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Mr. J.C. Mitchell,
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20th March, 1984

Dear Mr. Loomis,

I refer to your letter dated 29 February containing three copies of the summary of your thesis.

My letter of 3 February should not have contained the now 'standard' reference to loan and photocopying. My apologies for this oversight.

Your decision to withhold permission regarding loan and photocopying of your thesis was submitted to the Board of Research Studies and has been noted. The thesis will only become available two years after it is lodged in the Library.

Yours sincerely,

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Mr. T. Loomis,
c/o. Department of Anthropology.

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EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE - REPORT NO. 10/83

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The Executive Committee endorsed the recommendation of the Faculty of Arts Higher Degrees Committee that an arbitrator be appointed to consider the three examiners' reports.

MS. E. JARDINE (PSYCHOLOGY)

The Executive Committee endorsed the recommendation of the Faculty of Arts Higher Degrees Committee that Dr. David Horne, Department of Psychiatry, University of Melbourne be appointed as a third, academic examiner for Ms. Jardine's thesis.

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The Executive Committee endorsed the recommendation of the Faculty of Arts Higher Degrees Committee that these candidates be allowed leave of absence from the university for study purposes, in Mr. Strahle's case for seven months, and in the other cases for one year.

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The Executive Committee noted that Mr. Loomis has withheld permission for his thesis to be loaned or photocopied.

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The Executive Committee noted the withdrawal of Ms. Stephens from her Ph.D. candidature.

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12 December 1983



THE COUNTERFEIT SAVAGE

(Te Aviri a te Etene)

A Study of Cook Islands Migrants,
Class and Racialisation in New Zealand

Terrence M. Loomis, M.A. (Hons.)

Thesis submitted in partial fulfilment
of the requirements for the degree of Doctor
of Philosophy in Anthropology at the

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1984

Awarded 22 May 1985

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THE COUNTERFEIT SAVAGE
(Te Aviri a te Etene)

SUMMARY

Over the past century and a half, New Zealand has developed economically and politically as a semi-colony or 'white settler dominion' within the world economic system (Bedggood, 1980; Armstrong, 1978). Often overlooked in the history of that development has been the importance of the coalescence of modes of production between the South Pacific islands nations and New Zealand into one regional political economy. Within this framework, New Zealand has emerged as the regional metropole in a dominant relationship to its peripheral micro-state neighbours. Increasingly throughout the 20th century New Zealand's influence has been a crucial factor in the evolution of the islands economies.

While the role of the State and foreign capital proved pivotal for New Zealand's own economic development, unequal relations with countries like the Cook Islands provided conditions which underwrote capitalist growth in New Zealand. In the latter half of the 19th century the restricted scope for the expansion of domestic capital was partially offset by the establishment of mercantile operations in the islands. The operations were facilitated by the cooperation of local arikis (chiefs) through the institution of the trade store, and subsequently the resident trader. British and later New Zealand colonial administrations intervened on behalf of the indigenous population, blocking private overseas capital from exercising full expropriative control.

Following World War II, which seriously depleted New Zealand's manpower, the growth of industrial capital was held up by severe labour shortages. The demand for labour set in motion a fundamental

shift in the articulation of modes of production between the islands and New Zealand. Serious pressure was brought to bear on the previous balance between subsistence, petty commodity and capitalist forms of production in the islands. The new articulation took the form locally and regionally of labour migration from the outer islands to the main island of Rarotonga, and to New Zealand.

This study begins with an examination of those historical processes, paying particular attention to the post-war changes in the South Pacific regional political economy and migration patterns. I consider the structural determinants of continuing Cook Islander migrant investment, remittances and circular migration back to the islands. But since social structures and individual practice are constituted in dialectical relationship to one another (cf. Bourdieu, 1977), I also demonstrate how migrant homeland links comprise creative improvisations regarding their position in New Zealand society.

In New Zealand I explore developments in the relations of production and distribution whereby Polynesian migrant labour -- including the internal migration of rural Maoris to large cities -- was recruited into less skilled blue collar work and concentrated into slum areas and State housing estates. Subsequent to rising working class power and recent economic recession, I show how ideological strategies of racialisation and ethnic categorisation (cf. Miles, 1982) were employed by capital and the State to reproduce most Polynesians as a fraction of the working class juxtaposed against labour-in-general. I also consider how a handful of Cook Islanders came to be situated in the 'supervisory' fraction of the working class and others in the petty bourgeoisie, but how they identify as -- and are perceived as -- a 'social category' which in some contexts acts as a 'social force' (Poulantzas, 1978).

In particular I pay attention to migrant social organisation, marriage practices and personal networks, along with Cook Islanders' cultural rites and performances. I show how all these are influenced profoundly by the wider social order such that there are fundamental differences between the 'ethnic community' and the home islands. I focus on the tere-party culture troupe performance, arguing that such institutions and performances provide settings for corporate Cook Islander reflection and creative improvisation regarding their relations with one another and the wider social order.

This thesis contains no material which has been accepted for a degree or diploma at any university. To the best of my knowledge and belief, it contains no material previously published or written by another person, except where due reference is made in the text of this thesis.

Signed,

Acknowledgements

I should like to express my appreciation to the University of Adelaide for making this thesis possible through the provision of a four-year university research grant, along with library and computer facilities that greatly aided my work.

I am, of course, deeply indebted for the support and intellectual stimulation provided by my colleagues in the Department of Anthropology. The opportunity to have fellow students and staff comment on chapter drafts, and participate together in various seminars and workshops was an invaluable experience. In particular I must thank Susan Barham for giving formative guidance to my initial fieldwork design and preliminary data analysis. My appreciation also to Kingsley Garbett for his steadying influence and for teaching me the intricacies of SPSS computer analysis. I owe much to my advisor, Bruce Kapferer, whose keen mind, lateral thinking, passion and fury kept me at the task through thick and thin. I must also thank my fellow post-grads for their patience, help, and empathy.

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To those many Cook Islanders and their community leaders who gave unstintingly of their time, kindness, aro'a, hospitality and kai I say kua akameitaki au iakotou katoatoa no to kotou tauturu. In particular I must thank those families who took me under their wing, let me stay with them and ask interminable questions. My fieldwork would also have been much the poorer without the generous support of the Cook Islands government and their officers, the PIPC church and my dear au taeake of Aitutaki Enea. I am also indebted to those Cook Islanders who gave voluntarily of their time to help with my fieldwork survey. If I started naming names I should have to mention everyone. Kia maroiroi.

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
INTRODUCTION


Ethnographic Setting

The Cook Islands are located some 2000 miles northeast of New Zealand, midway between Tahiti and Western Samoa (Map A). There are fifteen islands clustered geographically in two groups. The six islands to the north are mostly coral atolls with small populations. Those of the southern group are high, volcanic-origin islands with substantial numbers of inhabitants (Map B). Rarotonga is the administrative and commercial capital of the islands. This lush, mountainous island with its coral reefs is located some 600 miles west of Tahiti and 800 miles southeast of Western Samoa. Its tropical beauty and modern facilities make it the principal tourist destination in the islands.

Culturally and physically, Cook Island Maoris belong to the Polynesian branch of Oceanic peoples, though only Manihiki and Rakahanga share the same recent cultural origins (Gilson, 1980:213). The population of the Cooks at present is 16,900, down 1600 people from the census four years earlier (Cook Islands Quarterly Statistical Bulletin, December, 1982). Due to steady emigration to New Zealand, more Cook Islanders live outside the islands than in them. There has been a constant flow of migrants from the outer islands to Rarotonga, and a pattern of temporary circular migration between the islands and New Zealand.

Demographically, New Zealand is becoming more Polynesian though it still tends to conceive of itself as a European rather than a Pacific nation. Twelve percent of the population identified itself as either Maori or Pacific Islander in the 1981 Census. Polynesians have increased 1% as a portion of the total population since the last census. They are now in a similar position numerically to that of Blacks in America. The number of Pacific Islanders increased a





Source: Crocombe, 1979

dramatic 50.2% over their numbers in the last census (New Zealand Department of Statistics, 1981a).

Most Pacific Islands migrants live in a few main urban centres, since most have been recruited into factory or service employment. This fact alone has important bearing on national political developments, racism and stereotyping, and class conflict to say nothing of migrant social organisation. Approximately 14,000 Cook Islanders live in metropolitan Auckland, the majority in South Auckland. Almost a quarter live in the State housing area of Otara (1976 Census). Many also live in Central Auckland, though their numbers have declined in recent years with inner city gentrification.


As a group, Cook Islanders are still predominantly a migrant population, though the situation is changing (Figure I.1). There are large cohorts of school-age children and working-age adults under fifty years of age, with fewer elderly people and youth in their late teens. However, it is striking that more than 50% of Cook Islanders living in Auckland are under twenty years of age. Approximately one third of Cook Islanders in the 1981 Census were born in New Zealand, so it is already problematic to refer to them as a 'migrant community'.

Compared with other Pacific Islanders, New Zealand Maoris and the New Zealand population as a whole, Cook Islanders are clearly in a disadvantaged position. With respect to occupational distribution (Figure I.2), Cook Islanders are disproportionately located in Production/Transportation/Labouring employment. Their concentration has in fact increased since the last census in 1976. When compared with other Pacific Islands workers, Cook Islanders are under-represented in all other sectors, and also have the highest percentage of 'new workers seeking work', an official term combining school leavers and the unemployed.

Cook Islanders' annual earnings tend to correlate with their

Figure I. 1

Cook Islander and New Zealand Comparative Population Profiles, 1981 Census



Source: New Zealand Department of Statistics, 10% sample.

Figure I.2 Comparative Occupational Distributions of Cook Islanders and Other Groups, 1981 Census

	<u>N.Z.</u>	<u>Maori</u>	<u>Pac. Is.</u>	<u>Cook Is.</u>
Profess/Tech.	14.1	4.2	3.1	2.2
Admin/Mgr.	4.0	.5	.3	.2
Clerical	16.0	7.2	6.9	6.5
Sales	9.3	2.2	1.7	1.1
Service	8.0	9.7	10.7	10.1
Ag/Fors/Fish	10.9	11.2	1.7	.9
Prod/Trans/Labr	33.9	52.8	62.2	64.5
Seeking Work	.8	3.4	1.9	3.6
Inadeq. Descrip	.8	1.6	2.2	2.3
No Occup	2.3	7.0	9.2	8.6
	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>
Total %	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Figure I.3 Comparative Incomes Between Cook Islanders and the New Zealand Average, 1981 Census

	<u>New Zealand</u>	<u>Cook Islanders</u>
Nil	2.8	9.5
\$1-1999	2.0	6.3
\$2000-4999	8.6	5.6
\$5000-7999	16.2	21.3
\$8000-9999	13.1	18.9
\$10,000-11,999	14.7	15.9
\$12,000-13,999	10.2	8.3
\$14,000-17,999	11.9	3.1
\$18,000-24,999	7.7	.7
\$25,000 and over	4.2	.2
Not specified	6.1	10.3
	<hr/>	<hr/>
Total %	100.0	100.0

concentration in industrial, semi- and unskilled occupations (Figure I.3). Most earn between \$5000 and \$11,999 before tax, while a third of New Zealanders earn more than \$12,000 a year. Educationally, Cook Islander numbers are well below the national average at all levels of schooling attended. However, as can be seen in Figure I.4, they consistently outrank Maoris in educational level attained, though they are below the average for Pacific Islanders.

While these statistics say nothing specifically about class position or class relations per se, they do provide indicators of Cook Islanders' relative social standing in comparison with other Polynesians and the New Zealand population as a whole. Many Cook Islanders, particularly community leaders, believe Cook Islanders are in a superior position to other Polynesians, but this is not the case.

Approaches to the Study of Race and Ethnicity

Since the last world war, there has been a succession of theories regarding minorities, from the sociology of race relations and discrimination, the plural society and the sociology of ethnic relations, to more recent attempts to situate race and ethnicity within a framework of class analysis. These latter developments occurred during the 1960s and 1970s, in part as a result of anthropological studies of migrants in the Third World. From a number of directions, the thrust has been toward a more comprehensive, wholistic framework within which to understand race and ethnicity, especially in advanced capitalist societies.

Myrdall (1964) and Leggett (1968) popularised the concept of the 'underclass' in the U.S. and Rex (1968) and Giddens (1973) utilised it to explain the situation of minorities in Britain. Rex employed a stratification model based on the same distributive notion of class widely held by most Weberian theorists. Adopting the

Figure I.4 Comparative Educational Levels of Cook Islanders and Other Groups, 1981 Census (by last educational level attended)

	<u>N.Z.</u>	<u>Maori</u>	<u>Pac. Is.</u>	<u>Cook Is.</u>
No secondary educ.	15.4	17.2	25.8	72.7 (no tert'y)
Still at primary	4.7	5.7	7.4	5.3
University	5.2	.8	1.3	.4
Teachers College	1.8	.9	1.4	.1
Polytech/tech instit/ comm'y college	10.3	4.1	3.6	2.5
University/teachers college	1.7	.4	.3	.1
Univ/polytech/tech/ comm'y college	.8	.2	.2	.6
Other combinations	6.0	1.5	1.9	.1
Not specified	2.7	3.6	8.7	16.1
	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>
Total %	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

concept of the 'split labour market' of Doeringer and Piore (1971), Rex and Tomlinson (1979) posit a lower stratum of unskilled, exploited workers in insecure positions within the production system. By using their criteria, women as a group comprise part of the same underclass along with all members of racial minorities. By not beginning with concrete economic relations, Rex and Tomlinson encounter the familiar contradiction to which models of underclass structuration are subject. In the final analysis they conclude that production relations themselves may not be as determinative of class as other factors (Ibid.:24).

Giddens (Ibid.; 1979) considers the way in which classes are 'structured' at mediate and proximate levels in relationship to market competition. Thus,

...the structuration of classes is facilitated to the degree to which mobility closure exists in relation to any specified form of market capacity (1973:107).

The result is the 'basic three-class system in capitalist society': the upper, middle and lower or working class. But, since he considers other forms of social organisation and categorisation to be of equal importance to class, where economic structuration 'overlaps' with ethnic or racial differences, an underclass is said to exist (Ibid.:112).

As with Rex, all members of an ethnic or racial group end up in the underclass. The idea of the market is linked to a distributive notion of class rather than productive relations and historical events, so class membership appears to be little more than a problem of proper typology and statistical analysis. Such an approach ignores the objective realities of economic and political developments in capitalist society, to say nothing of the cultural heterogeneity of the ethnic group and the respective class position of its members.

Pearson is one of the leading proponents of the neo-Weberian position in New Zealand, though his recent research has been on

West Indians in Britain (1981)⁽¹⁾. Like Rex and Giddens, his attention is on market competition and access to resources. He accepts that the racial minority as an entity constitutes an underclass, a position which he suggests results from 'inferior life chances' in different 'market situations' (Ibid.:3).

His perspective has recently undergone somewhat of a change. In his latest writing (1983) he links Pacific Islands migration to the political economy of New Zealand. However, he does not adequately explain why such an imported labour force was required by capital in the first place, or how it has been systematically restricted to an underclass position. Indeed, a major difficulty with most studies of race and ethnicity to date is their inadequate conceptualisation of the broader social formation within which the minority is situated and the manner in which it is reproduced (Miles and Spoonley, n.d.:8). There is typically an understatement of the significance of production relations and specific historical events as determinative of minority position. At the other extreme, there is a lack of an effective framework within which to understand processes linking host society and migrant homeland (much of post-war anthropological studies of African societies being an exception).

Nonetheless, Pearson provides a needed corrective in maintaining a distinction between ethnicity and race. From his British fieldwork, he emphasises the necessity of paying attention to the

internal dynamics of minority group organisation and identification particularly the basis of status distinctions, the essential task of separating out the social and cultural divisions within a common class position....(1981:3).

(1) See also Pitt and Macpherson, 1974; Macpherson, 1977; Thorns, 1977; Kilmartin and Thorns, 1979.

Such diversity is typically glossed over in most forms of class analysis, since such matters are treated only as ideological constructions imposed by capital for purposes of domination, not as complex responses to such determinations.

Marxist Perspectives: The Political Economy of Labour Migration

Castles and Kosack (1973) criticise the race relations approach, arguing that racial and ethnic groupings must be considered within a broader theory of migrant labour, and located systematically within the international division of labour.

According to their model, migrant labour has a specific function within capitalist relations of production prior to and of a different order of reality to the social constructions of 'race' and 'ethnicity'. Migrant labour is cheaper initially and takes over the undesirable work vacated by the indigenous working class. Migrant labour is thus part of the working class, but forms a 'reserve army' disadvantaged with respect to employment, housing and social facilities. These are the semi- and unskilled who are sloughed off under depressed economic conditions. Their availability assists Capital and the State to maintain control of the remainder of the workforce, both in regard to wage demands and access to political power.

However, such a broad conceptualisation of the reserve army contains difficulties similar to the Weberian underclass. Again all minority members are indiscriminately located in a single class sector. The concept has been employed in New Zealand to account for the status of Polynesians with similar results:

Maori workers (sic.) constitute a major component of the reserve army of labour, to be used along with immigrants from other Pacific nations (sic.) when capital has need of them, and to be discarded equally as easily when a surplus of labour develops (Bedgood, 1980:85; see also Steven, 1978; Wilkes, n.d.).

While such an approach has the benefit of grounding the existence of racial and ethnic groups firmly in relations of production, it is only a crude approximation of actual class relations in New Zealand. All post-war Pacific migrants were not recruited into a 'reserve army' nor even into the working class. Nor can this formulation account for divisions within the so-called reserve army, or the fact that some Polynesians have recently moved out of the working class to which they were originally recruited (see Chapter 2).

Castles and Kosack are vulnerable to criticism on a related point. In their economistic emphasis they pay scant attention to the way in which 'race' and 'ethnicity' are utilised ideologically and politically in the reproduction of classes. A further problem is the tendency to confuse the concepts 'race' and 'ethnicity'. Both may be social constructions, but that is no reason to muddle them or dismiss them as of not analytic value simply because they have been employed uncritically in social science (cf. Miles, 1982:44ff). Without question, the emphasis in analysis must seek to avoid reification of such notions and concentrate on the process of differentiation itself. It is within such a process that 'race' typically is used with reference to meanings attributed to phenotypical markers, while ethnicity refers to indicators such as language, life style, origin and culture. And in everyday practice they are indeed often used in such a fashion that they overlap. Just as equally, like religion and caste, identities may be self-selected or imposed from outside (cf. Mitchell, 1974). One is then dealing with the study of processes of categorisation which involve conflicting interests and differential power, of domination and resistance.

The work of Phizacklea and Miles (1980) builds upon the theoretical discourses of Poulantzas and E.O. Wright. Like Castles and Kosack, they are critical of earlier race and ethnicity studies

which under-emphasized economic factors in the explanation of minority positions. But they are also critical of crude Marxist approaches to race, ethnicity and migrant labour which mix an economic view with simple structural determinism, portraying coloured workers as 'nothing more than workers' (Ibid.:1).

These writers take as given that in capitalist society, class relations are prior to and inclusive of all others. Class is an 'objective structural reality' while 'race' and 'ethnicity' are social constructions. Nevertheless, classes are internally fragmented and constantly changing through history. To account for such flux and heterogeneity, they borrow the Poulantzian notion of the 'class fraction':

We will use the concept of class fraction to refer to an objective position within a class boundary which is, in turn, determined by economic and politico-ideological relations. That is to say, class boundaries mark the objectively different structural positions in economic, political and ideological relations, but these relations also have independent effects within these boundaries (Ibid.:6).

Embracing the Poulantzian three-level model of the determinacy of class relations and structural positions circumvents the pit-falls of economism. Thus at the political level they incorporate the role of the State, and at the 'ideological' level the social construction of racial identity as a process of racial categorisation or 'racialisation' (Ibid.:21).

Phizacklea and Miles dismiss critics who attack class analysis for lumping all coloured minorities at the bottom of the economic order (Ibid.:17). They concur with writers like Westergaard and Resler that all black migrants are not located in one class. But they contradict themselves soon afterwards by observing that the manual, unskilled position of 'black labour' is being reproduced over time. I contend that it is possible to insist on the reality of class relations and the primacy of the economic level without reifying the concept of 'migrant labour' itself.

The difficulty for Phizacklea and Miles seems to stem from their application of the 'class fraction' concept without sufficient regard to the problems which arise when developments at the political and ideological levels do not precisely reinforce class positions at the economic level. They acknowledge that some migrants who are members of racialised groupings are in fact located elsewhere in the class structure. Unfortunately, apart from anecdotes and commonsense observations, they cannot systematically account for how such individuals attained their positions, how they evidently escaped racial categorisation and thus entrapment in a particular class position.

Spoonley (1982) has attempted to apply a similar migrant labour model to the study of race relations in New Zealand. Once again, all Polynesians are found in a single working class sector:

The distinct position of the Polynesian (sic.) in economic, political and ideological relations in New Zealand means they constitute a fraction of the working class (Ibid.:265).

According to Spoonley, Pacific Islanders and Maoris are 'concentrated' into the working class en mass and categorised negatively by racial stereotypes. The problem with such a construction is that a significant minority of Polynesians are not located within such a fraction, nor even within the working class.

Racism and Ethnicity as Forms of Social Categorisation

Miles' recent publication (1982) is an important statement regarding a class analysis of racism and migrant labour. He situates his discussion of the ideological construction of racial and ethnic minorities within a broader outline of class analysis, beginning with the political economy of the social formation and mapping the class structure. He turns his attention particularly to the categorisation or 'racialisation' of migrant labour.

What strikes the anthropologist from the outset is the singular attention to 'racial' categorisation. All social interaction invariably proceeds by categorisation, of which race and ethnicity are two interrelated forms. Individuals and groups order their relations with one another on the basis of perceived similarities and differences in appearance, behaviour, language and symbols in turn structured around shared meanings and/or political 'interests'.⁽²⁾ These are interpreted by means of commonly-held cultural 'maps' of the world, themselves continually reconstituted in daily experience including the exigencies of the very interactions themselves. From such maps, actors and groups attribute meanings to observed markers and act according to their own interests.

There is by now a long-established body of literature on what Mitchell (1974) terms 'ethnic categorisation,' for example Mitchell, 1956, *Ibid.*; Cohen, 1969, 1974a; Barth, 1969; Epstein, 1958; Parkin, 1969. Quite often, as in the New Zealand case, ascribed and self-identity based on ethnic markers take place within a more overarching racial categorisation. There are also specialised studies of religious, caste and sexual categorisation and discrimination. Any of these may be utilised in the process of class domination, and employed in

(2) This appears to be what Cohen (1974a) had in mind in referring to the 'heuristic value of ethnicity'. See also 1974b regarding the notion of political interests of such groupings.

(3) In spite of devoting an entire chapter to evaluating the contribution of 'ethnic relations' studies, Miles nowhere follows through the logical implication that ethnicity is also a social construction. He alludes to studies of Caribbean migrants (Lyons, Person, etc.) which show that both they and Asians are racially categorised from outside, but also internally differentiated by ethnic diacritica less known to the dominant society.

the diverse responses (Miles, Ibid.: 'resistance') to such categorisation . In New Zealand ethnic and racial identities are not precisely synonymous; they may be ascribed, chosen and situationally altered over time. The precise forms that such labels and identities take at any historical juncture, their underlying structural causes and the particular interests they serve need to be confronted in analysis.

Miles defines racial categorisation as follows:

...a process of delineation of group boundaries and of allocation of persons within those boundaries by primary reference to (supposedly) inherent and/or biological (usually phenotypical) characteristics. It is therefore an ideological process, but it has effects at all three levels of a social formation.... These effects can, in combination, cohere to lead to the formation of fractions within classes (Ibid.:157).

It is important to be clear on how Miles initially conceives the categorisation process, since he diverges from it significantly in subsequent analysis. Firstly, social categorisation may involve negative or positive evaluations at the 'ideological' level. For instance, paternalistic racism in New Zealand often proceeds by positive stereotypes which are nonetheless untrue and propagated for the purpose of maintaining the hegemony of the ruling class. Second and most importantly, social categorisation may be a process of group or individual self-identity as much as the ascription of labels or markers from outside the group (Ibid.:159). Finally, social categorisation may be operationalised either in thought (stereotypes, prejudice, rhetoric) or action (discrimination).

From whichever perspective one considers it -- the minority or the dominant class -- categorisation involves the exercise of power of one group over another, either by self-assertion and defence, or domination and exploitation. The outcome is to control the allocation of persons in the production process, and the resulting distribution of rewards or disadvantages (Ibid.:159). If the effects of such categorisation coincide with and reproduce a particular position at the economic, political and 'ideological' levels at once the result is

a racialised fraction of the working class (Ibid.:158). If they do not, as in New Zealand, then the case must be examined and our analysis further refined.

Miles summarises the racialisation process in the following manner:


--Diagram, Figure 1.5 --

The thrust of his discussion is toward an historical explanation of the way in which migrant labour to Britain was brought in to do semi- and unskilled work, and then negatively portrayed as a 'race relations problem'.

Miles then turns to a consideration of the way in which minority political interests and strategies are likely to emerge. Among Caribbean migrants black pride, English language classes and Rastafarianism are all forms of response to racialisation. Perhaps predictably, he neglects various cultural responses such as reggae and carnival (see Cohen, 1981a). These various strategies are responses by the racialised migrant grouping to their structural position and racism itself. All the more puzzling, then, why Miles should choose to delete minority responses from his diagram of racialisation. The omission is pivotal if not intentional, since he proceeds from the misleading impression that forms of social categorisation like racialisation are only imposed and ascribed from outside. Even though in his formal definition they may also be forms of migrant political and ideological response. The gloss enables him to sustain his polemic against the so-called anthropological perspective⁽⁴⁾ and avoid coming to terms with the valid insights of the 'culturalist problematic'.

(4) Miles evidently concurs with the Poulantzian (1978:124) typification of the 'anthropological' focus on the subject/agent rather than on structures and forces.

Figure I.5 The Racialisation of Migrant Labour
(ie. social categorisation)



Source: Miles, 1982:169


I offer the following diagram (Figure I.6) as an alternative representation of the racialisation process as Miles conceives it and from which I will develop certain modifications toward a model of class and social categorisation in the final section of this

Introduction:

-- Figure I.6 --

Primarily, it seems necessary to maintain a much clearer distinction schematically between developments at the various levels and their interrelationship, and to add the response of the racialised grouping which Miles omits. Thus capital requires labour and looks elsewhere partly as a result of wage and political demands by indigenous labour. The subsequent arrival of migrant labour generates an economic threat and thus political response from the indigenous population which is legitimated politically. Most migrant labour is structured into a delimited fraction of the working class, and then maintained there by the process of racialisation. At both the political and 'ideological' levels, 'race relations' and 'multiculturalism' are forms that legitimate the process of social categorisation in policy and commonsense perceptions, and thus the domination of migrant labour. Racialisation, and less often the actual structural position of migrants, is reacted to politically and 'ideologically' (including culturally) by migrants. I add cultural responses in light of the foregoing discussion, and in a later chapter clarify the distinction I draw between culture and ideology.

Figure I.6 A Modified Diagram of Miles' Racialisation Process



The Problem of the Reproduction of the Racialised Fraction of Labour

In effect the final step of Miles' scheme of class analysis has to do with the perpetuation or alteration of classes and their relations to one another. At this point, he attempts to come to terms with two issues which I have suggested challenge the effectiveness of the migrant labour theory. One is the class position of so-called second generation migrants, and the other is the existence of coloured migrants -- one could hardly call them 'labour' -- as members of the petit bourgeoisie.

The second-generation issue has to do with whether the class position of racialised migrant labour is being reproduced over time, and strikes at the heart of the assimilationist model⁽⁵⁾. Unfortunately, Miles (Ibid.:176ff) wants to claim that his own theory of migrant labour does not apply to the second generation (a) because they are in a different economic position to that of their parents (ie. they are not 'migrant labour' per se); and (b) they are in a different political/legal position (ie. migration laws and citizenship). Both assertions, while dubious as generalisations, allow Miles to avoid dealing with the diverse class positions of migrant youth and also their political, ideological and cultural responses to their circumstance.

With reference to Cook Islanders in New Zealand, for example, these statements are quite simply erroneous. Putting aside the fact that some are located in or shift to other classes, those in the working

(5) Spoonley (1982:274-6) claims that in New Zealand a Pakeha-Polynesian dichotomy in class relations is being reproduced from one generation to the next: "Younger Polynesians (under 25 years of age) are as likely to be concentrated in the working class as previous generations." The situation is considerably more complex than that. Until this study, no data had been available on inter-generation class mobility among Polynesians (see Davis, 1979 regarding occupational mobility among Pakehas). Spoonley may compare the class situation of older and younger migrants, but appears to have no data upon which to base his conclusions about inter-generational closure among Polynesians.

class share similar positions in the relations of production irrespective of whether they moved to such jobs from overseas or across town. Miles more than anyone should recognise that sustained islands contacts, remittances, and plans to return -- all of which he suggests 'soften the impact' (Ibid.:179) of class exploitation for the first generation -- are resources available to such migrants but generated in dialectical relationship to their continuing structural position in the host society. They do not, as the assimilationist presumes, automatically fade away as the migrant adapts and becomes 'modernised', or as the second generation is somehow inevitably socialised into the dominant society. Given the continuance of similar economic circumstances, such resources are available and indeed encouraged by the first generation in the second. And with respect to migrant status, Cook Islander youth are in exactly the same political/legal position as their parents. They are citizens of both New Zealand and the Cook Islands. So this can have little bearing on their class position or political response.

The important point is that there is no hard and fast rule of determinacy either at the level of ideological racialisation, or at the economic level for either first or second generation migrant. It is possible to resist processes of racialisation, to subvert their content as well as rebel against one's class position. Miles gives the impression that such responses are the prerogative of the second generation:

They do not have the experience of a 'home' elsewhere which can serve as an alternative identity or even a rationalisation in the face of racial categorisation....Consequently, there is less of an ideological buffer to soften the impact, which leads one to expect a more hostile ideological and political response to racism and discrimination....The response to a negative racial categorisation involves inverting the evaluative element but retaining the notion of 'race' as the dimension of categorisation; 'race' will be positively appraised around a construct of blackness and common historical exploitation : (Ibid.:179)

But political, ideological and cultural responses are possible and in fact practised by all migrants regardless of generation, and they include inverting negative ethnic categorisation within racial labels. Indeed, in the New Zealand context, organisation and action on the basis of shared culture within the Polynesian 'racial' grouping has been the norm. Miles states with respect to Britain:

Part of the significance of these distinctions [between Caribbean migrant groups] lies in their potential for the creation and maintenance of political and ideological divisions within the racialised fraction of the working class (Ibid.:180).

This is similar to Wright's (1979:91) distinction between the immediate and fundamental interests of classes -- in effect, those which are 'phenomenal' and material, false and real. Wright mentions the different apparent interests of black and white workers⁽⁶⁾.

This distinction lies at the heart of the Marxist critique of the 'culturalist' problematic, as well as its attack (however muted) on the so-called false consciousness of minority groups which organise on the basis of re-valued racial identity or common cultural heritage. In this study I give detailed attention to stereotyping of and social categorisation among one Polynesian group in New Zealand, exploring how social categories (Poulantzas, 1978) may become the basis of organisation and action. I suggest they do not automatically reinforce the status quo merely because they are 'ideological,' since they are also determined at the economic and political levels. Further, I consider briefly the scope for the organisation of interests and action around such identities when

(6) Wright states "Because immediate interests divide the working class, and because they do not directly call into question the structure of capitalist relations, the durability of capitalism depends, in part, on the extent to which struggles over fundamental interests are displaced into struggles over immediate interests (Ibid.)."

they tend to correspond closely with shared positions of marginality in the political economy of the host society.

The other problem with respect to the reproduction of the racialised fraction of the working class is the existence of a migrant petit bourgeoisie. If all migrants do not occupy a position within the fraction of the working class then they are not migrant 'labour' even though they may still be migrants. If that is the case one must ask how they gained mobility given negative racialisation? Did they somehow escape racialisation or its negative typifications, and if so how? . . . If, as Miles contends in recent correspondence (December, 1983) they are all racialised, what does this say regarding the importance of racialisation for confining migrants to a working class fraction. Were a few migrants in fact recruited directly into the petit bourgeoisie or the 'supervisory' fraction initially or subsequent to their arrival? And if, as Miles has suggested (Ibid.) 'this move into this class location is a direct response to racism and discrimination,' does this not raise questions with the notion of the determinacy of racialisation? At least we need to account for those economic, political and 'ideological' developments which in the case of a few migrants permitted them to move outside the racialised fraction of the working class, in particular their importance to capital and the State.

An Amended Model of Classes and the Social Categorisation of Migrants

The general procedures of class analysis outlined by Miles (1982) are widely known and followed in the first half of this thesis. I am also in basic agreement with the theory of migrant labour and racialisation. I choose to place greater emphasis on the relatively unexplored aspects of social categorisation in advanced capitalist society, especially on the basis of ethnic identities, and migrant 'ideological' and political responses to racialisation.

A class or class fraction cannot be said to exist as an autonomous social force unless its position in the relations of production and overagainst other classes or fractions is reinforced at other levels of the political economy. Having several times raised doubts over any approach which cannot account for the objective fact that not all Cook Islanders are members of the so-called Polynesian fraction, I now upend the critique and ask whether a Polynesian fraction exists in New Zealand. For such a test, Poulantzas (1978:78-9) sets out what he considers to be the 'pertinent effects' of the economic position of the supposed class (or fraction) on the other levels of the social formation.

In the case of New Zealand the salient issue is whether Polynesians en toto can in any way be said to constitute a distinctive class or class fraction, as most contemporary sociologists seem to contend. Using the Poulantzian test, one must ask whether they live under economic conditions which separate their mode of life, their interests and their culture from those of other classes? (Ibid.).

Furthermore, do all Polynesians, or for that matter all Cook Islanders, share a particular position in the relations of production? The answer must quite unequivocally be negative.

Having established this, it is undeniable that in New Zealand there is an identifiable fraction of the working class which is largely Polynesian, and in which the majority of Cook Islanders are situated. My point in this little exercise is to highlight the dangers of an 'objectivist' theory of class relations which reifies 'migrant labour'. Not all the racialised, ethnicised population is migrant 'labour', nor migrants nor members of the largely Polynesian fraction of the working class. There are concrete, historical reasons why this is so; that is, why there is no precise 'overdetermination' at all levels of the social order. Thus, two aspects of a more adequate theory of migrant labour need to be addressed in analysis: (1) the existence of 'racial' or 'ethnic' migrants outside the working class fraction, and their purpose with respect to the State and capitalist relations of production; and (2) the process of social categorisation itself, in particular effects at the political and 'ideological' levels constituting such groupings and which similarly comprise their responses (improvisations) to domination.

For Poulantzas (Ibid:27) class fractions and social categories are not external to or imposed upon classes, but located within and constitutive of their production. Social categories are "defined principally by their place in the political and ideological relations...." (Ibid.:23). The State bureaucracy is an instance of a category defined by their place in political relations, while intellectuals in their role of articulating ideology are an example of the latter. But Poulantzas emphasises that categories are economically determined as well. It is simply that in this instance, agents within the category belong to several social classes (Ibid.:24,187). What he objects to with respect to a category like the state apparatus is the tendency to reduce membership "mechanically to a common denominator with respect to their origin or even their class membership"(Ibid.:185). To do so overlooks the specific mode of functioning of social categories, of which I suggest 'ethnic communities' and 'racial groups' are other examples.

This notion of the social category is in rather marked contrast to the interpretation of Poulantzas by Phizacklea and Miles (op cit:24).⁽⁷⁾ Poulantzas' (1978:185ff) discussion of the position of state functionaries provides clues as to how to apply the concept of the social category in the analysis of capitalist society:

- 1) social categories are emergent within and delimited by material realities and class relations;
- 2) social categories differ from fractions in being significantly overdetermined by political or ideological relations, or both;
- 3) the functioning of a social category cannot be reduced to the class origins or even class memberships of its members. Once again, agents are recruited across class boundaries. They remain part of diverse social classes even though part of the same social category (Ibid.:186);
- 4) the social category under certain opportune historical junctures can function as an effective social force in its own right, intervening in class struggle politically, economically and/or 'ideologically' with weight of its own (Ibid.);
- 5) a social category may serve the interests of classes or fractions other than those of its leadership;
- 6) the social category, in spite of the diversity of class membership of its agents, often exhibits "a specific internal unity" which is the effect on members of the power and/or institutional unity of the political or ideological configuration which constituted it.

In addition it will be recalled that categories may involve positive or negative evaluations, be operationalised in thought or action, and be ascribed or self-selected identity. At the very least, I suggest that such a conceptualisation might shed new light on our understanding

(7) They state, ..."the concept of social category is of little relevance if it is used to refer to 'social ensembles...which...may become social forces whose distinguishing feature is based on their specific and over-determining relation to structures other than economic ones' (Poulantzas, 1973:84), that is defined by their place only (sic.) in political and ideological relations (1978:23). Hence, if we are to argue, as we will, that the position of black workers has to be defined by their place in economic and political and ideological relations, then they cannot be defined as a social category, along with bureaucratic officials and intellectuals (Miles and Phizacklea, 1980:24)."

Apparently in order to steer a wide berth around stratification theory, Miles and Phizacklea intentionally misrepresent Poulantzas so that the idea of the social category appears divorced from the structural determinacy of economic relations. This is clearly not what Poulantzas intended.

of the position of ethnic and racial groupings in industrial society.

Social categorisation may serve to reinforce class boundaries, or it may blur class position, common interests and thus the emergence of class consciousness. Both as ascribed identity and in the organisation and articulation of special interests, social categorisation can be important in reproducing or undermining existing class relations. Miles is astray in suggesting that social categorisation is merely "a phenomenal reality" (Op cit.:18).

Polynesian Migrant Labour and the Cook Islander Social Category

Pacific Islands and Maori migrants in New Zealand comprise a separate fraction of the working class, though not all Polynesians are located in such a fraction. In this thesis I show how most Cook Islanders came to be situated in such a fraction, but also how they are constituted and reproduce themselves as a social category with members from several classes and fractions. To maintain Polynesians in their class position, then, the ruling class must employ additional negative criteria such as being unskilled, uneducated, undisciplined, violent or culturally different in addition to racial typifications.

The policies of the welfare state in New Zealand partially offset legal and economic moves by capital designed to totally segregate Polynesians. The experience of Cook Islanders suggests that racial and ethnic categorisation at the ideological level seldom coincide precisely with or 'overdetermine' political and economic relations. An example of such a situation in the world today is apartheid in South Africa. The lack of exact correspondence between the effects of economic, political and ideological determination is a reflection of the actual mode by which the working class is kept divided in organisation, consciousness and interests. The inconsistencies or even contradictions in structural determinancies at various levels also provide leeway for minority group responses, whether they be formal or informal (Cohen, 1974a,b). Or whether they

take the form of intentional strategies or improvisational manoeuvres. Furthermore, internal contradictions in social categorisation at the ideological level, and their lack of synchrony with economic and political practices also provide the individual room to 'escape' or counteract negative stereotypes and identities. These will occur particularly at the political and ideological/cultural levels where they are not perceived as such a direct threat to the bourgeoisie. Where there is synchrony of structural determinancy at all levels, it is more difficult for individual improvisation or group manoeuvring. Conversely, such a situation is more conducive to engendering greater class or class fraction consciousness and direct political action .

Though Cook Islanders exist as an 'ethnic community' within a broader racial category of Polynesians, their position is also economically determined in the manner indicated schematically by Poulantzas. The majority of Cook Islanders migrating to New Zealand after the Second World War were unskilled and under-educated, bring essentially their cheap labour power. They were just the kind of workers capital required to fill expanding industry, especially smaller factories and service industries. Racialisation of this Polynesian migrant labour took place virtually simultaneously, borrowing significantly from previous experiences and positive paternalism toward rural Maoris. Both streams of Polynesian migrant labour, from the domestic hinterland and South Pacific periphery, were typified as preferring to specialise in and thus suitable for sectors unattractive to European labour. They were concentrated together in central slums or State housing, and then portrayed as creating the conditions under which they had to reside. This fraction became important in the control of disruptive, Pakeha labour particularly during the early 1950s with the rise of Communist influence and the dockworkers strike when troops had to be called out.

However, there were Cook Islanders who for a variety of reasons were not recruited into working class positions. These were essentially three types of people: (a) those who originally held public service positions in the islands, (b) those who married or were the offspring of Europeans, and (c) those who managed to obtain sufficient educational qualifications along with other credentials and contacts with which to neutralise the negative consequences of racialisation. Most of these individuals slotted into positions within the new petty bourgeoisie (middle class), obtaining positions in sales or commerce at junior levels, or in the State bureaucracy, police, teaching and other "helping" agencies. In a majority of cases such individuals were or became ethnic community leaders who in part obtained their position by a combination of customary status and outside support from the dominant class. Along with many who were recruited by management into the supervisory fraction of the working class to increase the control and productivity of their Polynesian workforces, these individuals came to occupy what Wright (Op cit.:74ff) has termed "contradictory locations" within the class structure.⁽⁸⁾

As I have stated, Cook Islanders as a social category are primarily determined at the political and 'ideological' levels. The most significant political developments effecting the existence of this category stem are (a) co-optation of Cook Islands leaders and qualified individuals into departments like Maori and Island Affairs, (b) the establishment of an official multiculturalism policy to encourage ethnic diversity only in cultural matters, not as a basis of commercial

(8) In the public sector this appears to be an instance of what Miles and Spoonley (n.d.:3) refer to as the role of the state in supporting capital accumulation and "disorganising" the working class through strategies of incorporation and cooptation. On the other hand, Wilkes (n.d.:10) is confused in suggesting that the State turns its disorganising strategies on Polynesians, for instance in the "despoilation of their cultural traditions". Unlike multiculturalism policy, this would tend to highlight shared 'racial' and class grievances and run contrary to the interests of capital.

and political organisation, and (c) social control measures in which the extended family attributed as a valuable asset of the 'ethnic community' is utilised as a means of social control. Cook Islanders have always enjoyed an intermediate position politically, since they are by right citizens of New Zealand and the Cook Islands, but they are still subject to these same strategies at the political level.

Migrant social organisation based on shared culture, language and origin is, on the other hand, the way in which political determinacy of the ethnic category takes on social force from within. This occurs in a dialectic with external developments such as those just mentioned, resulting in the production of a grouping that takes on common interests and corporate form irrespective of the class membership of individual participants. This has important consequences, especially in the polity and ideology of the grouping as I shall mention.

Ideological determinacy occurs primarily through political rhetoric from the State and through the mass media. The academic establishment, by its emphasis on the 'Polynesian problem' and 'race relations' plays an important role in the categorisation of ethnic and racial groupings. Initially at least, Pacific Islanders and Maoris were given identities with more or less positive evaluation, which nevertheless served to construct them as a racial category. Above all, they were manageable, non-threatening and unequal to Pakehas. Within this category, a broad distinction was maintained between the indigenous Polynesians (tangata whenua) and outsiders or 'migrants'. As various African studies have shown, the dominant grouping often has little need to take careful note of ethnic distinctions in light of their dominant position in economic and political institutions. Precisely because of this blurring, Cook Islanders made considerable efforts to differentiate themselves from other Polynesians as being harder workers, less troublesome, solid citizens, church-goers, family people and good performers.

Negative typifications were present from an early point among particular sectors of the population most threatened, but they became more wide-spread with the economic recession of the 1970s and 80s.

It is generally the case that common experiences of discrimination in employment and housing along with political attacks 'stimulate resistance' and 'bring about a distinct political consciousness and political practice from those subject to those practices' (Miles, 1982:169). Among Polynesians in New Zealand, responses and political consciousness have been diverse at least in part because there is not an exact correlation between their class positions and racialisation. Besides the social organisation of 'ethnic communities,' there have been three recent minority political responses: (1) the emergence of Maori radicalism, taking the form of a Maori political party, land-rights claims and protests against the Treaty of Waitangi; (2) youth gangs, 'street kids' and rastafarianism; and (3) attempts by Pacific Islands leaders to enter local politics. Nevertheless, while there is a general perception of broadly-shared cultural values particularly as measured against some of the supposed shortcomings of Pakeha society, there is still no united Polynesian political consciousness or organisation (ie. in Poulantzian terms, the social category becoming social force). The State and capital are interested in reproducing such diversity across class lines, relying on the petty bourgeoisie, co-opted leaders and the supervisory fraction to maintain the status quo. Radical Maori claims to superior political and cultural status through insistence on 'bi-culturalism' and Pacific Islanders becoming 'Maoris', and the distancing by various Pacific Islands groupings contribute to this diversity of interests and organisation.

Thus, the task of those who attempt to maintain an ethnic or racial 'community' on the basis of ascribed or chosen identity is not a simple one in capitalist society. Claims by such leaders for cohesiveness of membership and organisation on the basis of common interests and shared identity do carry a certain validity. All share a categorical position ascribed by the ruling class that can serve as a social force in certain contexts. But the objective interests of members are as diverse as their class membership, and there is potential for continual fragmentation and dispute.

For their part Cook Islanders have made much of their contradictory location politically and ideologically. Rather than radicalism, withdrawal or assimilation they have chosen a path of accommodation and flexible improvisation. In particular they have established useful patronage relations in both the private and public sectors, learned to manipulate the bureaucracy in their favour occasionally and presented themselves in a positive light vis-a-vis other Polynesians. One of their most creative forms of response to racialisation is through their rituals and cultural performances, by which they also confront internal conflicts. Indeed, problems of Cook Islands community cohesiveness and divergent interests (eg. worries about affluent members 'dropping away') are first and foremost a consequence of class divisions within the social category itself. And widely-expressed concerns over the second generation are not only a concern for the continuity of the 'community' in the face of class divisions, but a response to State pressure for social control of deviants.

Performance and Improvisation

To this point, I have maintained the importance of class relations in the organisation and development of advanced capitalist societies. And that 'race' and 'ethnicity' be understood as imposed and selected social categories determined essentially at the political and ideological levels which nevertheless may become the basis of collective interests and action. The danger in class theory is that of 'objectivism,' from which perspective the role of the individual as agent is relegated to secondary importance and the structures made determinate of action 'in the final instance'. It is those who view the social order from such a perspective who perceive the so-called cultural or anthropological problematic as so misguided. In a similar fashion the objectivism of French Structuralism falls prey to concentrating on 'text' to the exclusion of performance.

Bourdieu (1977) has been particularly critical of the objectivist position:

So long as one accepts the canonic opposition which, endlessly reappearing in new forms throughout the history of social thought, nowadays pits 'humanist' against 'structuralist' readings of Marx, to declare diametrical opposition to subjectivism is not genuinely to break with it, but to fall into the fetishism of social laws to which objectivism consigns itself when establishing between structure and practice the relation of the virtual to the actual, of the score to the performance, of essence to existence, it merely substitutes for the creative man of subjectivism a man subjugated to the dead laws of natural history (Ibid.:84).

While I acknowledge the influence of material conditions and structures on human action, my interest throughout this study will be on the dialectics of practice and structure -- that is, the contingency of structures on human agency by which they are constantly reproduced and potentially transformed. As Bourdieu states, in social analysis one must not forget

...the dialectical relationship between the objective structures and the cognitive and motivating structures which they produce and which tend to produce them...These objective structures are

themselves products of historical practices and are constantly reproduced and transformed by historical practices (Ibid.:83, emphasis added).

Thus, while I pay attention to the description of social and cultural structures which shape the existence of Cook Islanders, I also look to the dialectic by which they participate in the generation and modification of such structures. Put another way, I attempt to explore the structure of practice and the structuring of practice, not simply the practicing of structure. I therefore acknowledge from the outset the influence of Kapferer's (1983) notion of 'performance,' upon which I elaborate briefly in the final chapter. It will be apparent from the beginning that I consider the concept of performance to have relevance to understanding all forms of human activity, but in the instance of Cook Islanders to have particular significance in organised settings of cultural dramaturgy.

In connection with this understanding of human praxis as performance I borrow Bourdieu's concept of the 'standard improvisations' of actors instead of their strategies. There has been a tendency in certain sociological theory to over-emphasize the conscious choices and schemes of social actors. This voluntarism is particularly strong in ethnic relations studies which stress situational identity or the critical role of gatekeepers, brokers and mediators (Barth, 1969; Paine, 1971, 1976; Spoonley, 1978, 1982). Such a perspective not only neglects the dialectic between structure and practice, but the often inadvertent consequences of unplanned human activity (cf. Sahlins, 1981). By 'improvisation' I mean to indicate both the reflexivity with which the social actor engages in daily life (both regarding his own map of the world and 'objective' structures), and the possibility of creative invention that is his. But by 'standard improvisations' I understand with Bourdieu (p.79) the way in which such practice is influenced by the material world.

and shared contexts of meaning and interpretation maintained among sets of individuals precisely because they are perceived as effective solutions to the problems of everyday existence. As Bourdieu states of improvisations,

each agent, wittingly or unwittingly, willy nilly, is a producer and reproducer of objective meaning. Because his actions and works are the product of a modus operandi of which he is not the producer and has no conscious mastery, they contain an 'objective intention,' as the Scholastics put it, which always outruns his conscious intentions. The schemes of thought and expression he has acquired are the basis for the intentionless invention of regulated improvisation (Ibid.).

