



CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY BETWEEN
THE NINTH AND TENTH PARTY CONGRESSES

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SUMMARY

In the period under review there emerged dramatic evidence of changes in China's foreign policy — including entry into the United Nations, improved relations with the United States, diplomatic recognition of Japan and in general a much more active diplomacy than in the past. The focus of this thesis is an analysis of the changes in China's foreign policy formulation of which these developments are symptomatic and an assessment of the world view to which the new formulation corresponds.

The approach adopted implies that China's national interests are perceived through Marxist-Leninist perspectives and that its ideology is pragmatically implemented. Alternative approaches which consider that the Chinese are capable of seeing the world "as it is" apart from their ideological perspectives, or that their ideology prevents them from attaining a valid grasp of international reality are rejected as epistemologically unsound.

A brief historical survey is made of the principles which have come to dominate Chinese foreign policy and indications are given of the way in which these have been applied in practice by the Chinese Communist Party.

The central chapter of the thesis gives an account of the extended debate which took place within the Chinese leadership between 1968 and 1971 over the character of the contemporary international balance of class forces and the manner in which it was altering. The following chapters illustrate the ways in which this debate was resolved with respect to particular areas — the United States and the Soviet Union, the second intermediate zone and the Third World.

In the chapter dealing with the "superpowers" it is argued — contrary to the dominant analysis in the West — that what the Chinese Communist

Party regarded as the decline of United States imperialism was primarily responsible for the abandonment of the foreign policy formulation which had prevailed during the Cultural Revolution.

The reorientation of China's perception of the second intermediate zone is examined with particular attention to Western Europe, Japan and Eastern Europe.

The changes which took place in China's policy towards the Third World are examined as an integral part of the new assessment of international contradictions made by the Chinese Communist Party. It is argued that in the new assessment the Third World is no longer seen as the primary focus of international contradictions but that new opportunities are open to Third World states for reducing their dependence on imperialist powers.

The general argument pursued throughout the thesis is that the reformulation of Chinese foreign policy was achieved by the application of consistently held principles to a new international situation and that relevant debates within the Chinese leadership were concerned primarily with the character of international developments rather than the validity of the principles which should be applied to them.

This thesis contains no material which has been accepted for the award of any other degree or diploma in any university and to the best of my knowledge, it contains no material previously published or written by anyone else, except when due reference is made in the text.

G. O'Leary

PREFACE

It should be clarified at the outset that this thesis is an analysis of the formulation rather than the practice of Chinese foreign policy in the period specified. It concentrates on the analytical method and the statements of Chinese foreign policy makers rather than the activities they generate. There is consequently no attempt to describe with any completeness or precision the detailed working out of Chinese foreign policy between the Ninth and Tenth Party Congresses. This is not to suggest that such details are considered trivial, or even secondary — it is an attempt rather to explain them within the limits of a thesis.

It is argued that China's foreign policy is formulated in accordance with an ongoing analysis of the world predicated upon a set of Marxist-Leninist principles. Since this analysis forms the very subject matter of the thesis it has been necessary to some extent to follow the organizational structure adopted by Chinese foreign policy spokesmen. The final three chapters in particular, dealing respectively with the "superpowers", i.e., the United States and the Soviet Union, the "second intermediate zone", i.e., developed industrial nations other than the "superpowers", and the "Third World", follow the Chinese division of the world into three zones which prevailed for much of the period under review.

The Chinese analysis of the world, as well as being based on Marxist-Leninist principles, is generally expressed in Marxist-Leninist terms. It is frequently necessary, therefore, to use the terminology of the Chinese for sustained periods. For stylistic simplicity, this terminology is not always placed within parentheses. Thus when "United States imperialism", "Soviet social-imperialism" and other such terms in the distinctive Chinese vocabulary are used without parentheses they generally refer to the Chinese understanding of them except where the context makes

it clear that this is not the case. For reasons of simplicity also the particular formulation of Chinese foreign policy which happens to be dominant at any one time is frequently referred to as the "Chinese position" or the "Chinese view" when in fact this position is being challenged by or is coexisting with alternative formulations. Once again, the context within which the terms are used makes their meaning clear.

It will be apparent from the sources quoted throughout the thesis that the author's knowledge of the Chinese language is severely limited, such that translations, both by Chinese official sources and other government and private agencies have been used extensively. While it must be conceded that a command of the Chinese language would have been an advantage, the scholarship limitations associated with Ph.D. theses in this country make it virtually impossible for one whose undergraduate training has been in social sciences rather than languages to undertake an adequate language study as well as fulfilling the thesis requirements within the allotted time. Were the subject of this thesis more directly concerned with domestic Chinese policy the language disadvantage could well have been crucial. But in analysing foreign policy this disadvantage is much less severe. Most published Chinese material on foreign policy is available in translation and is of considerable quantity. The subject of Chinese foreign policy, moreover, demands an acquaintance with the views, official and otherwise, of the United States, Soviet, Japanese and other governments. Ideally a familiarity with Russian and Japanese at least would have benefitted a study such as this. Realistically, however, it is necessary to be content with material from such sources in translation. I have been fortunate in having the assistance of Dr. Bill Brugger, Lecturer in Chinese Politics at Flinders University, and Mr. Andrew Watson, Lecturer in Chinese at Adelaide University, to prevent any gross errors of translation.

A further brief point should be made on the subject of language. The romanization of the particular translating agency being cited has been adopted. Thus *People's Daily*, when cited in *pīnyīn* by official Chinese sources is *Renmin Ribao*, and when cited in Wade-Giles by *Survey of China Mainland Press*, e.g., it is *Jen-min Jih-pao*. The spelling of 'Mao Tsetung' also constitutes a minor dilemma. Where sources being utilized have romanized it in the pre-1969 form of 'Mao Tse-tung' that spelling has been retained. Otherwise the current hyphenless version is used.

It remains to thank some of the many people who have assisted in the production of this thesis. Bill Brugger and Andrew Watson have already been mentioned in connection with their language assistance. Their help did not stop there, however. Bill Brugger has been an unfailing source of encouragement as well as enlightenment throughout the three years spent in researching and writing the thesis and Andrew Watson read almost the whole of it in draft form and provided detailed and valuable comments. My thanks are also due to Michael Yahuda of the London School of Economics, John Gittings of the *Guardian* and Edward Friedman of the University of Wisconsin who read drafts of individual chapters and made helpful comments. I am also grateful to the postgraduate students of Adelaide and Flinders University Politics Departments who took an active and helpful interest in the production of the thesis and to the staff members of the Politics Department at Adelaide University who did likewise -- particularly Bruce McFarlane whose comments were invariably stimulating. Special thanks are due to my supervisor, Dr. Bob Catley whose enthusiasm especially when my own flagged and whose understanding of international political economy were of invaluable assistance. For his patience and availability I am also grateful. Needless to say, none of the above can

be held responsible for any of the views expressed or conclusions reached. Gratitude for help of a different kind is due to my wife, Eva, whose patience and encouragement have been indispensable. The thesis was typed efficiently and quickly by Jacki Gray.



CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

Between the Ninth and Tenth Congresses of the Chinese Communist Party, i.e., between April 1969 and September 1973, there emerged dramatic evidence of significant changes in China's foreign policy. Among this evidence was China's entry into the United Nations, its improved relations with the United States, diplomatic recognition of Japan and in general a much more active diplomacy than in the past -- particularly the recent past of the Cultural Revolution. These symptoms of important policy developments have been catalogued in some detail, both in the press and the relevant academic literature.

Consequently, there is no attempt here to compile a detailed diplomatic chronology of China's international behaviour during the period specified. The subtleties of diplomatic behaviour -- the varying degrees of favour and disfavour reflected in altered protocol arrangements, the novelty and intricacy of "ping-pong diplomacy" and the like -- are not generally recorded here. This largely descriptive task has been undertaken elsewhere with painstaking industry and reference is made to it where appropriate. The focus of this thesis is an analysis of the fundamental alterations to China's foreign policy formulation of which the above diplomatic developments are symptomatic, and an assessment of the world view to which the new formulation corresponds.

In attempting such an analysis the task is generally made more difficult by the inherited corpus of Western wisdom on the subject. Few areas of academic interest can have been so influenced by the propaganda agencies of hostile governments, particularly those of the United States, as the study of the People's Republic of China.¹ While recent years have seen the lessening of some of this government-inspired distortion, its

legacy in the prevailing patterns of thinking about China remains strong. Discussions of foreign policy are by no means exempt from this general picture as the following examples may illustrate. There is a wide variety of factors given causal significance in the formation of China's foreign policy including traditional Chinese attitudes to its neighbours, Marxist-Leninist theory, factional politics within the Chinese leadership and the personality of Mao Tsetung among others. While there is no necessity here to engage in a discussion of the relative merits of these analytical standpoints, it is important to show that most interpretations, no matter what their analytical perspectives, argue or imply that there is a very low correlation between international reality and China's perception of it.

Edward Friedman, a writer who has done much to dispel the distortions surrounding American perceptions of China, can nevertheless say that he makes no claim that Chinese leaders "generally see the world as it is."² More traditional authors in the field are much less inclined to see any correspondence between the world and China's view of it. Philip L. Bridgham, for instance, claims that Mao's perception of reality is "simplistic" and "distorted".³ Ishwer C. Ojha, in a recent book on Chinese foreign policy, states that,

Chinese leaders do not judge issues on their face value but in reference to their overall significance to China's struggle for power and influence.⁴

Harold C. Hinton, who has written a great deal on Chinese foreign policy, considers that what he calls "Maoism" necessitates "the acceptance of much absurdity."⁵ Elsewhere Hinton claims that the Chinese, in their official sources, "specialize in the art of masterly omission and tendentious distortion."⁶ The list could be developed *ad nauseam*, but the point should be clear that Western authors who differ in other respects

frequently give little credence to the reality of China's world view. The point is made in a different way by other authors who consider that China's foreign policy has alternated between periods of "pragmatism" and "fanaticism" — the periods of "pragmatism" corresponding to "realistic" perceptions of the world and the periods of "fanaticism" to periods when the particular ideology of the Chinese leadership has prevented it from appreciating reality. The composition of this ideology is viewed differently by different authors — some considering Marxist theory to be dominant,⁷ others believing that traditional Chinese chauvinist and strategic concerns hold sway.⁸ Whatever element is considered dominant in the ideology mix, the point is essentially the same. The "ideology" is conceived as a distorting screen through which China sees the world — at least for part of the time.

The approach adopted in this thesis is an attempt to avoid the problems involved with the approaches specified above. It is argued throughout the thesis that the Chinese leadership formulates its foreign policy in response to international developments which they interpret according to a perception consistent with principles derived from the social practice of their own society. This is to say that the Chinese apply their particular Sinified Marxist-Leninist yardstick to international developments and formulate their international policies and practice accordingly. In approaching the subject in this way there is an apparent inference that China's foreign policy is an artificially contrived one, having been sifted through the complex grid of Marxism-Leninism. The inference is unwarranted. Rather it is argued that China's foreign policy is a "natural", "logical" outgrowth of the material reality of Chinese society and the class interests which are dominant there as they are situated within the international balance of class forces. In

the same way, the foreign policy of the United States might be considered the "natural", "logical" international expression of the material reality of that country and its dominant class interests. The dominant classes in either country act "rationally" in accordance with the fundamental principles governing their interests. The fact that their activities have continued to be in conflict is an indication not of the "irrationality" of one power — as so much scholarship on China would have us believe — but an expression of the fact that different classes are pursuing their "logical" but conflicting interests.

The contrived dilemma over the credence to be given China's world view is thus dissolved. Whether China's foreign policy is informed by Marxism or by national interests, by ideology or by pragmatism, is a false dilemma since no valid distinction can be drawn between its two horns. China's national interests are perceived through Marxist-Leninist eyes and its ideology is pragmatically implemented. To claim otherwise, i.e., to assert that the Chinese are capable of seeing the world "as it is" apart from their ideological perspectives, or that their ideology prevents them from attaining a valid grasp of international reality is to court immense epistemological confusion at the outset. It would, of course, be equally confusing to assume that United States foreign policy or that of any other state implies a perception of international reality which is independent of the class interests which dominate that state. It is worth noting in passing that a great deal of the confusion in relation to China's world view has arisen because a view of the world close to that of the United States government has frequently been accepted as an objective account independent of any value assumptions.⁹

In keeping with the above approach, a brief historical study is made in the following chapter of the development of the principles which

have come to dominate Chinese foreign policy and indications are given of the way these principles have been applied in practice by the Chinese Communist Party.

In Chapter III, a detailed account is given from the limited sources available of the extended debate which took place within the Chinese leadership between 1968 and 1971 over the character of the contemporary international balance of class forces and the manner and direction in which it was altering. It is indicated in this chapter and argued in greater detail in Chapter IV, that the dominant Western analyses of the foreign policy changes which occurred at this time are incorrect. Such interpretations argue that China's new foreign policy was motivated by a reassessment of the strategic threats facing China such that the Soviet Union replaced the United States as the principle and most immediate threat facing China. While it is not denied that the Soviet Union came to dominate Chinese threat perceptions, it is argued that what the Chinese regarded as the decline of United States imperialism -- in conjunction with a number of other factors, including the rise of "Soviet social-imperialism" -- was the primary international development responsible for the abandonment of the foreign policy formulation which had prevailed during the Cultural Revolution and for the implementation of the new formulation. As well as tracing in detail the changes in the analysis made by the Chinese of both the United States and the Soviet Union, this chapter subjects the best argued case for those who consider fear of the Soviet Union as the cause of the change in Chinese policy to critical examination.

Chapter V looks in greater detail at the changes which occurred in China's view of the "second intermediate zone" -- those countries which have achieved considerable industrial development and which lie between

the imperialist and socialist countries. It is argued that the same factors which were responsible for the reformulation of China's view of and policies towards the superpowers — the decline of American imperialism and the rise of Soviet social-imperialism — were also basically responsible for the redefinition and reorientation of Chinese policy towards the second intermediate zone. The developments in China's view of Western Europe, Japan and Eastern Europe, the latter region a newly designated component of the second intermediate zone, are examined in particular. Each region is considered by China to have become the focus of major contemporary contradictions and to have benefited, in terms of independence from one or other or both of the superpowers as a result of the relative changes in the latter's strength. As a result, China's policies in these regions are an attempt to promote and consolidate the independence available to them in the new international situation.

Chapter VI pursues the foreign policy reformulation into the "first intermediate zone" or the "Third World". Once again, it is shown that the new policies towards and relations with the Third World countries are premised on the analysis of the international situation which is detailed in Chapter III. The new policy is contrasted with that which preceded it during the period of the Cultural Revolution when China's relations with Third World governments were minimal while support for liberation movements preoccupied its attention. In the new situation, the Chinese envisage the anti-imperialist liberation struggles in the Third World to have been primarily responsible for stimulating the decline of United States imperialism. Thus, it is argued, the focus of contemporary world contradictions is no longer simply in the Third World. In fact much of the direct imperialist aggression against Third World liberation movements has been discontinued in the face of recurrent defeats. Under

these conditions the Chinese consider that Third World states have an objective potential for reducing their dependence on imperialist powers and, consequently, their flourishing diplomacy in the Third World is geared to activating whatever anti-imperialist and anti-hegemonic tendencies are extant there.

It is also argued in this chapter that China's newly developed relations with Third World states do not prejudice their ability to maintain relations based on political affinity with liberation movements even though they be in countries with which China has correct diplomatic relations.

While the thesis has been laid out in the manner described above, there are a number of propositions which are common to each chapter and which are developed throughout. To take but one example: in Chapter II, the proposition is introduced that China's foreign policy, unlike that of most countries, is practiced in accordance with a set of consciously articulated theoretical principles which are publicly applied to the prevailing international order. With developments in the latter, there is a constant process of reformulating a coherent analysis and practice. In Chapter III it is shown that this process of reformulation was the subject of major debate within the Chinese leadership during the period under consideration. It is demonstrated in this chapter, however, that differences which did occur within the Chinese leadership in this area were generally related to the reluctance on the part of one section of the Chinese leadership to abandon the analysis of the world which had prevailed during the Cultural Revolution period. The principles involved were similar. Debate centred around the character of international developments to which they were to be applied rather than the validity of the principles themselves.

NOTES

¹For accounts of government manipulation of scholarship on China, cf. John Gittings, "China Watching in Hong Kong", *Journal of Contemporary Asia* Vol. 2, No. 4, 1972; D. Horowitz, "The China Scholars and U.S. Intelligence", *Ramparts* Vol. 11, No. 1, February 1972; and "Politics and Knowledge: An Unorthodox History of Modern China Studies", *Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars* Vol. 3, Nos. 3-4, Summer-Fall 1971.

²"Problems in Dealing with an Irrational Power: America Declares War on China", in Edward Friedman and Mark Seldon (eds.), *America's Asia: Dissenting Essays on Asian-American Relations*, Vintage Books, New York, 1971, p. 219.

³"The International Impact of Maoist Ideology", in Chalmers Johnson (ed.), *Ideology and Politics in Contemporary China*, University of Washington Press, Seattle and London, 1973, p. 327.

⁴*Chinese Foreign Policy in an Age of Transition*, Beacon Press, Boston, 1969, p. 205.

⁵*China's Turbulent Quest*, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1970, p. 31.

⁶*Communist China in World Politics*, MacMillan, London, 1966, p. viii.

⁷Albert Feuerwerker, "Chinese History and the Foreign Relations of Contemporary China", *The Annals of the American Academy* Vol. 402, July 1972.

⁸E.g., C.P. Fitzgerald, "Developments or Changes in China's Foreign Policy", *World Review* Vol. 9, No. 2, July 1970.

⁹Harold C. Hinton's approach to this question is rather typical. In declaring his own analysis free of ideology, he states, "I prefer history, in the sense of observed data and inferences from them, to what may be called science fiction, or the imposition of theory on data." *Communist China*, p. viii. Such a statement implies the simplistic and patently false assumption that different observers will draw the same inferences from the same data by correctly applying the same logic, no matter from what society or class the observers are drawn.

CHAPTER II
A HISTORY OF CHINA'S FOREIGN POLICY

From the beginning of the Chinese Communist Party, its primary foreign policy preoccupation has been with imperialism. Combatting imperialism was seen not as a task in any way independent of conducting a democratic revolution within China. Rather,

These two great tasks (to carry out a national revolution to overthrow foreign imperialist oppression and a democratic revolution to overthrow feudal landlord oppression) are interrelated. Unless imperialist rule is overthrown, the rule of the feudal landlord class cannot be terminated, because imperialism is its main support. Conversely, unless help is given to the peasants in their struggle to overthrow the feudal landlord class, it will be impossible to build powerful revolutionary contingents to overthrow imperialist rule, because the feudal landlord class is the main social base of imperialist rule in China and the peasantry is the main force in the Chinese revolution.¹

Thus while it was considered that the "contradiction between imperialism and the Chinese nation is the principle one,"² the inseparable targets of the Chinese revolution in its attempt to combat imperialism were "the bourgeoisie of the imperialist countries and the landlord class of our country."³ In this way was the primary "foreign policy" objective of the Chinese Communist Party established and the classes whose defeat was necessary for its attainment specified. Although in the years to follow, particularly after the elimination of the feudal landlord class, combatting imperialism took on a different practical meaning, it was never replaced as the fundamental objective of China's foreign policy.

The preoccupation of the Chinese Communist Party with imperialism, far from being a dogmatic echo of Lenin, was the result of bitter experience at the hands of the Western powers. Although the impact of imperialism was undoubtedly to accelerate the revolutionary tendencies within

Chinese society, the costs borne by the Chinese people were immense.

A prohibition by the Chinese government on the imposition of opium occasioned the First Opium War with Britain in 1840. Britain had begun producing opium in Bengal at the beginning of the century and used it as a means of paying for its imports thereby causing profound deleterious effects on the health of the Chinese populace but also provoking a rural crisis as China's balance of trade deteriorated.⁴ As a result of the war, Hong Kong was ceded to Britain, China was compelled to pay an indemnity for opium confiscated, to open five treaty ports to foreign trade and to accept the principle of extra-territoriality which freed foreign nationals in treaty ports from Chinese law. The privileges which Britain gained in battle were also extended to other imperial powers.

By 1856 Britain was once again at war with China, this time joined by the forces of Napoleon III. By 1860 they had captured Peking, burning down the Summer Palace in the process and imposing further "unequal treaties" -- the Treaties of Peking and Tientsin -- which opened another eleven ports as treaty ports and provided increased foreign access to China's interior. Russia, meanwhile, gained control of a vast strip of land north of the Amur River, including the port of Haishenwei which became Vladivostok ('ruler of the East').

In the early 1880's, China suffered defeats at the hands of the French who proceeded to create a sphere of influence in Southern China (Yunnan, Kwangtung and Kwangsi provinces). Japan and Germany were late imperial arrivals, Japan annexing Taiwan and Germany receiving a 99-year lease on Kiaochow Bay as well as mining and railway rights in Shantung province.

The actions of the "Boxer" rebels who stormed the foreign legations in Peking in 1900 led to a bloody war between China and eight foreign

powers. The latter's victory was enshrined in the "Boxer Protocols" which required China to pay an indemnity of some \$320 million, granted all control over customs to foreign powers, allowed foreign garrisons in Peking and elsewhere and prohibited the import of arms.

The United States joined Britain in pursuing an "open door" policy which they both generally considered more profitable than seizing colonies and concessions, though Britain had it both ways in forcing the Chinese to grant a lease on Weihaiwei and a 99-year lease on Kowloon. But from the American point of view, the "open door" policy,

merely admonished the European mercantilists to abandon those gunboat privileges which we happened not to share. Its outer principle was that American business could hold its own in any fair competition in an open market. The inner principle was that American business happened to find itself at the moment on the short end of the concessions stick.⁵

To focus on these instances where resistance to imperialist advances broke out and was suppressed scarcely makes clear the profound impact which the various imperial powers had on the social structure of China and the lives of its inhabitants. While it is inappropriate here to detail the extent of imperialist exploitation, the disruption caused to traditional industries, the domination of extractive industries and the outflow of wealth from China, it must be borne in mind that these were the substantive concomitants of China's penetration by the imperialist powers.⁶

It is worth noting that from the early 1920's, the Chinese Communists were far more interested in the impact of imperialism in China and how to combat it than in an analysis of its origins in the capitalist mode of production. A typical example from their *Manifesto* of 1922 is illustrative,

During eighty years' invasion by the imperialist powers, China...has become their joint colony. They not only occupy their broad territories, islands, protectorates and new colonies, but have robbed China of many important harbours in order to create foreign settlements; and finally have divided China into several spheres of influence in order to realize their policy of monopolistic exploitation.

In China one-third of the railways are owned by the foreign capitalists; others are also directly or indirectly controlled by foreign creditors. Foreign steamers freely navigate in Chinese harbours and rivers, postal and telegraph services are closely supervised, and the tariff is dependent on and controlled by the foreign imperialists — under such a regime it is not only convenient for the foreigners to import their capital, absorb raw material, but worst of all, the soul of Chinese economic life has mercilessly been clutched in the imperialistic claw.

The foreign capitalists also occupy many mines; they have established factories in Shanghai and Tientsin, and drive the Chinese labourers with whips in the mines and factories as their productive slaves. At the same time the imports of foreign commodities rise like a relentless tide. Not only the cloth and paper, but the old home-made needles and nails are obliged to give way to the imported ones.

The disastrous effect of this is the rise in cost of living. Three hundred millions of peasants tend to become paupers, the livelihood of ten million handicraftsmen is jeopardized by the handsome imported manufactured commodities.⁷

But while theoretical statements as to the origin of imperialism were sparse there were clear indications that Mao Tsetung in particular had understood Lenin's work on the subject.⁸

This is nowhere more evident than in Mao's treatment as early as 1928 of inter-imperialist rivalries as they affected China. The lasting rivalries of which Lenin had written were regarded by Mao as a unique advantage in the case of the Chinese revolution, for unlike the classic case of a colonized country or one under direct imperialist rule, China was regarded as being "semi-colonial and under indirect imperialist rule."⁹ This point is crucial to an understanding of recent Chinese policy

towards the Third World at a time when inter-imperialist rivalries are considered to be intense. Mao considered that the wars and splits within China's "White regime" were a function of its diverse imperialist backers each of which was attempting to expand its sphere of influence to the detriment not only of the local populace but also to competing imperial powers. Combined with the fact that great portions of the countryside had not been integrated into a unified capitalist economy, the "splits and wars within the White regime" were considered to,

provide a condition for the emergence and persistence of one or more small Red areas under the leadership of the Communist Party amidst the encirclement of the White regime....If we only realize that splits and wars will never cease within the White regime in China, we shall have no doubts about the emergence of Red political power.¹⁰

While the similarities between the position of China in the early twentieth century and that of many Third World states are important, it is also necessary to take note of the differences. As will be made clear in Chapter VI, China's post-Cultural Revolutionary foreign policy towards Third World countries also takes account of inter-imperialist rivalries but uses them to promote the strengthening and independence of Third World states vis-à-vis the more developed countries rather than as an explanation of why local communist parties might flourish. The two primary reasons for this difference would seem to be the far greater imperialist penetration of Third World economies in the 1970's and the possibility of joint action on the part of Third World states in defence of their collective independence and the safeguarding of their natural resources. This latter point is particularly important as it explains an apparent contradiction between the fundamental position adopted by Mao Tsetung from the 1920's onwards and the position adopted by the Chinese Communist Party in the 1970's.

In his letter to Lin Piao in 1930, Mao argued,

Since contradictions are developing in the world between the imperialist countries, between the imperialist countries and their colonies, and between the imperialists and the proletariat in their own countries, there is an intensified need for the imperialists to contend for the domination of China. While the imperialists' contention over China becomes more intense, both the contradiction between imperialism and the whole Chinese nation and the contradictions among the imperialists themselves develop simultaneously on Chinese soil, thereby creating the tangled warfare which is expanding and intensifying daily and giving rise to the continuous development of the contradictions among the reactionary ruling cliques of China's reactionary rulers.¹¹

It is shown in Chapter VI that it is still an assumption of Chinese policy in the 1970's that "contradictions among the imperialists themselves" develop on Third World soil. But in an era where the struggles of Third World movements have been directly responsible for the weakening of imperialism and where Third World states have shown an increasing ability to act in concert to the detriment of imperial powers, the intensified imperialist contradictions are not assumed to give rise to the widespread and acute contradictions among the local ruling classes that was characteristic of China. In fact with the diminished possibility of military intervention by the imperialist powers as well as their intensified rivalry, the formation of a military-bureaucratic state which has among its functions the arbitration of competing comprador interests as well as playing one imperial power off against another has already become an observable phenomenon.

In the late 1920's and during the 1930's Mao's position was to bring him into conflict with his own party, with the Comintern and with Stalin — all of whom placed far less emphasis on the importance of inter-imperialist rivalries to the development of the Chinese revolution.¹² By the end of 1935, the Chinese Communist Party was prepared to accept once

again the accuracy of the analysis made by Mao in 1928. At the Wayaopao Politburo meeting in December 1935, shortly after the completion of the Long March, Mao's report revived his earlier analysis of inter-imperialist rivalries.¹³ Since Japanese intentions to occupy large sections of China, if not the whole of it, were no longer disguised at this time and since these intentions had aroused the hostility of other imperialist powers, the validity of Mao's position had begun to receive public acclaim.

Mao's position was evidently still strongly opposed from within the party as he spends some time defending it against what he called the "closed door mentality" which argued that the "forces of the revolution must be pure and the road of the revolution must be straight, absolutely straight."¹⁴ He went on to provide details of this mentality which opposed his own policy of reviving the united front. According to the advocates of closed-door tactics,

Nothing is correct except what is literally recorded in Holy Writ. The national bourgeoisie is entirely and eternally counter-revolutionary. Not an inch must be conceded to the rich peasants. The yellow trade unions must be fought tooth and nail. If we shake hands with Tsai Ting-kai, we must call him a counter-revolutionary at the same time. Was there ever a cat that did not love fish or a warlord who was not a counter-revolutionary? Intellectuals are three-day revolutionaries whom it is dangerous to recruit. It follows therefore that closed-doorism is the sole wonder-working magic, while the united front is an opportunistic tactic.¹⁵

The flexible, anti-dogmatic policies and tactics advocated by Mao are typical and have persisted. In the internal debate within the Chinese Communist Party which preceded the normalization of relations with the United States at the beginning of the 1970's, echoes of the sentiments expressed in the above quotation are clearly evident — as documented in Chapter III. Again, it seems, Mao Tsetung and the group within the party in ideological sympathy with him on this question were opposed by those

whose commitment to "Holy Writ" was less flexible than their own and who did not recognize that the "revolutionary situation" had changed. In urging the adoption of a revised form of the united front in 1935 Mao had argued, "When the revolutionary situation changes, revolutionary tactics and methods of leadership must change."¹⁶ Years later Mao summed up with characteristic forthrightness his "pragmatic" approach to Marxism-Leninism,

The arrow of Marxism-Leninism must be used to hit the target of the Chinese revolution. If it were otherwise, why would we want to study Marxism-Leninism?...Our comrades must understand that we do not study Marxism-Leninism because it is pleasing to the eye, or because it has some mystical value, like the doctrines of the Taoist priests who ascend Mao Shan to learn how to subdue devils and evil spirits. Marxism-Leninism has no beauty, nor has it any mystical value. It is only extremely useful.¹⁷

The emphasis on pragmatism should not be interpreted as a loss of revolutionary perspective or a denial of principle. In seeking an alliance with and even aid from imperialist powers¹⁸ Mao, at least, was not overlooking the separate interests these powers might have in providing it. The "contradictions between China and certain other imperialist powers" were "relegated to a secondary position, while the rift between these powers and Japan has been widened."¹⁹ But the contradictions were not dissolved. The contemporary situation merely meant that "at the present time" the other imperialist countries "are willing to maintain peace and are against new wars of aggression."²⁰ Moreover, it was believed that as a result of fighting the Japanese in a united front with the British and Americans, China would paradoxically increase its strength and independence, for the practice of fighting an imperial power once begun was regarded as difficult to curtail. In 1937, Lo Fu, the Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party, summed up his party's tactic with precision,

The British think that by helping China against Japan they are consolidating their position, but in the meantime China is consolidating her own position too.

After the defeat of Japanese imperialism the strength of China will be much greater and the nation more independent.²¹

During the military and diplomatic manoeuvres in both Europe and the Far East prior to the outbreak of the Second World War and during the war itself the Chinese Communists generally adhered to the principles already outlined — although the Nazi-Soviet and Soviet-Japanese pacts introduced severe strains into the retention of these principles.²² The seeds of the Sino-Soviet dispute, long since sown but still well covered, were watered abundantly by the Soviet-Japanese "Neutrality Pact" accompanied as it was by a Frontier Declaration in which the Soviet Union agreed to respect the territoriality and inviolability of the Japanese puppet state of Manchukuo while the Japanese agreed to respect the same in relation to the Mongolian People's Republic. The fear on the part of the Chinese Communists, and other sections of the Chinese population, of a "Far Eastern Munich" was once again activated and with obvious good reason.

Given the situation of the Chinese Communist Party, its focus, insofar as foreign policy was concerned, remained directed to questions of imperialist policy and the character of the splits among imperialist powers. This did not mean that questions of proletarian internationalism or "party-to-party relations" were considered unimportant or not considered at all. Under the circumstances they were relegated to a position of secondary importance and simply did not arise as subjects of major disagreement or controversy. That they were not altogether ignored is apparent from Mao's report to the Sixth Plenum of the Sixth Central Committee in October 1938 where he is at some pains to point out that for Chinese communists "patriotism" and internationalism must be combined

while Japanese and German communists should "resolutely oppose the 'patriotism' of the Japanese aggressors and of Hitler."²³ After Pearl Harbour and the United States entry into the war in December 1941, Mao also extended some advice to the Communist parties of Asia, counselling against "ultra-leftism" — "i.e., the understandable reluctance to collaborate with the colonial powers."²⁴

But in the situation in which the Chinese Communist Party found itself, it was the correct relationship to the various imperialist powers which needed most elucidation and which caused most contention. In a series of articles in 1940 Mao Tsetung outlined his own position with greater precision than previously. The question is of critical importance in interpreting China's attitude to the imperialist powers in the post-Cultural Revolutionary period and will be taken up again in the following chapter when discussing the use made of Mao's writings from this period by the Chinese in 1971 when explaining the policies being implemented at that time.²⁵

The point is explicitly made in "On Policy", the central work from this period used to explain the initiatives of 1971, that "the ultra-left viewpoint" was the "main danger within the Party."²⁶ Mao is concerned to strike a different balance to that of the "ultra-leftists" between struggle and alliance. In general terms he claimed,

our Anti-Japanese National United Front policy is neither all alliance and no struggle nor all struggle and no alliance, but combines alliance and struggle.²⁷

"Ultra-left policies" or "Left" opportunism tended to a position of "all struggle and no alliance" — a position which Mao claimed had caused "great losses to the Party and the revolution" in the latter period of the Agrarian Revolution. Mao used his understanding of the contradictions

within Chinese society to specify in detail the particular combination of alliance and struggle which was appropriate to the contemporary circumstances. While urging the retention of independence and initiative within the united front, he sought its expansion by exploiting the "dual character" of many of those who opposed it. With regard, for instance to those categorized by Mao as "anti-Communist die-hards", he proclaimed a "revolutionary dual policy of uniting with them insofar as they are still in favour of resisting Japan, and of isolating them, insofar as they are determined to oppose the Communist Party."²⁸

The policy of the Communist Party towards the imperialists was a reflection of the above policy. "We deal with imperialism," claimed Mao, "in the same way."

Our tactics are guided by one and the same principle: to make use of contradictions, win over the many, oppose the few and crush the enemies one by one....On our part we must draw certain distinctions, first between the Soviet Union and the capitalist countries, second between Britain and the United States on the one hand and Germany and Italy on the other, third, between the people of Britain and the United States and their imperialist governments, and fourth, between the policy of Britain and the United States during their Far Eastern Munich period and their policy today. We build our policy on these distinctions. In direct contrast to the Kuomintang our basic policy is to use all possible foreign help, subject to the principle of independent prosecution of the war and reliance on our own efforts, and not, as the Kuomintang does, to abandon this principle by relying entirely on foreign help or hanging on to one imperialist bloc or another.²⁹

But in terms of basic principles, the war years did not produce any major developments in foreign policy. The problems of the time were in determining with whom to form an alliance and to what extent, and whom to oppose, in the fluid international situation which prevailed. The problems experienced were thus in the realm of how existing principles should be put into practice.

In terms of the Chinese Communist Party's relations with the Soviet Union the war years saw the maintenance of basic ideological agreement, but a marked realization on the Chinese side that their Soviet counterparts would be of little direct assistance to them and where such assistance was attempted it was usually regarded as either misguided or meddling. The dissolution of the Comintern in 1943 was consequently regarded with total equanimity by the Chinese.³⁰ Stalin was later charged by Mao with having "tried to prevent the Chinese revolution by saying that we must collaborate with Chiang Kai-shek." It was only by acting against such advice (given in 1945), claimed Mao, that "the revolution was victorious."³¹

By far the closest relationship between the Chinese Communist Party and the United States, at least until the 1970's, was achieved in the latter stages of the war. The "Dixie Mission" — a team of United States observers — arrived in Yen-an in July 1944 and quickly acquired an understanding of the importance of the Communist Party to the future of China, the significance of its role in the anti-Japanese war and the advantages which would accrue to it as a result of American material assistance. The history of the Dixie Mission is by now well known — it is sufficient to note here that its most accurate assessments and recommendations were not accepted and its members were subsequently attacked for having made them.³² The United States government correctly recognized that its post-war interests in China would be far better served by the classes represented by Chiang Kai-shek than those represented by Mao Tsetung in spite of the latter's stated willingness to accept trade with the United States as a necessary part of China's development.³³ It chose, therefore, to support Chiang Kai-shek and to abandon, for some twenty-five years the closeness of contact and the possibility of peaceful coexistence achieved

at Yen-an. In the immediate post-war period, the United States extended considerable support to the Kuomintang forces in order to restrict communist advances. In Manchuria United States marines were allied not only with the Kuomintang but also with the former puppet regime and the Japanese army in order to prevent the communist partisans assuming control of mines and railways.³⁴ Although the Chinese Communist Party continued for a time to voice approval of the anti-Japanese American assistance given to China, it soon came to regard United States post-war assistance to Chiang Kai-shek as the fuel which enabled the latter to fight the civil war.³⁵ By 1947, Mao Tsetung had reassessed the relationship between United States imperialism and China to the extent that he regarded ^{U.S.}it as having "taken the place of Japanese imperialism."³⁶

The analysis of the world situation made by Mao Tsetung at the end of the war illustrates clearly the principles which he had adopted and the methods which he used to apply them. The fundamental change which he considered to have taken place was that the "democratic forces" had overtaken the "reactionary forces". What this meant in practice was that the forces of reaction, notably the United States, Britain and France, were severely constrained in their preparations for further war. They would be forced to reach a series of compromises — trade relations was suggested as one area — through peaceful negotiations. The idea is a foreshadowing of the later notion of peaceful coexistence. Any "compromises" which took place between the Soviet Union and the "reactionary forces" would be the result not simply of increased Soviet strength but "of resolute, effective struggles by all the democratic forces of the world against the reactionary forces of the United States, Britain and France." As in the case of "peaceful coexistence", it was stipulated that,

such compromise does not require the people in the countries of the capitalist world to follow suit and make compromises at home. The people in those countries will continue to wage different struggles in accordance with their different conditions.³⁷

This position is particularly worth recalling in connection with post-Cultural Revolutionary foreign policy. The long history of this position and its profound integration into the structure of Chinese foreign policy are implicitly denied in many analyses of recent Chinese foreign policy as is shown in Chapter IV. It is also worth recalling in connection with this later period that Mao's statement was in opposition to Stalin's analysis which feared a civil war in China would lead to the outbreak of a new world war.

The forces of reaction — particularly the United States — were faced with contradictions other than that posed by the Soviet Union. Contradictions between the United States reactionaries and "the American people", "other capitalist countries" and "colonial and semi-colonial countries" were listed. The danger of Soviet-American war which was being rumoured by the United States at the time was considered by Mao to be an expression not simply of the contradiction between the United States and the Soviet Union, but more importantly in the short term, it was a means by which United States imperialism sought to expand its "oppression of the American people" and its "aggression in the rest of the capitalist world."³⁸ It was this latter concept which led to Mao's initial exposition of what would later be called the "intermediate zone". In the analysis of 1946 it was simply referred to as a "vast zone which includes many capitalist, colonial and semi-colonial countries in Europe, Asia and Africa."³⁹

Mao Tsetung considered the United States to have expanded its power in this zone between the United States and the Soviet Union by the end of

the war. Having detailed some of this expansion, Mao went on to say,

Using various pretexts, the United States is making large scale military arrangements and setting up military bases in many countries. The U.S. reactionaries say that the military bases they have set up and are preparing to set up all over the world are directed against the Soviet Union. At present, however, it is not the Soviet Union but the countries in which these military bases are located that are the first to suffer U.S. aggression. I believe it won't be long before these countries come to realize who is really oppressing them, the Soviet Union or the United States. The day will come when the U.S. reactionaries find themselves opposed by the people of the world.⁴⁰

The concept of the "intermediate zone" and the role assigned to it by Mao Tsetung is so fundamental to the formulation of Chinese foreign policy that its two parts (the first and second intermediate zones, corresponding to the developed and underdeveloped areas mentioned above) have been taken as the subject of separate chapters — V and VI — of this thesis.

It was on this same occasion that Mao Tsetung launched his concept of imperialism as a "paper tiger". In answer to a question by Anna Louise Strong as to the danger of the United States using the atom bomb, Mao replied that,

the atom bomb is a paper tiger which the U.S. reactionaries use to scare people. It looks terrible but in fact it isn't. Of course, the atom bomb is a weapon of mass slaughter but the outcome of a war is decided by the people, not by one or two new types of weapon.⁴¹

The image was generalized to cover the strategic character of imperialism itself — "all reactionaries," it was said, "are paper tigers." Although they might have tactical and temporary superiority, Mao's image was to serve as a powerful reminder that such superiority was necessarily short-

lived. The slogan continued to be used in times when the forces of reaction seemed to have temporary advantages. The widespread use of the "paper tigers" theme in the mid-1960's and its meagre usage in the early 1970's is thus an index of the decline which the Chinese Communist Party estimates imperialism to have suffered during that period.

As the Chinese Communist Party came closer to attaining nation-wide power foreign policy issues involving the type of diplomatic relations to be adopted with countries having different social systems became important. While in the previous quarter of a century policy issues relating to international affairs had been formulated with considerable precision, questions of a diplomatic kind had understandably received little public attention. Mao Tsetung's basic position was nevertheless stated with some firmness as early as March 1949:

As for the recognition of our country by the imperialist countries, we should not be in a hurry to solve it now and need not be in a hurry to solve it for a fairly long period after country wide victory. We are willing to establish diplomatic relations with all countries on the principle of equality, but the imperialists, who have always been hostile to the Chinese people, will definitely not be in a hurry to treat us as equals. As long as the imperialist countries do not change their hostile attitude, we shall not grant them legal status in China. As for doing business with foreigners, there is no question; wherever there is business to do, we shall do it and we have already started; the businessmen of several capitalist countries are already competing for such business. So far as is possible we must first of all trade with the socialist and people's democratic countries; at the same time we will also trade with capitalist countries.⁴²

The "principle of equality" mentioned in the above report was expanded later in the year to assume a form somewhat closer to the eventual position adopted in 1954 where the "five principles of peaceful coexistence" were pronounced as the basis of relations between China and countries

having different social systems. A proviso about severing diplomatic ties with Chiang Kai-shek was also added. Mao proclaimed that the Chinese Communist Party was,

willing to discuss with any foreign government the establishment of diplomatic relations on the basis of the principles of equality, mutual benefit and mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty, provided it is willing to sever relations with the Chinese reactionaries, stops conspiring with them or helping them and adopts an attitude of genuine, and not hypocritical, friendship towards People's China. The Chinese people wish to have friendly cooperation with the people of all countries and to resume and expand international trade in order to develop production and promote economic prosperity.⁴³

In light of the developments in the diplomatic field of China's foreign policy in the post-Cultural Revolutionary period, the above statements are particularly significant. While the policy of recognition alluded to in these statements has not been implemented to any extent until this latter period, the reasons for this have been less to do with alterations to the policy than collusion by other powers to prevent its implementation. When the People's Liberation Army had crossed the Yangtze and captured the Kuomintang capital of Nanking so that eventual victory was certain, the United States reacted by issuing directives to its embassies in the major Western capitals to counsel their foreign ministers on "the disadvantages of initiating any moves towards recognition...and (2) the desirability of concerned Western powers adopting a common front in this regard."⁴⁴ Despite attempts from this time until later in the year by the communists to acquire United States recognition on the basis of the policy outlined by Mao Tsetung, the United States attitude was to persist for some twenty years and it had considerable success in persuading other countries to adopt a "common front". That success was judged by the Chinese to be an indication of the dominance of United States imperialism

and — as will be argued throughout the thesis — the waning of United States imperialism is judged to be reflected in its loss of ability to maintain China's diplomatic isolation.

It was these harsh facts of Chinese Communist Party-United States relations rather than any close alliance with the Soviet Union forged in years of revolutionary struggle which prompted the communists to "lean to one side" on attaining state power. Although the Chinese party remained reluctant at this time to engage in public criticism of its Soviet counterpart, there is ample evidence available to refute the official United States position which argued that the Chinese party was a puppet of the Soviet Union.⁴⁵ The Korean war consolidated the Sino-Soviet relationship and promoted the element of dependence involved in it as well as hardening the Sino-American disagreements. The war also ensured the protracted survival of the Kuomintang on Taiwan and gave rise to the large scale military containment of China by the United States. A further consequence of the war was the branding of China as an aggressor by the United Nations under pressure from the United States — a move which facilitated the subsequent diplomatic blockade of China.

While it is certainly not denied in this thesis that the fundamental principles of Chinese foreign policy, or that of any other country, are a reflection of the domestic social formation and the interests which this generates, it is nevertheless true that the practice of those policies is greatly influenced by the external restraints within which a country has to operate. In the case of the People's Republic of China, for the first twenty years of its existence, these restraints were severe. What was regarded by China as the imperialist hegemony of the time was sufficiently strong and sufficiently intent on denying China an international role that there was scant prospect of China challenging the existing hegemony or asserting an effective independent diplomacy.

After the Sino-Soviet rupture at the end of the 1950's, the international hostility mounted against China was increased and the possibilities for exercising influence at an international level were reduced. The issues which had come to separate the Soviet Union and China are discussed where relevant in Chapters III and IV.⁴⁶ Here, it is germane to note that even in the case of the Sino-Soviet split itself there were strong causal factors outside the control of the Chinese. The fundamental origins of the dispute lay in the developing differences between the Chinese and Soviet social formations and the differing world views to which they gave rise, but with sufficient hindsight it is clear that the United States was active in promoting the split. By 1959, the Soviet Union had come to place greater priority on its detente with Washington than its alliance with Peking and a choice between the two priorities was to some extent forced on it by the United States. As James Peck has written,

...the Americans made it clear that a detente with Moscow would be jeopardized by continued Russian assistance to China's nuclear programme. (An agreement had been signed in October 1957.) In June 1959 Khrushchev cancelled the nuclear sharing pact.⁴⁷

Adam Ulam has claimed that Khrushchev's decision to deny nuclear assistance to China was the result of an attempted package deal with the United States whereby West Germany, the Soviet Union's principal strategic fear at the time, would not receive nuclear weapons assistance from the United States.⁴⁸

In the early 1960's, the Chinese repeatedly warned the Soviet Union not to mistake the peaceful gestures adopted by the Kennedy regime towards the Soviet Union for a fundamental change in the economic and military dominance of imperialism, or its need to act aggressively.⁴⁹ As the

Soviet-American detente burgeoned, the escalation of United States involvement in Indochina, together with interventions in Africa and Latin America, were glaring proof for the Chinese of the validity of their position and the falsity of the assumptions underlying that of the Soviet Union. China considered that the Soviet Union could not be oblivious to the real intentions of the United States and consequently its continued "colluding" with imperialism could only stem from an acceptance of the rules of the imperialist game. Given this position, which they believe subsequent Soviet behaviour to have vindicated, the Chinese isolated themselves from their principal socialist ally.

Within the narrow boundaries remaining for the Chinese to determine their foreign policy practice with a measure of unilateral decision-making power, there have nevertheless been discernably different tendencies among Chinese foreign policy makers which can only in part be attributed to external restraints and changes within the international balance of class forces. The transition from the set of foreign policies which characterized the Cultural Revolution period and of which Lin Piao was the most prominent spokesman to the policies adopted in the period between the Ninth and Tenth Party Congresses forms the central concern of this thesis. In general, it is argued that the policies adopted in the two separate periods can most easily be understood as logical applications of basic Chinese Communist Party foreign policy principles to different international situations. It is also argued, however, that the character of the contemporary international situation was the source of major contentions within the Chinese leadership and that the tendency associated with Lin Piao was reluctant to alter its interpretation of the contemporary strength of imperialism and the manner in which it should be combatted.

The policy associated with Lin Piao came to a position of dominance in the Chinese Communist Party as a result of a similar combination of domestic and international differences. Although it is not possible to examine this transition in any detail here, some indication of its substance is warranted.

In the early 1960's with the collapse of the Sino-Soviet alliance, there was a tendency to create a Chinese version of Soviet "internationalism". Moscow, it was assumed, had abdicated its responsibility of socialist leadership so existing communist parties and states had to be separated from Moscow's influence, and where this was not possible, splinter parties had to be created. This policy can for the sake of simplicity be identified with Liu Shao-ch'i -- although for a time the whole of the Chinese leadership seemed to be in fundamental agreement with it. Also associated with this tendency was the development of an alliance with the national bourgeois governments in the Third World, particularly those in China's vicinity, partly to enhance her security.

By 1965, this 'Luist' tendency was in decline. China had proved unable to wean many socialist governments away from the Soviet Union's tutelage, the pro-Peking communist parties generally developed only minimal support and some of them had openly criticized China. Although the alliance of "anti-imperialist" governments had some initial success in stalling the advances of United States power in Asia, the destruction of the PKI in Indonesia, the failure of plans for a second Bandung conference in Algiers and the American aggression in Indochina heralded the need for a new policy formulation.

The debates within the Chinese leadership which led to the adoption of the new policy have been studied in some detail.⁵⁰ Essentially the problem was one of supporting the Vietnamese in their struggle for

liberation and national salvation without provoking Washington unduly (given nuclear threats from that quarter in the 1950's) and without becoming dependent on Moscow once again. It was from this debate that the formulation of foreign policy which was to become linked to Lin Piao emerged. The details of that policy and the perspective which informed it are discussed in the following chapter.

It will be apparent from the above that Mao Tsetung's understanding of Chinese society, both before and after 1949, has generally been expressed in terms of "contradictions" -- especially those between classes. This type of analysis, formally expounded in "On Contradiction"⁵¹ and "On the Correct Handling of Contradictions"⁵² has been adopted by the Chinese Communist Party and used extensively in their analysis of international as well as domestic developments. The priority afforded the various international and national contradictions and the relationship between them constitute a major part of the basic source material from which Chinese foreign policy is fashioned. While the guidelines for ordering and acting upon the various contradictions are extensive and precise there is nevertheless room for considerable differences of interpretation. As the brief historical outline above shows, these differences have been sufficient to occasion major disagreements within the Chinese leadership.

The body of this thesis is concerned with the way in which a new assessment of the world's major contradictions was made at the end of the 1960's by the Chinese Communist Party, the validity of that reassessment and its internal cohesion.

NOTES

¹Mao Tsetung, "The Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party", *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung* Vol. II, Foreign Languages Press, Peking, 1967, p. 318.

²*Ibid.*, p. 313.

³*Ibid.*, p. 315.

⁴By 1870, opium constituted 43% of China's imports, having risen from 3,210 chests (each of 150 pounds) in 1817 to 85,000 in 1860. A. Feuerwerker, *The Chinese Economy 1870-1911*, Center for Chinese Studies, Ann Arbor, Michigan, 1969, p. 52.

⁵Carl Oglesby, "Vietnamese Crucible", in Carl Oglesby and Richard Schaul, *Containment and Change*, Macmillan, New York, 1970, p. 51. Oglesby quotes Woodrow Wilson to telling effect: "Since trade ignores national boundaries," said Wilson in 1907, "and the manufacturer insists on having the world as a market, the flag of his nation must follow him, and the doors of nations which are closed must be battered down."

⁶For an account of some of these elements, see W. Brugger, *A Brief History of Contemporary China* (Mss.), Flinders University, 1975, Chapter 1, "Historical Background". For an account of the disruption and hardship brought to large sections of the Chinese population by one foreign company, see John Gittings' study of the British-American Tobacco Company in his, *The World and China, 1922-1972*, Eyre Methuen, London, 1974, Chapter 1, "Cigarettes and Exploitation: A Prologue". For general accounts of the situation in the first decades of the twentieth century see the classics: Agnes Smedley, *The Great Road*, Monthly Review Press, New York 1956; Edgar Snow, *Red Star Over China*, Revised Edition, Gower Press, New York, 1968; William Hinton, *Fanshen*, Monthly Review Press, New York, 1966; Jack Belden, *China Shakes the World*, Monthly Review Press, New York, 1970.

⁷"Manifesto of the Chinese Communist Party Second Congress", in John Gittings, *op. cit.*, p. 32.

⁸I.e., *Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism*, Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow, 1950. (This work was published in a French and German edition in 1920.)

⁹"Why is it that Red Political Power Can Exist in China?", Mao Tsetung, *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung* Vol. I, Foreign Languages Press, Peking, 1967, p. 65.

¹⁰*Ibid.*

¹¹"A Single Spark Can Start a Prairie Fire", Mao Tsetung, *Selected Works* Vol. I, p. 120.

¹²For an account of these conflicts, cf. John Gittings, *op. cit.*, Chapter 2, and S. Swarup, *A Study of the Chinese Communist Movement 1927-1934*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1966, Chapter 6.

¹³"On Tactics Against Japanese Imperialism", Mao Tsetung, *Selected Works* Vol. I.

¹⁴*Ibid.*, p. 164.

¹⁵*Ibid.*

¹⁶*Ibid.*, p. 162.

¹⁷Quoted in Boyd Compton, *Mao's China*, University of Washington Press, Seattle, 1952, p. 21, as cited in Stuart Schram (ed.), *Authority, Participation and Cultural Change in China*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1973, p. 22.

¹⁸"World Affairs Interview", in Edgar Snow, *op. cit.*, pp. 443-5.

¹⁹Mao Tsetung, "The Tasks of the Chinese Communist Party in the Period of Resistance to Japan", *Selected Works* Vol. I, pp. 263-4.

²⁰*Ibid.*

²¹As stated to Nym Wales. Cited in John Gittings, *op. cit.*, p. 57.

²²For detailed discussions of Chinese Communist policy during the war years and the strains these introduced into Sino-Soviet relations see, Mao Tsetung, *Selected Works* Vols. II and III, and John Gittings, *op. cit.*, Chapter 4.

²³"The Role of the Chinese Communist Party in the National War", in Mao Tsetung, *Selected Works* Vol. II, p. 196.

²⁴John Gittings, *op. cit.*, p. 88, referring to Mao's "Pacific Front Directive", in *Jiefang Ribao* (Liberation Daily), Yen-an, December 13, 1941.

²⁵The relevant articles are, "Unite All Anti-Japanese Forces and Combat the Anti-Communist Die-hards"; "We Must Stress Unity and Progress"; "Current Problems of Tactics in the Anti-Japanese United Front"; "Freely Expand the Anti-Japanese Forces and Resist the Onslaughts of the Anti-Communist Die-hards"; "Unity to the Very End"; and "On Policy". All are in Mao Tsetung, *Selected Works* Vol. II.

²⁶"On Policy", Mao Tsetung, *Selected Works* Vol. II, p. 444.

²⁷*Ibid.*, p. 442.

²⁸*Ibid.*

²⁹*Ibid.*, p. 444.

³⁰For a discussion of the Chinese reaction to the dissolution of the Comintern in some detail, cf. John Gittings, *op. cit.*, pp. 93-6.

³¹"Speech at the Tenth Plenum of the Eighth Central Committee", September 24, 1962, in Stuart Schram (ed.), *Mao Tse-tung Unrehearsed*, p. 191.

³²See for instance, Joseph W. Esherick, *Lost Chance in China: The World War II Despatches of John S. Service*, Random House, New York, 1974; Paul A. Varg, *The Closing of the Door: Sino-American Relations 1936-46*, Michigan State University Press, Ann Arbor, 1973; David D. Barrett, *Dixie Mission: The United States Army Observer Group in Yen-an, 1944*.

³³Cf. "First Service Interview", United States Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States:China*. (1944) Washington, 1967, pp. 602-14.

³⁴See John Gittings, *op. cit.*, pp. 119-122.

³⁵*Ibid.*, p. 134.

³⁶Mao Tsetung, "The Chiang Kai-shek Government is Besieged by the Whole People", *Selected Works* Vol. IV, p. 136.

³⁷"Some Points in Appraisal of the Present Situation", April 1946, Mao Tsetung, *Selected Works* Vol. IV, pp. 87-88.

³⁸"Talk with the American Correspondent Anna Louise Strong", Mao Tsetung, *Selected Works* Vol. IV, p. 98.

³⁹*Ibid.*, p. 99.

⁴⁰*Ibid.*, pp. 99-100.

⁴¹*Ibid.*, p. 100.

⁴²"Report to the Second Plenary Session of the Seventh Central Committee of the Communist Party of China", March 5, 1949, Mao Tsetung, *Selected Works* Vol. IV, p. 371.

⁴³"Address to the Preparatory Meeting of the New Political Consultative Conference", Mao Tsetung, *Selected Works* Vol. IV, p. 408.

⁴⁴John Gittings, *op. cit.*, p. 164.

⁴⁵Chapter 7, "Relations with Moscow, 1946-50: Ally or Rival?", in John Gittings, *op. cit.*, pp. 141-62, is a useful summary of this evidence. See also Chapter 20, "China: The Triumphant Revolution, 1947-1950", in Joyce and Gabriel Kolko, *The Limits of Power*, Harper and Row, New York, 1972, pp. 534-62.

⁴⁶For an analysis of these issues, see my, *The All-Round Restoration of Capitalism in the Soviet Union* (The Chinese View of the Soviet Union), B.A. Honours Thesis, University of Adelaide, Politics Department, 1970.

⁴⁷"Why China Turned West?", in R. Miliband and J. Savile, *Socialist Register*, The Merlin Press, London, 1972, p. 291.

⁴⁸*Expansion and Co-existence, The History of Soviet Foreign Policy 1917-67*, Secker and Warburg, London, 1968, p. 623.

⁴⁹*The Polemic on the General Line of the International Communist Movement*, Foreign Languages Press, Peking, 1965, *passim*.

⁵⁰See for instance, Uri Ra'anani, "Peking's Foreign Policy 'Debate', 1965-1966", and Donald Zagoria, "The Strategic Debate in Peking", both in Tang Tsou (ed.), *China in Crisis* Vol. 2, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1968; Donald Zagoria, *Vietnam Triangle*, Pegasus, New York, 1967; Harry Harding and Melvin Gurton, *The Purge of Lo Jui-ch'ing: The Politics of Chinese Strategic Planning*, Rand Report, R-548-PR, February 1971; Michael Yahuda, "Kremlinology and the Chinese Strategic Debate, 1965-66", in *The China Quarterly* No. 49, January-March 1972; Donald S. Zagoria, "On Kremlinology: A Reply to Michael Yahuda", and Uri Ra'anani, "On Kremlinology: A Second Reply", both in *The China Quarterly* No. 50, April-June 1972, and Michael Yahuda, "A Reply to the Kremlinologists", in *The China Quarterly* No. 51, July-September 1972.

⁵¹Mao Tsetung, *Selected Works* Vol. I.

⁵²Mao Tsetung in *Four Essays on Philosophy*, Foreign Languages Press, Peking, 1966.

CHAPTER III

THE DEVELOPMENT OF NEW THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES

It is the same in the international sphere, we speak of unity with all Marxist-Leninists, all revolutionary comrades, the whole people. We definitely do not speak of unity with the anti-communists, anti-popular imperialists and reactionaries of various countries. Whenever possible we also want to establish diplomatic relations with these people, and strive to have peaceful coexistence with them on the basis of the five principles. But these matters are in a different category from the matter of uniting with the people of all countries.

Mao Tsetung, 1962¹

The dominant and almost unchallenged interpretation by Sinologists of varying political persuasions considers the new Chinese foreign policy initiatives since the end of the 1960's to be a response motivated by Soviet military pressure — primarily that along the common border. This pressure, greatly increased in 1969 after a series of border conflicts and combined with the Brezhnev doctrine of "limited sovereignty" enunciated after the Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia, is considered so fundamental to the policy initiatives undertaken in the period between the Ninth and Tenth Congresses that all Chinese external relations in the period have been considered a reaction to it. Thus Chinese policy, whether it be in Bangladesh, the Sudan, the Middle East or Southeast Asia is best understood, according to this view, as an unprincipled opposition to any policy which the Soviet Union adopts in any one of these regions.²

Anti-Soviet concerns too, it is claimed, are responsible for China's turn to the West. The United States has been deliberately sought out as an ally in a power game so that the possibility of a Soviet attack might be forestalled by China's association with the American nuclear umbrella. In this scenario China is considered to have suffered a decisive loss in terms of revolutionary commitment for the sake of the American alliance.

This alliance, it is also claimed, necessitates compromises with respect to China's support for revolutionary movements, its opposition to other capitalist powers and reactionary Third World governments.

This form of analysis will be discussed in some detail in the next chapter. It is mentioned here to provide a background for an analysis of the Chinese reaction to international developments during the period. It will be argued that such an analysis removes plausibility from the scenario outlined above.

While the behavioural aspects of China's revamped foreign policy have been widely discussed, little attention has been given to their theoretical underpinnings. There have, as is customary in this field of study, been attempts to speculate in Pekinological fashion as to which particular elite faction any Chinese leader belonged with respect to the various disputes during the period.³ Such studies, while often admirably meticulous, are invariably contentious in their conclusions as well as, at best, being of marginal importance in relation to an examination of the substantive issues involved. This applies even to Soviet studies where the practice originated and where the volume and scope of information sources are greater.

The approach adopted in this chapter derives from the seemingly little recognized fact that Chinese foreign policy has consistently been based on consciously held and carefully articulated theoretical propositions derived from an analysis of the international order. China's perception of its external environment is constantly distilled through Marxist-Leninist perspectives to provide what one of the few authors to take such an approach seriously has called a set of "authoritative conceptualizations as a basis for Chinese foreign policy making."⁴ It is argued below that from late 1968 until late 1971 the Chinese developed, after a

most extensive debate, a systematic formulation of foreign policy principles no less coherent and in their view no less closely attuned to the realities of the international situation than those which had been operative in the previous phase. It is also argued that the new formulation signifies no necessary diminution in China's revolutionary commitments internationally despite somewhat misleading but superficial phenomena which have served as the basis for contrary interpretations.

It is necessary, however, in order to understand the significance of the developments during this period and to put them into sharper theoretical perspective, to outline the structure of China's foreign policy during the previous period, the premises on which it rested and the manner in which it was applied.

Foreign policy under Lin Piao and the environment to which it was a response.

Despite the fact that Lin Piao was the most vocal proponent of Mao Tsetung's achievements as the revolutionary theorist in the era of imperialist collapse and socialist victory, it is significant that in the period during which Lin exercised most influence United States imperialism, especially in Southeast Asia, was particularly aggressive. While there is no necessary contradiction here, since it is a cardinal principle of the Chinese perspective that imperialism will be driven to ever more reckless aggression in the face of its impending collapse, it is nonetheless true that many of the principles underlying the formulation of Chinese foreign policy in the second half of the 1960's were grounded in the assumption that the United States was determined to extend its economic and political hegemony by the application of sheer military might for the foreseeable future. The events in Indonesia and other parts of Southeast Asia provided ample ground for taking such an assumption seriously.

The primary focus on United States imperialism during this period was the linch pin of Chinese foreign policy. While Soviet revisionism submitted to imperialist nuclear blackmail and betrayed peoples' wars,⁵ it was not seen as an imperialist power in its own right nor was it seen as particularly interested in creating spheres of influence outside Eastern Europe. It is now known that Mao Tsetung had, even by 1962, considered the possibility of the Soviet Union acting in an imperialist manner.⁶ His suspicions quite probably go back much further than this as he warned in 1958 that the Soviet Union had developed an almost exclusively offensive military capacity.⁷ But in spite of these forerunners of the Soviet Union's foreign policy being categorized as social imperialism, such considerations were by no means public at this time, nor had they come to form part of the "authoritative conceptualization on which foreign policy is based." Rather there was a public belief that the Soviet Union would eventually rehabilitate socialism by means of a revolutionary overthrow of the "revisionist clique"⁸ and a recognition, albeit a critical one, of the support given by the Russians to the struggle in Indochina. In retrospect, the basis of China's opposition to the Soviet Union in the period in which Lin Piao had a dominant influence on foreign policy illustrates well the coherence of the principles governing China's policy at the time. Under Lin, Soviet policies which received most critical and hostile attention were those which were clearly opposed to the cardinal tenets of his policy. The Soviet Union with its emphasis on weapons rather than those in control of them and their consequently faint support, if not opposition to peoples' war in effect sacrificed Third World countries to imperialism. In so doing, the Russians were considered to be submitting to nuclear blackmail. Later, with the waning of Lin's star and the policies which it illuminated the Chinese

critique of the Soviet Union took on a new form. But during the Lin Piao phase the decision taken in 1965-1966 in the "strategic debate" was firmly adhered to as a practical guideline - China would not re-open the political alliance with the Soviet Union despite the strong possibility, while the Vietnam war continued, of an imminent American attack on China.⁹

While the focus of contemporary contradictions was considered to emanate primarily from United States' behaviour, the locus of these contradictions was clearly considered to be in the Third World - for it was there that the full force of American aggression was being unleashed against revolution.¹⁰ According to Lin,

In the final analysis, the whole cause of world revolution hinges on the revolutionary struggles of the Asian, African and Latin American peoples who make up the overwhelming majority of the world's population.¹¹

One clear implication of the above premises is the existence of a considerable pessimism about the short-term prospects of a revolutionary overthrow of capitalism in the imperialist countries themselves - as subsequent events have demonstrated, a pessimism soundly based. The struggles of the proletariat in capitalist countries were thus assigned a somewhat secondary role in defeating capitalism in their own countries, for the liberation struggles which imperialism headed by the United States was precipitating were considered to be potentially engulfing for the latter.¹²

An enormous revolutionary optimism was entertained about the global destruction of imperialism as a result of its over-extension in Third World insurrectionary wars for which it was improperly equipped and in which peoples' wars based on guerilla tactics would prove invincible. The world's "countryside" would overrun its "cities" in the global extension by Lin Piao of the image developed in the Chinese Communist Party's own revolutionary struggles.¹³ One of the most optimistic facets of all in

this scenario of imperialism's collapse was summed up in the phrase that "a single spark can start a prairie fire." This phrase of Mao's was interpreted during the period to mean that any liberation struggle was capable of quickly generating widespread anti-imperialist activity on the part of liberation movements around the world.

In Lin's global analogy states are treated as the analogue of classes. In the Chinese civil war, the city/countryside distinction was reasonably successful as a geographical description of class differences. Its adequacy depended on the extent to which class and geographical boundaries were coincident. Globalizing the analogy made such a coincidence less frequent. It led in fact to some blatantly un-Marxist tendencies within, but to a much larger extent outside China. At root a form of *étatisme* when shifted onto a global plane, the analogy tended to focus on "rich" versus "poor" nations rather than the character of the exploitation suffered by the oppressed classes in each country whether rich or poor. It contributed to the phenomenon of "Third Worldism" — the downplaying of the role of the domestic proletariat in the advanced capitalist countries in the overthrow of capitalism or even to the position that the working class in these countries is positively counter-revolutionary in almost the same manner as the ruling classes which exploit them.¹⁴

If the Third World was ripe for revolution, China's role was to be a "bastion of socialism" and "centre of world revolution"¹⁵ — a touchstone by which liberation movements could test the correctness of their ideology and a backstop on which to depend for moral, and to a lesser extent, material support. While concessions were made to the particularities of local conditions and contradictions, little hope was expressed for movements which did not expressly apply to them the 'genius' of Mao Tsetung Thought. People's war could only be fought by the people concerned

but without concrete applications of Mao's tactical and strategic guidelines under the leadership of the local Marxist-Leninist party committed to protracted guerilla war on the Chinese model, its success was unlikely or impossible. An editorial in 1966 put it in the following way,

...revolutionary fighters in Asia, Africa and Latin America are today waging a bitter struggle against imperialism, particularly U.S. imperialism. They have seen their own future from the glorious example of the Chinese revolution. From their own revolutionary struggle they have realized the invincibility of the thought of Mao Tse-tung. This is the reason why they call the works of Chairman Mao the 'guiding light' and the 'spiritual atom bomb', and regard Chairman Mao as their 'close comrade-in-arms', 'the most outstanding revolutionary mentor' and the 'leader of world revolution'.¹⁶

Mao Tsetung has subsequently been at some pains to dispel the extravagant claims made for his thought as a result of this facet of Lin's policy.¹⁷ At the time, Marxism-Leninism was said to have "developed into a completely new stage, the stage of Mao Tse-tung thought."¹⁸ K'ang Sheng was even moved to suggest that "scientific socialism is a unique creation by Chairman Mao",¹⁹ while Yang Ch'eng-wu posed the question, "Where can one find theory at such a high level, or thought of such maturity, either in ancient times or in the present era, in China or elsewhere?"²⁰ It is scarcely surprising that the Chinese people have been encouraged to "study Marxism seriously" since Lin's death.

When taken out of their historical context, the above statements have a slightly bizarre ring but the general framework of Lin's policy had considerable plausibility given the contemporary situation. Post-World War II history had been shaped to a remarkable extent by the expansion of American economic and strategic power. This phenomenon was nowhere more evident than in China's vicinity. The United States had largely replaced the collection of colonial powers which had dominated

the area. While China, North Korea and North Vietnam escaped the neo-colonial net, the United States was prepared to lend its qualified support to other anti-colonial movements in the area prior to establishing trade, aid and military agreements which ensured that the rich resources of the area would not escape from American domination. By 1954 the Korean War had been fought to a stalemate but the price which Asian nations would have to pay for genuine independence was revealed in the devastation of the Korean peninsula.

By 1965 this accelerated expansion of the United States had reached extraordinary proportions. Direct American investment abroad which had been less than \$25 billion in 1955 had more than doubled by 1965 and was increasing at a rate of \$10 million a day.²¹ More than half of United States corporations' profits from direct investments overseas came from Third World countries and some 70% of these profits were repatriated to the United States.²² The Third World had proved to be a far richer source of profit than Europe and Canada which had received more in direct investment from the United States but had returned less than half the amount returned by the Third World between 1950 and 1965. Countries of the Third World returned more than \$25 billion in the fifteen-year period; or in net terms, the United States had a net inflow from Third World countries of over one billion dollars annually.²³ In fact, "U.S. foreign investment, on balance, supplied capital to developed countries and took capital from underdeveloped countries."²⁴ The much vaunted American and multilateral, but American dominated, foreign aid programmes were equally beneficial to the United States and detrimental to the Third World countries.²⁵

The price paid by Third World countries for their incorporation into the American empire is accountable not simply in economic terms.

The cost in terms of political independence has been severe whether it involved direct U.S. military intervention as in Greece at the end of World War II, in Iran in 1953, in Guatemala in 1954, in Lebanon in 1958, in the Dominican Republic in 1965 or numerous other instances where American "advisers" or the C.I.A. have assisted in the overthrow of non-compliant governments. The United States was less successful in the Bay of Pigs assault on Cuba in 1961 and the attempt to support the Sumatran separatist revolt in 1957-58. But in the mid-sixties the U.S. seemed to be stepping up its global commitments and intervention. Coups which produced results favourable to the United States in Brazil (1964), Indonesia (1965), Algeria (1965), Ghana (1966), and Greece (1967) underlined the extent of American power. The Untung coup in Indonesia²⁶ was a particularly severe blow for Chinese diplomacy at the time as was the overthrow of Ben Bella which ensured that the Second Bandung Conference was not held. Apart from these events the escalation and Americanization of the war in Vietnam to the point where China's security was in doubt could not but lend weight to the arguments of those within China who promoted the "bastion of socialism" concept. Though the diplomatic forms in which the Cultural Revolution dictated that this policy was expressed were not to be found in the best protocol manuals, the fundamental principles of the policy were based on evidence which was incontrovertible. Lin's estimation of the primary contradiction in the world as that between imperialism headed by the United States and the peoples of the Asian, African and Latin American countries was not a product of aprioristic dogmatism.

There was also another aspect of Lin Piao's foreign policy which received confirmation from imperialist policy makers themselves. The United States in the early 1960's downgraded the "massive retaliation" approach to warfare which had been dominant under Eisenhower in favour of

counterinsurgency theory. The change represented a recognition by the United States that the Soviet Union was no longer a source of imminent nuclear conflict, or indeed of any direct military conflict at all. As George Ball, at the time Under Secretary of State, was to put it a few years later,

A main focus of the (East-West) struggle has shifted recently from Europe to Asia because the Soviet Union, having grown too powerful, has begun to have a stake in the *status quo*.²⁷

In Chinese terms, the Americans had realized that the Soviet Union had come to accept the nuclear blackmail which the United States imposed upon them. The change in American strategic policy was also a recognition that wars in which the United States was likely to be involved were guerilla wars, and these almost certainly in Third World countries. Vietnam has been likened to a "counterinsurgency test tube" and with some justification given General Westmoreland's infamous comment that "we are fighting in Vietnam to show that guerilla warfare doesn't work."²⁸ The American empire was no longer under attack from the Soviet Union but from sporadic and contagious liberation movements. As with the proponents of "people's war", counterinsurgency theorists recognized that the force of arms may not be enough to win in guerilla warfare. The discovery was a startling one for American leaders. Hubert Humphrey considered that guerilla techniques were so ingenious as to "rank with the discovery of gunpowder" and so ominous as to constitute a "major challenge to our security."²⁹

Thus on the major planks of his foreign policy, Lin Piao's view of the world reflected a keen appreciation of imperialist practice at the time as well as the Chinese conviction that the Soviet Union had abandoned its socialist responsibility to support the people's wars which

United States aggression fostered. Given the appropriateness of Lin's perspectives it is ludicrous to suggest, as some have, that his "battle drill Maoism" is a "deviation" resulting from "Messianism"³⁰ or that he and his views are a "joke".³¹

But while the basic tenets of Lin's policy were non-controversial, the position with which he was associated occasionally went a good deal further in postulating a rapid and cataclysmic transformation on a world-wide scale from one epoch to another. With such a vision in mind there was little need and certainly no attempt to create tactical alliances and the compromises, real or apparent, which they entail. State-to-state relations could have little significance in such a context.³² Thus Chinese diplomats had their functions reduced to providing moral support for revolutionary struggles and disseminating Mao Tsetung Thought. Consequently Chinese diplomatic relations were virtually abandoned as an instrument of foreign policy. These, admittedly peripheral, aspects of the Lin Piao phase in China's foreign policy seem in retrospect to be somewhat fanciful.

