes, Hampden and Stapleton on the other hand were Middle Group men at this stage clearly against a conciliatory line at the negotiations. On the second committee, although there were no confirmed War Party men, Stapleton, Harley and Stridland, and possibly Browne and Nicholls represented the harder line, while

Whitelock, Evelyn and Pierrepoint supported Holles, Grimston and Waller. Although this group was less trenchantly militant it was still well to the "left" of the Lords. They disagreed for instance on the issue of whether to name specifically the judges whom Parliament wanted to have removed. This indicates the differences of attitude among the supporters of peace in the two Houses.

The committee to attend the king to discuss the propositions which were finally drawn up was composed of men who were all eager for the unqualified success of the negotiations. ^{48.} It therefore provides a marked contrast to the divided committees which had been responsible for the drafting of the terms, and whose members, as we saw, agreed only on the outward necessity of appearing to carry on the negotiations.

This striking contrast illustrates the determination to present a united front to the king and to appear at least on the face of things eager for a settlement; hence the delegation of an agreed body of supporters of peace, whose functions were not in themselves important, acting as they did merely as messengers for Parliament - a fact which Charles was not slow in pointing out to them. On committees which dealt with any kind of policy-making however, there was always a mixture of all opinions. The War Party for instance felt the need to be represented on committees whose main task was concerned with possible disarmament. They did not necessarily wish to avoid a settlement, but wanted to make sure that the prior conditions were as favourable as possible to Parliament. The potential split in the Middle Group on attitudes to the negotiations need not be over-stressed. They did not differ essentially about whether there should be an attempt made to reach agreement with the king. Most agreed that the attempt must be made, but disagreed on minor points

such as the conditions of oblivion and the timing of disbanding. At the same time, the issue was probably confused by the anxiety of the army men to carry on preparations for the coming campaign, come what may. It is easy to see where even those to the "left" of the Middle Group differed from the dyed-in-the-wool War Party. Henry Marten's technique for sidetracking Walter Long's anxiety to discuss the king's answer to the parliamentary propositions is typical. He used one of the standard methods of the War Party to discredit the unenthusiastic. More important than the king's answer, he said, was the need for members of Parliament to pay up their proposition money, for those who had not paid "might have no voice in the making of peace, who had not had a hand in supporting the warre".^{49.} With this he showed a fundamental lack of concern about the outcome of the treaty.

The king's counter-propositions it was agreed, were no kind of answer to Parliament's proposals and his demands in turn were far too embracing. They included restoration of his revenues, forts and ships, his legislative power, the Book of Common Prayer, and he asked for provisions to be made for the trial of all those exempted from the general pardon.^{50.} But the hardest pill to swallow was his stand that the negotiations should be preceded by a mere cessation of hostilities rather than by the parliamentary demand for disbanding. His enemies clearly saw that this would enable him in the meantime to continue recruiting and collecting money. In this obvious way he would improve not only his military position but his bargaining power also. Once again, the king's attitude left the Peace Lords and the supporters of negotiation in the Commons in an embarrassing position as they were well aware of the dangers with which Charles' tactics were fraught. As a result,

the War Party gained the support of the army men, who made up the more militant wing of the Middle Group, and together they defeated the negotiators in the divisions of February 10th. ^{51.} They stymied the king's proposal to precede negotiations with a mere cessation of hostilities, and in this way ensured that the army would remain at the ready in case the talks failed. ^{52.} The committee to put these radical views of the Commons to the Lords ^{53.} comprised Marten and Prideaux supported by army men Armine, Stapleton and Hampden. Pym who was appointed to draft the views of the House, evidently must have supported them here. Only Glyn and Whitelock may have been in a minority on this committee, although their views on the matter are not definitely known. However there was some anxiety on the part of the peace supporters at least to keep the door of the negotiations open and to delay their apparently inevitable failure.

On February 17th the Lords put their position in regard to the disbanding to the Commons at a conference reported by Pym, Hampden, Stapleton and Holles. ^{54.} There is no doubt here that the first three disagreed with Holles about the issue, but at a conference called by the Lords the Commons could not express an opinion, and the reporters appointed could not reflect the tone of the conference, as they were appointed ^{55.} before the outcome of the Lords' votes was known. D'Ewes insisted that those who opposed the Lords on this score were really against peace of any sort, and he included Pym with this particular group of "fiery spirits". We can at this stage measure the strength of the views on methods of proceeding with the treaty. Stapleton and Purefoy, army men from the Middle Group counted a majority of three on their side in a

56.

division against Holles and J. Holland. The Peace faction clung, with the majority of the Lords, to the hope that a compromise with the king would be possible if his method of treating were conceded. Further, Stapleton wanted the king to agree to treating first about the disbanding of both armies and the restitution of his ships and forts before the rest of the treaty was touched on. This was an obvious move to test the king's good faith and to tie his hands at the later negotiations. The army men of the Middle Group evidently disagreed on this point with their temporary allies of the War Party. D'Ewes, who used the generic term "fiery spirit", to condemn anyone to the "left" of himself, indicated a split among his opponents; Rigby and Vane, both real radicals, were against Stapleton's view. It may be, as D'Ewes suggests, that they were hoping for a complete breakdown in the treaty talks, and feared that Stapleton's realistic safeguards would increase the chances of successful negotiation. The differences of attitude crystallized in a division which the radicals lost by only three votes. D'Ewes attributes their near-success to the support of the Peace Party, who it seems, got lost in the complexities of the political situation and feared that they would somehow be tricked by supporting Stapleton's views. On the winning side were the now united factions of the Middle Group, and the negotiations therefore fitfully dragged on.

Later in February the question of immediate cessation of
57.

hostilities was mooted, to safeguard the success of the treaty.

Charles wrote to his wife that he had no intention of accepting the propositions sent and in good faith sponsored by the misguided supporters
58.

of peace. One would expect this issue to be taken on by the peace supporters, and shunned by those impatient of the negotiations and the

king's manoeuvres. The conference at which the idea of a ceasefire was first proposed was managed by Holles and Pym, but the people who actually proceeded with the arrangement for a ceasefire included many of the intransigent army group and others not associated with accommodation. Thus Sir John Corbett, Erie, Clotworthy and Pym were to arrange the cessation with Essex,^{59.} and they also managed a conference of February 24th^{60.} at which they insisted to the Lords on the more rigid line taken by the Commons. In other words, the arranging of the ceasefire was not in itself a move towards accommodation of the king's wishes. It was merely a prior step to holding a successful meeting with the king, and reflected on the one hand a general desire to end the fighting, but on the other no willingness to compromise the parliamentary position to the king's advantage. Its arrangement was therefore no victory for the Peace Party.

61.

This spirit was further evident in the committee of February 24th to meet the Lords and frame the propositions into a form to be presented to the king. There was no sign here of any pacific spirit, the nearest to a soft line on the negotiations being probably Glyn and perhaps Curzon.^{62.} The strength of the more virulent of the Middle Group combined with the War Party men on this committee may have been due to two reasons - Charles' cooperation to date may have made the peace supporters less worried about the resumption of the war, and therefore more prepared to gamble for better conditions for Parliament; at the same time the Commons may have taken a rather harder line because they suspected that the Lords would want to tone it down in any case.

It is perhaps significant that such a militant committee with a

very weak representation of the pacific elements should have produced a motion which the House later rejected. Pym brought in from the committee an addition to the articles of cessation: this was that all standing orders in the country were to continue, bar actual hostilities between the armies. In other words, he was representing the typical double-edged view of trying to get a favourable peace on the one hand, without losing the advantages of a prepared war-machine on the other.

The different attitudes contained in the House at the same time were expressed in the choice of reporters of a conference with the Lords on February 25th.^{63.} Holles and Grimston managed one part dealing with the manner of presentation of the treaty, namely by a committee of both Houses, while Marten and Pym managed the part asking the Lords to extend this committee's power to prepare an answer to His Majesty, that is, to take a tougher line over the treaty. The Commons were justified in fearing the Lords' timidity which expressed itself in their desire to omit any particular limitations to the treaty^{64.} as drafted by the committee in its preamble. Pym had evidently been personally responsible for inserting in it the intention of Parliament to treat first about the disbanding, forts, etc., before the rest of the treaty. The hardening of feeling in the Commons against the line of the Lords can be deduced from D'Ewes' lack of comment here.^{65.} He appeared to identify himself with the House's vote for its committee's preamble. Whether this was true also of Holles is doubtful, but he did report with Marten, Pym and Armine, all in favour of Pym's line, on February 27th,^{66.} although later in the day at another similar conference his place was significantly taken by Vane.^{67.}

Once again, the committee to attend the king with the propositions was an entirely moderate one, though with a variety of shades within it. All were Middle Group men or supporters, whose line on the negotiations varied according to circumstances. Pierrepont at this time supported peace consistently, Sir John Holland varied on different issues, Whitelock was named by D'Ewes as having tempered his support of the war, but sometimes acted as teller on the side of the more militant people, and Armine was a Middle Group-Army man, who was a consistent supporter of Hampden and a tougher line on the negotiations. But there was no real split between them, and once again a fairly consistent view was presented to the king. Charles' equivocal answers at first led to uneasy cooperation within the House. Thus Pym, Glyn and Holles represented all shades of moderate to 68. pacific opinions in managing a conference of March 6th on the king's answer to the treaty and cessation articles. There was a universal objection to the exception he took against Lord Say being a member of the committee, but the whole answer was referred to a joint committee, of which the Commons' part comprised all shades. 70. This committee did not report so we cannot be sure what this meeting yielded, except a firm line on Say.

At the same time the Lords continued to try to manipulate the tone of the negotiations with the king and to make the treaty more acceptable to him. D'Ewes and therefore probably Holles agreed with them, while 71. the fiery spirits continued on their side to use delaying tactics. They 72. began capriciously by dividing the House on whether to rise to dinner, and then continued stalling with the suggestion that the House should resolve itself into a committee of the Whole so that a more serious form

of debate would be possible, on the grounds that people spoke more than once in the House. After all this the Lords' amendments were thrown out, to D'Ewes' disgust. Gradually the Lords agreed to particular instances of keeping the army and its machinery of supply intact until after the treaty, although on martial law and the liberty of the subject they held

73.

out against the Commons. Gardiner suggests that even the Lords felt that Charles' demand for control of the Navy and for the surrendering of Parliament's power to imprison was capitulation, and no longer hoped for a fruitful outcome of the talks, although loathing the idea of actually breaking off the negotiations. The Commons' disapproval of the Lords' hedging and delays was perhaps reflected in the managers

74.

appointed for the conference. Pym, Armine and Marten would have stood out against the Lords, but Holles was their heartfelt supporter. To deal with the Lords' continued intransigence on this issue, the

75.

committee named on March 6th was appointed. This, as we saw, comprised all shades of opinion including the Peace supporters, but was very much dominated by the War Party and its supporters from the Middle Group. The composition of this committee ably suited the purpose of persuading the Lords of the Commons' attitude. D'Ewes perspicaciously credits the radicals' foresight in this delicate matter to the committee. It was they who diplomatically introduced the subject immediately after Wentworth's well-timed news of the king's ban on the newly-formed

76.

parliamentary Association and its attendant levies. The fact that the committee was also to answer the declaration of the ban indicates that the radicals felt it to be an undisputed vehicle for their point of view.

At the same time, as we have seen, the balance in the Commons could be very easily swayed by outside circumstances, and the strength of the radicals increased by any unfavourable action of the king's. The peace supporters had their most fertile time while the negotiations were going well. But with Charles' reaction, some of the less committed peace supporters could well have changed their minds about the advisability of trusting the king, on which the whole issue hinged.

77.

Throughout the negotiations Pym's role as master of the situation must have been tricky in the extreme. We have no positive evidence of the sides he favoured at the various stages of the negotiations when his habitual supporters vacillated between a conciliatory and a cautious "ever ready" attitude. Pym was always careful to have several irons in the fire, and it seems likely that he favoured trying to negotiate with the king in the hope of gaining an advantageous position for Parliament, even though he may not have hoped for a final solution to the basic disagreements. He very probably supported Hampden and the others who wanted to see the army properly equipped and at the ready in case the negotiations broke down. He was certainly not going to compromise the parliamentary position or lower terms in order to achieve peace at any price. In any case, Pym was spokesman for the committee which was dominated by the radicals, and which constantly worried the negotiators by its critical attitude.

78.

At the same time, Pym was manager at a conference which was to consider the instructions to the committee to go to Oxford, along with the pacific Waller and Holles. This represented his hopes for some kind of settlement.

79.

Once the actual negotiations were under way, the War Party acted

in a concerted fashion to hinder them and to hamstring the committee at Oxford. They insisted on being notified of every move made by the committee, and Marten evidently swayed the house to vote that the committee should return if no answer was received quickly from the king. 80.

As usual, D'Ewes ascribed this victory to the thinness of the House, although the Peace Party must have been there in strength to oppose it. 81.

Three days later they attempted to interfere again, this time voting against the enlargement of the committee's power. They proceeded with the same tactics, trying to put a deadline on the time for the king's answer before ordering the committee to return. But on this occasion 82.

they were defeated in a division. The change in voting strength could have been due to a different balance in the House, and if D'Ewes was right, the parties could forestall one another by choosing a favourable time to put matter to the vote. But it is equally possible that the vacillating middle groups swayed peacewards when it looked as though their might be promising results from the king. The fact that there was no Middle Group representation among the tellers may indicate that the opinion among them was quite undetermined on this issue. It would obviously be dangerous to ascribe consistent political behaviour to the Middle Group, or in fact to anyone except the extremists. The War Party sometimes gained substantial majorities because of the absence of any party control on voting. With no whips individual members could vent their distrust of the king by voting with the radicals, while a wave of optimism might lure them to the other side if a positive new move to negotiation was suggested. Thus, the War Party made a stand on seeing that all communications to the committee at Oxford were signed by both

Speakers, presumably to prevent the Lords from having an independent line
 at the negotiations,^{83.} and on this the majority agreed, even when on
 April 7th^{84.} the Lords made difficulties about this clause.^{85.} Already
 on March 23rd the king had made it obvious that he would not soften his own
 demands on the articles for cessation by agreeing to the Commons' compromise
 suggestion that the Navy and forts should be entrusted by him to men whom
 Parliament could trust. His own counter-proposal that command should be
 returned into the hands of those who had held them before the war would
 have meant the return to positions of power of Byron, Goring and Newcastle,^{86.}
 who could not have been accepted even by his warmest supporters in Parliament.
 By April 8th he not only confirmed his conditions for the cessation but
 also insisted on the restoration of all expelled M.P.'s, the removal of
 Parliament to a place outside London, and the punishment of all who had
 justified the taking up of arms against the king. The only concession
 was a stricter attitude towards recusants.^{87.} These proposals could
 only have served to isolate the entrenched Peace Party from any doubtful
 supporters and virtually closed the negotiation.

^{88.}
 When on April 11th his conditional message came agreeing to a
 cessation, Manchester, presumably speaking for the army faction, said that
 preparations must be continued for the campaign at this time of the year,
 and warned against accepting too limiting conditions from the king. The
 Lords suggested that the Committee of Safety should consider the affair
 "in as private and silent a way as may be". This desire for secrecy
 cloaked a much more pertinent political motive. The committee dominated
 by the Peace Lords was more likely to act in the spirit of the Lords as
 a House and come to terms with the king. Actually, the matter was
 referred to a radical committee of March 6th to answer the king's messages,

89.

where the War Party held sway with the support of the Army faction.

Despite its composition, the committee drafted a reply which even D'Ewes thought reasonable, but Pym's report was interrupted by Bainton, later supported by Marten, both impatient at the implied delay of the curtailment of the negotiations. Then followed an interesting split in the ranks of the War Party proper, as Mildmay, always a consistent radical, and a member of the committee, spoke vehemently against them. Thus the majority of the committee, being Middle Group men who were on the whole identified with a cautious and slightly antagonistic attitude to the negotiations must at this stage have wanted to make a favourable agreement with the king, and in doing so, swayed Mildmay, and perhaps the other two radicals Vane and Wentworth, to agree with them. Marten on the other hand was open in his denunciation of the whole idea of negotiating, and went further than anyone in the House in his distrust of the king.

His implicit republicanism probably isolated him even among the fellow-members of his party. He was certainly in a minority here on this

91.

issue, despite the royalist opinion that Pym agreed with him. The latter obviously supported the position of the majority of the committee.

92.

When the treaty failed, Parliament fell to self-recrimination and discord.

93.

This was presumably all the more painful because the members who had been cautious and distrustful throughout, had at the end allowed a measure of hope and trust to emerge, only to be disillusioned by Charles, who vindicated the obstructive attitude to which Marten almost alone had clung. The committees which were appointed to draw together what had been gained or lost were certainly carefully balanced and consisted of all the shades of opinion which had emerged during the

negotiations; the committee to present the history of the whole business to the House ^{94.} was constructed so that all the views which had been held could be aired once again, and post facto justifications sought. Apart from the mutual soul-searching, it is to be supposed that such a group could only fulfil its function by a fairly united front against the king, at least for the moment. Similarly, on April 24th a committee to draw up a declaration to the nation at large about the whole proceedings of the negotiations was constructed from all shades. ^{95.} Perhaps the disillusionment of the supporters of peace was to be seen in the fact that by May 4th the committee had not met and Glyn was ordered to give an account of those who did not attend. ^{96.} Certainly the more radical supporters must have been anxious to make as much political capital as possible out of Charles' faithlessness and the zeal and determination of Parliament in seeking to achieve an honorable peace.

August 1643

The next bout of negotiations in August reflected the changed military and political situation of the summer months. Militarily Parliament was at a very low ebb, with the king encroaching on parliamentary strongholds in the north and west, with the strategic loss of Gainsborough and with the generally disorganized and disorientated state of the parliamentary army. ^{97.} Essex's equivocal position as commander on a side which he did not think could or should win was worsened by having been manoeuvred to appear to be asking more for mercy than negotiation. Fym saw the need to close ranks and to push Parliament into a better bargaining position before once again facing the king across the conference table. He therefore opposed the opening of negotiations quite overtly,

despite the fact that the proposal was introduced by Essex whom he sponsored and trusted. Despite his disagreement with the general, Pym fought for his vindication against the onslaught of the War Party, and at the same time sought to spur him on to more active efforts by promising him re-organization and unreserved military support. The War Party remained unchanged, but Evelyn now became clearly associated with the advocates of peace, after a turbulent history of side-changing. Stapleton, previously a supporter of Hampden, now acted as a teller for the Peace Party, because of his loyalty to Essex. Sir John Holland, too, was now a consistent supporter of the negotiations. On the other hand D'Ewes named Yelverton, Glyn, Waller, Jephson and Moore as opponents of the negotiations.

98.

99.

In effect the Peace Party's support from Middle Group sources was much diminished. Pym's unambiguous position this time probably gave his followers a clear lead. The peace proposals, sponsored as they were by the Earl of Holland whose integrity just then was open to doubt, and supported by an equivocating Essex, were so weak and would have given the king such an advantage during the negotiations, that only those ignorant of the military necessities could have supported them. The political situation at this time certainly did not favour support of peace manoeuvres, after the shock of the Waller Plot, and the obvious need to gain a military advantage over the king before trying to get favourable terms from him. The changing political scene had led to some significant realignments which affected the chances of success of any peace talks. Pym had only just succeeded in ridding himself of the untrustworthy support of the vacillating pro-royalists, and the Peace Party itself had been generally discredited due to the recent defections and plots. The radicals' independent venture into army organization had

failed with the ignominious failure of the General Rising and the volunteer army. Fym therefore draw on renewed backing from the radical quarter to support his aim of vigorous prosecution of the war under Essex's leadership. He was unlikely to throw aside the political advantage of an alliance with the War Party in order to indulge in negotiations from an inferior position. It seems reasonable to suppose that these views were shared by the majority of his supporters. D'Ewes' idea that Fym's followers were motivated by support for the recently begun scheme for Scottish intervention, though relevant, would appear peripheral in comparison with the other reasons against negotiation.

The Divisions on the Peace Negotiations

Frequent reference has been made to the splits in the Middle Group over the vital issue of peace negotiations. We have found that no clear-cut attitude towards treating with the king emerged, even among the members of the extreme War and Peace Parties. Among the former we have seen Marten acting in an isolated, albeit finally more realistic manner than his otherwise faithful colleagues of the War Party. Among the Peace Party too, differences emerged. The main difficulty however, was to try to identify how various members of the Middle Group behaved. Hexter used as the index of Middle Party affiliation the criterion of inconsistent behaviour on the issues arising out of the negotiations. Here we are concerned more with trying to pinpoint the individual attitudes of members of the group he designated in this way. One easily identifiable group among the Middle Group supporters and others, was the army officers who consistently showed concern with the danger of letting the defences stagnate during the negotiations. These have here been usually called

the Middle Group Army faction. Others were identified by D'Ewes as significantly for or against the negotiations, such as Glyn and Whitelock. But the best criterion for the ranges of opinion on the peace proposals and therefore on general policy remain the activities of the tellers on the 21 odd divisions arising from the negotiations. The chart indicates an almost complete consistency of behaviour by the men who acted as tellers. The issues put to divisions were always straightforward and the names of the tellers therefore afford us an excellent guide to the political support of the parties at the time of negotiations.

Thus, of the Peace Party proper, Holles was teller 16 times, Waller 4, Lewes, Palmes and Cholmley each once. Of those in the Middle Group who inclined towards peace and accommodation of the king, Sir John Holland was teller 7 times, Evelyn 5 (including once for the radicals), Pierrepont twice and Pye, Whitelock and Poole once each. All these, with the one exception were tellers on the side inclining towards peace. Those on the side favouring a firmer hand if not the discontinuation of the negotiations, included: the War Party proper, Marten 6 times, Strode 5, Wentworth 2 and St. John, Ludlow and Hayman once each; the Middle Group inclining towards the War Party, Stapleton 6 times (including in August on the peace side), Purefroy and Barrington twice, Hampden, Fiennes and Moore once each; they were supported by Harley 4 times, and Long and Crane once. All the latter possibly propounded the Army's point of view.

The Management of Conferences

We can divide, very roughly, the total of 41 conferences relating to the negotiations, and held with the Lords over this period, into those

which were intended to promote a peaceful solution and the success of the negotiations, and those which were intended to take a tougher line with the Lords and which worked against the accommodation of the king. This division must be rough and possibly inaccurate, as from the scant reports it is not always easy to tell what the purpose of the conference was. Remembering that the division into these two categories is by no means accurate, it is nevertheless interesting to compare the names of those who predominated in the management of the two kinds of conferences. From these names, it may be possible to form some further estimate of the composition and strength of the parties during this period. If, first of all, for the sake of comparison, we take all the conferences together, we find that Pym managed 38 of them, Holles, 26, Glyn and Marten 15, Pierrepont 6, and Stapleton, Vane Jr. and Vane Snr. 5 each. The total number of managers on the 41 conferences was 27 who between them filled 144 places. Thus 30% of the managers took up 70% of the total places. This indicates a very high degree of specialization among the most active managers of conferences. What is more, the first four of the above list covered between them the range of possible positions on the negotiations - Pym for the Middle Group inclining to the War Party, Holles for the Peace Party, Glyn for the Middle Group inclining towards the Peace Party, and Marten for the War Party. However, the list of all the managers for each shade of opinion indicates that, when taking all the conferences together, the anti-peace faction was numerically stronger, providing 11 members of the Middle Group and 5 of the War Party, compared with 5 Middle Group men and 5 Peace Party men on the other side. Naturally the anti-peace groups therefore filled more

places at the conferences than their opponents - 38 to 56 places in fact. These figures show that at the conferences at least, the anti-accommodation supporters were stronger and better represented which must have helped them in their political victory.

Now comparing the management of the conferences which were more or less orientated towards peace, the chart ^{103.} indicates the numbers of conferences managed by every participator in each section. From these attendances we see that Holles, Waller and Pierrepont (and possibly Vane Sr. ^{104.}) managed significantly more peaceful conferences. ^{105.}

Glyn and Whitelock, although inclining towards peace, were on more of the militant conferences. ^{106.}

On the other hand, among the Middle Group inclining towards the radicals, Stapleton, Erle and Hampden were each on significantly more militant conferences, as also were Strode and St. John of the War Party, and Lisle and Reynolds who probably supported them. Pym, Armine, Marten and Vane Jr. attended proportionally equally at both sorts of conferences. One need not place too much stress on the apparent inconsistency of Glyn, Whitelock, Pym, Armine and Marten. This group managed more conferences with a peaceful orientation, despite their own more radical stand. Pym, in any case did not make his position clear, and obviously wanted to be in charge of the situation, whether it looked as though a more or a less peaceful conference was to take place. Glyn, Whitelock and Armine were all Middle Group adherents of his, and the shades of their opinion at this time were very fine. Marten was the only one whose views were well known by all in the House, and whose appointment as manager must have been consciously due to his political position. His own desire to be present at conferences which might favour the more peaceful approach need

not be queried, and his appointment to the position may have been due to the strength of the anti-accommodation section in the House, which at all times appeared to outnumber its opponents. It is of course possible, that his appointment was not due to his political views at all, but to his general ability and zealousness, as suggested by C. W. Williams.^{107.} Apart from him, the House could hardly have been certain of the finer shades of political opinion held by each of its prominent members at any stage, nor could it have known in advance exactly what form the conference with the Lords would take. Thus the waverers of the Middle Group could well have been appointed to manage conferences which in the end turned out to be against the view which they upheld at the time.

Membership of Committees on the Negotiations

For comparative purposes the same type of analysis was attempted for the membership of the committees examined in this chapter.

The total number of committees dealt with here was 25, roughly divisible into 12 taking a tougher line on the negotiations, and 11 of more peaceful orientation.

The activists comprised: Pym on 17 committees; Glyn 12, Marten, Vane Jr. and Pierrepont 10; Armine and Holles 8; Whitelock and Edmund Waller 7; Wentworth, Erie, Evelyn, St. John and Strode 6; Stapleton and Browne 5; Mildmay, Barrington, Clotworthy, Rous, Gerrard, J. Holland, and Harley 4; Wilde, Maynard, Vane Sr., J. Corbett, Reynolds and Hampden 3. Among the activists, the War Party and their Middle Group adherents outnumbered the other side, both among the first 16 as among the first 29.^{108.} The tendency over the membership as a whole is even greater towards the militant groups.^{109.} Thus in both groups as a whole and among the

activists the radical parties far outnumber the pacific ones, and the largest and most significant group was the Middle Group who supported the War Party. Certainly the split in the Middle Group was critical to the success or failure of the negotiations, and it is the behaviour of this group especially which should be looked at.

If we divide the committees into two groups of roughly equal numbers ^{110.} representing those of more and less pacific intention, we can divide the attendance of members according to which group they attended more. ^{111.} The Table which indicates the number of attendances of members from each of the political groups on each of the two types of committees yields the following results. The members of the Peace Party who attended more than one committee were all on more radical committees than on pacific ones. ^{112.} Among the Middle Group inclining to Peace 4 were on more radical committees and 3 on more pacific ones. ^{113.} Among the Middle Group inclining to the War Party, 4 were on more radical and 6 on more pacific committees. ^{114.} Among the War Party all attended more radical than pacific committees. ^{115.}

This contradictory behaviour is at first very difficult to account for. Its key lies, I think, in the lack of awareness of members of the affiliations of their colleagues at any particular time. This would seem to be substantiated by the comparatively consistent behaviour of the War Party, whose identity and views were well known by the House as a whole. ^{116.} They were therefore more apt to attend committees in which the business was likely to be less conciliatory. In fact the delegation of much of this kind of business to a committee at all was probably due to the instigation of the War Party members themselves. The fact that they did also occasionally attend at committees with a more pacific

intention need not invalidate this argument, and a variety of circumstances might be held to be relevant. The outcome of a committee's business could never be certainly foretold before it had met, making it desirable to have members from each group on it in order to influence its decisions. The division of the committees into the two categories is quite arbitrary, and the members doubtless did not have this distinction clearly in mind when nominating prospective committee members. The confusion among the more moderate members about the views of the "fiery spirits" could have led to some anomalous appointments. The predominance in the House of the more militant spirit over the more pacific would in any case have led to a wish to see a good representation of radicals on all committees to do with the negotiations, if for no other reason than to counterbalance the weight of the predominantly pacific Lords.

The Peace Party behaved with greater inconsistency. Holles and Waller, the only two who attended in significant numbers, were well established in the minds of the members as the leaders of the pacific faction. The smallness of the representation of their group reflects the lack of general support which their view had at this time, and the nomination of the two leaders to committees at all must have been due to personal influence, as well as to the established custom to have all kinds of opinions represented on important committees. Many of the arguments applicable to the War Party would fit equally the case for the Peace Party. But, apart from the reasons already mentioned, their attendance at committees where it was most unlikely that they would predominate was perhaps due to their hope of tempering the more hot-blooded resolutions.

The behaviour of the Middle Group factions appears to be the most inconsistent of all, as the members who inclined towards Peace are to be found on more radical committees, while those who inclined towards the War Party were on a greater number of accommodating committees. Thus, all the active members of the faction inclining towards the War Party who were tellers on the radical side, were in fact on more peace-seeking committees. 117.

As has been indicated before, the behaviour of the Middle Party determined the mood and behaviour of the House as a whole on the matter of the peace negotiations; without their support both the more extreme parties were in a minority. They formed the largest and most fluid group in the Commons, and their behaviour both in the House and on committee must therefore have played a significant part. The following factors probably influenced the odd distribution of the Middle Party over the two sorts of committees:

- (1) The division into the two groups of committees, more, and less pacific, is an arbitrary one, and the implications of each committee's purpose and decisions were not necessarily clear in advance.
- (2) The division of members into groups such as the Middle Group, let alone into sub-groups like Middle Group inclining to War Party, has been done post facto from the overall view of the member's behaviour. The House as a whole need not have been at all conscious of the delicate shades needed to identify one of themselves as supporting any particular category.
- (3) The members of the Middle Group themselves have been shown to alter their line of approach during the period discussed here, and quite minor issues apparently determined the way they

placed their support. They were in no way bound to behave consistently throughout these months. They must have felt free to decide each matter before any committee in the light of the particular circumstances related to it, and not in the light of any prior allegiance.

(4) Those who did have a pre-determined idea of how they would vote on any matter before a committee may have felt that it was more important to see that their point of view was put well at a time when things appeared to be going in a contrary direction - thus the more militant Middle Group may have felt that their presence was imperative on committees concerned with the positive draughting of the peace propositions, in order to see that those should not be too favourable to the king.

(5) The whole Middle Party, in any case shared a common interest in the success of the negotiations, differing only in the degree of firmness with which they were prepared to approach them. The difference of opinion that arose on each proposition and its treatment as it came up was ad hoc and probably developed only out of the discussion and argument in the committee meetings.

(6) One major difference between the two lines taken by the Middle Group arose due to the influence of the leadership. It may be argued that the more militant wing of the Middle Group had a more definite platform to stand on over particular issues as they arose. They were dominated by the idea of keeping the army in readiness in case of any eventuality. This was the preoccupation of the leaders of the Middle Group, especially Hampden and Armins,

if not of Fym also. On the other hand, the more pacific wing were probably the more easily swung from their view by the magnetic leadership of Fym, as well as receiving little encouragement from Charles' behaviour. This could also in part account for the penetration of those with more radical views into committees concerned with measures of more accommodating nature in order to determine vacillating members in a more rigorous attitude.

It can be seen that the correlation of members' views with their activities in divisions, in management of conferences, and in committee, was much closer in the former two activities than in committees. The reason is obvious. Divisions were about specific issues, known in advance by the members, and the tellers appointed were outspoken and enthusiastic upholders of the side which they represented. The management of conferences too, being the means of liaison with the other House, presented a more consistent picture of the views of the small numbers of managers appointed. The whole point of committees, on the other hand, was to deal with matter which was not predetermined in the House, and where the individual influence of the committee members might be able to sway the general decisions of the meeting. Therefore a wider representation was both unavoidable, and for democratic reasons, desirable, in that the final decision reached could be seen more truly as the distilled will of the whole House. If the radicals won their point in committee, this represented their strength in the House as a whole. The list of committee activists ^{118.} indicates the strength of the War Party and their Middle Party supporters. These were the people who led the opinion of the House as a whole towards rejecting the negotiations, and the leadership

they afforded in the committees was probably more influential in determining parliamentary policy than the number of their supporters in the House.

It is interesting to compare the lists of activists in the committees, conferences and divisions, with the names of men castigated by the royalist-inspired ballad probably written in London. ^{119.} The views of some disenchanted royalist listing the enemies of peace within the two Houses indicate ignorance outside Parliament of even the most diverse political splits. Holles and Cholmley find themselves in the strange company of Marten, the most outspoken republican, together with Wheeler and Pye, who appeared to have no set views on the matter at all. It is obvious that the finer shades of political difference indicated here were well beyond the sphere of speculation of people who reflected on the attitudes held in Parliament. To some extent this confusion must have been shared by the Houses themselves.

Yet it is clear that the committees examined here helped the parliamentary leaders to implement the policies they sought by predetermining to some degree the feelings of the House. The confusion about who was on whose side was an added factor aiding the strong men of the committees to sway opinion in their own direction. There can be no doubt of the confusion and shifting nature of the political affiliations of members, especially those of the centre. Despite this, the victory of the radicals was assured by their astute manipulation of the committees and their membership.

APPENDIX I

DIVISIONS ON PEACE NEGOTIATIONS

DECEMBER 1642 - AUGUST 1643

Date	Source	Subject of Division	Tellers for Treaty	Tellers against Treaty
Dec. 29	C.J.ii.905	On naming other than chief delinquents	Pierrepoint Waller S.	Strode Corbett M.
Dec. 29	Ibid.	Ditto	Holles Pye	Hayman Stapleton
Dec. 30	Ibid.907	Removal of Earl of Bristol from Court	Holland J. Waller	Marten Barrington
Jan. 14	Ibid.928	Whether king's answer on militia satisfactory	Holles Holland J.	Fiennes Harley
Jan. 14	Ibid.	Ditto	Holles Whitelock	Crane Long
Feb. 8	Ibid.959	Whether king's answer satisfactory	Holles Evelyn	Stapleton Moore J.
Feb. 9	Ibid.960	Whether persons should be nominated to treat with king	Evelyn Holles	Strode Purefroy
Feb. 10	Ibid.961	Whether treaty before disbanding	Holles Holland J.	Hampden Stapleton
Feb. 10	Ibid.	Whether cessation of arms before treaty	Holles Waller	Stapleton Hampden
Feb. 17	(Harl.164) (f.300)	Whether committee of Whole House to reject Lords' votes	Holles Holland	Stapleton Purefroy
Feb. 27	C.J.ii.982	Manner and time of treaty	Holles Pierrepoint	Ludlow Marten
Mar. 4		Put off debate	Holles Holland	Harley Marten
Mar. 11	(Harl.364) (f.321)	Adjourn to dinner	Holland Holles	Marten Harley
Apr. 3	(Ibid.) (f.352)	Notice from Oxford committee of all negotiations	Holles Evelyn	Corbett Strode
Apr. 6	C.J.iii.32	Whether power of Oxford committee be enlarged	Holles Lewes	Vane Jr. Marten
Apr. 7	Ibid.34	Leave off last clause as Lords desire	Falnes Waller	Wentworth Evelyn
Apr. 8	Ibid.36	Leave off immediate instructions to return	Poole Holles	Wentworth St. John
Aug. 5	Harl.165f.141	Whether to discuss propositions	Holles Evelyn	Strode Marten
Aug. 5	(Harl.165) (f.141)	Ditto	Cholmy Stapleton	Strode Long
Aug. 7	Ibid.f.145	Ditto	Holland Holles	Barrington Harley

APPENDIX II

MANAGERS OF CONFERENCES ON PEACE NEGOTIATIONS

	Number of anti-peace committees conferences	Number of peace committees conferences		Number of anti-peace committees conferences	Number of peace conferences
<u>Peace Party</u>			<u>Middle Party supporting Peace</u>		
Holles	8	18	Glyn	8	5
Waller	0	2	Whitelock	3	0
Grimston		1	Evelyn	1	1
Maynard		1	Pierrepoint	6	0
Rudyard		1	Green	0	1
D'Ewes	1				
<u>War Party</u>			<u>Middle Party supporting War</u>		
Strode	2	0	Fyn	15	25
St. John	2	2	Stapleton	4	1
Marten	5	8	Erle	2	0
Vane Jr.	2	3	Armine	1	2
Vane Sr.	1	4	Hampden	2	1
Wentworth	1	0	Barrington	1	0
			Clotworthy	1	0
			Corbett J.	1	0
			Lisle	2	0
			Reynolds	2	0
			Harley	0	1

MOST ACTIVE MANAGERS OF CONFERENCES

Fyn	38
Holles	26
Glyn	13
Marten	13
Pierrepoint	6
Vane Jr.	5
Vane Sr.	5
Stapleton	5
St. John	4

APPENDIX III

MOST ACTIVE MEMBERS ON COMMITTEES FOR PEACE NEGOTIATIONS

	Number of anti-peace committees	Number of peace committees		Number of anti-peace committees	Number of peace committees
<u>Peace Party</u>			<u>Middle Party supporting Peace</u>		
Holles	5	3	Holland J.	1	3
Waller	4	3	Evelyn	4	2
Maynard	2	1	Whitlock	3	4
Grimston	1	1	Glyn	8	4
			Pierrepont	4	6
			Cage	11	1
			Reynolds	2	1
			Wilde	2	1

<u>War Party</u>			<u>Middle Party supporting War</u>		
Hayman	1	1	Armins	3	5
Wentworth	4	2	Erle	3	3
Prideaux	1	1	Pym	11	6
St. John	5	1	Stapleton	2	3
Strode	5	1	Barrington	2	2
Marten	7	3	Browne	3	2
Mildmay	2	2	Corbett J.	0	5
Vane Jr.	8	2	Clotworthy	1	3
Vane Sr. (?)	3	0	Rous	4	0
Rigby	1	1	Gerrard	3	1
			Hampden	1	2
			Harley	1	3

MOST ACTIVE COMMITTEE-MEN

Fym	17	Stapleton	5
Glyn	12	Brown	5
Marten	10	Mildmay	4
Vane Jr.	10	Barrington	4
Pierrepont	10	Clotworthy	4
Armins	8	Rous	4
Holles	8	Gerrard	4
Whitlock	7	Holland J.	4
Waller	7	Harley	4
Wentworth	6	Wilde	3
Erle	6	Maynard	3
Evelyn	6	Vane	3
St. John	6	Corbett J.	3
Strode	6	Reynolds	3
		Hampden	3

CHAPTER 9

FINANCEThe Poore Committeeman's Accompt. 1.

"Oyes! behold, here's my accompt,
 I'm ready for to make it
 If any man who loves the king
 Will please to come and take it.
 I am not as the cavaliers
 Are pleasd to call me, traytor;
 I am a poore committees clerke,
 A simple harmlesse creature.
 That this is true you need not doubt,
 Examine Mr. Needham; 2.
 Hee'll tell you true, and swear it too,
 'tis for the kingdomes freedome.

Free pole-money; free money lent
 Upon the propositions;
 Free money raised for Irelands lands,
 but God knows the conditions!
 Free money lent on ordinance;
 Free subsidies full fifty;
 If our committees grow not rich
 He never think them thrifty.

The 1/5 and 1/20 part, excise,
 Customes and sequestrations;
 The king's revenues too, we have,
 besides the great taxations.
 And that great tax is monthly paid
 Upon the Associated,
 Which comes to threescore thousand pounds
 a month, if rightly stated.

Some say they four score thousand had,
 Some make it up a hundred;
 Suppose 400 pounds a man,
 a sum scarce to be numbred.
 The bishops' lands are but a toy
 with much great summes compound;
 Yet those we hope will one day come
 amongst us to be shared.

Ship money was a hideous thing;
 these payments are but trifles;
 that was enjoyned by the king,
 all lawe and justice stifles;
 these toyes the parliament injoines,
 therein all subjects share, too.
 Yet they who at the sterne doe sit
 for this will take a care too.....

These men defie all wicked tongues,
That challenge close-committees.....

It is in matters of administration rather than politics that the committee system really flourished and proliferated. As we have seen with the earlier experiments of Parliament in executive government, an ad hoc system was developed in which committees were appointed for hosts of particular matters as they arose, and only experience taught which were to be the strongest, most efficient and useful surviving ones.

After the war broke out, the administration of finance was of course one of the most fundamental problems to be dealt with. No permanent machinery for controlling taxation collection and administration had as yet been developed by Parliament,^{3,} and it was only the reluctant London trained bands who could be at all certain of where their pay was coming from. All Parliament's military problems were at first related one way or another to the difficulties of collection and distribution of money. Until the influential fiscal committees for the Advance of Money, and for Compounding, were initiated, large numbers of committees were appointed to deal with an almost equal number of fiscal expedients.

Subscriptions on Money and Plate

The only scheme for anything like an organized method of collecting money was the method of subscriptions of money and plate, which had begun shortly before the outbreak of hostilities, in July 1642. Although the committees concerned with this centred their activities about London, and the City's fiscal machinery was employed in the collection,^{4.} it was extended to the rest of the kingdom by September 12th^{5.} when a method of collection had been devised. A local committee, usually under the egis^{6.} of the deputation of M.P.'s for the area appointed earlier was to be

responsible for the collection, to act as liaison between Parliament and the people, and to nominate its own Treasurer, to be assisted by the loyal local officers. The Treasurers in London - all Aldermen - were to receive the money.

The fact that London was vitally concerned with the fiscal machinery is not surprising, considering the extent ^{to which} ~~that~~ the City's coffers provided the immediate supplies needed to begin recruiting and supplying realistic bodies of soldiers. London's central position in the nation-wide net to gather taxes and allocate outgoing payments was not due only to its proximity to Westminster but also to the very real control that the powerful City lobby exercised over all money matters. Pennington ^{7.} points out not only that Sir Gilbert Gerrard, the Treasurer for the Army, had his offices and administrative centre at Guildhall, but also that it was not the City which was called before Parliament to receive orders, but rather it became the custom for certain privileged Members with a foot in both camps to approach the City when finance was needed.

All this sounds perfectly efficient and well organized, but there were many obstacles to be met. Parliament had no way of enlisting loyal help and had to depend on the local officers, who may or may not have been loyal and honest. ^{8.} The liaison through the M.P.'s themselves was not really suitable, as it involved their continued absence from Westminster, and slowed down activities there. There was no way of enforcing payment nor of justifying the proportions allocated to different localities. ^{9.} The whole method of collection had at first to be declared legal; and people cited the Petition of Right against the collectors' summons. There was general inexperience in covering all cases concerned in the collections. ^{10.} It was inefficient too, to have separate committees

for each additional move, so that one committee was responsible for the dissemination of the propositions and their administration; ^{11.} and a later different one was to look into the receipts and what was owing. ^{12.} Much duplication of work followed, and many details lost.

One of the recurrent themes of the difficulties of fiscal administration was the diversion of money to local bodies to pay for local forces. ^{13.} We shall see this bugbear to centralized government cropping up repeatedly, Parliament often was faced with the choice of not receiving money from the more distant counties at all, or having it deployed for local use and administered by bodies with no strict affiliation to Parliament. This became one of the major issues recurring between the county committees and the central administration. ^{14.}

The collection of subscriptions also caused quite some trouble in the Commons itself, and became a party issue, as one might expect from an expedient which ensured that the war would be carried on by a more certain and organized, and therefore less dilletante method. It was agreed right at the start of the war that the members themselves should contribute to the subscriptions as generously as possible, in order to encourage both London and the rest of the country to do likewise.

It was on a motion of the radical John Gardon ^{15.} that a committee was appointed on September 12th ^{16.} to disseminate the propositions and to look after their administration. D'Ewes says that the real reason for the appointment of the committee at this stage was not so much that action was sought on the nation-wide collection of subscriptions, as that it was a plan of the "fiery spirits" to encourage the prospective lenders of immediate funds in the City to be generous following a good response from the Members' own pockets. The fact that this new committee comprising

17.

of seven War Party men out of ten was appointed when there was already one in existence to take Members' subscriptions, indicates that the House really wanted more action, and was led in this respect by the virulence of the War Party. One of the radicals' chief aims in pressing so hard for Members' contributions was to force the lukewarm Parliamentarians to declare themselves, and to shame them before the House, or else to get rid of them altogether, as Marten's humiliation of D'Ewes shows. 18.

When 19.
later a committee of the Whole House met about the Members' subscriptions, one of D'Ewes neighbours in a division commented that most of the wealthy men of the House were on their side, voting against the levying of the 1/20th part on the estates of members who had not contributed enough;

D'Ewes argued that the other side were not so aware of the danger to property. 20.
Whatever the truth of these generalizations, there is no doubt that the War Party were less concerned with their pockets, in their enthusiasm to see the war fought effectively, and were prepared to sacrifice a lot in order to gain a victory for Parliament. Their occasional vindictiveness towards their opponents was aimed at just this complacency: that one could participate in a war without sustaining any personal losses.

The method of collecting money by subscriptions petered out when the more efficient and widely spread Assessments became established, and only the sporadic quarrels about the subscriptions of M.P.'s continued into 1643.

Finance for Ireland

Ireland had its own financial administration, separate from the mainstream of war finance, and it remained in action throughout this period, not being seriously disturbed by the outbreak of hostilities,

except that collections slowed down as more pressing ~~and~~ domestic needs arose.

The methods and machinery used for financing the war in Ireland have been
21.

dealt with by J. R. McCormack. Ireland had always been a joint interest of London and Parliament, and its financial administration through the Adventurers was a joint effort also. Ireland was thus in a special category as regards finance, as in a sense parliamentary policy was dictated by the City Adventurers, who included many influential M.P.'s as well. It is impossible to detach finance from other features of its administration, and the whole subject will be treated together.
22.

Special London Loans

The organization of finance in the City itself was, through a system of clever manoeuvres, shifted into the hands of a far more radical group than the Commons Council, ^{and} ~~which~~ took the form of a sub-committee to arrange the assessments on which Pym's first permanent tax depended.

It was through this radical group and its connections with the City burgesses in the House that the proposals of the large loans were made, rather than through the Common Council.
23.

The loans were initially to be raised in order to find immediate cash for the preparations for war, and the subscriptions were to be the security for them. They covered the advantageous period of the peace negotiations and were exploited by Pym and his more radical followers both to back up the parliamentary side at the negotiations, and to be ready in the case of failure of the talks. A strong element in the City as well as some people in the Commons were
24.

against negotiating at all, and these quarters were therefore forthcoming with loans to further the war.

25.

On November 25th, apart from the ever-present Holles, all the committee to go to the Common Hall for negotiating the loan were men of

the War Party, those of the Middle Party who inclined towards them, or London merchants and others who had connections there. ^{26.} The same is true of the committee on the following day ^{27.} to put the order for raising money into execution. ^{28.} The co-ordination of Pym's policy towards the king with the radical London financial interest as organized by the sub-committee lasted throughout the negotiations. The failure of the talks and the king's usual and demonstrable shiftiness reconciled the differing shades of opinion in the City once again and by February the Common Council was swayed in the direction of Pym's views ^{29.} and prepared to join in the provision of the necessary loans. ~~although~~ They asked for specific guarantees before they were prepared to lend any large sum, presumably because they wanted to be sure that in the event of successful negotiations they would not be victimized for the active role they had played, as well as having some say in the conditions for the proposed peace treaty. ^{30.} Their conditions were; first, a prior large contribution by M.P.'s - as we have seen, this was a tactic of the War Party as well, implying as it did, the shared guilt of all; secondly, efficient organization of the Assessment Money to facilitate and ensure the repayment of the loan; thirdly, no disbanded soldiers were to come to London during the treaty; fourthly, delinquents were to be rooted out of the army and fired; all these were radical moves. The committee to negotiate the loan once again comprised members representing the War Party, the more radical Middle Party, and London, although Pierrepoint and Evelyn, both of whom ^{31.} were more pacific, were also present.