Thesis Outline

This study begins with the essential steps of class analysis indicated previously. Part I deals with the racialisation process as imposed categorisation and class domination. In the first chapter I discuss the political economy of migration, describing historical and structural developments in the South Pacific regional political economy which created conditions of dependency and necessitated Cook Islander migration to New Zealand. I also discuss how Cook Islanders have evolved particular modes of migration and ongoing contacts with their home islands in response to their structural position in New Zealand and the political and economic situation in the islands.

Chapter two examines production relations in New Zealand and the processes leading to the emergence of the predominantly Polynesian fraction of the working class. Once again, I am concerned not only to consider broad structures but the particular ways in which Cook Islanders have struggled against but also perpetuated their own marginality.

In the third chapter I discuss the access of Cook Islanders to housing. The argument focusses on an exposition of the accommodation system and its historical development, paying particular attention to the role of the State in housing. I include case-studies of

Cook Islander experiences of discrimination as well as statistical evidence, and against this backdrop examine their standard improvisations for coping with racism and discrimination.

The final chapter of Part I analyses the ideological construction of the Polynesian social category and the Cook Islander 'ethnic community'. Here I pay particular attention to political rhetoric and the role of the media, and how such typifications influence the way in which Cook Islanders articulate their own identity to one another and the wider society.

In the second part of the thesis I turn my attention to an analysis of the response of the Cook Islander social category within the ideologically constructed Polynesian racial grouping to racialisation and their structural position as discussed in Part I. Chapter 5 considers the ethnic community as a corporate entity, or as the social (ethnic) category acting as a social force. The discussion centres on the primary institutions in which Cook Islanders engage as Cook Islanders (ie. the Church, enua, sports groups and political parties), their interrelationships and how they link into the New Zealand social order. In Chapter 6 the discussion centres on the individual response in the form of kinship relations and obligations, marriage practises and social networks.

In the final chapter I examine at length what I consider to be the crux of the thesis: Cook Islanders' improvisations to racialisation and structural marginality through the medium of cultural performances and rituals. Under the concept of 'dramatization,' I consider a range of events from formal rituals to weekend socials, concentrating on the political and symbolic significance of the visiting tere-party culture troupe performance as addressing and subverting certain relations of domination located in various external contexts.

Part I

The Racialisation of Migrant Labour
in
New Zealand



The Political Economy of Cook Islands Migration

Introduction

Since the Second World War, the Cook Islands' most important export has been people -- or more to the point, labour power. I do not mean, of course, that Cook Islanders have been forcibly transported as in the days of the blackbirders. Contemporary migration is the result of individuals making their own decisions about moving for a variety of reasons. On the other hand, when one considers the extent of post-war emigration, the inexorability with which a structure of dependency developed making such migration to New Zealand unavoidable, and the political and class agents promoting such developments, then it is not too great an overstatement to say that Cook Islanders during the past quarter century have been subject to a sophisticated form of modern blackbirding.

I want to concentrate on the specific historical contexts and structural relations which have constrained individual choices and created the necessity for continuing migration⁽¹⁾. Such processes have often been referred to as the development of under-development. My objective is to locate Cook Islanders within what I consider to be a single field of social and institutional relations: the Cook Islands and New Zealand⁽²⁾.

(1) I reiterate at the outset my sympathy for the position of Bourdieu (1977) and Garbett (1975), both of whom insist on what the former termed the dialectic between structure and practice.

(2) For a discussion of the concept of the "social field," its application in African studies, and the criteria for establishing its borders see Garbett and Kapferer (1970) and Parkin (1975).

My attention here is on political, economic and ideological processes rather than personal relations per se. The nexus of South Pacific islands comprising New Zealand and the Cook Islands constitute a single sub-set within the capitalist-dominated world system. Within that sub-set, Auckland functions as the paramount regional metropole, and Rarotonga an administrative and economic district node within the Cook Islands peripheral economy.

Some time ago, Hooper (1961b) argued that the social organisation of Cook Islands migrants in Auckland could not be adequately understood without including their links with the islands. Curzon (1979:185) subsequently expanded upon this idea, claiming that Cook Islanders in New Zealand and the islands constituted "an integrated social community". However, where foreign boundaries, expensive travel, a dominant host society and alien institutions are concerned, such a model neglects the differences generated within such a far-flung population. Cook Islanders are not a single, homogenous community "transcending physical or spatial boundaries" (Ibid.). The factors producing differentiation even into the second generation need to be carefully examined.

Nor does such an approach take into account the emergence of a particular configuration of political, economic and cultural structures based on exploitive social relations, and the subsequent necessity of maintaining close connections with the migrant homeland. While I do not deny the very real emotional ties which bind Cook Islanders with one another, their culture and their islands, I begin with a discussion of structural developments as the essential context for grasping the basis of Cook Islander migrant practices, motives and customs. After examining migration patterns, I turn to emigrant activities with respect to continuing links and how these are shaped by and at the same time influence the existing structural arrangements. I pay particular attention to reciprocal visiting, remittances and

"investment" in land by absentee Cook Islanders.

Dependent Development and Labour Migration

The factors underlying migration, and the impact of population movements on sending and host societies have been the topics of study by economists and social scientists alike since the last world war. In the Pacific these studies have tended to dwell on migrant choices and motives, or historical trends, with little attention to how the two relate (Connell, 1980). Weberian ideal-type analysis has been the predominant mode of explanation of migration patterns.

Macpherson (1979:110), like Taylor (1980:26) and Crocombe (1971a) argues that symptomatic problems such as increasing population density, imported inflation, unstable prices for agricultural produce and irregular shipping somehow "produce emigration". Another case in point is Curzon's (op cit.) "emigration-remittance model". From his surveys of Cook Islander behaviour and motives, he derives a construct of migrant-homeland links: "a complex cyclical process involving the reciprocation of money-order remittances, information and goods for a return flow of emigrants and general prestige" (Ibid.:193). He concludes

in the Cook Islands case the 'push-pull' hypothesis would seem to have only limited relevance and it is doubtful whether or not the two general causes postulated by this school apply. Rather, the stimulus to migrate would appear closely related to the size and activity of the migrant community in Rarotonga and New Zealand and their transmission of money, goods and information back to village kin (Ibid.:194).

Curzon's argument is essentially tautological. We are left with a virtual closed system in which Cook Islanders cause and facilitate their own mobility for their own private reasons. His caricature of dependency theory is regrettable, since it allows him to avoid confronting some of the serious challenges to his own position. One does not have to subscribe to the hyperbole of Samir Amin (1974:99) to argue that an explanation of Cook Islands migration must include the political economy of the islands and New Zealand.

The development of capitalism on a world scale has been enhanced by reliance on internal and foreign migrant labour. The production process requires labour power, and profits increase to the extent that labour can be procured cheaply. Following the Second World War, advanced capitalist economies like Australia and New Zealand experienced severe labour shortages in their burgeoning industrial sectors. This in turn created pressure from indigenous labour for wage increases and greater control of the means of production. Capital's solution was to import migrant labour from their own hinterland and from overseas.

The catalyst to labour migration was the expansion of these same dominant economies into the 'peripheral' societies such as Ireland, Southern Europe, Africa and Latin America, moulding them into economic and political dependencies of the 'core' societies. This meant not only that the metropolitan economies concentrated production and profits in their own hands, but the peripheral societies (a) reproduced cheap labour which (b) they could not support which (c) they were forced to export to the expanding metropolitan and regional centres of capitalist power. As Miles has stated, "uneven capitalist development is both precondition and cause of the internationalisation of the labour market" (1982:162)⁽³⁾.

(3) Some argue that the indigenous reserve army of capital has become more difficult to maintain due to political conflicts arising from cycles of unemployment and recession, along with the rising cost of reproducing the national workforce (Harris, 1980:41). For both political and economic reasons then, migrant labour is important to the continued development of capitalism. As Harris (Ibid:40) observes, there is no such thing as a scarcity of labour, only a shortage of workers willing to sell their labour at a given price.

The development of dependency at the periphery proceeds by means of the penetration of capitalism, the establishment of systems of unequal exchange (Wallerstein), and the flow of capital from the centre and profits back again. However, it is an oversimplification to suggest that capitalist expansion never results in growth or 'development'. Thus Caporaso (1978) rightly calls attention to the distinction between dependence -- "the external reliance on other actors" -- and dependency -- "the process of incorporation of the less developed countries into the global capitalist system and the 'structural distortions' resulting therefrom" (quoted in Higgott, 1981:79).

One further way in which dependency often develops is by the establishment of an economy based on a meshing or articulation of more than one mode of production within a single social formation (cf. Amin, 1974, 1976; Long, 1975; Foster-Carter, 1978). Capitalism may penetrate and indeed dominate a peripheral economy, but it occasionally finds sustaining other forms of production useful to its requirements. Through its own operations or by means of governmental action, it thus insures the continuation of non-capitalist forms such as subsistence agriculture. In the Cook Islands it was in this manner that problems of productivity and the inexpensive reproduction of labour were managed in the interests of New Zealand capital. Circular, seasonal or return migration, all of which have received attention in African, Latin American and Pacific studies, can be understood as both manifestations of and contributing to structural relations of dependency between core and periphery.

The Development of Cook Islands Dependency on New Zealand

Since the latter half of the 19th century, expanding New Zealand state-capitalism has played an increasingly important role in the transformation of Cook Islands society. To understand New Zealand's own development and its influence over the Cook Islands it is necessary to locate the former within a perspective of recent political and economic history.

One difficulty with the core-periphery model lies in not being able to account for intermediate social formations⁽⁴⁾.

At the outset, New Zealand was constituted as a "white settler dominion" (Bedggood, 1980) or a "dominion capitalist society" (Armstrong, 1980) providing minerals, timber and farm produce to the mother country. Far from a transitional phase, New Zealand has been reproduced through specific historical events as a "semi-colony" (Bedggood, 1978). It exists today as neither core nor periphery but is maintained by processes characteristic of each.

While agrarian and comprador capital played an important part in New Zealand's development, foreign investment (mainly British) established early structural relations of exploitation which persist in modified form to the present day. Indigenous capital formation on any substantial scale would have permitted greater local control and early sustained growth. But the establishment of an indigenous modern industrial sector was blocked until at least the 1930s by the political dominance of the mercantile, financial and large landholder classes in concert with this same foreign capital

(Armstrong, op cit:40). This intervention of foreign capital was the ~~(4) A.G. Frank denies that former colonies which are not economically~~ developed were ever dependent. For Baran (in Armstrong, 1980:29) if countries like New Zealand were ever underdeveloped, they have not moved either to centre or periphery. Amin (1974) argues that these exceptional formations are nothing other than "young central economies" which developed because, for some unexplained reason, foreign investment was beneficial to sustained growth.

the consequence of internal crises in Europe, especially the need for external markets and outlets for surplus labour. New Zealand at least until the Second World War enjoyed a relationship of "benign dependency" with the motherland in playing both roles, until Britain entered the EEC.

The colonial government took an active part in providing the conditions for expanding capital, with assisted passage for British migrants, legal codes and military force to expropriate Maori land, and provision of the infrastructure for agricultural growth.

Bedggood (1980) with some justification, refers to New Zealand as a "State-capitalist" economy. The State was to play a similar role in the Cook Islands.

The principal shortcoming of the semi-colony analysis as applied to New Zealand is that one half of the model is missing. Arguments to date have focussed on New Zealand's dependent, exploited relation to foreign capital. Thus, it cannot be part of the 'core'. Yet, it has enjoyed industrial growth and a relatively high national income, and thus it cannot be a true 'peripheral' formation. What writers like Bedggood and Armstrong omit is any detailed consideration of how New Zealand was able to attain growth and escape peripheral dependency. This is a crucial omission for a study of the Cook Islands, since at least a minor factor in New Zealand's development has been its political and economic influence over its Pacific Islands neighbours. The exploitation of cheap produce and importation of unskilled, low-cost labour from the islands has enabled a moderate level of growth since the 19th century⁽⁵⁾. After World War II, indigenous New Zealand capital began to assume a greater role in the national economy.

(5) Of even greater significance, of course, was the appropriation of Maori land and the creation of a rural Maori labour reserve which was if anything more significant than migrant labour from the Pacific.

During the latter half of the 19th century, a class of wealthy bankers, merchants and their political representatives emerged which envisioned a great trading empire of their own. They began actively promoting New Zealand as a potential "Britain of the South Seas" (Ross, 1964:2.3; Gordon, 1960:9). The outspoken imperialist Julius Vogel became Premier in 1871 and championed joint venture schemes between private enterprise and the State. However, British capital was reluctant to make extensive commitments and the trade empire never eventuated. New Zealand did manage to convince Britain that a French threat existed in the 1880s, and the Cook Islands were made a British protectorate. By 1901 New Zealand was granted permission, having gained the support required of islands leaders by false pretenses, to annex the Cook Islands (Gilson, op cit). Annexation was one of a series of steps taken by the New Zealand government which were not the direct result of economic requirements, but an example of the State acting in relative autonomy (Bedggood, 1978:286) to make way for capitalist expansion.

By the early 20th century, administrative costs overshadowed indigenous production and imperialist dreams. The New Zealand government began to press for 'progress,' 'productivity' and more recently 'development, at the same time encouraging the islanders to maintain their subsistence production to fall back on. Manufacturing industry in New Zealand began to develop rapidly following World War II, partly due to the strengthening of indigenous investment capital. It was during the initial stages of this economic transformation that immigrant Polynesians began to play a crucial role. Pacific Islanders and rural Maoris provided a ready source of cheap labour, created in part by State-capitalist underdevelopment of their home regions.

In the Cook Islands the structure of dependent economic and political relations developed gradually and incompletely, rather than with the sudden overwhelming domination of capitalism.

Nonetheless, the New Zealand government introduced a number of administrative programmes to stimulate the wider penetration of capitalism. It also sought to protect the rights and social order of Cook Islanders. On a number of occasions it moved to block increasing monopoly power by outside capital, while stimulating local initiatives (cf. Gilson, 1980:189). The result of this contradictory set of practices was that for much of the 20th century, New Zealand shipping and mercantile interests were forced to contend against the Administration and the New Zealand government for control of trade, access to produce and extraction of profits. It suited both the State and capital that Rarotonga become the central hub of commerce and government, with the outer islands reliant upon it. In the end the Cook Islands became directly dependent on the New Zealand government for public services, administrative staff and financial aid.

The reason why a complete penetration of capitalism was blocked for almost the entire modern history of the islands lies with the early emergence of a system of articulated modes of production within a single social formation. Initially, there existed a form of providore trade with passing ships, controlled by the arikis (chiefs) with support from the Christian missions. However, restrictions were placed on the permanent settlement of non-mission Europeans because of their corrupting influence. The power of arikis reached unprecedented heights with their strategic control of trade stores and the subsequent petty commodity production arising from Church requirements that people wear 'civilised' apparel. At the same time, the common people on the outer islands and the hinterland relied primarily on a subsistence or domestic mode of production for their daily needs, increasing production and gathering when so ordered by their chief for trade purposes.

During the latter half of the 19th century, this balanced articulation between capitalist trade, petty commodity production and subsistence economy was further reinforced with the arrival of a

limited number of European traders⁽⁶⁾. Invariably such men relied upon the patronage of the arikis for access to islands produce, a place to conduct business and even a place to live. The more successful traders often married a kinswoman of the chief, and thus enjoyed greater success with a clientele of relatives and friends. Beaglehole (1957:150) indicates such men could function effectively to the extent they made efforts to learn local customs and participate in reciprocal kinship obligations. As a result, by pursuing trading arrangements in a way that was to their own advantage, they also helped maintain the existing social organisation and balance in modes of production.

Furthermore, in spite of pressure from large New Zealand merchants and would-be plantation owners, chiefs prohibited land from being alienated or leased to foreigners in lieu of debts. This effectively curtailed access by European entrepreneurs to land, and commoners to credit and imports (Gilson, 1964:951). With the initial support of the Church and later the British administration, these arrangements predominated for most of the last century.

Bedggood's observation regarding what might have transpired had capitalist penetration taken a different course in New Zealand in fact serves as an apt summary of what actually did occur in the Cook Islands:

...Had the colonisation of New Zealand taken place one hundred years earlier without the influx of settlers, capitalist merchants would have taken advantage of Maori production for the capitalist market (assuming there was one) and made their 'profits' by buying cheap and selling dear, without any need to destroy Maori society (sic.). It is not necessary therefore for agricultural production to be run on capitalist lines so that raw materials can be produced cheaply for the capitalist market (1980:34-5).

(6) Residential rules were relaxed when the whaling industry declined, causing an economic depression in the islands. Resident traders were needed to arrange new outlets for islands produce and to contract for ships to visit the islands.

Because of their small size, lack of resources and the chiefly control over land in the southern islands, the Cook Islands were not conducive to such settlement and thus an articulated formation emerged⁽⁷⁾. Nevertheless, the arikis traders came to comprise an influential compradore class which the New Zealand government sought to overthrow after Annexation in 1901 in its quest for 'progress' by indigenous producers.

The principal means by which the New Zealand colonial administration moved against this local faction and paved the way for more extensive capital development domestically was through depriving arikis of their judicial authority and control of land. In both instances the effective power of the arikis was soon undermined. But the Administration did not anticipate the consequences of divesting lineages of their leadership, nor the complication of land rights through the granting of bilateral inheritance to all descendants of an individual landholder (Gilson, 1964:953; Crocombe, 1964; 1967; 1971a). It became impossible to gain access to sufficient land for Cook Islanders to launch a profitable enterprise, and equally difficult to get shareholders of land to work together to make their jointly-owned property productive.

Crocombe (op cit.), Taylor (1980) and others have concerned themselves with this problem of productivity, a consensus of concern which deserves critical evaluation in its own right. Marx contended that productivity was merely another way of speaking about the extraction of surplus value from labour. The concerns over lack of 'progress,' low 'productivity', slow 'growth' and stagnant 'development' are

(7) Bedggood (Ibid.;1978) is in error to claim that Maori society and economic organisation were totally destroyed by European settlement. Maoris were divested of much of their land and pushed into the rural hinterland where customary production persisted, reproducing a cheap labour force useful later. In consequence Bedggood has difficulty accounting for the resurgence of Maori culture and 'communal' production in recent years.

in themselves ideological conceptualisations of the problem of the islands economy, without accounting for outside forces and the state of the regional political economy. They mirror the essential concerns of the State and New Zealand mercantile and investment capital: removal of blocks to the complete penetration of the capitalist mode of production.

Capitalism has been the principal mode of production and exchange in the islands for quite some time. But, since early in the 20th century the Cook Islands have constituted what Kahn (1978) has termed a "neo-colonial" formation. That is, a society which has capitalism dominant among several modes of production in a systematic structure of articulation. This articulation has in turn been reproduced both intentionally and inadvertently, institutionally and by individual practice. It has been the primary means by which dependency on New Zealand has been maintained. Dependency in the sense that there has been an increasing burden of costs from administrative services on the islanders, which in turn must be met by wage labour and cash cropping for export. At the same time, under-employment is rife, shipping costly, and local capital formation inhibited through State intervention and insufficient support for alternative forms of production organisation.

These developments in turn have necessitated the 'export' of labour to New Zealand and the sending back of remittances and other forms of assistance. The consequence has been the undermining of the previous arrangement of "mixed modes of production" (Crocombe, 1964; 1971a) and greater economic dependency.

My basic contention is this: the continued practice of "mixed modes of production" among Cook Islanders was a rational economic choice, given the difficult land tenure arrangements, a tacit encouragement of subsistence farming by the Administration and insecure income from agriculture due to Administration intervention

against foreign capital along with mercantile protectionism in New Zealand. The system of articulated modes of production was established and maintained jurally, administratively and economically through the joint efforts of New Zealand capital and the State.

Of course, Cook Islanders were not merely the victims of these developments. They did, for instance, engage in violent struggles against merchant monopolies after both world wars. But by and large, their own activities helped reproduce the existing structure in what they believed to be their own best interests. The Cook Islander perspective is best understood in the context of Scott's (1976) analysis of the moral economy of the peasant. What may seem irrational and inordinately conservative to the outsider makes considerable sense in the peasant's perspective, given the parameters within which he must operate.

Early economic consultants slated 'traditionalism' as a primary block to growth (Johnston, 1951; 1959). What these writers consistently overlooked was the resilience and adaptability of peasant producers. Johnston himself (1959:114) noted that in years of good agricultural export prices in the Cook Islands, subsistence production fell off. Rather than a permanent, 'enlightened' switch to cash-cropping, local producers simply shifted back to subsistence farming during lean years. Maori producers seem to have been able to maintain flexibility, a flexibility enhanced by what seemed to some as their obstinate resistance to concerted efforts to alter their land tenure system (Crocombe, 1964) and encourage 'progress'.⁽⁸⁾ Instead, they retained their ability to

(8) On Mangaia, Allen found that "Because in most cases agriculture alone cannot adequately supply an individual's needs, it is becoming increasingly a second-grade full-time occupation. Public service is chosen by most people interviewed as the most desirable, and most said it was because of the higher income. Many stated they wanted a job for half the year to satisfy their money needs, and then wanted to fish and plant the rest of the year (Allen, 1969:82).

Similarly, on Rarotonga "Few Arorangi growers have made a complete transition to commercial cropping. Most are either small producers relying partly on cash crops while cultivating the bulk of their own

expand or contract their involvement in subsistence production, cash-cropping or wage labour as conditions dictated. Such a resource of standard improvisations thus constituted the Cook Islander's insurance policy against future contingency. To date, neither wage labour, agriculture, commercial investment nor government welfare have been sufficient or consistent enough to entirely guarantee the livelihood of Cook Islanders.

The resultant economic configuration eventually created conditions of rising import costs, increased administrative levies, the necessity of emigrating to New Zealand and subsequent reliance on remittances. These 'underdeveloped' structural arrangements were not the result of fate or accident, but part of the requirements of an expanding foreign capital, augmented by the operations of the New Zealand government. New Zealand enjoyed modest trade profits, cheap islands produce and -- most importantly of all besides its own captive tourist resort -- low-cost migrant labour to supply its expanding post-war industry.

In fact the Administration actively assisted New Zealand manufacturers to recruit in the islands, though most Cook Islanders had to pay their own way to the land of opportunity. Indeed, the social reproduction of labour at a minimal cost was an explicit component of Administration policy in the islands. In its 1953 annual report, the Administration of the day stated quite unequivocally

No employment problem exists. Although a large proportion of the adult male population is employed for wages, the system

(8)(continued) food supply, or are part-time planters employed in wage-labour when available, but also cultivating several food crops. That is, it is a highly developed money economy tied closely to production for subsistence needs (Bassett, 1969:54).

At about the same time, Curzon (1968:44) found that employment in Avarua was "extremely fluid, with a high percentage of temporary or casual labour". The Union Steamship Company had 39 full-time employees, but called up an additional 150 casual workers when a ship berthed.

of land ownership insures that no Maori is solely dependent on wages for food and shelter (sic.), and no employment problems therefore exist (Cook Islands Administration Annual Report, 1953:663).

New Zealand expanded the public service and development programmes in preparation for the granting of internal self-government in 1965. This meant not only a significant increase in the availability of wage and salary employment in Rarotonga, but rising household levies, both of which stimulated migration from the outer islands. It also caused major changes in the occupational structure, again with greatest impact in the southern islands (Table 1.1).

A number of trends are apparent in this comparative data, trends which challenge the accuracy of some of Hayes's (1982:262ff) conclusions. Firstly, those engaged in agriculture and fishing increased dramatically, reversing the decline which Hayes and Taylor (1980:28) imply is somehow an inevitable consequence of modernisation⁽⁹⁾. Since this period coincided with serious economic recession, continuing net emigration and a decline in population for the first time in modern history, it is assumed that most of these 'planters' were recruited locally. I surmise they came largely from the 'not classified' and 'production' categories plus new workers, but I am unable to verify this supposition.

The proportion in the labour force engaged in "white collar" occupations has continued to increase to 46.8%. However, most of these positions are located in Rarotonga and a significant majority are public service (non-productive) positions. The professional/

(9) There was an inordinately large number engaged in unclassified work in the 1976 census, of which based on past studies I estimate half included some form of subsistence farming. The agricultural decline may not have been as marked as Hayes believed, especially if referring to activities other than commercial production.

Table 1.1 Cook Islands Labour Force by Major Occupational Group: 1966, 1976, 1981.

Occupational Category		1966		1976		1981	
		No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
White Collar	Professional & Technical	733	13.4	882	16.4	884	16.0
	Administrative, Executive & Managerial	71	1.3	187	3.5	183	3.3
	Clerical	286	5.2	511	9.5	669	12.1
	Sales & Service	242	4.4	279	5.2	849	15.4*
	Sport & Recreation	276	4.9	410	7.6	--	--
White Collar Total		1608	29.2	2269	42.2	2585	46.8
Blue Collar	Agriculture & Fisherman	2062	38.0	1117	20.7	1543	28.0
	Production & Related	1645	30.1	1425	26.5	1382	25.2
Blue Collar Total		3707	68.1	2542	47.2	2925	53.0
Not Classified		246	4.5	573	10.6	255	4.6
Total Economically Active		5561	100	5384	100	5510	100

Source: Hayes, 1982; Cook Islands Statistics Office Census, 1981

* It is assumed that the large increase in the sales and service category is partially accounted for by subsuming those in the Sport & Recreation category in the 1981 census.

technical and administrative/managerial categories have actually declined as a percentage of the workforce. There are a considerable number of expatriot Europeans at this level, and a high turnover rate as islanders who acquire skills emigrate to New Zealand. Where the gains have occurred are in the clerical and sales/service groupings, most of which are situated in Rarotonga and some being associated with expanded tourism. In all the picture is more clearly one of continuing underdevelopment that even Hayes portrayed.

Under Albert Henry, the Cook Islands government in concert with New Zealand sought to expand its role in guiding the economy. The eventual result was a series of set-backs for various development programmes, with the government ending up virtually running commercial agricultural production at one stage. Costs locally and to the New Zealand taxpayer soared. With the deepening world recession in the late 1970s, the new Democratic government under Tom Davis turned to encouraging private enterprise and overseas investment capital, particularly in tourism and small business. The result was to make the islands even further dependent on New Zealand aid and outside capital (cf. Britton, 1981).

It was agricultural decline, expansion of public service employment, tourism development and remittances from absentee Cook Islanders that eventually eroded the position of cash-cropping and subsistence farming in the economy, particularly in the southern islands. A prominent indicator of the destabilisation of the previous structure of interrelated modes of production was the emergence of the individual entrepreneur (cf. Crocombe, 1964; Taylor, 1980). The government sought to encourage individual initiatives through measures such as leasehold agreements on land and small business assistance by way of tax incentives. Nevertheless, there still was sufficient economic uncertainty to lead many people to supplement their wage income or salaries by "moonlighting" in horticulture (Taylor, p. 43).

By the late 1970s, a handful of Cook Islanders in the southern islands were engaged in the small business sector, particularly shops, small service firms, restaurants and motels catering for the tourist trade. At the same time, banking, insurance, transport, hotels, groceries and furniture were all controlled by overseas capital. The Cook Islands government had part interest in some of the larger ventures, notably the luxury Rarotongan Hotel. With the encouragement of local and overseas private enterprise, there emerged along with a few agricultural entrepreneurs an indigenous petite bourgeoisie, many of whom were also prominent politicians.

The contradiction inherent in such 'progress,' as Crocombe perceived twenty years ago, was that the entrepreneur succeeded at the expense of others through unequal advantage: "there is a danger of their achieving excessive power over the community" (1965:150). In agriculture he noted an increasing class differentiation between land-working and land-owning units. More recently, Taylor found that such individuals "tend to form monopolies, amplify unequal distribution of wealth and capital, and outmanoeuvre individuals for political power" (1980:44). Baddeley (1978) also noted increasing class differences among the people of Ruatonga tapere (sub-district) on Rarotonga.

The transformation of the social and economic order may be more striking in a setting such as the Cook Islands. Nonetheless, liberal commentators fail to see the wood for the trees. These developments are not a few isolated, regrettable consequences of modernisation, nor the deterioration of traditional culture due to individual selfishness as many Cook Islanders believe. These changes are merely the normal process of capital penetration, through increasing structural dependency, exploitation and class separation. In the broader regional economy it is the extension of a "chain of exploitive relations" (Bedggood, 1980:41).

In view of what I argue to be the transformation of the previous structure of articulated modes of production, and the deepening of capitalist-dominated dependency, the recent report of the Asian Development Bank regarding the future of the Cook Islands makes disturbing reading indeed:

...The situation in which the Cook Islands finds itself is as follows. For those who find a traditional existence based on an integral subsistence mode unacceptable, the long-standing compromise of mixed subsistence-cash cropping is unable to provide the standard of living to which many aspire (sic.). With the substantial advantage of unrestricted entry into New Zealand and increasing mobility of the workforce, particularly younger segments of it, the Cook Islands can only expect to retain those who do not see their welfare better served by emigrating (Asian Development Bank, 1980:378).
Ward and Proctor

The report's authors construe the problems of future development as contingent largely upon individual choices and preferences, irrespective of how those choices are influenced by wider political, economic and ideological constraints. One needs to bear in mind they are in reality describing declining productivity, increased dependency ratios, a soaring cost of living, under-employment and the export of labour power to New Zealand. The report concludes innocently,

The future then must be one of closer links to New Zealand, with increased trade, greater tourist flows and more frequent movement of Cook Islanders between the two countries. The longer term solution might be the absorption of the islands more completely into the New Zealand economy (sic.) with similar economic values operating in the Cook Islands as in New Zealand. There seems no good reason why, in time, the Cook Islands may not achieve, in New Zealand terms, a similar position to that which Tasmania enjoys in the Australian Commonwealth--largely self-governing, highly productive in specialised areas and operating almost entirely within the mainland economy, though not able to support the total level of services it enjoys and thus dependent on more productive or less disadvantaged areas to provide subsidies for its domestic budget (Ibid.:380).

After the recent Franklin Dam controversy with Canberra, it is hardly likely that Tasmanians would share this glowing account of their position in the Australian commonwealth. The report does, however, stand as an accurate if unintended description of the process of the development of dependency, and as an ideological apologetic for it.

Cook Islands Migration Patterns

Emigration impoverishes the region, it also prevents the socio-economic structure from undergoing radical progressive change; also, to defend themselves, to survive, these societies react by reinforcing those aspects of their traditional structure which enable them to survive this impoverishment. But at the same time, this impoverishment reinforces the push effect on certain elements of the population, reproducing the conditions of emigration. The form that this development takes is that of a degenerated, agrarian capitalism, corrupted and poor (Amin, 1976;104).


Trends in Cook Island Maori migration during the 20th century suggest several distinct phases, as seen in the following diagram (Figure 1). Clearly when gross mobility or total number of movements across frontier are calculated, the last quarter-century has been a watershed in Cook Islands migration⁽¹⁰⁾. The proximate causes of Cook Islander migration patterns are generally recognised. Total movements just after the granting of self-government were the highest in modern history, though only slightly more than the immediate post-war period when hundreds of men engaged in contract labour on the French phosphate island of Makatea. The dramatic increase in over-all migration from the early 1970s coincided with the completion of the international airport on Rarotonga, when scores of laid-off workers travelled to New Zealand to seek further employment (Taylor, 1980:24). According to the Cook Islands News (Sept. 9, 1980) which quoted official sources, nearly 10% of the population of Rarotonga left in 1974.

The flow of migrants was also affected by the world economic recession following the 1973 oil crisis. Because of imported inflation, declining export prices and joblessness, Cook Islanders were forced to travel to New Zealand in hope of finding better

(10) Curzon (1970a,b,1973) apparently misread early trends when suggesting that the mid-1960s were the "take-off" point in Cook Islands migration. Maori departures from the islands at the time barely matched those of 1950.

COOK ISLANDS MAORI MIGRATION HISTORY,
1924 - 1982

(Sources: Curzon, 1973; Cook Islands Statistics
Bulletins; N.Z. Dept. of Statistics Yearbook)



cash employment. The apparent 'delay factor' in the migration peaks is strong evidence that the economy of the islands is closely tied to developments in New Zealand. Downturn in New Zealand ramifies to the islands and encourages rather than inhibits migration.

The relative poverty of the outer islands and the central position of Rarotonga in the economy as well as a migration hub becomes apparent when direction of migration flows is examined (Figure 2). Individual islands like Aitutaki contribute more than the average to such flows, though there is little overall difference between the northern and southern islands. Proportionally, many more emigrate from the islands than return to them.


The picture is modified somewhat when net migration is taken into consideration, as in Figure 3 and Table 1.2. It is apparent when compared with trends in population growth in the islands that net emigration has had a significant effect on population growth rates. The rate of emigration has been highest over the past decade.

Hayes (1982:127) estimates that while total moves have increased dramatically since self-government, although the absolute number of emigrants remained relatively high, the rate of emigration as a percentage of total movements fell. Thus 45.2% of moves in and out of the islands between 1961 and 1965 resulted in emigration; 16.8% between 1971-1975 and only 4.9% between 1976 and 1980.

Until recently, the final destination for most migrants was New Zealand. But with deepening economic recession there and soaring unemployment particularly among Polynesians, an increasing number of Cook Islanders began moving to Australia. Sydney was the principal destination, though by chain migration small communities were begun in Adelaide and Melbourne. The following table indicates recent migration patterns to Australia (Table 1.3). There is a clear relationship again between the economic situation in New Zealand and the commencement of migration to Australia. Prior to the mid-70s, numbers of Cook Islands migrants were negligible; an Australian


FIG.NO.2

COOK ISLANDS MIGRATION STREAMS



Source: Hayes, 1982:121

FIGURE 3 Net Migration of Cook Islands Maori, 1946-1982



Source: Hayes, 1982:126; Cook Islands Statistics Office Quarterly Bulletin

Table 1.2 Net Migration of Cook Islands Maori by Five-Yearly Averages

Period	Arrivals	Departures	Net Balance	Gross Movement
1926-30	93	80	+13	173
1931-35	71	56	+15	127
1936-40	52	42	+10	94
1941-45	165	270	-105	435
1946-50	740	807	-67	1547
1951-55	551	681	-130	1232
1956-60	264	493	-229	757
1961-65	320	847	-527	1167
1966-70	642	967	-325	1609
1971-75	2320	3259	-939	5579
1976-80	5044	5557	-525	10601
1981	4648	5309	-472	9957
1982	5863	5923	-60	11786

Source: Hayes, 1982:121; Cook Islands Statistics Office

Table 1.3 Cook Islander Migration to Australia

(a) Cook Island Residents Moving to Australia

Year	Perm. settler	resident long-term returning	long-term visitor	Totals
1977	6	24	1	31
1978	0	33	2	35
1979	3	7	6	16
1980	7	20	10	37

(b) Cook Islands Born Moving to Australia

Year	Perm. settler	resident long-term returning	long-term visitor	Totals	NZ origin*
1977	16	1	43	60	29
1978	16	1	28	45	10
1979	36	4	44	84	68
1980	48	4	53	105	68

* Total (b) - (a)

Source: Australian Bureau of Census and Statistics

statistician stated that they were counted as New Zealand Maoris.

Various political factors in the islands and New Zealand influenced long-term migration patterns. Public service positions involving both manual labour and salaried appointments became an important means of influencing party loyalties after self-government. Where possible, the Cook Islands Party government under Albert Henry made sure such positions went to their supporters (Crocombe, 1979). Many opposition party supporters in Auckland mentioned political harassment as a major reason for their decision to emigrate (see Hayes, op cit:96ff for similar findings). The use of the public service for political purposes was not, of course, the exclusive province of the CIP.

For New Zealand's part, immigration policy became an important means of controlling the flow of labour from the Pacific to suit capital requirements and social conditions. After the war, emphasis was placed on encouraging British and European migrants

by paying their travel expenses. By the 1960s Pacific Islanders were being actively encouraged. The mid-1970s saw government moves to restrict entry and evict Polynesian "overstayers" since by now there was enough industrial labour. As Farmer (1979) and de Bres and Campbell (1976) have recorded, the tightening of the short-term work permit scheme resulted from the National Party's attempt to blame Polynesian migrants for deteriorating economic and social conditions in the country. Cook Islanders as New Zealand citizens were not legally affected. But that did not preclude Immigration Minister Gill stopping off in Rarotonga during a Pacific tour to pressure the Cook Islands government to curtail migration to New Zealand.

In the Cook Islands there is a clear relationship between emigration and population decline, though the effects have not been

uniform (cf. Hayes, op cit.:186). Over the past few years, labour power has either been concentrated in Rarotonga or transferred overseas. The outlying islands were depleted of many of their young able-bodied workers. The overall pattern can be seen in the following table (Table 1.4). The Cook Islands have transferred large numbers of unskilled or semi-skilled workers to New Zealand industry (Hayes, Ibid.:288ff). There has also been an increased reliance on remittances and hidden unemployment, with many being forced into periodic subsistence farming (Ibid:270ff). The rapidly expanding public service sector gives the appearance that local skill levels have actually increased. Incorporating large numbers of under-employed people into this sector does little to increase 'productivity' or real development. The configuration is closely akin to that of many other Third World countries with an unproductive public service playing such a prominent role in the economy.

Hayes summarises what these migration patterns indicate about how emigration has affected Cook Islands development:

Given the various arguments that emigration represents 'aid' to developed countries...it is illustrative to compare the social capital costs of a worker raised in New Zealand with the costs of an emigrant worker (or would-be worker) from the Cook Islands....The 'savings' involved in 'importing' a Cook Islander are considerable: each immigrant represents a social investment 'saving' to New Zealand of about \$1000 in 1967 prices (Ibid.:360).

What Hayes does not say, of course, is that saving is passed on directly to the employer in the form of additional profits. He states further,

...It is clear that the total contribution of Cook Islands migrants to the New Zealand economy substantially outweigh the amount of 'foreign aid' which is received by the Cook Islands (Ibid.:263).

In sum the overall effect of existing structural relations of dependency has been negative for the Cook Islands and favourable for New Zealand -- particularly New Zealand industrial capital.

There are four major characteristics of labour migration from the Cook Islands which are relevant to subsequent class relations and

Table 1.4

Populations and Population Changes 1956-1981

Island	Year					% Change			
	1956	1966	1971	1976	1981*	1956-1966	1966-76	1976-81	
South Islands	Rarotonga	7212	9971	11478	9811	9477	+38.3	-1.6	-3.3
	Aitutaki	2565	2579	2855	2414	2348	+0.5	-6.3	-3.0
	Mangaia	1970	2002	2081	1530	1364	+1.6	-23.5	-10.8
	Atiu	1307	1327	1455	1312	1225	+1.5	-1.1	-6.6
	Mauke	815	671	763	710	684	-17.7	+5.8	-3.7
	Mitiaro	275	293	331	305	256	+6.5	+4.0	-16.0
North Islands	Palmerston	77	86	62	53	51	+11.7	-38.3	-8.9
	Pukapuka	638	684	732	786	797	+7.2	+14.9	+1.5
	Nassau	110	167	160	113	134	+51.8	-32.3	+9.5
	Manihiki	661	584	452	263	405	-11.6	-54.9	+52.2
	Rakahanga	341	323	339	283	269	-5.3	-12.3	-4.9
	Penrhyn	619	545	612	531	608	-11.9	-2.5	+14.5
Totals	16680	19247	21323	18112	17695*				

*Note: Small itinerant populations on the Islands of Manuae and Suvarrow. Also, 1981 figures are provisional.

Source: Cook Islands Statistics Office Quarterly Bulletins; and Taylor, 1980

racialisation in New Zealand. First, has been the demand for industrial and service sector wage labour. The majority of Cook Islands migrants have thus entered directly into the New Zealand working class.

Secondly, it has been equally significant that a minority of emigrants have entered into other class positions. This was due in part to their previous experience and training, particularly in the public service. This 'middle class' segment was to play a crucial role in the maintenance of the 'ethnic community' in New Zealand, and in class relations generally.

Third there has been a concentration of demand for wage labour in the manufacturing, construction and unskilled service sectors (eg. cleaning, cafeteria help, laundry work) often organised as rather small firms of less than 100 workers, where 'chain migration' and paternalistic management were key strategies. This sectoral concentration also meant geographical concentration in two or three main urban centres and a few one-industry towns (eg. Tokoroa and Kowarau with timber). Within the larger urban areas, they were relegated by their economic position and discrimination to the poorest housing districts.

Fourthly, the Cook Islands were not a conquered colony whose resources were the subject of violent struggle and whose people were enslaved and dehumanised. Instead, they were taken over as a backward dependency with an affable populace perceived as virtual caretakers of a European-conceived South Seas paradise. Considerable racial intermarriage occurred, and resultant attitudes of New Zealand Pakehas (tempered by the Maori land wars) have been typically a well-meaning, paternalistic racism. All these factors in migration patterns were to have significant effect on the direction of the production of a predominantly-Polynesian class fraction and class conflict in New Zealand.

Remittances, Land and Return Visiting: the Reproduction of Homeland Links

Participant observation is the sine qu non of anthropological research. On many occasions during my fieldwork, a vivid personal experience brought home to me some important aspect of Cook Islands culture as when I was first challenged to engage in dancing. During the Christmas holidays of 1980, my family and I flew to the islands with several Cook Islander friends who were returning for a visit. Air New Zealand had put on several extra flights that week to accomodate all the Cook Islanders who wanted to travel back. We landed in the early morning after a hectic night of on-board partying and gossip, and stood in the outdoor baggage area, breathing in the warm, flower-scented pre-dawn air. As excited friends and kin embraced one another and gave ei (fresh blossom necklaces) to friends and perfect strangers, the importance of return visiting for Cook Islanders came home forcefully to me in a way no migration statistics could do.

Much effort has been devoted to the study of periodic labour mobility. In some contexts the emphasis has been on seasonal migration (Amin, 1976; Garbett, 1975) or target migration (Dahya, 1974). Elsewhere, the interest has been on circular and return migration (Curzon, 1979; Connell, 1980; Chapman, in press), while others have examined the persistence of communication, assistance and visiting between absentees and those in the sending region (Doughty, 1972; Skeldon, 1976; Philpott, 1968, 1973). Such research has identified economic necessity and custom -- either obligation to assist kin or 'traditionalism' -- as primary motives for migration and continuing contact with the homeland. If people emigrate more or less permanently it is assumed homeland contacts and assistance will decline over time (Connell, 1980:43). If visiting and remittances continue it is assumed that they must be "target migrants" or sojourners

who plan an immanent return (Dahya, Philpott).

Less attention has been paid to those migrants who maintain contacts and visiting over an extended period, even into the second generation, though they are apparently permanently settled in another society (eg. overseas Chinese). The idea that visiting, remittances and other forms of so-called assistance actually constitute an "investment" -- or go to maintaining existing rights and holdings in the homeland -- needs to be examined more fully. Equally important, the structural relations within the host society, the position of the migrant and conditions in the homeland all need to be included in such an analysis.

Chapman (in press:2) has suggested a model of population mobility which distinguishes displacement movement (migration) from reciprocal flows (circulation). The latter form of mobility is identified with shorter distances of movement, for briefer durations and usually ending in the place where the movement originated. Given this definition, it would be inaccurate to refer to the ongoing contacts between Cook Islanders in the islands and New Zealand as circular migration (Taylor, 1980). In fact Cook Islander mobility has characteristics of both migration and circulation, since they have migrated but may return, and continue moving back and forth over long distances with little certainty where they will eventually remain. Cook Islanders in New Zealand tend to be long-term migrants who consider themselves permanent migrants, but many of whom keep open the option of an eventual permanent return to the islands. They maintain rights and contacts in both countries and travel back and forth as their funds permit. Most importantly, they are under no urgent pressure to choose one or the other location as a fixed abode. The same can be said for many of the second generation, though their first experience and usually allegiance is to New Zealand as "home". For this reason, it is preferable to speak of them as practicing

reciprocal visiting, assistance and 'investment'.

While net emigration rates have remained constant, return and reciprocal visiting have become a more widespread practice since the influx of the mid-seventies began. It is not just individuals who are engaged in such mobility either. Because of the savings involved, more and more people find it convenient to join a tere- (travelling) party expressly for the purpose of making a journey to the islands. Those arriving from the islands to New Zealand in similar groups usually perform as a troupe to raise funds for their travel costs and for some charitable project back in the islands (see Chapter 7). Those journeying to the islands from New Zealand are primarily interested in renewing contacts with kin and friends, having a holiday and seeing the sights, and checking on their land holdings and other rights. These groups of 60 to 100 must be included in any discussion of reciprocal visiting, since they are an increasingly important institutionalised form of contact distinct from the practices and motives of individual travellers.

Curzon (1973) observed that instead of the immanent return anticipated by many of Hooper's informants, a number of men were planning to stay and bring their families over when they had saved enough money. Pitt and Macpherson (1974) found that less than 50% of Samoans planned to remain in New Zealand permanently, a result of most are not citizens of New Zealand by right and many are only on six-month work permits. A Labour Department survey (1979) of Pacific migrants in the Wellington area concluded that

...return migration, the movement back to some previous place of residence, always has been one of the shadowy features of the migration process. Its existence is of course known, but its incidence has not been documented for a variety of contexts and so its significance is hard to ascertain (Ibid.:110).

The survey found that only 17.8% of those who responded planned to return to live in the islands in the next two years (Ibid.:111). However, many had the intention of returning sometime in the future. This attitude has often been referred to in the literature as the "myth of the return". It can have a significant influence on migrant behaviour. For most Cook Islanders, however, there is nothing 'mythical' at all about returning, since a majority have been back at least once, and some travel back and forth to the islands again and again. The same is true of reciprocal visiting among the islands:

Outer islanders visit Rarotonga for shorter stays, to visit relatives, as part of a tere (travelling) party, or for intermittent employment and business reasons. People make short-term visits to New Zealand and there is the annual influx of visitors from New Zealand at Christmas. This circular migration has important consequences for maintaining family relationships and has a variety of social and economic functions (Taylor, op cit.:23).

Reciprocal visiting has increased significantly in recent years. The record 11,786 Maori entries and departures to and from the Cook Islands in 1982 resulted in a net loss of only 60 people⁽¹¹⁾.

My own survey of Cook Islanders in Auckland in 1981 found that of those interviewed, 60% had made one or more visits back to the islands since their arrival in New Zealand, or since birth if they were born in New Zealand (Table 1.5). Of those who had not made a visit, half had been in the country less than five years, or had been born in New Zealand. Contrary to expectations, almost 60% of those adults (15 years and over) born in New Zealand had made at least one trip to the islands, almost an identical rate of reciprocal visiting

(11) Hayes (op cit.) found that when total movements were compared with the 1976 population of Cook Islanders in New Zealand and the islands, approximately 14% would travel back and forth between the two countries in any given year. A proportion of this movement is accounted for by the multiple trips of government and business people. Even if the figure were closer to 10% it would mean that upwards of 3-4000 people a year make the trip.

Table 1.5 Incidence Of Reciprocal Visiting Among Cook Islanders in New Zealand by Year of Migration

NZ MIGRATION PROFILE

FILE RARD1 (CREATION DATE = 02/02/22) BASEDATA, COMMUNITY INVOLVE

CROSS TABULATION OF YRNZ YEAR MIGRATED TO NZ BY RETVISIT

YRNZ	COUNT ROW PCT COL PCT TOT PCT	RETVISIT					NO RESP	ROW TOTAL
		INEVER	ONCE-TWICE	3-4 TIMES	5+			
		1.I	2.I	3.I	4.I	5.I		
NO RESP	I	1	1	0	0	0	0	2
	I	50.0	50.0	0	0	0	0	1.0
	I	1.3	1.0	0	0	0	0	
	I	.5	.5	0	0	0	0	
1940-45	I	0	1	0	0	0	0	1
	I	0	100.0	0	0	0	0	.5
	I	0	1.0	0	0	0	0	
	I	0	.5	0	0	0	0	
1946-49	I	0	2	0	2	0	0	4
	I	0	50.0	0	50.0	0	0	1.0
	I	0	2.0	0	22.2	0	0	
	I	0	1.0	0	11.1	0	0	
1950-54	I	0	7	0	1	0	0	8
	I	0	67.5	0	12.5	0	0	3.0
	I	0	6.8	0	11.1	0	0	
	I	0	3.4	0	5.5	0	0	
1955-59	I	0	8	1	2	0	0	11
	I	0	72.7	9.1	18.2	0	0	5.3
	I	0	7.8	7.1	22.2	0	0	
	I	0	3.8	3.5	11.0	0	0	
1960-64	I	4	12	4	2	0	0	26
	I	30.8	46.2	15.4	7.7	0	0	12.5
	I	10.1	11.8	28.6	22.2	0	0	
	I	3.8	5.8	14.9	11.0	0	0	
1965-69	I	10	20	3	1	0	0	34
	I	29.4	58.8	4.8	2.9	0	0	16.3
	I	12.7	19.6	21.4	11.1	0	0	
	I	4.8	9.8	10.4	5.5	0	0	
1970-74	I	23	22	5	0	1	0	51
	I	45.1	43.1	9.8	0	2.0	0	24.3
	I	29.1	21.6	35.7	0	25.0	0	
	I	11.1	10.6	20.4	0	12.5	0	
1975-79	I	18	7	1	0	1	0	27
	I	68.7	25.9	3.7	0	3.7	0	13.0
	I	22.8	6.8	7.1	0	25.0	0	
	I	8.7	3.4	3.5	0	12.5	0	
90+	I	8	2	0	0	0	0	10
	I	80.0	20.0	0	0	0	0	4.8
	I	10.1	2.0	0	0	0	0	
	I	3.8	1.0	0	0	0	0	
BORN NZ	I	11	20	0	1	2	0	34
	I	32.4	58.8	0	2.9	5.9	0	16.3
	I	13.9	19.6	0	11.1	12.5	0	
	I	5.3	3.6	0	3.5	12.5	0	
COLUMN TOTAL		79	102	4	3	4	208	
		38.0	49.0	5.7	4.3	1.9	100.0	

Source: 1981 Cook Islands Fieldwork Survey

as for the Cook Islander migrant population as a whole.