The abandonment of Lin's thesis between 1968 and 1971 involved major controversies within China and was at least partly responsible for Lin's downfall. It is to these controversies and the new policy which they brought forth that attention will now be drawn.

The emergence of the new policy.

Lin Piao's protracted loss of power and sudden demise were paralleled by an equally extended and ultimately decisive change in the foreign policy with which he was associated. The policy transformation, which only reached public theoretical maturity at the time of Lin's fall, has its beginnings as far back as 1968. Though most authorities on the subject accept 1968 as the year in which the transformation began, they usually

regard China as having adopted a courting posture towards the United States at that time in order to countermand the strategic pressure imposed by the Soviet Union on China's borders in the wake of the Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia. The primary stimulus for the new policy, therefore, is seen as a defensive nationalism. There is, in my view, little evidence to support such a position.³³ The analysis of the policy transformation presented below indicates that its primary catalyst was the perception of American weakness rather than Soviet strength.³⁴ The emergence of the new policy, its gradual deviation from the position of Lin Piao and its incremental development towards an articulate and coherent systematic position can be traced in some detail, for it gives some insight into the conflicting analyses of the international situation made by different sections of the Chinese leadership and their relation to domestic policies as well as the way in which the competition was resolved.

In his speech at the National Day reception in 1968, Chou En-lai, who, with Mao Tsetung himself, has become most closely associated with the new policy, hailed "a new historical stage of opposing U.S. imperialism and Soviet revisionism."³⁵ The National Day joint editorial also spoke of "a new era in history, an era of struggle against U.S. imperialism and Soviet revisionism" which "has now begun."³⁶ Lin Piao, however, more in keeping with his former foreign policy pronouncements which were already beginning to contrast with the newly emerging position, had the following to say:

U.S. imperialists are finding it difficult to get along, and so are the Soviet revisionists and reactionaries of all countries. Their counter-revolutionary rule will not last long. Awaiting them are the total collapse of the old world of capitalism and the winning of world-wide victory of the proletarian socialist revolution.³⁷

The latter victory and capitalism's "total collapse" became from this time on increasingly less prominent features of China's foreign policy statements and where these eventualities were mentioned, they took on a different meaning. At the Twelfth Plenum of the Eighth Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, the communique of November 1 stated that:

The Communist Party of China holds that all peoples oppressed by U.S. imperialism, Soviet revisionism and their lackeys should form a broad united front to smash the plots hatched by U.S. imperialism and Soviet revisionism in their vain attempt to dominate the world, so as to win victory and liberation more quickly.³⁸

The "broad united front" which is envisaged here clearly includes members of both the imperialist and revisionist blocs. The same echoes of a "broad united front" in concert with the "people of China" are to be found in the official greetings for the twenty-fourth anniversary of the liberation of Albania later in the same month.³⁹ Although the content of the united front which plays an important part in the new policy when fully articulated is significantly different from that suggested above, it emerges from an unbroken stress on a "united front" against imperialism and revisionism which was revived at this time.

The New Year's Day joint editorial of 1969 asserts that "the struggle for liberation by the oppressed people and oppressed nations all over the world is advancing from strength to strength with great vigour."⁴⁰ In this way, the fairly exclusive stress of the cultural revolutionary period on the opposition of "oppressed peoples" to imperialism and revisionism is modified by the reintroduction of "oppressed nations" into the anti-imperialist struggle. The same editorial includes a statement made some seven years previously by Mao which heralds future policy changes:

Chairman Mao teaches us: "The next fifty to one hundred years, beginning from now, will be a great era of radical change in the social system throughout the world, an earthshaking era without equal in any previous historical period. Living in such an era, we must be prepared to engage in *great struggles which will have many features different in form from those of the past.*"⁴¹

Interestingly, however, an article was published at the same time which is a quite thoroughgoing restatement of Lin's position. "The main storm centre of the world revolution," it is claimed, "lies in Asia, Africa and Latin America. In the year gone by, the people's armed struggle made new advances in this vast region."⁴² Southeast Asia, in particular, was seen as an area in which people's armed struggle had made progress in the past year.

In Southeast Asia as a whole, armed struggle by the people carried the day. In both Thailand and Burma, the people's armed forces grew stronger in repulsing the enemy's 'encirclement and repression' campaigns. A steady flow of news of victories also came from Indonesia, Malaya and the Philippines, where the people were waging armed struggles.⁴³

Also, "in Europe, North America and Oceania, revolutionary mass movements" were considered to have "followed one another unrelentingly" and the genuinely Marxist-Leninist parties were (said to be) "tempered in these struggles and (to have) constantly expanded their ranks."⁴⁴ Although the new "broad united front" was mentioned, there was no hint here that "nations" were to play their part in it. Rather:

All peoples oppressed by U.S. imperialism and Soviet revisionism and their lackeys will further unite, form a broad united front and launch a violent sustained attack on their common enemy.⁴⁵

The one concession to the possibility of an imminent policy change was the statement that:

There are twists and turns and ups and downs in the development of history and revolution. Some persons in the revolutionary ranks may waver, others compromise, still others surrender.⁴⁶

Reports of Nixon's trip to Europe in early 1969 revealed a new analytical perspective. De Gaulle was given considerable publicity for his attempt to co-opt the British into a decisive reduction of American influence in Europe — as in the words of the *Peking Review* commentator, he advocated the establishment of a "truly independent Europe" and the liquidation of NATO and United States domination over it.⁴⁷ Nixon was portrayed as exercising caution lest he offend either Britain or France — "a far cry", it was said, "from the overweening arrogance with which his predecessors, Eisenhower, Kennedy and Johnson, treated the rulers of France and Britain."⁴⁸ While the "total collapse" of the imperialist system was still envisaged, a nationalist element had been introduced into its probable causes. Inter-imperialist rivalries, or "the struggle to shift the burden of the crisis on to one another" was seen as a major factor accelerating the impending doom of capitalist countries. The changed assumptions implicit in the above statements increasingly became reflected in a change in strategy on the part of the Chinese — in this instance, vocal encouragement to De Gaulle's independent tendencies was backed up by renewed interest in Sino-French state-to-state relations.

It is at this time also that Peking increased diplomatic and trade contacts with members of the Eastern European bloc, particularly those such as Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia and Romania which were least integrated into the Soviet bloc and most open to penetration by capitalist countries. There is no evidence to suggest, however, that the Chinese regarded policy changes in these countries as the basis of renewed interest, nor is there evidence of more harmonious party-to-party relations which would

imply such an ideological confluence. Rather, the Chinese would seem to have followed the logic of their position with tenacity. If the Soviet Union had become an imperialist country then state-to-state relations with its satellites could be developed in order to exacerbate their tensions with the Soviet Union just as they could in the capitalist world.

The Ninth Congress.

In Chou En-lai's report to the Tenth Party Congress in 1973 he claimed that the report prepared by Lin Piao and Chen Po-ta in March 1969 for the Ninth Party Congress was rejected by the Central Committee and had to be rewritten "under Chairman Mao's personal guidance."⁴⁹ It is not clear the extent to which foreign policy issues were involved here, although it is unlikely that they were central to the disagreement, but the report eventually delivered by Lin does make significant departures from the position which he had previously espoused. Although the people/nations dichotomy was left in an ambiguous state, nations were elevated to a new level of importance in the anti-imperialist struggle.

While there are scattered references to the "people of the world", "the revolutionary struggles of the people of various countries", "the proletariat and revolutionary people of all countries" and the like, the world's major contradictions, listed for the first time since 1965, excluded all mention of "the people". The four major contradictions were considered to be:

the contradiction between the oppressed nations on the one hand and imperialism and social imperialism on the other; the contradiction between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie in the capitalist and revisionist countries; the contradiction between imperialist and social-imperialist countries and among the imperialist countries; and the contradiction between socialist countries on the one hand and imperialism and social-imperialism on the other.⁵⁰

It was the development of all these contradictions which would "give rise to revolution". The "broad united front" strategy was reiterated in its newest form:

All countries and people subjected to aggression, control, intervention or bullying by U.S. imperialism and Soviet revisionism, let us unite and form the broadest possible united front and overthrow our common enemies.⁵¹

The "oppressed people and nations" were guaranteed China's support; this policy being presented as a "consistent" element of the "foreign policy of our Party and Government". The changes which had taken place in the theoretical assumptions underpinning Chinese foreign policy at this stage can be seen by comparing the list of contradictions presented at the Ninth Congress with those presented by P'eng Chen in 1965.⁵² In Peng's version Marxist-Leninists and contemporary revisionists were seen as two poles of one contradiction while socialism and imperialism were considered to constitute the poles of another. Revisionism, therefore, in spite of the deleterious effects on those subjected to it, was not regarded as being imperialist. But, the principal contradiction as presented by Lin Piao was that between the oppressed peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America and imperialism headed by the United States.⁵³

Unlike the 1969 formulation, the Soviet Union was excluded from the principal contradiction. It is this aspect, the elevation of the Soviet Union to a parallel position with that of the United States, which is most remarkable about the 1969 formulation. The Soviet Union was no longer the primary accomplice of United States imperialism, or even the negative example from which true socialist countries should learn — it had achieved independent imperialist status.⁵⁴ The four contradictions reflected this elevation by placing social-imperialism on a par with imperialism in each contradiction. The only difference apparent is the fact that there are

no contradictions specified between social-imperialist countries as there are with imperialist ones, since there is only one social-imperialist country.

In spite of this new theoretical formulation, some ambiguity remained. This, United States imperialism was still regarded as "the most ferocious enemy of the people of the whole world."⁵⁵ Such comments were presumably intended to draw a distinction between the similarities in principle between imperialism and social-imperialism mentioned in the four contradictions and the more aggressive behaviour of the United States.

Another feature of the document presented by Lin was the renewed stress given to the five principles of peaceful co-existence as the basis for relations between China and "countries with different social systems."⁵⁶ While no other basis for relations had ever been suggested by China, little emphasis had been given to the five principles during the Cultural Revolution.

The Ninth Congress also marks the formal deletion of the more cataclysmic elements involved in the Lin Piao thesis. While specific revolutionary struggles in the Third World were guaranteed China's support, there was no hint that one or all of these was about to escalate onto a global plane and precipitate capitalism's prompt demise. There was certainly no equivocation at this time, or in fact at any time since, about the certainty of capitalism's demise, but its life-span seems to have been granted an extension. Remarks such as that made only a few months previously when the "whole imperialist system" was seen as "fast heading for total collapse"⁵⁷ are not found in the Ninth Congress report. Rather, in keeping with the four major contradictions outlined, struggles on all four fronts were acknowledged as the catalysts of imperial decay.

Domestic developments at this time illustrate the broader ideological dimensions within which these discussions were being conducted. Between the Ninth Party Congress and the Lushan Plenum of August-September 1970, a polarization and struggle occurred between what Mao Tsetung has called the "two headquarters".⁵⁸ The issues involved arose out of the activities of the May 16 Movement which emerged in the Cultural Revolution, and with which Lin Piao and Ch'en Po-ta were associated.⁵⁹ The primary issue involved in 1969 was that of rebuilding the Communist Party whose ranks had been drastically thinned particularly at the leadership level, during the Cultural Revolution. After his death, Lin Piao was accused by Mao Tsetung of opposing party rebuilding after the Ninth Congress.⁶⁰ There would certainly seem to be some evidence of a campaign to resist the call for rebuilding in that it was eighteen months before the first new provincial party committee was established.

By the autumn of 1970 in fact, only 45 of the 2,185 *hsien* in China had established party committees.⁶¹ When the process of party building did get underway it proceeded quickly but the influence of the People's Liberation Army within the new provincial party committees had, if anything, been strengthened in comparison with the very powerful position which its officers had exercised in the Revolutionary Committees of the Cultural Revolution.⁶² Such developments do not necessarily indicate what type of policies were being pursued or whether the People's Liberation Army influence was being exercised in a Bonapartist manner, though such inferences have been blandly drawn by some commentators.⁶³ In fact the influence of local rather than central military commanders at the provincial level and lower may well have served to limit any influence Lin Piao and the ultra-left faction had within the provinces.⁶⁴ Mao's initial remarks about party rebuilding at the Central Committee Plenum

immediately following the Ninth Congress do not in fact single out the People's Liberation Army as the main offenders in the conduct of the revolution by name — although sections of the People's Liberation Army would seem to be the group to whom he is referring. What he is concerned about in this speech is not so much whether they are army or party members or both but their style of work — whether they had imposed revolutionary committees from above or whether the mass line had been adhered to; whether they had been excessively harsh towards old cadres, and the like.⁶⁵

Also associated with disputes centring around "ultra-leftism" were a series of issues concerned with leadership. The precise basis for these discussions would seem to have been a number of quite separate events from which the same lesson about the incorrectness of elitist leadership was drawn. These events included Lin's promotion of Mao Tsetung as a genius in the Cultural Revolution; Lin's attempt to have himself appointed State Chairman after Mao's death and Ch'en Po-ta until that time; Lin's championing of his son, Lin Li-kuo as a 'genius' (an operation which afforded the latter rapid promotion within the air force); views which had been publicly expressed by Lin about the role of coups d'etat in historical development; the intrigue and conspiracy of the ultra-left and the like.⁶⁶ All of these events were linked in a general way with tendencies considered fundamental to ultra-leftism. The latter phenomenon was considered to be an idealist deviation stemming not from an incorrect view of communist objectives but from an impatient attempt to achieve them too quickly without doing the necessary and time-consuming mass work which would ensure that communist goals are not imposed from above. The "instant communism" sought in this way inevitably implies an elitist leadership style and an impatient hostility with the less tractable aspects of contemporary reality which bear little resemblance to

ultimate objectives. In retrospect, it would seem that this lesson, which was presented to the Chinese people at some length, is very similar to that which was drawn from the attack on the right in the Cultural Revolution. Just as the Cultural Revolution had as one of its principal aims the eradication of an elite drawn from the party bureaucracy, the movement against the ultra-left sought to prevent the rise of a military based elite, no more responsive to pressure from the masses although this time attempting to move them in a "left" direction.⁶⁷

This general tendency of the ultra-leftist movement and of Lin Piao's "commandist" and "conspiratorial" work style was evidently not confined to domestic policy. Lin, we are told,

advocated down with everything, both at home and abroad at a time when the revolutionary people were very enthusiastic. (He) tried to provoke tension with friendly countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America and he tried to sabotage relations with some European countries....He wanted to create trouble everywhere, both at home and abroad.⁶⁸

The continuation of the debate.

Just as the call for party rebuilding issues at the Ninth Congress was resisted by the group surrounding Lin, so too it can be shown was the foreign policy formulation adopted at that time. In one of the first public statements about Lin's disappearance, Chinese embassy officials in Algiers later claimed that Lin had opposed the "revolutionary foreign policy worked out by him (Mao) especially after the Ninth Congress."⁶⁹ In the National Day speeches of October 1969, Lin Piao and Chou En-lai gave pro forma speeches identical in most respects. Chou, however, stressed that "the peace we uphold is one based on the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence,"⁷⁰ while Lin omitted any mention of peaceful coexistence. The joint editorial published at the same time reflected the position of Lin rather than Chou.⁷¹

Acceptance of the Ninth Congress position would seem to have been resisted for some time. The New Year's Day joint editorial for 1970 claimed that "it has long been our consistent policy to develop diplomatic relations with all countries on the Basis of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence."⁷² But in "Leninism or Social-imperialism?",⁷³ the lengthy statement published in honour of the centenary of Lenin's birth in April, all reference to the five principles was deleted. While the statement concludes that "the broadest united front" is being formed by "all countries and peoples subjected to aggression, control, intervention or bullying by U.S. imperialism and Soviet revisionism," it is a surprising conclusion given that "countries" have not been mentioned previously.

In another statement published in honour of the Lenin centenary the position put forward deviated even further from that of the Ninth Congress. It was claimed that "the broadest united front" was being formed, not with oppressed nations and peoples but with "the people of the world", and not on the basis of the five principles, but "proletarian internationalism" which had previously, as well as subsequently, been reserved for relations with genuinely Socialist countries.⁷⁴ It is also noticeable that all aspects of the four major contradictions of the Ninth Congress receive adequate attention except that between imperialist countries which is nowhere mentioned. A week later a series of articles was published under the general heading of "Chairman Mao's Military Thinking is the Magic Weapon in Defeating the Enemy" — indicative of an apparent fear of a combined United States-Soviet attack on China but also one of the last such references to Mao Tsetung Thought as the locus of preternatural powers.⁷⁵ In June Huang Yung-Sheng, Chief of General Staff, speaking at a rally in Pynongyang attended by leaders of liberation movements in

Indochina specifically raised the question of Sino-U.S. relations. He reiterated China's long-standing position that they should be possible on the basis of the five principles, but since the U.S. was considered to be interfering in internal Chinese affairs by maintaining armed forces in Taiwan and the Taiwan Straits, relations on this basis were "out of the question."⁷⁶ These remarks are significant when it is realized that Huang Yung-Sheng was a member of the Lin Piao-Ch'en Po-ta group. At this time, the lines were being more and more clearly and publicly drawn in the struggle to oppose the Lin-Ch'en group. Huang Yung-Sheng's statement was presumably intended to counter the suggestion of Sino-American normalization which was no doubt abroad in Peking at this time. Huang seems to have become something of a spokesman for the Lin group. On Army Day, August 1, 1970, he described the People's Liberation Army as "personally founded and led by our great leader Chairman Mao and directly commanded by Vice Chairman Lin."⁷⁷ Mao later claimed this was an attempt to diminish his authority over the army and after the Lushan Plenum the formulation was altered. In the October 1 celebrations Mao was referred to as "the great leader of the people of all nationalities of our country, and the supreme commander of the whole nation and the entire army."⁷⁸

The Second Plenum of the Ninth Central Committee at Lushan from August 23 to September 6 has generally been judged as a turning point in Lin Piao's political fortunes as well as the policy he had come to represent.⁷⁹ It was at this point that the dispute became public. The communique released after the Second Plenum naturally concentrated on domestic issues which had been the bone of most contention, but the section on foreign policy was noteworthy for its revival of the slogan, "We have friends all over the world."⁸⁰ An obvious reference to the upsurge in Chinese diplomatic activity the phrase directly followed a reference to

China's "foreign relations which are daily developing" on the basis of the five principles, as opposed to the United States and the Soviet Union which were considered to be "increasingly isolated". This latter statement, along with the new slogan, was repeated verbatim by Lin Piao at the National Day rally, but Lin omitted all reference to opposing the Soviet Union. A united front was seen as "constantly expanding and growing in strength." but it was only understood to be in opposition to U.S. imperialism.⁸¹ One of the more mysterious allegations against Lin after his death was his alleged desire to "capitulate to Soviet revisionism."⁸² While this seems unlikely except in the broadest possible sense of policies which he espoused ultimately imparting a direction to Chinese society which would lead to revisionism, the above statements of Lin suggest he was unwilling to accept the categorization of the Soviet Union as the coequal imperialist enemy of the nations (or peoples) of the world along with United States imperialism.

The joint editorial published on the same day as Lin's statements was more in line with the alternative position which was developing on the basis of the Ninth Congress statement:

We must further strengthen our militant unity with the proletariat, the oppressed people and oppressed nations throughout the world and carry the great struggle against imperialism, revisionism and the reactionaries through to the end.⁸³

That the position adopted only a few months previously by Huang Yung-Sheng was not in line with the position of Chairman Mao himself would seem to be the implication of the latter's remarks to Edgar Snow in December of 1970:

In the meantime, he said, the foreign ministry was studying the matter of admitting Americans from the left, middle and right to visit China. Should

rightists like Nixon, who represented the monopoly capitalists, be permitted to come? He should be welcomed because, Mao explained, at present the problems between China and the U.S.A. would have to be solved by Nixon. Mao would be happy to talk to him, either as a tourist or as President.⁸⁴

From this point onwards, although the new policy was still very much open for discussion, reversal of it was extremely difficult for it had Mao's public endorsement. Domestic opposition to the new foreign policy orientation had presumably been countered if not silenced, at the Lushan Plenum.

The New Year's Day editorial of 1971, reflected the new determination. "Many medium-sized and small nations," it was claimed, "have risen against the power politics of the two superpowers, U.S. imperialism and social imperialism; this has become an irresistible trend of history."⁸⁵ It is upon this trend of history, which received wide publicity after this time, that one prong of China's foreign policy strategy would seem to be based. The newly named "superpowers" form the target of a united front no longer based exclusively on common exploitation by class opponents. Rather governmental, or state-to-state opposition to hegemonic control is the basis of the new "irresistible trend". It is the "power politics," or the ability and willingness of the two superpowers to exercise the international muscle which accrues to them by their sheer size and global interests which is perceived as the issue capable of welding a united front of all other countries. Against the superpowers, "proceeding from the position of strength" and wanting to "lord it over others," China began its promotion of an international egalitarianism "among all nations, big or small."⁸⁶ This did not imply that revolutionary movements or fraternal parties would lose China's ideological or physical support or in fact that they were no longer the main force

fighting imperialism directly, but merely that a new weapon had been added to the strategic armory of Chinese foreign policy. It is presumably with possible objections of this kind in mind that the editorial continued:

We will persistently fulfil our proletarian internationalist obligations, firmly support the revolutionary struggles of the people of all countries and learn from them, and together with them we will fight to the finish to defeat the U.S. aggressors and all their running dogs and oppose modern revisionism with Soviet revisionism at its centre and the reactionaries of all countries.⁸⁷

Beginning in May of 1971 a quite distinctive position appeared. This was a different version of the united front in which the United States is the only target. The May Day editorial claimed that "the international united front against U.S. imperialism is constantly expanding."⁸⁸ Although the new conventional wisdom of medium-sized and small nations uniting in opposition to superpower hegemony received brief mention, it was greatly overshadowed by the stress on the former version. Later in the month "A Programme for Anti-Imperialist Struggle" was issued by the editorial departments of *People's Daily*, *Red Flag* and *Liberation Army Daily* in which the same theme was taken up. It claimed that:

The international united front against U.S. imperialism is an important magic weapon for the world people to defeat U.S. imperialism and all its running dogs.⁸⁹

In an even more explicit revision of the Ninth Congress strategic orthodoxy, it was proclaimed in unmistakable fashion that the U.S. was the principal enemy of the world's people:

In order to completely defeat U.S. imperialism, the common enemy of the world people, we should further expand and strengthen the international united front against U.S. imperialism, unite to the greatest extent with all forces that can be

united, mobilise to the fullest extent all the positive factors favourable to the struggle against U.S. imperialism, and isolate and strike at the chief enemy to the utmost, so as to push to a new high the struggle of the world people against U.S. imperialism and all its running dogs.⁹⁰

Even in this statement, however, cursory reference was made to the thesis that, "more and more small and medium-sized *countries* have risen to oppose the power politics of the superpowers."⁹¹ It will be remembered that only a month prior to these statements American table tennis players had been invited and admitted to China, apparently at Mao's behest,⁹² making opposition to the emerging Sino-American normalization of relations even more urgent for those who considered it undesirable.⁹³ The period from February to September was generally marked by increasingly desperate manoeuvres by both parties to the dispute prior to the final confrontation and it is likely that the above statements were part of the Lin group's campaign. The United States-backed South Vietnamese invasion of Laos in February was seized upon by them as further evidence of U.S. unwillingness to vacate Southeast Asia.

By July, the joint editorial commemorating the Chinese Communist Party's fiftieth anniversary -- a statement unaccountably seen by some as a thinly disguised attack on Chou En-lai⁹⁴ -- the two conflicting versions of the united front were given equal emphasis and placed side by side.⁹⁵ But by July, Henry Kissinger was in Peking, presumably pre-empting further discussion about the advisability of normalizing relations with U.S. which Mao had publicly aired the previous December.⁹⁶ In August, only six weeks before Lin's death aboard the British-made Trident in Mongolia, the fullest statement yet of the new position was published and referred to as "Chairman Mao's revolutionary diplomatic line".⁹⁷ Variations on this title such as "Chairman Mao's great strategic plan,"⁹⁸ and "Chairman Mao's

proletarian revolutionary line in foreign affairs"⁹⁹ were also used apparently with the deliberate intention of setting the new foreign policy quite apart from its predecessor and to identify the latter with Lin Piao.¹⁰⁰ For the first time, the rapid increase in China's diplomatic relations was acknowledged as well as approved.

We have established diplomatic relations with more and more countries. The U.S. imperialist policy of blockading and isolating China has failed completely. Chairman Mao's revolutionary diplomatic line has won great victories. China's international prestige is increasing. We have friends all over the world.¹⁰¹

Somewhat ironically this Army Day editorial, which amounts to a thoroughgoing reversal of Lin Piao's policy, still refers to him, although in terms of which he would scarcely have approved.¹⁰² The article amounts to a 'defence' of China's flourishing diplomatic relations along the lines that they signify the decreased hegemonic capacity of the United States to prevail upon other countries to refrain from recognizing China. It is within this context -- the collapse of the United States -- imposed diplomatic blockade of China being symptomatic of the decline of United States imperialism -- that subsequent explanations of China's diplomatic activity, especially in relation to the United States, have been formulated. There is a consistency in the Chinese position which is worth noting here. In 1963, they had argued vigourously against the Russians that imperialist countries would never voluntarily accept the principles of peaceful co-existence even if such non-acceptance exacerbated the possibility of global nuclear war. The Soviet leaders adopted the position that the United States recognised such a possibility and had taken steps to avoid it by moderating its external aggression, to such an extent that it was prepared to opt for peaceful co-existence. The Chinese countered that peaceful co-existence could only be imposed on imperialist

countries and such an imposition would herald their demise.¹⁰³ Subsequent American foreign policy, especially in Indochina lent weight to the Chinese argument. But the United States rampant, especially in Asia, in 1963, or 1965, was a different proposition from the United States on the defensive at the beginning of the 1970's.

This change in United States fortunes was clearly reflected in precisely this month of August 1971 which witnessed the end of the post-war international monetary system based on gold, fixed international exchange rates and supremacy of the United States dollar. While it would be fatuous to suggest that this upheaval in the international monetary system was immediately responsible for the fact that at the same time the foreign policy formulation identified with Lin Piao, and which assumed a dominant United States, was written out of Chinese foreign policy statements, the two events are not unrelated. The irony is compounded when it is considered that the reconstruction of the provincial party apparatus in China which Lin is said to have opposed, was also completed in August 1971 with the establishment of party committees in Tibet, Szechuan, Ningsia and Heilungkiang.¹⁰⁴

Chinese statements on the subject still contain no hint that they consider imperialist leaders to have changed either their subjective orientation or their objective need to exploit with aggression. The sole basis alluded to for any change in United States behaviour is its decreased objective capacity to implement policies of aggressive exploitation which stem from its basic structure.¹⁰⁵

The editorial article under consideration foreshadows a defence of Chinese relations with the United States along these lines:

Imperialism will never change its aggressive nature because it is defeated. Sometimes it has to change its tactics and play every kind

of insidious trick, but in the final analysis it does so only to serve its policies of aggression and war....Imperialism means war. So long as imperialism exists, the world will have no peace.¹⁰⁶

The "whole Party, the whole army and the people throughout the country" were enjoined to "conscientiously study" the "historical experience of our Party in carrying out tit-for-tat struggles against the class enemies at home and abroad, so as to follow Chairman Mao's great strategic plan closely and advance victoriously."¹⁰⁷

Historical precedents for the new policy.

One such historical experience recommended for study was the Chungking Negotiations with the Kuomintang at the end of the war with the Japanese in 1945. Mao's article on the subject received regular commentary in the Chinese press particularly in connection with the normalization of relations with the United States.¹⁰⁸ The aim of such commentaries was similar to that of the original article -- to reassure cadres hardened in the struggle that negotiations are not tantamount to unity but may in fact constitute a new form of struggle.

How to give "tit-for-tat" depends on the situation. Sometimes not going to negotiations is tit-for-tat; and sometimes, going to negotiations is also tit-for-tat. We were right not to go before and also right to go this time; in both cases we have given tit-for-tat.¹⁰⁹

A further aim may well have been to assure the Chinese people that as well as having no illusions as to the continued imperialist character of the United States, they also had no illusions as to what was achievable in such negotiations. The article states for instance,

The Kuomintang and the Communist Party are sure to fail in their negotiations, sure to start fighting and sure to break with each other, but that is only one aspect of the matter. Another aspect is that many other factors are bound to make Chiang Kai-shek have misgivings.¹¹⁰

It may not be too implausible to suggest also that the description given in the article of Chiang Kai-shek was meant to apply to Nixon, "In Chungking, some people think that Chiang Kai-shek is unreliable and deceitful and that negotiations with him can lead nowhere. So I was told by many people I met, including some members of the Kuomintang."¹¹¹

"On Policy", another article chosen to illustrate the historical precedents for the changes occurring at this time in Chinese foreign policy, contains even more obvious lessons. The article, written in 1940, begins with an admonition against "ultra-left policies" which had been current in the former period of the Agrarian Revolution, but which, it is claimed, were wrong then and even less appropriate now. "This tendency," Mao claims, "has been corrected to some extent but not altogether, and it still finds expression in concrete policies in many places. It is therefore most necessary for us to examine and define our concrete policies now."¹¹² The article continues to delineate policies suitable to the present and to distinguish them from those of an "ultra-left" character. Mao wrote "On Policy" at a time when the Communist Party was under severe pressure from both the Japanese and the Kuomintang and when within the party, "the ultra-left viewpoint...(was)...creating trouble and...(was)... still the main danger in the Party."¹¹³

The general point made is that the present "policy is neither all alliance and no struggle nor all struggle and no alliance, but combines alliance and struggle."¹¹⁴ The similarities between the specific points made and the present situation are so great that a brief discussion of them is warranted in this context. The advice given in the article is clearly to be construed within a general framework which assumes that the Japanese are the principle enemy at the time. It is argued that struggle and alliance should be blended in such a way that all forces which can be

united against this principal enemy should be so united -- whether they be "anti-Japanese workers, peasants, soldiers, students and intellectuals, and businessmen"¹¹⁵ -- i.e., irrespective of their class backgrounds. This did not point to a loss of class perspective on Mao's part for he went on to explain that,

With respect to the alignment of the various classes within our country, our basic policy is develop the progressive forces, win over the middle forces and isolate the anti-communist die-hard forces.¹¹⁶

Even among the anti-communist die-hards, however, distinctions had to be drawn. In the struggles against them, "our policy," it is argued, "is to make use of contradictions, win over the many, oppose the few and crush our enemies one by one, and to wage struggles on just grounds, and to our advantage and with restraint."¹¹⁷ The contradictions in question here arise out of the 'dual character' of many of the die-hard groups. Among the "big landlords" and "big bourgeoisie", for instance, some were pro-British and pro-American while others were pro-Japanese. While all pro-imperialist, this distinction was crucial during a war of resistance against the Japanese, and opened the possibility of some of the die-hards joining a united front in which the Communist Party retains both "independence and initiative." "Ours is a revolutionary dual policy of uniting with them, in so far as they are still in favour of resisting Japan, and of isolating them, in so far as they are determined to oppose the Communist Party."¹¹⁸ Finer and separate distinctions were drawn between die-hards who vacillate in their attitudes towards the Japanese or the Communist Party as compared with those who were "out-and-out traitors." Thus even some of the "traitors" could be won over.

At this stage of the war against Japan, Mao was particularly concerned about what he called the "middle forces", how they could be won

over and not driven into the arms of the "anti-Communist die-hards". A few months before he had written "On Policy", he wrote,

The middle forces carry considerable weight in China and may often be the decisive factor in our struggle against the die-hards; we must therefore be prudent in dealing with them.¹¹⁹

The various fractions of these classes were analysed in great detail and an assessment was made on this basis of the issues on which each fraction would join in a united front against imperialism and/or the "anti-Communist die-hards".¹²⁰

But the most direct implications for Chinese policy in the 1970's in "On Policy" are in Mao's discussion of imperialism. The principle governing his analysis is the same -- how to "win over the many, oppose the few and crush our enemies one by one."¹²¹ The contradictions in question at this time were outlined,

First, between the Soviet Union and the capitalist countries, second, between Britain and the United States on the one hand and Germany and Italy on the other, third, between the people of Britain and the United States and their imperialist governments, and fourth, between the policy of Britain and the United States during their Far Eastern Munich period and their policy today.¹²²

On the basis of these distinctions, all foreign assistance possible was sought, subject only to the basic principle of "independent prosecution of the war and reliance on our own efforts, and not, as the Kuomintang does, to abandon this principle by relying on foreign help or hanging on to one imperialist bloc or another."¹²³

The ultra-Leftist alternative to this policy outline is sketched only briefly, but some indication of its different emphasis is apparent. The ultra-Left viewpoint, it is said, cannot accept "the policy of having well selected cadres working underground for a long period, of accumulating

strength and biding our time, because they underestimate the Kuomintang's anti-Communist policy." Further, such a viewpoint tends to "oversimplify matters and consider the entire Kuomintang to be quite hopeless." As a result those espousing such a viewpoint are not prepared to engage in the expansion of the united front.¹²⁴

If the reader is left in any doubt as to the contemporary implications of this text, the commentaries of the time make clear what lessons are to be drawn from it. It was pointed out in the most notable of these commentaries that for every historical period there is not only an appropriate general line but also "tactical principles and various concrete policies for struggle."¹²⁵ These tactical principles and policies, it is argued, are formulated on the basis of a rigorous analysis of both the domestic and international situations. We are told that,

...correct observations and a concrete analysis of the situation in class struggle internationally and domestically, the relations between the various classes and the changes and developments in them.¹²⁶

are the basis for a Marxist set of tactical principles and policies. The point clearly being made here is that there have been developments which make it incumbent on the Marxist to formulate a new set of "tactical principles and policies."

The developments indicated centre around the exacerbation of contradictions in the imperialist camp. The contemporary opposition indicated is clearly the remains of Lin Piao's foreign policy, which, with slight exaggeration is viewed as regarding all enemies as the same and "completely affirming or negating complicated matters" as well as not recognizing the changes which had taken place in their tactics.¹²⁷ The policy implications which stem from this lack of recognition are said to be considerable and include the possibility of forming a broad united

front and of isolating the principal enemy. The central passage dealing with the application of "On Policy" to the contemporary situation needs to be quoted at length.

To preserve their reactionary force and exploit and oppress the people, the imperialist countries and the various class strata, cliques and factions in all enemy camps are bound to collude and work hand in glove. But, as determined by their class nature, they are bound to have many contradictions and contentions. That these contradictions are an objective reality means they are independent of the subjective wishes of any reactionary. The view that all enemies are the same, that they are one monolithic bloc, is not in accord with objective reality. Moreover, with the development of the situation and with the people's revolutionary forces daily expanding, the enemies' contradictions will become more and more acute. The proletariat and its party must learn to concretely analyse the situation in the international and domestic spheres at different historical periods and be good at seizing the opportunity to "turn to good account all such fights, rifts and contradictions in the enemy camp and turn them against our present main enemy" ("On Tactics Against Japanese Imperialism", *Selected Works*, Vol. I)....On our part we must seize and make use of all enemy contradictions and difficulties, wage a tit-for-tat struggle against him, strive to gain as much as possible for the people's fundamental interests and seize victory in the struggle against him. To smash the enemy's counter-revolutionary dual policy, we must adopt a revolutionary dual policy. While persisting in armed struggle as the main form of struggle, we must also engage in various forms of struggle with the enemy on many fronts. The different forms of flexible tactics in struggle are required by the proletariat in the fight against the enemy.¹²⁸

The above passage shows clearly how little the momentous changes taking place in Chinese foreign policy at this time had to do with the rationale commonly ascribed to them by Western observers. The Chinese, whether at the time of Lin's dominance or in mid-1971, were basing their foreign policy, not on a defensive nationalism reawakened by the sound of Soviet battle drums on their borders, but by a thoroughgoing class analysis — one which attempted to take account of the subtlest differences in the inter-

national balance of class forces and their relationship to the domestic situation. Lin is not accused of succumbing to an international viewpoint which denied the relevance of class differences but rather of not noticing their complicated nature or the manner in which they were developing.

The quotation from "On Tactics Against Japanese Imperialism" -- that "all fights, rifts and contradictions in the enemy camp" must be seized and turned against "our present main enemy" -- has been generally interpreted in the literature on the subject in the most literal and superficial sense to reinforce the view that the United States and other countries are being sought out as allies against the "principal enemy" -- the Soviet Union.¹²⁹ The reason for this would seem to be that the quotation cited is the least ambiguous of any which could be used to suggest that the Soviet Union is understood in this way. In the context within which it is used, however, this interpretation would seem unwarranted. The world's "four major contradictions" as set out at the Ninth Party Congress are reaffirmed immediately after the passage cited, with the United States and the Soviet Union sharing enemy roles equally. Moreover, as already noted, Mao had written in "On Policy", that Chinese Communist Party policy was based on the contradictions within the enemy camp, independence and self reliance -- *not relying on one imperialist bloc or another*. In 1971, it would seem less superficial to suggest that the Chinese Communist Party did not have a principal enemy in the sense in which Japan was its principal enemy in the 1930's and 1940's. Consequently China's interest in this regard was a less Sinocentric delineation of global contradictions.

Another fallacy of interpretation which the above passage undermines is the widespread suggestion that in the post-Cultural Revolution period China's foreign policy displaced from theoretical prominence the role of armed struggle in the confrontation with imperialism. The

passage, which is by no means isolated, maintains armed struggle as "primary", but makes the point that the "dual tactics" adopted by the enemy necessitated a broader struggle in response. This article, which is the most thorough theoretical statement of the developing Chinese foreign policy platform cannot therefore be read as denying the validity or importance of liberation struggles (where armed struggle is after all most likely to occur). Rather, a broader picture is painted in which liberation struggles are the tactical expression of one of the four major contradictions. Other tactical principles and policies must be used in relation to the other contradictions if advantage is to be taken of them. This elucidation would seem to be an entirely logical development of the schematic principles established at the Ninth Congress.

In "On Chungking Negotiations", Mao had suggested that "complicated" brains were necessary to understand China's complicated situation.¹³⁰ To those without such an asset, the Chinese press of the time was something of a mystery — but it did express the new determination in foreign policy with considerable validity. In the same issue of *Peking Review* which bore the translation of the *Honggi* article discussing the relevance of "On Policy", there appeared an article on the armed struggle of the Thai People's Liberation Army against the "U.S.-Thanom clique"; a *Renmin Ribao* editorial greeting the establishment of diplomatic relations with the Iran government and stressing the latter's struggle against imperialism "in order to uphold national independence"; articles on Yugoslavia and Rumania stressing their determination to resist domination from the Soviet Union; warnings against Japanese militarism and a lengthy rebuttal of the American-sponsored "two Chinas" policy which was being debated before the United Nations.¹³¹ Such a collection of articles, although markedly dissimilar from a typical collection during the Cultural Revolution, never-

theless reflected a foreign policy which took seriously the "four major contradictions" in the world and sought to exacerbate them "to the benefit of the people."

The new developments continued.

To return to the stage which the debate had reached in August 1971, the Army Day editorial of that month which has already been mentioned spoke of the "excellent international situation" being the "result of the development of the basic contradictions in the world today." It then went on to talk of two separate struggles — one of "the world's people" against "U.S. imperialism and its running dogs" and the other, "the common struggle waged by all the countries and people that are subjected to aggression, control, intervention and bullying by the two super-powers."¹³² This formulation is a continuation of that begun in May¹³³ in which the anti-imperialist struggle waged by the "world's people" does not include social-imperialism as a target, while the anti-hegemonism struggle of those "countries and people" subjected to aggression, etc., is directed against the two superpowers.

The "superpower" terminology, it should be noted, is used strictly to refer to this hegemonic relationship — not to an exploitative class relationship in the Marxist sense. The term is used in a "behavioural" sense¹³⁴ outside of conventional Marxist terminology which derives from an analysis of a country's domestic mode of production and the international structures of which it forms a part. These domestic and international structures are conventionally seen as giving rise to a particular form of behaviour. The reason for the Chinese abandonment of this convention would seem to be clear. The basis for the existence of "inter-imperialist rivalries", of the opposition even of reactionary Third World governments to the United States on some issues, of Eastern European

opposition to the Soviet Union -- in a word, of anti-hegemonism is frequently not class antagonism, but the "dual character" of many governments in the intermediate zone which Mao Tsetung had noted some thirty years earlier.

The reason for the Soviet Union's exclusion from being a target of "the continuous victories of the world's people in their protracted struggles against U.S. imperialism and its running dogs," is also apparent. Quite simply, as a statement of fact, no such protracted struggles against social-imperialism have been fought. Such a factual observation does not, of course, contradict the general proposition made at the Ninth Congress that there is an objectively based contradiction between the Soviet Union as well as the United States and the oppressed nations.

These two separate struggles, both conceptually and practically distinct, are nonetheless closely related, for while the anti-hegemonic struggle is theoretically limited to nationalist objectives, the pursuit of such objectives inevitably embroils a country in a confrontation with imperialism-as-such within the Chinese perspective of struggles for national self-determination. The point is a critical one for without this link in the chain of Chinese reasoning their projected tactical scenario becomes pointless. They would be in the position of encouraging anti-hegemonic struggles for their own sake.

The intermediate zone.

The same editorial marks the revival of the "intermediate zone" which had formerly been used to describe a range of countries sandwiched politically, and usually geographically, between the socialist and imperialist blocs -- i.e., capitalist countries which are both exploiters and exploited as well as Third World countries.¹³⁵ The revival of the category marks a shift in its meaning to take account of the changed inter-

national situation — especially the collapse of the "socialist bloc". Now this "vast intermediate zone" was seen as uniting against the superpowers — i.e., it would seem to include all non-superpower countries, notably Eastern European countries.

For some time prior to this use of the intermediate zone, there had been an element of theoretical indecision surrounding the issue. The vacillation centred on the way in which Eastern European countries ought to be categorized, both in respect to their domestic social formation and their role in the international arena. The vacillation is scarcely surprising given the complex character of the issue which involved the nature of the Soviet Union and its international relations — both with respect to the world at large as well as in Eastern Europe, the way in which the five principles of peaceful coexistence ought to be applied to the Eastern European countries and a number of other issues which the Chinese consider to be mutually interdependent within their foreign policy structure.

To indicate something of the considerations which were involved in this issue, two of the related topics which appear to have come under scrutiny were the types of countries with whom diplomatic relations should be on the basis of the five principles, and secondly, the existence of the socialist bloc. The New Year's Day editorial for 1970 had (misleadingly) claimed,

It has long been our consistent policy to develop diplomatic relations with *all countries* on the basis of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence.¹³⁶

China's "consistent policy" had in fact been "to strive for peaceful coexistence on the basis of the Five Principles with countries having different social systems." Between socialist countries, relations were

meant to develop "in accordance with proletarian international aims" and China's role towards the oppressed peoples was one of support and assistance. Such was the policy decided and defended in the ideological dispute with the Soviet Union in the early 1960's, and repeated almost verbatim at the Ninth Congress in 1969.¹³⁷

In the months following the New Year's Day editorial — a time when the five principles were receiving considerable attention in the Chinese press as an explanatory mechanism for the increased diplomatic activity in which China was engaging — the more orthodox version of the way in which the principles were applied, and to whom, was mentioned frequently. The Communique of the Second Plenum of the Ninth Congress at Lushan claimed, for instance, that "we strive for peaceful co-existence with countries having different social systems...on the basis of adhering to the five principles."¹³⁸ But Chiao Kuan-hua, at the time vice foreign minister, proclaimed at celebrations for the Yugoslavian national day that,

The Chinese government has always held that the relations between states should be guided by the Five principles of mutual respect for sovereignty...(etc.)....These principles should apply to *all countries, whether they have the same or different social systems*. We note with pleasure that it is precisely on the basis of these principles that the relations between China and Yugoslavia have developed in recent years.¹³⁹

As noted earlier, there was a tendency associated with ultra-left spokesmen to omit references to the five principles in the period after the Ninth Congress when other spokesmen were giving them emphasis. Such a reaction is intelligible given the small role which peaceful coexistence had to play within the ultra-left foreign policy perspective. But the above differences as to how far peaceful coexistence should extend do not seem to be connected with this basic dispute. At least two explanations

are possible. Firstly, given the reluctance of the Soviet Union or any Eastern European country to accept a form of relation with China which directly implied that the country involved was not a socialist one (as a relationship on the basis of the five principles does), then Chiao Kuan-hua was saving the Yugoslavian leaders any embarrassment on this score by leaving ambiguous his assessment of the character of the social formation over which they presided. If this is the correct interpretation, then the concession involved in terms of theoretical classification is slight or non-existent particularly with respect to the possible gains to be had by the incorporation of the Eastern European bloc into a united front against the superpowers.¹⁴⁰

A more likely explanation, however, leads to the second topic which was discussed in the Chinese press in relation to the intermediate zone — the existence of the socialist bloc. If the Chinese no longer regard any other countries as socialist, then clearly relations with all other countries are "with countries having different social systems." There are, nevertheless, countries whom China definitely did regard as socialist at this time — notably Albania, North Korea and North Vietnam.¹⁴¹ But the "socialist camp" which China had in mind in formulating the relations which one socialist country should have with another in the dispute with the Soviet Union was at this time being written out of the Chinese view of the world. At the Ninth Congress, the role of the socialist camp had been minimized in the four major contradictions in the world — only one of which involved the socialist countries, viz. that between imperialism and social imperialism on the one hand and the socialist countries on the other. By 1972 it was reported that,

In East Europe there are countries, for instance Albania, which are socialist. Apart from these, countries in East Europe in general belong to the second intermediate zone.¹⁴²

The logical extension of these propositions did not come until 1974 when it was stated that, "as a result of the emergence of social-imperialism, the socialist camp which existed for a time after World War II is no longer in existence."¹⁴³ Thus the former "socialist camp" has been collapsed as a category. The few remaining countries which are classified as socialist do not, presumably, exercise such a centrally organized, Comintern-style leadership of the broad united front as was envisaged in 1963, when it was stated,

In all this we have but one objective in view, that is with the socialist camp and the international proletariat as the nucleus, to unite all the forces that can be united in order to form a broad united front against imperialism and its lackeys.¹⁴⁴

That the new foreign policy formulation which was emerging had come a considerable way from the period when only genuine Marxist-Leninist parties, adhering to Mao Tsetung Thought and engaging in protracted guerilla warfare received Chinese endorsement, can be gauged from two statements in the Army Day editorial to which reference has already been made. "Whoever opposes imperialism or makes revolution," it was claimed, "has our support," and "we firmly support the just struggles of all the countries and people subjected to aggression, control, intervention or bullying by the two superpowers."¹⁴⁵ The manner in which imperialism is opposed or revolution made seems no longer to require the dogmatic conformity of a few years previously and there is a recognition of the fact that non-revolutionary groups, acting in accordance with their non-revolutionary class interests, can objectively obstruct imperialist development or propel its demise.

As part of the new policy, China had given great emphasis to its being seated in the United Nations. This was achieved in October of 1971

despite the very active attempts of the United States and Japan to prevent it. It has frequently been suggested that Nixon's impending visit to China and the fact that Kissinger was in Peking at the time when Albania's draft resolution was adopted by the General Assembly warrant the inference that the United States had accepted the inevitability of China's entry with tacit approval. While it is possible that this was in fact the case, and United States government opposition was merely to quiet the voice of the "China Lobby" and the American right wing generally, the level of opposition put up by the United States both inside and outside the United Nations and the near success of its "important question" resolution suggest otherwise.

With Nixon's visit to Peking in February of 1972, the distinctiveness of the new policy formulation was fully evident. No longer was Nixon to be referred to as the "god of plague", "imperialist chieftain", or "fanatic advocate of counter-revolutionary war" — but as President Nixon. Criticism of U.S. policy, both domestically and internationally did not noticeably alter, but invective, particularly of a personal kind, was dropped. Chou En-lai's toast to Nixon made patently clear the limited store set by China on the achievements possible as a result of such diplomacy. In a rather pointed remark he reminded those present that "the people and the people alone are the motive force of world history."¹⁴⁶ Kuo Mo-jo had been even more frank in an interview with an Australian delegation just before Nixon's visit. "The Chinese," he claimed, "do not think the trip will change anything," however it was better to talk than fight with nuclear weapons. Kuo made a point of dispelling illusions that China was unappreciative of Nixon's motives in visiting China or his basic philosophy. "Nixon," he said, "makes this trip because of pressure. The pressure has come both from the U.S. domestic and international situation."

The Chinese (he also claimed) have studied Nixon's way of working and think that Nixon's way will not change. For example, on January 20th of this year in his State of the Union message, Nixon increased military expenditure from \$76.1 billion to \$83.1 billion, showing that he hasn't changed....Nixon has dual tactics, namely negotiation and at the same time military preparedness. The Chinese are prepared for Nixon's dual tactics. The Chinese... will not change for Nixon and if there is any result from his visit and negotiations it will have to be by compromises from Nixon and not by the Chinese.¹⁴⁷

Chinese spokesmen have gone to considerable lengths to explain that detente diplomacy can neither mask nor replace international divisions based on exploitation. To cite but one example, the former Chairman of the Chinese delegation to the United Nations, Chiao Kuan-hua (later foreign minister), claimed:

The Chinese Delegation holds that the people of all countries must not be deluded by certain temporary and superficial phenomena of detente at the present time and develop a false sense of security. While striving for world peace and the progress of mankind, we must maintain sufficient vigilance and make necessary preparations against the danger of new wars of aggression any imperialism may launch.¹⁴⁸

At the time of Nixon's visit, the policy of "studying Marxist works" took the form of a series of articles on Mao's 1930 article "A Single Spark Can Start a Prairie Fire", which had been written to Lin Piao criticizing his pessimism in the wake of the defeat of the 1927 revolution. This indicates clearly that foreign policy was an important element of disagreement with the ultra-leftist tendency headed by Lin Piao and Ch'en Po-ta and that normalizing relations with the United States was one particular bone of contention. The specific lessons drawn from Mao's letter to Lin are not new in terms of the ongoing discussion of foreign policy. The general point made is that when the situation had undergone a period

of rapid change there is a tendency to be swayed by instinctive reactions to these developments rather than making a thorough analysis of them.

Lenin's authority was lent to the proposition that,

Whether a correct appraisal of the balance of class forces and of the situation in class struggle can be made or not is a precondition of whether the correct line and policies can be formulated and the proletarian revolution can be ensured to advance along the correct road.¹⁴⁹

More specifically, "pessimists" were rebuked for regarding "things that are developing and changing as static and isolated." Such pessimists, "when the revolution advances smoothly or is at a high tide," are said to,

take an ultra-"left" stand, regard all successes as their own and push a reactionary line that is ultra-"left" or "Left" in form but right in essence. Persons clinging to this reactionary world outlook will inevitably set themselves against the masses, keep back the tide of history and become reactionaries vainly trying to stop the world from rotating.¹⁵⁰

The need for the Chinese to publish such material would seem to point either to a continued resistance to the policy of normalizing relations with the United States by ultra-left tendencies or possibly a more general attempt to explain the new policy practices to a less opposed but bemused population at large.

The "irresistible historical trend" of intermediate zone countries opposing the superpowers was set in historical perspective at this time and endorsed as the distinguishing characteristic of the 1970's:

In the 1950's U.S. imperialism was swashbuckling as the sole world overlord, claiming wildly that the whole world must be put under U.S. "leadership". In the 60's, the United States and the Soviet Union contended for world hegemony and domination....Today in the 70's, the medium-sized and small countries are uniting against hegemony and this situation is developing....

A vast number of medium-sized and small countries have come to the fore on the stage of history. They are further closing their ranks and waging a resolute struggle against the hegemony and power politics practised by the two superpowers.¹⁵¹

From about this period onwards changes which take place in the Chinese analysis of the international situation and their response to it are of a marginal kind — clarifications, elaborations and changes of emphasis. Some of these, however, are interesting.

The National Day editorial of 1972 pointed out that the five principles of peaceful coexistence were "not only conducive to the easing of international tensions" (the position expressed by the United States but not endorsed by China in the Joint Communiqué), "but are in the interests of the revolutionary struggles of the people of various countries."¹⁵² The point is worth noting. It is essential in distinguishing the Chinese position on peaceful coexistence from that of the Soviet Union which regards such a relationship as much more of a passive, defensive one. The Chinese, on the other hand, had made it clear as early as 1963 that their five principles were much more properly seen as embodying active and revolutionary attitudes and policies, in spite of the accommodating, diplomatic ring of the terminology involved. "We have always held," it was claimed,

that the correct application of Lenin's policy of peaceful coexistence by the socialist countries helps to develop their power, to expose the imperialist policies of aggression and war and to unite all the anti-imperialist peoples and countries, and it therefore helps the peoples' struggles against imperialism and its lackeys.¹⁵³

The editorial mentioned above stated very briefly the position that has been argued in this chapter, viz. that the developments which had come to be subsumed under the title of "Chairman Mao's revolutionary diplomatic

line" flow quite logically from the analysis of the world's major contradictions made at the Ninth Congress. "The new achievements on the diplomatic front," it was claimed, "are victories for Chairman Mao's proletarian revolutionary line, victories for the line of the Ninth Congress."¹⁵⁴

"Diplomatic achievements" continued to be given great stress — one *People's Daily* editorial even elevating the "establishment of diplomatic relations with all countries, which are willing to live peacefully with us" on the basis of peaceful coexistence, to the level of "principle".¹⁵⁵ The new perspective on the Soviet Union was also clarified at this time. "The Soviet revisionist renegade clique," it was claimed:

has further revealed its true colours of social-imperialism. With a growing appetite, it has further reached out its hands everywhere. It is even more deceitful than old-line imperialist countries, and therefore more dangerous.¹⁵⁶

The Soviet Union as enemy.

It is important to note here that while the Chinese, here as in other places, refer to the more "dangerous", "deceitful" or "vicious"¹⁵⁷ characteristics of the Soviet Union, this is by no means tantamount to elevating them to the position of sole principal enemy — although the temptation to do so has overcome a number of commentators. Chang Wen-chin, the Assistant Foreign Minister, clarified the Chinese viewpoint with some precision a year later in talking of the united front against hegemonism. In deciding which of the superpowers is the greater threat he pointed out that,

this should be viewed from different places and according to different circumstances — in Indonesia and Latin America the struggle is mainly against the U.S. This is only natural as since the Second World War most parts of the world have been under U.S. control, and although it has shortened its line, some parts are still under

U.S. control. But to take it as a whole and see it as a trend, because the U.S. has overreached itself, the Soviet Union takes this advantage to try to reach its arms into various parts of the world. So the U.S. is in a posture of defence, the USSR in a posture of offence. So as a whole it has the greater desire for expansion. On the other hand, the USSR has more deceit because it is waving the banners of so called socialism, revolutionary war, peace and collective security. The Soviet Union says it will support you, assist you, send you arms and weapons. Actually it sends its weapons to control - weapons were sent to Egypt but they were not allowed to use them without Soviet consent and in certain cases the weapons were in the charge of their own personnel.¹⁵⁸

Details of Soviet "deceit" in carrying out expansionism were cited. Czechoslovakia was mentioned as an example where the Soviet Union had tightened its rule even though that country was within its sphere of influence and Iraq, India and Bangladesh were cited as examples of Soviet aggression under the guise of "Peace and Friendship Treaties".

After this analysis, the conclusion and policy of the Chinese is in no doubt,

we consider the Soviet Union more dangerous because it is more deceitful and because quite a few people especially in the Third World can't see through the Soviet Union. That is why we try to expose it.¹⁵⁹

This question has been the source of considerable confusion in the literature. The above clarifications in the context of the consistent adherence to the "four major contradictions in the world" expounded at the Ninth Congress make it possible to resolve the analytical perspective being adopted by the Chinese. Firstly, the global standpoint adopted in sketching the major contradictions is necessary to set out the class antagonisms which were most acute at the time. The situation in any one country, however, is dependent not merely on its class composition in relation to

the general international balance of class forces and the major contradictions between them but also on such empirical imponderables as geography, the boundaries of major powers' spheres of influence, the specific history of the country involved and the like.

Secondly, when the Chinese express the opinion the Soviet Union is more "dangerous" than the United States the categorization being used here is only indirectly related to class antagonisms -- for with regard to the latter both the Soviet Union and the United States are considered to be "equally imperialist" and the contradiction between imperialism and those it exploits is absolute. But the description of the Soviet Union as more dangerous can be understood in two main ways. In the first place, as Chang Wen-chin stated, threat perception varies with time and circumstances. For China at this time, the Soviet Union clearly constitutes the greater threat, and while China has been reluctant to assert that the Soviet Union is its "principal enemy", it makes no secret of the fact that it takes the Soviet military threat seriously. The elevation of the Soviet Union to the position of "principal threat" is not the same as elevating it to the position of sole "principal enemy" -- much less is it the same as making this the determining factor in reformulating the whole structure of Chinese foreign policy on the basis of the perceived threat. It is noteworthy that this understanding of the Soviet Union as more dangerous (i.e., the understanding that it is more dangerous to China) is the only one to receive serious attention in the literature on the subject. While such an interpretation may be useful in serving various ideological functions it scarcely accords with the remarkably coherent body of Chinese literature debating and explaining the new direction being taken in foreign policy.¹⁶⁰

In the second place, as the Chinese Vice Foreign Minister also stated, there are at least two ways in which the Soviet Union is regarded as more "dangerous" in relation to the world at large.

The first of these ways is that which the Chinese have embodied in the very title they have applied to the Soviet Union since before the Ninth Congress — social imperialism. In their explanations of this term as in Chang Wen-chin's explanation of the Soviet Union as "dangerous" they concentrate on the deceit involved in an ostensibly socialist country pursuing an expansionist and exploitative foreign policy — of parading imperialism under the guise of socialism.

The second way in which the Chinese regard the Soviet Union as the more dangerous superpower in relation to the world at large is the most fundamental way in which they use the term. It involves the basic trend which was responsible for the dismantling of the Lin Piao phase in foreign policy — the relative decline of United States global military and political influence and the relatively increasing power of the Soviet Union. This trend they consider to have resulted in the United States being put on the defensive internationally while the Soviet Union has assumed an offensive role.

Further policy clarifications.

To continue with the analytical clarifications being made at this time — the new conception of the intermediate zone was developed in November of 1972, when it was stated that,

The first intermediate zone includes the Asian, African and Latin American countries which have suffered from colonialist and imperialist aggression and oppression in the past and are today carrying on a valiant struggle against imperialism and colonialism and especially against the two superpowers. The second intermediate zone includes the major capitalist countries both in the West and

in the East except the two superpowers. These countries too, are subjected to the control, intervention and bullying of the two overlords to varying degrees, and the contradictions between these countries and the two superpowers are daily developing.¹⁶¹

The "second intermediate zone countries", although under pressure from the "overlords" are still considered to be exploiters themselves.¹⁶²

A more important clarification, however, relates to an apparent dalliance on the part of some Chinese leaders with the "balance of power" concept put forward by Nixon in which China was to form one side of a five-pointed star along with the United States, the Soviet Union, Western Europe and Japan.¹⁶³

Nixon's concept has never been elaborated at any length, so that one can only speculate as to its meaning. In part, one could safely presume, it was a recognition that the United States did not have the same relative superiority in economic and political terms as it has in much of the post-war era, or even the ability to exercise it with such abandon. In part too, it would seem that there was a recognition that the United States no longer had to contend with the Soviet Union as the only source of potential rivalry. One presumes also that built into the five-pointed star there is an understanding that the five countries or blocs envisaged, as a result of their relative strength, are meant to avoid conflict among themselves (because it is too damaging) and exercise hegemony over their own spheres of influence, or at least combine to ensure no smaller state or group of states upset the prevailing order. For such an arrangement to work there is an implied flexibility of alliances among the major powers.

The implausibility of such a concept, even without the historical precedents which are witness to its futility, would seem to require little

exposition for the Marxist-Leninist, for whom aggression and war are an inescapable consequence of imperialism. It is rather remarkable, therefore that the idea was entertained at all in China. Direct endorsement of the five-power balancing arrangement has not, to this writer's knowledge, appeared in the Chinese press. However, Kuo Mo-jo, Vice-Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, and a close associate of Mao Tsetung's over many years, appeared to give some credence to the idea on at least two occasions in 1971 and 1972.¹⁶⁴ Chou En-lai, in a similar 'non-official' interview,

did not formally endorse such a view when given the opportunity. His reply was that "we admit that we can develop in some decades into a strong and prosperous country. But we have declared that we will never be a Super Power, neither today nor ever in the future."¹⁶⁵

Chou En-lai, while not directly rejecting the notion and admitting that China fully intended to become economically and militarily powerful, in fact rejected the hegemonic charter built into the balance of power concept in rejecting the title of superpower, given the specific connotations which the term has in Chinese pronouncements.

A more interesting rejection of the notion was provided, however by Chang Wen-chin, the Assistant Foreign Minister in mid-1973, in reply to a direct question about the Nixon/Kissinger concept. His reply deserves quoting in full.

There are now only two countries in a position to practice hegemony. Nixon has said that there are five forces in the world. Of course in Europe the economic structure is powerful, but there is not yet political unity and in the military field they are dependent on the U.S. Japan is economically powerful but this is an illusory power because it relies on raw materials from abroad. That is why we say that conditions are not yet ample for Japan and Europe to practice hegemony, whether they have the desire or not. As for China -- of course it is an independent and sovereign

country, but it is not so strong economically, and in the military field it only aims to defend itself. Also its policies and the nature of its social system do not allow it to practice hegemony. Only the U.S. and the Soviet Union can practice hegemony in the present circumstances. Both have strong economic and military capabilities both in the conventional and nuclear fields, which they are still developing, and they have also established military bases abroad. As Kissinger put it, there are only two military powers.¹⁶⁶

Chang Wen-chin's reply is interesting not only because of his outright rejection of the concept but also because of the way in which he rejected it. Firstly, he claimed Nixon was wrong because there were two, not five, hegemonic powers and secondly, because China would not and could not practice hegemony. Thus in his first argument he goes much further towards accepting the feasibility of the balance of power concept than one could have predicted of a Marxist by criticising the Nixon statement from within its own terms.

It is tempting to suggest that the concept has been the subject of debate in Peking — although not on such a scale as to warrant press coverage. But without the latter it is impossible to be sure. If it did have to be discussed at some length, then it would seem that the super-power/hegemony/imperialist rivalry conceptualization of international relations had begun to obscure class realities rather than complement them.

The Tenth Congress.

At the Tenth Congress both Chou En-lai and the newly elected Vice-Chairman, Wang Hung-wen read reports. The report delivered by Chou — at least in its foreign policy sections — is not marked by the crisp theoretical distinctions which characterized the report delivered by Lin at the Ninth Congress. The four major contradictions, for instance, which

were set out with such precision in Lin's report are not explicitly mentioned although they are clearly implied.

Chou claimed that "the Party and Government have firmly implemented the foreign policy laid down by the Ninth Congress."¹⁶⁷ The proof he immediately offers for this statement is somewhat less than convincing.

He states:

Our revolutionary friendship with fraternal socialist countries and with genuine Marxist-Leninist Parties and organizations of various countries and our co-operation with friendly countries have been further strengthened. Our country had established diplomatic relations with an increasing number of countries on the basis of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. The legitimate status of our country in the United Nations has been restored. The policy of isolating China has gone bankrupt; Sino-U.S. relations have been improved to some extent. China and Japan have normalized their relations. Friendly contacts between our people and the people of other countries are more extensive than ever; we assist and support each other, impelling the world situation to continue to develop in the direction favourable to the people of all countries.¹⁶⁸

Notable in this passage, which is aimed to link the prevailing foreign policy to the Ninth Congress are: firstly, the omission from such a general policy summary of a statement of support and assistance for the oppressed people and nations and secondly, the inclusion, or intrusion, into such a general statement of such practical achievements as entry into the United Nations, the developments in Sino-American and Sino-Japanese relations and the increasing number of diplomatic relations generally. This section of Chou's report is admittedly brief -- but as a summary of the Ninth Congress it is scarcely accurate.

The next section of Chou's report deals with "Smashing the Lin Piao Anti-Party Clique". The most significant point made with respect to foreign policy is that,

Today, in both international and domestic struggles, tendencies may still occur similar to those of the past, namely, where there was an alliance with the bourgeoisie, necessary struggles were forgotten and when there was a split with the bourgeoisie the possibility of an alliance under given conditions was forgotten.¹⁶⁹

The context of the passage makes it reasonably clear that the former error was associated with Liu Shao-chi and the latter with Lin Piao. Chou's catalogue of Lin's deviations in relation to domestic policy is quite extensive and it is therefore surprising to see such little attention devoted to Lin's foreign policy. Given the theoretical material which had been assembled over the previous two years and more as a critique of Lin's foreign policy it is also surprising that Chou did not draw on it more heavily.

The major section of Chou's report and the section most concerned with foreign policy is entitled "On the Situation and Our Tasks". As mentioned above, the four major contradictions which had been outlined by Lin, are implicit in Chou's analysis, but they certainly do not receive the same emphasis as given them by Lin. The changes can best be illustrated by setting the appropriate passages from the two reports alongside each other.

Lin

On the one hand, the revolutionary movement of the proletariat of the world and of the people of various countries is vigorously surging forward. The armed struggles of the people of southern Vietnam, Malaya, Indonesia, India, Palestine and other countries and regions in Asia, Africa and Latin America are steadily growing in strength. The truth that "political power grows out of the barrel of a gun" is being grasped by ever broader masses of the oppressed people and nations.¹⁷⁰

Chou

The Third World has strengthened its unity in the struggle against hegemonism and power politics of the superpowers and is playing an ever more significant role in international affairs. The great victories won by the people of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia in their war against U.S. aggression and for national salvation have strongly encouraged the people of the world in their struggles against imperialism and colonialism. A new situation has arisen

The U.S. imperialists...have dispatched aggressor troops to many countries and have also set up hundreds upon hundreds of military bases and military installations in different parts of the world....By doing so they make themselves the enemy of the people everywhere, and find themselves besieged and battered by the broad masses of the proletariat and people all over the world, and this will definitely lead to revolutions throughout the world on a still larger scale.¹⁷¹

in the Korean people's struggle for the independent and peaceful reunification of their fatherland. The struggles of the Palestinian and other Arab peoples against aggression by Israeli, Zionism, the African peoples' struggles for maintaining 200 nautical mile territorial waters or economic zones all continue to forge ahead. The struggles of the Asian, African and Latin American peoples to win and defend national independence and safeguard state sovereignty and national resources have further deepened and broadened. The just struggles of the Third World as well as of the people of Europe, North America and Oceania support and encourage each other. Countries want independence, nations want liberation and people want revolution — this has become an irresistible historical trend.¹⁷²

The difference in theoretical perspective is marked. For Lin Piao, there is no question of Third World *governments* playing an anti-hegemonic role — let alone an anti-imperialist one. Nor did Lin envisage support for the defence of "state sovereignty", for the unity of Third World countries generally or for their increased role on the international stage. While the report delivered by Lin laid the groundwork for very significant changes as has been shown — it was still very much a product of its times in its discussion of the Third World. "Armed struggle" is the secret which would free the people of the Third World and more and more of them were coming to know it. The United States on the other hand, was persisting in its counterrevolutionary aggression and thereby continued to encourage widescale revolution.

For Chou En-lai, in 1973, the Third World was discussed almost entirely within the bounds of opposition to superpower hegemony. The tactic to be adopted in this struggle is no longer simply "armed struggle",

but unity on a country-to-country, government-to-government basis. The passage is characteristic of Chou's report in which direct anti-imperialist struggle is hardly mentioned while the anti-hegemonic struggle against the superpowers receives great attention.

The differences between the two reports is also very clear in their respective approach to proletarian struggles within capitalist countries.

Lin

...the revolutionary movement of the proletariat of the world and of the people of various countries is vigorously surging forward....An unprecedentedly gigantic revolutionary mass movement has broken out in Japan, Western Europe and North America, the "heartlands" of capitalism. More and more people are awakening.¹⁷³

...we firmly support the proletariat, the students and youth and the masses of the Black people of the United States in their just struggle against the U.S. ruling clique; we firmly support the proletariat and the labouring people of the Soviet Union in their just struggle to overthrow the Soviet revisionist regegade clique...we firmly support the revolutionary struggles of the people of Japan and the West European and Oceanian countries.¹⁷⁵

Chou

...on the international front, our party must uphold proletarian internationalism, uphold the Party's consistent policies, strengthen our unity with the proletariat and the oppressed people and nations of the whole world.¹⁷⁴

Thus while Lin in 1969 was prepared to specifically endorse the working class struggles in both capitalist and revisionist countries and to speak of mass "revolutionary" movements in the capitalist countries, Chou En-lai, on the other hand was not prepared to state that the proletarian struggle was "vigorously surging forward" or to endorse any specific proletarian struggles.

Another interesting development over the period of four and one half years is the change in attitude towards other Marxist-Leninist parties.

The respective statements read:

Lin

The genuine fraternal Marxist-Leninist Parties and organizations are growing steadily in the course of integrating Marxism-Leninism with the concrete practice of revolution in their own countries.¹⁷⁶

The genuine Marxist-Leninist Parties and organizations of various countries, which are composed of the advanced elements of the proletariat, are a new rising force with infinitely broad prospects. The Communist Party of China is determined to unite and fight together with them.¹⁷⁸

Chou

We must unite with all genuine Marxist-Leninist Parties and organizations the world over, and carry the struggle against modern revisionism through to the end.¹⁷⁷

As has been noted previously, in the course of the cultural revolution the Marxist-Leninist parties which were favourably regarded by China received considerable publicity in the Chinese press. The fact that they were usually small even in comparison to other established communist parties particularly in the developed capitalist countries tended not to receive publicity. It was a time for ideological purity and the Marxist-Leninist parties were considered to embody it. The different statements of Lin and Chou perhaps reflect a change in the way such parties are now regarded. China is now involved in diplomatic and cultural relations with many of the governments and people of countries where formerly the local Marxist-Leninist party was the only contact. Its information on the relative strength, influence and policies of the local parties is therefore no longer provided solely by those parties themselves, but supported by firsthand observation. It is most likely that the new information available to China would tend to reduce rather than improve its estimation of such parties' worth as revolutionary organizations. Such remarks are largely speculation but the different bases for unity between China and the Marxist-Leninist parties expounded by Chou and Lin suggest the parties have indeed been downgraded by Peking. Lin talked of uniting

"to fight together with them," in their capacity as "advanced elements of the Proletariat" while Chou merely sought unity with them in the context of carrying on "the struggle against modern revisionism." Whether they are still considered likely or capable forces to carry on the struggle against the local bourgeoisie is not mentioned in 1973.

Perhaps the most noticeable of all difference between the two reports is the great emphasis placed by Chou En-lai on exploiting the anti-hegemonic struggle and in defence of the particular type of compromise which is involved in such tactics. The basis for Chou En-lai's emphasis is the assumption that there is a "broad united front" against the hegemonism of the superpowers as well as a number of united fronts on specific issues against them, and that these united fronts are at least as important in the current situation as the more direct anti-imperialist struggle. A few selected passages will illustrate the different perspectives involved.