When the negotiations failed, Pym and his more radical supporters made another strenuous bid for a loan to enable immediate preparation for resumed hostilities. This time, the War Party men organized the entire

project. D'Ewes indicates that there was definite collusion between them and their opposite numbers in the City, not only to get the loan, but to establish the efficient nation-wide organization of tax collection. ^{32.}

This close affiliation between the City financial interests and the War Party was reflected in the committee which was to negotiate the loan, which was now of an even stronger War Party composition. ^{33.} The men who played a leading part in financial committees were, as we shall see, chiefly radicals who were more concerned with effecting workable administrative measures. They evidently realized very well that successful all-out war could only be fought with efficient and appropriately moulded machinery into which the entire available resources of the nation could be fed, and they accordingly were prepared to put a great deal of effort into building its parts and keeping it well-oiled.

The method of getting quick money from London guaranteed by eventual tax collection was of course a heavy and undistributed burden borne because of the enthusiasm of the London leaders. But such a system could not go on indefinitely. The parliamentary executive had to develop a means of control over finances of this kind, if it was not to be influenced by parochial interests, albeit that the Londoners had a far more national outlook than the counties.

Sequestration of royalist Lands

The notion that the other side should be made to pay for the losses incurred by the war was shared by both sides, but was only put into wholesale effect by Parliament. It is obvious that money from the estates of delinquents and royalists was difficult to collect efficiently, unless very good and trustworthy men could be put in as managers of the estates. These men were very hard to find as it was only too easy for

anyone astute enough to be capable of running an estate to make a private fortune. What is more, it was virtually impossible to police their honesty.

The money from sequestered estates was best forthcoming if it was used as a surety for loans from other sources. There was indeed great pressure from London on Parliament to put the ordinances against delinquents into operation, both because the citizens resented paying the lion's share of the war, and because they could see the potential of running and farming estates of delinquents in return for their loans. In this way Parliament was saved the trouble of administering some of these estates, and for an approximate annual valuation was able to get ready money while the merchant or dependant who ran the estate was at liberty to work it for his own profit. ^{54.} Actually, what the merchants really wanted was to be allowed to buy the estates outright, as a means to cheap property, as well as to landed pretensions. Although this was later done, in 1643 it was looked upon still as too drastic and destructive of the status quo, as well as an infringement of a person's ^{55.} property rights.

There were great political pressures brought to bear both ways concerning this method of tax collection. The Londoners and radicals were strongly in favour of a widespread and systematic sequestration, while the House of Lords and the Peace Party objected long to the illegality and dangers to personal liberty involved in it, on their side fearing similar treatment of their own lands in royalist hands, while the radicals' and Londoners' property was safe within the parliamentary ^{55.} boundaries. In any case the Lords probably disliked the treatment

in store for some of their friends and relatives fighting on the other side; property was perhaps more sacred than life. As one would expect from his other utterances, D'Ewes was appalled at the injustice of the Ordinance, even in relation to bishops' lands (although he was a foremost fighter against Episcopacy in the early days) let alone against those who "had not contributed to Parliament or not sufficiently", — himself, in other words. He includes among his own supporters on this issue the pacific lawyers Maynard and Whitslock, but the leaders of the War Party swayed the House as one might expect.

The first committee to deal with sequestration matters — in relation to the sequestration of Capell's estate in September 1642, was later expanded to deal with the whole business of sequestration of delinquents. It was composed mainly of lawyers, of whom only Griston might have objected to the business in hand, and a strong contingent of War Party men.

However, the standing committee on Sequestrations was not formed until February 3rd, 1643. This very powerful committee, in whose hands the fortunes of the enemy potentially lay, consisted in the first instance of a 50% War Party membership including among them many merchants and Londoners. Of the remaining eleven, seven also represented city interests, although not all were Londoners, while the only Peace Party member, Whittaker, was himself a Londoner and may have been there in that capacity. The Middle Party contributed only two militants, while Glyn, the only certain political supporter of the pacific group was also a strong and influential Londoner. This seems to indicate that the interest such a committee held for members

was spread between the political proponents of war to the death, and those who hoped to gain a return for their financial outlay. This is not true of the additions made to the committee on February 6th^{47.} which contained only two active War Party men^{48.} and six more radical Middle Party supporters,^{49.} but were mostly made up of people whose county interests and connections would help in the discovery and administration of delinquents' estates.

The committee appeared to act as a middle-man in the complicated financial transactions necessitated by the grave lack of ready cash; thus in order for the Scots to be paid part of the money assigned to them out of sequestrations, the committee was to treat with merchants to supply immediately a part of it.^{50.} There were specific orders to hurry or tidy up the administration of sequestrations in the counties,^{51.} to look into specific cases that came to the notice of Parliament,^{52.} and occasionally to meet out-of-pocket expenses.^{53.}

Although this committee was set up in February, nothing was done, in deference to the peace negotiations and its supporters, until the War Party was lucky enough to produce documented evidence that the king was in the meantime seizing the estates of people who had contributed to Parliament.^{54.} This had been the very thing of which the more pacific and perhaps richer country squires were afraid, and the timing of the news was evidently so good that those who had hung back now evidently voted to put the ordinance into execution.^{55.} The distribution of the ordinance and its manner of execution was not referred to the standing committee but to a separate one, most of whose members were also on the larger committee.^{56.} The presence of Pym, Glyn and St. John indicates

an urgency not associated with an administrative committee such as this was meant to be. It was also to begin at once, presumably by way of immediate retaliation, to sequester delinquents' estates in London. The membership of the committee was all either War Party men and their Middle Party supporters, or Londoners and their connections. Glyn, himself a Londoner, was the only one known to be involved with the success of the negotiations. It was left to Essex, the Lord General, to execute the ordinance in all places under his control outside of London. This initial overlapping with what was meant to be a fairly self-contained committee, was due presumably to the political pressures necessitating speedy retaliation to the king's move. Throughout the period there were other committees set up to deal with specific sequestrations where information came direct to the House and not to the committee, but most matters relevant were referred here.

The King's Revenue

Such money as remained in the royal coffers did not prove a very valuable source of finance. This comprised of income from those "illegal" sources condemned as non-parliamentary. The source was to be exploited to the full, but could hardly be more than pin-money, because the organs of the king's revenue had either been removed, or their jurisdiction impaired. Money from the tin and iron farmers was to be channelled into Parliament's hands, together with money received by Lambeth House, while on the other hand all former pensions to those who took the king's side were revoked, and either distributed to worthy supporters of Parliament, or stopped altogether. Also the reform of the farthing token office after complaints of its monopolistic practices took the form of altering the direction of flow of money but hardly

63.

stopped the abuse.

64.

However, in April 1643 a standing committee to deal with the whole matter of receiving and improving the King's Revenue was established, indicating Parliament's intention to render as efficient as possible what remained of the props of arbitrary government regardless of the oppressions which it had been so concerned to remove in the beginning. The committee dealt immediately with the Court of Wards. But no permanent settlement was reached until the Ordinance of November, ^{65.} and the committee did not

really get down to business until after that time. It remained preoccupied with the Court of Wards presumably as the most lucrative of the relics, although the alum mines ^{66.} and the tin-farmers and monopolies also

featured as part of its business. The advantages gained from these revenues were doubtless reflected in the membership of the committee - with all the additions, at least 26 out of the 32 who sat had London or trading connections. ^{67.} Like sequestrations, this tax on a privileged group was

going to those who provided ready money in the hope of profit from privileges. When we compare those most active in this group of committees with those who dealt with sequestration, it is notable that the London and trading interest was far stronger than the political affiliation of its members. ^{68.} Of the twenty activists at least thirteen had interests

in London or trading, while adherents to definite political groups numbered only five War Party men, four Middle Party men and one Peace Party adherent. This would indicate, by contrast to the sequestration committees where the War Party were by far the most active, that converting the king's revenue to Parliament's purposes was not meant to promote swift and drastic action, but rather was regarded as a sinecure and safeguard for those who advanced the ready cash - as one would expect from an expedient of

this sort which could not be relied upon to bring in significant or steady amounts.

Customs and Excise

Customs had of course already an established form of collection, although a committee to confer with the collectors indicates that their loyalty was distrusted; new collectors, most of whom were London merchants, and Aldermen, were appointed and put under parliamentary indemnity. But even with the new personnel the manner of taxation was established and remained continuous, and perhaps more efficient, with committees to check on the accounts of the collectors keeping a careful eye on the spending. As was customary, these funds continued to be used for the maintenance of the Navy, and in fact the Customs committee seemed to have a certain control over the Navy's accounts. The Customs Commissioners were also expected to finance quick ready cash loans for the Navy's needs on the security of the receipts.

But far more revolutionary and unpopular with those who hated to see the established order disappearing more and more quickly, was Pym's cherished scheme of an excise tax which had never been levied on any permanent basis in the past. This scheme had been part of the much publicized plan to substitute the reform leaders for the king's "evil Counsellors" under the aegeis of the Earl of Bedford in 1641. Pym, who was to become the Chancellor of the Exchequer on the blueprint, was to undertake reformation of the royal finances by levying excise, presumably along the lines which he finally drafted when he had achieved control of the national coffers through other, though more revolutionary, means. Pym chose his moment for serious action well, after the failure

of the Oxford Treaty. Previously it had been rejected on several occasions in the House, condemned at that time no doubt for its "destructive" nature as D'Ewes and his cronies viewed any attacks on the established order, especially when it hit the pocket. ^{75.} On April 12th a committee to consider laying a charge on commodities was formed. ^{76.} Together with a group of well-to-do London merchants it was to consider the best method for distribution of this tax, ^{77.} and on their recommendation, no doubt inspired by the know-how of London business quarters, the House voted the first charges on liquor. ^{78.} In this way Pym had established perhaps the fairest, and certainly the most modern and distributed manner of taxation yet devised; at the same time, not being responsible to the electorate in the direct modern sense, the increased price of ale probably did not worry him. It was at last, a permanent and ever-available source of money, unlike almost all the other expedients discussed so far.

^{79.} ^{80.} After trouble with the Lords and London about the choice of Commissioners, some were appointed, ^{81.} but Parliament, through its committees, kept a pretty firm check on their activities, as indeed was necessary to stop abuses from over-zealousness - pay being proportionate to the inflow - and laziness or corruption. ^{82.} By the end of the year, Commissioners were set up in the counties under Parliament's sway to collect excise, sometimes under the regis of the local commander, such as Brereton in Chester, ^{83.} or by a committee of local M.P.'s. The standing committee dealt with abuses reported from these agents and held the Excise Commissioners to account. ^{84.} Gradually the scope of excise was spread to more and more items, such as poultry, ^{85.} and soap. ^{86.} An interesting comment on the effects of the tax emerges from D'Ewes' account of the debate in the House

on the committee's recommendations. The House agreed not to tax poultry sold mainly by poorer people, but only rabbits and pigeons which were more luxurious items. The poor were not exempted only on charitable grounds, for the small amounts which could be gained from their consumption of fowls was not worth the administrative cost. But he names Hoyle, Bond, and Haselrig as wanting the tax on all products. This indicates that the War Party were fully behind Pym in making this tax as effective and widespread as possible, and that they were not concerned to restrict the tax to a richer rather than a poorer section of the community, quashing any parallels one might be tempted to make between modern political divisions and those of the political "parties" in the Long Parliament. The comment is additionally interesting in that many of the War Party and their adherents, including Hoyle and Bond, were merchants themselves, and therefore first in line in the payment of the tax which was handed down to the consumer only in second place.

Looking at the membership of the Excise Committee and its additions
87.
on January 8th we find that the War Party represented the biggest
88.
political group making up 25% of the membership, while the Middle Party and their supporters together with the Peace Party have only seventeen members compared to the War Party's thirteen. The proportions on the original committee and the additions remained approximately the same. More
89.
significantly, the proportion of merchants, men with financial training and background, and men with London connections or trading interests were even higher. Out of 45 members 31 were presumably there for their experience in trading ventures or interest in fiscal administration. It is thus clear that support for the excise measure came mainly from the radical political wing and from the merchants.

90.

The table of activists on the Excise committees highlights this point more clearly still. The five most active men were not closely identified with the political groups, but were all either merchants or had financial training. Of the twentyfour activists, twenty were men with these special interests. Politically, there were seven War Party men, five Middle Party men with three likely supporters, and one Peace Party man, but significantly all but the War Party people were towards the end of the activist list. This confirms the interest of excise to merchants and Londoners mainly, and also to the radicals.

The Weekly Assessment and the Committee for the Advance of Money

Pym's other largescale financial scheme, initiated at the end of 1642 and continuing into the Protectorate, was the Weekly Assessment. The Committee for the Advance of Money was the first of the large administrative committees in cooperation with London and the Lords, and its work embraced by far the most widespread tax of the period, as well as payments and borrowing on security to provide immediate funds. Levying a tax on real estate and personal possessions of all persons who had property worth £100 p.a. was not an enterprise which could spring into being over-night. It was intended at first/only to levy the 1/5 and 1/20 tax on London and the environs, but it was soon extended to the counties under Parliament's sway. The committee's work was later also extended to taxing sequestered properties which it took over from the sequestration committees in 1644.

Despite its very extensive and yet centrally organized administration, the assessments did not at first function with great efficiency - as always they depended on the honesty of the collectors and the cooperation

of the tax payers. Thus despite the fact that Parliament declared for itself the right to confiscate property up to the amount of the assessment, by June 1643 only £260,000 out of an estimated total of £1,400,000 had

come in. ^{96.} The details of the committee's work and organization are well known and need not be dealt with here; the Calendar of the Committee for the Advance of Money provides far more information than we have of the work of any of the committees of this period. Collection was done by the churchwardens as well as by special collectors appointed by the local

M.P.'s and they were paid a proportion of their collection. ^{97.} In addition, assessors valued estates and property. Theoretically great ^{98.} trouble was taken about the accounts of both sets of officials.

The original order for collection of assessment money was made as early as November 14th 1642. ^{99.} A committee was set up in the Commons to consider the issue of assessments. ^{100.} Whether it was this committee's recommendations, Pym's direct guidance on the project, or Browne's rough plan of the levy as it was in fact later carried out, ^{101.} the actual joint committee of Lords and Commons to discuss with the City the advance of money was appointed on November 26th ^{102.} and was given Browne's proposals to consider. The committee was not only to administer the collection, but also to issue warrants for payment of arms and victuals, and to be responsible to the Committee of Safety for the receipts. ^{103.} It was thus peculiarly situated in relation to the City, the Committee of Safety, and both Houses. The administrative difficulties and the complex arrangements which were made to meet them emerge clearly from the Calendar. Here my concern is more with the membership of the committee, and the support it had from various sections of the Commons.

The committees of November 23rd and December 6th ^{104.} to draw up the

ordinance for the advance of money comprised a now recognisable syndrome. On the first, there were three War Party men, two from the Middle Party both with strong London connections, and three others with legal, financial and merchant interests. ^{105.} On the second committee there were two War

Party men, one Middle Party member with London connections, one Peace Party man of similar background, with three others with financial and trading backgrounds. ^{106.}

On the Committee for the Advance of Moneys itself, there were Pridcaux, Strode and Vane Jr. from the War Party, Fym and Purefroy from the Middle Party, Spurstoe, Soame, Vassall and Middleton who were all London merchants, Long, with his financial background, ^{107.} as well as

Erereton, who with Purefroy became active army leaders. There seems little doubt that the committee was appointed to provide a link between London, Parliament and the Army, and that it consisted of men with knowledge and experience in matters relating to City and Army matters, as well as men with deep political interests, all orientated towards the execution of a vigorous war-like policy. But what is more interesting is the later additions to the membership of the committee. On February ^{108.} 12th

Holland and Corbett were put in the place of Spurstoe and Vassall; ^{109.} on the 15th, Marten was added; on May 2nd, Hill, Bond and Wentworth were put in to replace Purefroy, Erereton and Soames; ^{110.} on

October 9th Lisle replaced Middleton; ^{111.} on November 15th Gurdon replaced Wentworth. ^{112.} Some of the men who were replaced were forced to be absent

by their commitment on the battlefield, such as Purefroy and Erereton, or in their counties, such as Wentworth. But it is nevertheless noteworthy that a year later the three War Party men on a committee of eleven in

November 1642 became eight out of twelve, supported by three administrators, Long, Hill and Lisle, and by Pym as the sole political balance. By November 1645 the soldiers and merchants had all been dropped. This seems inexplicable because in a large and time-consuming administrative committee one would expect the people with the special knowledge, rather than the political figures to play the larger part. However, right from the beginning there were issues which might have caused trouble with the radical element in London, if the War Party had not taken control firmly. For example, there was the taxing of Members of Parliament, which had already played a large part in setting the parties against one another, and which became a measuring rod for the political enthusiasm of the Members. D'Swes and the Peace Party opposed a move by the War Party and Pym (though not by Sam Browne, otherwise a Middle Party supporter of Pym) for compelling all men, including Members of Parliament to declare on oath what the value of their estates was. This was of course a necessity, as it was next to impossible for an assessor to establish the value of a man's estates, let alone of his personal possessions. This division was more or less along the lines of those who supported a vigorous and effective means of taxation to enable the war to be fought efficiently, a necessity which the more pacific Members never really faced.

Later, on December 15th there was strife in the House of Lords, who wanted to assess their own members and exempt them from the assessment valuers. The War Party fought against this and brought it to a division, supported evidently by the more militant Middle Party men, because it had always been their policy to see that the Houses set an example of enthusiasm and willingness to contribute in order to encourage both the

London financiers and the country at large; self-assessment could very easily have had the opposite effect. Although the War Party lost on the division at this time, this did not mean the end of the struggle to make Members contribute as heavily as possible. With the help of the radical merchants collaborating with the Committee for Advance of Money, they managed to push through a vote that Members should contribute £20,000 to the Assessment, to counteract the previous impression made by the unpopular idea of self-assessment, and to serve as encouragement and example to the country. ^{118.} As "encouragement" to the Members themselves, on the other hand, Trenchard, the chairman of the committee for Members' contributions, was periodically to read out what individual members had promised, and what they had actually paid. Thus the War Party gained their point, and the Committee for the Advance of Money began to be ruled by political considerations. These were in fact identical with a policy of efficient administration, and it was this aim which probably made the War Party men more valuable to the committee than all the specialist knowledge of the merchants, especially if some of them were not wholeheartedly set on contributing the largest possible amount, and collecting the same from their friends. The large numbers of War Party members who infiltrated the Committee for the Advance of Money to the exclusion of others, preceded the triumph of the radicals in the House as a whole, and must have been due wholly to the enthusiasm of the new members.

Other committees were set up to deal with specific aspects of the assessments and were not dominated by the War Party - who were, after all, not very powerful numerically, and who doubtless concentrated on the most vital issues. Thus on a committee to consider the Weekly Assessment in February, ^{119.} there were only three War Party men out of fifteen, with

120.

six Middle Party men and three of their possible supporters. On the committee to consider the Ordinance of the 1/20th part and its abuses, 121.

there ~~was~~ two War Party men, eight Middle Party men and three of their supporters out of nineteen. 122. Another committee later in the year 123.

was to discuss the assessments and their slow collection with the London Militia Committee. This very sensibly dealt with the problem on a local level, investigating the assessments of areas where free quarter had been taken. It considered how this should affect their contributions - an important point of principle. The committee comprised ten members from the counties concerned, five Londoners, who would have connections with the Committee of Militia, and only two War Party men and four Middle Party men out of twentyseven, thus meeting the problem on a suitably administrative level, especially as at least eight of them had some special administrative experience. 124.

The men most active on the assessment committees were distributed among the War Party, the merchants and financial experts, as the individual committees had been. Two War Party men and two specialists were the most active workers. The rest included two more War Party men, three Middle Party men and two more specialists. 125.

The Committee for Compounding.

One of the most highly organized financial ventures was raising money for the Scots, through what was later to become the Committee for Compounding with Delinquents, which was begun under Pym's regis, just before his death. Its origins were however extremely confused, as a series of activities were lumped together which were found right from the start to be incompatible, and which anyway encroached upon the business of other

committees already in existence. One of Pym's long-range plans, to bring the Scots into the war in order to give Parliament the edge on the king, depended on making the proposition financially attractive to them, without the haggling that accompanied the tardy payments of the Brotherly Assistance. Leaving aside for the moment the political considerations, the financial arrangements had to cover payment to the Scots, to the Army in the North, and to the Scottish Army in Ireland, and all these encroached upon the work of other bodies. The committee was also ordered to deal with the Lord General's army. To confuse matters even more, it came eventually to deal with the financial as opposed to the judicial side of the sale of delinquent estates, hence its designation of Committee of Compounding. The committees dealt with in the section on Sequestration eventually came to deal only with the discovery, administration and take-over of delinquent estates, whereas this committee arranged for their sale. However, in the period up to January 1644 this was not yet the major concern of the committee which was known at this time by its place of meeting - the Goldsmith Hall.

It was first appointed to meet jointly with a committee in London for raising money for the Scots on September 28th 1643. ^{126.} Its importance as the Committee for Compounding was foreshadowed by its very first instructions, specifying that the estates of delinquents in the north, including coal mines of royalists, were to be the security on which the loans from London merchants were to be negotiated. The committee was immediately split into two, one part to deal with raising money for the Scots, and the other with raising money for Waller's army. The former of these met at Goldsmiths' Hall, together with the Scottish

Commissioners. This committee was also ordered to provide money for
 127.
 the Scottish Army in Ireland. In fact the settling of the balance
 of power between the English and the Scots in Ireland, seems to have
 emerged from a meeting of this committee and the Committee of Adventurers
 128.
 for Ireland. The actual administration of the committee, apart
 from the setting up of its executive machinery all falls into a later
 period and is covered in detail by its Calendar.

The composition of the committee for raising money for the Scots
 as it was alternatively called was similar to that other major financial
 committee of a year earlier, the Committee for the Advance of Money.
 Surprisingly few members overlapped, yet the general pattern remained the
 same. Of the original members appointed on September 26th 1643
 129.
 five were War Party men, four were Middle Party men and five were merchants or
 financial experts, on a committee of fourteen. 130.
 The ten additions
 131.
 from October to December included four War Party men, three Middle
 Party and five merchants and financial experts, of whom two overlapped
 132.
 with the political designation. Once again, the War Party grew
 stronger at the expense of the less committed administrators and merchants.
 Of course many of the merchants as well as the politicians were interested
 in the Irish venture and therefore had a special stake in the proceedings,
 but on the whole I think similar conclusions may be drawn from the
 membership of this committee as from that for the Advance of Money. The
 money, as in the other case, was to come immediately from the financial
 interests in London, and although the security was different, the motive
 for promoting it remained the same, hence the activity of the War Party.

Problems of Financial Administration and Committees of Accounts

From the multifarious committees and functions it is obvious that even with Pym's guiding hand no ultimate policy of how to run the war had been evolved at this period. The confusion of aims and local pressures helped to make the task of the central administration very difficult, and as we have seen, it was on the whole only the most enthusiastic members of the radicals and an active group of administrators who kept abreast of events and sought some correlation in the activities of the finance committees. But during 1642-1643 the experimental stage of meeting new demands with new and separate expedients was still taking place. It was only towards the end of this period that a definite pattern of financial administration developed, so that by 1644 matters had become far less complex and more centralized rather than diffuse.

133.

Dr. Pennington in discussing the "accounts of the kingdom" draws attention to several early committees which showed the Commons' consciousness of the need for steady auditing and accounting. Two set up in 1642, each with specific functions relating to particular financial expedients^{134.} were obviously in line with the later policy which continued throughout the first year of the war; the same is true of the committee which combined political and expert financial interests set up in March 1643.^{135.}

Further attempts to draw together the different groups administering finance were made. On April 26th 1643,^{136.} it was ordered that all committees dealing with raising money were to give weekly accounts to Parliament. On June 5th a general accounts committee was set up,^{137.} covering the work of all receivers. This made it clear that the difficulties lay not only at the centre through the large numbers of committees dealing with finance without a central administrative body, but

also at the other end, with the neglect and corruption of the agents of Parliament taking receipt of the various collections. Parliament never quite got over the difficulty of handling the venality of the collectors, and its committees were constantly flooded with complaints of high-handedness and over-assessment, brought on by the method of paying collectors proportionally to the amounts collected, and by offering rewards for the discovery of any new sources of taxation. The Accounts committee was set up as a foil to these manoeuvres, and at least achieved some form of centralized activity, drawing together the accounts of all finance committees. It was also an ultimate authority over the hierarchy of officials, and to some extent it was even responsible for the other finance committees, which were to account here for the success or failure of the local committees working under them; to do this it could attend any of the committees. In this way, some of the difficulties of checking collection with expenditure were minimized, as all the Collectors, Sequestrators, Commanders and local officers had to render accounts of their receipts and disbursements, so that even if the money did not reach London, at least there was a record of how it had been spent.

In this capacity of co-ordinating committee, it often discovered useful amounts of money which had not yet been assigned to any special purpose and it then directed where the money was most needed. The functions from time to time delegated to it by Parliament varied from the grievances arising from the soap monopoly, to supplying clothes for the soldiers in Ireland, to directing the sequestration of particular estates. It was only three weeks after its inauguration that Trenchard reported on the accounts of all the money collected and spent,

together with an important political rider, that the money from Sequestrations was constantly being retarded by the protections given to particular estates by the House of Lords and the joint committee of Sequestrations. ^{142.} Parliament immediately resolved that only on a vote from both Houses could protections be given in future.

This is sufficient indication of the haphazard manner in which functions were allocated by Parliament to any committee which seemed active and efficient, so that in only two months an incredible medley of jobs were to be covered by this small committee of six, most of which encroached on the work of other existing committees. This must have become clear by July, as on the 29th a committee was set up "to consider the authority of any committee of Parliament or the House of Commons for the receiving and disposing of moneys", ^{143.} which was to remind everyone of the complexities which had been created and presumably to point a way to the rationalization of the system. The power of the Committee of Accounts was so great that this committee was amalgamated with it two days after its inception, ^{144.} so that the former was now in command of all the information relating to the finance committees, as well as having delegated to it many of the functions overlapping with them. The committee was for example, entrusted with bringing in the money from sequestrations with the help of the Haberdashers Hall Committee - thus overriding the latter as well as the committee of Sequestrations, and it was actually ordered to seize on its own authority any sequestrable property in Whitehall. However, after the formation of the Goldsmiths Hall Committee its functions seemed to shrink back to the original one of dealing with accounts, for most of the orders referred to it after that date refer to accounts of receipts and disbursements. ^{145.}

In fact, on the day the Goldsmiths Hall Committee was established, a committee to consider "the best course for getting in moneys and continual supply and to propose what committees are fit to be settled for that service" was the outcome of deliberations of the Committee of Accounts. Presumably it was on the reports of this committee that the latter was put back in its proper place. This committee, which did not, unfortunately, report back to Parliament, possibly helped to inaugurate a more rational system of powerful standing committees such as we find in 1644 and onwards. The proliferation of minor and overlapping committees tapered off after this period, and their functions became more and more absorbed by a major committee. The issue of a Committee of Accounts was then solved unexpectedly by a committee which was to be right outside of Parliament itself, presumably on the principle that auditors must have nothing to do with the firm. This move was administratively desirable, in that it made all M.P.'s liable for any payments or disbursements without danger of protection. On the other hand, it did mean an abrogation of authority on the part of Parliament.

From the membership of these committees it seems unlikely that any of the changes of administrative responsibility were due to political reasons. In all of these committees, the merchants and experienced administrators predominated. In the original Committee of Accounts, which at first usurped so many functions, there were only two members out of the seven with any strong political affiliations, Frideaux of the War Party, and Glyn of the Middle Party. The others were all either merchants like Rose and Bence, or financial experts and committee-men like Trenchard, Cage and Green. The committee of September 28th which took over most of the functions of the Accounts committee had seven War Party

men, four Middle Party men and eight merchants and administrators.

Membership of Committees and Background of Members

In this section the activities and backgrounds of members have been classified both as to politics and social background and interests, as it was important to establish what sort of men were chosen to be active financial administrators. I have very broadly called people "Londoners" if they owned substantial real estate there, or lived there for lengthy periods of time before 1640, or if they had strong family ties there. I have classified as merchants all who either traded or were craftsmen in their towns. Most importantly, I have called one group "financial experts" who were made up of a heterogeneous background; some had been intensively concerned with county administration on financial matters; others had widespread dealings with the subsidiaries of the Court during the period of personal rule; some had been through extensive litigation on taxation matters, like Poole, Long or John Brown; others again had been officers of the Household or of some other department in a financial capacity; another group were known to have extensive interests in colonial ventures or Ireland. This group seemed to make up a nucleus of experienced men whose personal background made them valuable in the all too new business of running the country's Treasury.

150.

Looking at the Table listing the active committee-men who sat on three or more committees on financial matters, the general impression made from the above review is borne out. The War Party were numerically and proportionally far more active than any other political group. Proportionally they were highest on the sequestration committees, where they formed 60% of the list of activists. This was due, as we saw, to the

correlation between the idea of winning the war by pursuing an active policy, and making the enemy pay for as much of the damage as possible. It was their activity on these kinds of matters and their readiness to see estates divided up and sold, that led to accusations by their opponents in Parliament of not being sufficiently property-minded (which in turn led to accusations of anarchy). In fact the War Party formed 25% or more of the activists of every group, and their participation increased proportionally according to the value of the form of financial enterprise - being lowest on the temporary and exhaustible fields of direct loans from London, and the use of the king's revenue. This reflects their very active attitude towards fiscal administration. The Middle Party's strikingly small participation in these committees, especially considering their numerical strength in the House in 1643 is reflected in their proportionally higher membership of just these groups.

Of the specialist groups we find predictably a large percentage of merchants in groups on London loans and on Customs and Excise, in both of which they were directly concerned, and the smallest percentage on the Assessment committees which were of the widest possible concern to all parts of the community. It says something for the organization of these committees that the really important group of "financial experts" made up very nearly one third of the active list of every group, so that there was in fact an experienced core in each.

These figures are also mirrored in the list of activists in the whole field of 75 financial committees. Of the total list of 79 activists, the War Party form 28% (i.e. 22 members), the Middle Party 23% (18), the Peace Party 5% (4), while the merchants form 26% (21), and the

financial experts make up 30% (25), and the Londoners 10% (8). Comparing this with the list of the first 30 activists on more than ten committees, we find that the specialists remain in approximately the same percentage, and so do the Middle Party, but the War Party form 37% (11) of the total. The specialists thus made up well over half the membership both of the short list as well as of the whole activist list. The political radicals were far more active at the top of the list, probably reflecting not only their enthusiasm, but also their comparative lack of numbers. The War Party thus provided a very essential radical element to the proceedings, making up the disadvantage of fewness of members by frequent election to committees. ^{151.} Pennington discusses a group of "recognized financial experts" from whom he says the nucleus of committees was drawn. His list features prominently among the activist list here discussed but does not exhaust all the men who participated in the role of financial experts. The background and training of the men listed is discussed in a later section in relation to the special qualities of the administrators of the ^{152.} whole period.

TABLE I

MOST ACTIVE MEN ON COMMITTEES IN EACH GROUP OF FISCAL EXPERIMENTS

Note: WP. - War Party MP. - Middle Party PP. - Peace Party
M. - Merchant F. - Financial expert

No. of Activists WP. MP. PP. M. F. No. of Activists WP. MP. PP. M. F.
Ctees. Ctees.

Subscriptions

Total: 13 committees

7	Mildmay	x			
4	Vane Jr.	x			
4	Holland C.	x			
4	Harley			x	
4	Barrington		x		
4	Vassall			x	
3	Pye			x	
3	Grey of Ruthen				
3	Rigby	x			
3	Spurstoe			x	
3	Wheeler				x
3	Corbett M.	x			
3	Tenchard				x

London Loans

Total: 11 committees

8	Vassall				x
5	Pym			x	
5	Vane Jr.	x			
4	Rolle				x
3	Spurstoe				x
3	Strode	x			
3	Erle			x	
3	Ash E.			x	
3	Mildmay	x			
3	Lumley				

Sequestrations

Total: 8 committees

7	Glyn		x		
5	Wilde			x	
5	Lisle			x	
4	Prideaux	x			
3	Strode	x			
3	Wentworth	x			
3	Reynolds			x	
3	Millington	x			
3	Bond	x			
3	Vane Jr.	x			

King's Revenue

Total: 14 committees

5	Grimston				x
5	Holland	x			
5	Pye				x
5	Wheeler				x
5	Glyn			x	
4	Prideaux	x			
4	Rolle				x
3	Hill				x
3	Harley				x
3	Lisle				x
3	Pym			x	
3	St. John	x			
3	Strickland				
3	Scawen				x
3	Wilde				x
3	Vane Jr.	x			
3	Irby			x	
3	Corbett	x			
3	Browne			x	
3	Hedingfield				x

TABLE I

MOST ACTIVE MEN ON COMMITTEES IN EACH GROUP OF FISCAL EXPERIMENTS

<u>Notes:</u>		WP. - War Party	MP. - Middle Party	PP. - Peace Party			MP. - Middle Party	PP. - Peace Party					
		M. - Merchant	F. - Financial expert			F. - Financial expert							
No. of Ctces.	Activists	WP.	MP.	PP.	M.	F.	No. of Ctces.	Activists	WP.	MP.	PP.	M.	F.
<u>Customs and Excise</u>						<u>Assessments</u>							
Total: 12 committees						Total: 9 committees							
8	Green					x	4	Prideaux	x				
7	Vassall				x		4	Wheeler					x
7	Trenchard					x	4	Strode	x				
6	Beddingfield				x		4	Cage				x	
6	Rolle				x		3	Rous		x			
5	Spurston				x		3	Bond	x			x	
5	Hoyle	x				x	3	Holland	x				
5	Bond	x				x	3	Hill					x
5	Wane Jr.	x					3	Gerrard		x			x
5	Mildmay	x					3	Glyn		x			
4	Ashe E.		x			x	3	Wilde					x
4	Bence					x							
4	Reynolds												x
4	Cage												x
3	Holland	x											
3	Holles			x									
3	Pye												x
3	Prideaux	x											
3	Wilde												x
3	Blakiston	x				x							
3	Browne		x										x
3	Gerrard		x										x
3	Glyn		x										
3	Clotworthy		x										
<u>Miscellaneous Finance</u>						<u>Accounts</u>							
Total: 3 committees						Total: 5 committees							
	Blakiston	x				x		Trenchard					x

CHAPTER 10

COUNTY COMMITTEES AND ORGANIZATION

"A New Ballad. Called a Review of the Rebellion.

Committees sit in most great townes
 To awe both the gentry and the clownes,
 They keepe the peace in every sheire,
 By ferretting the cavalier.
 Yea, these men are so just,
 In discharging of their trust,
 Impos'd upon them by the state,
 That none shall dare to quatch.
 Though for lying at the catch
 They deserve both of God and man the hate." 1.

Although the central subject of this study is concerned with the work of parliamentary committees in the House of Commons, it has been found that the setting up and organization of the county committees was an integral part of the study of the administration of those central committees, whose executive wing the county committees formed. Not only were they often composed of local M.P.'s, but they were directly responsible to committees for the counties or Associations within the House. The study of the relations between the central and the local bodies not only throws light upon the work of the central administrative committees themselves and on alignments in the Houses, but also illustrates the effectiveness of the whole method of government by committees.

There is no need here to outline the well-known areas of fighting or the various local loyalties. What is of interest here is to see how Parliament was able to run the country and the war in the different areas, ranging from the almost totally royalist west and north, through the ever changing and beleaguered midlands, to the largely parliamentary east and south-east.

Parliament had begun recruiting in the counties before the outbreak of actual war, as we have seen, by sending M.P.'s to their homes to organize the militias. In many places the local committees consisted mainly of the M.P.'s and the Deputy Lieutenants and their subordinates, but in others committees were appointed by the M.P.'s, by the local Councils, or later by Parliament itself. These were not always the same as those appointed to sit under the jurisdiction of the central finance committees to carry out the collection of the various taxes imposed from time to time by the Houses, and trouble often developed between these conflicting and overlapping authorities.

The closer we look at the actual establishment of administrative government in the country at large, the more obvious it becomes that there was no master plan underlying the system that was developed to cope with the necessities of the war, however much Pym's actions indicated a desire for one. Each of the major ordinances for the collection of funds, the Weekly Assessment, the Sequestration Ordinance, and the Ordinance for the collection of the $\frac{1}{5}$ and $\frac{1}{20}$ part, ^{2.} appointed a different committee in each county to be responsible for the collection. Although there was an obvious advantage in spreading the administrative work of the county as wide as possible, thus involving more gentry in Parliament's toils and perhaps gaining wider support as well as extending the obvious benefits of office, yet as Pennington and Roots point out ^{5.} all the functions were in fact absorbed into the existing committee, at least in Staffordshire, and probably elsewhere. Even that committee was not the same as any one group named by the Houses to be their administrators in that county.

During the early period of the war under discussion here, it was

only possible to develop a relatively efficient local organization in the areas whose loyalty to Parliament was fairly widespread and uninterrupted by large-scale royalist incursions. Although Parliament had made the attempt to counter the Commissions of Array and to put the Militia Ordinance into execution everywhere, it could count on the automatic support neither of the local M.P.'s, nor of the existing local government, nor of the people at large - especially in the west and north. Because of this, a uniform policy of county organization and administration was impossible. Nevertheless in the early months of the war, Parliament did behave as though all counties owed allegiance to it and attempted various moves to run the local war preparations from London.

4. On August 5th the instructions taken by the local M.P.'s to their counties for raising the militias were amplified, an attempt was made to unify policy regarding the king's interference with local government bodies,^{5.} and a committee was set up on October 28th^{6.} to receive all dispatches from M.P.'s in the counties to keep Parliament informed and act as a sorting place for information about local feelings. Although it did not report, it was evidently regarded as an important liaison committee as it was ordered to sit daily and had the power to commit anyone.^{7.} The original committee of fifteen was carefully composed of members from all areas - five from the south west, four from the north, one from North Wales, two from the south east, and three from the central counties ranging from Staffordshire to Buckinghamshire;^{8.} the nine later additions^{9.} all came from the west. It is evident from its orders regarding imprisoning that its functions were concerned with trying to enforce loyalty to Parliament and with establishing a working nucleus for

administrative purposes; the dispersion of members would confirm this.

Parliament also had to try to persuade the counties that the defence measures it was taking were legal at the same time as countering the king's orders by giving its deputations more power and credentials.^{10.}

By 1643 the various local authorities to collect taxes and assessments were appointed and Parliament, through the standing finance committees in order to cut down on the floods of petitions and complaints, devolved authority to them^{11.} for the collection, as well as for all disputes^{12.} concerning taxes. It met active or neutral opposition or plain inactivity from its appointees by declaring them delinquents and subject to penalties. By this method it could hardly persuade its officers to act diligently in areas where there was general antagonism, but it probably had some effect in places where the threat of seizure of estates^{13.} held some reality.

Parliament also had difficulties at the centre with its national policy, as local committees and the M.P.'s themselves put on pressure to be excused from contributing the county's share to the national finances. The strength of local feeling and its effect on the war effort has been touched on before, and throughout the period there were pressure groups representing the particular interests of a county as against the national interest. Thus Parliament had constantly to adjust the local contributions to meet with reality, and was besieged with demands to lower the local assessments due to circumstances of the war.^{14.}

The South-West

At the very beginning of hostilities the only royalist stronghold in the south west was Sherborne Castle, and Parliament regarded the entire area as within its circle of influence. A force of 2,000 was ordered to

be raised by the Deputy Lieutenants of Somerset and Devon in order to dislodge the Marquis of Hertford from the one royalist blemish. It was evidently hoped that the money from the Propositions would enable the undertaking to be financed locally.^{15.} However, the force never eventuated in any reasonable size and Hertford remained undisturbed. The hoped-for county organization never even got going, due to the royalist or neutralist sentiments prevalent in the whole area. But it does appear that the Earl of Bedford's dual loyalties interfered with his task of capturing the Castle - which added to the Parliament's difficulties.^{16.}

Once Hopton had organized his small but devoted royalist following, the only communications which Parliament succeeded in having with the west consisted of very empty threats and one-sided action in an undertaking that was essentially two-sided. Cornwall was written off almost right away, but Parliament centred its hopes and organization in the west around Exeter, depending upon the local M.P.'s and the town corporation. On the one hand its fatalistic attitude there was deplored by those of the local gentry who still tried to gain support for the Houses. A committee of Cornishmen sitting at Plymouth felt that it was only parliamentary procrastination that had encouraged the royalists, and they urged belated action to reclaim the lost territory.^{17.} On the other hand Parliament's bid to gain the cooperation of Exeter failed due to the strong neutralist element there, and the controversial motion to give those who were well disposed to the Houses power to disarm all malignants, a move which was opposed by D. 'Ewes and the Peace Party, but supported and indeed urged for universal application by the War Party.^{18.} Ironically this turned out to be a pious hope, in view of the very few trustworthy well-affected people in the region.

The Commons tried to meet the growing challenge of neutralism which it had already had to face in the north, by sending down to the west its most trusted local M.P.'s, Frideaux and Nicholls, to declare separatist action illegal, but to no avail. Its other manoeuvres were similarly empty of hope as was probably realized by the vain effort to pardon the clubmen if they became supporters of Parliament. After that, Devon and Cornwall were used mainly as examples of wickedness and treachery because of the neutralist action taking place there.

Only after the middle of 1643 when Parliament seriously undertook a western campaign, did the committees in the Commons form a positive policy of raising men and money for it - but without support from the local authorities. The relief of Exeter was seriously considered in August, as was the Isle of Wight, and later a committee for the "preservation of the west", that is, to provide the wherewithal for Waller's army, was inaugurated as a standing committee. It mainly acted as a liaison between the Eastern Association which was to provide the men, and the various finance committees to provide the money. Thus by the end of our period no link between Parliament and those able to execute its orders in the west had been established.

The same can be said for Wales where Parliament did not even make an attempt to rally forces. Not until the end of 1643 was there even a suggestion of a campaign there, and this finally stemmed from Sir Thomas Middleton, a member for North Wales, who was ^{to} later become very active in affairs there.

The North

The situation in the north was very similar to the south-west, Parliament at this time was quite unable to get a foothold, with the sole

exception of Hull, which, as Gardiner pointed out, played the same role as Plymouth in being a parliamentary outpost in enemy territory. ^{26.}

Even more than in the west, Parliament was hampered by the defection of its chief officers in the middle of the campaign - the Hothams and Cholmley, and like in the west, things looked unrelievedly grey. ^{27.} It was in the north that the notion of local neutrality was first found; this idea was repulsive to Parliament which liked to think of itself as the champion of English liberty, and therefore did not wish to see large areas which wanted no part in the war. ^{28.} This feeling went hand in hand with the parochialism and lack of vision noticed everywhere, whenever money matters were raised. Sir John Hotham spoke collectively for the northern counties when he asked for local money to be used locally and not to be sent to London. ^{29.} In the remote north this feeling was especially strong, as London was very far off indeed. With the strong autonomist feelings and doubts about which side to espouse the local leaders felt more strongly than elsewhere that to send money to a central committee would compromise any future choice of action.

The only action of which Parliament felt capable, apart from the sporadic aid sent to the Fairfaxes and the Hothams was to try to stimulate local feelings against the enemy. The difficulties faced were of course tremendous, as Parliament found it well nigh impossible to persuade anyone to take office in that hostile area, ^{30.} or to lay their hands on delinquent estates, far less to recruit an army. ^{31.} Any action in the north had therefore to be regarded as action in enemy territory with little or no support from local sources. Any moves regarding these regions were restricted to the London side - such as "providing for the safety of the Northern coasts". ^{32.}

In effect, all government seemed to have come to a grinding halt judging by the constant adjournments of the Quarter Sessions and the inability to collect even local rates for hospitals, prisons, etc., it was not surprising that the parliamentary committees found it difficult to organize defence in the north.

The Home Counties

The affairs of the Home Counties are difficult to separate from the domination of London, which exerted different influences at different times. The surrounding counties depended for their defence upon the London Militia. Committees of M.P.'s were dispatched to these counties for putting the Militia Ordinance into action, and in some cases local men outside Parliament were nominated to deal with provisioning. Without any extant county committee records for this area it is impossible to differentiate between the activities ruled by Parliament, the London Common Council and the local groups. However, there seems to be no doubt that the powerful Committee for the London Militia had jurisdiction over much of the area after the middle of 1643, and Waller's army as a London army was able to be deployed anywhere and collect its own sustenance, as well as being recruited from these counties. Because of the extent of this dependence upon London, it is likely that only the local provisioning, sequestration, and so on, was carried out by local committees. It was the London army that occupied Windsor on October 21st, and when Brentford was attacked by Rupert on November 11th it was the Committee of Militia which was to send aid and provisions. Often when local matters arose which otherwise would have been dealt with by a local committee, a parliamentary committee was set up to deal with them. Another

reason why county committees were not really needed in the Home Counties was that in the garrisoned places such as Windsor and Aylesbury, the garrisons collected the local Assessment money and used it for the upkeep of the town's defences,^{40.} although the London treasurers also contributed. In cases of arrears, a parliamentary committee settled the issue. Both the upkeep as well as the manning of defences in the Home Counties were thus a cooperative effort between them and London, and a great deal of the administrative detail was handled either by the London authorities or by Parliament itself.^{41.}

The Government of London

The government of London was at this time a curious mixture of edicts by Parliament and the corporations of the three cities involved. On the financial side the relations between Parliament and the City have been shown to be close, although differences within City between the peace and war supporters and their relative supremacy obviously greatly affected its policy to Parliament. The details of this balance of power lie outside the scope of this thesis. Here it is only relevant to examine the extent of parliamentary participation in the defence and administration of the City.^{42.}

At the outbreak of war Parliament was grateful to the initiative of the enthusiastic elements in the City for providing the backbone of the defence forces on which it had to depend to meet the king. The setting up, reinforcing and training of the City's trained bands and the issue of their command has already been touched on. The Militia committee was autonomous and only indirectly responsible to Parliament through the liaison of the City burgesses. The volunteer and trained bands raised in 1842 were initially also meant to defend the surrounding counties although

as in other cases of men having to leave their places of origin this decision gave rise to some disagreements. ^{43.} On matters of City defence itself no sharp line appeared to have been drawn between the jurisdiction of Parliament and the City bodies. For example the quartering of soldiers in the City was considered by a parliamentary committee with the advice of the Lord General, the Lord Mayor, the Committee of the Militia, and the London magistrates. ^{44.} Similarly the provision of the Tower was dealt with by a joint effort, ^{45.} as was action on tumults or sedition in the City, ^{46.} and even the details of deploying soldiers around the outworks were a joint enterprise between Parliament and the Committee of Militia. ^{47.} So was the removal of prisoners to ships for transport to overseas. ^{48.} The working smoothness of this multi-headed bureaucracy could be disturbed easily by any signs of inefficiency, as in the discovery by the Commons ^{49.} that the watches were being neglected.

Parliament also acted in cases of overlapping authority, or in the legalizing of any new authority of any of the parties who had a say in the City's government. ^{50.} Any moves to deal with local malignants and the disaffected were not only covered by Ordinances and orders of Parliament ^{51.} but were actually carried out by parliamentary committees. ^{52.}

As in other parts of the kingdom, Parliament also covered the activities of the London authorities by declarations of indemnity for war-like acts especially in anticipation of the peace talks with the king. ^{53.} The train band of Westminster itself appeared to be directly under ^{54.} parliamentary command, as its fitting out indicates.

On many other issues Parliament acted unilaterally to give orders or present "desires" to the Common Council, such as the supplying of Brentford when danger appeared there, ^{55.} and Plymouth when it was in dire

56. straits, or else when matters of general administration were concerned,
 57. such as providing the City with fuel, or getting in accounts for
 58. billets, as well as a great many peripheral matters.