Having established the evidence for an increased level of reciprocal visiting, the important question is why such contact continues with such intensity. The reasons stem from structural developments at all levels of the regional political economy. Culturally, to be a Cook Islander is to be enmeshed in an extensive web of kinship, natal village and island identities, all of which mediate a complex system of reciprocity and obligations. By custom, one is constantly called upon to be a responsible participant, actively demonstrating his aro'a (love) through unstinting service and selfless giving of his resources. These ties ought to remain strong regardless of distance or length of absence.

Culture is of course a dynamic process, and customs can change as material conditions and social relations dictate. Certain economic processes have been important in sustaining ideals of reciprocity and continued contact between migrant Cook Islanders and those in the islands. With respect to the political economy of the region, I have indicated the fundamental aspects of structural dependency and state-capitalist exploitation in the islands, particularly the fact that labour migration is both a response to and a catalyst of continuing underdevelopment. The resulting reliance on absentee remittances (see p. 64) below is a prime factor underlying continued emphasis by community leaders on loyalty, love and mutual assistance between those in the islands and New Zealand.

A related development has been the persistent economic recession in New Zealand and its impact on the Polynesian fraction of the working class. Unemployment rates among Cook Islanders were several times the national average, while incomes among those who could find work were consistently well below the median for the rest of the populace (see Introduction). The welfare state provides a

range of programmes in areas such as health, education, housing, family maintenance and old age pensions. These programmes, instituted by the State out of political rather than economic considerations, are important in partially ameliorating the conditions of Cook Islanders. Nevertheless, with soaring inflation and increasing joblessness, the situation of the majority of Cook Islands migrants was far from secure.

Under such conditions, a minority of the more destitute migrants find it possible to pool resources from the State and withdraw from engagement in the reciprocity system, relying only on immediate kin and the occasional contact back in the islands. At the other extreme are those among the small middle class who are sufficiently established and affluent to also be able to cut themselves off from the reciprocity system. For the majority of Cook Islanders, however, the reciprocity system constitutes an additional form of security, a means of resources redistribution and insurance against adversity, as long as everyone maintains responsible participation as custom requires (see Chapter 6). The system of course includes relations with those in the islands.

However, in terms of the economic necessities of everyday existence in New Zealand, ongoing contacts with the islands are expensive to maintain. A broad distinction therefore exists with respect to reciprocity and islands contacts between those in the working class fraction who are financially well-established and those who are economically in a more marginal position. The former are usually long-term residents, older persons, with a stable work record and perhaps in a supervisory position, often with more than one member of the family bringing in an income. The latter are typically more recent arrivals, younger, who may be unemployed or had a series of jobs, rent rather than own their home and have fewer financial resources.

Both types of Cook Islanders find it possible to participate in the New Zealand reciprocity system of family life crisis rituals, church programmes and islands association projects. Both also realise that continued access to the ancestral house, land rights and other privileges back in the islands is contingent upon continued assistance to kin and periodic visits. For the more marginal migrant family, remittances and the occasional letter are their primary means of contact. The other form of contact of particular importance to less-established migrants is the visiting tere-party. Here they may greet and show affection for visiting kin from the islands, billet them in their homes, feed them and make ostentatious displays of donating money to the tere culture troupe performances all of which are much less expensive than a personal visit back to the islands. Their names are also recorded in the minute books of the touring group, and their kind deeds remembered in the hearts of their returning kin.

Long-term, more established migrants also involve themselves in the tere-party visit, though their assistance is usually more substantial. On the other hand, it is the more well-off Cook Islander who is able to engage in regular return visiting to insure his land rights. For marginal migrants, return visiting is a luxury unless they can manage to be included in a group visiting back in the islands. Even then, unlike their cousins coming to New Zealand in tere-parties, they must pay for their own fare.

For the more marginal migrant, then, the reciprocity system and home islands contacts assume the characteristics of an extension of state social security benefits, a form of insurance against adversity. For the longer-term, established Cook Islander who long ago placed a priority not simply on personal advancement in New Zealand but on status in the reciprocity system and access to resources "back home,"

assistance and visiting back in the islands constitute more of an investment.

Politically, unlike many immigrants who must renounce their previous citizenship to remain in New Zealand, Cook Islanders have dual citizenship as of right and so are free to come and go at will. Nonetheless, they are cognizant of racist attitudes toward "overstayers" and government immigration policies to prohibit Pacific Islanders access, so they keep their options open where possible. An important factor in helping reproduce the system of reciprocal assistance and visiting in the islands is the Cook Islands constitutional stipulation that persons resident overseas for more than three years may not vote in local elections without returning to the islands for at least three months. With a long history of islands resentment and political rhetoric about the subsequent effects of absentees on government and economic development, Cook Islanders in Auckland are concerned that if they do not maintain their voting rights actively, the government will move to curtail their franchise and thus their land rights.

All in all, it is usually more than homesickness or kinship obligations that underly remittances, gifts and extended holiday visits. In many respects the situation of Cook Islanders in New Zealand is not entirely dissimilar to that of Montserratians in Britain:

Virtually all migrants believe they will someday return to Monserrat if only for a holiday or for retirement. Migrants anticipate the general community approval of a man (or woman) who 'never sent an empty letter all the time he was out'. More important, they fear the specific displeasure of their family members should they return without having met their obligations... Also there is the notion of insurance, of holding their place with their families in Montserrat, because of the possibility of sickness, declining employment or restrictive legislation compelling them to go home and even seek the help of families there.

In some cases there is the potential of more specific gain in the future such as through the inheritance of land or a house...Most migrants are interested in land mainly for housing sites on which to build when they return to Montserrat (Philpott, 1973:472-3).

Remittances

Both the extent and nature of remittances, to say nothing of the actual uses to which they are put, are matters which do not lend themselves easily to analysis. One of the primary reasons is the fact that the Cook Islands and New Zealand have the same banking system and currency, so the postal money orders are only a crude approximation of the actual amounts interchanged (Hayes , p. 363). When people visit kin and friends in the islands, or when a tere-party arrives in New Zealand, a considerable amount of cash changes hands privately.

Studies of Pacific migrant remittance practices in New Zealand consistently show that the average individual sends back large amounts -- sometimes several hundred dollars a year⁽⁹⁾. Setting aside consideration of money which Cook Islanders contribute to tere-parties , church appeals and other forms of assistance back to the islands, the following tables show the amount each individual respondent reported sending to kin the year prior to the 1981 survey (Table 1.6).

At face value, there does not seem to be a case to be made for an inevitable decline in the amount remitted the longer a person is away from the islands (Connell, op Cit). If anything more recent arrivals tended to remit less than those who came earlier and had become more established. Connell's model is not automatically invalidated, however, since it is possible that many of these older respondents were beginning to seriously consider a return to retire and/or invest. But there is a connection between the level of assistance and the socio-economic status of the migrant, which in turn is related to class position and recent economic developments in New Zealand.

(9) eg. see the New Zealand Dept. of Labour, 1979. Not surprisingly, island groups which are not citizens of New Zealand by right tend to remit more, or at least they claim to do so. There is a tendency for an individual engaged in gifting or the reciprocity system to inflate estimates of assistance in view of the status involved.

Table 1.6 Cash Remittances of Individuals by Year of Migration to New Zealand

NZ MIGRATION PROFILE

FILE RAR01 (CREATION DATE = 82/02/22) BASE:DATA,COMMUNITY INVOLVED

***** C N I S T A B U L A T I O N O F
 YRNZ YEAR MIGRATED TO NZ BY CASHRMT

YRNZ	COUNT ROW PCT COL PCT TOT PCT	CASHRMT					ROW TOTAL
		\$1-25	26-50	51-100	100+	NO RESP	
		1.1	2.1	3.1	4.1	5.1	
		I	I	I	I	I	
NO RESP	4	0	0	0	1	1	2
		0	0	0	50.0	50.0	1.0
		0	0	0	1.5	1.0	
		0	0	0	.5	.5	
1940-45	2.	0	0	0	0	1	1
		0	0	0	0	100.0	.5
		0	0	0	0	1.0	
		1	0	0	0	.5	
1946-49	3.	1	0	1	1	1	1
		25.0	0	21.7	25.0	25.0	1.9
		14.3	0	4.5	1.5	1.0	
		.4	0	.5	.5	.5	
1950-54	4.	0	0	1	4	3	1
		0	0	12.5	50.0	37.3	3.4
		0	0	4.5	6.1	3.1	
		0	0	.5	1.8	1.4	
1955-59	5.	0	0	1	4	6	1
		0	0	9.1	38.4	54.3	5.3
		0	0	4.5	8.1	6.1	
		0	0	.5	1.8	2.9	
1960-64	6.	1	3	3	10	9	26
		3.8	11.5	11.5	38.5	34.8	12.3
		14.3	20.0	13.6	15.2	8.2	
		.5	1.4	1.4	4.8	4.3	
1965-69	7.	0	4	6	9	15	34
		0	11.8	17.8	26.5	44.1	16.3
		0	26.7	27.3	13.8	15.3	
		0	1.9	2.9	4.3	7.2	
1970-74	8.	2	5	1	21	22	51
		3.9	9.8	2.0	41.2	43.1	24.5
		28.8	33.3	4.5	31.8	22.4	
		1.4	2.4	.7	10.1	10.6	
1975-79	9.	0	1	5	8	14	27
		0	3.7	22.2	22.2	51.8	13.0
		0	6.7	27.3	3.1	16.3	
		0	.9	2.8	2.8	6.7	
80+	10.	0	1	2	3	4	10
		0	10.0	20.0	30.0	40.0	4.1
		0	8.7	9.1	4.5	4.1	
		0	.5	1.0	1.4	1.8	
BORN NZ	39.	3	1	1	7	22	34
		8.8	2.8	2.8	20.6	64.7	16.3
		42.8	5.7	4.5	19.5	22.4	
		1.4	.5	.5	3.4	10.4	
COLUMN TOTAL		7	19	22	68	98	205
		3.4	7.2	10.6	31.7	47.1	100.0

Source: 1981 Cook Islands Fieldwork Survey

I have argued that one consequence of the transformation of the 'neo-colonial' political economy in the islands and accompanying labour export has been an increased dependency on remittances (cf. Harris, 1980:57; Castles and Kosack, 1973). New Zealand aid has always been the largest portion of Cook Islands government income, but overall remittances from Cook Islanders in New Zealand have remained of considerable importance to the economy. Hayes reached a similar conclusion: "remittance income from migrants has increased as a proportion of total per capita income, leading to greater 'dependency' on an external economy" (Op cit.:iii). The situation is not quite so straight-forward. If one is speaking of current dollar values then per capita remittance income has indeed risen (Op cit:363, Table 8.10). But the value to the local economy of remittances has actually declined over time.

A similar picture emerges when remittances are compared with total export earnings (Table 1.7 and 1.8). From a high of over 40% five years ago, postal order remittances now comprise only a fifth of Cook Islands export earnings. Allowing for inflation rates over the same period of some 15%, the value of remittances has lagged well behind in all but the most recent year of record. Since numbers of postal orders have remained constant while emigrant numbers in Auckland have increased, these also represent a relative decline in per capita frequency of remittances sent back.

While there is no doubt the Cook Islands government and the economy are dependent on funds from absentees, the overall situation has shown a trend away from such a high reliance on overseas Cook Islanders. This does little to alter the state of dependency, but on the other hand indicates the impact of recession in New Zealand on migrants' finances. It is unclear to what extent these postal orders and other transactions reflect actual investments in, for example, business ventures or house building in the islands.

Table 1.7 Remittances as a Percentage of Export Earnings

Year	Export Value (NZ \$000)	Remittances (\$NZ) 000	% of Exports
1977	2,386	978	40.8
1978	2,413	911	37.7
1979	3,778	1,106	29.2
1980	4,189	1,120	26.7
1981	5,014	1,662	23.1

Table 1.8 Value of Remittances Against Inflation

Year	Number	Face Value (\$NZ 000)	Inflation	Deficit Value (\$NZ000)
1976	15,655	869	24%	(base year)
1977	13,909	978	17%	\$-23
1978	13,946	916	8%	\$-240
1979	14,375	1,106	15%	\$-225
1980	12,632	1,120	n.a.	\$-423
1981	15,853	1,662	n.a.	\$+374

Source: Cook Islands Statistics Office Quarterly Bulletin

'Investments' in Land

Politically and economically, the matter of land rights for absentees has been seen as a block to 'progress' since Annexation (Crocombe, 1964:121ff; 1971a:67). One means for insuring the absentee's rights to land has been through regular, strategic gift-giving (Crocombe, 1971a:55-6). As an example, Crocombe describes a feast on Atiu to which local residents contributed extra food on behalf of emigrant kinsmen in order to reserve their land rights against their return. Such rights guarantee a person's status locally as well as providing a base for subsistence and accomodation. More recently, Taylor, Hayes and my own fieldwork all noted the relatively widespread practice of an emigrant handing over his land to a kinsman who works it and acts as a caretaker. Many orange plots, gardens and even houses are held in this way for someone who has migrated and may return to claim what is his. This practice can lead to difficulties when an absentee is gone too long, and the wise migrant makes repeated efforts to maintain his kopu tangata (bilateral kin group) assistance and involvement in absentia., (see Appendix A for a case study).

An increasingly popular motive for the retention of land shares, particularly by more established migrants, is to build a house back in the islands. The practice is particularly popular in the southern islands, due in large part to an expanded tourist industry and the large number of expatriate Europeans in the public service. The cost of transporting materials from New Zealand is more than off-set by savings in labour in the islands since relatives can be counted on to assist with the building. Financing can also be arranged in New Zealand if one has property or an established savings history. Some people retain land rights in the islands and build a house as a long-term investment for their

children or their retirement, as a holiday-home, or to lease to tourists or public servants.

To build a house one must secure a 'partition order' from the Land Court for sole rights to a quarter acre section, which can only be obtained with the majority consent of fellow-shareholders in that block of land. To receive such support, one must demonstrate he an active, responsible, loving member of the family even though he is living at a distance. This he does through sending back cash and gifts, and by making periodic visits.

Once he has convinced his kinsmen of his upright standing -- or in order to do so -- he may ask that a uipa'anga kopu tangata (family meeting) be held so he may present his case. For this occasion, he will fare better if he has the support of key elders, speaks Cook Islands Maori, and has a good grasp of his papa'anga (geneology), customary legends and family history. Many parents and elders in Auckland worry about their children's ability to defend their rights because they are so deficient in these areas.

Sometimes local kopu tangata procrastinate about having a meeting and make the migrant return to New Zealand to come back a second time to test his sincerity. The test is a stern one, since air fares are now approaching \$1000 for a return ticket. Kinsmen in the islands are cautious because of the legal stipulation that once the partition order or lease-hold has been granted, the member has exclusive rights to any proceeds which may accrue from the property. The law was meant for agricultural production, but in practice includes income from sub-leasing or renting homes to manuiri (outsiders, guests). Some Cook Islanders have built houses expressly to invest in the accomodation market in the southern islands. One Rarotongan family who lives in a rented home in Auckland are responsible also for the family homestead on the island in which their elderly parents are now living. They also own a second house in

the main village which they rent to a European public servant, and have just finished building a brick beach house on the southern side of the island which they are leasing to a European small businessman who has lived in the islands since the last world war. Families like this are an exception. But those who enter into such developments, sometimes with partners in building small motels, are in direct competition with the Cook Islands government's own tourist ventures. Matters came to a head in the late 1970s when the government moved to license small motels to curtail their proliferation. So far, the government has not taken action against those renting private houses to tourists.

Summary

Since I take as my beginning point in this study the Cook Islands population of Auckland, my concern in this chapter has been to understand how they came to be in New Zealand and what factors have contributed to their continued migration and their social organisation and culture. Throughout this chapter, I have been critical of migrant studies which focus primarily upon individual choices or pattern variables. Philpott (1973:180) has acknowledged his own study of Monserradians suffers from not having paid sufficient attention to 'economic variables' in Britain. I have considered at least some of the structural relations and specific historical developments influencing motives, behaviour of individuals and migration patterns. I have also examined the dialectic between structure and practice in discussing the reproduction of articulated modes of production and remittances.

I began with the political economy of the Cook Islands and New Zealand as a single region with the capitalist-dominated world system. New Zealand has been maintained throughout most of its modern history as an intermediate social formation, which in turn

has affected the way in which it established a dominant relation with its island neighbours. I argued that in the case of the Cook Islands, capitalist expansion proceeded gradually and incompletely due to specific historical factors to do with New Zealand's own dependency on Britain. The result was a social formation in which three modes of production were reproduced together over a period of more than a century, maintained in part by the ongoing struggle between the State and mercantile capital, and in part by the improvisational 'moral economy' of Cook Islanders themselves. But I also suggested that the practice of "mixed modes of production" by Cook Islanders was a consequence of the very structures within which they were forced to operate. Recent government initiatives toward development have not overcome dependency entirely. They have, through the expansion of tourism and incentives to private investment and commerce, served as a catalyst to the emergence of an indigenous entrepreneurial bourgeoisie with extensive political power in its own right. The result has been a transformation of the articulated social formation, and the more rapid expansion of state-capitalism and class differentiation.

I consider ^{ed} ~~various aspects of~~ migration trends, indicating some of the proximate causes for post-war stages and expansion of mobility. Among other things, I demonstrated the effects of migration patterns of outer islands underdevelopment and the nodal position of Rarotonga politically and economically, as well as recent migration flows to Australia. I argued that there was clear evidence of continued development of dependency in the islands, including increased dependency ratios, changes to the occupational structure and the quality of emigrants as 'surplus value' exported to New Zealand. There are also specific characteristics of the migration process itself which, as I demonstrate in the following chapter, have considerable importance for the formation of a

'Polynesian' fraction of the working class and the strategic distribution of a minority of Cook Islanders into other classes.

Finally, I discussed reciprocal visiting, remittances and 'investments' in land. My primary interest was to reject tautological models of migrant practices, particularly claims that Cook Islanders in the islands and New Zealand constitute a unified, homogenous community. I was only able to indicate in a cursory fashion the factors contributing to differentiation between the two populations which I will elaborate upon in subsequent chapters. I spelled out some of the structural determinants of migrant-homeland links politically, economically and at the ideological/cultural level. In particular I examined the specific manner in which remittances and land investments are both the result of and yet serve to reproduce continued dependency.

Chapter 2

Cook Islanders at Work: the Reproduction of the Polynesian Fraction of the Working Class

Introduction

In a recent article Nairn and Nairn (1981:117) criticise class analysis for understating the 'racial factor' in accounting for contemporary New Zealand social ills. For them, within capitalist political economy, racism may be "related to" processes of class domination, but constitutes a separate system of "socio-racial oppression". Furthermore,

...when the argument that racial oppression is subsumed by class domination is put forward, it helps to maintain racism because it denies the reality of socio-racial oppression (Ibid.).

While I concur that certain class analyses have been reductionist with respect to the role of race and ethnicity, there is little to be gained by reifying racism as a separate system of oppression. To insist that 'race' is an ideological construction and that racism is an important mode of class domination is in no way to belittle its significance.

This chapter is not about racism per se, since I intend to dwell upon these processes at length in Chapter 4. Rather I examine here how a Polynesian fraction of the working class in New Zealand has been produced and maintained over time. The first section of this chapter corresponds to that stage of analysis I termed earlier the mapping of class positions. Here I engage in a more detailed -- though by no means exhaustive -- discussion of the emergence of the new, migrant labour fraction in relation to other classes and fractions. I also show how the recruitment by Capital and the State of a few Cook Islanders into supervisory positions and into the petite bourgeoisie has been an important means of maintaining most Cook Islanders in the Polynesian fraction of the working class.

I then move to the question of how Cook Islanders came to 'specialise' -- or more precisely came to be concentrated by external forces -- in certain industrial sectors. I look particularly at the requirements of Capital and management strategies, showing as well how these very strategies of labour exploitation have been mythologised by management studies as "migrant adaptation" or as instances of "cultural diversity". In a related section I consider the kinds of resources and so-called limitations Cook Islanders bring to the job market, paying particular attention to the process of credentialism through which Cook Islanders are encouraged to make a fetish out of education.

Finally, I consider the matter of the reproduction of the Polynesian fraction of the working class, both in terms of broader structural relations and by way of the individual practices of Cook Islanders themselves. With respect to the former, I criticise the ideological nature of occupational mobility research, looking instead at shifts in actual class positions of Cook Islanders over time. I question implicit constructions of hierarchical strata and "preferred" jobs, considering in the process their own conceptions of their work world and how these are shaped by their position in the political economy.

Classes and the Polynesian Fraction in New Zealand

While a thorough mapping of class relations in New Zealand and their historical development is beyond the scope of this study, a brief outline is necessary to properly situate the 'Polynesian' fraction and understand the forces brought to bear upon it. It is important to emphasise from the outset that it is the way in which production is organised, the constitutive relations of power and exploitation, which are determinative of wider social relations in capitalist society. The more simplified Marxist viewpoint holds that there is a basic distinction between those who own the means of

production and those who possess and must sell their labour power. The maturation of Capitalism involves an increasing separation and conflict between these two forces (Allen, 1981).

Bedgood (1980) in fact claims that recent economic developments and political confrontations in New Zealand signal an expansion of capitalist monopoly power and thus class polarisation (p. 70ff). He is critical of writers like Steven (1978) and Wright (1978) who claim the existence of a "new middle class" in New Zealand. He is unconvinced of the utility of the productive/non-productive labour distinction and queries the notion of 'contradictory' class positions propounded by Wright.

On the contrary, I find the Stevens/Wright point of view convincing in accounting for class relations in New Zealand. In addition it more accurately explains the position of Cook Islanders and how their structural position has been reproduced since the Second World War. The notion of class itself also needs clarification before I proceed. Poulantzas (1978) and Allen (op cit.) maintain as do I that a class is a shared historical relationship between groupings constituted first and foremost within the production arrangements of an economy. A class is not a category, strata, object or even a 'group' in the sense of existing as a formal organisation. Classes are constituted in struggle, and have to do ultimately with the distribution and use of power emergent in the relations of production (a term which for Poulantzas, Ibid.:17 includes consumption and distribution). The political and ideological are integral to the structuring of social classes.

The relations of productive organisation are built upon two forces: the producer and non-producer. The resulting configuration distinguishes owners who have real control over the means of production and thus exploit the direct producers by extracting surplus

labour (Poulantzas, Ibid.:18). Other classes and class fractions do exist, however, and I should like to spell these out briefly with respect to New Zealand society.

The bourgeoisie or ruling class is organised into two rather distinct fractions, (a) the owners of money and land from which an income is generated, and (b) company directors and upper-level managers along with individual proprietors of farms or firms that employ wage labour in significant numbers. Allen (op cit.) includes under the former those employers who operate largely in the export and luxury sectors. However, he is astray in identifying working proprietors of smaller domestic firms as a third fraction of the bourgeoisie. In light of their contingent position with respect to larger firms and investment capital, they must be located with what he terms the petty bourgeoisie.

The petty bourgeoisie (or for Poulantzas the 'old' petty bourgeoisie) may be identified by the fact that they are small owners who work on their own account without controlling wage labour, or at least very few workers. In New Zealand Allen considers close to half the members of this class are small to medium farmers. The remainder are small retailers, builders and manufacturers.

The middle class, (or for Poulantzas the 'new' petty bourgeoisie) requires more discussion than I have space for here. Members of this class, comprised particularly of the new wage-earning groupings, do not rightly belong to the bourgeoisie in the sense that they do not own their firms or the means of production (Poulantzas, Ibid.:209). While they receive a wage, they are in a position also to control the production of other workers, and thus the importance of the distinction between "productive" and "non-productive" labour. For Poulantzas (p. 211) productive labour is that which is directly engaged

in the production of surplus-value and exchanging it against capital, ie. directly engaged in material production of use-values.

As such, the middle class are in a contradictory position, since they are not directly engaged in the production of surplus value but have control over production and are themselves exploited by the ruling class. Ailen (op cit.:125) characterises their position as one of ambiguity and duplicity. They may from time to time criticise the so-called power structure on matters of principle, but they are dependent on the bourgeoisie for their very existence. In Stevens' summation

...Its skills and knowledge have played major parts in the battle to legitimate capitalism, and it has hidden behind its 'professionalisms' to defend its 'detachment' from working class struggles (Ibid.).

Members of this class are lawyers, doctors, teachers, academics, research scientists, architects, engineers and other salaried professional and technical workers. But Poulantzas also would include those engaged in the "sphere of circulation of capital" including bankers, salespersons, clerks, media personnel and similar professionals who earn wages. To this class I would also add judges, clergy, welfare officers, police and community workers who are in a pivotal position relative to the Polynesian fraction (including a few Polynesians) and yet who play such an important role in reproducing that same fraction.

The working class in New Zealand is generally considered to be divided into three fractions. There is what is often referred to as the "labour aristocracy" or the supervisory fraction who have limited control over how other workers carry out their jobs, but who themselves are also directly engaged in the production process. Examples are factory formen and supervisors, though tradesmen can also be located in this fraction .

Allen contends that they are better organised into unions than the other working class fractions. (1)

The second fraction is a larger grouping of less skilled and less organised workers, typically located in domestic production (Ibid.:126). Finally, there is a fraction often labelled the "reserve army" with which this study has most to do. Broadly characterised as unproductive, unskilled, unorganised and insecure of position, they are usually identified in New Zealand with Polynesians and women. Steven goes astray in locating all Polynesians as members of the reserve army (see Introduction). A significant minority are supervisors and foremen, a separate fraction within the working class. The reserve army is in fact comprised of workers who are maintained there by a conjuncture of bourgeois-determined "disvalues" of which 'race' and 'ethnicity' are powerful markers of social categorisation (Chapter 4).

The important question is whether or not such a fraction can be said to exist at all (Introduction). In following sections I deal with the structuring of at least the majority of Polynesians into this particular working class fraction, as well as political and ideological developments which constitute Cook Islanders as a social category.

The Class Position of Cook Islanders and the Polynesian Fraction

In chapter 1 I identified several factors integral to the process of labour transfer from the islands which were conducive to the structuring of most Cook Islanders into a distinctive fraction.

(1)Poulantzas (Ibid.:227) argues that such people really belong to the petty bourgeoisie since their real function is sustaining the political relations between capital and the working class manifest in the "despotism of the factory". I place them in the working class in light of the economic role, but the function which Poulantzas identifies is particularly important for the Polynesian fraction regardless.

of the New Zealand working class. This is an appropriate point to examine in greater detail the location of these migrants in blue collar wage labour particularly in manufacturing, construction and service sectors.

Between 1976 and 1981, the full-time labour force grew by 5.7% in spite of prolonged economic recession, high unemployment and a steady stream of emigrants from New Zealand. Most went to Australia looking for work opportunities. According to Immigration Department surveys, they were equally divided between skilled white collar workers and the unemployed. The increase in the New Zealand workforce did not keep pace with the rate of school-leaving or redundancies, however. It was achieved by an influx of married women, an expansion of some white collar positions and laying off labour from manufacturing and construction. The trends are evident in the transformation in the Auckland regional occupational structure (Table 2.1).

Pacific Islanders increased their share of the labour market from 2% to 3% in spite of high Polynesian unemployment rates and government efforts to curtail Pacific immigration. There were some 12,500 more islands-born workers in 1981 than in 1976. Since only 1200 of these were Cook Islanders and the majority of the remainder Samoans, State migration restrictions do not seem to have achieved the stated aims at least of conservative politicians.

At present there are some 5550 Cook Islanders in the full-time Auckland workforce, an increase of 21% since the previous census. Like other Pacific Islanders and Maoris (Hill, 1979) they have been recruited primarily into wage labouring positions (Tables 2.2 & 2.3). The percentage of Cook Islanders engaged in manufacturing remained well above the national average over the past fifteen years. The

Table 2.1

Changes in Occupational Structure of the Full-time Work Force
Auckland Metropolitan Area

Occupational Grouping	1951		1956		1961		1966		1971		1976		1981	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Professional/Tech.	10,036	7.5	14,553	9.4	19,518	9.5	25,825	10.3	36,665	12.8	49,291	14.9	50,058	14.6
Admin, Managerial	3,842	2.8	32,467 [†]	21.0	12,970	6.3	15,600	6.2	9,232	3.2	16,189	4.9	18,666	5.4
Clerical	22,428	16.7			28,984	14.1	37,799	15.2	50,872	17.7	59,584	18.1	64,368	18.8
Sales	12,932	9.6	14,121	9.1	17,111	8.3	21,182	8.5	30,695	10.7	34,159	10.3	35,064	10.2
Service	11,378	8.5	13,457	8.7	16,043	7.8	19,500	7.8	23,749	8.2	25,574	7.7	29,234	8.5
Agric, Fish, For.	3,939	2.9	4,154	2.6	10,995	5.3	11,270	4.5	10,930	3.8	10,939	3.3	12,222	3.6
Prod/Transp/Labr.	67,528	50.5	75,230	48.6	97,718	47.8	116,167	46.7	120,908	42.2	133,081	40.4	130,326	38.0
Other, Inadeq Descrp.	773	.5	513	.3	862	.4	1,212	.4	3,346	1.1	----- # ----		2,643	.8
Total	133,629		154,595		204,201		248,582		286,397		328,781		342,581	

1976 figures include those not classifiable

Source: New Zealand Department of Census and Statistics

present proportion of 56.6% was however a slight decline from the last census, mirroring the economic downturn, restructuring and redundancies in this sector (Table 2.1). The only sector showing an increase of Cook Islanders was the "inadequately described" category, a further reflection of hidden unemployment.

In terms of occupational distribution (Table 2.3) only 10% of Cook Islanders are classified as holding white collar positions. Even here, they tend to be located in junior positions. The significant decline in the percentage engaged in production, transport and labouring jobs is a direct consequence of the economic recession and industry restructuring, not 'upward mobility'.

In sum there have been major structural changes, the result of capital shedding labour, technological substitutions and government assistance for export while cutting subsidies.⁽²⁾ All of this has served to further expand and sharpen the boundaries of the Polynesian fraction of the working class.

The national unemployment rate has increased steadily since the beginning of the world-wide recession in the mid-1970s (Table 2.4). Because of New Zealand's isolation, dependency on trade and limited capacity for import substitution, the effects have been particularly severe and prolonged. With the necessity for capital to curtail labour costs the Polynesian fraction has been particularly hard hit.

For political reasons obfuscated by 'procedural problems' and budgetary restrictions, official statistics do not take 'race'

(2) McDermott (1980:21ff) reported that firms in financial difficulty were mostly those involved in manufacturing, particularly textiles and clothing, paper, and fabricated metals. These areas were protected against import competition and suffered most from the government's lowering import tariffs. They are the same sectors in which large numbers of Polynesians have been employed, further exacerbating their high unemployment rate.

Table 2.2

Employment of Cook Islanders by
Industry in Metropolitan Auckland

<u>Industry</u>	<u>1966</u>	<u>1976</u>	<u>1981</u>
Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing	40 (2.2%)	9 (0%)	30 (.5%)
Mining and Quarrying	14 (.7%)	2 (0%)	0 (0%)
Manufacturing	950 (53.2%)	2590 (59.3%)	3140 (56.6%)
Construction	122 (6.7%)	178 (3.9%)	190 (3.4%)
Electricity, Gas, Water	42 (2.1%)	33 (.7%)	60 (1.1%)
Commerce, Wholesale, Retail, Hotels	94 (5.2%)	357 (8.1%)	420 (7.6%)
Transport and Communications	167 (9.2%)	211 (4.8%)	320 (5.8%)
Services: Community, Social, Personal	342 (19.1%)	538 (12.3%)	640 (12.4%)
Finance, Insurance, Real Estate, Busins.	0 (0%)	37 (.8%)	60 (1.1%)
Other, Not Adequately Described	14 (.7%)	407 (9.3%)	690 (12.4%)
Total Actively Engaged	1785 (100%)	4362 (99.2%)	5550 (100%)

Source: Curzon, 1970; New Zealand Department of Census and Statistics

Table 2.3

Employment of Cook Islanders by Major
Occupational Grouping in Metropolitan Auckland

<u>Occupational Grouping</u>	<u>1976</u>	<u>1981</u>
Professional, Technical and Related	104 (2.3%)	120 (2.2%)
Administrative and Managerial	2 (0%)	10 (.2%)
Clerical and Related	181 (4.1%)	360 (6.5%)
Sales Workers	55 (1.2%)	60 (1.1%)
Service Workers	500 (11.4%)	560 (10.1%)
Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing, Hunting	19 (.3%)	50 (.9%)
Production, Transportation, Equipment Operator, Labourer	3147 (72.1%)	3580 (64.5%)
Other--		
New Workers Seeking Work	85 (1.9%)	200 (3.6%)
Inadequately Described	269 (6.1%)	130 (2.3%)
Not Reporting Any Occup.	0 (0%)	480 (8.6%)
Total Under- or Unemployed	354 (8.1%)	810 (14.6%)
<hr/>		
Total	4362 (99.4%)	5550 (100%)
<hr/>		

Source: New Zealand Department of Census and Statistics

Table 2.4 N.Z. Annual Registered Unemployed Figures*
(Source: N.Z. Monthly Abstracts of Statistics)

Year	Auckland	N.Z.	Special Work Schemes			Total Unemp	
			Gov. Dept.	Loc. Auth.	Priv.		
1960	220	633	-	-	-	633	
1961	169	376	-	-	-	376	
1962	483	1040	-	-	-	1040	
1963	248	849	-	-	-	849	
1964	132	650	-	-	-	650	
1965	74	513	-	-	-	513	
1966	62	463	-	-	-	463	
1967	1177	3852	-	-	-	3852	
1968	1541	6881	-	-	-	6881	
1969	573	2926	-	-	-	2926	
1970	231	1600	-	-	-	1600	
1971	347	3116	-	-	-	3116	
1972	858++	5684	1499	56	-	7239	
1973	222	2321	772	52	-	3145	
1974	-	955	287	2	-	1284	
1975	954	4166	2969	124	-	7259	
1976	976	5356	5593	581	-	11530	
1977	1553	7385	6195	906	-	14486	
1978	7218	22,330	9939	4422	5430	22021	
1979	Jan	7164	23830#	10749	6894	8919	50392
	Feb	6796	23780	10329	6682	9413	50204
	Mar	6641	23930	9852	6611	9645	50038
	Apr	6483	25160	9900	6707	8991	50758
	May	5699	24520	9927	6794	8260	49501
	Jun	5376	24670	9990	7119	7844	49623
	Jul	5301	25620	10348	7238	7666	50872
	Aug	5115	25590	10382	7419	6805	50196
	Sep	5167	26540	10230	7573	6818	51161
1980	Mar						49365
1982	Dec						104000

* Calendar year averages to 1972; then monthly averages reported

++ Manukau City added to Auckland figures from 1972

Annual seasonally adjusted figures begin in 1979

and 'ethnicity' into account. Therefore, it is impossible to gage accurately the Polynesian unemployment rate. Reliable estimates suggest that the figures may be several times the national average (Dept. of Labour survey, 1978). McDermott (1980) found a "clear ethnic component" in current unemployment rates, estimating a 1:4 differential between average national unemployment rates and Maori job seekers. Other studies put the Maori unemployment rate by the early 1980s at 15%. From my own 1981 fieldwork survey and the census data reported in Table 2.3, I estimate the Cook Islander under- and unemployment level was similarly around 15%.

Of course, occupation, income level, life style and relative levels of so-called underprivilege are only symptoms of class position³⁾. The claims of conventional sociology aside, they have nothing directly to do with economic classes in actual human history (pace Davis, 1979; 1982).

It is because classes as I conceive them are contentious relationships emergent in the realities of productive organisation and political power that I eschew studies of occupational or social 'mobility' (Ibid.; Goldthorpe, 1977; Goldthorpe, Llewellyn and Payne, 1980). Allen (Op cit.) insists that whatever their avowed intent, stratification theories function as apologetics for the capitalist system. They not only begin with dubious premiss that strata exist, but that these strata are hierarchically ranked in ascending levels of superiority (p. 62). Further, the 'higher'

(3) Poulantzas (1978:17) states that the major factor in social differentiation is not the 'social inequalities' between groups or individuals, because these are merely the "effects on the agents of the social classes" -- that is, the consequences of the objective places they occupy in the relations of production.

strata are automatically assumed to be smaller in membership than those below. And finally, that the higher up the pyramid -- or "ladder of success" -- one moves, the greater the status and income accruing to one's position. These notions in turn inform the commonsense conceptions of the populace at large in advanced capitalist societies.

Class analysis, however, must deal with real structures and social relationships. Having spelled out some of the essential criteria for membership in each class in New Zealand, and with the previous qualifications in mind, I wish to examine the current class situation of Cook Islanders in Auckland. By considering the position of a sample population of Cook Islander males over time, I want to address the question of whether the Polynesian fraction of the working class is being reproduced. Changes in Cook Islander class position⁽⁴⁾ based on data from the 1981 fieldwork survey can be seen in the following table (Table 2.5). The progression from father's class to ego's initial class to his present position provides clear evidence of a trend toward 'proletarianisation,' both as peasant producers in the islands and those who moved to petty bourgeois positions with migration to New Zealand and then were forced back into the working class. At the other extreme, the number of individuals in the ruling class inter- and intra-generationally has remained negligible.

Many fathers were members of the 'old' petty bourgeoisie of

(4) Identification of social class from survey responses was made on the basis of classifications under the N.Z. Standard Classification of Occupations index. Though they do not correspond precisely with class position as I have defined it, the above criteria were applied rather than Davis's (Op cit.) combination of skill level, income and authority. Students under 18 were classified as working class in line with Poulantzas' assertion that the educational apparatus tends to reproduce individuals into similar class positions as required by capital, particularly the working class.

Table 2.5

Changes in Class Positions of Male Cook Islanders
(Source: 1981 Fieldwork Survey)

<u>Class</u>	<u>Father's Class</u>		<u>Ego's Initial Class</u>		<u>Ego's Present Class</u>	
	N	%	N	%	N	%
Peasant Producer	17	8.2	0	0	0	0
Proletariat	129	62	181	87	198	95.2
(Old) Petty Bourgeoisie	50	24	10	4.8	1	.5
New Bourgeoisie (Middle Class)	11	5.3	17	8.2	8	3.8
Bourgeoisie (Ruling Class)	1	.5	0	0	1	.5
Totals	208	100	208	100	208	100

planters and fishermen in the islands. Of those few sons who began in a similar position, none remain today. Secondly, a few sons did manage to attain middle class positions upon initial entry into the workforce, but were forced to accept working class occupations when they migrated to New Zealand. Several cases of medical assistants, public service clerks, and teachers were encountered during the survey to illustrate this trend. Finally, the most striking trend has been the dramatic increase in those reproduced as part of the working class, from 62% of fathers to 95.2% of sons in their current position.

It is informative to compare Bedggood's (1980:72) overview of class distribution in New Zealand with numbers of Cook Islanders in each class. He holds that 5% of the total population are located in the capitalist class or bourgeoisie, 5% in the petty capitalist class and the remainder in the working class. In comparison a higher proportion of Cook Islanders are located in the working class -- and indeed a particular fraction of it. Slightly fewer than average are located in the combined old and new petty bourgeoisie and almost none in the ruling class.

On the basis of how he defines 'mobility' and 'class,' Davis (1979) may well conclude that New Zealand is a relatively "open" society. But his qualification regarding ethnic and racial factors which he did not consider is important. The class situation of Cook Islanders provides a much different picture, especially if one is concerned with 'economic' class. Clearly they are being reproduced and concentrated in increasing numbers in the working class over time, particularly at the expense of a minority of earlier middle class positions. The question is how they have been structured into such positions, particularly into a distinctive fraction and into certain "specialised" sectors of the production process.

Capital Strategies and the Myth of Migrant Adaptation

Since the Second World War, rural Maoris and Pacific Islanders have been recruited into expanding New Zealand industry to fill dirty, dangerous and physically demanding positions no one else wanted. Employers found such labour highly profitable and useful in controlling the demands of indigenous labour. They actively defended their employees during the State's initial moves against the "overstayers" in the mid-1970s. But their concern did not prohibit them from shedding Polynesian labour as economic conditions became increasingly difficult. When it came to a choice, most industrial capitalists chose the profitability of their operations over the welfare of their workers.

An industrial chaplain who previously worked for the Department of Labour recalled his own experiences of these developments:

I know of one guy who was making spring rolls. But all the other Pacific Islands people were in pretty dirty jobs. I remember one was stuffing lamp-black into these elements that are on stoves, you know. It's a filthy job, and your whole face and neck and hands, everything gets grimed in with lamp-black.

And the employers were sort of wringing their hands (at government immigration restrictions) and saying, 'Well, I can't get anybody else to do these jobs!' They were saying, 'We've tried all sorts of people. We've tried itinerant Aussie, and we just can't get anybody else to do the job!'

Immigrant labour from the Pacific became and in certain sectors remained an essential component in the continued prosperity of the firm.

Recent studies have emphasised personal attitudes, cultural traits and "adaptive strategies" as explanations for the economic position of Polynesian migrants, particularly their concentration in certain industrial sectors. What is often overlooked is the fact that migrant 'strategies' are themselves often generated by the requirements of industrial capitalism, particularly as a response to the way management selects workers and organises production.

Chain migration and "kin-reliant strategies" (Graves and Graves, 1974;1978) are cases in point. As Hooper (1961) found,

Those already employed introduce others as vacancies become available, and these others are commonly kinsmen or from the same island or settlement. Some firms work the Cook Islanders as a 'gang,' and they staff whole departments or stages of a manufacturing process---usually not those stages involving technical skills, but where the work is heavy (Ibid.:162)

Fares were often paid by a kinsman or friend to whom one then became indebted. The obligation became the basis of an ongoing reciprocal relationship in the islands and New Zealand.

Management's recruitment of Cook Islander employees through kin and village networks results in a number of benefits to Capital. Firstly, it creates for the firm a manageable, stable, hard-working labour force. According to a previously-mentioned industrial chaplain with extensive experience as a personnel manager, many service and manufacturing employers have taken this approach over the years⁽⁵⁾. As the manager of a laundry firm employing mainly Polynesians, he encouraged employees as a matter of company policy to provide him with names of kin and friends to recruit:

We hired them unseen! We were giving up to, oh, twenty letters a month. People asked and we'd say, "Yep, sure! Bring 'em in'. Part of this was because I believe in the right of people to immigrate around the Pacific freely anyway. Quite a middle class, liber thing on my part. But also it was damn good for business, you know!

The European supervisor of a large cement products company indicated that such recruitment practices have been strengthened by the continuing economic recession and the scarcity of jobs. Whereas

(5) Or in the convoluted reasoning of a recent management study, "an increasing number of employers have recognised the kin-reliant approach, and are utilising it (sic.) to reach appropriate segments of the labour force" (Nedd and Nedd, 1978:35).

his firm had been experiencing a moderately steady turnover, particularly among younger migrant workers, in recent years the company had "enjoyed a very stable workforce". Another value to the firm is continued productivity in spite of absenteeism. Kinsmen and friends working together are more likely to help one another out on the job, and feel obligated to work an extra shift to cover for a kinsman who is out of work due to illness or to meet some customary obligation such as a funeral.

Unlike the general populace, European factory managers, personnel officers and supervisors have found it necessary to make categorical distinctions between different Pacific Islands groups in the workplace. At the same time, it is Polynesians themselves who have made inter-ethnic distinctions salient in employment recruitment and production organisation. Many managers, for instance take pride in knowing from experience which islands groups "work well together" and which need to be given their own part of the production process. This is why it is misleading to imply that because 'race' or 'ethnic' categories utilised by migrants themselves are only ideological and in the final analysis have no effect at the economic level or simply reproduce their position in production relations.

Cook Islanders bring to the struggle for jobs certain resources which most other Polynesian groupings do not have. They are New Zealand citizens with no work-permit restrictions. They have been educated in a New Zealand-style educational system which includes the teaching of English. And some have acquired work experience in public service and commercial employment which give them an edge in the New Zealand employment market. Cook Islanders have used these 'qualifications' as markers to differentiate themselves from other ethnic groups, especially in the Polynesian working class fraction. They have linked such capacities with valued behaviour as industrious,

enthusiastic workers. The combination of the two has been incorporated into the ethos of their own self-identity in New Zealand. An identity shared among Cook Islanders as informal guidelines regarding their social standing in the wider community and as a means of access to jobs, housing and services. The key principles of this identity are conveyed by oratorical rhetoric at ritual and performative events, and by means of communication among themselves and with their employers.

The extent to which these distancing manoeuvres have informed the perceptions of employers and fellow workmates is evident in a recent study of employee attitudes toward workers of different ethnic groups (Table 2.6). Based on this study, everyone enjoys harmonious relationships with Cook Islander employees, and other than Samoans, Cook Islanders get along with everyone. All other groups report differing amounts of conflict with one another. It should be stressed that one is dealing here with the perceptions or stereotypes workers have of different ethnic categories.

For reasons of profit and patronage, management staff encourage Cook Islanders in these stereotypical presentations. Cook Islanders in turn work hard to maintain their image, in the belief they are getting ahead and gaining an advantage. In consequence Cook Islanders with the tacit cooperation of management have been concentrated into certain sectors of industry and particular departments of firms. As early as the first decade of migration after the war, Hooper (Ibid.) wrote

They have acquired a reputation among certain employers for being stable and capable workers, and generally willing to accept a lot of overtime and shift-work hours. Consequently, a number of firms and institutions in the city have built up large groups of Cook Island employees, and they appear to give them preference over others seeking employment (p. 162).

To take one instructive case, Hooper found with employment at

Table 2.6

Percentage of
Reported Difficulty Getting Along With or
Understanding Workers of Other Ethnic Groups

Ethnic Group	Islanders	Samoans	Cook Islanders	Tongans	Maoris	Pakehas	Other	No-One	Total Pacific Island
Respondent's Group									
Pakehas	38.5	11.5	0	5.7	1.9	3.8	5.8	32.1	55.7
Maoris	16.0	34.0	0	2.0	0	2.0	10.0	36.0	52.0
Samoans	0	6.1	0	10.2	4.1	6.1	8.2	65.3	16.3
Cook Islanders	0	62.0	0	2.0	0	0	0	36.0	64.0

Source: Marsh and McDonald, 1979:12

the Auckland hospital that,
At one time there were approximately equal number of Samoans, Niueans and Cook Islander women employed in the laundry, but the Cook Islanders have increased at the expense of the others until there are now only three or four Samoans and Niueans there (Ibid.:164).

What is of interest here is not that one is necessarily dealing with factual developments as with the reports of informants. Cook Islanders working in the hospital laundry and cafeteria today still give the same explanation for their numerical predominance:

"Management prefers Cook Islanders because we are harder workers with low absentee rates, and don't cause trouble like the others do". Twenty years later Cook Islander employees are still telling themselves, their employers, other migrant groups and researchers the same contextualising story about their value, progress and why they should be preferred in this service sector. The story has been passed on from worker to worker as an effective standard improvisation for holding such positions. Since they tend to act in accordance with their own self-perceptions, it is also a story which employers have been interested to encourage.

By similar means, certain firms have maintained a reputation not only as places where Cook Islanders usually can find employment, but where specific islands or village groups predominate. Companies like the Auckland Laundry, Hannah's Shoes and Burns and Ferrell have large concentrations of Cook Islanders in mixed numbers, but Hardies in Penrose tends to be an Arorangi village firm, Farnsworths an Aitutaki company and Biro-Bic pen factory a place where Pukapukans work.

The Hardies No. 2 plant is an interesting case in point. According to one long-term employee, fifteen or twenty years ago jobs were plentiful and many Europeans there wanted other work. Polynesians were eager to get jobs, so the firm began hiring Pacific

migrants, mostly Cook Islanders. A number of remaining Europeans became dissatisfied with this company policy, and left. The plant is now comprised of some 75% Cook Islanders, a few Tongans, Niueans and New Zealand Maoris. There are no Samoans who, according to the European personnel manager preferred to stay away.

The men value their jobs because there is security of tenure, friendly workmates, good wages and opportunities to do overtime. The firm is running at near capacity, and prefers to offer more overtime rather than put on extra staff. Employees need the extra money the overtime pays because of the effects of economic recession and inflation. The work is there at present, and the management is always asking. The same self-story is articulated among Cook Islanders at this firm. According to leading hand Pakari Inaka, "this is one thing about the Cook Islanders on the job. When the company asks, they are always willing to work overtime". Younger men often take all the extra shifts they can for the small amount of cash they can obtain in additional salary. Some of the older hands are not quite so enthusiastic because of high government tax on overtime: "you work half your shift for yourself and the other half for Muldoon (Prime Minister)". For those heavily engaged in kin and community obligations, the trade-offs in time are often not worth the effort and one runs the risk of being criticised for being selfish.

Industrial capital has also benefitted from the placement of authoritative ethnic community leaders in supervisory positions -- a separate fraction of the working class-- to wield informal control, insure discipline and thereby sustain productivity. The daughter of a Pukapukan elder recalled that when she went for an interview at Biro-Bic, she was asked after perfunctory questions to do with her qualifications whether she had any relatives working with the firm. When she mentioned her aunt, "I was hired on the spot".