Lin

They collude and at the same time contend with each other in a vain attempt to redivide the world.... They scheme against each other and get locked in strife for raw materials, markets, dependencies, important strategic points and spheres of influence. They are both stepping up arms expansion and war preparations, each trying to realize its own ambitions. Lenin pointed out: Imperialism means war. "...imperialist wars are absolutely inevitable under such an economic system, as long as private property in the means of production exists."¹⁷⁹

Chou

Lenin said that "an essential feature of imperialism is the rivalry between several Great Powers in the striving for hegemony." Today, it is mainly the two nuclear superpowers — the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. — that are contending for hegemony ... They contend as well as collude with each other.... At present, the Soviet revisionists are "making a feint to the east while attacking in the west," and stepping up their contention in Europe and their expansion in the Mediterranean, the Indian Ocean and every place their hands can reach. The U.S.-Soviet hegemony is the cause of world intranquillity. It cannot be covered up by any false appearances they create and is already perceived by an increasing number of people and countries. It has met with strong resistance from the Third World and has caused resentment on the part of Japan and West European countries.¹⁸⁰

Thus while Lin quoted Lenin to show that imperialism means war in 1969, in 1973 Chou quoted him to prove that imperialism means rivalry.¹⁸¹ Both are, of course, correct depending on whether the strictly exploitative aspect of imperialism is being considered or its coercive, hegemonic aspect. In a passage, the like of which was certainly not to be found in Lin's report, Chou En-lai talked about the type of compromises necessary:

We should point out here that necessary compromises between revolutionary countries and imperialist countries must be distinguished from collusion and compromise between Soviet revisionism and U.S. imperialism. Lenin put it well: "There are compromises and compromises. One must be able to analyse the situation and the concrete conditions of each compromise, or of each variety of compromise. One must learn to distinguish between a man who gave bandits money and firearms in order to lessen the damage they can do and a man who gives bandits money and firearms in order to share in the loot." ("Left-Wing" Communism, and Infantile Disorder) The Brest-Litovsk Treaty concluded by Lenin with German imperialism comes under the former category; and the doings of Khrushchev and Brezhnev, both betrayers of Lenin, fall under the latter.¹⁸²

Chou could as well have quoted Mao on the subject of compromise in order to point out the continuity of tactical compromise within the Chinese Communist Party. After the Second World War, Mao had argued that "the capitalist and the socialist countries will yet reach compromises on a number of international matters, because compromise will be advantageous."¹⁸³ Explaining this policy in some detail a few months later, Mao made it clear that compromise on "all international issues" was impossible as long as "the United States, Britain and France continue to be ruled by reactionaries." He also made clear that such international compromises do not entail similar compromises on the part of domestic revolutionaries within the capitalist countries themselves. "The people in those countries," he claimed, "will continue to wage different struggles in accordance with their different conditions."¹⁸⁴

Wang Hung-wen in his Report on the revision of the Party Constitution given at the Tenth Congress made some brief comments about foreign policy.¹⁸⁵ He carefully drew the distinction between China's permanent policy of always standing "together with the proletariat and the revolutionary people of the world to oppose imperialism, modern revisionism and all reaction" and China's current and temporary policy which aims "to oppose especially the hegemonism of the two superpowers -- the U.S. and the U.S.S.R."¹⁸⁶ The remainder of his comments were confined to reiterating China's own position with regard to hegemony -- viz. that it seeks to become "prosperous and strong" but not to seek hegemony or become a superpower.

The basis of the new policy.

The foregoing textual analysis shows that after extensive debate over a period of some years, the Chinese Communist Party radically altered a number of key assumptions underpinning its foreign policy. The primary focus of China's concern was shifted from United States imperialist aggression in the Third World to the hegemony of the two superpowers in the intermediate zone. The most critical basis for this reassessment was that the United States, as well as being subject to the economic problems and long-term decline inherent in the very nature of capitalism, had entered a period where these characteristics of capitalism were being realized at an accelerated rate. Although Chinese spokesmen had continually remarked on the inevitability of United States imperialism's downfall even prior to the Cultural Revolution, a tone of immediacy was injected into their predictions at the time of Nixon's election as President in 1968. The Chinese media concentrated, in its coverage of the election on those sections of his campaign which recognized the necessity of reducing America's overseas commitments, its lonehanded policing of the capitalist

empire and its military overextension. They had, in fact, extracted from the mass of campaign propaganda the seeds of the "Nixon Doctrine", which they clearly regard as the logical military consequence of United States imperialism's decline. Underlying the new policy formulation, therefore, is the assumption that an era has been entered in which U.S. imperialism is no longer capable of the rampant aggression which characterized its previous behaviour, particularly in the Third World, but where it is on the defensive -- as much from rivals with similar imperial ambitions as from Third World peoples themselves. The other critical assumption involved in this aspect of the reassessment was the reappraisal of the Soviet Union as imperialist -- a judgement which entered the formulation of China's foreign policy at the time of the Ninth Congress and was thoroughly integrated into its web of principles and policies over the ensuing years. The Soviet Union had become an imperialist power in its own right. As such it was subject to the same general tendency to self-destruct under the weight of its own internal contradictions as any other imperialist power, but at this particular stage of history it was advancing at a time when United States imperialism was in serious decline and moreover it was advancing under the banner of socialism. From its modest beginnings in exploiting the Eastern European bloc countries, Soviet social-imperialism was regarded as having set its sights on the world. This relative increase in the fortunes of Soviet social-imperialism, however, was only one of the perceived assaults on the dominance of United States imperialism. The domestic proletariat as well as the people of the Third World were still considered to be directly countering imperialist power while the states of the Third World in league with those of the second intermediate zone had begun an assault on the hegemony of both the United States and the Soviet Union. By 1972, this assault of the inter-

mediate zone countries had been established as the distinguishing feature of the 1970's.¹⁸⁷ With the change in perspective on such fundamental aspects of China's foreign policy, it was not surprising that changes in emphasis occurred in almost every other aspect of China's policy. Under the Lin Piao formulation of foreign policy the world's contradictions frequently tended to be reduced to one -- that between United States imperialism and the peoples of the Third World. In the new formulation the four major contradictions outlined at the Ninth Congress all receive attention.

One consequence of the alteration of the key elements mentioned above was a shift, or at least a diversification, of the locus of contemporary contradictions. While the United States is perceived as being no less anxious to retain its dominance over Third World countries, it is also perceived as being increasingly unwilling and unable to do so directly and therefore in need of assistance from the other major capitalist powers as well as Third World governments themselves: the former to assume their capitalist "responsibilities" in this regard and the latter to bolster their own counterinsurgency capabilities in order to cope with their recurrent insurrectionary problems. In this sense the locus of contemporary contradictions has been judged to have shifted from Third World countries to imperialist countries themselves. While the contradiction between oppressed nations and imperialism still receives considerable attention from Chinese commentators, as John Gittings argued,

the potential for revolution in this area is now very closely linked to and inspired by the 'imperialism versus social-imperialism' contradiction. The implication follows that developments in the latter contradiction dictate the shape of the former contradiction, whereas in the mid-1960's the relationship was seen to be the other way around.¹⁸⁸

It should be noted that the above statement of the position, while perceptive, is not strictly accurate in that "social-imperialism" did not exist as a description for the Soviet Union in the mid-1960's and other imperialist powers, as well as the "social-imperialist" Soviet Union are said to be in opposition to United States imperialism, and therefore contribute to the "shape" of the oppressed nations versus imperialism contradiction.

Whereas in the Lin Piao phase, the Indochina war had been the archetypical example of the world's major contradictions, in the new policy it becomes the exception. Vietnam embodied not only the major contradictions but showed also how imperialism should be fought — in the armed struggle of guerilla war. As Vietnam came to be considered as less of a stereotype of imperialist practice and more of an example of abandoned policy, there was also a marked change in the tactics to which China gave emphasis. As has been pointed out previously, one of the major texts presented in the Chinese press to explain the new policy argued that every historical period, as well as having a correct general line must also have appropriate "tactical principles and various concrete policies for struggle."¹⁸⁹ In accordance with the newly identified contradictions a variety of new tactics were culled from the historical experience of the Chinese Communist Party and developed for use in the contemporary circumstances. If the enemy uses counterrevolutionary peaceful tactics as well as counterrevolutionary war to oppress people and nations, then the enemy must be fought with its own weapons and its own "dual tactics". If there were opportunities to win advantages from negotiation and compromise without sacrificing principle then such would be the order of the day. If there were opportunities for the Leninist tactic of exploiting inter-imperialist rivalries then these too should be used. Limited tactical alliances with one

imperialist power or group of powers against others, so long as China did not come to rely "on foreign help or (hang) on to one imperialist bloc or another" were in order.¹⁹⁰ If advantage could be taken of the "dual character" of many capitalist or revisionist governments, i.e., their different positions when viewed from the perspective of different contradictions, then such advantages should be taken. Lenin, in his *Left-Wing Communism, an Infantile Disorder*, a work which the Chinese were encouraged to read during this period, made the point very clearly:

In politics, it is even harder to know in advance which methods of struggle will be applicable and to our advantage in certain future conditions. Unless we learn to apply all the methods of struggle we may suffer grave and even decisive defeat, if changes beyond our control in the position of the other classes bring to the forefront a form of activity in which we are especially weak. If, however, we learn to use all the methods of 'struggle', victory will be certain, because we represent the interests of the really revolutionary class, even if circumstances do not permit us to make use of weapons that are most dangerous to the enemy, weapons that deal the swiftest mortal blows.¹⁹¹

Given the identification by China of the four major contradictions then clearly such tactical diversification was appropriate, if not mandatory. Embodied in such tactics was a diplomatic posture more sharply differentiated from the immediately preceding phase of China's foreign policy than from any other phase in its history. An active diplomacy with regard to most other countries and international agencies was called for. This most visible aspect of the new policy, especially in its sharp contrast with the isolationist diplomatic tendencies of the Cultural Revolution period, has formed the basis for a number of assessments of China's foreign policy which argue that its revolutionary direction has been lost. Such arguments cannot be less superficial than the basis from which they begin.¹⁹² The analysis undertaken in this chapter shows that far from



being an extravagant retreat to real politik, the new policy is formulated in response to anti-imperialist and revolutionary principles and tactics no less firmly held than in the past, but married to a new assessment of the international balance of class forces. It has also been demonstrated that the lengthy and profound debate which took place was not basically concerned with whether or not China ought to continue its revolutionary course but rather about what were the dominant features of the international order and consequently about the tactics which should be adopted to implement its revolutionary principles.

The resistance to the emergence of the new policy from the group surrounding Lin Piao was founded in the belief that the international disposition of class forces had not substantively altered since the mid-sixties. It was thus not until the leaders of that group had become politically 'inoperative' (or even physically so) that the full dimensions of the new policy were clarified, but the basic view of the world which informed the new policy was no longer debated.

The change which had taken place was considerably more than the victory of one leadership faction over another in apparent isolation from the major domestic or international issues of the period — as some elite theorists would have us believe.¹⁹³ It is clear that "factions" or ideological tendencies of different varieties were involved in the debate discussed in this chapter, but to assume that personal, non-ideological, disputes which are primarily concerned with status, prestige and private power form the very basis of disputes among Marxist practitioners as serious as those in the Chinese leadership seems unwarranted.

To this point the evolution of the principles used in formulating Chinese foreign policy and the development of the new perspectives which came to dominate China's view of the world by the Tenth Congress have

been documented. The following chapters examine in detail the changes which occurred in China's analysis of different areas of the world -- the United States and the Soviet Union, the second intermediate zone and the Third World.

NOTES

¹"Talk at an Enlarged Central Work Conference", January 30, 1962. Translated in Stuart Schram (ed.), *Mao Tse-tung Unrehearsed*, Penguin, Middlesex, 1974, p. 182.

²For examples of this interpretation, cf. W.A.C. Adie, "One World Restored? Sino-American Relations on a New Footing", *Asian Survey* Vol. 12, No. 5; Franz Michael, "The New United States-China Policy", *Current History*, September 1972; Robert A. Scalapino, "China and the Balance of Power", *Foreign Affairs* Vol. 52, No. 2, January 1974; A. Doak Barnett, "The Changing Pattern of U.S.-China Relations", *Current Survey* Vol. I, No. 4, April 10, 1972; Albert Feuerwerker, "Chinese History and the Foreign Relations of Contemporary China", *The Annals of the American Academy* Vol. 402, July 1972; E. Rice, "The Sino-U.S. Detente: How Durable?", *Asian Survey* Vol. 13, No. 9, September 1973; A.S. Whiting, "The Sino-American Detente: Genesis and Prospects", in Ian Wilson (ed.), *China and the World Community*, Angus and Robertson, Sydney, 1973; Harold C. Hinton, *The Bear at the Gate*, American Institute for Public Policy Research, 1971; T.C. Rhee, "Sino-Soviet Conflict and the Global Balance of Power", *The World Today*, January 1970. This position is also that of the Soviet government.

³E.g., Philip Bridgham, "The Fall of Lin Piao", *China Quarterly* No. 55, July/September 1973; Ellis Joffe, "The Chinese Army After the Cultural Revolution: The Effects of Intervention", *China Quarterly*, No. 55, July/September 1973; J. Domes, "The Chinese Leadership Crisis: Doom of an Heir", *Orbis* Vol. 17, No. 3, 1973; Michael Oksenburg and Steven Goldstein, "The Chinese Political Spectrum", *Problems of Communism* Vol. XXIII, March/April 1974 and the comments which it aroused in the same journal Vol. XXIV, January/February 1975.

⁴Michael B. Yahuda, "Chinese Conceptions of Their Role in the World", *Political Quarterly* Vol. 45, No. 1, 1974, p. 13.

⁵Lin Piao, "Long Live the Victory of the People's War", *Renmin Ribao*, September 3, 1965. Reprinted as a pamphlet by the Foreign Languages Press, Peking, 1965, pp. 58-64.

⁶Stuart Schram, *op. cit.*, p. 40.

⁷Mao Tsetung, "Speech at the Group Leaders' Forum of the Enlarged Meeting of the Military Affairs Committee", June 28, 1958, in Stuart Schram, *op. cit.*, p. 128.

⁸Cf. for instance, "Revolutionary Soviet People Will Rise Up to Overthrow Reactionary Rule of Kremlin's New Tsars", *Peking Review* No. 6, February 9, 1968.

⁹Cf. Michael B. Yahuda, "Kremlinology and the Chinese Strategic Debate, 1965-66", *China Quarterly* No. 49, January/March 1972.

¹⁰E.g., P'eng Ch'en's speech to the Indonesian Communist Party, May 25, 1965, *Peking Review* No. 24, July 11, 1965; Lin Piao, *op. cit.*; New China News Agency Peking, September 29, 1966, in *Survey of China Mainland Press* No. 3794, p. 42.

¹¹Lin Piao, *op. cit.*, p. 49.

¹²*Ibid.*, pp. 47, 55.

¹³*Ibid.*, pp. 48-9.

¹⁴John Gittings in *The World and China*, claims that Lin's 1965 essay represents "the essence of Mao's thinking on people's wars" (p. 43). Such is only the case if the global analogy, which forms a rather significant theme of the essay, is dismissed.

¹⁵Cf. Lin Piao on the fiftieth anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution, *Peking Review* No. 46, November 10, 1967.

¹⁶"Third Discussion on the Peak of Contemporary Marxism-Leninism", *Yang-Ch'eng Wan-pao*, Canton, in *Survey of China Mainland Press* No. 3711, p. 11.

¹⁷"Chung Fa", No. 12, *Issues and Studies* (Taipei), September 1972, p. 67. Mao also remarked to Edgar Snow that the 'cult of personality' which he had allowed during the Cultural Revolution to shore up his position against the rightists had been overdone. Edgar Snow, "A Conversation with Mao Tse-tung", *Life*, April 30, 1971.

¹⁸"Observer", in *Peking Review* No. 48, November 24, 1967, p. 15.

¹⁹Canton *Wen-ke T'ung-hsun* (Cultural Revolution Bulletin), November 8, 1967, in *Survey of China Mainland Press* No. 4076, p. 5.

²⁰"Thoroughly Establish the Absolute Authority of the Great Supreme Commander Chairman Mao and of his Great Thought", *Peking Review* No. 46, November 10, 1967.

²¹Richard J. Barber, "Big, Bigger, Biggest: American Business Goes Global", *New Republic*, April 30, 1966.

²²Walter Lederer and Frederick Cutler, "International Business Investments of the U.S. in 1966", *Survey of Current Business*, September 1967. Quoted in Committee of Concerned Asian Scholars, *The Indochina Story*, Bantam, 1970, p. 270.

²³Harry Magdoff, *The Age of Imperialism*, New York, Monthly Review Press, 1969, p. 198.

²⁴Committee of Concerned Asian Scholars, *op. cit.*, p. 272.

²⁵See e.g. on the International Monetary Fund, Cheryl Payer, *The Debt Trap*, Penguin, Middlesex, 1974; on the Asian Development Bank, cf. Richard de Camp, "The Asian Development Bank: An Imperial Thrust into the Pacific", in Mark Seldon (ed.), *Re-making Asia*, Pantheon, New York, 1974; on the World Bank, cf. Bruce Nissen, "The World Bank: A Political Institution", *Pacific Research and World Empire Telegram* Vol. 2, No. 6, September/October 1971, and Teresa Hayter, *Aid as Imperialism*, Penguin, Middlesex, 1971.

²⁶For a discussion of Sukarno's downfall and possible CIA complicity, see e.g., David Ransom, "The Berkeley Mafia and the Indonesian Massacre", *Ramparts*, October 1970; Deirdre Griswold, *Indonesia - Second Greatest Crime of the Century*, Youth Against War and Fascism, New York, 1969; W.F. Wertheim, "Suharto and the Untung Coup - The Missing Link", *Journal of Contemporary Asia* Vol. 1, No. 2, 1971.

²⁷*New York Times*, February 1, 1966. Quoted in Carl Oglesby and Richard Shaull, *Containment and Change*, Macmillan, New York, 1967, p. 28.

²⁸Committee of Concerned Asian Scholars, *op. cit.*, p. 74.

²⁹*Ibid.*

³⁰W.A.C. Adie, "One World Restored? Sino-American Relations on a New Footing", *Asian Survey* Vol. 12, No. 5, May 1972, p. 376.

³¹Albert Feuerwerker, "Chinese History and the Foreign Relations of Contemporary China", *The Annals of the American Academy* Vol. 402, July 1972, p. 11.

³²Thus while the Warsaw talks with the United States were maintained during the Cultural Revolution, they were held on an irregular basis: three sessions being held in 1965, two in 1966, two in 1967 and another in January 1968.

³³The best argued cases for this position are, A.S. Whiting, "The Sino-American Detente: Genesis and Prospects", in Ian Wilson (ed.), *China and the World Community*, Angus and Robertson, Sydney, 1973, and Harold C. Hinton, *The Bear at the Gate*, American Institute for Public Policy Research, 1971. They will be discussed in Chapter IV.

³⁴It is noteworthy that the Chinese considered Nixon's election, at least in part, as the result of an American realization of its decreased international capabilities. "Nixon was 'elected'," they claimed, "after he called for the necessity to reduce our commitments around the world in the areas where we are overtaxed," *Peking Review* No. 46, November 15, 1968.

³⁵September 30, 1968, *Current Bulletin* No. 865, p. 14.

³⁶*Ibid.*, p. 30.

³⁷*Ibid.*, p. 12.

³⁸New China News Agency, November 1, 1968, *Survey of China Mainland Press* No. 4293, pp. 15-6.

³⁹New China News Agency, November 28, 1968, *Survey of China Mainland Press* No. 4311, p. 18.

⁴⁰"1969 New Year Editorial by *Renmin Ribao*, *Honggi* and *Jiefangjun Bao*", *Peking Review* No. 1, January 3, 1969, p. 10.

⁴¹*Ibid.*, (my emphasis).

⁴²"The World Revolution Has Entered a Great New Era", *Peking Review* No. 1, January 3, 1969, p. 17.

⁴³*Ibid.*

⁴⁴For a critique of Peking's constant overestimation of the revolutionary content of Western anti-war movements and the mass base ascribed to them during the Cultural Revolution, cf. H.D. Fletcher, "America's Anti-War Movement — A View from Peking", *World Review* (Australia) Vol. 12, No. 3, October 1973.

⁴⁵"The World Revolution Has Entered a Great New Era", *op. cit.*, p. 19.

⁴⁶*Ibid.* This statement, like the former one concerning struggles "different in form from those of the past" may well be the initial statements in a rather elaborate campaign to provide a context for understanding the normalization of Sino-American relations. The statement that "the road has twists and turns" comes from "On Chungking Negotiations" written by Mao at the end of World War II. The statement, as well as the article became as essential part of the Chinese explanation of the new policy.

⁴⁷"Unprecedented Big Row Within Imperialist Bloc", *Peking Review* No. 14, April 4, 1969, p. 28. The same perspective is applied to Nixon's February 18, foreign policy report to Congress. The "Nixon Doctrine" is portrayed as an admission that U.S. predominance has been lessened by the increased strength of Japan and Western Europe as well as by the working class struggles within the advanced capitalist countries and liberation struggles in the Third World. Cf., e.g., "Nixon's 'New Strategy for Peace' Cannot Save U.S. Imperialism From Doom", *Peking Review* No. 10, March 6, 1970.

⁴⁸"Unprecedented Big Row...", p. 29.

⁴⁹*The Tenth National Congress of the Communist Party of China*, (Documents), Foreign Languages Press, Peking, 1973, p. 5.

⁵⁰Lin Piao, *Report to the Ninth National Congress of the Communist Party of China*, Foreign Languages Press, Peking, 1969, p. 81.

⁵¹*Ibid.*, p. 99.

⁵²*Peking Review* No. 24, June 11, 1965. Despite his subsequent condemnation as a leading revisionist in the Cultural Revolution, Peng's formulation reflected the policies pursued by China (and Lin Piao) at the time.

⁵³"The contradiction between the revolutionary peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America and the imperialists headed by the United States is the principal contradiction in the contemporary world", Lin Piao, *Long Live the Victory...*, p. 53.

⁵⁴A status it acquired, according to the Chinese, after the Czechoslovakian invasion. Cf. Chapter IV.

⁵⁵*Report to the Ninth National Congress...*, p. 83.

⁵⁶The five principles are "mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence", *ibid.*, p. 95.

⁵⁷"The World Revolution Has Entered a Great New Era", p. 18.

⁵⁸"Summary of Chairman Mao's Talks with Responsible Comrades at Various Places During His Provincial Tour", in Stuart Schram (ed.), *op. cit.*, p. 294.

⁵⁹For a discussion of the origins of the May 16 Movement cf. Jaap Van Ginnekan, "The 1967 'Plot of the May 16 Movement'", *Journal of Contemporary Asia* Vol. 2, No. 3. For a discussion of the issues involved and the associations of Lin and Ch'en with the Movement see my, "Lin Piao and Ultra-Leftism", *ibid.*, Vol. 4, No. 2.

⁶⁰Mao made the comment to Mrs. Bandaranaike and Maurice Schumann according to Peking diplomatic sources. Cf. "Quarterly Chronicle and Documentation", *The China Quarterly* No. 52, October/December 1972, p. 768.

⁶¹Jurgen Domes, *The Internal Politics of China 1949-1972*, Hurst and Co., London, 1973, p. 215.

⁶²Edward E. Rice, *Mao's Way*, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1974, p. 502.

⁶³Cf. for instance Jurgen Domes, *op. cit.*; "New Course in Chinese Domestic Politics: The Anatomy of Readjustment", *Asian Survey* Vol. XIII, No. 7, July 1973; "Transition Towards a New Political System in China", in Ian Wilson (ed.), *op. cit.*; Parris H. Chang, "Regional Military Power: The Aftermath of the Cultural Revolution", *Asian Survey* Vol. XII, No. 12, December 1972; Thomas W. Robinson, "China in 1972; Socio-economic Progress Against Military Uncertainty", *Asian Survey* Vol. XIII, No. 1, January 1973.

⁶⁴W. Brugger, *A Brief History of Contemporary China* (Mss.), Flinders University, 1975, p. 580. The fact that most regional military commanders retained their posts after Lin's death, with only the small group closely tied to Lin being dismissed suggests that Lin's tendency was in no way to be construed as a People's Liberation Army-wide movement. Cf. Ellis Joffe, "The Chinese Army After the Cultural Revolution: The Effects of Intervention", *China Quarterly* No. 55, July/September 1973.

⁶⁵"Talk at the First Plenum of the Ninth Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party", in Stuart Schram, *op. cit.*, pp. 282-9.

⁶⁶For documentation of these events see, W. Brugger, *op. cit.*, Chapter 10, and my "Lin Piao and Ultra-Leftism", *op. cit.*, pp. 157-9, 166-7.

⁶⁷*Ibid.* Also for some illuminating comments on how the mass line has been redefined in relation to ultra-leftism and the comparison with the redefinition which occurred after the Great Leap Forward, cf. Jack Gray, "Politics in Command", *Political Quarterly* Vol. 45, No. 1, 1974.

⁶⁸Chang Wen-chin, Assistant Foreign Minister, in an interview with a delegation from the Australian National University, Peking, June 14, 1973.

⁶⁹To the newspaper, *El Moudjahid*, Reuters, July 28, 1972. Quoted in "Quarterly Chronicle and Documentation", *China Quarterly* No. 52, October/December 1972, p. 768.

⁷⁰*Peking Review* No. 40, October 3, 1969, p. 16.

⁷¹*Ibid.*

⁷²*Peking Review* No. 1, January 2, 1970, p. 7. In fact this is a bastardization of the "consistent policy" which had reserved the five principles as the basis for relations with countries having "different social systems".

⁷³By the Editorial Departments of *Renmin Ribao*, *Honggi* and *Jiefangjun Bao*, April 22, 1970, Foreign Languages Press, Peking, 1970.

⁷⁴"People Throughout China Commemorate Birth Centenary of the Great Lenin", *Peking Review* No. 18, April 30, 1970.

⁷⁵*Peking Review* No. 2, January 9, 1970. As is now known, Mao was highly critical of this conception of his thinking which he claimed was promoted by Lin Piao, cf. "Chung Fa", No. 12, *Issues and Studies* (Taipeh), September 1972, pp. 67-8.

⁷⁶"Speech by Chief of General Staff Huang Yung-Sheng", *Peking Review* No. 27, July 3, 1970.

⁷⁷*Peking Review* No. 32, August 7, 1970, p. 9.

⁷⁸*Ibid.*, No. 41, October 9, 1970, p. 9.

⁷⁹The basis for this judgement is Mao Tsetung's statements in "Chung Fa", No. 12, Marcy 17, 1972, published in *Issues and Studies* (Taipeh), September 1972, pp. 18-24.

⁸⁰"Communique of the Second Plenary Session of the Ninth Central Committee of the Communist Party of China", September 6, 1970, *Peking Review* No. 37, September 11, 1970, p. 6.

⁸¹Speech by Vice-Chairman Lin Piao, *Peking Review* No. 41, October 9, 1970.

⁸²See, e.g., Chou En-lai's "Report to the Tenth National Congress", in *Peking Review* Nos. 35-6, September 7, 1973, p. 20.

⁸³"Continue the Revolution, Advance From Victory to Victory", editorial by *Renmin Ribao*, *Honggi* and *Jiefangjun Bao*, *Peking Review* No. 41, October 9, 1970, p. 19.

⁸⁴Edgar Snow, *The Long Revolution*, New York, Random House, 1972, p. 146.

⁸⁵"Advance Victoriously Along Chairman Mao's Revolutionary Diplomatic Line", editorial by *Renmin Ribao*, *Honggi* and *Jiefangjun Bao*, *Peking Review* No. 1, January 1, 1971, p. 8.

⁸⁶*Ibid.*, p. 9. The basis for unity expounded here was clearly likely to maximize widespread opposition to the "superpowers" in international organizations, including the United Nations, to which China was on the verge of gaining entry.

⁸⁷*Ibid.*

⁸⁸"Long Live the Great Unity of the People of the World!", editorial by *Renmin Ribao*, *Honggi* and *Jiefangjun Bao*, in *Peking Review*, No. 19, May 7, 1971, p. 10.

⁸⁹May 20, in *Peking Review* No. 21, May 21, 1971, p. 5. This article was a commentary on Mao's statement issued a year earlier: "People of the World, Unite and Defeat the U.S. Aggressors and All Their Running Dogs!", *Peking Review*, Special Issue, May 23, 1970, pp. 8-9.

⁹⁰*Ibid.*, p. 5. Robert Guillain has claimed that "Lin Piao still had control of the information media" at this stage. "The Fall of Lin Piao", in the *Manchester Guardian*, August 5, 1972, reprinted in David Milton, Nancy Milton and Franz Schurmann (eds.), *People's China*, Vintage Books, New York, 1974, p. 384.

⁹¹*Ibid.*, (my emphasis).

⁹²Cf. Chou En-lai's insistence that this was the case in an interview with Harrison E. Salisbury in the latter's *To Peking and Beyond: A Report on the New Asia*, Arrow Books, London, 1973, p. 256.

⁹³In February, Lin had allegedly written, "B-52 (the code name for Mao used by Lin and his group) cannot enjoy good health for long; he is anxious to make posthumous arrangements in recent years. He is uneasy about us. We would rather be determined to do something than wait to be captured. It is necessary to forestall our enemy politically and militarily." Cf. "The Struggle of Smashing the Counter-revolutionary Coup of the Lin-Ch'en Anti-Party Clique", (Material No. 2), *Chinese Law and Government* Vol. 5, Nos. 3-4, 1972-73.

⁹⁴E.g., Robert Guillain, *loc. cit.*

⁹⁵"The task of the Chinese Communist Party is...to exert our greatest efforts to struggle together with the people of all countries to defeat the U.S. aggressors and all their running dogs, oppose the politics of hegemony pushed by the two superpowers", *Peking Review* No. 27, July 2, 1971.

⁹⁶One exception to this was the determined Huang Yung-sheng whose Army Day speech on August 1, 1971, seemingly remained opposed to the prevailing position on normalization with the U.S. Cf. *Current Scene* Vol. 14, No. 12, December 7, 1971, pp. 13-9. See also his speech to a Korean military delegation on August 18, *Peking Review* No. 35, August 27, 1971.

⁹⁷"Commemorate August 1, Army Day", editorial by *Renmin Ribao*, *Honggi* and *Jiefangjun Bao* in *Peking Review* No. 32, August 6, 1971.

⁹⁸"A Hsinhua Correspondent", *New China News*, October 25, 1972.

⁹⁹*Peking Review* No. 9, March 3, 1972.

¹⁰⁰Chang Wen-chin, *op. cit.*

¹⁰¹"Commemorate August 1,...", *ibid.*

¹⁰²The Chinese people were exhorted to "strengthen army-government and army-civilian unity and, under the leadership of the Party Central Committee with Chairman Mao as its leader and Vice Chairman Lin as its deputy leader."

¹⁰³Cf. *The Polemic on the General Line of the International Communist Movement*, Foreign Languages Press, Peking, 1965. This question is discussed further in Chapter IV.

¹⁰⁴Cf. *Peking Review* No. 36, September 3, 1971, pp. 6-7.

¹⁰⁵Allegations by some that Chinese policies are now hypocritically mimicking those of the Soviet Union which they previously criticized are thus misconceived. For one such allegation, cf. Allen S. Whiting, *op. cit.* This is discussed in Chapter IV.

¹⁰⁶"Commemorate August 1, Army Day", p. 8.

¹⁰⁷*Ibid.*

¹⁰⁸"On Chungking Negotiations", *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung* Vol. IV, pp. 53-63.

¹⁰⁹*Ibid.*, p. 56.

¹¹⁰*Ibid.*, p. 54.

¹¹¹*Ibid.*

¹¹²Mao Tsetung, "On Policy", *Selected Works* Vol. II, pp. 441, 445.

¹¹³*Ibid.*, p. 444.

¹¹⁴*Ibid.*, p. 442.

¹¹⁵*Ibid.*

¹¹⁶*Ibid.*

¹¹⁷*Ibid.*

¹¹⁸*Ibid.*

¹¹⁹"Current Problems of Tactics in the Anti-Japanese United Front", *Selected Works* Vol. II, p. 425.

¹²⁰Apart from "Current Problems..." and "On Policy", see "Freely Expand the Anti-Japanese Forces and Resist the Onslaughts of the Anti-Communist Die-Hards", *op. cit.*; "Unity to the Very End", *op. cit.*; "We Must Stress Unity and Progress", *op. cit.*; "Unite All Anti-Japanese Forces and Combat the Anti-Communist Die-hards", *op. cit.*

- ¹²¹"On Policy", *op. cit.*, p. 444.
- ¹²²*Ibid.*
- ¹²³*Ibid.*
- ¹²⁴*Ibid.*
- ¹²⁵"A Powerful Weapon to Unite the People and Defeat the Enemy — A Study of 'On Policy'", *Honggi* No. 9, August 2, 1971. Translated in *Selections from China Mainland Magazines* No. 711, pp. 1-9; abridged translation in *Peking Review* No. 35, August 27, 1971. This translation from the latter, p. 10.
- ¹²⁶*Ibid.*, pp. 11-12.
- ¹²⁷*Ibid.*, pp. 12-13.
- ¹²⁸*Ibid.*, p. 12.
- ¹²⁹I have regretfully given some credence to this view myself in the past. Cf. my "Lin Piao and Ultra-leftism", *op. cit.*, pp. 165-66.
- ¹³⁰*Selected Works* Vol. IV, p. 56.
- ¹³¹*Peking Review* No. 35, August 27, 1971.
- ¹³²"Commemorate August 1, Army Day", p. 8.
- ¹³³Cf. above pp. 59-60.
- ¹³⁴M. Yahuda, *op. cit.*, p. 86.
- ¹³⁵For a discussion of the development and usage of this concept see Chapter V.
- ¹³⁶*Peking Review* No. 1, January 2, 1970, p. 7. My emphasis.
- ¹³⁷"Peaceful Coexistence — Two Diametrically Opposed Views", in *The Polemic on the General Line of the International Communist Movement*, Foreign Languages Press, Peking, 1965, *passim*, and Lin Piao, *Report to the Ninth National Congress...*, p. 82.
- ¹³⁸*Peking Review* No. 37, September 11, 1970, p. 6.
- ¹³⁹*Ibid.*, No. 49, December 4, 1970, (my emphasis).
- ¹⁴⁰The theoretical concession involved is in fact minimal. The most complete statement of the Chinese position states "Of course, socialist countries too must abide by the Five Principles in their mutual relations. It is absolutely impermissible for any one of them to undermine the territorial integrity of another fraternal country, to impair its independence and sovereignty, interfere in its internal affairs, carry on subversive activities inside it, or violate the principle of equality and mutual benefit in its relations with another fraternal country." "Peaceful Coexistence...", p. 283. The article went on to say that such relations while necessary were not sufficient for fraternal socialist countries.
- ¹⁴¹In late 1972, in an uncharacteristic confusion of class and anti-hegemonic alliances, China was said to have "sustained, consolidated and strengthened fraternal and revolutionary unity with such socialist countries as Albania, Korea, Vietnam and Romania." *Kuang-ming Jih-pao*, October 12, 1972, in *Survey of China Mainland Press*, No. 5244, p. 1, (my emphasis).

¹⁴²Wen Hui Pao, Hong Kong, November 19, 1972. Cited in "Quarterly Chronicle of Events", *China Quarterly* No. 53, p. 200.

¹⁴³Teng Hsiao-ping at the Sixth Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly on April 10, 1974, in *Peking Review* No. 16, April 19, 1974, p. 6.

¹⁴⁴"Peaceful Coexistence...", p. 274.

¹⁴⁵"Commemorate August 1...", p. 9.

¹⁴⁶*Peking Review*, Nos. 7-8, February 25, 1972, p. 8.

¹⁴⁷From a transcript by Bill Synnot, an agricultural economist who was a member of the delegation. Chou En-lai expressed similar views in an interview with Neville Maxwell, *Sunday Times*, December 5, 1971.

¹⁴⁸"Chairman of Chinese Delegation Chiao Kuan-hua's Speech at 27th General Assembly Session", *Peking Review*, No. 41, October 13, 1972, p. 5.

¹⁴⁹"Restudying 'A Single Spark Can Start a Prairie Fire'", *Peking Review*, Nos. 7-8, February 25, 1972, abridged translation from *Honggi*, No. 13, 1971, p. 10.

¹⁵⁰*Ibid.*, p. 12.

¹⁵¹"The World Trend: Medium-sized and Small Nations Unite to Oppose Two Superpowers' Hegemony", *Peking Review*, No. 4, January 28, 1972, p. 16.

¹⁵²"Strive for New Victories", editorial by *Renmin Ribao*, *Honggi* and *Jiefangjun Bao*, *Peking Review*, No. 40, October 6, 1972, p. 10.

¹⁵³"Peaceful Coexistence...", p. 285.

¹⁵⁴*Ibid.*, p. 11.

¹⁵⁵*Renmin Ribao* editorial, September 30, 1972, translated *Peking Review*, No. 40, October 6, 1972.

¹⁵⁶"Strive for New Victories", editorial by *Renmin Ribao*, *Honggi* and *Jiefangjun Bao*, October 1, 1972, in *Peking Review*, No. 40, October 6, 1972, p. 10.

¹⁵⁷Special Supplement to *Peking Review*, No. 15, April 12, 1974.

¹⁵⁸Interview on June 14, 1973, *op. cit.*

¹⁵⁹*Ibid.*

¹⁶⁰This issue is discussed in detail in Chapter IV.

¹⁶¹*Honggi*, No. 11, November 1972. Reprinted *Peking Review*, No. 45, November 10, 1972, p. 8.

¹⁶²"Some of them still retain colonial relations of one form or another with Third World countries", *Peking Review*, Special Supplement to No. 15, April 12, 1974.

¹⁶³Nixon originally floated the concept in a speech in Kansas City on July 6, 1971. Reported in *New York Times*, July 7, 1971.

¹⁶⁴In an interview with Graham Rowbotham in *East is Red*, October 1971, York, S.A.C.U., pp. 6-10; and Bill Synnot, *op. cit.*

¹⁶⁵Interviewed by Neville Maxwell in *Sunday Times* (London), December 19, 1971, quoted in Michael Yahuda, *op. cit.*, p. 86.

- ¹⁶⁶Interview with Australian National University Delegation, *op. cit.*
- ¹⁶⁷"Report to the Tenth National Congress of the Communist Party of China", *Peking Review*, Nos. 35-36. September 7, 1973, p. 19.
- ¹⁶⁸*Ibid.*
- ¹⁶⁹*Ibid.*, p. 21.
- ¹⁷⁰Lin Piao, "Report to the Ninth National Congress of the People's Republic of China", *op. cit.*, p. 79.
- ¹⁷¹Lin Piao, *ibid.*, p. 80.
- ¹⁷²Chou En-lai, *op. cit.*, p. 22.
- ¹⁷³Lin Piao, *op. cit.*, p. 79.
- ¹⁷⁴*Ibid.*, p. 98.
- ¹⁷⁵Chou En-lai, *op. cit.*, p. 22.
- ¹⁷⁶Lin Piao, *op. cit.*, p. 79.
- ¹⁷⁷Chou En-lai, *op. cit.*, p. 24.
- ¹⁷⁸*Ibid.*, p. 97.
- ¹⁷⁹Lin Piao, *op. cit.*, p. 80.
- ¹⁸⁰Chou En-lai, *op. cit.*, p. 22.
- ¹⁸¹Chou also stated that Lenin "pointed out repeatedly that imperialism means aggression and war" but he went on to point out that it would be possible to prevent a new world war. *Op. cit.*, p. 23. Lin, on the other hand, did not quote Lenin to the effect that imperialism means rivalry.
- ¹⁸²Chou En-lai, *op. cit.*, p. 23.
- ¹⁸³"On Chungking Negotiations", *op. cit.*, p. 59.
- ¹⁸⁴"Some Points in Appraisal of the Present International Situation", *ibid.*, p. 87.
- ¹⁸⁵For the background to Wang Hung-wen's sudden prominence and its probable significance, cf. Richard Wich, "The Tenth Party Congress: The Power Structure and the Succession Question", *China Quarterly*, No. 58, April/June 1974, pp. 231-249; Parris H. Chang, "Political Profiles: Wang Hung-wen and Li Teh-shang", *China Quarterly*, No. 57, January/March 1974, pp. 124-133.
- ¹⁸⁶"Report on the Revision of the Party Constitution", *Peking Review*, Nos. 35-36, September 1973, p. 33.
- ¹⁸⁷Cf. above p. 80, n. 151.
- ¹⁸⁸"China's Foreign Policy: Continuity or Change?", *Journal of Contemporary Asia* Vol. 2, No. 1, 1972, p. 32.
- ¹⁸⁹"A Powerful Weapon to Unite the People and Defeat the Enemy - A Study of 'On Policy'", *op. cit.*, p. 10.
- ¹⁹⁰*Ibid.*
- ¹⁹¹Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, Moscow, 1969, p. 101.
- ¹⁹²For a "left" argument of this kind, cf. "China Takes the Capitalist Road", by "A Progressive Labor Party Member", in *Workers' International Newsletter* Vol.1, No. 1, 1973, p. 13.

¹⁹³Cf. for instance, Philip Bridgham, "The Fall of Lin Piao", *China Quarterly* No. 55, July/September 1973; Ellis Joffe, "The Chinese Army After the Cultural Revolution: The Effects of Intervention", *China Quarterly* No. 55, July/September 1973; Ying-mao Kau and P. Perrolle, "The Politics of Lin Piao's Abortive Military Coup", *Asian Survey* Vol. XIV, No. 6, June 1974; W. Parish, "Factions in Chinese Military Politics", *China Quarterly* No. 56, October/December 1973. The ability of many Sinologists to carry on extended debates without reference to policy issues is considerable — as exemplified in the above articles where it would seem the intrigue, hypocrisy and non-substantive character of the Watergate affair make it a universal archetype of all political struggle.

CHAPTER IV
CHINA AND THE SUPERPOWERS

The function of this chapter is to analyse the changes which took place in the Chinese categorization of the United States and the Soviet Union between the Ninth and Tenth Congresses; to indicate the origins of those changes and to test the validity of the arguments which prompted them. The chapter thus constitutes an examination of one pole of the broadest (if not the principal) contradiction in the world as outlined at the Ninth Congress. Chapters V and VI will examine the other pole of that contradiction — the first and second intermediate zones.

As has been argued in the previous chapter, a formulation of the world's major contradictions was introduced at the Ninth Congress which was contrary to that implicit, and occasionally explicit, in China's view of the world prior to that time. It was also argued that theoretical and practical developments in Chinese policy between the Ninth and Tenth Congresses can most plausibly be interpreted as elaborations and refinements of the new perspectives introduced formally in the report delivered by Lin Piao to the Ninth Congress. To assess the full significance of the new perspectives it is therefore necessary to contrast them with the attitudes and theoretical perspectives of China towards the United States and the Soviet Union and towards United States-Soviet relations which prevailed in the period prior to this when Lin Piao's influence on China's formulation of foreign policy was dominant.

The United States.

It has been shown above that the view of the world implicit in the Lin Piao phase of foreign policy, when shed of some of its more grandiloquent terminology and extravagant predictions, had considerable validity

— especially in Asia which has always exercised an understandably strong influence on China's view of the world. In short, the view that the United States was intent on exercising its hegemony, particularly in Asia, with all the military might at its disposal if necessary, was not simply the product of Maoist dogmatism — it had a solid basis in fact. "U.S. imperialism," in Lin's words, was "like a mad bull dashing from place to place,"¹ or as he stated in more precise theoretical terms,

The contradiction between the revolutionary peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America and the imperialists headed by the United States is the principal contradiction in the contemporary world. The development of this contradiction is promoting the struggle of the people of the whole world against U.S. imperialism and its lackeys.²

Together with the heading for this section of Lin's famous article, "Defeat U.S. Imperialism and Its Lackeys by People's War", Lin's position was precisely defined — the principal enemy was United States imperialism, the principal contradiction was between imperialism headed by the United States and the revolutionary peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America, and the tactic to be adopted in order to defeat imperialism was people's war.

While Lin was as forthright as any other Chinese leader in his denunciation of the Soviet Union, he did not envisage it as being involved in the principal contradiction. The only other Chinese leader to offer a formulation of world contradictions in this period was P'eng Chen who, as mentioned in the previous chapter, regarded the contradictions between socialism and imperialism, and between Marxist-Leninists and contemporary revisionists as the major ones.³ Thus while P'eng was prepared to recognize the contradiction between Marxist-Leninists and contemporary revisionists as a major one for understanding the present era, he seemed to

regard it as a subdivision of the socialist pole of the contradiction between socialism and imperialism. This latter contradiction, as has been suggested earlier, can only be entertained logically within the context of a viable socialist camp.

Given the locus of contemporary contradictions, Lin's strategic predictions for the defeat of imperialism entailed surrounding the metropolitan imperialist countries with the "raging flames" of people's war in the satellite countryside. The proletariat of imperialist countries, the divisions within the imperialist bloc and the opposition of socialist countries, while analysed in the Chinese press, were not emphasised as likely sources of imperialist collapse until 1968.

To attain a clear perception of the position of departure for the changes in China's view of the United States and also to show that the schematic developments of the Ninth Congress did not emerge fully developed from a period in which they were not intertained at all, it is useful to examine the Chinese perspective on the United States in the year or so prior to the Ninth Congress.

As has been noted, during the 'Linist' phase of Foreign policy, China considered itself the bastion of socialism, not merely in the sense that revolutionary movements in the Third World looked to it for ideological guidance and material support but also in that China was regarded as the major obstacle to the realization of United States' aims to dominate the world. "United States' imperialism," it was claimed,

sees in China the biggest obstacle in the way of its world domination. Its inveterate hatred for and implacable enmity toward the Chinese people is itself evidence that the Chinese people are among the most revolutionary and progressive. Otherwise, U.S. imperialism would not be opposing us as it is now doing. To be oppressed by our enemy is not a bad thing; it adds to our honor.⁴

In keeping with this perception, there was a consistent public belief that the United States was giving serious consideration to an invasion of China — especially during the period when the United States was in the process of escalating the war in Indochina. The United States, it was said,

has switched the emphasis of its global strategy to Asia, speeded up its military dispositions to encircle China and is feverishly planning to carry the war of aggression from Vietnam to China. Top U.S. military and civil officials even openly talk about a trial of strength with China.⁵

This aspect of China's foreign policy, which was a quite integral part of Lin's position received far less attention in the Chinese press after the United States Senate Foreign Relations Committee Hearings on China during which a number of the more eminent American Sinologists gave evidence. The general impression gained by the Chinese was that their collective testimony amounted to a plea for continued hostility towards and containment of China — but containment "without isolation".⁶ Henceforth, United States aggression was to be understood as primarily directed at national liberation movements — and while China clearly understood itself to be implicated in that focus of aggression it would not consider itself to be threatened directly. The conclusions of the China scholars,⁷ like those of the United States Assistant Secretary of State, William Bundy,⁸ and the *New York Times* editor who put his faith in China's younger generation,⁹ were that China, given time and encouragement, would tread the same "evolutionary" path to revisionism which the Soviet Union had trodden in the 1950's after years of United States containment and isolation.

At this time, in 1966, while the Chinese seem to have accepted that the United States had finally abandoned what had become known as the

"roll back theory" of defeating communism¹⁰ as a result of a general decline in the strength of United States imperialism, their statements in this respect are more easily understood in the epochal sense of capitalism ultimately giving way to socialism. The "raging flames" of people's war were the method by which the new epoch was to be ushered in, but beyond that the specific mechanisms for the decline of United States imperialism were not a subject of much discussion. This aspect of China's perception of the United States was one which began to undergo modification in 1968 when very specific causal patterns were identified from contemporary developments which were at work in reducing American power.

In 1966, also, there were no hints that the Chinese considered it possible that the United States might in the near future reduce its aggressive global strategy directed at liberation movements and especially that in Vietnam. Though chinks appearing in the American armour in Vietnam had been noted with approval, there was no suggestion on the part of the Chinese that the United States might have to scale down its activities in the area. Rather, the United States still appeared to China to be single-minded about extending its aggression further. By 1968, this aspect of China's policy had also begun to receive modification.

Although submerged in the overwhelming emphasis of the Linist period on people's war, there were intermittent references during this period to the contradictions existing between imperialist powers themselves.¹¹ With the devaluation of the pound sterling in November 1967, this form of analysis became a much more integral part of the Chinese view of the world and eventually became crucial to the foreign policy formulation which develops after the Ninth Congress.

In order to indicate how alien this form of analysis was at the beginning of 1968, it may be useful to quote at length a not untypical

piece of writing from the period embodying the more familiar analyses of the time. It was claimed that,

After long years of arduous groping and struggle, the revolutionary people of Asia, Africa and Latin America have finally found the great truth, Mao Tse-tung's thought. Today, more and more revolutionaries on these continents have come to understand that the road taken by the Chinese people under the leadership of Chairman Mao to seize political power by force of arms is the correct and bright road for them to win victory in revolution. This road may be summarized as follows: under the leadership of the political party of the proletariat, to arouse the peasant masses in the countryside, to wage guerilla war, unfold an agrarian revolution, build rural base areas, use the countryside to encircle the cities and finally capture the cities....In the course of their struggle, they have come to deepen their understanding of Chairman Mao's brilliant theses, such as "political power grows out of the barrel of a gun," "only with guns can the whole world be transformed," "without a people's army the people have nothing," etc., are irrefutable truths.¹²

While the analysis of inter-imperialist contradictions which develops after this time is not in conflict with an appreciation of the role played by people's war it was certainly not seen as implied in the latter before this time. Now Vietnam was seen as generating inter-imperialist rivalries.

For some years China had openly recognized the anti-hegemonic tendencies of De Gaulle towards the United States. Those tendencies were now regarded as taking on a European-wide dimension and as being intensified by the Vietnam war.

The interpretation of these developments made by the Chinese must be set against the background of their view of economic relations between the United States and Europe since World War II. The financial and trade superiority with which the United States emerged from the war became reflected and institutionalized in, among other things, the direct convert-

ibility of the dollar into gold. According to the Chinese analysis, this facilitated a massive export of American capital. Along with economic and military "aid" programmes, the establishment of military bases and recurrent military engagements, this had produced regular deficits of enormous proportions in the United States balance of international trade, had run down the United States gold reserves to less than half that of the immediate post-war years and of course had given rise to a massive accumulation of dollars abroad, especially in Europe.

The various measures taken by United States and European treasuries throughout 1968 were considered temporary stop-gap measures which could in no way remove the underlying contradictions or prevent the decline of the dollar — a forecast confirmed in the ensuing years. The incorporation of this form of analysis into the Chinese view of the world was clearly not intended as a transient or peripheral piece of financial reporting.

But, even by 1968, these trends had, according to the Chinese, reached crisis point. United States gold reserves were less than a third of the dollar claims held against them in foreign hands and the pegged price for gold was unable to cope with the consequent rush to exchange dollar holdings in the European bullion markets. The effects of these developments and the key position of the dollar were certainly not underestimated. "The fate of the dollar," it was said,

affects not only the United States itself but also the entire Western world. The collapse of the dollar will spell the end of the U.S. imperialist hegemony in the capitalist world, and it is a blow to all the capitalist countries in varying degrees according to their dependence on the United States.¹³

President Johnson's initial moves to strengthen the position of the dollar were coterminous with the beginning of the South Vietnamese National Liberation Front's Spring Offensive — or what in the West came to be called

the Tet Offensive. Causal links were drawn by the Chinese as both the dollar crisis and the guerilla offensive escalated. Continued increases in American military spending, particularly in Vietnam, in recent years were said to have intensified the contemporary dollar crisis by adding to the deficits in the United States financial budgets and international balance of payments. The war had been escalated by the United States in 1965, it was claimed, to "give a shot in the arm to the weakening U.S. economy and thus delay the arrival of a crisis of overproduction," but all that had been achieved was "a sharp rise in budget deficits."¹⁴ The Tet Offensive having shown America that even greater expenditure was needed in order to maintain an offensive posture in Vietnam, it was now clear that the dollar crisis would become more acute. But while the Vietnam war and other Third World encounters were assigned causal significance, the effect of the currency and financial crises, like that of the trade war which the Chinese judged they were precipitating, was primarily in the "capitalist world". And when the Chinese talked of this latter world the terminology which was to become so familiar in the articulation of "Chairman Mao's revolutionary line in foreign affairs" was employed.

The economic crises which had developed were to do with "hegemony" within the imperialist world. The "position of strength" of United States imperialism, which had been "lording it over" European countries and "bullying" them had meaning within the context of inter-imperialist contradictions, but in 1968 it was in stark contrast to the pro and anti-imperialist contradictions which had generated a quite alternative terminology.

One important distinction between the Chinese position of this time and that which it was later to adopt was in the alignment of European powers. France's attempts to oppose United States hegemony in Europe

were still regarded as under pressure from within Europe by United States "accomplices". The United Kingdom was considered the primary economic accomplice of the United States, its "junior partner" in fact, and consequently China took the position that British entry into the Common Market should be strongly opposed.¹⁵ West Germany was in a more complex position. Still regarded as intent upon swallowing the German Democratic Republic and afforded ample encouragement by the United States to do so, it was generally considered the primary military accomplice of the United States in Europe — apart, of course, from the military hegemony which the United States was able to exert through the collective forces of NATO. But the West German ruling class was also beginning to realize that there were advantages to be had in adopting the French posture and were beginning to bear their American alliance with increasing reluctance.¹⁶ By the time of the new policy formulation some years later Europe was regarded as much more closely united on anti-American issues and British entry into the Common Market was thoroughly approved.¹⁷

The major point being made here is that there entered the Chinese analysis of the world after late 1967 a strong and consistent emphasis on inter-imperialist contradictions. Such an emphasis clearly ran a distant second to the stress still placed on the "raging flames" of guerilla war which were considered to be engulfing United States imperialism, but the schematic outline of the world's major contradictions at the Ninth Congress which included that among the imperialist countries themselves was not, in this sense, an innovation. The assertion of contradictions among imperialist powers as one of the major ones in the world was simply summarizing part of the analysis of the international order which the Chinese had been making for well over a year. As will be discussed below, some analyses of the changes in China's foreign policy place a great deal of emphasis on a

few diplomatic communications between China and other countries. The extensive analytical energy which went into the Chinese interpretation of changes taking place in United States influence within the capitalist world, as outlined above, suggests that any interpretation which retains its primary focus on diplomatic protocol and manoeuvring as an explanation of China's policy changes cannot but remain superficial.¹⁸

Vietnam.

A second aspect of China's understanding of U.S. imperialism which underwent a change in the period immediately prior to the Ninth Congress was its position in Vietnam. The Tet Offensive at the beginning of 1968 was primarily responsible for the modification of the Chinese view, as in fact it modified the view of all parties to the Vietnam war. The Chinese regarded it as

unmatched in the annals of the South Vietnamese people's war of resistance against U.S. aggression and for national salvation by its scale, overwhelming momentum, excellent organization and the number of casualties inflicted on the enemy. It has carried the Vietnam people's war to a higher plane.¹⁹

Perhaps the most significant development in the Chinese analysis of the war as a result of the Tet Offensive was their conclusion that from this point onwards in the war although there were still unresolved questions — such as how long the war would take to reach a conclusion and how far the United States would extend it — there was no longer any doubt as to whether the Vietnamese people would eventually win. "They are definitely going to win and they have already won great victories."²⁰ In the terminology of the Chinese press, the Tet Offensive had "opened up a new situation for the Vietnamese people's war."²¹ "Victory," it was said, "is already in sight."²² There were numerous — and accurate — predictions

that even though this was the case, the United States would continue to raise its level of involvement in Vietnam, in both an intensive and extensive way.

While this development was by far the most significant in the Chinese analysis of the war at this time and was of major importance in reaching the conclusion that the United States was moving away from a period in which it had little hesitation about committing troops against Third World independence movements, it was not the only development.

The United States was said to have been placed in a "passive position"²³ by the Tet Offensive but there were insistent reminders to the Vietnamese people that the consolidation of victories already won and the way to final victory was via the "magic weapon" of "people's war".²⁴ The Chinese insistence on this "magic weapon" as a condition of victory, particularly in their communiques to the National Liberation Front and at speeches where their representatives were present may simply be an expression of the conventional strategic wisdom which was being promoted at the time. Other possibilities are that the Chinese were not satisfied that the advances made by the National Liberation Front in the Tet Offensive were according to the logic of guerilla war and were therefore vulnerable to reversals and/or that their warnings had an anti-Soviet intent.

The latter possibility would seem to be confirmed to some extent by the Chinese reaction — or non-reaction — to the initiation of the Paris Peace Talks in 1968. For some time before the Tet Offensive the Chinese had been issuing warnings against the "peace talks frauds"²⁵ of both the United States and the Soviet Union as merely another way in which the United States sought victory in its war of aggression against the Vietnamese people and in which the Soviet Union was acting as an accomplice. Apart from the didactic purposes involved in such warnings it also publicly counselled the Vietnamese to reject the peace talks proposals.

The Tet Offensive was promptly pronounced "a slap in the face of the Soviet revisionist clique who have been running hither and thither doing their best to serve the U.S. imperialist 'peace talks' frauds and they delivered fatal blows to those die-hard lackeys and running dogs of U.S. imperialism."²⁶

No mention was made in the Chinese press of the beginning of the Paris peace talks, although in the following months the polemics against them were by and large stopped.²⁷ After the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, however, Chou En-lai in a speech delivered at a reception given by the North Vietnamese ambassador in Peking, once again denounced in strong language the "peace talks fraud" perpetrated by the United States and the Soviet Union. "It is high time," he warned his audience, "that all those who cherish illusions about Soviet revisionism and U.S. imperialism woke up!"²⁸ Ngo Minh Loan, the Vietnamese ambassador, made no reference at all to the Soviet Union in his speech.²⁹

On October 19, the Chinese reported for the first time, and in an unusually oblique manner, the fact that the Paris talks had actually begun — and begun on May 13. The Chinese press reported Western press reports to the effect that President Johnson envisaged a complete bombing halt and made no comment other than the fact that "these reports remain to be confirmed by further developments in the situation."³⁰ When the bombing of North Vietnam was halted and the agreement was reached to hold four-power peace talks in Paris the Chinese were content to reprint the National Liberation Front announcement of these events without comment.³¹ It is difficult not to conclude that the willingness of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and later of the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam to participate in the Paris negotiations was a source of embarrassment to at least one section of the Chinese leadership because of the

apparent conflict with the strategy of people's war or the apparent endorsement of a Soviet-promoted policy, or both. Such sources of apparent tactical disagreement between China and its Vietnamese allies should not, however, be confused with the major change in the analytical perspectives of China which occurred at this time. The war had reached a turning point. The United States had been tried in the "test case" of its own construction in Vietnam and had been found wanting. While still at the head of the imperialist countries — and even this was under challenge — the United States was still capable of aggression on a prodigious scale and was still the implacable enemy of liberation movements but to the Chinese it was now seen as defending its present position rather than enhancing it.³²

The Soviet Union and Soviet-United States relations.

Reflecting this changed perception of United States imperialist fortunes was a new assessment of the relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union. The 1960's had retrospectively been regarded as a period during which the United States and the Soviet Union had "contended for world domination."³³ During most of the 1960's, however, the contention between what were later to be called the two superpowers, had not received a great deal of attention. What was referred to as their "collusion" had been noted early in the Sixties and had been the subject of sustained and forceful criticism. This collusion or collaboration had been regarded as the very "heart and soul of the CPSU leaders' general line of 'peaceful coexistence'."³⁴ By 1964, this collusion had been branded an "alliance" and it was claimed, with more regard for Chinese hyperbole than accuracy, that,

Everything Khrushchov did over the last eleven years proves that the policy he pursued was one of alliance with imperialism against socialism,

alliance with the United States against China, alliance with the reactionaries against the national liberation movements and the people's revolutions, and alliance with the Tito clique and renegades of all descriptions against all Marxist-Leninist fraternal parties and all revolutionaries fighting imperialism.³⁵

As well as collaboration and alliance with imperialism, the Soviet Union under Khrushchov was considered to be capitulating to United States imperialism whenever the contradictions between them became manifest.³⁶ While the 'alliance' relationship was being given emphasis, it was still stressed that, "In the very nature of things, there are irreconcilable contradictions between the socialist Soviet Union and the imperialist United States."³⁷ But contradictions of a class character were a different matter from the contention for world hegemony which was later ascribed to this period. Wherever "domination of the world" was mentioned it was regarded as the "fond dream" of Soviet revisionists who envisaged it as the result of Soviet-United States collaboration rather than a goal for which they both competed.³⁸ In general terms, the foreign policy of the Soviet Union was seen as one of "capitulation (to imperialism), betrayal (of national liberation movements) and split (of socialist countries and Marxist-Leninist parties)."³⁹ The second anniversary of the "Proposal Concerning the General Line of the International Communist Movement", which had formulated the major grounds of disagreement in the public Sino-Soviet polemics was the occasion for an extended appraisal of the post-Khrushchov leadership in the Soviet Union. But here again, the Soviet Union was not seen as contending for world hegemony with the United States, although the cooperative, collaborative relationship was seen as persisting.⁴⁰ So far from being the rival of United States imperialism was the Soviet Union that it was regarded as "a social prop of imperialism, a force serving imperialism."⁴¹

This Chinese assessment of the new Soviet leaders concluded that the Chinese Communist Party and the Chinese people would "unswervingly follow the general line of the international communist movement...proposed two years ago."⁴² When it is remembered that this "Proposal Concerning the General Line" was addressed to the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party as a plea for "the unity of the entire socialist camp and the international communist movement," it will readily be seen that the whole context of this discussion lies outside the framework within which superpowers contending for world hegemony has meaning. The Soviet Union was still being enjoined to form part of a broad united front against United States imperialist policies of aggression and war.⁴³ Apart from what the Chinese judged to be a steadfast refusal to form part of this united front, the specific collaborative activities which attracted Chinese criticism were,

vainly attempting to see out the struggle of the Vietnamese people against U.S. aggression and for national salvation and to drag the Vietnam question into the orbit of Soviet-U.S. collaboration....(and) actively trying to build a ring of encirclement around socialist China.⁴⁴

Japan and India were countries where the Soviet Union and the United States were envisaged as being in strategic collaboration against China, and the sale by the Soviets of military and naval equipment to the post-coup Indonesian junta was noted with apprehension.⁴⁵ As mentioned when charting the features of the foreign policy associated with Lin Piao, the Chinese considered at this time that there had been a "shift of emphasis of U.S. imperialist strategy from Europe to Asia."⁴⁶ This shift, they argued, could not have been achieved without the tacit approval of the Soviet Union which had made it possible for the United States to withdraw some of its armed forces from Europe and reposition them in Asia. In the

1970's, Europe was clearly seen by the Chinese as a bone of Soviet-American contention -- the Chinese going so far as to alert both European countries and the United States that the Soviet Union was merely making "a feint to the East while attacking the West." But at this time Europe was regarded as a major element in the global collaboration being effected by America and Russia. The policies of detente in Europe and nuclear non-proliferation which had begun to receive attention were singled out as specific issues which ensured that the United States was able to deploy much of its attention as well as its troops from Europe to Asia.⁴⁷

The Soviet support of this American deployment was regarded as stemming from its anti-China posture -- as well as its concern to keep national liberation struggles from escalating into nuclear conflicts. At this time when Chinese leaders saw themselves as the embattled defenders of a capitalist and revisionist-encircled "bastion of socialism" it was understandable that critical attention to the element of contention between the Soviet Union and the United States received little or no emphasis. By early 1967 in fact, the Soviet Union had been elevated to the position of "accomplice Number One of United States imperialism" in a "counter-revolutionary 'holy alliance' and an anti-China 'ring' in Asia."⁴⁸ In this context the Chinese were able to quote the Malaysian Prime Minister Abdul Rahman to telling effect when discussing the newly established trade relations of his country with the Soviet Union. Their "common interest", he claimed, lay in a relationship which "may have a deterrent effect on China."⁴⁹

By 1967, a new element had entered the Chinese critique of Soviet foreign policy. Soviet trade and aid policies, particularly in the Third World came under attack as being based on profit motives rather than those of mutual benefit. The Soviet Minister of Foreign Trade Patolichev was quoted as saying,

I would like to make it perfectly clear that neither in the Asian countries, nor in the countries in the Near East, nor in any other country have we been 'running at a loss' in selling commodities.⁵⁰

This strain of criticism begins an approach which eventually resulted in the branding of the Soviet Union as "social-imperialist". In fact, many of the features of Soviet behaviour which came to be classified under the social-imperialist banner were already evident in the criticisms being made in 1967, although they did not fit neatly into the prevailing conceptualizations of Soviet-American relations. The Soviet Union was considered to be exploiting "fraternal" countries by "making use of the disparity in prices between industrial goods and agricultural products."⁵¹ The question was asked, "Where is the difference between it and the foreign trade of imperialism, capitalism?"⁵² But no explicitly imperialist labels were attached to the Soviets. Without recognition of possible analytical complications, the new strand of criticism was simply subordinated to the prevailing general critique. The confusion was articulated in one article where it was stated that "the Soviet revisionists are bourgeois merchants working exclusively for profit," and a few paragraphs later it was asserted that,

Of course, the Soviet revisionists' foreign trade does not exist merely for the sake of profits. It is the Soviet revisionist clique's tool for pushing their policies of revisionism and great-power chauvinism and it serves their general line of "Soviet-U.S. collaboration for world domination".⁵³

Thus in spite of the fact that the Soviets were regarded as engaging in exploitative aid and trade relations with "'fraternal' countries and Asian, African and Latin American countries" and using "foreign trade to try to exercise political control over these countries and force them into dependency," the Chinese drew back from branding the Soviets as imperialists.

The only element, it would seem, which is missing from the later analysis of the Soviet Union as social-imperialist is its willingness to pursue its economic and political interests by means of the direct application of military force.

Later in 1967, the Chinese classified Soviet aid to India as "neo-colonialist" and considered it to be directly comparable to that given by the United States. The aim of neo-colonialist aid was specified as creating dependency in the recipient country as well as exploiting it. But the small step from this position to one where the United States and the Soviet Union were seen as contending for neo-colonialist rights was not taken. Rather the Soviet Union was seen as emulating the behaviour of the United States.⁵⁴ By mid-1968, the Chinese had drawn attention to Soviet naval interests in Indian ports and in the Indian Ocean, but here again, although the purpose of such interest was specified as gaining "a foothold in the Indian Ocean and Southeast Asia," the Soviet Union was branded "neo-colonialist" rather than imperialist and as the Chinese saw it, "the 'Soviet-Indian cooperation' advertised by the Soviet revisionists is actually part of their reactionary policy of 'U.S.-Soviet cooperation against China'."⁵⁵

The next step taken in the Chinese critique of Soviet-American relations was to argue that the 'general line' of Soviet foreign policy which they had long since regarded as inherently counter-revolutionary was being integrated with the counter-revolutionary global strategy of the United States. The theoretical principles to which the Soviet revisionists had become committed over a number of years had found what, to the Chinese, was their logical expression in practice — conformity with world-wide American military strategy to suppress revolution. This marriage of Soviet theory to American practice was still not regarded as one in which

the partners were equal -- for while they colluded they certainly did not contend. The Soviet Union, in fact, was considered to be "falling prostrate at the feet of the Yankees."⁵⁶ The Sino-centric interpretation of Soviet-American collaboration was retained. China, because of its unwavering socialism and resolute support for revolutionary struggles, was regarded as the "biggest obstacle" in the way of this new alliance for world domination. "Therefore," it was concluded, "it has been the need for both Washington and Moscow in their counter-revolution to direct the spearhead of their struggle against China."⁵⁷

An indication of how different was the Chinese understanding of Soviet-American relations of this time from what was to come later was the way in which Soviet domination of Eastern Europe was regarded. The Soviet Union, it was claimed, "has been tightening its political control over other member countries of 'COMECON' and squeezed them economically in carrying out its policy of neo-colonialism."⁵⁸ Soviet slogans of "economic cooperation" and the "international division of labor" were seized upon with derision as transparent camouflages for Soviet exploitation. As in imperialist exploitation of colonies, it was pointed out, Comecon countries had become no more than suppliers of raw materials and the market for Soviet-manufactured goods.⁵⁹ The contrast between this and later critiques in terms of Soviet-American relations is marked. Criticism of Soviet policy in Eastern Europe at this time is simply not related to their policy towards the United States. In the new policy which develops after the Czechoslovakian invasion and the Ninth Congress the need for the Soviet Union to maintain and tighten its control over the Eastern European countries is inexplicable without reference to Soviet-American contention. Europe, both East and West, as will be discussed in the following chapter, is regarded in the later Chinese criticisms as the source of more intense rivalry and contention than any other area.

The same contrast is noticeable in relation to Chinese critiques of Soviet policy in the Third World at the time. Indonesia, ever since the Untung coup, had been the target of considerable attention in the Chinese press in relation to Soviet support for the Suharto regime, but here again although both the United States and the Soviet Union were assigned blame in various measure for the coup and its bloody aftermath, and although both were portrayed as pursuing neo-colonialist policies in Indonesia, the Leninist implications about the inevitability of imperialist rivalry were simply not stated.⁶⁰ The reason, once again, would seem to be clear. The global framework within which the Lin Piao phase of China's foreign policy was conceived presented a picture of besieged socialist China with the combined forces of imperialism, revisionism and reaction arraigned against it. To affirm ongoing critical contentions between these groups is antithetical to such a perspective.

The United Nations received attention as an important forum in which United States-Soviet collusive activities were planned and in some cases imposed on "the people of the world." United Nations resolutions in the wake of the 1967 Middle East war were seen as attempts by the United States and the Soviet Union "to use the United Nations to force the Arab states to capitulate completely." Such collusion and conspiracy, however, did not mean that the Soviet Union had yet attained imperialist parity with the United States, nor even that the Soviet Union had come to share in the manipulation of the United Nations. Rather, the resolutions passed by the United Nations enabled the Arab people to,

see more clearly than ever that U.S. imperialism is their most ferocious enemy, that the Soviet revisionist ruling clique is the No. 1 henchman of U.S. imperialism and that the United Nations is a tool of U.S. imperialism and a stock exchange for the U.S. and the Soviet Union to make political deals.⁶¹

The Glassboro meetings between Kosygin and Johnson in June of 1967 came to be interpreted as critical in heightening the collaboration between United States imperialism and Soviet revisionism. The need for greater collaboration was seen as arising from a number of contemporary events which were regarded as damaging for the United States and consequently for its Number One accomplice — the Soviet Union. As the Chinese put it,

the earth-shaking great proletarian cultural revolution was forging ahead vigourously in China; the Vietnamese people were winning one victory after another in their war to resist U.S. aggression and save their fatherland; the revolutionary anti-imperialist movement was gaining momentum in the Middle East and in other areas the world over and the U.S. imperialists and the Soviet revisionists were finding the going tougher with each passing day.⁶²

Two developments in particular were regarded as flowing from the Glassboro meetings — the NATO decision of December 1967 to reduce divisional strength in Western Europe from thirty to twenty and the reduction of United States' forces in Western Europe "to ease the manpower strain of the U.S. imperialists resulting from the heavy casualties on the Vietnam battlefield."⁶³ Other strategic developments of the time which involved the United States and the Soviet Union were regarded as having been developed at Glassboro. The joint drafts submitted by the United States and the Soviet Union on nuclear non-proliferation at Geneva in August 1967 and again in January 1968 as well as the development of an anti-ballistic missile system by the United States were regarded as further instances of strategic collaboration against China. The Chinese position on nuclear non-proliferation is particularly interesting at this time as it considered such proposals to be solely directed against China and to be directly prompted by China's development of nuclear weapons. This position is in

marked contrast to that which it would later adopt when the rights of all countries to develop nuclear weapons were strongly asserted as a means of reducing the impact of the nuclear blackmail practiced by the superpowers.

As mentioned in discussing China's attitude to the United States, considerable emphasis was also given at this time to the Soviet Union's endorsement of peace talk proposals for ending the Vietnam war. This Soviet endorsement was seen as a prime example of its betrayal of people's wars out of fear of retarding the development of Soviet-American relations.

A great deal of emphasis has been placed by Western analysts on the reaction by China to the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in August of 1968. The Chinese response was subtle, penetrating, and in terms of their analytical principles, uncompromising.

Whereas the Soviets had been referred to as revisionists practicing neo-colonialism, as the Number One accomplice, henchman, and emulator of United States imperialism, they had never directly been referred to as imperialists. After Czechoslovakia they were regarded as pursuing "imperialist power politics". "Social-imperialism" was introduced as a term now relevant to the Soviet Union.⁶⁴ For the first time also, strong elements of Soviet-American contention entered the Chinese analysis. "Extremely acute contradictions between U.S. imperialism and Soviet modern revisionism in their struggle for control of Eastern Europe" were mentioned as one of the major causes of the invasion.⁶⁵ But in spite of this development, the main focus of Chinese criticism was kept on Soviet-American collusion. The Soviets, it was claimed wished to preserve rights to direct collaboration with the United States to themselves, while the Dubcek regime, equally revisionist in Chinese eyes, but less of a Soviet puppet than the Novotny regime it replaced, wished to pursue direct relations with United States imperialism. In the Chinese analysis, the Soviets regarded Eastern Europe as their own sphere of influence and by,

practicing big-nation chauvinism and national egoism, turning their East European countries into their dependencies and colonies, tightening steadily their control over the ruling cliques of these countries and ruthlessly oppressing and exploiting the broad masses of the people,

they were prepared to ensure that the United States did not encroach.⁶⁶ Now they had introduced the one element previously lacking in their imperialist behaviour — the use of armed force — to ensure their sole dominance of Eastern Europe. The use of such force, rather than subduing recalcitrant Eastern European countries, was considered by the Chinese to be more likely to exacerbate the centrifugal tendencies which they identified within the 'revisionist bloc'.⁶⁷ In fact, "extremely acute contradictions within the whole modern revisionist bloc" were identified for the first time and began a mode of analysis which led to the eventual inclusion of the Eastern European countries in the second intermediate zone as outlined in the previous chapter.