The North West Midlands

Worcestershire, Warwickshire, Staffordshire, Shropshire and Cheshire formed a central area over which much fighting and changing of hands occurred, but about whose county organization at this early stage little is known. The Staffordshire Order Book does not begin till December 1645 and cannot be used for illustration of early administration. It is evident that a committee did exist there which probably carried out the orders of Parliament and administered the county whenever the royalist incursions allowed, and very likely the same is true of the other counties of that Association. The feeling of antipathy for the war generally was shared by the gentry in these districts with those already described in the north and south-west. The High Sheriff of Stafford at the sessions of the peace on November 15th 1642 issued a declaration against "the manie outrages, riots, routs, and unlawful assemblies that have been made and committed in divers parts of this county by certain persons in arrays and warlike manner" to "the great fear of all the inhabitants in general".
 60. In Cheshire too, the declared neutrality of some of the office-holding gentry was attacked by Parliament, as a secret royalist weapon to stop the "necessary Association" of the neighbouring counties. This is illustrated by the "agreement of neutrality" made in the county between men who later took opposing sides in the fighting; Orlando Bridgman who became an active royalist and Sir George Booth who took up the fight for Parliament. But the succeeding months of 1645 forced the county into
 61.

the war despite the strong desire of its gentry and peasantry to keep out
 62.
 of the fighting.

Despite the fighting at Worcester, Edgehill and elsewhere, and the constantly changing situation in these counties, there seems to have been little contact between Parliament and the affairs of the area. On 31st December Warwickshire and Staffordshire associated under their respective committees and Deputy Lieutenants, 63. but this appeared to have led to no close cooperation and later under Brereton's military leadership much strife ensued between these two counties due to the parochialism of their interests. What the position of the county committees during these changes of influence was, is unknown. Parliament appointed very few committees in the Commons to deal with these regions, except one to hurry in the subscription money from Shropshire, 64. which stimulated a parliamentary enquiry, and later to introduce Denbigh's forces into the area. County activity in this region therefore remained disorganized and as far as we know, undocumented, until 1644.

The Eastern Midland Association

Here we are faced with the same problem of lack of information about the organization of the war in the area, which was one of the most heavily taxed by war, being the starting place for both protagonists in the struggle, and constantly transversed by the opposing armies. Rupert extended his forages for money southwards from Nottingham to Leicester 65. in September 1642, and Essex mobilized in Northampton, causing great local uneasiness right from the start of the war. The usual committee of M.P.'s was sent to Northampton to put the Militia Ordinance into execution. 66. But despite the proximity of the two armies no fighting occurred in the area before the peace negotiations of early 1643, due to the westward and

then southward move of the royalist camp. The counties became associated at about the same time as the Eastern Association under Lord Grey.^{67.} It is interesting that the Lords were worried at this time about the possibly conflicting authorities of the general of the Association and the Lords Lieutenant of the counties, and also by the possible loss of face for Parliament if the Lords Lieutenant should hand in their commissions, indicating a lukewarm attitude to their duties. Sir William Armine, an experienced military man and foremost in the activities of his own northern county, moved that the authorities of the Lords Lieutenant and Lord Grey should be drafted so as not to conflict, while Marten, in typical War Party haste, urged immediate action and the setting aside of these delicate points. This exchange indicates at the highest level the difficulties of imposing a centralized administration on an existing decentralized form of local government. True, the Lords Lieutenant had their authority from Parliament, but this did not mean that it was easy for Parliament to superimpose a higher and unaccustomed authority over them. Yet some form of centralization was necessary and implicit in the very notion of a kind of federated "Association", which for the first time was to substitute a supra-county allegiance for what had always been regarded as the natural governmental unit. We cannot be sure how this particular agglomeration of counties was governed as there are no extant records to aid us. The only association which can be studied in detail is the Eastern Association where there was an Association Committee as well as individual member county committees. Presumably while these areas were under parliamentary sway this was also the case here. The authority of the commander of the forces in the area was nearly absolute, but its execution needed the assistance of a civil authority,

as there is no doubt that the collection of taxes and the civil administration was very much resented when attempted by soldiers in cases of refractory areas, and in any case could be best carried out with the help and support of the traditional ruling families of the districts. This reflects upon the Lords' second concern, to keep the Lords Lieutenant, and by implication all the lower ranks of the country gentry, loyal to Parliament. Parliament did in fact try to propitiate the local magnates by enabling and encouraging them to participate in the local government, perhaps even extending their duties beyond those previously held. But this was seldom sufficient to keep those whose affections lay with the king, on Parliament's side. In Lincolnshire it seems that the local gentry and farmers were just as unwilling to take sides as in the extreme north and west, and agitated to keep their county out of the conflict, much to Parliament's chagrin. The fact of association certainly was not sufficient for those accustomed to traditional county-mindedness.

Although Lincolnshire and the whole Association was under the sway of the royalists from Newark, they were not in possession of the whole county. Cromwell, after cleaning up the Eastern Association attempted to take Newark, but failed to get the cooperation of Metham's forces there (the latter apart from his later treachery, had also shown himself to be very parochial). However, Cromwell did take Grantham, establishing a strong parliamentary foothold in these counties, so that by the end of the year the royalists were ousted everywhere in this area except in Nottinghamshire and Derbyshire. In the absence of information about the local committees it is interesting to note that at the first sign of action in Lincolnshire, a committee was nominated to assist Cromwell

to defend the county, consisting of five local M.P.'s and three local gentlemen.^{70.} These may well have been the first definitely established parliamentary authority in the area. There is no doubt that their function, like that of most county committees, must have been mainly to supply Cromwell with local funds and provisions, as well as providing a liaison between the hostile or apathetic gentry and Parliament.^{71.} This they evidently did not achieve because neither Cromwell nor Grey of Willoughbynor Cell could persuade the local militias to leave their counties and make an essay on the north where Parliament had been unable to secure a foothold.

The South East

Here Parliament acted with promptness and resolution and gained areas which were not by disposition enthusiastic supporters. Parliament was of course most anxious about securing the ports which were wary of committing themselves at the beginning,^{72.} or else were split between a parliamentary merchant and trader group, and a more timorously conservative peasantry.^{73.} Despite this, Waller's prompt action retained them for Parliament.

In Kent where the feeling was dominantly Anglican and tended to be very county-minded Parliament had trouble at the beginning, but when Dover Castle was surprised on August 21st, Kent was subdued. In order to keep it so, Parliament worked through the local M.P.'s to arm a loyal section of the county,^{74.} but as Everitt points out,^{75.} all these except Sir Peter Heyman were notoriously moderate, either deserting, not attending, moving for secession for Kent, or generally taking a most conservative attitude. This meant that Parliament faced grave difficulties in its relation with Kent, as it could not count on effective execution of policy

through its Members. The declaration for peace from Kent sent to the Commons, was dealt with not by the local Members, but by a more dependably radical committee. ^{76.} The same difficulties to ensure loyalty from Surrey were met by appointing local M.P.'s to suggest fit Deputy Lieutenants for the county and penalizing all who refused - thus attempting simultaneously to expose and extirpate royalism and lukewarmness. ^{77.} Charles tried to interfere, attempting to win internal support in the region in the hope of another rising in his favour. His declaration wrecked the peace talks, and as a result Parliament reaffirmed the South Eastern Association and underlined its legality by a committee of mixed political allegiances and with no local members. ^{78.}

In Kent Parliament did not appoint a committee of local men to form a central committee, although its M.P.'s were delegated to execute the ordinances by bringing in money. ^{79.} As there was no dominant family, the work was split up between rival lesser county families each dominating the lathal sub-committees in the areas where they were most powerful. Everitt has dealt fully with the committee organization there, but it is worth mentioning the special aspects of Kent which made it such an unwilling member of the Association. Partly this was due to the weakness of the local Puritans, and a lack of militant and enthusiastic M.P.'s to carry Parliament's active policies to their own districts. Partly it was due to the more or less equal strength of rival families there. Then there was the strong feeling of separatism inspired by what was thought of as interference from London - all of twenty miles away - and the concomitant lack of nationalistic sentiments. There was also trouble with the Cinque Ports ^{wh} ~~was~~ claimed at first to be excluded from the Association, because their taxation burden was already high. One of

the difficulties of administering the area too was the proliferation of committees. No central committee was nominated by Parliament, nor was one evolved from the local M.P.'s and Deputy Lieutenants for the reasons stated above. Instead, separate committees were appointed for the collection of each of the major taxes, but the pyramid of authority was never clearly defined, due partly to the sloppiness of the ordinances, partly to the worries about the legality of office tenure, and partly to the peripatetic nature of the central administrative committees sitting in sessions in all the major towns. Some attempt was made after 80. suppression of the July rising to bolster this situation by declarations of legality, and by adjudicating the quarrels between the leading groups there. 81. It is noteworthy that on both these parliamentary committees there were no Kentish M.P.'s at all.

There seemed certainly to be a wide gulf between those who thought in national terms about the successful waging of the war, and those moderate and unenthusiastic members who put the interests of the county uppermost. This county-mindedness was not restricted to the extreme peace-orientated members or the later deserters. Sir Richard Onslow, often associated with the Middle Party, was attacked by the War Party member Miles Corbett for objecting to the levy of an army for Manchester in his county of Surrey, claiming that it had already been exhausted by Essex's levies. Corbett evidently went on an inspection tour of the Eastern counties and reported any breakdown of the parliamentary executive machinery he found, to the 82. discomfiture of the slack M.P.'s responsible.

Because of the strategic importance of Portsmouth and the danger of leaving its care to the vagaries of an unenthusiastic local government body its administration was put in the hands of five Hampshire M.P.'s in

October 1643 until the Lord General was ready to protect and administer it
83.
himself.

Towards the end of the period under discussion here, the four counties were associated under Waller with the aim of supporting the war elsewhere, especially in the west, and it was obvious that many difficulties would have to be faced to get the county-minded forces out of their own homeground, as well as seeing that the local committees did not sabotage the effort. The local forces were anyway often dissipated by death and desertion so that the county committees obviously had great trouble to arrange for local defence, let alone meeting the Association requirements. 84.
These considerations were prevalent when the Kent county committee was summoned to appear before the parliamentary committee for the four Associated counties to discuss expediting of the local force. 85. The committee consisted of twelve M.P.'s from the Associated Counties, including as the only Kentish representative its sole radical, Hayman, and ten M.P.'s from the west - the hopeful beneficiaries of the action.

The other main area to be studied for its county organization is the Eastern Association. As in this area a great deal of material has enabled a far more detailed study, it will be dealt with in a separate chapter.

Membership of the Parliamentary County Committees

This section seeks to examine the Members of the Commons appointed to take care of the execution of Parliament's policy at the county level. Naturally the local influence here adds an extra dimension to the analysis, which covers both the areas of origin as well as the political interests of the committee appointees. It also includes the areas of the Eastern Association which will be discussed in the next chapter.

First we must look at the men who sat on more than two committees in any one of the areas considered. ^{86.} In the south-east, of the eleven who were on more than two of the thirteen committees, only two, Hayman and Wallop, were M.P.'s for the south-east, although six more were men of local origin. In the south-east the counties were represented in the House by incorrigibly moderate/neutralist/royalist members. Although there were others - Onslow, Owfield, Goodwyn and so on, who were strongly committed to Parliament, and who did sit on one or two committees, the more active men were evidently appointed for their political rather than their local interest. Hayman and Wallop who were from the south-east were also strong War Party men, and so were Morley, Wentworth and Vane, who were not directly interested in the area. The others, Strickland, Brown, Onslow, Pye, Pelham and Lisle were all either active supporters of Pym, or able administrators who dominated the committee scene in most fields as we have seen.

In the Eastern Association group, although there were plenty of enthusiastic local Members to choose from, eight out of fourteen of those who attended more than two of the fourteen committees were local men - Barrington, Iusley and Masham from the Middle Party, and Curdon, Corbett and Mildmay of the War Party, Grimston of the Peace Party and Reynolds, an administrator. The seven non-locals were made up of Vane, St. John, and Wentworth of the War Party, Rouse of the Middle Party, Wilde an administrator and committee-man, and Holles from the Peace Party. Thus the enthusiasm of the War and Middle Parties must have played an important role in determining action in this area as being a local representative. The reason is obvious - no matter how well known or devoted to the county an M.P. was, he was useless as an administrator of parliamentary policy if he did not subscribe enthusiastically to Parliament's aim in organizing

national defence. Political enthusiasm was more important for national policy than local influence, although whenever the two coincided in a person, he was very likely to be useful in county affairs.

In the London group naturally the picture is somewhat different, for there, as we have seen, local and political interests to some extent coincided. People tended to be involved in London ventures and have connections with the City's government if they were interested in reform and politics. Of the activists in this group then, the fortyseven who attended more than two of the thirtytwo committees were made up of thirtyfour who had some connection with the City - either owned land, had business connections, or spent the larger part of their time in their town house. It is significant that of the remaining thirteen "outsiders" nine were prominent War Party men. Of the total fortyseven activists, seventeen were War Party men and fourteen Middle Party. Thus there was no shortage of politically active men to fill the local committees for London.

Of the twelve activists on the eleven committees on matters of the south west, ten were from the area, while Whitlock and Glyn were active presumably because of the close link between London and the affairs of the south-west. Of the local men four were War Party men, two Middle Party and two administrators. We might explain the very high concentration of local men here more by the political enthusiasm of the local members, who differed drastically from the neutralist and royalist constituencies. The northern committees cannot be properly discussed as there were only four in the group, but those who sat on two of them were all from the north, and all were War Party men, which we noticed was also the case among the men most active in promoting the interests of Fairfax's army discussed in the chapter on Defence and Administration. In the Home

Counties there were also not sufficient activists to make an effective analysis, but the four who sat on three of the seven committees were all men with local interests, and apart from Lytton, not very active otherwise in parliamentary affairs. However, as we saw, the affairs of these counties were so dominated from London that matters involving important political decisions were invariably dealt with at the centre, and men with local interests were of more value in the minutiae of administrative affairs than politically minded strangers. The Welsh and Midlands committees were also dominated by political figures rather than local ones, with Prideaux, Haselrig and Vane of the War Party, Wray and Irby of the Middle Party and Reynolds and Lisle who were "committeemen". Haselrig, Vane, Wray and Irby had local interests as well.

The committees dealing with county administration split fairly evenly between administrators and political figures, but again the numbers involved were too low to be significant.

87.

Looking now at the overall list of activists, we find a surprising number of men who attended committees in nearly all areas. The activists can be examined in two ways - those who sat on the largest number of committees over the whole range, and those who spread their activities most evenly over all the groups. Glyn sat on the largest total number of committees, yet his activities were very largely centred upon London, which took up 15 of his 26 committee nominations, and he did not appear at all on the committees relating to the south-east. On the other hand St. John attended at all eight sections and spent his time about equally at each. The same is more or less true of Vane Jr. who attended seven sections and a proportionate number of committees in each. It is interesting that the up-and-coming leaders of the House, who were to

become far more involved in the mechanics of committee rule, should have realized the importance of keeping in touch with all areas of county administration, whereas Pym was disproportionately active on London affairs. The remaining activists may be divided according to their interests in the local affairs of their own region, and the general affairs of all the counties. Although he attended a larger proportion of local south-western committees, Prideaux still remained active on most others especially London. The same is true of Hill, Bond, Rolle and Browne. Vassall obviously specialized in London affairs. Wilde displayed fairly even interest in county matters generally, although he was also active in his own area, and so was Erle. Cage on the other hand evidently did not attend significantly on committees involving his county but centred his interest on London. Edward Ashe, whose interests were split between London and the south west, behaved accordingly. Rous was predominant on his south-western committees as was Barrington on the eastern ones. Lisle was fairly spread in his interests, as were Holles, Whitelock, Trenchard, Millington and Hayman. Wheeler and Marten concentrated on London, Mildmay on his own Eastern Association. Wentworth, Corbett, Eye and Reynolds were most interested in affairs away from home. It is therefore impossible to say that any political party was more active on the local front than on county committees generally. Both the War Party and the Middle Party men were as usual very active on this series of committees generally, but they each had members who were more specifically active in their own counties, and others who distributed their interests over all the areas.

Of those who were on ten or more of all the committees, thirteen were War Party men, eight Middle Party, one was from the Peace Party, Vassall

was an active London alderman and merchant, and nine were administrators and committee-men. The Middle Party concentrated most upon London committees, whereas the War Party were active in London as well as in their own counties, and at the same time spread their activities over most areas, confirming the impression that the War Party had a wider outlook on the future running of the war, and were less active on the existing centre of interest and money, namely, London. The Middle Party on the other hand, were inextricably committed to strategy related to London and centred their interests there. The administrators were on the whole spreading their interests over all the counties, fulfilling their position as embryo public servants. Their special skills and interests made them eminently suitable to act as administrators both in carrying parliamentary policy to the executive arm of government, the counties, as well as working consistently and industriously on central parliamentary committee.

TABLE I

MOST ACTIVE MEMBERS ON COMMITTEES IN LOCAL DISTRICTS

Note: WP. - War Party MP. - Middle Party PP. - Peace Party
Ad. - Administrators L. - Locals

No. of	Activists	WP.	MP.	PP.	Ad.	L.	No. of	Activists	WP.	MP.	PP.	Ad.	L.
ctees.							ctees.						

South East Committees

Total: 13 committees

4	Strickland	x				
4	Morley	x			x	
3	Hayman	x			x	
3	Wallop	x			x	
3	Wentworth	x				
3	Brown		x		x	
3	Onslow		x		x	
3	Fye				x	x
3	Felham	x			x	
3	Vane Jr.	x				
3	Lisle				x	x

East Committees

Total: 14 committees

8	Barrington				x	
6	Gurdon	x				x
4	Grimston				x	x
4	Corbett	x				x
4	Reynolds					x
4	Mildmay	x				x
4	Masham		x			x
3	Holles				x	
3	St. John	x				
3	Rous		x			
3	Wilde					x
3	Wentowrth	x				
3	Lumley					x
3	Vane Jr.	x				x

South West Committees

Total: 11 committees

5	Erle		x		x	
5	Bond	x			x	
4	Rous		x		x	
4	Préaux	x			x	
4	Strode	x			x	
4	Hill				x	x
3	Whitelock		x			
3	Rolle J.				x	x
3	Glyn		x			
3	Holles			x		x
3	Brown J.					x
3	Trenchard				x	x

Home County Committees

Total: 7 committees

3	Winwood					x
3	Lytton					x
3	Dacres					x
3	Fountain					x

TABLE I

MOST ACTIVE MEMBERS ON COMMITTEES IN LOCAL DISTRICTS

Note: WP. - War Party MP. - Middle Party PP. - Peace Party
Ad. - Administrators L. - Locals

No. of Activists WP. MP. PP. Ad. L. No. of Activists WP. MP. PP. Ad. L.
Ctees. Ctees.

London Committees

Total: 32 committees

15	Glyn		x		x
13	Vassall			x	x
8	Rigby	x			
6	Frideaux	x			
7	Vane Jr.	x			
7	Ashe E.		x		x
7	Cage			x	x
7	Pye			x	x
7	Fym		x		
7	Wheeler			x	x
7	Bond	x			x
6	Wilde			x	
6	Hoyle	x			
5	Hill			x	x
5	Erle		x		
5	Marten	x			x
5	Corbett		x		x
5	Whitelock		x		x
5	Bence A.			x	x
5	Browne S.		x		x
5	Rolle S.		x		x
4	Bell				x
4	Bence S.			x	x
4	Harley			x	x
4	Asherst				
4	Gerrard		x		x
4	Green			x	x
4	St. John	x			
4	Strode	x			

Northern Midlands and Wales Committees

Total: 9 committees

4	Frideaux	x			
3	Wray		x		x
3	Wilde				x
3	Irby		x		x
3	Haselrig	x			x
3	Reynolds				x
3	Lisle				x
3	Vane Jr.	x			

Northern Committees

Total: 4 committees

No activists on 3 or more committees.

General Orders on County Administration

Total: 7 committees

3	Hill				x
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TABLE II

MOST ACTIVE MEMBERS ON COUNTY COMMITTEES

Note: SE. - South East E. - East L. - London
 GO. - General Orders SW. - South West N. - Northern
 HC. - Home County NM. - Northern Midlands
 WP. - War Party MP. - Middle Party PP. - Peace Party
 Ad. - Administrators

Name	No. of Ctees.	No. of Areas.	SE.	E.	L.	GO.	SW.	N.	HC.	NM.	WP.	MP.	PP.	Ad.
Glyn	26	7		2	15	1	5	1	2	2		x		
Frideaux	22	6	2	2	8	2	4			4	x			
Vane Jr.	20	7	3	3	7	1	1	2		5	x			
Hill	18	7	2	2	5	3	4		1	1				x
Bond	17	6	1		7	1	5		1	2	x			
Vassall	17	5	1	1	13		1		1	1				x
St. John	16	8	2	3	4	2	2	1	1	1	x			
Wilde	16	7	1	3	6	1	1		1	5				x
Erle	16	5	2	2	5		5			1		x		
Cage	15	7	1	2	7	2	1		1	1				x
Ashes E.	14	6		1	7	1	2		1	1		x		
Fye	14	5	3		7		1		1	2				x
Reynolds	14	5		4	3	2			2	3				x
Rous	13	5	1	3	3	2	4					x		
Barrington	14	6	1	6	2	1		1		1		x		
Strode	13	5	1	2	4	2	3				x			
Fym	13	5	1	2	7		2			1		x		
Liale	14	6	3	2	3	1	2			3				x
Rigby	12	5	1	1	6	1		1			x			
Corbett M.	12	4	1	4	6					1	x			
Holles	12	6	1	3	3		3	1		1				x
Browne S.	12	4	3	1	5		3					x		
Wentworth	12	5	3	3	3		1			2	x			
Whitelock	12	5			5	1	3		1	2		x		
Trenchard	11	5	2	1	3		3		2					x
Rolle	10	4			5	1	3		1	2				
Strickland	10	5	4		1		1	2		2	x			
Mildmay	10	5	1	4	3				1	1	x			
Marten	10	5	1		5	1	2	1			x			
Millington	10	7	1	1	2	2	1	1		2	x			
Hayman	10	6	3	1	3	1	1		1		x			
Wheeler	10	4	1		7				1	1				x
Flakiston	9	5			3	1		2	1	2	x			
Gurdon	9	4		6		1			1	1	x			
Gerrard	8	5	1		4	1			1	1		x		
Hoyle	8	2				6				2	x			
Masham	7	3		4	1					2		x		
Maynard	7	3			3		2			2				x

TABLE II (Cont.)

Name	No. of Ctees.	No. of Areas	SE.	E.	L.	CO.	SW.	N.	HC.	NM.	WP.	MP.	PP.	Ad.
Bence	7	3	1	2	4							X		
Young	7	4	1		2	2	2							
Asherst	7	3			4				1	2				X
Long	7	5	1	1	3				1	1				X
Lytton	7	3			2				3	2				X
Nicholas	7	4			1		2		2	2				
Grimston	7	4		4	1				1	1			X	
Brown R.	6	4	2		1	1			2					
Onslow	6	2	3		3							X		
Irby	6	3	1	2						3		X		
Stapleton	6	3			2				1	2		X		
Moore R.	6	4			3	1			1	1				
Haselrig	6	4	1	1		1				3	X			
Rose	6	4			2	1	2			1				X
Knightley	6	5	1		2			1	1	1				X
Tate	6	4		1		1			2	2	X			
Green	6	3			4	1	1							X
Goodwyn R.	6	4	2	1	2				1			X		
Felham	6	3	3		2	1								
Ludlow	5	4			1		2		1	1	X			
Noble	5	4	1	2		1				1				X
Nicholls	5	4		1	1		2			1		X		
Lumley	5	2		3	2							X		
Morley	5	2	4		1						X			
Middleton	5	4		1	2	1				1				X
Holland C.	5	3		1	2				2		X			
Harley	5	3		1	3	1								X
Buller	5	3				1	2			2				
Bell	5	2			4				1					
Bainton	5	2	2		3						X?			
Whittaker	5	3	1		3				1				X	
Sallop	5	3	3		1		1				X			
Fountain	5	2			2				3					
Yelverton	4	3				2	1			1		X		
Pierrepoint	4	3		1				1		2				X
Pickering	4	5		1		1				2				
Dacres	4	2				1			3					X
Darley	4	3				1		2		1		X		
North	4	3	1	2						1		X		
Sampden	4	3		1	2				1			X		
Hippisley	4	2			3				1					
Wray	4	2		1						3		X		
Evelyn	4	3	2	1		1						X		

CHAPTER 11

COUNTY COMMITTEES IN THE EASTERN ASSOCIATION

Perhaps the best simple case study of county organization can be made by looking at the Eastern Association. The surviving records of local government in this region mirror the relative strength of the parliamentary machinery there. For of all the areas affected by the war, this was the most loyal to Parliament; royalism was quashed by Cromwell and his regiment in March 1643. Although threatened by uprisings from Kent and invasion from the west there was no real fighting within the Association. The main difficulties encountered by the military and political leaders were to get the Associated counties to agree to let their militias out of their counties' borders. In Hertford for instance, Sir Thomas Dacres, a local Member responsible for the accounts of the Weekly Assessment found that collections were hindered by an order from the Association committee at Cambridge to send down two paid companies of trained bands. He himself seemed to share the view that this was a bad thing as he was writing in appeal to the Speaker of the House. Provincial-mindedness on matters of finance and defence extended even to some of the national representatives of the Associated Counties, who may have supported the idea of the Association as a measure to wage war more successfully, but who were nevertheless subject to local pressures when it came to footing the bill.

1.

Suffolk

2.

The Order Book of the committee at Bury St. Edmunds although not complete, gives some insight into the changeover from the administration of the Deputy Lieutenants, sheriffs and J.P.'s to the hands of a county

committee. The parliamentary order naming "committees" to collect the Subscriptions at Bury and Ipswich in July 1642 was addressed to Sir William Castleton, High Sheriff, who was the first named on a list of members which included some local M.P.'s - Flayters, Crane, Barnardiston, Parker, Heveningham, Facon and Cage. In this way authority remained primarily in established hands and was not wrested by the parliamentary committee of M.P.'s, even though in Suffolk there were plenty of enthusiastic parliamentarians among them. By September 10th Castleton was no longer mentioned in the parliamentary order for collecting money, plate and horses; instead, the two burgesses of Ipswich were to be commissioners to administer the ordinance aided by the others previously named. The style of address changed quickly from the traditional authorities to the county committees. On October 15th ^{3.} Corbett and Gardon were ordered to prepare instructions for the Deputy Lieutenants of Suffolk to appoint officers, leaving authority for the local militia for the time being in their hands. On October 28th ^{4.} an order of the House of Commons referred to a letter from Barnardiston "and other committees" asking that the local receivers for money (that is, the committee itself) might retain some of the money for local defence, and that the arrangements might be left to the "Deputy lieutenants and committees". This incidentally indicates the early concern of the county committees for local as opposed to national defence, and the natural and widespread abhorrence for seeing local money drained off to London.

However, the Deputy Lieutenants remained for the time being the people directly responsible to the Earl of Essex for military matters. The Lord General ^{5.} wrote to them to furnish a troop with horses, and they ^{6.} appointed the troop to stay for local defence. The Committee of Safety

7. wrote to them to send local forces to London. It is interesting that a petition from the "cheife inhabitants" of Bury and Horton hundred urging for more widespread conscription and financial contribution was addressed to the committee at Bury and not to the Deputy Lieutenants, possibly because it was felt that the new authority was more likely to deal with a petition for more vigorous execution of the war.

We cannot be certain from the Order Book when the committee first began to meet formally. 8. The first proper order of the committee, signed by its clerk Edward Lelan is recorded on November 20th 1643. This order reflects the hierarchical way authority was delegated in the county; it stressed that the ultimate authority for deciding the amounts to be paid for the 1/5th and 1/20th part by anyone in any division rested with the Bury committee, not with the local one^{or} with the assessors. The committee was most concerned with collecting taxes, and interpreting the parliamentary ordinances to suit the needs of the county. They decided the parliamentary order that 2d. in the £ might be kept by the collectors for their pay should be worked so that the sub-collectors and petty constables who were subordinate to the chief collectors were to get 1d. of the amount. 9. This was a typical way of adjusting a parliamentary order to meet administrative realities at the lowest rung of the executive ladder which Parliament all but ignored. For instance, it did not necessarily appoint the Receivers for the Weekly Pay in charge of the various divisions. One order indicates that the Bury committee appointed from its own membership two receivers for each of the four divisions. 10. Under these Receivers there were Collectors and High Collectors for the hundreds of each division, the committee being responsible for their appointment. It appears that after pressure from the Earl of Manchester the Association

general, they ordered the collectors to use troopers to facilitate collection. Cooperation between the civil and military authorities waxed and waned as the relative authority of the committee and the General tended to overlap; it was virtually impossible to separate military from financial matters in a setup where the committee was responsible for the collection, and sometimes for the distribution of pay to the county's troops - both functions also pertinent to the Commander's duties.

The committee not only decided how much each division was to pay, but also what individual men were to contribute in the way of arms and money for the local militia and Manchester's Association army. ^{11.} It was solely in charge of the militia's maintenance. ^{12.} Theoretically it held control of the local forces but in practice this caused overlapping between the committee and Manchester's jurisdiction.

One of the chief obstacles to smooth relations was the complicated decentralized system of collection and payment which resulted due to the unwillingness of men to pay for the forces outside the county or even outside their own division. The committee itself did not necessarily set eyes on the money collected in the county. For example, it ordered the local High Collector for Ipswich to pay specified amounts monthly to certain officers for themselves and their troops, while the other divisions were to pay the troops in their territory directly. ^{13.} This involved the troopers themselves in the collection, and caused some hard feelings that would have been avoided by a purely civil administration. On the other hand the committee had to discipline soldiers who took unwarranted free quarter; ^{14.} it also tried offenders and cared for the sick and disabled, both physically and financially. ^{15.} Because the commander's and the committee's functions were so undefined, both used the same

executive officers and issued instructions directly to them, which led to contradiction as well as overlapping. Thus, the constables were ordered to see that all bachelors "voluntarily" trained for the militia under the Deputy Lieutenants' command, though as we have seen, the militia was part of the committee's responsibility. The collectors and constables were ordered by Manchester to bring all non-contributors before a committee of his appointees - not before the Bury committee. It was Manchester's warrant too, which ordered the removal of all signs of popery from the churches - not ^{that} of the constituted civil authority. This was not due to any executive zeal on Manchester's part. Parliament often appointed him to be in charge of quite non-military matters, such as hearing complaints against ministers and schoolmasters. Yet it was through the committee that these complaints were heard, to be referred to the commander himself whenever there seemed to be anything in the accusations. He appeared to take great care to spur the committee on by praising their power and warning them of their responsibility if the job was not well done. Parliament left it to Manchester to authorize the committee to put the ordinance against Scandalous Ministers into execution. He not only recommended how these hearings were to be carried out, but how much pay the Commissioners could take and from what source.

Manchester made some one-sided attempts to sort out the various jurisdictions involved in the collection of taxes for his regiments. His commissioners for the collection of the 1/5th and 1/20th part were to give an account of their collections to the Bury committee; he detailed which he considered to be the classes who were to be dealt with leniently; he appointed as Treasurer and Receivers some members of the committee, but

specified that their duties did not embrace the money collected by his commissioners for the payment of the county's forces; in any case they were to be responsible with their collections for the whole Association to his appointees, who were to see that all the Association forces were paid equally, and by being on the spot, would stop appeals back to the committees. The Bury committee was to be responsible for the collection of horses. The General evidently put the stamp of finality to the committee's order for the payment of the sub-collectors out of the allotted 2d. in the £. Thus, in almost every field there was duplication of authority and overlapping of function and jurisdiction between Manchester and the committee. Naturally in a supra-regional arrangement of the Association some form of coordination between the county committees was needed. The Committee of the Associated Counties sitting at Cambridge comprised representatives of all the counties, and formed yet another authority which to some extent interfered, overlapped and at the same time conflicted with Manchester's authority and that of the county committee.

22. In the commission issued by Essex to the Committee of the Association they were empowered to order the officers and men of the Association, presumably receiving their own orders in turn from the Lord General and from Manchester. In addition the Collectors for the Weekly Pay and for Sequestration were to be responsible to them. In fact the Associated Counties Committee's power explicitly overrode that of the Deputy Lieutenants of the counties, and presumably therefore also that of the committees. The Associated Counties Committee sent instructions to the local committees 23. to prepare their militias for local defence, in this way assuming authority over the work of the individual county committees by making

the Deputy Lieutenants as well as the officers directly responsible to the Associated Counties Committee.

When once the Association really began to function as a unit, all sorts of administrative measures were centralized, though, it seems, with difficulty. Even the minor expenditure of "sending scouts, messengers, dragoners to fetch in money, charges of the commissioners, clerk and doorkeeper, reliefs of lame and sick soldiers in their travell or for sending soldiers to there Colliers, fire and candle at guard"^{24.} were to be distributed from the Cambridge treasury (though no doubt collected locally). Specific edicts on administrative matters were issued to all the Associated Counties, such as calling to account the Treasurers for maimed soldiers, and payment of relief money. This called for a centralization of what had previously been a purely local function. More important, the payment of all ranks and officers was to be regulated from Cambridge in order to cut out local variations.

This centralization was accompanied by the atrophy of some of the functions, and thereby the authority of the Suffolk committee. We can catch a glimpse of this from the fact that the Ipswich division petitioned Manchester, who referred it to the Associated Counties Committee, to clarify whether general charges levied upon the town were to be borne by the local hundreds only or by the county as a whole.^{25.} This indicates some local rift of authority between the central Bury committee who were notified of the hearing, and the other sub-committees, especially at Ipswich.

Apart from these conflicting authorities, and the complexities of a new series of hierarchical relationships there was the direct contact between Parliament and the County Committee. As we have seen, Parliament's

will often reached the county only by the agency of the Lord General through the Major General of the Associated Counties, to the Association Committee, and only thence to the county committee. But on many occasions Parliament felt it worthwhile to remain in direct touch with the county committees. For example, the county committee was asked to organize a force for local defence to be sent to London and paid locally with the hope of eventual repayment.^{26.} Again, when the Goldsmiths Hall Committee began to collect money on a county basis in order to pay the Scots to cease to Parliament's aid, a new but very similar county committee was appointed in Suffolk,^{27.} with power to collect voluntary contributions quite independent of the Associated Counties but directly responsible to the Goldsmiths Hall Committee.

It is difficult to draw any conclusions about the efficiency and organisation of the County Committees and their relations with London at this early stage before the system had really had a chance to function over a large area. But there is no doubt that the Eastern Association must have acted as a model for other areas whose administrative processes were interrupted by more military disruption during the early years of the war. But the general trends are obvious. First there was the shift from the traditional authority of the Deputy Lieutenants to the committee which incorporated many of them and which further delegated functions to the sub-committees in different areas of the county. The traditional officers, the J.P.'s, sheriffs, headborough and constables usually acted in conjunction with the newly established ones - the Receivers, Collectors and sub-collectors of the various areas. Uneasily presiding over a group of these committees sat the Committee of the Associated Counties at Cambridge,

comprising some local M.P.'s and other local representatives, usually Deputy Lieutenants, who annexed some of the newly acquired functions of county government. The authority of the military commanders in relation to these bodies was never defined by Parliament, which sometimes used the Lord General or Manchester as intermediary in the executive hierarchy, and at other times gave the commanders an open hand for local matters both civil and military. But Parliament often acted as the deus ex machina in situations when it considered that its direct intervention in county affairs was needed, and bypassed both the Association committee and the military commanders in communicating with the county committee direct.

28.

Essex

Essex was a member of the same association as Suffolk and its political orientation was similar. However its organization differed in some important respects due to the overweening influence of Sir Thomas Barrington, a giant among the local magnates and on intimate terms with the opposition group at Westminster. Essex, already tied in a special sense to the interests of Parliament and the City by proximity and strategic importance, was fortunate in having as its chief parliamentary champion an important political figure with wide and influential connections. It is wellknown that the parliamentary leaders were not only tied by kinship relations but by mutual interests in the Puritan colonizing ventures, and that the meetings at the manorial homes of the Eastern gentry before 1640 concerned not only the economic ventures for the New World but the political ventures for the Old.

29.

Sir Thomas Barrington, described by Mark Noble as "one of the heads of that famous confederacy of relationship that met in the House

of Commons in 1640, all of whom were extremely dissatisfied with the Court",^{30.} was in some way related to the Earls of Warwick, Holland and Manchester, Lord Robartes, and, more remotely, Lords Say and Brooke, as well as to Hampden, Fyn, St. John, Knightly, Upton, Cromwell,^{31.} the Fiennes, Cheeke, Masham and Grimston from the House of Commons.^{32.} His position at the centre of this cluster of distant relatives was eminently suited to the role which he was to play in politics and in the administration of his county. The leaders trusted him and held him in high regard, while the gentry of his county deferred to him as their senior in wealth and influence.

Barrington did not make many speeches in the Commons and his name cannot be found frequently among the best known of the opposition leaders.^{33.} Publicly he was a nonentity, a backbencher whose name was rarely heard in the House and who did not speak significantly in the cause of reform. This makes it all the more arresting that in the period from November 1640 to July 1642 Barrington was named to 111 committees in the Commons - second only to John Glyn, the renowned Presbyterian lawyer and Recorder of the City of London, who was named to 118 committees, and overreaching even Fyn himself.^{34.} To be named to so many committees does not of course mean that he attended them all or that he exercised a decisive influence upon them, but it does indicate the degree of trust and importance with which he was regarded by the leaders and the rank and file who voted him there. Nor were his prodigious attendances centred about any speciality; rather they were distributed over a very wide range of affairs dealt with by committees.

By contrast, in the period from August 1642 at the outbreak of

war, to December 1643 he appeared on only 41 committees, although the indefatigable Glyn was named in the same period to 161 and Pym to 154. This decline of administrative diligence was not due to any loss of political favour or personal sloth, but rather to the newly divided loyalty between duty to his country and to his county. As a member of the politically vital Committee of Safety to which he was evidently co-opted or named after its original inception on July 4th 1642 ^{35.} he certainly maintained his position among his political colleagues. He appears to have attended on at least 53 of the committee's meetings from August 1642 to December 1643. ^{36.} What is more, Barrington's attendances centred about the periods of crisis, such as during the time of the peace negotiations with the king; at the same time he also acted as teller for the less compromising members in the House on issues of peace and war. ^{37.} Occasionally he acted as signatory on the small committee to authorize the payments of the Committee of Safety, which consisted otherwise of Pym, Bond, Cornelius Holland and Vane Jr. ^{38.} Barrington took his position as a national politician and administrator during the early part of the war seriously, and attended at Westminster as often as his presence there was needed and could be dispensed with in the county.

His importance as a county figure is indicated primarily by the fact that most of the material relating to Essex during this period is to be found in his own correspondence. He received letters from parliamentary leaders, other Members of Parliament, parliamentary committees, and the Committee of the Eastern Association as well as from the parliamentary generals, county officials, petitioners and soldiers. These succinctly illustrate the unique position which he held at the pivot between

parliamentary decisions and county administrations. On the other hand, he was no local oligarch with parochial views, like some of the neutralist Kentish gentry. His relations with his influential parliamentary superiors on the one hand, and with the county administration on the other, is well illustrated by the fact that someone as eminent as Warwick's brother the Earl of Holland should appeal to Barrington to try to look after the assessment on the property of the recusant Lady Rivers in Essex, rather than using his undoubted weight in Parliament to affect his ends. 39.

There were other petitions for intervention by the influential Barrington 40. which indicated that dealing through the foremost gentleman in the county was more likely to reap results than direct action in the Commons. The widespread use of nepotism and influence must have added considerably to Barrington's difficulties and hindered the efficient collection of the local assessments. On the other hand it did perhaps occasionally guarantee surer justice than the new bureaucratic methods of appeal to the parliamentary committee.

Barrington's position in the county and his relation to the leaders of the House is also well illustrated by the correspondence between him and some of the leading Members. Pym, his brother-in-law, wrote to him frequently and directly. For example, he reinforced Parliament's order for a local troop to which the county had evidently objected as too heavy a burden. 41. "But I wish [it] may be represented by you to the country in such manner as may give them most encouragement and service to the House", he wrote, stressing Barrington's excellent position as intermediary. Concerning some malignants in the county he wrote: "I pray be carefull to keepe them in order"; and "I thank you for your forwardness in sending

42.
 the horse and dragons". The injunctions are interspersed with conversational news - the letters were not meant to be directives, nor is there ever any mention of "according to the orders of the House". They read very much as though Pym and Barrington, old friends and colleagues, were arranging the affairs of Essex between them. Pym evidently expected Barrington to manage this strategically important and basically friendly county in the same way as he was managing the House - personally, but with the appearance of constitutional right. Barrington's social and political superiority in the county meant that he could in fact comply with Pym's orders without necessarily referring them to the committee of Deputy Lieutenants. He obviously saw himself as somehow the personal representative of the county and in return occasionally spoke for its interests in a somewhat parochial manner 43. - although he usually tried to put the national interest first.

The point is made even more explicit in a letter of Hampden's 44. to Barrington on 9th June 1643: "My Lord General hath written to the Committee of Essex to call in the well affected people to his assistance, and hath instructed the help of the Deputy Lieutenants in it. The worke is so necessary and so hopefull that I cannot but improve the interest I have in your selfe for the promotinge of it. The power of Essex is greate, a place of most life of Religion in the land, and your power in the Countie is greate too." The Lord General went through the official channels, contacting the civic authorities and invoking the traditional military commanders, while Hampden wrote personally to press the point home to Barrington who was regarded as above all these agencies. 45.
 Warwick too, wrote, in the tones of a kinsman, asking Barrington to attend the committee to "know their pleasure" in regard to keeping or

dismissing a particular troop of horse. "If they dismiss them I pray cause one of your servants to see them out of towne ... that so there armes or horses be not taken from them". This implies that the "rascality of the country" would not dare disarm them or rise up if they were seen to be sanctioned by Barrington. Warwick may also be implying that Barrington should put the view to the committee that the troops should be kept for local protection. In any case Barrington was again being used as the agent of the parliamentary leaders in the county.

Other Members of the Commons also wrote to Barrington, both keeping him abreast of national events when he was absent from the Houses, and keeping in touch, through him, with Essex affairs. Anthony Nicholls, related through Lady Barrington, wrote frequently, slanting the political news towards their common views - support for the Lord General and unity of the parliamentary cause, ^{46.} expressing pleasure at the Scots' resolution to assist Parliament, ^{47.} and sadness at the news of Hampden's death. ^{48.} Other correspondents from Westminster were Robert Goodwyn, ^{49.} Edward Copeley ^{50.} and Sir Edward Hales. ^{51.}

Although at this time Barrington was not often away from his local responsibilities, there were occasions when he had to go to London. His absence from the committee shows how dependent they were upon his decisions. ^{52.} His fellow committee-men wrote frequently for advice. Complications would arise-such as the case of Colonel Longe who had evidently been collecting for the assessment of the 1/20th part, probably as an officer of the Association under Manchester, and whose removal so relieved the county that the money for payment was quickly collected, the county "beinge farre more willinge to pay it to the country's use (that is, for stopping the Essex men from deserting) than to be carried away by a stranger",

53.

and one, to boot, who was a "domineering and insulting man". It was a typically provincial concern to keep the county's money for its own use and not have it dissipated among the Associated Counties, and at the same time wishing to be assessed by local, and if possible, civil authorities. On the whole however, Barrington seemed rarely to put the county first on matters of importance. The correspondence with Barrington gives the impression that the committee could decide nothing in his absence.

54.

The Chelmsford committee, too, wrote for advice about how to supply the forces under the Lord General.^{55.} Another committee-man wrote of the lukewarm reception that his town had given the Lord General's letter asking for more men and money. He asked Barrington to secure a parliamentary order for men to pay compulsorily according to their means, so that the enthusiasts did not always have the greatest burden.^{56.} This adds to the impression that Barrington was indispensable to the county and that his absence must have paralysed the county administration - hardly therefore a way to establish efficient government.

The communications between Parliament and the county through Barrington all sounded deferential enough. However, in his position as principal man in the county Barrington also came in for some criticism, mainly from the commanders of the Association forces - Lord Grey at first, and then Cromwell and Manchester. He was usually the first to get flayed when the county did not live up to its military assurances. Lord Grey wrote^{57.} that the Essex regiment was mutinous and had insufficient pay. He felt that Barrington's presence would "carry some authority with it", as his blessing evidently counted for much among even the lowliest of the Essex men. Grey also complained of poor officers.^{58.} At the same time

he leant heavily on Barrington's aid, although he was quick to blame him
 59.
 if anything went wrong.

Manchester used at first to write to "Sir Thomas Barrington,
 60.
 Sir Thomas Cheeke, and the rest of the Deputy Lieutenants of Essex",
 but later he came to deal directly with Barrington, a sure indication that
 he realized who was responsible for all the activity of the county. He
 thanked Barrington himself for the men and money sent and asked for more
 61.
 and informed him of his movements in the Association. It is probably
 62.
 in reply to this that Barrington wrote pathetically that he had asked
 Pym to send an order compelling men to go out to fight for the Association
 and punishing those who refused. He added that the committee was most
 distressed by an order from the Committee of Safety which left the county
 almost without horses. As a result there was no way of coping with
 unrest from malignants, royalist incursions or unwillingness of the
 taxpayers to contribute to the assessments. Apart from the horses there
 was so little money that soon they would be able to expect nothing but
 "marthers, rapes and all disorders by reason that all the usuall government
 either by sheriff or any other meanes like it appears not of so long a
 63.
 time among us". This perhaps showed signs of Barrington's preoccupation
 with local defences and his scepticism about the cooperation of the other
 Associated Counties. Barrington obviously thought Essex should have its
 own forces to deal with local disturbances, and he pleaded that the
 county should not be milked to such an extent that it became unable to
 comply with the parliamentary ordinances for lack of an efficient executive
 machine.

At the same time a stream of complaints came from the Association

Committee, stressing the other side of the picture, namely the inability of the county to fulfil its quota as a member of the Association.

Manchester began to blame Barrington and his committee outright for the desertion of the county's soldiers, for the arrival of unarmed reinforcements, for the absence of officers and for sending strangers who fostered mutinies. ^{64.}

On the other hand he complained of Barrington sending too many officers, ^{65.} and asked for more money and men. ^{66.} These complaints were legion before the formation of the New Model. The system of multiple authorities had many inherent inefficiencies; the absence of adequate methods of compulsion, the utter lack of enthusiasm of men and officers for going outside their own counties - thus the very purpose of the Association was being defeated. The fact that Barrington was held responsible for all this indicates the amount of work he accumulated in his own hands and the futility of trying to run a war with the outdated machinery at his disposal.

In the letters from Cromwell addressed to the Deputy Lieutenants of Essex, this exasperation with the county administration dominated all else. For he was fundamentally out of sympathy with the idea of working even with Associations, let alone with counties, whereas Manchester, despite the administrative clumsiness he encountered, was essentially a man of local rather than national interests. Cromwell was quite terse in his demands for money, equipment and recruits. ^{67.} When the Essex men scurried home he wrote: "Is this the way to save a kingdom? Where is the doctrine of some of your countye concerninge the trained bands and other forces not goeing out of the Association? I wish your forces may be ready to meete with the enemy when Hee is in the Association." He pointed out

succinctly that if Newcastle invaded the Association, the county would need all the help it could get, and suggested as a remedy that trustworthy escorts should be sent to keep the men at their colours.^{68.}

The Earl of Essex also wrote mainly to the Deputy Lieutenants of Essex - partly because he had no personal connection with Barrington, and partly because his injunctions at least at the beginning were quite general, needing no specific instructions. He appealed to the "county" as a

whole.^{69.} Essex's interest had perforce to be nationwide as he was the supreme commander of the parliamentary forces and his aim was to cajole the counties into cooperating. Despite the general tone of his injunctions however, even Essex interfered to some extent in the government of the county by suggesting that Middleton, Mildmay and Barrington should be

Collectors.^{70.} He occasionally complained like the other army chiefs that Essex regiments were left unpaid.^{71.} He added further to the administrative

confusion by sending a direct order to the Deputy Lieutenants to send men to Cambridge - the sort of order Manchester would have been the obvious

person to give.^{72.} No wonder then that so many commands were not complied with.

The system of multiple authorities was even more complicated. There were of course several parliamentary committees set up to deal with the various affairs of Essex, especially before the Association was inaugurated.^{73.} On these, enthusiastic local M.P.'s predominated.

These committees certainly affected the work and authority of the county committee and to some extent overlapped even further than did the military command.^{74.}

In practice this did not lead to any conflict of authority because the members of the committees were infact all Essex Deputy Lieutenants and therefore could be seen merely to be acting in a dual

capacity.