Another individual who was an ex-supervisor explained management's rationale for indirect control:

(With several migrants from the same locale) there's going to be group pressure there, particularly family pressure...to make everybody toe the line. So if you've got a good group of workers you'll take their relatives. For example, if you know that there's an old auntie, and she's sort of a bit of a matriarch on the mound, you just know that they're going to be damned good.

In this way the Cook Islands supervisor or foreman plays a pivotal role not only in recruiting fellow islanders into 'specialised' sectors of industry, but making sure their output remains high and their wage demands temperate. They are, of course, of vital importance to industrial capital. From a very early point in post-war migration, Nokise (1978:52ff) notes that church and community leaders "saw themselves as mediators between the migrants and their employers". Such a function was not difficult since they were themselves in key supervisory positions, placed there by management precisely to play these mediatory roles.

Since they are in the class structure set out earlier located in a separate supervisory fraction, their objective interests are not entirely those of the majority of Cook Islanders though their common racialisation often overrides such considerations. In Chapter 5 I discuss the elder/leader role more fully, particularly their persistent rhetoric on behalf of 'ethnic community' cohesion. Here it is important to note their economic position in the relations of production, the way in which management supports and helps legitimate their status in the eyes of the wider community and their fellow workers.

The other grouping to play a crucial role in reproducing the existing social order are that minority of Cook Islanders who have acceded to the middle class (petite bourgeoisie), particularly those who have been coopted by the State or private enterprise into positions in public service, academia, educational apparatus,

the police and the welfare bureaucracy. If foremen and supervisors have been important in economic control in the production process, the coopted petite bourgeoisie have been particularly useful to the State as agents of social control during times of youth unrest, political turmoil and potential civil upheaval resulting from economic recession.

Much of what has passed for 'horizontal mobility' from one firm to another (Macrae, 1979) or lack of interest in positions of responsibility noted in some studies is in fact a reaction by some Polynesian migrants to capital's strategies of indirect control. Contrary to assimilation theories, many younger Cook Islander employees -- especially those in smaller firms where pressure from peers and elders is more intense and direct -- change jobs not because they have "gained greater familiarity with New Zealand life" (Graves and Graves, 1978: 34) but as a deliberate attempt to escape oppressive paternalistic supervision in the workplace.

The powers these supervisors/elders wield comes not simply from their generalised status in the ethnic community, but from the fact that they are familiar with the employee's kin in New Zealand and the islands, are involved in their social networks outside work and usually in some sort of kin relationship to the younger worker requiring acquiescence to his authority. By various means, the elder can report on and call up sanctions against those who misbehave at work. These leaders often use ritual gatherings to comment discreetly about wayward members. The gossip network which Cook Islanders call the "coconut wireless" is also an effective and, to its victims, irksome means of social control. Many younger people try to avoid it if possible by moving to other jobs or frequenting social settings outside elder control.

As a result of these mutually-created strategies of specialisation and control, it is not unusual for informal patron-client relationships to exist between Cook Islanders and their employers. This is often the case with respect to supervisors and European managers, but also occurs between Cook Islander employees and Papa'a (European) bosses whose favour they seek. In subsequent chapters I will discuss the role of these honoured guests at family and ethnic community rituals and cultural performances. Suffice it to say that class relations in New Zealand are not simply a matter of exploitation, injustice and racist discrimination in the crude sense.

In New Zealand many managers have learned to be liberal and patronising with respect to their Polynesian workforce for most effective labour relations. The majority of industrial firms in the country have less than 100 employees, a scale of production which lends itself to a more paternalistic approach. In these firms management leads from strength since staff are usually personally acquainted with all their workers. Migrant employees are in rather vulnerable positions compared with larger operations which have strong unions. On the other hand, employers in smaller firms are more accessible to workers, who can take advantage of less formal work relations if they choose.

An industrial chaplain described one such mostly Cook Islander firm:

It seems to be run on a very informal kind of management. There's a very paternalistic kind of manager in there, who they seem to respond to very well. But he is very paternalisticHe talks about them as the 'boys' and 'girls,' and yet they're grown men and women.

Management often institutes such practices to present a front of friendliness that legitimates their authority and deflects worker disgruntlement. As an ex-supervisor stated,

These kind of things all make for a very docile labour force which...well, you know, management sort of rubs their hands in glee.

While working for a service firm, he was in charge of personnel. They used to take all their Polynesian foremen and stewards for an annual conference at a modern hotel and put on a large meal for them. The employees were unused to such treatment, and "fell over themselves being agreeable," when it came time to talk about policies and pay rates. A small plastics firm went to considerable lengths to maintain their existing workforce of Pacific migrants, as another example. Anyone going back to the islands for an extended holiday or family matters was always taken on again when they returned to New Zealand. The reason, according to a manager, was that

they turn up every day. They turn up on time. They will work overtime when you ask them. And they never answer back.

Needless to say, Cook Islanders value this form of special treatment since it guarantees job access for themselves and kin, and job security when unemployment among Polynesians is high. Their relationships with Papa'as date back to missionary settlement and colonisation. While the European has always formally been the subject of respect and deference, such relationships have involved a degree of subtle manipulation of the European. The contexts and opportunities for such control or redirection of European domination are more limited in New Zealand. The patron-client relationship is one mode of manoeuvring which has been mutually beneficial, while reproducing Cook Islanders in their 'specialised' sectors.

The role which the academic establishment plays in reproducing existing social relationships needs to be highlighted, of which management studies have been particularly influential. A primary goal of these studies has been to help Capital "understand New Zealand's multicultural workforce" (Graves and Graves, 1977) or more to the point, how to "utilise" such workers (Nedd and Nedd, op cit.). To a large

degree the owners and managers of capital, through procedures and organisation of production, in fact create the "customary attitudes" and work behaviour of migrant employees. Ironically, Capital then hires researchers to advise management on how to profit from the very practices and attitudes which they have helped produce.

A typical case is the labelling of migrant labour behaviour as "adaptation," "cultural distinctiveness" or "traditionalism" which in fact are procedures of management itself, or improvisational responses to such procedures. Thus, according to one study,

...Whether New Zealand-educated Maoris or Pacific Islanders- or new migrants, the majority received help in obtaining their first job either from friends, or far more commonly from relatives. Among migrants, Kin-Reliance is the overwhelmingly preferred strategy (Graves and Graves, Op cit.:9).

I have already suggested the important role management played in initiating and maintaining the practice of chain-migration. Management studies claim to have identified certain 'adaptive strategies' which migrants have supposedly come to out of custom, such as "preferring" to work with kin and friends. Finally, they chastise factory management for being slow to make use of these strategies for their own ends! In another instance (Op cit.:24) they note that Pacific Islanders lodge the fewest complaints about their conditions of employment or pay. In light of what has already been said about management's practice of kin-based recruitment, reliance on authoritarian community elders for workforce control and management paternalism, such findings are hardly surprising.

The real purpose of such studies is apparent. As Nedd and Nedd (Op cit.:36) express it, the Pacific migrants' "social systems can be harnessed for the good of the company" !

...For purely economic reasons (sic.), employers should be willing to adapt their organisation to the specific needs of the Polynesians they employ (Ibid.:31).

Resources, Disqualifications and the Fetish of Education

The resources and capacities which Cook Islanders bring to New Zealand, and the way these are evaluated both by Capital and the welfare State delimit the range of standard improvisations which Cook Islanders create in the struggle for work. Seldom do they arrive in the country with more than their clothing and a small amount of cash saved or donated for the trip. Few have had experience or training in anything but unskilled or semi-skilled work. Yet they are physically capable of sustained, energetic effort in demanding manual labour. Indeed, they take great pride in their reputation as hard workers.

Another valuable resource which all Cook Islanders share is the kinship links and village relationships from the islands. They have been of importance in facilitating the migration process, locating employment and finding accomodation. A fairly common means of gaining access to finances and other resources has been to intermarry with or be the offspring of Europeans. Most Cook Islanders tend to marry working class Europeans whom they meet as work and in social contacts. However, a few have been able to move out of the working class altogether by marrying wealthy business people, professional or public servants, thus gaining access to resources such as employment contacts not normally available through their own kinship networks. But in New Zealand offspring of such unions have also been placed under greater pressure to succeed in the educational system and in acquiring better jobs, in line with dominant bourgeois values.

The educational system in the Cook Islands is based on that of New Zealand, and English is used and taught in all schools along with

the Rarotongan dialect. This early training places Cook Islanders at an advantage over other Pacific Islands migrants. Their skills often provide them the opportunity to attain positions as foremen, leading hands, higher manual and even clerical occupations.

Still, on the basis of these resources most Cook Islanders find that options other than blue collar positions are closed to them. They also observe in the islands and in New Zealand that Papa'as are more successful and stay in positions of power. They are taught that this is because Europeans use their brains and get a good education. Thus Cook Islanders come to prize education as the avenue to a better life, if not for themselves then for their children. Most Cook Islanders attribute their underprivileged economic and political position in New Zealand to themselves, by which they mean among other things their lack of relevant experience and educational qualifications as dictated by capital and the State. These attitudes are in turn generated by the very structural conditions which determine their day-to-day existence.. The dream of many is that their sacrifice will allow their children to escape their plight and their kopu tangata to prosper. A dream based upon a faith in education as the door to advancement in a supposedly egalitarian society.

The dream itself is propagated by liberal, bourgeois ideology and serves to obfuscate the inequities of the "credentialist" evaluation system of Capitalism. Credentialism is an essential component of class domination in New Zealand society, for Europeans as well as Polynesians. At the level of bureaucratic policy, job qualifications and public rhetoric, it is one means by which the ruling class dictates differentiating values between productive tasks, and defines and controls the "proper" channels of access to the reward system. Credentialism operates as a dimension of the cultural imperialism of the ruling class, and is typically associated with

societies reliant upon large numbers of migrant labour. It is practised both within private enterprise and the public bureaucracy, since the determination of who is properly qualified is firstly a matter of political control within the production process as well as by the State. Since credentialism rests upon the social construction and institutionalisation of what constitutes "knowledge," it is legitimated with ultimate reference to learned societies and the academic establishment, an essentially European institution dominated not by some nebulous 'Pakeha' values but by the culture of class as set by the bourgeoisie.

Thy lynchpin of credentialism is rationality. Like other life style requirements presented to the disenfranchised, the ruling class says in effect "we have what you need to achieve mobility, to gain access to the rewards of society. We will dictate the proper, decent and acceptable means of attaining what we define as success". It rules out as illegitimate other experiences, qualities and forms of knowledge, as for instance a sense of honour, empathy, reciprocal obligations, mutual assistance, communal meetings for decisions and the ability to dance. Such things are nonsense, non-productive and threatening to the hegemony of the bourgeoisie over what constitutes 'achievement'.

To the Polynesian fraction, it is made abundantly clear that while cultural diversity is permitted and even encouraged by a State policy of multiculturalism in their own private social and recreational pursuits, such diversity has no place in the hard realities of New Zealand economic and political life. Their own structural position of inferiority is thus due to supposed endemic life style, cultural and personality deficiencies -- in particular, the lack of rational

and 'acceptable' behaviour. For Cook Islanders like Tangi, the daughter of a Mauke orometua (clergyman) credentialism means she is prohibited from teaching in New Zealand without undergoing supplementary training. Even though she was educated under a New Zealand-style system which included four years of teacher training in Rarotonga and five years of teaching experience in Penrhyn and Rarotonga islands, her handicap is that she was not actually educated in New Zealand.⁽⁶⁾

The credentialist ideology declares most foreign education and experience to be inferior as established within the standards set by the ruling class, standards which of course limit access to the bourgeoisie or control over the means of production.

From difficult personal experience and in view of persistent liberal/credentialist ideology, Cook Islanders like so many migrants in marginal positions turn education into a fetish, a passionate obsession that only by this avenue will their children be able to advance themselves. What they do not comprehend--indeed, what they are prevented from comprehending--is the way that the structural relations of capitalism reproduce conditions which perpetuate their subservience and those of their children through the self-same educational system.

Furthermore Cook Islands leaders in strategic brokerage positions convey to migrants credentialist values as taken-for-granted wisdom on how to get on in New Zealand. Indeed, their very position vis-a-vis industrial capital requires that they play this role. Parents are placed in a similar position with respect to the family.

(6) The Labour government in 1975, upon advice from a newly-appointed Polynesian Advisory Committee, took the opportunity of coopting some of these partially-qualified migrants into special placements in schools with high Polynesian numbers. They were to deal with potential language and adjustment difficulties, as well as problems of discipline and high drop-out rates.

The State places the burden of responsibility on Polynesian parents for their children's difficulties, through political discourse and through bureaucratic agents with permission to intervene in the life of the family by law. The school itself pressures parents for greater involvement with regard to disciplinary matters and proper advancement, blaming them for neglect when their children fail, drop out or become delinquent. In spite of the pressures parents then place on their children to progress by means of the credentialist system, they become disillusioned when their youth often lose interest in school or must take a job because of economic circumstances of the family.

Tini, a Rarotongan who was a teacher herself at one time, becomes irritated at parent-teacher meetings with all the talk about 'problem-children' and high drop-out rates. It is what they teach, she says, and the way the schools teach that contributes to the problem. Of her own children, she says

I wish sometimes we didn't come to New Zealand. That's what I used to tell my children. Especially the three teenagers. I said, 'Well, I sort of wasted my time behind your education there...and you go do labouring work.' I was trying to go for a job that will be of use to the Cook Islands, to go back home. But none of them would listen.

One daughter is on the unemployment benefit, has been turned down for so many jobs she has lost count, and now spends her days with one or two friends getting high on drugs. Another son did well until his last year, especially in art. Then when he realistically considered his prospects for the future, his performance fell away. His father got him a job at a freezing works which subsequently closed down.

With economic recession in New Zealand, the highest unemployment rate is among Polynesian youth who often lack education or experience to compete on the job market, markers which are picked up and used against them in racialisation. Under such circumstances and under

the credentialist ideology, one would expect them to remain in school longer as is the overall national trend. In fact Polynesian drop-out rates are the highest of any group. In effect such actions constitute further instances of those standard improvisations which social actors adopt in response to various determinations in their lives. In this instance it is the more or less conscious recognition of the nexus of contradictions hedging them in and attempts to extricate themselves from the situation.

With economic recession and soaring cost of living, the Polynesian fraction of the working class not only finds it difficult to obtain employment or adequate rates of pay, but their very subsistence is in jeopardy. Therefore there is constant pressure for young people to drop out of school to take any work they can get, or get on the unemployment benefit to assist the family. On the other hand, credentialism blocks all but a select few from obtaining meaningful employment, while insisting that the road to opportunity lies in remaining in school. Since fewer and fewer job seekers even with qualifications are able to locate employment, and institutionalised racism separates out those of the migrant labour fraction, few Polynesian youth have incentive to continue in school regardless of the pressures to do so.

The educational system itself contributes to this nexus of contradictions, directly in that the curriculum, teaching methods and programmes are often irrelevant or seen as culturally bounded by many Polynesian students. Furthermore, no matter how schools try, they cannot motivate and equip students for jobs that do not exist. Having witnessed the experiences of their peers who have dropped out of the educational system, many of whom have at least some money in pocket from welfare or meagre employment, or those who have become qualified and then encountered barriers, many

Cook Islands students are skeptical about just how great a resource education really is.

Structural Effects and Cook Islanders' Perceptions of their
Work World

I am critical of stratification theories for the ideological function they perform in conditioning the populace to accept a particular conception of the social order favourable to the perpetuation of Capitalism, a model which does not conform to reality. Nowhere is this more apparent than in the juxtaposition of the concept of "social mobility" with the practice of credentialism.

In effect the educational apparatus of the State in conjunction with academicians, civil servants and the media, all serve the interests of the ruling class in instituting a coherent culture of class of which the 'myth of the expert' is a vital component. Another component of this taken-for-granted construction of the social order is the occupational hierarchy, along with the standardised values attributed to various positions within it.

By means of these valuations, the bourgeoisie succeeds in legitimating its own existence as the economic and political management of society. Secondly, it communicates acceptance of the existing order as the best of all possible worlds. And finally, it specifies the permissible steps one may take in gaining access to desired resources and social statuses within that world. As Allen summarises the implicit message underlying stratification theory:

The contemporary stratified model is projected as an inspirational pattern for those who commit themselves to the dominant values of the system, work hard and are thrifty. Movement, meaning progress, through the social class categories is regarded as an individual matter, depending upon exercising those qualities most likely to consolidate the status quo (Op cit.:62).

I wish to consider briefly how Cook Islanders' evaluations of their work world are an instance of the effects of their structural position in the production process on their perceptions of their social world. But also how their divergence from notions imbedded in the dominant culture is a manifestation of alternative improvisations for dealing with their exploitation, which practices in turn influence the way in which the system reacts to them.

To reiterate, an individual's location in existing economic relations is of primary consequence to how he conceives and feels about his social world and how he explains his actions in it. Cook Islands migrants may well choose manual labour for the cash and overtime it brings. They may migrate in the first place out of frustration over lower returns from cash-cropping and islands wages (Hooper, 1961b:166). My contention is that these very choices and frustrations occur within the constraints placed upon individuals by the existing social order which impoverishes agricultural production, deprives them of the ability to accumulate resources, devalues their experiential qualifications when they arrive in New Zealand and forces them into wage labour.

Both Hooper (Ibid.:167) and recent management studies contend that Cook Islanders and other Pacific migrants do not aspire to positions of prestige, responsibility and income in the supposed occupational hierarchy. This is so, it is claimed, for various cultural, social psychological and economic reasons. In essence I contend that Cook Islanders do not conceive the occupational-prestige hierarchy

in the 'accepted' manner. Far from a manifestation of ignorance of the class structure, their own evaluative constructs are a response to the dominant culture of class with respect to what their aspirations 'ought to be'.

During the 1981 fieldwork survey, a 2% stratified random sample of Cook Islanders in Auckland were asked to examine a list of occupations and indicate which three they would rank as the "best" and which three the "worst," whatever they chose to mean by those terms. In the process they were asked to list some of the criteria they used in making such assessments. Income, hours worked, difficulty of the task and social status were some of the factors mentioned. Respondents were also asked to choose the job they themselves would most prefer, assuming they had all the necessary qualifications. The findings were as follows (Table 2.7).

Perhaps the most significant finding does not even appear on the table, but confirms the earlier contention regarding the structural effects on migrant perceptions. Most informants found it difficult to name "best" positions, at least as conceived initially by the interviewers. The identification of "worst" job was apparently a similar task. With respect to the latter respondents consistently selected occupations which the popular stratification model would rank as less than top level positions. During the pilot test of the survey, so many informants identified what seemed "worst" instead of "best" jobs that it was thought they were misunderstanding the questions. It eventually became apparent that the average Cook Islander, particularly older, less well-educated migrants tended to conceive the occupational hierarchy within a much narrower range of positions than the model held by the dominant culture. In other words their evaluations were delimited by the more narrow, pragmatic

Table 2.7

Occupational Hierarchy as Conceived by
Cook Islanders

Best Jobs				Worst Jobs				Preferred Jobs			
Rank	Occupation	No.	Percent	Rank	Occupation	No.	Percent	Rank	Occup.	No.	Percent
1	Doctor	100	48.3	1	Cleaner	99	47.8	1	Nurse	23	11.2
2	Solicitor	65	31.4	2	Garbage Col.	86	41.5	2	Soc. Wkr	18	8.8
3	Teacher	37	17.9	3	Bar man	45	21.7	3	Police	18	8.8
4	Accountant	35	16.9	4	Kit. Helper	37	17.9	4	Auto Mech.	12	5.9
5	Policeman	33	15.9	5	Teacher	31	15.0	5	Accountant	10	4.9
6	M.P/P.M	33	15.9	6	Freezing wkr	25	12.1	6	Teacher	10	4.9
7	Social worker	31	15.0	7	Bus driver	21	10.0	7	Doctor	8	3.9
8	Nurse	25	12.1	8	Shop Assist.	20	9.7	8	Secretary	8	3.9
9	Freezing Wkr.	25	12.1	9	Timber workr	18	8.7	9	Offic/Typ.	7	3.4
10	Bank Manager	22	10.6	10	Factory assmb	17	8.2	10	Solicitor	6	2.9

Source: 1981 Fieldwork Survey. Note: Best and worst job percentages are listed as percentages of total responses among three choices; preferred job percentages are listed as percentages of responses by each individual.



world of work as they experienced it.

Another feature of Cook Islander responses regarding "best" jobs was the number of community service positions mentioned -- teacher, policeman, social worker and nurse. Again, such positions take precedence in ranking for Cook Islanders since they are directly experienced as important in their own lives, particularly those positions which have been opened to a few of them through State co-optation. These are positions filled by people who stand in an important brokerage or mediator role with respect to the various apparatuses of the welfare state, and thus Cook Islanders not only think highly of them, but assume others must as well. These are typically 'helping' professions which embody ideals close to church teachings, and which positions Pacific migrants are taught to accord deference and respect to be able to manage in New Zealand.

With regard to "worst" occupations the category of "cleaner" was so easily recognised as to be treated as a standard joke by most informants. Since such occupations are those in which many respondents themselves are presently engaged, their ready selection of such positions as "worst" jobs would seem to indicate both an awareness of their low status in the popularly-conceived occupational hierarchy, their stereotypical linkage with Polynesian migrant labour and an ironic acceptance of their position in such jobs. Rather than anger, however, there seemed more commonly a fatalism that their lack of qualifications or knowledge made their plight inevitable.

When asked about the job they would prefer to have, the influence of their present structural position as a grouping again became apparent. Preferred jobs were conceived by Cook Islanders within a very circumscribed selection of possible positions. In such selections social status was an important factor along with

the desirability of gaining a higher-paid position that did not require extensive schooling or qualifications. At the same time, there was a finer distinction between some positions which the dominant culture would rank as virtually the same. A number of respondents ranked freezing worker over bus driver, even though the job was more physically demanding and the freezing industry was experiencing massive lay-offs and closures at the time. The reasons given included higher pay rates with long periods of 'holiday' after the killing season was over.

Not unexpectedly, most respondents rated their chances of obtaining the position they preferred fairly remote. They were typically more sanguine about their children's prospects when compared with their own plight. In other words their own personal experience of the oppression of their structural position was not transferred to their assessment of prospects for their offspring, other than inversely as a strong conviction that their children would enjoy a better material position than they. (Table 2.8).

Confirming the earlier discussion of credentialism, the most often-mentioned factor that might hinder their children's advancement in New Zealand is a lack of education. Admittedly, this attitude mirrors the dominant ideology upon which credentialism is built -- that New Zealand is an egalitarian society in which success comes to the individual who strives to achieve. But is also a perspective accepted by Cook Islanders as the explanation for why they are located where they are in the political economy of the country, and why they must accept their lot as given.

The most poignant finding (Table 2.8) is the fact that the majority of respondents, young and old alike, actually locate the blocks to their advancement not in the wider society but subjectively

Table 2.8 Blocks Cook Islanders Perceive to Their
Children's Advancement

Blocks	Number	Percent
Inadequate education	70	36.8
Jobs - N.Z. economy	32	16.8
Language skills	31	16.3
Lack experience	23	12.1
Employer discrimination	10	5.3
Motivation	10	5.3
Peer Influence	7	3.4
Other	8	4.7
No Response	18	8.7
Total	208	100

Source: 1981 Fieldwork Survey

within Cook Islanders themselves. In effect some 65% of the answers given indicated that Cook Islanders themselves somehow did not measure up, and thus were the cause of their own underprivilege. They were where they were because of lack of education, lack of skills, inexperience or lack of motivation. Such responses are not simply an acquiescence to the credentialist ideology of the ruling class, not simply a 'victim image'. These and earlier occupational rankings are both a recognition of the conditions of their work situation and a pragmatic assessment of the current chances within it. They evidence a singular concentration of energies and resources on the attainable and on practical necessity, though they consider their efforts will result in rewards for their offspring. Like Degas' washer women, they are not quite victims, finding humour and collegiality where they may, accepting with a tired yawn the secure inevitability of their social condition while working determinedly toward the better future they envision for their children.

Conclusions

I began this chapter with a section mapping the basic classes and their fractions in contemporary New Zealand society. My primary concern was to amplify the contention in the Introduction that all Cook Islanders are not part of the Polynesian fraction of the working class. I showed by means of occupational distribution and objective class positions based on my opening definition of class that significant minorities of Cook Islanders have been structured into the 'new' petite bourgeoisie or into the separate 'supervisory' fraction of the working class.

I then addressed the question of whether or not the class position of most Cook Islanders -- that is, their location in the

Polynesian fraction of the working class -- is being reproduced from one generation to the next. Having demonstrated a marked trend toward proletarianisation from fathers to sons among migrants irrespective of their original class background, I then attempted to explore at greater length the dialectics of structure and practice as emergent in class relations. My specific focus once again was upon the position of the Cook Islander supervisory fraction and the petite bourgeoisie, particularly those 'community leaders' whose activities are so important both to capital and to the ethnic category as an organised grouping.

It is clear that industrial capital's strategies for the organisation of production and labour exploitation have been mythologised by capital itself and by management studies as adaptive cultural traits. This has been an important means of the reproduction of the Polynesian fraction of the working class. The Cook Islander supervisory fraction have played a vital role in the recruitment and control of fellow Cook Islanders into specific industrial sectors and into the fraction of the working class which most now occupy. As a consequence of their activities, but also as a popularly shared standard improvisation, I discussed the widespread practice of patron-client relationships by which Cook Islanders have been able to insure their hold on certain employment sectors when job insecurity is high, and establish reciprocal relations with some European bosses to their own benefit.

I outlined some of the essential resources which Cook Islanders bring with them to New Zealand in the struggle to obtain a livelihood. I showed how they utilise some of these resources to distance themselves from other ethnic groupings among the Polynesian fraction, and thus further cement their claim to certain desired positions.

I suggested that credentialism was an important aspect of 'mobility' studies and a means of domination by the ruling class. Having defined what I meant by that concept and showed how it operated in reproducing existing class relations, I described Cook Islanders' responses to credentialist ideology, particularly the efforts parents make to pressure their children to attaining higher qualifications, and the improvisations of youth with respect to the nexus of contradictions centred around the schooling process and unemployment.

In the final section I demonstrated the relationship between the way in which Cook Islanders perceive their work world -- the so-called occupational hierarchy in particular -- and the structural conditions which influence their ways of viewing their social world. I argued that their perceptions were at variance with the dominant culture of the ruling class in certain important respects. I concluded that these variations were an indication both of their recognition of their status in New Zealand society, and also a pragmatic assessment of their opportunities and those of their children leading to moves to concentrate their energies toward the future advancement of their offspring and the kopu tangata.

Chapter 3

The Housing of Cook Islanders

Introduction

At the economic level, society is comprised of relations of production, distribution and consumption. In this chapter I focus upon class conflict and racialisation in the distribution and consumption of accommodation. Cook Islanders' marginal position in production relations results in particular, "disadvantaged" housing patterns. Control of property consumption processes can, like control of production, be a means of class domination and thus the subject of continuing conflict in advanced capitalist societies.

A major debate in urban sociology has centred around the notion of housing classes as introduced by Rex and Moore (1968). The central issue had to do with the definition of "class," and whether there was a necessary link between relations of production and reproduction (consumption). Housing was understood as one factor in the distribution and consumption of produced goods. A number of writers (eg Rex and Moore; Rex, 1971; Giddens, 1973) tended to conceive of class as a distributive phenomenon distinct from relations of production (cf. Bell, 1978; 1980). Stratification theory again invented types of groupings based on difference in house value, tenure and locale.

Some New Zealand writers have taken a similar line in explaining the housing situation of Maoris and Pacific Islands migrants. Davey and Barrington (1980) attribute Polynesian residential segregation to their being "less used to urban life" (Ibid.:37). Racial concentrations in private and public housing are the consequence of migrant choices alone:

Movement from the islands tends to take place by chain migration, which leads to a concentration of migrants in distinct groups (Ibid.).

They acknowledge the existence of racial discrimination, but "Maori and Pacific Island 'ghettos' have not developed" (Ibid.). If in contemporary parlance a ghetto is taken to mean an area of economic and social disvalue, of low-quality, crowded or otherwise undesirable housing where the poor and migrant minorities are concentrated with little say in the matter, then such statements are blatantly wrong. I will show that they are wrong, and describe the way in which such ghettos developed and have changed in recent years.

Some Marxist writers in New Zealand have also confused housing distribution with distributive notions of class. Bedggood (1980) contends that government policy of reducing State housing aid has hit "low income families hardest" (Ibid.:111). His explanation of the plight of the majority of Polynesians rests on a relative disparity between income strata, not classes:

The consequences are the growth of unequal access to adequate housing, and the deprivation of below-average income families and single-income families increasingly locked into their housing situation (Ibid.).

Such an approach must inevitably lead back to housing classes. Whatever the difference of interest or class position among Cook Islanders, they are constituted firstly in relations of production. Difference in value or tenure of housing are outcomes of differences in class situation.

Followers of Castells and certain neo-Weberians have been critical of the 'housing class' model while still maintaining the centrality of the market. Housing is considered to be one aspect of the system of allocation of "rewards" in society (Myers, 1975;

Kilmartin and Thorns, 1978;Thorns and Smith, 1980). Subsequent analysis seeks to identify the "blocks" to access to such rewards, particularly with respect to racial discrimination and including the role played by urban managers, brokers and gatekeepers -- in effect, the Ali Baba model of class relations.

Kilmartin and Thorns (Ibid.) describe a highly schematic 'allocation system,' detailing the way in which certain groupings consistently miss out on equitable allocation due to certain systemic 'constraints'. In order to account for such inequity, they presume competition and conflict in the market (Ibid.:119). Where Rex and Moore focus on house value, these authors argue that access to finance is the key determinant of distributive groupings. They do not explain how such access is achieved, whether by political power, kinship ties, inherited wealth or just plain hard work. According to this approach, it is urban managers such as estate agents, mortgage lenders, solicitors and public housing officers who keep 'the poor' from getting adequate housing. This kind of voluntarism (see also Pahl, 1977), focussed as it is on the racial prejudices of strategically-placed individuals, can be misleading in explaining the class and housing situation of Polynesians in New Zealand.

Harvey (1973; 1978) proposes a Marxist model of class struggle for control of what he terms the built environment. Consistent with Marx, production not only produces consumption but the mode of consumption as well. The fundamental dichotomy in housing consumption is between the interests of capital and those of labour. The theory of housing classes is merely one means by which labour is set against itself.

According to Harvey (1978:11), labour needs land as living space to reproduce itself, and capital systematically excludes labour from land as the condition for production⁽¹⁾. This inevitably contrasts the interests of labour with those of landed property, the appropriators of rent and construction interests, all of whom seek to profit from the control of housing (Ibid.:9).

The difficulty with Harvey's model is that he does not systematically retain the link between class positions in the relations of production and the struggle over the built environment. In New Zealand at least, construction interests and rent appropriators are different sectors of the bourgeoisie. And the middle and 'old' petty bourgeoisie certainly play distinctive roles with respect to the housing of Polynesian migrants. Also, differences between the working class fractions in New Zealand are mirrored in disparate housing tenure situations, with the supervisory fraction and the majority of the indigenous (European) working class living in blue collar, low-cost suburbs. The Polynesian fraction is more reliant on rental, particularly of State rental accommodation.

This chapter begins with a brief look at the current housing position of Cook Islanders in Auckland as an indicator of the class situation of most Polynesians with respect to housing. In the second section I consider aspects of the class struggle over the built environment, while in the third section I examine the way in which capital intervenes in an attempt to control consumption. I identify three forms of intervention, all of which in New Zealand are heavily reliant upon the function of the State: rationalisation,

(1) Wakefield's early colonial policies were an instance in New Zealand of the necessity of depriving migrant labour of land rights in order to provide larger landed and mercantile interests with the labour they required.

valuation and collectivisation. All three processes are intimately bound up with one another. In the final section I discuss at greater length the various standard improvisations Cook Islanders have adopted in engaging in the the struggle for adequate accomodation.

The Contemporary Cook Islander Housing Situation

The relative differences in dwelling tenure between Cook Islanders and the rest of the population are a useful beginning point for assessing their class situation with respect to housing. Compared to other nations, New Zealand is well-off in quality and quantity of housing units. It has one of the highest home-ownership rates in the world at around 73% (National Housing Commission Research Paper, 1977/3; 1981 Census). Less than a quarter of all New Zealanders rent their accomodation, while half own their home with a mortgage (Table 3.1) The accomodation situation of Cook Islanders stands in clear contrast to that of the general populace. More than 56% rent while only 42% own their home. One in five New Zealanders owns their property outright, but only a small minority of Cook Islanders are unencumbered by mortgage debt.

Renting is much more important to Cook Islanders than to the average New Zealander. They are also more dependent on the State Housing Corporation for their rental accomodation (1981 fieldwork survey). However, contrary to the stereotype that Polynesians "bludge off the system," Cook Islanders are forced to pay much higher weekly rents than most New Zealanders (Table 3.2). At the time of the last census, one third of all New Zealand renters paid less than \$20 per week, while the same was true of only 3% of Cook Islanders. At the other extreme, more than one in five Cook Islanders paid over \$50 per week

Table 3.1

1981 Dwelling Tenure Comparison Between
Cook Islanders and the National Population

	N.Z. National Population		Cook Islanders	
	N	%	N	%
<u>Owned</u>				
W/out mortgage	665,150	22.1	640	5.4
With mortgage	1,535,960	50.9	4320	36.5
<u>Sub-total</u>	<u>1,601,110</u>	<u>73.0</u>	<u>4960</u>	<u>41.9</u>
<u>Rented</u>				
Not from Emplr	552,570	18.3	5480	46.2
From Employer	136,910	4.5	970	8.2
Undefined	8,170	.3	210	1.8
<u>Sub-total</u>	<u>697,590</u>	<u>23.1</u>	<u>6660</u>	<u>56.2</u>
<u>Other</u>				
Provided free/ not with job	29,020	1.0	70	.6
Provided free/ with job	73,280	2.4	40	.3
Not specified	14,900	.5	120	1.0
<u>Sub-total</u>	<u>117,200</u>	<u>3.9</u>	<u>230</u>	<u>1.9</u>
 Total	 3,015,900	 100.0	 11,850	 100.0

Source: 1981 Census, N.Z. Department of Statistics

Table 3.2

Comparative 1981 Weekly Household Rents
Between Cook Islanders and the National Population
(unfurnished units only)

Rent paid	N.Z. National Population		Cook Islanders Auckland Region	
	N	%	N	%
Under \$10	12,050	6.3	N.A.	N.A.
\$10-14.99	24,500	12.9	20	1.4
\$15-19.99	22,180	11.6	20	1.4
\$20-24.99	14,970	7.9	90	6.3
\$25-29.99	16,610	8.7	60	4.2
\$30-34.99	20,920	11.0	200	14.0
\$35-39.99	22,230	11.7	260	18.2
\$40-49.99	28,580	15.1	390	27.7
\$50 and over	20,190	10.6	310	21.7
Not specified	8,360	4.4	80	5.6
Total	190,590	100.2	1430	100.0

Source: 1981 Census, N. Z. Department of Statistics

in rent, while only one in ten New Zealanders did so. Cook Islanders' weekly rents were heavily weighted toward the top of the scale. It should be noted that this was a period of high national inflation and rapidly escalating housing rents. Even the rent for an average three-bedroom State house was around \$39 per week. It is quite clear that the so-called rental crisis was affecting particular sectors of the population disproportionately. There is no validity to the claim that Cook Islanders as a group nor Polynesians generally were receiving preferential treatment. In fact just the opposite was the case.

Cook Islanders tend to live in larger household groupings than the average New Zealand family (Table 3.3). These patterns are not simply the result of cultural differences, but the consequence of the economic position. Such configurations are also creative improvisations providing needed emotional support, mutual assistance and flexibility of financial priorities.

The dwelling tenure situation of Cook Islanders is in part a consequence of their recent migration to New Zealand. One would anticipate that like other migrants, it would take them awhile to become established. But the depressed economic plight of the islands means that few have the capital to afford a house deposit when they arrive. Racism and class exploitation in New Zealand serve to prolong their underprivileged housing position.

Racialisation and Class Conflict Over Housing

In the last chapter I argued that classes can only be understood as relations of opposition. Conflict between classes in turn is the outcome of contradictions emergent in relations within the structures of society. At various historical junctures particular

Table 3.3

Comparative Household Type by Number of
Occupants -- Cook Islanders and National
Average

	N.Z. National Population		Cook Islanders Auckland Region		
	N	%	N	%	
1 Family Only complete	1,884,340	62.5	4910	41.4	
1 Family only incomplete	326,980	10.8	1420	12.0	
Other Family	469,340	15.6	90	.8	
			1 Family & other persons	3330	28.1
			2 Families	370	3.1
			2 Families & Other persons	400	3.4
			Sub-total Other	4190	35.3
Non-Family	149,770	5.1	680	5.7	
One Person	185,470	6.1	650	5.5	
Total	3,015,470	100.1	11,850	100.3	

Source: 1981 Census, N.Z. Department of Statistics

contradictions define the situation of domination and subordination between classes (Poulantzas, 1976:86).

In the distributive/consumption dimension of the economic, the typical property contradiction is between practices aimed at increasing profit from housing (rent, sales, construction) and practices aimed at providing cheaper accommodation. This contradiction juxtaposes the interests of the owners of property, finance capital (the circulation sector) and construction interests against the working class (renters and mortgaged owners, Polynesian and European alike).

Obviously, these varied sectors and fractions have overlapping interests. Racialisation and discrimination in housing have been important means by which labour is kept divided. The welfare State in New Zealand for reasons of political expediency and social order has in the current recession been forced to moderate the demands of capital. It has acted to "rationalise" the construction industry, hold loan limits and interest rates and provide State-subsidised mortgages and rental accommodation.

Two factors have been most prominent in the conflict over accommodation which have served to reproduce the racialised fraction of the working class in New Zealand. Both stem from the fact that the central contradiction mentioned has its greatest consequences for Polynesians in the rental sector, particularly private inner city property. Over the years, many Cook Islanders have aimed for rental accommodation, but now have become trapped in it.

The first factor is that New Zealand is largely a nation of petty bourgeois property owners, at least with respect to residential land and housing (Whitely, 1979). This situation has come about largely

because of the lack of opportunity for alternative investment and accumulation of wealth without incurring heavy State tax levies. Property improvements and rental income are actually subsidised by the State in the form of tax deductions and write-offs. The State has caused difficulties for the petty bourgeoisie especially through the provision of public rental housing and fair rent legislation. Nevertheless, the small landholding class constitutes an important, conservative force dictating the conditions of Polynesian access to rental accomodation.

Following World War II, the inner city was the initial destination for a majority of Pacific and Maori migrants. This was certainly the case for Cook Islanders (Hooper, 1961b; Curzon, 1973, 1979). Kin and friends already there could obtain cheap housing with relative ease. Many larger old buildings were subdivided to accomodate individuals or multiple families (Hooper, Ibid.:151ff). The growing migrant Polynesian population came to comprise an important clientele for these petty bourgeois rent appropriators. Many landlords had only recently managed to extricate themselves from the working class by investing in older houses or renting inherited family property.

Petty bourgeoisie property managers and landlords alike treated the tenants with condescending paternalism since large areas of the inner city were considered virtual slums. Rental property was plentiful as were migrants, and most New Zealanders preferred to live elsewhere if possible. It was in the interest of these landlords to adopt a patronising relationship with the Polynesian migrants to insure a steady income. Indeed, it is the personalistic nature of the housing rental market which has done so much to blur the outlines

of exploitation and racial discrimination in New Zealand. Such attitudes and practices were grounded in economic necessity, and changed markedly with recession and competition for housing in the 1970s. This is merely to reiterate an earlier point that the saliency of attitudes, perceptions and behaviour is established within the structural relations of the social order itself.

The renovation boom in the inner city was in response to declining quality of new housing, the costs of building, expensive mortgage finance in accompaniment with the energy crisis and savage petrol rises. Petty bourgeois speculators and affluent professionals began competing for old housing as an inflation hedge and investment (Loomis, 1979; 1980). The State played a major role in limiting the availability of finance for new construction, encouraged the "recycling" of existing dwellings and at the same time cut back on public housing construction.

The Auckland City Council, traditionally dominated by business and financial interests from the wealthy Eastern suburbs, actively encouraged economic and social change in the inner city mainly through its Town Planning division. While slating the central government for not providing housing for the "poor and Polynesians" who were being uprooted by "trendies," it actively set about encouraging housing renovation, new construction, commercial development and residential "densification" close to the urban core to insure the continued, long-term commercial viability of the CBD where most had their business interests.

The availability of private rental accommodation declined markedly as a consequence of all these developments, and rents soared. Petty bourgeois landlords were prohibited by legislation from raising rents sufficiently to keep ahead of inflation and make a profit, however. Large numbers took advantage of the inner city property boom

to sell out while they could. All these events had a particularly devastating effect on Polynesians, who in a competitive accommodation market quickly became an "undesirable clientele," and discriminatory practices ran rife.

Since many could not place a priority on long-term home investment by accumulating sufficient savings for a deposit, their rental situation became a trap. At the same time, State housing in popular ideology became increasingly downgraded and vilified, its residents typified as Polynesian and as exploiting the housing system, thus providing political justification for curbing public housing expenditures. Cook Islanders' own need for just such accommodation became a further factor in their marginal class position. Caught in a classic double-bind, they like other Polynesian migrants were forced to overcrowd, to share rents or shift further out of the city. More and more they came to rely on the State to provide relief from rental exploitation.

The second major consumption factor contributing to the reproduction of the racialised fraction of the working class is the nature of discrimination itself and its connection with rental housing. Racial prejudice takes its form and content within the structure of class relations in any society. Its force comes not from the fact that it is an 'attitude' but the way it is operationalised as discrimination within class conflict, and as it is articulated as racist ideology in the interests of the dominant classes. The social construction of Polynesians as an "undesirable clientele" is only one example. But because of the particular nature of paternalistic racism in New Zealand and the structure of the rental housing market previously outlined, there is some case for arguing that it is in respect particularly to rental housing that racial

discrimination has its full force. It is also the sector where personal prejudice has most scope, since its victims have fewer economic or political resources upon which to call.

Racialisation in housing -- that is, prejudice and discrimination -- have been documented by other New Zealand researchers (eg. Pitt and Macpherson, 1974; Spoonley, 1978). Hooper (Op cit.:151ff) carried out a rent application survey which confirmed moderate racial discrimination by Pakeha landlords. Cook Islander applications for rental accomodation were refused on the basis of race in 60% of the cases. Whether such formal applications were the means by which Cook Islanders normally obtained accomodation is an issue which could have modified the findings. But racial discrimination became a more forceful tool of class conflict from the mid-1970s, because competition for housing had become vigorous and people were looking for a scapegoat.

Racist stereotyping accompanied the escalating class struggle over residential property. Polynesians were portrayed as uninterested or unable to adopt a "Western way of life" in housing. According to one property manager,

You can walk around these homes yourself and see a broom made out of twigs [a customary Polynesian coconut whisk]. And a woman trying to sweep an expensive carpet with it. But she wouldn't use a vacuum cleaner. She wouldn't know how to.

They're so used in their homes to see their bush rats running around outside, that they don't worry about our Norwegian rats. And the bloody things...well, I was in a house just recently where we just had to get rid of the people and clean the place up or it would have been condemned.

A widespread attitude holds that Pacific Islanders are problems to landlords because of their ignorance and childish naivete regarding housing and finance. Such constructions serve to legitimate paternalist racism, since these 'children' need looking after. According to one landlord,

I actually recall going to one house in Mt. Eden one night to see about some rent, and these people had a modern gas stove and they were cooking fish on the hearth in the lounge. They didn't know how to use the stove! (sic.)

The struggle for domination in the housing system, and in particular the conflict between the petty bourgeoisie and Pacific Islands migrants is one specific context in which the negative stereotyping of racialisation occurs.

Several Cook Islanders during the period of my fieldwork were denied rental accomodation when they appeared to inspect a property, even though they had been told over the phone by the landlord that the residence was available. One man was turned away three times in this fashion. Others were put out of houses or apartment blocks where several Polynesian families lived with the excuse that the building was about to be sold or renovated. This is a typical ploy for circumventing current rental appeal legislation. On one occasion, the landlord openly admitted to his Cook Islands tenant that he no longer wished to rent to Polynesians since they were too much trouble. He was taking advantage of the rental accomodation shortage to move in the kind of tenants he preferred.

I do not mean to leave the impression that Cook Islanders are merely the nescient victims of discrimination and exploitation in housing. I shall shortly discuss the sorts of improvisations which they have employed for dealing with their housing predicaments, and the way in which these same sorts of actions sometimes end up inadvertently reinforcing their class position.

My contention is that the re-valuation of the inner city by the various capitalist classes through both economic and political means, and the recent trend to locate State housing in cheaper peripheral suburbs have been two related processes which have helped to further structure the Polynesian working class fraction into

contiguous, less valued residential areas of the metropolis. Nonetheless, their common conditions of living and similar experiences of racialisation do provide at least the potential for shared class fraction awareness and action in future. A measure of the extent and pattern of social change in the inner city and at the periphery as a consequence of these developments can be seen in shifts in the location of ethnic populations in selected districts (Table 3.4).

Of the three suburbs, Freemans Bay was earliest to experience the impact of renovation and housing redevelopment, due in no small part to intervention by the Auckland City Council. Ponsonby was further away and lacked amenities such as sea views, while more industrial Grey Lynn was even less valued initially. Freemans Bay was one of the first to experience stabilisation of population and an increase of Europeans, while the Maori and Pacific Islands numbers declined markedly. European numbers have dropped in Ponsonby though the overall rate has slowed in the recent census. Polynesian numbers there increased in the mid-1970s, and then as competition for housing increased their numbers began to decline. Grey Lynn has seen a recent dramatic decline in its European population, corresponding with the steady increase of Polynesian numbers. Trends in inner city property values further confirm this spatial sequence of class competition for housing (Table 3.5).

A portion of my fieldwork was spent working alongside Cook Islander housing welfare officers with Maori and Island Affairs and the Cook Islands Government Consulate. The officers provided records of their own activities for the first half of 1980 which gave a further perspective on the housing problems of Cook Islanders (see Appendix B, Tables 1 through 6). These problems arise directly

Table 3.4

Changes in Inner City Population
by Ethnic Origin, 1971-1981

Suburb	European	NZ Maori	Cook Isld.	Niue & Tokelau	Samoan	Total Pacific Island Pop.
Freemans Bay						
1971	2277	605	307	199	223	789
1976	2125	460	284	163	165	719
1981	2271	414	NA	NA	NA	507
Ponsonby						
1971	4067	865	482	402	726	1724
1976	3257	734	617	426	665	1888
1981	2469	585	NA	NA	NA	1686
Grey Lynn						
1971	5669	159	700	458	1474	2861
1976	4443	1043	915	524	1481	3374
1981	2469	585	NA	NA	NA	3141

Source: Percy, 1980; 1981 Census

Table 3.5

TRENDS IN INNER CITY AUCKLAND PROPERTY SALES, 1976-1980 (R1-Pre-1920)
(Source: Valuation Dept.)

R1 -Houses built Pre-1920

Year	Freemans Bay		Ponsonby		Grey Lynn		Kingsland	
	No.	Average \$	No.	Average \$	No.	Average \$	No.	Average \$
1976	9	\$24,466	8	\$21,743	23	\$19,736	NA	(\$14,500)
1977	17	\$25,394	22	\$22,888	32	\$18,712	12	\$15,391
1978	37	\$30,785	37	\$21,317	42	\$22,200	29	\$17,370
1979	35	\$33,190	52	\$27,051	11	\$22,377	52	\$19,082
1980*	23	\$35,318	33	\$33,383	13	\$26,246	40	\$19,725

Flat Conversions (re-conversion)

1976	10	\$34,750	8	\$24,491	10	\$19,736	8	\$22,000
1977	9	\$27,900	11	\$25,954	10	\$21,220	7	\$20,371
1978	8	\$34,500	17	\$23,308	11	\$20,522	3	\$17,716
1979	11	\$35,981	32	\$25,811	20	\$23,790	7	\$22,471
1980*	8	\$56,812	15	\$32,233	24	\$26,627	10	\$24,160

*First 9 months only.

from the sorts of developments just discussed, particularly documenting the extent of Cook Islander reliance on State housing.

The majority of people these officers assisted were renters. Only in the case of the Cook Islands consular officer was I able to obtain a full list of past residences of each individual. Contrary to expectations, those seeking housing aid are not all recent migrants. Of the fifty cases surveyed, the average length of residence in New Zealand is 8.6 years (Appendix B, Table 5). The average number of previous residences is 3.6, showing a high rate of residential mobility. The applicants average a new residential location every 2.4 years.

The age distribution of the applicants (Appendix B, Table 1) is similar to the profile of Cook Islanders as a whole in Auckland, as is the reported island of origin (Appendix B, Table 4). For occupational distribution (Appendix B, Table 2) as expected the largest proportion of those gainfully employed are factory workers or other manual labourers. Judging by the high numbers of individuals subsisting on various forms of government welfare, there is a clear and understandable relationship between exclusion from a position in the production process and difficulty obtaining accommodation.

The residential locations of the applicants seeking assistance (Appendix B, Table 3) also reveal patterns consistent with the analysis of class conflict and social change discussed above. Older central and middle suburban areas with increased competition for rental accommodation are heavily represented locales from which individuals are reporting difficulties, as is South Auckland where there are high concentrations of State housing. All three areas are those in which large numbers of Cook Islanders live, or into which they are moving.