Thus as a result of the Czechoslovakian invasion by Soviet-led forces, the Chinese had introduced a number of new elements into their analysis of United States-Soviet Union relations. They were regarded as contending as well as colluding "to redivide the world" and although the collusive aspect of the relationship was still afforded priority, it was no longer possible to assert an anti-China motive as its mainstay and this theme is consequently given less emphasis from this time onwards. The Soviet Union was branded with the formal title of social-imperialism and was said to have resorted to "imperialist jungle law".⁶⁸ The development of revisionism within the Soviet bloc was regarded as having given rise to explosive centrifugal tendencies as Eastern European leaders sought their own relationships with the West as a means of diminishing stern Soviet control and pursuing their own revisionist class interests.

Although these developments were considerable and tended to undermine some of the major theses of the Lin Piao foreign policy as it affected Soviet-American relations they still left the Chinese position a long way from the eventual formulation at the end of 1971 where a broad united front which included both Eastern and Western European countries was called for to oppose the superpowers, in which Soviet-American contention was clearly seen as being of greater importance than their collusion and where the Soviet Union as well as the United States was regarded as a fully imperialist power. Had the Czechoslovakian incident occurred four years later then clearly the Dubcek regime would have received greater encouragement in its anti-Soviet tendencies, while the criticism of its revisionist tendencies may well have been muted. Such speculation, however, tends to overlook the fact that the invasion of Czechoslovakia was instrumental in helping to shape the Chinese formulation of its view of the world.

The months following the Czechoslovakian invasion did not see a consistent development of the new perspectives. Strands of criticism far more readily identifiable as part of the Lin Piao strategic orthodoxy were invoked in analysing moves by the Soviet Union to enlist Japanese capital in a comprehensive development programme for Siberia which included the exploitation of natural gas, timber, iron ore and coal. While the Soviets were rebuked for "sell(ing) out state sovereignty in throwing the door wide open for Japanese monopoly capital to plunder the natural resources of Siberia and the Soviet far east"⁶⁹ and "relying on the economic strength of the Japanese monopolies to carry out all-round restoration of capitalism,"⁷⁰ the Chinese criticism was couched within the general framework of a counter-revolutionary encirclement of China by imperialists (the United States), revisionists (the Soviet Union) and reactionaries (Japan):

The Soviet revisionist renegade clique is attempting to intensify its political collusion with the Japanese reactionaries through "economic cooperation" to speed up their encirclement of China under the pretext of "developing" Siberia. To form, in alliance with the U.S. and Japanese reactionaries, a military cordon around China is an important component part of the counter-revolutionary strategy of the Soviet revisionist clique.⁷¹

This framework was again reaffirmed in the very brief section dealing with foreign policy in the New Year editorial of 1969. The 1960's were summarized as an era in which "a great polemic against modern revisionism" had been mounted. The international situation was summarized as follows,

Imperialism headed by the United States, modern revisionism with Soviet revisionism at its centre and all reaction are falling on harder and harder times, and the struggles for liberation waged by the oppressed people and oppressed nations all over the world is advancing from strength to strength with great vigour.⁷²

Thus while oppressed *nations* had joined oppressed peoples in struggling for liberation in a prefiguration of the position adopted at the Ninth Congress, there was nothing else to suggest major revisions were in the offing. "Mutual rivalries" between the Soviet Union and the United States were coming to be acknowledged more frequently but these were regarded basically as the forerunners of more intense collaboration.⁷³ In fact, the United States and the Soviet Union were seen as being propelled towards greater collaboration by the sheer pressure of their own internal contradictions:

The tougher going for imperialism, the more it needs revisionism and the tougher going for revisionism, the more it needs to hire itself out to imperialism. This is an inexorable law.⁷⁴

After the Chenpao border clashes with the Soviet Union in February 1969, Soviet behaviour towards China was brought in under the social-imperialist banner,⁷⁵ and it was pointed out that social-imperialism had reached such a stage of entrenchment within Soviet society that it was no longer possible to reverse the process by peaceful means. In terms reminiscent of those used in the polemic with the Soviet Union over peaceful coexistence it was asserted that "the nature of Soviet revisionist social-imperialism, like that of U.S. imperialism, will never change."⁷⁶ In 1963-64, the Chinese had argued against the Soviets that it was of no use hoping that a more humane, liberal or progressive leadership of the United States would emerge, for as long as it remained capitalist it would throw up an exploitative ruling class which would exercise political dominance and as long as the United States remained powerful it would extend its exploitation elsewhere. The Soviet Union's external behaviour was no longer regarded as a behavioural quirk without solid domestic foundations in the class structure of Soviet society. One implication of the Chinese adopting this position was that they had set themselves the formidable task of explaining not merely "the all-round restoration of capitalism" in the Soviet Union, but how "the highest stage of capitalism" had been attained in a country which they had called socialist only a few years previously.

In the weeks prior to the Ninth Congress, there were hints of the united front strategy which was to become prominent later in calls for "the people of the world who oppose aggression (to) unite and strike down U.S. imperialism, Soviet revisionism and the new Tsars,"⁷⁷ but the broad framework for discussion of Soviet behaviour was still one in which they were "persistently ganging up with U.S. imperialism frantically opposing China and stubbornly setting...(themselves)...against the Chinese people."⁷⁸ The "major aim," it was still argued, "of the counter-revolutionary

U.S.-Soviet 'holy alliance' is to oppose China."⁷⁹ The Soviets were accused of going so far in their attempts to construct an "anti-China ring" in concert with the United States that they had joined forces with the "Chiang Kai-shek bandit clique" on Taiwan.⁸⁰

Thus by the time of the Ninth Congress large inroads had already been made into the conceptualization of Soviet-American relations which had been operative in the heyday of Lin Piao's foreign policy formulation. After the Czechoslovakian invasion it was no longer possible to conceive of contemporary contradictions as being located only in the Third World, and for the same reasons it was no longer possible to regard the Soviet Union as simply the accomplice or henchman of United States imperialism. The Soviet Union's activities in Eastern Europe, Mongolia and in the Third World had, according to the Chinese, become so exploitative that they warranted categorizing as "social-imperialist".

After the Tet Offensive in Vietnam and the enunciation of the Guam doctrine it seemed the United States had accepted that its ability to inflict its will aggressively in Asia had reached a turning point. The shift in strategic emphasis from Europe to Asia which had characterized Lin Piao's view of the world was being halted or redirected. In this situation the future would witness a declining relevance for the applicability of people's war. A novice Soviet form of imperialism and a stagnant United States form set the stage for wide areas of inter-imperialist contention which in spite of the retrospective statements to the contrary had not featured prominently in Chinese analysis in the Sixties — being submerged in the prevailing orthodoxy of an "anti-China holy alliance". But by the time of the Ninth Congress, Eastern Europe had been mentioned explicitly as an area of contention between the United States and the Soviet Union and other areas of both the first and second intermediate zones were implicitly so.

As argued in the previous chapter, the basic theoretical formulation for the foreign policy line which was to become known as Chairman Mao's revolutionary diplomatic line was stated at the Ninth Congress. This applies a *fortiori* to the United States and the Soviet Union and the relation between them. It has been shown above that the new conceptualization did not emerge from an unreconstructed Linist position into overnight theoretical maturity. But as with other characteristics of the new policy, a decisive theoretical leap was made at this time and given the authoritative imprimatur of a Party Congress. The major contradictions outlined at the time of the Ninth Congress listed imperialism and social-imperialism as allied in their opposition to both "oppressed nations" and to "socialist countries"; to be similar in terms of their internal contradictions between proletariat and bourgeoisie; and to form two poles of a multi-polar contradiction between themselves and all other imperialist powers. Just as in the case of the broadest perspectives of the new policy, this formulation of imperialist/social-imperialist relations by no means meant that all of the theoretical and tactical implications of the new relations were realized and welcomed at the time. In fact, resistance to the new outline in the manner detailed in the previous chapter was to be its fate until the time of the Lin Piao affair.

The new policy.

China's analysis of the United States, the Soviet Union and Soviet-American relations in the new policy which was schematically implicit in the Ninth Congress Report, which attains virtually unchallenged dominance in mid-1971 and continues beyond the Tenth Congress, has been outlined in the previous chapter. In order to contrast it with the Chinese position in the period leading up to the Ninth Congress which has been discussed above and to provide a background for an analysis of the changes which

took place, the new policy as it relates to the United States and the Soviet Union and the relations between them will be summarized here.

While the schematic formulation of the Ninth Congress decisively changed the analytical 'base' of China's foreign policy, there was, as the previous chapter illustrated, the equivalent of a 'superstructural lag' in its implementation. The emphases of the 1960's took time and struggle to change. With the full flowering of the new policy after Lin Piao's demise, however, it is the newer structural elements introduced at the Ninth Congress which receive emphasis. The trends in world contradictions which the Chinese considered to be developing at the time, rather than those which were features constant to both periods, were the ones to be stressed.

The monetary/financial crises centred on the United States, Western Europe and Japan which were analysed in the Chinese press in 1968, and of which the inclusion of the contradiction between imperialist powers at the Ninth Congress was a logical result, received constant analytical attention as they developed in the period after the Ninth Congress and directly inspired a large number of tactical initiatives on the part of Chinese foreign policy makers. The conclusions which had begun to emerge in 1968 were consolidated. The imperialist policies of the United States since World War II had begun to reap their harvest, not only in the form of anti-imperialist people's war but in reprisals from other capitalist powers who had borne part of the burden of United States expansion. Such imperialist rivalry only served to exacerbate the already mounting pressures on the United States economy from within as well as without. The hesitant measures towards European economic cooperation after 1968 continued to receive Chinese approval in their anti-United States aspects and increasingly in their anti-Soviet aspects.

After the Tet Offensive, while there was no suggestion that the enunciation of the Guam or Nixon Doctrine meant that the United States has decided to reduce its aggressive posture in Southeast Asia, it was increasingly noted that the United States would henceforth have to rely much more on "lackeys" and "puppets" to carry on its aggression indirectly. During much of the period under review, the Chinese clearly thought the prime candidate for such policing activity in Asia was Japan, and they campaigned vigourously against the militarization of Japan as a consequence. But as the threat of Japanese militarization waned — and presumably guarantees of sorts were obtained by the Chinese on this score prior to diplomatic recognition⁸¹ — only the increasingly vulnerable governments of Southeast Asia remained to protect and enforce American interests in the area as the United States withdrew. By the Tenth Congress and in the period immediately afterwards, China had moved to take advantage of this situation in forming government-to-government and people-to-people relations with many of the countries in the region with the apparent intention of reducing the need and desire of such countries to maintain relationships of dependency with the United States. With entry into the United Nations and other international bodies, China frequently acted as spokesman for Southeast Asian and other Third World governments on those occasions where anti-American or anti-Soviet policies were being pursued. As in the case of Europe, encouragement and applause was given to all attempts by Third World governments to unite in their opposition to the "superpowers". The "broad united front" which emerged in the theoretical discussions outlined in the previous chapter was made the subject of intense diplomatic activity.

It is not too far fetched to suggest that the Tet Offensive was a landmark in the reappraisal made by the Chinese of United States' strength

in Southeast Asia and in the Third World generally. Certainly the beginning of China's new analysis of the world in which the United States plays a far less dominant role and is the subject of more intense and diverse pressures can be seen to date from this time and to be consistent with the interpretation of the Tet Offensive which the Chinese made at the time.

Conclusions which had begun to be drawn about the character of United States-Soviet relations in 1968 and which were embodied in the Ninth Congress were also developed forcefully in the period under review. Thus the contention between the United States and the Soviet Union received much more attention in this period than in the previous one. Apart from the decline of United States imperial fortunes as a result of the factors listed above, the major development which gave rise to this new situation was the consolidation — at least to Chinese eyes — of the view that the Soviet Union was increasingly acting as a social-imperialist power. By the time of the Tenth Congress very few areas of the world had not been linked to Soviet attempts at imperial expansion. The Middle East, South Asia, East and West Europe and China itself were of course seen as the principal areas in which the Soviet Union was seeking to consolidate or expand its social-imperialist hegemony, but Japan, Latin America, Southeast Asia and the Mediterranean, Indian and Pacific Oceans were also regarded as areas in which the Soviet Union had an interest and was seeking an expansion of its imperial presence. In fact, by the time of the Tenth Congress, the Chinese press concentrated on little else in its reportage of the Soviet Union than its alleged imperialist behaviour. This was contrary to a later tendency to relate the emergence of "social-imperialism" to domestic developments within the Soviet political economy in accordance with a Leninist theory of imperialism in which the "highest

stage of capitalism" was a condition of a state acting in an imperialist way.

In accordance with this increased tendency to have regard to the contention between the Soviet Union and the United States as well as their collusion and with the diversified imperial interests of the Soviet Union, the anti-Chinese motivation which was previously said to have prompted Soviet-American collusion was abandoned. In this sense, the new policy was far less Sino-centric than in the former phase of foreign policy. Several observers have drawn parallels between China's diplomatic behaviour, in this period, particularly the increased number of foreign dignitaries who visited China, and previous Chinese dynasties in which bearers of imperial tribute had journeyed to Chinese courts.⁸² The implication here is that Han chauvinism has returned to the extent that the "barbarians" are now trekking to civilization to pay homage to the new bearer of the heavenly mandate. As has been argued above, the basis of the new policy which calls for increased diplomatic activity is in fact a far less Sino-centric one than that in the previous period in which virtually all diplomatic contacts were suspended. Analyses which concentrate on evidence as superficial as diplomatic to-ing and fro-ing are not likely, however, to reach more substantial or accurate conclusions save by accident.

One implication of this less Sino-centric motivation in China's foreign policy should be noted by way of contrast with the previous period. It had been asserted during the period in which American involvement in the Vietnam war was at its most intense that the Soviet Union and the United States were colluding in developing a detente situation in Europe so that military emphasis could be shifted from there to Asia with China as the ultimate strategic objective. Now, with both the United States and the Soviet Union being involved in more contradictions, China was by no

means the prime target of their opposition with respect to all these contradictions. The drift of Soviet-American collusion (and now contention) to Asia had, within the Chinese analysis, been halted and reversed. In the case of the United States, its fortunes had waned in Asia and it needed to devote extraordinary energy to maintain its dominance in the capitalist world in the face of unprecedented pressure from its rivals. In the case of the Soviet Union, it was asserted that the border conflicts with China which began the period under review were in reality deceptive. The Soviets, it was claimed, were "making a feint to the East while attacking the West." Their real interest, the prize which their new imperial ambitions most cherished was Western Europe. And in Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union was now constrained to guard its sphere of influence with increased vigilance as individual countries within that sphere sought their separate contacts with the capitalist world.

Such were some of the central conclusions which were reached by the Chinese leadership about the nature of contemporary reality and the appropriate response for a Marxist-Leninist party. In terms of the broadest contradiction now envisaged — that between imperialism and social-imperialism on the one hand and the oppressed nations on the other, the struggle against imperialism had wider perspectives. Since the United States and the Soviet Union no longer had China as their sole principal adversary and since liberation struggles were not the only arena of conflict, a broad united front was possible. The abandonment of China as the primary focus of imperial hostility implied the abandonment of China as the sole focus of struggle against imperialism.

Interpretations.

Thus far a contrast has been drawn between the assumptions adopted by Chinese foreign policy makers during the Cultural Revolution period

and the period immediately prior to the Ninth Congress towards the United States and the Soviet Union and the relations between the two — and the assumptions adopted in the new policy. Such a procedure serves to contrast the very basis of foreign policy decisions, tactical initiatives and propaganda in the two periods. As has been indicated, the Chinese claim that developments in the world's contradictions provide the initiative for the new formulation. The validity of this claim will be examined below, but since alternative explanations of the change in China's relations with the superpowers have received acceptance, an examination of them is warranted.

Interpretation 1: Fear of the Soviet Union. The interpretation which has gained widest academic acceptance is presented primarily as an explanation of Sino-American normalization of diplomatic relations. As stated at the beginning of the previous chapter, this interpretation considers the initiative for the reduction of diplomatic hostilities was taken by China and to have been generated by an increasing fear of Soviet military attack. This thesis has reached the stage of dogma, having gained the imprimaturs of the most respected authors in the field. The implications of accepting such a thesis rather than alternative ones are monumental for the understanding of Chinese foreign policy since it commits China to a form of reactive diplomacy which denudes it of revolutionary initiative and intent.

The analysis below is intended as a critique primarily of the best argued case for this position, viz. that by Allen S. Whiting.⁸³ There are some idiosyncrasies in Whiting's position, relating to the timing of China's contemplation of acquiring America as an 'ally' in its opposition to the Soviet Union and the particular Soviet threats to which it was responding. These will be elaborated upon, but they do not alter Whiting's

fundamental commitment to the major propositions of the new conventional wisdom.

Crucial to Whiting's argument is the understanding that the Sino-American detente of 1971-72 has its genesis in developments which took place between the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968 and the resumption of the Sino-American ambassadorial talks in Warsaw in January 1970. It is consequently to this period he turns for a detailed examination of both Chinese and American motivation in seeking a less hostile relationship.

The "strategic initiative" for improved relations was, according to Whiting, taken by the Chinese. To be more specific, he identifies a Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs statement of November 26, 1968,⁸⁴ proposing the following February 20 as a suitable date for the resumption of Sino-American ambassadorial talks in Warsaw as the first move of at least one section of the Chinese leadership towards a detente with the United States. The aspect of this Ministry of Foreign Affairs statement which Whiting considers indicative of a new Peking "posture" towards the United States was the mention of the "Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence". The key passage reads:

Over the past thirteen years, the Chinese Government has consistently adhered to the following principles in the Sino-U.S. ambassadorial talks: first, the U.S. Government undertakes to immediately withdraw all its armed forces from China's territory, Taiwan Province and the Taiwan Straits area, and dismantle all its military installations in Taiwan Province; second, the U.S. Government agrees that China and the U.S. conclude an agreement on the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence.⁸⁵

Whiting claims that the mention of these principles in this context indicates a changed attitude on the part of "at least one portion of the

leadership" which had become interested in exploring "the possibility of easing relations on the second hostile front, the Taiwan Strait."⁸⁶ He justifies this claim by drawing on his presumably detailed knowledge of previous Warsaw talks⁸⁷ where, in spite of the Chinese inference to the contrary by their mention of the past thirteen years, he states that there was little mention of the principles of peaceful coexistence.⁸⁸ This diplomatic evidence is, however, rather misleading insofar as no alternative basis for negotiations, or indeed relations, other than the principles of peaceful coexistence had ever been advocated in the Chinese press for relations with the United States or other countries with "differing social systems". Whiting makes no claim that any other principles were put forward in the secret Warsaw talks. Successive Chinese leaderships, in terms of their stated positions have never deviated from this position since it was fully elaborated in 1963.

As stated in the previous chapter, the five principles of peaceful coexistence received little emphasis during the Cultural Revolution period when struggle of a more direct kind predominated. As also stated, there was a period after the Ninth Congress when the mention or non-mention of the five principles was frequently consistent with opposed ideological objectives. These differences, however, were clearly a matter of stress. At no time was there any suggestion that the five principles had been abandoned or repudiated even by the ultra-leftists.

Whiting compounds the misleading nature of his remarks by inferring that the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs statement is not only an analytical development of some novelty, but also is hypocritical. He asserts that the Chinese media had "ritualistically chastized Soviet policy, personified by Premier Nikita Khrushchev, as "betraying the world revolutionary movement" by "advocating peaceful coexistence with U.S.

imperialism "⁸⁹ — thereby suggesting that the Chinese statement supports a position which the Chinese press had spent years denouncing. In fact, the Chinese media had consistently, since the polemics with the Soviet Union in 1963-64, stated the ways in which the Soviet policy of peaceful coexistence differed in its formulation and application from that which they themselves adopted.

The Chinese leadership considered the difference between their own concept of peaceful coexistence and that of the Soviet Union to be so great in fact that their "Sixth Comment on the Open Letter of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union" in 1963 was entitled "Peaceful Coexistence — Two Diametrically Opposed Views".⁹⁰ In this pamphlet, the Chinese state quite explicitly that they endorse "peaceful coexistence" as a correct policy towards countries "having different social systems." What is in dispute between themselves and the Russians is the type of peaceful coexistence possible with imperialist powers.

The Chinese laid out with great clarity the conditions under which such a relationship would be possible,

As the international balance of class forces grows increasingly favourable to socialism and as the imperialist forces become daily weaker and the contradictions among them daily sharper, it is possible for the socialist countries to compel one imperialist country or another to establish some sort of peaceful coexistence with them by relying on their own strength, the expansion of the revolutionary forces of the peoples, the unity with the nationalist countries and the struggle of all the peace-loving people, and by utilizing the internal contradictions of imperialism.⁹¹

The importance of the above statement can scarcely be overestimated in this discussion as there is a remarkable correspondence between the conditions which the Chinese claimed in 1963 would have to prevail for peaceful coexistence to be imposed on an imperialist country and the conditions which they saw developing in relation to the United States in 1968.

Somewhat paradoxically, the dominant theme of Chinese peaceful coexistence is that of "struggle". Chinese publications have insisted that it is necessary to wage struggle against imperialism in order to attain peaceful coexistence with an imperialist country. In the 1963-64 polemics and for some years before they took place, the Chinese had argued with the Soviet Union that the latter's concept of peaceful coexistence implied a qualitatively more benign view of imperialism, particularly the American variety. They argued on the contrary, that the only possibility of peaceful coexistence with imperialist powers succeeding is "not because of any change in the nature of imperialism, but in the situation in which imperialism finds itself."⁹² The Chinese reasoning is uncomplicated and watertight. Since the imperialists are implacably hostile and aggressive and necessarily opposed to peaceful coexistence, they must be forced to accept it against their will.⁹³ It follows, therefore, in the Chinese scheme of things, that peaceful coexistence can never be substituted for revolutionary struggle as the "general line" of the socialist countries.⁹⁴ This idiosyncratic Chinese view of peaceful coexistence deserves emphasis not merely in the context of Whiting's argument but also in the broader context of the later Sino-American detente. In the 1963-64 polemics, the Chinese were able to quote to telling effect statements by Soviet leaders which indicated their distinctive understanding of contemporary imperialist motivation. Khrushchev himself had claimed that peaceful coexistence should be made the "basic law of life for the whole of modern society"⁹⁵ and that "not a few government and state leaders of Western countries are now also coming out for peace and peaceful coexistence "⁹⁶ since they "understand more and more clearly the necessity of peaceful coexistence."⁹⁷ That the United States is the "Western government" which the Soviet leaders had principally in mind, we were left in

no doubt. *Izvestia* was prepared to applaud President Kennedy's "admission of the reasonableness and practicability of peaceful coexistence between countries with different social systems."⁹⁸

The Chinese were thus quite convincing in their demonstration that the Soviet policy of peaceful coexistence and consequently of detente with the United States implied a qualitatively different view of United States imperialism and its ability to engage in "efforts for the good of all humanity"⁹⁹ than that which the Chinese were prepared to tolerate. The significant point here in the context of the subsequent Sino-American detente -- a point which is overlooked by Whiting and other commentators -- is that no Chinese pronouncements on their own detente with the United States embody any suggestion that it is the result of a diminution in the hegemonic designs of American imperialism. On the contrary, as will be discussed elsewhere, the Chinese clearly perceive their own detente with the United States as one which the latter was compelled to accept as the result of its massive setbacks, particularly in Asia and the growing rivalry of other imperialist powers including the Soviet Union. There is thus no theoretical inconsistency, much less hypocrisy, in respect to the principle of peaceful coexistence elaborated by the Chinese as Whiting and many other commentators suggest in the normalization of relations achieved by the Chinese with the United States. It is difficult to take some of these allegations by Western scholars as anything more than deliberate mystifications.¹⁰⁰

Other differences between the Sino-American detente and that established between the Soviet Union and the United States in the early 1960's also bear examination in this context. "Peaceful competition", a concept elaborated by the Soviet Union in the 1963-64 polemics with China and endorsed as one of the pillars of their detente with the United States, has still not met with Chinese approval. It is noteworthy that the

Shanghai Communique made reference to countries being willing to "compete peacefully" only in one of the passages which did not meet with Chinese approval, suggesting perhaps that it was the subject of negotiations but not one where the Americans could entice Chinese agreement.¹⁰¹ The Soviets have persisted with and developed this notion. One of their charges against the Chinese during the period under review was that they refused to affirm "the possibility of defeating capitalism in economic competition."¹⁰² Apart from the patent contradictions involved in this Soviet strategy, the fact that the United States is prepared to approve of the very strategy which the Soviet Union argues will lead to its downfall is, at the very least, perplexing.

Whiting purports to document evidence "suggestive of a high-level policy review which recast Soviet intentions in the light of reassessments of Soviet military behaviour."¹⁰³ This evidence is, however, far from convincing. Whiting correctly observes that Chou En-lai's initial reaction on August 23 to "the Soviet military occupation of Czechoslovakia" did not mention the possibility of a Soviet threat to China. Brezhnev's subsequent enunciation of the doctrine of "limited sovereignty" in an attempt to legitimate Soviet actions in Czechoslovakia is understood by Whiting as the probable source of a Chinese "reassessment of Russian intentions." Indications of this reassessment are perceived in the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs statement of September 16 which "suddenly" protested about Soviet overflights during the last year and in Chou's National Day address on October 1 which enjoined the Chinese people to "smash any invasion launched by U.S. imperialism, Soviet revisionism, and their lackeys whether individually or collectively." Whiting claims that this was the first time that the possibility of invasion had been explicitly linked to Soviet revisionism. Following Chou's speech there were

further allusions to the possibility of a Soviet invasion in the Chinese press. Whiting cites that of October 1, when the Chief of Staff Huang Yung-sheng spoke of Soviet troop concentrations along the Sino-Soviet and Sino-Mongolian borders¹⁰⁴ and that of October 8, when Wang En-mao, Vice Chairman of the Revolutionary Committee of the Sinkiang-Uighur Autonomous Region and political commissar of the People's Liberation Army Sinkiang Military Area Command stated that local People's Liberation Army units "were maintaining sharp vigilance, strengthening preparedness against war, consolidating frontier defence, and defending the motherland. Should the Soviet revisionists dare to attack us we would wipe them out resolutely, thoroughly, wholly and completely."¹⁰⁵

Once again, however, Whiting's compilation of evidence to prove that "in the short space of two months top officials moved from total silence on the threat of a Soviet invasion to explicit alarms keyed to this specific contingency," is rather misleading. To begin with, Brezhnev's enunciation of the "limited sovereignty" doctrine did not take place in early September as Whiting suggests but was first expounded in *Pravda* on September 26 where it was asserted that the Soviet Union and other members of "the socialist commonwealth" had a duty to ensure that Czechoslovakia's "fundamental interests," as well as those of other bloc countries, were pursued. It was claimed that "the allied socialist countries' soldiers who are in Czechoslovakia...have no task other than to defend the socialist gains in that country. They are not interfering in the country's internal affairs."¹⁰⁶ On October 3, the Soviet Foreign Minister, Gromyko, expressed similar views.¹⁰⁷ Brezhnev himself, it seems, did not pronounce on the subject and impart its definitive form until November 12 at the Polish United Workers' Party Congress.¹⁰⁸ It is difficult to conclude with Whiting, therefore, that the Brezhnev doctrine

served to "accelerate" the alleged Chinese "reassessment of Russian intentions" as its enunciation and elaboration took place after the Ministry of Foreign Affairs statement of September 16 on Soviet overflights.

Other aspects of Whiting's documentation are even more likely to mislead. He claims for instance, that the official statements issued on People's Liberation Army Day, August 1, 1968 — i.e., three weeks prior to the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia — made no specific allusions to a threat from the Soviet Union, although they "routinely warned against war preparations aimed at China."¹⁰⁹ In this he is correct but he has overlooked the fact that on the same day Huang Yung-sheng, speaking at an Army Day reception stated,

At present, U.S. imperialism, Soviet revisionism and the Indian and other reactionaries are intensifying their efforts to form a counter-revolutionary ring of encirclement against the People's Republic of China and they create border tension by frequently encroaching upon our territorial waters and airspace. By these stupid and frantic actions of theirs, they are inviting their own destruction like an egg dashed against a rock.¹¹⁰

Thus the Chief of Staff was speaking three weeks prior to the Czech invasion in terms almost identical to those he used two weeks after it took place. The available evidence would not, therefore, seem to suggest, as Whiting claims, that "Chinese estimates of Soviet intentions took an alarming turn after the Russian invasion of Czechoslovakia"¹¹¹ or even that a "high-level policy review" took place.

In fact the Chinese Foreign Minister, Ch'en Yi had warned as early as September 29, 1965, at a press conference in Peking of Soviet military aggression in China.¹¹² In 1964, Mao Tsetung noted with obvious disapproval that there were Soviet troop concentrations on China's borders¹¹³ in spite of Whiting's curious statement that a "qualitative and quantitative increase in Soviet military deployment toward and around China's borders

had been under way since 1965, with some awareness being reflected in Peking already in 1967."¹¹⁴ On the contrary, the Chinese press, at least since Ch'en Yi's September 1965 statement, had continued to mention as pointed out at the beginning of this chapter Soviet collaboration in United States strategic efforts to contain China.¹¹⁵ Whiting's rather elaborate contention that a realization on the part of the Chinese government of Soviet military developments on the Chinese border only occurred in 1968-69 with the coming into operation of more sophisticated reconnaissance capabilities¹¹⁶ would thus seem unwarranted.

It may, of course, have been the case that a high-level "strategic debate" of the kind which allegedly took place three years earlier in the face of an imminent American threat, did in fact take place in the winter of 1968-69 with its focus on the possibility of a Soviet attack but the evidence for such a contention scarcely seems overwhelming. In any case the Ministry of Foreign Affairs statement of November 26 calling for renewed Sino-American ambassadorial talks on the basis of the five principles of peaceful coexistence is scanty evidence indeed that the alleged debate was resolved, at least for one section of the Chinese leadership, by adopting a programme for the relaxation of tension between China and the United States.¹¹⁷ That there was in Peking in the winter of 1968-69 serious concern about the possibility of Soviet military pressure is not here in question. Such concern had presumably accompanied the Chinese awareness of Soviet troop deployments along their borders. These had continued to escalate since their initial positioning in the wake of the collapse of the border negotiations in 1964. By 1969, the Soviets had assembled some forty-five fully equipped divisions — over half a million men — along their Chinese border thus guarding their eastern frontier with a military concentration even greater than that arraigned along their European borders. As Franz Michael has pointed out,

The location of the main troop concentrations around Vladivostok, north of the Amur, and in the Mongolian panhandle were the same as those occupied by the Soviet forces in 1945, before the blitzkrieg attack against the Japanese armies in Manchuria. Other Soviet armies threatened the Kansu corridor and Sinkiang, China's area of mineral resources and nuclear testing ground.¹¹⁸

It is safe to assume, therefore, that the Chinese concern existed in varying, but generally increasing, intensity for at least four years. It may, in fact, be confidently asserted that between 1967 and 1969 the Chinese Communist Party changed its sights from the United States to the Soviet Union as the most likely source of a military threat. What is not established, however, is Whiting's contention that this concern was primarily responsible for sowing the seeds of the Sino-American detente which came to fruition some three years later.

Even if Whiting's view of developments up to this point were to be accepted, events subsequent to those immediately following the invasion of Czechoslovakia do not bear out his interpretation. Both the Sino-Soviet border clashes in March 1969 and the as yet vague, but to Chinese ears, still menacing proposal by Brezhnev in June 1969¹¹⁹ of an Asian system of "collective security" with all its anti-Chinese implications, could only have served to exacerbate Chinese fears of Soviet intentions. Whiting is unable to demonstrate that the injection of these new "threats" into the already apprehensive Chinese state of mind produces any more "feelers" or "signals" towards an accommodation with the United States.

Some scholars are prepared to claim that it is precisely one or other of these latter developments which prompted China's interest in pursuing a rapprochement with the United States, although they do not burden us with proof of these assertions. Thus Thomas W. Robinson can state,

The sharpening of Sino-Soviet hostility after the border clashes of 1969 was the principal causative agent that led Peking to the conclusion that the greater immediate threat from the north made it advisable to compromise with the lesser threat from the east and southeast. The result was the PRC's move towards reconciliation with a U.S. government likewise disposed to resolve Sino-American differences.¹²⁰

Robert A. Scalapino, a long-time defender of containing China but converted to the Nixonian view of detente, can write with apparent approval of Whiting's claim that a high-level policy review took place,

China witnessed Czechoslovakia, the enunciation of the Brezhnev Doctrine (that no state was free to leave socialism — as defined by the U.S.S.R.), and veiled threats to the effect that if the border controversy with China led to serious conflict, the war would not be restricted to conventional weapons.

The events of 1968-69 caused the most profound soul-searching in Peking. At this point, real fear of a Soviet attack existed within Chinese elite circles. All earlier matters dividing China and Russia, as previously noted, now merged into one overwhelming concern, that of security. Men like Mao and Chou must have sworn that never again would China face the Soviet Union weak in every sense, and hence vulnerable whether in a bargaining situation or in conflict.

The key to a new policy was the United States.¹²¹

Scalapino's version of events contributing to the detente with America differs from that of Whiting only in the lack of an attempt to pin the Chinese decision down to any specific Soviet threat and the lack of any attempt to prove that Chinese threat perceptions contributed to the Sino-American diplomatic detente. This vague and unproven position is widely echoed among those who write in the field. A. Doak Barnett,¹²² Albert Feuerwerker,¹²³ Franz Michael,¹²⁴ and Edward E. Rice,¹²⁵ for instance, all adopt this position without deeming proof necessary.

Harold C. Hinton, a persistently harsh critic of Chinese foreign policy adopts a position which closely resembles that of Whiting. He goes

slightly further in giving the status of probability to the suggestion that following the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, Chou En-lai led one faction of the Chinese leadership in arguing for renewed ambassadorial contacts with the United States "as a political restraint on Moscow," while Lin Piao led another in arguing for the maintenance of diplomatic hostility towards both the United States and the Soviet Union.¹²⁶ Chou's position, he claims, was strengthened when, "in 1969 Moscow privately asked the United States what its reaction would be to a Soviet destruction of China's nuclear installations and was strongly discouraged; the American attitude probably played a part in Moscow's decision not to attack China."¹²⁷

Hinton's position is made clear in the following passage:

In reality, Peking has subordinated its popular support for revolution (without abandoning it, because it is a sacred cause and China wants to keep this option open) to its cultivation of other governments with a primarily anti-Soviet purpose — obviously in order to build political support for China against Soviet pressures and competition. In fact, although not in theory or in its propaganda, Peking has begun to climb down from the dual adversary strategy and has begun to "tilt" in the direction of the United States as the best potentially available counterweight to the Soviet Union.¹²⁸

Unlike Whiting, however, Hinton considers that Nixon initiated detente proceedings by conveying to Peking "through a variety of intermediaries" from March 1969 onwards "his desire to visit Peking and otherwise improve Sino-American relations."¹²⁹ To this latter end he reduced travel restrictions, embargoes on "nonstrategic" trade and suspended the Seventh Fleet's patrolling of the Taiwan Strait in 1969. Hinton even accepts at face value Nixon's position that "since before the beginning of his administration" he "had regarded an improvement of relations with China as highly desirable."¹³⁰ "He believed, correctly," according to

Hinton, "that there had been a tendency in the United States to overestimate Chinese 'expansionism' and therefore the Chinese 'threat' to Asia."¹³¹ Hinton neglects to mention that few people had done more than Nixon in fostering such an overestimation and that he himself had given it considerable academic respectability as well as credence in previous studies.¹³² According to Hinton's analysis, Peking insisted that "any real improvement of Sino-American relations was contingent on a prior indication of firm and sincere American intent to de-escalate the war in Indochina and withdraw American forces." This was precisely Nixon's intention on assuming office, according to Hinton, so that all that remained was for Peking to become convinced of it. While he admits that the invasion of Cambodia by American troops in May 1970 didn't help, the set-back, he argues, was temporary. Peking, he continues, became convinced of America's honourable intentions on seeing its "willingness to accept a defeat of South Vietnamese forces in southern Laos in February-March 1971 rather than inject its own forces into the struggle there."¹³³ While Hinton may have more insight into the workings of Richard Nixon's mind than the present author, it would seem on the face of things that there were more plausible reasons for Nixon's failure to escalate the war in Laos — not least the abject failure of the same strategy in Cambodia less than a year earlier as well as the domestic furore it aroused, including the Kent State fiasco.

A striking feature of the arguments and assertions put forward by the above writers on Chinese foreign policy are the contentious assumptions which they have in common and which are left unexplored. Foremost among these, and most contentious of all, is the apparent willingness ascribed to the Chinese leadership to seek a rapprochement with the United States as a defensive ally against the Soviet Union. The shred of credibility which attaches to this assumption is the unproven, and in the case

of the above authors, unstated, contention that the Soviet Union had by this time been perceived as the sole principal enemy of the people and nations of the world¹³⁴ by the Chinese who had consequently decided to mount a united front policy, to include the United States, against Soviet influence. This contention must, however, be set in the context of the history of Chinese perceptions of United States policy towards China for the preceding twenty years. The Chinese had consistently considered United States foreign policy as the international arm of the United States ruling class which sought as its primary objective the extension of that class's power as widely as possible. Furthermore, the Chinese had, for at least ten years, considered that one of the prime ideological functions of United States foreign policy was to pose Chinese communism as the principal threat to world peace. Over and above these perceptions on the part of the Chinese was the physical presence of the United States army, navy and air force along sections of China's perimeter and the constant threat they presented, as well as the hostility of American client states in Asia.

One would assume, in light of these widely known facts, that an explanation of why and how the Chinese came to perceive the possibility of the United States being prepared to form an alliance which in undefined ways shielded China from possible Soviet aggression should form a major part of the thesis put forward by Whiting and others. Such, however, is not the case. That the United States had reasons of its own for proceeding along the path of normalizing diplomatic relations with China is not here being questioned. Nor is the fact that the Chinese had frequently alluded to such a possibility. But what is implied in the thesis in question is much more than this. We are asked to assume that the Chinese leadership consciously sought out the United States believing that they

would put their diplomatic and military influence behind China in her dispute with the Soviet Union. It is sufficient to elaborate this major assumption of the Whiting thesis to expose its absurdity.

Another unexplored factor in the Whiting analysis is the apparent pliability of American foreign policy in such a crucial area. Once the Chinese have reconsidered their position in the face of a potential Soviet threat, it is assumed that the United States is automatically prepared to accede to Chinese demands for improved relations. Liberal scholars, such as Whiting, have generally applauded this dismantling of the containment policy in favour of a form of "peaceful coexistence" as a sane, if overdue, reaction to the non-aggressive character of Chinese international behaviour.¹³⁵ But the timing of the American decision, given the long-standing commitment of that country to either a "roll-back" or "containment" policy¹³⁶ cries out for explanation. In the years immediately prior to 1969 there was little in developments which had taken place within China which could have encouraged the United States to reconsider its determined opposition towards China. If China had changed at all during the Cultural Revolution, it had become more decisively socialist and more stridently opposed to capitalism in its various forms. It is not possible, therefore, that a conciliatory change in United States policy towards China originated from changes within China amenable to United States policy. Moreover, the Vietnam war, in which China had consistently supported the liberation forces to the point where Sino-American war was imminent, had served to exacerbate tensions up to and subsequent to Nixon's visit to China.

This last point deserves mention as a number of the authors cited in this section have alluded to the possibility of the United States applying pressure on China to have them restrain their Vietnamese allies.

Some have suggested that the normalization of relations between the United States and China has effectively meant that China has agreed to betray its Third World allies active in liberation struggles, particularly the Vietnamese. The assumptions involved in such an alleged about-face are not of course discussed. The United States government has been particularly active in encouraging such rumours. A typical example is that of United States Deputy Secretary of State Rush, who claimed,

as a result of the President's visit to Peking, and his very successful visit to Moscow, both Moscow and China have reevaluated what are our objectives. They realize that we were not in Vietnam, in South Vietnam, for any kind of imperialistic purpose. We were there to protect an independent country fighting for its freedom. We were not there to fight Russia: we were not there to fight China. I think this realization was a very important thing in the changed attitude that Russia and China have had toward peace in Vietnam and their willingness to cooperate in bringing about that peace.¹³⁷

In the months immediately following Nixon's visit to China, the United States dropped leaflets in North Vietnam and the liberated zones of the South featuring a photo of Nixon with Mao Tsetung in an attempt to demoralize "the enemy". Thus, even if the Chinese were not about to betray their Vietnamese allies, the United States sought to use their new relations with China to make it appear as if they had.¹³⁸ The attempt by the United States seems peculiarly ill-advised in light of China's Vietnamese allies' ability to carry on simultaneously both war and negotiations with the United States.

Thomas Robinson is one scholar who is prepared to lend academic support to such a position, although he produces no more evidence than Deputy Secretary Rush. The Chinese, he simply states, had to suffer "embarrassment at having to cooperate with the Americans in forcing the North Vietnamese to negotiate seriously for peace."¹³⁹

In concluding the analysis of the position which Whiting has been chosen to represent, suffice it to say that it is an artificial construct based on assumptions so novel and apparently false that they would require extensive proof. At every step of the argument there are major points which are at very least misleading. Most importantly, however, the position ignores the fundamental changes which were taking place in the Chinese view of the world and which have been discussed in the previous chapter and the first part of this one. In fact one is drawn to the suspicion that the analysis which sees China's normalization of relations with the United States as a defensive reaction to Soviet pressure, a view so widely affirmed and so rarely justified, is designed primarily to conceal the decrease in American power which lies closer to the real reason for normalizing relations. Such conspiratorial suspicions are, of course, notoriously difficult to prove. All that is possible is to expose the apparently false assumptions, the apparent manipulation of facts and the logical flaws involved in the construction of the best argued cases for the position.

Interpretation 2: China has become revisionist. There is a quite separate analysis of the changes which took place in China's relations with the United States and which does not rely on the geopolitical/realpolitik assumptions involved in the previous position.¹⁴⁰ It is argued that the opening to the United States is essentially the result of an emerging technocratically-based class gaining dominance in China or re-emerging after the Cultural Revolution. The interests of such a class in the international arena, it is suggested, are more divorced from those of the proletariat of the capitalist countries and liberation movements of the Third World than were the interests of those who held power in China during the Cultural Revolution. The new leadership, it is claimed,

represents a tendency which seeks the advanced technology, the trade and the access to resources which, while serving to develop the Chinese economy generally, certainly do not do so at the expense of technocrats such as themselves. Chou En-lai is often painted as the personification of the new "pragmatism" or "revisionism".¹⁴¹

As advanced in this way, the argument is not primarily about China's foreign policy. It stems basically from a particular view of post-Cultural Revolution developments in the Chinese political economy — arguing that a number of indices from a variety of fields, including agricultural and industrial policy, education and other social policies point to the revival of revisionist tendencies and the emergence of a revisionist elite. The link with foreign policy, it is argued, arises out of the development programme of this elite which deems advanced technology as essential to its technocratically oriented policy. It is mandatory, therefore, that bonds be forged with the major capitalist industrial powers, especially the United States, Japan and Western Europe — at least to the extent that advanced technology can be imported from them. Considerable emphasis in this regard has been given to the importation of whole plants (or "turnkey plants") of which China bought a number in the post-Cultural Revolution period.¹⁴² These, it is claimed, only serve to consolidate further the productive foundations of a technocratically oriented elite by creating divisions among Chinese workers in terms of productivity, work style, conditions, management participation and the like. Machinery, once operative, it is argued, is not socially neutral but embodies the social relations, be they capitalist or socialist, of the society which brought it forth. Given the origins of the turnkey plants imported after the Cultural Revolution they will tend to reproduce capitalist social relations according to this view. The plausibility of

this particular argument can be seen by reflecting on the typical large capitalist plant with its assembly lines, its wage differentials according to criteria foreign to socialist perspectives, its fundamental commitment to individual, material incentives, its divorce of labor and management and other characteristics stemming from the capitalist mode of production. When placed in the milieu of China's relatively backward industrial sector, the new plants take on an even more disruptive role given the contrasts between workers, their conditions and possibly their wages in the older plants and those which obtain in the newer ones. It has also been argued that the importation of such capital goods and the influential role which they are destined to play in shaping the future Chinese economy cannot but serve to emasculate China's traditional adherence to self-reliance in economic policy.

It could well be suggested too, that imperialist forces, ever alive to the possibility of a China less antagonistic towards economic cooperation with them, would be only too anxious to encourage the above tendencies, even apart from considerations of the export revenue which has accrued to them. The United States has at various times spoken openly of the advantages of such strategies. Thus the argument need not necessarily be tied to domestic considerations alone.

It is not possible here to discuss all the implications and to test all aspects of this argument. The discussion will therefore be limited to key steps of the argument as presented above as well as developments of the period which it ignores.

The developments in economic policy, both agricultural and industrial, is one area which cannot be analysed in any detail here, but it should be pointed out that the interpretation of economic developments implicit in the argument above is certainly open to challenge. One

central issue which has been used as an indication of a reversion to economic policies which operated prior to the Cultural Revolution is a change in emphasis on the question of the "red versus expert" controversy after the fall of Lin Piao. A renewed stress on the importance of expertise is regarded as at least an implicit denial of the importance of political outlook which had been so strongly emphasised during the Cultural Revolution.¹⁴³

In fact what would seem to have happened in this regard is that the Cultural Revolution excess which had led to such an emphasis on "redness" that the importance of expertise was no longer acknowledged, was redressed. The ultra-leftist resolution of the debate came under severe criticism after Lin Piao's fall and the criticism was accompanied by the return to political respectability of a large number of experts dismissed during the Cultural Revolution. In the majority of cases, their return signalled no more than the end of their period of re-education in the May 7 Cadre Schools — not, as implied in the argument outlined above, the mass return of unreconstructed technocrats about to resume their functions in the same manner as prior to the Cultural Revolution.¹⁴⁴ The position adopted with respect to the red versus expert debate and the way in which it is opposed to an ultra-leftist position may be gauged from the following:

When the mill encouraged the workers to improve their technical knowledge for the revolution, some people still said: "This is putting technology first." All these muddle-headed ideas in the minds of cadres and masses proved how deeply the evil influence of the counter-revolutionary revisionist line put forward by swindlers like Liu Shao-ch'i had affected them, and that the evil influence was far from being purged.¹⁴⁵

And again,

We must...distinguish clearly between grasping production for the sake of the revolution and putting production first, between carrying out

economic accounting for the revolution and putting profits in command, between learning technique and professional matters for the revolution and putting technical and professional matters in command, and between observing labour discipline for the revolution and controlling, stifling and repressing.¹⁴⁶

This position was generalized to include all intellectuals:

As regards intellectuals with a bad family background but good political performance, we should have full confidence in them and boldly use them. It is politically necessary to show warm concern for them, provide active support for them in their work, give full play to their professional specialities and properly arrange positions for them. In a word, we must encourage them to put down their burdens and march forward....¹⁴⁷

The general trend in evidence here is re-enforced by the degree of endorsement given to private plots in agriculture and the retention of material incentives in industry.¹⁴⁸ The argument invariably accompanying such endorsements is directed at ultra-leftists who are opposed to "the objective law of social development" and do not "take into account the actual situation...so as to fully arouse the initiative of the broad masses in developing production and consolidating the collective economy, and firmly lead them on the road to socialism. Such people attempt to use shortcuts to check the bourgeois trend." In opposition to this it is claimed, "we are Marxists who follow the theory of continuing the revolution. We must not stop at a certain stage of development, nor should we bypass an objective period of development."¹⁴⁹ The writings of Mao Tsetung which have become available in recent years, particularly those commenting on Stalin's economic works, are thoroughly in accordance with these views.¹⁵⁰ They point to the necessity of retaining various capitalist economic and social forms while consolidating the power of the proletariat. The ultra-leftist position can best be understood in this context as a confusion of socialist aims with immediate tactics which can only be derived in accor-

dance with the objective circumstances, especially mass consciousness at any particular time.

The above evidence does indicate that the basic proposition of the "China has become revisionist argument", viz. that economic policy and economic management were restored to their pre-Cultural Revolution status, is, at the very least, open to challenge. In fact, a very plausible case may be made out that the idealist elements inherent in the Cultural Revolutionary strategy were being eliminated — a development which could only contribute to the transition to socialism in China.

With respect to the argument that the import of capital goods on a scale which exceeds even that of the late 1950's is damaging to China's policy of self-reliance a number of points should be made. The policy of self-reliance as enunciated by the Chinese has had a somewhat chequered career but its central core has never implied a complete disavowal of capital imports — it has, on the other hand, implied that all capital imports be adapted to Chinese usage with socialist initiative and that they should not become the vehicle of economic dependence on other countries. With the disastrous experience of dependence on Soviet capital imports behind them and the ideological consolidation of the Cultural Revolution, it could well be argued that the Chinese were in a peculiarly good position in the early 1970's to avoid the mistakes made in the Fifties in this regard. It should also be noted that the experiences of the late Fifties were as much the result of the Soviet-style economic centralization practiced in that period and hierarchic organization within factories (both noticeably absent now) and the fact that imported technicians departed leaving numerous unfinished plants in their wake — as they were the result of the import of the plants themselves. But most importantly of all, it can be argued that the particular areas in which foreign plants

have been imported are such as to increase China's policy of self-reliance rather than vice versa.

One example of this is the complete fertilizer plants which have been imported. During the Fifties and Sixties an increasing drain had been put on China's exchange earnings by imports of grain — mainly for the large coastal cities and for reserves. Attempts to boost production of wheat in the vicinity of these cities had required large quantities of fertilizer which had added to the drain on foreign reserves. It is reported that after 1972, eleven urea plants, apparently among the largest in the world, were ordered from the Netherlands; two urea and two ammonia plants were ordered from Japan and three fertilizer plants were ordered from France.¹⁵¹

A second, and perhaps the major example of this process at work, is in the area of petroleum-related industries. By the early 1970's it had become clear that China could develop into a major oil exporter. In order to realize fully the potential newly available to them it would seem that China faced a choice between developing from its own rather primitive industrial base the capital equipment and technological know-how necessary to capitalize on the new resources and suffer the inevitably lengthy delay involved — or to import the nucleus of the plant requirements and the equipment needed for the new industries. The Chinese — it would seem — opted for the latter.¹⁵² While such a course does not entirely accord with some popular Western perceptions of Maoist development strategy, it would seem to be entirely consonant with the economic policies of Mao Tsetung himself. At the beginning of 1969, in the press communique celebrating the explosion of a Chinese H-bomb, Mao is quoted thus:

We cannot just take the beaten track traversed by other countries in the development of technology and trail behind them at a snail's pace.

We must break away from convention and do our utmost to adopt advanced technique in order to build our country into a powerful modern socialist state in a not too long historical period.¹⁵³

Certainly, Mao's statement would seem to have been implemented in the Chinese Fourth Five-Year Plan which began in 1971. Li Chiang, the Minister for Trade in summing up the programme of importing capital equipment which had begun to flourish in 1971, stressed the adaptation of such equipment to China's needs. He spoke of China's willingness,

to learn from other countries' merits and obtain necessary materials, equipment and technique through exchange. This is an implementation of the principle of making foreign things serve China.¹⁵⁴

Western (and presumably domestic Chinese) critics of the policy of importing capital equipment who have based their objections on the detrimental effects on China's policy of self-reliance are therefore countered in the long run and at the expense of a greater involvement in world trade, at least in the short term. Audrey Donnithorne in a lengthy analysis of the data available on China's complete plant and heavy equipment orders in 1972-74 argues that,

The policy behind the complete plant purchases is in line with a long-term policy of self-reliance in that it aims at diminishing China's dependence on imported raw materials (notably fertilizers, cotton, industrial chemicals, rubber, steel) and imported grain. Also the programme would make China's economy less subject to fluctuations of its own harvests by substituting synthetic raw materials for those of agricultural origin; and through greater use of chemical fertilizers, it would make yields more stable as well as higher.¹⁵⁵

An associated development which has been the focus of some discussion in this context is China's willingness to accept foreign credit in order to pay for the import of whole plants. Doubts have been raised

about the ability of China to avoid accepting long-term foreign loans and the decreased economic autonomy which they imply. In fact, the import of whole plants (mainly from mid-1971 to mid-1974) was frequently financed on a normal medium-term commercial credit basis in the form of deferred payments -- a financial arrangement which had also been followed in dealings with the West in the early 1960's when debt repayment to the Soviet Union was nearing completion.¹⁵⁶

In the 1972-74 imports, United States and West German sales of plants were on a cash basis but other countries, especially Japan and France have regularly made sales under deferred payments arrangements -- usually with part-payment extended to a period of about five years. This is made possible by the willingness of the governments of these countries to offer financial backing for their nationals' contacts with China. The arrangement has led to interest rates considerably lower than prevailing market rates -- in 1973 6% was common. Such financial arrangements are clearly differentiated by the Chinese from those of the Soviet Union which they themselves regard as open to the criticisms of decreased economic independence. In 1974 the Minister for Trade claimed that,

socialist China will never try to attract foreign capital or exploit domestic or foreign natural resources in conjunction with other countries, as does a certain superpower masquerading under the name of 'socialism'. She will never go in for joint-management with foreign countries, still less grovel for foreign loans as does that superpower.¹⁵⁷

Statements of such apparent clarity have not, however, stifled speculation that China will eventually accept long-term loans.¹⁵⁸ Even if China were committed to a long-term policy of importing capital equipment on a large scale,¹⁵⁹ it would seem that her rapidly expanding exports of petroleum products would enable her to continue the policy of attempting to balance her trade annually.

It will be clear therefore, that the argument which considers China's international behaviour since the Cultural Revolution to be explicable in terms of a revisionist domestic drift is at the very least challengeable at its roots. The evidence of such a drift is highly contentious and the developments in terms of foreign imports are innovative, it has been shown, primarily in terms of the quantitative leap involved and do not detract from China's policy of self-reliance or commit it to a policy of diminished international independence. Such developments, it has been argued, would seem to be grounded more logically in a socialist consciousness which has been sufficiently advanced to adapt inbuilt capitalist social relations in imported technology to the needs of socialism; the long-term advantages with respect to the policy of self-reliance and the short-term advantage of a rapid technological advance.

That the Chinese are aware of the difficulties involved in the import of foreign technology as well as the specific advantages may be gauged from the following statement:

Self-reliance does not mean closing the door to the outside world. It is necessary to import and introduce some equipment and technique from abroad according to the needs of socialist construction, and the purpose of doing so is to enhance our country's ability to rely on itself. However, we must adopt the scientific attitude of "one divides into two" with respect to foreign equipment and technique. Learning from foreign countries must be combined with a spirit of independent creation. It is wrong to imagine that foreign technology is flawless. There has never been anything in the world that is perfect in every sense. Restricted by the law of profit and tied up in the idealist and metaphysical world outlook, technology in capitalist-imperialist countries inevitably has its backward side. If we do not analyse it and discard its dross while using its strong points as examples or learning from them, and fail to rest on our own independent creations, we will go astray, and bring about losses to our construction.¹⁶⁰

Apart from these criticisms from within, the above argument is open to criticism from outside the terms in which it is posed. To begin with it is an exclusively domestic argument -- based on a particular and contentious view of domestic developments after the Cultural Revolution. Such an approach clearly has its limitations when the enormous impact of international developments on the structure of Chinese foreign policy in the period under review is considered. As outlined in the previous chapter and as detailed with respect to the superpowers at the beginning of this chapter, the Chinese took careful cognisance of what they considered to be the major international developments of the period and made sweeping changes to the strategy and tactics underpinning their international behaviour. As has been argued, the primary observations recorded by the Chinese and incorporated into their foreign policy behaviour revolved around what they considered to be the decline of United States imperialism and the rise of Soviet social-imperialism.

To ignore these issues as catalysts of the changes in China's foreign policy would seem highly unrealistic. Sufficient evidence has already been brought forward in the course of this thesis to show that there can be no question of the Chinese not taking these developments seriously and reconstructing a comprehensive and coherent foreign policy taking account of them. It is not thereby being suggested that domestic developments were not also involved in the foreign policy reconstruction. Far from it. As has been outlined in the previous chapter, domestic struggles of major proportions were involved in the development of the new policy. But to put these struggles in the context of China's recent history, it is difficult to produce evidence which would support an argument that the demise of Lin Piao (and the foreign policy with which he was associated) was analogous in all respects to that of Liu Shao-ch'i (and

the foreign policy with which he was associated). Unlike Liu Shao-ch'i, Lin Piao could not be directly linked to the promulgation or defence of a systematic economic programme which could be deemed revisionist, or even ultra-leftist. The domestic struggles which occasioned Lin Piao's downfall, were, at least in terms of the immediate issues involved, far less socially convulsive than those of the Cultural Revolution precisely because the issues involved had less direct and less extensive implications for the direction of socialist construction in China. The denunciation of Lin Piao as a "careerist", "conspirator" and the like is a far cry from the denunciation of Liu Shao-ch'i as the "chief Party person in authority taking the capitalist road." The elitist, authoritarian attitudes implied in the alleged activities of Lin Piao would ultimately have had a deforming effect on the character of socialism in China but their immediate effects were likely to be in terms of political consciousness rather than wholesale changes in the structure of Chinese socialism. In short, while the demise of Liu Shao-ch'i had clear-cut implications for class leadership in China, the implications of Lin Piao's demise were far less clear-cut in this respect, at least in the short-term.

Putting the major domestic developments in the period between the Ninth and Tenth Party Congresses in this context only serves to emphasize the role played by international developments in China's foreign policy. The view of these developments which became dominant in China in the second half of 1971 has already been considered in some detail and while no comprehensive study of the legitimacy of these Chinese observations is possible here, their main features need some examination. Consequently the decline of United States imperialism and the rise of Soviet social-imperialism will be examined briefly.

The decline of United States imperialism.

As noted previously, the Chinese have consistently viewed the present 'era', considered as a number of decades, as one in which imperialism is on the decline. The United States — regarded as the dominant imperialist power in post-World War II years — has never been considered exempt from this long-term tendency which is a fundamental Marxist-Leninist proposition predicated upon the inherent contradictions in capitalism, primarily that between wage labour and capital. Just as slavery gave way to feudalism and feudalism to capitalism, the internal contradictions of capitalism and its "highest form" — imperialism — will, according to the laws of historical materialism, cause its eventual demise and give rise to the birth of socialism. It was precisely for these reasons that Mao Tsetung in his celebrated interview with Anna Louise Strong in 1946, spoke of imperialism as a "paper tiger", and Chinese commentators subsequently have continued to remind their readers of the "feet of clay" on which United States imperialism rests.

Such tendencies and such contradictions are not, however, incompatible with temporary expansions of economic and military power and political hegemony which the Chinese have always regarded as expressions of desperation on the part of imperialist powers since they create more opponents with every expansive move as well as intensifying and extending the contradictions at the heart of the system itself. Throughout the 1950's and 1960's this position was repeatedly affirmed in the Chinese press with respect to the United States and was central to the Chinese Communist Party's view of the world. United States aggression in Vietnam in conjunction with its intervention in other Third World countries in the mid-1960's was thus regarded as the last in a long series of desperate attempts on the part of the United States at imperial expansion.

The scope and intensity of United States aggression in Vietnam indicated to the Chinese not merely the enormous military forces available to the United States and the capacity it had for destructive purposes, but also, and more importantly, it indicated a new level of desperation had been reached by the United States ruling class and the United States government. Above all, it indicated the onset of domestic crises unprecedented in the long boom period since the Second World War.¹⁶¹

But the Vietnam war was distinctive in terms of American imperial behaviour, not merely in terms of the level of aggression but also in the unqualified failure of United States policy in economic, military, strategic and social terms. Not only was the United States forced at this stage of its history to invest enormous quantities of its resources, manpower and political energy into a war which produced seriously divisive political tensions domestically, but the investment was to no avail and the domestic and international problems for which the war was embraced as a solution were in fact compounded by the war.

In adopting this interpretation, the Chinese would seem to have made the judgement, or at least implied, that in their view the long-term decline of imperialism, insofar as the United States is concerned, had a clearly observable short-term counterpart in the diminished American ability to impose its will on the Third World and in signs of a fairly definitive kind that massive military intervention such as that used in Indochina to suppress liberation movements would not be used again in the foreseeable future.

This particular coincidence of short and long-term characteristics of the decline of United States imperialism was not the only one — and perhaps not even the major one which occupied Chinese attention during the period. The domestic economic difficulties faced by the United

States understandably received widespread Chinese coverage and analysis also, but as shown earlier the Chinese began to place great emphasis on the problems now being encountered by United States imperialism as a result of its imperialist rivalry with Western Europe and Japan. The other source of international attack on United States imperialism was the rise of Soviet social-imperialism as a global force no longer engaged primarily in colluding with the United States but regarded as locked into a relationship with the United States of which the primary characteristic was contention rather than collusion.

Each of these specific means by which United States imperialism is said to have declined deserves some examination.

In 1965, the United States Secretary of Commerce, Mr. Henry Fowler, in a speech to the United States Council of the International Chamber of Commerce stressed the fact that without its extended military presence the United States economy would be extremely vulnerable. "Indeed," he said,

while it is most difficult to quantify, it is also impossible to over-estimate the extent to which the efforts and opportunities for American firms abroad depend upon the vast presence and influence and prestige that America holds in the world. It is impossible to over-estimate the extent to which private American ventures overseas benefit from our commitments, tangible and intangible, to furnish economic assistance to those in need and to defend the frontiers of freedom...in fact if we were to contemplate abandoning those frontiers and withholding our assistance...I wonder not whether the opportunities for private American enterprise would wither - I wonder only how long it would take.¹⁶²

But the costs of administering, policing and expanding the United States empire are enormous - a fact that is reflected in the long-term United States balance of payments deficit and also in the \$80 billion a year overall military budget. The Vietnam war was particularly costly

and consequently exacerbated the inherent difficulties of the American economy at a time when the long post-war capitalist boom was winding down. Between 1965 and 1968 alone, the Vietnam war accounted for an \$11 billion drain on the United States balance of payments —

\$6 billion in direct military expenditures and \$5 billion in extra imports and reduced exports resulting from the fact that the economy was being run at a faster tempo during the war than Congressional conservatism had ever permitted during peacetime. In addition, direct investment abroad by U.S. corporations exceeded foreign companies' investments in the United States by \$8 billion in the same period.¹⁶³

The expense of maintaining its empire is not, however, borne by the United States alone. A large part of the 'burden' of fighting in Vietnam was shifted onto the countries of Western Europe who were forced to build up a massive amount of unwanted and decreasingly valuable Euro-dollars. The point is made well by the authors quoted above,

Heedless of balance of payments constraints, America had financed the foreign currency needs of her military expansion in Asia and corporate expansion in both Europe and Asia (e.g., in Korea) simply by spending dollars and letting others accumulate them. Because of the dollar's role as an international reserve currency, the Europeans complained, there was no effective limit on this process.¹⁶⁴

In 1971, the United States Treasury Secretary Connally, reputedly the architect of Nixon's "New Economic Policy", claimed,

I find it an impressive fact, and a depressing fact that the persistent underlying balance-of-payments deficit which causes such concern is more than covered, year in and year out, by our net military expenses abroad, over the above amounts received from foreign military purchases in the United States.¹⁶⁵

The impending crisis was staved off in 1968, "by the willingness of the European central banks to hold and accumulate paper dollars. But in 1971

the day of reckoning arrived."¹⁶⁶ By 1971 the long-standing United States surplus in its trade balance had shrunk from \$6.8 billion in 1964 to a deficit of \$2.7 billion. But the sharp decline in the inflow of dollars was not matched by a reduction in the outflow — in fact what is referred to in United States official figures as the "basic balance" or the balance on current account and long-term capital had become a deficit four times larger than that recorded in 1965-67. This development had become evident early in 1971 and occasioned heavy speculative pressure on the dollar such that the pressure to devalue it was no longer able to be contained. Thus while the underlying cause of the crisis in 1971 and those of 1973-74 was the relationship between the United States and countries of the Third World, the immediate and precipitating causes were the accumulated developments in the relationship between the imperialist powers, particularly the relationship between the United States and the other major capitalist powers of Western Europe, Japan and Canada.

The background to the emergence of a trade deficit in the United States illustrates clearly the declining strength of the United States economy in relation to its rivals. The trade deficit which appeared in 1971 was the result not of a decline in the rate of increase of American exports, but of a rapid growth in imports. After 1965, imports rose at a rate nearly double that of the United States gross national product whereas for the previous fifteen years they had risen at a rate slightly lower than it. The disproportionate rise after 1964 was accounted for by increases in manufactured products, particularly capital and durable consumer goods which came primarily from Japan, West Germany and Canada. Manufactured products accounted for 17% of total imports in 1964 and for 37% in 1971.¹⁶⁷ Moreover, the prices of United States exports rose much faster than those of its rivals during this period. The end result of

these developments was as the United States First National City Bank claimed,

Structural changes in world trade during the 1960's have weakened the U.S. competitive position and impaired the U.S. trade balance....The explosive growth of industrial capacity in Japan and Western Europe as well as the narrowing or elimination of the U.S. lead in technology in many sectors have weakened the position of U.S. industry.¹⁶⁸

In President Nixon's August 15 speech in 1971 he made it extremely clear that rivalry with other capitalist powers was the occasion, if not the cause of the present crisis and that the measures taken by the United States to cope with the crisis were aimed at improving its competitive position. In fact the liberal talk about internationalism, cooperation, freer trade and the like which had dominated official American statements about international trade since the Second World War was summarily abandoned in favour of a much more overt nationalist rhetoric. "There is no longer any need for the United States to fight with one hand behind its back," Nixon stated. The Treasury Secretary Connally in the speech already quoted issued a similar challenge,

I do not for a moment call into question the worth of a self-confident, cohesive Common Market, a strong Japan, and a progressing Canada to the peace and prosperity of the free-world community.

The question is only -- but the "only" is important -- whether these nations, now more than amply supplied with reserves as well as with productive power, should not now be called upon for fresh initiative in opening their markets to the products of others.¹⁶⁹

These inter-imperialist contradictions must, however, be set against the background of United States political and military activities abroad at the time -- particularly those in Vietnam.

The Chinese, as has been seen, set considerable store by the Tet Offensive of the liberation forces in South Vietnam which began at the end of January in 1968. This, the Chinese analysis implies, was a major indicator of diminished American ability to win the war and the American response to the offensive a major index of their diminished willingness to fight. The *Pentagon Papers* tend to confirm the Chinese analysis. Three days after the assault on the United States embassy in Saigon President Johnson assured White House reporters that the enemy attack had been "anticipated, prepared for and met."

Militarily, the enemy had suffered a "complete failure". As for a "psychological victory," the enemy's second objective, the President said that "when the American people know the facts," they would see that here, too, the enemy had failed.¹⁷⁰

The President also assured reporters that General Westmoreland had or would receive everything he wanted in order to continue the fight against the enemy and that there would be no change "of great consequence" in strategy.

The Pentagon study discloses a totally different reality from these Presidential statements. The Tet Offensive, it claims, took the White House and the Joint Chiefs of Staff "by surprise, and its strength, length and intensity prolonged this shock."¹⁷¹ As some indication of the magnitude of the American surprise, General Westmoreland's assessment given four days before the Tet Offensive began may be cited.

Interdiction of the enemy's logistics train in Laos and NVN (North Vietnam) by our indispensable air efforts has imposed significant difficulties on him. In many areas the enemy has been driven away from the population centers; in others he has been compelled to disperse and evade contact, thus nullifying much of his potential. The year (1967) ended with the enemy increasingly resorting to desperation tactics in attempting to achieve military/psychological victory; and he has experienced only failure in these attempts.¹⁷²

In contrast to this report revealed in the Pentagon study, Westmoreland had to admit on February 12 that "the enemy" had attacked "34 provincial towns, 64 district towns and all of the autonomous cities."¹⁷³ In response, Westmoreland requested a further 206,000 American troops be put into Vietnam; the Joint Chiefs of Staff urged bombing closer to urban centres in the D.R.V.N. and General Wheeler, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff reported at the end of February after his visit to Vietnam that the Vietcong and the North Vietnamese now had the initiative; that they were "operating with relative freedom in the countryside" and that Westmoreland's figure of 206,000 extra men would be needed in order to cope with the new situation.¹⁷⁴

The Pentagon study realized fairly clearly the implications of the Tet Offensive. "A fork in the road has been reached," it stated,

Now the alternatives stood out in stark reality. To accept and meet General Wheeler's request would mean a total U.S. military commitment to SVN (South Vietnam) — an Americanization of the war, a call up of reserve forces, vastly increased expenditures. To deny the request for troops, or to attempt to again cut it to a size which could be sustained by the thinly stretched active forces, would just as surely signify that an upper limit to the U.S. military commitment in SVN had been reached.¹⁷⁵

Studies commissioned by the Pentagon's Office of Systems Analysis and submissions by the Central Intelligence Agency indicated even more clearly that the massive American commitment to date had not accomplished any significant reduction in the political support or the military capacity of "the enemy forces" from those of mid-1965.¹⁷⁶ The options, it seems, were understood and both had their supporters within the Pentagon and the civil administration. Either to "contend with and defeat the new enemy threat" as Westmoreland stated and the Joint Chiefs encouraged, or to recognize, along with Clark Clifford and most of the Central Intelligence

Agency submissions, that major increases in troop levels would have little or no effect on the eventual outcome of the war and could certainly not guarantee military victory — such was the choice facing President Johnson. He opted for retreat. As clearly foreseen at the time by his personal military advisor, General Maxwell Taylor, this meant defeat. "There is clearly nothing to recommend trying to do more than we are now doing at such great cost," he said,

To undertake to do less (which is what Johnson manifestly did) is to accept needlessly a serious defeat for which we would pay dearly in terms of our worldwide position of leadership, of the political stability of Southeast Asia and of the credibility of our pledges to friends and allies.¹⁷⁷

Despite last minute advice to intensify the bombing of "remaining important targets" in the North "to erode the will of the population by exposing a wider area of NVN to casualties and destruction" — advice given by Dr. Harold Brown, the Secretary of the Air Force¹⁷⁸ — President Johnson recalled Westmoreland to Washington to be Army Chief of Staff and on March 31 announced a major reduction in the bombing of the North, limiting it to below the 20th parallel. More significantly, Johnson, in the same speech, announced his intention not to accept nomination for the Presidential election later in the year. By April 3, North Vietnam had declared its willingness to enter negotiations with the United States — a clear indication that they now considered themselves to have a position of strength from which to bargain. Despite the subsequent zigzags of American policy under Nixon and Kissinger, a turning point had been reached in the war. By October of 1968, Johnson had announced a total bombing halt of the DRVN and agreed to the South Vietnamese National Liberation Front as well as the Saigon government jointing the Paris negotiations. Nixon announced that troop withdrawals were to begin the

following May and in spite of the reintroduction of bombing and the use of American troops in Cambodia and Laos in the years to come, the United States was never to regain the initiative in Indochina, which it seemed to have acquired during the massive build up of 1967.

In mid-1969 Nixon was in a position to formulate the new policy which became known as the Guam or "Nixon Doctrine".¹⁷⁹ While the broad aims of American foreign policy were clearly unchanged, the "Nixon Doctrine" was an attempt to come to terms with its decreased capacity to pursue them by enlisting greater support from those classes in the Third World supporting United States strategy. The Secretary of State, William Rogers asked to summarize the "Nixon Doctrine" stated that,

the United States will reduce its presence, particularly its military presence, in areas where we're overextended....We say to a country; "Now you have to defend yourself against subversion, guerilla attacks and so forth. Our treaty commitment with you applies to an attack by a major power."¹⁸⁰

Essentially the United States sought to provide under the "Nixon Doctrine" the same massive air cover and military advisory services without the commitment of large numbers of American troops. Local governments were to provide the troops to deal with local problems — or as the Chinese put it acidly, the United States was now committed to a policy of Asians fighting Asians. In future, it seems, American intervention in the Third World would be modelled more on its style of aggression in Laos than that in Vietnam.¹⁸¹

When the "Nixon Doctrine" was first enunciated, the full extent of the American decline would not, however, seem to have been appreciated by the American administration. Western Europe and Japan, were envisaged less as direct imperialist rivals than as junior partners in the defence and extension of the American empire. Japan particularly was called upon

to intensify its military role in Asia and to reject cooperation with China. Nixon himself announced that, "Japan's partnership with us will be the key to the success of the new doctrine in Asia."¹⁸²

The Chinese were understandably quick to detect the differing implications of the "Nixon Doctrine" in their area. On the one hand they recognized it as the continuation of consistent American policy objectives,¹⁸³ but in a manner forced upon it by the successful activities of anti-imperialist forces in Indochina¹⁸⁴ and they also recognized the United States intention of persuading Japan to assume the role of providing much more in the way of conventional military forces in implementing United States policy in Asia.¹⁸⁵ The latter implication of the "Nixon Doctrine" coupled with its abiding commitment to the containment of China was the source of an intense concern on the part of China with a revival of Japanese militarism during the next two years. After the international financial upheavals of August and December 1971 when it became clear that Japan was no longer to be considered the junior partner in the exploitation of Asia, particularly Southeast Asia — but rather was to be seen as a global economic rival, Japan no longer appeared so immediately threatening to China. As the head of a large firm of financial consultants put it in the *New York Times*,

The real target of our international trade and monetary moves was Japan — not the Europeans. U.S. patience has worn thin with the onesided, lopsided, inequitable, unfair economic and monetary treatment which we've received from the Japanese. The day of bowing and scraping to them is over. From now on the Japanese will have to give more than they get or suffer more counterattack.¹⁸⁶

As will be discussed more fully in the next chapter, there was little difficulty after this clarification of American policy in the Chinese coming to adopt normal governmental relations with Japan. The

transition from Japan as junior partner to Japan as economic rival of the United States had, at least in the Chinese perspective, reached a definitive stage. Such a development in American-Japanese relations was clearly in perfect harmony with the new trends in Chinese foreign policy which had developed since the Ninth Congress and which were just beginning to receive full public exposition at this time.¹⁸⁷

It can be seen therefore, that there was significant evidence available to provide a solid foundation for the Chinese view that the United States, while still the most powerful and aggressive imperialist nation, had entered an era quite distinct from that which had prevailed since the Second World War when its dominance went unchallenged. The international developments which confirm the Chinese view were matched by developments within the American domestic economy as inflation reached unprecedented levels and unemployment soared to the highest rates since the depression — a situation which was duplicated in the economies of all other major capitalist countries. The oscillation between unemployment and inflation — the sterile choice which had been made throughout the 1960's and sanitized academically in the Phillips curve was no longer workable. Reviewing the economic performance of its member countries in the immediately preceding years, the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (O.E.C.D.) which is normally steeped in optimism in its discussion of such matters, admitted:

There can be no denying the disappointing news which abounds at present: the recent slowing down of activity in a number of important countries; the continued virulence of inflation; the apparent worsening of the traditional trade-off between employment and prices; the likelihood, indeed, that many countries over the period immediately ahead will record unsatisfactory experiences in respect of virtually all the macro-economic yardsticks by which they normally set store. It

is beyond argument that governments are today faced with policy dilemmas which will severely tax their ability to obtain domestic and international consensus on the priorities to be observed.¹⁸⁸

The rise of Soviet social-imperialism.