In fact, the correspondence between these parliamentary committees and the county committee seems to have been done almost entirely on a personal basis - from whichever of the Deputy Lieutenants - cum-M.P.'s happened to be in attendance at Westminster, to the others who were at home. This necessarily involved Harrington himself, especially in the months from April to October 1645 which he spent in the country. On 15th May 75. 76. the "Deputy Lieutenants of Essex" - that is, the local M.P.'s at Westminster, wrote to "the rest of the Deputy Lieutenants of Essex" that the sudden uprising within the Association had been discussed by the Committee of Safety, and provisions of mutual defence had been made. But evidently they regarded this as mere fobbing off, for on the 19th 77. the M.P.'s wrote that they could get no further information from the "Close Committee ... (which) ... sett very seldom, so that wee have litel hope to receive satisfaction from thence". At the same time the M.P.'s were reassuring about the royalist positions in the county, stressing that the Association was not seriously threatened.

There emerges a great ambiguity in the relations between the parliamentary committee and the county committee, due partly to the overlap of personnel and to the ill-defined functions of each. So far all that the central parliamentary committee imparted to the Essex committee was advisory. But they continued: "we must leave the further prosecution of this busines to your judgements ... according to informations you shall receive from Cambridge". The military dispositions were to be ruled from the Association's centre and were not considered to be the business of the parliamentary committee. However, they continued:

"If there should be any occasion to send forth any forces we doubt not but that it will be done by an equall proportion. The Ordinance is passed both Houses for the 20th parts which will be a good grounds for levyings of money." Although appearing to leave everything to the committee and to Barrington's discretion, in fact they assumed that all these things would be done without venturing on any positive directive. Barrington waxed indignant over this dereliction of duty: "I perceive myself left to the discretion in a matter of more than comon difficulty without either advertisement or advice. It is a very hard matter to satisfy the County of Essex, the Towne of Cambridge, and the Parliament If I overact the Charge they will charge mee in Essex, if less than the board at Cambridge expects I will be censured there. The Parliament will expect a due account and I know not how to give it. The committee at Cambridge requires so highly.^{78.} This cri-de-coeur illustrates the crux of the administrative difficulties with no clear definition of duty and no shared responsibility. The committee and Barrington in particular found themselves responsible to forces pulling in three directions - the local interest, the Association interest, and the national interest.

Parliament's dependence on Barrington can be seen in a letter from the parliamentary to the local committee while Barrington was in London. He was entrusted with £4,000 to buy arms for the county, in addition to his own contribution of £1,200.

The parliamentary committee acted as liaison between Parliament and the county. It passed on to Barrington the Weekly Pay warrants^{79.} which were directed to the High Constables for collection. Barrington and the other Deputy Lieutenants were responsible. But in attempting to

act in the interest of national security, the Essex M.P.'s at Westminster were putting a great strain on Barrington and the others who were out in the county. As Barrington pointed out, it was one thing to put a signature on a warrant, and another to go out and urge the people to contribute to yet another collection for the Weekly Pay. ^{80.} It is clear that those who worked at the county end of the administrative ladder had the far more onerous and unpleasant duty. Their attitude is quite understandable and not as county-orientated as might at first appear. Barrington did not feel apparently, that his county was over-assessed or that the money was not really needed, but he would have preferred that the money should be borrowed from those prepared to pay large sums at interest rather than collected painfully from those of smaller means.

The parliamentary committee were entirely dependent on Barrington's advice. They flattered his industry and expressed disappointment at the mean-spiritedness of the county; otherwise they passively agreed to try borrowing the money, giving security themselves. ^{81.} So the parliamentary order was laid aside and the money was to be raised in ways which would not antagonize the county.

The Ordinance of the 1/5th and 1/20th part put an additional burden of collection on Barrington and his colleagues. At first it looked as though the new tax would involve a new committee, and so spread the administrative work among more people. ^{82.} However, it was assumed in the later correspondence that this was a mere formality and that the work would automatically fall into the hands of the existing committee and collectors. ^{83.} Despite the added burden, Barrington appeared pleased because this new tax was to be levied upon the recalcitrant rather than on the "well-affected" and would ease the burden of the latter, offering a good security

84. for loans. As soon as they noticed his hopefulness the Essex M.P.'s at once pinned their hopes on the success of the new tax and scrapped their previous order for the third month's pay. 85.

Another matter which the parliamentary committee left to Barrington's discretion was sending troops to Cambridge. 86. As we have seen, Barrington patently resented this wide discretionary power and he pressed for specific instructions to some of the Essex officers in charge of paying the troops. 87. Characteristically however, the committee begged off, and disarmingly stated its trust in Barrington's decisions. All this confirms Barrington's superior position in the county, even among his fellow M.P.'s, but it also appears that his position was exploited by the others in order to avoid work, unpleasantness and responsibility. They were quite prepared to give him all the glory in exchange for avoiding all local administration themselves. The Essex M.P.'s were perhaps atypical in that they were all concerned with the successful execution of the war and also because of the strong man in their midst. They never allowed themselves to appear unpatriotic in the House by asking for a reduction in the allocation for their county. Rather, they made adjustments to the local taxes to ease their burden by judicious redistribution.

The liaison between Parliament and the county was sometimes transacted on an even more personal basis between the Essex M.P.'s and Barrington. They concerned Essex's part in the Association after the parliamentary committees amalgamated into the parliamentary committee for the Association. 88. Masham, Grimston and Mildmay sent strategic information, asked for pay 89. for the Essex contingent, and forwarded parliamentary orders. 90. Sometimes the business was done on a completely man-to-man basis. For

example Mildmay, a kinsman of Barrington's, advised him to organize the security of Walton Abbey with the cooperation of the City through the Lord Mayor and Waller. He also suggested that Barrington should see to it that Parliament provided good ministers in the county; ^{91.} and avoid the crisis of having them march to London to petition for better pay. On October 18th Mildmay wrote to Barrington that he must quickly send along the local contingent for the defence of the Associated Counties and repay the Lord General for his outlay for the Essex men. He forwarded the parliamentary orders for arrears, especially those on delinquents' estates, to which he added the rider that he hoped his brother would be exempted. ^{92.} This method of doing things seems typical of Essex, run as it was by a very few individuals. The inefficiencies, liability to error, and nepotism inherent in the system could be clearly anticipated. On another occasion Barrington's friend, Robert Goodwyn, who was not an Essex man, but who often wrote sending news, seems to have been commissioned to look after the affairs of Essex at Westminster in Barrington's absence, for he wrote: "There is nothing yett done in your committee since you went although I pressed it. For the other business that concerns Essex I will do anything that you command." ^{93.} This indicates both that Barrington's influence with the Associated Counties Committee at Westminster receded despite his able deputy, as soon as he left London, and also that he considered Goodwyn a more reliable and perhaps more able man to put the county's business to the House than any of the other local M.P.'s.

In the end Barrington's disillusion with the multiple authorities with whom he had to negotiate emerged:

"We hope we shall not be found disobedient to the House of Commons, but we shall be both discouraged and disabled to proceed in the present service if such contradictions of superior commands be issued. The Earl of Manchester required us to enlist men raised in our county by virtue of Sir William Waller's commission, under captains whom his Lordship sent us and enjoined us to prohibit the raising of any more but for the service under his Lordship, which power we are confident he received either from the Committee of Safety or the House of Commons. We desire you therefore to represent this to your Committee and to the House, that in general it will be rendered impossible for us to supply the Earl of Manchester if these very men whom we have impressed shall be received by other captains, as volunteers. This work is made quite impossible if the men raised with such difficulty are to be taken out of the county." 94.

Barrington's personality and interests dominated relations with other parliamentary committees. He could be seen influencing the appointment of an office-bearer for the Isle of Wight. The local committee showed every deference to Barrington's opinion, although that area was quite outside his actual sphere of influence. 95. Clotworthy, who was probably as great an expert on Ireland as Barrington was on Essex, wrote from the Committee for Ireland that Barrington ought to help the collector for corn for Ireland to fulfil his quota in the district. 96. Milmay wrote, as a committee-man for his Majesty's Revenues to tell Barrington of the order that all tenants of the royal family were to pay their rent to the committee. It must have been very galling for Barrington to be told that Parliament was taking steps to liven the collection of all payments, and that the Houses were very disappointed with the partiality shown and the slowness of the receipts. 97. He may have succeeded in getting some compensation for his troubles when the sequestered Hatfield Chase was put in his care by the Committee of Sequestrations in 1644. 98.

Further complications among the various authorities arose when

when Parliament, through the Speaker, issued orders direct to Barrington and the Deputy Lieutenants. On one occasion Parliament ordered a troop of horse and a regiment of foot into Kent to help quell the uprising.^{99.} This was an extraordinary occasion, quite outside the scope of the Association, and presumably needed special methods to achieve prompt action. The House even ordered Barrington to stay in the county to see it put into execution. But on another occasion the Commons intervened directly to order Barrington to pay the county's proportion of the cost of Cromwell's defence of Gainsborough.^{100.} This was very much an Association matter and should have been left to the Associated Counties Committee and the commanders. But possibly Parliament realized how unwilling the county would be to contribute a large sum for the defence of a place so far from its borders^{101.} and thought it best to issue the order direct. We have seen how Cromwell reacted to the parochialism of Essex. These interventions can be understood under the circumstances, but nevertheless they risked countering other orders and generally overtaxing the county; certainly they added considerably to the difficulties facing Barrington and his committee colleagues.

Surprisingly the Committee of Safety hardly seemed to deal with Essex directly, probably because it concerned itself more with national affairs and dealt through the Association and the commanders. Even so it did interfere, and on quite explicit minor matters, which added to the multiplicity of commands. For example, on 28th July the Committee of Safety ordered Barrington and the Deputy Lieutenants to send a large force to join Waller, promising that it would care for the county's safety in the meantime - probably not a very reassuring promise for those

who were loath to part with their forces to regions beyond the county's control. ^{102.} The only order of the magnitude and generality one might expect from the Committee of Safety was one which urged quicker recruiting for Manchester's army and exact notification of what had been sent to date. ^{103.}

Other pressures were brought to bear on the county from its fellow Association members. Of course these could not countermand orders from other sources, but they did advise, exhort, warn and generally added to the burdens of the county. The Suffolk committee being concerned at the imminence of the enemy suggested that the chief gentlemen of all the Associated Counties should meet at Cambridge to discuss mutual defences and implied that Essex should send more forces. ^{104.}

The meeting was probably suggested by Cromwell who was preoccupied with Essex's remissness in sending its share of troops to Cambridge. ^{105.}

This plea is reminiscent of the constant urging of the other counties for Essex to send her delegation of Commissioners to the Cambridge committee where there was a continued absence of Essex representatives. ^{106.}

It now remains to look at the most pressing authority of all, the Committee of the Association at Cambridge. The business of the Association will be discussed later; here we are concerned only with relations between Essex and the Association.

The members of the Association Committee at Cambridge were appointed from among the Deputy Lieutenants in each county. One of the most constant complaints of the committee was lack of Essex representatives. In fact, only one Essex member had been present for the month of May, obviously putting a strain on the other members, especially the Cambridge ones. ^{107.} By July even the one Deputy Lieutenant from Essex, Richard Harlakenden, had left and the Association Committee wrote to the county: "Wee can

but wonder at your failure of commissioners of your county at the Board. However we are not discouraged to do our duties and we shall each labour your preservation as our own according to the Knott of the Association." 108.

The Cambridge committee supported the pleas of the Suffolk gentlemen for a full meeting of the Deputy Lieutenants from each county, which, it appears, had not taken place at the time suggested. Another date for the meeting was set by the Cambridge committee, suggesting Bury as the meeting place. But this was a request of a different kind, an extraordinary meeting of all the best men of the counties to meet immediate danger. Presumably the Associated Counties Committee, being composed of the less prominent squires, wanted the full support of the counties behind them before taking the expensive steps necessary to defend its own borders. In any case the plea for extra commissioners was not connected with the remissness of Essex at the Board of Association because Sir William Rowe, himself an Essex man, wrote to Barrington later than month: "Mr. Myddleton [another Essex Deputy Lieutenant] is so useful in both places that the board cannot absolutely resolve to spare, but for the present he hath leave to see you, and if you please to send any other committee in his room your request is granted". 109.

This indicates that there was constant pressure on the more useful members of the local committee to go to Cambridge as well as seeing to the executive work at home. In Essex the work of administration seems to have fallen to a very few men, and this rift with Cambridge was due to the overloading of work on the enthusiastic and perhaps power-hungry few. But from this time - late August - on, there was at least one Essex man, Rowe, present most of the time, with Harlakenden and Middleton appearing occasionally as signatories of letters.

Apart from pleas for extra members to be present at the Board, the Cambridge Committee asked for financial and military aid, both as part of Essex's proportion, and special levies in emergencies. In May the committee asked for a special company or two to defend Cambridge as all available forces had been sent to quell an uprising in Ely. By June the situation had worsened with Cromwell leading the Associated forces out of the Association and with the Queen advancing towards Cambridge. As Cromwell's pressure mounted on the Cambridge committee for men and pay, so did the committee's pressure on the counties. A few days later, with Newcastle marching towards the Associated counties the committee's demands took on an even more urgent note - "according to the Ordinance, and all other requests apart" Essex was to send all the money and forces owing for their mutual defence. These imprecations were supported on August 4th by a personal letter from Cromwell, Miles Corbett and Richard Harlakenden, all writing from Cambridge, requesting money for the existing troops and backpay for the Essex regiments who were near mutiny and would not go on their appointed march. From Rowe we gather that the mutiny was stopped by some supplies finally reaching the soldiers. But three days later, on the 29th August, yet a further complaint set in - Essex had sent reinforcements but had not armed them. This confusion is typical of the multi-headed command and of the general maladministration of the army under it. The demand was reiterated on August 31st together with complaints of the want of clothing and shoes, none of which the Cambridge committee would supply, as it claimed that it was the county's responsibility to send men who could be used for fighting, and who were properly equipped. The men

117.
 affirmed that the equipment had been promised them in Essex. By
 September 4th the committee was still asking for arms for the Essex
 118.
 contingent. The next day Harlakenden wrote despairingly that he and
 Rowe had promised supplies and clothes to the men, and begged the county
 committee not to make his position as Treasurer and Paymaster of the
 119.
 local troops impossible. At the same time there was now a new demand
 for £300 for the extra expense of Manchester's seige of King's Lynn.
 120.
 All these complaints burst out together on September 7th, 121.
 that the
 committee "must not only discontynue their commission but the army must
 totally disband, many of them being at that point already if you
 were here to see specatators of our condition you would act faster and
 furnish better", adding that even the committee's own credit was wearing
 out. The substantiated pleas of its own Commissioners plus the urgency
 of this appeal must have turned the tide in the county, as men and supplies
 122.
 were sent; but the demands continued - from Manchester, and from Rowe
 for more money for the county's forces, and for more authority for himself
 123.
 to act as its representative. He became quite defeatist about the
 fate of Cambridge and blamed the county committee for not taking heed of
 his constant demands for money, men and commissioners for Cambridge, fearing
 124.
 that events would soon show how earnest his demands have been.

What led to this colossal maladministration and breakdown of
 efficiency? Partly the reason can be seen in the multiple calls on the
 county's men and finances, and in the time-consuming administrative work
 spread among so few men. But probably the main reason for the slowness
 of sending recruits was that the men were loath to leave the county,
 especially at a time when there seemed to be danger from the opposite
 side from the Association - the rising in Kent. No matter how national-

minded Barrington and his colleagues were, the soldiers remained most loyal to the county. Efficient administration was impossible with the many-sided demands made on the county from all conflicting authorities and with the cumbersome method of recruiting and impressing. Financially, the county always fulfilled its requirements in the end, but there/seems to have been a real hiatus in the relation of need to supply; there was no method of obtaining money at the time at which it was needed. This was due to the lack of regular revenue from the various parliamentary ordinances, none of which were yet functioning with automatic regularity. Barrington was concerned, as we have seen, with the "well affected" who were called upon too often at this stage. It took time for the collectors to organize themselves, and for money to come in steadily on the ordinance for the 1/20th part.

It remains now to look at the activities of the Essex committee itself. As one might expect, a very large/part of its business consisted of military affairs - arranging for troops to be outfitted and sent to Cambridge, hearing complaints of its officers and men, as well as arranging for local defence.

When we look at the committee's despatching of men and supplies to Cambridge, the other side of the picture emerges. So far we have seen only the exasperation on the part of the Associated Counties Committee. But the local Essex committee also had its troubles. One of its officers, William Walden, wrote of his consternation at arriving at Cambridge with "those souldiers which I could gett to goe, which is not many", and finding
135.
the committee unprepared to supply him with arms and clothes. The disorientation of these events is only explicgble in terms of inexperience,

126.

overwork and lack of coordinated authority.

Apart from the difficulties of collecting money for the men's pay, there was also evidently a large amount of red tape to penetrate in order for the proper authorities to get hold of it. Barrington's Major Sackville Moore could not get pay for his men from the Associated Counties' treasurer Holcroft, despite a warrant from the Lord General, signed by Barrington and Middleton, because the warrant was still not in order. A similar

hiatus can be seen in an officer's complaint that the Essex paymasters refused to pay his men or refund the money he had himself paid them in order to keep them together. Another Essex officer, Nathaniel Rich, anticipated

his later Leveller arguments: "The greatest cause for wonder among our soldiers is this, that when most service is done least pay is coming".

His own men had no pay for nine weeks and could not get free quarter.

"Sir, what I speake is in behalfe of the comon soldiers not officers ... let the comon soldiers be constantly payed though the officers goe without any at all". He quite rightly pointed out the precariousness of an army unpaid - that at the first adverse move in the war complete collapse would set in. These deficiencies in pay and equipment were not brought about

by ignorance of the need. We can see in the memorandum "touching the provisions necessary for the Regiments which are to march to his Excellency", that the requirements were known and included provision for a basic ration of cheese to be provided by the men themselves. These complaints point not only to a general lack of funds to pay the army, but also to a lack of organization of the money available.

There were also other major complaints not directly attributable to lack of pay, such as inefficient and quarrelsome officers; the unwillingness of the soldiers to stay away from the county and the countless

132. desertions; the troopers' raiding market towns for horses. 133. There was also confusion about the employment of officers, who never had enough men to command and had to be transferred to different parts of the army so that they could get positions worthy of their station and service. 134.

The committee did try to compensate for some of these deficiencies and saddles by reorganizing some of its proceedings. 135. It proceeded to vote itself power to raise money and arms in times of emergency, and to punish non-conformers; it was to punish disobedient soldiers, to lead forces out of the county, to appoint officers, to sequester the estates of any committee-man or Deputy Lieutenant who refused to do his duty or to sign orders, or who left his post without leave from the rest; it was to keep one third of all the Sequestration money to pay the men who were in the service of the Association; and it was to levy carts and horses for its own use. These orders were immediately put into execution and all defaulters were to be fined. 136.

Unfortunately we have no evidence to show whether these regulations did achieve the desired effect. However, it was exceedingly difficult to establish a valid ruling for all facets of the committee's activity. A memo submitted for Barrington consisted of a host of particular and general orders with which he was to deal. 137. This brings us back to the essentially one-man rule in Essex where any command or resolution had to go through Barrington's hands to have any power behind it. With the disorganization of the lower echelons it is not surprising that the military setup of the Association was so chaotic, at least from Essex's side.

The committee had also to keep a firm hand and eye upon matters of local defence. It had to care for the defence of its ports, especially Harwich. Its enthusiastic M.P., Harbottle Grimston, pleaded with the

committee on behalf of the town corporation to have the port fortified. 138.
 He tried himself to organize its defence but found it beyond him, 139. and
 finally asked for the committee's formal votes to be quickly implemented. 140.
 Grimston's care and the neglect of Cheske (the other local member) are
 stressed in a desperate letter from the town corporation to Barrington
 as Treasurer of the county. They had previously written to the Speaker
 of the Commons to get their fortifications put into working order, but
 had got no satisfaction. Evidently their Member at Westminster refused
 to act on their behalf, while Grimston did what he could locally. So
 Barrington was presented with the whole tangled issue; he had to decide
 who was to be responsible for the defence of the town as well as being
 responsible for paying for its defence. 141. He and the committee would
 dearly have liked to be rid of this extra responsibility and after providing
 for the town's fortification they resolved to write to the Earl of Warwick
 to ask him to accept their nominee as governor of the town, in this way
 making him rather than themselves the final authority. At the same time
 they were prepared to finance its defence, and this arrangement grew to
 become the generally accepted one for the major ports. 142. In Tilbury
 there was already a semi-independent governor, James Temple, who however,
 did not appear to be directly under the Lord Admiral, for in writing to
 the Essex committee he said that on the news of the Kent rising the Committee
 of Scotland had been asked and had given approval for his immediate defences
 of the fort. He notified the committee of his activities and complained
 of ten months of petitioning to the committee for funds with no answer,
 with the result that some of his best men had deserted to the king. 143.

The administration of the trained bands and local militia was infested

with similar disorganization as the Associated forces. There were complaints by officers that different sub-committees sent their companies to different places. Lady Barrington seemed forever to be worrying about her husband's ability to get the local forces organized - the officers had evidently complained to her that there was never enough time to get the trained bands ready for action, the constables were slow and uncooperative ^{144.} - which allowed down the forces getting to Cambridge; generally all was muddle and panic. ^{145.} She also criticized Barrington and the committee at Chelmsford for their inactive calm when the rest of the county was seething with rumours of invasion, and chided her husband for not even issuing warrants to get the local troops ready. Her concern can be seen to be partly domestic. "If Cambridge be lost I doubt to much censure will lye on your committy at Chelmsford yet are reported to be merry and incredilous. And all the House will fall on the comitty." ^{146.}

We do not know whether Barrington had information which kept him from action, or whether Lady Barrington was just voicing one of the complaints against the overworked committee. She certainly kept up with the minutias ^{147.} of local defence and seemed unhesitating in giving advice, reminding her husband of a needed warning to "our nephew Washam", and of new lines of defence.

So far no real mention has been made of the hierarchy within the county authorities, and ~~in fact~~ I have used the term "Essex committee" as though there had been only one in the county. In fact, like in other counties, there was a chief committee at Chelmsford and then a series of sub-committees in other divisions. It is not clear whether in the sub-committees there were further divisions to deal with the different parliamentary ordinances or whether the one authority covered all the

collections and was responsible for all the assessors and collectors.

It would appear however, that the local sub-committees did in fact collect on all the ordinances. The Colchester committee gave an account of its divisional collection of the 1/5th and 1/20th. ^{148.} A letter from

Parliament and the Essex Deputy Lieutenants to arrange for the collection of the Sequestration ordinance would indicate that this work was to fall to the Deputy Lieutenants who were the chief men on the sub-committees. ^{149.}

The committee at Walden also complained on behalf of the parishioners that they had to collect for the third month's weekly Assessment and at the same time to serve as collectors of the Sequestration ordinance. ^{150.} However,

there is no doubt that Barrington's committee at Chelmsford was the highest authority in the county; it was constantly besieged with queries from the divisions and in turn issued orders to them. Part of the decentralization was evidently carried out by keeping Barrington very much in control of things. Two of his nephews, Masham and Meade were in equivalent positions to his own in their divisions, and wrote personally to him for instructions. ^{151.}

From the letter of two Deputy Lieutenants - Honeywood and Sayer, it appears that the sub-committees met together at Chelmsford when any business arose affecting other local areas, so even the sub-committees had to choose between meeting at the centre of things, or administering policy out at their posts. ^{152.} It also appears that the local committees had power not only to collect money by the ordinances of Parliament, but also to pay it out to the troops in the division, both for local defence and for the men sent to join the Association forces. The Colchester committee not only paid money into the Associated Counties' Treasury in London, but also paid the soldiers raised in its division, and at the same time supplied

Harwich. However, the committee rendered its accounts to Chelmsford and depended on warrants from Barrington to issue payments, as well as to order the troopers to aid the collection. ^{153.} There is some evidence of parochialism from the local Deputy Lieutenants - a concern not to be exploited at the expense of the other divisions merely because of local enthusiasm. ^{154.} The Chelmsford committee could direct the movements of the local trained bands which resulted in a great deal of shunting about. Colchester felt deprived without its guard and pleaded its own special charges, such as Harwich presumably, the dangers from "our unruly multitude" and the decay of trade due to the absence of so many of its shopkeepers. ^{155.}

At times the Chelmsford committee wrote directly to the lower echelons, especially when they had neglected their duty. Perhaps this was to give greater force to the commands of the local committee or else just impatience at the slowness of collection and recruiting. ^{156.} But certainly the usual method was for orders to go from Chelmsford to the local committee and thence to the collectors and constables.

Sometimes the local committees presumed to advise their betters at Chelmsford about matters of no specific concern to them. The Romford Deputy Lieutenants showed concern at the danger to the Association from the north, and even made suggestions about what strategy should be employed to counter the danger. ^{157.} The Colchester committee wrote about Sir William Constable's plea for men and money so that his regiment could join Fairfax. Constable wrote direct to Barrington telling him of the Commons' wishes in this matter, and suggesting that the levy be popularized from the pulpit - some ministers from the Westminster Assembly were then in the county. ^{158.} The committee urged Barrington to give as much

cooperation as possible, and they also suggested the means of supplying Constable's needs. ^{159.} We do not know how this advice was received by Barrington, but on the whole where he agreed with the principle of the thing he was amenable to suggestions. However, he could be very curt if ^{160.} his instructions were not obeyed.

One source not mentioned so far is the correspondence between the Chelmsford committee and the City of Colchester. ^{161.} It is interesting that before the Essex committee really got under way, the parliamentary committee, Barrington, Lumley, Mildmay, Grimston and Masham, wrote their orders directly to the corporation. In fact the Mayor and Aldermen were used as go-betweens for establishing the beginnings of a loyal civil service by interviewing all likely committee members, both those suggested by the ^{162.} parliamentary committee and others of their own nomination. Unfortunately there are no other early letters in the correspondence which then jumps to April 1643. It provides an excellent and unified picture of the execution of government at the local level in the early war years, dealing as it does with one division only. The Colchester committee, like the other Essex sub-committees, evidently dealt with all the ^{163.} parliamentary financial ordinances and received its instructions through the Chelmsford committee, which for example organized the collection and distribution of the sequestration funds but left the actual work to the local committee. Similarly, when the collection came in slowly the Chelmsford committee issued directions to fine the collectors and constables who had not fulfilled their quotas and appointed the reward for those who ^{164.} had. The central committee also transmitted news of delinquencies ^{165.} and fulfilled schedules to and from Parliament. The promoting of

the Scottish loan was referred to the committee which was to ferret out those who had not yet contributed with enough enthusiasm. 166. Other additional financial burdens for the Colchester committee were the maintenance of the Newport garrison and arrears to repay Barrington's loan for the county. 167. It is a pity that there is no record of the sub-committee's replies to these demands made throughout the year. But as the letters are not too pressing in tone the committee must have been fairly satisfied with the division's returns.

Apart from these financial demands, there were the even more onerous ones for recruits. The Chelmsford committee was constantly prodding, unlike on the financial ordinances, to get Colchester to fulfil its quota for Manchester's army. 168. Like other divisions in this part of the country the sub-committee received through the Chelmsford committee the summons for the General Rising called in London by a radical group, in June 1648. But ironically for a movement of supposedly enthusiastic volunteers for religion and liberty, the Chelmsford committee asked for a list of all who refused to contribute according to their means "so that they can be secured". 169.

At the same time came warrants from Lord Essex for horses for Sir Samuel Luke's regiment outside the county. 170. That there were local pressures and fears at work in sending away so many of its men is obvious. The Chelmsford committee practically admitted that Colchester had been dangerously denuded by calling away the trained bands but tried to compensate to some extent for the loss by asking Parliament to pass an Ordinance for impressing the ablebodied in the area, to make home defence possible. 171. This order was turned against the interests of the division

soon after, when the next summons from Manchester came to complete his regiment and the constables were ordered to impress all who were eligible, even householders if necessary, and especially runaway soldiers. 172.

These must have been quite a problem - several letters deal with the men hiding in Colchester who should have been marching away, 173. and an order was sent from Chelmsford to fine all constables who did not bring in their proportion. The constables appeared to have been part accomplices in the dereliction of duty, as the orders for chasing and impressing those in hiding imply. 174. This must have been a far more unpleasant task to perform among one's friends and neighbours even than extracting tax payments. When fining the constables did not bring the desired results, an attempt was made to fine the town itself for harbouring deserters, 175. although these orders all relate to a later period. 176.

These difficulties apart, the sub-committee received many further calls on its military strength. Of course its militia was called out to other parts of the county for local defence, and had to be supplied with arms, ammunition, food and pay even when it was absent from home territory. 177. Despite the harassed and defeatist tone of all these orders and requests which the sub-committee seemed to have had the greatest difficulty to execute, the ordinance for the new army of the Association in August 1644 hopefully asked for volunteers, though more true to reality, those who had not been listed in the previous campaigns were to be impressed as well. The punishments upon the lower echelons for non-fulfilment of their quotas became more drastic - imprisonment and sequestration presumably outweighed considerations of friendship and tact in fulfilling their duties. 178.

Some concluding remarks might be made about the affairs of Essex at this period. As an administrative unit it was perhaps not typical

of other counties because of its relatively solid backing for the parliamentary cause (bar some uprisings which were never dangerous), and because of the presence of Barrington who dominated the scene so exclusively. This led on the one hand to excellent close relations with Parliament, through his own influence there and that of his very important friends, providing a firm link between government and executive in the county. Other counties were less fortunate in their national representatives. On the other hand it suffered from the disadvantage of too much responsibility and work for one individual leading to inefficiency and sometimes chaos when communications broke down, either because of Barrington's absence from the county necessitated by his duties as an M.P., or because of his absence from Parliament necessitated by his duties as an active committee-man, Deputy Lieutenant and officer. There was thus an inherent difficulty in his position, and the whole administration suffered for it. There were other reasons for inefficiency too; the multiplicity of commands from Parliament itself, from its finance and county committees, from the various commanders ranging from the Lord General, Manchester and Cromwell, to Grey, Warwick and Fairfax and from the Committee of the Association in Cambridge; absence of any established liaison between these bodies except for Barrington himself no doubt contributed greatly towards the chaos. On the county level, there were the difficulties of the assessors and collectors for all the taxes and claims from all these authorities which sometimes overtaxed people especially those who had contributed enthusiastically at the start. Constantly hindering the work, too, was the parochial attitude of contributors each concerned with not being exploited at the expense of the neighbouring division or hundred. And the perennial problem of an

unenthusiastic executive at the lower braches faced all counties - people resented being taxed and impressed by strangers, or worse, soldiers, but the local officers were prone to too many pressures to do their job efficiently and fairly.

The Committee of the Associated Counties

There is no need here to go into great detail about the organization of the Committee of the Associated Counties. However, some of its features are relevant to this discussion on the scope and work of the county committees. There is no doubt that the notion of associating counties into clusters to increase the effectiveness against the enemy and to increase the size of the administrative unit was a progressive step in the development of the war machinery, and as such was backed by the political enthusiasts who stood in favour of a vigorous policy, as can be seen from the composition of the parliamentary committee of the Association. Grimston, although from the Peace Party, favoured the Association because of his interest in the security of Harwich, his own constituency, which now had stronger backing from inland. To D'Ewes the idea of an Association was a "sadd and desperate business", on a par with robbing the subject of his right to withhold contributions to Parliament, but he must have been in a very small minority.

Generally speaking, the parliamentary committee ruled the major decisions of the committee at Cambridge which comprised members from each of the Associated Counties, appointed by Parliament, although in fact the county committees appeared to have had a say in who was actually sent. This committee was to keep in continual session and to put in execution all orders received from Parliament, and to be subordinate to the authority of the Lord General and the general of the Association. All the financial

administration was to be dealt with by the committee which had the ultimate authority over the collectors. The members of the committee were to have equivalent powers to the local Deputy Lieutenants, any of whom had a vote on the committee. From this it can be predicted that many difficulties would arise in relation to the various authorities and that for efficient administration the coordination between the county of Essex, Lord Grey (and later Manchester), Parliament and the Associated Counties committee would have had to be perfect. In fact there was quite some trouble about the duties and rights of the committee. When the Association was mooted on the 6th December 1642 at a conference of both Houses, 182. the Lords objected that the power of Lord Grey and the committee inferred a lessening of the powers of the Lords Lieutenant, although the latter were prepared to renounce their commissions in order not to hinder the project. Later the committee at Cambridge were concerned that the committees in the various counties "make null and void this general Committee of the Association". At the same time they stressed the deficiency in the powers allotted to them, as they could not imprison delinquents nor punish mutinous soldiers, nor force their fellow committee members to attend in sufficient numbers, nor raise sufficient money for 183. the defence of Cambridge, and the payment of scouts and servants. In other words, the powers of the committee were too theoretical and in actual practice its work was impeded by the independent action of the military commanders on the one hand, and the county committees on the other. This was practically rectified by the parliamentary committee in sending down two M.P.'s to investigate the defence of Cambridge, and to see that each county paid its proper due and sent its committee members 184. along. The committee was evidently very prickly about interference

from London, as its dealings with the Committee of Examinations show.

A brief look at the activities of the parliamentary committee for the Associated Counties shows the extent of duplication of authority.

186.

On July 15th the committee ordered the Cambridge committee to send forces to Ely under Torrell Jocelyn (one of its members) and to await instructions from the House or the Lord General. At the same time it wrote to the Lord General to get his approval of this measure. This kind of manoeuvre was bound to lead to friction. On July 24th the House of Commons ordered all the Association forces under Cromwell to the defence of Gainsborough by informing the Cambridge committee and the commanders in question. The Cambridge committee was to look after the financing of the venture. At the same time the parliamentary committee also wrote to the individual member counties for more aid to support this move. A similar series of moves accompanied the equipping of Cromwell's troops, again involving the Commons, the parliamentary committee, the Cambridge committee and the member county committees.

187.

The evolution of the administrative machinery of the Associated Counties was as jerky and unplanned as that of its authority. Thus, though the Association was formed on December 20th, the constitution of the committee was not sent out to the counties until 23rd April 1643. This named the members of the committee from each of the counties, referring the instructions to the "Deputy Lieutenants and others". The names specified, including a few local M.P.'s like Barnardiston, Bacon and Soames in Suffolk, bore no necessary relation to the actual membership of the local committees, and certainly not to the eventual committee at Cambridge, which as we have seen was hard put to it to have representatives from each of the counties on its board, whereas the commission was sent

188.

189.

to sixteen or more Deputy Lieutenants and others in each of the counties, as well as extra ones for Ely and Norwich. It was intended at first that all the named commissioners should sit daily. As the correspondence shows, this was not only not feasible, but a system of different weekly committees was established, whereby a complete new committee of men from each county was to sit each week. The signatures confirm roughly that this took place, although Cambridge itself always supplied the largest number of attendances and Essex was always remiss, with one or none attending. The parliamentary list in any case included many who never attended and who probably did not sit on the local committee either; it constituted rather a hopeful compilation of those whom Parliament sought to carry its influence in the counties. Many who did sit on the local committees and at Cambridge, were not named in the commission, which provided for coptions and appointees to be made by the committees. Other regulations included in the commission but ignored in practice were a quorum of eleven, and leave of absence to be sought from the majority by any absenting member. The commission also specified the authority of the committee. "All commands and directives by any officers or other persons shall issue from you with subordination to the Lord General and Major General", whereas the officers and men of the Association were to obey the instructions of the committee. As we have seen, this was both cumbersome and impractical, especially in connection with the full authority to collect taxes in the area. The authority issued to Lord Grey of Warke as commander-in-chief of the Association did not specify his relation to
190.
the Cambridge committee at all.

When the Cambridge committee first began to sit remains a mystery - with the formation of the Association ante-dating the appointment of a

commission at Cambridge by four months. No correspondence or orders have been found earlier than May 1643, at which time too the parliamentary committee for the Associated Counties finally got started, despite its appointment in December 1642. Evidently the Cambridge Deputy Lieutenants urged their city as the meeting place, indicating the zeal later displayed by their activity on the Associated Counties' committee in February 1643. ^{191.} Probably the administrative move needed to precede a joint committee actually meeting was the ordinance to apply money raised by sequestration in the five Associated Counties to maintain the forces there. ^{192.} This was the essential fiscal arrangement which made the supra-county administrative unit of the Association possible.

On August 10th Manchester was put at the head of the Association, ^{193.} and on 20th September Lincolnshire was added as the sixth county. ^{194.} At the same time the authorities began to display concern for the membership of the Associated Counties' committee. Evidently the lackadaisical attitude of the county committees themselves and their representatives in Cambridge was brought before Parliament by the members of the War Party as an obvious practical measure to tighten up the administration. Miles Corbett reported from Norfolk that the committee members there were remiss in putting the financial ordinances in execution, naming only those few exceptions who were zealous. He must have been doing a general inspection tour of the Associated Counties as he visited Suffolk for the same reason and wrote from Cambridge about it. ^{195.} D'Ewes stressed that this was a political ploy to get the unenthusiastic local M.P.'s named, for Corbett proceeded to accuse Sir John Holland and Framlingham Gawdy of neglecting their duties in the county. This was later used as a basis for an order to sequester and fine these appointees for parliamentary executive posts

who neglected them. It is interesting that Manchester was asked to nominate (and not appoint) committees to put in execution the ordinances for bringing in money in the Associated Counties. As he was the recipient of the money and in the last resort the authority behind the collection, this seems logical enough. Also it may be presumed that having been in closer touch with the tribulations of the Cambridge committee than the parliamentary committee, he would be in a good position to know who were the worthy and hardworking members to be reappointed. Nevertheless this was an unprecedented encroachment on the hitherto unquestioned supremacy of the Deputy Lieutenants in the areas concerned. However, on October 24th Parliament finally issued an order to the parliamentary committee to review the attendances and general fitness of the local representatives at Cambridge, thus regulating the procedure for the appointments once again.

This brings us to the activities of the Associated Counties' committee at Cambridge. At a later date the orders and activities of this committee feature widely throughout the Calendars of State Papers (domestic), in relation to the Committee of Both Kingdoms. But at this period the orders of the committee are intermittent and not easily accessible. Probably the most time-consuming and perhaps important task of the committee, that of acting as a centralized authority for the activities of the Associated Counties has been dealt with in relation to Essex, and Suffolk. By looking at some of the early general orders of the committee some further information on its method of functioning and scope of activity emerges.

It has been noted that the committee at Cambridge probably did not meet earlier than April 1643. What appears to be one of its first

printed orders on April 15th appointed a sub-committee to be set up to deal with all minor matters referred to it and to report back. This is in accordance with the original constitution of the committee as we have seen. ^{197.} Its first task was organizing the defence of the City itself, controlling soldiers about the town, ^{198.} securing the river, ^{199.} and punishing all deserters. ^{200.} Apart from these local measures the committee acted as a transmitting station for orders from Parliament or the Committee of the Association to the Associated Counties themselves, for example in appointing the county contributions of men and funds, and ordering troops ^{201.} to places outside the Association when the need arose.

The relations between the Cambridge committee and Manchester were always difficult despite the unanimity of their aims and the local feeling of both parties. However, the collection and payment of local taxes did cause trouble. Valentine Walton, distantly related and connected with Manchester's family in Huntingdonshire, evidently acted as his spokesman at the Cambridge committee during his many necessary absences. His correspondence with Manchester indicates the difficulties encountered at the committee and the stratagems required to get Manchester's views ^{202.} across. In order to get the Cambridge committee to agree to letting the army have the collections of excise he argued that either the 1/5th and 1/20th had to be collected in full or some other way found to save the army from disintegration. He also suggested that the committee, and not the army should be entirely responsible for the levying and collection ^{203.} and thus actually had his motion received enthusiastically.

The pressure from Cambridge on Manchester can be seen in the plea of the Essex M.P. Mildmay who asked Manchester to attend to the defence

of Cambridge which supported his army rather than defend areas right away from the centre of the Association. This pressure is typical of the parochial attitude still prevalent at the end of 1643, when even a radical was prepared to call for a halt to an important military operation in order to safeguard the county.

It has been shown that no matter how zealous the parliamentary committees may have been in the execution of the war, they depended to a large extent on the cooperation of the county committees, over which they had a firm control, at least in the Eastern Association, through the M.P.'s who were both enthusiastic politicians at the centre and hard workers for the war effort in the county. The large-scale inefficiencies which have been noted were primarily due to the strength of local as opposed to national interests in the counties, which often affected the leaders as well as the rank and file. However, the complicated administrative system and multi-headed authority in military, financial and to some extent civil matters was also an important factor in the chaotic conditions of the early years of the war. The "committee system" which had proliferated so abundantly since 1640 was in fact in danger of choking itself to death through the complicated collective and delegated authority on which it was based. The system was only revitalized by the formation of the more effective and centralized Committee of Both Kingdoms at the Westminster end, and by the formation of the New Model with the ensuing rationalizing of the army administration at the county end.

CHAPTER 12RELATIONS WITH SCOTLAND

In her article on the role of the Covenanters in the English Civil War¹ Miss C. V. Wedgwood tells the complicated story of the relations between the King, the royalist Scots, the Covenanters and the English Parliament over the whole period of the first Civil War. The scope of this chapter is restricted to only one aspect of the whole, namely to account for the origin and support of the English parliamentary leaders' plan to bring the Scots into the conflict at home on the right side and on the right terms. The kind of questions to be dealt with here are: Who was responsible for the plan to involve the Scots on Parliament's side? When was the plan formulated? What support or opposition did it meet from the various politico-religious factions? Were there any determining factors other than that of religion responsible for support of Scottish intervention? Was a conscious attempt made to foreshadow the formation of the Committee of both Kingdoms as the chief executive body to supervise the running of a joint war effort? How did the shifting political situation in the English Parliament affect relations with the Scots? How did the shifting military situation of the English armies affect relations with the Scots? What were the real motives underlying the Scots' rather unwilling entry into English affairs? In order to answer some of these questions it will be necessary to look not only at the scant comments of participants in these affairs, but also to examine the forces which determined the actions of the English political leaders, and in particular to see what machinery they employed to set their scheme into motion.

Much of the planning and negotiating of Scottish participation was done on a personal level by the leaders. But they used the medium of commissioners on the spot and committees in Westminster to bring the plan to fruition. Scottish affairs did differ from the mainstream of parliamentary proceedings in that they required the effective agents of the leaders to absent themselves from the Houses and negotiate with the various parties in Edinburgh. This variation on the theme of government through committees serves to highlight the need for close consultation among the Commons' leaders and their dependence on effective delegation of authority.

The relations between England and Scotland at this time form an intricate web of good intention and intrigue on both sides. On the part of the Scots there was a double and conflicting desire; first, to see the Scottish form of Presbyterianism instituted in England and a close link between the two churches established; and secondly to act as mediators and possibly determinants in the struggle between the two sides, assuming that in a fairly even conflict their intervention would give them power to dictate their own terms. ^{2.} These aims were of course mutually exclusive, as too close an involvement with Parliament would prejudice their chances of mediation between the contenders. On Parliament's side, there was Pym's long-standing desire to effect an alliance with Scotland for military as well as religious advantages. As with his other well-implemented schemes, Pym took some time to effect his results. But as early as October 1642 he voiced the hope of Scottish assistance, ^{3.} preceding any effective action by a year. ^{4.} On the other hand was the fear of irrevocable commitment to the oppressive Presbyterian system. The compromising attitude was already foreshadowed by the message to Scotland in July 1642

which declared to the General Assembly: "we do not doubt that we shall settle matters in church and state to the ... glory of God by the advancement of the true religion and such reformation of the church as shall be agreeable to God's word".^{5.} Leaving caution about compromising themselves

with Parliament aside, the Assembly sent instructions via its commissioners in London about how this "true religion and ... reformation" should be achieved.^{6.} But the House of Commons did not react in any way until

September 1st when a declaration about the abolition of episcopacy was made specifically in answer to the Scottish instructions;^{7.} even this was not very close to the positive measures advocated by the Scots.

Pym's greater concern for a definite alliance was already brought up tentatively in September in answer to the Scottish instructions. It was suggested that uniformity of religion could only be achieved by "mutual communication and conjunction of counsel" regarding both doctrine and church government, as well as safety of government.^{8.} Of course the Assembly

of Divines was meant to be the religious guiding body, to be used, as the Scots hoped, to assert their well planned influence on English church settlement, and also serving on the English side as a decoy for Scottish assistance in a wider sphere.^{9.} The English had no definite planned

positive settlement in mind; it was therefore useful to thrash out the inherent differences at meetings of the Assembly, giving the Scots hope of prevailing with the Presbyterian form, but at the same time allowing Parliament to get on with other matters; in this way the Assembly could be used as a lever to heave the Scots finally into the conflict on their side.

In the meantime other means of establishing "correspondency" were being used. Commissioners were appointed by Parliament to negotiate

with the Scottish Commissioners about "mutual commerce and trade and
 10. the preservation of peace". Parliament hoped to use them as a means to
 keep communications with the north open, appointing northerners to counter-
 act the king's influence there. In addition they served as a permanent
 negotiating body talking to the Scotch Commissioners in London. However,
 perhaps more significantly, Parliament dispatched an emissary to the
 Scottish Council of State who acted as a confidential agent for Fym.
 John Pickering went officially to put to the Scots Fym's scheme for
 11. their assistance, to Parliament, which had by November been sanctioned
 by both Houses. It was obvious that he was trying to counter any
 move made by the royalists for Scottish support, and to discountenance
 12. the pro-royalist Hamilton group in Scotland. Fym was probably more
 concerned with the strength of Charles' friends in Scotland than with
 13. the intentions of the Estates or the Assembly as a whole. His trust
 in their emissaries, the Commissioners in London, was probably based on
 14. the firm foundation of the Scots' desire to see England Presbyterian.

The letters from Pickering to Fym seem preoccupied with the internal
 strife and relative strength of the wealthy and undisciplined barons in
 Scotland. The cryptic and conspiratorial note which makes the letters
 partly meaningless smacks of intrigue probably necessitated by the
 ominous stirrings among the royalists there. Pickering asked for powers
 of arrest and deportation and continually urged the importance of secrecy.
 He even begged Fym to flatter the Scots by notifying them of Parliament's
 15. measures banning all proclamations against them. Pickering in fact
 combined a proper diplomatic mission, noted by various contemporaries, with
 a bit of spying for Parliament on the side. He reproached the royalists
 in Scotland with allowing Parliament to be maligned in print despite the

16. ban on any anti-Scottish publications in England. In his position he was obviously acting not only as a silent observer but as an active proponent of the English cause. He found it hard to answer some of the sceptics who argued that there was no point in intervening on either side as the quarrel between king and Parliament was not based on a religious issue.

In other words the Scots indicated that they were worried about parliamentary assurances to establish a Presbyterian type settlement, and Pickering asked his masters for help in answering this doubt. 17. By the 9th January

he appeared to have affected a change in the general attitude of those who mattered, many of whom had been swayed by Parliament's arguments: "the coales now want only blowing from England". Of course the whole matter of negotiations between the parties was still openly being discussed by the Scots, and Hamilton was trying to stop the Scots from antagonizing Charles. Pickering seemed very concerned at the lack of cooperation from Pym who had not written, and he feared that lack of constant prompting from London could still make the Scots take the wrong decision. Evidently his letter to Clotworthy on the 9th January was meant partly to widen the publicity of his efforts in Scotland in case for some reason Pym had turned cool on the scheme. In fact the last letter on the 14th January, which was partly in code, was sent only to Clotworthy, which perhaps indicates that Pickering had more hopes of Clotworthy's cooperation than of Pym's, as he wrote asking the former to notify "10,000" of his letter, as "I shall not wryt to him".

Pickering did not realize that his letters to Pym and Clotworthy were being intercepted and never reached their destination. In fact when he wrote, Clotworthy was already at Antrim and not in London at all.

Burnet's account of the intrigue included the clear statement that it was based on this correspondence which had been intercepted. 18. Charles used

the letters as evidence that Parliament wanted to send agents to Scotland to treat about getting aid, and consequently tried to block that move. Clearly, from the method of procedure, this was not the ostensible aim of Pickering's mission.