The patterns are clearer when residential location of applicant is cross-tabulated with the type of assistance he is seeking (Appendix B, Table 6). The different kinds of assistance sought reveal interrelated processes. Many people come to the Cook Islands housing welfare officers asking directly for help to get into a State house. Usually their present private rent is too great a burden, and they are seeking lower rental costs. Other cite urgent circumstances such as overcrowding, unhealthy living conditions or immanent eviction as their main concerns. In most instances this means that their need for State aid is classified as more of a priority by the Housing Corporation⁽²⁾.

It is clear from Table 6 that certain problems tend to occur in specific areas. Evictions make up a quarter of all housing problems reported. But the vast majority of private evictions take place in the inner city and the older middle suburbs where competition is keen from petty bourgeois European buyers. Through the Housing Corporation, the National Party government since 1976 has required tenants to buy after six years of occupation of a State unit. The first of these cases came up for review during my fieldwork. It is from the State housing areas of South Auckland where most evictions or negotiations with the Housing Corporation are taking place, both as a result of such terminations and illegal overcrowding. Those seeking help buying a private home to escape the rental spiral are more likely to be from the older middle suburbs, where prices have

(2) The various housing officers and Cook Islanders themselves are aware of the broad criteria for being considered a priority. With lengthening waiting lists, their application is more readily facilitated if they can successfully present their case as 'urgent'. One way to do this is to arrange their extended household population in such a fashion that, however temporarily, they approximate to the profile of hardship given priority by the State bureaucracy.


not yet soared to the levels of the inner city. There is a fairly even locational spread of those seeking State housing expressly for the lower rent, though the greatest number are already located in South Auckland where most of the State housing is located.

The following map (Figure 1) and Symap (Figure 2) show Cook Islander residential mobility since the Second World War reported in the 1981 fieldwork survey. When total housing moves of all respondents were plotted, the result was a much more complex pattern than anticipated. Certainly, the generalisation still made in the literature that the inner city is a 'migrant staging area' for movement elsewhere in the city is not born out. It may have been true for a period after the war, but specific cases show many others moved first to the southern or older middle suburbs and then into the inner city. A considerable number remained in the inner city, shifting from one place to another.

Patterns of Cook Islander residential mobility take on further significance when juxtaposed overagainst ethnic population changes across the entire motropolis (Table 3.6). Since Pacific Islander numbers have declined markedly in recent years in many inner city suburbs, it seems clear that the large flow indicated on Map 1 would tend to have occurred earlier. Those arriving there more recently would have more likely moved into Ponsonby or Grey Lynn. The Eastern suburbs have maintained and even increased their racial and economic exclusivity, as has the North Shore. West Auckland has begun to show increases in selected suburbs, coincidentally where some State housing units are located in latest construction projects. The two substantial areas of growth in Pacific Islands population are the older middle suburbs and South Auckland, where ethnic minorities have in some districts come to comprise 30-40% of the population. It seems apparent in comparing Map 1 that Cook Islanders have begun moving in greater numbers

FIG.NO.1

COOK ISLANDER RESIDENTIAL MOBILITY, 1945 - 1981



Source: 1981 Fieldwork Survey

Figure 2 (a)

DISTRIBUTION OF COOK ISLANDERS IN
AUCKLAND (1971 Census)





Figure 2 (b)

DISTRIBUTION OF COOK ISLANDERS
IN AUCKLAND (1976 Census)



FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF DATA POINT VALUES IN EACH LEVEL

LEVEL	1	2	3	4	5
SYMBOLS	+++++	00000000	00000000	00000000
FREQ.	93	31	30	6	4

Table 3.6

Changes in Pacific Islander Distributions
in Selected Suburbs in Auckland, 1976-1981

(Source: 1976, 1981 Census)

Suburb	1976		1981		% Change
	N	% of Total	N	% of Total	
<u>Inner City</u>					
Freemans Bay	719	20.1%	507	15.2%	-4.9%
Ponsonby	1880	29.2	1686	30.1	+ .9
Herne Bay	250	4.8	273	5.6	+ .8
Grey Lynn	3374	33.4	3141	32.4	-1
<u>Eastern Suburbs</u>					
Epsom Nth/Sth	187	2.1	156	1.8	- .3
Remuera East	26	.4	27	.4	0
Mission Bay	13	.3	27	.7	+ .4
Kohimarama	3	.1	6	.1	0
<u>Middle Districts</u>					
Avondale Nth	465	6.8	744	11.5	+4.7
Rosebank	543	10.3	993	18.4	+8.1
Waterview	40	1.9	141	6.7	+4.8
Pt. Chev.	244	3.2	318	4.5	+1.3
<u>South Auckland</u>					
Mangere Central	2046	18.9	3384	31.0	+12.1
Otara South	2154	27.9	2934	40.3	+12.4
Harania	1680	18.5	3492	32.9	+14.3
Howick	9	.1	6	.1	0
<u>West Auckland</u>					
Henderson Sth	237	6.2	279	7.9	+1.7
Glen Eden West	98	2.6	369	7.7	+5.1
New Lynn Sth	228	3.7	303	5.0	+1.3
Titirange Sth	4	.1	6	.2	+ .1
<u>North Shore</u>					
Browns Bay	7	.2	33	.6	+ .4
Takapuna Central	27	.4	15	.6	+ .2
Northcote Nth	72	1.1	108	1.5	+ .4
Beachhaven	126	1.8	222	2.8	+1

into South Auckland as earlier case studies confirm, but also are shifting from both the inner city and middle suburbs from whence at least some seek to purchase to purchase a home.

The Intervention of Capital in the Struggle for Accomodation

There are at least three ways in which capital seeks to intervene in the distribution and consumption of housing and thus maintain its domination over labour. Usually such intervention takes place through the direct agency of the State, though there are various indirect manoeuvres which I will indicate briefly. For the sake of simplicity I term these three forms of intervention rationalisation, valuation and collectivisation⁽⁴⁾.

a.) Rationalisation

To many Cook Islanders, buying a house is a burden rather than what the average New Zealander might consider a "sensible investment". Under present economic circumstances many simply cannot afford to enter into home ownership. They do not have the savings nor the weekly income to repay major debt. Alternatively, renting or sharing accomodation means flexibility and greater availability of resources for those things which are more important to them, including personal goods, funds for participation in ethnic community activities and helping kin back in the islands. This is why they constitute an implicit threat to State-capitalist property arrangements in New Zealand, and why they are targeted as a "social problem".

The concept of private property, enshrined in law, is at the

(4) I am indebted to David Harvey (1978) for the inspiration of this formulation along with certain components of my argument. However, I differ from his approach in certain important respects as will be apparent when I apply these concepts to Cook Islander housing.

very heart of the class struggle over the built environment (Harvey, Ibid.:15). Thus the various classes controlling property have a vested interest in keeping the principle sacrosanct. They maintain their hold on housing by promoting

...the allegiance of at least a segment of the working class to the principle of private property; an ethic of 'possessive individualism'; and a fragmentation of the working class into 'housing classes' of homeowners and tenants. This gives the capitalist class a handy ideological lever against public ownership and nationalisation demands....(Ibid.).

Today it is largely taken-for-granted as a tenet of the dominant class culture that home ownership is the desired goal and the right of every New Zealand citizen⁽⁵⁾.

Two developments during the latter 1970s served to highlight the widening gulf between rhetoric and reality in home ownership. One was the increasing difficulty for young couples to purchase a home of their own. The other was the preference of many Polynesians for renting and their growing concentration in State housing. Both created a crisis for bourgeois culture, and when such a crisis occurs it is time for the work of ideology to begin.

New Zealand had a high rental rate until well after the Second World War. When indigenous capital's monopoly expansion was resisted by labour with respect to property, a moral homology had to be forged between home ownership and being a decent, upstanding citizen. The recent so-called housing crisis was merely one more episode in this struggle. Conservative political spokesmen entered the fray claiming there was a threat to the social order itself.

(5) The State has played a major part in the promotion of home ownership. But State housing was never intended to remain under public ownership, unlike certain European countries. Individual clients have been encouraged to purchase their homes from the government. Today less than 6% of the housing stock in the country is in State hands.

A town planner from one of Auckland's wealthy Eastern suburbs stated the ruling ideology succinctly:

A recent suggestion from an Auckland City Council staff member that local authorities should embark on an emergency housing programme makes a lot of sense. It is well known that housing is not only the foundation of a stable family but also the foundation of a responsible and caring society (Letters to the Editor, Auckland Star, August 19, 1980; emphasis added).

With an unstable property market, renters were stereotyped as uncaring, transient members of the community. As proof, conservative politicians pointed to the supposed transformation in the physical condition of State housing properties when the 1949 National Party government introduced a policy of encouraging tenants to purchase their house. As the Auckland District Valuer stated,

It is an undisputed fact from long experience that there are social consequences to home ownership. People take more pride in upgrading their properties, and they also become more involved in their own local communities (Interview, March, 1980).

At least they become more concerned to defend their personal and usually mortgaged property. A similar philosophy underlies recent National Party government moves to renovate multiple units in Otara because applicants in this State housing area were complaining about having to live in them.

In the inner city tenants are construed as the cause, not the victims of the "creeping rot" as Auckland City Councillor Jolyn Firth refers to slum conditions. The Auckland District Valuer phrased the problem as a matter of simple commonsense:

Slum conditions are a state of mind. People either take responsibility for their place, or they don't care and destroy property. Property and rental restrictions by various governments after the war helped create the so-called slum conditions in the inner city. Plus tenants didn't care. And the situation fed upon itself [presumably the creeping rot, again].

Under bourgeois ideology, many Cook Islanders are doubly

condemned in the struggle for adequate accomodation, first as Polynesians and then as renters. The ideology itself is a powerful legitimation of discrimination. Like other Polynesians, Cook Islanders virtually have to choose whether to remain in New Zealand pressured into "responsible citizenship" by mortgaging themselves in a home purchase, or return to the islands where economic conditions are no better.

Those who have purchased their homes have certain advantages over those who rent. Most have seen their property values increase, especially those in the inner city. But many recent home buyers in working class areas in south and even west Auckland have only been able to afford a small deposit, so their mortgage repayments are financially debilitating to the family budget. If they own an older house in the inner city they are pressured by local authorities and by more subtle means at the neighbourhood level to "show they care" by upgrading their property (Loomis, 1979; 1980). In addition inner city gentrification has caused property rates to skyrocket. Many are reluctant to make such expenditures and choose to avoid them where possible, for instance by selling or leaving their house derelict.

Such developments are merely the contemporary mode of class struggle over the built environment. But they also reveal the fundamental separation in different class and fractional interests among Cook Islanders in spite of shared home ownership. Those in the supervisory 'labour aristocracy' tend to identify more with ruling ideology regarding the moral components of home ownership. Such persons are often in positions of leadership where they can propound this same ideology to fellow migrants.

In light of such class divisions it is not surprising that such 'community leaders' stress the importance of owning property. They say those Cook Islanders having trouble finding affordable rent should have planned ahead, worked hard and invested in property of their

own. But they were irresponsible with their money, or retained the dream of eventually returning to the islands:

Now look where they are. And then they come to us for help
Our people never learn. When in the Papa'a world, you do as
the Papa'a does.

In sum Cook Islanders housing problems are the fault of the people themselves.

The intentional choice of State rental by Cook Islanders is construed by the ruling class as a sign of taking unfair advantage of the system. Such practices can become a major demand on the State and a burden on the taxpayer. For these reasons Polynesians must be 'encouraged' and 'educated' into more rational consumption -- savings and responsible citizenship through mortgage indebtedness.

This is easily understood. Housing is a consumption good over which capital must constantly strive to maintain control.

Workers mediate the circulation of commodities by using their wages to purchase means of consumption from capitalists. Any failure on the part of workers to use their purchasing power 'correctly' or rationally, from the standpoint of the capitalist production and realisation system will disrupt the circulation of commodities (Harvey, Op cit.:17).

The stereotypical traditionalist or backward Polynesian migrant is the housing pariah par excellence. As an irrational consumer, he constitutes a threat to the very economic and political order itself (see Chapter 4).

There are a number of means by which capital encourages rational consumption and thus curtails any serious threat to its hegemony over domestic property. One of the most common means is through the moral emphasis on savings and debt repayment. By borrowing, one becomes a responsible citizen and a stable member of society, legally obligated to pay off one's indebtedness by contract through steady labour. In an economy based on indebtedness and usury by the ruling

class, anyone who pays cash -- as many migrants do in an attempt to maintain some semblance of control over their financial affairs -- not only has a low credit rating, but is often penalised financially.

In public and private sector finance the lending decision depends on the value of the property and the credit-worthiness of the individual as determined by the lender (Burtt, 1979). Applicants are expected to be able to demonstrate that they can repay debt, that they have built up a "savings history," by voluntarily setting aside part of their income under a disciplined regimen of self-deprivation to obtain a desired want. Anyone who engages in practices contrary to this ruling philosophy is considered an economic risk. The emphasis on savings creates a decisive separation between those who are contributory citizens -- 'home seekers' -- and an undeserving housing poor of profligates and inveterate renters.

Seminars of 'expert' speakers on contemporary social ills are typical venues in New Zealand for propounding and legitimating ruling ideology. They are also good places for hearing out and defusing competing claims. For instance, at a seminar on housing finance during 1979, the Minister of Housing state unambiguously, "The State's role is to provide incentives for people prepared to make an effort and save" (Quigley, 1979).

On the question of access to housing finance, another speaker denied the existence of "disadvantaged groups" altogether (Grant, 1979:69). His rhetorical manoeuvre was to 'individualise'⁽⁶⁾ the problem of access to finance, rather than confront the evidence of discrimination against particular groups in society. The ideology

(6) See Giddens (1973) for a useful discussion of the individualist strategy of ruling class domination of threatening minorities.

of the isolated individual is crucial to paternalistic racism, since in one movement it separates the actor from his social context, from the potential for collective awareness and action, while at the same time authenticating the role of the 'helping' agent in question. It follows this speaker -- a banker -- should be at particular pains to deny that stereotypes of Maoris and Pacific Islanders influenced the decisions of money managers. Nonetheless, some individuals did frighten lenders, he stated, because of their "anti-social attitudes". They also intentionally misled "their folk" (Ibid.:72). Here the social control function of consumption rationalisation is made all the more explicit.

Such deviants have little recourse but to rent, either privately or from the State. This in turn ensnares them in poor accommodation and exacerbates the rental housing 'crisis' in New Zealand. Echoing the well-worn Protestant ethic of work and savings, a property developer at the seminar summarised predictably,

We must be prepared to help people who help themselves
(Neill, 1979:77).

It was the necessity for intervening in a chaotic home buying market, especially rationalising consumption behaviour of Polynesians that led the government to establish the Home Guidance Bureau in the latter 1970s. Too many families were getting into financial difficulty and becoming a "burden on society". As the director of the Bureau confirmed in an interview, many Polynesian migrants were having problems obtaining housing finance or mortgages. The solution was to instill more rational consumption practices into their family budget:

One would not expect to help every citizen in New Zealand. Because what we mainly do, we virtually educate the populace towards home ownership.

A lot of people come here and they already appreciate from

the beginning that since they haven't saved very well they don't stand a chance. So we put them on a savings scheme... and say 'Do exactly as we say. Come back after a year and tell us how much you've got'.

That's one of the dire results of the welfare society. People just expect a handout. They just want to be bailed out without making an effort.

Polynesians are in double jeopardy again from such an ideology and the practices which it condones, because they are proportionately more likely to be on welfare and in State housing. Racialised stereotypes typify them as irrational consumers: lazy, ignorant, ill-informed.

Now, as far as Cook Islanders and the Polynesian population is concerned they are not very conversant generally speaking with housing. And the result is that they fall for these advertisements in the paper where it says 'Babe deposit, \$500' or '\$1000 and finance will be found'. In other words they fall into the hands of the speculators--whatever they are--landowners. A lot of people get into this kind of difficulty these days, and then come to the Home Guidance Bureau expecting a handout or to get bailed out somehow.

Various landlord, property managers and financiers interviewed during my fieldwork felt that Polynesians were to blame for their own housing plight since they did not know the intricacies of savings, credit and contracts, or would not make an effort to understand. As one commented,

We find that the Pacific Islander in his early stage anyway has very little sense of property ownership. They come from a common-law society where yours was mine and mine was yours and so on. They had no conception of interest or money. None whatsoever. (sic.)

They would come to me and say they wanted \$200 to bring their aunty or family or something down from the islands. And they would pay me -- in a fortnight's time they would give me \$250 back. It wasn't interest to them. It was accomodation for a loan.

And when I told them I couldn't accept it [thereby giving affront by refusing a reciprocal gift] they couldn't believe it. And in many cases, when we have tenants in arrears, we used to bail them up here. And they'd say 'But you're my friend (sic.). You've got plenty of money. You give me some'.

Of course, these dominant class agents in the housing sector

do not really believe their own patronising propaganda in many cases. It is meant largely to secure public approbrium for their activities. Their real difficulty, and inevitably that of the State, is what do with the 'communal,' 'traditionalist,' irrational economic behaviour that is persistent and intentional among Polynesian migrants.

One ethnocentric practice is to ascribe the same competitive, economic aspirations to "modern," enterprising Polynesians as Europeans themselves. Such energetic individuals supposedly try to acculturate and advance themselves, but they are blocked by their customs and their own ethnic community. As one property manager stated, all their "bludging relatives hold them back," suddenly appearing when the individual tries to make a financial success of himself.

Such rhetorical presentations and the structural relations which they legitimate can only be reproduced over time with at least the tacit acceptance of Polynesians themselves. In particular many Cook Islander leaders share ruling notions of the moral propriety of rational consumption, castigating relatives for dragging down an entrepreneurial family member, blaming Cook Islanders themselves for ignorance or devious behaviour.

Interestingly enough, they usually avoid blaming external factors such as bosses, their economic position or European discrimination. Donnison (1982) argues that "true discrimination begins when its victims believe that they deserve to be scapegoats". In reality this is the way in which all discrimination proceeds from the outset. Without the tacit or conscious acquiescence of the exploited there would be little exploitation. Often, however, they have few alternatives.

b). Valuation


The valuation pattern of real estate in the metropolis is both an expression and a means of class struggle. How these values are determined, how various groupings are excluded from some areas and concentrated in others reveals much about the way in which capital manages the consumption process in its own interests. It can also reveal areas of contradiction and competition between classes.

Harvey (1973) has suggested one model to account for the differential valuation of urban property (Figure 3). Location is the prime factor, which in turn is influenced by the price of accessibility and the cost of proximity (Ibid.:57). Cost of transportation is the primary factor in determining accessibility. Historically, the ability to undertake longer journeys to work and to reach social amenities played a significant role in labour's being able to counteract the extent of monopoly power of capital (Ibid.:13). Travel costs in turn depend on (1) the ability to pay for travel, (2) the length of the work day, allowing time to travel, and (3) the cost of transport itself. These factors have been the focus of intense conflict between capital and labour over the years.

Proximity costs are comprised of environmental factors (eg. pollution, noise, slum conditions) and various externality effects. There are two sorts of such effects: neighbourhood effects and third party effects. Among the former would be included such factors as (1) shared belief that the value of one's house is influenced by the quality of the locale and the degree of investment and improvement of one's neighbours, all of which may have negative or positive consequences; (2) the location of public housing and other institutions; and (3) the presence of preferred or negatively valued groups (eg. affluent professional vs. Polynesian migrants). Finally there are third party effects attributable to the rhetoric and

Figure 3

Harvey's Model of Urban Spatial Valuation
(Source: Harvey, 1973)



practices of real estate agents, the media, finance managers and solicitors.

The total configuration of these factors exists as a spatial field of effects, or in Harvey's words a complex pattern of externality fields and accompanying values throughout the metropolis (Ibid.:60). Through its monopoly control of real property capital attempts to control and exploit labour. It does so by denying labour mobility and burdening it with negative proximity effects while it secures the preferred areas for itself. These value patterns must be considered in the context of wider political and economic practices. Much of what takes place economically and politically in the city is an attempt to organise accessibility and proximity costs to the advantage of one party or the other (Ibid.:58).

One of the main drawbacks of such an approach is that it tends to take the constitutive factors of valuation as given, rather than as social constructions which are the subject of intense struggle and debate. But then, Harvey is clearly a geographer. To invert his argument, the valuation pattern of externality fields is both a consequence of inequality of distribution and consumption, and a mode of the reproduction of these same inequities⁽⁸⁾.

Unfortunately, it is beyond the scope of this study to apply such a model to a mapping of all the externality fields in the Auckland metropolis. I must briefly indicate those areas which have been of most consequence to Cook Islanders. The affluent, politically conservative and power Eastern suburbs have increased

(8) Similarly, the difficulty with the Thorns and Smith (1980) model of "housing sub-markets" is that it tends to reify the spatial configuration of values, without explaining how such differential values and access to certain areas are constituted in the class struggle over the built environment. In consequence their model runs the risk of merely legitimating existing structural arrangements of capitalist domination by mystifying "market competition".

in valuation, particularly as transport has become more simplified with the construction a quarter of a century ago of bridges and roading to connect its scenic bays. These areas are also close to the CBD where most residents are employed, own and run businesses, and whose salaries make transport a minor consideration anyway. This area is characterised by harbour views, expensive housing, a minimum of negative neighbourhood effects (only one concentrated public housing estate) and is promoted vigorously as the most exclusive area in the region by third parties. Between 1976 and 1981, most suburbs in this area actually increased their already high racial and economic exclusivity. Several suburbs are now as much as 98% European, constituting a formidable bastion of bourgeois political and economic power blocking residential penetration for most Cook Islanders.

South Auckland, particularly Otara and Mangere where a high proportion of Cook Islanders live, has become the stereotypical Polynesian ghetto in recent years⁽⁹⁾. For many working class residents, transport costs are moderated due to the proximity of these areas to new industrial developments, though they are constrained from seeking employment too far afield for the same reason. But these also comprise significant negative externality effects which, combined with high concentrations of State housing and third party effects from agents and the media reproduce the area as one of disvalue.

(9) For instance, newspapers in the early 1980s declared Otara to be "New Zealand's Soweto," and ran repeated stories about gangs and violence there. By 1983 shopkeepers were threatening to pull out if vandalism did not stop. According to one property reported (Star, June 21, 1980) if one were selling a house "and you live in parts of South Auckland then you may have real problems". An agent stated properties in the area were selling below the city average "because people don't want to live in these areas".

The inner city has been the most significant area of transformation in valuation and thereby the area of greatest class conflict in recent years. The effects of rising fuel costs and soaring new home building expenses, on the middle and 'old' petty bourgeoisie have seen this previously low-valued 'slum' become very popular. Environmental factors and neighbourhood effects have been reversed by a combination of private investment and political action through town planning schemes. Public housing has to date been minimal, though 'special uses' are beginning to be perceived locally as new disvalues (eg. drug rehabilitation centres, half-way houses for 'street kids', mental patients, prisoners). Polynesian numbers have declined due in no small part to the conversion of rental housing to private accommodation, and the efforts of third party agents.

Indeed, the racialisation of "undesirable" residents has been an important means of class hegemony over this area. Racial identity and attendant stereotypes have been ways in which Polynesians have been systematically excluded and relocated into other areas. Estate agents, the media, financiers and solicitors systematically guide the 'renovation boom' and the attendant structure of values resulting from inner city gentrification.

In 1978 agents were telling some prospective customers that within ten years, there would not be an "Islander" left in the better inner city suburbs. The rentals officer for the Housing Corporation in 1980 confirmed that the inner city 'rental crisis' was forcing many Polynesians and poorer people to relocate in outer suburbs and apply for State assistance. Evidence of these trends was to be found by examining the records for previous residence of applicants and the experience of field officers.

c.) Collectivisation

Processes of rationalisation and valuation need to be considered in conjunction with the collectivisation of consumption, particularly in the form of State housing. Collectivisation is not so much a means of capital's intervention in consumption as the State's moderation of the monopoly power of capital over housing. A chronic shortage of adequate accomodation prior to and just after World War II meant government housing policy was for years dominated by new home construction. Social amenities and distance from work were given low priority after availability of cheap, usually peripheral land on which to build large public housing tracts of standardised houses. The result was an inequitable distribution of disvalues in the housing system generally.

An additional complex of factors have contributed to the concentration of Polynesians in various State housing areas (cf. the National Inquiry into Housing , 1971). Trlin (1977) lists four reasons for this racial concentration. One is the racial selectivity of the income limit for applications since a high proportion of Maoris and Pacific Islanders are engaged in low-paying blue collar jobs. Another is the higher natural increase in the Polynesian population, augmented by the arrival of large numbers of migrants over the past decade. And finally, in 1969 the government extended Maori and Island Affairs housing coverage to Pacific migrants, facilitating their entry into public housing (Ibid.:124). Added to these factors have been the recent developments in the inner city sending many Polynesian renters there looking for help from the State.

The State was sensitive to accusations that it was creating public housing ghettos. But such developments required large tracts of land, in lower valued areas with standardised house designs.

The government did what it could to distribute some units in other existing suburbs, but met with stiff local opposition. The State's long-term policy of encouraging tenants to purchase their homes meant most rental units were located in these same concentrated estates, mostly in South Auckland. High travel costs due to the energy crisis coupled with the relatively sudden renovation and gentrification of the inner city meant lengthening cues of Polynesian applicants for State help. There was little recourse but to locate them in the increasingly disvalued peripheral southern housing estates, which practice reinforced the stereotyping of such areas. The process became self-perpetuating as such areas became further racialised and stigmatised. The State in conjunction with capital became an influential perpetrator of changes in externality fields across the region, and the subsequent injustices of forced racial minority peripheralisation.

At present there are five main areas of public housing in the Auckland metropolis, developed in stages:

Stage 1 - Mt. Roskill (20-30 years old)

Stage 2 - Glen Innes (20 years old)

Stage 3 - Otara (10-15 years old or less)

Stage 4 - Mangere (5-10 years old or less)

Stage 5 - South/West Auckland (present & future)

These areas correlate closely with Polynesian population concentrations except for the inner city. In March 1980 the Deputy-director of the Auckland branch of the Housing Corporation addressed an Otara Cook Islands advisory committee meeting and inadvertently confirmed that nearly half of the Corporation's clients live in the greater Otara area.

The Housing Corporation is sensitive also to accusations of racial bias not only in where it builds estates but in its allocation procedures. It uses the Race Relations Act as the reason why no record is kept of an applicant's race or ethnic background. Each particular applicant is ideally treated with equanimity. By pursuing such a policy, questions of remedial positive discrimination never become an issue. Large Polynesian concentrations in public housing and resulting inequalities are the direct outcome of the 'individualist' strategies discussed previously which the ruling class through its political representatives is interested to maintain. As the Corporation's deputy-director stated,

As far as we're concerned, there is no such things as Polynesians or Maoris or Pakehas. There are applicants for state rental housing...I don't give a damn if you come from Niue or the Shetland Islands (taped record of March, 1980 meeting).

Throughout the past two decades, Maori and Island Affairs housing division have pursued a policy of "pepper-potting" Polynesian clients into European neighbourhoods. In the mid-1970s a top-ranking officer was critical of the State Advances (Housing) Corporation as well as the private real estate market for nullifying M.I.A. policy.

In response to criticisms the Housing Corporation has actively pursued a policy aimed at a more "balanced mix" in its own housing estates⁽¹⁰⁾. It is precisely at this juncture that the contradiction in State housing policy is revealed. In the deputy-director's words,

(10) The notion of a balanced mix in communities has enjoyed widespread popularity in government policy and town planning in N. Z. The inner city today is often lauded as a desired place to live because of the "interesting and varied lifestyles there". Sarkissian and Hine (1976) have demonstrated through their own research that policies of racial or class mix are not only misguided, but seem to have the opposite effect for which they were intended.

race is not a factor in the allocation of housing, and yet race is a factor in assuring equal distribution. If race of the applicant is not considered in allocation procedures, it is difficult to see how the Corporation could possibly pursue an enlightened policy of balancing their communities.

The culprits for racial and ethnic concentration in collectivised housing are quite often implied to be Polynesian migrants themselves. For years they have been blamed for their failure to assimilate, for traditionalism and particularly their supposed communal desire to live together. As the deputy-director stated,

Rightly or wrongly, I've found in the past that if you isolate a Polynesian family, you've got an unhappy family. There's a group living lifestyle, I suppose....So I've got to put one or two Polynesian families in fairly close proximity. But then I come up against all sorts of problems. I've got a couple of privately-owned Pakeha houses around, and they immediately get up in arms and accuse me of creating an Island ghetto.

In fact Polynesians themselves often seek to avoid such concentration. At the particular meeting in question, one audience member stated that Cook Islanders were beginning to realise that they had created problems by bunching together in Otara and now no longer wanted to live there. The problem was trying to get the Corporation to let them move or be allocated a unit somewhere else.

Cook Islander housing welfare officers suggest that Cook Islanders, especially young couples are aware of the stigma that Otara and South Auckland generally have gained. They seek specifically to be placed somewhere else. They are concerned about the vandalism, gang violence, disruptive environment and school problems their children may have to endure. And some, contrary to the ruling mythology about Polynesian communalism, try to live away from close kin who may make constant demands for assistance or seek to regulate their lives too much. Another reason for living elsewhere is the high cost of travel to work.

Since Corporation policy and allocation procedures are informed by such simplistic views of Polynesian housing preferences applicants must go to extraordinary lengths in dealing with the State system. Since many rental units coming available in South Auckland are blocks of multi-story flats, one widespread improvisation is to insist on accommodation without stairs. Often the claim is backed up by a doctor's note about the person's health, or the fact that stairs are a danger because they are not part of the Pacific culture. At the time of my fieldwork, the Corporation was beginning to reject such claims out of hand because so many were using them. According to Corporation figures, in one week alone in 1980 some sixty units offered were turned down by applicants, of which 30 were Polynesians who gave stairs as a major reason.

Standard Improvisations in the Struggle for Accommodation

Cook Islanders are not very different from other migrants in relying on relatives and friends for initial accommodation. What is distinctive for many is their continuing reliance on kin and friends for housing assistance long after their arrival in New Zealand. Most Cook Islanders utilise kinship connections not so much for emotional or cultural reasons as because of circumstances pertaining in the wider housing distribution system. Furthermore, current structural contradictions with respect to accommodation have necessitated more and more Cook Islanders renting for prolonged periods.

Cook Islanders seem to have made use of a wider range of resources than kinship in obtaining accommodation (Table 3.7). When asked in the 1981 fieldwork survey which source they thought most likely to secure them accommodation, most informants named the Housing Corporation or similar housing welfare agency (over 60%). Family and

Table 3.7

Cook Islanders Preferred Sources of Housing Assistance

<u>Source</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percentage</u>
Housing-Welfare agencies	126	60.6
Cook Islanders-family	33	15.9
Church	28	13.5
Enua association	4	1.9
Citiz. Advice Bureau	4	1.9
Government agencies	3	1.4
C.Is. government office	3	1.4
C.Is. Advisory committee	2	1.0
C.Is. Volunteers	2	1.0
Church/Housing/Welfare ag.	1	.5
No response	2	1.0
	<hr/>	<hr/>
Totals	208	100%

Source: 1981 Fieldwork Survey

church rated much lower.

In actual practice however, kin gave assistance to the informant in 50.1% of the 685 reported cases of housing moves (Table 3.8). The Housing Corporation was involved only 14.2% of the time, and church aid -- so important to post-war migrants (Hooper, op cit.) -- was virtually non-existent. Relatives continue to assist in finding housing from one shift to the next. If a distinction is drawn between immediate family (ngutuare, or nuclear household) and distant kin (aunts, uncles and cousins) then 33.1% of kin assistance came from the immediate relative while 17.0% came from those more distant.

From the same data, the landlord and estate agent play a significant role in the location of accomodation. These are not neutral 'brokers' or 'mediators' but class agents within the consumption process. Together, they comprise 14.9% of assistance given to Cook Islanders in all housing moves. This is at variance with Hooper's earlier finding that Cook Islanders preferred to rely on kin and friends almost exclusively to obtain housing.

Reported sources of information people use to find housing provides much the same picture of assistance (Table 3.9). The Housing Corporation once again is the single most important source of information in seeking accomodation. However, when all relatives are calculated together, they provide information in 40.8% of cases. Again, Cook Islanders use a wide range of sources in finding out about housing. Many make their own search using the newspaper. Immediate kin are more helpful in providing information (32.0%) than distant kin 8.8%). The landlord and agent are also useful sources of information, though less so than with respect to actual assistance.

Cook Islanders have created, shared and thus perpetuated a number of relatively ad hoc practices in recent years for obtaining

Table 3.8

Who Assisted in Locating Accommodation
Source: 1981 Fieldwork Survey

<u>Category</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percentage</u>
Housing Corporation	97	14.2%
Parent/Step-parents	80	11.7%
Aunt/Uncle/Great uncle	70	10.2%
Estate Agent	61	8.9
Relative/family	59	8.6%
Friend/neighbour	41	6.0%
Landlord	41	6.0%
Brother/sister	40	5.8%
Cousin	31	4.5%
Grandparents	17	2.5%
Company house/boss	17	2.5% ✓
Nephew/niece	16	2.3%
Personal search	16	2.3% ✓
Affines	13	1.9%
Maori & Island Affairs	11	1.6%
Daughter/son	9	1.3%
Husband/wife	8	1.2%
Boyfriend/girlfriend	5	.7%
Council Emergency Hsng.	2	.3%
Clergyman	2	.3%
Family doctor	2	.3%
Adopted parents	1	.1%
Social welfare	1	.1%
Builder	1	.1%
No response	44	6.4%
Totals	685	100%

Table 3.9

Sources of Information in the Search
For Accommodation

<u>Source</u>	<u>Cases</u>	<u>Percentage</u>
Housing Corporation	92	13.4%
Newspaper	79	11.5%
Relative-Family	69	10.1%
Parent/Step-parent	62	9.1%
Aunt/Uncle	61	8.9%
Estate Agent	43	6.3%
Friend/Neighbour	31	4.5%
Cousin/nephew, neice	27	3.9%
Brother/Sister	26	3.8%
Affines	25	3.6%
Company hse/boss	17	2.5%
Grandparents	15	2.2%
Daughter/son	12	1.8%
Landlord	12	1.8%
Husband/wife	9	1.3%
Maori Isld. Affairs	9	1.3%
Boyfriend/girlfriend	5	.7%
Personal search	4	.6%
Adopted parents	1	.1%
Council Emerg, Hsng.	1	.1%
Social Welfare	1	.1%
No response	80	11.7%
<hr/>		
Totals	685	100%

Source: 1981 Fieldwork Survey

accomodation. I have referred to these practices with the term borrowed from Bourdieu (1977:54,79,95): standard improvisations. They are creative, pragmatic solutions invented of necessity and shared among social actors because they are effective solutions to common difficulties. They are in fact emergent within the dialectic between actor and his social world in which he must act. The latter structures shape his behaviour and the way he conceives his world, but which in turn are reproduced and often changed by him. I want to discuss five such improvisations in concluding this discussion of housing.

The first is that of the mobile or nomadic household.

Following initial migration one would expect a higher rate of residential mobility until the migrant becomes settled permanently. What is striking is the extent to which many Cook Islanders continue to move residence over an extended period of time. Because of their marginal class position and low income, they are forced to find whatever affordable accomodation they can. Younger single people do a considerable amount of shifting about. The composition of their households can change dramatically from one week to the next. This is partly out of preference to escape the interference of elders, and partially out of necessity. If the landlord does not object, or the Housing Corporation find out, living in a group situation can be a cheap way of sharing the rental burden.

The life of the nomadic household has been experienced by most Cook Islanders at one time or another. It is particularly hard on solo mothers and young families with several children. One is continually having to prevail upon the kindness of kin. The welcome can wear thin in an overcrowded house. Moving about often means the children have to change schools and their education suffers. Those with jobs have to make new and often costly travel arrangements.

The strains on the family's emotional and material resources can be great.

The mobile household does enjoy certain benefits: being able to leave an undesirable situation more easily, the existing social life of the young, rent and food sharing and free babysitting. The most significant drawbacks include having to move often, pay increasing rents without gaining anything in equity, being labelled a poor credit risk for not owning property, and missing out on a State house if one moves after having made application and neglects to notify the Corporation.

Marriage or cohabitation is another common improvisation for getting a roof over one's head. Just as some illegal Pacific Islands immigrants marry a Cook Islander or other New Zealand citizen to remain in the country, some individuals follow a similar practice just to find accommodation. The harsh realities of the migrant housing predicament are often a prime motive for choosing to marry or move in with another person, as for instance in the case of solo mothers. Related to this is intermarriage with an European, which some believe is an avenue to financial security.

Another common improvisation is obtaining the patronage of a landlord...in effect , being 'adopted' by a paternalistic Papa'a. Admittedly, this was more the case before competition for rental accommodation became so fierce, particularly exacerbating the conflict between the petite bourgeoisie and Polynesian fraction of the working class. Inner city landlords were particularly anxious to find new tenants and interested in establishing a good clientele which did not require costly upkeep. The patron-client relationship suited both parties well. A landlord looked after 'his people', and the tenant looked after the property and did not make too many demands.

If a man's wife arrived from the islands with their children, the landlord moved the family to another property or found more suitable housing through his personal contacts. The same applied if he wished to sell or repair a property.

Chain recruitment into older inner city houses also took place. Cook Islands tenants were encouraged to bring kin or friends to take over a lease when they moved. Often an individual went first to his landlord to find a place for an arriving kinsman. As in employment competition, Cook Islanders made efforts to present themselves as good tenants and kept a close eye on the behaviour of new arrivals. However, such presentations have become increasingly difficult in the midst of present class conflict over housing and attendant racialisation. As one Atiu island leader stated,

That's why I hate this 'Pacific Island people'. Because Cook Island people is alright. The problem is with all this Samoan, Tongan, Niuean...because we are classed as one people: Pacific Islanders! I always talk about Cook Islanders is a different thing altogether.

TL: What's the difference then?

Papa T: The Cook Islander will look after their own place.

Mama T: Some will!

Papa T: No! I don't like that. I never seen any Cook Islands 'some'. Cook Islands people will always look after their place.

Since gaining long-term access to desired housing is so problematic due to competition in the private sector and ineffectiveness in the public sector, certain improvisations decidedly bend the rules. One widespread practice is accommodation swapping. Landlords have been interested just to keep the rent coming in, though more recently they are less likely to be lenient. Today, they may use a change or addition in the number of tenants as an excuse to extract extra rent. There are plenty of others waiting if the tenants cause trouble.

Accommodation-swapping is equally prevalent with respect to State housing, rented and purchased units alike. With long waiting lists it is simpler to use one's personal network to locate or 'pass around' a State house. Such a practice often results in people being thrown out when they are caught, though they can equally succeed because of confusions over Islands surnames on applications.

Another common practice is to rely on Cook Islands intermediaries who are effective at providing access to housing. They may not necessarily be recognised community leaders, but have a reputation for knowing the ins and outs of the public housing bureaucracy. Most are decidedly less adept with respect to the private property market. They are sometimes coopted as housing workers with various private agencies or government departments. In earlier years the clergyman, enua (island) association leader or church elder played a valuable role in providing for such migrant needs, but this is less the case today.

It should be noted that there are at present no pressure groups among Cook Islanders as there are among some Maori communities or in particular local neighbourhoods to press for better housing finance and conditions. Nor are there housing finance cooperatives to assist migrant housing needs similar to the Samoan 'ainga' (extended kin group). To date they have been able to utilise the kinds of networks and intermediaries and patronage relations discussed to acquire housing, though the effectiveness of such improvisations is increasing under question.

Conclusions

Any explanation of the housing situation of Cook Islanders in Auckland must begin from their position in the relations of production. Distributive groupings such as so-called housing classes cannot sufficiently account for class relations, present transformations in the social order of the metropolis nor the contradictions which are generating conflict.

To begin I presented several statistical analyses which demonstrated the extent of Cook Islander underprivilege in housing. I then proceeded to identify trends in re-evaluation of certain areas, the 'housing crisis' and population changes as all related to class conflict over the control of accommodation. I documented the operations of the racialisation process with respect to Cook Islanders as a means by which the property classes separate off an 'undesirable clientele' and divide the interests of labour.

I then pointed out the personalised nature of the housing system in New Zealand and the role of the petite bourgeoisie in reproducing the housing position of most Cook Islanders. I dealt particularly with the inner city renovation boom and gentrification as instances of contradiction and class struggle forcing Polynesians and other members of the working class out of the city centre and increasingly into peripheral State housing. I documented the extent of the impact of the struggle for domination of the inner city with trends in ethnic population and property values juxtaposed against patterns of residential mobility of Cook Islanders since World War II.

In the final two sections I contrasted the way in which capital attempts to intervene and control the consumption process through rationalisation, valuation and collectivisation, with the sorts of

standard improvisations Cook Islanders have come up with for coping with their accomodation predicaments. I attempted to specify the way in which the State has attempted to moderate the monopoly power of capital with respect to housing, but has through its various practices -- in conjunction with unforeseen developments such as the energy crisis and inner city gentrification -- actually contributed to the uprooting and concentration of Polynesians in less preferred residential areas.

In discussing the improvisations of Cook Islanders I pointed out the disparity between the approaches of members of different fractions within the the ethnic community, particularly the tendency for the supervisors and petite bourgeois to conform to the interests of capital in its intervention strategies. I also gave instances in which certain of these creative practices successfully assisted the migrant population combat racialisation and obtain accomodation (eg. landlord patronage and presenting themselves as 'priority' cases with the Housing Corporation), while in other actions they further reinforced their predicament.

Chapter 4

Racialisation and Cook Islander Ethnic Ideology

Like other Pacific migrants and Maoris, Cook Islanders in New Zealand have been socially constructed by bourgeoisie and State alike as a Polynesian racial minority. Their marginal political and economic position over time is the outcome of such categorisation, particularly at the ideological level. I intend to spell out more precisely how I conceive the racialisation process and how it is related to political domination and economic exploitation. Racialisation must also be grounded in recent historical developments in the political economy of the region. Finally, I will explore the connection between racialisation and ethnic identity using Cook Islanders as a case in point. Contemporary concerns of Cook Islanders over the breaking away of some families and the dropping out of youth are related to these wider social constructions. The concerns of the 'ethnic community' as a social category are both the consequence of racialisation and an array of responses to it.

A recent authoritative study of New Zealand race relations has claimed,

In the New Zealand context race is used to legitimate the dominance of the Pakeha and its ideological role is exposed by a central contradiction. Despite the propensity of the Pakeha to use race as a means of classifying others and to act on this categorisation, there is a widely expressed denial that race is an important consideration in New Zealand or that racial problems exist (Spoonley, 1982:283).

In actuality there is no such thing as "Pakeha" dominance except as a social construction -- the same kind of social construction Spoonley warns against with the term "race". Just as there is no "contradiction" in the way race is used ideologically in New Zealand, given the nature of racialisation. Paternalistic racism usually proceeds by denying the fact of its own existence.

Spoonley employs the term racialisation without taking sufficient account of the fact that, for Miles (op cit.), the concept refers to a process of class domination. Pakehas in New Zealand do not constitute a single class. Racialisation and migrant/common interests and practices are modes of class struggle in advanced capitalist society. In Poulantzian terms racial categorisation has its roots not in the ethnocentric sinfulness of "White people", but in political and economic relations. It is therefore impossible to speak of classes and racialisation on the one hand, and "Pakeha society" and "Pakeha discrimination" on the other.

Racial ideology also needs to be distinguished from culture, since the social categorisation of Polynesians is usually so imbedded in commonsense ways of viewoing the social world that it is assumed to be unquestionable. I am interested in public knowledge and attitudes about Polynesians dictated by the ruling class, but relied upon by all New Zealanders in their daily lives and guiding their institutions.

There is a considerable body of literature on the mediation of ideology and the devices by which "ideologies transform sentiment into significance and so make them socially available" (Geertz, 1964:207). My focus here is upon the content of racist ideology in New Zealand and the class interests it serves. I take culture to be comprised of those implicit, commonsense meanings, rules and values by which a people order their lives with respect to one another and their environment. Rather than a "cultural system" (Geertz, Ibid.) ideology is in some respects the very antithesis of culture. It occurs at those turbulent historical junctures during which the taken-for-granted understandings are called into question by alternative views of the social world.

Ideology is the conscious, reflective articulation -- often incomplete and inconsistent (Spoonley, Op cit.:283) -- of claims about the way things ought to be. It is not synonymous with political rhetoric or factional interests, though it is political in the broader sense of mobilising social action (cf. Geertz, 1973). Ideology always has an axe to grind. It defends and justifies the status quo or champions the new order, depending on whether it is articulated by those in power or those seeking to share power. Ideology presents the 'correct' perspective. The relevance of ideology to individual understanding and practice is not its veracity but the "appropriateness of interpretations and solutions offered" (Cohen, 1974a:81)⁽¹⁾. The success of an ideology depends on how well it addresses and solves the perceived crises of the moment.

Racialisation, like any form of social categorisation, is an ideological process both at the general level and in the more active sense in which I have defined it. Earlier, I identified racialisation as a means of allocating people to bounded groupings on the basis of supposedly natural phenotypical characteristics. Ascribed ethnic identity is a similar process employing largely cultural characteristics. Both influence the form that group self-identity takes. Minority members must respond to racial stereotypes and ethnic labels whether these match self-identity or not.

The ideological construction of derogatory social identities is an exercise in differential power. The economic purpose of racial categorisation is the allocation of persons into certain sectors

(1) Spoonley (Ibid.) wants to avoid suggesting that ideology presents the truth in the sense of the "real". But this is to deprive ideology of an important aspect of its effectiveness. It always claims to represent 'the truth'. Indeed, in Foucault's (1977) notion of the circularity of truth as determined by the ruling class, it is always 'true'.

of the production process. At the political level, racialisation and ethnic labelling have to do with domination by capitalist classes and counter-assertions by the 'social categories' themselves. Capital always moves first to categorise all migrant labour to a specific class position. But there are those who are necessary to maintain control of the exploitation process who are coopted into positions outside this fraction, so that there is no perfect 'overdetermination' between the economic, political and 'ideological' levels. From one society to the next this creates variations in the latitude for manoeuvring for the racialised or ethnically categorised minorities. Members of such groupings are active subjects and not simply the victims of racialisation. From such a perspective, in the latter half of this thesis I discuss Cook Islander social organisation and cultural performances. Here I consider how they are categorised racially and as an 'ethnic community,' and how such ascribed identities are addressed explicitly in various counter-assertions of self-identity.

The conundrum Cook Islanders face is typical of most Polynesians in New Zealand. First, they are lumped together in a racial category and ascribed certain characteristics by the dominant class which they must deal with in a variety of ways. Secondly, ethnic identity and characteristics attributed to Cook Islanders qua Cook Islanders by politicians, the church, the educational establishment and the media are often erroneous. Bourgeois cultural imperialism augments its domination of the political economy and prohibits the intervention of alternative cultural understandings into mainstream institutions. The previous comments of the housing manager are a case in point. Polynesian cultures may add diversity of life style and appeal for the tourist. But cultural diversity is relegated to private ethnic domains. Polynesian values are not allowed to disrupt 'normal' economic and political operations.

Unlike bi-lingual Canada, Air New Zealand captains are not required to greet passengers in both English and Maori, and parliamentary select committees seldom sit as a hui (Maori meeting).

Cook Islanders are structured into racial and ethnic categories regardless of class or fraction membership, though the aim of capital is to relegate all migrants to a single fraction of the working class. The fact that they choose not to ally politically with other Polynesians creates problems for themselves. But their organisation as an ethnic category on the basis of various cultural markers -- that is, when the category acts as a social force -- creates the possibility of questioning the existing order and subverting certain of ruling class ideological constructions not only tacitly through cultural performances (Chapter 6), but through the 'politicisation' of Cook Islands culture itself.

I emphasize that I am speaking of social facts which have real effects when I refer to perceptions, categories, values and stereotypes. Such categories shape and are determined by contemporary social conditions in a dialectical relationship. They do guide human practice.

The Historical Context of Polynesian Racialisation

The global recession of the 1970s and early 80s had a profound effect on New Zealand. Trade and farm production were hard hit, as was labour-intensive manufacturing industry where so many Polynesians were located. The government began lowering tariff protections for selected industries, maintaining import restrictions while encouraging a general 'restructuring' of industry for greater export earnings.

These and related moves in turn had a significant effect on the

plight of the ordinary worker, especially in those sectors directly involved. Encouraged by the State and motivated by economic necessity, industrial capital moved rapidly to divest itself of thousands of labourers. The State assisted through various policies designed to curb labour costs, including intervening directly in wage bargaining to dictate annual pay scale adjustments. Unemployment soared as did the cost of living, and the value of earnings fell further and further behind inflation. The working class became increasingly restive about its worsening position. By the end of the decade, street marches of the unemployed and their supporters were a regular occurrence.

The middle class and 'old' petty bourgeoisie were not exempted from widespread layoffs, company closings, bankruptcies and declining returns on investments. They also made their voices heard at public meetings and street marches, mostly in the name of hard work and patriotism, ironically in opposition to unions and unemployed workers whose plight they in fact shared. To stay in power, the conservative National government played up these divisions. It also moved against excessive profit-taking by capital, expanded welfare spending and doubled its efforts to maintain public order.