While the decline of United States imperialism has received considerable comment in the West in recent years and has received virtual acknowledgement from the American administration, the second major assumption underpinning the new direction in China's foreign policy — viz. the rise of Soviet social-imperialism — has not received much comment until recently.¹⁸⁹

In the present context it is not possible to test all aspects of the Chinese charges against the Soviet Union in relation to social-imperialism, but some insight into the validity of their charges can be gained by a brief examination of the development of the economic and strategic aspects of Indo-Soviet relations. Other areas such as Eastern Europe and the Middle East could equally well have been chosen for examination.¹⁹⁰ Nor is it possible to examine at any length the developments within Soviet society itself which have accompanied the foreign policy developments under review. The Chinese consider Soviet attempts to achieve the transition to socialism have been arrested and reversed to the extent that the Soviet social formation is now dominated by "the bureaucrat monopoly capitalist class".¹⁹¹ The question of how to correctly categorize the Soviet social formation has also been the subject of controversy among Western Marxists, some of whom regard it as a form of state capitalism¹⁹² and others as a bureaucratically deformed socialist state.¹⁹³

At the moment, therefore, discussion will be restricted to a brief scan of developments in Indo-Soviet aid and trade and Soviet strategic policy in the Indian subcontinent to test the validity of the essentially

behavioural criticisms directed by the Chinese against Soviet social-imperialism in the area. India is a particularly fruitful source for an examination of this kind as it has been the focus of numerous Third World policy initiatives on the part of the Soviet Union.

Whatever the purpose and ultimate effects of Soviet policy in India it is clear that one of the prime mechanisms being used to achieve them is foreign aid. In light of the notorious and now well documented neo-colonial uses to which foreign aid has conventionally been harnessed by the West,¹⁹⁴ it is instructive to scrutinize the character of Soviet aid to India to assess the social development policies for India which underpin these Soviet pursuits.

The Soviet Union has understandably never been a large foreign aid donor when compared to the apparently munificent United States. Its aid to non-communist countries, however, has been highly concentrated. Of the twenty-nine Third World countries receiving Soviet loans between 1953 and 1966, four accounted for 61%, so that its effect on the major recipient countries is exaggerated out of proportion to its overall aid programme. Soviet aid, moreover, is far from insignificant in a Third World country such as India where it has been responsible for constructing plants which,

now turn out 30 per cent of steel smelted in India, 80 per cent of the total metallurgical and 60 per cent of power engineering equipment, nearly one third of oil products and 20 per cent of the total amount of generated electrical energy.¹⁹⁵

The typical Soviet loan exhibits many of the characteristics for which Western loans have been so justifiably criticized. Soviet loans have almost without exception been tied to the import of Soviet goods, though they are usually repayable in local currency or products rather than

convertible currency. Even this apparent benefit is not without its drawbacks given that the Soviets use it to insist on aid repayments from Iran and Afghanistan in vital oil and natural gas.¹⁹⁶

With respect to this policy, the Soviet Union claims in its defence that it is minimizing the burden on the recipient country's foreign exchange reserves, but this is only the case if the local products cannot be otherwise exported for convertible currency, or if the Soviet lender is willing to purchase them at prices above those obtainable on the free market. With very few exceptions, the Soviet Union appears unwilling to do the latter.¹⁹⁷ In fact the literature abounds with references to the "bargaining postures" and "business-like attitudes" adopted by Soviet purchasing agencies.

Soviet loans almost invariably bear an interest rate of 2.5% to 3% and are repayable within eight to twelve years. The interest on Soviet loans is repayable from the granting of the loan while repayments of the principal normally begin when the facility built with the credit has begun to produce, or a year after the Soviet Union has made the final deliveries under the credit.¹⁹⁸ The Soviets' claim that they offer loans to Third World countries on "easy terms" may have made some arithmetical sense in the Fifties and early Sixties but funding organizations dominated by the United States, such as U.S. AID and the International Development Association now offer loans with interest rates as low as 0.75% and repayable in terms of up to fifty years. While it is certainly true that Soviet aid terms were more competitive than those of the West in the 1950's, unlike the latter they have not changed since that time.¹⁹⁹

India, along with other recipient countries, has been hampered not only by being tied to Soviet products in exchange for aid, but also by technical and follow up problems. The products supplied have frequently

occasioned problems such as their unsuitability in warmer climates, higher running costs than equivalent Western products, shorter periods between overhauls and the lack of a ready supply of spare parts. Even where countries have recognized these deficiencies of Soviet assistance, they have often been prevailed upon to accept it. One author, for instance, talks of the "massive pressures on the Indian government to accept the uneconomic TU-134 aircraft for India's national airline."²⁰⁰

The cost of maintaining Soviet technicians during the installation of Soviet technical aid, a cost which must be met out of the loan, has also been a continuing source of discontent in the Indian parliament and elsewhere. Unlike their Chinese counterparts who insist on living at exactly similar standards as the local population and write such stipulations into their aid agreements, the Soviet Union insists on living standards which far outstrip that of most of the local population and often the technicians' living conditions in the Soviet Union. The Bokaro Steel plant built in India with Soviet assistance is a case in point.

For the Soviet specialists Bokaro Steel would have to pay salaries (in Roubles) ranging from Roubles 116 to 380 per month, together with an allowance ranging from Rs. 44 to 83 per day, transfer allowance for specialists ranging from Rs. 400 to 750, first class air travel for specialist and his family with up to 240 kg. of baggage per family, first class air travel on leave once in two years, hotel and travel between Delhi and Bokaro on the way to Moscow and back, insurance, all business travel within India, business trunk-calls and cables in India, cars, air conditioned and furnished offices, air conditioned and fully-appointed accommodation, medical expenses including hospitalization, full pay during sickness, provision of schools, clubs and excursion facilities, etc., all free of taxes.²⁰¹

It is ironic to note that in the case of Bokaro, much of the expense could have been saved if the Soviet Union had been prepared to utilize locally available expertise.²⁰² Michael Barratt Brown, who is by and

large opposed to the idea of "Soviet imperialism", claims in his book *The Economics of Imperialism*, that his "own experience in India, talking to Soviet experts, confirms that they see themselves there somewhat in the role of successors to the British raj."²⁰³

The terms under which China's foreign aid programme operates place Soviet operations in clearer perspective. All Chinese loans are interest-free and these constitute the bulk of her aid, grants being generally reserved for disaster relief. Chinese aid usually stipulates that repayments begin sometime after completion of the project or delivery of the goods (often a period of twenty years or more) but in practice, there are at present no repayments. "Officials in Peking have underlined this by stating that there is no revenue column to their aid account. If, later on, a recipient country finds itself in a position to make a repayment, that will create a new situation."²⁰⁴

To understand the meaning of Soviet aid to India, however, it is necessary to examine its history and the strategic context within which it has developed. Two quite separate factors were responsible for the initiation of Soviet aid to India in 1955. One was the death of Stalin in 1953 and with him the determined Soviet opposition to Indian domestic policies and the policy of 'non-alignment' pursued internationally. The other was Pakistan's newly acquired membership of SEATO and the Baghdad Pact (later to become CENTO) and its consequent receipt of United States military aid. Khrushchev and Bulganin visited India in late 1955 as part of a general Soviet courting operation at that time of India, Indonesia, Afghanistan, Burma and Egypt — i.e., these Asian nations which had shown some preference for remaining outside American-sponsored alliance systems. While at one level this operation was clearly aimed at consolidating the anti-colonialist/imperialist tendencies already strong in these countries and restraining the Western alliance being developed along the Soviet

southern border — as later events were to prove, it also opened the way for the creation of an economic and military presence and influence in Asia as an alternative to that which it then possessed in China.

The thaw in Indo-Soviet relations at this time was given substance by the February 1955 agreement to build a major steelworks at Bhilai in Madhya Pradesh — the first major project undertaken by the Soviets in a non-communist country. The Soviet Union authorized over \$US132 million in credits for use in India's second Five-Year Plan to finance it. The implicit endorsement of Nehru's domestic and foreign policies embodied in the agreements, and publicly stated in *Pravda*, clearly placed the Communist Party of India with its strong pro-Soviet heritage in an invidious position — as did the Soviet call for the Communist Party of India to work within the Indian parliamentary framework, particularly since Nehru's rhetorically dismissive, and in practice, fiercely repressive attitudes to the C.P.I. did not alter. The basis of Indo-Soviet cooperation was summarized quite acutely as follows:

the promise of Soviet aid; endorsement of India's unity; the acceptance of Indian national leadership as a progressive and desirable phenomenon; the promotion of India's status in the world; the acceptance of the desirability of India's friendship with the United States and of American aid to India; and finally, the use of Soviet influence to prevent the irresponsible functioning of its followers in India.²⁰⁵

What the latter point has meant in practice is that the Soviet Union has generally sided with the Indian government when it has been in dispute with the Communist Party of India in spite of the unequivocal parliamentary character of the latter party. One example of this Soviet practice was in July of 1959 when the Soviet government chose to ignore Nehru's dismissal of the C.P.I. state government in Kerala.²⁰⁶

The next development of major significance in Indo-Soviet aid relations was again of strategic origin. In March of 1959 the Sino-Indian border dispute broke out in the wake of the "Tibetan revolt". Given the inaccessibility of the terrain and lack of firsthand information, reactions were delayed and cautious. By April, however, the Soviet Union had on at least two occasions, supported Chinese contentions of Indian complicity in the revolt. Thereafter, Soviet support for China was not forthcoming. By September 9, a TASS bulletin was calling on both sides to settle the dispute according to the canons of peaceful coexistence and alluding to China as the instigator of the dispute. This bulletin was published in spite of Chinese objections to the Soviet position transmitted to their *chargé d'affaires* in Peking three days earlier.²⁰⁷ This was the first ever case of a communist government supporting a non-communist government in a dispute with a communist one. Since this time, however, the Soviet government has never supported the Chinese government in a Sino-Indian disagreement. Later in the same year Khrushchev authorized a \$US378 million loan for projects in India in connection with the Third Five-Year Plan. It is of importance to note here that although 1959 was the peak year of Soviet aid and trade with China, its aid commitments to India in that year were greater than those to China.²⁰⁸

The timing of the loan for India's Third Five-Year Plan and the increased Soviet commitment to Indian development which it indicates are best understood, however, within a broader strategic pattern. The Camp David talks between Eisenhower and Khrushchev were held in 1959 and while the transcripts of these talks are not public, the prior posturings and monumental changes in Soviet policies towards both the United States and the subcontinent which occurred at this time and shortly afterwards suggest that an agreement could well have been reached between the participants

which encompassed the future of the Indian subcontinent. It is quite possible that the agreement involved the United States relinquishing its plan to rearm West Germany with nuclear weapons²⁰⁹ and its determination to retain unchallenged dominance in the economic and military penetration of the subcontinent in return for the Soviet Union relinquishing its plan to assist China in the development of nuclear weapons and its international support for the Chinese, particularly in South Asia.

The Soviet loan mentioned above was authorized by Khrushchev on his return from the Camp David talks before proceeding immediately to Peking presumably in a vain attempt to allay incipient Chinese fears of Soviet intentions and to explain the new situation now prevailing.²¹⁰ Khrushchev next went to India in February 1960, his visit coinciding with the tenth anniversary of the Sino-Soviet Agreement of Friendship and Alliance of 1950 — a coincidence which can scarcely have escaped the notice of the Chinese.

Thus whatever unrevealed decisions were taken at Camp David, the surrounding events support the interpretation outlined above.

Like the two previous occasions for increased Soviet commitment to India, the third, the Sino-Indian border dispute, was also a military conflict with major strategic overtones for the Soviet Union. When armed conflict broke out on the Sino-Indian border in 1962, and in spite of the mounting hostility which had preceded it, the Soviet Union had begun supplies of military aid to India — at this stage in the form of Antonov-12 heavy transport aircraft and "Hound" helicopters — both vital tools in the implementation of the Indian "forward policy". The Chinese fears that "an international anti-Chinese campaign" was "the root cause and background of the Sino-Indian border dispute," were thereby consolidated.²¹¹

It is important to recognize here that Soviet arms shipments to India at this time and the larger shipments since have done virtually nothing to create Indian arms parity with the Chinese, let alone generate new resources or boost internal production. The only decisive effect, apart from exacerbating relations with Pakistan, is to draw development funds into the vortex of military spending and make the Indian navy and air force in particular dependent on Soviet equipment.

When the Sino-Indian border conflict was eventually precipitated United States military equipment was promptly requested and received in massive quantities,²¹² although Negru's extraordinary request for American bombers (which was kept secret until 1965) was denied.²¹³ The British also complied. But it was in Soviet helicopters and planes that Indian troops and supplies were transported to the areas where they were nibbling at Chinese territory.

In October 1962, prior to the outbreak of fighting but after a number of preliminary skirmishes, it was announced that the Soviet Union would supply two squadrons of MIG-21's to India, ostensibly at least, to counterbalance the United States supply of F-104's to Pakistan, and would at a later date build factories in India to manufacture MIG's and ancillary equipment — a decision which understandably infuriated the Chinese. After considerable delays (due in part to a rise in cost estimates from \$US136 million in August 1962 to \$US336 million in December 1963) delivery began in February 1963. The massive repression of the Indian Communist Party and the anti-Chinese hysteria unleashed by the Indian government at the time of the war elicited no more than seeming indifference from the Soviet Union. The Russians did display some caution towards the urgency of Indian arms requests, although the caution may well have been the result more of their tentative attempts to retain the possibility of a renewed

Sino-Soviet alliance while the Cuban crisis was still promising catastrophe, rather than genuine reluctance to assist in an anti-Chinese war. In any case, their reluctance dissolved with the Cuban crisis.

Soviet military assistance to India was continued after the war at an increased rate. In May 1964 it was announced that a \$US40 million missile programme had been initiated and that fifty ground-to-air missiles had been delivered along with infantry support weapons and army engineering equipment. Altogether \$US130 million in military aid was given or promised between the autumn of 1962 and May of 1964.²¹⁴ In 1965, the Soviet Union became India's main supplier of military weaponry.²¹⁵ Since that year Russian SAM's have been deployed around major Indian cities. The build up has continued to the extent that,

By 1970, with 120 MIG's in service, and 140 SU-7B in course of delivery, over one-third of the air force's combat strength was Soviet-built. So too were 450 of India's 1,150 tanks, about one-sixth of its artillery (490 out of 3,000 guns), and half of its helicopters (109 out of about 200), while its navy, though still overwhelmingly British-built or designed, had no submarines other than Soviet-built.²¹⁶

Apart from the obvious advantage of such a development to the Soviet economy, the strategic importance of Soviet arms assistance is almost certainly of major significance. While the days of gunboat diplomacy are clearly not quite over, 'gun diplomacy' currently plays a more important role than its cruder forebear. In the Middle East large-scale arms purchases by the Arab countries in the mid-Fifties provided the primary entree for the Soviet Union, and like the gunboats of former days preceded economic agreements. In this particular move a whole chain of events, beginning with the immediate strategic devaluation of the newly-formed Baghdad Pact and the creation of an arms-balancing rivalry which still continues with disastrous results, was set in motion. In India,

the Soviet Union has acquired a position of considerable 'leverage' over political decision making — a position which can be exploited by exercising its control over the timing of spare parts, ammunition and other supplies. Internal political decisions, as well as foreign policy can be decisively compromised by such an arrangement. Leo Tansky, a CIA economist, who could scarcely be accused of naivety in such matters, argues that "A recipient government's political survival may well depend upon Soviet willingness to continue its program."²¹⁷

Soviet economic assistance to India continued alongside the increasing arms commitments. Towards the end of 1963 the Soviet Union promised \$US500 million for India's Fourth Five-Year Plan — the same amount it had promised for the Third. In May of 1964 the long debate as to who would build the Bokaro steel plant was settled when the United States conspicuously opted out and the local corporation involved in the early planning stages was "muscled out by the Soviet negotiators."²¹⁸ U.S. capital has refused, as it had previously, both in India and elsewhere on the grounds that the plant was to be in the Indian public sector. In spite of the determined efforts of J.K. Galbraith, the United States ambassador to India at the time, who urged American capital to throw off its more reactionary rhetoric, take up the job and make a quick killing, they refused. Some of Galbraith's remarks in this context are worth noting. He used a number of arguments: this would be a 'dramatic' form of aid, and as such, good propaganda; it would silence Indian opinion which had been vocal about the United States only giving aid in forms that assisted local Indian capitalists and so on, but his main arguments were economic ones. He claimed that for U.S. Steel, the firm which was to be involved in the project, Bokaro would be "a real bargain". "They would get control of a \$500 million dollar firm for ten years — their

control is to be guaranteed for that time -- for an investment of \$16.7 million."²¹⁹ Galbraith also "emphasized that the U.S. financing of Bokaro would activate the capacities of the machine building industries in Western Pennsylvania, Ohio, Northern Indiana, Illinois, and elsewhere."²²⁰ American shipping and steel corporations felt themselves mildly threatened by the advent of another competitor and protestations about assistance to a project in the public sector being contrary to the "American way of life" were raised, so the project was finally dropped.

The Russians, however, were unencumbered by such reactionary rhetoric and quickly took up the project, presumably reaping the financial rewards of which Galbraith had spoken.

One of the major Soviet rationales for supplying arms to India was to preserve intact India's non-alignment objectives by enabling it to resist United States pressures via Pakistan to join an American-sponsored alliance. Soviet military assistance to India was seen as providing an effective counterweight to any military pressure which Pakistan could bring to bear on India. This rationale no longer carried so much weight -- especially in the eyes of the Indian government under pressure from a frequently anti-Soviet opposition in the Lok Sabha -- when in 1968 the Soviet Union began supplies of armaments to Pakistan.

Heightened American support for India as a result of its border conflicts with China overflowed to an apparent favouring of India in its long-standing dispute with Pakistan over Kashmir. Pakistan's consequent disenchantment with its Western ally prompted it to seek rapprochement with China, whose anti-Indian credentials at the time were understandably impeccable. India's characteristic response was to hasten the total integration of Kashmir into the rest of India, thereby giving rise to Pakistan's ill-fated attempt to force the issue before India's arms superiority

became overwhelming. When America placed an arms embargo on Pakistan during the conflict, Chinese weapons were sought and obtained. Neither the Soviet Union nor the United States was pleased with this development and both reacted with 'gun diplomacy' — the Americans by resuming arms shipments (of what they called "nonlethal" weapons) and the Russians by promising a steel mill, a power station and eventually, in 1968, weapons.

The final act in the saga of strategically-inspired Soviet military and economic aid to India occurred as a result of the events surrounding the emergence of Bangladesh in 1971. Soviet and Indian fears of an emerging Washington-Peking-Rawalpindi axis, crystallized by Yahya Khan's June 20 warning that he would "declare war" if "India made any attempt to seize any part of East Pakistan" and that in a war, "Pakistan would not be alone" led to the signing on August 9 of the Indo-Soviet treaty of peace and friendship.

The increased Soviet military assistance made possible by the treaty as well as the cancellation of United States military aid to Pakistan (although this was partly offset by increased Chinese supplies) ensured a quick and decisive victory for India in the ensuing war.²²¹ This increased assistance along with Indian preparations for intervention was both known to and apparently accepted by the United States government. There was even American "equanimity" about the dismembering of its ally and the probability that Bangladesh would come "not only under Indian but Russian influence."²²² In the words of one astute observer,

the extension of the Soviet role in India and Bangladesh — and this has been noticeable especially in the field of armaments — helps promote the single most important objective of recent American policy: the stimulation of Sino-Soviet confrontation and the military encirclement of China by the U.S.S.R. Since the U.S. is less interested in multiplying its own encirclement of China, Bangladesh and Eastern India have

practically no strategic value for it. On the other hand, expanding Soviet presence on their southwestern flank can be perceived as an ominous development by the Chinese.²²³

United States equanimity did not extend, however, to the possibility of losing West Pakistan to Soviet influence. When India had crushed the Pakistani defence in the East and mooted the idea of an attack on the West, the United States made arrangements for supplying Pakistan with arms secretly. More importantly, in the present context, the United States was able to get Soviet compliance in pressuring India to desist from further belligerence.²²⁴

Even Indian commentators have emphasized the importance of the Soviet contribution to India's victory. Girilal Jain, for instance, considered that,

It is obvious in retrospect that India could not have liberated Bangladesh in April-May, as many leaders of public opinion had advocated at that time, and it could not have done so even in November-December in the absence of the treaty of friendship with the Soviet Union.²²⁵

The acceptance of Soviet influence in both India and Bangladesh was consequently unprecedented. In the 1972 elections to the state assemblies, Mrs. Gandhi's Congress Party formed electoral pacts with the pro-Soviet Communist Party in Bihar, Punjab, Rajasthan, West Bengal and Assam. Soviet commentators have continued to rebuke non-Soviet oriented Communist parties in India for not working within the "framework of bourgeois constitutions."²²⁶ Ironically, Soviet support for India's "liberation" of Bangladesh and the dismemberment of Pakistan must create some Indian apprehension as it seemingly gives a measure of approval to secessionist movements. But the Nagas, Mizos and Kashmiris are not likely to be accorded the same measure of approval under the guise of national libera-

tion movements" while the Soviet Union appears so anxious to retain popularity within India.

During the period under discussion Soviet aid policy to India has undergone considerable alteration. Originally an attempt to assert a subcontinental presence in support of fledgling and vulnerable Indian attempts at non-alignment, it has become a massive commitment to the status quo in India. In strategic terms the character and timing of Soviet aid has meant that the Soviet Union, from an initial position of encouraging Indian non-alignment by facilitating its ability to withstand American-sponsored alliances in the area, has moved to a policy of ensuring the presence of India and Bangladesh in a Soviet sphere of strategic influence. The Soviet Union made no secret of the fact that it saw the 1971 Indo-Soviet treaty as the first concrete step in the construction of its Asian Collective Security System.²²⁷ India, however, expressed little enthusiasm for the development of the treaty in this direction.²²⁸ The change in Soviet policy has been matched by a transition in American policy from a position of hostility to any Soviet influence in the area to a willing acquiescence in if not active support for Soviet strategic developments in India and Bangladesh, while maintaining a much closer hold on West Pakistan, which for the United States has far greater strategic implications both in terms of its contiguity with both the Soviet Union and China and its position at the Indian Ocean's opening to the Persian Gulf.

The development of Indo-Soviet trade also warrants some scrutiny. According to Soviet spokesmen,

It is determined by lofty and noble principles underlying close mutual relations: full equality of the two sides, mutual benefit and sincere desire of the U.S.S.R. to render the Indian people disinterested assistance in their struggle for economic and social progress.²²⁹

The Chinese, on the other hand, have consistently maintained that in its trade with India, as with other Third World countries, the Soviet Union has been "buying cheap and selling dear."²³⁰

One of the most significant features of Indo-Soviet trade in recent years is its rapid expansion both absolutely and relative to Indian trade with other countries. This expansion is to continue to the extent that the 20% of India's total foreign trade turnover accounted for by the Soviet bloc in 1973 will be expanded to 40% by 1980.²³¹ As has been stated above, Indo-Soviet trade is inseparable from Soviet aid policies to India and it is not surprising, therefore, that the recent trade expansion has largely been the result of increased imports of military equipment to deal with the problem of Bangladesh. As in the past, these imports have generally been paid for with traditional items.

The composition of goods traded between India and the Soviet Union still falls squarely within the traditional pattern of trade between industrialized and Third World countries.²³² Some indication of the composition of Soviet trade with Asian countries generally can be gained from the following table. The products listed comprised at least half, by value, of those traded in 1959.²³³ Frequent Soviet allegations that the West trades with Third World countries in order to keep them in their position of neo-colonial subservience as suppliers of raw materials shows that they are at least aware of the problem, which like the West, they are intensifying. Geoffrey Jukes, who has a particularly benign view of Soviet policy in Asia, examines other Soviet claims of this kind. He finds, for instance, that the claim that the planned character of the Soviet economy provides a stable long-term market for the goods of Third World countries to be insupportable. "Bargaining situations rather than stable long-term deals" are shown to be the basis of Soviet policy making.²³⁴

Table IV.1

Country	Principal exports to U.S.S.R.	Principal imports from U.S.S.R.
Afghanistan	Cotton, wool, fruit	Machinery
Burma	Rubber	Ferrous metals
Cambodia	Rice	Metal products, machinery
India	Tea, coffee, skins, jute, cashew nuts, textiles, footwear	Machinery
Indonesia	Rubber	Textiles, machinery
Iran	Cotton, skins, wool textiles, ores, dried fruit	Machinery
Malaysia	Rubber	Plant seeds, cotton cloth
Mongolia	Wool, cattle	Machinery
Nepal	Jute	Machinery
Pakistan	Jute, cotton, textiles	Machinery
Singapore	Coconut oil	Textiles
Thailand	Rubber	Textiles
Turkey	Fruit, nuts	Machinery, metal products
Ceylon	Coconut oil	Oil products, plywood, cement
Japan	Machinery, textiles	Timber, cotton, metals
North Korea	Metal products, construction materials	Machinery, oil products, metal products
China	Textiles, ores, foodstuffs	Explosives, metal products, machinery, cable, spare parts

But the primary Chinese charge in relation to Soviet trading policy in India has been that it buys cheap and sells dear. The most thorough of a number of Western studies on this subject supports the Chinese contention. J.R. Carter analysed the relative prices of a number of Soviet exports to both developed and underdeveloped countries. In 1958, the first of the two years chosen for study, he found that,

among the covered commodities (i.e., exports common to at least one less developed country and one of the industrial West), the average annual unit prices of Soviet exports to less

developed countries were higher than the average annual unit prices of Soviet exports of similar commodities to the industries West in thirty-eight instances, and lower in only four instances.²³⁵

In 1965, the second year surveyed, the pattern was similar. Of the sixty-three commodities common to both export categories,

the average annual unit prices of Soviet exports to less developed countries were again higher than the average annual unit prices of Soviet exports to countries of the industrial West, being higher in fifty-three instances and lower in only ten instances.²³⁶

The degree of price discrimination implicit in this Soviet export policy was calculated by Carter to be 14.9% in 1958 and 13.1% in 1965. When Soviet exports of machinery and equipment are considered separately from the other exports, the degree of price discrimination against Third World countries was even greater -- amounting to 32.6% in 1958 and 34.7% in 1965.²³⁷

Carter's conclusion that the Soviet Union is "selling dear" to India as with other Third World countries is matched by his conclusion that Soviet price discrimination operates in regard to imports from less developed countries as well. He considers that between 1955 and 1968, the Soviet Union,

paid an average of 10 to 15 percent less for its imports from the less developed countries under its bilateral trade arrangements than it would have paid had these commodities been purchased at world market prices.²³⁸

Those who have chosen to defend Soviet trading policies in the Third World have used a variety of arguments. The defence of M. Sebastian is particularly interesting because he specifically attacks Carter's conclusions. Sebastian accepts the accuracy of Carter's data and thereby accepts that there *is* price discrimination between the Soviet Union and

the "less developed countries" but he, "cannot fully agree...that there is *planned* price discrimination by the Soviet Union against the less developed countries."²³⁹ He offers two possible reasons for the existence of Soviet discriminatory practice. Firstly, he considers that machinery and equipment which the Soviet Union, like other industrial powers, tends to export to Third World countries, "are on the whole more remunerative than primary products and basic raw materials" which Third World countries tend to trade in exchange. Secondly, he points out that,

the Soviet Union as well as the East European countries, being very much short of free foreign exchange, are only too willing to undersell their goods in the developed countries where competition is stiff and quality standards are very high.²⁴⁰

While both of these points may be conceded, neither of them offers counter evidence suggesting that the Soviet Union does not practice price discrimination in its dealings with the Third World -- or for that matter that the discrimination practiced is anything other than planned.

Sebastian then changes the terms of Carter's study to compare Soviet pricing policy in its trade with India to that of the United States and the United Kingdom in their trade with that country. He finds, somewhat predictably, that all three practice price discrimination against India to a degree that is roughly comparable. His suggestion that this diminishes or dissolves Soviet culpability is scarcely compelling.²⁴¹

Since the August 1971 signing of the Indo-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation there have been developments in the economic relations between the two countries which have implications qualitatively different from those outlined above. On September 19, 1972, a Commission on Economic, Scientific and Technical Cooperation was established as an institutional framework to implement the provisions of the treaty. The

prime function of the Commission is to "dovetail" the Five-Year Plans of the two countries in the areas of cooperation agreed upon.²⁴² Prior to the establishment of the Commission there was extensive bargaining in the areas identified for economic cooperation. "Very hard bargaining" was reported to have taken place in relation to the steel industry where the Russian Gosplan team and their Indian counterparts eventually decided to "dovetail" Indian Steel production into the Soviet target, by exporting heavy engineering equipment from the Soviet Union to India to improve the production schedules of the Soviet-built Bhilai steel plant and to bring into early commission the Soviet-built Bokaro steel plant and at the same time to export Indian-made steel from the Russian-assisted plants back to the Soviet Union.²⁴³

It is difficult to envisage how such an arrangement is in any way more beneficial to Indian development than the Western neo-colonialist schemes which it so closely resembles. While increased steel production is clearly crucial to Indian development, the tailoring of Soviet "assisted" production of steel in India to Russian industrial needs would seem to indicate little more than the exploitation of cheap Indian labour by the Soviet Union as well as another shackle of economic, and therefore political, dependence on the Soviet Union. That steel is not an isolated instance of this type of cooperation may be inferred from the protocol which resulted from the Commission's meeting early in 1973 and which "encompasses the entire spectrum of economic development programme in India for steel, non-ferrous metallurgy, power generation, oil exploration and production, fertilizers, drugs and pharmaceuticals and foreign trade."²⁴⁴

Given these developments it is not surprising that the possibility of India joining the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon) has

been seriously mooted in India. While Mrs. Gandhi has been at pains to point out that India has no such intention, the debate has continued with those in favour arguing that India is in a very similar position to that which prompted Eastern European countries to join Comecon, with bilateral agreements covering the dovetailing and integration of plans to secure cooperation in specific fields. It is only in very recent years that Comecon has developed beyond this stage to a supranational economic system to facilitate the long-range planning and integration of production and the coordination of tariff and monetary arrangements. It could well be that the next step in the development of Indo-Soviet economic ties will be the granting of observer status within the relevant bodies of Comecon, as was granted to Yugoslavia recently.

One could salvage some "socialist legitimacy" for these trends in Soviet economic policy towards India if there was clear indication that India was moving towards a brand of 'socialism' more apparently genuine than in the past. Such, however, is not the case. In fact, even the mild redistributive measures originally intended for inclusion in the Fifth Five-Year Plan were severely curtailed.²⁴⁵ It could also be said that the Soviet Union had attained some of its original idealistic trading aims in India if the impact of private enterprise had been reduced. But, in fact, the reverse is true — "private enterprise... (has)... been accorded a progressively expanded role."²⁴⁶

Thus, like their aid policy, Soviet trading policy with India began with the object of supporting Indian non-alignment. It was also intended as an attempt to assist with the development of an infrastructure for a public sector. It has become a policy which ensures Indian alignment with a Soviet sphere of influence and which, at least in part, is a means of integrating Indian production into Soviet industrial needs. It is

difficult to envisage, therefore, that Soviet policy in India can do other than reinforce the bourgeois/landlord alliance which holds state power there or mitigate against the professed Indian policy of achieving a "socialist pattern of society".

It is possible to understand from the above survey of Soviet aid, trade and strategic policies in India why it is that the Chinese regard its behaviour there as in some way "imperialist". In the rather descriptive analysis which the Chinese adopt, Soviet behaviour bears a considerable resemblance to the trappings of imperial behaviour more common among Western powers. The survey above also reveals in a practical way that Chinese allegations of Soviet-American collusion and contention in the acquisition of spheres of strategic and economic influence are well founded — at least in South Asia.²⁴⁷

Summary.

This chapter has detailed the ways in which the Chinese Communist Party altered its categorization of the United States and the Soviet Union and the relationship between them in accordance with the major contradictions in the world introduced at the Ninth Congress. It has been shown that the fundamental reasons for these changes and the reformulation of foreign policy which was consequent upon them was a developing Chinese awareness of a decline in United States imperialism as well as the emergence of "Soviet social-imperialism" and serious inter-imperialist rivalries.

Alternative explanations which seek to show that a heightened Chinese fear of Soviet military intentions or the emergence of a revisionist class within China are responsible for the new Chinese policies towards the United States and the Soviet Union, have been examined and found wanting.

Finally, it has been indicated from non-Chinese sources that there is considerable evidence supporting the new evaluations made by the Chinese of the relative strengths of the United States and the Soviet Union. The following two chapters show the ways in which the Chinese Communist Party altered its views of the first and second intermediate zones in accordance with the changes in its perception of the United States and the Soviet Union.

NOTES

- ¹"Long Live the Victory of People's War", p. 58.
- ²*Ibid.*, p. 53.
- ³*Peking Review* No. 24, June 11, 1965.
- ⁴"*Jen-min Jih-pao* Observer Refutes William Bundy's Anti-China Speech", New China News Agency, February 20, 1966, *Survey of China Mainland Press* No. 3645, p. 34.
- ⁵"*Jen-min Jih-pao* Observer on U.S. Overtures of Friendship with China", New China News Agency, March 29, 1966, *Survey of China Mainland Press* No. 3670, p. 44. Cf. also, "New China News Agency Correspondent on U.S. Military Provocations Against China", New China News Agency, April 5, 1966, *Survey of China Mainland Press* No. 3675, pp. 37-9; "*Jen-min Jih-pao* Analyzes the Threat of U.S. War Against China", New China News Agency, April 6, 1966, *Survey of China Mainland Press* No. 3675, pp. 39ff.
- ⁶"*Jen-min Jih-pao* Observer Refutes William Bundy's Anti-China Speech", *op. cit.*, p. 37.
- ⁷"What Does U.S. Big Debate on China Policy Signify?", New China News Agency, April 9, 1966, *Survey of China Mainland Press* No. 3678, pp. 35ff.
- ⁸"*Jen-min Jih-pao* Observer Refutes...", p. 37.
- ⁹"*Jen-min Jih-pao* Observer on U.S. Overtures of Friendship with China", *op. cit.*, p. 46.
- ¹⁰For a succinct account of the "roll-back" theory as opposed to that of containment, cf. Franz Schurmann, "Ending the Permanent Confrontation with Asia", in Earl C. Ravenal (ed.), *Peace with China?*, Liverwright, New York, 1971.
- ¹¹E.g., "World's Revolutionary People Have Excellent Situation", New China News Agency, September 29, 1966, *Survey of China Mainland Press* No. 3794, p. 44, where "contradictions between U.S. imperialism on the one hand and other imperialist powers on the other" and "the disintegration of the imperialist camp" were mentioned.
- ¹²"Asian, African and Latin American People Make Surging Advances in Their Revolutionary Armed Struggles", *Peking Review* No. 1, January 3, 1968, p. 33.
- ¹³"Financial Crisis in the West Testifies to Further Decay of Imperialism", *Peking Review* No. 13, March 29, 1968, p. 25.
- ¹⁴"War of Aggression Against Vietnam Accelerates Bankruptcy of the Dollar", *Peking Review* No. 14, April 5, 1968, p. 27.
- ¹⁵"Inter-imperialist Struggle for Hegemony: The De Gaulle-Kiesinger Talks", *Peking Review* No. 10, March 8, 1968, pp. 30-1.
- ¹⁶*Ibid.*
- ¹⁷"U.S.-British 'Special-Relationship' Dead", *Peking Review* No. 53, December 31, 1971, p. 22.
- ¹⁸The Chinese position, as summarized above, is taken from a reading of the Chinese press of the time. To indicate that the Chinese had begun to take inter-imperialist contradictions seriously and incorporate them

much more integrally into their view of the world, just some of the sources from one journal, *Peking Review*, will be listed: "'New Strategy' Cannot Save NATO from Disintegration", No. 1, January 3, 1968, p. 49; "An Ominous Sign for U.S. Imperialism", by *Renmin Ribao* Commentator, No. 2, January 12, 1968, p. 37; "The Ailing Dollar: Johnson's 'Emergency Measures'", No. 2, January 12, 1968, p. 38; "War of Aggression Lands U.S. Imperialism in Unprecedented Difficulties", No. 4, January 26, 1968, p. 19; "British Imperialism on Its Last Legs", by *Renmin Ribao* Commentator, No. 4, January 26, 1968, p. 26; "Contradictions Sharpen in Capitalist World: U.S. Officials Rebuffed", No. 4, January 26, 1968, p. 31; "The Inter-Imperialist Struggle for Hegemony: The De Gaulle-Kiesinger Talks", No. 10, March 8, 1968, p. 30; "Vice-Premier Chen Yi on the Present Excellent International Situation", No. 13, March 29, 1968, p. 8; "Financial Crisis in the West Testifies to Further Decay of Imperialism", No. 13, March 29, 1968, p. 24; "Imperialism Feverishly Prepares Conditions for Its Own Doom", by *Renmin Ribao* Commentator, No. 13, March 29, 1968, p. 23; "War of Aggression Against Vietnam Accelerates Bankruptcy of the Dollar", No. 14, April 5, 1968, p. 26; "Badly Split Imperialist Bloc Nears Its End", by *Renmin Ribao* Commentator, No. 15, April 12, 1968, p. 22; "The Disintegrating Imperialist Bloc: Franco-U.S. Currency War is Intensifying", No. 15, April 12, 1968, p. 23; "Economic Crisis Looming Large in Capitalist World: The Imperialist System Heads Fast for Total Collapse", No. 15, April 12, 1968, p. 24; "U.S. Imperialism Cannot Save the Dollar", No. 16, April 19, 1968, p. 14; "A Grave Step Taken by U.S. Imperialism in Speeding Up the Revival of West German Militarism", No. 23, June 27, 1968, p. 29; "Trade War Between Imperialist Powers Sharpening", No. 32, August 9, 1968, p. 23; "Presidential Elections Farce Exposes U.S. Imperialism's Predicament at Home and Abroad", No. 38, September 20, 1968, p. 39; "Aggressive NATO: Sharpening Strife", No. 46, November 15, 1968, p. 30; "Grave Financial Crisis Grips Capitalist World", No. 49, December 6, 1968, p. 26; "Inextricable Crisis Hit (*sic*) Capitalist World", No. 51, December 20, 1968, p. 22.

¹⁹"Victory Certainly Belongs to the Heroic Vietnamese People Persevering in Struggle", *Peking Review* No. 7, February 16, 1968, p. 7.

²⁰*Ibid.*, p. 8.

²¹"Ceaselessly Wiping Out the Enemy and Winning Greater Victories", *Peking Review* No. 10, March 8, 1968, p. 21.

²²"Excellent Situation in Vietnamese People's War Against U.S. Aggression and for National Salvation", by *Renmin Ribao* Commentator, *Peking Review* No. 13, March 29, 1968, p. 21.

²³"War of Aggression Against Vietnam Accelerates Bankruptcy of the Dollar", *Peking Review* No. 14, April 5, 1968, p. 27.

²⁴"Excellent Situation in Vietnamese People's Struggle...", *op. cit.*, p. 21.

²⁵E.g., "Premier Chou En-lai Expresses Firm Support for D.R.V. Government's Just Stand", *Peking Review* No. 46, November 10, 1965, p. 25. "Soviet Revisionism Steps Up Collaboration with U.S. Imperialism", *Peking Review* No. 52, December 25, 1967, especially p. 41.

²⁶"Victory Certainly Belongs...", *op. cit.*, p. 7.

²⁷"Chinese National Defence Ministry Congratulates Vietnamese People and Army on Downing 3,000 U.S. Planes", *Peking Review* No. 28, July 12, 1968, p. 4, is an exception.

²⁸"Premier Chou En-lai Makes Important Speech", *Peking Review* No. 36, September 6, 1968, p. 7.

²⁹"Vietnamese Ambassador Gives National Day Reception", *Peking Review* No. 36, September 6, 1968, p. 6.

³⁰"Vietnam-U.S. 'Paris Talks' Enter 'Delicate Stage'", *Peking Review* No. 43, October 25, 1968, p. 12.

³¹"Statement of Central Committee of South Vietnam National Front for Liberation on the Political Settlement of the South Vietnam Problem", *Peking Review* No. 46, November 15, 1968, p. 25.

³²As is now known, Nixon concluded immediately after the Tet Offensive that the war was unwinnable but realized that a policy based on such a realization was not electorally feasible. On March 29, 1968, Nixon said to his speechwriters, "I've come to the conclusion that there's no way to win the war. But we can't say that of course. In fact, we have to seem to say the opposite, just to keep some degree of bargaining leverage." I.F. Stone, "Nixon's War Gamble and Why It Won't Work", *New York Review of Books*, June 1, 1972, p. 11, quoting Richard J. Whalen, *Catch the Falling Flag*, Houghton Mifflin, 1972.

³³"The World Trend: Medium-sized and Small Nations United to Oppose Two Superpowers' Hegemony", *Peking Review* No. 4, January 28, 1972, p. 16.

³⁴"Peaceful Coexistence - Two Diametrically Opposed Policies", p. 289.

³⁵"Why Khrushchov Fell", editorial, *Honggi*, November 21, 1964, reprinted in *The Polemic on the General Line of the International Communist Movement*, *op. cit.*, p. 489.

³⁶*Ibid.*, p. 485.

³⁷"Confessions Concerning the Line of Soviet-U.S. Collaboration Pursued by the New Leaders of the CPSU", *Honggi*, February 11, 1966. Reprinted as a pamphlet by Foreign Languages Press, Peking, 1966, p. 11.

³⁸*Ibid.*, p. 17. See also Lin Piao, "Long Live the Victory of People's War", *op. cit.*, p. 59.

³⁹"Khrushchev Revisionist Line of Compromise Capitulation Must be Opposed", New China News Agency, July 31, 1965, *Survey of China Mainland Press* No. 3511, p. 46.

⁴⁰"Carry the Struggle Against Khrushchev Revisionism Through to the End", editorial in *Jen-min Jih-pao* and *Hung-ch'i*, New China News Agency, June 13, 1965, *Survey of China Mainland Press* No. 3479, p. 24ff.

⁴¹*Ibid.*, p. 31.

⁴²*Ibid.*, p. 32.

⁴³"CPSU Leaders are Betrayers of the Statement and the Declaration", New China News Agency, December 29, 1965, *Survey of China Mainland Press* No. 3609, p. 32.

⁴⁴"Chinese Communist Party Central Committee Replies to the CPSU Central Committee", New China News Agency, March 23, 1966, *Survey of China Mainland Press* No. 3666, p. 36.

- ⁴⁵"The U.S. and the Soviet Union Step Up World Wide Collusion", New China News Agency, December 30, 1966, *Survey of China Mainland Press* No. 3853, p. 33.
- ⁴⁶*Ibid.*
- ⁴⁷*Ibid.*, p. 36.
- ⁴⁸"Moscow Gangs Up with Washington in Forming an Anti-China, Counter-Revolutionary Alliance in Asia", New China News Agency, April 19, 1967, *Survey of China Mainland Press* No. 3924, p. 38.
- ⁴⁹*Ibid.*, p. 39.
- ⁵⁰"Red Guard Article Exposes Soviet Revisionist Minister of Foreign Trade", New China News Agency, May 8, 1967, *Survey of China Mainland Press* No. 3937, p. 36.
- ⁵¹*Ibid.*, p. 37.
- ⁵²*Ibid.*, p. 36.
- ⁵³*Ibid.*, p. 37.
- ⁵⁴New China News Agency, September 12, 1967, *Survey of China Mainland Press* No. 4021, p. 41.
- ⁵⁵"Soviet Revisionist Renegades Step Up Over-All Collaboration With Indian Reactionaries", New China News Agency, June 1, 1968, *Survey of China Mainland Press* No. 4193, pp. 33-5.
- ⁵⁶"Increasing U.S.-Soviet Counter-revolutionary Collaboration on a World Scale", New China News Agency, November 5, 1967, *Survey of China Mainland Press* No. 4057, p. 32.
- ⁵⁷*Ibid.*, p. 33.
- ⁵⁸"Mutual Aid and Cooperation or Jungle Law?", New China News Agency, November 15, 1967, *Survey of China Mainland Press* No. 4062, p. 45.
- ⁵⁹*Ibid.*, pp. 45-7.
- ⁶⁰"Soviet Revisionists' Towering Crimes in Opposing the Indonesian Revolution", New China News Agency, December 1, 1967, *Survey of China Mainland Press* No. 4073, p. 33.
- ⁶¹"Another Act of Betrayal by Soviet Revisionists Against Arab People", New China News Agency, November 25, 1967, *Survey of China Mainland Press* No. 4068, p. 42.
- ⁶²"Soviet Revisionist Ruling Clique Unusually Energetic in Serving U.S. Imperialism", New China News Agency, February 29, 1968, *Survey of China Mainland Press* No. 4131, p. 26.
- ⁶³*Ibid.*, p. 29.
- ⁶⁴*Renmin Ribao* Commentator, "Total Bankruptcy of Soviet Modern Revisionism", August 23, 1967, in *Peking Review* No. 34, Supplement, August 23, 1967, p. v.
- ⁶⁵*Ibid.*, p. iv.
- ⁶⁶"Beset with Difficulties at Home and Abroad and Finding Itself in a Tight Corner, the Soviet Revisionist Renegade Clique Blatantly Sends Troops to Occupy Czechoslovakia", New China News Agency, August 22, 1968, *Survey of China Mainland Press* No. 4247, p. 24.

⁶⁷*Ibid.*, p. 26.

⁶⁸*Ibid.*

⁶⁹"Soviet Renegade Clique Steps Up Economic Collaboration with Japanese Reactionaries", New China News Agency, December 12, 1968, *Survey of China Mainland Press* No. 4322, p. 20.

⁷⁰"Soviet Revisionists Will Come to no Good End in Colluding with Japanese Reactionaries Against China", New China News Agency, December 13, 1968, *Survey of China Mainland Press* No. 4322, p. 21.

⁷¹*Ibid.*

⁷²"Place Mao Tse-tung's Thought in Command of Everything", New Year editorial, *Renmin Ribao, Honggi, Jiefangjun Bao*, in *Peking Review* No. 1, January 3, 1969, p. 10.

⁷³"Soviet Revisionist Ruling Clique Riddled with Contradictions", *Peking Review* No. 2, January 10, 1969, p. 23.

⁷⁴"Another Big Exposure of Soviet Revisionist Renegades", *Peking Review* No. 6, February 6, 1969.

⁷⁵"Down with the New Tsars", *Renmin Ribao* and *Jiefangjun Bao* editorial, reprinted in a pamphlet of the same title, Foreign Languages Press, Peking 1969, p. 1.

⁷⁶"On Summing Up Experience", editorial of *Honggi* Nos. 3-4, 1969, in *Peking Review* No. 12, March 21, 1969, p. 4.

⁷⁷"Soviet Revisionists Create Fresh Incident of Bloodshed by Once Again Intruding into China's Chenpao Island Area", *Peking Review* No. 12, March 21, 1969, p. 9.

⁷⁸*Ibid.*

⁷⁹"Soviet Revisionism is U.S. Imperialism's No. 1 Accomplice", *Peking Review* No. 12, March 21, 1969, p. 25.

⁸⁰"Soviet Revisionists Step Up Counter-Revolutionary Collusion with the Chiang Kai-shek Bandit Gang", New China News Agency, March 6, 1969, *Survey of China Mainland Press* No. 4374, p. 35.

⁸¹*I.e.*, prior to October 1972.

⁸²Albert Feuerwerker is one author who has drawn attention to such parallels. Rightly, however, he attaches little credence to them. Cf. "Chinese History and the Foreign Relations of Contemporary China", *The Annals of the American Academy* Vol. 402, July 1972. Others are less cautious, e.g., Robert A. Scalapino, in "China and the Balance of Power", *Foreign Affairs* Vol. 52, No. 2, January 1974, especially pp. 368, 380.

⁸³"The Sino-American Detente: Genesis and Prospects", in Ian Wilson (ed.), *China and the World Community*, The Australian Institute of International Affairs, Angus and Robertson, Sydney, 1973.

⁸⁴*Peking Review* No. 48, November 29, 1968, p. 31.

⁸⁵*Ibid.*

⁸⁶A.S. Whiting, *op. cit.*, p. 73.

⁸⁷Whiting was Director of Research and Analysis for the Far East in the United States Department of State, from 1962-66 and Deputy Consul General in Hong Kong from 1966-68. In personal correspondence Professor

Whiting, now of Michigan State University, has also assured the author that he knows the United States position with respect to China "intimately". His references to personal discussions with and the private opinions of such officials as Henry Kissinger leave little room for doubt on this score.

⁸⁸The Chinese have been more explicit on this point than in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs statement. A *People's Daily* editorial of July 1, 1964, after describing the United States as the "biggest, lawless international gangster and the worst menace to the peace and security of the Far East and Asia" and claiming that "the Chinese people will resolutely fight the U.S. imperialist policy of aggression and war against China to the very end" continued,

However, China has at all times exercised the greatest possible forbearance and restraint in the interest of relaxation of tension between the two countries. In the course of nine years of the Sino-American ambassadorial talks, China has again and again proposed that the Chinese and American governments first of all reach agreement of principle on two points: one, the two countries coexist peacefully on the basis of the Five Principles; two, that the U.S. guarantee to withdraw all its armed forces from China's Taiwan Province and the Taiwan Straits. Translated in *Peking Review* No. 27, July 3, 1964.

⁸⁹A.S. Whiting, *op. cit.*, p. 72.

⁹⁰Published in *The Polemic on the General Line of the International Communist Movement*, Foreign Languages Press, Peking, 1965. The Sixth Comment was originally published on December 12, 1963.

⁹¹*Ibid.*, pp. 273-4.

⁹²Yu Chao-li, *Honggi*, April 1, 1960, quoted in *Peking Review*, April 12, 1960.

⁹³"Peaceful Coexistence...", *op. cit.*, p. 279.

⁹⁴*Ibid.*, pp. 275-8.

⁹⁵N. Khrushchev, speech at the U.S. General Assembly, September 23, 1960, quoted in "Peaceful Coexistence...", *ibid.*, p. 275.

⁹⁶N. Khrushchev, speech at the Gadjah Mada University, Djakarta, Indonesia, February 21, 1968, quoted in "Peaceful Coexistence...", *ibid.*

⁹⁷N. Khrushchev, report to the Session of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R., January 1960, quoted in "Peaceful Coexistence...", *ibid.*

⁹⁸"On the Interview of the U.S. President J. Kennedy", editorial board article in *Izvestia*, December 4, 1961, quoted *ibid.*, p. 276.

⁹⁹Telegram of greetings from Khrushchev and Brezhnev to Kennedy, December 30, 1961, quoted *ibid.*

¹⁰⁰See for instance, the extraordinary statement by Lucien Bianco that Chinese "negotiations with Washington" constituted a "volte-face". "Fu-Chiang and Red Fervour", *Problems of Communism*, September/October 1974, p. 2.

¹⁰¹The Shanghai Communique is reprinted in *Peking Review* No. 9, March 3, 1972, pp. 4-5.

¹⁰²G. Apalin, "Ideological Foundations of the Maoist Foreign Policy", in V.F. Feoktistov (compiler), *Maoism Unmasked*, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1972, p. 224.

¹⁰³A.S. Whiting, *op.cit.*, p. 74.

¹⁰⁴Speaking at a mass rally in Peking for the Albanian Party and Government Delegation. *Peking Review* No. 41, October 11, 1968, p. 9.

¹⁰⁵*Peking Review* No. 42, October 11, 1968, p. 29.

¹⁰⁶"The 'Brezhnev Doctrine'", translation of Sergei Kouvalov's article in *Pravda* September 26, 1968, in *Problems of Communism* Vol. XVII, No. 6, November/December 1968, p. 25.

¹⁰⁷Richard Lowenthal, "The Sparrow in the Cage", *Problems of Communism* Vol. XVII, No. 6, November/December 1968, p. 24.

¹⁰⁸Keesing's Research Report, *The Sino-Soviet Dispute*, Keesing's Publications Ltd., Wiltshire, U.K., 1970, p. 106.

¹⁰⁹A.S. Whiting, *op. cit.*, p. 74, f.n. 10.

¹¹⁰"Comrade Huang Yung-sheng's Speech at P.L.A. 41st Anniversary Reception", *Peking Review* No. 32, August 9, 1968, p. 13.

¹¹¹A.S. Whiting, *op. cit.*, p. 73.

¹¹²"Remarks at a Press Conference", reprinted in Franz Schurmann and Orville Schell (eds.), *China Readings III, Communist China*, Penguin, London, 1967, p. 542.

¹¹³"Interview of Mao Tse-tung with the Japanese Socialists", in Franz Schurmann and Orville Schell (eds.), *Communist China*, p. 370.

¹¹⁴A.S. Whiting, *op. cit.*, p. 73.

¹¹⁵E.g., "Whom is the Soviet Leadership Taking United Action With?", *Peking Review* No. 5, January 4, 1966, pp. 10-13.

¹¹⁶A.S. Whiting, *op. cit.*, p. 74.

¹¹⁷If such events as warning the Soviet Union about intruding into Chinese territory are to be seriously considered as evidence indicative of a conciliatory move on China's part towards the United States then China's warnings to the United States about its intrusions are peculiarly timed indeed in relation to the allegedly conciliatory Ministry of Foreign Affairs statement of November 26. On October 23, China issued its 464th warning to the United States as a result of warship and plane intrusions into Chinese territory. Cf. *Survey of China Mainland Press* No. 4288, p. 25. On October 30, the 465th warning was issued. Cf. *Survey of China Mainland Press* No. 4292, p. 23, and on December 10 there was a strong protest against the strafing by a U.S. helicopter of a Chinese fishing boat off Hainan five days earlier. *Survey of China Mainland Press* No. 4318, pp. 20-1.

¹¹⁸"The New United States-China Policy", *Current History* Vol. 63, No. 373, September 1972, p. 127. This author also accepts Whiting's position, though he produces no argument for it. He states, for instance, "It was, however, only after the Soviet action in Czechoslovakia that the Chinese leadership in Peking seemed to awake to the full seriousness of

the situation. Not only had the Soviets demonstrated their willingness to use military force against a recalcitrant member of the socialist community, but they had also justified their actions by what had become known in the West as the Brezhnev Doctrine." According to Michael, "The great pressure which alone can explain this shift in Chinese policy (to "deal in new terms with the archenemy of the 'imperialist camp'") was the Chinese perception of a graver threat than American 'imperialism' — that of Soviet military action against Peking." *Ibid.*

¹¹⁹The original formulation was on June 7, 1969. See "Speech by Comrade L.I. Brezhnev" (to the International Conference of Communist and Workers' Parties), *Pravda*. Translated in *Current Digest of Soviet Press*, July 2, 1969, p. 16.

¹²⁰"Soviet Policy in East Asia", *Problems of Communism* Vol. XXII, No. 6, p. 40.

¹²¹"China and the Balance of Power", *Foreign Affairs* Vol. 52, No. 2, January 1974, p. 356.

¹²²"The Changing Pattern of U.S.-China Relations", *Current Survey* Vol. X, No. 4, April 10, 1972.

¹²³"The Chinese History and the Foreign Relations of Contemporary China", *The Annals of the American Academy*, July 1972.

¹²⁴Franz Michael, *loc. cit.*

¹²⁵"The Sino-U.S. Detente: How Durable?", *Asian Survey* Vol. 13, No. 9, September 1973.

¹²⁶*China's Turbulent Quest*, Indiana University Press, Bloomington and London, Revised Edition, 1972, p. 284. In *The Bear at the Gate*, American Institute for Public Policy Research, 1971, Hinton argues that Mao took the same position as Lin. Cf. p. 46.

¹²⁷*China's Turbulent Quest*, *op. cit.*, p. 240. This assertion by Hinton is reiterated by a number of American commentators. Joseph Alsop claims Peking's air raid shelters were the result of fear on the part of the Chinese leadership of a Soviet surprise attack — a fear "which became acute when the Soviet government vainly asked for U.S. support for such an attack in 1969." "Peking's Awesome Underground City", *San Francisco Chronicle*, December 1, 1972, in David Milton, Nancy Milton and Franz Schurmann, *People's China*, Vintage, New York, 1974, p. 615. It is possible that the assertion is more than an American government-inspired rumour but there is little in the way of evidence to prove it. The rumour began with a statement by Secretary of State Rogers. *New York Times*, August 8 and 9, 1969.

¹²⁸*China's Turbulent Quest*, *op. cit.*, p. 287.

¹²⁹*Ibid.*, p. 291.

¹³⁰Whiting strongly rejects this view, "The White House has tried very, very hard by taking quotations out of context to show that as far back as 1967 the President always had this detente in mind. I just don't think the evidence supports that...." *Op. cit.*, p. 93.

¹³¹*China's Turbulent Quest*, *loc. cit.*

¹³²E.g., *Communist China in World Politics*, Macmillan, London and Melbourne, 1966, *passim*.

¹³³*Ibid.*, p. 290. The Chinese statement — strongly worded even for the polemics of the time — entitled "Don't Lose Your Head, Nixon", *Peking Review* No. 9, February 26, 1971, translated from *Renmin Ribao*, February 20, 1971, may also have played its part here. The statement went closer than almost any other in the history of the Indochina war to threatening direct Chinese military involvement if the new American policy was pursued or intensified in Laos.

¹³⁴Mao was said to have advised the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee that the Soviet Union "represents a greater threat to China than the weary paper tiger of American imperialism." According to John Gittings, *Far Eastern Economic Review*, January 30, 1969, p. 175. This is not, however, tantamount to concluding that the Soviet Union had come to occupy the position of sole principal enemy

¹³⁵As with other liberal authors, there remains some ambiguity in Whiting's position. Cf. for instance his, "The Use of Force in Foreign Policy by the People's Republic of China", *The Annals of the American Academy*, July 1972, where he argues that on all occasions where the People's Republic has used force internationally it has done so reactively and with unusual restraint. In spite of this conclusion he suggests that the Chinese may be non-aggressive and non-expansionist only because of the American containment policy. In personal correspondence Whiting admitted to the author "a fundamental ambivalence in my (his) analysis, stemming as much from intellectual uncertainty as from political prudence." Ross Terrill is another, who like Whiting believes that "Chinese expansionism," though it has not yet seen the light of day, has been kept in darkness only by the shadow of American containment and the comparative international powerlessness thereby induced in China. Shortly after his visit to China in 1972 as advisor to Australian opposition leader Gough Whitlam, later Prime Minister, he wrote,

Of course, as China grows in power, her ambitions will increase. She will go, when she is able to, from 'strategic defence' to 'counter-offensive'. China will not always be in a condition of relative weakness...having 'stood up', China is likely to 'stretch out'. *Bulletin* (Sydney), February 1972, p. 26.

This attitude still finds an echo in the words of a more liberal generation of Sinologists in spite of the glaring lack of support it receives from Chinese Communist ideology, history and military/defence development.

¹³⁶For a succinct account of these different policies, cf. Franz Schurmann, "Ending the Permanent Confrontation with Asia", in Carl C. Ravenal, *Peace with China?*, Liverwright, New York, 1971.

¹³⁷"Talk on the Nixon Administration's Foreign Policy Objectives", March 29, 1973, in *Department of State Bulletin*, April 23, 1973, p. 480.

¹³⁸Henry Bradsher, *Washington Star*, May 30, 1972, quoted in I.F. Stone, "The New Shape of Nixon's World", *New York Review of Books*, June 29, 1972, p. 12.

¹³⁹"China in 1972: Socio-economic Progress Amidst Political Uncertainty", *Asian Survey* Vol. XIII, No. 1, p. 1. For a ringing rebuttal of this position and the assumptions involved, see C.R. Hensman, "China: How Wrong, How Dangerous?", *Journal of Contemporary Asia* Vol. 3, No. 3.

¹⁴⁰This position has been put to the author over the period in which research has been conducted by Mr. B. McFarlane, author, with E.L. Wheelwright of *The Chinese Road to Socialism: Economics of the Cultural Revolution*, Monthly Review Press, New York, 1971. Elements of this position can be found scattered in the analysis of other authors and some of them are cited where relevant below, but the fact that it has been so little aired is a sad reflection on the paucity of those willing and able to conduct a class analysis of international relations generally and of those of China in particular.

¹⁴¹See for instance, Audrey Donnithorne's statement that in this period, "Chou En-lai's men, it seemed, held the chief positions on the economic side of the government and imparted to it their master's own pragmatic touch." "China's Import of Capital Goods and Policy on Foreign Credit", *Seminar on China's Foreign Trade*, Australian National University, 1975, p. 6.

¹⁴²The aggregate value of these turnkey project contracts entered into between 1972 and mid-1974 is estimated to be between two and two-and-one-half billion U.S. dollars. A. Eckstein, "The Role of Foreign Trade in China's Economic Development", *Seminar on China's Foreign Trade*, p. 5.

¹⁴³One major development in the second half of 1971 was the price adjustment whereby agricultural production was upgraded vis-à-vis industrial production. The increase in the net income of communes was effected by reducing chemical fertilizers by about 10%, farm insecticides by 15%, kerosine by 21%, and a number of farm implements and machinery by an average of 16%. The state purchase price for a number of crops was also substantially raised. Such developments are extremely difficult to reconcile with the emergence of an industrially-based, technocratically-oriented elite. Cf. *Current Scene*, April 10, 1972, pp. 16-7; Kuan-I Chen, "The Outlook for China's Economy", *Current History*, September 1972, pp. 105-6; and Roland Berger, "Chinese Economic Planning", *Broadsheet* Vol. 11, No. 3, March 1974.

¹⁴⁴Some otherwise astute observers have overlooked this simple point. Cf. for instance, Marianne Bastid, "Levels of Economic Decision Making", in S. Schram (ed.), *Authority, Participation and Cultural Change in China*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1973, p. 188, where the "rehabilitation of pure technicians" is discussed. Since 1968 cadres have been "sent down" to the countryside on a regular basis to engage in manual labour in order to counteract both careerism and urban-rural imbalances.

¹⁴⁵Sian Radio, November 6, 1972, discussing the experiences of a textile mill. *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, Part III, The Far East*, (FE)/4141.

¹⁴⁶Chengtu Radio, March 3, (FE)/3934.

¹⁴⁷Hofei Radio, May 29, 1972. (FE)/4005.

¹⁴⁸E.g., "It is imperative resolutely to implement the policies of 'to each according to his ability, to each according to his work', 'exchange at equal value', and to allow commune members to engage in proper sideline production." Editorial, *Ningsia Daily*, Yingchuang Radio, March 10, 1972, (FE)/3945; and "When the mill unfolded labour emulation and prepared to give appropriate material rewards to those who had a good attitude to labour and had recorded outstanding achievements in accordance with socialist principles, some people commented that it was championship mentality and putting bonuses in command." Sian Radio, (FE)/4141.

¹⁴⁹*Ninghsia Daily, op. cit.*

¹⁵⁰Some of these are translated in Stuart Schram, *op. cit.* For a larger selection see *Miscellany of Mao Tse-tung Thought* Parts I and II, Arlington, Virginia: Joint Publications Research Service, Nos. 61269-1 and 61269-2, 1974. For a commentary on Mao's economics as revealed in these writings, cf. Richard Levy, "New Light on Mao: His Views on the Soviet Union's Political Economy", *China Quarterly* No. 61, March 1975.

¹⁵¹Audrey Donnithorne, *op. cit.*, p. 12.

¹⁵²The magnitude and speed of the developments likely to follow from this policy are considerable.

On one estimate, by 1977-78, the complete plants ordered in 1972-74 will raise the previous consumption of chemical fertilizers by over 50% and the output of synthetic fibres by 250%, of plastics by 400%, of synthetic rubber by 200% and of steel sheet rolling capacity by over 100%, while China will possess a civil aviation fleet capable of providing extensive international services. Port and harbour facilities will be improved, coal and power production riased and oil exploration and output boosted.

Audrey Donnithorne, *op. cit.*, p. 25.

¹⁵³*Peking Review* No. 1, January 3, 1969, p. 5.

¹⁵⁴*China's Foreign Trade* No. 1, 1974, p. 4.

¹⁵⁵*Op. cit.*, p. 11.

¹⁵⁶R.L. Price, "The International Trade of Communist China, 1950-65", in Joint Economic Committee, Congress of the United States: *An Economic Profile of Communist China*, Washington, 1967, p. 587.

¹⁵⁷Cf. *China's Foreign Trade* No. 1, 1974, p. 5.

¹⁵⁸For example, Christopher Howe, "Economic Trends and Policies", *Political Quarterly* Vol. 45, No. 1, January 1974, p. 24, where both Japanese and British sources are cited to this effect.

¹⁵⁹Although at this stage it is too early to be definitive, it would seem that the fall-off in orders of whole plants in the latter half of 1974 may not be due simply to a temporary shortage of foreign exchange. In a speech at the Second General Conference of the United Nations Industrial Development Organization in March 1975, the head of the Chinese delegation claimed,

We will learn from the good experience of other countries, accelerate the building of socialism and complete the establishment of an independent and relatively comprehensive industrial and economic system before 1980. *Peking Review* No. 12, March 21, 1975, p. 19. (My emphasis.)

Plants already ordered would be coming into operation by about 1980.

¹⁶⁰Li Hsin, "Self-Reliance is a Question of Line", *Peking Review* No. 32, August 8, 1975, p. 23. Cf. also "Taking the Road of Self-Reliance", *Peking Review* No. 42, October 18, 1974, p. 5, where the building of

Shanghai's industry through self-reliance and without foreign ideas and capital is praised while the concept that refusal to import is equatable with self-reliance is criticized as "superficial".

¹⁶¹This summary of the Chinese position can be verified by reference to the Chinese media of the time. The core position as stated here was not the subject of debate.

¹⁶²Speech given in December 1965, quoted in H.L. Robinson, "The Downfall of the Dollar", in Ralph Miliband and John Saville (eds.), *The Socialist Register*, 1973, The Merlin Press, London, 1974, p. 405.

¹⁶³Peter Passell and Leonard Ross, "Mr. Nixon's Economic Melodrama", *New York Review of Books* Vol. XVII, No. 4, September 23, 1971, p. 12.

¹⁶⁴*Ibid.* The same point is made more bluntly by others. Geoffrey Barraclough claims, "It could be argued — as Perlo argues — that such countries as West Germany, Switzerland and Japan were in effect 'subsidizing ...U.S. imperialism to the tune of many billions of dollars per year,' and doing themselves untold harm in the process" in "The End of an Era", *New York Review of Books* Vol. XXI, No. 11, June 27, 1974, p. 18, quoting from Victor Perlo, *The Unstable Economy: Booms and Recessions in the U.S. Since 1945*, International Publishers, 1974. H.L. Robinson states that,

the United States has since World War II increased its investment in the other imperialist countries several times over, it has acquired ownership and control of key sectors of the economies of many of them and it exercises a significant influence on their economic and therefore their political development. By this and other means...the U.S. is able to extract from these countries huge amounts of surplus value and to compel them to pay, whether they want to or not, a large part of the costs of defending and expanding its own empire. *Op. cit.*, p. 398.

¹⁶⁵Speech on May 28 to the Munich conference of American Bankers Association in *U.S. News and World Report*, June 14, p. 52.

¹⁶⁶Geoffrey Barraclough, *op. cit.*, p. 17.

¹⁶⁷Bank for International Settlements, *42nd Annual Report*, Basle, June 1972, p. 6, quoted in H.L. Robinson, *op. cit.*, p. 415.

¹⁶⁸*Monthly Economic Newsletter*, March 1973, quoted in H.L. Robinson, *op. cit.*, p. 447.

¹⁶⁹Speech of May 28, 1971, *op. cit.* This issue is discussed at length in Ernest Mandel, *Europe versus America? Contradictions of Imperialism*, New Left Books, London, 1970. See also Bob Rowthorn, "Imperialism in the Seventies — Unity or Rivalry?", *New Left Review* No. 69, September/October 1971; Galeazzo Santini, "The U.S.-EEC Trade War: Blackmailing with Protectionism", *Successo*, June 1973; Grant L. Reuber, "What's New About Recent United States Foreign Economic Policy", *International Journal* Vol. XXVII, No. 2, Spring 1972; Jack S. Parker, "U.S. Investment in Japan — Opportunities and Obstacles", *Conference Board Record*, May 1973.

¹⁷⁰Reported in *The Pentagon Papers* as published by the *New York Times*, Bantam Books, New York, 1971, p. 592.

¹⁷¹*Ibid.*

¹⁷²*Ibid.*, p. 593.

¹⁷³*Ibid.*

¹⁷⁴"Report of Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, on Situation in Vietnam and MACV Requirements", *ibid.*, p. 616.

¹⁷⁵*Ibid.*, p. 597.

¹⁷⁶*Ibid.*, pp. 599, 600.

¹⁷⁷*Ibid.*, p. 600.

¹⁷⁸*Ibid.*, p. 606.

¹⁷⁹While the "Nixon Doctrine" is not fully elaborated in any one place, its essence can be seen in the following: R. Nixon, *U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970's: A New Strategy for Peace*, Washington, Government Printing Office, 1970; *U.S. Foreign Policy, 1969-1970: A Report of the Secretary of State*, Washington, Department of State Publications, No. 8575, March 1971; Secretary Rogers, speeches or press conferences of April 7, 1969, August 8, 1969, December 23, 1969, and January 15, 1970, in *Major Public Statements on China by U.S. Officials, 1969-1970*, Washington, United States Information Agency, January 1971. Nixon's original Guam speech of July 1969 was not available for direct quotation but a version of it appeared as his "State of the World" address to Congress on February 18, 1970, *Department of State Bulletin*, 62:325, March 9, 1970. See also his "State of the World" address of February 25, 1971, for an expanded version. *Department of State Bulletin*, 64:342-432, March 22, 1971.

¹⁸⁰"Interview with Secretary of State, William P. Rogers", *U.S. News and World Report*, November 22, 1971, p. 32.

¹⁸¹For a discussion of the way in which the war was carried on in Laos, cf. Wilfred Burchett, *Second Indochina War: Cambodia and Laos Today*, Lorrimer Publishing, London, 1970, and Nina Adams and Al McCoy, *Laos: War and Revolution*, Harper and Row, New York, 1970. For a discussion of Laos as the model for the Nixon Doctrine, cf. Fred Branfman, "Laos: 'No Place to Hide'", *Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars* Vol. 2, No. 4, Fall 1970.

¹⁸²*New York Times*, November 4, 1969.

¹⁸³E.g., *New China News Agency*, August 5, 1969, in *Survey of China Mainland Press* No. 4473, pp. 26ff.

¹⁸⁴E.g., "'Nixon Doctrine' Reflects Victory of Asian People and Defeat of U.S. Imperialism", *New China News Agency*, March 5, 1970, in *Survey of China Mainland Press* No. 4615, p. 145.

¹⁸⁵E.g., "Laird Wants Japanese Militarism to Provide Conventional Forces to Implement U.S. Imperialist Policy of 'Making Asians Fight Asians'", *New China News Agency*, July 22, 1971, in *Survey of China Mainland Press* No. 4947, p. 281.