This correspondence indicates the personal nature of the diplomacy with Scotland. The preparatory steps were "master-minded" by Fym and his closest associates right outside of the parliamentary machinery. It was several months before a parliamentary committee was sent to Scotland. This peculiar procedure is further evidence of Fym's underhand machinations. He chose a non-Member who was safely in his own group as emissary to ensure that there would be no other parliamentary pressures upon him; at the same time he needed someone who had not committed himself publicly about his religious views. Fym's strategy to get Scottish aid without any definite promises for uniform church government was not only directed at the divergent factions in Scotland (whom Charles by his uncompromising attitude, represented by Hamilton, managed to unite firmly in opposition to himself) but also at the English Parliament whose religious opinions were ^{as yet} ~~not only~~ unformed. Pickering, a nonentity to them, could not be seen as selling Parliament out to the Scots for Presbyterianism - something the majority would at this stage have abhorred as interference in their religious freedom.

20.

In the meantime another facet of relations with the Scots appeared, namely the payment of their armies in Ireland, which was a constant source of worry as no satisfactory way of paying them had been developed. Direct collection for the purpose never worked efficiently. The obvious method, to let the war in Ireland pay for itself by letting the Scots take the produce of the land and "colonizing" it, had already earlier been rejected

as dangerous to English interests there. An interesting solution was put up by Denis Bond and the "fiery spirits"; he suggested that as the Scots and the English had a common enemy in the papist army they ought not expect payment from the whole English nation, but should come into England and collect the money owing directly from the estates of papists and malignants. This could hardly have been a practical scheme; it would certainly have entailed the Scots perpetrating great injustices on the whole population; in addition, D'Ewes argued sensibly that the Scots were hardly likely to fight in return for money which was already owing to them. But the War Party may have been less gauche than would at first appear in linking the two aspects of Scottish policy and suggesting an added motive to lure the Scots into England. The suggestion was not taken up although two committees were set up to think of ways of supplying the Scottish army.

It was the failure of the Oxford Treaty which the Scots had eyed with suspicion to see what religious settlement would emerge, that brought about the first decision of the Scots to aid Parliament. In Scotland the royalists had irrevocably committed themselves and were declared incendiaries by Parliament for writing to the Queen in an apparently traitorous manner. Charles wanted them to block any moves by the proposed commission from Parliament. As if these tactics were not highhanded enough - and the group of royalists were already viewed with suspicion at home - Charles refused to let the Scottish Commissioners who were at Oxford go to Parliament. In his usual devious and ill-advised manner, Charles chose this time to give support to the Antrim plot, a desperately conceived plan to bring an army from Ireland to aid Montrose in staging an uprising in Scotland. If anything was needed to unite the Covenanters and push them into an

alliance with Parliament this threat of foreign troops on their own territory decided them. Meanwhile in England Pym was manoeuvring hard to get the Lords to agree to send a joint commission to Scotland. It took the whole month of May to persuade them, through weekly conferences and arguments. Pym had of course already thought out the scheme and the composition of the commission but it was necessary in a matter of such importance to talk the Lords round in order to put up a common front. But the Lords were obviously worried by the implications of inviting the Scots and the Covenant in together.

The decision to appoint a commission did not end the confusion. Although the Commons prevailed on the Lords to nominate Lord Grey of Wark on June 3rd, partly through his own unwillingness (he had the Eastern Association to think of), and partly through their own disinclination to act in this dangerous course, they did not officially appoint him until July 6th, and then suggested, but did not name, another Lord in addition. By July 11th the Commons became insistent that another man be nominated. The timely combination of the Waller Plot (June 6th) and the treachery of Hotham spurred even the Lords on to agreement to send Miles Corbett as an official preliminary commissioner on June 27th.

At the same time in Scotland the good work of Pickering was evidently bearing fruit. A commission of the General Assembly roused by the Kirk slowly got around to the supporting of Parliament against the king on the grounds that if the latter were victorious in England he would turn against the Scots; they were able to use the appearance of royalist troops on the border as an incentive for the lukewarm. By the time Corbett came to get Scottish cooperation for the Westminster Assembly the atmosphere was generally favourable towards Parliament, and the royalist Lords had been

pushed into the background by the pressure from the Scottish church. The suggestion of an assembly of churchmen was of course welcome to the Scottish supporters of Parliament, and served as good bait for those who were worried about Parliament's intentions concerning the religious settlement. It was naturally assumed that this direct invitation to the Scots meant not only an increased chance to influence events in England, but actually denoted a real intention to establish a Scottish-inspired Presbyterian church. 55.

The hiatus in the English Parliament between the appointment of the Commissioners to go to Scotland and their actual departure was of course noted in Scotland where the new session of the Estates General was awaiting them. 34. Bailie records surprise that there was not even an excuse offered. The arrival of Sir John Meldrum unexpectedly from Scotland indicates the extent of Scottish disquiet about the absence of the expected commissioners, although they had finally been dispatched by the time he arrived on August 1st. His preoccupation was, interestingly, with the money owed to the Scots, and not with the Church settlement. 35.

We must assume that the delay in England was due to the Commons' desire to wait until the Lords finally appointed their commissioner, so that the commission would be representative of both Houses, and therefore regarded as a more authoritative body in Scotland. They felt, however, that to hold fire too long would prejudice their chances, and Corbett was sent accordingly as an emissary from the Commons only, with powers to treat solely about the Westminster Assembly, and not about general relations between the two nations. This was in the end an astute move, even after the four week lapse, because as we have seen, the Estates were given hope that Presbyterianism was making headway in England. 36.

The choice of commissioners was interesting too. Corbett was

known to be a sincere Puritan, although not of the Presbyterian persuasion. But at this early stage it is impossible to tell what his views were on Church government. He was certainly not one of the well-known Presbyterians of the House. He could not have been sent by the House of Commons in order to confirm the Scottish estimates of the strength of their ideas among the members of the House. He must have spoken with circumspection to give the Scots hopes of a favourable outcome in the Westminster Assembly. Weeks before he was sent the two Commons' commissioners had already been named - Darley and Armine, both men from the north who had earlier been active in affairs relating to Scotland, and both later political Independents without any positive Presbyterian attachments. Darley in fact had been a patentee of the American colonizing ventures and was a friend of Pym and Winthrop. It is therefore very likely that he had strong Independent religious views, especially as he had planned to migrate under Laud. Armine also later became "one of the Saints" but need not have been identified with the Independents at this stage. It is interesting that in the interval between the appointment and the dispatch of the commission, and after Corbett's mission had been mooted, Vane Jr. and Hatcher were added to the commission. The addition of the former was obviously due to his efforts to gloss over the basic difference between the Independent and Presbyterian forms of church government in his masterly phrasing of the Solemn League and Covenant which he must have completed during this period. He turned out also to be a masterful negotiator in this, his first taste of leadership of the House. Hatcher, his partner on the other hand, really was a Presbyterian as well as a northerner, and was probably sent along to encourage the Scots. The other thing that helped Vane in his diplomacy was the dispatch from the City of the remainder of the £100,000 debt to Scotland, which

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removed another reason for the Scots' hesitations. Clarendon places the whole success of the mission in Vane's lap, as being not only the ablest negotiator, apart from Hampden, in the House, but also the natural leader and inspiration of the English commissioners.

Whether Vane was genuinely concerned with the conviction that different people could legitimately interpret "the Word of God" in different ways, or whether he was interested purely in a political victory for a nascent Independent party is arguable, especially as it involves the whole complex issue of the relation between political and religious Independency. The insertion of the phrase "according to the word of God" into the Covenant was accredited to him and there is no reason to suppose that he was not genuinely concerned to safeguard a measure of freedom of conscience for the sectaries.

Yule sees this event as the first political step towards the establishment of an Independent party and cites evidence to indicate the awareness of contemporaries of a concerted anti-Scottish group within and outside of Parliament. There was certainly no doubt in the minds of most of his Scottish counterparts that his ruse left the door open for Independency. Guthry saw Vane's proposals as "clear and particular upon the privative part, viz. that they would extirpate Episcopacy root and branch; but as to the positive part ... they huddled it up in many ambiguous terms. So that whether it would be Presbyterianism or Independency or any other thing else God only knew". Despite the obviousness of the ruse, Guthry deplored that the majority would not listen to him and his criticism but agreed to sign the Covenant.

Miss Wedgwood has argued that Vane's modification did not really allow much leeway for the sects and cites the terms of the Covenant to

prove it. From what has been said here and from her own evidence however, it would appear that whether the contentious phrase actually allowed for Independency or not, it was regarded by contemporaries as doing so; this manifest awareness of an Independent policy towards the Scots is the significant factor here.

It is agreed by all that Vane was the life and soul of the commission and was responsible for its success. His wouldbe supporters from the Lords never in fact turned up. Grey excused himself, being too busy in the South,^{46.} and the appointment of Rutland, for which the Commons had so long delayed negotiations, came to nothing, as at the last moment he pleaded illness and did not go.^{47.} Thus although the Commons achieved the purpose of sending the commission from both Houses^{48.} neither of the Lords nominated dared to compromise themselves with the Scots. The Lords actually appeared embarrassed at the obvious unwillingness of their candidates and promised to "think of another" while hastily urging the Commons to send off their own commissioners with speed,^{49.} in this way sanctioning the latter's delegates as representative of both Houses. Mercurius Aulicus suggested as early as May that the Commons were actually pressing for the appointment of Lords Wharton and Howard of Escrig as being more reliably Puritan, and that the delays were due to their hopes of achieving this aim.^{50.} Indeed, Wharton was in the end sent, ten weeks later, and presumably as a result of the Lords' dilatoriness and unsuccessful hedging.

The details of the negotiation with the Scots are dealt with at length by Gardiner.^{51.} But it is worth noting that the Declaration sent to the Scots by the English Parliament made their concern with the "civil

league" quite explicit as no mention of the establishment of a Scottish-orientated church was made. ^{52.} It is clear that on the Scottish side too purely military arguments were put up in favour of sending an army to aid Parliament, despite Baillie's belief that its main purpose was to safeguard the religious settlement in England which the Scots wanted. ^{53.} Baillie says that Warriston dissuaded him of the notion that the Scottish army could go to England as mediators in the struggle there, and the military position was made clear to him. ^{54.} Burnet ^{55.} showed that a defence against the garrisoned Berwick and Carlisle was in any case necessary, while a royalist army on the borders might well mean at the very least the extortion of a contribution towards its upkeep. Parliament's friends therefore argued that it was preferable to have the Scottish army (needed in any case) paid for by the English counties and garrisoned there, rather than be responsible for its upkeep in Scotland. The result - an army of 20,000 to be sent at a cost of £30,000 per month, became quite an embarrassment to Parliament, which had not expected to be saddled with an army of quite such dimensions, ^{56.} and which, it was suspected, was being sent in order to relieve the Scottish purse of its heaviest military commitments. ^{57.} The delay between the Scottish decision to intervene and the actual sending of troops appeared not to be affected by the run of Parliament's military disasters in the middle of 1643. It was due to their desire to get the harvest in before calling up the troops, as well as their anxiety to have the Covenant accepted first and guarantees of payment of their army forwarded. ^{58.}

The job of the Commissioners in Scotland negotiating for troops and the Covenant was not confined to the broad issues of the Covenant, but also to hard bargaining on particulars. Darley was sent off to Berwick to persuade the town to be loyal to Parliament, ^{59.} and to make the difficult

decision of allowing the Scots to garrison the town in the absence of English troops. ^{60.} Similarly, the affairs of the Scots in Ireland had to be tackled and the Commissioners begged for something more concrete ^{61.} than fair words to make up for eighteen months' lack of pay. The Commissioners were still writing similar letters by the end of November, that is, six weeks later, before Parliament finally decided to settle all outstanding questions by turning over the financial affairs of the Scots in Ireland to the Goldsmiths Hall committee. Just as the Scots had played a waiting game for their money and the taking of the Covenant, the English refused to make the final move until they could see Scottish aid forthcoming. ^{62.}

Once the Covenant had in principle been agreed to, the House lost no time in putting pressure on the Scots to act. Between September 11th and 20th an elaborate framework of cooperation between the two nations was built up. A committee to meet the Scottish Commissioners who arrived in London to see their side of the bargain carried out, treated with them ^{63.} from September 12th and agreement was reached by the 14th. ^{64.} By the 20th, only the technical and administrative details were left, relating to the Scots' garrisoning of Berwick, the payment of their arrears in Ireland ^{65.} and the payment of the Scottish army in England.

This group could therefore be seen as a real antecedent of the Committee of Both Kingdoms, dealing as it did with affairs relating to both nations and caring at least at the central level for the military arrangements, including the settlement of Berwick. It was to meet a committee of the Assembly and some Scottish divines to discuss a Directory ^{66.} of Worship and a form of church government, to consider administering ^{67.} the Covenant to the nation at large, and to take over the issuing of

68.

further instructions to the Commissioners in Scotland. From the scope and increase in the committee's business it can be seen that Pym's stratagem for a joint control of the war was to be based on a committee of the two nations. At first this was an ad hoc committee to treat with the Scottish representatives but gradually it became obvious that a larger and more permanent body would have to be set up to administer the problems arising out of a dually controlled war effort which soon absorbed almost the entire running of the war. This earlier committee was not only dominated by Pym in its inception but comprised to a large extent of his followers. Pym, Gerrard and Clotworthy were on the original committee together with St. John and Mildmay, and Long and Erie were added on September 18th. The idea of a Committee of Both Kingdoms had been mooted by Pym as a necessary correlative to his favoured scheme of Scottish intervention. But because the Scots took so long to make a decisive move, he did not live to see the Grand Committee come into being.

69.

This early committee did not however absorb all the business relating to Scottish affairs. A week after its inception, on September 9th, a separate committee consisting of the same members with extra additions was set up to consider letters from the English commissioners in Scotland and to report their opinions on matters like the securing of Berwick and the capturing of Holy Island. Thus it had not yet developed into an exclusive committee, and in fact many matters such as the returned Captain Hatcher's report were heard in the House, and decisions were taken without any prior commitment being made. Matters relating to the Covenant, too, were fully debated in the House without setting up committees except on technicalities. In fact the War Party which was not strongly represented on these committees probably swayed the House as a whole to take the Covenant

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71.

quickly in order to stop further delays to the Scots' entry into England, even though it was argued that the Scots might not agree with the Covenant in its changed form,^{72.} an argument disposed of by the relieved Scots who were anxious for some form of commitment by the English.^{73.}

The unspecified recall of Vane from his commission in Scotland on October 26th "for present and imminent necessity" leaving Armine and Darley as sole Commissioners with full powers^{74.} was obviously connected with the incipient establishment of the Committee of Both Kingdoms in which he played a leading part, at a time when Fyn was already so ill as to be no longer regarded as a leader of the House. Ostensibly his recall was in answer to a request of the Committee of Estates that one of the Commissioners be returned to Westminster to put over a stronger case for the Scottish demands.^{75.}

In the meantime in order to facilitate a joint command of the armies, committees were appointed by both countries to be on the spot and deal with any difficulties arising from the presence of the Scottish army in the north of England.^{76.} This consisted of two M.P.'s - Robert Goodwyn and Richard Barwis, two representatives from the City, whose money was invested in the venture and who presumably wanted a say in affairs, and two Lords. Despite the decision on the composition of the committee, the Lords again did not decide on their members until November 2nd.^{77.} It appears that this committee, combined with the remaining Commissioners in Scotland, Hatcher and Armine, dealt with the general issues which had faced the earlier Commission, for we find Vane Jr., now back at Westminster, urging that the committee's promises in relation to pay for the troops in Ireland be honoured.^{78.} It was not that Vane was more concerned with supplying the Scots than with recruiting Essex's army. He knew very well that even in December the Scots could withdraw if their demands were not met. For

this reason he argued, supported by St. John and Mildmay and other War Party men, that Parliament should meet their demands for a Scottish Commander-in-Chief, namely Lesley, who would be in charge of all the troops including the English in Ireland. ^{79.} The Middle Party, now leaderless, clung to Clotworthy's argument from experience that the English would mutiny under foreign leadership, in which he was supported by Reynolds and John Goodwyn. These three, with their Irish experience, were possibly worried at the prevalence of the Scottish influence there. A split on this subject had already developed between the Middle Party at Westminster and the Commissioners under Armine in Scotland, the latter pleading for accession to the Scottish demands so as to safeguard the existence of their army in Ireland. ^{80.}

Vane displayed his early assumption of leadership by winning the point. The committee in the north also had to handle the delicate situation caused by the interference of the French Agent Boiswain who already in October was trying to dissuade the Scots from entering England on Parliament's side, ^{81.} and was mediating for Antrim's release. Even then, Vane, who was at that time still in Scotland wrote that "it is conceived here he comes too late". By December 23rd he was still negotiating propositions of peace which would satisfy both king and Parliament. By then the Scots felt themselves already compromised and panicked lest Parliament might act without prior consultation, leaving them between two stools. ^{82.}

It can be seen from these negotiations that Pym's scheme for securing the aid of the Scots in order to threaten the royalist strongholds in the north from the rear, came to fruition under Vane whose dominance in the Commons was assured as a result. The role of the religious divisions in the House, and the attitude to the Covenant is well known. It now remains

to see how the political divisions in the House reacted to the Scottish scheme, and an examination of the membership of the committees dealing with these matters will be relevant. Some caution is needed in examining a list of most active members of committees relating to Scottish affairs. The people presumably most active in Scottish affairs were the Commissioners in Scotland who were therefore not present at Westminster and not available for committees. Despite this, all the Commissioners did in fact sit on four or more committees.

We find in this group of committees a great concentration of very active figures. Eight men between them filled 80 places (15% of the membership took up 40% of the places). The Table ^{83.} indicating the list of most active members shows that Pym still dominated Scottish affairs at the Westminster end while Vane was in the north putting into practice their common policy. Armine, a Commissioner, was both a close associate of Pym's and a northerner. Of the most active committee-men, Pym, Armine, Stapleton and Glyn were dominant Middle Group men, while St. John, Vane and Marten were War Party men. Of those on six or more committees only Reynolds was not a politico but rather an administrator. Of those who were on four or more committees, nine were Middle Groupers, six were War Party, leaving Reynolds and Hatcher, the latter a northerner and Commissioner.

If we review the evidence from D'Ewes about the behaviour of the War Party in relation to Scottish affairs it becomes fairly obvious that they had no firm platform about the principle or method of getting Scottish aid. In December 1642 ^{84.} some of them were advocating not paying the Scots the money owing to them, but getting them to come in and collect the money from malignants' property themselves. This hardly indicated a

preoccupation with enlisting Scottish aid, as such a measure, apart from
 85.
 being impractical was liable to antagonise them. In May Marten made
 an outburst against any form of supplication to any Protestant state which
 Pym had advocated. In September Rolfe argued that the Covenant should
 86.
 be taken quietly so as to involve the Scots immediately in beating Newcastle.
 However, when Vane returned from Scotland a more united spirit was
 87.
 discernible. His influence prevailed in stressing the importance of
 the Scottish alliance even to the detriment of the English commanders both
 in England and Ireland, and he was supported by St. John and Mildmay
 against what appeared to be a Middle Party/Irish lobby who wanted the
 English to remain in command there.

From this and the evidence of the committee membership it seems
 clear that the policy of enlisting Scottish aid was originated and
 sustained by Pym and his associates throughout all the difficult months of
 negotiation. The War Party was not as active and was either divided or
 muddled about what line to take on the Scots' planned arrival in England.
 It was Vane's espousal of the cause which appeared solely to influence the
 War Party at the end of the negotiations to stand behind a wholehearted
 support of the Scots. D'Ewes mentioned a northern faction in the Commons
 88.
 at the end of 1645 which represented the interests of the northern
 members and was led by Vane. The support on which Vane must have drawn
 for his "faction" was not entirely a party one. He was backed by
 northerners who were otherwise active in both the Middle and War parties,
 as well as by some who were politically quiescent; at the same time he also
 89.
 had the support of some leading War Party figures who were not northerners.
 The Commissioners Darley, Armine and Hatcher, were also interested parties
 in relation to Fairfax's army. But it is noticeable that only Vane,

St. John and Strickland appeared on more than three committees in both groups, while Stapleton who was an activist on Scottish affairs, backed Essex and was regarded as one of his "faction" by D'Ewes, and Pym of course was already deceased at the time of the "split". The other active War Party northerners were conspicuously absent from the committees on Scottish affairs, although they dominated the Fairfax committees. The planning of the Scottish intervention therefore appeared to have been quite distinct from the support of a strong northern campaign, and rested in different hands, although both spheres were dominated by Vane and supported by St. John, both at this time already well in control of the management of policy in Parliament. It seems likely that the Scottish venture was in fact the training ground for Vane in taking over the leadership from Pym with whom he appeared to have cooperated closely in the plan to bring in the Scots and the Covenant. The contrast between the support which he got for the two policies would tend to confirm this hypothesis. Pym appeared inactive on the earlier Fairfax committees, and would perhaps even have disapproved of anything smacking of regional interests. Accordingly too, his supporters did not interest themselves in the affairs of the north, but followed his lead in giving support to Essex, the only non-regional "faction" of the three D'Ewes mentioned. The War Party on the other hand, supported, as a strategically sound plan, the claims of the northerners for more attention to their counties in the war effort. The intervention of the Scots appears to have been a plan worked out by the cooperation of the leaders of both parties, and the committee-men reflected this cooperation. St. John, Vane, Mildmay, Marten and Prideaux (the latter having been identified with the "western faction" in contrast to the northern) cooperated with well-known Middle Party supporters, all close to Pym personally - Armine, Glyn,

Hatcher, Goodwyn and Clotworthy.

On the religious level, it is noticeable that there were only four active Presbyterians among the seventeen men who were on four or more committees. Some of these are unclassifiable, but nevertheless the thinness of real support for a genuinely conceived Covenant does indicate a lack of interest in the Scottish side of the bargain, the establishment of Presbyterianism.

The plan to bring the Scots into the English dispute serves as a testing ground for the shifting political pressures in the English Parliament. It was on this ground that the change of dynasty from King Pym and his moderate supporters to Vane and the Independent radicals was first felt. The parallel plan for the establishment of the Committee of Both Kingdoms suffered the same fate, and the subsequent years of bitter squabbling between the dignitaries from both countries on the Committee appear inevitable in view of the differing aims, and consequently different methods of the allies in the war. As the records of the Committee of Both Kingdoms and the correspondence of the Scottish Commissioners on the committee show, the English never regarded the Scottish intervention as militarily significant. They resented the drain on their resources by a recalcitrant and uncooperative ally, while the Scots never ceased to complain of lack of funds and supplies. The whole ill-fated effort of coordination between the signatories of the Covenant was doomed because of the inherently schizophrenic nature of Puritanism itself; the self-righteous reforming zeal of the Scottish theocracy and the disorganized libertarian anarchy of the sects were inevitably drawn to the fratricidal conflict of the second Civil War.

MOST ACTIVE MEMBERS ON SCOTTISH COMMITTEES

Total: 29 committees.

Name	No. of Ctees.	War Pty.	Middle Party	Peace Party	Admin- istra- tors	Pres- byter- ians	Inde- pen- dents	North- erners
Fym	17		x					
Armine	14		x				I	x
St. John	11	x					Erast/I	
Vane Jr.	9	x					I	x
Reynolds	8				x		Erast/I	
Glyn	8		x			x		
Stapleton	7		x			x		x
Marten	6	x					I	
Wilde	5				x		I	
Hatcher	5					x		x
Goodwyn R.	5		x				P/I	
Clotworthy	5		x			x		
Strode	4	x						
Mildmay	4	x					I	
Whitelock	4		x				Erast/I	
Darley	4		x				I	x
Prideaux	4	x					I	
Strickland	3	x					I	x
Pierrepoint	3			x			I	
Bond	3	x					I	
Wheeler	3				x	x		
Rous	3		x				I	
Holles	3			x		x		
Holland	3	x					I	
Piemes N.	3		x				I	
Gerrard	3		x			x		

CHAPTER 13OTHER COMMITTEES

The major issues which faced Parliament during the first eighteen months of the war were all dealt with by delegating vital aspects to select committees, as we have seen. There were a host of other matters which at any other time might have preoccupied the Members more fully, but which, due to the pressing necessity of organizing the running of the war, were temporarily relegated to the bottom of the parliamentary agenda. We have already noted that religious issues were treated very circumspectly by the Commons because of the danger of splitting the unstable political alliance on matters of doctrine or, more likely, church discipline. Before the outbreak of war few religious issues were dealt with by select committees; this was because of the danger of entrusting any settlement to a body which might not have been representative of the wishes of the Houses as a whole; because of the general uncertainty of everyone about how they wanted the church to look; and because many people felt that the political struggle had to be won before any move on the religious front could have any meaning. After the middle of 1642 the religious question was further shelved by referring it to an extra-parliamentary Assembly which could busy itself arguing about the finer points without stopping the general run of business in the Commons. As a result religion did not at this time form a major preoccupation of the Houses. However such issues as could not be avoided were tackled once again by delegation to select committees.

Before the break with the king great stress had been placed upon making the position of Parliament seem as legal as possible in the eyes of men who were dominated by the idea of righteousness of precedent.

When the unavoidable revolutionary step was taken and Parliament found itself in arms against the Lord's anointed these justifications became more ephemeral. Such legal matters as did need the attention of the Commons were dealt with when expediency dictated and tended to be avoided as much as possible.

Another subject which had occupied the Members more fully before the war was the settling of affairs in Ireland. When the fighting began on home territory the majority in the Commons felt that the Irish ^{war} was irrelevant and could be largely ignored, especially as it created difficulties with the king who was supposed to be fighting the war on Parliament's side. In the rush of more pressing affairs therefore, Ireland tended to be left out of the major discussions of the day and few committees were appointed.

On the other hand a completely new sphere opened up for parliamentary attention at this time, namely, foreign affairs. This new acquisition from the powers of the king's prerogative gave the Members some trouble in the early years, for even the Protestant nations were sceptical about dealing with the revolutionary government. However during our period these difficulties were comparatively unimportant and although Parliament initiated contacts with the outside world it was too busy to deal with the international propaganda at great length.

Finally, a brief outline has been included of the parliamentary organization of the Navy. In the early part of the war naval action played a very minor part, although securing its support initially was a matter for intricate and careful negotiation. The role of the Navy in the war has been discussed at length by D. E. Kennedy and our concern here is merely to describe briefly the machinery of Parliament's supervision of the Navy.

Religion

The negative aims of Parliament in regard to religion had already

been fulfilled with the big split over the abolition of bishops, and the uneasy gap that followed had to be filled with some positive measures. The degree of dissention, and the inability of M.P.'s to formulate a readily acceptable alternative to the government of the bishops is illustrated by the early concern to shelve the whole problem by setting up the semi-autonomous Assembly of Divines. It is a truism that the bulk of the Puritans knew what they were against, but not what they were for. Pym's own equivocation and his patent dislike of committing himself, even on the bishop's' controversy, can be paralleled by the support his group gave the idea of the Assembly. It is not of course the case that no individual Puritans in Parliament knew what form of church organization (or lack of it) they wanted. The difficulty facing all was to reach a system which a majority of Puritans in the House and out of it would be prepared to support. This was complicated by the Scots' schemes for a positive Presbyterian movement. Pym had to see that the Erastian, the Separatist, and the Presbyterian elements acted together for long enough to ensure an apparently united front against the king, and at the same time to show the Scots that there was a willingness to follow the Presbyterian pattern without committing anyone to strict forms.

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Professor Yule discusses the anti-Presbyterian sentiments in the Commons in 1641 and shows that men who later sided definitely with one side or the other were undecided about their affiliations at that stage. Baillie who was commissioner in London at the outset of the Long Parliament as well as later member of the Westminster Assembly was obviously disappointed at the "lame, Erastian Presbytery" which was the nearest thing to the Kirk which was likely to be achieved in England. In this confusion it is not surprising that Parliament was anxious to delegate the thorny problem

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to a group of experts who could formulate a distinctively English form of church government and take into consideration the wishes of the vocal sections of society. The fact that the Assembly was predominantly Presbyterian in sympathy did not mean that it was ready to accept the Scottish forms, nor did it alienate that body from the leading Independents in the House. The anomaly of the Independent leadership of St. John and Vane sponsoring the whole politically intricate scheme of inviting the Scots into the war has been previously discussed.^{4.}

In any case, the preparations for the Assembly started almost as soon as the war broke out and gave the impression of activity and concern for the problem on Parliament's part. Committees were set up to prepare relevant bills to authorize the Assembly,^{5.} and a committee of the Whole discussed it.^{6.} By June 1643 at a conference of both Houses, the last difficulties were overcome. The Lords were talked into accepting the orthodox pro-Scottish line in relation to the government of the church, and the Houses nominated their members to attend the Assembly in a lay capacity.^{7.} The Houses left the setting up of a constitution for the Assembly to their own members of it.^{8.}

The actual business of the Assembly and the relations within it between the Scots, the Presbyterians and the Independents need not be detailed here as they have been described elsewhere.^{9.} Baillie indicates that the Scots were the driving force behind forcing active discussion of the Solemn League and Covenant rather than irrelevant and academic talk about the 39 Articles.^{10.} He expresses well the purpose of the Scottish pressures and their misguided hopes for intervention in the religious affairs of England.^{11.} To counteract to some extent the organized Presbyterian Scottish lobby, the lay members and M.P.'s were useful for

supervising the proceedings, never letting them get close enough to a real commitment to Presbyterianism. The fear of Scottish interference haunted the English members, probably even those who were convinced Presbyterians themselves; As the Erastian Selden commented: ^{12.} "There need be some laymen in the Synod, just as when the good woman puts the cat into the milk house to kill a mouse, she sends a maid to look after the cat, lest the cat eat up the cream."

Here however, we need only be concerned with the Assembly in so far as it affected Parliament. Although Parliament was well aware of the wrangles and lengthy proceedings, and indeed had its own Members present as a sort of committee, the only direct contact between the two bodies was in the form of petitions for redress of certain wrongs and grievances of the Assembly, such as asking Parliament to enforce and aid churchwardens in putting across the godly discipline, ^{13.} to consider the banning of controversial religious books named by the Assembly, ^{14.} and disabling antinomians ^{15.} from preaching.

Another series of committees dealt with the abolition of the trappings of Episcopacy. The abolition of tithes and the declaration against ecclesiastical courts, as well as the bill for removing the bishops were all passed in 1642, ^{16.} and the impeachment and sequestration of the twelve ^{17.} bishops and the trial of Laud were under way by the end of 1643.

In addition, there were several committees dealing with Puritan religious practices and iconoclastic activities. The destruction of the Capuchin enclave at Somerset House and the ensuing trouble with the French Agent who intervened on their behalf ^{18.} was a strongly Puritan affair, as ^{19.} were the remodelling of Westminster Abbey, ^{20.} and the ordering of fast days. These may be contrasted with the more positive religious activities such

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as the committee for plundered ministers.

This brief survey of the way in which religious matters were dealt with by committees of the Commons serves as a framework for examining the membership of these committees and comparing the relative strengths of the different religious affiliations in each of the aspects considered.

The classification I have used is somewhat arbitrary in the absence of detailed knowledge of the religious behaviour of all the individuals. I have labelled as "Presbyterians" those who were expelled at Pride's Purge; that is, those whose Presbyterianism was "political" as well as religious. The others have been labelled according to Yule's system, which classifies those who fled to the Army and sat in the Ramp as "political" Independents, but whose religion varied from Presbyterianism to Erastianism, to sectarianism, and - where the sources do not specify - just Puritanism.

Of the twenty three Members of the House of Commons who sat on the Westminster Assembly, eight were Presbyterians by conviction, ^{22.} while White and Pym are unclassifiable due to early death. Six were probably Independents by religion, ^{23.} four were Erastians, ^{24.} and three others were "political" Independents whose religious behaviour is unknown, but who were probably not committed. ^{25.} It is likely that of these groups the Presbyterians were the best organized and the strongest. Yet on the nine committees dealing with the Assembly of Divines the Presbyterians only contributed three members who were on three or more committees; the Independents had four; the others were the unclassifiable Pym and White; while Sallway and Wilde, lay members of the Assembly, were probably not active Puritans at all; together with three Erastians. ^{26.} The reason for this discrepancy in the strength of the Presbyterian interest is

probably due to the identification of the War Party generally with the Independent group. The members of the War Party were overwhelmingly Independent in religion as well as in politics. Only Zouch, Tate and Sir William Waller, if he can be classified as War Party at all, were certain Presbyterians. Some, like Gurdon, Corbett and Hoyle, were Presbyterian elders, but encouraged Independent ministers, or were in other ways tainted by Independency. Thus one could conclude from the membership that the whole group of committees relating to the Assembly was dominated by the political interests of the War Party rather than by their religious interests as Independents. But on the Assembly of Divines itself, the Scottish influence and the importance of establishing amity with that nation, through religious uniformity, gave the Presbyterians a relatively stronger representation there, although even the Presbyterians were chary of the Scottish influence at the Assembly.

It is illuminating to compare this with the membership of the committees dealing with the abolition of bishops and the hierarchy. The three who sat on three of the four committees represent the Independents, (Prideaux), the Presbyterians (Wheeler) and the Erastians (St. John) - all groups most interested in the matter in hand. Of the thirty members who sat on these committees ten can be classified as Independents, nine as Presbyterians, three as Erastians and eight doubtfuls. In other words, the two main religious groups acted in about equal strength. Although the War Party were in evidence here too, they did not form the dominant group as in the other clusters of committees. It can be assumed that by mid-1642 the abolition of bishops ceased to be a matter of political importance, as the main political battle had already been won on that score.

The group of committees dealing with extreme anti-papist and iconoclastic activities form another contrast. One might have thought that the more extreme of the sectarians would be eager participants. But the forty members involved divide fairly evenly into thirteen Independents, fifteen Presbyterians (including three political Independents), three Erastians and nine doubtfuls. It is true that of these there were more War Party men who were Independents and Middle Party men who were Presbyterians than vice versa, but there were also exceptions. Marten was probably not a Puritan at all; Rous, Brown, St. John and possibly Goodwyn were Middle Party Independents; St. John was a War Party Erastian; Tate a War Party Presbyterian.

29.

It is interesting too that D'Ewes identified the backers of the chapel defacing and those who wished to disregard Christmas as "violent spirits", naming Marten, Clotworthy, Bond, Rigby and Gurdon as the iconoclasts. These were the committee to deface Somerset House. On the other hand Selden, Maynard, and Glyn were named as supporting the adjournment for Christmas. It is noticeable that there is here a correlation between religious and political views, but not a complete one - Clotworthy being neither War Party nor Independent, while Glyn in the latter group was Presbyterian along with his colleagues, but unlike them Middle, not Peace, Party. D'Ewes, himself a staunch Presbyterian, called the defacing "a good work" in principle but politically disastrous as it was at a time of treaty with the French, which had bearing on the general hopes for peace. In him then the religious and political aspects of the situation conflicted, yet he saw no distinction between the political and religious interests of the "fiery spirits". Marten for instance could hardly be classed as a zealous Puritan, and his

presence as an iconoclast was probably motivated by anti-French rather than anti-idolatrous attitudes. But no clear correlations between the religious and political extremists can be made, despite D'Ewes' comments.

The only other group of committees relate to the plundered ministers, and these, as one might expect, interested the Presbyterians more; they were more concerned at this stage with a strong and firmly established clergy, while the Independents' decentralizing motif led them to distrust any organization of ministers from the centre; and there were probably a far greater number of plundered ministers who were Presbyterian rather than Independent.

Taking all these committees on religious matters as a whole, we find that of the twenty most active committee-men on the twenty one committees, ^{30.} the Presbyterians had six adherents, the Independents had seven, while three were Erastians and five doubtfuls. Politically too, there seems to have been a balance of five each in the War and Middle parties, though there was no clear correlation between these and the religious groupings. No conclusions can be drawn about the predominance of any group or interest in these committees as a whole. However, as the Table shows, the activist group of those who sat on more than five committees was very concentrated compared to the whole membership of the committees, which would appear to indicate that the division among the political and religious groups was not random, but that the interests of the House were indeed split evenly on these issues.

TABLE I

MOST ACTIVE MEMBERS ON COMMITTEES RELATING TO RELIGION

No. of Ctees.	Activists	War Par- ty	Mid- dle Party	Peace Party	Pres- byter- ians	Inde- pen- dents	Eras- tian
<u>Iconoclasm</u>							
Total: 6 committees							
3	Bond	x				P/I	
3	Clotworthy		x		x		
3	Gurdon	x				P/I	
<u>Ecclesiastical Hierarchy</u>							
Total: 4 committees							
3	Prideaux	x				I	
3	St. John	x					x
3	Wheeler				x		
<u>Assembly of Divines</u>							
Total: 9 committees							
5	Rous		x			P/I	
5	Wilde					I	
4	Rigby	x				P/I	
3	Wentworth	x				I	
3	White						
3	Whitelock		x				x
3	Asherst					I	
3	Pym		x				
3	Harley				x		
3	Maynard			x	x		
3	Barrington		x		x		
3	Selden			x			x
3	Salloway					I	
3	St. John	x					x
3	Vane Jr.	x				I	

TABLE II

MOST ACTIVE MEMBERS ON ALL RELIGIOUS COMMITTEES

Name	No. of Ctees.	War Par- ty	Mid- dle Party	Peace Party	Pres- byter- ian	Inde- pen- dent	Eras- tian
Total: 21 committees							
Wilde	9					I	
Wheeler	9				x		
Rous	9		x			P/I	
Frideaux	8	x				I	
St. John	8	x					x
White	7						
Reynolds	7						x
Asherst	6				x		
Salloway	6					I	
Clotworthy	5		x		x		
Cage	5						
Glyn	5		x		x		
Maynard	5			x	x		
Wentworth	5	x				I	
Brown	5		x			P/I	
Rigby	5	x				P/I	
Holland C.	5	x				P/I	
Harley	5				x		
Fym	5		x				
Selden	5			x			x
Bond	4	x				P/I	
Corbett	4	x				I	
Gurden	4	x				P/I	
Whitelock	4		x				x
Lisle	4					I	
Young	4				x		
Goodwyn	3		x			P/I	
Gerrard	3		x		x		
Millington	3	x				I	
Marten	3	x				P/I?	
Whittaker	3			x		I	
Ruthyn	3					I	
Haselrig	3	x				I	
Hill	3					P/I	
Smyth	3					I	
Nicholas	3					I	
Vane	3	x				I	

Legal Matters

A glimpse of the breakdown in the proceedings of the common law courts is afforded by the parliamentary committees appointed to deal with the deficiencies as they arose. In the counties where fighting took place the processes of the law were seriously interrupted for several years and the difficulty of holding Assizes cropped up everywhere, so that complaints reached Parliament even from relatively loyal and undisturbed counties like Essex. Apart from the substitution of parliamentary for royal authority in the appointment of J.P.'s and other legal officers Parliament had to cope with the sifting of loyal legal administrators. There were also difficulties in keeping civil offices separate from military, and often the assizes were used to put across parliamentary policy and to punish offenders for other than common law offences.

Many of these difficulties arose right at the beginning of the war; Parliament had to meet completely novel situations without interrupting the time-honoured practices too drastically. Attempts were made to hold assizes in places judged safe for the parliamentary side; ^{31.} to convince local authorities of parliamentary power to hold the sessions; ^{32.} to regulate relations between local justices, sheriffs and juries; ^{33.} to appoint local clerks and J.P.'s where new ones were needed; ^{34.} and, where Parliament had no other means to enforce law and order, to postpone the meeting of assizes, a measure of which the Commons had to convince the Lords, who stood for closer ties with tradition. ^{35.} These expedients were all concerned with the practices of the common law. The only prerogative court left, the Court of Wards, was not abolished until July 1645, while its profits were being slowly reabsorbed into parliamentary ^{36.} revenue.

The greatest inconvenience which faced Parliament however, was the duplicate authority which the king exercised over the law courts. In January 1643 the king tried to get the courts to sit at Oxford instead of at London, which forced Parliament to do what it did not wish - to declare arbitrarily that the king's declaration was illegal. ^{37.} But the chief inconvenience for Parliament was the disappearance of the Great Seal to Oxford with the person of the Lord Keeper. Parliament was especially unwilling to make any unconstitutional moves in regard to the processes of law, and in fact a whole year of negotiations and speculation was spent before a Commission of the Great Seal was set up in November 1643. ^{38.} The difficulties were obvious. As the Lords pointed out, ^{39.} Parliament had ruled by Ordinance until that time, so the Seal was not strictly necessary. They also felt that there would be unnecessary confusion with two seals being current at the same time. But obviously their greatest difficulty was with the illegality of the situation. The House of Commons, although they shared the concern for the appearance of legality, were however prepared to depart even further from the traditional policy of non-interference in matters of the law in order to give themselves greater stature in the eyes of the country at large, despite the dubious means of achieving their end.

The activists on these eighteen legal committees were a very specialized group - not only were they nearly all lawyers, as one might expect (of those who sat on five or more committees all by Armyne had legal training), ^{40.} but a very small group was very active indeed, as the Table indicates. Eight percent of the total membership of 74 sat on thirty percent of the places. The most talented and enthusiastic lawyers of the House were the obvious people to dominate the proceedings of these committees dealing

exclusively with legal matters, where no multiple interests had to be represented as on other matters where political views played a bigger part. True, a marked difference of view was prevalent in the two Houses, but in the Commons even the most conservative lawyers felt that if Parliament was worth supporting at all it would have to displace, to some extent, the activities of the Privy Council. It is therefore likely that despite the differing political views of many of the active lawyers on these committees they nevertheless presented a common attitude to the House on legal matters.

It is interesting to compare the list of active lawyers with those on legal committees before the outbreak of war. Comparing the activists of the group on Prerogative Courts before mid-1642 with the present one, only St. John was common to both lists. All the rest who appeared as activists on the former committees were either future royalists, or very conservative parliamentarians like Selden and D'Ewes. Comparing the activists of the large group of earlier committees dealing with petitions which were largely referred to lawyers also, only Glyn, St. John, Rigby and Prideaux coincide with the activists of the present group. It therefore appears that a new group of active lawyers came to the fore in this period, who were not necessarily politicians, but who appeared to be more active in the role of specialists and administrators in the event of the early war years, by acting on large numbers of committees on all manner of subjects where their training and background may have given them special knowledge or useful techniques.

MOST ACTIVE MEMBERS ON LEGAL COMMITTEES

Total: 18 committees

Name	No. of Ctees.	War Party	Middle Party	Peace Party	Lawyers	Adminis- trators
Wilde	12				X	X
Hill	11				X	X
Glyn	10		X		X	
Prideaux	9	X			X	
Whitelock	7		X		X	
Rigby	6	X			X	
White	5				X	X
St. John	5	X			X	
Young	5				X	
Armine	5		X			
Goodwyn R.	5		X		X	
Maynard	5			X	X	
Marten	5	X			X	
Reynolds	5				X	X
Wheeler	4				X	X
Strode	4	X			X	
Pym	4		X		X	
Fye	4				X	X
Corbett J.	4		X		X	
Nicholas	4				X	
Browne	4				X	
Harley	3				X	X
Cage	3				X	X
Millington	3	X			X	
Rous	3		X		X	

Irish Affairs

The affairs of Ireland were complicated at the outbreak of the war by the fact that there remained some need for Parliament and the king to cooperate in the war which was begun before hostilities broke out, although Parliament naturally doubted Charles' enthusiasm for its prosecution. As we have seen, Parliament hit almost at once upon a method of obtaining money for this war which was actually popular with those who forwarded it, as it was widely regarded as a safe investment to help to subdue the rebels in return for rich grants of land. The Irish Adventurers were so eager to forward loans for Ireland that one of the

first sources of income for the Committee of Safety for domestic military consumption was a massive loan from the Adventurers of £100,000.^{42.}

This was regarded at first purely as a guarantee to vouch for payment of the expenses incurred in setting up defences at home. But quite evidently the money became tied up for a much longer period than the Committee of Safety intended (or at least declared), as over a month later, on September 3rd, Robert Goodwyn reported from the Irish committee that affairs in Ireland were worsening and that the money was now needed and should be repaid, in which he was supported by Fym whose interests could not have been sectarian on this issue.^{43.}

The king's attitude to the parliamentary treatment of Irish affairs was naturally one of indignation. On July 7th Charles wrote that he could no longer give any directions regarding Ireland as the requested warrant for sending forces there struck him, correctly, as ironical. He thus washed his hands of the responsibility for the campaign. However, when he heard of the loan of £100,000 to be used against his own side, his indignation waxed strong and Parliament had to issue declarations that his renunciation of the role of defender of the Irish Protestants meant that the war in Ireland could now properly be regarded as a natural extension of the domestic one.^{44.} But, as late as May 1643 Parliament was still worried about the king's statements concerning the use to which money for Ireland was allegedly being put by Parliament.^{45.} At a time when relations with the king were particularly vituperative, after the failure of the Oxford Treaty, Parliament was nevertheless concerned enough to answer his charges in detail, even admitting to the use of part of the £100,000 for Essex's army, but justifying the rest. The radicals who

felt that this was altogether too humiliating, were all in favour of totally ignoring the king's declaration, as the division showed.

At the same time as reporting the need for repayment of the Irish money to the committee, Goodwyn complained ^{47.} that the Irish Commissioners did not meet regularly - in fact the last report from the committee had been from Pym on August 10th giving estimates of money needed for Ireland. ^{48.} The Commissioners themselves suggested that another committee should be appointed to look after Irish affairs. Pym, whose concern was for the smoothest possible organization, wanted to exonerate the Commissioners from charges of neglect of their duties by saying that most of them were absent ^{49.} from Westminster on service for the House; he blamed the Committee of Safety for its tardiness in repaying the loan which had helped to bring about the disorganization of the Irish committee. At the same time he wanted to ensure that an active and available committee could sit regularly. He therefore asked that the commissioners be discharged from their duties ^{50.} altogether. In this he was supported by Harley. In the end, the House appointed a new committee, but added all the Commissioners collectively ^{51.} as well as all the Irish Adventurers to sit on it.

The committee met at once on September 3rd, and Pym's report ^{52.} concerning the necessities for Ireland were referred to it. At the same time a committee of four Adventurers - all non-members of Parliament, was nominated to go to form direct contacts in Ireland with instructions to inform themselves and to report back on the progress of the war, the strength of the army, the loyal as well as the disloyal, and to see to the conviction of rebels. ^{53.} Whether there was trouble with the City, or whether the radicals considered it necessary to have ~~p~~parliamentary representation on the committee, the four nominees were withdrawn later in the day

and the Commons nominated Reynolds and Mildmay to go, leaving it to the
54.
London committee to nominate two other Adventurers.

Despite this mission, there were still continual enquiries about
55.
the maladministration of the war and the supplies sent there. One
of the reasons for the sluggishness besetting Irish affairs at this time
was the war now seriously under way in England. As Henry Marten - an
earlier Irish Adventurer - put it in December: "We had at this time more
56.
cause to looke to the safetie of England than to the safety of Ireland".
Robert Goodwyn, trying to report his mission, had to wait for a week before
his report was heard in the House. In fact it was only after he had
warned that the Irish committee would not send any more aid to Ireland
unless Parliament heard his report that an order was made that the
contractors should be paid. At the same time Parliament was under pressure
from the Scots who were demanding that the remainder of their Brotherly
Assistance should be paid to their troops in Ireland. Further delaying
tactics had to be used to stall off the Adventurers who had underwritten
payment of the supplies for Ireland and to use the money meant as payment
57.
for them for the Scots instead. Of course there was always the ultimate
threat of the radicals to use against the Adventurers if they proved
unwilling to outlay further sums - namely, dropping Ireland from the
parliamentary budget altogether. This had been suggested by Marten in
58.
December and again in January 1643 so that the pressure of the Scots
(reported by Pym), and of the Irish Protestants (reported by Clotworthy),
could be met. This was strengthened by the proposals of a treaty put to
59.
the rebels by the king. It can be seen that the anxiety which
Marten's view would have caused the Adventurers was echoed by the rumours
spreading in Ireland that Parliament was going to let it fall to the

60. rebels. The Adventurers thus sought to tighten their organization and to increase their investments by calling on all who had listed themselves but had not in fact contributed, including various M.P.'s. 61. To reinforce the position of the Committee of Adventurers the Commons insisted upon a bill to pay the subscription money for Irish use. 62. In the meantime the Irish committee was busy checking on all the inefficiencies of the system of payment and supplies by not only going through all the accounts of those concerned with payment of men and goods, but also by duplicating the inventories of goods and arms sent and checking them against those received by the Irish justices. 63. As has been noted, an attempt was made to collect a separate levy from the country at large for the Irish campaign but it was always the least successful, and the collectors were always permanently in deep arrears. 64. Partly as an incentive to the recalcitrant a declaration was issued which stressed the heinousness of the rebellion, and linked the importance of victory in Ireland with success in England against the common enemy. 65.