The widening separation of interests between capital and labour, and the resultant social conflicts which ensued were the consequence of certain basic contradictions at the time which became increasingly apparent. In restructuring for greater efficiency and profitability, industrial and service capital had to discard labour. Economic well-being became increasingly the provenance of the few. The growing pool of unemployed created mounting welfare costs on the State, while those with work were forced to accept stagnant wages and declining buying power in accompaniment with rising taxes. Taking care of the unemployed and destitute along with costs of

policing violence and disorder resulted not only in rising taxes but massive overseas borrowing. These demands fell heaviest on the 'old' and 'new' petite bourgeoisie, making their objective situation that much closer to the working class which capital feared. The State and capital worked overtime to blame the working class for the plight of "the average bloke"...especially a certain undesirable sector of the working class.

The government used a range of devices to undercut social unrest and nascent class consciousness among disparate groupings. A heavy rhetorical emphasis was placed on New Zealand as a close-knit community whose way of life was threatened by economic forces from without, and enemies from within. In the words of a bank advertisement it was time to roll up the sleeves and pull together. The dole bludgers, shirkers, stirrers, strikers and trendy lefties were to blame for the ills of society.

Since such efforts were only partially successful, it was during this period that Polynesians as a social category were raised to new prominence. Indeed, as others have pointed out, it is at times of greatest economic and political upheaval that racial and class distinctions become the source of and excuse for sharpened social conflict. Polynesians came to play an important role in capital's struggle to maintain the existing order. Poignant new symbolic meanings were added to ascribed racial and ethnic identities.

Until the 1970s, with only minor fluctuations, New Zealand's economy prospered and per capita incomes increased rapidly. There was a shortage of manufacturing and service labour until at least 1973. Rural Maoris and Pacific Islanders were welcomed to help fill the gap. As Polyesian migrants began entering the cities, an imprecise

distinction emerged in the popular consciousness between Maoris and Pacific Islanders. For the most part they were positively evaluated within the paternalistic racism of the time as happy-go-lucky, occasionally hard-working, family-oriented people.

With the onset of economic and political crisis and the influx of large numbers of Pacific migrants, Polynesians were an easily identified pariah group. The separation between Maoris and "Islanders" became more important, the latter being typified as outsiders and "coconuts". Granted the generality of the preceding statements, there were certain fundamental differences in the way in which Maoris and Pacific Islanders were socially constructed and re-evaluated to suit the requirements of embattled capital which I wish to consider in more detail. These constructions have important consequences for the way in which Cook Islanders chose to articulate their ethnic identity and social organisation in New Zealand.

Pacific Islanders as "Overstayers"

Social categorisations arise during specific historical episodes in the struggle for power, in order to differentiate competing interests. I have previously indicated the sorts of basic transformations which occurred in the way Polynesians were typified, and the emergent separation which occurred between 'Maoris' and 'Pacific Islanders' as a consequence of deepening economic crisis and working class unrest.

Graves and Graves (1974) in their study of racial attitudes concluded that

it was as though Pakehas had developed an image based on their experience with Maoris, and projected this image onto each new Polynesian group to arrive (p. 14).

But this seems to have been a fundamental misreading of the situation

as a result of not systematically relating changing attitudes to actual political and economic developments during the post-war period.⁽²⁾ The dominant ideology was to lump all Pacific Islands migrants together: an 'Islander' was an Islander regardless of where he came from. A survey of news media during my own fieldwork revealed similar tendencies, though there were a minority of Pakeha foremen, landlords, church workers and welfare officers with whom Cook Islanders and other Pacific migrants deal regularly who were able and found it necessary to make further distinctions between various ethnic groupings as they perceived them.

Up to the important historical juncture of the mid-1970s, Polynesians managed to rather effectively accommodate to racist paternalism since jobs, housing and other services were relatively plentiful. After this turning-point, however, Polynesian racial categorisation became more problematic as Maoris and Pacific Islanders suddenly found themselves bearing the brunt of economic recession and targeted as a prime cause of social disruption and decline. This more virulent form of racialisation occurred in a number of ways, some of them quite subtle.

The first had to do with a widening categorical separation between Maoris and Pacific Islanders for which the so-called overstayers issue was a significant catalyst. The early 1970s were a period of protest demonstrations, particularly associated with Viet Nam and Maori land rights. The general populace was concerned about violence in the streets, law and order, and the limits of lawful protest. White racism and the problem of racial harmony were

(2) The Graves survey, carried out in the early pre-recession 1970s, found that Polynesians generally were widely evaluated as harmless. They were happy, musical easy-going, friendly, generous, quiet and clannish, though they could also be dirty, uneducated and quick-tempered. (Ibid.:7).

significant issues. There was talk of vigilante groups and some parliamentarians openly urged the Returned Services League to take direct action against the radicals (Hohepa, 1972). Maoris expressed renewed anger over the enforcement of what was termed "majority standards" on the Polynesian minority.

The "Overstayers" and the Maori/Pacific Islander Separation

The focus of public concern on Pacific migrant work-permit overstayers coincided with all these developments against a background of economic recession and political turmoil. Pacific migrants were a visible, useful foreign presence to blame. More than anything, the overstayers issue was a deliberate manoeuvre by capital through its control of government. The conservative National Party successfully portrayed the overstayers issue as a matter of national -- and of course, National -- survival⁽³⁾. They fought and won the 1975 election partly on the same issue. National even went so far as to hire the American animation company of Hanna-Barbera to produce a series of cartoons, one of which showed an "Islander" instigating a violent disturbance. National's success relied on sharpening the categorical distinction between Maoris and Pacific Islander migrants, heightening negative typifications of the latter and linking popular perceptions of economic crisis and social decline to this outsider group. Economic and social ills would be remedied by returning Pacific Islanders to their homelands. After taking power, the National government reduced visitor permits

(3) The Labour government was in office when the first concerted actions began against migrant overstayers in the early 1970s. Dawn raids were carried out from 1972, to arrest and deport Pacific aliens (de Bres and Campbell, 1976:20). But Labour soon directed that a major review of policy be carried out in light of the controversy the Immigration Department's actions aroused.

to one month.

The overstayers controversy, associated as it was with violent crime, unemployment and welfare costs, has been perpetuated as a cause celebre by bourgeois ideology during the prolonged recession. The very image of the 'overstayer' contained several negative qualities -- one who is ignorant of social etiquette, devious in order to avoid detection, and an intentional rule-breaker. The overstayer was explicitly identified as a homonym for all Pacific Islands migrants regardless of citizenship or migration status, thus including Cook Islanders. Pacific Islanders were categorised in contradistinction to Maoris as marginal, temporary aliens who did not understand and were disruptive of the "New Zealand way of life". Maoris for the most part subscribed to the separation, distinguishing themselves as tangata whenua (people of the land) and the manuiri (visitors, outsiders) who were Pacific Islanders. One Maori political activist claimed that Pacific Islanders of the first generation were too concerned about "back home" to have common cause with Maoris. A radical land rights newsletter of the early 1980s claimed that the way into the future lay in bi-culturalism not multiculturalism. All Pacific Islanders would have to "become Maoris". The 'outsiders' were systematically constructed in dominant ideology as such, so as to be more readily denied employment, housing and other services. Though there was strong pressure for Maoris to conform to this construction, there was also a countermovement particularly among Maori elders and culture groups to emphasise their common heritage and continue to maintain reciprocal ties of assistance.

The recent philosophy of 'multiculturalism' emerged as a liberal adaptation of the plural society model, and was quickly utilised

by capital as a more subtle form of racialisation. Multiculturalism became official state policy not because of the weight of humanitarian argument on its side, but because the conjuncture of integrationist policies and economic recession coincided with the rise of Maori radicalism and threatened to generate political consciousness and cooperative action among Polynesians -- perhaps even with other workers. Prime Minister Muldoon himself emphasised in a speech to Maori elders on a marae (meeting ground) in 1981 that they must keep their people suitably occupied, involved in family affairs and off the streets because "the avoidance of a 'brown proletariat' must be avoided at all costs". Thus, racialisation in New Zealand proceeded in a single direction, not by apartheid, but by more subtle means of divide-and-rule.

"One Family" and the Wayward Delinquents

A number of recent writers (Schneider, 1968; Barnett and Silverman, 1979; Sahlins, 1976) have pointed to kinship relations and the image of the family as key symbols in national culture. The "one people" or one family concept has enjoyed prominence in New Zealand as a metaphor of racial harmony since the Treaty of Waitangi a century and a half ago. It has also been an important tool in the maintenance of bourgeois control over the social order. This version of 'New Zealand society' came under serious challenge through a series of annual Waitangi Day protests beginning in the late 1970s.

The treaty was originally signed at a public ceremony in 1840, during which Captain Hobson represented the Crown and a number of Maori chiefs signed for the indigenous population. The Treaty promised peace through British protection, but also guaranteed Maori land rights. Today the annual commemorative ceremonies at the Waitangi marae in Northland are the closest thing to a national day

that New Zealand has. The symbolism of the document and enactment of the speeches and military parade have taken on new significance in recent years. To many they have become a symbol of New Zealand race relations in their contemporary form and a focal point for protests by Maori radicals over the denial of land rights.

More accurately, Waitangi has been used to highlight social injustices and thus has become the symbolic focus of ideological struggle between the bourgeoisie and opposing ideologies. For the former, the treaty ceremonies are an enactment of key social relationships as they should be and the treaty as a charter of authority underwriting the existing social order. For the latter, the annual ritual symbolises broken promises and "Pakeha domination". In recent years a widening division has been evident between Maori elders who host the event and the national council which supports them, and younger Maoris who accuse them of selling out to the Pakeha. Prominent civic leaders emphasise Hobson's statement "we are all one people," while protesters point to racism and inequality. The theme of the family -- of parents and children -- is prominent throughout.

One of the key figures each year is the Governor-general, who represents the Crown and is the symbolic embodiment of the Queen's presence. He himself stands for the rule of law, his office sacrosanct and aloof from the petty squabbles of the body politic. For this reason, there was understandable public indignation when at the 1980 ceremonies he was shoved by protesters outside the marae. The incident was portrayed in the media as an attack on the authority of the Crown and, by implication society itself. Conservative politicians typified the protesters as irrational, violent, senseless louts -- children that needed to be taught a lesson.

The parent and wayward child theme was also explicit in confrontations between Maori elders and radicals in debates before the ceremonies. The same theme recurred in exchanges between the governor-general and protestors during the ceremonies themselves. In the morning Sir Keith Holyoake, an ex-Prime Minister, was formally welcomed onto the marae by Maori elders. He was also, however, subjected to a steady barrage of catcalls and booing from nearby demonstrators. When he rose to speak, the following exchange took place:

Demonstrators: Boycott! Boycott! The treaty is a fraud.
Holyoake is a fraud!

Governor-general: (startled, folds his arms and waits. When there is a lull in the chanting, he shouts..) I think you will get tired before I will.

Demonstrators: (break into singing)

Governor-general: (after the singing) We can talk reasonably....

Demonstrators: The treaty is a fraud!

Governor-general: (waits for another lull) I will explain....
You will not have heard that in my family, my wife and I have some fairly noisy children too!

(Auckland Star, Feb. 6, 1980)

The governor-general quoted Governor Hobson at the first treaty signing later in his speech:

We are all New Zealanders. There are many races living in New Zealand. So we are one family living in this country.

Holyoake said there were sometimes bitter arguments within a family, but it was rare for it to disown one of its members.

The metaphor of the unified, harmonious family has for most of New Zealand's history been an effective political device for maintaining the position of the bourgeoisie and the status quo. The governor-general merely employed an available and widely-accepted

symbol to typify the protesters as noisy children. They were by implication immature, irrational and deserving of strong discipline from the more mature 'parent'. There was a complete denial in such a metaphor that the radical ideology of the young Maoris and their Pakeha supporters in anyway constituted a serious challenge to the existing order, or worthy of being taken seriously. In everyday discourse the metaphor of children is easily generalised to all Polynesians who are considered in need of control and teaching. Most of the qualities attributed to Polynesians in the Graves survey indicated Europeans perceived Polynesians as basically childish. And Maoris and Pacific Islanders expressed anger in the same survey, over what they perceived as "patronising attitudes" and "paternalistic Pakeha behaviour" (Ibid.:12). The parent-child diad has remained an important symbol of differential power in New Zealand.

The symbol of the family and the wayward child also gives the State the legitimation it needs to intervene directly in the 'policing' of Polynesian families (cf. Foucault, 1977). Since they constitute not only an offense to their elders, but a potential threat to the social order, Prime Minister Muldoon, the Minister of Police and others contend publically that if Maori elders cannot control their young, then the authorities will step in and take direct action. Throughout the latter 70s and early 1980s, the State repeatedly intervened in the lives of Maoris and Pacific Islanders to maintain the social order, even though as in the days of the British Empire they would prefer to operate by means of Gordon's 'indirect rule'. State intervention occurred primarily by means of the functions of the 'caring' arm of government bureaucracy (education, health, welfare, housing) though it also included police action.

While New Zealand has for years prided itself in its harmonious race relations, the image of the stern parent and the wayward child so popular in public rhetoric suggests another reality. Racist paternalism circumvents confrontation, prevents catharsis, and renders its victims impotent through a virtual castration by civility. Since it denies the selfhood of the minority member and, by taking for granted his acquiescence to the existing order, undercuts his right to dissent, racist paternalism is in many ways more insidious than overt discrimination. One is reminded of a poem by D.H. Lawrence, part of which reads

We must be nice to them, of course [Polynesians?]
of course, naturally.
But it doesn't really matter what you say to them,
they don't really understand....

just be nice, you know! oh, fairly nice,
not too nice of course, they take advantage
but nice enough, just nice enough
to let them feel they're not quite as nice as they might be.

(1969:117).

As the Graves's aptly observe,

it may well be even more psychologically debilitating
to be treated as an irresponsible child than to be
feared and hated as an enemy (Op cit.:12).

Certainly the relationship of enemies or combatants or opposition not only attributes selfhood to the other, but power to endanger one's own position, self and world. Little wonder that bourgeois ideology in New Zealand has consistently misrepresented racial conflicts and the rise of Black Power movements elsewhere in the world as regressive threats to the civilised order to be avoided at all costs in New Zealand.

The Savage: Violent Crime and the Dehumanisation of the Polynesian

In analysing ideological domination, Barnett and Silverman (1979) draw a distinction between substantialised and contractualised

symbolism. With respect to the individual this permits an ideological separation between a person's performance and his substance. A further separation can then be made between the construction of the ideal individual in the context of egalitarian relations and the less-than-human individual. Racialisation proceeds by the denial of human status to the oppressed minority -- the partial or incomplete person (Ibid.:66).

In New Zealand such constructions are often conveyed by humour, elevating cultural, life style or phenotypical markers to the level of the ludicrous. An example during my fieldwork was a bogus employment application form for Polynesians which received widespread distribution among offices and factories in Auckland (eg. Auckland Star, June 24, 1981). At one stage it was the subject of investigations by the Race Relations Conciliator (Figure 1). While the sheet illustrates the nature of racist stereotypes in New Zealand, the important point is the assumption that Polynesians are legitimate objects of ridicule. But the object of villification also constitutes a 'danger' to society and a personal threat. Such people were referred to in the writings of early missionaries and explorers as "savages" to be conquered and civilised. The symbolism is still relevant today though the term is avoided in dominant ideology. Like the term "nigger" previously in America, it is often used humourously among Polynesians themselves as a back-handed jibe at racist stereotypes. One means of rendering the 'savage' impotent is through joking such as the job form, just as Polynesians often employ joking to subvert the epithets of the Pakeha.

Polynesians are also defined as threats and sub-human through such issues as violent crime, particularly rape. One of the most publicised events during the early 1980s was the rape and murder of a six-year-old European girl in Auckland. It had a profound effect

FIG NO 1

(NOTE: IT IS NOT NECESSARY TO ATTACH A PHOTO AS YOU ALL LOOK ALIKE)

NAME: _____ DATE: _____

ADDRESS: _____ (IF LIVING IN CAR GIVE MAKE, MODEL & REG. NO.)

NAME OF MUVA: _____ NAME OF FAVA (IF KNOWN) _____

MAKE OF CAR: MK II ZEPHYR () MK III ZEPHYR () MK IV ZEPHYR () VALIANT ()

IS THE VEHICLE: (A) UNDER HIRE PURCHASE () OR (B) STOLEN ()

IF UNDER HIRE PURCHASE: WHAT IS AN POSSESSION DATE: _____

MARITAL STATUS: COMMON LAW () SHACKED UP () OR OTHER ()

APPROXIMATE ESTIMATE & SOURCE OF PRESENT INCOME: UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFIT _____

ARMED ROBBERY _____ THEFT _____ ACCIDENT COMPD _____

PLACE OF BIRTH: FREE PUBLIC HOSPITAL () UNDER COCONUT PALM () ZOO ()

WHAT SPORTS DO YOU PLAY? RUGBY LEAGUE () HEAD KICKING () SOFTBALL ()

TICK EQUIPMENT YOU CAN OPERATE: CROW BAR () SPACE INVADERS () KNIFE ()

CAR CONVERTING TOOL () RECORD PLAYER () BIKE CHAIN

BIKE CHAIN ()

TICK FOODS YOU LIKE BEST: JELLIMEAT () FISH & CHIPS () OPOSSUM ()

KENTUCKY FRIED DOD () HAMBURGER () POVI MABBIMA () MEAT PIES ()

TICK ILLNESSES YOU HAVE HAD IN THE PAST YEAR: SCABIES () HEAD LICE ()

VD ()

AT WHAT DISTANCE CAN OTHERS SMELL YOU? 800 METRES () 400 METRES

100 METRES

HOW OFTEN DO YOU SHOWER? YEARLY () MONTHLY () WEEKLY ()

ABILITIES: TRUCK DRIVER () PROCESS WORKER () FREEZING WORKER ()

PUD FIGHT STARTER () CAR BONNET BITTER () RAPIST ()

STOLEN CAR SALESMAN () LABOURER () WHARFIE ()

VENEREAL DISEASE SPREADER ()

HOW MANY CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS HAVE YOU HAD? MORE THAN 30 () 20-30 ()

10-20 ()

IN 50 WORDS OR LESS, LIST YOUR GREATEST DESIRE IN LIFE _____
(OTHER THAN A WHITE GIRL)

on public evaluations of Polynesians due in no small part to its linkage by the media and politicians with the overstayers issue. The child was sexually abused and killed in her own bedroom allegedly by a Polynesian man. There was widespread shock and outrage in the media over the incident. Some European residents in the area wanted to take vigilante action. In response and with political pressure, forty police personnel were assigned to the case. At that particular time Polynesians had already been the subject of more negative stereotyping in conjunction with the developments discussed earlier. The murder and rape became a focal point for public anger and ideological work with reference to this wider context of concern. An important proximate cause was the fact that the suburb itself had experienced significant economic change and an influx of Polynesians in recent years, so they were easily identified as the cause of a whole complex of problems.

The subsequent handling of developments by the police and media was itself a lesson in Polynesian racialisation. A week after the murder a newspaper carried the story of a seven-year-old girl who was reportedly accosted by a Polynesian man near the murder house (New Zealand Herald, August 23, 1980). By innuendo the newspaper gave the impression that either it was the same man or there was a Polynesian crime wave in the area, both of which corresponded with wider perceptions of all Polynesians as rapists. Another paper covering the investigation displayed front-page identikit photos of two Polynesians who "could help police with their inquiries" (Star, August 23, 1980). Presumably they were the culprits (Figure 2).

The images themselves were sinister in appearance, virtual typifications of the feared 'savage'. The article went on to recount a number of sightings of each man in which he (or they) vary in

These men could point police to Alicia's killer

Police today released identikit pictures of two men they hope can lead them to the killer of six-year-old Alicia O'Reilly.

The two men were seen outside the O'Reillys' Canal Rd home in Avondale within hours of Alicia's death a week ago today.

Identikit One (on left) was compiled from a sighting made by a newspaper boy who saw the man walking past the address smoking.

He is described as a Polynesian, aged 20 to 24, 1.88 metres (6ft 2in) tall, medium build, clean shaven and with a large Afro haircut.

He was wearing a khaki military bomber jacket with a dull-coloured long scarf, blue jeans faded at the knees and light brown knee-high boots with pointed toes.

He was carrying a blue duffel bag with a white stripe and was walking towards Rosebank Rd.

Three sightings have been made by one witness of the man in the second identikit.

He is described as a Polynesian, aged 19 or 20, 1.88 metres or 1.90 metres tall, of muscular build with broad shoulders and an Afro haircut. His hair had an orange tint at the back, the witness said.

He was also clean shaven and is believed to have a scar or some mark

on the left side of his neck at collar level. He has thick eyebrows and was wearing blue jeans, a big coat and ankle boots.

In the two other sightings he was wearing a white jersey and brown corduroy trousers; and a red shirt, grey jersey and cream trousers.

The man heading the hunt for Alicia's killer, Detective Inspector Barry Matthews, today appealed to the men represented in the identikits to come forward and explain why they were in the area.

"They could have been there for some lawful purpose and if they told us we could eliminate them from the inquiry," he said.

He also asked for a Polynesian man who allegedly accosted a seven-year-old Avondale girl yesterday to come forward.

"He engaged the girl in conversation about a schoolbook she was carrying. It could well have been an innocent encounter and we wish to see him."

Early today police closed off Canal Rd and stopped people entering and leaving the area in a bid to locate the two men described in the identikits. The operation began at 4.30 a.m. and lasted four hours.

"It could have been a shift worker," said Mr Matthews.



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height, hair colour and style of clothing. How the police were able to specify which sightings among frantic residents had to do with which man, or whether all sightings were of these two, was not explained. On national radio a day later, the inspector heading the investigation was interviewed about the identikit pictures:

Interviewer: There are many, sort of...racial groups within the Pacific Islands, ahm...ah...population here. Have the, ahm...the ah, faces in the identikit been narrowed down to any specific ra...ahm, ra...racial group?

Inspector: No, they haven't. Ahm...well, we may well have to consider the possibility...ahm...But, I think one has to bear in mind the people who have supplied the identikits are...are not...ahm, persons from...island...nations. So therefore, it's very difficult I think for people from, for example New Zealand or other European races to categorise, you know...what race they're looking at.

Furthermore, the distinction between overstayers and the Polynesian population was purposefully glossed so that racial minority members of every ethnic group were identified as part of a circumspect, shadowy grouping. With lack of immediate results in the investigation, Polynesians were construed as delaying proceedings and protecting the criminal. Obstruction of justice was an outrage which both liberals and conservatives could condemn. According to the indignant Star (August 26, 1980), the "Murder hunt had met with a wall of silence" from Polynesians. Pacific Islanders found themselves lumped together as an alien grouping of secretive, clannish and "savage" law-breakers. The rest of the population saw in the murder and subsequent events conformation of entrenched stereotypes which had their force with respect to economic and political crises generally.

Cook Islander Identity and Ethnic Ideology

I have contended previously that there is no fundamental heuristic distinction to be drawn between racialisation and ethnic stereotyping, or racial 'identity' and ethnicity. By this I mean that both are

processes of social categorisation involving interrelated movements of ascription and self-identity, typification and action. To begin with, ethnicity has to do with relations within or between groupings organised on the basis of classification or categories of common origin, ancestry or cultural heritage (Cf. Grillo , 1974: 159). But another fundamental political aspect is the recognition of difference and the maintenance of boundaries between groupings, which incorporates the notion of power relationships (Barth, op cit; Kahn, 1976; Wallman, 1979;Cohen, 1969, 1974a). Ethnicity is constituted in opposition to other identities and interests. Like any configuration of culture, it is taken for granted prior to coming up against other symbol systems. In this sense ethnicity like racialisation is always ideological whether identity is ascribed or chosen.

For Cook Islanders migrating to New Zealand, 'Polynesian' and 'Pacific Islander' identity was of less significance than it was for Europeans. Since the colonial era and even more so since self-government in 1965, they have had some sense of national identity, first as Hervey Islanders and then as Cook Islanders when the northern islands were added. Until major migrations to New Zealand such identities were of general relevance only in dealings with foreign powers or agencies.

Cook Islander self-identity and organisation in New Zealand has tended to focus on village, district and island of origin (Chapter 5). It is more true today than in the late 1950s that

a Cook Islander in Auckland is still primarily a person from a certain island or district....(Hooper, 1961b:168).

The reason why ethnic community identities have been further differentiated in recent years have to do not only with the rapid increase in populations from these various islands, but with wider

structural developments and attendant categorisations which I spelled out earlier.

Cook Islanders have responded to racialisation and ethnic stereotyping by means of at least five different forms of ethnic ideology: (a) ethnic differentiation, (b) community solidarity, (c) identity avoidance, (d) supra-rational practices and (e) cultural performances. With respect to employment and the struggle for adequate accomodation, I have already discussed the sorts of proximate contexts in which Cook Islanders attempt to differentiate themselves from the other Pacific Islands groups to their own advantage. Such presentations are typically addressed to politicians and those in intermediate positions for whom such identities are meaningful in daily practice. Access to public bureaucracy is another context in which identity differentiation as a distinctive 'ethnic community' has been both necessary and effective. Regardless of official policy, in the day-to-day activities of the State welfare bureaucracy for instance, Samoans -- particularly young males -- are the most negatively stereotyped and least likely to obtain adequate assistance. Therefore, Cook Islanders make every effort to distinguish themselves from Samoans.

During ritual and performance oratory, elders often stress such distinctions and elaborate on the positive values of being Cook Islander, particularly when "outsiders" are present as honoured guests (see Chapter 7). Such oratory is also an important vehicle for the rhetorical construction of community solidarity. The shared economic circumstances of the majority of Cook Islands migrants and crude categorisation of 'Islanders' are more than sufficient reasons for them to rely on aspects of similar cultural background to maintain an 'ethnic community'. This community is based on a

reciprocity system which is in turn dependent on continually reiterating island and village identity to motivate people to participate and contribute their time and resources.

Many writers have pointed out that ethnic identities can be flexible, overlapping or be relevant in one context but not in another. Within the broad constraints of bourgeois categorisation this is the case with Cook Islanders. At a civic ceremony or when addressed by a political candidate, participants from various islands may be referred to and understand themselves as 'Cook Islanders'. Certain fund-raising occasions, however, may see different islands competing against one another. At other times and for other purposes, single island populations may subdivide according to village or district identities. A single individual may hold many such identities and memberships at once, each relevant in the same or different contexts. Indeed, it is when these identities overlap with respect to a single project or claim that a Cook Islander experiences a burden of obligations. Because of the increase of migrant population and diversity of identity claims on each person, many consider that such burdens are increasing⁽⁴⁾.

There is a constant tension between broader social settings in which all Cook Islanders are drawn under a single ethnic or racial label, and the persistence of island and village identities. Against this are outside political pressures from church, State and other institutions upon such ethnic communities to look after "their own

(4) I do not mean to deny the mandatory nature of ascribed identities. Since ethnicity occurs within structural determinants, I would prefer to speak of 'improvisational' ethnicity.

people" as a total population. At the economic level are the requirements of industrial capital for manageable migrant workforces based on common origin and kinship links.

Community solidarity goes hand-in-hand with differentiation from other ethnic groupings (social categories). It is a classic illustration of the point that ethnicity is constituted in opposition. Fundamental to the insistence by leaders on the unity of the iti tangata Kuki Irani (the Cook Islands people) is the symbolic separation between 'good' and 'bad' Polynesians. Cook Islanders present themselves as good hard-working, church-going, family people. Since some Cook Islanders clearly do not fit this image, leaders must "hit the people hard" with demand for upright behaviour and community support. Targets of attack are families who are not contributing or participating as much as others, and wayward youth who are said to be forgetting their culture, drifting away and getting into trouble with the authorities. From the perspective of the bourgeoisie, this sort of ethnic 'community' ideology serves well to augment its own mechanisms of social control in the wider social order.

The third response to dominant ideology, foreshadowed in the foregoing discussion, is for Cook Islanders to attempt to evade ethnic identity and racialisation, or at least subvert the force of its negative typifications. If such categorisations cannot be avoided the efforts are made to attain positive markers in the eyes of bourgeois ideology. One way of doing this is by intermarrying with Europeans (see Chapter 5), or by being of mixed parentage. In this way the presence or contact of one's spouse or parents can help offset some of the worst effects of racist discrimination. The apa maori (mixed race) or 'half-caste' seems to enjoy a certain elevated status not only among Cook Islanders, but in New Zealand

society as well⁽⁵⁾. Racial intermarriage is often augmented by another practice, the acquisition of additional qualification such as trade skills or tertiary education. Such positive markers can off-set negative racial or ethnic stereotypes, implying one is an "exception" in adopting more 'progressive' ways. While such a combination of practices can be effective in moderating the effects of racialisation, they can place one under greater demands from the ethnic grouping itself. Many more affluent families simply choose to avoid extensive involvement in community affairs, usually acquiring the stigma of being bad Cook Islanders in the process. By so doing they might mask their ethnic identity, at least in wider contexts, but have greater difficulty escaping racialisation.

A fourth response centres around various weekend social and cultural performances, the latter usually involving visiting groups of dancers and singers from the islands. On such occasions, there are varying amounts of 'traditional' oratory which may contain indirect reference to the wider society and issues concerning the Cook Islands community in New Zealand. More significant is the joking behaviour with honoured guests and the enactment of tacit alternative identities and values within the performance itself. Since I treat these at length in the final chapter I shall not discuss them further here.

(5) Some writers along with many Cook Islanders deny that the 'half-caste' has any real social standing in Cook Islands society, unlike the 'demi' of Tahiti or the 'mixed-blood' of Samoa. Undoubtedly, such egalitarianism is the ideal. But others claim (Framheim, 1979) with a certain weight of evidence and personal experience on their side, that the apa maori have enjoyed a somewhat privileged position from the colonial period to the present. It is also likely that the emergence of political factionalism since 1965 has made such social categories more relevant. Children of European parents were sent to special schools, and in the past as today, have been influential in government, business and in the social circles of the main island.

One other form of response to racialisation and ethnic categorisation from the ruling class has to do with what I term supra-rational beliefs and practices. I refer specifically to the persistence of beliefs in spirits and ghosts, but also to dream interpretation, the knowledge and practice of customary medicine, and ill-fortune and luck. These are typically construed by non-Polynesians as superstitious hold-overs from the past. Some maintain these are vestiges of 'tradition' which Cook Islanders have valiantly managed to cling to, and which should be preserved before they inevitably die out.

Undoubtedly such practices and beliefs partake of pre-Christian culture, and their perpetuation has been a prodigious feat. Cook Islanders are different culturally, and not merely brown Pakehas. I insist however, that there are forces outside the ethnic community itself in contemporary New Zealand society which served to help reproduce such customs. Besides political and economic developments, at the 'ideological' level these factors include the negative aspects of Polynesian categorisation and the dominance of bourgeois institutions in opposition to Cook Islands customs and beliefs. These same factors impinging on the daily lives and social organisation of Cook Islanders give these non-rational, esoteric practices a distinctive character somewhat different even from the islands precisely because they are maintained in the midst of a society which does not recognise their validity or legitimacy.

Because such customs are considered superstitious and the butt of ridicule, they are usually practiced covertly. For this reason, they have the potential for mediating tacit political meanings in opposition to "Papa'a society". Such practices constitute a supplemental store of accrued wisdom, skill and belief which can be brought into

force when the Papa'a way fails. European medicine is a case in point. Many Cook Islanders follow the doctor's advice or take prescriptions as instructed. But when there is some doubt about the cause of illness or a patient's recovery, customary medicine is resorted to in order to supplement modern medical practice.

Cook Islanders share a complex of beliefs regarding vaerua (spirits) and tupapaku (ghosts, malevolent spirits) and other entities who have the power to intervene in the affairs of humans. For Cook Islanders there is no clear boundary between life and death, te ao nei (this world) and te ao ra (the other/next world). These spirit beings are usually related through traceable kinship links to the living, and can cause illness, healing, fortune or misfortune. They can possess an individual, and communicate with others nearby through the voice of an ancestor. They can appear as their own form or as some other creature, offer signs of their presence, or appear in dreams to communicate through words or signs some warning or forecast. They may protect land or haunt a house. Vaerua tend to be friendly, similar to a guardian angel, while tupapaku are capricious and often demonic. The distinction is not entirely clear. They may operate in New Zealand as well as in the islands, though in New Zealand they tend to work through signs and dreams rather than by personal manifestation or 'haunting' certain places.

Almost every serious illness, death or sudden reversal of fortune among Cook Islanders in New Zealand is accompanied by discussion among some family members about the likely causes. Most kopu tangata have one or more members who are noted for their abilities at discerning the workings of the spirits, the causes of misfortune and apportioning blame among the living. Often these are older persons though younger people specially designated or with a unique gift or descent line may play such a role. There are

adepts who have a wide reputation among Cook Islanders as a customary ta'unga (healer, seer; expert in traditional medicine) to whom people come for diagnosis, healing, prescriptions for treatment, dream interpretation and the like (cf. Baddeley, 1978:250ff).

Tupapaku can cause accidents and punish those who are guilty of wrong-doing. More precisely, when an accident has occurred an adept or kinsman of authority may claim that this is the action of a tupapaku, perhaps of a particular ancestor, who has caused suffering to the individual because of some misdeed such as the ill-treatment of a relative. A considerable majority of the incidents of misfortune and dream interpretation (messages, illness, death) recorded during my fieldwork involved accustations by the wife or someone on the wife's side of the kopu tangata against the husband's ill-treatment of his spouse or one of her close relations, ^{less often it was} or a close male relation of the husband against someone on the wife's side.

Such interpretations must be accepted by the parties immediately affected for them to have force. One way of avoiding these accusations is to scoff or profess disbelief in "that old stuff". But if such interpretations, prescriptions or apportionments of blame are accepted often enough over time, the individual may gain considerable prestige as his reputation grows. It is the kind of personal recognition and authority often denied 'unqualified' Cook Islanders in the wider society and only available within the context of the ethnic community of shared esoteric knowledge. Circumstantial confirmation of such a suggestion comes from the fact that few if any church elders, community leaders or supervisors engage in such practices. Since such a status of healer or seer is relatively open, there are often several persons with respect to any one incident who make competing claims and dispute one another's interpretations. Often

these discussions lead to open conflict among relatives over having caused an accident, illness or death. Sometimes the argument is over the name the afflicted person may have been given at birth. Naming at birth is an honour given first to the husband and then the wife. The name can contribute to an individual's health or misfortune. It is usually linked to some important event in the life of the family or is that of an ancestor which is "not allowed to die" (not forgotten). Thus the spirit relationship again is important in the naming, and linked with well-being or disaster. The person giving the name may be blamed for the child's problems, and the name may be changed.

Spirits not only accuse. They can protect. In one instance a single woman and her child lived alone but had a series of boyfriends. Whenever the relationship became serious, the man was taken ill. A brother of the woman [who not doubt pointed out this fact to his sister] felt the men were no good for his sister, and that her grandmother's spirit was intervening for her own good. Spirits can also empower, as in the provision of information about the future or warning of peril. Indeed, supra-rational practices can be a source of power for the individual not only in immediate social contexts but in the metaphysical sense. Many individuals feel they have extra powers to see the real significance of day-to-day happenings, or anticipate something in the future because of their access to this supra-rational realm. A number of people reported the experience of what in European culture is called the transmigration of the soul, where their vaerua left their body and travelled while they slept. During this experience they sometimes did things they would not have dared do or were not capable of in real life. The converse in these empowerment experiences from their everyday experiences in New

Zealand society is striking.

Some Cook Islanders rely on signs or direct communication from spirits when deciding about a job, a trip or marriage. But many also rely on dreams, signs and spirits when betting on the horses or buying a lottery ticket. Belief in luck and betting practices are rightly placed alongside spirits, illness and healing, dream interpretation and ideas of fortune and misfortune as supra-rational ideology in large part reproduced in response to their experience of their structural position and social categorisation in the social order at large. They all constitute different means of coping with adversity, explaining the inexplicable, locating causes and attributing blame, all of which in turn are related to efforts to gain access to status and power denied them in New Zealand society.

In fact games of chance, betting on the horses and the ubiquitous lotteries in which even church elders occasionally indulge all comprise virtually an adjunct segment of the reciprocity system knitting together the ethnic community, since they rely on loans and pay-backs among networks of kin, work-mates and friends. There is a striking similarity in motivation between such practices and the 'revolving credit association' among West Indians in Britain (Philpott, Op cit.). Only the formal organisation and overt calculation of return are missing. Most Cook Islanders simply put aside portions of their weekly earnings to make regular 'investments' in luck. Given the right circumstances, guidance and signs such bets or tickets are bound to pay off sooner or later. Few indeed are the Cook Islanders who do not secretly live for the day when "my ship comes in" and they can afford all the things which they only dream about.

Supra-rational beliefs and practices are not unique to Cook

Islanders. European civilisation has its own so-called superstitions, old-wives tales and activities designed to ward off misfortune and guarantee luck. In general they are means which the uninformed and/or powerless employ to account for the inexplicable in their lives, to accord blame or to gain some access to individual control over their external circumstances. Since early missionisation Cook Islanders have been taught to respect the Papa'a and his culture. In the contemporary setting this ideology takes on new significance of the maintenance of dominance and social control under the notion of respect for the existing order. Many church and community elders are influential in explicitly or inadvertently perpetuating this conception of their position as guest and grateful 'children'. The 1981 fieldwork survey revealed the extent to which Cook Islanders blame themselves or other Cook Islanders for their employment and housing difficulties, and for their children's lack of opportunity for advancement. In a sense the supra-rational beliefs and practices comprise a range of standard improvisations for coping with not only the external social world, but with the problem of blame, anger and guilt over their plight. Gambling, along with the activities of the spirits and the efficaciousness of dreams, are ways of coping with adversity, of managing the unmanageable not through fatalism or direct conflict and political action, which are other alternatives some have taken. Messages from the spirits, and the apportionment of blame privately and publically, are also effective means of bringing pressure to bear on members who may be tempted to withdraw their support for kin and community.

Conclusions

I began this chapter by elaborating upon the distinction between culture and ideology. Culture is a shared set of symbols, signs, myths and codes and their commonsense meanings comprising a group's social world, while ideology is the problem-solving, rhetorical defense of that universe of meaning by discursive or non-discursive means. It is therefore appropriate to speak of culture and ideology as constituting contrasting aspects of the same level of the social formation. In this respect racialisation and the articulation of 'racial' identity and interest, along with ethnic categorisation and ethnicity are ideological processes which can only be fully comprehended with reference to developments at the political and economic levels.

In New Zealand Cook Islanders have been defined within a broader racial category of Polynesians. From the mid-1970s with continuing economic recession, social unrest and political turmoil, two important changes have occurred in that racialisation process which have direct bearing on the class position of Polynesians. One has been the marked alteration of paternalistic racism toward more negative typifications of Polynesians and more explicit discrimination (eg. housing), in direct relation to growing threats to the status quo and the hegemony of the bourgeoisie. The other has been the wider categorical separation in popular consciousness between Maoris and Pacific Islanders, a separation supported by certain sectors of minority communities themselves. The three main ideological metaphors by which such transformations have been accomplished have been the image of the overstayer, the image of the family, and the image of the savage. All three have served in the final analysis to heighten divergent interests within the racial and ethnic categories themselves, which in turn have helped reproduce the class position of the Polynesian fraction and

helped legitimate the existing order and the social control of the State at a time of serious stress. Underlying these moves has been a concern by the ruling class to (a) temper the possibility of alternative cultural values and ideologies challenging operations of "the majority" institutions at the economic and political levels, and (b) undercut the emergence of any consciousness that Polynesians mostly share a common class position whose interests might be articulated via shared racial categorisation/identity.

In the midst of these developments Cook Islanders -- particularly through the role of the 'community elder' -- have sought to differentiate themselves from other ethnic communities thus constituting themselves as a distinct category with its own ideology and organisation as a social force. In this they have received the support particularly of the State and capital by means of relevant intermediaries such as academics, managers, welfare officers and clerics. There has been a concentrated effort in ethnic gatherings and in their interaction with the wider society to present themselves as good citizens, hard workers, church-going people, tight-knit families who look after their youth.

I also discussed a range of contemporary practical improvisations which individual Cook Islanders have invented and shared among one another because of their utilitarian value in dealing with the effects of their class position and racialisation. I paid greatest attention to those widespread supra-rational beliefs and practices in which Cook Islanders engage, such as dream interpretation, customary medicine, illness and the intervention of spirits, luck and misfortune. I suggested that these may borrow from common cultural resources rooted in the islands history, but are reproduced over time in direct relation to their efforts to cope with their structural position in New Zealand society, not as merely a set of superstitions.

Part II

Cook Islanders as a 'Social Force':
Ethnic Organisation and Improvisations

Chapter 5

Cook Islander Social Organisation

Introduction

Cook Islander social organisation in Auckland is not simply a transplanted traditional community, nor an extension of contemporary islands society. Neither is it a neatly-bounded and homogeneous ethnic group per se. The Cook Islands comprise thirteen inhabited islands separated by hundreds of miles of ocean and characterised by a diversity of cultures and social organisation. Most adult Cook Islanders in Auckland were born and raised in the islands, and there is regular visiting back and forth. While such diversity is influential for the social and cultural organisation of Cook Islanders in Auckland, it is by no means wholly determinative of that ordering⁽¹⁾.

In this chapter I pay attention to those institutions which are most important in organising social relations among Cook Islanders, and articulating them into New Zealand society more generally. Apart from those pervasive economic and political institutions which structure Polynesians as such into a particular set of class relations, there are various activities which Cook Islanders engage in regularly as Cook Islanders. Participation in these corporate activities is largely based on shared island of birth. Such identity in turn presupposes certain common experiences, legends, customs and symbols summarised in the often-heard phrase to tatou ipukaria (our heritage). It is through engagement in these organisation that Cook Islanders in New Zealand both enact and re-create their common self-understandings

(1) Curzon (1979) claims that Cook Islanders in Auckland and the islands constitute virtually a single, unified community. Neither he nor Hooper (Op cit.) pay adequate attention to those structuring influences in the wider society which influence Cook Islander's lives and social organisation in Auckland.

and confront the wider social order.

There is an ideal model of the Cook Islands community which various metua (elders) present to outsiders for ideological purposes and which is widely accepted by Cook Islanders and Europeans alike. In this model the Church is at the centre of the community just as it is back in the islands. Enua (island) groups, representing persisting associations of people from the same island, district or village help meet the needs of their home area in the islands and contribute resources and service to the community and church in New Zealand. They do this largely through raising funds by means of various performances and competitive donations. Sports and culture groups of mapu (young adults) receive their charter from and support the activities of the enua. Kopu tangata (bilateral kin groups of two or three generations depth) are incorporated directly into the Church and into their respective enua. Politics is a recent and rather insignificant activity which divides the people and disrupts normally harmonious community relations.

Cook Islander practice differs in substantial ways from this stated ideal. In day-to-day pursuits most Cook Islanders rely upon a fairly limited number of kin and friends comprising a person's kin-based action set (Mayer, 1966). These action sets function in a variety of ways and are constituted within the specific circumstances of daily life and work: job contacts, shared transportation to and from work, baby-sitting assistance, information about a house to rent, help in applying for welfare, temporary loans and gifts of food to augment the family budget, regular drinks at the pub and the emotional support of intimate friendships. Leisure activities such as private parties, Saturday socials and sports are also generative of this limited set of personal relationships.

Regularly, however, an individual's network of personal contacts fails to provide access to resources, services or stores of information located in the society at large. For these he must turn to known Cook Islands community leaders who have contacts and know-how to get results. Furthermore, the formal institutions within the Cook Islands community depend for their very existence on expanding their memberships and redistributing the resources of participants in mutual assistance. They continually intervene in the lives of Cook Islanders, reiterating ethnic identity and shared norms, and levelling claims to participation on the basis of that identity. There are also occasions when powerful sectors of the wider society are perceived to move politically or economically or ideologically against Polynesians or sometimes Cook Islanders. In these instances Cook Islanders have recourse to and are influenced by the ethnic institutions such as the Church and enua to be discussed in this chapter.

The Church as Community Centre and the Institution of Elder-rule

European missionaries aided by Tahitian teachers established the Church as a significant influence in Cook Islands society by the early part of the last century. As Crocombe states,

By the mid-nineteenth century the church was the dominant social force in the Cook Islands and was closely linked with the traditional rank hierarchy. The missionaries drafted all laws and specified most sanctions within the law and without. Church deacons were often ex officio the policemen of the islands. The traditional ariki or high chiefs were reinforced in their position, and their younger brothers or senior under-chiefs appointed judges (1970:7).

In effect the L.M.S. was the government until the latter part of the last century. The Church continued to provide education, health and other services to the islands until well after the Second World War. The Church's influence began to decline during the 1960s and 1970s, with the granting of internal self-government and the

secularisation resulting from an expanding commerce and tourist industry.

Most Cook Islands migrants to New Zealand were raised in a society dominated by institutionalised religion, evangelical moralism and the authoritarianism of church deacons. That is not to suggest that Cook Islanders merely "brought their church with them", or that the Church in its many denominational forms⁽²⁾ is the same as in the islands. The differences which developed in New Zealand had to do firstly with the cooptation by the State of the Church as a welfare institution whereby migrants were settled, cared for, morally instructed and incorporated into the expanding industrial sector of the economy. Secondly, the encouragement of individual enua (island) identities instead of districts or villages or kin groups as the unprecedented basis of formal community organisation. And fostering competitive donations between these groups to raise funds for the work of the Church. Finally, the expansion of elder authority by way of ritual roles, church offices, and mediatory positions with institutions in the wider New Zealand society.

Let me begin with the matter of State cooptation. The Pacific Islanders Church in Auckland was founded during the last world war when Cook Islanders, Niueans and other Pacific Islanders began attending Beresford Congregational Church in the inner city. Each grouping hoped to eventually establish its own church and worship in its customary fashion. The Congregational assembly decided against

(2)By law, only four denominations are permitted to practice in the islands: Cook Islands Congregational Church (L.M.S.), Roman Catholic, Seventh Day Adventist and Mormon. In New Zealand following Presbyterian and Congregational union, a considerable majority of Cook Islanders are members of the Pacific Islanders Presbyterian Church, which has some 25 congregations throughout New Zealand under the aegis of the United Presbyterian Church. Denominations do not actively proselytise one another's members, though there have been attempts to establish a branch of the islands CICC in South Auckland.

such an arrangement, and today these same groups are combined into unified PIPC and Roman Catholic congregations (Nokise, n.d.). They still hold separate services in their own languages each Sunday besides an earlier English-language service all may attend, have their own leaders and their donations are accounted separately in financial records.

After the war, the Labour government under Frazer anticipated difficulties coping with the new migrants. The party had committed itself to progress in the Cook Islands, for instance, and had expressed a concern for Pacific Islanders' welfare in New Zealand. Thus, when Rev. Tariu Teaia was brought to New Zealand and inducted at a ceremony in 1944, the Prime Minister himself sent a letter which was read aloud commending the minister's work among Pacific migrants in Auckland (Nokise, *Ibid.*:35). With migrant numbers increasing, Rev. Challis was called from the Cooks in 1946. In January 1947 he petitioned the government for financial assistance to enable the church to deal with migrant welfare, housing and health problems.

At the same time, the CIPA and Albert Henry were causing the Frazer government considerable trouble in the islands as a result of Communist-advised union militancy (See Gilson, 1980; Hancock, 1979). Ngatire Pama, a founding member of the CIPA in Auckland and still a CIP organiser, recalls that along with their islands activities the association decided to build up membership and expand its influence in Auckland through the coordination of welfare and housing aid.

The Challis petition was just the opportunity the government needed to undercut expanding CIPA influence among the Cook Islands migrants in New Zealand. From 1947 the Department of Island Territories provided direct financial grants to the Pacific Islanders Congregational Church and the Roman Catholic church for welfare and related work.

The CIPA was understandably irate over these moves, but there was little they could do. Tense relations have existed between the Church and Cook Islands political parties ever since.

As part of its community centre function the PICC in Edinburgh Street -- the 'mother church' -- renovated its hall for recreational and social activities. These were especially aimed at young people "to keep them out of trouble". The role of clergy and Elders as interpreters and mediators with hospitals, police, and the courts also emerged during this early period. As a result, the Church became a central meeting place and played an important integrating and social control function with respect to the nascent ethnic community.

Equally valuable as far as the State was concerned was the educational role played by the Church. Through sermons, Sunday School and other programmes members were admonished to be upstanding, law-abiding citizens of New Zealand. There were also classes in English and basic social skills, helping them not only 'adjust' but making them more valuable employees. Clergy met with employers to ease any problems with growing Polynesian workforces.

By the 1970s, migrant numbers were growing too rapidly for the Church to manage adequately. State and local authorities assumed control over various aspects of "the Polynesian problem," as it was now constructed, in the areas of housing, welfare, health and crime prevention. The bureaucratisation and 'professionalisation' of services out of the hands of church amateurs undercut the intermediary role the Church had enjoyed, and permitted the State to intervene directly in controlling the lives of migrants.

Subsequent developments in Church operations had a significant effect on the emergent migrant social organisation in New Zealand. The impetus was the Church's fostering of intra-ethnic competition in public donations. The early missionaries instigated competitive

gifting to increase material and financial support for the work of the Church, though it seems likely they were adapting a customary institution. It became a matter of some honour among competing tapere(sub-districts) within a village congregation to contribute the largest amount.

In Cook Islands custom there is little latitude for the recognition of individual status apart from one's cooperative participation in the activities of his local or kin group. A traditional chiefly title was not automatically inherited by the first-born male of the principal line, but was ritually bestowed by the lineage who evaluated his qualifications and to whom he was accountable. To strive to further one's personal ambitions without assisting others even today is to risk being labelled akateitei (selfish, over-reaching) and being publically humiliated.