¹⁸⁶Pierre Renfret, *New York Times*, August 30, 1971.

¹⁸⁷See the previous chapter. The recent major work of Franz Schurmann, *The Logic of World Power*, New York, Pantheon, 1974, while contributing numerous valuable insights into recent international developments, is based very profoundly on the premises that this transition of Japan, and indeed of Western Europe, has not taken place. The United

States alone remains the fundamental determinant of the "world political scene" in the immediate future. Even China, he claims, is appreciative of this fact and came to terms with the United States because it had come to fear the international consequences of an American economic collapse. His prediction that "in whatever way America moves, that will be the decisive fact on the world political scene during this new stage of world history" (p. xxvii) is not only unwarranted in its American-centredness but ignores the international tendencies of recent years. It also contradicts his own views as expressed in "The Waning of the American Empire", *Journal of Contemporary Asia* Vol. 1, No. 3.

¹⁸⁸O.E.C.D. *Economic Outlook* No. 16, December 1974, p. 5.

¹⁸⁹Emphasis in recent years in the Western press on the growth of Soviet arms expenditure, particularly in connection with its sea power, should not be confused or equated with the Chinese position. The Western reports are much more in keeping with the traditional cold war fears which were generated to cover the expansion of the American empire and generally concentrate solely on the changing military balance between the Soviet Union and the United States. For a typical example, cf. the *Time* cover story, "Reaching for Supremacy at Sea", January 31, 1972, pp. 12-17.

¹⁹⁰For a discussion of Soviet policy in Eastern Europe, cf. S. Mallet, *Bureaucracy and Technocracy in the Socialist Countries*, Spokesman, Nottingham, 1970; F.L. Pryor, *The Communist Foreign Trade System - The Other Common Market*, Allen and Unwin, London, 1963; A. Zauberman, *Economic Imperialism, the Lesson of Eastern Europe*, Bellman Books, London, 1955; H.W. Schaefer, *Comecon and the Politics of Integration*, Praeger, New York, 1972; P.J.D. Wiles, *Communist International Economics*, Praeger, New York, 1969. On Soviet policy in the Middle East, cf. Aryeh Yodfat, *Arab Politics in the Soviet Mirror*, Israel Universities Press, Jerusalem, 1973; Foy D. Kohler, Leon Gouré, Mose L. Harvey, *The Soviet Union and the 1973 Middle East War: The Implications for Detente*, University of Miami, Washington, 1974; Ivo J. Lederer and Wayne S. Vucinich (eds.), *The Soviet Union and the Middle East: The Post World War II Era*, Hoover Institution Press, Stanford, 1974.

¹⁹¹For a recent discussion in these terms, cf. Hsin Feng, "Mighty Ideological Weapon in the Struggle Against Revisionism", *Peking Review* No. 20, May 17, 1974.

¹⁹²The editors of *Monthly Review* have consistently adopted this position. For a recent exposition, see their two-part review of Charles Bettelheim, *Les Luttes des Classes en URSS: Première Période 1917-1923*, Paris, Sevil/Maspero, 1974; in *Monthly Review* Vol. 26, No. 6, November 1974 and Vol. 26, No. 8, January 1975.

¹⁹³Trotskyists, adhering to the rather legalistic position that without private ownership of the means of production capitalism cannot exist, generally adopt this position.

¹⁹⁴See for instance, Teresa Hayter, *Aid as Imperialism*, Penguin, Middlesex, 1971; Harry Magdoff, *The Age of Imperialism*, Monthly Review Press, New York, 1969, Chapter 4 on "Aid and Trade"; Cheryl Payer, *The Debt Trap*, Penguin, Middlesex, 1974.

¹⁹⁵L. Kochlovsky, "Two Decades of Purposeful Cooperation", *Eastern Economist*, January 31, 1975, p. 237. (Kochlovsky is attached to the Soviet Embassy in India.) The Soviet interest in the Indian economy, and its implications, are larger in the view of others. Cf. Tarun Roy,

"Fresh Pastures", *Frontier*, February 26, 1972:

As of early 1972, the Soviet Union controlled 80 percent of India's electricity-generating equipment industries, 80 percent of oil extraction, 34 percent of refineries, 80 percent of heavy engineering industries, 30 percent of iron and steel industries, 60 percent of electrical equipment industries, and 25 percent of power industries. With respect to India's export trade, the U.S.S.R. controlled 57 percent of India's export of wool, 75 percent of woollen garments, 53 percent of cotton, 75 percent of jute, and 51 percent of skins.

Quoted in Kathleen Gough, "Imperialism and Revolutionary Potential", in Kathleen Gough and Hari Sharma (eds.), *Imperialism and Revolution in South Asia*, Monthly Review Press, New York, 1973, p. 38.

¹⁹⁶At least one major Soviet Economist has argued that foreign aid should only be offered when some valuable commodity such as oil, natural gas or iron ore can be obtained in return. Quoted in Marshall I. Goldman, "Soviet Foreign Aid Since the Death of Stalin: Progress and Problems", in W. Raymond Duncan (ed.), *Soviet Policy in Developing Countries*, Ginn-Blaisdell, Waltham, Massachusetts, 1970, p. 41.

¹⁹⁷Geoffrey Jukes, *The Soviet Union in Asia*, Angus and Robertson, Sydney, 1973, p. 278.

¹⁹⁸*Ibid.*, p. 277.

¹⁹⁹*Ibid.*

²⁰⁰See for instance, Maharaj K. Chopra, "The Soviet Military Aid", *The Indian Express*, January 28, 1970, quoted in Patwant Singh, *The Struggle for Power in Asia*, Hutchinson, London, 1971, p. 191. Geoffrey Jukes, *op. cit.*, p. 285, reports of Soviet military aid to Third World countries generally,

it is relatively free of economic considerations, as for the most part the weapons supplied are obsolescent or obsolete in the Soviet armed forces and would be stockpiled or scrapped if not disposed of to Third World countries.

²⁰¹Padma Desai, *The Bokaro Steel Plant*, North Holland Publishing Company, Amsterdam, 1972, p. 66.

²⁰²According to one C.I.A. analyst, "in many countries outlays for technical assistance have accounted for 25 to 30 percent of total drawings on Soviet credits to these countries." Leo Tansky, "Soviet Military Aid, Technical Assistance and Academic Training", in W. Raymond Duncan, *op. cit.*, p. 48.

²⁰³Penguin, Middlesex, 1974, p. 302.

²⁰⁴"Another Look at Chinese Aid", *China Trade and Economic Newsletter*, July 1972, p. 5.

²⁰⁵Sisir Gupta, "India and the Soviet Union", *Current History* No. 3, 1963, p. 145.

²⁰⁶E.M.S. Namboodiripad, the C.P.I. chief minister of Kerala had been to Moscow in January of 1959 seeking foreign aid when the local anti-Communist opposition groups were launching their campaign to oust the C.P.I.-led government. Moscow, however, was "unwilling to incur the wrath of the Congress Party by assisting in the economic development of Kerala during a period of C.P.I. rule." Namboodiripad returned empty-handed. A. Stein, *India and the Soviet Union*, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1967, p. 176.

²⁰⁷As later revealed by the Chinese, *Peking Review*, November 8, 1963.

²⁰⁸Geoffrey Jukes, *op. cit.*, p. 176.

²⁰⁹Eisenhower's Secretary of Defence, "Engine Charlie" Wilson termed his "new look" defence policy "more bang for the buck". Tactical nuclear weapons were to be provided for the West German army and air force to counterbalance the Red Army's numerical superiority. William E. Griffith, *Cold War and Coexistence*, Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1971, p. 64.

²¹⁰The Chinese attempted to explain the border dispute with India, pointing out that the provocation had come from India and in an area north of the de facto boundary. Khrushchev, they later claimed, "did not wish to know the true situation and the identity of the people committing the provocation, but insisted that anyway it was wrong to shoot people dead." *Peking Review* No. 45, November 8, 1963.

²¹¹*Peking Review* No. 44, November 2, 1962.

²¹²Senator Sparkman, acting as head of the Foreign Relations Committee, gave voice to the official American view at the time when he stated, "We know right now that India is pressing very hard against Communist China upon her north-eastern frontier..." He argued against reducing aid..."at the very time she is moving in the direction that we have been wanting her to move for a long time." Quoted in Neville Maxwell, *India's China War*, Penguin, Middlesex, 1972, pp. 263-4.

²¹³*Ibid.*, pp. 412, 419.

²¹⁴A. Stein, *op. cit.*, p. 207.

²¹⁵*Ibid.*, p. 270.

²¹⁶G. Jukes, *op. cit.*, p. 266.

²¹⁷Leo Tansky, *op. cit.*, p. 43.

²¹⁸Padma Desai, *op. cit.*, p. xi.

²¹⁹*Ibid.*, p. 25, quoting Galbraith's *Ambassador's Journal - A Personal Account of the Kennedy Years*, London, Hamish Hamilton, 1969, p. 240.

²²⁰*Ibid.*, p. 29.

²²¹E.g., *The Times* (London), November 6, 1971, disclosed that "at least 12 Soviet transport aircraft have landed at Bombay and Delhi during the past few days loaded with military equipment."

²²²Egbal Ahmad, "America and Russia in South Asia: Conflict or Collusion?", *Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars* Vol. 6, No. 1, January/March 1974, p. 24. Ahmad cites the Anderson papers in support of his contention.

²²³*Ibid.*, p. 25.

²²⁴Nixon pressured the Kremlin into sending the Deputy Foreign Minister, V.V. Kuznetov, to New Delhi "with warnings favouring Indian acceptance of a cease-fire." *Ibid.*, p. 25.

²²⁵"New Equations in Asia", *The Times of India*, December 21, 1971.

²²⁶P. Kutsobin, V. Shurygin, "South Asia: Tendencies Toward Stability", *International Affairs*, Moscow, April 1973.

²²⁷See for instance, Andrei Gromyko's statement reported in *The Hindu*, August 18, 1971.

²²⁸Indian leaders were in fact embarrassed by the Soviet suggestion. Norman D. Palmer, "The Communist Tug-of-War in India", *Problems of Communism* Vol. 23, No. 4, July/August 1974, p. 63.

²²⁹L. Kochlovsky, *op. cit.*, p. 237.

²³⁰For examples of this critique, cf. *Peking Review* No. 45, November 5, 1973; No. 48, November 30, 1973; No. 2, January 11, 1974; No. 5, February 1, 1974.

²³¹*Economic and Political Weekly* Vol. VIII, No. 49, December 8, 1973, p. 2152.

²³²For critical evaluations of the character of this trade, see, Harry Magdoff, *The Age of Imperialism*, Monthly Review Press, New York, 1969; Pierre Jalée, *The Pillage of the Third World*, Monthly Review Press, New York, 1968; Arghiri Emmanuel, *Unequal Exchange: A Study of the Imperialism of Trade*, Monthly Review Press, New York, 1972.

²³³This list is compiled by Geoffrey Jukes, *op. cit.*, p. 278, from Soviet trade publications.

²³⁴G. Jukes, *op. cit.*, p. 279. For a series of other disadvantages see the conclusions of the late Asha L. Datar, *India's Economic Relations with the U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe: 1953 to 1969*, Columbia University Press, Columbia, 1972, pp. 256-263.

²³⁵J.R. Carter, *The Net Cost of Soviet Foreign Aid*, Praeger, New York, 1971, p. 37.

²³⁶*Ibid.*, p. 38.

²³⁷*Ibid.*

²³⁸*Ibid.*, p. 41. Other studies tend to support Carter's conclusions. See for instance, J. Berliner, *Soviet Economic Aid*, Praeger, New York, 1958; Vassil Vassilev, *Policy in the Soviet Bloc on Aid to Developing Countries*, O.E.C.D. Development Centre Studies, Paris, 1969; Kurt Muller, *The Soviet Bloc and the Developing Countries*, Thacker and Co., Bombay, 1970.

²³⁹"Does India Buy Dear and Sell Cheap to the Soviet Union?", *Economic and Political Weekly* Vol. VIII, No. 48, December 1, 1973, p. 2145. (My emphasis.)

²⁴⁰*Ibid.*

²⁴¹See also the concerns of J. Naik arising from the sectoral imbalance in Indo-Soviet trade. J. Naik, *Soviet Policy Towards India From Stalin to Brezhnev*, Vikas Publications, Delhi, 1970, p. 184.

²⁴²*The Statesman*, Calcutta, February 1, 1972, quoted in Chandrasekhara Rao, "Indo-Soviet Economic Relations", *Asian Survey* Vol. XIII, No. 8, August 1973, p. 793.

²⁴³*Ibid.*

²⁴⁴*The Hindu*, Madras, March 5, 1973, quoted *ibid.*, p. 797.

²⁴⁵Ramashray Roy, "India 1972: Fissure in the Fortress", *Asian Survey* Vol. XIII, No. 2, February 1973, p. 240.

²⁴⁶P.J. Eldridge, *The Politics of Foreign Aid in India*, Weidenfield and Nicolson, London, 1969, p. 54.

²⁴⁷The analytical problems involved in the above conclusions should not be underplayed. For Marxists, the basic analytical tool for understanding imperialism remains Lenin's theory which sees it as the natural outgrowth of the highest, monopoly stage of capitalism, propelled by a falling rate of profit within the metropolitan economies and made possible by the increasing dominance of finance capital, and of which the essential feature is the export of capital. That the Soviet Union has attained "the highest stage of capitalism" is by no means immediately apparent, though the Chinese have begun an analysis which purports to prove the latter. Cf. Hsin Peng, "Might Ideological Weapon in the Struggle Against Revisionism — A Study of Lenin's 'Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism'", *Peking Review* No. 20, May 17, 1974, p. 15.

CHAPTER V
CHINA AND THE SECOND INTERMEDIATE ZONE

The purpose of this chapter is to trace the developments which took place in China's conceptualization of and relations with the group of countries which it regarded as falling within the category of the "second intermediate zone" in the period after the Cultural Revolution. Space clearly precludes an examination of China's relations with every country considered to be within this category. Primary emphasis will therefore be concentrated on those areas which were most significant in the reformulation of China's views on this zone — Western Europe, Eastern Europe and Japan. It will be argued that the developments in China's policy towards the "second intermediate zone" form a coherent part of the general reformulation of Chinese foreign policy in this period and complement the specific changes in China's policies towards the United States and the Soviet Union as described in the previous chapter.

The "intermediate zone" was initially used as a category by Mao Tsetung in reply to a question from Anna Louise Strong in 1946 as to the possibility of the United States starting a war against the Soviet Union. Mao replied that at one level the anti-Soviet propaganda was "political preparation for such a war" but at present,

the actual significance of the U.S. slogan of waging an anti-Soviet war is the oppression of the American people and the expansion of the U.S. forces of aggression in the rest of the capitalist world.¹

Mao went on to delineate a "vast zone which includes many capitalist, colonial and semi-colonial countries in Europe, Asia and Africa." He predicted that the United States would only dare launch a war against the Soviet Union if it had already subjugated these countries. It was for

this latter purpose rather than the stated aim of containing the Soviet Union that the United States was installing military bases in the countries separating it from its arch enemy. Mao's tactical suggestion to counteract this United States attempt to turn all these intermediate countries into "U.S. dependencies" has a familiar ring:

I think the American people and the peoples of all countries menaced by U.S. aggression should unite and struggle against the attacks of the U.S. reactionaries and their running dogs in these countries. Only by victory in this struggle can a third world war be avoided; otherwise it is unavoidable.²

In light of the way in which the concept of the "intermediate zone" was subsequently developed it is important to note that Mao considered the anti-Soviet propaganda to be but a "smoke-screen put up by the U.S. reactionaries to cover many actual contradictions immediately confronting U.S. imperialism"³ These contradictions were listed as the "U.S. reactionaries" against the "American people" and imperialism against other capitalist, colonial and neo-colonial countries. To be sure, socialist contradictions with imperialism were real enough but it would be in the battleground of capitalist, colonial and neo-colonial countries that they would be fought out.

By the late 1950's Mao had so consolidated his thinking in this direction that he was able to claim with apparent confidence that the socialist countries were now relatively safe from imperialist attack unless they should be "beset by great disorder."⁴ For all its considerable power in the 1950's, the United States was simply not able to tackle the socialist bloc directly. To attempt to do so would according to Mao have been "stupid". The complex structure of military bases and especially military alliances such as SEATO, NATO and CENTO constructed with Dullesian anti-communist fervour and ostensibly aimed at the socialist

countries were in fact directed at the very countries which they incorporated in an attempt to control and guide them in a capitalist pattern of development.

By the time the Sino-Soviet dispute had hardened into irreconcilable differences — a factor which could have constituted "great disorder" in the socialist camp — other factors had emerged to prevent the possibility of imperialism launching a direct assault upon the socialist countries. Mao listed a series of anti-imperialist struggles which had occupied imperial attention and thereby forestalled it from waging direct war on socialism.⁵

By mid-1963, this point had become critical in the Sino-Soviet dispute. The Chinese contended in their polemic with the Soviet Union that the United States was intent upon attacking "the most vulnerable areas under imperialist rule and the storm centres of world revolution." There was a sense for the Chinese in which the "whole cause of the international proletarian revolution hinges on the outcome of the revolutionary struggles of the people of these areas."⁶ The Soviet Union on the other hand, had by this time adopted the position that wholehearted support of movements as inflammatory as some of those developing in Third World countries in opposition to the United States and other imperialist powers constituted a grave threat to world peace at a time when nuclear weapons had made such a threat horrendous to contemplate. Such at least was the appearance the Soviet position gave to the Chinese.⁷

It should be clearly borne in mind that all such discussion of the intermediate zone at this time took place within a framework which did not question the existence of the "socialist camp". Loyalty to and unity with the socialist countries constituted the very "touchstone of proletarian internationalism" as far as the Chinese were concerned. The fact that

the Soviet Union had begun to engage in what the Chinese regarded as "splittist" activities was not allowed to interfere with the logic of the intermediate zone's existence. As will be seen below, the exacerbation of the Sino-Soviet split and the eventual dissolution of the "socialist camp" were eventually, and quite logically, responsible for the reformulation of the concept of the intermediate zone.

In early 1964, Mao foreshadowed a revision of the intermediate zone concept in accordance with the changing character of the "socialist bloc" and the widened range of countries adopting anti-imperialist tendencies of various kinds. "It's no fun being a running dog," said Mao,

Nehru is in bad shape, imperialism and revisionism have robbed him blind. Revisionism is being rebuffed everywhere. It was rebuffed in Romania, it is not listened to in Poland. In Cuba they listen to half and reject half; they listen to half because they can't do otherwise, since they don't produce oil or weapons. Imperialism is having a hard time, too. Japan is opposing the United States, and it's not only the Japanese Communist Party and the Japanese people that are opposing the United States — the big capitalists are doing so too. Not long ago the Kita — iron works rejected an American inspection. De Gaulle's opposition to the United States is also in response to the demands of the capitalists. They are also behind his establishment of diplomatic relations with China.⁸

It is clear that at this time, the "two camp doctrine" which had dominated Chinese thinking on international relations in the Fifties was being recast as a result of the recognition of splits in both the capitalist and socialist camps. Important capitalist powers were presented as exhibiting anti-imperialist tendencies in much the same manner as Third World countries, and socialist countries were presented as exhibiting anti-hegemonic tendencies with respect to the Soviet Union.

Later in 1964, Mao, in an interview with a group of visiting Japanese socialists, formalized the new perspectives by claiming that,

At the present time, there exist two intermediate zones in the world. Asia, Africa and Latin America constitute the first intermediate zone. Europe, North America and Oceania constitute the second. Japanese monopoly capital belongs to the second intermediate zone, but even it is discontented with the United States, and some of its representatives are openly rising against the United States. Though Japanese monopoly capital now is dependent on the United States, the time will come when it too will shake off the American yoke.⁹

Japan was urged to become "completely independent, to establish relations and enter into cooperation with those forces in Asia striving for national independence."¹⁰ It is noteworthy that this formulation does not include the Eastern European countries in their opposition to Soviet hegemony as forming part of the second intermediate zone.¹¹

As will be seen below, the second intermediate zone plays an insignificant role in the formulation of Chinese foreign policy or its strategy and tactics in the years of the Cultural Revolution but when it re-emerged in 1971 as an integral part of "Chairman Mao's revolutionary line in foreign affairs" it had undergone a shift in meaning as a result of the new Chinese perceptions of the world order. In 1972 it received authoritative elucidation — along with the "first intermediate zone", the second was considered to be sandwiched between the two superpowers, "like two slices of bread with meat in between them." The analogy was made explicit and at some length:

the two superpowers — Soviet revisionism and U.S. imperialism — are trying to sandwich other countries in various parts of the world. They not only plunder the small and medium-sized countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America, but also practise the 'jungle law' policy towards their 'allies' in Europe, Asia, North America and Oceania. The Soviet revisionists are sparing no effort to extend their sphere of influence to Western Europe. Thus between these two overlords and the socialist countries there exist two broad intermediate zones....

The second intermediate zone includes the major capitalist powers both in the West and the East except the two superpowers. These countries too, are subjected to the control, intervention and bullying of the two overlords to varying degrees, and the contradictions between these countries and the two superpowers are daily developing.¹²

The tactical outcome of this new situation paralleled that which Mao promoted in his original 1946 version of the "vast intermediate zone",

Countries in the first as well as the second intermediate zones are getting united in different forms and different scopes to oppose the power politics and hegemonism of the superpowers. This is a trend of world history.¹³

The composition of the second intermediate zone was unofficially clarified in the Hong Kong Communist newspaper, *Wen hui pao*, when it was stated that Japan, although Asian, still constituted part of the second intermediate zone and that "In East Europe there are countries, for instance Albania, which are socialist. Apart from these, countries in East Europe in general belong to the second intermediate zone."¹⁴

The shift in meaning which had occurred in the new formulation of the concept is in accordance with the disintegration, in the Chinese estimation, of the socialist bloc. The Soviet Union's position in the 1964 formulation of the intermediate zone had been somewhat ambiguous. While the Chinese had by that time argued that the Soviet Union was wholeheartedly engaged in the "all-round restoration of capitalism" they were not yet prepared to brand it as imperialist. Its international behaviour, while deleterious to the progress of the socialist camp, was not bent on enslaving it. Rather, its activities were seen as resulting in the destruction from within of the socialist camp's unity.

By the early 1970's this ambiguity had clearly been resolved. Socialist unity was no longer contemplated with the Soviet Union and con-

sequently there could be no question of the intermediate countries being sandwiched between an imperialist camp led by the United States and a socialist camp which was led by or at least included in some fringe way the Soviet Union. A new ambiguity has arisen, however, in that the intermediate zone countries are considered to be sandwiched between the two "superpowers" and regarded by the latter as pawns in a hegemonic struggle for spheres of influence, and at the same time to be placed between the two "superpowers" on the one hand and the "socialist countries" on the others.

Previously, the intermediate zone countries were so called because they constituted the object of imperialist attack for the United States. Under the guise of restricting the development of socialism, the United States had sought to ensure the continuation and/or development of capitalism in the intermediate zone. As Mao stated quite explicitly in relation to Japan in 1964 in the passage quoted above, the contradictions which arose from this situation were not merely those between classes having different relationships to the means of production. In the case of the second intermediate zone the local ruling capitalist classes inevitably found themselves in contradiction to United States capitalists. It was precisely this "dual character" of the local ruling class which enabled the Chinese to contemplate the mobilization of a united front utilizing the anti-hegemonic tendencies of local capitalists.

In the new formulation, the first sandwiching effect alluded to is that which places the intermediate zone between the two superpowers. As noted in Chapter III, the Chinese systematically use the term "superpower" in a hegemonic rather than a strictly imperialist sense although imperialist policies and behaviour are by no means excluded from the Chinese understanding of hegemonism. Thus the intermediate zone is primarily

perceived as being sandwiched between two capitalist and imperialist powers each with similar designs upon them.¹⁵

The second sandwiching effect to which the Chinese refer is the more conventional one arising from the fundamental contradiction between the major capitalist power(s) — now the Soviet Union as well as the United States — and the socialist countries — whose ranks have now appreciably thinned. It arises, in effect, from the fourth of the major contradictions in the world as outlined at the Ninth Congress, whereas the first sandwiching effect arises from the third contradiction.¹⁶

The concept has thus been moulded to suit the exigencies of the current era. The emphasis accorded to the first sandwiching effect is in keeping with the broad tactical priorities which the Chinese consider appropriate to the unification and intensification of anti-imperialist forces at the present time.

The other notable feature of the "second intermediate zone" in the new formulation is the inclusion of the Eastern European countries.¹⁷ This development merely reflects the fact that the Chinese consider these countries to have abandoned socialism in favour of revisionism and to form part of a Soviet sphere of influence.

While the above may serve as a summary of the conceptual development of the intermediate zone and the second intermediate zone in particular, it is necessary to examine why the concept attained prominence at this time and the way in which China's relations with the groups of countries involved changed as it did so. Western Europe, Japan and Eastern Europe will be examined in turn.

Western Europe.

As in the case of the superpowers, Chinese policy developments towards Western Europe between the Ninth and Tenth Party Congresses were

implicit in the political report delivered by Lin Piao at the Ninth Congress, although their implementation took a considerable time. The new policy towards Western European countries is best understood by comparing it with the preceding policy of the Cultural Revolution.

The most noticeable feature of China's treatment of these countries during the Cultural Revolution was the lack of emphasis accorded to them, particularly in relation to Third World countries. As argued previously, the contradiction between these latter countries and United States imperialism was regarded as the principal contradiction in the world and often as virtually the sole major contradiction from which all others were seen to flow and to which all anti-imperialist strategies and tactics were to be directed. But as was also suggested in the previous chapter, the contradictions between imperialist powers although submerged during this 'Linist' phase of China's foreign policy, were not entirely absent even though the intermediate zone terminology was not used.¹⁸ In fact, when the Western European countries were discussed in the Chinese press it was frequently in relation to their contradictions with the United States. China had, of course, long since recognized the anti-American virtues of De Gaulle's bourgeois nationalism. Mutual diplomatic recognition was effected in January 1964 after both countries had rejected the Moscow nuclear agreement the year before for the same reason that they both wanted to build independent nuclear defence systems. But this tendency toward cooperation with the second intermediate zone was curtailed by what the Chinese perceived as a reduction of the United States strategic and military presence in Western Europe in order to deal with the recalcitrant Asian reaches of its empire as well as the isolationist tendencies induced by the Cultural Revolution domestically.

But it should be emphasised that the preponderant majority of Chinese writing on foreign policy during the Cultural Revolution payed very little attention to Western Europe, either in terms of proletarian struggles being waged there,¹⁹ the inter-imperialist contradictions with the United States or even within the 'Linist' perspectives where Western Europe was regarded as a metropolitan adjunct of the United States surrounded by the "rural areas of the world" — Asia, Africa and Latin America.²⁰

It was the latter perspectives, however, which seemed to have most practical impact during the Cultural Revolution. Prior to the Cultural Revolution trade with Western Europe had been developing in the wake of the Sino-Soviet split and initial negotiations which could have led to diplomatic recognition, in spite of the considerable pressure exerted by the American State Department, were begun with Italy and West Germany.²¹

State-to-state contacts were greatly reduced as the perspectives which informed Lin Piao's writing and speeches came to predominate. The importance of nationalism, the second intermediate zone and peaceful coexistence were downgraded. When Yao Teng-shan, who became known as the "red diplomat" returned from Indonesia in April 1967 after suffering at the hands of Suharto organized anti-Chinese violence he accused the foreign minister at the time, Ch'en Yi, of a policy of "three capitulations and one annihilation." The capitulations were said to have been made to the imperialists, the revisionists and domestic reactionaries and the annihilation to which he referred was the destruction of revolutionary movements in the Third World through lack of Chinese support. Yao Teng-shan was able to muster sufficient support for his position at the time to eventually head the "May 16 Movement" group which took over the Foreign Ministry for a short while later in the year.²²

In such an atmosphere the subtleties of the more familiar Chinese Communist Party and in fact distinctly 'Maoist' understanding of inter-imperialist contradictions and the dual character of satellite capitalist classes were not likely to be stressed. The implied hostility towards countries such as those of Western Europe overflowed into demonstrations outside the French embassy in Peking and the burning of the British embassy as well as the gaoling of European nationals such as the British Reuters correspondent, Anthony Grey. These rather gratuitous diplomatic hostilities were later ascribed by Chou En-lai to ultra-leftist excess which had engendered a degree of xenophobia in China at the time.²³

The upsurge of the anti-Vietnam war movement in the "second intermediate zone" as well as in the United States received extensive coverage in the Chinese press as did the student movement. The May uprising in France of 1968 was the object of particular interest. In general it would seem in retrospect that the Chinese coverage of these events as "revolutionary struggles" overestimated their transient and partial identification with proletarian interests. The heightened awareness of the importance of correct ideology which was so prevalent in China at the time did not seem to spill over to their understanding of Western radicalism. While the importance of Mao Tsetung thought, the Marxist-Leninist party, people's war and the like were the *sine qua non* of China's endorsement of Third World revolutionary struggles during the period, the same rigid requirements were not applied to Western movements.²⁴

While this state of affairs was certainly anomalous, the reasons for the anomaly were not totally obscure. In the view of the world which obtained in China at the time the objective revolutionary potential of the proletariat of advanced capitalist countries received relatively little stress. Revolution, for the present at least, was in the hands of the

"countryside of the world" which was "directly" engaged in the struggle against metropolitan imperialism. Any struggle of workers, students or blacks in the metropolises was deemed "revolutionary" less, one presumes, because of its likelihood of bringing the proletariat to a position of state power within those countries, but rather because of its ability to weaken the will of metropolitan countries in pursuing their imperialist policies in the Third World. The only other condition which needed to be fulfilled before Chinese enthusiasm was evoked was the lack of any affiliation with the Soviet Union or Soviet-oriented communist parties.

The case of France in May 1968 is particularly interesting in that the Chinese carefully avoided trespassing on official state-to-state relations while giving maximum moral support to the uprising. China's position is adequately summarized by Bressi,

The Chinese press, when reporting on West European affairs, emphasized only the struggles. In the case of France, *New China News Agency* never directly attacked the French government nor mentioned De Gaulle's name, but put the blame on the French bourgeoisie, the trade unions, the French Communist party and accused the Soviet Union of having dampened the spirit of the French workers and students. It was evidently in Peking's interests not to confuse the two issues: firstly, the revolutionary struggle and secondly, its official relations with Paris. This was an example of how China could apply a rigid scheme of peaceful coexistence.²⁵

The transition in China's foreign policy from the perspectives which obtained during the Cultural Revolution to those which came to dominate after that time has been covered in general terms and in relation to the superpowers in the previous two chapters. Here it will be necessary only to summarize the relevant steps in that transition and develop them with respect to Western Europe.

At the most general level, the transition which occurred in Sino-West European relations in this period was from the position where Western Europe was accorded least priority in the history of Chinese communist foreign policy — the position of the Cultural Revolution — to a position where it was accorded most priority. The way for this general change was paved by the theoretical developments which were formalized in Lin's report at the Ninth Congress. In the perspectives of the Cultural Revolution, the Western European countries were not directly involved in the (sole) major contradiction in the world — that between United States imperialism and the people of the world. But in the formulation presented at the Ninth Congress and implemented practically in the following years, Western European countries are involved in all four major contradictions. As a result of the rise of Soviet social-imperialism, they are pitted — insofar as they are considered "oppressed nations" — against the United States and the Soviet Union as their hegemonic oppressors; being capitalist countries they display the second major contradiction — that between bourgeois and proletarian classes; insofar as they act in an imperialist manner themselves, the Western European countries are subject to the inter-imperialist rivalries regarded as the world's third major contradiction and fourthly, they are arraigned against the socialist countries.

The stress placed by the Chinese on Western European involvement in each of these contradictions has clearly not been equally or constantly proportioned. As suggested above, it is as members of the intermediate zone that the Western European countries receive most emphasis after the Cultural Revolution. The dual sandwiching effect explained above is consistent with the position of these countries with respect to the first and third major world contradictions as outlined above. The lack of emphasis given to Western European involvement in the other two contra-

dictions, particularly that between the domestic bourgeoisie and proletariat has given rise to the criticism in some quarters that the Chinese are so eager to support anti-imperial and anti-hegemonic tendencies among these countries at a state-to-state level that they ignore their proletarian internationalist responsibilities.²⁶ A second major criticism mounted against Chinese perspectives and operations in relation to Western Europe is that they — as in the case of the United States — are designed almost exclusively to counter the Soviet strategic threat.

This latter criticism is the counterpart of the "Whiting thesis" which was discussed in the previous chapter. Its proponents are no less numerous in relation to Western Europe than they are with respect to the United States, in fact they are frequently the same authors. Consequently there is little in the way of proof to support their contentions. Conventional Western strategic wisdom is simply applied unchanged to China without reference to the shift in ideological matrix into which it is received. A typical statement is as follows:

The obvious motive for this development in Chinese diplomacy (towards the European Economic Community) is to help "contain" the Soviet Union: the escalation of the Sino-Soviet hostility since the 1960's provides the first explanation for Peking's courtship of the EEC. The more the Soviet leaders have to worry about a build-up of hostile strength on their western border, the less energy and capability they can devote to their eastern frontier with China.

From the Chinese viewpoint, anything tending to strengthen the European voice in world affairs would give the Russians pause to think.²⁷

The position being adopted here is party to the same assumptions and subject to the same criticisms as when applied to the United States. Summarily, it makes only perfunctory allowance, if any, at the ideological level for the fact that China's foreign policy is consciously constructed in accordance with the perceived materialist objectives of the proletarian

dictatorship which, it is claimed, holds state power in China. It also makes scant allowance for the extended and substantive analysis of international developments which occurred in China from 1968 onwards, although the conclusions reached by the Chinese about the extent and character of the decline of United States imperialism as well as the rise of the Soviet Union as a social-imperialist power, are implicitly denied.

There is, however, as noted previously, an element of truth in the above criticism.²⁸ Since at least 1968, the Chinese have regarded the Soviet Union as a military threat. Moreover they are not unaware of the fact that the Soviet Union would almost certainly regard a united and somewhat suspicious Western Europe as a general strategic restraint on the possibility of any expansionist designs in the East. But to assume that these geopolitical considerations constitute the sum total of China's foreign policy perspectives and the pre-eminent determinants of its direction grossly distorts the small element of truth involved.

The criticism that China is in breach of its proletarian internationalist duty also contains an element of truth in that Western European workers' immediate interests do not always neatly coincide with the long-term global contradictions which the Chinese regard as defining the present era. More concretely, the Chinese vigorously supported British entry into the Common Market in spite of the almost unanimous opposition to the move by the British union movement and British Marxists.

But to suggest that Chinese championing of the Common Market is unconditional or that China has come to ignore proletarian struggles within Western Europe is simply incorrect. The Chinese have considered two factors to underlie the formation of the Common Market: firstly, a desire for unity, strength and independence in the face of superpower hegemony and secondly, a desire on the part of the ruling classes of the

various member countries to increase their exploitation of their local working classes. While the first factor has received overriding emphasis, the second has certainly not been ignored. In January 1972, by which time the new direction of China's foreign policy had reached maturity, the Chinese press reported with approval the accession of Britain, Norway, Denmark and Ireland to the Common Market, claiming that this was "a new step by the West European countries in joining forces against the hegemony of the superpowers, especially against U.S. control and interference in Western Europe."²⁹ At the same time that this report was made the Chinese press also reported at considerable length and with obvious enthusiasm the nationwide British miners' strike which, it was argued, "fully shows the decay of British capitalism and the ever sharpening domestic class struggles."³⁰ There was certainly no attempt to conceal from their readers the reasons which had, at least in part, prompted the formation of the EEC. "The Common Market," claimed *Peking Review*, "has been used by West European monopoly capital to step up exploitation of the working people as well as to strengthen economic rivalry with the United States."³¹ When the British parliament, in November of 1971 endorsed the accession agreement, the Chinese had commented approvingly,

This Conservative government policy shows its increasing tendency to drift away from the United States. It also reflects the fact that with growing financial and economic deterioration at home, the British monopoly class is hard at work to find a way out through participation in the "Common Market" so as to speed up its exploitation of the working people.³²

There can be little doubt, therefore that the Chinese remain conscious of their obligations towards the proletariat of European capitalist countries.

A further point needs to be made in this connection. It has long been a cardinal principle of Chinese foreign policy that the proletarian

and revolutionary movements within a country are primarily responsible for the development of a revolutionary situation and the eventual attainment of state power. The notion of outside interference from socialist allies, whether it be in the form of directives or support with strings, has never received much credence in China — a situation which is understandable in light of the damaging interference by the Soviet Union in the Chinese revolution. Even at the height of the Cultural Revolution, this principle was maintained. As Lin Piao put it,

The liberation of the masses is accomplished by the masses themselves — this is a basic principle of Marxism-Leninism. Revolution or people's war in any country is the business of the masses in that country and should be carried out primarily by their own efforts; there is no other way.³³

This blunt statement at a time when China was said to have engaged in "exporting the Cultural Revolution" applies a *fortiori* in the period which followed. China clearly regards its international function in relation to these questions not as the fount of a "Fifth International" — and most other revolutionary movements would surely be grateful for this — but rather to perceive and act upon, insofar as it is capable, the major contradictions which it considers to be developing at any particular time, leaving domestic struggle to domestic revolutionaries.

The dollar crisis of 1968, ushered in by the November 1967 devaluation of sterling and characterized by an increasing reluctance on the part of European governments to hold their fast accumulating Euro-dollars, was, as described in the previous chapter, the primary initiating factor of the new Chinese analysis of Western Europe. In light of assertions to the contrary, the point cannot be overstressed. There was simply no element of Western Europe uniting in an anti-Soviet strategic bloc at this stage. The Soviet position as characterized by the Chinese at this time was

considered to be one of cooperating rather wholeheartedly with the United States in a variety of detente programmes in Europe so that United States military forces could be withdrawn from Europe to Indochina and the containment of China. At least until the Czechoslovakian invasion, the United States and the Soviet Union were regarded as being in a state of collusion, the primary object of which was the "bastion of socialism" -- China. It was not until after this time that Europe -- or anywhere else -- became the object of Soviet-American contention. Consequently, it was not until after this time that Europe -- or anywhere else -- was considered the object of *independent* Soviet imperial and strategic attack. By the time this form of analysis had entered the Chinese perspectives, they had long since begun an analysis of inter-imperialist contradictions which pitted Western Europe uniting against the United States in the financial and currency crises of the time.

The passage from China's policy towards Western Europe in the period of the Cultural Revolution to that which came to prevail when "Chairman Mao's revolutionary line in foreign affairs" was in full operation was neither smooth nor sudden. There was a transition period from the initial backing of European opposition to American financial policy until mid-1968 when Western European unity began to receive unwavering Chinese encouragement. The transition period is in accordance with the time taken for the general changes which took place in China's policy as outlined in Chapter III.

In accordance with the increasing stress on peaceful coexistence around the time of the Ninth Congress, China began negotiations in January 1969 which eventually led to diplomatic recognition of Italy. Diplomatic contacts were made or upgraded with most West European countries in the next few years and trade, scientific and cultural exchanges as well as

inter-governmental exchanges became commonplace. These contacts to some extent belied the caution involved in China's emerging policy towards Western Europe, particularly insofar as the Common Market was concerned. Chinese Foreign Ministry officials had apparently counselled Western European diplomats towards the end of 1968 to the effect that they should "accelerate the pace of unification."³⁴ This same message was not always apparent in the public statements of the Chinese press where conflicts between the countries involved were frequently stressed. The common element to these conflicts as reported by the Chinese was the lingering attachment on the part of both the United Kingdom and West Germany to the United States and an apparently increasing dalliance on the part of West Germany with the Soviet Union. These contacts were regarded as giving rise to intense rivalries within Europe.

By early 1970 the Chinese press had acclaimed the virtues of Western European integration but even then difficulties remained. The way in which they were resolved for the Chinese illustrates clearly the origins of their interest in the matter. Franco-British negotiations over British entry into the Common Market in January 1970 were reported as making no headway but a change in China's attitude was evident in that it no longer opposed British entry. Britain's motivations were not disguised.

"British imperialism," it was affirmed,

is looking for a way out on the European continent because its colonial system is fast falling apart under the attacks by the revolutionary storms of the Asian, African and Latin American peoples.³⁵

Moreover, there were still "deep-rooted contradictions between the two countries." The reasons for the new Chinese attitude were given a week later when the "Special Relationship" between the United States and the United Kingdom was pronounced "bankrupt". Harold Wilson's visit to

the United States was seen as a last ditch attempt to remain in office at the ensuing elections by appearing to have United States support. The British Labour government's rule of the previous five years was characterized on an international level as "actively tailing after U.S. imperialism on major international questions."³⁶ The decline of both American and British imperialism in recent years had, however, given rise to a new situation. Whereas the United States had actively supported British entry into the Common Market for a number of years -- in the Chinese view, "hoping that Britain's admission would help it control Europe" -- the contradictions between the two countries had now so developed that "the United States is not sure whether Britain's entry into the 'Common Market' will be in its interest." It was now argued that,

The United States is fearful that if negotiations between Britain and the Common Market are successful and Britain gets into that body, the economic and political "challenge" of Western Europe to the United States might be intensified.³⁷

Britain had drifted or actively propelled itself away from the American orbit, in the view of the Chinese commentator, in order to avoid the detrimental effects of the looming United States economic crisis which would befall those closely tied to the American economy. The reflected discredit which would descend upon the British Labour Party would scarcely contribute to a winning election platform. The only hope it seemed was to gravitate towards a Western Europe which looked increasingly determined to resist American pressure to shoulder part of its economic burdens. The final proof for the Chinese of a rupture in American domination of Britain came with Britain's entry into the Common Market. Shortly after the British Parliament had given its approval, the Chinese press, commenting on the talks between President Nixon and Prime Minister Heath, pro-

nounced the "Special Relationship" between Britain and the United States to be "dead".³⁸

The other major Western European development which the Chinese press noted in this transition period was the change in West Germany's situation. During the Cultural Revolution, Germany had been regarded as having a number of basic contradictions with France — generally centred around which of the two countries would exercise local dominance in Western Europe. It was precisely these differences, according to the Chinese, which the United States and what was then considered to be its "junior partner" in Europe, Britain, were attempting to exploit in order to breach the Common Market with the British Trojan horse.

By 1968 West Germany was regarded as being in a dilemma. On the one hand it relied on United States encouragement and support for realizing "their ambitions to swallow the German Democratic Republic," but,

On the other hand they are keeping close ties with France so as to use France to resist U.S. control. This is why, although Brandt in his recent speech showed such great dissatisfaction with De Gaulle's European policy, West Germany had no intention of breaking with France on Britain's account.³⁹

As in the case of Britain, West Germany was ultimately persuaded by the decreasing economic fortunes of the United States to opt decisively in favour of European unity. A further factor was the growing tendency on the part of the United States to come to decisions with the Soviet Union which affected West European countries but in which they were not consulted.

In the case of West Germany, Willy Brandt's Ostpolitik was the cause of more uncertainty in this period of transition. The signing of the Soviet-West Germany Treaty in August 1970 was greeted with bitter criticism in Peking, where it was hailed as the confirmation of China's previous attitudes towards the Soviet Union and West Germany. The treaty, while

purporting to guarantee European peace, merely underlined the aggressive character of Soviet social-imperialism and the militarist and revanchist character of West Germany.⁴⁰ By this time West Germany was regarded in China as "the mainstay of the aggressive NATO bloc and chief partner of U.S. imperialism"⁴¹ and as a consequence, the Soviet-West German treaty was,

not only a dirty deal between the Soviet authorities and the West Germany Brandt government, but also a product of the collusion and contention between Soviet revisionism and U.S. imperialism, Soviet revisionism and West German militarism.⁴²

This Chinese position was moderated in 1971 as a result of growing West German-United States disagreements, notably over the payment for American troops stationed in West Germany,⁴³ and ultimately by the frigid reception which Nixon's "New Economic Policy" had in West Germany — as indeed it had in all West European countries.⁴⁴ The abandonment of China's previous position of supporting East Germany as the only German government was made easier by the retirement of Ulbricht and with his successor, Hoenecker, the adoption of a more pro-Moscow hawkish position on China. By September of 1972, West Germany — the country with which China's relations had always been most difficult, had decided to exchange ambassadors with China.⁴⁵

At in the case of the overall pattern of changes in China's foreign policy, 1971 proved to be the critical year in decisively implementing the new perspectives in Western Europe. It is in that year that the attempts by the United States to shift its burdens, and in the Chinese view the costs of maintaining its empire onto its Western European allies, reached the point where inter-governmental differences within Europe were submerged in favour of United financial opposition to Nixon's New Economic Policy.⁴⁶ It was in that year too, significantly, that the West European countries

desisted from their former practice of aligning with the United States in the United Nations on the question of China's entry into the United Nations.⁴⁷

By 1972, the transition period had virtually ended although developments in China's policy did not cease to take place. But while recognizing that strong and competing imperial ambitions remained within Europe; that there was something of a scramble among Western European countries for access to Eastern Europe as the countries there sought to put some economic distance between themselves and the Soviet Union; that there remained the ever present likelihood that one or more of the Western European countries would once again become Trojan horses for one or other of the two superpowers, China's view of Western Europe became, in general, a non-hostile one. Its support was based on the belief that the objective circumstances which had come to operate there were now recognized by the countries involved — that they were economically, politically and militarily sandwiched between the two superpowers and that their strength, if not survival, lay in uniting within that intermediate position on an anti-superpower basis.

Chinese reportage of Western European events from this time onwards consequently tends to concentrate on developments which consolidate or enlarge the scope of unity among the countries involved, particularly developments in terms of economic unity aimed at reducing American predominance. In this latter regard, the various steps taken by the European Economic Community on the establishment of a European monetary fund as a first step towards economic and financial unity were greeted with warm approval as well as detailed reporting by the Chinese.⁴⁸

The other consistent element in Chinese reporting of Western Europe became the issuing of warnings to the constituent countries about the

hegemonic designs of the superpowers in the various schemes which involved them in Western European affairs. The Conference on European Security and Co-operation became a prime target for this kind of report.⁴⁹

In line with their general position, the Chinese perspectives on NATO were somewhat altered in that NATO's anti-Soviet military potential seemed to be approvingly recognized, while United States presence in NATO seemed to be more tolerated. In conformity with this position, China seemed to display a growing equanimity to the idea of United States troops being stationed in Western Europe.⁵⁰ Ironically, so too did the Soviet Union being more fearful of a united Europe than one penetrated militarily by the United States.⁵¹ The Chinese position in this instance should not be understood to mean that they have opted for a pro-American anti-Soviet Western Europe as an ideal. Rather, their position reflects the fact that in the case of the Soviet Union, Western European anti-hegemonic endeavors have a large military component and for this United States assistance can be of benefit. Anti-hegemonic pressures in relation to the United States are still clearly regarded in the full development of the new policy as at least as necessary as those directed against the Soviet Union. With regard to economic matters, they are clearly regarded as being of greater importance.

In general the Chinese attitude towards Western Europe in the new policy is summarized in their statement of October 1972:

...in spite of the classes of interests and differences in opinion among the West European countries, with their independence and security increasingly threatened by the two superpowers' keen rivalry in Europe, the West European countries are determined to take steps to further their union, to strengthen their economic and political cooperation, and to build an independent Europe which will "affirm its personality" and rid itself of the interference and control by the two superpowers.⁵²

Japan.

As noted in the introductory section of this chapter, Japan was included in the second intermediate zone by Mao in 1964. As in the case of Western Europe, the years immediately following — the period of the Cultural Revolution — saw a marked decline, if not disappearance, of the perspectives involved in the concept of the intermediate zone in relation to Japan. Whereas in 1964, Mao had described Japanese capitalists and their governmental representatives as wearing the yoke of American domination with increasing displeasure, so that the possibility of an alliance with them on the basis of their differences with United States imperialism was an objective possibility, in the years of the Cultural Revolution, Japan, even more than most Western European countries, was regarded as an adjunct of American imperialist aggression — especially in Asia.

The deterioration in Sino-Japanese relations which occurred at this time was, however, far from simply a reflection of a more militant and isolationist trend within China. The spectacular achievements of Japanese capitalism since World War II had received their initial boost as a result of the Korean War.⁵³ The involvement of the Japanese economy with the Vietnam war was one of the major factors in producing its most rapid period of growth in the second half of the Sixties after Sato "had been worried about a recession and a worsening balance-of-payments deficit during 1964."⁵⁴ American defence expenditure in Japan, to consider only the most obvious benefit accruing to Japanese capitalists, was greater in Japan than it was in Vietnam itself between 1964 and 1969 with the sole exception of 1967.⁵⁵ It is estimated by Japanese sources that from the mid-1960's to the early 1970's, "something like \$(U.S.)2 billion a year accrued to Japanese business, directly and indirectly, from the American wars against the Indochinese countries."⁵⁶ The political and military

cooperation necessary between the Japanese and American governments for this economic arrangement to be pursued were such that the inter-imperialist contradictions which the Chinese had detected in the early 1960's tended to be muted and the possibilities for fruitful Sino-Japanese relations lessened.

Domestic Japanese political developments also played their part in worsening Sino-Japanese relations. Sato's attainment of office in late 1964, his strong commitment to the American prosecution of the war in Vietnam in 1965 and his decision to sign a treaty of friendship with the Republic of Korea in June of that year represented to the Chinese significant victories for the more reactionary elements of the Japanese ruling class. The Chinese responded with more stringent trade controls which were increasingly dominated by political criteria. On a domestic level also, the susceptibility of the Sato government to pressures from the Taiwan and South Korean lobbies, with their heavy American backing, played its part in cutting back drastically the successful level of trade achieved in 1963-64 under the Liao-Takasaki Trade Agreement (the L-T Agreement) signed in 1962.⁵⁷

But as in the case of Western Europe, the revival of the Japanese economy under American domination, led by the end of the 1960's, to a set of inescapable contradictions. In 1968, these conflicts assumed critical proportions as the dollar came under attack internationally, the American economy entered a serious business recession and at the same time, Japanese exports to the American market began to expand rapidly, and in the eyes of American capitalists, disproportionately in relation to American exports to Japan where a variety of protective barriers had given rise to a huge export surplus. Moreover, much of this export surplus provided the capital to more than triple overseas Japanese investments

between 1966 and 1971 to an estimated \$3.6 billion. Since most of it was invested in Southeast Asia it was the occasion for further conflict with the United States with whom it was often in direct competition.⁵⁸

As discussed in the previous chapter, the American setbacks in Indochina during and after the Tet Offensive resulted eventually in the rationalization which became known as the Nixon Doctrine. As a result, and in spite of the growing economic contradictions, the United States was forced by the same logic which compelled it to formulate the Nixon Doctrine, to place an even greater stress on Japan as a politico-military ally even if economic cooperation was no longer as easy as in the past. The new circumstances seemed to threaten basic imperial interests common to both countries — primarily retaining the majority of Asian states as an area safe for foreign investment and the extraction of raw materials. The fear which had currency within the American administration since the "loss of China" — that Japan could find China a more attractive ally than the United States — was reactivated, as it had been by Eisenhower in 1954. The concerns of Eisenhower, as stated at a press conference on April 7, 1954, a month before the fall of Dien Bien Phu were indeed relevant at the end of the 1960's:

in its economic aspects, the President added, (loss of Indochina) would take away that region that Japan must have as a trading area, or it would force Japan to turn toward China and Manchuria, or toward the Communist areas in order to live. The possible consequences of the loss (of Japan) to the free world are just incalculable, Mr. Eisenhower said.⁵⁹

In accordance with the general perspectives of the Nixon Doctrine, Japan's regional role in the maintenance of capitalism, even if it was less subordinate to American direction than in the past, had to be expanded. A few months after the initial promulgation of the Nixon Doctrine in Guam, the Nixon-Sato Joint Communique issued on November 21, 1969, stated that

"the security of the Republic of Korea is essential to Japan's own security," and also that "the maintenance of peace and security in the Taiwan area is also a most important factor for the security of Japan."⁶⁰ In the same month, the patrolling by the Seventh Fleet of the Taiwan Straits was stopped for the first time since the Korean War⁶¹ and the following year the Pentagon announced the United States garrison in South Korea would be reduced during that year alone from 64,000 to 50,000 while \$1.5 billion would be given to the Park Chung Hee regime in military aid in the period 1971-1975.⁶² The Nixon-Sato Communique also announced the restoration to Japan of "administrative rights" over Okinawa. What in practice this seems to have meant, since the magnitude of American installation was increased after this time, was that Japanese troops would now be responsible for their protection — as well as paying \$320 million for the privilege.⁶³ Accordingly,

In 1972, 68,000 Japanese soldiers were dispatched to Okinawa, and the Japanese have announced the deployment of Nike and Hawk missile systems purchased from the United States to provide surface-to-air missile defence by July 1, 1972.⁶⁴

Thus within a very short space of time the Nixon Doctrine as it relates to Japan had been formalized in a communique which subsequently assumed treaty status. More importantly it had been operationalized in that Japan had assumed military responsibility for its former colonies, South Korea and Taiwan — countries in which its economic domination had developed dramatically in the previous few years.⁶⁵ And in Okinawa Japan had also assumed some of the more labour intensive responsibilities of defending capitalism in the region as well as lifting from American shoulders the increasingly distasteful burden of defending its military bases from the local population.

In keeping with these developments it is germane to consider Japan's military potential and disposition. It has long been purveyed by both the United States as well as the Japanese government that Japan's military potential is strictly limited to self defence forces which are subject to rigid limitations in terms of both size and power, and that Japanese spending on its armed forces is minute in comparison to the international standards set by other major powers. The reality, particularly in recent years, is clearly otherwise.

While it is true that the Japanese armed forces were officially disbanded at the time of the Japanese surrender in 1945, unofficially there was considerable continuity in terms of personnel and organization — a continuity which was consolidated in the Korean War when MacArthur authorized thousands of Japanese troops to be transferred back to Korea, where they were familiar with the terrain, to form part of the 'United Nations' command. Since that time the Japanese armed forces have continued to grow to the point where they are "the seventh strongest all-round military establishment in the world with the third most powerful navy and air-force in the Pacific after the United States and the Soviet Union."⁶⁶ Even these figures do not adequately portray the power of the Japanese armed forces or, more importantly in the present context, the rate at which they are expanding.

Japan has concentrated its military build-up in two key areas — the navy and the air force — where its technological superiority over its neighbours gives it a vast advantage in the region. Its conventional armed forces are not on the same proportionate scale as those of South Korea and Taiwan where conscription operates, but they are still the world's seventh largest. Moreover they "have now grown to a point of maximum advantage, and further expansion of the land army is unnecessary."⁶⁷

The other feature of the Japanese army which is relevant here is the fact that it is heavily over-officered so that rapid expansion of the ranks is possible.⁶⁸

While it remains desperately vulnerable in terms of raw materials, Japan has pursued a policy of self-reliance in the manufacture of armaments far more thoroughgoing than that of its Western counterparts. "By the end of 1969, Japan was making 97 percent of its own ammunition and 84 percent of its aircraft, tanks, guns, naval craft and other military equipment."⁶⁹

But it is in the rapid growth of the Japanese defence budget that the most striking confirmation of Japanese readjustment to the logic of the Nixon Doctrine has occurred. Between 1956 and 1971, Japan had expanded its military capacity at a quite rapid pace in three consecutive five-year plans, but at the end of the third plan defence spending was suddenly and drastically stepped up — by 15.1 percent in 1970, 17.8 percent in 1971 and 19.3 percent in 1972. As a result of the economic difficulties after Nixon's New Economic Policy and the revaluation of the yen, the five-year plan scheduled to begin in 1972 was reduced from \$16.7 billion to approximately \$15 billion but even this amount was more than double that spent in the previous five-year plan. The fifth five-year plan, scheduled to begin in 1977, is expected to continue the increase in geometric proportions to over \$33 billion.⁷⁰ While this development of Japan's armed forces may have been a personal predilection on the part of Richard Nixon,⁷¹ its timing clearly points to an underlying logic which is independent of Nixon's will but which intimately reflects the decline in American power over which he presided.

The significance of all these developments was keenly noted by the Chinese who had warned prior to the former announcement of the "Nixon Doctrine" in June of 1969 that the United States envisaged an expanded

military role for Japan in the maintenance of its empire.⁷² Nixon's Guam talk and his speeches on his Asian tour which followed were regarded by the Chinese as pointers to a new oppressive security system in Asia to replace the outmoded SEATO system of John Foster Dulles. This "collective security system" was still to be "controlled by U.S. imperialism" and was to consist of "a new anti-China, anti-popular military alliance under the guise of 'regional economic cooperation' with Japan as its mainstay."⁷³ As Chou En-lai was to put it later, the Nixon Doctrine had turned Japan into a "vanguard in the Far East."⁷⁴ The Nixon-Sato Communique of November 1969 confirmed the analysis which the Chinese had been making for some months. The true meaning of the "intensified Japan-U.S. military collaboration," it had been argued was that the,

Japanese reactionaries act as storm troopers in carrying out aggression in Asia by colluding with such reactionaries as the Chiang Kai-shek bandit gang and South Korea's Pak Jung Hi clique to intensify the anti-China activities and suppress the people's revolutionary movement so as to "stabilize" U.S. imperialism's aggressive positions in Asia and safeguard the colonial interests of the U.S. and Japanese reactionaries there.⁷⁵

The comments on the communique added little to this. "U.S. imperialism," it was stated,

beset with difficulties at home and abroad, will make the Japanese militarist forces act as its advance guard and serve the policies of aggression and war which it is pushing still more frantically in Asia.⁷⁶

The ostensible reason for the talks — the return of administrative rights over Okinawa to Japan was ridiculed as a "fraud" since the United States military bases would remain there under American military control as indeed would the nuclear weapons.⁷⁷

The inter-imperialist rivalries which had begun to re-emerge as a coherent part of the Chinese analysis as the formal stages of the Cultural Revolution drew to a close were by and large submerged by what was perceived as the increased necessity of military cooperation. Far from concentrating on the contradictions between the American and Japanese ruling classes, the Japanese, in return for assuming an increased role in the maintenance of empire were to be granted a *share* in its Asian reaches. "As a reward," it was said, for taking up an increased military burden,

"U.S. imperialism agrees to let the Japanese reactionaries have a share in such areas as Taiwan, South Korea and the part of Indo-China under its forcible occupation. This is an extremely vicious conspiracy jointly engineered by the U.S. and Japanese reactionaries."⁷⁸

The hardening Chinese position on Japan was to some extent formalized when Chou En-lai signed a joint communique with Kim Il Sung in April of 1970 which was primarily directed at Japan. The Pyongyang communique warned that,

Japanese militarism is vainly trying to realize its old dream of a 'Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere' and has openly embarked on the road of aggression against the people of Asia."⁷⁹

The general softening of China's position on state-to-state relations which occurred from 1969 onwards was not evident in relation to Japan. Governmental relations had in fact consistently worsened since the Ninth Congress. The communique reflected the position accurately. It was stated that,

Failure to see the dangers of Japanese militarism and fraternization with the Sato government mean encouraging Japanese militarist expansion abroad and strengthening the U.S. imperialist position in Asia."⁸⁰

This apparent anomaly is worth clarifying as it illustrates the underlying logic of the Chinese position. The move for better state-to-state relations arose out of a belief that a new era of history had been entered in which imperialism did not have the strength to attack the Third World directly and with the same ferocity as in the past. This decline in imperial strength had, in Chinese eyes, forced it to attack its capitalist allies in the second intermediate zone thereby rendering them candidates for an anti-imperialist alliance. The other feature of the United States reaction to its decline was a tendency to appoint 'regional commanders' of its empire -- primarily West Germany in Europe and Japan in Asia -- in order to exert the military control which the United States could previously afford. As the Indochina war -- the very archetype of the previous 'Linist' perspective of the world -- was still continuing, it was this latter feature of the Nixon Doctrine which had most relevance in relation to Japan. The emerging inter-imperialist rivalries had been noted in America-Japan relations but the continuation and the proximity of the Vietnam war which had done a great deal to usher in such contentions still demanded a strong element of collusion.

By 1971 this situation had been irretrievably altered. The dollar crises of 1968 had been followed in 1971 by another of far greater proportions as described in the previous chapter. The immediate causes of this latter crisis were the increasing reluctance on the part of America's allies to bear the increased costs of maintaining capitalism on a global scale. Japan, in fact, was prominent among the nations which had latterly come to enjoy a much more favourable trade relationship with the United States and thus precipitated its trade deficit of 1971. The relationship between the United States and its junior capitalist partner and regional military commander was ruptured. When the United States announced its

"New Economic Policy" to cope with its mounting economic difficulties, Japan was clearly identified as a target which Nixon was prepared to attack without 'one hand tied behind his back.' Japan's obedient subordination to United States policy since the Second World War proved to be of little avail as Japan was eventually forced by the devastating effects of the American import surcharge to revalue the yen in December 1971. Just prior to the August economic crisis, moreover, the United States had announced without prior Japanese notification that Nixon would visit China early the following year. Not only was the economic substance of Japanese-American relations radically altered but their political-military aspects were also thrown into confusion. As stated by Halliday and McCormack,

The policy of faithful adherence to a conservative, pro-U.S. policy, of concentration on relationships with the anti-Communist, anti-China regimes of the Pacific rim in overall subordination to American imperial aims, has proved in the end utterly bankrupt.⁸¹

The general character of the new Japanese-American relationship was quite accurately summarized by Barraclough. "The essential fact," he concluded,

is not the close alliance with the United States which was the basis of Japanese policies from the days of MacArthur to those of Rostow, but rather the "imbalances"...and tensions which are so clearly building up in American-Japanese relationships.⁸²

The Chinese reaction to this new relationship was sudden and substantial. Whereas they had been particularly vocal about the revival of Japanese militarism, especially since the enunciation of the Nixon Doctrine, to the point where other aspects of Japanese politics were virtually not mentioned, the effect on Japan of Nixon's New Economic Policy was now given considerable emphasis.

China's position on Japanese militarism had been stated with some precision a month prior to Nixon's announcement:

the Japanese people is fully entitled to genuine armed self-defence, but Japanese militarism is absolutely not allowed to carry out expansion and commit aggression abroad under the pretext of "self-defence"; and (the Chinese side) categorically opposes U.S. imperialism's making the Japanese reactionaries act as a shock force in aggression against Asia and opposes the revival of Japanese militarism by the U.S. and Japanese reactionaries.⁸³

In commenting on Defence Secretary Laird's visit to Japan at the beginning of July, the Chinese had logically concentrated as they had since 1969, on the third of the above alternatives — a revival of Japanese militarism by local reactionaries assisted and promoted by the United States. Laird, it was said,

put new demands on the revamped Sato cabinet... (and)...schemed to make further use of Japanese militarism to implement U.S. imperialist policies of aggression and war in Asia.⁸⁴

It was Japan as the 'regional commander' that received comment. Laird was cited as expressing confidence that Japan would meet "its increased military responsibilities" brought about by the "reversion" of Okinawa in order that the United States could "maintain a realistic deterrent in Asia."⁸⁵ Laird's visit was the occasion of extensive comment which continued in the same vein almost until Nixon's August 15 announcement.⁸⁶

After Nixon's announcement a great deal of China's criticism of Japan was now directed to its collusion with the United States in promoting the retention of Taiwan in the United Nations.⁸⁷ In its first comments on Nixon's New Economic Policy, the Chinese press gave great emphasis to the element of contention it had introduced into the relationships between major capitalist powers. Japan, especially was singled out for attention in this regard:

Under the situation of the daily shrinking markets in the capitalist world and continuously sharpening competition in international trade, the unilateral U.S. action of raising tariffs by wide margins is a heavy blow to the other capitalist countries, particularly to Japan, West Germany and others which traditionally export heavily to the United States. Therefore, Nixon's announcement of this measure immediately drew unanimous and vehement attacks from the official and economic circles and the press of these countries. The reactionary nature of the Sato government of Japan, which has been consistently tailing behind U.S. imperialism has been exposed more clearly. It is more isolated than ever from the Japanese people. The demand for a change in the Japanese Government's foreign policy is becoming louder and louder.⁸⁸

The details of the economic impact of the American policy in the Japanese economy were recorded extensively and the fact that the Sato government had not been consulted or told of the new policy prior to its announcement was given prominence.⁸⁹ Japan was increasingly discussed in the same context as the Western European countries in their "second intermediate zone" role of resisting United States hegemony⁹⁰ — in sharp contrast to the rather exclusive stress on Japanese militarism previously.

While Sato's policies and practice had accorded harmoniously with Japan as a regional overseer of American and Japanese capitalism, his close alliance with American policy and strong objection to the improvement of relations with China and conversely his close ties with the Taiwan regime were not suitable for a country suddenly thrust into economic and strategic crisis by the unilateral actions of its major ally. By the end of his term of office a year later Sato and his government had the public support of twelve percent of the population.⁹¹ His replacement, Tanaka, was quick to regularize relations with Peking as demanded by the new situation.

The core of China's commentary on Japan has subsequently conformed to the pattern which is evident in its commentary on Western Europe. The

concept of the second intermediate zone was clearly central. As with Western Europe, Japan was seen as under hegemonic pressure not only from the United States but also from the Soviet Union. In this latter regard, the Chinese were bitterly critical of Soviet refusal to return the northern islands to Japanese sovereignty,⁹² and were probably instrumental in delaying Japanese participation in the projected Siberian development programmes.⁹³ China's policy of exporting limited, but increasing quantities of oil to Japan would seem to be related directly to its conception of Japan as exploiter and exploited. On the one hand it reduces Japanese dependence on American suppliers and refiners of Middle East oil and lowers the incentive to invest in Siberian joint ventures and on the other hand it reduces the Japanese imperative to seize command of Southeast Asian supplies.

That this is the general purpose of such policies would seem to be the logical inference of such statements as that used to explain the new policy to the Chinese people. It was claimed that,

After the World War II, the United States was the only country occupying and controlling Japan. Diplomatically Japan was entirely dependent on the United States. Yet, in recent years, owing to the great changes in the international situation, and because of the need to accommodate itself to the changing situation, Japan has attempted to make a gradual revision of her diplomacy of 'leaning one-sidedly to the United States' in order to carry into effect a 'free and multilateral' diplomatic line.

...As a result of our improvement of relations with Japan, the Japanese are now in possession of the means of bargaining with the United States and the Soviet Union. They have become all the more daring and brave.⁹⁴

There remained during the period under review a number of unresolved issues in Sino-Japanese relations — notably the character of Japan's new relationship with Taiwan once diplomatic relations had been terminated;

its relations with South Korea and sovereignty over the Tiao-yu Islands (called the Senkaku by the Japanese) between the Ryukyu chain and Taiwan. While these and other issues are clearly important the disputes which took place between China and Japan over them tend to reflect rather than challenge the new Chinese policy towards Japan which had arisen out of fundamental changes.⁹⁵

Eastern Europe.

The countries of Eastern Europe were the last to be included in China's category of the second intermediate zone. The structural changes which occurred in Chinese foreign policy between 1968 and the Tenth Party Congress and which allowed for this development have been touched upon at various stages of the argument in the previous two chapters. It will suffice here to draw these developments together insofar as they relate to Eastern Europe.

Until the definitive break in Sino-Soviet relations and the changes in the social formation of the Soviet Union which the Chinese deemed responsible for this break, the Eastern European countries had been considered part of the "socialist camp". They thus formed part of one bloc, which along with the imperialist bloc bounded and gave meaning to the intermediate zone which lay between them. Even in 1963 in the Sino-Soviet polemics Eastern European countries were still thought capable of being united into a socialist camp which would lead a broad united front against imperialism.⁹⁶ Yugoslavia was regarded as the exception in this respect. Its break with Moscow long before the Chinese officially regarded the Soviet Union as becoming revisionist signalled to the Chinese not so much an anti-hegemonic move but a decisive break with socialism. The adoption of capitalist economic forms and relations with the West at a time when the Chinese considered the unity of the socialist camp to be

essential in combating imperialism was regarded by China as an act of betrayal by the Yugoslavian government. The withdrawal by China of its ambassador from Yugoslavia in 1958 was symbolic of this attitude.⁹⁷

By 1964 Mao Tsetung had spoken of anti-hegemonic pressures in Eastern Europe in the same context as the opposition by the French and Japanese governments and their capitalist backers to United States imperialism.⁹⁸ But as in the case of Western Europe and Japan, these developments were truncated by what the Chinese regarded as the more aggressive policies of the United States in the Third World, especially in Asia, and domestically by the preoccupation with internal policy matters during the Cultural Revolution. At a time when the Soviet Union was regarded as actively assisting the United States in its imperialist policies in Asia by allowing it to withdraw some of its forces and a good deal of its strategic preoccupation with Europe to Asia as a result of the emerging detente in Europe, the Eastern European countries were regarded neither as potentially active members of the "socialist camp" nor as potentially objective members of the "second intermediate zone". The socialist camp was in a state of increasing disarray as far as the Chinese were concerned both ideologically and in terms of political unity, but reportage of Eastern Europe — apart from the special cases of Albania and Yugoslavia — was generally confined to analyses of the way in which Soviet "political control" and economic "neo-colonialism" was being extended in the area.⁹⁹ It is Eastern Europe as victims of Soviet oppression rather than as meat in a capitalist-revisionist sandwich which occupies Chinese attention.

When the Soviet Union attained independent imperial status in the Chinese view after the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 an element of Soviet-American contention entered the Chinese analysis of Eastern Europe. The countries involved were regarded as a prize for which both Russia and

the United States were in contention but over which Russia considered itself to have sole rights. The eventual Chinese view which regards this perspective as dominant took a considerable time to mature. As has been mentioned in the previous chapter, the Czechoslovakian invasion was still regarded primarily as the outcome of Soviet-American collusion -- the Soviets wishing to preserve the rewarding benefits of colluding with the United States to themselves rather than allowing their revisionist neo-colonies to engage in direct collusion. But from this time onwards the critique which regards the Soviet need to strengthen its domination in Eastern Europe as a product of Soviet-American contention is developed.¹⁰⁰

In accordance with the decline of American imperialism, the rise of Soviet social-imperialism and the contention between the two powers which these developments produced, Eastern Europe becomes increasingly prominent in China's view of the world as the primary group of countries seeking to free themselves from Soviet hegemony. In this situation where the focus of world contradictions has shifted from the Third World back to the second intermediate zone, the fears which China had about Yugoslavia's defection from the "socialist camp" in the 1960's or even the revisionist tendencies of the Polish and Hungarian uprisings of 1956, were now less disconcerting. Where contention between the two superpowers and opposition to their hegemony have become primary determinants of current contradictions, the "nationalist" element involved in Eastern European deviance from Soviet orthodoxy has come to predominate over the revisionist elements in the Chinese view.

Practical policy initiatives were taken by the Chinese in conjunction with the maturation of its theoretical position. The Eastern European states which had exhibited the most marked tendencies to reject Soviet dominance, and in effect, to substitute trade and other relations

with Western capitalist powers for those with the Soviet Union, were the subject of new state-to-state relations with China. The vocal Yugoslavian condemnation of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia had been noted with interest as had their expressed determination to forcefully resist any such Russian designs in their part of the world should it be considered part of the territory included under the aegis of the Brezhnev Doctrine.¹⁰¹ The announcement of these Yugoslavian intentions was the occasion of rapid improvements in diplomatic and other relations with their neighbour Albania. Few events could have more dramatically illustrated the extent to which China's view of the world and its policy had changed. Albania, as China's closest ideological ally and Yugoslavia as the first revisionist stereotype had been the original surrogates through which the Sino-Soviet ideological dispute had been fought out. Within the realm of those countries seriously professing socialism their ideological differences remain extreme. The alliance being constructed here was clearly not based on any convergence of their domestic social formations. Neither country expressed the opinion that any agreements on ideological matters had been reached. Nor was this the case in the reopening of Sino-Yugoslavian relations or the flourishing of China's relations with Rumania and Czechoslovakia after the Cultural Revolution.