The cumbersomely large committee, with all the additions made during the months and the automatic inclusion of all Adventurers and Irish Commissioners was replaced by another committee "to expedite the affairs of Ireland and to consider the army there". 66. Its duties must have embraced the same field as its predecessors, although its instructions stressed attention to the military aspects of the situation. It was to cut out all wrangling about misappropriation and fund collection being carried out by the Adventurers and the Merchant Taylors Hall committee, and to concentrate on decisive military victory for the army. The membership of the new committee however was again open to swamping

by the interested parties, as it could co-opt practically anyone to help, and in any case the old committee was empowered to attend its meetings. In fact, they were to confer with the Adventurers to think of new methods of raising money.^{67.} At meetings it was not unusual for over 60 members and Adventurers to be present under Goodwyn's chairmanship. The committee was thus spread over the same membership as before.^{68.} The tried method of sending parliamentary committees as observers and military advisers was repeated. One outcome of their deliberations was the vast increase of acreage allowed for the rewarding of Adventurers. By September 1643 the committee was dealing with: the ordering, shipping and distribution of arms to the various regiments through appointed commissaries; payment for stores, arrears and commissions to the collectors in England;^{69.} claims from large numbers of officers who said they had raised and paid their own regiments;^{70.} additional worries induced by Scottish claims for expenses.^{71.}

Another crisis faced by those who were interested in Ireland was the king's offer of a ceasefire to the rebels. This had the effect of producing renewed enthusiasm for the Irish cause, and a whole bevy of committees was set up in October to deal with the new situation, practically, by seeing that Ireland was cut off from the royalists and by pumping more men and provisions into the war, and theoretically, by issuing proclamations against the king's stand.^{72.} The lure of rich rewards in land was reiterated also.^{73.} The offer of cessation, needless to say, was regarded with gloom and suspicion by the London committee.^{74.} It was the hope of a rich reward to come, the fear of a largescale influx of pro-royalist Irish coming to England and the existence of a hostile centre near her borders, that finally clinched parliamentary determination to give

financial support for the war.

On the twenty five Irish committees, there were some very constantly active men, as the Table indicates. ^{75.} There was a remarkable absence of Londoners and merchants, but this is presumably due to their activities on the London Adventurers committee. This would account for the absence of Pennington, Soame, Hungerford, Pye and Long, all of whom had been activists on Irish affairs in the earlier period. The new names, Wentworth, Prideaux, Rous, Holland and Strickland were all political enthusiasts and probably represented the usual War Party and active Middle Party interest in the vigorous policy, although as we have seen, other War Party men such as Marten belittled the importance of this front as compared with the domestic situation. Pym on the other hand obviously felt that Ireland was important and stressed the need for efficient and speedy financing of the war there. Of the twenty nine activists, at least Robert and John Goodwyn, Clotworthy, Jephson, Lisle and Parkhurst were known to have Irish connections, and many of the others, including Pym, were Adventurers. Politically Pym's group was very dominant among them making up over half, and reflecting probably the combined political and colonizing interests which bound the leadership of the Opposition of the Commons together right at the beginning of the Long Parliament.

MOST ACTIVE MEMBERS ON IRISH COMMITTEES

Total: 25 committees.

Name	No. of Ctees.	War Party	Middle Party	Peace Party	Adminis- trators	Irish Interest
Reynolds	12				x	
Goodwyn R.	10		x			x
Clotworthy	10		x			x
Pym	9		x			
Marten	8	x				
Glyn	8		x			
Wentworth	7	x				
Armine	7		x			
Prideaux	7	x				
Holles	6			x		
Whitelock	6		x			
Jephson	6					x
Rous	5		x			
Maynard	5			x		
Vane Sr.	5					
Vane Jr.	5	x				
Wheeler	5				x	
Gerrard	5		x			
Goodwyn J.	5		x			x
Lisle	5				x	x
Parkhurst	5					x
Rolle	4				x	
Barrington	4		x			
Strickland	4	x				
Strode	4	x				
Hatcher	4					
Holland	4	x				
Erle	4		x			
Cage	4				x	
Bond	3	x				
Brown S.	3		x			
Mildmay	3	x				
St. John	3	x				
Harley	3				x	
Trenchard	3				x	
Vassall	3				x	
Whittaker	3			x		
Wilde	3				x	
Ashe	3		x			
D'Ewes	3			x		

Foreign Affairs

Here our concern is with matters relating to other countries dealt with by separate committees, and not covered by the Committee of Safety. Earlier, Parliament was of course too busy worrying about pressing affairs at home to care much for setting up embassies and creating regular relations with foreign states. Nevertheless efforts were made in the direction of other Protestant states to form a legitimate channel of diplomatic exchange. The United Provinces were really the only power with whom any measure of cooperation was reached, and Walter Strickland, the chief parliamentary Agent abroad, was stationed in Holland. Mutual expressions of affection were passed in September 1642,^{76.} and propositions were put forward for an alliance.^{77.} Later in September 1643 Parliament actually sent a mission "for the closer union with princes of the Protestant religion" whose chief aim appeared to be borrowing money for Parliament.^{78.} When the ambassadors visited England, Parliament became very anxious to be the sole authority to enter into diplomatic relations with them, cutting off the king from the official channels of international recognition.^{79.} Parliament also tried, unsuccessfully at first, to send agents to Hamburgh and Denmark,^{80.} but it took a long time before even the Protestant princes agreed to accept the unheard of revolutionary government, and by July Parliament evidently suspected that Danish aid was going to the king.^{81.} This sort of threat had the more useful side-effect of inducing panic at times of lessening enthusiasm for the parliamentary cause, when a foreign invasion could be conjured up on the horizon as a common enemy.

Parliament's relation with Queen Elizabeth of Bohemia was a dual one; on the one hand they resented any partisan action on her part, as a

Protestant monarch in aiding or even encouraging her son Rupert;^{82.} but on the other, being also the Elector Palatine's mother, Parliament agreed to vote her and her son an annual pension in order to keep warm the possibility of asking him to replace Charles on the English throne.^{83.}

With France, too, Parliament had its troubles. On the one hand it never trusted a country which was the natural haven for all exiled royalists because of the close relationship with the royal family,^{84.} and on the other it half-cooperated with the shady offers of mediation which periodically issued forth across the channel. According to the Venetian Ambassador, the French envoy was used by Parliament as early as September 1642^{85.} to mediate between them and the king, but he suggested that the offer was purely a gesture in order to appear appeasing, especially as it was known that Charles disliked the envoy personally.

When the Ambassador returned in October 1643 Parliament at first turned on all the official honours and ceremonies, no doubt hoping to impress by their established authority and care for protocol.^{86.} Because of the tenderness of their position in the eyes of outside established authorities, they at once fell out with him as he refused to address the Houses directly. It was objected at a joint conference of both Houses that he gave "himself so high a title and Parliament so low",^{87.} and his request for the release of Lord Montague was met by a more uncompromising attitude than the Queen Mother's much earlier request for the release of Lord Digby. It is not clear what d'Harcourt's mission actually was in England, but even if Parliament's suspicions of his duplicity with them had been confirmed, they bungled the affair by keeping him under guard and censoring his diplomatic mail,^{88.} putting themselves in the very position of inexperienced

upstarts which they had hoped to avoid. Misunderstandings between d'Harcourt and Parliament continued to grow as their suspicions of him increased; he continually refused to address them through the proper channels of both Speakers, and finally nothing positive was achieved by the mission.

On the nineteen committees related to foreign affairs the parliamentary leaders from all political views predominated as the Table shows. ^{89.}

Holles' activity is noteworthy, as his general attendance at committees declined sharply early in this period when he lost his political zeal for the war. Perhaps he felt that the bewilderment of domestic policies left only foreign affairs to occupy him. He was an experienced Parliamentarian with a knowledge of the affairs of other countries, and administrative experience under Charles. ~~Like the activists were experienced parliamentarians with also political connections, and~~ Holles was of course also serving in the cause of peace in acting on matters conducive to setting up a channel of communication with the king, no matter how devious. The elder Vane, who was perhaps the only figure not closely associated with the parties, was an experienced politician, ex-Privy Councillor and an obvious expert on foreign matters. Of the others, at least Mildmay and Whitelock had had experience at Court and were versed in the ways of etiquette. The absence of purely administrative figures is noteworthy, indicating the importance attached to this bid for the powers of the Privy Council by the more positively active M.P.'s.

MOST ACTIVE MEMBERS ON COMMITTEES ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Total: 19 committees.

Name	No. of Ctees.	War Party	Middle Party	Peace Party	Adminis- trator
Holles	9			x	
Vane Jr.	7	x			
Glyn	7		x		
Fym	7		x		
St. John	6	x			
Vane Sr.	5	x?			
Whitlock	5		x		
Yelverton	4		x		
Mildmay	4	x			
Haselrig	4	x			
Vassall	3				
Rudyerd	3			x	
Reynolds	3				x
Stapleton	3		x		
Erle	3		x		
Prideaux	3	x			
Rolle	3	x			

Committees for the Navy.

The whole problem of the role of the Navy and its administration during the Civil War has been dealt with by D. E. Kennedy ^{90.} who is primarily concerned with attacking the view that Parliament's administration was less corrupt and more efficient than the preceding royal administration. He shows at length that the Navy committee was regarded by contemporaries as self-interested and speculating - that the members used their own and their friends' ships to meet Parliament's orders for the safety of the ports and the Irish seas and that they made handsome profits out of the service. Certainly some of its members made a great deal of money from the government contracts and all had interests in the business. People were conscious of the possible abuses of a system where the committee ^{91.} members hired out their own ships for use of the government.

Certainly naval administration was for a time in the hands of ship-owning

merchants who issued the contracts and provided some of the vessels. Parliament worked in its habitual way, delegating this aspect of its administration to the men most knowledgeable in the subject and with the most useful contacts - namely the important provincial and London merchants with shipping interests. It does not seem surprising that they used their knowledge to their own advantage and preferred their own vessels to those of others. But the abuse levelled at the committee in 1647^{92.} only echoed the general dislike of the work of the committeemen and their administration after years of high taxation and long dragged out fighting.

Our concern here is merely with the setting up of the naval administrative machine in the Commons. Before the war we have already noted the existence of a committee which provided funds and administered the provisioning of the royal fleet. When war broke out the immediate problem was to get control of the fleet, and Parliament won this bloodless battle in the first month of hostilities.^{93.} There was then an organic connection between naval administration from pre-war times. The Commons' committee provided a central organization and a body of integrated specialists for the Navy which was not paralleled on the military side until the setting up of the Committee of Both Kingdoms.^{94.} Its experience in the earlier Irish war proved useful once hostilities began at home.^{95.}

Financing the Navy remained in the hands of the committee under the new chairman, the younger Vane.^{96.} He was responsible for using the customs revenue for the needs of the Navy and for procuring special loans from London merchants to outfit the fleet. Giles Greene, the later chairman of the Admiralty committee, also sat on Vane's committee as a special officer to keep the customs collectors up to the mark.^{97.} The

Admiralty committee was set up soon after the Navy came unequivocally to support Parliament in order to administer all its needs, leaving the other committee with purely money-raising functions. It comprised Northumberland and Warwick - the two successive Admirals, Holland, Vane, Marten, Rolle, Fye and Greene. Vassall and the two Bences were later added. The committee acted as the right hand of Warwick when he was appointed in Northumberland's place as Admiral and at the same time it provided a useful liaison between him and the Commons. It was less cumbersome than the large amorphous Commons committee and it included the two chief executors of the Navy's affairs in the Commons, as well as a body of merchants who were not only familiar with the methods of finance used to supply the Navy, but who might be useful in implementing loans at moments of crisis. Naturally the activities of the two bodies within the Commons overlapped a great deal and when Warwick became Lord High Admiral in November 1643 they merged into a single financial committee.

The main parliamentary administrator of naval affairs remained Giles Greene. It was he who issued the warrants to the Commissioners of the Navy - the officers responsible for fitting out the ships who were under direct orders from the Commons. It was through Greene that orders relating to the surveys of provisions of all the ships in the shipyards and their restocking were made. Kennedy provides no direct proof of Greene's peculation, but he uses as evidence of the corruption of the Navy committee, Greene's lengthy and detailed defence of its integrity, which, he argues, was made in answer to a virulent attack.

Greene's committee certainly had plenty of opportunity to fleece governmental funds. It dealt with matters such as deciding what ships were to remain in Ireland at various times, it put in estimates of

the wages necessary for the maintenance of the Navy and the merchant
 navy at the present proportions, ^{103.} it paid particular ^{104.} seamen and captains,
 and through them paid their colleagues in Ireland, ^{105.} it cared for the
 revictualling of ships during the winter ^{106.} and outfitting them again ready
 for the summer, ^{107.} it ordered the necessary replenishment of timber for
 masts and repairs, ^{108.} and saw to it that particular ships brought in their
 accounts. ^{109.} The Commissioners for the Admiralty directed defence measures
 such as setting up a guard on the river at Deptford. ^{110.} They dealt with
 the problem of supplying technicians for the Navy in a rather peremptory
 fashion, ordering the ships' officers and those of Trinity House to
 "persuade" them to do repair work on ships, and offering as an inducement
 a rise of 4/- per month in wages. ^{111.} The Navy committee on the other
 hand appeared to have dealt only with matters of larger policy and
 organization, such as accepting Henry Marten's offer of a ship (although
 the details of the arrangement were referred to the Commissioners), ^{112.} and
 planning the disposition of ships for the Irish campaign. ^{113.}

Political matters which arose concerning both the Navy and merchant
 navy were dealt with by separate parliamentary committees, presumably in
 order that the important political figures in the House might have their
 say, for on the whole they were absent from the special Navy committees.
 For example, Parliament made an injunction against ships carrying on trade
 for coal with the royalist North and Newcastle, and it was referred to a
 committee to rationalize the move in the eyes of the merchants who were
 involved in the venture by finding alternative employment for the ships. ^{114.}
 Another committee dealt with the scruples put up by the Lords about this
 interference with trade. ^{115.} In the committees and conferences the
 merchant members who also featured on the Navy committee were present in

strong numbers, but they were supplemented by other political figures such as Pym, St. John, Hayman etc., and of course the merchants were themselves in many cases very ardent militants. The appointment of Warwick as Admiral too, being a political matter, was referred to a political committee of Strode, Glyn, Hampden and Marten, ^{116.} who were to prevail upon the dilatory Lords to overcome their unwillingness and make a positive move to appoint a radical, especially against Northumberland's advice. The controversy continued throughout 1643 and even panicky tales, which were circulating in the Houses about threatened preparations by the French, Dutch and Danish to come to the king's aid, did not finally lead to the ratification of Warwick's appointment until December. ^{117.}

From April on the Navy committee seemed to be mainly occupied with raising funds for the Navy's commitments, partly in consultation with the Irish Adventurers, ^{118.} and partly on credit to be repaid by the customs, ^{119.} as well as by expedients such as money coming from delinquent merchants who had had monopolies, ^{120.} the careful vetting of expenditures, ^{121.} and the gathering in of old debts from the deposed Customers. ^{122.} Quite evidently all this was insufficient as the costs of the fleet, especially in summer were very high, both for outfitting and for daily running expenses. Green reported that in April 1643 there was a debt of £244,310 owing which had to be paid to keep the Navy loyal and enable ships to set out from Portsmouth for Ireland. The cost of the fleet amounted to several hundreds of pounds daily. The customs only fetched in £150,000 a year, and came in slowly. This clearly presaged the desertions to come, and the committee was quite unable to meet the expenditure except by asking for credit once again from the Irish Adventurers and the customs officers. ^{123.} It is in this context

that Pym introduced his cherished scheme of levying excise in order to meet these extraordinary costs by extraordinary means which could be borne by as great a section of the population as possible. The Navy was allotted the excise on meat and salt especially, ^{124.} and later on tobacco pipes, which ^{125.} was to be used for arms and ammunition for the Navy.

Occasionally the committee issued orders for local defence of coastal waters, ^{126.} and for the payment of arrears. When the Scots agreed to come to Parliament's aid the committee considered a proposition that Warwick should also see to the defence of the Scottish coast, no doubt to ensure the safe communication between the allies and avoid enemy territory, as well as lessening the costs of Scottish internal defence. ^{127.}

The committee was of course fairly powerless at the first disloyalty of parts of the Navy. It did sometimes bring into the open the grievances of officers and it certainly saw to the punishment of the disaffected as well as putting the Admiral on the mat for allowing supplies to reach the royalists in Ireland. ^{128.} But no really effective means of disciplining the bulk of the Navy had been formulated, nor, apart from the device of excise, was any method brought forth to remedy the discontents of the ships' crews. Kennedy shows that the revolt of 1648 was occasioned by the discontent of the sailors with Parliament's administration with its nepotism and speculation.

The membership of the eleven committees dealing with various aspects of Navy affairs reflects the specialization noticed in the earlier period in this field. The Table indicates that eight of the fourteen who sat on three or more committees were merchants who had had experience with shipping and customs; one, Green, had a background of administrative experience which fitted him for the specialist's work he pursued. All

these and Marten were noteworthy contributors of ships and some lent funds for the Navy, which, it has been argued, were later amply repaid at the public expense. Glyn had London interests as Recorder, and trading connections, the elder Vane had a good administrative background as well as first-rate training in shipping and trade affairs as an erstwhile monopolist in his Court days. Pym and Vane Jr. were presumably also familiar with mercantile affairs, especially the former from his colonizing activities. It is interesting to note that of the merchants active here only Bond had definite political interest, the remainder being present presumably in their capacities as specialists rather than politicians. Both men and the elder Vane had had experience with the court and were able administrators as well.

129.

Comparing these activists with the pre-war ones we find Mathews no longer present due to incipient royalism, Barrington absent organizing the counties, Hotham also either fighting in the North or already deserted, and Pennington presumably busy with his City responsibilities as Mayor. Cage, Glyn, Bence, Vassall and Vane Jr. were active throughout, but Gerrard was by now organising finance on a larger scale as Treasurer of War. The men who were new to the service were Rolle, Soame, Green, Brown, A. Bence, Bond and Marten, all interested as merchants or contributors.

MOST ACTIVE MEMBERS ON NAVY COMMITTEES

Total: 11 committees.

Name	No. of Ctees.	War Party	Middle Party	Peace Party	Admin- istra- tor	Mer- chant	London
Vassall	7					X	X
Cage	6				X	X	
Rolle	4				X	X	X
Soame	4					X	X
Green	4				X		
Glyn	3		X				X
Vane Sr.	3	X?			X		
Vane Jr.	3	X					
Pym	3		X				X
Browne	3		X				X
Bence A.	3					X	X
Bence S.	3					X	X
Bond	3	X				X	
Marten	3	X					

CHAPTER 14THE COMMITTEE MEN

"A Committee"

"Cast Knaves, my Masters, fortune guide the chance,
 No packing, I beseech you, us by glance,
 To mingle pairs, but fairly shake the bag
 Cheats in their spheres like subtle spirits wag
 These are the Raw-boned breed of Pharaoh's Kine
 Which eat up all your fatling, yet look lean,
 These are the after-claps of bloody shoures,
 Which, like the Scots, come for your guide and yours.
 The Gleaners of the Fielde, where, if a man
 Escape the sword, that milder frying-pan;
 He leaps into the fire, cramping the claws,
 Of such can speak no English but the Cause.
 Under that foggy term, that Inquisition,
 Y'are wracked of all adventures on suspicion:
 No matter what's the crime, a good estate's
 Delinquency enough to ground their hate
 Merciful Hell! They judges are but thres,
 Ours multiiform and in plurality.
 They calmer censures flow without recall,
 And in one Doom souls see their final All,
 We travel with Expectance: Sufferings here
 Are but the earnest of a second feare.
 They plagues and paines are infinite tis true;
 Ours are not only infinite, but new,
 So that the dread of what's to come exceeds
 The anguish of that part already bleeds." 1.

It has been said that the Civil War was won by committees. Recent writers on this subject have begun to show how parliamentary policy and its execution was forged in the committee chambers rather than on the crowded floor of the House of Commons. 2. Committees bridged the hiatus between the legislature and executive government which had in the past bedevilled relations between Parliament and the King-in-Council. They also enabled an enthusiastic group of leaders to manipulate parliamentary policy more easily and unobtrusively. An active minority was far more influential when formed into decisive "action" groups than when spread among the entire

membership of the House of Commons. Pym as leader of the House exploited the system of delegated authority which he and his supporters brought into being in order to promote the policy of his own party of the centre. His successors, the radicals, learnt from him that the simplest method of pushing the House in the direction of all-out war was through the domination of the committees. Pym, who led the nation into war and the Independent radicals who eventually won it, did so largely through the pliant system which could be modified to suit the needs of the moment.

If committees provided the means of victory over the king it becomes important to see how they were managed. Obviously, a core of leaders was needed in order to direct the business of the committees, to give continuity to their proceedings and to ensure that their work was in accord with the policy of the Commons. But the political "parties" were relatively small, and with all the enthusiasm in the world their members could not attend personally to all aspects of government, civil and military. Apart from the Pym, the Hampdens, the St. Johns and the Vanes there were large numbers of men who had no known political views, but who contributed a great deal of time and effort to the running of parliamentary affairs. Our concern here is therefore a double one; first, to look at how much of the work and planning on committees was done by the members of the political "parties", and second, to examine those men who were active on committees but who were relatively obscure in the House. It will be useful to ask why particular political interests dominated some committees, while others were largely left to the uncommitted. If men were not politically motivated why were they chosen to serve on certain committees, how did their background and activities compare with that of their more "political" colleagues, and how did they react to situations where they

were required to take a political stand? Above all it will be possible to judge whether these men formed a coherent group rather than a random collection of individuals. They owed their position to administrative skill. As administrators they were responsible to the legislature, and during a time of intensified state intervention, they became analogous to a non-political civil service, ready to execute the policy decisions of the party leaders. At the same time the leaders of the dominant parties depended on their support in order to implement policies which the political enthusiasts were never strong enough to secure unaided.

A Table has been drawn up showing who was nominated most frequently to committees during the first eighteen months of the war. The subjects referred to committees have been broken down into appropriate headings and we can see how the committee men divided their interests and time. ^{4.} Two others indicate the relative strength of each of the "parties" and the administrators in each of the subjects dealt with by committees. ^{5.} At the same time it will be useful to look for correlations between the background and experience of members and their activity on committees. In the case of those Members who had political attachments brief sketches will be given of the line they took on significant issues. Those who had no known political orientation can be compared purely on their background and administrative training.

The Middle Party

Glyn, as a prominent member of the Middle Party, headed the list of those most active on committees after the outbreak of war, just as he had done on the earlier ones. Apart from being Recorder of the City of London and a member of the Committee of Safety he also found time to be

nominated on 161 of the 477 committees of this period. We have already
 6. seen that Glyn was not linked to the Middle Party in the usual chain
 of kinship relations, nor was he a slavish follower of Pym. He certainly
 had his own views on the Oxford Treaty talks which he favoured while Pym
 probably opposed them. Although independent in his political thinking he
 did find himself very largely in sympathy with Pym and the middle-of-the-road
 policies he sponsored. His indefatigable attendances at committees were
 spread over all subjects equally. In all but four of the ten categories
 of subjects covered by the work of the committees he was the most commonly
 named member; these reflect his administrative interests and his London
 connections.

Pym was the next among the most frequent attenders at committees
 from the Middle Party, and third on the entire list, as he had been in the
 earlier period. His diverse background and administrative experience has
 been described earlier^{7.} and his profuse attendance at committees through
 which he worked so effectively needs no comment. Although he participated
 on committees over the whole range of topics, his interests were centred
 about the peace negotiations, Irish affairs and relations with Scotland;
 these were the fields closest to his own policy. Comparatively he attended
 fewer committees on administrative matters such as finance or county
 administration. He was evidently a more discriminating committee attender
 than Glyn who could hardly have been effective in all the spheres on which
 he concentrated with equal vigour. On the other hand Pym must have spent
 considerably longer at the sessions of the Committee of Safety where he
 established an attendance record of 227 days, compared to Glyn's 76
 8. attendances.

It is perhaps surprising that no other member of the Middle Party

appears at the top of the list of most active members. Barrington who had before the war taken second place in committee attendances now came to relatively few. This abatement was not due to any slothfulness, for Barrington became the focal point of parliamentary organization in the vital county of Essex, as we have seen.⁹ His commitments there made it difficult for him to attend at Westminster in his former enthusiastic manner. Nevertheless he did manage to attend regularly at the Committee of Safety as well as being among the 40 most active committeemen of this period. Other important Middle Party personalities whose committee attendances fell off after the outbreak of war included Erle, Hampden and Fiennes, all of whom were absent for large periods of time on active service. Erle declined for this reason from 5th to 26th place; Hampden died during the period; Fiennes attended so rarely that he quite disappeared from the Journals as an active politician once he began on his not very successful military career, leaving the political side of the family's activities to his father, Lord Say and Sele who was Pym's alter ego in the Lords. Hotham and Stapleton were also absent from Westminster fighting in the war. The former defected soon after the outbreak and nearly lost his life in the process. Stapleton, the Lord General's friend and subordinate, attended to defend his patron's interests, but less often than in his politically more radical days before the war. Irby was another military man whose committee attendances declined. On the other hand Sir Gilbert Gerrard, the Treasurer at War, was an important administrative figure among Pym's supporters. He had financial training and a merchant background, and his committee activities remained constant - devoted, naturally, to administrative matters. The Goodwyns and Whitelock were other supporters of Pym who remained

relatively active in both periods; the former continued to specialize in Irish matters while the latter as a prominent lawyer concerned himself with legal matters as well as acting in the peace talks.

The general distribution of the Middle Party among the 50 most active committee attenders hardly altered - they provided 14 before the war and 11 in the later period. But what is more significant is that among the 10 most prominent members, they had provided 7 earlier but only 3 in the later period. In this way we can see that individual members of the Middle Party lost their dominant roles on committees to a combination of War Party men and administrators. In general this reflects the picture we saw emerging in considering the activities of the parties in each of the topics dealt with by committees. The War Party became eager to support any improvements to the machinery of war administration as well as influencing political deliberations on committees out of all proportion to their actual representation on the floor of the House. The administrators came into their own in the early months of the war as experts to provide the specialized knowledge needed to make the wheels of government and administration - however haltingly - grind on.

The Radicals

The younger Vane and St. John, the two young radicals who took over the leadership of the House after Fyn's death, occasionally anticipated their positions as we saw, using the committee system as skilfully as did their mentor. Vane, especially, jumped from 26th to 2nd place among the activists and testified to the importance which he and his colleague attached to working through committees. Both were active on a wide range of subjects: St. John, as befitted the Solicitor General, specialized in legal committees, while Vane as Treasurer of the Navy, diverted some of

his activities to naval affairs.

Marten and Frideaux helped to contribute to the increased committee activity of the War Party. Despite Marten's banishment from the House in the middle of 1643 he was still 8th among the activists. One might have thought that his extreme radicalism which sometimes brought him into conflict with the War Party supporters themselves, might have made his election difficult. Evidently the reputation of firebrand which D'Ewes consistently ascribed to him,^{10.} together with his occasional radical and anti-monarchical speeches did not deter members from appointing him to committees. His very popularity as a nominee testifies to the strength of the War Party's influence among members generally, for it is difficult to imagine how the most radical of Commoners could have been elected so often, even despite his evident ability as administrator and committeeman, if members had not been led to believe that his view had something positive to offer Parliament.^{11.}

Frideaux, who had been named by D'Ewes as one of the emergent faction leaders representing the interests of the western gentry,^{12.} was also an uncompromising Puritan and a recognized radical leader.^{13.} It is significant that he appeared on relatively more religious committees than most of the others, while Marten was dominant on the peace negotiations.

Mildmay was another radical who rose dramatically in his committee activities. His early conflicting history and the different interpretations which various historians have placed upon him have already been noted.^{14.} Whatever his motives for becoming identified with the extreme faction, it was he together with the other leading War Party men who was responsible for the aggressive point of view put forward at the bulk of committees which came gradually to voice the views of the most ardent supporters of all-out

war against the king. His preoccupation on committees with matters of finance reflects his useful fiscal background as an ex-office holder in the Treasury, while his participation on the minor matters relating to foreign affairs mirrors his usefulness to Parliament as an official of the court who could be depended upon to know his protocol.

Strode maintained his position among the foremost War Party men on committees. Clarendon had disqualified him from really deserving the distinction of being picked out by the king as one of the notorious ^{15.} Five Members. Perhaps this view was close to the truth as his position was in fact rivalled by other War Party men who outshone him, on committees at least. However, he did continue to interest himself in the work of committees with predominantly political implications.

Cornelius Holland on the other hand had hardly appeared on committees at all before the war, and his substantial contribution to committee activity must have added considerably to the War Party's increasing prominence on committees. Aylmer calls him a "middle-class careerist who rose socially and prospered by means of office", ^{16.} having come from a mere trading family in London. Through the elder Vane's influence he became first Clerk of Acatry, then Clerk Comptroller of the Prince's Household, until in 1638 he reached the position of Paymaster and sole Clerk of the Greencloth to the Prince. His association with the reform party in 1641 appears to have preceded Vane's fall from favour and cannot therefore be connected with it. Even before he lost his positions and sinecures such as the wine composition, he obviously disliked the king's policies - he refused to subscribe money for the Bishops' War in 1639 but later lent heavily on Parliament's Irish loan. It is unlikely that his loss of office determined

his later political affiliations, but rather vice versa. By the end of 1642 he was so closely identified with the core of the War Party that he opened the attack on the Committee of Safety, which, as we saw, grew to be dominated by the supporters of peace in the Lords.^{17.} Like his colleague Mildmay, Holland used the skills he had acquired while being handsomely paid by the previous administration, for the benefit of Parliament, especially in the appropriate financial sphere and in political and administrative matters relating to the army.^{18.}

Denis Bond and Sir Peter Wentworth only came to the forefront of committee activity after the middle of 1642. Both had always been firmly attached to the opposition; while Wentworth belonged to the northern gentry groups which supported Vane's northern and Scottish policy, Bond came in for more approbrium as a man of low social origins with an uncompromising Puritan conviction. Wentworth later became attached to the mystic and extreme separatist Fifth Monarchist sect, but immediately after the outbreak of war he probably shared his friend Marten's prominence and interest in political affairs.^{19.} Bond, who sat for Dorchester, had held many civic offices before election to the Commons.^{20.} As a wool-draper without great wealth, he was one of the group of "fiery spirits" who together with Lowry, Hoyle and Hance were condemned by D'Ewes as those "meane or beggarlie followers on the other side were those who undid us for they commonlie ... having been merchants and being men of meane fortunes were not see sensible of the destruction of the kingdome as wee who had estates to loose and besides they weere see sillie for the most parte they followed Mr. Pym and some others which way so ever they went as if they had voted by an implicate faith".^{21.} D'Ewes was fond of distinguishing between the two

extreme parties by the comparative wealth and therefore their "interest" in the kingdom. It served as a standard defence against the enthusiasm of the War Party for getting M.P.'s to pay up their contributions. But although D'Ewes' observation was true of some carefully sampled individuals, it does not appear to be true of the group as a whole. ^{22.} Whatever Bond's social origin, he had certainly become identified with reform and religious extremism in 1641 when Clarendon described him as "very severe and resolved against the Church and the Court". ^{23.} After the outbreak of war he was one of the first to voice the radicals' disenchantment with the Irish war, suggesting that the Scots could hardly expect to be paid for fighting there. He anticipated the plan for involving the Scots in English affairs and suggested that they ought to be invited to enter the northern counties and collect their pay direct from the estates of delinquents. ^{24.} His scheme was ostensibly unpractical and yet extreme, for it implied complete disregard for the rights of royalists and their estates which were to be turned over without question to the Scots, and at the same time belittled the claims of the Scots who were very unlikely to favour this form of self-service pay. His extreme Puritanism grew through his association with the founder of the Dorchester Colonizing Company ^{25.} and later manifested itself in the defacing of Somerset House together with the Presbyterian Clotworthy, the Independent radicals Gurdon and Rigby and the political extremist Marten. ^{26.} As a wellknown radical and extremist his increased activity on committees clearly indicates the way in which the War Party came to take over the machinery for running the war.

These were the men who shouldered themselves into places vacated by the supporters of Pym who were either absent in the army, in the

counties, or else had lost their enthusiasm. The only radical who attended relatively fewer committees after the outbreak of war was Haselrig, who was called away once the fighting began.

The Administrators

The other notable feature in the personnel of those most active on committees is the rise of the administrators. We have already seen in the months preceding the war that a group of men without known political views, whose role on the floor of the House was negligible in the eyes of contemporaries, helped to bring the committee system into being by consistent participation in matters involving administration. After war broke out and the immediate problems of executive government had to be met on the spot, their role increased, and the political leaders came to rely upon them even more to handle the newly built machinery of war administration and civil government.

Robert Reynolds was the most prolific attender of the non-political committee-men; in him we can see an administrator par excellence. His early history has been described in relation to his activities on the earlier committees of the Long Parliament. After the outbreak of war he nearly equalled the performance of St. John, the future leader of the House. His early administrative training in Charles' government later applied to parliamentary committees, together with his interest in Ireland made him well suited to take over a share of the work of developing the political and administrative machinery on which the policy of the leaders depended. When the war broke out he appeared at first to lean towards the moderates, especially in the matter of naming delinquents, but his later change of allegiance from Presbyterianism to Independency probably

27.

28.

made him more active in supporting a government which was becoming increasingly radical. His background and interests clearly affected the kind of committees on which he participated most. He represented a Wiltshire constituency, ^{29.} became involved in the affairs of the Western Association, ^{30.} and at the same time had family connections with the Eastern counties - Cambridge in particular; ^{31.} this is reflected in his attendance at committees relating to county administration in the war. Similarly, his previous experience turned him appropriately towards committees dealing with Ireland. As a Presbyterian elder and a member of the Westminster Assembly ^{32.} he was evidently interested in religious questions, which may have influenced his volte face, but Yule suggested he was only Brazilian and therefore had no solution to the settlement of the church in mind.

However his interests show in his participation on committees about religion. ^{33.} His legal training, his London practice, and his connection with financial administration in the courts were put to good use on the many committees relating to army administration and finance. On the other hand, he attended relatively few committees on peace negotiations or Scottish affairs, which confirms his status as a non-political administrator.

John Wilde had been active on committees before the war, ^{34.} but now became far more prominent in this sphere. He was an influential ^{35.} country lawyer from Worcester, where he had been the town's Recorder, and at the same time he had been a J.P. and Commissioner in the county; he had sat in six earlier Parliaments as an open critic of the Crown's policies. Despite this he had been made a Deputy Lieutenant of his county. Unlike most other non-political committee-men, Wilde had taken part in the activities of the Commons before the war as a reporter from

committees and conferences with the Lords on matters relating to Ireland,
 Puritan measures against Bishops, legislation against recusants, and so on. 36.
 D'Ewes, who recorded the part he played, therefore noticed him as a capable
 committee-man, chosen for his ability and enthusiasm, to speak for the
 committees on which he sat. It is clear from the committees which he
 attended most assiduously after the outbreak of war how his talents were
 applied to the new forms of government. As a prominent lawyer he dominated
 attendances at the important legal committees which gave the necessary 17th
 century rationale to the activities of Parliament. His interest in reli-
 gious matters, which later manifested itself in his lay membership of the
 Westminster Assembly, 37. was also reflected in his attendance at religious
 committees: but there is no direct evidence of his positive religious
 identification. Probably his experience in administration in town and
 county gave him the training and impetus to busy himself with financial
 affairs; as chairman of the committee which first propounded the principle
 of sequestering royalist and episcopal lands to boost parliamentary finances
 he naturally antagonized his pacific legal colleague D'Ewes who found these
 proceedings "so unjust and illegal as it almost astonished me to heare it". 38.
 Despite the bad press from the Peace Party, Wilde was later rewarded for
 his activities by becoming a Baron of the Exchequer 39. and an adviser on
 the Great Seal. 40.

Samuel Vassall, the London burgess, unlike some of his City
 colleagues never became a radical, 41. nor did he attach himself to Fym's
 group before the outbreak of war. In the absence of any information
 about his general political stand, he too may be listed among the committee-
 men. Certainly he restricted himself almost entirely to affairs relating
 to London and to financial matters, such as provisioning the Navy. He

was quite evidently useful to Parliament, both as a wealthy man in his own right,^{42.} and as a link with the London coffers. In September 1643 another spokesman for London, its new Recorder, John Glyn, proposed that the power of the committee of the London Militia should be extended and troops under the command of Sir William Waller be sent into the surrounding counties to collect taxation.^{43.} Glyn and the committee for which he spoke was by no means radical, concerned as he was with the parochial interests of the City rather than with the national effort. Vassall's opposition to his colleague's proposal may have shown that he had become even more pacific than the committee (as Mrs. Pearl suggests),^{44.} or it may merely indicate a different attitude to particular London interests, wishing to cut down on the City's expenditure in extending the size and scope of the Militia (as D'Ewes supposes).^{45.} It looks therefore as though he did not take any of the usual political sides in Parliament, but restricted himself to the service of the narrower interests of his electorate. But this restricted vision did not make him useless as an administrator; his background knowledge of overseas trading, his powerful position in the City as Alderman and the administrative training this provided, his association with the king's government through the Court of Requests, and his interest in Ireland as an Adventurer and creditor,^{46.} could all be usefully applied to the service of Parliament.

William Cage, like several of his colleagues on committees, was an important provincial legal figure, as alderman, portman and attorney for his town of Ipswich.^{47.} His pre-war background has been given in the earlier discussion of his role on committees before the war^{48.} and now he intensified his part.^{49.} His background fitted him for work on committees

dealing with county administration and finance, and his special regional interests and knowledge made him a useful specialist on the Navy committees. It was evidently not any change in political orientation or greater zeal for a Parliamentary victory which made him more active on committees, but rather his usefulness as an administrator could now be put to fuller use in the service of Parliament.

William Wheeler became, in many ways, the paradigm of the new kind of committee-man. Although he sat for a Wiltshire seat, he was a Londoner with trade connections. His training appears to have been quite cosmopolitan, due to his foreign mother and continental education. Despite having had no previous experience of Parliaments he had therefore something unique to bring to his role as committee-man. In addition, he had useful training and connections at court, as an officer of the First Fruits Office, and through his wife who had served the king as laundress. He had sat on several committees relating to finance before the war, and his major contribution to committee work during this period was also in fiscal matters. His Presbyterianism made him take an early interest in religious affairs, to become a lay member of the Westminster Assembly, and to act on religious committees.

John Trenchard and Roger Hill shared a somewhat similar background which disposed them towards committee work. Both were Dorsetshire lawyers who had been active in local affairs before 1640, and both came from well-known and long established local families. Trenchard came to interest himself largely in technical and financial matters, although there is no evidence of any administrative training before his parliamentary activities. Unlike so many of his colleagues who tended to be provincial lawyers with

51.
 town interests, Trenchard was a country gentleman. He had however had long experience of Parliaments, while Hill had sat only in the Short Parliament. 52. Both men had connections with Independency, 53. and were active on religious committees. But Hill was a "Presbyterian Independent" with an interest in colonial companies, known only for his opposition to Episcopacy, while Trenchard left no direct evidence of his religious independency. But their main preoccupation was with administrative committees, especially relating to the south-west and finance, where Trenchard's London connections may have proved useful. 54. Trenchard was known to be a zealous promoter of local interests, and was named by D'Ewes at the end of 1643 as one of the "western faction" which was promoting Waller and the London forces in his south western drive. 55.

John Lisle from Winchester, was another provincial lawyer of note; he had been town Recorder, 56. and had served his county as sewers commissioner. He was perhaps more actively Puritan than most of his colleagues, identifying himself early with the Independents, 57. which reflected on his attendance at religious committees. There can certainly be no doubt about his later political affiliation with the Independents - he supported Cromwell in his quarrel with Manchester, 58. and was firmly opposed to reaching settlement with the king. 59. He subscribed handsomely to the Irish cause, 60. and sustained his interests there by working on the Irish committee.

Sir Robert Harley was well trained as a parliamentary administrator - he attended his first session in 1604 and learnt administration directly in the king's service, as Master of the Mint. We have already seen how useful his training and background were for the activities of parliamentary committees before the war. 61. His diverse administrative experience was reflected in his attendance at various committees concerned with local and

national affairs. There is some evidence connecting Harley with Pym's more radical policy especially on the matter of peace negotiations which gave him some claim to be counted among the politicians, although he was not known otherwise to be active. He supported Marten in a division to interrupt the proceedings on the peace negotiations in March 1643 and again during the next round of proposed talks in August he appeared with Darrington opposing the negotiations.

Sir Robert Pye had been active on committees before the outbreak of war, and his ample experience as local office-holder and royal servant has been discussed together with his propensities for sitting on the fence. As we have seen, even before the outbreak of war Pye equivocated without actually compromising his position on the parliamentary side; this emerges from his protection of the Duchess of Buckingham in those stormy days, and his preferment of a petition from a Roman Catholic priest. On the other hand he was quite prepared to put to Parliament's use the skills he had acquired as a servant of the king's administration, acting as Treasurer of Poll-Money, in which capacity he was responsible for the payment of parliamentary expenditure. While he continued to serve in a technical capacity especially on matters of financial administration, Pye showed his cautious attitude to political affairs by objecting in December 1642 to naming too many delinquents on the grounds that the king was himself generous in pardoning crimes committed on the other side - a view difficult to substantiate in view of the indictment of the harmless Sir John Evelyn as a traitor. Shortly afterwards, in January 1643, he was suspected of having "correspondence" with Oxford, but his relationship with Hampden was sufficient, according to D'Ewes, to safeguard him from

being thrown out of the House for this indiscretion. Indeed, after that time Pye resumed his activities on behalf of the House in his technical capacity.

John Rolfe who had always been active on committees in the Long Parliament,^{71.} was exceptional as a committee-man in that he was a merchant without gentry connections. As a trader he was familiar with finance and foreign countries, both of which he could apply to his service on committees. At the same time he continued to be interested in the Irish committees as an Adventurer for Ireland.^{72.} He was actively concerned in the affairs of London, both in its internal government and in Parliament's liaison with the City. He favoured Scottish intervention in England, probably as a result of his leanings towards Presbyterianism and his practical attitude towards the running of the war. In the debate on whether the Covenant should be taken first in England before it was sent to the Scots for approval he argued that everything should be done to get the Scots across the border in order to defeat Newcastle; this process would certainly be speeded up by making sure that the English had already subscribed to the Covenant "without which (the Scots) would not stir a foot".^{73.} Although he was clearly in line with the War Party attitude, D'Ewes who was usually a sensitive indicator of provocative attitudes did not condemn the policy, nor Rolfe's attitude. In fact his practical view of the war was probably shared by the City financiers who wanted to see the Scots doing the work of defending the remote north.

Unlike Rolfe who had been active on committees before the war, some members came into prominence in this field only after the opening of hostilities. The newly active committee-men were Robert Nicholas,

Walter Long, Giles Green, John White and John Moore. Nicholas, like many of his colleagues, was an important legal figure in a provincial town, as Recorder of Devizes, town clerk, and general legal adviser for the borough.^{74.} His family had been long established in the district and was well regarded. He appears to have no prior experience in Parliaments, but his position in the Commons was probably partly due to his stand against Ship Money. His activities on committees dealing with legal matters, local affairs and administration reflect his earlier experience. Although there is no evidence of his religious interest in Independency^{75.} his activity on religious committees might indicate that his siding with the Independents was not purely political.

Walter Long, a lawyer from Wiltshire, had been active in town and county affairs, as a member of Salisbury council and sheriff of the county. His family had acted as local officials for generations, and he himself had sat for the local seat in several earlier Parliaments in which he had distinguished himself by his repeated attacks on the crown's policy and on Buckingham.^{76.} He became a wholehearted Presbyterian supporter and was one of those expelled from the House by the Army. He did occasionally take up a political issue in the House. For example, he insisted on the discussion of the propositions sent by the king to Parliament in February 1643;^{77.} and he was attacked for his pains by Marten, who in his unwillingness to countenance any relations with the royal family at all, changed the subject under discussion by inserting the embarrassing matter of the Members' payment of subscription money - a favourite radical scheme to discomfit the less enthusiastic members. Long had only been insisting on the formality of discussing the already failing propositions,

and cannot therefore be taken as a supporter of Peace. In August he
 opposed peace negotiations;^{78.} and later in November 1643, when the
 Committee of Safety had become the organ of the Peace Party, he opposed
 (together with radicals Vane, St. John and Strode) its proposal to borrow
 money from the sequestration funds for Waller's army.^{79.} Because he
 appeared otherwise uncommitted on political issues we may argue that he
 was here merely defending the need of keeping the money to pay the Scots,
 to whom it had in the first instance been allocated.

Giles Green came from a merchant family in Dorset. He himself
 had legal experience and town interests in Weymouth where he was legal
 adviser and Town Clerk. At various times he had also been a merchant, a
 commissioner in his county to investigate shipping imposts, a local royal
 office-holder, and manager of Lady Hatton's estate at Corfe Castle for which
 seat he was eventually returned to the Long Parliament. He had sat in
 Parliaments during the 1620's and later during the non-parliamentary
 period he busied himself as local sewers commissioner and in shipping and
 port affairs. His contacts with London and the court obtained him a
 patent for the new salt works in the district, but nevertheless he refused
 to support the royal administration by contributing to its voluntary taxes
 or to Ship Money.^{80.} He had sat on a number of committees in the pre-
 war months, especially on those relating to monopolies where he was,
 ironically, able to speak with inside knowledge, as an ex-patent holder.
 Later he devoted himself to service on committees dealing with customs and
 naval matters for which his experience fitted him, and where he predominated
 together with the younger Vane.^{81.} His specialization in financial
 affairs was more exclusive than most of his colleagues, but perhaps he

was more directly qualified through his legal and mercantile background. By religion he appears to have been Presbyterian, although the only evidence of any interest in religious reformation is his donation to his borough of a copy of Melancthon's works.

John White was a prominent Puritan who sat for Southwark; his early death makes his religious affiliation difficult to pin down. He had been a prominent supporter of the Virginia and Massachusetts Bay companies which reflected his merchant background and his religious leanings. He was also trained as a lawyer, and had some experience in running local affairs in Middlesex. During the years of non-parliamentary rule he, with many of his colleagues, appears to have been in trouble with the royal administration. He participated on committees dealing with religious, legal and administrative matters, which appear related to his background and interests.

John Moore represented Liverpool in the Long Parliament. Both he and his father had been active in the affairs of their county, and John was at one time Mayor of the town and a local J.P. He had interests in Ireland and lent a large sum for the war there. He was a Presbyterian elder, although, as a regicide he was certainly an Independent by political affiliation. He would probably have been named far more often to committees but for his service as a colonel in the army. In 1643 D'Ewes refers to him as a supporter of the radicals because he was called into the House to vote in the division against the August peace proposals, but no other political behaviour has been ascribed to him; his committee activities were largely restricted to administrative matters.