In the islands shared residence and kin ties tended to reinforce one another. But in New Zealand, which group to participate in and even one's claim to membership are problematic. Migrants from particular islands are not concentrated in local neighbourhoods. Rather, they are scattered across several predominantly Polynesian areas throughout the metropolis. The result for the Pacific Islander churches as they have been established across the city and country was that their congregations were comprised of migrants living in the vicinity who were from a wide range of villages, districts and islands. Granted the subdivision of these same congregations into ethnic sections (ekalesia) of Samoans, Niueans and others, it was virtually impossible for the Cook Islands ekalesia in each congregation to function like a local church back in the islands. There were too many competing loyalties and diverse identities among members.

Church leaders came to realise that organising programmes,

pastoral visiting, communication and fund-raising on the basis of individual and ngutuare (household) identity was less effective than customary local divisions. The matter became urgent when lagging individual family contributions for the new hall at Edinburgh Street in the early 1970s threatened the entire project. It was decided to challenge people on the basis of enua (island) affiliation, since a few groupings had been functioning as such outside the church for some time. The move brought an enthusiastic response, according to church leaders. The people were used to working together in such groups and responding to the exhortations of their own leaders.

The response may have been enthusiastic, but I suggest that an additional reason was the fact that these new groupings in church organisation provided an acceptable communal context for competition, status striving and distribution of resources not available to the individual on his own. Certainly, there was little that was natural or customary about organising on the basis of island identity. Rather, Church leaders introduced an unprecedented set of intra-ethnic identities which they and island leaders then filled with new meanings and revitalised traditions. As Mitchell (1956) and other writers have observed of African tribal societies, ethnic identity is conditioned and made significant within the specific context of the urban political and economic order itself. Island traditions and legends have thus taken on a new significance in the contemporary islands and New Zealand context.

In this way the Church acted as a catalyst to the beginning or expansion of activities of many of the enua in existence today. Although the churches and enua are mutually supportive, the relationship is not always an easy one. In effect the Church fostered an organisational dynamic which eventually challenged its own authority among Cook Islanders.


This was so because the membership criteria and interests of the Church and enua were different in important respects. Whereas congregations are recruited by denominational affiliation and shared locale in New Zealand, enua are recruited on the basis of kinship relations and shared locale of origin back in the islands. Once sanctioned in local congregational operations, enua identity as an organising principle was bound to incorporate members across congregations and metropolitan neighbourhoods, as in the following diagram (Figure 1). In practice congregational members from different islands tend to act as representatives of their respective enua in worship, life crisis rituals and fund-raising. Major requests for congregational help are conveyed back to the enua and this often results in an accumulation of claims on enua resources which causes friction with the churches.

Historically, the Church developed as the central institution for articulating migrants within the broader social order, as well as the guardian of religious rites and life crisis rituals. It also served to channel resources to migrants and see that these resources were redistributed fairly. The enua became the means of maintaining customary ties through channeling resources back to the natal homeland by charitable projects and visiting, fund-raising tere (travelling) parties. To these ends the enua borrowed some of the same fund-raising techniques of the Church while adding a few refinements of their own.

The main drawback to organising on the basis of common island origin in New Zealand was the diversity of available identities and potential for conflicts of interests among individuals. A person may be from a particular island, but he is also from a village (oire), and some of the larger islands were also divided into districts and sub-districts. Then there was the problem of offspring of parents from

FIG. NO.1

THE DYNAMICS OF CHURCH-ENUA RELATIONS



different villages or islands in a culture following the principle of bilateral descent. All of these identities became detached from their residential/participatory criteria when migrants moved to New Zealand and instead became much more than in the islands a range of memberships ascribed on the individual by competing groups and conversely optionally open to the individual to select.

The dramatic upsurge of migrants in New Zealand in the 1970s meant that there were more Cook Islanders eager to establish contacts with kin and friends from the same locale in the islands, and insure various rights back in the islands by sending back assistance. While membership in the enua grew rapidly, it was inevitable that conflicts over what to do with funds and over the legitimacy of leaders should surface. Besides the emergence of new factions, old oppositions from the islands gained sufficient supporters to break away and form their own enua, for instance based on village identity.

This organisational competition for members and resources in turn casts light on a number of recent developments in Cook Islands society in New Zealand. One has been the emergence of more elaborate life crisis rituals and family ceremonials than in the islands. These became the basis for claims upon the redistribution network, particularly in view of steadily worsening economic conditions. When combined with requests for church donations and contributions to enua projects, they generated widespread complaints about the heavy obligations individuals were having to bear. Since people from various islands and districts have been intermarrying for generations, older members of the various enua who know their genealogical records can trace most living Cook Islanders or at least claim to know their backgrounds. It is not unusual for an individual to

receive many such identity claims which require his help, and which he must weigh against his own interests and resources.

Another development has been the acrimonious debate over tere parties travelling back and forth between New Zealand and the islands to visit and raise funds. The argument is the extent to which these groups drain financial resources from the islands or from the migrant community in New Zealand, and whether one is having to contribute an inequitable amount to the other. Also there is the divergence of purposes between the Church and enua in New Zealand, manifesting itself in the concern by the Church that incessant demands on the pocketbooks of parishoners for various enua projects to help their own home area or visiting tere will jeopardise the work of the Church in New Zealand.

Elder-rule

The emergence of the Church in New Zealand as the dominant institution in Cook Islands social organisation caused important changes in the role of the metua (community elder). To begin with, clergy and church tiakono (deacons; Presbyterian "Elder") enjoyed an increased status because of the Church's community centre role, settling and linking migrants into the wider social order. Those who arrived earlier and helped others locate housing and jobs gained a reputation as someone to turn to, and were likely to be asked to serve as spokesperson for a group or as a church tiakono.

Subsequent events in New Zealand undermined the initial pre-eminence of church officers, not the least of which was the upsurge of migrant numbers in the 1970s, who dispersed across large areas of the city out of touch with the Church. Government agencies became more important in the lives of more and more Cook Islanders. The

encouragement of intra-ethnic competition in the Church and the establishment and subsequent fragmentation of the enua associations further weakened the position of Church elders. To overcome the decline in their authority some Church tiakono concentrated their religious and welfare activities on constituencies of people from their own island, combining the roles of church Elder and enua leader.

With the influx of Polynesian migrants in the 1970s, the welfare state defined certain problem populations which were "at risk" and thereby in need of special attention. To facilitate the provision of services, it was necessary to identify and give greater formal administration responsibility to certain "community leaders". By acting as contact points and spokespersons for other Cook Islanders, serving as welfare volunteers and court interpreters, and sitting on various boards and committees to advise the State these leaders were able to further extend their claim to authority beyond purely church functions.

In Cook Islands culture church positions should be filled by people who have a proven record of service to the Church, a good command of the Bible and known as a faithful Christian. Descent status, proximity to a title, party politics, occupation and income, or the island a person comes from should not be taken into consideration. This perspective seems to have been superceded by recent developments in the institution of elder-rule, as elders seek to legitimate their authority any way they can.

Many now contend that the various roles community elders have as tiakono, their rank in kopu tangata (lineages), their position as enua leaders, proximity to a traditional tao'anga (title) or other customary position are mutually reinforcing. They maintain that the grounding of these roles in custom serves to explain elders'

practically demonstrated skills and public mana (authority, prestige). Such effective practices in turn legitimate their claims to these very roles and the authority they bring (3).

The specific consequence of these transformations in the institutional form of leadership was the emergence of a fundamental contradiction in ethnic polity. The very practice of legitimating their power under changing circumstances, augmented by influences such as the bureaucratic needs of the welfare State, has required that they escalate the frequency of rites and the amount of individual donations that invariably follow. This has led to increased financial burdens particularly on the 25% or so who are the core of active members of the 'ethnic community'. To act as responsible leaders and to speak out against what one elder called the 'senseless competition' for ceremonial status and financial assistance would be to call into question the very basis of their own leadership authority.

The Enea Associations as the Focus of Ethnic Identity and Organisation

Enea (island) associations in Auckland are groupings of Cook Islanders who meet together on the basis of common natal village, district or island. Together they organise social and recreational functions, and collectively provide financial assistance to charitable projects in New Zealand and back in the islands. The enea are the primary focus of ethnic organisation and identity among Cook Islanders in New Zealand.

(3) In his study Nokise (Op cit.:131) points to the importance of 'external social factors' like traditional rank in the selection of church Elders. As a leading orometua (clergyman) said, all orometua and Elders have some customary status. Most are mata'iapos (sub-lineage head) though some like himself are rangatira (younger brothers of ariki) and he himself is in line for the title of a ngati (major lineage) and comes from a long line of clergymen. For this reason, his words carry extra weight. Conversely, people point to his traditional statuses as an explanation for why he is a forceful speaker and good minister.

Some groups have a hundred or more members and a constitution, elected officers and a bank account. Others gather only when there is the necessity, as when hosting a visiting tere-party or raising funds for some worthy project. Some enua exist in name only --a few stalwarts may simply attend important community-wide events to uphold the name of the group and the reputation of the locale back in the islands. Like migrant clubs and associations in other societies, the enua maintain links with their home islands and regularly send back funds for civic and church purposes. Some associations arrange regular social and recreational activities in rented halls. Members enjoy the chance to exchange news and gossip, speak their own language and generally 'be themselves' in private.

The enua are not specifically organised to provide finances, information, contacts or other forms of assistance to members or new migrants from the islands. The Church and kinship networks have seen to most of those needs, along with the government welfare agencies. Yet their involvement in the enua does help members establish relationships which they may call upon for various kinds of assistance. The enua usually avoid raising funds expressly for themselves or individual members. Enua activities are always said to be on behalf of some other cause or institution usually back in the islands. As Skeldon (1976) has observed of regional clubs and migrant associations in Peru, some may specifically aim to help the migrant integrate into the urban milieu and provide assistance back to the home region. But others have little to do with the home region, and seem more to offer meeting and recreational facilities than welfare services.

I suggest that the difference in large part stems from the initial

class of the migrants, and how they are structured ideologically and economically into the wider society. Membership in an enua does indeed give the migrant the sort of contacts and material support his economic position makes necessary, but cannot publically be construed as a threat to bourgeois domination or racialisation. To avoid becoming a political challenge to the ruling class or conflicting directly with the Church's role, the enua organise themselves like voluntary service organisations in Western society. By operating under the umbrella image of helping others, either back in the islands or assisting the Church in New Zealand, they can in effect help themselves. They can organise regular recreatioal activities, lotteries, social dances on weekends, trips, queen pageants, food sales, host tere parties from the islands, have their own officers and bank account, make demands on government cultural funds and enjoy participating in their customary rites and cultural performances -- all in the name of respectability and selfless service to others. Enua can widen their calls for migrants to join in, insisting on their obligation to do so as a sign of their aro'a (love) for 'the people', not out of loyalty to the enua itself. Thus their constituencies and resource base are continually expanding. Similarly, individual members are able to act out the cultural ideal of self-giving while accruing social standing and contacts valuable to his personal interests outside the club.

Like the Church and ritual-performance complex, enua activities call upon and thus serve to reproduce a more inclusive reciprocity system. This system is in actuality a contextual re-ordering of complex personal networks of kin, friends and outsider contacts by way of requests for assistance or claims of obligation to repay a kaio'u (debt). In such a system Cook Islanders say they give because

it is "love in action," because uncalculating, selfless giving of one's resources is the Cook Islands way. Ideally, everyone gives what they can and no one counts the cost or personal rewards. Cook Islanders also say the community of mutual assistance is "our insurance policy". One attends ceremonies, helps others not to build up a personal reputation but so that "when it is your turn, they will help you". When one has a family crisis, a ritual requirement or in other ways has a claim on the reciprocity system, then goods, funds, food and help are redistributed according to one's need. Such things are never planned or calculated, at least not overtly. But Cook Islanders -- especially the more active members who make the biggest contributions -- do plan, calculate and grumble about those who are not helping enough.

These expressions of egalitarian self-help by the enua are directed as much at European society as to Cook Islanders themselves. Unlike Pakistanis in England, Blacks in Chicago, or Italians in Adelaide, enua associations have chosen not to organise in such a manner that their combined financial resources or sheer numbers challenge ruling class economic or political power. Nor have they formally organised to secure employment, better accommodation, credit or access to the state bureaucracy. Nor have they structured themselves as an easily-identified 'interest group' to press for political power on the basis of ethnic identity (cf. Cohen, 1974a,b). It would not only be counter-productive but "improper" to do so in New Zealand, given their relatively few numbers and to date moderately successful improvisations in the face of paternalistic racialisation. Formal organisation of ethnic identity, diversity and interests are encouraged only at the cultural level (eg. schools, cultural performances, arts and crafts). So, in the matter of internal polity and mutual

financial assistance, Cook Islanders organise informally by means of cultural performances and other forms of ethnic practice for 'charitable' purposes, not economic or political power in the wider society. Aitutaki Enuā and Pukapuka are illustrative of the variety of funding procedures and organisational configurations among the enuā in Auckland.

Aitutaki Enuā

Aitutaki Enuā is one of the most widely-known island associations in Auckland. It has some 100-150 active members with an equal number who contribute financially and attend special functions. Chairman Ratu Daniela is a PIPC tiakono and supervisor at a ship refitting firm. The secretary, John Tepaki, is the pu'apii (cultural director) and a bus driver. Treasurer Noo Paniōra is also a tiakono and works in the accounts section of a large timber firm. The association is not legally incorporated nor does it have a constitution, but it does have a bank account.

Aitutaki Enuā's activities are divided between fund-raising, hosting visiting groups and individuals, and presenting cultural performances for Cook Islanders and general audience. The group meets weekly at an inner city community hall. Meetings are a family occasion, attended by babies and children, young adults, parents and elderly persons. Recreational activities take place early in the evening. When the principal leaders arrive, there is a prayer and announcements. The remainder of the evening is taken up in rehearsals for coming performances. The evening concludes with announcements and a prayer.

The group is often called upon to represent the Cook Islands people at festivals and civic functions in New Zealand. Group leaders feel that the emphasis on public performance of their cultural heritage keeps the group strong, reminding members of their common

identity, attracts youth who might otherwise be tempted to get into trouble, and brings regular government funding. Most enua are similarly concerned to maintain island cohesiveness and cultural identity in New Zealand, and incorporate locally-born children into the activities of the organisation so they are not 'lost'.

Like most enua associations, Aitutaki Enea relies primarily upon members for financial support. For specific projects, each ngutuare (household) is levied a set amount which they must try to contribute. The suggested contribution is based on the size of the project, not the ability of the ngutuare to pay. The enua often augments members' donations with funds from its bank account when there is a special need or an important occasion. For a visiting tere-party the quota might be \$10-20 per household. However, for the renovation of the main Cook Islands Congregational Church on Aitutaki in the late 1970s, each household was asked to contribute \$50. When this proved insufficient, each male was asked to give an additional \$20 and each adult woman \$10 to achieve their target.

Some thirty households make up the core which contributes most funds to such projects. Additional activities may be introduced by the leadership committee as less painful ways of tapping the resources of members. Regular 'bring and buy' sales of islands food raise between \$400-600 a time, and recently a weekly lottery has been instituted. In 1980 alone Aitutaki Enea hosted six visiting groups, each of which received a feast and several hundred dollars in average donations to cover trip expenses or projects in the islands. This cost core families around \$200 each -- half in cash and half in food. The association also gave several hundred dollars from its bank account to the opening of a church hall in Wellington, and the

group also travelled down to perform for free on buses they themselves hired. They donated \$1000 the same year to a school in Aitutaki. When the school later sent a tere-party to New Zealand to raise further funds, Aitutaki Enea played host, gave them a feast and donated a further \$1000. The enea contributed a further \$500 to the building fund for the new church hall at the Mangere PIPC in South Auckland.

Members are also expected to give of their services and contribute when visitors are on hand. The demands on members' financial resources can be considerable. At a conservative estimate the more active families give in excess of \$500 and perhaps closer to \$1000 a year if one includes donations to church and kopu tangata needs. Based on earlier estimates of incomes, this would constitute a true tithe (ten percent) or more of their annual earnings, which for a factory worker is a considerable sacrifice.

A second source of enea income comes from the cultural performances the group engages in around the country. They have gained a reputation from their many civic appearances, and can command a fee of several hundred dollars for appearing at conventions and promotions. When performing at Cook Islands functions, the fee is usually waived. On occasions such as cultural competitions, audience members show their appreciation for the group's skill by making contributions in a pot or to individual performers. These are turned over to the organisers of the event, and sometimes the performing group receives a return donation. Grants from various government and private agencies are a third source of funding. The group's main benefactor in recent years has been the Maori and Pacific Islands Arts Council, which gave \$700 in 1977, and \$2000 in the next two years toward the enea's cultural activities.

Pukapuka Enu

The Pukapukan population in Auckland comes from a distant northern atoll with a complex, interlocking social organisation (cf. Hecht, 1977). They also have a reputation in Auckland as a close-knit community, which at least in part is a holdover from the ill-treatment they have received back in the islands as stereotypical 'outer-islanders'. Leaders in Auckland speak of themselves as Taokotai Enu Pukapuka -- the united Pukapukan people. Pukapukans have been somewhat less than that over the years.

The social order of the enua has undergone a number of significant alterations since the early years when migrants adopted a model based on European voluntary associations. In 1971 it was decided to re-organise on the basis of the three suburbs in which most members lived at the time: Mt. Eden, Kingsland and Onehunga in the central metropolis. These local residential units took over responsibility for fundraising, sports and cultural competitions. Although the model attempted to follow the principle of three-village organisation back in the atoll, the suburbs in fact contained Pukapukans from all three atoll villages. The model failed to take account of the long-term loyalties and common interests that existed as a result of having lived and worked together and shared land rights and local heritage. The new arrangement was no more successful in overcoming the rifts between people or boosting lagging participation than the previous model.

As with other enua associations, the Edinburgh Street PIPC hall project proved to be a watershed. In response to the challenge from other enua, Pukapukan leaders again decided to re-organise, this time on the basis of each individual's village of origin back on the atoll. The tendency toward virilocal marriage was continued.

In the case of those born in New Zealand, individuals joined the village of their parents (cf. Beaglehole, 1948; Beckett, 1964; Hech, op cit.). In fact community elders succeeded in coalescing petty divisions and interests already dividing the community around more customary identities, leaders and loyalties. People knew where they "belonged" regarding memberships on the home atoll. As a result, meeting attendance rose, assistance with funding increased and sports and culture competitions between the villages took on a new spirit. The organisation permitted people to be socially and geographically dispersed in Auckland while knowing just which village banner to gather under when Pukapuka enua met.

In Auckland for village-based activities such as sporting and cultural competitions, hosting tere-parties and fund-raising, the household usually supports the village of the father. Since people do not actually reside together in the village and depend on one another for help in food production and the like, or are not buried by village plot as in the islands, village identity can be problematic particularly with respect to the second generation. In practice, there is a tendency for the wife to ally with the village of her father, while the children go with the father. To further complicate matters, there is the issue of those born and raised in New Zealand. Parents are often from different villages. In this instance the practice is for the children to participate with and support the village of the father. Further flexibility is gained through the practice of naming. The father usually has the prerogative of naming the first child, and then the wife or someone on her tua (side). In New Zealand even more than in the islands there has been a tendency to make more of the fact that certain names are associated with particular villages. For instance, one of the

community leaders, Ataua Ropati's name is said to be typical of Roto village. By giving a child the name of an ancestor that is associated with a different village from the father even though in the father's descent line, it is possible for the family to "send" the child to support and act with another village. In the long run the current basis of Pukapukan organisation seems destined to encounter difficulties both due to structural rationale and the increasing numbers of teenagers who the elders say are dropping out of enua involvement.

The Enu Hall Controversy

Having considered different perspectives on enua organisation, it is interesting to consider their overall impact on Cook Islander social organisation and the 'political' significance of Aitutaki Enu's recent decision to build a hall of their own in Auckland in addition to continuing to fund islands projects.

There is continuous, good-natured debate among enua and oire (village) groups over who gives the most and makes the greatest effort in raising funds for projects and hosting visiting tere-parties. There is considerable status at stake in being known as the group that has contributed the most money. These fund-raising activities within the groups and public occasions of competitive donations are a continuing process which interrelates the enua in New Zealand with one another, with churches and with locales back in the islands. The entire organisation of assistance is one not of direct exchange, but of negotiating about the worthiness of a project, gaining assent that it is a priority on the resources of the community and that obligations to contribute do exist. These events also, of course, are opportunities by which one group may repay a kaio'u (debt) with

another group. Thus, with varying degrees of participation, the entire network of Cook Islanders up and down the country provides food, gifts and finances to the tere-party or other projects. The process occurs several times a year and is rather like the national telethon in New Zealand which raises millions of dollars for charity.

The structure of reciprocity among Cook Islanders in Auckland, while grounded in tradition, comprises a distinctive ordering of their social relations emergent in the specific historical context of contemporary New Zealand society. This systematic expansion of multiplex individual memberships, group status competition, and continuing claims of indebtedness and repayment together refract the underlying insecurity of Cook Islanders' position in New Zealand.

Not all migrants send remittance and group donations back to their homeland. Few of those around the world that do, organise the collection and distribution of their resources in such a complicated manner as Cook Islanders. Underlying such practices and the mutual expectations which sustain them is the economic plight of the islands, which necessitates channelling funds back. Such conditions are a consequence of the perpetuation of dependency already discussed, but also the outcome of material circumstances of Cook Islanders in New Zealand.

Most adult Cook Islanders immigrated to New Zealand within the past fifteen years, and most have been back to visit the islands at least once. The first generation still consider themselves essentially Cook Islanders and members of islands society as well as citizens of New Zealand. This is not quite the same thing as being a "sojourner" (Connell, 1980). While many Cook Islanders would like to return to the islands, few have actually gone back to stay.

Most consider that they never really left in the sense of severing personal ties, kin-group obligations and land and voting rights. There is widespread interest in maintaining close contact and practical involvement in the affairs of one's home district. Participation in one's kin-group and village is essential to maintaining one's rights. Enthusiastic support for the village by way of one's enua involvement in New Zealand, like individual remittances and return visits, is a means of securing these rights for oneself and one's heirs.

Such practices are not merely the result of individual preference or ethnic idiosyncracies. Cook Islanders' continuing position of 'structural marginality' (Kapferer, 1978) reproduces such contacts over time, as I have already argued. The continuing stream of collective and individual contributions and visiting back and forth serve as an investment in relationships and groups upon whom the individual may rely in future.

In 1982 Aitutaki Enea announced that it was launching a five-year, \$250,000 campaign to build their own community hall in Auckland. Many Cook Islanders were enthusiastic about the idea, but many including several community elders expressed concern and anger. The main accusation was that the proposed hall would "divide the people". Migrant halls in history (eg. the Irish, Poles and Italians in America) have been important institutions for unifying and maintaining the identity of these initially powerless minorities. But they soon became important bases for unity and political organisation as well. Aitutaki Enea's move seemed to strengthen the solidarity of their own people at the expense of the larger 'ethnic community'.

The more urgent concern was the disintegration of the reciprocity system itself, and with it the basis of elder authority. Aitutaki

Enua might not be able to meet all its other obligations to the rest of the community, would keep its resources more and more to itself and other groups would be tempted to follow suit. Fragmentation into separate, self-interested and mutually exclusive island associations would result. Some Church leaders were worried that the move would further jeopardise their community centre function among Cook Islanders. Moreover, they feared the weakening of their crucial integrating role between competing groups under the umbrella of the Church. The Cook Island government was concerned as well about the potential decline in the flow of remittances and collective donations back to the islands.

In light of the earlier discussion about Latin American migrant clubs, it would appear that Aitutaki Enua had become sufficiently affluent to forego contributions to their home region. Since they had attained a degree of economic stability, they had apparently no need to effusively honour old obligations or maintain a base "back home" in lieu of a return. Their primary interest was now with their own advancement and recreational and cultural pursuits in New Zealand.

Such an argument would be in error because it fails to take account of the specific circumstances of Cook Islanders in the political economy of New Zealand. The position of most Cook Islanders as a part of the Polynesians fraction of the working class has not altered since they began migrating. Aitutakians are certainly nor more affluent or mobile than their compatriots. If anything the continuing economic depression has further locked Cook Islanders into their structural position, kept wages low and separated out Polynesian youth as a major component of the unemployed. These conditions and the political/ideological pressures discussed in the

previous chapter underly the building of the hall.

The policies and programmes of the welfare state must also be taken into account. While conservative politicians of the National party attacked Polynesian communities for losing control of their youth, the government also maintained a policy of encouraging ethnic diversity in cultural activities. Generous funding and political support were forthcoming to all such groupings. One of the most successful developments has been the Maori urban marae movement. As a result of social problems encountered by increasing number of rural Maoris as they moved to the city, government assistance was made available to establish a number of such maraes in larger towns and cities as bases for community meetings, cultural activities and teaching, and as residences for elders. The new maraes have been responsible for a resurgence of Maori pride in their heritage and language, of tribal identity as well as the focus for political debate between conservative and radical Maoris.

These developments have not gone unnoticed by Cook Islands leaders. Groups like Aitutaki Enea have developed close ties and even reciprocal obligations to assist with a number of groups of "our Maori cousins". Aitutaki Enea members look forward to their hall not only as a facility for meetings and recreation, but as a focus for the retention of cultural heritage and group unity. Ratu Danieal refers to the hall as "our marae". There is also the possibility that political consciousness based on re-evaluated cultural heritage set in a contemporary New Zealand context will emerge as young people are encouraged to seek a greater role in the enea. Given the recent developments among Maori people, at least the potential for such a transformation is there.

Sports Clubs: Mapu-Elder Conflict and 'Secular Ethnicity'

Throughout recent Cook Island history, the social position of mapu (young adults) and their relation to elder and chiefly authority has been a recurrent concern (4). The question of the status and responsibility of the rising generation always comes to the fore during times of social change. At issue during such crises are such fundamental matters as the continuation of the social order or group itself, existing polity arrangements within that order and the authority of the older generation and those who aspire to power.

Organised recreational activities have been an important means by which elders in the islands and in New Zealand, especially through the Church, have dealt with such problems. Accompanying the decline in the popularity of Church recreational activities and the emergence of enua were the rise of semi-autonomous sports clubs. Sports groups have become the locus of contention over the relevance of custom and ethnic identity in the face of competing European values. But above all was the question of the authority of the Church and elders.

From available accounts (Hooper, Op cit.; Nokise, Op cit.) sports clubs in New Zealand are a fairly recent development, though they have been in existence in the islands for years. Most of the early sports groups in New Zealand began in conjunction with enua. Today their activities tend to take place outside the aegis of both Church and enua. Some clubs involve most of the members of a particular enua, while in others the memberships are almost completely separate. Like the enua associations, some are ad hoc groups

while others are formal organisations with officers, dues, a bank (4) Examples include the 19th century anti-missionary Rechabite movement, the emigration of mapu on whaling ships without chiefly permission, and the decline of church influence due to lack of youth support in recent years in the islands (Gilson, 1980).

account and regular fund-raising activities along with their sporting engagements. Most function as a kind of workers club, even though very few have a clubhouse. People drop in to a member's house to talk, have a meeting, or for drinking.

Sporting clubs at least in principle should be responsive to the wishes of their enua. They usually ask the enua for permission to use the name of the island in their club name, which symbolically recognises the authority of enua leaders and obligates them to help in fund-raising and hosting visiting tere-parties. Privately, many club members cannot be bothered with Church or enua involvement. They openly disparage the constant moralising of the Church and the intervention of elders in their affairs. Sports clubs are vehicles of mapu autonomy from elder-rule, a group in which they may engage in their own pursuits and interests while retaining their identity as Cook Islanders.

The more established clubs field both rugby and netball teams in the regular Auckland metropolitan leagues. Each year many of these same clubs host visiting tere-parties from the islands, and most try at some point to plan a trip to the islands to play teams there. There is great rivalry when teams from New Zealand arrive. Local sides take great pride in trying to thrash the visitors soundly to show their superior skills and strength.

The Atiu Rugby team or 'Rusty Atiuans' as they prefer to be called, is one of the earlier established clubs. They are atypical only in their consistent winning record in the tough University League. Some members attribute their success, with a twinkle in the eye, to their illustrious heritage in the islands as great warriors. To use the name 'Atiu,' the club originally had to gain permission of the elders of the Enea Manua (Atiu) association. At the time of my fieldwork, relations between the elders and club members were not

particularly cordial. From the perspective of the elders, young people did not participate enough in church, enua and other Cook Islands activities. The combined rugby and netball teams had in fact raised funds toward enua projects such as a \$1000 donation to the Atiu hostel in Rarotonga from the proceeds of a dance they held. The sports club also sent a representative occasionally to enua meetings. Nonetheless, the elders thought the efforts of the young men and women rather lacklustre. For their part, the mapu felt there was too much preaching, nagging and interference in their affairs.

During the season, the rugby team met once a month for business matter, usually to plan social dances and fundraising. Tuesdays and Thursdays were their regular practice nights at an inner city primary school grounds. Before each session, the chaplain of the club -- an older man with close association with the the enua -- said a prayer. After practice, there were announcements by the president and another prayer to close. Most Cook Islander group activities begin and end with a prayer. Then everyone retired to the team's usual pub. The team played games almost every weekend of the winter season. At the end of the year, they held a feast and prize-giving combined with the netball women. The president and secretary of Enea Manu were honoured guests and helped present the awards. After the formalities were over, the elders were politely nudged on their way. When they had gone, the young people pushed back the tables, brought in a band and liquor and danced and drank until the small hours of the next day.

One of the more contentious issues between enua elders and sports club leaders is the practice of playing sport on the Sabbath. For European and most Maori sporting enthusiasts, this is not a matter

of great concern. But Cook Islands elders make it a central bone of contention with respect to their authority, and their stewardship of Cook Islands traditions in New Zealand. Many enua leaders are Church Elders as well. The Church maintains a close ideological link between faith, upright moral behaviour and being a good Cook Islander. Frivolous activities on the Sabbath are against biblical injunctions. Enforcing the Sabbath in the islands was always the task of Church tiakono. Playing sport on the Sabbath in New Zealand is thus not only a sign of disobedience to the Church and Elders, but a denial of one's heritage, Cook Island identity and one's community responsibility.

To illustrate, I was present at a feast sponsored by the newly-formed Aitutaki Rugby Club late in 1980. A number of enua and church leaders were present to formally dedicate the club's uniforms, and lend their support to the club. Also present were the coaches and manager of the European club which the Aitutaki team had joined. On this occasion, the leader of Aitutaki Enua took the opportunity to address the members about playing sport on the Sabbath. His message was quite obviously directed at the club's Papa'a administrators and coaches as well as the young men. The relevant portion of his speech, delivered in English, went as follows:

There is one point that I want to stress, and I hope that the boys and other people belonging to the Aitutaki community at large will establish this firmly in their minds. One: sporting activities on Sunday is not our way of behaviour...Not my way! I didn't establish this. It relates back to our island which we have drank a toast to: te Ingoa o te Enua [the name of the island -- the speaker leaves the phrase untranslated, apparently for effect].

Perhaps some of us will think it's not important. But to us... to the elders, to the more mature people, it is a reality. And its importance is so great that we cannot divert or even substitute for its significance amongst us.

Play netball or football or whatever on Sunday by all means! I have nothing against that whatever. But the question will come to

each one of us individually. Here is the question, the crucial question. If you know your parents or even your forefathers have been playing sporting activities on Sunday, my answer today is 'yes, go ahead! Play football, netball, tennis or whatever on Sunday.' If you don't know they have been practicing this in the past, then the answer is 'no'.

Because we have a pride to look after. And that pride will always be with us! And it will have a reflection on us if we cannot maintain it in the New Zealand environment or the New Zealand society today. And I hope that the boys and girls will remember this point which is an important point: our identity in the New Zealand community at large.

I'm not saying you can't play football on Sunday as an individual. But I'm saying you cannot play football or netball or any other game on Sunday as an Aitutaki representative. The boys and girls are happy playing their sporting events. From this day, tomorrow and even forever.

* * *

The dilemma of this elder is to lay down the law with force to the young people, or at least be seen to do so. At the same time, aware of the tenuous relations between the elders and many youth, uncertain of their attitude toward their cultural heritage, he must prevaricate and allow them leeway. He must also give them support if they choose to honour the Sabbath. The rules about the Sabbath are not his but long-established custom; not abstract custom but the practices of their parents and ancestors whose name he knows they would not openly denigrate. Thus the diplomatic compromise is struck: custom, the Church and elder authority are rendered legitimate publically and the individuals may still play on the Sabbath as long as the name of the enua is not used. In the end members could still engage in their sporting activities as they likely would have regardless of what the elders had said.

Politics and Voluntary Associations

Historically, Cook Islanders living under a benign New Zealand administration in the islands occasionally did take collective action to right certain injustices or protect their interests.

But it was not until the granting of internal self-government in 1965 that political developments in the islands began to have significant influence on Cook Islander social organisation in New Zealand. These developments centred on the rise of permanent political parties and the articulation of clear ideological positions, which many church leaders in Auckland considered were unnecessarily dividing the people. Economic conditions in New Zealand during the 1970s and early 1980s tended to sustain interest in the islands, as I have already suggested, making political divisions all the more relevant. Though most Cook Islanders would hold that political matters have little to do with their daily lives, the issues and divisions seem to emerge with little pretext, being most sharply in perspective during islands elections.

Albert Henry and the Cook Islands Party governed from independence until 1978. He maintained power by a particularly Polynesian mixture of personal charisma, largesse with public funds, nepotism (Crocombe, 1979), parliamentary skill and facility as a traditional orator. There were accusations from his opponents that he used control of the public service to extend his influence. In light of the importance of the public service to the islands economy, to say nothing of governmental scope for political appointments and demotions, such control was bound to have an impact on opposition parties. A considerable number of Cook Islanders left the islands to escape what they perceived as oppression. The government in Avarua harboured an abiding suspicion regarding the allegiance of migrants in New Zealand.

The Democratic (Demo) party under Dr. Tom Davis came to power in 1978, following a court action and Henry's removal from office for misuse of funds during the elections that year. Henry had

never been adverse to causing difficulties for the New Zealand government and the conservative National Party felt disposed to encourage Dr. Davis's free enterprise leanings to try to reduce the annual grants from New Zealand. By tax incentives and seeking additional overseas aid, the new Demo government hoped to stimulate business investment and encourage experienced Cook Islands emigrants to return. To date, few have taken the opportunity due largely to low islands salary scales, higher living costs and no New Zealand superannuation payments once they return.

At the same time, due to continued insecurity of the position in New Zealand and doubts about their childrens' prospects, most Cook Islanders are sufficiently wary to wish to retain their voting and land rights in the islands⁽⁴⁾. Judging by history, their concerns are well-founded. Periodically during the present century, the New Zealand administration has attempted to curtail the rights of absentees which they perceived to be a hindrance to agricultural production. Since the granting of self-government, the islands government has considered similar moves, which in turn have been strenuously resisted by overseas Cook Islanders. Migrants residing abroad have within certain limits retained the voting franchise in their 'home' electorate until recently, and had a powerful influence on recent elections. In 1978 there were more Cook Islanders living overseas than in the islands. Since it was necessary to actually physically cast one's vote in the islands, both major parties chartered several planes to fly supporters from New Zealand to vote on election day.

(4) To retain his voting rights, a Cook Islander must have lived in the islands three months prior to the elections, held every three years. Though Cook Islanders in New Zealand have continued to press for voting by ballot, the government has resisted. The voting residency requirement is another stimulus to regular 'reciprocal visiting'.

The real power of these overseas electors was by then apparent, as was the increasing level of local criticism against the absentees for not contributing to economic advancement with their own hands, and still dictating who would run the country. Whichever party came to power was bound to consider this emerging threat to political stability in the islands. The Demo party was placed in office after a court overturned Albert Henry's victory. Demo party branches in New Zealand saw their opportunity, and in 1980 pressed their colleagues in Avarua to honour their campaign pledge to give overseas Cook Islanders the right of postal voting in their 'home' electorates. In fact the Demo election manifesto mentioned neither provision, merely promising "special voting facilities" would be established in New Zealand (Demo Policy Statement, 1978:92). Turning down the representations of branches in New Zealand, instead the new government pushed through an amendment to the Constitution establishing an "overseas electorate" in which one M.P. would represent all Cook Islanders not living in the islands. The Demo party thus kept its election promise at the same time significantly curtailing the influence of overseas Cook Islanders, particularly their influence on specific seats. In effect the overseas electorate covered the entire globe! Well may the first M.P. had the same feelings as the young John Wesley as missionary to the Indians being "set free on the continent of North America" by his bishop. Such constitutional moves spurred many overseas Cook Islanders to make greater efforts to secure land and voting rights by more frequent visits.

Another significant political development in New Zealand in accompaniment with the emergence of party politics was the increased tension between the Church and political authorities. Problems had their beginning after the war, as mentioned, when the Labour government

sided with the Church against the growing influence of the CIPA in Auckland. But due to the unique voting arrangements which persisted until recently, and the steady increase in migrant numbers, the community in New Zealand was an important constituency which the Avarua government could not afford to neglect. The government established a consular office in Auckland, which with the declining influence of the Church's welfare role, began to be much more active in the lives of migrants. Consular officers took an active part in dealing with the legal, housing, employment and welfare problems of Cook Islanders. A full-time welfare officer was appointed, and the office promoted the image that it was the best place to come for help and information.

The consulate also extended its political influence, albeit cautiously, by encouraging the establishment of Cook Islander "advisory committees" in Otara, Mangere and more recently in the central city. These committees are comprised of volunteers who organise by subcommittees to deal with problems people report to them in such areas as housing, health, education and law. Ideally, they should act as go-betweens with relevant State agencies. Committee members complain they are sometimes treated as bumbling amateurs by New Zealand government bureaucrats and fieldworkers, but the consulate defends them as part of an important self-help effort on behalf of their people. The Cook Islands government provides them with secretarial services, personnel and funds, though the latter is a delicate issue. For political reasons, the committees are encouraged to maintain their independence so as not to create problems with the New Zealand government and so that migrants to not view the committees as attempts by Avarua to curry their favour. Equally significantly, the committees provide an organisational base outside the Church in which young, articulate

and concerned Cook Islanders can take a public role in helping the people and establish their mana among the migrant community.

Finally, there is the matter of the long-standing and virtually taken-for-granted support of Cook Islanders for the New Zealand Labour party. A New Zealand branch of the Party, comprised entirely of Cook Islanders, was established shortly after the last world war (Hooper, Op cit.:187). Similar to the efforts of the CIPA at the time, primary emphasis was placed on meeting the housing and welfare needs of migrants as well as insuring their political support.

A number of Cook Islanders today are active at the branch level in the Labour party, which in turn relies heavily on general Polynesian support in seats like Auckland Central and South Auckland (Mangere). A few of the younger Cook Islander leaders are becoming aware of the minor degree of influence they do have as an ethnic group in politics, and make attempts to get Cook Islanders to vote at election time and give special recognition to Labour officials who attend Cook Islander functions. As yet, no Cook Islander has gained local or national office on the Labour or any other ticket. During the 1983 Auckland City Council elections, one Cook Islander stood as an Independent and the other as a Labour candidate. Both lost, as did a women who contested the Auckland Central parliamentary seat the year before against the long-standing Labour member. Most Cook Islanders felt she lost because she stood for the wrong party, and was not sufficiently "in touch with the people".

The extent to which the Labour/Polynesian alliance will persist unchallenged is open to question, though given the reproduction of most Cook Islanders in a largely working class, marginal position it seems likely that such support will continue. The emergence of the Maori Mana Motuhake in recent years, led by a breakaway Labour member of Parliament, has not yet posed a threat since its ideology is

strictly bi-cultural. It does not actively encourage Pacific Islander involvement or speak to their interests, even though there have been occasional informal contacts made between more radical Maori political activists and some Pacific Islands community leaders. There is also the possibility that some young, articulate Cook Islanders will see political involvement as a legitimate avenue to pursue the interests and grievances of Cook Islanders, perhaps in concert with those from other 'communities' but likely without the support of more traditional leaders and Church elders. Whether such engagement is likely to be through existing political parties or radicalism such as Mana Motuhake depends in part on the success of recent attempt by established Cook Islands community leaders to enter politics. Another alternative could emerge by way of the community hall movement of Aitutaki Enea, and the possible reinterpretation of cultural traditions to speak to the situation of Cook Islanders in contemporary New Zealand. It is clear that the continued structuring of most Polynesians together as a fraction of the working class, along with the debilitating effects of economic recession and the wider inclusiveness of racialisation incorporating migrants regardless of class membership will have a profound influence on which of these developments come to the fore. The curtailing of voting and land rights in the islands seems to add further impetus to increased political consciousness and action in New Zealand, at least over the long run.

Conclusion

In this chapter I have examined the more significant forms of Cook Islander 'community' organisation in New Zealand: the Church, enua associations, sports clubs and political parties. I emphasised the necessity of marking the distinction between Cook Islander social order in New Zealand and in the islands, rather than glossing them as one ethnic group or society. Certainly they share a common history, experiences and cultural background. But I have emphasised the necessity of paying attention to how Cook Islander migrants' position in New Zealand society has produced a certain ordering of the social and cultural heritage to maintain an 'ethnic diversity' as a social category which is in some respects distinctive not only from other Pacific groupings but from the islands also.

I discussed the broad development of each form of social organisation, showing not only major changes that have occurred but how these often took place in relation to other forms within the migrant community and in consequence of developments in the political economy since the last world war. A major example was the rise and decline of the Church's welfare role, and the way in which the encouragement of competitive donations served as a catalyst to the enua groupings. The recent emergence of political parties and government welfare activities at the expense of the Church is another case in point.

I also outlined the more significant changes in the institution of elder-rule in recent years. I attempted to indicate the basic contradiction which they now face, that their position in part relies on their importance to capital and the State who maintain them as 'community leaders' in their relations with Cook Islanders; but the very institutions which they have helped expand and elaborate

are generating greater burdens of reciprocity alienating many, but which elders are reluctant to criticise for fear of losing their own base of authority. Their conflicts with youth in some of the sports clubs regarding the authority of their office and the status of custom are another manifestation of the pressures that the institution of elder-rule is under.

Finally I described recent transformation in the political rights of absentee Cook Islanders in New Zealand, and how these changes heightened the concern and for many the level of visiting and remittances to try to protect their franchise and land rights. I also indicated the emergence of Maori political radicalism, and the possibility of new forms of political expression among younger Cook Islanders. These could involve engagement in existing political parties in New Zealand, radicalism based on shared ethnic group or Polynesian interests or some sort of cultural revitalisation movement. While trends among the second generation are not yet apparent in any way that is divergent from their parents, radicalism could become an option if few opportunities are made available for attaining power within existing political parties.

Chapter 6

Marriage Practices and Personal Networks

I have previously defined ethnicity as a configuration of identities and life styles based on shared cultural resources improvised in response to imposed ethnic categorisation, structural marginality and conflicts of interest. In this chapter I consider how such improvisations are created at the level of individual behaviour through Cook Islander marriage practices and personal networks. I pay particular attention to how 'race,' kinship and class position influence who Cook Islanders marry and who they interact with in everyday life.

Cook Islander marriage practices are significantly influenced by their place in New Zealand society and the specific effects of racialisation. This being so, a high rate of intermarriage with Europeans since the last world war raises important questions with any straight-forward "race relations" analysis. And with respect to personal networks, I discuss the results of a series of weekend "network serials" taken from a cross-section of Cook Islanders. I pay particular attention to the relative importance of alter's 'race,' 'ethnic' identity, kinship relation and class with respect to ego.

Cook Islander Marriage Practices

Choice of marriage partner and the social constraints which influence those choices have a significant bearing on the organisational coherence of an ethnic group, the maintenance of ethnic identity and the way members are articulated into the wider society. Cultural background, ethnic community expectations and location in the political economy are important determinants of individual behaviour.

Cook Islanders usually avoid marrying someone who stands in a relation of second cousin or closer -- that is, classificatory brother or sister. With so many Cook Islands migrants in New Zealand, kinship relations are often confused to say the least. To avoid possible incestual relationships, preference is given to marrying someone from a different village or island⁽¹⁾. There are no customary sanctions against marrying non-Cook Islanders. Indeed, there is considerable prestige in marrying a European because of the presumed financial security and social status one might gain. I shall have more to say on that subject shortly.

Given a theory of the structuring of migrant labour as a marginal fraction of the working class through racialisation and ethnic categorisation, one would anticipate clear patterns of Polynesian and Cook Islander endogamy in New Zealand. Of course, one must allow for race relations legislation and the vagueries of paternalistic racism. Marriage patterns would hardly be as clear-cut and exclusive as societies characterised by institutionalised segregation or apartheid. One might also anticipate a considerable degree of intermarriage among the different Polynesian groupings, given the fact that they share for the most part a common position in the political economy and are identified as a single social category. But, it will be clear from preceding chapters that the situation is considerably more complicated.

The case of the Cook Islands migrant population is a good


(1) Given such ambiguities, an older kinsman wishing to discourage a particular marriage can claim the man and woman are related too closely (pirianga vaiata). If such claims are accepted by the couple or the wider kindred, the marriage is off. Some elders use inuendo to warn off prospective suitors. Young people who wish to avoid problems prefer to date people from another enua. But if the individuals are just "having a good time," they merely avoid asking about one another's background.

example of both the complexity of marriage patterns and the reasons for such complexity. To gain a proper perspective it is useful to go back a few years. During the 1950s, Hooper (Op Cit:150) described the thousand or so Cook Islanders living in central Auckland as a relatively close-knit ethnic enclave. Of the quarter or so of Cook Islanders who had moved elsewhere, approximately half had been allocated a State housing unit while the other half had married Europeans. In fact between 1952-1957 more Cook Islanders married Pakehas than they did other Cook Islanders (Ibid.). The common pairing was a Pakeha male and a Cook Islander female. Between three and four times as many Cook Islander women married Pakehas as did Cook Islander men (Ibid.:175). At face value the ethnic group seemed under threat as a community, and Cook Islanders rapidly assimilating into New Zealand society.

With the benefit of hindsight, it is now evident that Hooper was observing a transition period in Cook Islander marriage practices as the following graph demonstrates (Figure 1). Prior to 1957, there is no question that a higher proportion of Cook Islander marriages were with non-Cook Islanders. But the trend was toward a rapid decline in racial exogamy and a rise in 'ethnic community' endogamy. By 1956 a point of virtual balance was achieved which has continued to the present with minor fluctuations. Even so, intermarriage with New Zealanders⁽²⁾ has continued at a higher rate than might have been anticipated.

(2) Hooper found that relatively few Cook Islanders married Maoris. My own fieldwork tends to confirm that such unions are still considerably fewer than with Pakehas, though not as rare as earlier. Official marriage statistics are reported only for country of birth, so without survey data it is impossible to differentiate "New Zealanders". I take it most of such reported marriages are with Europeans.

TRENDS IN COOK ISLANDER MARRIAGE BY BIRTHPLACE
OF SPOUSE, 1954 - 1982




Source: New Zealand Dept. of Statistics
Yearbook

A partial explanation for these trends becomes apparent when marriage rates for Cook Islander men and women are contrasted (Figure 2). Until 1960, a higher percentage of Cook Islander women married non-Cook Islanders than did Cook Islander males. The early high rate of female outmarriage was related to the recruitment of female domestics and service workers during and just after the war. Also, until the late 1960s a preponderance of males coming to New Zealand had a wife and children back in the islands. Recently the rate of female Cook Islander ethnic exogamy has again increased due to intermarriage with other Pacific Islanders (endogamy within the racial category). The steady increase since around 1972 coincides with the onset of economic recession and government moves against Pacific overstayers. Fijians, Tongans, Samoans and others have married Cook Islanders to stay in the country. Overall, intermarriage with Maoris and Pacific Islanders may be lower than anticipated from a general theory of racialisation. But recent trends find confirmation in such a theory, and if continued over time could likely have political consequences among the racial category.

The important issue is why, given discrimination and class domination in New Zealand, Cook Islander rates of ethnic exogamy could have continued so consistently high. Intermarriage as opposed to extramarital relations with the dominant group would seem to indicate social equality, particularly where rights of inheritance are passed on to the offspring of such unions as in various colonial societies (Henriquez, 1974). How is it possible to speak of Cook Islanders as a 'social category' and a persistent ethnic group (social force) over time? Certainly this has been of more than academic interest to Cook Islander elders in recent years.

TRENDS IN MARRIAGES OF COOK ISLANDER MALES & FEMALES
TO NON - COOK ISLANDERS




In a recent study of marriage patterns among Japanese-Americans in Seattle, Leonetti and Newell-Morris (1982) found that since the last world war there had been a steady increase in levels of "racial exogamy" (Figure 3). The first generation was subject to wartime internment, virulent racism and economic deprivation and was almost totally endogamous as an ethnic group. By the third generation, however, outmarriage rates had reached 50% -- approximating what the authors call a state of "panmixis". As causes of this apparent "progress," Leonetti and Newell-Morris list greater residential integration, educational advance and occupational mobility (Ibid.:24). They also distinguish a "nuclear" from "non-nuclear" ethnic population (ei. core community versus a more peripheral membership). They claim as a general principle that those who retain links through parents to the highly-organised core community are more endogamous, as opposed to those whose personal networks have expanded to include Europeans (Ibid.). Third generation racial exogamy, they conclude, is a natural progression from expanded rates of ethnic community exogamy between core and peripheral populations in the second generation. So third generation racial exogamy is a virtual evolutionary process based on expanding networks and increased economic opportunities.