When President Ceausescu visited China in June 1971, the joint communique issued with Chou En-lai typified the kind of support which the Chinese were prepared to give to the countries of Eastern Europe and the basis on which governmental, if not party-to-party, relations were able to be constructed. "The Chinese side," it was stated,

reaffirms that, tempered through the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, the Chinese people will, as always, fulfil their internationalist duty, firmly support the Romanian people in their just struggle to safeguard their national independence and state sovereignty, and firmly support the Romanian people's cause of socialist construction.¹⁰²

Much was made in Chou En-lai's speech at a Peking mass rally for the Romanian delegation of their opposition to "the armed aggression against other countries under whatever pretext" and their support for "the oppressed people in their struggle against foreign occupationists."¹⁰³ Ceausescu, in his reply made the point that,

Under present conditions, the existence of a centre in the communist and workers' movement is neither necessary nor possible,

as well as affirming that between socialist countries,

respect for national independence and sovereignty, non-interference in each other's internal affairs and comradely unity and mutual aid,

should operate.¹⁰⁴

Chinese support for Yugoslavia's independent stance was no less forthcoming when the Yugoslavian Foreign Minister Mirko Tepavac visited China shortly afterwards. China's "firm support" was guaranteed for Yugoslavia's "struggle to oppose foreign aggression and defend national independence and state sovereignty." Tepavac's reply indicated that there was no illusion as to the basis of cooperation between the two countries:

Fallacious and precarious is the peace in which aggression and armed intervention are so readily undertaken with impunity, in which the right of the stronger reigns and in which interference in the internal affairs of other countries is legalized. The wings of freedom and progress are clipped by imperialism, disguised colonialism, hegemony and racialism.¹⁰⁵

The lack of subtlety in both Chinese and Yugoslavian or Romanian references to questions of state sovereignty leaves no doubt that there is an anti-Soviet bias in the development of relations between China and the Eastern European countries since the Cultural Revolution. This should not be understood to mean that an anti-Soviet united front was being

constructed with China at its head any more than similar statements about Western European countries and Japan in relation to the United States mean that a united front directed only at the United States is visualized. Both superpowers are the targets of the unity which the Chinese regard as emerging in both East and West Europe. In relation to the European Security Conference the Chinese press made this clear:

(The United States) is trying to adjust its overall relationships with Europe, ease its contradictions with West Europe and consolidate its position there, and, together with West Europe, contend with the Soviet Union for East Europe.¹⁰⁶

The Eastern European countries had thus in the revised Chinese view of the world joined the industrialized capitalist world as the meat in the superpower sandwich. By 1972, this emergence of Eastern European countries from the "socialist camp" to the second intermediate zone had been explicitly stated in the Chinese press as noted at the beginning of the chapter. "The second intermediate zone," it was said, "includes the major capitalist countries both in the West and in the East except the two superpowers."¹⁰⁷ Albania, which was still regarded as socialist, was excepted from this general rule.¹⁰⁸ It is quite noticeable, however, that the enormous emphasis placed by the Chinese on the socialist achievements of and the alliance with Albania during the Cultural Revolution has markedly declined as the new policy of tactical unity with all Eastern European states has developed.

Conclusion.

The emphasis and development of the second intermediate zone in China's deliberations about the current state of international reality between the Ninth and Tenth Party Congresses reflects their basic contention that the forces of imperialism have had to retreat from the direct

assault on the Third World which characterized their behaviour from the mid to the late 1960's. It also reflects the fact that contention between the superpowers, as a result of the decline of United States imperialism and the rise of Soviet social-imperialism, has to a large extent replaced, in the Chinese view, the collusion between the United States and the Soviet Union which helped make the attacks on the Third World possible.

Faced with this new situation, it is argued, the imperialist powers, with their empires shrinking and the costs of maintaining them escalating both economically and politically, have attempted to shift their economic, political and military burdens onto their capitalist and revisionist allies. These allies consequently had an increasing interest in loosening the bonds which tied them to the political economies of the imperialist powers which dominate them. It is as a result of this movement that the Chinese came to regard the "second intermediate zone" as the locus of some of the most acute contemporary contradictions and to devote extraordinary diplomatic attention to cultivating the anti-imperialist and anti-hegemonic tendencies of the countries involved. The Chinese view is neither idiosyncratic or isolated. The liberal scholar Geoffrey Barraclough has made a similar point (although Eastern Europe is excluded from his considerations):

This incipient conflict of interests between Japan and the United States and between Japan and the EEC, and of course between the EEC and the United States, is probably the single most important factor in the current world situation.¹⁰⁹

While it is undoubtedly the case that Nixon's New Economic Policy of 1971 and the escalation of oil prices of 1973 helped to redress the competitive advantages which Western Europe and Japan had begun to enjoy vis-à-vis the United States¹¹⁰ these events have only served to exacerbate the fundamental contradictions existing between these countries and blocs.

NOTES

¹"Talk with the American Correspondent Anna Louise Strong", August 1946, *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung* Vol. IV, p. 98.

²*Ibid.*, p. 100.

³*Ibid.*, p. 98.

⁴"Talk to the Supreme State Conference", September 8, 1958, quoted by John Gittings, "New Light on Mao: His View of the World", *China Quarterly* No. 60, December 1974, p. 756.

⁵"Speech at the Tenth Plenum of the Eighth Central Committee", in S. Schram (ed.), *Mao Tse-tung Unrehearsed*, p. 192.

⁶*The Polemic on the General Line of the International Communist Movement*, p. 13.

⁷See the Chinese statement, "Apologists of Neo-Colonialism", in *The Polemic on the General Line of the International Communist Movement*, pp. 185-220.

⁸"Remarks at the Spring Festival", February 13, 1964, in S. Schram (ed.), *op. cit.*, p. 198. *Renmin Ribao* put it less colourfully, if more theoretically, the previous month,

While the ruling classes are exploiters and oppressors, these countries are themselves subjected to United States control, interference and bullying....Therefore they have something in common with Socialist countries.

It is possible for all forces, except United States imperialism and its lackeys, to unite.... The Socialist countries should vigorously support the anti-United States struggle in the intermediate zone. "All the World's Forces Opposing U.S. Imperialism, Unite!", January 21, 1964, translated in *Peking Review* No. 4, January 24, 1964, p. 7.

⁹"Interview of Mao Tse-tung with the Japanese Socialists", translated from the Japanese journal *Sekai Shuho*, August 11, 1964, by Franz Schurmann in Franz Schurmann and Orville Schell (eds.), *China Readings 3: Communist China*, Penguin, Middlesex, 1967, p. 368.

¹⁰*Ibid.*

¹¹The Japanese audience may explain the omission, as it does the concentration on Japan among the capitalist second intermediate zone countries.

¹²The concept was mentioned in the National Day editorial, cf. *Peking Review* No. 40, October 6, 1972, p. 9. The above elucidation is from Shih Chun, "On Studying Some History of the National Liberation Movement", *op. cit.*, No. 45, November 10, 1972, p. 8.

¹³*Ibid.*

¹⁴November 19, 1972. Quoted in "Quarterly Chronicle and Documentation", *China Quarterly* No. 53, January/March 1973, p. 200.

¹⁵See Chapter III, pp. 72-73.

¹⁶See Chapter III, pp. 49-50.

¹⁷Albania is, of course, excluded from these considerations while Mongolia is considered to have the same status as the Eastern European countries.

¹⁸Chapter IV, pp. 211-212, f.n. 18 *supra* for a list of references to articles relating to these contradictions in 1968.

¹⁹Lin had said that "the proletarian revolutionary movement has for various reasons been temporarily held back in the North American and West European capitalist countries." *Long Live the Victory of People's War!*, *op. cit.*, p. 48.

²⁰*Ibid.*

²¹In 1963, the Chinese Vice-Minister of Foreign Trade, Lu Hsung-chang, had visited Britain, Switzerland and Holland and the following year French and British trade exhibitions were held in China. For an account of the trading developments as well as United States attempts to forestall them, cf. Giovanni Bressi, "China and Western Europe", *Asian Survey* Vol. XII, No. 10, October 1972, pp. 826-7.

²²For an account of these events see for instance, D.W. Fokkema, *Report from Peking*, Angus and Robertson, Sydney, 1971, Chapter 6.

²³"Chou En-lai Sets the Record Straight", *Broadsheet* Vol. 10, No. 4, April 1973.

²⁴For one account of the factors influencing China's endorsement of revolutionary movements at this time see Peter Van Ness, *Revolution and Chinese Foreign Policy*, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1971, *passim*.

²⁵Giovanni Bressi, *op. cit.*, p. 829.

²⁶See for instance, Giovanni Sofri, "China and the Left", *Socialist Revolution* Vol. 2, No. 4, July/August 1972, p. 70, where it is asked,

Try to explain to them (European workers) that in the present 'stage' the Common Market must be supported against Yankee imperialism and that Great Britain's entry should even be favoured. Who will keep them from seeing in it a revised and corrected rendition of the 'defense of the Socialist homeland' which smells of Stalinism?

²⁷Dick Wilson, "China and the European Community", *China Quarterly* No. 56, October/December 1973, p. 649. It is perhaps worth recalling in this context the essay by R.D. Laing, "The Obvious", in David Cooper (ed.), *The Dialectics of Liberation*, Penguin, Middlesex, 1968. Laing simply makes the point that what is "obvious" to any individual depends on his material and ideological environment. As he said, "What is obvious to Lyndon Johnson is not at all obvious to Ho Chi Minh."

²⁸For an example of China's awareness of the strategic implications with respect to the Soviet Union, cf. the remarks of Chi P'eng-fei to Sir Alec Douglas-Home,

The actions taken by any superpower to push expansionism under the facade of "detente", to legalize the division of spheres of influence and further bring more European countries under its domination will only aggravate the tension in Europe and will definitely not be accepted. "Foreign Secretary Douglas-Home Visits China", *Peking Review* No. 44, November 3, 1972, p. 4.

²⁹"Common Market to be Enlarged", *Peking Review* No. 5, February 4, 1972, p. 22.

³⁰"Miners on Strike", *Peking Review* No. 5, February 4, 1972, p. 22; "Miners Get Results from Coal Strike", *Peking Review* No. 10, March 10, 1972, p. 20.

³¹"The Common Market to be Enlarged", *loc. cit.*

³²"Parliament Approves 'Common Market' Entry", *Peking Review* No. 46, November 12, 1971, p. 22.

³³Lin Piao, "Long Live the Victory of People's War", p. 38.

³⁴According to Giovanni Bressi, *op. cit.*, p. 831.

³⁵"Franco-British Wrangling Over Common Market", *Peking Review* No. 6, February 6, 1970, p. 28.

³⁶"U.S.-U.K. 'Special Relationship' Bankrupt", *Peking Review* No. 7, February 13, 1970, p. 28.

³⁷*Ibid.*

³⁸"U.S.-British 'Special Relationship' Dead", *Peking Review* No. 53, December 31, 1971, p. 22.

³⁹"Inter-imperialist Struggle for Hegemony: The De Gaulle-Kiesinger Talks", *Peking Review* No. 10, March 8, 1968, p. 31.

⁴⁰"Comment on Soviet-West German Treaty", by *Renmin Ribao* Commentator, *Peking Review* No. 38, September 18, 1970.

⁴¹*Ibid.*, p. 9.

⁴²*Ibid.*

⁴³"U.S.-West Germany: Fruitless Financial Talks", *Peking Review* No. 29, July 16, 1971, p. 30.

⁴⁴"U.S. Unprecedentedly Isolated", *Peking Review* No. 39, September 24, 1971, p. 18.

⁴⁵"Talks Between China and Federal Republic of Germany Successfully Concluded", *Peking Review* No. 40, October 6, 1972, p. 8.

⁴⁶See Chapter IV *supra*.

⁴⁷For the list of countries voting for China's entry into the United Nations, see "Quarterly Chronicle and Documentation", *China Quarterly* No. 49, January/March 1972, p. 202.

⁴⁸For the initial statements along these lines, cf. "Western Europe: The Nine-Nation Summit Conference", *Peking Review* No. 43, October 27, 1972, pp. 17-23.

⁴⁹For some of the first comments on the conference, cf. "Europe: CESC Preparatory Talks", *Peking Review* No. 51, December 22, 1972, p. 17.

⁵⁰Cf. for instance, *New China News*, June 20, 1973, p. 11 This is in sharp contrast to the position adopted in 1968 when "the West European people" were urged by Chou En-lai "to win liberation... (by)... thoroughly bury(ing) NATO controlled by U.S. imperialism." *New China News Agency*, September 30, 1968, in *Survey of China Mainland Press* No. 4273, p. 30.

⁵¹Benjamin J. Rosenthal, "America's Move", *Foreign Affairs* Vol. 51, No. 2, p. 384.

⁵²"Western Europe: The Nine-Nation Summit Conference", *Peking Review* No. 43, October 27, 1972, p. 17.

⁵³See for instance, G.C. Allen, *A Short Economic History of Modern Japan*, Allen and Unwin, London, 1962, pp. 170-5.

⁵⁴Herbert P. Bix, "Report from Japan — Part II", *Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars* Vol. 4, No. 4, December 1972, p. 20. Bix also highlights two other factors involved in the Japanese expansion after 1964 — the "full scale economic offensive" launched by Japanese businessmen in the Republic of Korea after the normalization of relations (direct Japanese investment increased from \$1.2 million in 1965 to \$27.1 million in 1969), and the infusion of Japanese loans to the receptive post-coup Indonesian government.

⁵⁵Jon Halliday and Gavan McCormack, *Japanese Imperialism Today*, Penguin, Middlesex, 1973, p. 11.

⁵⁶According to T.A. Bisson, "The American-Japanese 'Co-Prosperity Sphere'", *Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars* Vol. 6, No. 1, p. 60.

⁵⁷For a discussion of these issues, cf. Michio Royama, "China and Japan", in Ian Wilson (ed.), *China and the World Community*.

⁵⁸Richard De Camp, "The Asian Development Bank: An Imperial Thrust into the Pacific", in Mark Seldon (ed.), *Remaking Asia*, Pantheon Books, New York, 1974, p. 77. De Camp's article shows that the Asian Development Bank, originally dominated by the United States, was ceded to Japanese domination at the end of the 1960's as the United States was forced to economize on the cost of its global commitments.

⁵⁹Cited in William Appleman Williams, *The Shaping of American Diplomacy*, Rand McNally and Co., Chicago, 1956, p. 1119.

⁶⁰The Communique is reprinted as Appendix III in Jon Halliday and Gavan McCormack, pp. 241-244.

⁶¹Michael Yahuda, "China's New Era of International Relations", *Political Quarterly* Vol. 43, No. 3, p. 301.

⁶²Herbert P. Bix, "Regional Integration: Japan and South Korea in America's Asia Policy", *Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars* Vol. 5, No. 3, November 1973, p. 28.

⁶³Jon Halliday and Gavan McCormack, *op. cit.*, p. 200.

⁶⁴Mark Seldon, "Okinawa and American Security Imperialism", in Mark Seldon (ed.), *Remaking Asia*, p. 296. Seldon's essay is a thorough critique of American policy on the island, from its capture in 1945 at the cost of over a quarter of a million Japanese lives — most of them civilians — to the present.

⁶⁵It is confidently asserted by Geoffrey Barraclough that, "In regard to Korea at least, it is no secret that Japan would not hesitate to move in to protect its interests there, if need arose." "Watch Out for Japan", *New York Review of Books*, June 14, 1973, p. 28.

⁶⁶Herbert P. Bix, "Report on Japan 1972 - Part I: The Military Dimension", *Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars* Vol. 4, No. 2, Summer 1972, p. 22.

⁶⁷Jon Halliday and Gavan McCormack, *op. cit.*, p. 86, quoting M.B. Jansen, "The United States and Japan in the 1970's", in Gerald L. Curtis (ed.), *Japanese-American Relations in the 1970's*, Columbia Books, Washington, 1970, p. 36.

⁶⁸*Ibid.*, p. 82.

⁶⁹*Ibid.*, p. 81.

⁷⁰These figures are from Herbert P. Bix, *op. cit.*, and Jon Halliday and Gavan McCormack, *op. cit.*, Chapter 3, "The Military".

⁷¹Cf. Richard J. Barnet, "Nixon's Plan to Save the World", *New York Review of Books*, November 16, 1972, p. 16.

⁷²See e.g., "Reactionary Sato Government Further Hires Itself Out to U.S. Imperialism", *New China News Agency*, February 27, 1969, *Survey of China Mainland Press* No. 4369, pp. 20-1.

⁷³"Nixon's Peddling of Counter-Revolutionary 'New Policy' in Asia Meets Strong Rebuff from Asian People", *New China News Agency*, August 5, 1969, *Survey of China Mainland Press* No. 4473, p. 27.

⁷⁴To Gough Whitlam, at the time leader of the opposition in the Australian Parliament. As recorded in Ross Terrill, *800,000,000: The Real China*, Delta, New York, 1971, p. 136.

⁷⁵"Japanese Reactionaries Feverishly Push Policy of Armaments Expansion and War Preparations", *Peking Review* No. 47, November 27, 1969, p. 28.

⁷⁶"Nixon-Sato Talks: U.S. and Japanese Reactionaries Step Up Military Collaboration", *Peking Review* No. 48, November 28, 1969, p. 28.

⁷⁷Hung Chih, "Japanese Reactionaries' Pipe Dream", *Peking Review* No. 38, September 19, 1969, p. 26.

⁷⁸"U.S.-Japanese Reactionaries Criminal Designs", *Peking Review* No. 49, December 5, 1969, p. 15.

⁷⁹"Joint Communique of the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea", *Peking Review* No. 15, April 10, 1970, p. 4.

⁸⁰*Ibid.*

⁸¹*Op. cit.*, p. 131.

⁸²*Op. cit.*, p. 29. See also William Shawcross, "Unstoppable Sun", *Far Eastern Economic Review*, May 28, 1973, pp. 24-8, *passim*.

⁸³"Joint Statement of Delegation of China-Japan Friendship Association and Delegation of Japanese Komeido (Komei Party) to China", *Peking Review* No. 28, July 9, 1971, p. 21.

⁸⁴"Laird's Far East Visit: Aggression Plotted", *Peking Review* No. 30, July 23, 1971, p. 23.

⁸⁵"Laird Wants Japanese Militarism to Provide Conventional Forces to Implement U.S. Imperialist Policy of 'Making Asians Fight Asians'", New China News Agency, July 22, 1971, *Survey of China Mainland Press* No. 4947, p. 282.

⁸⁶E.g., "U.S. and Japan Tighten Military Collusion", *Peking Review* No. 33, August 13, 1971.

⁸⁷See, e.g., "Sato Government: Collusion with U.S. Imperialism in 'Two Chinas' Scheme", *Peking Review* No. 34, August 20, 1971, p. 20.

⁸⁸"Nixon's 'New Economic Policy' Cannot Save United States from Financial and Economic Chaos", *Peking Review* No. 35, August 27, 1971, p. 18.

⁸⁹E.g., "Capitalist World: U.S. 'New Economic Policy' Causes Great Confusion", *Peking Review* No. 36, September 3, 1971, pp. 22-3.

⁹⁰E.g., "No Way Out for Ailing U.S. Economy", *Peking Review* No. 40, September 30, 1971, p. 19.

⁹¹Halliday and McCormack, *op. cit.*, p. 255.

⁹²See, e.g., "Japan: Demand the Return of Northern Territory", *Peking Review* No. 49, December 8, 1972, p. 19.

⁹³Sheldon W. Simon, "The Japan-China-U.S.S.R. Triangle", *Pacific Affairs*, Summer 1974, p. 128.

⁹⁴"Confidential Reference Materials Concerning Education on Situation, No. 43, Lesson 3: The Great Victory of Chairman Mao's Revolutionary Diplomatic Line", in Editorial Committee of *Issues and Studies* (eds.), *Chinese Communist Internal Politics and Foreign Policy*, Institute of International Relations, Taipei, 1974, p. 132.

⁹⁵For discussion of some of these issues in detail, cf. Sheldon W. Simon, *op. cit.*; Geoffrey Hudson, "Japanese Attitudes and Policies Towards China in 1973", *China Quarterly* No. 56, October/December 1973; Gene T. Hsiao, "The Sino-Japanese Rapprochement: A Relationship of Ambivalence", *China Quarterly* No. 57, January/March 1974; Gene T. Hsiao, "Prospects for a New Sino-Japanese Relationship", *China Quarterly* No. 60, December 1974; Monte R. Ballard, "Japan's Nuclear Choice", *Asian Survey* Vol. XIV, No. 9, September 1974; David G. Brown, "Chinese Economic Leverage in Sino-Japanese Relations", *Asian Survey* Vol. XII, No. 9, September 1972; Frank C. Langdon, *Japan's Foreign Policy*, Vancouver, University of British Columbia Press, 1973. On the issue of the Tiao-yu T'ai, cf. Kung-chung Wu, "A New May Fourth Movement", *Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars* Vol. 3, No. 2; for a statement of the Chinese position on the subject, cf. *Renmin Ribao* Commentator, "China's Territory and Sovereignty Brook No Encroachment", *Peking Review* No. 19, May 7, 1971, p. 14.

⁹⁶"Peaceful Coexistence — Two Diametrically Opposed Policies", p. 274.

⁹⁷See "Is Yugoslavia a Socialist Country?", in *The Polemic on the General Line...*, pp. 139-84.

⁹⁸"Interview of Mao Tse-tung with the Japanese Socialists", p. 368.

⁹⁹E.g., "Mutual Aid and Cooperation or Jungle Law?", New China News Agency, November 15, 1967, *Survey of China Mainland* Press No. 4062, p. 45.

¹⁰⁰One of the major causes of the invasion was cited as the "acute contradictions between U.S. imperialism and Soviet modern revisionism in their struggle for control of Eastern Europe." *Peking Review* No. 34, Supplement, August 23, 1968, p. iv.

¹⁰¹For a discussion of this point, see Anton Logoreci, "China's Policies in East Europe", *Current History*, September 1972, pp. 118-120.

¹⁰²"China-Romania Joint Communiqué", *Peking Review* No. 24, June 11, 1971, p. 9.

¹⁰³"Comrade Chou En-lai's Speech", *Peking Review* No. 24, June 11, 1971, p. 14.

¹⁰⁴"Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu's Speech", *Peking Review* No. 24, June 11, 1971, p. 19.

¹⁰⁵"Yugoslav Government Delegation Visits China", *Peking Review* No. 25, June 18, 1971, p. 4.

¹⁰⁶"European Security Conference: Preparatory Talks Concluded", *Peking Review* No. 24, June 15, 1973, p. 21.

¹⁰⁷Shih Chun, "On Studying Some History of the National Liberation Movement", *Peking Review* No. 45, November 10, 1972, p. 8.

¹⁰⁸*Wen hui pao*, quoted in "Quarterly Chronicle and Documentation", *China Quarterly* No. 53, January/March 1973, p. 200.

¹⁰⁹"Watch Out for Japan", *New York Review of Books*, June 14, 1973, p. 29.

¹¹⁰For a discussion of what is considered to be a "drastic shift in economic power from Western Europe and Japan to the United States", cf. Michael Tanzer, *The Energy Crisis: World Struggle for Power and Wealth*, Monthly Review Press, New York, 1975, pp. 124ff.

CHAPTER VI
CHINA AND THE THIRD WORLD

At the end of the 1960's, the Chinese instituted an analysis of the contemporary situation which implied that the forces of imperialism had been compelled to alter the approaches used in attempting to subjugate and exploit the countries of the Third World. It was shown in Chapters III and IV that in the Chinese view the primary stimulus for this change of imperialist policy was the increasingly successful anti-imperialist struggles of liberation forces in a number of Third World countries, particularly those of Indochina. In Chapter V it was shown that although the forces of imperialism, headed by the United States, may have been forced by struggles in the Third World to reorient their strategy and tactics, it was in the second intermediate zone that many of the resultant pressures and tensions accrued. As a consequence the Chinese reformulated their policies, albeit after extended debate occasioning considerable domestic upheaval, such that their fundamental perspectives could better be implemented in the new situation.

It remains to draw together what has already been said in previous chapters in relation to the Third World, to establish with some precision the role of the Third World in China's foreign policy prior to the major developments which took place at the beginning of the Seventies, to determine the most important features of the new policy as it relates to the Third World, to demonstrate the way in which the new policy has been implemented and finally to assess the validity of the assumptions on which the new policy towards the Third World rests.

The Third World during the 'Lin Piao Phase' of foreign policy.

The principal aspects of the policy towards the Third World which came to be adopted in the Cultural Revolution have already been outlined

in Chapter III. It will suffice here to recall these and to sharpen the focus on those aspects of China's policy which underwent changes of some consequence.

The fundamental assumption of the foreign policy which was dominant when Lin Piao exercised most influence within the Chinese Communist Party was that the United States had embarked on a course of imperialist expansion in the Third World by all means at its disposal. In the Chinese view this gave rise to the world's principal contradiction, defined by Lin as that "between the revolutionary people of Asia, Africa and Latin America and the imperialists headed by the United States."¹

Consequently it was this fundamental assumption which defined for the Chinese the position of other powers. The Soviet Union was thus regarded as the accomplice of imperialism and, as has been shown in Chapter IV, any contradictions between the Soviet Union and the United States were almost totally subordinated in the Chinese analysis to their collusion -- primarily to their collusion in attacking the revolutionary people of the Third World and the Chinese people in particular. The Western European powers, as shown in the previous chapter, were also defined as adjuncts to the imperialist pole of the above contradiction. Third World governments themselves, with notable exceptions, were categorized as lackeys and running dogs of the imperialist powers. And while the working class of capitalist countries was regarded as being objectively on the side of the oppressed people of the Third World its subjective recognition of this fact, or its revolutionary consciousness, was so minimal as to warrant scant attention from the Chinese and to be inconsequential in the formulation of the principal contradiction.

The disposition of other national and class forces flowed from this principal contradiction as did the manner in which its resolution was to

be effected. Given the determination of imperialism's assault in the Third World it quickly led to armed aggression against the people of those countries and the only manner in which such aggression was able to be resisted in the Chinese canon was by people's war, which became the defining test of a Third World movement's anti-imperialist credentials. At a time when the world's revolutionary forces were so sorely pressed and imperialism had been so successful in acquiring the complicity and collusion of most other forces, there was little room for the tactical perspectives associated with the concept of the intermediate zone, of which the Third World countries had originally constituted the primary members.² The five principles of peaceful coexistence and the possibility of forming a united front with those Third World countries professing non-alignment were also given little or no consideration.

In spite of the fact that this period was clearly perceived as one of great hardship for the world's "revolutionary people", the course of attack on which imperialism had embarked was considered a measure of its desperation. Moreover, it was argued that the forces of liberation were rapidly unifying as the United States extended its imperial aggression more and more widely, and rapidly multiplying as the mode of its aggression became bellicose. In the somewhat expansive statements of the time the growing revolutionary struggles of the liberation forces were presented as almost the exclusive instrument of imperialist doom which was foreseen in the near future. This position is in sharp contrast to that of the new policy where the positions are reversed. The pressure on the world's revolutionary people, while still manifestly present, is somewhat less as a result of their successful struggles and the consequent diversification of imperialist exploitation, but the defeat of imperialism would seem to be envisaged in the context of a much longer time span and by a much more complex set of direct and indirect causal factors.

China's own position in relation to "the revolutionary storms" of Asia, Africa and Latin America was one of inspiration, guidance and assistance. China was invoked not simply as the "bastion of socialism" which could serve as an ideological model and rearguard for the liberation struggles of Indochina but also as the course of correct practice. Mao's writings acquired remarkable authority in this respect. His "military thinking", for instance was said to be,

a universal truth that can be applied everywhere; this is why it is the invincible weapon that guarantees victory in revolutionary wars.... Chairman Mao has made a Marxist scientific analysis of the rich experience of the Chinese revolutionary war and epitomized this experience at a high level, making it reflect the objective law of people's revolutionary wars in various countries in our time, which, as a matter of course, is of universal significance to the people's revolutionary wars being waged or to be waged.³

The authority of Mao's writings, moreover, was regarded as being held in wide respect by the "vast number of revolutionaries in the world," who,

regard the military thinking of Mao Tse-tung as "the greatest, the most outstanding and the most precious asset" in guiding revolutionary war, "the most powerful weapon for opposing oppression and oppressors" and "the most correct truth for the proletariat and the oppressed people and nations to win liberation."⁴

This exemplary role of Mao Tsetung's military thinking and the Chinese revolution was accorded such emphasis that one of the primary functions of Soviet revisionism in its attempt "to demoralize the revolutionary people of the world and stamp out the raging flames of the revolutionary peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America," was to try to divorce these peoples from Mao Tsetung thought. The Communist Party of the Soviet Union was depicted as "vainly hoping to keep it from spreading throughout the world."⁵

As has been pointed out in Chapter IV, China was involved in this picture in a more direct way in that United States imperialism had identified China as the ultimate target of its attacks on the Third World. Asia was regarded as the primary focus of imperial attack on the Third World and the Soviet Union had assisted in the establishment of this focus by fostering European detente. An "anti-China 'cordon sanitaire'" was considered the ultimate purpose of this collusion in shifting the emphasis of "counter-revolutionary strategy from Europe to Asia."⁶ "Indian, Japanese and other reactionaries," were regarded as having been co-opted by the United States and the Soviet Union into "organizing an encirclement round China and patching together a 'Holy Alliance' against China."⁷

Within the perspectives of the time, the struggles waged by the National Liberation Front in South Vietnam and by their compatriots in the North constituted the archetype of the way in which the world's principal contradiction was operating and the way in which the United States should be fought. The archetype was not perfect in that the Soviet Union did contribute substantial and sophisticated assistance to the liberation struggles, even if it was not the most sophisticated at their disposal. But the Soviet Union was attempting to manipulate the Vietnamese communists into "peace talks frauds" with United States imperialism and was far less than wholehearted in its endorsement of China's model of people's war as the way forward in Vietnam. In other respects, however, the Vietnam struggle was extremely close to the pattern of combatting the United States which the Chinese promoted in this period. The city-countryside dichotomy was widely used to describe the operations of the Vietnamese liberation forces and also to describe the divorce between two relatively distinct modes of production — that in the city being capitalist and foreign-dominated. The day when the countryside would cease to be the

area in which foreign domination was repelled by the people and would become the instrument for overrunning the city was confidently predicted, and by Lin Piao it was already regarded as happening in 1967.⁸ Provided they retained their commitment to the principles of people's war the liberation forces were assured of victory in the Chinese eyes and would continue to signal the way forward for the defeat of United States imperialism everywhere.

So long as the Vietnamese people pin down the several hundred thousand U.S. aggressor troops by a protracted war and develop their all-nation war of resistance to U.S. aggression and for national salvation, they can certainly deal the U.S. aggressor the death blow and win final victory.⁹

The conditional element in statements at this time was typical. While the situation was generally considered excellent and the eventual defeat of the United States certain, provisos similar to those above were invariably added — at least until the Tet Offensive of 1968. A fairly standard form of assessment prior to this time is as follows:

At present, the situation in the Vietnamese people's struggle against U.S. aggression and for national salvation is excellent. The U.S. aggressors are beset with insurmountable difficulties. For all their present bluster they cannot possibly avert total defeat. Provided the Vietnamese people persevere in their way of resistance against U.S. aggression and for national salvation, keep the U.S. aggressors firmly in their grip, and fight a protracted war with them, they can certainly wear down these wild beasts, the U.S. aggressors, and finish them off.¹⁰

Vietnam as the archetypical example of how to defeat imperialism was reinforced by China's perception of itself as the "reliable rear area" for the Indochinese liberation forces; the well-spring of moral, material and ideological support.

the Chinese Government and people regard it as their bounden internationalist duty to support and aid the Vietnamese people's revolutionary struggle, China is the rear area of Vietnam, and the great proletarian cultural revolution now vigourously going on will surely make China all the more powerful and consolidated....Whatever the storm and stress, the Chinese and Vietnamese peoples will always be united, will always fight together and be victorious.¹¹

It was this "lips and teeth" relationship between the Chinese Government and people and the Vietnamese people which the Chinese regarded the Soviet Union as intent upon destroying. Soviet attempts to reduce China's credibility as a supporter of revolutionary movements was also regarded as eminently consistent with, if not essential, to its general and globally operative policy of attempting to defuse the people's wars which characterized the era. In 1967, the Soviet Union began a series of statements about Chinese obstruction of Soviet military supplies to Vietnam which travelled across the Chinese mainland. Delays, pilfering and damaging of Soviet assistance was widely reported in both the Soviet Union and the West as the result of Red Guard anarchy and anti-Soviet fanaticism. The Chinese were able to publish in their press statements authorized by the Vietnam News Agency which categorically denied the reports as "sheer fabrications invented for the most vile purposes."¹² Soviet leaders were likened to Goebbels in their attempts to gain credence for lies by repeating them frequently.¹³ But the didactic purposes of the Soviet and Western reports was never doubted by the Chinese. They had one aim - to dissuade the revolutionary people of Vietnam and particularly of other Third World countries from believing that they had any unequivocal revolutionary support. For if they did not have it from China they had it from no-one. A fabricated interview with Chou En-lai by an American journalist which claimed that Chou En-lai had said that the continuation

of the war in Vietnam was in China's interest was widely reported by both the West and the Soviet Union. Its purpose was presumed by the Chinese to be similar to that of the stories about the transit of Soviet aid to Vietnam.¹⁴

In other respects also, the war in Vietnam represented China's view of the primary way in which United States imperialism could be fought at the time. The Chinese considered the vulnerability of American forces in Vietnam and other Third World countries to arise from their propensity to arouse popular hostility and their inability to maintain morale over an extended period of time against a highly motivated and organized resistance even though the latter be less well equipped. It was along these lines that China's encouragement of the liberation forces in Indochina continually went. To quote but one summary example, Chou En-lai, speaking at a celebration for the seventh anniversary of the founding of the South Vietnam National Liberation Front in December 1967,

The Vietnamese people's war against U.S. aggression and for national salvation has proved to the whole world that a country, whether big or small, can defeat any powerful aggressor so long as it dares to struggle, fully arouses and relies on the people, turns the country into a nation of soldiers, undertakes people's war and persists in a long-term war of resistance. The great victories of the Vietnamese people's war against U.S. aggression and for national salvation have set a brilliant example for the oppressed peoples and oppressed nations throughout the world in their struggle for liberation.¹⁵

With the growing realization that the Vietnamese people were in fact going to persist in their protracted war against United States aggression, their struggle became not merely archetypical in the sense that it served as an exemplary inspiration to other liberation struggles but also in manifestly reduced the physical capacity of the United States to pursue its aggression elsewhere. The area in which the world's principal

contradiction was being most dramatically realized was the area which would be the cause of its reformulation. At the end of 1967 it was already being stated by Chou En-lai that,

These victories (of the Vietnamese people against U.S. aggression) have upset U.S. imperialism's counter-revolutionary global strategic plan and given powerful support to the liberation struggles of the people of Asia, Africa and Latin America and to the revolutionary struggles of the people of all countries. The Vietnamese people are playing a vital role in the struggle in the present era of the revolutionary forces of the world against the counter-revolutionary forces and are making a great contribution to the cause of world revolution.¹⁶

People's war in Asia.

The same implications of the world's principal contradiction which gave rise to the Vietnamese conflict were present to varying degrees and in varying forms in other areas of Asia, as well as in Africa and Latin America. For the sake of brevity, and because China's policy towards the countries of Asia was typical of its Third World policy, Asia will be the focus of attention here. By the end of 1967, although elements of the analytical framework which came to dominate in the years after the Ninth Congress were already present, the way forward for the forces of liberation and revolution was still largely perceived as via people's war. And although the liberation struggles of most other Third World countries did not conform as closely or as successfully as did Vietnam to the model prescribed by China at this time, the encouragement and support which was given to them was consistently aimed at directing them along the path of "Chairman Mao's theory of people's war."

Thus, while Vietnam remained "the most convincing proof of Chairman Mao's brilliant theses" in Asia,

The people's armed forces in Burma, Thailand, Malaya, the Philippines and North Kalimantan are also studying and applying the principles of guerilla warfare laid down by Chairman Mao, and in the course of fighting they, too, are growing in size and strength.¹⁷

The Communist Party and the people of Indonesia were said to have realized that their decimation following the coup of 1965 was the result of not having followed "Mao Tse-tung's road, the road of the armed peasants' agrarian revolution under the leadership of the proletariat."¹⁸ The Burmese Communist Party was regarded as having successfully negotiated the numerous ideological and practical pitfalls to which China was so sensitive at the time. "The Communist Party of Burma," it was claimed,

has successfully resisted the pressure from the Soviet revisionist leading clique and from the top power-holder taking the capitalist road in the Chinese Party, overcame "Left" and Right opportunism within its own ranks and held fast to the revolutionary line of Marxism-Leninism, Mao Tse-tung's thought. In this way too, the Burmese C.P. has become the force at the core leading the revolutionary cause of the people of various nationalities in Burma, ensuring the triumphant advance of the Burmese people's revolutionary armed struggle.¹⁹

In Thailand, the armed struggle of the people was said to be "spreading like a prairie fire over the whole country."²⁰ The increasing involvement of American military personnel in conjunction with the Thai government ("the Thanom-Praphas clique") to suppress guerilla activity was seen as confirmation of the general position that the United States was intent upon shoring up its empire in the area by military means. But here again "Chairman Mao's theory of people's war" was regarded as being the appropriate form of countering American imperialism and one which was being enthusiastically adopted.

Chairman Mao's brilliant theories on the establishment of rural bases and using the villages to surround the cities and "political power grows out of the barrel of a gun" have shown their great vitality in Thailand. From their own experience, the Thai people have come to see that they can liberate themselves only by taking up arms and fighting a people's war.²¹

In "Malaya" also, the Vietnam archetype had parallels. The historical legacy of British imperialism was clearly recognized as economically important. "Malaya (including Singapore) continues to be a British new type colony to this day," it was said but with "the decline of British imperialism, the danger of U.S. imperialism replacing it in enslaving the Malayan people is becoming graver."²² Moreover, in the strategic context of the late 1960's, with the withdrawal of British military supervision from the area and the expansion of "the counter-revolutionary armed force" of the United States in Southeast Asia, it was against United States imperialism that the people's armed struggle was directly committed. Although the victories of the Malayan National Liberation Army were comparatively small, particularly compared to the scale of the Vietnamese liberation struggle, they were reported enthusiastically and in some detail. Ultimate victory was assured so long as it was remembered that,

it is imperative to persist in the path of using the countryside to encircle the cities and seizing political power by armed force, to oppose the counter-revolutionary armed force of the U.S. and British imperialists and their running dogs with revolutionary armed force and to oppose the unjust colonial war of the imperialists and their running dogs with the just war of national liberation.²³

The emphasis on people's war was such that the Malayan Communist Party, which had long since received Chinese support, invariably received only the briefest mention in the reports on Malaya which concentrated almost entirely on the exploits of the Malayan National Liberation Army which the Party was nevertheless said to lead.²⁴

In ways even more explicit than that in Vietnam, the Soviet Union was considered to be assisting in the suppression of the Malayan people's armed struggle. Not only was it collaborating with the United States as in Vietnam, but it was in direct collusion with "the Rahman-Lee Kuan Yew puppet groups in the attempts to undermine the Malayan people's revolutionary struggle."²⁵

The Philippines was also a country in which revolutionary armed struggle was considered to be successfully operating. The Hukbalahap movement which had operated with some success against the Japanese occupation and had achieved considerable political strength in rural areas after the war, had been decimated by the Magsaysay regime in the mid-1950's. In 1965, however, there was a Huk resurgence and since that time the potential for a liberation struggle in the Philippines was recognized by Peking. Towards the end of 1967 it was claimed that,

The Philippine People's Liberation Army has scored one victory after another in incessant attacks launched in Central Luzon. As a result of vigorous propaganda and organizational work among the masses in the rural areas, the Philippine people's armed forces are growing in size and strength.²⁶

There was comparatively scant mention of the Philippines in this period, but a year later there was said to have been "a new development of the protracted armed struggle in which the Philippine people have persevered."²⁷

The Chinese understanding of the disposition of international forces in Southeast Asia is perhaps nowhere more clearly illustrated than in their reaction to the inauguration of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). The members of the association were regarded as the "handful of U.S. imperialism's running dogs in Southeast Asia." The purposes of the alliance were "to oppose China, communism and the people" and while Washington was considered the primary instigator and beneficiary

of the new arrangement, it was also claimed that it was an instrument of Soviet neo-colonial pursuits. ASEAN was regarded in historical terms as the latest in a series of American multilateral contrivances aimed at containing China — its creation having become necessary by the nominal existence to which CENTO and SEATO had been reduced. The stated aims of the organization to "accelerate the economic growth, social progress and cultural development in the region" were regarded as a thin disguise for the counter-revolutionary strategic purposes which lay at its heart. The joint declaration issued at ASEAN's inauguration showed,

that this alliance of U.S. stooges openly supported the existence of U.S. military bases in Southeast Asia, not even bothering to make any excuses for them. All this proves that this reactionary association formed in the name of "economic co-operation" is a military alliance directed specifically against China.²⁸

Apart from illustrating China's position on Southeast Asia, its attitude towards ASEAN in 1967 when contrasted to that which it comes to adopt after the Cultural Revolution illustrates with some precision, as will be explained below, the change which occurs in China's perspectives and the developments in the distribution of power in the region.

In other parts of Asia also, the relevance of Mao Tsetung's "model" was enjoined upon local revolutionaries. In March of 1967, India was described as being "littered with dry faggots." And it was considered "certain that revolutionary flames will rage throughout the vast territory of India."²⁹ The Indian elections which sparked these comments were said to have given rise to a Congress Party government more reactionary and more willing to do the bidding of the United States and the Soviet Union than those in the past. In China's view the new government quickly acquired a reputation for,

eagerly selling out India's national interests, tailing ever more faithfully behind U.S. imperialism and Soviet revisionism and serving as a pawn in their joint conspiracy against China.³⁰

The armed peasant struggle of the Naxalites against landlords in the Darjeeling area of West Bengal which began in July 1967 was seized upon as the fulfilment of China's predictions. It was regarded as the "prelude to a violent revolution by the hundreds of millions of people throughout India." "This," it was said, "is the general trend of Indian history which no force on earth can check or hinder."³¹ Rather confident, and at least in the short term, erroneous, predictions were made as to the development of the struggle along the, by now, classic pattern of Chinese revolutionary experience.

So long as the Indian proletarian revolutionaries adhere to the revolutionary line of Marxism-Leninism, Mao Tse-tung's thought and rely on their greatest ally, the peasants, it is entirely possible for them to establish one advanced revolutionary base area after another in the huge backward rural areas and build a people's army of a new type. Whatever difficulties and twists and turns the Indian revolutionaries may experience in the course of building such revolutionary base areas, they will eventually develop them from isolated points into a vast expanse, from small areas into extensive ones, in a wave like expansion. Thus, a situation in which the cities are encircled from the countryside will gradually be brought about in the Indian revolution to pave the way for the final seizure of the cities and winning nationwide victory.³²

The "revolutionary group" within the Indian Communist Party, or the Naxalites, were considered by the Chinese to have triumphed, not merely in taking up the gun, but to have done so in a country where the influence of the Soviet Union within the local Communist Party was stronger than in most others. In April, the pro-Soviet leader of the Indian Communist Party, Dange, had been ridiculed for his assertions about the possibility of a "peaceful transition to socialism" in India. The state governments

of Kerala and West Bengal where the Communist Party held office in united front governments were specifically mentioned as "component parts of the state apparatus of India's big landlords and big bourgeoisie."³³ When the United Front government became engaged in the suppression of the Naxalite movement, the Chinese considered their predictions to have been resoundingly confirmed.

The so-called "non-Congress government" in West Bengal openly sides with the reactionary Indian government in its bloody suppression of the revolutionary peasants of Darjeeling. This is added proof that these renegades and revisionists are running dogs of U.S. imperialism and Soviet revisionism and stooges of the big Indian landlords and bourgeoisie.³⁴

The Naxalite movement was clearly regarded by the Chinese as the "spark" from which the flames of revolutionary struggle would rapidly spread. It was claimed in October of 1968 that, "Up to early 1968 'Naxalbari - type' peasant movements had erupted in 50 areas in 8 states and regions under direct central control."³⁵

Though it is possible, with sufficient hindsight to conclude that the Naxalite uprising was overoptimistically taken up by the Chinese as the prelude to a nationwide revolution, it is also true that they provided considerable evidence of a general trend towards increased United States and Soviet penetration of the Indian economy and an increased tendency to use India as a strategic weapon in the containment of China.³⁶ The foremost victims in this situation of increased exploitation and increased military spending were, according to the Chinese, the peasants. The logic of their revolt was thus not in question. The parallels between India and its Southeast Asian counterparts in relation to the principal contradiction as perceived by the Chinese were considerable.

In contrast to the above instances, the case of Pakistan deserves brief mention. Although the object of extensive United States economic penetration and to a much lesser extent of Soviet aid,³⁷ Pakistan enjoyed cordial diplomatic relations with China throughout the period of the Cultural Revolution, as in fact it has subsequently. Despite the obvious similarities between the Pakistani ruling class and its formidable state machinery with those characterized by China at this time as "puppets" and "lackeys" of United States imperialism in Southeast Asia, the Chinese did not suggest that Pakistan was awaiting the spark which would kindle a national liberation struggle.

To a large extent the explanation for this lies within the general rationale for China's policy of acquiring diplomatic relations with those Third World states which, in spite of their fundamental integration into the United States dominated imperialist network, were also prepared to express a significant measure of disagreement with their imperial overlords. This policy was much more in evidence in China's foreign policy prior to the Cultural Revolution — notably in relation to such countries as Cambodia, Indonesia and Burma.³⁸ One of the prime indices of disaffection on the part of local governments was considered to be their willingness to recognize the People's Republic of China. Consequently, Chinese practice in relation to this question was occasionally, and mistakenly, regarded as the outcome of an opportunist foreign policy. In the case of Pakistan, a member of the Baghdad Pact and its successor CENTO as well as the specifically anti-Chinese SEATO, its preparedness to recognize China in the face of imperialist pressure could clearly be construed as an attempt to seek its development outside the imperialist orbit.

Tactical cooperation on anti-imperialist issues was not, however, meant as a blanket endorsement of the national bourgeoisie. It was a

relationship of "unity and struggle" such that most domestic economic systems were tolerated to the extent of normal state-to-state relations although relations with revolutionary groups whose aim was the overthrow of existing governments were also fostered.

By far the major portion of scholarship devoted to China's policy towards the Third World in the period of the Cultural Revolution tends to concentrate on the sometimes dramatic character of China's diplomatic relations with these countries rather than seeking an explanation for them in the dominant analysis of the world being made within China at the time and making an assessment of that analysis.³⁹ While diplomatic behaviour will not be the subject of emphasis here, it is worthy of mention as a symptom of the minimal regard in which state-to-state relations were generally held at the time and serves to contrast the emphasis given to revolutionary struggle and the overwhelming importance placed on domestic events.

Towards the end of 1966, Chinese diplomats began returning to Peking from overseas postings. A year later this development left only Huang Hua, at the time China's ambassador to the United Arab Republic, as the only Chinese ambassador abroad, although some officials in less senior posts had remained abroad or returned. Chinese students abroad also returned, occasionally, as in Paris and Moscow, after their Cultural Revolutionary fervour had brought them into conflict with local authorities. Demonstrations against foreign missions were frequent in Peking during 1967, particularly while the "May 16" group had control of the Foreign Ministry. It was during this latter period when the British Chancery was burnt down on August 22. China engaged in public hostilities with Afghanistan, Cambodia, Ceylon, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Italy, Japan, Kenya, Tanzania, Tunisia and of course Britain and the Soviet Union. Foreign reporters

and diplomats in China were subjected to considerable abuse and sometimes to physical attack and imprisonment. In this general diplomatic atmosphere, no quarter was given to Third World countries many of them, such as Burma and Cambodia, becoming the object of rather gratuitous insult.

The new policy towards the Third World.

When fully developed, from late 1971 onwards, the new policy adopted by China towards Third World countries is more sharply contrasted with the policy described above than it is with any former period of China's policy towards the Third World. A brief summary of the policies pursued and the diplomacy practiced during this period will provide the basis for an understanding of the new and radically different Chinese perspectives on the Third World. Once again, because contacts were most extensive and policies most explicit, Third World countries in Asia, especially Southeast Asia, will be the main focus of attention.

The most noticeable and most commented upon feature of China's relations with the Third World in the new policy is the willingness and ability of China to normalize relations with these countries, even those with reactionary domestic political systems. Although in the Southeast Asian area this development was by no means completed by the Tenth Congress, the announcement of Kissinger's visit to Peking in July of 1971 and the forthcoming visit of President Nixon set in train a series of moves which led to improved diplomatic relations between China and most of the Southeast Asian states. China's entry into the United Nations gave further momentum to these tendencies. The final event which consolidated such tendencies was the liberation of South Vietnam at the end of April 1975. As one conservative scholar put it,

Southeast Asian leaders today are deeply disturbed by the Ford Administration's apparent lack of ability to carry through on U.S. foreign policy commitments made by previous administrations in Washington, and they worry about the U.S. withdrawing completely from responsibility in that area. American behaviour in Indo-China in the spring of 1975 shocked the governments of the Philippines, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia and raised serious questions about whether the U.S. would honour defence commitments anywhere in Southeast Asia.⁴⁰

It was precisely this kind of consideration which led most of the above mentioned countries to adopt a much less hostile attitude towards China in the years prior to Vietnam's liberation. Since World War II these countries had been enticed into anti-Chinese strategic alliances by the United States, or had been under severe pressure from that country to refrain from contact with China. Moreover, they had been inundated with American military bases, economic "aid", military aid, equipment and advisors as well as American investment. The ideology which justified such United States initiatives was invariably and fundamentally based on the supposition that these countries needed to be protected from Chinese aggression and expansion of one form or another. The regimes favoured with American support were consequently those whose interests coincided with a hostile policy towards China.

With the United States leadership openly moving towards improved diplomatic relations with China in mid-1971, clearly without any prior explanations being offered to Southeast Asian governments, the rationale for the latter's anti-Chinese posture became much less coherent. In fact it would seem to have become a positive embarrassment as one after another of the countries in Southeast Asia, as indeed other Third World countries, which had formerly acted in close concert with the United States in international affairs, moved to reduce or remove the obstacles to normal diplo-

matic relations. The "containment of China" — that overarching public aim of United States foreign policy — had previously served to contain the capitalist countries of Asia, and particularly of Southeast Asia, within an American economic, political and strategic orbit. As the United States moved to undercut this position by effectively signalling the end of the containment policy, and later by refusing to support the Saigon regime to the hilt when it was faced with extinction, then the logic of these countries being contained within an American orbit ceased to exist. As the Chinese National Day editorial of 1972 claimed,

the policy of those who dreamt of isolating China has gone bankrupt and the still extant counter-revolutionary schemes to encircle China are falling apart.⁴¹

These developments were reflected at the diplomatic level in China's relations with Southeast Asian countries. In August 1971, President Ne Win of Burma, who in 1967 had been the subject of vitriolic criticism in the Chinese press, was welcomed in Peking and met Mao Tsetung. He was followed by a trade delegation in November and in subsequent years by sporting, cultural and government delegations.⁴² While such state-to-state and people-to-people relations were being developed, there is little evidence to suggest, however, that party-to-party relations suffered as a consequence.

According to sources in Rangoon, deemed by Robert Scalapino to be "reliable", Ne Win was dissatisfied with his 1971 visit, being unable to exact assurances that the Chinese would discontinue their aid to communist liberation forces in Burma. Chou En-lai's response to Ne Win's requests along these lines was said to be "a bland, 'China never interferes in the internal affairs of another nation.'" As Scalapino reports,

A few months later, in November-December 1971, some 2,000 rebel troops under White Flag Communist leadership, armed with AK-47's and other relatively

sophisticated Chinese-derived equipment, launched a very serious attack in the northeast, and almost succeeded in seizing the provincial capital.⁴³

While the use of "Chinese-derived equipment" by a party which had consistently received Chinese support does not necessarily indicate Chinese endorsement of this particular engagement, there is little evidence to suggest that the Chinese changed their position in relation to the White Flag Communist Party in any way except to offer it marginally less vocal support. The "Voice of the People of Burma" — a radio station believed to operate from Chinese territory — broadcast attacks on the Ne Win government both before and after Ne Win's visit to China. A broadcast of August 5, announcing the visit called for the establishment of "people's democratic power...after Ne Win's military government is overthrown by an armed uprising."⁴⁴ Only two weeks prior to Ne Win's China visit, Chou En-lai was photographed in Peking with the Burmese Communist Party Vice Chairman, Ba Thien Tin, and Central Committee member, Pe Tint,⁴⁵ while the Chinese press published a Burmese Communist Party message of congratulations to the Central Committee of the Chinese Party in which it was claimed, "we will surely defeat the Ne Win military regime, an imperialist lackey."⁴⁶

Although it is true that the Chinese have discontinued their verbal assaults on the Ne Win government and direct calls for its overthrow, there is no evidence to suggest, as Robert A. Holmes does, that,

Peking seems to have realized that the communist forces were disintegrating and it reverted once again to its self-imposed ban on openly identifying with the "people's liberation war" in Burma.⁴⁷

In fact the evidence would seem to contradict this statement on all counts. Consider for instance the statement of the United States ambassador to Burma between 1971 and December 1973:

As 1974 began some 20 battalions of the Burmese Army were engaged near the Chinese border against a force of Burmese Communist Party (BCP) insurgents estimated to number as high as 10,000. This force had in the past two years "liberated" most of Burma east of the Salween River and north of the Shan city of Kengtung. An aspect of the BCP thrust which especially worried the Burmese was the participation of Chinese cadres and technicians. Chinese material support of the BCP (to say nothing of training) is an old and long story but direct involvement of Chinese personnel in battle was alarming.⁴⁸

The subsequent Chinese reporting of the death "in action" of the Chairman and Secretary of the Central Committee of the Burmese Communist Party confirms that China has continued its party-to-party relations and its commitment to the Burmese revolution.⁴⁹ The message of condolence issued by the Central Committee of the Chinese party and published in the Chinese press asserted that the "historical trend of the Burmese revolution cannot be checked." "We are confident," it was claimed,

that all members of the Communist Party of Burma and commanders and fighters of the People's Army will unite closely around the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Burma headed by Chairman Thakin Ba Thien Tin and win thorough and complete victory in their revolutionary war by upholding a correct line, firmly relying on the people of all nationalities and carrying out a dauntless struggle.⁵⁰

In a period where high priority has certainly been placed on correct state-to-state relations such sentiments as those expressed above clearly show that diplomacy has not been to the exclusion of revolutionary principles in the case of Burma.

In the case of Thailand, where government relations had never flourished as in Burma, diplomatic relations were much slower in maturing. Thailand's diplomatic relations with Taiwan and its commitment of troops to the United States cause in Vietnam also proved obstacles. Throughout

1972, the Chinese press reportage of Thai events generally concentrated on advances made in the armed struggle of the people and the close liaison between the United States and the Thai governments.⁵¹ By late 1972, however, the thaw in official relations had begun with visits to China by sporting, government and trade officers.⁵² In 1973, Chinese sporting teams visited Thailand and vice versa, in both cases the teams being accompanied by foreign ministry representatives and in August, the Thai government announced that its trade regulations would be altered to allow trade with China which had been banned since 1959.⁵³ The Chinese press still published, however, the Thai Communist Party greetings when China's Tenth Party Congress was held in August.⁵⁴ After the Tenth Congress official delegations of various kinds and of varying importance continued to go back and forth until diplomatic relations were eventually established in July 1975 at which time Prime Minister Kukrit Pramoj was in China.⁵⁵ In the intervening period China did not desist from its support of the Thai Communist Party with its stated objective of armed struggle against the government⁵⁶ or even of its approving reports of anti-government student activities, which were responsible for ousting the Thanom Kittikachorn government in 1973.⁵⁷

In spite of occasional reports suggesting that the Chinese are anxious to retain an American Southeast Asian presence to counter the strategic expansion of the Soviet Union in that area,⁵⁸ in the period after the Ninth Congress and up to and beyond the Tenth Congress, the Chinese continued to place major importance in their analysis of Thai developments on the necessity for the Thai government to sever its ties with the United States.⁵⁹ In general, therefore, it may be said that party-to-party relations were maintained between the Chinese Communist Party and the Thai Communist Party, while relations at the people-to-people

and state-to-state level were improved considerably. In the context of state-to-state relations it should be noted that one important aspect of China's growing trade with Thailand was its offer of oil at what was termed a "special assistance price" below that of the world market price.⁶⁰

The development of Sino-Malaysian relations in the period under review presents a picture comparable to those of Burma and Thailand. Along with growing state-to-state relations, the Chinese continued to support, particularly through the "Voice of the Malayan Revolution" radio station based in China, the anti-government struggle of the Malayan Communist Party. This was particularly noticeable at the initiation of governmental contacts when a Chinese trade delegation to Malaysia signed an agreement to import Malaysian goods⁶¹ while the "Voice of the Malayan Revolution" was claiming that the "Razak clique has no real intention of promoting friendship and unity between the people of our country and the people of China."⁶² It was also claimed by this radio station that Razak had proved his "reactionary attitude of obstinately remaining hostile to the People's Republic" by stating a month earlier that Taiwan had a right to United Nation's membership as an independent country.⁶³ In fact, at this time the Malayan Communist Party seemed to enjoy considerable prominence in the Chinese press.⁶⁴

Throughout 1972, both the tempo and level of governmental contacts were increased — the highlights being Tun Razak's meeting with the Chinese Ambassador to Austria in Vienna and the visit of Tan Sri Raja Mohar, the Prime Minister's special advisor on economic matters to Canton and Peking in November.⁶⁵ 1973 saw the discussion of issues on which the two countries disagreed through their New York representatives — the primary issues being China's support for the Malayan Communist Party, the Malayan Voice of Revolution or "Suara Revolusi" radio broadcasts and China's policy towards Chinese-Malaysians.⁶⁶

In May of 1974 Tun Razak visited China at which time diplomatic relations were established, Malaysia thus becoming the first ASEAN country to establish diplomatic relations with China. The general trend which culminated in diplomatic recognition did not, however, signal the end of China's apparent approval of the Malayan Communist Party's armed assaults on government forces. In the months and weeks prior to Razak's visit, the Chinese press continued to endorse such activities.⁶⁷ After recognition, the Chinese saw fit to publish the greetings sent from the Central Committee of the Chinese party to that of the Communist Party of Malaya. Having outlined the leadership of the Malayan Communist Party in the struggles against British colonialism and Japanese imperialism in the cause of national independence, the article states that at present,

the Communist Party of Malaya is pushing the liberation struggle of the Malayan people constantly forward by holding aloft the revolutionary banner of opposing imperialism, feudalism and bureaucrat-capitalism and adhering to the road of armed struggle.⁶⁸

While the Malaysian government was not explicitly mentioned by name, it is difficult to see how it could be excluded from the targets of the Malayan Communist Party's armed struggle as envisaged by the Chinese, who were "convinced" that the Malayan Communist Party would,

enhance unity on the basis of Marxist-Leninist principles, fully mobilize the masses of the people of all nationalities and from various walks of life, unite all forces that can be united to wage a common struggle against the enemy, and strive for new and still greater victories by overcoming all kinds of difficulties....We firmly believe that the revolutionary armed struggle of the Malayan people will certainly triumph.⁶⁹

On the question of Chinese-Malaysians it was agreed that dual nationality would not apply and Chinese-Malaysians who retained their

Chinese nationality were enjoined to obey the local laws, customs and habits by the Chinese government.⁷⁰

The diplomatic wording which served as a resolution of the thorny problem of China's support for the Malayan Communist Party was revealed by Tun Razak on his return to Malaysia. He claimed that,

Chairman Mao Tse-tung and Premier Chou En-lai and other leaders of China have categorically assured us that they regard the remnant terrorists in our country as our internal problem that is for us to deal with as we think best.⁷¹

Together with the statements in the joint communique recognizing the differences in social systems between China and Malaysia and the principles of peaceful coexistence including that of non-interference in the other country's internal affairs, China's subsequent attitude to the Malayan Communist Party, as mentioned above, makes clear the Chinese policy towards Malaysia — as it does towards many other capitalist Third World countries. China states its disagreement with the social system of Malaysia and publicly endorses that promoted by the Malayan Communist Party as well as its methods of achieving it. The historical struggle between the forces represented by the Malaysian government and the Malayan Communist Party is not one, however, which is regarded as the proper subject of interstate relations.

The definition of "non-interference in each other's internal affairs" is necessarily arbitrary, as it may cogently be argued that any form of contact between states or their members — or even a lack of contact — alters in some way the configuration of domestic political, economic and social forces. Thus Chinese trade with the Malaysian government or Malaysian capitalists, as well as its moral and/or material support for the Malayan Communist Party all produce domestic political effects, and may even affect the balance of class forces within Malaysia. The

Chinese definition of the term does not, however, seem subject to any vagaries. In the many explanations of its policy of peaceful coexistence, China has always stipulated that its policy,

proceeds from the historical mission of the international proletariat and therefore requires the socialist countries to give firm support to the revolutionary struggles of the oppressed peoples and nations while pursuing this policy.⁷²

Consequently, the Chinese understanding of the "non-interference" principle cannot conflict with its proletarian internationalist duty. Capitalist and imperialist countries are only envisaged as accepting the principles of peaceful coexistence under "unfavourable objective circumstances" for it "is in the very nature of imperialism to commit aggression against other countries and nations and to desire to enslave them."⁷³ As explained by the Chinese their Leninist policy of peaceful coexistence is an active anti-imperialist weapon.

Clear allusions are made in the official pronouncements surrounding China's recognition of Malaysia, as indeed they are in relation to the recognition of similar countries, to developments which could well fall into the category of "unfavourable historical circumstances" for imperialism. The joint communique with Malaysia stated that,

The two Prime Ministers agree that in recent years the situation in Asia has undergone deep changes favourable to the people of all countries. It is in conformity with the interests of the peoples of China and Malaysia to normalize relations....The two Governments consider all foreign aggression, interference control and subversion to be impermissible....They are opposed to any attempt by any country or group of countries to establish hegemony or create spheres of influence in any part of the world.⁷⁴

It would seem to be clear, therefore, that the Chinese regard the willingness of countries such as Malaysia to establish diplomatic relations with

them as an indication of the current weakness of imperialism in this part of the world and an opportunity to capitalize on that weakness.

The areas of cooperation in interstate relations as envisaged by the Chinese confirm this interpretation. As both the joint communique with Malaysia, and more particularly, Chou En-lai's speech at the welcoming banquet for Tun Razak make clear any Chinese enthusiasm for the government of Malaysia has absolutely no reference to any domestic policies it may pursue. Malaysia, as a geographical entity, is commended for its beauty. The Malaysian people "of various nationalities" are commended for their "glorious tradition of opposing imperialism and colonialism." The Malaysian government is commended only for certain aspects of its foreign policy -- viz. its active participation in "the activities of the Third World countries" and its opposition to "great power hegemonism and power politics." Specifically, Malaysia's call for a zone of peace and neutrality in Southeast Asia was commended. All such commendations, moreover, are placed in the context of Third World countries having "become the main force in the united struggle of the people of the world against hegemonism." The Southeast Asian political context was explicitly regarded as a reflection of this global reality:

The realities of Southeast Asia show that super-power aggression and expansion are the main source of danger to peace and security in this region. We are convinced that, so long as the Southeast Asian peoples strengthen their unity and persist in struggle, they will certainly be able to frustrate superpower schemes and safeguard their own independence and sovereignty.⁷⁵

The Philippines in some ways constitutes an even more striking example of these attitudes in operation. When Mrs. Imelda Marcos visited China in September 1974, martial law had been in operation in the Philippines for two years. The repression perpetrated by the Marcos

regime on political opponents, student and religious groups, workers and liberation movements is well known in the West — as well as in China.⁷⁶ As in the case of the other countries discussed above, it was clearly not because of any fascination with the Filipino political system that Chinese interest in diplomatic relations with the Philippines developed.

The normalization of Sino-Philippine relations coincided with foreign policy initiatives on the part of the Philippines government comparable to those of Malaysia. In August of 1974 Marcos announced that his government's foreign policy had changed from one based on anti-communism to one of "peaceful coexistence" with communist countries⁷⁷ and on October 7, shortly after Mrs. Marcos' return from Peking, he informed United States and ASEAN ambassadors that he intended to normalize relations with both China and the Soviet Union.⁷⁸ Significantly, 1974 saw the reduction of American troops in the Philippines from 25,000 to 16,000 as a prelude to further reductions, while total American assistance to the Philippines was cut by almost \$90 million including a reduction in military aid from \$91.5 million in 1973 to \$30.5 million in 1974.⁷⁹

As in the case of Malaysia, the official Chinese statements issued during President Marcos' visit to China in June 1975 exhibit great care in what is commended. The five principles of peaceful coexistence were presented as the basis of interstate relations and the joint communique proclaimed that all disputes would be settled by peaceful means according to those principles.⁸⁰ Also, as in the case of Malaysia, the Chinese were completely silent about the character of the Filipino social system except to say that it differed from that of their own. Again, it was in the field of foreign relations that the Filipino government, as distinct from the Filipino people, received commendation.

Teng Hsiao-ping's speech at the banquet welcoming President Marcos and his wife was fulsome in its praise for the "unremitting efforts to safeguard national independence and defend state sovereignty" which the Philippines was said to have made in recent years. "In international affairs," it was said,

the Philippines has actively developed relations with other third world countries, supported the struggle of developing countries to safeguard their national economic rights and interests and opposed hegemonism and power politics. We sincerely wish the Filipino people new and greater successes on their road of advance.⁸¹

While these remarks of Teng can best be understood as an indication of China's support of the tendency rather than the completed reality on the part of the Philippines to reduce its commitment to the United States, especially in the wake of the American debacle in Indochina, there was no possibility of misunderstanding about Teng's allusions to the Soviet Union. "Everywhere," he said,

the superpowers are contending for hegemony. What should especially put people on the alert is that where one superpower has to withdraw after suffering defeat, the other superpower, with unbridled ambition, is trying to seize the chance to carry out expansion by overt or covert means of contest. But the people of all countries who hold their destiny in their own hands will never allow any superpower to lord it over them. The people of Asian countries, who have rich experience in combatting imperialism, will certainly see through superpower wiles and schemes, guard against "letting the tiger in through the back door while repelling the wolf through the front gate," and thus frustrate the superpower policy of aggression and expansion.⁸²

Although quite evident in the period between the Ninth and Tenth Chinese Party Congresses, this tendency to warn Southeast Asian countries of the dangers of the Soviet Union adopting the foreign policy of John Foster Dulles was greatly accelerated as the defeat of the United States in Indochina became more and more imminent and was eventually realized.

Sino-Indonesian relations at a state-to-state level did not develop as rapidly as in the case of some of Indonesia's Southeast Asian neighbours, the ethnic bitterness associated with "anti-communist" purge of 1965 no doubt being a difficult historical legacy to overcome. The Chinese continued with their vocal support of the Indonesian Communist Party and its revolutionary methods as revised after 1965⁸³ but the initiation of contacts which elsewhere culminated in diplomatic recognition and Indonesia's adherence to the neutralization of Southeast Asia as advocated by the ASEAN countries suggest that diplomatic recognition will take place in the years immediately ahead. The Indonesian Foreign Minister, Adam Malik, was reported at the end of 1973 as saying that "China has now fulfilled the conditions set by Indonesia for thawing relations with that country."⁸⁴

As the Vietnam war drew to a close and the magnitude of the American defeat became obvious as well as its economic inability to do any other than suffer it, China's policy towards ASEAN altered. The strategic climate within which ASEAN had meaning was considered to have changed so much that far from being "an alliance of U.S. stooges...directed specifically against China,"⁸⁵ it was understood as a valuable alliance in the struggle of Third World countries to achieve cooperation and unity among themselves as well as with second world countries and also as a significant neutralizing anti-hegemonic force in the area. While the latter point has been commented upon above, it should be mentioned that cooperation of a specifically economic kind among Third World countries particularly in their attempts to protect the prices of their raw materials vis-à-vis those of manufactured goods which they generally had to import, came to form an increasing portion of Chinese press reportage of Third World activity and underlay much of their analysis. Thus in spite of the

lack of development in China's relations with Singapore and Indonesia, China commented favourably on their recognition of the need for regional economic cooperation with other ASEAN states.⁸⁶ Once again, China's approval is limited and specific. While the more reactionary aspects of ASEAN can scarcely have escaped the notice of the Chinese,⁸⁷ their understanding of contemporary contradictions led them to concentrate on endorsing the anti-imperialist, anti-hegemonic aspects.

This same policy is archetypically evident in China's attitude towards the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). While there is no evidence to suggest that China is in any way sympathetic to the reactionary regimes which make up this organization,⁸⁸ it has strongly supported their tendencies to act in concert both economically and politically insofar as these tendencies are directed against the imperialist powers.

The Chinese strategy is already evident in the communique establishing diplomatic relations with Iran in August 1971, at which time, as has been shown in Chapter III, the perspectives of China's new policy were acquiring public maturity. In a very short communique, space was found to say that,

The Government of the People's Republic of China firmly supports the Imperial Government of Iran in its just struggle to safeguard national independence and state sovereignty and protect its natural resources.⁸⁹

In the *Renmin Ribao* editorial commenting on the establishment of relations it was stated,

At the beginning of this year, the Iranian Government, uniting with Iraq, Kuwait and three other oil producing countries in West Asia and with the support of other members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries, won positive results in effective struggle against the Western petroleum

monopoly groups. We express resolute support of the Iranian Government and people in their just struggle to safeguard national interests and national resources.⁹⁰

It was logical, therefore, for China to support the unprecedented oil price rises of 1973 and the simultaneous Arab oil embargo which banned the export of oil to the United States and Holland and reduced oil output by 25% in an attempt to apply pressure to Israel. The "energy crisis" which followed was at least "in part an orchestrated attempt by the oil companies and the U.S. government to justify a rise in oil prices",⁹¹ but it also demonstrated something of the political power available to raw material producing countries — a fact which the Chinese continued to stress.

The inter-imperialist contradictions which the Chinese had commented upon for the previous two years were sharply exacerbated by these developments as the United States and the European Economic Community adopted different attitudes towards the Arab world.⁹² The domestic economic recessions current in the capitalist world were also exacerbated —

a blunt demonstration of the fact that the prosperity and inter-class peace of the developed world was historically based on obtaining raw materials at prices below their market value. Most important of all, the crisis of 1973 represented an enormous shift of wealth, and reflected a parallel shift of power, between the advanced capitalist and oil-producing states.⁹³

It is not surprising therefore, that the Chinese in their active participation in the United Nations and particularly in its various economic agencies, frequently used the "oil weapon" of the OPEC countries as an example of the type of concerted action which can prove successful in the struggle of Third World countries against superpower hegemony.⁹⁴

Chinese policy towards India and Pakistan after the Ninth Congress has been the subject of widespread discussion -- especially in relation to the Indo-Pakistani war of 1971 which resulted in the emergence of Bangladesh. It is not necessary to conduct an extended analysis of Chinese policy towards the Indo-Pakistani war here but since it has occasionally been used to assert that China is prepared to support counter-revolution, or at the very least, to oppose self-determination, in pursuit of its anti-Soviet objectives and since such assertions run counter to the evidence so far presented in this chapter they require some discussion.

The charge of counter-revolutionary support needs least discussion. There can be little doubt that the regime of Yahya Khan was anything other than counter-revolutionary, but there can be equally little doubt that the Awami League led by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was a non-revolutionary force -- Indian and Soviet assertions that it was fighting a war of "national liberation" notwithstanding.⁹⁵ There are, however, clear indications that groups such as the pro-Peking East Pakistan Communist Party (Marxist-Leninist),

attempted to lead struggles on two fronts, against the West Pakistani invaders and against soldiers of the Awami League who entered Bangladesh after training in India.⁹⁶

It was precisely these revolutionary elements within the more broadly-based opposition to the West Pakistani forces which caused India greatest concern, especially as in November they were reported in command of the Noakhali district and "fighting Awami League forces entering from India even more fiercely than the Bengalis were fighting the West Pakistani troops."⁹⁷

While such movements remained small, they were not a threat which India was prepared to take lightly -- particularly given their similarity to and links with the Naxalite groups in India. As Kathleen Gough argued,

In general it seemed clear that the Bangladesh liberation movement (*sic*) was becoming radicalized. Such developments threatened not only the West Pakistani government but that of India, which could not afford to see a socialist liberation struggle fully unleashed in East Bengal, let alone in some wider area involving large parts of eastern India.⁹⁸

Elements such as those of the East Pakistan Communist Party (Marxist-Leninist) remained minor in the overall opposition to the West Pakistan forces of which the bulk supported the Awami League — "which was from the very beginning a bourgeois-nationalist party, and to this day has retained its middle-class base."⁹⁹ As India and Pakistan moved inevitably towards war throughout November — largely as a result of the invasion of East Bengal by hundreds of thousands of regular Indian troops armed with Soviet equipment — it was the Indian troops along with the Indian-based, armed and supported Mukti Bahini which formed the most effective opposition to the forces of Yahya Khan. Such an opposition was clearly without revolutionary perspectives.