There were some Members who had been active on committees before the outbreak of war, but whose names disappear from the most active list

of committee participants during the period considered here. There was Sir John Evelyn of Wiltshire who went through an agonizing period of indecision and doubt about what side to support.^{87.} At the end of 1643 he was censured for his pacific-neutralist-royalist attitude which arose out of his frustration at the repeated failure of the peace talks. Together with Northumberland from the Lords he retired to the country and opted out of the parliamentary arena altogether for a time, attempting meanwhile to come to terms with the king. His subsequent return in the reincarnation of a radical by 1644 is less surprising in view of his early history, and will be discussed later.^{88.} Sir John Holland too, became an unreliable Parliamentarian, keeping in the background and trying not to commit himself irrevocably against the king. His colleagues noted his lack of enthusiasm in supporting the war effort of his county^{89.} and it was obvious that he did not attend the House often.^{90.} When he did, he supported Holles in repeatedly asking to begin negotiations with the king.^{91.} Others lost their place among prominent committee-men due to their activities for the parliamentary cause in their counties. George Beard went to his constituency in Barnstaple to organize resistance to the local royalists;^{92.} Sir Thomas Widdrington who had earlier used his administrative skills at Westminster^{93.} now helped his kinsman Sir Thomas Fairfax organize parliamentary forces in the north.^{94.} Others again were lost to committee government through active military service. Sir William Lytton fought alongside Hampden;^{95.} Sir Edward Hungerford served under Sir William Waller in the west,^{96.} and was made Governor of Malmesbury after its recapture;^{97.} and John Crew left his earlier role as committee-man administrator for more overtly political employment as an active

speaker in the House and a member of the Council of the Army which kept him
 away from London.^{98.} On the other hand, there is some indication that
 for a time his fervour towards the parliamentary cause cooled, only to
 be revived again in 1844. Clarendon wrote of him and Pierrepont at the
 time of the Uxbridge peace talks that both were "men of great fortunes, and
 had always been of the greatest moderation in their counsels, and most
 solicitous upon all opportunities for peace, but appeared now to have
 contracted more bitterness and sourness than formerly".^{99.} On the whole
 the men who had been administrators during the months of early experiment
 in government by committees did not later become involved in active politics
 but remained faithful to their new executive functions, unless they had
 very strong reasons for absence from the Commons.

The following table lists all those men who were not noted for their
 political activities in the House but who were active on the committees of
 the first eighteen months of the war.

Table of Background of Committee-men, July 1642 - December 1643

<u>Note:</u>	ILF - Important local family	CA - County activity
	PE - Parliamentary experience	PF - parliamentary family
	L - Lawyer	OC - Office-holder under Charles
	OF - Office holding family	TO - town origin
	MC - Merchant connections	EM - Estate manager
	IA - Irish Adventurer	ME - Military experience
	R - Religion	Pre-1640 OC - Pre-1640 Opposition to Crown
	IC - Interest in colonies	
	PC - Previous committee-man.	

Name	County	ILF	CA	PE	PF	L	OC	OF	TO	MC	EM	IA	ME	R	Pre- 1640 OC	IC	PC
Reynolds	Wilts. & Camb.	x	x		x	x?	x				x			P/I			x
Wilde	Worcest.		x	x		x			x				x	I	x		x
Vassall	London		x						x	x		x		P	x	x	x
Cage	Suffolk	x	x	x		x			x	x		x	x	Br	x		x
Wheeler	Westmstr.		x				x		x	x				P			
Bill	Dorset	x	x	x	x	x								P/I			
Lisle	Winchest.		x	x		x			x					I			
Trenchard	Dorset	x	x	x	x	x				x				I	x		
Harley	Heref.		x	x		x	x			x			x	P	x		x
Pye	Berks & London		x	x		x	x	x	x	x	x	x		P			x
Rolle	Cornwall & London			x					x	x		x		P	x		x
Nicholas	Devizes	x	x			x								I	x	x	
Long	Wilts.	x	x	x		x			x				x	P	x		
Green	Dorset	x	x	x		x	x		x	x	x			P	x	x	
White	Middlesex		x			x			x	x				Fur	x	x	
Moore	Liverpool	x	x	x		x			x					P/I			

Of the 16 men considered here the great majority were lawyers by training; Rolle, Wheeler and Vassall, due to their mercantile background were the only exceptions. Although most had had previous parliamentary experience it is noticeable that those who came to be active on committees only after the outbreak of war had attended fewer sessions and probably were therefore less familiar with the conventions of the Commons. In any case it seems obvious that men who had not expressed themselves publicly

about their political convictions before the king's departure were unlikely to become major political figures after the outbreak of war. Those who were nevertheless enthusiastic for an efficiently administered war machine were therefore likely to be recruited as administrators, provided that their ability, background and experience warranted it. For this reason it is probably also not surprising that there was only one ex-office holder among the newer recruits to the ranks of active committee-men. Those who had shown that they were suited for the work of the newly formed executive by early training under the crown's administration began their work, on the whole, as soon as the Long Parliament met. Giles Green was the only exception, and his experience under the crown had been in a minor capacity. Presumably anyone who was known to have possessed special skills or knowledge due to their apprenticeship with the Court was likely to have become active in the new administration right at the outset. Whether the Member's family was an old established one, well-known in the county, appears to have been of some importance in determining his administrative bent, especially when of country background. Presumably men whose roots went deep into the life of the county had more early experience open to them in local administration and therefore they were probably more knowledgeable and experienced than others whose families were perhaps less identified with local government. It is not surprising that this factor was not significant in those committee-men whose origins were in London, where personal push and influence was more likely to be the predominating factor in coming to prominence. Far more important to the choice of committee-men however, was their own personal experience in local administration and government. With the exception of Rolle who had roots both in the south-west and in

London and about whom there is no evidence of participation in local administration, all other committee-men had been active either as J.P.'s, Deputy Lieutenants, Sewers Commissioners, Sheriffs, Town Clerks, Recorders or officials of some kind in town or country or both. As early administrative training this kind of background obviously proved useful and relevant to the work of the committees.

The single most significant factor in the background of the committee-men was the large proportion of them who had town origins. With the exception of the three men from the south-west - Nicholas, Trenchard and Hill, and Sir Robert Harley from Hereford (who nevertheless had some merchant connections), all others were quite untypical gentry. If they were "mere" gentry they certainly had a long history of local importance, administrative experience and parliamentary background to aid them in their executive posts in which they grew to excel. The standard background for these administrators was one of local urban importance, training in town government and some knowledge of financial, trading, shipping and military matters. Apart from the active Londoners who had great trading connections and financial experience such as Vassall, Wheeler, Pye, Rolle and White, there were men from much smaller cities and towns whose civic responsibilities obviously equipped them for the greater administrative problems of government. Reynolds, Wilde, Cage, Hill, Lisle, Long, Green and Moore were therefore representatives of a special class of administrators, trained in the provinces, whose experience proved an invaluable asset to Parliament in making a success of the committee system. Their range of experience extended over practical fields such as shipping, trade with foreign countries, management of large financial ventures including the colonising companies, running large aristocratic estates for their patrons,

interest in the development of Ireland and its administration, and training in the local militias. Some of these interests and background they shared with the "mere" gentry who made up the bulk of the membership of the Commons, but in other ways they appeared to have specialist knowledge and training which came only as a result of their untypical provincial and bourgeois background. Their direct acquaintance with practical affairs, especially financial transactions and local administration was an invaluable asset to Parliament when it found itself of necessity organizing an executive system of government and war administration.

A great proportion of these committee-men were known to have made a stand against the rule of arbitrary government before the meeting of the Long Parliament, and as a result they were at once identified with the opposition party when the session began. At the same time the majority had the necessary experience of sitting in earlier Parliaments, which gave them insight into the methods and procedure of legislation and at the same time brought home to them the unsatisfactory nature of government through an executive which was not responsible to them. For political, constitutional and practical reasons these were the men who could make a workable and responsible executive machine possible. Those with previous parliamentary experience and a known record of opposition to the crown were further supported by a sprinkling of men who were trained under the royal administration, the office holders of Charles' government, who brought with them more direct experience of government. Parliament was therefore blessed with the practical help of men who had in the past been ranged on opposite sides in the struggle to overthrow the administration of arbitrary government. Politically, there was little risk in employing men who had

earlier served the king; some of the ex-office-holders such as Harley and Green had been in opposition to the very system they were working under, while the rest, in supporting Parliament at all, showed that they were prepared to forego the advantages and advancement of royal favour.

Religious views did not apparently affect the committee-men in their work as administrators during this period. Four on our list were Independents who were not Presbyterian elders, but only one, Lisle, was known to be actively involved in Independent doctrine and church settlement. Three political Independents had been Presbyterian elders, but Reynolds and Hill were probably only interested in the destruction of the power of bishops rather than in any positive church form. White and Cage could only be classified as Puritans because they died before the later classification could be made. The remaining seven were politically Presbyterian, but only Harley was known directly for his Calvinist views as a lay member of the Westminster Assembly, and Wheeler was perhaps more directly involved in settlement of a Presbyterian form. It does not look therefore, as though religious views determined whether men were going to interest themselves in the work of committees as a positive means of helping the arrival of the rule of the Saints.

From what has been said it is possible to picture the kind of men necessary to strengthen the backbone of the new form of parliamentary government. These men who had no real ties with any of the political groups and who were not drawn together by similar religious views did not necessarily provide the largest numbers of committee attendances - the members of the War Party were likely to be in the lead in attending committees related to the effective execution of the war. But with no settled political

attitudes, the committee men formed a stable and consistent basis of committee membership, whose work could be relied on. As a group they were well suited to their roles of impartial administrators without the obvious bias of their more committed or more dilettante colleagues.

We have already noted how the most suitable men were delegated to functions for which they were trained. ^{100.} As a group their background differed from that of the majority of M.P.'s. These facts indicate the skill of the parliamentary leaders in channelling the experts into the most appropriate grooves. It is true that once a man's reputation for any speciality was established he could be constantly called upon to stick to his last. But when we consider the ad hoc way in which nominations were received for membership of committees - catching the Speaker's eye and ensuring that the Clerk wrote down the candidate's name - this required planning and constant vigilance.

These non-political committee-men did more than a competent job of administration. Because there was no party cohesion, especially among those men who vacillated between the extreme parties, they must have provided the backing for policies of the leaders whose political followers were never numerous enough to gain majorities. Because their concern was for effective administration they were prepared to support those leaders whose policies promised a firm line on government and administration. This would explain their cooperation first with Fyn and his policy of arbitration, and when that failed, their equally firm support for the new and more radical policies later in 1643.

One last observation might be made about the men who formed the backbone of the new administration. As we have seen, these men were

mainly urban lawyers and administrators with backgrounds quite untypical of the country squires who made up the bulk of the parliamentarians. If Trevor Roper's "mere gentry" had been trying so hard to gain entree into the world of officialdom they might have been expected to monopolize the effective posts on the road to the Utopia of the "Outs". Instead, the first attempt at government without the corrupt Court was made effective by men who had been trained in the microcosm of office-holding, local urban government.

The Royalists and Peace Party

The other notable difference between the men who took the brunt of committee activity before and after the outbreak of war is the obvious absence of the royalists and the decline of participating Peace Party members. Culpepper, Whistler, Hyde, Falkland, Dering and Belassis all left Westminster about the time of the break with the king and their activities in the House began to decline at various times since the beginning of the year. Palmes and Cholmley deserted Parliament after the fighting had started, but in the meantime they were so lukewarm towards its cause that they did not participate in setting up the new executive. But even those who remained loyal to Parliament despite their acute dismay at the turn of events, tended to take a back seat in the affairs of the House and avoided committee nominations. Holles who became the leader of the Peace Party after becoming disillusioned by the first few months of fighting and the hopelessness of carrying on a war to the death against the king, dropped from 4th to 16th place among those most active on committees. At first he sided with the radicals; after his change of heart he continued to take a vital interest in the peace negotiations

which he sponsored in the Commons whenever he could initiate them or follow the lead given by the Lords. Even among the committees which were largely concerned with wrecking the talks he often took part in order to represent the line of accommodation with the king. ^{101.} His continued interest in Irish affairs stemmed from his own investments and his early enthusiasm for the war there; in addition he represented the Peace Party line on Ireland, namely that the Protestants had to be protected even at the cost of not pursuing the war at home with such vigour and backing. Perhaps his interest in foreign affairs indicated his disillusionment with the domestic scene. It also mirrored his connections with the nobility and the court which gave him insight and training into the intricacies of protocol. Maynard and Pierrepoint continued to act on committee in a minor capacity. They did not contribute much on political issues or army organisation which indicates their withdrawal from the most immediate and pressing problems of running the war. Maynard, a Presbyterian lawyer, acted on legal and religious committees and shared with Holles an interest in Irish affairs. Pierrepoint supported his leader mainly on the peace negotiations. D'Ewes and Selden who had helped the reform party before the outbreak of war with their expert legal knowledge tended to sink back into inactivity the more they feared and disapproved of the direction in which things were going after 1642.

How the Parties Specialized

Several trends emerge in this summing up of the change among those Members who played the most prominent part on committees before and after the outbreak of war. The royalists, the early deserters and the pacific lawyers disappeared for obvious reasons. Enthusiasm for the cause was a

necessary characteristic for largescale committee attendances which were responsible for setting up the efficient and workable machine to carry on the war. The absence of some of the most influential members of the Middle and War Parties due to military service altered attendances at committees to some extent, as did the cooling off of some of the initial supporters of a warlike policy. Thesame factors influenced some of the non-political committee-men; some became less active due to war service and others lost their enthusiasm for the cause. In both periods the non-political men made up 11 of the top 40 men who contributed most time to committees. But their growth in importance as the committee system developed is seen from the fact that they crept higher up the list and took the more important places. Evelyn had been the most prolific of these administrators before July 1842, and he had been 12th on the list; later there were three non-political men among the top 12 committee-men.

The most notable feature of the change among the committee attenders was, however, the growth in importance of the War Party. Before the war the Middle Party contributed 14 of the top 40 attenders and the War Party only 6; in the following 18 months the proportions changed with 11 Middle Party men and 16 War Party men. This increase in the representation of the War Party on committees measures their enthusiasm for pursuing victory through establishing an efficient executive machine to fight the war and control policy. It also accounts for the changed orientation of the Commons itself, for, as we have seen, the deliberations of the committees grew more and more to determine the decisions made in the House. In addition, the growing proportion of radicals on committees affected their proceedings even more drastically than the mere numbers would indicate; for the

radicals not only took up more places themselves, they did so at the expense of the royalists and Peace Party as well as cutting down on the moderate element generally. There can be no doubt that all this increased activity on committees reflected on the orientation of the House itself. Fym and his associates probably had the support of the non-political administrators at critical moments in the House and on committees - (unless they had done so the prevalence of Middle Party policies for a year after the outbreak of war would be difficult to explain) - and in this way they could outnumber the radicals. But the War Party's strength was outpacing their actual numerical representation in the House. The War Party's influence in the House during 1645 was directly related to their infiltration of the committee system. By hard work, vigilance and constant attendance they were able to exercise an influence out of all proportion to their actual numbers.

We can look at the political exploitation of the committees in a different way by seeing which parties predominated in the various subjects they covered. Tables have been drawn up showing how the 40 most active members on committees were distributed among each of the committee subjects. All the members of the War Party among the 40 most active committee attenders sat on some committees concerned in the topic labelled "Policy, Defence and Politics" (making a 100% attendance). They made up a total of 416 attendances at committees in this section. All the Middle Party adherents among the first 40 also attended in this group (hence 100% attendance) but only totalled 298 attendances. The 11 administrators were responsible for 217 attendances. The average attendance for each Party member at this group of committees was 26, the Middle Party's was 27 and the

administrators' 20. The War Party attended at most of the committees on this topic because they were concerned with points of principle and the struggle for power of the various parliamentary generals. They had the biggest stake in seeing that the army was administered efficiently and according to an effective military policy. In particular they crowded the committee-lists on this subject to counteract the influence of the Committee of Safety from which they were all but excluded and which was dominated by the pacific Lords and their vacillating policy. The Middle Party attended frequently, especially when the fate of the Earl of Essex was at stake. It is clear that this subject had mainly political implications and it was accordingly dominated by the men with strongest political convictions.

The Middle Party was clearly in the ascendant on Irish affairs, with all its most active members attending. Accordingly they accounted for 70 nominations compared with the War Party's 48 and the administrators' 42. Pym was ~~strongly~~ supported on his Irish policy by the Adventurers who were closely identified with the Middle Party and many of whom had lived in, and fought against, Ireland. The War Party, we saw, was split on the issue of how much of the war effort should be put into this peripheral war, while Pym made success in Ireland a preliminary to winning the war at home. In addition he used it as a lever to throw the Scots more willingly into the English struggle. Ireland was therefore also not really a field for the administrative expert, for the issues it raised were mainly political and economic, and concerned the leading politicians directly.

The finance committees were so numerous that they provided all

the activists with a chance of attending some of them. While the greatest number of War Party men attended the administrators produced the highest average attendance. The Middle Party members averaged 10 committees, the War Party 13 and the administrators 15 each. Clearly the administrators came into their own here in setting up a system of fiscal administration necessary for running the war. On the other hand the importance of fiscal policy for successful campaigns did not escape the militants who were more consistently active on the finance committees than were the Middle Party who tended to leave these matters to their non-political allies.

The Middle Party however had a much higher proportion of activists attending committees relating to the peace negotiations. They were far more interested in the king's proposals than the War Party, and many of them hoped desperately for a successful treaty. Fym himself had to give lip service to the idea of a peaceful solution with the king. On the other hand it was apparent when looking at the details of these committees that the War Party did attend persistently even at committees which were meant to work out ways of coming to terms with the king. It appears now that this attendance was due largely to a small group of War Party leaders who may have had a concerted policy of wrecking the talks by constant pressure in the opposite direction and repeated cautioning against trusting the king. As one would expect the administrators played a minimal part in the negotiations which were entirely political in their implications.

In county administration however they came into their own. Many of the administrators were, as we saw, men of strong connections with provincial towns with a great deal of experience and a history of local office-holding. Accordingly their experience was put to good use in building up a new hierarchy of local government after the old edifice had

been summarily removed. It was the administrators who were responsible for building up and maintaining the liaison between Westminster and the country at large. The administrators outstripped both the political parties in their average attendances at these committees--each sat on an average of 13 to the others' 12.

The administrators were also very active on the Navy committees where they provided the necessary financial and trading knowledge needed in connection with providing and handling ships and raising the money to outfit them. They made up twice as many committee attendances as either of the two parties. ^{103.} Probably until the threat of rebellion occurred the Navy was not regarded as a field for political interest.

Foreign affairs was very largely dominated by a very few leaders from the political factions - predominantly the Middle Party. They attended an average of 6 committees in this group compared with the War Party's 5 and the administrators' 3. Pym, Vane and Glyn shared the greatest attendances for the obvious reason that the leaders wanted to handle the delicate relations with foreign powers themselves without delegating this newly acquired power to minor men.

From the study of relations with Scotland soon after the outbreak of war it is not surprising to find that the group which dominated the committee activities on Scotland was from the Middle Party and especially Pym's intimates. Although the leaders of the radicals also participated in the plan to bring the Scots into the war the rank and file members were excluded, perhaps because of the personal level at which the diplomacy was handled.

^{104.} As the Tables indicate the men who attended most at these committees were Pym, Armine, St. John and Vane, but with Pym still the leader of the

House, the committees under his sponsorship tended to be filled with his own supporters.

The legal committees were dominated by administrators of whom at least 9 were active and well-known lawyers. All groups of course had large numbers of lawyers among their supporters but it is clear that the men who interested themselves in administrative issues would wish to apply their specialist experience in this applied field.

This analysis helps to illuminate the way in which the parliamentary leaders were able to organize the rank and file into a working wartime administration and also shows the degree of cooperation they received from each of the main political groups and the administrators, each with their own specific preoccupations. It is abundantly clear from the high correlation between the subject and the interests of the men who dealt with it that the administrators formed a recognisable body of men on whom the administrative burden rested most heavily and who helped the ruling party to achieve its aims at each stage. In this way it was possible for the Middle Party, which was often numerically weaker on the committees than the War Party, nevertheless to triumph in its major policies if they were supported by the main body of the non-political experts.

Throughout the survey of activists who attended at most committees in each subject it was noted that the top 10% of all the men who participated in it always covered roughly 50% of the total committee attendances. On an average the most active committee attenders did about three times as much work as the rank and file. This even specialization among the experts in each sphere must have greatly facilitated the method of government by committees. Without a core of constant attenders the system of ruling

by delegated authority could never have worked, for it would have been subject to arbitrary fluctuations dependent on unconsidered on-the-spot decisions by large numbers of people. As it turned out, the composition of committees was such that an interested and often capable inner core was present enough of the time to make for coherent and continuous policies on which government by committee depended. In this way the myriads of committees and their innumerable lists of members recorded in the Journals had an underlying purpose and method which far outweighed the immediate and ostensible purpose of each committee. The leaders had to work with the only material available - the members of the House of Commons. By deftly allowing them to group themselves according to political inclination and practical training, and by providing them with direction from within these groups, they could control the evolution of an experiment in responsible government.

TABLE I

MOST ACTIVE MEMBERS ON ALL COMMITTEES AUGUST 1842 - JANUARY 1844

Name	No. of Ctees.	No. of Catgs.	DP.	I.	R.	F.	PN	C	N	FA	S	L	WP	MP	PP	Ad.
Glyn	161	10	61	8	5	21	12	26	3	7	8	10		x		
Vane Jr.	154	9	56	5	3	21	10	20	3	7	9		x			
Pym	151	10	44	9	5	12	17	13	3	7	17	4		x		
St. John	148	9	40	3	8	13	6	16		6	11	5	x			
Reynolds	104	9	38	12	7	14	5	14		3	8	5				x
Frideaux	103	8	31	7	8	19		22		3	4	9	x			
Wilde	87	8	20	3	9	19	3	16			5	12				x
Marten	80	9	27	8	3	8	10	10	3		6	5	x			
Vassall	76	6	23	3		23	17	7	3							x
Rous	75	8	27	5	9	11	4	13			5	3		x		
Mildmay	75	7	32	3		18	4	10		4	4		x			
Whitelock	74	9	18	6	4	11	7	12		5	4	7		x		
Cage	74	7	25	4	5	16		15	6			3				x
Strode	72	7	27	4		14	6	13			4	5	x			
Bond	71	7	24	3	4	17		17	3		3		x			
Holles	69	7	23	6		8	8	12		9	3					x
Holland C.	68	6	34	4	5	17		5			3		x			
Wentworth	67	6	27	7	5	10	6	12					x			
Wheeler	65	7	20	5	9	14		10			3	4				x
Brown S.	64	6	32	3		9	5	12	5					x		
Gerrard	63	7	28	5	3	12	4	8			3			x		
Armine	61	6	20	7		7	8				14	5		x		
Goodwyn R.	60	7	24	10	5	7		6			5	5		x		
Hill	58	5	17		3	9		18				11				x
Lisle	56	5	18	5	4	15		14								x
Erle	54	6	20	4		6	6	15		3				x		
Rolle J.	52	6	14	4		17		10	4	3						x
Rigby	51	5	17		5	11		12				6	x			
Corbett M.	48	4	20		4	12		12					x			
Harley	47	7	16	5	5	11	4	5				3				x
Maynard	47	7	16	5	5	6	3	7				5			x	
Pye	46	4	15			15		14				4				x
Trenchard	45	4	11	3		20		11								x
Hasselrig	44	5	22		3	9		6		4			x			
Barrington	41	5	12	4		7	4	14						x		

TABLE I (Cont.)

MOST ACTIVE MEMBERS ON ALL COMMITTEES AUGUST 1642 - JANUARY 1644

Name	No. of Ctees.	No. of Catgs.	DP	I	R	F	PN	C	N	FA	S	L	WP	MP	PP	Ad.
Clotworthy	40	6	12	10	5	4	4					5		X		
Strickland	40	5	15	4		8		10			3		X			
Millington	40	5	18		3	6		10			3		X			
Gurdon	36	4	14		4	9		9					X			
Blakiston	34	3	12			13		9					X			
Ashe E.	33	3		3		16		14						X		
Pierrepoint	32	5	10			5	10	4			3				X	
Stapleton	32	5	11				5	6		3	7			X		
Asherst	31	4	14		6	4		7								X
Hoyle	29	3	10			11		8					X			
Hayman	28	3	12			6		10					X			
Nicholas	28	3	10		3	4		7				4				X
Long	28	3	12			9		7								X
Vane Sr.	27	6	6	5		5	3		3	5			X?			
Whittaker	26	4	15	3	3			5							X	
Green	26	3				16		6	4							X
Grimston	24	3	9			8		7							X	
White	24	3	12		7							5				X
Selden	22	3	12		5	5									X	
Irby	21	3	9			6		6						X		
Moore J.	20	2	14					6								X
Dence A.	19	3				9		7	3					X		
Wray	19	3	10			5		4						X		
Onslow	18	2	12					6						X		
Brown J.	18	3			5	9						4				
Hatcher	18	3		4								4				
Peole	18	2	13			5								X		
Venn	17	2	11			6							X			
Ellis	17	2	12			5										
Middleton	16	3	5			6		5								
Bainton	16	2	11					5					X?			
Darley	12	3				4		4			4			X		
Yelverton	12	3				4		4		4				X		
Corbett J.	13	3	6				3					4		X		
Felham	13	2				7		6								
Soame	13	2				9			4							
Spurstow	13	1				13										
Curzon	13	1	13													
Bedingfield	13	1				13										
Dacres	16	3	8			4		4								
Young	16	3			4			7				5				
Evelyn	14	3				4	6	4						X		
Rose	12	2				4		6								
Pury	10	2	5			5										
Knightley	10	2				4		6						X		
TOTALS:	477		159	25	21	75	23	97	11	19	29	18				

TABLE II

COMMITTEE SPECIALIZATION OF MIDDLE AND WAR PARTIES

<u>Note:</u>	AA. - Army Administration	I. - Ireland
	R. - Religion	F. - Finance
	P. - Peace	C. - County
	N. - Navy	FA. - Foreign Affairs
	S. - Scots	L. - Law

Middle Party

	AA.	I.	R.	F.	P.	C.	N.	FA.	S.	L.
Glyn	61	8	5	21	12	26	3	7	8	10
Fym	44	9	5	12	17	15	3	7	17	4
Hous	27	5	9	11	4	15			3	3
Whitelock	18	6	4	11	7	12		5	4	7
Brown	32	3		9	5	12	3			
Gerrard	28	5	3	12	4	8			5	
Armine	20	7		7	8				14	5
Goodwyn R.	24	10	3	7					5	5
Erle	20	4		6	6	15		3		
Barrington	12	4		7	4	14				
Clotworthy	12	10	5	4	4					5

No. of activists in the subject grp.	11	11	7	11	10	9	3	4	7	7
% of total	100%	100%	63%	100%	90%	80%	27%	33%	63%	63%
Total no. of c'tees. att.	298	71	34	107	71	113	9	22	54	39
Average att.	27	6	5	10	7	12	3	6	8	5

War Party

Vane Jr.	56	5	3	21	10	20	3	7	9	
St. John	40	3	8	15	6	16		6	11	5
Prideaux	31	7	8	19		22		3	4	9
Marten	27	8	3	8	10	10	3		6	5
Mildmay	32	3		18	4	10		4	4	
Strode	27	4		14	6	13			4	5
Bond	24	3	4	17		17	3		3	
Holland	34	4	5	17		5			3	
Wentworth	27	7	5	10	6	12				
Rigby	17		5	11		12				6
Corbett	20		4	12		12				
Haselrig	22		3	9		8		4		
Strickland	15	4		8		10			3	
Millington	18		3	6		10				3
Gurdon	14		4	9		9				
Blakiston	12			13		9				
No. of activists in the subject grp.	16	10	12	16	6	16	3	5	9	6
% of total	100%	70%	80%	100%	40%	100%	20%	30%	55%	40%
Total no. of c'tees. att.	416	48	55	205	42	193	9	24	47	33
Average att.	26	5	5	13	7	12	3	5	5	5

TABLE III

COMMITTEE SPECIALIZATION OF THE ADMINISTRATORS

Name	Total No. of Ctees.	Total No. of Catgs.	AA.	I.	R.	F.	PP.	C.	N.	FA.	S.	L.	Notes:									
													AA. - Army Administration	I. - Ireland								
															R. - Religion							
															F. - Finance							
															C. - County							
															FA. - Foreign Affairs							
															L. - Law							
<u>Total number of committees on subject</u>													159	25	21	75	23	97	11	19	29	18
Reynolds	104	9	38	12	7	14	3	14		3	8	5										
Wilde	87	8	20	3	9	19	3	16			5	12										
Vassall	76	6	23	3		25		17	7	3												
Cage	74	7	25	4	5	16		15	6						3							
Wheeler	65	7	20	5	9	14		10			3	4										
Hill	58	5	17		3	9		16							11							
Lisle	56	5	18	5	4	15		14														
Rolle	52	6	14	4		17		10	4	3												
Harley	47	7	16	3	5	11	4	5							3							
Pye	46	4	15			15		14							4							
Trenchard	45	4	11	3		20		11														
Nicholas	28	6	10		3	4		7							4							
Long	28	3	12			9		7														
Green	26	3				16		6	4													
White	24	3	12		7										5							
Moore	20	2	14					6														
% attendances by 16 committee-men of possible committee attendances													14	15	22	20	5	20	20	7	8	26

TABLE IV

CONCENTRATION OF ACTIVISTS IN THE SUBJECT GROUPS OF COMMITTEES
AUGUST 1942 - JANUARY 1944

Group	Tot.no. of c'tees. in group	Tot.no. of C'tee places.	Tot.No. men on c'tees. in grp.	Av.No.of nomina- tions in the grp.						
Scotland	29	195	60	3.2	147	places by	26	men=73%	pls. by	43% men
					67	"	6	" =50%	"	10% "
Religion	21	252	79	3	176	"	36	" =75%	"	47% "
					63	"	8	" =27%	"	10% "
Legal	18	195	74	2.6	95	"	14	" =50%	"	20% "
					60	"	7	" =30%	"	10% "
Ireland	25	281	94	2	173	"	29	" =62%	"	25% "
					78	"	9	" =28%	"	10% "
Foreign Affairs	19	127	40	3	85	"	17	" =67%	"	42% "
					30	"	4	" =24%	"	10% "
Navy	11	123	69	2	52	"	14	" =42%	"	20% "
					31	"	7	" =25%	"	10% "
Peace Negots.	23	215	60	3.6	175	"	29	" =80%	"	50% "
					67	"	6	" =30%	"	10% "
Army Politics and Administration	159	2053	190	11	865	"	35	" =41%	"	18% "
					623	"	19	" =30%	"	10% "
Finance	75	1042	142	7.3	544	"	40	" =50%	"	28% "
					255	"	14	" =25%	"	10% "
County Administration	97	907	181	5	488	"	37	" = 54%	"	20% "
					291	"	18	" = 33%	"	10% "

PART III

EPilogue - AFTER 1644

CHAPTER 15EPILOGUE: POLITICAL AFFILIATIONS AFTER PYM'S DEATH

The death of Pym brought about a political crisis in the House of Commons. The House was bereft of its most talented leader, and his own party of the centre lost the unifying force which had held it together. It had been traditional for historians to identify the opposing factions in the two Houses as the War and Peace Parties before the end of 1643, and as the Presbyterians and Independents after the beginning of 1644, as though there was some necessary connection between these categories. In effect the majority of the Peace Party core were Presbyterians, and the most militant War Party men, with one exception, ^{1.} were Independents. But where do these tight groupings leave the majority of the vocal and backbench members of the Commons? What happened to the vacillators, so ably led by the versatile and undoctrinaire Pym? What determined their political attitudes after his death? Were they consistent or predictable in their change? Two further problems arise in the course of answering these questions. Did the same body of men remain prominent after the initiative shifted from the centre to the radical side? And what was the nature of the relationship between the old parties of Pym's day and the Presbyterians and Independents after 1644? This discussion attempts to deal with these questions.

Pym's effective middle-of-the-road policy died with him, and many of the issues which had held his supporters together during his lifetime changed due to the course of the war. In his time he had upheld many divergent causes. By simultaneously pursuing inconsistent policies, he

attracted supporters whose interests actually differed widely but who were prepared to vote together as a result of his expert handling. Pym had been a supporter of the war in Ireland, attracting Sir John Clotworthy and the Irish lobby; after 1644 this war came to be regarded as a wasteful and digressionary activity by all who wanted to see the king defeated in England. He had been a prime mover of the alliance with Scotland, collecting many northerners like Sir William Armine, and many Presbyterians like Sir Walter Erle and Sir John Corbett; after 1644 the alliance had wilted under the strain of mutual distrust and disillusionment about a uniform religious settlement, and only the staunchest Presbyterians who wanted a quick restoration of peace and monarchy continued to ally themselves with Scottish interests. He had depended strongly upon the military and financial assistance of London, winning the support of men with City interests like John Glyn, Sir Gilbert Gerrard, Bulstrode Whitelock and Sir William Waller. After the establishment of the New Model army the London militia became obsolete and its talents were dispersed in the national army. He had consistently defended the Lord General, the unpopular Earl of Essex, gaining the undying allegiance of the latter's friends, like Sir William Stapleton; after Pym's death Essex became discredited by all who wanted to see a parliamentary victory, and his supporters looked for accommodation with the king. Pym had held together the early opposition faction based on the eastern gentry connection which included Sir Thomas Barrington, Sir William Masham, Oliver Cromwell, Richard Knightley, James and Nathaniel Fiennes and others; with his death the pivot of this rambling kinship system collapsed leaving the members free to align themselves on political issues. Pym's policy could be all things to all men; army

officers such as Armine and Purefoy, who wanted to go on fighting while allowing the door for negotiation to remain open, looked towards his vigorous lead; on the other hand, men like Whitelock and Glyn, who distrusted Charles but who could see no alternative but to come to terms with him soon, supported all Pym's attempts to negotiate. The success of the reorganized army resolved some of these problems, and the cluster of wavering opinion on political and religious matters tended to spread itself to the extremes.

This could in one sense be the answer to what happened to the Middle Party after the death of Pym. But until we can bring together all the evidence of the political behaviour of the more vocal members of the Commons, and especially of the ones who had earlier followed Pym, the answer remains only an hypothesis. This leaves the problem of how to identify different political opinions during the period from 1644 - 1646. The most obviously useful indicator of political attitude which can be gleaned from the meagre material printed in the Commons' Journals is the information on divisions in the House. We cannot be certain in every case what the issue of controversy was, but we can usually see how the tellers aligned themselves. Divisions took place on such subjects as church government, negotiation with the king, policy towards the royalists, what to do with delinquents and their property, the campaign in Ireland, relations with the Scots, the New Model and army organization, the Self-Denying Ordinance, Navy administration, favours for individual M.P.'s, local defence and administration, and so on. From these issues we can get some idea of the attitudes of the tellers to the major political crises of the day.

To illustrate the changing political orientation of some of the active Parliamentarians a Table has been drawn up ^{2.} comparing their behaviour

before and after 1644. It ascribes to each member his known political stand before 1644, the number of times he acted as teller in divisions after that time, what side he took on political and religious issues, and tentatively places him in a new political category.

The Fate of the Old War Party

It will be useful to look first at what happened to the people who belonged to political parties before 1644. It is striking that all who had earlier been uncompromisingly in favour of the war remained unambiguously radical. A large number of the earlier small but active War Party acted as tellers. Of the 22 identifiable "fiery spirits" 12 appear in our list; at least 5 of the remainder were away on active service or became disqualified by the Self-Denying Ordinance.^{3.} The only notable absentee from the most active of the earlier radicals was Oliver St. John, who, apart from being busy on the Committee of both Kingdoms, may have been technically excluded from being teller due to his position as Solicitor.

Not only did the War Party remain radical, but its members rarely acted inconsistently in any controversy. With the exception of Waller, who had been a radical only by adoption and not by temperament,^{4.} there were no defections; and only Henry Marten and Edward Bainton ever blotted their copybook by appearing even once with the opposition. Bainton was in any case regarded as on the lunatic fringe of the radicals. He was known to be litigious and fractious^{5.} and his activity in divisions mirrored more his personal interest in the fate of individuals, than any political principles.^{6.} Unlike him, Marten was an extremist on political principle, having been expelled for his outspoken Republicanism in 1643. His return two years later showed the strength of the new radical wing. As teller

he upheld in most cases the typical War Party line; for example, he maintained with the radicals that Ireland should be ignored until the war was won in England;^{7.} he favoured the publication of a democratic and levelling document presented to the House;^{8.} and he opposed a royalist petition from London seeking to exonerate Sir Thomas Glenham, held there after his capture.^{9.} His apparent inconsistency in siding with the pacific leader, Holles, on the treaty with Scotland was probably due to tactical rather than political reasoning.^{10.}

With a few exceptions then, the old radicals remained wholehearted enthusiasts for the war. This is hardly surprising; ideologically, anyone who was rash enough to fight the anointed king in 1642 (when such a course of action was not only unprecedented but could well have been militarily impracticable) was not likely to lose enthusiasm when the king, committing too many human errors, appeared to be nearing total defeat; more cynically, anyone who had risked his neck by becoming a known enemy of the crown, could hardly afford to lose enthusiasm and hope for a reasonable compromise.

The Old Peace Party

The fate of the old Peace Party was also predictable. Some members of it could never have been very happy with their decision to remain behind in Westminster after the king's departure, and their initial support for Parliament was likely to be at best lukewarm. The desertions of the Bothams and Edmund Waller were much publicized, and were emulated^{11.} by less spectacular Peace Party men such as Sir Hugh Cholmley, Sir Geoffrey Palmes and William Constantine. Those of them who had fought on Parliament's side^{12.} probably felt that their knowledge of parliamentary warfare would make them doubly acceptable to the king. All came from

the royalist dominated areas of the north and west. But there were others, especially civilians, who could see no benefit in actually joining the king, and who slipped quietly out of the parliamentary arena, hoping not to be noticed, in order to preserve their estates. Their very real desire for peace stemmed from their sympathy for the king's cause, which conflicted with the sad fact of finding their estates enmeshed in areas under parliamentary sway. Sir Edward Hales, Sir Norton Knatchbull, and Sir Humphrey Tufton were all Kentish M.P.'s. This notoriously unenthusiastic county was nevertheless within the parliamentary sphere of influence, as everyone found who participated in the various uprisings there. Sir Robert Crane, Sir Thomas Playters, and Sir Thomas Jermy from Suffolk and Sir Harbottle Grimston from Essex were well within the Eastern Association, while Sir Poyning's Moore came more centrally from Surrey.

This list of absentees seriously handicapped the old Peace Party, although its leaders remained loyal to their anachronistic cause. Sir Benjamin Rudyerd, John Selden, Sir Simonds D'Ewes, John Maynard, Sir Robert Parkhurst and Sir Edward Partridge all remained to some extent vocal in parliamentary affairs. Only Densil Holles, Sir John Coke, Sir William Lewes and William Pierrepont appeared as tellers during this period, enabling us to gauge their political opinions. Lewes and Coke both consistently took the side of peace, the former on almost all issues of Peace Party politics, the latter more restrictedly. Pierrepont had never been entirely loyal to the cause of peace despite taking part in the negotiations of 1643, and he now came forward as a convert to the War Party. His change of attitude at the end of 1643, preceded by his request for leave to go overseas, and followed by his activity on the

Committee of both Kingdoms, ^{was} probably due to a mixture of reasons -
 29.
 leanings towards Independency, disappointment with the king's attitude,
 desire to preserve his large estates which were clearly soon to fall into
 30.
 Parliament's hands. In divisions he took the typical War Party stand
 31.
 on the Scots and Ireland, wanting to be rid of the former and shrugging
 32.
 off responsibility of the latter. Pierrepont was probably not unique
 in his volte face but he is the most notable example.

Holles, now the undisputed leader of the Peace Party had also
 33.
 undergone a radical change, after harrowing experience on the battlefield.
 34.
 His frequent appearances as teller indicate the wide range of issues on
 which he felt strongly enough to be in the forefront of Peace Party opinion.
 With his colleagues Lewes, Stapleton and Clotworthy, this small band made up
 154 nominations as tellers for the Peace side in the 158 divisions during
 the period.

Stapleton was inconsistent only once in his 50 appearances as
 teller on the Peace side, while Clotworthy and Lewes never deviated. Holles
 and Stapleton clearly bore the brunt of Peace Party activity in this period
 and it is illuminating to see how they managed to cover such a wide sphere
 of activity. For example, there were 18 divisions on Scottish policy.
 Not surprisingly, Holles was teller in favour of the Scots on 14 occasions,
 identifying the strength of their influence with the dominance of political
 and religious Presbyterianism, and with the concomitant eclipse of
 36. 37.
 Independency in Parliament. Stapleton supported him here, but on
 the whole he concentrated more upon matters relating to negotiation with
 38.
 the king and policy towards the royalists. His own record vis-a-vis
 the royalist camp was quite spotless, whilst Holles was perhaps still

suffering from anxiety over his earlier implication in the Saville plot. 39.
 In divisions on Ireland Holles was ably supported by Clotworthy 40. whose
 preoccupation with the third kingdom took up most of his time in the Long
 Parliament, spurred on as he was by his interests and connections there. 41.
 Holles, too, had family connections in Ireland; 42. but he was motivated to
 preserve Irish interests politically as well. He was convinced, with the
 rest of the Peace Party, that the Irish war must be won if the Catholic
 influence was to be vanquished in England; at the same time he hoped
 by deploying the warring armies on Irish soil, to shorten the period of
 fighting in England. 43. In matters relating to the formation of the New
 Model he and Stapleton cooperated to hamper and frustrate this latest means
 of prolonging the fighting and annihilating the king. 44. In religious
 matters too, they played by far the greatest part in upholding the
 Presbyterian interest, 45. not so much by approving the Scottish forms, as
 by constantly wishing to subordinate the regulation of church life and
 discipline to a hierarchical structure with Parliament at the top as
 final arbiter. 46.

The only other significant supporters of the Peace Party in divi-
 sions were Clotworthy and Sir William Lewes, the latter an old stalwart of
 the pacific group, the former with Stapleton imported from the old Middle
 Party. Both were strong Presbyterians, but only Lewes appeared as teller
 in religious matters. 47. While Clotworthy specialized most on Irish
 matters, Lewes attended to relations with the king and the royalists.

The Old Middle Party Men who turned Pacific

It is significant that two of the four most active supporters of
 the Peace Party after 1644 were recruits from the old Middle Party.
 Stapleton had had a difficult time trimming before the death of Pym.

At the Oxford Treaty talks he had sided with other army leaders, Purefoy, Hampden and Gerrard against prolonging the negotiations, a predictable course of action from one compromised by active service, who had some insight into strategy. But in August 1645 he was in favour of further consideration for the new set of peace proposals. Here he was quite evidently acting out of friendship for the Earl of Essex who had foolishly allowed himself to become discredited as supreme commander of the parliamentary forces by taking part in the negotiations. Stapleton probably supported Fym and his party because of the latter's loyalty to Essex despite his inconsistent attitude to his job. At Fym's death Stapleton was therefore no longer torn between his anxiety not to take matters against the king too far, and his role as military subordinate to the Lord General. As Essex became discredited and the War Party gained ascendancy, his natural affinity towards the party of peace asserted itself and he became one of its most devoted supporters.

Clotworthy's inconsistent political behaviour in 1642-3 is described and accounted for by Hexter; attitudes which made him in D'Ewes' eyes a "fiery spirit" in 1643, such as his Puritan iconoclasm, his support for a strong policy on Ireland and his involvement in Fym's Scottish schemes were hardly considered revolutionary after 1644. Indeed, these attitudes became typical of the Peace Party as we have seen.

Other converts from the old Middle Party to the Peace Party played smaller roles. John Glyn, Sir Christopher Wray and Anthony Nicholls had all been staunch supporters of Fym. Glyn, like Clotworthy behaved inconsistently in the peace negotiations. Contrary to Stapleton he was an active negotiator at the time of the Oxford talks but by August 1645

he was against a treaty. ^{58.} His motives for tripping were obviously
 different from both Stapleton and Clotworthy. ^{59.} He was a prominent
 London lawyer who became Recorder for the City. Although his interest
 in political affairs concerned the whole nation ^{60.} he was clearly immersed
 in London politics as well as being an active and devout Presbyterian. ^{61.}
 Although overwhelmingly influential in London affairs, he kept well away
 from all radical schemes. In July and August 1643, despite his change of
 heart about the peace negotiations he nevertheless had nothing to do with
 the radical committees for the General Rising. ^{62.} His connections probably
 lay with the much more conservative and Presbyterian-orientated Committee
 of the Militia of London. He may well have been responsible for the
 factional vote that the new commander, Waller, who was to be at the head of
 the volunteer army, should be subordinate to Skippon, the Commander of
 the London Militia. ^{63.} Glyn obviously shared the conservative localism
 represented by this faction, which wanted to be sure that the London forces
 remained firmly within the City's reach to defend it rather than be used where
 it was of most benefit to the country. ^{64.} In December of that year he was
 responsible for an ordinance whereby a London officer and his forces were
 to fine and imprison malignants in the surrounding counties in order to
 counterbalance the heavy expenses already borne by the City. ^{65.} This self-
 righteous and morale-destroying idea stemmed from the London Militia
 committee which used Glyn as their spokesman. It was therefore his
 preoccupation with the affairs of the City whose interests he represented
 in the House ^{66.} which decided Glyn unequivocally for the side of peace
 after 1644. After that time the military threat to the City had subsided
 considerably, and the Scottish influence had been established. From then
 on continuing the war could only drain the resources of the merchants

whose wealth had already suffered untold losses through the fighting and the disrupted economy.

The issues in which Glyn chose to become involved as teller were all orientated towards Peace and Presbyterianism. He opposed the appointment of the radical Colonel Rich as an officer under Fairfax; ^{67.} in February 1646 he supported a Peace petition presented by the City; ^{68.} he took a favourable view of the king and his supporters; ^{69.} finally, he took the Peace Party line on the issue of the Great Seal - wanting to avoid cutting another slice off the king's prerogative. ^{70.}

Sir Christopher Wray had been a supporter of Pym, and in his capacity as a northern member and a probable Presbyterian ^{71.} had become part of the Fairfax lobby which wanted to see a greater proportion of the war effort used to protect the northern counties; ^{72.} his relationship with the younger Vane would have bound him closer to this cause in any case. ^{73.} We can only judge from his behaviour as teller for the cause

of peace what may have led to his unexpected rejection of the radicals after Pym's death. For instance, he was against the appointment of a committee to choose officers for the northern Association. ^{74.} He was evidently afraid of the power of his erstwhile colleagues of the northern lobby who might have seen to the appointment of too many Independents into the upper ranks of the northern armies. We can see that he was preoccupied with the subversion of the army by Independents and radicals from his stand on such matters as the dismissal of all commanders who refused to take the Solemn League and Covenant; ^{75.} the appointment of the radical Rich to Fairfax's army; ^{76.} and the immediate payment of the Presbyterian James Piennes for his troops. ^{77.} It looks as if Wray's

Presbyterianism overshadowed his solidarity both with his family connections and with his earlier radical local associations.

78.
 79. Anthony Nicholls, Fyn's nephew, had been in the centre of the old Middle Party, many of whose members were related in intricate family ramifications. During the first 18 months of the war, he was Fyn's

80. closest ally on the Committee of Safety. He became an active political Presbyterian and was especially regarded with suspicion by the army.

81. As a member of Parliament's first executive committee he acted inappropriately as an apologist for inaction. In September 1642 Alexander Rigby, an outspoken War Party man, complained in the House that an offer of some London citizens to pay for 1,000 soldiers to defend the north from the royalists had been made to the Committee of Safety, but no acknowledgment, let alone action, ensued. Nicholls spoke up for the committee which "had thought fit to lay aside all further care therein in respect that they did conceive that there could not any force be so soone made ready to send from hence as from the Lord General who was himselfe now marching that way".

82. As a result of this hedging Rigby's motion was not even discussed. This may be compared with a similar incident in August 1645 when Henry Marten urged for a commission from Essex for Waller's appointment at the head of the London volunteer army.