The charge that China's policy towards the Pakistan crisis was opposed to its declared policy of self-determination is equally misleading. China's statements on the crisis continually refer to West Pakistan's suppression of the Eastern secessionists as an internal problem and urged its settlement by peaceful means. Self-determination was understood by the Chinese in its more normal usage as applicable to a state as opposed to another state rather than one part of a state against another. National unity was counselled by Chou En-lai in his April letter to Yahya Khan as one of the "basic guarantees for Pakistan to attain prosperity and strength."¹⁰⁰ Although Chou's claim that it was "a handful of persons" rather than the "broad masses of the people...who want to sabotage the unification of Pakistan" is dubious, the emphasis was placed as it was at

all times subsequently, on the question of unity or secession as "purely an internal affair of Pakistan, which can only be settled by the Pakistan people themselves." The only danger to "state sovereignty and national independence" was regarded as coming from outside — primarily from India. Whatever self-determining had to be done was clearly envisaged as being done by the Pakistani people against outside interference. Even then, it was suggested by the Chinese that "disputes between States should always be settled through consultation and not by resorting to force."¹⁰¹ The Chinese derisively chided the Indian and Soviet governments for what was considered their hypocritical stance on the question of self-determination and reminded them of their respective records in dealing with the Nagas, Mizos, Tibetans and Kashmiris and in the case of the Soviet Union in dealing with the Czechoslovakians.¹⁰²

While it can therefore be clearly shown that descriptions of China's policy as counter-revolutionary or being opposed to self-determination arise out of a misunderstanding of the character of the Pakistani crisis, China's support of the Yahya Khan regime at a time when it was engaged in the brutal suppression of workers, students and other elements of opposition in East Pakistan, requires some explanation.

As in the case of China's policy towards other reactionary states it would seem that its policy towards Pakistan was not related to domestic policies at all. Beyond a gentle insinuation that Yahya Khan's regime should settle its differences with the East through negotiations and a much later semi-official registering of disagreement with the policies practiced by the Pakistan government,¹⁰³ the Chinese adhered rigidly to their proclaimed policy of non-interference in the internal affairs of another country.¹⁰⁴ By far the major portion of China's statements on the subject were devoted to the admonition of India, the Soviet Union and

the United States for interfering in Pakistani affairs -- that was the strength, and insofar as it appeared to endorse the behaviour of Yahya Khan's troops, the weakness of the Chinese position.

The Chinese position would seem to have been based on the supposition that dismemberment of Pakistan would, in materialist terms, mean that East Pakistan would emerge from being the oppressed quasi-colony of the West into being the oppressed quasi-colony of India, and to a lesser extent, of the Soviet Union -- and that such a development would not only result in a great deal of bloodshed but also would give rise to considerably less political independence for the people of East Pakistan. In the short run, this supposition would seem to have been proved true. The economic fortunes of Bangladesh have also deteriorated sharply.

The Indo-Pakistani war set back the development of Sino-Indian relations which were beginning to evolve in patterns which resulted in diplomatic normalization elsewhere. The assistant Chinese Foreign Minister revealed in 1973 that China had even indicated to the Indian government prior to the outbreak of hostilities that it was prepared to exchange ambassadors.¹⁰⁵ The cultural contacts which preceeded these formal diplomatic moves were not resumed again until 1975.¹⁰⁶

China's relations with Pakistan continued in much the same manner as previously, support being given to any Pakistani moves which could be interpreted as opposition to hegemonic power in South Asia,¹⁰⁷ or to moves towards South Asian cooperation.¹⁰⁸ A fortnight after the coup in Bangladesh which ousted Mujibur Rahman, the Chinese recognized that country.¹⁰⁹ The government of President Khandakar Mushtaque Ahmed was announced in the Chinese press in a manner which clearly reflected China's policy towards relations with such countries. No mention was made of domestic affairs beyond the statement that after the coup, "the situation in

Bangladesh now has returned to normal." Aspects of the new government's foreign policy were reported, however, with obvious approval. The new President, it was said,

proclaimed the policy of the new government, saying it would adopt a non-alignment policy and would maintain friendly relations with Islamic countries and non-aligned nations. He pledged continued support for Arab countries in regaining their lost territory from Israel. He pointed out that Bangladesh would tolerate no interference in its internal affairs.¹¹⁰

Such a statement, it would seem, provided ample encouragement for the Chinese to pursue the establishment of normal diplomatic relations with haste.¹¹¹

Indochina.

In an era defined by China as one in which imperialism headed by the United States was launching an all out assault on the peoples of the Third World, the struggles in Indochina occupied an unchallenged pre-eminence in China's conception of the way in which imperialism should be fought. As China's definition of contemporary society was altered, that pre-eminence naturally faded. While attempts were made by both United States and Soviet sources, among others, to suggest that this loss of pre-eminence amounted to a loss of interest or even a betrayal on China's part, there was little in the way of concrete evidence to support their suggestions as will be shown below.

China's reformulation of its strategy and tactics in relation to foreign policy was based on a revised conception of imperialist strength, but while that strength was still being exercised in Indochina as before, China continued to urge the peoples of that area to fight according to the principles of people's war. Even after the Tet Offensive when the North Vietnamese agreed to peace talks, the Chinese continued to praise

the virtues of protracted war as the only solution to the problem in Vietnam. The latter policy was even regarded as evidence in Soviet propaganda that,

China's leaders are even more loth than those in control of the U.S. imperialist administration to end the war in Vietnam as soon as possible. With their anti-popular political and military ideas they have ignored the Vietnamese people's interests and hope that the bloody war in Vietnam will go on forever.¹¹²

Although China came to endorse the possibilities of the Indochinese people gaining real concessions at the Paris peace talks, it did not stop its support for the war waged against American and American-sponsored forces in Indochina. In adopting this policy it manifestly agreed with principles and practice of the Indochinese liberation forces.

Undoubtedly, the major event to impinge on China's relations with the forces in Indochina during the period was the normalization of Sino-American relations, symbolizing the end of United States ability to maintain its containment of China. As has already been indicated the client states of America in the region quickly abandoned the exclusive allegiance which had been demanded of them in favour of a more normal posture towards China. In the case of the North Vietnamese and the Provisional Revolutionary Government, propaganda attempts were made by the United States and were duly echoed by its loyal academics, that Sino-American normalization implied China's abandonment of support for the revolution in Indochina. Thomas W. Robinson, for instance, asserted that the Nixon visit to Peking meant that China had been put in the position of "forcing the North Vietnamese to negotiate seriously for peace."¹¹³ From the vantage point of late 1975, Robinson's assertion, for which no proof was considered necessary, seems ludicrous. King C. Chen asserts, again without evidence,

that "Peking's decision to negotiate with Nixon was viewed by Hanoi as a betrayal."¹¹⁴

The United States government's principal attempts to demonstrate that its prosecution of the war in Vietnam was tolerated by the Chinese centred on its bombing of Haiphong and Hanoi timed to coincide with Nixon's visit to Peking. A number of North Vietnamese statements on the deceit of the Nixon Doctrine which attempted to disrupt socialist "solidarity against imperialism" received considerable publicity in the West.¹¹⁵ What was generally ignored in the West was that such statements directed their criticism at the United States and not at China. Nixon was denounced for his statement in the joint communique issued at the end of the visit to China that he supported self-determination for the Indochinese nations,¹¹⁶ United States imperialism was described as "now as in the past ...the Enemy Number One of all nations,"¹¹⁷ and Nixon was described as a "war maniac".¹¹⁸ These statements were interpreted in the Western press as implied criticisms of the Chinese government.

There is little in the way of concrete evidence to suggest, however, that the Vietnamese were concerned lest China negotiate an Indochinese settlement behind their backs or that they feared the Chinese were "betraying" them.¹¹⁹ In fact the Vietnamese would seem to understand very well both the motivation for and the advantages of such diplomacy. The following statement from *Nhan Dan* just prior to the Nixon visit makes clear that their assessment of developments in Southeast Asia is identical to that of the Chinese:

the fact that ASEAN, a product of the U.S. aggressive and interventionist policy, issued a statement urging for peace, freedom and neutrality reflected to some extent a change in the relations of forces in Southeast Asia and the world, favourable to the revolutionary and progressive forces, and detrimental to the imperialists and counter-revolutionary forces throughout the world.¹²⁰

The statement goes on to say that United States fortunes in Southeast Asia have been considerably weakened in the last "ten or fifteen years" and that,

(the) overwhelming majority for the reinstatement of the People's Republic of China in the UNO and the ousting of the Chiang Kai-shek clique from this body testified to the weakness of the U.S. which can no longer maintain its control over its allies and satellites.

That the Vietnamese were not in principle opposed to negotiations with the United States is of course evident from their own discussions in Paris.

Continued Chinese support to the Indochinese revolutionaries has made any discussion of the United States attempt to demonstrate a rift between China and the Indochinese liberation movements somewhat academic,¹²¹ but it is worth noting that the Chinese were not silent on the subject at the time. In the Shanghai Communique China reaffirmed its "firm support for the peoples of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia in their efforts for the attainment of their goal."¹²² Just prior to Nixon's arrival, the Chinese issued commentaries on the Vietnamese statements which were said in the West to be criticisms of China. Like the Vietnamese statements, the Chinese emphasized Nixon's "deceitful empty talk". "The Chinese Government," it was stated,

reaffirms its resolute support to the Vietnamese and other Indochinese peoples in their war against U.S. aggression and for national salvation. This is an unshakeable established policy of the Chinese Government and an unshirkable internationalist duty of the Chinese people.¹²³

The unprecedentedly savage bombing attacks on Hanoi and Haiphong initiated by Nixon just prior to his Peking visit appear, in retrospect, as a last desperate gamble to persuade the Vietnamese of their isolation.

The gamble was based on a gross misunderstanding of the relationship between China and North Vietnam and of China's understanding of what normalization of relations with the United States meant. As an exercise in political gambling it was extremely costly in terms of the damage inflicted on the cities of North Vietnam, but being based on quite false assumptions, it could not, and manifestly did not work.

As the Vietnam war drew to a close a new version of China's willingness to tolerate United States imperialism was propounded from Washington. In this instance it was claimed in both government and academic circles that far from wanting the expulsion of the United States from Southeast Asia as proclaimed, China in fact preferred its presence there to that of the Soviet Union and wished it to delay its departure. This particular distortion began with statements from Hale Boggs and Gerald Ford, at the time respective Democratic and Republican leaders in the United States House of Representatives. On their return from a visit to Peking in July 1972, they claimed to have been told by important Chinese officials of concern at "the possibility of continued Soviet armament and American disarmament." According to Ford, the officials, "don't want the United States to withdraw from the Pacific or other points. They believe our presence is important for the stability of the world now and in the future."¹²⁴

In entering academia, the statements of Boggs and Ford were somewhat transformed. Chou En-lai became the source of the statements according to Robert Scalapino and not only would a United States departure from Asia "lend weight to a greater Soviet presence" but also to a "renewed Japanese militarism".¹²⁵

Agence France-Presse, however, claimed that the statements were "categorically denied" by "reliable sources in Peking." It was stated that,

Far from wanting a continued American presence in Asia, Chou had complained to the visiting congressmen that the U.S. while withdrawing its troops from Vietnam appeared to be strengthening its forces elsewhere, particularly in Thailand and on the high seas off the coast of Vietnam.¹²⁶

Another academic purveyor of a similar rumour was W.A.C. Adie who claimed to have been told by "a Deputy Assistant Minister of Foreign Affairs" that "the U.S. and other foreign troops should not be in a hurry to leave Asia, because the Russians would come in to replace them. He evidently had Taiwan as well as Singapore and Malaysia in mind."¹²⁷ The transcript of the interview which was with Chang Wen-chin, the Assistant Foreign Minister, reveals otherwise. In a reply to a question from Ian Wilson, another member of the delegation, Chang replied in part,

Our understanding is that no big power should interfere in their (i.e., Southeast Asian countries) affairs so that their independence and sovereign rights can be respected. We are in favour of this approach. There is still a U.S. military presence in both Thailand and the Philippines. This is contrary to neutralization. It is not an easy job for the U.S. to withdraw at once because the Soviet Union tries to involve itself there, so there must be a process (of withdrawal).¹²⁸

Apart from there being no mention whatsoever in the interview of the "other foreign troops" mentioned by Adie, it is evident that the author has taken other liberties with Chang's statement. Given the context of other Chinese statements on the subject of Southeast Asia as outlined in this chapter it is apparent that the final sentence quoted cannot bear the construction placed upon it by Adie. As demonstrated in this and previous chapters, the whole burden of the change in China's foreign policy is based primarily on the advantages which have accrued to both nations and peoples as a result of the decline in American power — particularly as it is reflected in Southeast Asia. The consistent direction of Chinese

foreign policy in this period has been to promote the removal of American power from Second and Third World states. To say that this process of removal is complicated by the expanding power of the Soviet Union can scarcely be interpreted as a request for the United States to delay its departure from Southeast Asia.

Having said this it is also necessary to add that Chinese concern about Soviet expansion was nowhere more evident than in Asia after the propagation of the Asian Collective Security System by the Soviet Union in June 1969. The Chinese regarded this as an attempt by the Soviet Union to extend its contention with the United States to Asia, particularly to Southeast Asia, by taking advantage of American defeats in Southeast Asia and the acceptance of its military limitations as implicit in the Nixon Doctrine. In strategic terms, the Chinese regarded the Soviet system as an attempt to create an anti-Chinese military alliance. Coming shortly after the Sino-Soviet border clashes and with the demise of American containment of China in sight, there was clearly some substance to the Chinese fears, despite subsequent Soviet attempts to dispel them by countering that the scheme was designed only to encourage "friendly" and "good neighbourly" cooperation among Asian states.¹²⁹

The Chinese discussion of the proposed Soviet security system placed it in the historical context of the succession of alliances promoted by the United States since the 1950's to contain China. It was, they claimed, "picked up from the garbage heap of the notorious warmonger Dulles."¹³⁰ Chou En-lai made similar suggestions to Ross Terrill in an interview in 1971. "Now Dulles has a successor," he claimed, "in our northern neighbour."¹³¹ It is worth noting in this connection that some of those who continue to regard China as a force to be contained and who admit that this onerous task is being relinquished by the United States have welcomed

the alacrity with which the Soviet Union has attempted to take up the job. Thus the new John Foster Dulles would seem to have spawned the new academic cold warriors who speak of the "burden of containment borne by the Soviet Union" and how it might be lessened by the adoption of the Soviet plan for collective security in Asia "to create centres of military power... (to) be better able to withstand Maoist-based peasant insurrections."¹³²

In summing up China's new policy and contrasting it with its predecessor, the most obvious feature is China's willingness and/or ability to secure normal diplomatic relations with Third World countries. Where this has been done, the accompanying official statements have registered China's disagreement with the social system of the country in question but they have also registered China's approval of the government of the country insofar as it has attempted or is attempting to escape from the development policies and orbits of one or both of the superpowers. The above examination reveals this aspect of Third World countries' international behaviour to be the only basis for unity with China to which the Chinese government alludes.

In keeping with this development the Chinese have severely curtailed their public criticism of the governments which they have recognized, although factual news items depicting their economic, social and political problems, particularly where these can be related to external, and especially superpower, interference are still published. Also in accordance with the growth of diplomatic relations, China began an active support of the policy of non-alignment. In September 1970 Chou En-lai sent China's first ever congratulations to a summit meeting of the non-aligned countries, although he refrained from specifically endorsing non-alignment as such.¹³³ By 1972, Chi Peng-fei, the Chinese Foreign Minister, in discussing

the meeting of foreign ministers of non-aligned countries being held in Georgetown, claimed,

The Chinese Government always supports and respects the policy of peace, neutrality and non-alignment pursued by the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America and is happy to see that the non-aligned countries are playing an important role in international affairs.¹³⁴

Similarly, China gave support in its press and in the United Nations to various neutralization schemes — notably that in Southeast Asia as proposed by Malaysia, the proposal of Sri Lanka to have the Indian Ocean become a zone of peace and the proposal that Latin America should become a nuclear-free zone.¹³⁵ In similar vein was China's enthusiastic support for the Latin American attempts to affirm sovereignty over 200-nautical mile territorial waters¹³⁶ and its defence of Indonesian, Malaysian and Singaporean rights over the Malacca Straits.¹³⁷ In short, any unilateral, but more especially multilateral and regional proposal having an obvious anti-hegemonic direction which was put up by any Third World country or group of countries generally came to receive China's support.

With its newly extended diplomacy China attempted to expand its aid programme, although issuing frequent reminders of its limited capacity in this area. In large part, it would seem, this aspect of China's foreign policy also serves an anti-hegemonic purpose, at least in an exemplary way, in as much as it illustrates by contrast the element of dependency implicit in the aid granted by both the United States and the Soviet Union. Although this has been a continuing feature of Chinese aid, its extension during the period under review is noteworthy. An indication of the manner in which Chinese aid is given can be gained from the reflections of Norodom Sihanouk on his years as Cambodian Head of State. "The Chinese leaders," he remarked,

never tried to push us around. They never said — independence yes, but it must be 'red' independence. Neutrality yes but it must be 'leftist' neutrality. Independence and neutrality were good enough without any qualifications, good for Cambodia and South-East Asia as a whole. Chairman Mao or Premier Chou never subjected me to the homilies, the admonitions, warnings, 'friendly advice' and so forth that I had to endure from Western leaders and their Asian satellites. And what the Chinese gave in the way of economic aid, they gave modestly, usually with preface: We wish it were of better quality — but we are still a developing country. We wish it were more — but our own production is limited. We hope that as we build up our own industry we will be able to give our friends more effective help.¹³⁸

In a variety of United Nations organizations, Chinese spokesmen put forward the kind of aid policy described by Sihanouk as the only one which could be of benefit to Third World countries.¹³⁹

In accordance with these trends, a considerable emphasis was placed on China as a developing country suffering the same disadvantages and subject to similar needs as those of other Third World countries. In stressing this commonality, the Chinese, particularly in United Nations forums, sought not so much to establish at an international level the virtues of specific Chinese developmental policies, but rather to show that what development China had achieved was the result of having relentlessly pursued political independence as a precondition of achieving economic independence. Chou Hua-min, Vice-Minister of Foreign Trade, representing China at the third session of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development in 1972, stated this position clearly,

Throughout long years of struggle, the Chinese people have become keenly aware that in order to develop its national economy, a country must, first of all, win political independence and that in order to consolidate its independence, it must develop its economy, whereas in developing economy, it should first follow the principle of self-reliance, i.e., depending on the strength of its own people and making full use of its own resources.¹⁴⁶

In this context also, China lent its support to attempts by Third World countries in their efforts to throw off their colonial legacy of the "one-product economy" and to develop multi-sectoral balanced economies which are not geared to the requirements of Western countries but to those of their own people. As Chou Hua-min stated,

We resolutely support the reasonable demands of many developing countries to develop their national economy, gradually reshape their "single-product economy", stabilize the prices of raw materials, remove the tariff and non-tariff barriers set up by the "developed countries", participate in the reform of the international monetary system and develop national shipping, insurance and other enterprises so as to break the monopoly by a few countries.

China's support for revolutionary movements has been maintained. It is however, noticeable that the more exclusivist and cataclysmic elements of China's support for various liberation movements in Third World countries have been tempered. Chiao Kuan-hua's speech at the United Nations General Assembly in October 1972 is both authoritative and representative. In speaking of Southern Africa he claimed,

the only way to overthrow the white colonialist rule and win national liberation is to rely mainly on their own efforts, fully arousing and organizing the masses and waging an unyielding valiant struggle. It is necessary to seek external assistance, but more and more facts have proved that it is impossible to put an end to the colonialist rule by relying on other people. The Chinese Government and people resolutely support the heroic people of Mozambique, Angola, Guinea (Bissau), Azania, Zimbabwe, Namibia and Spanish Sahara. Their struggles are just, and so long as they carry on perseveringly, fear neither hardship or sacrifice and advance wave upon wave, they will surely, with the sympathy and support of the whole world, win final victory.¹⁴²

Essentially, the programme is quite similar to that propounded during the Lin Piao phase of foreign policy — particularly when due allowance is made for the forum in which the programme is being presented. Gone is

the formerly mandatory reference to the necessity of Mao Tsetung thought as the guiding principle of the struggle, and the "genuine Marxist-Leninist Party" to lead it; gone also is the prediction that prairie fires were about to begin; but the more basic features of Lin's *Long Live the Victory of People's War* are present. Liberation movements are to "rely mainly on their own efforts," but seek the support of others, including the Chinese Government and people. Moreover, they must persevere in struggle.

With regard to party-to-party relations, it has been shown above that relations have also been maintained -- even where the party in question is engaged in armed struggle against a government which China has recognized. As has also been shown above the support given by China has been at a somewhat less vocal, though no less definitive level. The inference that a conflict exists between support for such parties and simultaneous recognition of the governments which they oppose is clearly not warranted given the Chinese understanding of the Leninist notion of peaceful coexistence.

China's rationale for these policy developments has been made clear above. It has reformulated its policy towards the Third World primarily as a result of a belief that imperialism is on the defensive and as a consequence, Third World countries are no longer bound to the same degree by hegemonic/imperialist dictates. "Countries," claim the Chinese, "want independence." The direct armed assault of liberation movements has led to the situation where even former client states are prepared to a greater or lesser extent to repudiate their client status. In Asia particularly, this process has been accelerated by Sino-American relations being normalized and Chinese entry into the United Nations. Third World governments for whom United States domination had been rationalized as the only

obstacle to Chinese expansionism rapidly took advantage of their newly acquired leverage and consequently recognized China. Significant though this recognition was, China paid much more vocal attention to the underlying material reality which it reflected — viz. the attempts, often of a tentative and minimal kind, by Third World countries to gain a measure of economic independence from superpower hegemony, particularly where these attempts took a multilateral cooperative form. A great number of the tactical innovations introduced by the Chinese in the period are concentrated on developing this tendency which they regard as widespread and as having immense possibilities.

It is not possible given the space available to examine at sufficient depth to be probative the developments which have taken place in the Third World and in its relations with imperialism so that a thoroughgoing critique of the fundamental assumptions underlying China's new relations with the Third World may be undertaken. It is however, worth attempting to document in outline some of the major developments which may have been critical to the Chinese in reassessing their tactical priorities in the Third World.

It has already been shown in dealing with the decline of United States imperialism in Chapter IV that the most basic premise of the new Chinese tactics has a solid foundation. The Nixon government in particular was acutely conscious of this decline vis-à-vis other imperialist powers and was forced to take major economic and financial steps culminating in the Smithsonian agreement of December 1971 in order to rationalize its loss of dominance¹⁴³ and vis-à-vis the liberation struggles of Third World countries which forced the military rationalization known as the Nixon Doctrine.¹⁴⁴ Apart from these international developments the United States also entered a period of unemployment and inflation unprecedented

in the long boom since the Second World War. At this level of generality, the above propositions are readily acceptable — and indeed have been widely accepted. But the specific and critical premise on which much of China's strategy in the Third World rests, and which it regards as flowing from these major propositions, implies that in the new configuration of international power, Third World governments have a degree of independence and leverage which was previously not available to them, and that they are not only intent upon using it to the detriment of imperialist powers but also that they are capable of achieving significant results in this direction. It is this specific premise which needs examination here — no matter how cursory.

In the previous chapter some of the effects of heightened inter-imperialist rivalry in the "Second World" were canvassed. It is as a result of the effects of this rivalry on the states of the Third World that the Chinese regard their independence as having been acquired. In the case of Indochina, independence of a more genuine and absolute kind has been achieved as a result of the military defeat of imperialism and the establishment of societies which preclude the dominance of classes in whose interest it is to cooperate with imperialism. The analysis of China's relations with Third World countries conducted above shows quite clearly that it is not based on the misbelief that the majority of Asian and particularly Southeast Asian states have been transformed in the latter sense. Whatever the changes in the social formation of these states — and such changes at the domestic level are rarely the subject of public analysis in the Chinese press — it is not presumed that they are dominated by any class or group with anti-capitalist interests.

Previously it had been assumed by the Chinese that these states were subjected to the dominance of "imperialism headed by the United States."

In the new dispensation the decisive change which has taken place, "the great realignment", is the restructuring of the imperialist camp. The United States is considered to have declined to the extent that the Soviet Union issues its strategic and military challenge globally and to a lesser extent competes with the United States for economic hegemony, while the European Economic Community and Japan issue their economic challenges in various areas. It is this development — as it imposes itself on the countries of the Third World — that the Chinese deem to have created the new opportunities open to the latter. Clearly such a change has repercussions on the balance of class forces in satellite countries, but these are not regarded as primary or initiating.

Southeast Asia would seem to offer a quite considerable justification for the new Chinese policy. The major event in the area during the period under review was undoubtedly the continued decline of American power in Indo-china to the point where eventual withdrawal became certain. The withdrawal of American forces from other areas of Southeast Asia was either begun or foreshadowed under the terms of the Nixon Doctrine. Such tendencies were not paralleled by reductions in the flow of American investment in Southeast Asia which continued to run at a high level. The attractions of extensive raw materials, low labour costs, a massive reserve army of labour and a non-unionized or severely restricted labour force continued to prove irresistible.¹⁴⁵ In mid-1973 United States direct foreign investment in Southeast Asia had a book value of \$US2.6 billion and was still as large as that of any other foreign investor.¹⁴⁶ In spite of moderately rising tariff barriers on the part of some Southeast Asian countries in an attempt to promote local industry, United States exports to the area also continued to grow, and continued to be dominated by machinery and technical equipment.¹⁴⁷

The most significant trend evident in the quality of American investment during the period was towards industrialization by American-based multi-national companies. In the period since the Second World War the colonial structure had largely been preserved in much of Southeast Asia — the production of raw materials for utilization in metropolitan countries had dominated the shape of local economies. In accordance with this pattern landlords and merchants generally held effective power in the ex-colonies.

By the end of the 1960's as the long boom came to an end in the Western capitalist world, the low labour costs of the Third World became not merely an added advantage in the extraction of raw materials but sufficient incentive to warrant the export of capital to take advantage of it. This does not necessarily mean that the benefits of industrialization have begun to accrue to the local populations, since the products are generally intended for the export market or the members of local foreign enclaves.¹⁴⁸

But in the Southeast Asia of the 1970's it does produce interesting effects for it is not simply United States multi-nationals which have embarked on such programmes. As mentioned in the previous chapter, Japan, since the late 1960's has increased its financial stake in Southeast Asia enormously. Again the cause of this move has in large part been the 15%-20% wage rises per annum in Japan since the late 1960's which in effect "pushed" many large firms into Southeast Asia. The revaluations of the yen in December 1971 and February 1973 accelerated this trend for those firms heavily reliant on exports. The expansion of Japanese investment was remarkable — growing from a mere \$US5 million in 1969 to about \$US2½ billion in 1973.¹⁴⁹

As the report of the Asian Development Bank in 1971 makes clear, the "dominant motive for investing in Southeast Asia in the past" has been "securing, maintaining and developing markets" in Japan's case, but,

the desire to obtain low cost bases to export back to Japan and other countries will be of rapidly growing importance in the 1970's and by the 1980's will probably have become the dominant motive.... The bulk of Japanese industrial projects in Southeast Asia are mainly single-product and involve simple process plants.¹⁵⁰

The report also makes clear that Japanese willingness to enter joint ventures means that as foreign investors they have to supply less of the initial investment. Moreover it is shown that subsequent finance needed is obtained locally from the partners, profits, government subsidies and local banks and that little or no technology transfer took place. Thus whatever "development" or industrialization took place was geared to the needs of the Japanese economy rather than that of the Southeast Asian country concerned.

Western European countries both separately and latterly as the European Economic Community have also shown an increased interest in the area. In 1974 alone a German consortium announced plans to build a steel works in Indonesia, the French were reported as having launched an industrial drive in the region,¹⁵¹ and the EEC's Commissioner for External Relations, Sir Christopher Soames, met ASEAN representatives in Jakarta for continuing negotiations on trading and investment relations.¹⁵² The Soviet Union also signed a trade agreement with Indonesia with the composition of goods traded being along traditional lines — the Soviet Union importing rubber, copra, pepper, leather, mining products and handicrafts while Indonesia agreed to import cement, machinery, chemical products, medicines and generators.¹⁵³

Australia, although able to participate only in a small way in these developments, has nevertheless announced its intentions to do so. An article analysing Australia's involvement in the economies of Southeast Asia since the advent of the Whitlam government in 1972 states,

On 30 September 1973 Dr. Cairns, then Minister for Secondary Industry and Trade, announced that the Pacific Basin was ripe for Australian expansion. His department was certainly seeking to facilitate such penetration. On 15 June he told businessmen that "a constructive attitude to our balance of payments situation would consist, for example, in encouraging Australian firms to invest overseas." ...On 10 October 1973 Cairns announced he would send an official survey mission to Thailand and the Philippines to encourage private investment to go abroad. This would secure markets for processed products, provide a larger base on which to build Australian technology and management skills, strengthen Australia's political position in the Pacific Basin and enable Australian companies to get a better perspective on the world.¹⁵⁴

The domestic economic forces which were responsible for driving the United States and the Soviet Union as well as countries of the "Second World" into accelerated investment programmes in Southeast Asia, and in general terms in the Third World, were essentially similar. In summary form they amounted to domestic economic stagnation or recession. The most novel feature of this recession was the intensified attempts on the part of the developed countries to secure access to raw materials, particularly energy, at a time when the terms of trade had begun to shift in favour of raw materials producers which were mostly to be found in Third World countries. This aspect of Western capitalist recession and the inter-imperialist rivalries which accompanied it also had reverberations in Southeast Asia. The oil embargo by oil producing countries in the Middle East only strengthened a trend in evidence for a number of years in Southeast Asia. Multinational corporations had taken out leases covering

the area from the seventeenth parallel to Cape York and in many cases were actively engaged in locating and producing oil.¹⁵⁵ Japan, reliant on imports for almost all of its energy, and dependent on oil for some 74% of its energy consumption, was particularly active in the drive to obtain energy from Southeast Asia. Although oil is of primary importance the Indonesian government has signed an initial agreement with a Japanese consortium for the construction of one of the world's largest dams in north Sumatra to provide power for a number of extractive and processing plants.¹⁵⁶

It would appear therefore that Southeast Asia has become one locus of inter-imperialist contradictions. In spite of the fact that sellers cartels of the OPEC kind have not arisen with any economic muscle in Southeast Asia, the example has been noted as has the failure of Kissinger's efforts to organize an effective buyers cartel in response and the counter-productive nature of his military threats against recalcitrant oil producers.¹⁵⁷ To some extent the states of Southeast Asia have only to play the highest bidder to take advantage of their new situation. But in some cases comprador elements within the dominant classes are attached to particular imperial overlords¹⁵⁸ and other elements of the dominant classes derive their power from their relation to modes of production which are in the process of being superseded in the new situation. It is consequently predictable that a new form of regime will emerge to maximize autonomy both with respect to the interests of local exploiting classes and competing imperial interests. Although this process is likely to be an extended one the emergence of strong bureaucratic-military regimes to fulfil the above functions has already been observed.¹⁵⁹

As the needs of rival imperialist powers for raw materials and energy in particular increase, the independence of Southeast Asian states

vis-à-vis the various imperialist powers is likely to develop. Moreover it is in the objective interest of such states and of their ruling strata to unite against the developed countries — even if only to exact the maximum price for selling their national resources. The changes which took place in ASEAN in conjunction with Malaysia's call for neutralization would seem to have been understood by the Chinese in this context.

The policy of the Chinese towards the Third World is based on the assumption that the developments described as having begun above are inimical to the interests of imperialism. That this is also the view of the United States would seem to be the clear implication of Kissinger's speech of May 1974.

The present economic system, he repeated no less than three times, as though afraid he might not be heard, had "served the world well," but "the so-called Third World" was threatening to disrupt it by following the dictates of "ideology and national self-interest."¹⁶⁰

The new outlook being envisaged here by both the United States and China is not without its ironies. The United States continues to maintain massive military spending programmes less in the hope of waging and winning wars against national liberation movements than for the more likely possibility of having to go to war against one or more reactionary Third World states.¹⁶¹ This latter possibility has already been seriously mooted.¹⁶² China, on the other hand is engaged in an extensive foreign policy programme which aims at supporting these reactionary states insofar as they adopt anti-imperialist measures of the kind described above and has muted its support of armed struggle in the Third World even though its fundamental moral and in some cases material support remains.

NOTES

¹"Long Live the Victory...", p. 53.

²The notion of the intermediate zone was not mentioned in the Chinese press after 1964 until its revival in the 1970's.

³Tung Ming, "The Invincible Weapon that Guarantees Victory in People's Revolutionary Wars", *Peking Review* No. 1, January 1, 1967, p. 22.

⁴*Ibid.*, p. 23.

⁵*Ibid.*

⁶"1966 in Review: Great New Era of World Revolution — Asia: Revolutionary Struggles Surge Forward", *Peking Review* No. 3, January 13, 1967, p. 21.

⁷"1966 in Review: Imperialist Camp Enters Gloomy New Year", *Peking Review* No. 4, January 20, 1967, p. 29.

⁸"Vice-Premier Lin Piao Greets South Vietnam Liberation Armed Forces Unification Day", *Peking Review* No. 8, February 17, 1967, p. 10.

⁹*Renmin Ribao* Observer, "Smash the Big U.S.-Soviet Conspiracy", in *Peking Review* No. 9, February 24, 1967, p. 12.

¹⁰*Renmin Ribao* Observer, "A Sinister U.S. Imperialist Meeting to Expand the War of Aggression Against Vietnam", March 27, 1967, in *Peking Review* No. 14, March 31, 1967, p. 15.

¹¹"Statement of the Chinese Foreign Ministry on the New Developments in the Vietnam Situation", *Peking Review* No. 11, March 10, 1967, p. 12.

¹²"Authorized Statement by the Vietnam News Agency", *Peking Review* No. 11, March 10, 1967, p. 25.

¹³*Renmin Ribao* Commentator, "New Disciples of Goebbels", *Peking Review* No. 11, March 10, 1967, p. 25.

¹⁴"Fake Interview Exposed: U.S.-Soviet Rumour-Mongering", *Peking Review* No. 24, June 9, 1967, p. 37.

¹⁵"Chairman Mao Shows the World's People the Road to Defeat U.S. Imperialism", *Peking Review* No. 52, December 25, 1967, p. 11.

¹⁶*Ibid.*

¹⁷"Asian, African and Latin American People Make Surging Advances in Their Revolutionary Armed Struggles", *Peking Review* No. 1, January 3, 1968, p. 35.

¹⁸*Ibid.* The outbreak of guerilla activity in Indonesia in August of 1967 was greeted with enthusiasm in the Chinese press. See *Peking Review* No. 35, August 25, 1967, p. 30.

¹⁹*Ibid.* Liu Shao-ch'i was said to have encouraged the Burmese Communist Party to give up its struggle against Ne Win. See *Peking Review* No. 34, August 18, 1967, pp. 15-6.

²⁰*Ibid.*, p. 34.

²¹"People's Forces in Thailand: Steeled in Battle", *Peking Review* No. 34, August 18, 1967, p. 39.

²²"The Malayan People's Revolutionary Struggle Has Continuously Scored Victorious Development", *Peking Review* No. 10, March 8, 1968, p. 29.

²³*Ibid.*

²⁴*Ibid.* Cf. also, "Malayan National Liberation Army: Persevering in Guerilla War", *Peking Review* No. 41, November 1, 1968, p. 27; "Malayan National Liberation Army: Well Planned Ambush", *Peking Review* No. 36, September 6, 1968, p. 29.

²⁵"The Malayan People's Revolutionary Struggle...", *Peking Review*, p. 29. The same phenomena was evident in China's discussion of the situation in Indonesia. Cf. for example, "Indonesian Right-Wing Military: Open Fascist Dictatorship", *Peking Review* No. 13, March 24, 1967, p. 30; "The Man Talks Nonsense", *Peking Review* No. 17, April 21, 1967, p. 23.

²⁶"Under the Light of Mao Tse-tung's Thought: Excellent Revolutionary Situation in Asia, Africa and Latin America", *Peking Review* No. 43, October 20, 1967, p. 30.

²⁷"Situation of World Revolution is Excellent", *Peking Review* No. 42, October 18, 1968, p. 17.

²⁸"Meeting in Bangkok: Puny Counter-Revolutionary Alliance", *Peking Review* No. 34, August 18, 1967, pp. 39-40.

²⁹"After the Indian Elections: A Still More Reactionary Government", *Peking Review* No. 13, March 24, 1967, p. 30.

³⁰"The New Indian Government: U.S.-Soviet Pawn Against China", *Peking Review* No. 18, April 28, 1967, p. 37.

³¹"Spring Thunder Over India", *Renmin Ribao* editorial, July 5, 1967, in *Peking Review* No. 29, July 14, 1967, p. 22.

³²*Ibid.*, p. 23.

³³"Dange's Plot to Sabotage Indian Revolution Will Surely Fail", *Peking Review* No. 24, June 9, 1969, p. 34.

³⁴"Spring Thunder...", p. 23.

³⁵"Situation of World Revolution...", p. 16. It is claimed, incorrectly, by Peter Van Ness, that the Naga and Mizo struggles were subsequently regarded by the Chinese as "component parts of a broad nationwide struggle for national liberation." Neither the Chinese sources he cites or any others available to this author suggest that the Chinese position on the struggles of these national minorities was altered. Cf. Peter Van Ness, *Revolution and Chinese Foreign Policy*, p. 224.

³⁶Apart from the references already cited in this context, see for instance, "Enslaving India: Essence of Soviet Aid", *Peking Review* No. 27, June 30, 1967, p. 46; *Renmin Ribao* Commentator, "Let the Red Flag of Naxalbari Fly Still Higher", *Peking Review* No. 33, August 11, 1967, p. 21.

³⁷For discussions of these issues see, Richard Nations, "The Economic Structure of Pakistan and Bangladesh", in Robin Blackburn (ed.), *Explosion in a Subcontinent*, Penguin, Middlesex, 1975; Tariq Ali, *Pakistan Military Rule or People's Power*, Cape, London, 1970; Kathleen Gough and Hari P. Sharma (eds.), *Imperialism and Revolution in South Asia*, Monthly Review Press, New York, 1974.

³⁸In the case of Indonesia, China's diplomatic relations were terminated as a result of two factors — the coup in 1965 which, at least in the short term, eliminated any element of contention between the Indonesian government and United States domination and secondly, the overflow to the local Chinese community of the Cultural Revolution. In Cambodia it was to be the first of the above factors — in this case the 1970 coup which toppled Sihanouk — which was responsible for broken diplomatic relations. In Burma's case, it was the second of the above factors — an overflow of Cultural Revolutionary fervour to the local Chinese community in Rangoon — which was primarily responsible for the period of intergovernmental hostility between Burma and China.

³⁹For an example of such scholarship, cf. "China's Foreign Policy and International Position During a Year of Cultural Revolution", *Current Scene* Vol. V, No. 20, December 1, 1967.

⁴⁰Donald E. Nuechterlein, "Southeast Asia in International Politics: A 1975 Perspective", *Asian Survey* Vol. XV, No. 7, July 1975, p. 580.

⁴¹"Strive for New Victories", *Peking Review* No. 40, October 6, 1972, p. 9.

⁴²"Chairman Mao Meets Chairman Ne Win and Madame Ne Win", *Peking Review* No. 33, August 13, 1971, p. 3; "Burmese Guests in China", *Peking Review* No. 23, June 9, 1972, p. 4; "Chinese Table Tennis Team Visits Malaysia, Thailand and Burma", *Peking Review* No. 29, July 20, 1973, p. 18; "Greeting Burmese Leaders", *Peking Review* No. 11, March 15, 1974, p. 4.

⁴³Robert A. Scalapino, *Asia and the Major Powers*, American Enterprises Institute for Public Policy Research, Washington, D.C., 1972, p. 23.

⁴⁴*BBC Summary of World Broadcasts*, Part III, *The Far East* (FE)/3759.

⁴⁵*The New York Times*, August 18, 1971, quoted in Robert A. Holmes, "China-Burma Relations Since the Rift", *Asian Survey* Vol. XII, No. 8, p. 696.

⁴⁶"From Central Committee of Communist Party of Burma", *Peking Review* No. 30, July 23, 1971, p. 16.

⁴⁷Robert A. Holmes, *op. cit.*, p. 698.

⁴⁸Edwin W. Martin, "The Socialist Republic of the Union of Burma: How Much Change?", *Asian Survey* Vol. XV, No. 2, p. 134.

⁴⁹"Condolences Over Heroic Deaths of Comrades Thakin Zin and Thakin Chit", *Peking Review* No. 22, May 30, 1975, p. 3.

⁵⁰*Ibid.*

⁵¹*Renmin Ribao* Commentator, "Accomplices of U.S. Imperialism Will Come to No Good End", *Peking Review* No. 3, January 21, 1972, p. 13; "Thailand: People's Armed Struggle and Mass Movement Continue to Develop", *Peking Review* No. 11, March 17, 1972, p. 16; "Thai People's Armed Struggle: New Battle Results", *Peking Review* No. 12, March 24, 1972, p. 21; "People's Armed Forces Growing in Struggle", *Peking Review* No. 32, August 11, 1972, p. 19; "U.S. Military Buildup", *Peking Review* No. 33, August 18, 1972, p. 20.

⁵²"Premier Chou Meets Prasit Kanchanawat", *Peking Review* No. 37, September 15, 1972, p. 18; Bangkok Radio, October 10, 1972, (FE)/4116.

⁵³Bangkok Radio, August 30, (FE)/W741.

⁵⁴"Message of Greetings From Central Committee of Communist Party of Thailand", *Peking Review* No. 41, Supplement, October 12, 1973, p. 3.

⁵⁵For the Joint Communiqué the the Thai government statement terminating all official contacts with Taiwan, see *Peking Review* No. 27, July 4, 1975, pp. 8-9.

⁵⁶For an account of the Communist Party of Thailand's aims and recent activities, see Stephen I. Alpern, "Insurgency in Northeast Thailand: New Cause for Alarm", *Asian Survey* Vol. XV, No. 8, August 1975, pp. 684-92, and Justus M. van der Kroef, "Guerilla Communism in Thailand", *Orbis* Vol. XVIII, No. 1, Spring 1974. For China's endorsement of the Thai Communist Party's struggle during this time, see "'Voice of the People of Thailand': Persevere in Armed Struggle", *Peking Review* No. 34, August 23, 1974, p. 21; "On 32nd Founding Anniversary: Statement of Central Committee of Communist Party of Thailand", *Peking Review* No. 51, December 18, 1974, p. 17; "Peasants Persist in Armed Struggle", *Peking Review* No. 4, January 24, 1975, p. 29; "New Victories for Armed Struggle", *Peking Review* No. 6, February 7, 1975, p. 20.

⁵⁷"Big Students' Demonstration", *Peking Review* No. 42, October 19, 1973, p. 20; Shih Ping, "Rise of the Student Movement in Thailand", *Peking Review* No. 43, October 26, 1973, p. 15; "Thailand: Protest Against C.I.A. Interference", *Peking Review* No. 3, January 18, 1974, p. 20.

⁵⁸This suggestion will be discussed below, but for an example, see W.A.C. Adie, "Visit to China", *Current Affairs Bulletin* Vol. 50, No. 5, October 1973, p. 15.

⁵⁹See, e.g., "U.S. Military Buildup", *Peking Review* No. 33, August 18, 1972, p. 20; "Appeal to Stop U.S. — Thai Clique's Use of Chemical Weapons", *Peking Review* No. 41, October 13, 1972, p. 21; "Thailand Protest Against C.I.A. Interference", *loc. cit.*

⁶⁰January 13, 1975, (FE)/4802. The Thai Foreign Minister reported the arrangement on his return from a visit to China. 75,000 tons of high-speed deisel oil were involved in the initial deal.

⁶¹These included 40,000 tons of rubber, 5,000 tons of palm oil and 50,000 cubic metres of logs. (FE)/3774.

⁶²September 19, 1971, (FE)/3789.

⁶³August 28, 1971, (FE)/3774.

⁶⁴See, e.g., "Communist Party of Malaya Growing Stronger in Revolutionary Storm — Editorial of the *Voice of Malayan Revolution*", *Peking Review* No. 23, June 4, 1971, p. 16; "'Voice of Malayan Revolution' Radio: People's Struggle Constantly Ascending, Superpowers Meeting Difficulties", *Peking Review* No. 25, June 18, 1971, p. 12; "Greetings: From Central Committee of Communist Party of Malaya", *Peking Review* No. 30, July 23, 1971, p. 17; "North Kalimantan: People's Armed Forces Active in Wide Areas of Sarawak", *Peking Review* No. 11, March 17, 1972, p. 17; "Malaya: Advance Victoriously Along the Road of Armed Struggle", *Peking Review* No. 21, May 26, 1972, p. 18.

⁶⁵Stephen Chee, "Malaysia and Singapore: Separate Identities, Different Priorities", *Asian Survey* Vol. 13, No. 2, February 1973, pp. 156-61.

⁶⁶For an account of these developments see, Stephen Chee, "Malaysia and Singapore: The Political Economy of Multiracial Development", *Asian Survey* Vol. 14, No. 2, February 1974.

⁶⁷"'Voice of Malayan Revolution': 25th Anniversary of Malayan Liberation Army Marked", *Peking Review* No. 7, February 15, 1974, p. 20; "'Voice of the Malayan Revolution': Revolutionary Torrent of North Kalimantan People Irresistible", *Peking Review* No. 13, March 29, 1974, p. 27; "Continue Along the Road of Continuing to Seize Power by Armed Force — Statement of Chairman of Central Committee of Communist Party of North Kalimantan", *Peking Review* No. 17, April 26, 1974, p. 26.

⁶⁸"45th Anniversary of Founding of Communist Party of Malaya Greeted", *Peking Review* No. 18, May 2, 1975, p. 6.

⁶⁹*Ibid.*

⁷⁰"Joint Communique of the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of Malaysia", *Peking Review* No. 23, June 7, 1974, p. 8.

⁷¹June 2, 1974, (FE)/4616.

⁷²"Peaceful Coexistence — Two Diametrically Opposed Policies", in *The Polemic on the General Line...*, p. 278.

⁷³*Ibid.*, p. 279.

⁷⁴"Joint Communique of the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of Malaysia", *op. cit.*, p. 8.

⁷⁵"Premier Chou En-lai's Speech", *Peking Review* No. 23, June 7, 1974, p. 9.

⁷⁶See for instance, "Philippine People: Advancing Along the Road of Armed Struggle", *Peking Review* No. 2, January 14, 1972, p. 18; "The Philippines: Third Anniversary of New People's Army", *Peking Review* No. 21, May 26, 1972, p. 18; "Statement of Communist Party of the Philippines on 5th Anniversary of its Re-establishment", *Peking Review* No. 8, February 22, 1974, p. 16.

⁷⁷In an interview quoted in Rolando V. del Carmen, "Philippines 1974: A Holding Pattern — Power Consolidation or Prelude to a Decline?", *Asian Survey* Vol. 15, No. 2, February 1975, p. 141.

⁷⁸October 7, 1974, (FE)/4725.

⁷⁹Rolando V. del Carmen, *op. cit.*, pp. 140-41.

⁸⁰"Joint Communique of the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of the Republic of the Philippines", *Peking Review* No. 24, June 13, 1975, p. 7.

⁸¹"Vice-Premier Tend Hsiao-ping's Speech", *Peking Review* No. 24, June 13, 1975, p. 9.

⁸²*Ibid.*

⁸³E.g., "Greeting 55th Anniversary of Founding of Communist Party of Indonesia", *Peking Review* No. 22, May 30, 1975, p. 3; "Continue to Hold Aloft the Banner of Revolution and Strive to Realize National Liberation — The Delegation of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Indonesia Issues Statement to Mark the 55th Anniversary of the Founding of the Party", *Peking Review* No. 22, May 30, 1975, p. 17.

⁸⁴December 31, 1973, (FE)/4489.

⁸⁵"Meeting in Bangkok: Puny Counter-Revolutionary Alliance", *Peking Review* No. 34, August 18, 1967, pp. 39-40.

⁸⁶"Southeast Asian Countries Strengthen Economic Co-operation", *Peking Review* No. 25, June 20, 1975, pp. 19, 23.

⁸⁷For a Western account of these, see Malcolm Caldwell, "ASEANisation", *Journal of Contemporary Asia* Vol. 4, No. 1, 1974.

⁸⁸For a detailed account of the social formations of the countries involved see, Fred Halliday, *Arabia Without Sultans*, Penguin, Middlesex, 1974.

⁸⁹"Joint Communiqué of the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Imperial Government of Iran", *Peking Review* No. 34, August 20, 1971, p. 4. The establishment of diplomatic relations with Iran followed the visit of the Shah's sisters to Peking in April/May of 1971. This visit followed the rise in the posted price of oil from \$1.79 per barrel to \$2.17 per barrel negotiated by Iran, Iraq and Saudi Arabia on behalf of the Gulf countries in February.

⁹⁰"*Renmin Ribao* Editorial: Greeting Establishment of Diplomatic Relations Between China and Iran", *Peking Review* No. 35, August 27, 1971, p. 16.

⁹¹Fred Halliday, *op. cit.*, p. 418.

⁹²See, e.g., Jen Ku-ping, "What is Behind the Petrodollar Rush?", *Peking Review* No. 42, October 18, 1974, p. 18.

⁹³Fred Halliday, *op. cit.*, p. 408.

⁹⁴See, e.g., "Oil Weapon in the Hands of Arab Countries", *Peking Review* No. 48, November 30, 1973, pp. 10-11.

⁹⁵Kathleen Gough, "Imperialism and Revolutionary Potential in South Asia, in Kathleen Gough and Hari P. Sharma (eds.), *Imperialism and Revolution in South Asia*, Monthly Review Press, New York, 1973, pp. 26-8.

⁹⁶*Ibid.*, p. 24, quoting "Dawn of a New Era in East Pakistan", May 1971, and Charu Mazumdar's statement, "Pakistan and the Role of the Communist Party", June 29, 1971, in *Liberation* (Calcutta), April/June 1971.

⁹⁷Kathleen Gough, *op. cit.*, p. 25, citing *Far Eastern Economic Review*, November 20, 1971, p. 19.

⁹⁸Kathleen Gough, *op. cit.*, p. 25.

⁹⁹Tariq Ali, *Pakistan: Military Rule or People's Power*, William Morrow and Co., New York, 1970, p. 51.

¹⁰⁰"Chou En-lai's Message to Yahya Khan", *Pakistan Times*, April 13, 1971, reprinted in Robin Blackburn, *Explosion in a Subcontinent*, Penguin, Middlesex, 1975, p. 358.

¹⁰¹"Pakistan Delegation in China: Chi Peng-fei's Speech", *Peking Review* No. 46, November 12, 1971, p. 5.

¹⁰²See for instance, "Huang Hua Condemns Soviet Union for Supporting Indian Aggression", *Peking Review* No. 50, December 10, 1971.

¹⁰³See, for instance, the statement by Chang Wen-chin, Assistant Foreign Minister, in June 1973, "No matter what mistakes the Pakistani government made in East Bengal, we consider this their internal affair.

Of course we do not consider the Pakistani policy to have been correct, but India should not have sent troops to dismember that country." Interview with Australian National University Delegation, *op. cit.*, p. 4.

¹⁰⁴The statement by Tariq Ali that "Chou En-lai openly accepted and defended the right of the Pakistani Army to trample on the aspirations of an oppressed people," misconstrues, whether by accident or design, the character of Chinese support for the regime of Yahya Khan which was based on support neither for his domestic policies nor the manner in which he implemented them. Cf. "Pakistan and Bangladesh: Results and Prospects", in Robin Blackburn, *op. cit.*, p. 322.

¹⁰⁵"The year before last the Indian government made some gestures to improve relations, and we gave these serious consideration, and took some steps to respond — for example we indicated our willingness to exchange ambassadors, but just then the Indo-Pakistani war broke out." Chang Wen-chin, *op. cit.*, p. 4.

¹⁰⁶In February the Chinese team attended the 33rd World Table Tennis Championships in Calcutta, cf. "At Calcutta: The 33rd World Table Tennis Championships". *Peking Review* No. 8, February 21, 1975, p. 20. In the same month Vice Premier Chen Hsi-lien passed through Calcutta on his way to Nepal and claimed while there that India and China would eventually have friendly relations. (FE)/4839 and (FE)/4843.

¹⁰⁷E.g., "Not to Submit to Hegemony", *Peking Review* No. 31, August 3, 1973, p. 19.

¹⁰⁸"On Recognition of Bangladesh: Pakistan National Assembly Adopts Resolution", *Peking Review* No. 29, July 20, 1973, p. 19; "Pakistan-India: New Delhi Agreement", *Peking Review* No. 37, September 14, 1973, p. 23.

¹⁰⁹"China Recognizes Bangladesh", *Peking Review* No. 36, September 5, 1975, p. 6.

¹¹⁰"Bangladesh: New Government", *Peking Review* No. 35, August 29, 1975, p. 19.

¹¹¹The haste was such that diplomatic relations were effected through the medium of cabled messages rather than the customary joint communique signed at the one venue by the respective national leaders.

¹¹²*BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, Soviet Union, Moscow Radio, in Standard Chinese, March 16, 1970, 3332/A3/5.*

¹¹³"China in 1972: Socio-economic Progress Amidst Political Uncertainty", *Asian Survey* Vol. 13, No. 1, January 1973, p. 1.

¹¹⁴"Hanoi vs. Peking: Policies and Relations — A Survey", *Asian Survey* Vol. 12, No. 9, September 1972, p. 815.

¹¹⁵Hanoi Radio, February 1, 1972, (FE)/3907.

¹¹⁶*Nhan Dan*, March 3, (FE)/3931.

¹¹⁷*Ibid.*

¹¹⁸*Nhan Dan*, March 8, 1972, (FE)/3937.

¹¹⁹It cannot be said that the Chinese were unaware of the dangers involved in such negotiations. Chou En-lai in discussing the Geneva agreements on Vietnam in 1954 with Harrison Salisbury was reported as followed:

"So," he said sadly, "you must not say that we know how to handle foreign affairs well. We were greatly taken in at that time. That was my first experience in an international conference. We were taken in. I have also said as much to Premier Pham Van Dong. I have said that we were both taken in." Harrison Salisbury, *To Peking and Beyond*, p. 254.

¹²⁰"Neutralization of Southeast Asia", *Nhan Dan* December 1, 1971, reprinted in "Documents", *Journal of Contemporary Asia* Vol. 2, No. 1, 1972, p. 123.

¹²¹Even Douglas Pike, at the time Regional Information Officer for Asia of the United States Information Agency, estimated that China's economic aid to North Vietnam continued to grow in a steady progression from 1970 to 1972. His estimates are as follows. Military aid: 1970-\$90m; 1971-\$100m; 1972-\$110m. Non-military aid: 1970-\$87m; 1971-\$100m; 1972-\$120m. Cf. "North Vietnam in the Year 1972", *Asian Survey* Vol. 13, No. 1, January 1973, p. 56, f.n. 10.

¹²²*Peking Review* No. 9, March 3, 1972, p. 4.

¹²³"Statement of the Government of the People's Republic of China", *Peking Review* No. 6, February 11, 1972, p. 5. Cf. also "U.S. Imperialism Must Immediately Stop War of Aggression Against Viet Nam", *Peking Review* No. 6, February 11, 1972, p. 13.

¹²⁴*International Herald Tribune*, July 10, 1972, cited in "Quarterly Chronicle and Documentation", *China Quarterly* No. 52, October/December 1972, p. 789.

¹²⁵Robert A. Scalapino, *Asia and the Major Powers*, *op. cit.*, p. 33, f.n. 17. Another scholar, Frank C. Darling, claims, "Chinese communist leaders have quietly urged the continued presence of American military forces in the region." "United States Policy in Southeast Asia: Permanency and Change", *Asian Survey* Vol. 14, No. 7, July 1974, p. 613.

¹²⁶*New York Times*, July 18, 1972, as cited in *Asian Survey* Vol. 14, No. 7, July 1974, p. 790.

¹²⁷"Visit to China", *Current Affairs Bulletin* Vol. 50, No. 5, October 1973, p. 5.

¹²⁸"Interview with Chang Wen-chin", *op. cit.*, p. 6.

¹²⁹See, e.g., "'System of Collective Security in Asia' - Soviet Revisionism's Tattered Flag for Anti-China Military Farce", *Peking Review* No. 27, July 4, 1969, p. 22; "Soviet Navy: Why in the Sea of Japan?", *Peking Review* No. 27, July 6, 1973; "Soviet Naval Ships in Chittagong", *Peking Review* No. 25, June 22, 1973; "Every Inch a Hegemonic Sea Power", *Peking Review* No. 41, October 12, 1973; "New Tsars, Old Dreams - Social Imperialism's Expansion in South Asia and the Indian Ocean", *Peking Review* No. 49, December 7, 1973.

¹³⁰"'System of Collective Security in Asia' - Soviet Revisionism's Tattered Flag...", *op. cit.*, p. 22. For Western accounts of the dramatic upsurge in Soviet interest in Southeast Asia, cf. Robert C. Horn, "Changing Soviet Policies and Sino-Soviet Competition in Southeast Asia", *Orbis* Vol. XVII, No. 2, Summer 1973 and "Soviet-Indonesian Relations Since 1965", *Survey*, Winter 1971; Frances Sterner, "Selling Security, Soviet-Style",

Far Eastern Economic Review, April 8, 1972; T.C. Rhee, "Sino-Soviet Military Conflict and the Global Balance of Power", *The World Today*, January 1970; Dick Wilson, "Sino-Soviet Rivalry in Southeast Asia", *Problems of Communism* Vol. XIII, No. 5, 1974; Alexander O. Ghebhart, "The Soviet System of Collective Security in Asia", *Asian Survey* Vol. 13, No. 12, December 1973.

¹³¹Ross Terrill, "800,000,000...", *op. cit.*, p. 138.

¹³²Geoffrey Jukes, "Soviet Views of China", in Ian Wilson (ed.), *China and the World Community*, *op. cit.*, p. 96.

¹³³"Premier Chou's Message of Congratulations to Third Conference of Heads of State and Government of Non-Aligned Countries", *Peking Review* No. 37, September 11, 1970, p. 12.

¹³⁴"Cameroon Government Delegation", *Peking Review* No. 34, August 25, 1972, p. 16.

¹³⁵See for example, "Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Latin America", and accompanying statements in *Peking Review* No. 47, November 24, 1972, pp. 7-10.

¹³⁶See for example, "China and Peru: Minutes of Lima Talks", *Peking Review* No. 21, May 21, 1971, p. 24.

¹³⁷E.g., "U.N. Conference on Law of the Sea: Upsurge of Third World's Struggle in Unity Against Hegemony", *Peking Review* No. 30, July 26, 1974, p. 7.

¹³⁸Norodom Sihanouk and Wilfred Burchett, *My War with the C.I.A.*, Penguin, Middlesex, 1973, p. 206.

¹³⁹"China's Principled Stand on Relations of International Economy and Trade - Chou Hua-min's Speech at the Third U.N.C.T.A.D. Plenary Meeting", *Peking Review* No. 17, April 28, 1972, p. 14.

¹⁴⁰*Ibid.*, p. 13.

¹⁴¹*Ibid.*

¹⁴²"Chairman of Chinese Delegation Chiao Kuan-hua's Speech", *Peking Review* No. 41, October 13, 1972, p. 7.

¹⁴³As Douglas Evans claimed, the agreement marked, "not only the end of the Bretton Woods monetary system, but the end of an era of American leadership." *The Politics of Trade*, Halsted Press, New York, 1975, p. vii, cited in Geoffrey Barraclough, "Wealth and Power: The Politics of Food and Oil", *New York Review of Books*, August 7, 1975, p. 23.

¹⁴⁴See the discussion of the Nixon Doctrine in Chapter IV *supra*.

¹⁴⁵A member of a team which compiled a report for the Asian Development Bank in 1973 on Southeast Asia issued the following figures which measure the "hourly cost to the employer (including fringe benefits) of a new employee in manufacturing": Singapore-\$0.30; Korea-\$0.31; Taiwan-\$0.16; Indonesia, which he described as a "cornucopia" -\$0.10. Wilford H. Welch, "The Business Outlook for Southeast Asia", *Harvard Business Review*, May/June 1973, p. 79.

¹⁴⁶*Ibid.*, p. 73. A report issued at about the same time argues that although United States investment in Southeast Asia constitutes only 3% of total United States foreign investment, this percentage is likely to increase rapidly and by the early 1980's to total about \$US10 billion.

Thomas W. Allen, *Direct Investment of United States Enterprises in Southeast Asia*, Study No. 02, March 1973, ECOSIN, Bangkok.

¹⁴⁷Wilford H. Welch, *op. cit.*, "Export Trends", pp. 75-6.

¹⁴⁸For an account of the industrial development taking place in Southeast Asia, cf. Helen Hughes, "The Manufacturing Industry Sector", in Asian Development Bank, *Southeast Asia's Economy in the 1970's*, Longman, London, 1972, pp. 186-251. For a discussion of the phenomenon in Marxist terms, cf. Bill Warren, "Imperialism and Capitalist Industrialization", *New Left Review* No. 81, September/October 1973 and the responses elicited by this article in No. 85, May/June 1974. I am indebted to an unpublished paper of Bob Catley, "The Development of Underdevelopment in Southeast Asia", Adelaide, 1974, for much of the following analysis.

¹⁴⁹Wilford H. Welch, *op. cit.*, p. 73.

¹⁵⁰Thomas W. Allen, *Direct Investment of Japanese Enterprises in Southeast Asia*, Study No. 01, February 1973, The Economic Cooperation Centre for the Asian and Pacific Region, Bangkok.

¹⁵¹"French Industrial Drive Launched in S.E. Asia", *Financial Times*, March 27, 1974.

¹⁵²"Europe Comes to ASEAN", *Far Eastern Economic Review*, September 29, 1974, pp. 44-5.

¹⁵³*Financial Times*, March 27, 1974.

¹⁵⁴R. Catley and B. McFarlane, "Australia, Multinational Corporations and the Pacific Rim Strategy", *Kapitalistate - Working Papers on the Capitalist State*, No. 3, Spring 1975, p. 102.

¹⁵⁵Malcolm Caldwell, "Oil Imperialism in Southeast Asia", in Mark Seldon, *Remaking Asia*, *op. cit.*, pp. 21-50.

¹⁵⁶See the survey in *Financial Times*, February 20, 1974.

¹⁵⁷"In the wider perspective of history," writes Geoffrey Barraclough, "it may well turn out that the long-term significance of the 'oil-crisis' is the way it has served as a catalyst for the wider and more fundamental confrontation between the poor nations and the rich, which threatens to engulf the world. The issue today is not oil, in any narrow sense, but whether the existing economic system on which Western preponderance is based can withstand the challenge from the Third World. This is the question which OPEC, through the example it has given the underdeveloped nations, has brought to the centre of the international stage." *Op. cit.*, p. 29

¹⁵⁸The opposition to Tanaka's visit to Jakarta in January 1974 seems in part to have been the result of pro-American elements.

¹⁵⁹C.f. Hamza Alavi, "The State in Post-Colonial Societies", *New Left Review*, July/August 1972.

¹⁶⁰Cited in Geoffrey Barraclough, *op. cit.*, p. 29.

¹⁶¹"In all the capitalist countries, but particularly in the United States, there is a gnawing fear that the Third World, fortified by the new wealth of the Arab countries and their control over an essential source of energy, is going to take its revenge for centuries of colonial humiliation and tear down the existing system. It is this fear, as much as pressure from the liberal wing in Washington, that explains Kissinger's recent change of tactics. It also explains why — at the very moment when

the United States has extricated itself from the war in Southeast Asia — it has been saddled with a military budget of startling proportions." Geoffrey Barraclough, *op. cit.*, p. 29.

¹⁶²Robert W. Tucker, "Oil — the Issue of American Intervention", *Commentary*, January 1975.

CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSION

In the introduction to this thesis it was stated that the Chinese Communist Party leadership, in formulating its international policies and practice, applies its Sinified version of Marxism-Leninism to contemporary international developments. Such a statement does not preclude the possibility of the Chinese analysts and decision makers, collectively or otherwise, making erroneous judgements, either as a result of deficient information, incomplete understanding of the underlying principles governing their foreign policy or the faulty application of these principles. But in the period between April 1969 and September 1973 it has been shown that major changes occurred in China's foreign policy formulation such that the internally consistent formulation which had governed China's foreign policy for much of the Cultural Revolution was superseded by another which was equally consistent and which was based on an analysis of the world which was clearly plausible within the Chinese perspective.

Chapter III gave an account of the major elements in the extensive debate which took place within the Chinese leadership from 1968 to 1971 between those who considered that the analysis of the world which underpinned China's foreign policy during the Cultural Revolution was still relevant and those who considered that international developments occurring at the time demanded a new analysis and a new foreign policy formulation. Victory in this debate, it has been shown, went to the latter group who focussed their attention on the relative decline of the United States as an imperialist power, the rise of the Soviet Union as a social-imperialist power and the implications of these developments for Second and Third World countries. Chapters IV to VI traced in some detail the way in which the adoption of the new perspective altered China's analysis

of and relations with the "superpowers", the "second intermediate zone" and the Third World respectively.

The theoretical dimension of the developments which took place in China's foreign policy may be clarified by reference to the notion of "contradictions". Fundamental to any Chinese Communist analysis of the world is a Marxist-Leninist understanding of "contradictions". According to Mao Tsetung, "Contradiction is universal and absolute, it is present in the process of development of all things and permeates every process from beginning to end."¹ Within an individual society the contradictions between classes and fractions of classes are many and have complex and dynamic interrelationships. At the level of international relations the number of contradictions and the complexity of their relationships are understandably far greater. The problem of determining the "principal contradiction", and for Mao Tsetung the problem is a critical one, is consequently a problem of immense proportions at this level. In the words of Mao Tsetung,

There are many contradictions in the process of development of a complex thing, and one of them is necessarily the principal contradiction whose existence and development determine or influence the existence and development of the other contradictions.²

Over a period of time, it is argued, different contradictions can assume the position of principal one,

But whatever happens, there is no doubt at all that at every stage in the development of a process, there is only one principal contradiction which plays the leading role.

Hence, if in any process there are a number of contradictions, one of them must be the principal contradiction playing the leading and decisive role, while the rest occupy a secondary and subordinate position.³

The logical conclusion is drawn that "in studying any complex process... we must devote every effort to finding its principal contradiction. Once this...is grasped," is it claimed, "all problems can be readily solved."⁴ This analytical method has remained fundamental to the way in which the Chinese view the world.

It has been argued throughout this thesis that the world's principal contradiction which underlay the formulation of China's foreign policy during the period of the Cultural Revolution was formally abandoned at the Ninth Congress of the Chinese Communist Party and was abandoned in practice over the ensuing two and one half years. The principal contradiction in the world as stated by Lin Piao in September 1965 was "between the revolutionary peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America and the imperialists headed by the United States."⁵ In terms of Mao Tsetung's analysis of contradictions, it could be argued moreover that during this period of China's foreign policy "the imperialists headed by the United States" constituted the "principal aspect" of this contradiction. For Mao Tsetung,

In any contradiction the development of the contradictory aspects is uneven. Sometimes they seem to be in equilibrium, which is however only temporary and relative, while unevenness is basic. Of the two contradictory aspects one must be principal and the other secondary. The principal aspect is the one playing the leading role in the contradiction. The nature of a thing is determined mainly by the principal aspect of a contradiction, the aspect which has gained the dominant position.⁶

As shown in Chapter III, in the dominant Chinese foreign policy perspective during the Cultural Revolution it was argued with considerable cogency that the United States in particular among the imperialist powers had recently expanded its economic and military domination of Third World countries to the immediate detriment of the non-ruling classes therein. While

a rapid reversal of this situation was envisaged, there could be little doubt that within this formulation the "imperialists headed by the United States" were regarded as "the aspect which has gained the dominant position." Other contradictions within the world were not ignored in this foreign policy formulation but their subordination to the principal contradiction was such that they received little comment from the Chinese leadership and generated few strategic initiatives.

Within this theoretical context and terminology, the arguments pursued throughout the thesis demonstrate that the above factors were all subject to alteration when "Chairman Mao's revolutionary line in foreign affairs" — the new foreign policy formulation — was implemented. Firstly, the 'principal' contradiction in effect became that between United States imperialism and Soviet social-imperialist on the one hand and the "oppressed nations of the world" on the other. Secondly, the dominance of the imperialist aspect of the principal contradiction was regarded as having been reduced if not made subordinate, and thirdly, other contradictions were considered to be of such importance as to warrant major strategic initiatives.

Each of these developments merits summary comment here.

Although the contradiction between United States imperialism/Soviet social-imperialism and the "oppressed nations of the world" was not officially designated as the world's "principal contradiction" it clearly fulfilled that function within the new Chinese foreign policy. As a result it was this very broad contradiction which generated most propagandistic and strategic energy in China's conduct of its foreign policy. The "broad united front" pole of the principal contradiction was discussed and promoted in its various aspects — as "small and medium countries", as "second and third world countries" or as "oppressed nations", while at the

other pole of the contradiction the United States and the Soviet Union were regarded in their imperialist/social-imperialist aspect and in their hegemonic aspect as superpowers.

The international developments which were regarded by the leaders of the Chinese Communist Party as necessitating this new analysis of the world's principal contradiction have been discussed in Chapters III, IV, V and VI. The direct assaults of Third World liberation movements had checked the expansion of the American empire and closed off, at least temporarily, its option of military aggression in the Third World. America's principal capitalist allies — Western Europe, Japan and Canada — who had borne much of the cost of the war, came under increasing pressure to share the cost of maintaining the American empire, but for the first time since the Second World War they reacted decisively against American dominance forcing a devaluation of the dollar and sharply intensifying inter-imperialist rivalries. Thus while the Chinese analysts considered the direct cause of the decline or stagnation in United States imperialism to be the liberation struggles of the Third World, some of the primary effects of that change were regarded as having occurred in the Second World.

In the Chinese view also there occurred at the same time as this American decline the equally momentous development of Soviet "social-imperialism" or "imperialism masquerading as socialism." No longer was the Soviet Union prepared to facilitate the operations of American imperialism, it was regarded as having acquired independent imperial status and was contending with the United States for hegemony all around the globe.

In this new situation liberation movements are considered to be under less direct imperialist pressure and in general imperialism has been forced to make a number of concessions — a development which is epitomized

for the Chinese in the willingness of the United States to abandon its containment policy of China. The governments of Second and Third World countries are considered, however, to have come under increased pressure from imperialist contention. While many of these states are dominated by ruling classes which are particularly reactionary, they nevertheless find it in their interest to oppose the hegemony of one or both of the super-powers and are therefore capable of contributing to the latter's demise. In fostering such developments, it has been shown in Chapter VI that the Chinese do not thereby indicate any support for the domestic policies of the governments concerned. On the contrary, in weakening the bonds between such governments and imperialism, the Chinese appear to be conscious that the internal position of the local ruling classes would be weakened vis-à-vis progressive and revolutionary forces. But in the meantime the possibilities of regional cooperation between Third World states and between Second World and Third World states are being promoted as a central strategic feature of the new policy. Cooperation on a regional basis or on a global basis, in political military or economic terms, particularly where these involve energy or raw materials, has been vigorously promoted by China as a desirable direction in which Second and Third World states are moving and should continue to move.⁷

The new policy which emerged between the Ninth and Tenth Party Congresses had as its leitmotiv the slogan, "Countries want independence, nations want liberation and the people want revolution." The commitment of the Chinese Communist Party to the second and third elements of this slogan, i.e., to the struggles of national liberation movements and the international working class movement has been a consistent feature of its foreign policy. The stress given in the new policy to the independence of "countries" is far more novel and is the direct result of the new formulation of the world's major contradictions.

It was argued in the introduction to this thesis that the analysis of the world made by the Chinese at any particular time is capable of producing a valid interpretation of international reality. Although it has not been a primary aim here to assemble evidence supporting the validity of the new analysis of the world which was presented by the Chinese between the Ninth and Tenth Party Congresses, it has been shown in passing that it has considerable plausibility. In view of this plausibility, the prognoses currently being made by Chinese analysts on the basis of the new formulation are nothing short of alarming. Since the Tenth Congress the world's major contradictions have not been reformulated by the Chinese but the contention between United States imperialism and Soviet social-imperialism for global hegemony is considered to have so intensified that a third world war is extremely probable, if not inevitable.⁸

NOTES

¹"On Contradiction", *Selected Works...*Vol. I, p. 318.

²*Ibid.*, p. 331.

³*Ibid.* , p. 332.

⁴*Ibid.*

⁵Lin Piao, "Long Live the Victory of People's War", p. 53.

⁶Mao Tsetung, *op. cit.*, p. 333.

⁷A summary of developments along these lines and China's reaction to them are contained in the article, "Second World Develops Economic Relations with Third World", *Peking Review* No. 51, December 19, 1975.

⁸For discussions along these lines, see "Speech by Chiao Kuan-hua, Chairman of Chinese Delegation", *Peking Review* No. 40, October 3, 1975; Shen Chin, "Soviet-U.S. Contention for Hegemony Will Inevitably Lead to World War", *Peking Review* No. 44, October 31, 1975; Liang Hsiao, "Economic Cause of Soviet Revisionism's World Hegemony Bid", *Peking Review* No. 45, November 7, 1975; "Soviet 'Disarmament' Proposals: Camouflage for War Preparations", *Peking Review* No. 47, November 21, 1975; "Growing Danger of New World War", *Peking Review* No. 2, January 9, 1976; "Soviet Social-Imperialism — Most Dangerous Source of War", *Peking Review* No. 5, January 30, 1976.

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