83. When, after complaints of delay, the House asked Nicholls what the Committee of Safety had done about the matter,

84. he hedged again and avoided responsibility for letting the General know. While the radicals were still organizing their volunteer army, he wrote

85. with evident satisfaction to Sir Thomas Barrington in Essex about the City's decision to support the Lord General, which showed both his interest in the unity of the parliamentary organization and his wholehearted support for Essex. The fact that he was regarded as the unofficial emissary from

86.

the Committee of Safety to the army chief confirms his compliance with Fym's faith in Essex. It is not surprising therefore, that he joined Stapleton, the Lord General's most wholehearted supporter, in seeking a peaceful solution after Fym's death and the General's eclipse.

Despite his earlier active career he appeared only twice as teller in this period, both times for the Peace side. His withdrawal from parliamentary affairs probably stemmed not only from his influential uncle's death but from the anachronism of the political attitude he had earlier adopted.^{87.}

So far we have been looking at the men who were converted from supporting Fym and the Middle Party before the end of 1643 to become upholders of Peace. A variety of reasons emerged for this change. Stapleton, Clotworthy and Nicholls believed in policies and causes such as friendship with Essex, support for Ireland and Scottish intervention, which had tied them to Fym, but which progressively became identified with the policy of accommodation. At the same time their Presbyterianism grew to separate them further from the new association of radicalism with Independency. This was a common feature of all the men who moved to the "right". In addition to his Presbyterianism Glyn, for instance, was swayed by his allegiance to London interests which removed him further from the radicals and Independents. Wray's motives were dominated by his Presbyterian leanings and his interest in Scottish participation in English affairs, while Nicholls shared the outdated ideas of the others and was further excluded from active political life by Fym's death.

New Recruits for Peace

We may compare the activities of these men with those of the other supporters of the Peace Party after 1644 whose prior political allegiance

cannot be gauged. Sir John Holland for instance, had been very active on committees before the outbreak of war as an outspoken critic of the old regime.^{88.} But once the fighting began Holland disappeared from the parliamentary arena. In 1642 he was supposed to be organizing local defence, but a year later Miles Corbett on an inspection tour of the parliamentary counties reported back that the Norfolk county committee "were remiss and careless in putting the Sequestration Ordinance into Execution" and named Holland as particularly to blame.^{89.} At the same time he did not attend often in the House, although this was said to be due to health reasons. In both the Oxford talks and in the negotiations of August 1643 Holland supported Holles in favour of accommodation, and he acted as a parliamentary Commissioner at Oxford.^{90.} After 1644 his Presbyterianism manifested itself by opposing the establishment of a Walloon church in England^{91.} which would have meant a further proliferation of sectarianism. All further activity on divisions at this time showed him to be unswerving in his support for the Peace Party.

Lord Wenman could perhaps be seen as an obvious candidate for the Peace Party due to his great wealth;^{92.} the contemporary identification of wealth and conservatism was made in approving terms by Whitelock and supported by D'Ewes, both happy to include themselves in this category.^{93.} He did support the more national-minded attitude on the division concerning local abatement of taxes, but he may have been concerned only with self-protection, as his property in Oxfordshire would be easier regained by a well-supplied army. His other activities as teller put him firmly into the pacific group.^{94.} His brother-in-law, Sir John Trevor, had conflicting antecedents in that he was related to Hampden^{95.} without actually being identified as a political ally; he was also the son of an important

office-holder from the crown and had himself been one of the auditors for the Duchy of Lancaster and a coal farmer.^{96.} Despite the honours flung at him^{97.} he did not support the king's party before the war. But after 1644 his support for a quick settlement with the king is indicated by his wish to placate the Scots^{98.} and his vote for lenient treatment for the royalist prisoner Sir Thomas Glenham.^{99.}

Sir John Evelyn of Godstone was never as important in earlier parliamentary affairs as his nephew of the same name. Like him, he had been put under suspicion as a gunpowder monopolist in 1641; at the same time both were active Presbyterians.^{100.} In 1643 they were questioned about their loyalty although they retained their seats in the end. After 1644 the elder Evelyn was only concerned with leniency towards delinquents,^{101.} perhaps out of a sense of identification with them. Like him, Sir Robert Pyc was also an important ex-office holder from the crown. In the reforming months before the outbreak of war Pyc had been an active committee-man^{102.} and concerned himself particularly with administrative reforms for which his training in the king's service fitted him, and with Irish affairs, since he had interests there.^{103.} After the outbreak of war his enthusiasm for the reforming side waned and he became a supporter of peace.^{104.} Aylmer^{105.} characterizes him as a "mild parliamentarian with neutralist or 'trimming' inclinations". Like Evelyn he was also concerned after 1644 with the fate of delinquents,^{106.} perhaps for similar reasons; and he took the usual Peace Party line on the Great Seal.^{107.}

These Peace Party supporters shared with their colleagues recruited from the old Middle Party their allegiance to Presbyterianism. Other motives relevant to their pacific orientation was the uneasy realization

that they had given up wealth and offices by backing Parliament, they had compromised themselves forever with the king, and they were unlikely ever to gain equivalent rewards from their present position. The common concern of Wenman, Evelyn and Pye for the welfare of individual royalists might indicate both their conscience and an attempt to backpedal from an unrewarding position on Parliament's side. As these men had not been associated with any of the clear political divisions in the House before 1645 their support of the Peace Party after that date was obviously less founded on changes of political attitude and more on personal considerations.

This analysis of the activities of the Peace Party men shows what line they took on controversial topics and their general range of interests. The decimation of their ranks in the early months of the war through the inevitable defections to the king was made up for by successful recruiting from the more cautious wing of the old Middle Party which fell to pieces at the time of Pym's death. Those of his supporters who were prepared to give him their vote on issues such as confidence in Lord General Essex and encouragement of the Scots, fell away in the direction of the Peace Party, while those who admired more his firm line towards royalists and the centralized organization of an efficient war machine were left either to form a group of their own or to join the ranks of the radicals.

The Old Middle Party Men who turned Radical

The hard core of the radicals, unlike the Peace Party was left, with the exception of Waller, entirely intact, and it even acquired one recruit, William Pierrepont. Like the Peace Party, it also recruited from Pym's old supporters. At least 5 army officers had supported the middle way earlier, but had always shown themselves suspicious of the actual

108.

peace negotiations. Sir John Evelyn now became one of the most active tellers on the side of the War Party with an occasional lapse in the other direction.

109.

His career since the beginning of the Long Parliament was chequered with inconsistencies. He came from a family which had held the gunpowder monopoly from Charles, although this was not apparently held against him in the early days of the Parliament's sitting. His father had been an office-holder under the crown as one of the six Clerks of

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Chancery, and there is evidence of Sir John himself having had personal contact with the court.

111.

Before the outbreak of war however, he distinguished himself in the House as an ardent reformer of church discipline as well as advocating military preparation. But he was hardly counted by contemporaries as one of the reform leaders and his appointment to the commission to take proposals to the king shortly after the outbreak of hostilities meant that he was not regarded by his colleagues as a militant.

Charles' refusal to accept him as commissioner and his subsequent exemption from pardon

112.

therefore came as a surprise to all. He had been a very active committeeman, but after the failure of the Oxford Treaty in which he was unable to participate, he took an entirely peace-orientated line on

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such things as ordering the return of the Oxford Commissioners,

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chastizing delinquents in Pembrokeshire, initiating peace talks in August

115.

1645. Later he even fell under the suspicion of royalism. Together with the Earl of Northumberland, another undecided and cautious political figure, he retired to the country after the defection of Lords Holland and Bedford in August 1645. The failure of the peace negotiations evidently persuaded him for a time to come to terms with the king; but his plan was frustrated when his discreet enquiry to Oxford was intercepted. This

abrupt change in his fortunes appears to have led to his abandoning the royalists and, on the old established political principle, he joined the radicals. 116. Yule uses his evident opposition to "Presbyterian Church government" which accompanied his change of plan, to show the identification of the Independents with the radicals of the House; certainly after that he became once again involved in parliamentary affairs as a fairly consistent War Party member and Independent.

It is interesting to note in which matters Evelyn now specialized. In affairs relating to removing the Scots he was most uncompromisingly militant. In all eleven divisions on Scottish affairs, he was partnered by a radical. 117. These divisions were concerned with discrediting the Scots 118. by implying their duplicity, and with making the best possible financial bargain with them. 119. Clearly he took his stand with the Independents and his attitude to the New Model confirms this. He voted with Cromwell to make the army independent by giving the Commander-in-Chief the right to appoint officers, 120. and again to make it Independent by not compelling officers to take the Solemn League and Covenant. 121. In divisions relating to forms of church discipline he stood out as the chief supporter of Haselrig in rejecting the spread of the Solemn League, 122. in cutting the Assembly of Divines down to size, 123. and in minimizing the amount of interference by Parliament in matters of church government. 124. Only on one occasion did he act with a known Presbyterian, Glyn, 125. but they were opposed by a man from each religious group. 126. Evelyn had connections with the City of London as he had married into an influential merchant family, 127. but after 1644 his attitude towards the City took second place to his support of the War Party. 128. Any suspicion of his earlier

royalism was dispelled by his attitude towards the king.^{129.} But he was not entirely consistent. In divisions on Ireland he once sided with the Peace Party,^{130.} and he was known to take a soft line on delinquency,^{131.} perhaps remembering his own near lapse. From the evidence it is impossible to explain Evelyn's stand, but despite the occasional inconsistency which separated him from the members of the hard core of the War Party, he was now wholeheartedly in favour of Independency and complete victory over the king.

Oliver Cromwell is difficult to dissociate from his illustrious future, but from the opening of the Long Parliament until the formation of the New Model and his quarrel with the parliamentary commanders he was not a prominent member of any party. He had not been active on committees during the early months of the session, nor was he among the elite chosen for the Committee of Safety. Clarendon mentions, perhaps spitefully, that during the debate on the Grand Remonstrance he was still "at that time ... little taken notice of".^{132.} The only real evidence of his allegiance in 1641-2 was his relationship and close ties with Hampden.^{133.} The latter's preoccupation with parliamentary victory through the agency of the Lord General whom he admired, is well known.^{134.} On religious issues Cromwell clearly followed his famous cousin. He was Hampden's most enthusiastic supporter of Root and Branch, and swore that if the Grand Remonstrance had not been carried he would have left the country in disgust.^{135.} There were even some affinities between Cromwell and the Lord General on the virtues of a religious army,^{136.} but Hampden's death dissolved the ties which held Cromwell to his superior,^{137.} and the religious dissensions which were beginning to appear made any cooperation between Cromwell and

the Presbyterian leaders out of the question. By 1644 Cromwell, the Independent ministers of the Assembly and the party of Vane and St. John appeared to be linked, and the link helped to cement the Independent party of later months. ^{138.} As a teller in divisions for which he found time between his various campaigns, Cromwell was a consistent upholder of War Party principles. ^{139.} He appeared on such issues as the Great Seal, the Irish War, ^{140.} the campaign to remove the Scots, ^{141.} local defence, ^{142.} treatment of delinquents, ^{143.} relations between individual M.P.'s and the House ^{144.} and, of course, the formation of the New Model. ^{145.} The only surprising gap in his activities was on matters relating to negotiations with the king. It is difficult to account for this gap, but the fact that he was often absent from the House was partly responsible. He left this aspect of politics to Haselrig and the rest of his radical confreres, perhaps because he did not want to commit himself irrevocably to republicanism, about which he was known to be ambivalent. In church matters he also acted only where they affected the army. ^{146.} His antagonism to Presbyterianism was political - for example, he acted as teller to thwart a Presbyterian move to institute a ballot in the House whenever offices were to be given away. ^{147.} It may be that he felt that the new civil service should not come under political influences, but more likely it was the Presbyterian vote which worried him. ^{148.}

Sir William Armine was another old supporter of Pym through the Eastern gentry connection. ^{149.} As a northerner he was useful to the Middle Party in 1641 - in October he was sent as one of the Commissioners to accompany the king to the north, ^{150.} and in later years he repeatedly acted as commissioner in matters involving the Scots and the king. ^{151.} Whether

as has been suggested, his "real office was that of a spy upon the actions of his sovereign",^{152.} or whether he was sent on purely diplomatic grounds, his employment on such missions indicated his attachment to Pym's group in the early years. He certainly antagonized the pacific D'Ewes by stressing his lack of enthusiasm for the cause.^{153.} At a time when the Committee of Safety was still regarded as weapon of decisive action he appeared to lay great faith in it.^{154.} He took a middle stand when the Lords objected to the appointment of Lord Grey of Wark as commander of the proposed Eastern Association, and suggested that his powers should not be allowed to conflict with the established authority of the Lords Lieutenant.^{155.} After Pym's death his political line was determined by his military involvement in the north^{156.} and by his adherence to Vane's northern faction.^{157.} In divisions he acted in conjunction with the other War Party figures on all straight-forward political issues,^{158.} with a single exception.^{159.}

Nathaniel Fiennes had obvious links with Pym's group in the early days of the Long Parliament, as the son of the leading reformer in the House of Lords and as a member of the Eastern gentry connection.^{160.} As a soldier he was one of the militant wing of Pym's supporters despite his disgrace over the surrender of Bristol which even his enemies did not ascribe to any trace of crypto-royalism.^{161.} His Independency^{162.} and his identification with the leaders of the reform party would have excluded him from any attempt to bring the war to a premature conclusion. In divisions Fiennes was with one exception^{163.} on the War Party side, on such issues as sending forces to Ireland,^{164.} maintaining the strength of the army at home,^{165.} and being tough about the king's supporters.^{166.} In all these he was characteristically partnered by Haselrig. He also appeared twice on the Independent side^{167.} on religious matters.

William Purefoy, like Piennes, had been one of Pym's supporters. 168.
 As an officer fighting for the defence of his county where he held large
 estates and offices in local government 169. he joined fellow-officers Hampden,
 Stapleton and Gerrard 170. in acting as teller against prolonging the Oxford
 treaty talks in February 1645. 171. This militant wing of the Middle
 Party probably differed from the old radicals in wishing for the success
 of the treaty, but only on condition that the armies should be disbanded
 first, so as to forestall any further tricks from the king. 172. The
 failure of the treaties probably led to his shift towards the radicals.
 Like many of Pym's old supporters he chose to act on the side most likely
 to guarantee Independency. In the period after 1644 he rarely acted as
 teller, presumably because of absence on active service, but when he did,
 it was characteristically on the side of the War Party on such issues as
 introducing martial law against deserters, 173. and the sale of bishops' lands. 174.

Sir William Brereton was another army officer who became a radical
 after Pym's death. Due to his early field activities he rarely attended
 at Westminster, 175. being kept busy by his campaigns in Cheshire and the
 central counties. 176. His exemption from the Self-Denying Ordinance along
 with Cromwell 177. indicates his military worth. Clarendon, a great
 admirer of military skill, gave him a good press. 178. His connections
 with the Massachusetts Bay Company 179. and his active Puritanism inclining
 towards Independency 180. act as a pointer to his political affiliation,
 but there is no clear evidence of his support for Pym in the early days. 181.
 After 1644 he took the War Party position on delinquents, 182. relations
 with the Scots, 183. and local affairs in the north.

Sir William Masham was closely related to the Eastern gentry 184.
 connection which made up the effective centre of Pym's support. He

was an active committee-man in Essex as the right hand^{185.} of his important relative, Barrington, especially in matters of local defence.^{186.} At the same time he was also related to influential London families^{187.} and took part in the colonizing ventures which linked his town and county connections. He was a member of the radical committee for the General Rising in London,^{188.} which reflected his interest in the City as well as his potential radicalism. Although an elder of the Presbyterian church,^{189.} his leaning towards Independency grew alongside, and probably helped to determine his political course after Pym's death. In the divisions he behaved as a militant on army appointments,^{190.} on getting rid of the Scots^{191.} and on the sale of bishops' lands.^{192.}

Another of Pym's men, John Ashe, although said to be the "greatest clothier in England"^{193.} was also a soldier in the Civil War. He had objected to Laud's regime as much from principle as from dislike of trade regulation^{194.} - he had taken a firm stand against monopolies and the Laudian church, and had contributed freely to the parliamentary cause. He served the reform~~party~~ through his work on committees, devoting himself mainly to his own field of finance, especially as chairman of the Goldsmiths' Hall finance committee,^{195.} and to the affairs of his own area, the west.^{196.} After 1644 he followed the radicals on matters such as the Scots' handling^{197.} of the king, and on delinquents;^{198.} with his fellow-teller Robert Jenner, Ashe indicated the radical flavour of the compounding committee, which took the line that it was better that the royalists should pay for the ravages of war than the overtaxed businessmen of London and the south. It is probably significant that both men had close family ties and business connections in London.^{199.}

Robert Goodwyn had cooperated with Pym's attack on the king's
 200. councillors in 1642. As parliamentary envoy, he became involved in
 201. Irish affairs. His enthusiasm for the campaign there stood out strongly
 against the radical Marten's apathy, and as chairman of the Committee for
 Irish Affairs he was effectively able to threaten abandonment of financial
 202. support unless his committee's reports were heard. Before 1644 he
 203. had been very active on committees. He felt deeply the loss of Hampden 204.
 whose political and religious principles he had shared. Perhaps
 205. through him, he was closely in touch with Barrington, a key figure among
 206. the personalities of the Middle Party. Like so many of his colleagues
 mentioned here he was tinged with Independency, despite formal identification
 207. with Presbyterianism. Pym had sent him off in 1643 as a commissioner
 208. to reside with the Scottish army, probably as a good man to persuade
 209. the Scots to keep their unpaid regiments in Ireland under English command.
 Although he had cooperated with Pym in luring the Scots into English affairs
 in 1643 he moved adroitly with the War Party when the Scots had proved
 210. themselves timid and redundant, as his activity as teller after 1644 shows.

The New Middle Party

However, not all the military men joined the radicals after Pym's
 211. death. Sir Walter Erle, a soldier in his youth who fought during the
 212. war did not fully identify himself with the extreme parties before or
 after 1644. He makes an interesting contrast to those of his colleagues
 who chose to follow a definite and committed path during the later years.
 His behaviour before the end of 1643 was typical of the Middle Party. He
 213. had the right connections through Lord Say and Sale; he sat on a large
 214. number of committees on military matters and local south western affairs,

although his committee work declined after the outbreak of war due to his
 215. military duties. He was nominated to the Committee of Safety but ap-
 216. peared there only twice. He was regarded by Clarendon as one of the
 217. ephori of the opposition, and was known to be in danger of impeachment
 218. after the famous 5 members. It was, however, his religious attitude
 which probably made him ambivalent towards the radicals in later years.
 Despite his fervent hatred of Episcopacy, his interest in the Puritan
 219. settlements in America and his Independent family connections, 220. he
 221. took the Presbyterian line and in 1648 declared against the army. It
 is not surprising therefore to see that he kept very mixed company in the
 divisions, for he did not let his political indecisiveness interfere with
 his active role in the House. Only once did he act with a War Party leader,
 222. Haselrig, in refusing a royalist payment of composition fines. But
 he did not seem to be acting on the War Party principle that the royalists
 should be used to finance the war, as on another occasion he partnered
 223. Stapleton on the other side. Twice he voted against diverting taxes
 224. to relieve Munster, against the strong Irish lobby of the Peace Party.
 But unlike the War Party he allowed his parochial interests to predominate,
 and hindered the national war effort by opposing the assessment of his own
 225. south-west for the upkeep of Fairfax's army in the north. Nor did he
 226. want to see the Windsor garrison reinforced. On a religious split he
 once opposed Helles and Stapleton, but as both he and his fellow-teller
 Sir Anthony Irby were Presbyterians too it cannot have been a clearly
 227. defined issue. On all other occasions he voted in the orthodox Peace
 228. Party fashion, especially in relation to the Scots.

Erle therefore clearly belonged to neither camp. His major

concern after 1644 was with the role of the Scots, which as a Presbyterian he was bound to support. In other ways his unpredictable behaviour indicates that he was undoctrinaire but nevertheless sufficiently involved in parliamentary affairs to steer a determined, but erratic course through the centre of the political vortex.

Sir Anthony Irby suffered from a similar background and split in allegiance. Like Erle he was a member of the Eastern gentry connection through the Earl of Warwick. His activities on committees had been less prominent but more diverse than Erle's, specializing according to his background and interests in army organization, financial matters and northern county affairs. Like Erle, his later Presbyterianism caused him political difficulties. His only clear gesture towards the War Party was to side with Mildmay to maintain the Windsor garrison, where he was opposed by his colleague Erle. Later he sided with another military man, Valentine Walton, who had been Manchester's agent before 1645, yet who became a leading Independent and was related to Cromwell. Irby and Walton's vote to reduce a regiment, against the Peace Party vote to maintain it was therefore probably not meant as a retrenchment of the army but rather to rationalize the system of reformado officers. His opposition to Holles and Stapleton on an undefined religious vote has already been noted. Otherwise he acted in concert with the Peace Party - on sequestration, on royalists, and against the Self-Denying Ordinance.

Another member who fits into the category of post-1644 Middle Party is Richard Knightley. Like his colleagues, he belonged to the Eastern Gentry connection and at the same time was a Presbyterian;

he was also closely identified with Pym and acted as one of his pall-bearers. ^{240.} After 1644 he was as inconsistent as Erle and Irby.

On the one hand he wanted to send excise money to maintain the armies in Ireland, ^{241.} on the other he opposed the Irish lobby on payment for goods there. ^{242.} He was in favour of arming the Surrey militia ^{243.}

but voted for additions to the Warwickshire committee which was evidently loaded with moderates. ^{244.} On a general issue of attitude towards the king and catholics he sided with the War Party to chastise the interfering Spanish ambassador. ^{245.}

We have been considering a group of men, all of whom had supported Pym up to the end of 1643, but who had shown strong enough distrust of the king's intentions to form a more radical wing of the Middle Party. As men active in the army they had represented the cautious line of ever-readiness in case the king failed to honour the conditions of a ceasefire during the many negotiations of the early years. These men did not all go over to the War Party after Pym's death. Evelyn, Cromwell, Armine, Piennes, Purefroy, Erereton, Masham, Robert Goodwyn and John Ashe became almost entirely consistent followers of the radicals, while Erle, Irby and Knightley trimmed and hedged until finally declaring for the Presbyterians. Yet the latter group had been relatively just as active as the former in supporting reform; both before the outbreak of war and for the 16 months to follow. Some of both groups had not been famous for taking a stand before 1644; ^{246.} Evelyn had even trimmed precariously before finally opting for the War Party in 1644, while Erle, Irby and Knightley on the other hand had not compromised themselves in this way. They shared a common background of family connections through the eastern gentry group; ^{247.}

most were moderately rich, and many shared an early interest in the colonizing ventures. Most were "mere gentry", and had participated freely in the activities of their localities which were widely spread over the country. The positions which they took on political matters after 1644 merely indicate their general sympathies. The new radicals were consistently anti-Scottish, anti-Irish, tough on delinquents, royalists, and on the king himself, and supported every measure to strengthen the army. Some of the trimmers on the other hand were inconsistent on Ireland, while on the whole being conciliatory towards the Scots, the royalists and delinquents, local defence, and towards the king. This would indicate that they shared with the Peace Party a feeling of uneasiness about the radicalism of the times - they did not want reprisals against the royalists to get out of hand, nor to antagonize the king any further. The only criterion by which they could be clearly recognized as a group apart from their earlier colleagues is their Presbyterianism. None had any connection with Independency, unlike their opposite numbers who joined the radicals. This connects with their attitude of conciliation to the Scots, and once again points to the close relation between religious and political motives.

Apart from the old coterie around Pym there were other men who acted erratically in the post-1644 divisions. What did these men have in common with the trimmers already discussed? There was Waller, who fitted uneasily into the temporary part of hero of the War Party when he was put forward as the most likely alternative to the peace-bound Lord General. His absence from Westminster means that his career can only make sense on the military and not on the political arena. There is no doubt that he

pursued victory to the best of his ability and that he was violently opposed to Essex's dilatoriness. We can only guess what line he would have taken on the split between the radicals and Pym's more active supporters. He did not really get on with his violent sponsors, such as Marten. On the other hand he did not have the support from the powerful London spokesman and Middle Party leader Glyn. Politically Waller was certainly more in sympathy with the Middle than the War Party. Clarendon was almost moved to impartiality by Waller's lack of political colour, giving him good marks as well for breeding as for military skill, and clearly pointing out his passive role in the political game: "They who looked upon the Earl of Essex as a man that would not keep them company to the end of their journey, had their eyes upon Sir William Waller as a man more for their turn, and were desirous to extol him the more that he might eclipse the other." 261.

On one occasion Waller supported the radicals - in 1645 he opposed the peace negotiations. But this issue was sponsored by Pym, and his inclusion among the "fiery spirits" only conveys D'Ewes' confusion among the political intricacies. Gardiner describes Waller's failings as a military leader in terms which well reflect his political uncertainty and indecisiveness. When he returned to the House in 1644 as an ordinary member "desirous rather to give his Yea or No in the House of Commons than to remain amongst his troops so slighted and disesteemed by them," his political experience consisted mainly of his brief attendances at the Committee of Safety, and of the lesson learnt as a commander, that as a Presbyterian he could not hope to act in complete unison with the Independents in Parliament. As a result he remained rather inactive after 1644 and in divisions sided sometimes with the War Party, but more often with their opponents.

Two other members, Sir Michael Livesay and Robert Reynolds acted in a similar irregular fashion. Livesay was the only Recruiter active on divisions in this period, and he might well have been one of the Middle Party had he been in the House during Pym's lifetime. He was certainly a supporter of the Independents although nothing specific is known of his religious views. ^{268.} Exempted from pardon in 1642, ^{269.} he was clearly identified with the opposition at the outbreak of war, and as a man of great local influence (he had been Sheriff and military commander ^{270.}) he would have been useful to the political leaders. If he had sat in 1640 he could have been for Kent what Barrington was for Essex, the focal point of county organisation and the link with the central government. His position in the county was all the more unique as all the parliamentarians and nearly all the local gentry were notoriously neutral, anglican and even pro-royalist; ^{271.} so much so that Livesay was unable even to gain a position on the local county committee until late in 1643, crowded as it was with the Oxindens and Honiwoods. ^{272.} As a militant military man his support could have helped during the Kent risings which had troubled Parliament throughout the worst periods in the war. When he participated as teller after 1644 it was largely in support of the War Party on such matters as the Great Seal, ^{273.} the Irish campaign, ^{274.} the royalists, ^{275.} and other issues. ^{276.} On only two occasions he appeared with the opposition ^{277.} tellers, but in one of these a real divergence of principle from the War Party made him clearly not an automatic supporter of all War Party issues. ^{278.}

Robert Reynolds was not directly associated with Pym, but unlike Livesay, he was very active in some facets of business in the House from 1640 onwards. He was a prolific committee-man during the early years ^{279.} and was regarded as a specialist in Irish affairs throughout, ^{280.} both

at Westminster and as a commissioner there. ^{281.} But on the floor of the House he played only a very minor part. In September 1642 he supported Holles' pacific motion on delinquents. ^{282.} He was unlikely to have been nominated so often for important committee work if he had had an entirely negative attitude towards the war. Later Holles wrote of Reynolds that "his Presbyterianism is fallen off and (he is) become thoroughly theirs". ^{283.} This apostasy was probably political rather than religious as he remained a Presbyterian elder and a member of the Westminster Assembly. ^{284.} In later years he continued to be active but without firm affiliations to either extreme. He sided with the Peace Party on parliamentary control of the New Model ^{285.} and on the extension of martial law to the counties as well as to London, ^{286.} showing himself to be in favour of strong parliamentary rule which one might expect from an able administrator and bureaucrat. On the other hand he opposed the Peace Party quite clearly on major issues relating to the king and his supporters as his partnership with Haselrig ^{287.} shows.

What made these men, together with some of Pym's old followers remain uncommitted between the extreme parties? We have seen that those of the old Middle Party who chose to join the diminished Peace Party did go for coherent reasons. They were without exception Presbyterians (although it would be rash to be categorical about the exact nature of cause and effect in determining the relations between the interests of Peace and Presbyterianism); their loyalty to the Middle Party was due to their attachment to individual leaders such as Hampden, Essex or Pym himself, and with the death of two and the eclipse of the other, conflicting interests drew them away from the centre towards the paths of Peace; but most important of all, the issues which had held some of them to the Middle Party and Pym

changed as the progress of the war altered, reorientating them towards a new political outlook. Those of Fym's associates who joined the already strong core of War Party members did so for other reasons. All had been active in the army and had a more cautious and watchful attitude towards the king in the earlier negotiations; because they had taken part in the fighting they felt personally more committed and compromised; most of them held command in theatres of war which conflicted with the interests of the Lord General, and on Fym's death their other loyalties naturally took over, as D'Ewes suggested; finally, they were all Independents, most with some definite ties to sectarianism.

Those members who remained in the middle had none of these common characteristics. Some but not all of them were military men; some were Independents, other Presbyterians; some were closely connected with Fym and the Eastern gentry connection; Waller was only connected with the War Party and Livesay was a recruiter with no previous ties with the parliamentary parties; some had been extremely active on committees in earlier years, and were excellent administrators; others were relatively unnoticed in the House; some were enthusiastic local patriots and county committee-men, others concentrated their efforts on the national scale. In order to get some impression of their political interests during the later years we need to analyse their activities in divisions. For example all those who took part in divisions concerning the Scots were in favour of them, and therefore acted with the Peace Party. On Ireland, those who participated were on the War Party side. On the treatment of individual delinquents they were divided, as we might expect, as personal interests were often involved. When it came to negotiations with the king and the royalists however,

299.

they were, with one exception, heavily committed to the War Party.

It is probably significant that they hardly participated on matters relating to church government, ^{300.} which might mean that their religious affiliations

were only convenient tags for their behaviour at the time of Pride's Purge.

On local defence they tended to support the Peace Party and favoured dismantling the military machine. ^{301.}

From this emerges a tentative picture of the new Middle Party which wanted to conclude the war successfully in England, without the interference of extraneous issues like the Irish campaign. Although local and personal interests sometimes conflicted with this aim, it is noticeable that on the whole their policy was directed towards gaining the maximum from the war. The conciliatory line towards the Scots was not irreconcilable with this aim and was probably the result of the Presbyterian orientation of the majority of this group.

New Radicals

Apart from the recruits to the Peace and Middle Parties there were some men who had no set political viewpoint before Pym's death but who joined the radicals after that time. John Crew was an anomalous Presbyterian convert to the War Party. He had been one of the few ^{302.} Parliamentarians to vote against Strafford's attainder, and D'Ewes ^{305.} noted his change of attitude by July 1642 when he refers to his relative as his "formerlie seeming friend". ^{304.} During the war he helped to ^{305.} organize the midland counties and his own Northamptonshire particularly, and he was given a responsible position on the potentially powerful Council ^{306.} of War which was intended as a buffer between Essex and the radicals. He played along with Vane by being the proposer of the Scottish entry ^{307.} into English affairs while his support for the Self-Denying Ordinance is difficult to reconcile with his Presbyterianism - Clarendon condemned him

308. for hypocrisy. At Uxbridge he was more uncompromising than ever. 309.
 It was not until 1648 that he finally realized the inherent contradiction
 310. in his position but earlier he evidently tried to break down the fully
 centralized system of church control and opposed fellow-Presbyterians Coke
 311. and Glyn.

John Lisle by contrast was a much more obvious candidate for a
 straight War Party line. Earlier he had been an active committee-man
 312. with no ties to the political parties, but after 1644 his friendship
 with Cromwell and his developing strong religious Independency 313. made
 him identify himself openly with the radicals. He was entrusted with the
 314. chairmanship of the committee to draw up charges against Manchester
 and he continued to reap rich rewards from his friendship with the Lord
 315. Protector in later years, having earned his gratitude for signing the
 king's death warrant.

John Moore had also been a politically uncommitted committee-man
 316. before 1644. At the same time he served in the army and in his county,
 317. counteracting the predominant neutralist and Anglican attitudes there.
 318. D'Ewes did on one occasion in 1643 identify him with the militants, but
 this was exceptional. After the bulk of the fighting was over he took
 up his position with the radicals in the House and consistently acted as
 319. teller for them.

Sir John Danvers was a recruiter, although he had previous
 320. parliamentary experience. Clarendon branded him as a time-server
 321. because of his connections with the court; but his role with the radicals
 was a minor one and he did not act in divisions on any matter of high
 322. principle.

These newer members of the War Party do not make an obvious

group. Lisle was probably swayed towards the radicals by his strong religious Independency just as some of the old Middle Party adherents had steered "left". Crew on the other hand had no known religious ties with the Independents and was excluded at Pride's Purge. Nor were they all military men as the recruits from Pym's ranks had been, although they were most of them active at one time or another in organizing the defence of the counties.

Conclusions

We can now summarize the conclusions which can be drawn about the political behaviour of each of the groups analysed. The War Party of Pym's lifetime remained almost completely radical after 1644. Men who were prepared to thumb their noses at the king at a time when his armies stood just outside London were not likely to lose their impudence when Charles was neatly isolated and effectively cowed. They had everything to gain and nothing to lose from driving a hard bargain with him. Their policy after 1644 remained unclouded by compromise. They wanted to see the war effectively and quickly won with no distractions such as Ireland; they sought to exploit their enemies' wealth to lighten the burden of their own supporters; they jettisoned their timid allies the Scots; they wanted the king brought to heel and Parliament's supremacy guaranteed.

325.

Whatever their positive religious views, they were opposed to Presbyterianism and consistently supported religious decentralization and democracy. Like the other groups, they had no positive policy to put forward as a programme of reconstruction - their sole aim was to beat the king and maintain their political influence in the Commons and in the army.

324.

The War Party had only one defection, but gained many recruits.

Some were men who had taken no active part in earlier parliamentary affairs, such as John Moore, John Lisle, Sir John Danvers and John Crew. But the more active among the new radicals came from the old Middle Party which disintegrated at Pym's death. Evelyn, Cromwell, Armine, Fiennes, Puresfroy, Brereton, Masham, Goodwyn and Ashe were all men who had experience in the parliamentary army and who had been cautious about the peace negotiations with the king. They had probably differed from the real radicals who asked for the king's conclusive defeat by wanting peace on Parliament's terms. But when it became obvious that the talks led nowhere and that the king could not be trusted even for the periods of truce, they turned towards the War Party. Before 1643 they had felt with Pym the need for additional strength which the Scots could provide in order to make a second front against the king; but after 1644 they realized that the Scots were not prepared to extend themselves on behalf of the English and that the money spent on an overlarge army was diminishing the funds available for the New Model. So they helped to overturn Pym's old policy and cooperated wholeheartedly in getting rid of their neighbours with all possible speed.

Pym had exerted himself on behalf of the Irish campaign, partly because of the genuine threat from the rebels, partly for propaganda purposes, and partly because of the London money invested there. The need for propaganda disappeared with growing parliamentary ascendancy, the threat from the rebels dissipated itself in the need to fight the war on the home front, and the Irish investors found themselves largely backing the forces of peace which alone represented an early return to normal trading conditions. So Pym's erstwhile followers dropped Ireland from their list of priorities

and concentrated on an all-out effort at home. They welded themselves into a strong radical force, built up the New Model, and refused to compromise with the king and his followers. At the same time they evolved a method of using the wealth of their opponents to pay for the ravages of the war whenever they could lay their hands on rich royalist estates.

These old supporters of Pym who now went over to the War Party formed a coherent group. Not only had they all been army men; several were connected through the eastern gentry connection; they were moderately rich and had been interested in the colonizing ventures; and most of them were "mere gentry". They were less closely to be identified with the religious Independents than the old radicals. Brereton, Goodwyn, Ashe and Masham were "Presbyterian Independents", and Evelyn trimmed from one to the other at the critical time. The other men who joined the radicals but who had no previous political affiliations, such as Moore, Lisle, Danvers, Pierrepont and Crew help to heighten this contrast with the old radicals. Of these newcomers only Lisle was a known Independent; Crew was an anomalous Presbyterian, Moore was probably a "Presbyterian Independent"; Danvers and Pierrepont may have been Independents but nothing conclusive is known of their religious beliefs. This probably supports Yule's thesis that the real Independents were more radical than any other group and that the "Presbyterian Independents" formed a more conservative wing. However, in so far as these men acted in divisions on religious matters they supported independent church government, decentralization and democratization of church leadership; their "Presbyterianism" was not ^{enough} persuasive to make them support continued Scottish intervention in English affairs. To all intents and purposes therefore their political independency

predominated over their possible religious Presbyterianism.

Between the extreme parties there were some men who continued to trim on specific issues. Some of these new Middle Party men were undecided remnants of the old party under Pym, such as Erie, Irby and Knightley. Others, such as Waller, Livesay and Reynolds drifted together from other directions. They made a very disparate collection. It is true that they shared a similar background - most of them had been in open opposition to the crown in the early years of the Long Parliament, most were "mere" gentry who had been active in the counties and helped to strengthen parliamentary feeling there. Most of them had been army men, but unlike those who joined the radicals later their distrust of the king was balanced by uneasiness about all-out conflict. Some had family connections with the eastern gentry group, some had administrative experience on committees. All but Livesay and Reynolds took the Presbyterian line in the end, and the latter was probably a "Presbyterian Independent". If they had a coherent policy it was concerned only with the immediate future. They wanted to end the war quickly but decisively - but they allowed their local and personal interests to distract them occasionally. They tended to oppose support for the Irish campaign, agreeing with the radicals that to divert strength there would dissipate the forces needed against the king. Their leaning to Presbyterianism made them more favourable to the Scots than their Independent radical colleagues.

The old core of the Peace Party had largely been eaten away by defections to the king. Only Holles and Lewis remained among the active members of the old group, prepared to risk reputation and estates by unwillingly lagging behind the parliamentary cause. They were strengthened by the infusion of active men who joined them from the Middle Party after

Pym's death. Although active, these men were followers of lost men and lost causes. The death of Pym and Hampden, and the eclipse of Essex, as much as their unfashionable attachment to the outdated policy on Scotland and Ireland, or their regional interest, made them cling to the hope of early settlement and compromise. Their uniform Presbyterianism must also have played a definite part in drawing them towards those who feared the radicalism, decentralization and "democracy" of Independency, and welded them to the hopeless policy of dependence on the Scots. It has been suggested that these and others who were not known to have any specific political views earlier joined the Peace Party hoping by judicious appeasement of the king and the royalists to make up the loss of property and offices incurred as a result of the war. The relative wealth of the Peace Party supporters did not escape contemporaries.

Two other things may be noticed about the whole group of men examined here. The tellers in divisions after 1644 were nearly all men who played an active political role in the Commons from the first meeting of the Long Parliament. Our list of 46 tellers includes 34 men who were prominent enough to be identified with one or other of the political parties of Pym's day, and this means that their behaviour in the House was sufficiently obvious to enable one to class them appropriately. Six others had been active earlier in an administrative capacity - they attended enough committees to be called well-known committee administrators. In this capacity they were bound to make political decisions, as the executive system could not entirely separate policy-making from administration. The remaining six men include only one recruiter, Sir Michael Livesay. The political leadership of the Commons therefore remained in roughly the

same group, although the relative importance of men within that group shifted towards the radicals. Before the end of 1643 it was clearly political motives which determined the allegiance of prominent members. The reorientation after that time can be largely accounted for on political and personal grounds as we have seen. That is not to discount the importance of religious differences between the two parties. It is more than coincidence that there is almost complete correlation between the old War Party men who remained radicals, and Independency; those who joined them from the old Middle Party were evenly split between Independents and "Presbyterian Independents", while other recruits were mainly Independent, but not entirely so. On the other hand the old core of the Peace Party were all Presbyterian; and so were their recruits from the old Middle Party. Others who joined the pacific ranks were largely Presbyterian. Between them lay ^{the} uneasily shifting members of the new middle group, comprising of old supporters of Fyn who were all Presbyterian, a Presbyterian recruit from the radical ranks, and a mixed group of previously uncommitted members. With few exceptions then, the Independents were radicals, the "Presbyterian Independents" were new radicals, and the Presbyterians were pacific or wavering. Not enough is known about the motives of individual members to make any assessments of cause and effect between their religious and political affiliations. It would be difficult to measure the degree of religious conviction of individuals, and such evidence as Yule provides relates only to the minority of committed Independents. But we can account for the political behaviour of members in political and personal terms, without reference to their religious views, which indicates the coherence of the groups after 1644 as political parties.

This study has not been concerned with an analysis of who were

the "real" Independents and Presbyterians in the religious sense and how they differed from the ambiguous "Presbyterian Independents". These problems have been dealt with by Hexter and Yule. The main concern here has been with the political behaviour of members after Fym's death. There can be no doubt that Fym's personality played a large part in drawing together men whose interests and background varied widely, but who could see the need to cooperate under his guidance in order to implement their own plans. His control was made easier by his central position in the complex family ramifications of the eastern gentry, which enabled him to manipulate key men in Parliament and in the counties in a way which no later leader could emulate. As the overweening force which kept these men revolving around the centre to which they were irresistably attracted was extinguished, they were hurled temporarily into several opposing directions drawn by weaker local or factional interests which had previously not been manifest. Their realignment in more formal political groupings was due to a number of motives - enthusiasm for a more hopeful cause, fear of reprisals if the revolution were to go off half-cocked, desire for a more democratic and decentralized church government, a growing need for an absolutely controlled executive; these were the considerations which turned some of Fym's old allies to the War Party. Others were fired by a desire to hold on to and acquire new lands in Ireland, to secure their investments in the war, to support the Scots as a bulwark against the growing strength of an Independent army which was becoming independent of Parliament, to make Parliament supreme in all spheres including religion, to cultivate a rapprochement with the king as a safeguard against the rising forces of mob rule, to protect estates, property and trade from further destruction through war or anarchy - these motives gave strength to the previously discredited Peace Party.

Those who remained in the centre of the political arena formed a far less coherent group, but on the whole they were motivated by a desire to see the war concluded successfully, even at the cost of letting Ireland succumb to the rebels. But they were easily distracted from their major end by personal and regional interests, and at the same time appeared to consider the Scots an asset rather than a hindrance in concluding peace with the king, perhaps as a necessary bulwark against sectaries. This centre group failed to produce a coherent or workable political philosophy due to the weakness of its members and its lack of leadership which prevented it from following the precedent of the earlier Middle Party. It was further hampered by political circumstances which made compromise unlikely and undesirable.

The main problem here has been to study the political changes which took place in the period following the death of Pym. But by the end of 1644 the Independents or radicals had lost the power they gained in the House as a result of the changing situation and the replacement of moderate leadership by Vane and St. John. The study of tellers cannot help us much in explaining the ascendancy of the Presbyterian pacific party. Yule touches on the problem in the course of his breakdown of the meaning of political and religious Independency but he appears to become enmeshed in the very terminology which he condemns. In seeking to account for the triumph of the "Presbyterians" in the House he attributes their strength to their wholesale recruiting from the old Middle Party, basing his argument on the scant evidence of Holles' memoirs. We have seen that this did not happen, that in fact a larger number of Pym's supporters followed Vane and St. John, while others remained wavering in the middle. In any case, the 30-odd members who made up Pym's group were certainly not

numerically strong enough to sway the balance of power in the House after its recruitment, unless they had speakers of such startling magnetism and influence to mesmerize vast numbers of followers. As the division lists show, the old Middle Party did supply plenty of enthusiastic and active politicians, but the larger number of them spoke for the radicals. It was the radicals who claimed the most colourful and brilliant personalities during the later period, but their personal powers were swamped by the sheer numerical strength of the pacific party. The division lists also show that the Peace Party's lead was usually marginal. Of the 140 divisions in this period 70 were won by the Peace Party and 60 by the War Party; and the average numbers supporting either side differed by only 4. At the same time the political situation drastically affected the voting strength of the parties, so that for significant stretches of time the War Party won at divisions. For example, in April 1646 there were 12 divisions of which the radicals won 11. This was at a time when the king was about to put himself into Scottish hands and the Assembly of Divines was trying to set itself up as a tribunal more powerful than Parliament. At such times the "Presbyterians" in the Commons could not be relied upon to support the Peace Party. Again in July and August of that year the radicals won 11 out of 15 divisions. At that time the king was not only in the process of rejecting the Newcastle Propositions, but it became obvious that the Scots were prepared to use their army against Parliament. Once again, a violent wave of support for the radicals followed as the waverers could see the hopelessness of a policy which relied upon the Scots to establish a satisfactory peace with the king. It is true that the radicals won their victories in divisions more often when the attendance at the House was small, but towards

the end of 1646 they were able to call out a total number of members as great as the other side, ^{345.} although in fact the Peace Party actually won ^{346.} more divisions at that time. There is therefore every indication that the radicals and Independents were building up stronger support throughout 1646, and perhaps if it had not been for the Leveller agitation in the army which precipitated the cautious right back into the arms of the Peace Party, Parliament might have become marginally dominated by the Independents and the final split with the army avoided.

As it was, the radicals were hampered by three nearly insuperable obstacles; their numbers were depleted by the effect of the Self-Denying Ordinance; ^{347.} the new recruiters were predominantly Presbyterians; ^{348.} and finally, although they made political capital when they could from the shift king and the unreliable Scots, the radicals were hampered as were later left wings, from a public image which exaggerated their revolutionary tendencies and minimized those of their policies which were solidly rooted in political necessity.

Pym's successors were able, for a while, to harness the "historicist" forces unleashed at the time of his death. For a few crucial months they exerted control which enabled Parliament to all but defeat the king. But before they could turn his defeat into a victory for themselves and establish a stable parliamentary majority, their following was scattered and shaken by the impending renewal of fighting and the claims of a new and genuinely democratic movement.

APPENDIX.

TABLE OF TELLERS AT DIVISIONS IN THE COMMONS 1644-1646.

Name.	Pre-1644		1644-6 No. of				Post 1644		Religion*		
	Party		Times Teller				Party				
	War.	Mid. Pcc.	Totl.	War.	Pcc.	Prsb.	Ind.	War.	Mid. Pcc.		
Naselrig	X		65	58	0		7	X		I	
Holles		X	68	4	54	10			X	P	
Stapleton	X		60	1	49	9	1		X	P	
Evalyn	X?		44	31	5	1	7	X		P - I	
Glotworthy	X		16	0	16				X	P	
Leves		X	18	0	15	3			X	P	
Croswall	X		15	13	0		2	X		I	
Vane Jr.	X		11	9	0		2	X		I	
Erle		X	14	3	10		1		X	P	
Wentworthy	X		8	7	0		1	X		I	
Mildmay	X		8	7	0		1	X		P/I	
Moore J.			5	5	0			X		P/I	
Knightley		X	5	3	2				X	P	
Waller	X		5	2	3				X	P	
Armine		X	5	5	0			X		I	
Livesay			5	3	2				X	I	
Glyn		X	7	0	5	2				X	P
Fiennes		X	6	3	2		2	X		I	
Marten		X	4	3	1			X		I	
Welman			4	1	3				X	P	
Reynolds			4	3	2				X	P/I	
Wray C.		X	6	0	5	1				X	P
Irby		X	6	2	3		1		X	P	
Hayman		X	4	4	0			X		I?	
Baynton		X	4	3	1			X		I	
Purefoy		X	3	3	0			X		I	
Curzon			3	1					X	P	
Lisle			4	3	0		1	X		I	
Wallop		X	3	3	0			X		I?	
Strode		X	3	2	0		1	X		D	
Coke J.			X	3	0	2	1			X	P
Prideaux		X	2	2	0			X		I	
Holland J.			3	0	2	1				X	P
Brereton		X	2	2	0			X		P/I	
Danvers			2	2	0			X		I?	
Masham		X	2	2	0			X		P/I	
Trevor			2	0	2				X	I?	

* P = Presbyterian (Criterion - Pride's Purge).

I = Independent (Criterion - Yule).

P/I = "Presbyterian Independent" (Criterion - Yule and Hexter).

D = Died before 1648 (Criterion - Brunton and Pennington).

I? = uncertain classification.

CONT.

Nicholls	X		2	0	2		X	P
Bosville			2	0	2		X	P/I
Bond	X		3	3	0		X	I
Pierrepont		X	3	3	0		X	I?
Crow			3	2	0	I	X	P
Ash	X		2	2	0		X	P/I
Goodwyn R.	X		2	2	0		X	P/I
Evalyn (Sarry)			2	0	2		X	P
Pye			2	0	2		X	P