Their findings appear to lend support to the much-criticised assimilation model of migrant adaptation. One means by which an impression of migrant mobility economically, geographically and maritally is created is by their rather arbitrary construction of 'generations' in distinct stages. They underplay the significance of recent migration and of Nisei and Sansei born earlier or later than their defined states on the model. If the boundaries between discrete generations or between core community and peripheral members

FIG NO. 3

'RACIAL EXOGAMY' OF JAPANESE AMERICANS
IN SEATTLE-KING COUNTY, 1930-1975



Source: Leonetti and Newell-Morris, 1982:25

are problematic, then there must be serious reservations regarding their conclusions. Most tellingly, they neglect the structural position of the Japanese in the wider political economy and developments in racialisation over time, by reifying the notion of the 'ethnic community' and not locating Japanese in class relations of the American Northwest. They treat as causes what are in fact consequences of more fundamental realities. It is unclear why Japanese-American networks progressively expanded to include Europeans, how a racially stigmatised population became socially acceptable and why the subsequent two generations received increased economic opportunities.

Comparing Cook Islander and Japanese-American marriage patterns (Figure 1 and 3) the striking difference is that Cook Islanders have been much closer to a state of 'panmixis' since data on post-war marriages became available. Cook Islander marriages primarily involve migrants from the islands, and thus should be compared with pre-war figures for first generation Japanese migrants. Japanese migrants initially moved into factory and domestic jobs, and were discriminated against by immigration laws and wartime internment. As a result, they had very low out-marriage rates. Though similar, their situation was considerably more extreme than that of Cook Islanders. First generation Cook Islanders in contrast to first generation Japanese have been intermarrying with New Zealand-born individuals at a rate of some 40-50%, similar to third generation Japanese-Americans. In sum Cook Islanders may be as 'racially exogamous' as third generation Japanese-Americans, but their class position is similar to that of racialised and stigmatised Isei migrants.

Contrary to the Leonetti and Newell-Morris model, there cannot be

any necessary connection between the extent of racial intermarriage with members of the host society, the degree of 'assimilation' and class position. The Seattle study concluded that those who are active in the core community were more likely to marry Japanese than those less involved. Certainly the high rates of Cook Islander out-marriage indicate that the community elders and kin have been, by their own definition, less effective in enforcing ethnic endogamy in New Zealand. But what must be considered, and what Leonetti and Newell-Morris neglect, are both the standard improvisations and the broader structural factors effecting marriage practices, including the link between racialisation and class position.

The reproduction of the working class position of most Cook Islanders over time and recent developments in social categorisation have had certain consequences for their marriage patterns. Since the early 1970s there has been a slightly greater likelihood that Cook Islanders will marry other Cook Islanders, though the trend is not consistent from one year to the next (Figure 1). One factor off-setting recession and racialisation is the effort many make to secure a Papa'a spouse in order to gain economic security. Such improvisations are not always successful, nor are they necessarily an accurate assessment of the financial status of all Europeans. But they are an important part of contemporary folk wisdom among Cook Islanders on how to cope with their situation in New Zealand. For many, marrying a Papa'a is not so much a matter of opportunity and 'upward mobility' as a step taken as a last resort.

Two further observations can be made about the continuing high ethnic exogamy rate among Cook Islanders. One arises from a comparison of Cook Islands and Samoan marriage rates (Figure 4). Almost three-quarters of Samoan marriages have been with other

FIG. NO. 4


COOK ISLANDER AND WESTERN SAMOAN COMPARATIVE
MARRIAGE PATTERNS BY BIRTHPLACE OF SPOUSE,
1954 - 1977

WESTERN SAMOANS

Males Married:




Females Married:




COOK ISLANDERS

Males married:



Females married:



Source: N.Z. Dept. of Statistics Yearbooks

Samoans while Cook Islanders have been intermarrying with others as much as with Cook Islanders. This is puzzling because Miles has proposed that all such migrant groupings tend to develop common interests and may even organise together because of shared experiences of racialisation. Presumably these common experiences and the way they are perceived by the dominant class will effect their marriage practices. I have already indicated that, at least at the political and 'ideological' levels the situation of Cook Islanders and Samoans is different. An important distinction is that Cook Islanders are by right New Zealand citizens, while most Samoans are not. Samoans have if anything keener interest in their rights back home, where most will eventually return; their marriage patterns tend to reflect this fact. I have also indicated the separations which exist within the racial category and in structural relations (eg. patronage) and these are also mirrored in the different marriage patterns between Samoans and Cook Islanders. Cook Islander efforts to to differentiate themselves from other Pacific Island groupings ideologically and politically as an 'acceptable' migrant community contributes to the observed disparity of marriage patterns.

The second point in contrast to the Leonetti/Newell-Morris model is that racial and ethnic intermarriage does not automatically mean equality or economic mobility. Stratification theory aside, both Hooper's fieldwork and my own confirm that Cook Islanders tend to marry non-Cook Islanders who are members of the working class. The Seattle study did not take account of spouse's class, instead assuming that racial inter-marriage meant an increase in one's socio-economic status. Among Cook Islanders, there is a high rate of ethnic and racial category exogamy, unlike Samoans. At the same time, there is class endogamy in marriage practices which includes

Samoans and Papa'as. The increasing rate of female marriages with other Pacific Islanders also suggests similar developments, tending to reinforce their common membership in the Polynesian class fraction. Both of these broader class developments could have significant though contradictory consequences for the emerging generation of Cook Islanders.

Most significantly, these findings tend to confirm that racialisation operates differently in different societies. It is also evident that bourgeois ideology, which has its greatest social force in institutions dominated by the ruling class itself, is not necessarily accepted or relevant in particular contexts (social, recreational) involving Europeans and Cook Islanders of the working class. With respect to the cohesiveness of the Cook Islands community -- in other words, when the social category attempts to maintain itself as a distinct social force in the face of class diversity of its membership -- these patterns further illuminate the problems of identity and organisation which have become increasingly contentious among Cook Islanders in recent years. But there are other reasons why such individual marriage practices as general trends have not led to a breakdown and dispersal of the 'ethnic community' .

Marriage Exchange and the Reproduction of the 'Ethnic Community'

Cook Islander men have tended to marry New Zealand-born women at a greater rate than Cook Islander women have married New Zealanders (Figure 6.2) During the period from 1954 to 1980, 46.5% of Cook Islander males chose a New Zealand spouse while only 38.5% of females did so. Such findings raise important issues: why were male exogamy rates consistently higher than those of females? How has it been possible for the Cook Islander population to reproduce itself over time

as a self-conscious 'ethnic community' given such an apparently high outflow of members.

Beginning with the latter issue, the 'outflow' has been more apparent than real. My own fieldwork generally confirms Hooper's observations that

the women who marry Pakehas tend to be lost from the community to a greater extent than the men who marry Pakeha women (Op cit.:176).

Since Cook Islands male exogamy rates have continued higher than females rates, the overall effect has served to build up the numbers identifying as Cook Islanders and thus the 'ethnic community'⁽³⁾. Males are not lost to involvement as much as females, and their children more likely to be identified and included as Cook Islanders.

The tendency, if one adopts an exchange model, is for Cook Islands males to 'bring in' women along with some Maoris and Pacific Islanders. These spouses usually try to fit into their husband's kinship relations and engage in Cook Islands community activities. Cook Islander women, on the other hand, tend to move into their European (or Pacific Islander in a minority of cases) husband's sphere of activity and thus are less active in the Cook Islands community. The drift away may be offset by an older relative living with the couple or nearby, who may insist on the woman's continued involvement and the maintenance of her children's identity as Cook Islanders.

Although his sample was small, Hooper (Ibid.: 176) found that most of the European women married to Cook Islanders visited

(3) It should also be born in mind that the Cook Islander community has until recently been able to rely on a steady influx of migrants from the islands to replentish and expand its membership. Furthermore, as Hooper (Op cit.:178) showed, Cook Islander endogamous unions and extramarital births tend to produce more offspring identifying as Cook Islanders than do mixed marriages. The same is largely true today, though ethnic identity and practice are increasingly problematic for second generation Cook Islanders.

and entertained their affines, and took part in various ethnic community activities. While I carried out no systematic survey of mixed marriages, most Cook Islander men who I met that had curtailed their ethnic involvements were of higher socio-economic status and educational background. I rarely saw European men active in Cook Islands affairs, nor male spouses from other Pacific Islands groups. I did encounter several European and Pacific Islander women married to Cook Islanders who took an active role in the life of their kopu tangata, cooked for communal feasts and sometimes attended more important occasions themselves. Spouses from other Pacific Islands were considerably more active than Europeans, and I had the impression that involvement in ethnic community activities among mixed couples was generally rather low.

For the most part Cook Islander men are in an economic position which necessitates their continued reliance upon Cook Islander kin and friends for jobs, loans and other forms of assistance. They are not easily 'lost' to the community. Unless they somehow have managed to attain additional valuable 'qualifications,' they are under pressure from European affines to remain with their "own people" (cf. Harre, 1966 for similar findings among Maoris). Prejudice comes into force particularly when the domestic domain -- and private property -- is threatened. Here Polynesians may constitute both a psychological and an economic threat to bourgeois, Pakeha society.

The different rates of racial and ethnic exogamy between Cook Islander males and females have no single explanation. In comparative studies the most commonly recognised pattern of racial intermarriage is what Merton (1941) called somewhat labouriously "cast hypogamy", or in America marriage between a White female and a Black male

(Barron, 1972:25)⁽⁴⁾ Similarly, Benson (1981:21) found in Britain that up to 1971 there was a greater likelihood of marriage between Black men and White women. She attributed this to an early preponderance of male New Commonwealth migrants. This does not appear to have been the case with Cook Islanders; in fact just the opposite.

Leonetti and Newell-Morris (Op cit.:27) found that among Japanese-Americans, it was consistently more likely that females would marry European males than the opposite pairing. The intermarriage patterns of Japanese-Americans were in other words just the converse of Blacks in America, West Indians in Britain and Cook Islanders in New Zealand. However, when allowance is made for these authors' distinction between nuclear and non-nuclear populations, the results are informative. For a significant period after the last world war, during what these authors term the 'second generation,' both nuclear and non-nuclear males tended to intermarry with non-Japanese at a higher rate than females -- that is, the anticipated pattern from other studies. After 1960 and into the third generation, female exogamy rates once again begin to outstrip those of males.

Of course, the particular social setting for each case must be examined in its own right. There are undoubtedly specific factors in the economic position and racialisation of Japanese-Americans which would have to be considered. Offsetting positive markers linked with the resurgence of Japan as a world technological power might be one. Though there are similarities with Cook Islander marriage patterns over time, Cook Islanders are still essentially a first generation community with recent steady inflows of migrants from the islands. But there does seem to be some evidence to suggest (4) In various U.S. studies it was three to ten times more likely that hypogamy rather than hypergamy would occur. However, the opposite pattern was observed with respect to extramarital sexual relationships.

that where there is a relatively strong ethnic core of whatever generation, and that core community is constructed by the dominant class as a stigmatised minority, there will be less intermarriage. Changing structural conditions and racist evaluations will have differing effects on rates of male and female exogamy, in some cases the second generation males 'pioneering' unions with the host society through work contacts. Due to recent developments in New Zealand, any so-called mobility which Cook Islanders have achieved has been largely horizontal, particularly with respect to women who have married working class White or Pacific Islanders.

Cook Islander Marriage Preferences

Cook Islander marriage preferences have influenced these patterns and in particular the perception by many that marriage with a Papa'a is a means to gain respect and material security. Given their structural position, such an attitude is understandable and indeed perceptive as one kind of improvisation. Based on the 1981 fieldwork survey, the following list shows the most often-mentioned qualities Cook Islanders look for in a marriage, in order of the priority in which they were mentioned (Table 6.1). Many of the values Cook Islanders have in mind are not so different from those of Pakeha society. It goes without saying that their attitudes have been significantly shaped by the dominant culture, particularly through the media, advertising and popular music. But this may be misleading. Some of these same qualities have different meanings or referents from those of the average New Zealander. Most obvious is the fact that their concern for security, money, wealth and a better life mirrors their position as a racialised population, most of whom are locked into an underprivileged fraction of the working class.

Table 0.1

Qualities You Look For First in a Marriage Partner
(Source: 1981 Fieldwork Survey)

Quality	Rank	First Preference		Total of All Preference		
		Frequency	Percentage	Rank	Frequency	Adj. Percentage
Love	1	59	28.4	1	89	19.9
Security/a better life	2	24	11.5	2	46	10.3
Have kids/a family	3	20	9.6	4	41	9.2
Money/land/obtain wealth	4	15	7.2	3	43	9.6
A good personality	5	13	6.3	8	20	4.5
A Cook Islander	6	11	5.3	13	11	2.5
Sharing/ a companion	7	10	4.8	6	28	6.3
Good worker/housewife	8	9	4.3	5	40	8.9
Happiness	9	8	3.8	11	14	3.1
A good character	10	6	2.9	14	11	2.5
Attractive	11	5	2.4	10	15	3.3
Cooperation	12	4	1.9	7	26	5.8
Responsible/makes plans	13	4	1.9	15	9	2.0
Papa'a	14	3	1.4	16	5	1.1
For Sex	15	2	1.0	17	3	.7
Kind/caring	16	2	1.0	9	20	4.5
Trust/loyal	17	2	1.0	12	14	3.1
Know culture/in activities	18	2	1.0	19	2	.4
Educational background	19	-	-	18	3	.7
Children's education	20	-	-	20	2	.4
		199	100		462	100

Bourgeois romanticism was also apparent in the fact that the motive of "love" was virtually taken for granted as the sine qua non of marriage. In addition it was also a hoped-for quality and a legitimation of almost any relationship entered into. Love seemed to be a sentimental inclination between two people who only later considered more serious qualities in their partner and reasons for marriage. Few seemed to have given much thought to what qualities they expected in a partner, since a good marriage was a matter of luck.

With respect to the Cook Islander structural position, unstable, violent, economically stressed domestic situations were reflected in respondent's concern for someone who would look after them. They wanted a good provider/housewife, someone who would cooperate, share and be understanding. The powerless situation of women was particularly evident. Many stated they would consider anyone, so long as he was not lazy, a spendthrift or a wife-beater.

Cook Islander marriage preferences regarding Europeans also mirror their position in the wider society, as is evident in the following data (Table 6.2). Stated reasons for marrying Europeans show that certain motives are consistently more important no matter what a partner's race or ethnicity⁽⁵⁾. Love and security are given precedence in any marital arrangement. Two values which assume special importance in marrying Europeans are money/land and wealth. In addition there is the respect given Europeans within the Cook Islands community and the supposed status accorded to persons who

(5) It should be noted that the survey question was phrased to elicit responses about why others choose to marry Papa'as. This was done to give the respondent tacit permission to state motives which he or she may have been reluctant to divulge about his own preferences. The intent was to tap in on existing stereotypes or folk mythologies.

Table 6.2

Reasons Why Cook Islanders Marry Europeans
(Source: 1981 Fieldwork Survey)

Reason	First Reason			Total of All Reasons		
	Rank	Frequency	Percentage	Rank	Frequency	Adj. Percentage
Money/land/wealth	1	55	26.4	1	95	28.2
Love	2	20	9.6	4	26	7.7
Security	3	19	9.1	2	37	11.0
Cook Islands status	4	18	8.7	3	29	8.6
European is respected	5	16	7.7	6	22	6.5
Have White Kids	6	8	3.8	7	17	5.0
European treats diff.	7	8	3.8	8	15	4.5
Attractive	8	5	2.4	10	11	3.3
Prefer European ways	9	5	2.4	9	15	4.5
Escape Island ways	10	4	1.9	5	26	7.7
Europeans island escape	11	4	1.9	11	7	2.1
Good personality	12	3	1.4	15	4	1.2
Get along	13	3	1.4	16	4	1.2
Incest avoidance	14	3	1.4	17	4	1.2
European better	15	3	1.4	13	5	1.5
Other	16	3	1.4	20	3	1.0
European smarter	17	2	1.0	18	4	1.2
To travel	18	2	1.0	12	6	1.8
Meet at party/work	19	2	1.0		3	1.0
Cook Is. is stupid	20	2	1.0	19	4	1.2
		<hr/>	<hr/>		<hr/>	<hr/>
		185	100		340	100

marry them -- or more precisely, are selected by Europeans as a marriage partner.

The differences between general preferences and those particularly to do with marrying Europeans become clearer when reasons for marrying a Papa'a are grouped according to common themes, as in the following figure (Table 6.3). The most often-mentioned responses were economically grounded, having to do with attaining material security or getting away from the burden of assisting fellow Cook Islanders. The major themes in order of importance were (1) wealth and security, (2) escape racism and/or customary obligations, (3) better treatment by one's spouse, (4) status recognition among Cook Islanders and the wider society, and (5) romantic motives such as love. In the case of marriage to Europeans love was given the lowest priority as a preference or motive.

Unlike motives and qualities mentioned in response to general questions, here the overarching motif is utility and social mobility, away from community or customary obligations and away from one's present material conditions. Once again many of these motives are stated from the woman's perspective, whether the respondent was male or female. The responses also indicate that such persons are motivated -- or are at least perceived by other Cook Islanders as being motivated -- by the desire to escape the community and better their lot. They also confirm the emergent pattern of interracial exchange by which women marry out and thus are 'lost' to the community, but women marrying in are treated as Cook Islanders. The offspring of mixed marriages enjoy a particular social position among Cook Islanders which has additional meaning in New Zealand.

Table 6.3

Amalgamated Responses by Common Themes:
Why Marry a European

	Frequency	Percent	Theme Total	Percent
<u>A. Wealth and Security</u>				
1) Money/land/wealth	95	28.2		
2) Security	37	11.0		
			132	39.5
<u>B. Status Recognition</u>				
1) Cook Islands status	29	8.6		
2) European is respected	22	6.5		
			51	15.3
<u>C. Escape Racism/Obligations</u>				
1) Prefer European ways	15	4.5		
2) Escape Island ways	26	7.7		
3) Travel	6	1.8		
4) Have White kids	17	5.0		
5) European smarter	4	1.2		
			71	21.3
<u>D. Better Treatment</u>				
1) European treats better	15	4.5		
2) Get along	4	1.2		
3) European better	5	1.5		
4) Can manipulate Eur.	5	1.5		
			39	16.7
<u>E. Standard Motives of Eur.</u>				
1) Love	26	7.7		
2) Attractive	11	3.3		
3) Good personality	4	1.2		
			41	12.3

Mixed-Race Status and Ethnic Identity

Aesthetic criteria of beauty, including the significance of skin colour and related phenotypical features, is initially determined by the dominant group. This is usually done with reference to the 'best' features of the dominant group itself. Those minority members with qualities most 'like us' are more acceptable. Such factors are nominated by the dominant group -- in advanced capitalism the bourgeoisie -- as preferred diacritica for access to the status, power and resources of the society (cf. Barron, Op cit.).

A change in the evaluation of physical features occurred in Cook Islands society following European contact. Light skin seems to have become associated with beauty and high status. Various colonial agents and missionaries influenced the change in values by imposing what appeared to them to be commonsense perceptions. Thus, Rev. Buzacott states,

the chiefly class were often much more robust and light in colour than the rank and file (from Mission Life in the Islands of the Pacific, 1866; quoted in Gray, 1975:17).

In view of the forceful character and material wealth of early Europeans it is perhaps understandable that Cook Islanders should have been influenced to adopt similar values. An Arorangi village legend from Rarotonga recounts how the whole village eagerly sought to know from the first European that arrived how they might acquire white skin like his. A number of missionary accounts record the 'traditional' practice of secluding young women for a year before their 'coming out' feast and dance. Staying indoors made their complexion fairer. Dancers themselves often tried to avoid prolonged exposure to sun to maintain their light skin. In a legend from Mangaia recorded by Rev. W.W. Gill a young woman was refused permission to seclude herself ritually, because she had formed a liaison with an

outcaste⁽⁶⁾.

In an article on the 'mixed blood' in Polynesia, Ernest Beaglehole (1949) attempted to account for the number of persons of mixed race descent in various Pacific Islands societies and their social standing. At the end of World War II, he estimated that 14% of the Cook Islands population in the islands was of mixed race parentage, an estimate that was undoubtedly conservative. As to the social significance of interracial parentage, Beaglehole concluded that problems of status and discrimination existed in societies like Samoa and French Polynesia. But in the Cook Islands, European presence had been minor and there was social and economic equality.

There is no mixed blood problem in the Cook Islands. The Cook Islanders are singularly unconscious of race distinction. All natives, whatever their ancestry, are immediately absorbed into native life and participate equally in the values of native society (Ibid.:54).

Beaglehole's analysis lacks a certain veracity when examined in light of the facts. For instance, in 1953 shortly after Beaglehole wrote, Syme (1978) recalled an encounter with a mixed race planter:

'Plenty of mixed blood in Arorangi," said Taria. 'Quite a few Chinese used to live here in the old days, and their descendents still do. There were several Germans -- I've got a bit of German blood myself. And even one or two Negroes. But the Chinese are gone and only the children and grandchildren of the Germans are alive today. Perhaps all that foreign blood explains why we're said to be the hardest-working people in Rarotonga'. (Ibid.:83; emphasis added).

Whether the so called half-caste enjoys high or low esteem or is accorded little recognition or power at all is not simply a matter of cultural diversity from one society to the next or a whim of history. The status of the mixed-race population in the Third

(6) It was not only a scandal that the woman had co-habited with a social outcaste, but that she was no longer a virgin, an important aspect of the 'coming out' rite. There seems to have been an early connection made between whiteness and purity in Cook Islander thought.

World in particular is constituted in the form which colonialism and dependency took in each case, and the mode of local political relations by which such domination was reproduced. In the Cook Islands being apa-Maori (lit. half-Maori) has taken on increased social significance since the war and even moreso since the granting of independence.

Framhein (1979) has also indicated the connection between increased opportunities for political and economic advancement in the Cook Islands and the emergence of greater status distinctions for half-castes. She lists politics, public service, business, education, leisure clubs and other institutions where those of mixed race have risen to prominence. As an apa Maori herself, she relies heavily on personal experience and first-hand observation (and perhaps with a certain understandable bias).

There is a general recognition among Cook Islanders in the islands that the tangata ma'ata (big man) or entrepreneur in business ventures and planting is often an individual of mixed race background. It is likely that the domination of spheres of political and economic power by a significant number of apa Maori -- and the fact that they are identified as such by other Cook Islanders and Europeans -- is not only a result of their historical and contemporary structural positions, but a set of perceptions which they and administrators have been interested to promote. The daughter of a long-serving Papa'a public servant, now living in Adelaide, recalled that she, Framhein and other friends were sent to the English-speaking school at Nikao along with the children of expatriot Europeans. As they grew older, they participated in the yachting and golf clubs and were regularly invited to parties by apa Maori politicians and public servants for visiting dignitaries.

One other caveat must be lodged with Framhein's discussion of the apa Maori position. She takes as unproblematic the criteria for identifying who is and who is not an apa Maori. What she does not examine is the way in which the evaluation of mixed race ancestry and the individuals who are said to fit such identities are located in power relations in the social structure and constituted in daily practice. In Auckland identification as apa Maori seems to count less among Cook Islanders, either at the level of public organisation and oratory, or in daily personal encounter (see also Pearson, 1977). Persons who attempt to assert some claim to status on this basis are usually dismissed as akateitei (acting above themselves). That is simply to say that the category apa Maori has less social force among Cook Islanders in New Zealand because such markers have only moderate significance for bourgeois ideology, and because of overriding interests in maintaining the coherent identity of the enua and the 'Cook Islands community' in view of the broader political and economic setting. This is not to suggest that such labels among Cook Islanders are totally devoid of meaning. Mixed race parentage is often mentioned as one reason for social mobility or ascumen in the wider society. It is to suggest that perceptions of acceptability and respectability as defined by the ruling ideology tend to be restricted as to their applicability in specific social contexts.

Skin colour is an epiphenomenon of class mobility more than anything else, though in specific situations an 'acceptable' phenotypical appearance may serve to augment other counter-balancing qualifications or markers which offset racialisation. Besides education, another important factors seems to be the class position and personal networks of the European spouse, parent or affines which may provide limited access to employment, housing and the like.

Personal Networks and the Significance of Kinship, Ethnicity and Class

Having examined ethnic identity from the individual perspective and seen the influence of ethnic community involvement, kinship, racial categorisation and class position on marriage practices, I now turn the inquiry to consider how these same factors effect the total range of interpersonal relations among Cook Islanders and New Zealand society. For this purpose I turn to network analysis, specifically the "network serial" procedure pioneered by Epstein (1969) and developed by Sanjeck (1978).

Network analysis to date has tended to concentrate on matters of morphology (structure, density, clustering) and network transactions (exchange, communication). These emphases not only encountered certain methodological difficulties in the field (eg. tracing all the interactions between alters of ego) but left unanswered certain analytic issues. Less attention was accorded the range of settings in which ego was engaged, and how the characteristics of ego's alters might vary from one to the next. A systematic comparison of networks of a range of egos has also seldom been undertaken.

The network serial consists of a series of consecutive multi-actor scenes over a designated period of time which may be located within more or less discrete interaction settings or contexts. In each scene one or more individuals interact with ego in a particular activity. For the sake of analytic convenience I follow Sanjeck in differentiating action settings according three 'domains' (Eidheim, 1969:39-57): (1) work and public places, (2) leisure and social occasions, and (3) residence or the domestic domain⁽⁷⁾.

(7) See Sanjeck (Ibid.) for definition details. Work includes travel and shopping. Leisure includes hospital visits and society meetings. Domestic activities include visits to alters' homes.

In order to sample across all three domains and in view of the way in which work and leisure are organised in New Zealand, network serials were gathered over the period of Friday morning to the following Monday evening. In almost every instance I was able to carry out a structured de-briefing of ego myself regarding his weekend activities, as did the Sanjecks with their forty cases. I also lived with most of the households during the weekend of the recording of the network serials (the Sanjecks lived in the same housing estate as their informants), participating in their domestic life and leisure pursuits. By holding several short recording sessions during the weekend, I was able to overcome some of the difficulty with informant recall reported by the Sanjecks. Living with informants for a period was one way of overcoming the problems of a geographically spread population ⁽⁸⁾. I also judged that the additional insights into individuals' activities gained through participant-observation far outweighed the problem of upsetting ego's regular pattern of interactions. However, I did avoid most work contexts during the serial weekends, since I considered my presence would be unduly disruptive. I did spend some time at various individuals' places of work before and after the network serial weekend. I kept a diary of my observations and impressions during each weekend. The three case studies which conclude this chapter are a combination of formal de-briefing and personal experiences.

The individuals for whom network-serials were recorded --

(8) My fieldwork procedures in Auckland were relatively diverse and designed to maintain contact and involvement with as many individuals, organisations and activities as possible. I kept an activity schedule that at times looked like the flight chart of an airport control tower. I was able to maintain constant contact with five chosen families for the duration of my fieldwork, a notion I borrowed from Oscar Lewis. I also resided with Cook Islander friends and assistants when visiting the islands and when carrying out the concluding 1981 fieldwork survey.

there were twenty-eight -- were not randomly selected, but chosen by stratified criteria broadly in accord with the profile of the current Cook Islander population in Auckland. The following table shows the important variables in the sample selection (Table 6.4). Profiles of age cohorts, place of birth and island of origin along with education all approximate to the general Cook Islander population. The sample is unrepresentative with respect to the higher percent of women, lower ratio of production workers, higher number of middle class and greater degree of home-ownership than is the norm among Cook Islanders. Since the primary interest was a comparison of class positions, these statistical variations mattered less than the smallness of the sample in other areas (eg. one member of the bourgeoisie, and two young adults born in New Zealand). It must therefore be remembered that generalisations about the entire Cook Islands population must be treated with caution.

My main interest here is to examine the social characteristics of the alters in actual individual networks in order to shed light on the central points of this thesis. But I will also try to relate these same characteristics across the various domains in which interaction takes place, since this procedure reveals certain details of race and class relations not generally discussed in the New Zealand literature. At this point, one approaches the network data with certain assumptions from earlier research and from this thesis which can now be tested empirically.

For instance, one would anticipate that class position would be the most consistent determinant of who ego interacts with in his networks. Given class structuration on the basis of racialisation and ethnic categorisation, there should also be a clear relationship between race, ethnicity and class of ego and his alters. The working

Table 6.4

Profile of Network Sample

	<u>N</u>	<u>%</u>
Sex		
Male	8	28.6
Female	20	71.4
Age		
15-24	11	39.2
25-39	6	21.4
40-59	10	35.7
60+	1	3.6
Birth place		
Cook Is.	23	89.2
N.Z.	5	10.8
Island(Self or Parents)		
Rarotonga	14	50.0
Aitutaki	4	14.3
Mauke	3	10.7
Manihiki	1	3.6
Penrhyn	5	17.9
Pukapuka	1	3.6
Class		
Working	18	64.2
Middle	9	32.1
Bourgeois	1	3.6
Occupation		
Prof./Tech	1	3.6
Admin/Mgr.	3	10.7
Clerical	4	14.3
Sales	0	0
Service	4	14.3
Ag/For.	0	0
Prod/Tran	10	35.7
Hsewf/Student	4	14.3
Unemployd.	1	3.6
Education		
Primary	2	7.1
Secondary	23	82.1
Tchr Trn.	0	0
Tech. Inst.	2	7.1
Univ.	1	3.6
Dwelling Tenure		
Own w/o mort.	2	7.1
Own wi mort.	10	35.7
H.Corp'n rent	3	10.7
Priv. rent	8	28.6
Share/parnts	5	17.4

class should rely more on kin, fellow Cook Islanders and Polynesians in their networks, and other classes would have a proportionately greater percentage of European alters. Whether the position of Cook Islanders as a social category and most as also a racialised fraction of the working class is being reproduced into the second generation may also be considered, though the data on New Zealand-born individuals is limited. It is also possible to check for evidence that older people tend to have more Cook Islanders, kin and Polynesian alters and youth have wider ethnic, racial and even class contacts. One would anticipate in light of the foregoing discussion that racial and inter-ethnic contacts would tend to take place within (or horizontally) the same class.

Finally, both Harre (Op cit.:48) and Benson (Op cit.:118) suggest that the general pattern is for working class couples to have more network members of their own ethnic minority. But also that those in the 'middle' and capitalist classes will tend not only to have more diverse networks, but will often be of mixed parentage or racial intermarriage. To the extent this is true -- and only scant survey data is available -- they result not from assimilation but the adoption of alternative strategies, particularly to do with circumventing the disqualifying typifications of Polynesian categorisation.

There may also be marked differences in the sorts of alters various Cook Islanders interact with on the basis of which particular domain they are in. In his earlier New Zealand study Harre (Ibid.:47ff) found that "segmented social relations" tended to exist between Maoris and Pakehas, in spite of a popularly espoused egalitarian ideology. Europeans often protest they have many close friends who are Maoris or Pacific Islanders. Harre found that many Pakehas accepted Maoris as work-mates, team-mates and even "drinking cobbles". They interrelated in the domains of work and leisure, but these

same relationships seldom extended to the domestic sphere. One would anticipate a similar segmentation of relations to occur between Cook Islanders and Europeans. Interaction with other Polynesians should be higher than with Europeans since they share a similar structural position, categorical identity, discrimination and thus patterns of work and leisure. Those Europeans which are part of Cook Islander networks should occur largely in the workplace, and less in leisure domains and the domestic sphere since these are the territory of the 'ethnic institutions' outside mainstream society. Europeans appearing in leisure and domestic domains will likely be of the same class as ego, and primarily working class.

So much for hypotheses. The twenty-eight individuals involved in the network-serials moved through a total of 871 separate settings or scenes during their respective four-day time segments. It goes without saying that the assimilationist model is inadequate for explaining the various nuances that emerge from the network data. Though the sample of youth is small, there do not appear to be any major differences between the number of kin and affines young and old, New Zealand-born or islands-born have in their networks. In a separate calculation the grouping with the lowest percentage of kin and affines among their alters were those aged between 20-29. Place of birth was only a minor factor in predicting the extent of alters related by kinship, or even their ethnic identity (Table 6.5). The approximately one-third of alters who are Europeans is strikingly consistent for Cook Islanders right across the age cohorts and regardless of whether they were born in New Zealand or in the islands.

At a more general level of interaction with Polynesians and Europeans, between 80-90% of Cook Islander scenes contained Polynesian alters (Table 6.6), and one-third as mentioned had Europeans. As expected, older people born in the islands tended to have more

Table 6.5

Network Alter Characteristics by Age Group and Place of Birth of Ego

Birth	Age	No. Cases	No. of Affines	Mix of Affines	Ethnicity of alter			Race of alter			Class of alter		
					Macri	Cook Is.	Other	Polynes.	European	Other	Working Class	Middle Class	Bourgeois Class
I S L A N D S	15 to 19	3	99	59/ 59.6%	22/ 22.2%	73/ 73.7%	6/ 6.1%	84/ 84.8%	35/ 35.4%	0	96/ 97.0%	13/ 13.1%	2/ 2.0%
	20 to 29	5	140	67/ 47.9	20/ 14.3	105/ 75.0	15/ 10.7	119/ 85.0	41/ 29.3	3/ 2.1	125/ 89.3	25/ 17.9	1/ .7
	30 to 49	10	352	212/ 60.2	29/ 8.2	263/ 74.7	25/ 7.1	282/ 80.1	130/ 36.9	4/ 1.1	225/ 63.9	177/ 50.3	25/ 7.1
	50+	5	140	77/ 55.0	9/ 6.4	118/ 84.3	20/ 14.3	127/ 90.7	50/ 35.7	1/ .7	132/ 94.3	35/ 25.0	2/ .7
N.Z.	15 to 19	2	45	28/ 62.2	6/ 13.3	32/ 71.1	2/ 2.2	40/ 89.0	15/ 33.3	2/ 4.4	42/ 93.3	15/ 33.3	0
	20 to 29	3	95	39/ 36.8	20/ 21.1	60/ 63.2	15/ 15.8	76/ 80.0	32/ 33.7	1/ 1.1	76/ 80.0	34/ 35.8	1/ 1.1

Table 6.6

CHARACTERISTICS OF ALTERS IN COOK ISLANDER NETWORKS BY
CLASS POSITION OF EGO (N=Number of Scenes)

Ego's Class	Kinship & Affines	Ethnicity			Race			Class		
		Maori	Cook Islands	Other Pacific	Polynes.	European	Other	Working Class	'Middle' Class	Bourgeoisie
Capitalist Class (Bourg.)	8 (29%)	0 (0)	8 (29%)	5 (18%)	12 (43%)	15 (54%)	0 (0)	7 (25%)	22 (79%)	8 (29%)
'Middle' Class	126 (50%)	33 (13%)	171 (68%)	16 (6%)	195 (77%)	93 (37%)	4 (2%)	136 (54%)	155 (61%)	11 (4%)
Working Class	348 (59%)	73 (12%)	472 (80%)	61 (10%)	521 (88%)	195 (33%)	7 (1%)	552 (94%)	122 (21%)	13 (2%)

Polynesian contacts. But instead of the New Zealand-born, it was those in the 20-29 age bracket who had the fewest. This has much to do with the distribution of alters in the various domains, as I shall demonstrate.

When class position of alters was considered, by far the majority of alters in Cook Islander networks taken in total were of the working class. This is understandable since they are Polynesians, and as such are concentrated in the working class. Interestingly, while for most age groups around 90% of settings included working class alters, only 64% of the settings of those aged 30-49 did so. This is apparently the consequence of the fact that most of this age cohort are employed, that the minority of more affluent Cook Islanders tend to be in this group and that these same individuals tend to interact with non-Cook Islanders at work who are middle class or bourgeoisie.

Rather than age or birthplace, kinship or even ethnic identity, the class position of each Cook Islander was consistently a more reliable indicator of the social characteristics of his network-serial alters. In this respect substantiation of several assumptions outlined earlier is little short of striking (Table 6.6). First, the 'higher' the class position of the Cook Islander ego, the less likely he was to interact with kin or affines in his social settings. A similar pattern occurred with respect to scenes involving alters identified as Cook Islanders: the higher the class position the fewer Cook Islanders the individual had in his network.

Second, when drawing a broad 'racial' distinction between Polynesians and Europeans, the pattern of interactions was even clearer. If the Cook Islander was a member of the middle class ('new' petite bourgeoisie) or the bourgeoisie it was less likely that

his alters would be Polynesians. Such patterns are relative, of course, since all Cook Islander respondents regardless of class had fairly high numbers of Polynesian contacts when compared to the rest of the New Zealand population. This is simply a consequence of the fact of their structural position: the minority who are outside the working class tend to interact with Europeans at work, since few Polynesians are in other classes. Thirdly and not surprisingly, the greatest number of settings tended to involve alters whose class position was similar to that of ego. Thus, 94% of working class Cook Islanders engaged in scenes involving working class people, and only 25% for the bourgeois class informant. This individual also had the highest percentage of scenes with middle and capitalist class alters.

A fourth discovery was that Cook Islanders of whatever class position maintain a spread of contacts across domains by ethnicity, race and class. The petite bourgeoisie in particular have a significant number of alters who are in the working class, but who are also Cook Islanders, kinsmen and Polynesians. In other words they have maintained contacts across class and ethnic boundaries in support of my discussion of the ethnic category functioning as a social force whose members are of more than one class position. There is also a tendency for those outside the working class to be of mixed race parentage or be married to a European, though the sample was too limited to draw any clear conclusions.

Considering the social characteristics of alters across the various types of domains -- work, leisure, and domestic -- suggests the necessity of certain refinements to the analysis thusfar (Table 6.7).

Table 6.7

Comparison of Alters in Settings by Class Position

Class	Domain	Kinship	Ethnicity			Race			Class		
			Maori	Cook Is.	OtherPac.	Polyn.	European	Other	working cl	middle cl	bourgeois
Bourgeoisie	Domest T=12	4/33.3%	0	5/41.6%	2/16.6%	5/41.6%	5/41.6%	0	4/33.3%	6/50%	1/8.3%
	Leis. T=11	4/36.4	0	5/45.4	4/36.3	7/63.6	8/72.7	0	3/27.2	8/72.7	5/45.4
	Work/ Public T=8	1/12.5	0	1/12.5	0	1/12.5	7/87.5	0	1/12.5	5/62.5	3/37.5
Middle Peety.	Domest T=82	67/73.2	0	79/96.3	2/2.4	75/91.5	7/8.5	1/1.2	45/54.8	46/56.1	2/2.4
	Leis. T=54	26/48.1	11/20.4	43/79.6	6/11.1	48/88.9	13/24.1	0	34/63.0	34/63.0	0
	Work T=112	16/14.2	19/16.9	46/41.1	7/6.3	63/56.3	74/66.1	2/1.8	43/38.4	78/69.6	9/8.0
Working Classes	Domest T=229	205/89.5	6/2.6	221/96.5	4/1.7	221/96.5	27/11.8	0	222/96.9	8/3.5	3/1.3
	Leisr. T=162	81/50.0	12/7.4	142/87.7	25/15.4	146/90.1	47/29.0	0	146/90.1	59/36.4	2/1.2
	Work T=154	35/22.7	32/20.8	85/55.2	23/14.9	109/70.8	88/57.1	2/1.3	131/85.1	42/27.3	5/3.2

As anticipated, 'race relations' in New Zealand do tend to be segmented when Cook Islanders' interactions in all settings are considered. Europeans, who it will be recalled comprise an average of one-third of alters appearing in scenes [most appearing more than once] are predominantly to be found in the workplace/public domain. They are encountered less in leisure settings and much less likely to be present in settings located in the domestic domain. As I have already indicated, the extent of European involvement in Cook Islander network-serials is related to the class position of the Cook Islander. Working class Cook Islanders -- who are in the majority -- tend to work with other Cook Islanders and Polynesians, similar to their leisure and domestic settings. Those Europeans who are encountered tend much more to be in the workplace, particularly for working class Cook Islanders. Thus, there is also confirmation of earlier findings regarding the consequences of Cook Islander "specialisation" in certain sectors of industry and service employment. The bourgeois informant was much more likely to interact with Europeans in all three domains, though there was little difference in pattern between those in the 'middle class' and the working class.

Outside the work domain, working class Europeans are more likely to be encountered in leisure and domestic domains, confirming earlier assumptions with respect to the analysis of marriage practices. I contend that these results are the consequence of structural relations in the wider political economy, not merely inherent in better 'race relations' per se. One is dealing with modes of class determination in which race and ethnicity are utilised as social constructions, not some abstract predilection among Europeans to discriminate or, for that matter, for the "races to get along".

A further refinement may be made to a previous statement, and that is that if the Cook Islander is a member of the bourgeoisie,

the more likely he is to encounter Europeans in all his domains, and the converse with respect to Cook Islander and Polynesian alters. In this sense the 'race relation' analysis must be turned on its head: class relations are segmented through processes which include racialisation and ethnic categorisation, not the converse.

Third it seems that the domestic and leisure domains are those in which kinship, ethnicity and race are likely to be more influential in accounting for which alters ego will interact with in his network. In keeping with the position which I have attempted to argue regarding the role of race and ethnicity in class structuration this is much more the case for working class Cook Islanders and much less with respect to the bourgeoisie.

Finally, when birthplace of ego is taken into consideration (Table 6.5) it is clear that while those born in New Zealand tend to have almost as many Cook Islanders in their network generally, they usually interact with fellow Cook Islanders outside of the work setting. Those born in the islands for the most part tend to work with Cook Islanders as well as encounter them in domestic and leisure domains. In part of course, this is a consequence of differential class position as just mentioned. While there is some evidence of second-generational class mobility, these results also confirm the 'segmented' or compartmentalised nature of second generation interactions with non-Cook Islanders. They both tend to maintain their 'ethnic community involvement, and are structured into such limited 'cultural' activities by wider class relations as well as the demands of their own kin and elders.

The reader is referred to Appendix C in which I present three cases studies of the weekend network-serials of individuals of the working class, petite bourgeoisie and bourgeoisie to illustrate many of the basic arguments put forward in the final section of this chapter.

Conclusion

I argued in my introductory critique of migrant labour theory that while all Cook Islanders like Polynesians generally are constructed ideologically as a racial population, they are not all located in a single working class fraction. In response to racialisation and to their perceptions of their structural position Cook Islanders attempt to differentiate themselves as a social category ('ethnic community') and to function as a cohesive social force ('community organisation'). Ethnic community leaders, including those who are objectively located in the supervisory fraction or the petty bourgeoisie, assume prime responsibility for such a presentation, supported by the State and various important intermediaries such as managers, welfare workers, clergy and sometimes academics. In the first half of this thesis I examined the broader economic, political and ideological processes by which Cook Islanders were ethnically and racially categorised and how most were relegated to the Polynesian fraction of the working class. In this chapter I concentrated more upon individual practices by which the social category has been constituted as a social force and their class positions reproduced.

With respect to marriage practices, I was critical of evolutionary models (eg. assimilationism) like that of Leonetti and Newell-Morris for reifying the notion of the 'ethnic community' without examining the structural position and class relations in which migrants are situated. It certainly does not follow that simply because a migrant has married a member of the host society, he has 'assimilated' or changed his class position. However, given a model of class determination in which racialisation plays a significant role, one would expect a lower level of racial intermarriage. Since Cook Islanders marry 'New Zealanders' (mostly Europeans) about as

frequently as they do other Cook Islanders, there is obviously some explaining to be done. The problem really has two dimensions, one having to do with the reproduction of the Polynesian class fraction and the other how Cook Islanders as a social category have been able to organise and maintain themselves as a 'social force' as a population of diverse class memberships.

The most important point to stress regarding Cook Islanders' class position is that processes of racialisation and ethnic categorisation are not wholly determinative of that position. There may be a fairly close overdetermination between the ideological, political and economic levels or a wide divergence. And, as I have argued, there may be important changes in the social structure and content of racialisation over time, effecting marriage patterns and personal networks. The recent decline in the number of marriages with New Zealanders is a direct consequence of more negative racial typifications and economic threat.⁽⁸⁾ From another perspective, this is also to reiterate the ambivalent nature of paternalistic racism with respect to racial intermarriage as long as the existing order at the political and economic levels is unchallenged. Given such challenges as in the past few years, the nature of racism and racialisation itself has undergone important changes which only now are beginning to manifest themselves in marriage patterns and personal networks (eg. few Europeans interacting with Cook Islanders in domestic and leisure domains).

Neither is the structural position of all migrants exactly the same at the political and ideological levels, and these differences have consequences for marriage patterns and networks. The difference in Western Samoan and Cook Islander marriage patterns is a case in point. Politically, Cook Islanders are New Zealand citizens and thus under no legal pressure to return to the islands. They have also encouraged

(8) See Figure 1

informal patronage relations with a wide range of European intermediaries, and they have adopted the improvisation of marrying a Papa'a as one means of coping with their economic position. This, rather than having to maintain a close-knit kinship 'corporation' to survive in New Zealand and advance their interests back in the islands, as Samoans have tended to do (Macpherson, n.d. 1;1983). At least until recently, then, a small minority of Cook Islanders --approximately half of the 175-200 marriages a year -- have apparently moved out of the Polynesian fraction of the working class, but usually 'horizontally' in marrying a working class European. This promises to have interesting 'political' ramifications for the future if the trend continues into subsequent generations of Polynesians. However, in view of the Leonetti and Newell-Morris error, one must guard against the assumption that an individual Cook Islander automatically escapes the negative consequences of racialistion by marrying a Papa'a. This is what many Cook Islanders believe, but the facts particularly in access to employment tell another story. Once again, there is no direct causal relation between racial intermarriage and change of class position.

With respect to network-serials, I controlled for a number of variables in accounting for the social characteristics of each individual's alters, demonstrating ~~rather clearly~~ that class position was consistently^{ENT} the most reliable indicator of what sorts of persons would be involved in each action setting. There do not appear to be major differences between the generations or age groups of migrants in what sorts of individuals (kin, Cook Islanders, class) they interact with across the work, leisure and domestic domains. If anything those located in the petite bourgeoisie and the working class tend to have similar interactional patterns among kin and fellow

Cook Islanders, much different from the bourgeoisie informant. If this were born out in a larger survey sample it would suggest that the relevant divergence of interests within the social category (ie. the Cook Islands ethnic community) was between the bourgeoisie and members of other classes, with the former tending to be those who are consistently attacked in public rhetoric for dropping away and neglecting "their people".

This has important implications for the question of the continuation of the Cook Islander social category as a 'community' (or social force). For the moment it appears that there are wider ideological and political interests which Cook Islanders share which are not contradictory to their class positions, and which make it possible for a coherent community to survive, even though with persistent worries over those who are not giving enough support. Marriage patterns which I have examined would at first glance seem to cast doubts on the integrity of the ethnic community as an organisation, but I suggested the consequences of so-called racial and ethnic exogamy were more apparent than real. Using a somewhat simplified exchange model, it is possible to indicate how those identifying themselves as Cook Islanders are being reproduced at a greater rate than those being "lost". These processes along with high rates of immigration, racialisation and ethnic differentiation would seem to guarantee the existence of the iti tangata Kuki Irani for some time to come.

Chapter 7

Social Dramatizations: Contexts of Reflexivity and Ethnic Improvisation

Introduction

The importance of social dramatizations in most societies has been widely remarked in anthropological literature (Gluckman, 1954; Turner, 1974; Nadel, 1951; Cohen, 1974b). Various rituals, ceremonies, performances and dances have been said to reinforce group solidarity, display cultural symbols and reiterate accepted norms of behaviour. But it is more likely that

ritual and the sacred do not express the solidarity of the social group nor do they symbolize the constraint of its norms upon the individual. Rather, they bridge the contradiction between norm and action and mediate the alienation of man from his fellow man (Murphy, 1972:243).

Social dramatizations assume a special relevance for minority groupings who are restricted to subservient positions at the periphery of the social order. Whether African kalela dance, carnival in London or fiesta complex in Lima, politico-symbolic dramatizations among migrant populations are retained, invented, borrowed and adapted in the urban context. They provide a useful vehicle for managing internal community ambiguities and external contradictions inherent in their structural position in the political economy. The increased engagement in such dramatizations may also indicate significant transformations or crises in the ordering of their own social relations and perhaps the wider social order (cf. Turner, 1974:37ff). Their popularity and efficacy has less to do with the fact they are 'informal' (Cohen, 1974a) as that they are symbolic instead of overtly 'political' activities (which is what I take it Cohen means to suggest). As such, they do not give the appearance of threatening those domains directly controlled by the ruling class.

Traditionally, "recreative arts like music and dancing" were of central importance in Polynesian cultures (Burrows, 1940: 331). This was eminently true of Tahiti with its elaborate performing troupes (Oliver, 1974) as it was in the Cook Islands (Gill, 1892). Dramatizations of "affective culture" (Kealiinohomoku, 1979) in the form of rituals, ceremonials, cultural performances and weekend socials are as elaborate and perhaps of greater salience among Cook Islanders in New Zealand than in the islands. Problems associated with ethnic organisation, racialisation and class domination in New Zealand along with structural conditions and their ongoing interests in the islands account for why Cook Islanders continue to ritualise, to perform and in particular to dance. Whether it is a church fellowship gathering, a feast following a family rite, celebrating a sporting victory, a private party, a weekend social or the visit of a culture troupe, the sine qua non of Cook Islands social activity and identity is the dance (see Loomis, n.d. 3).

The development of advanced capitalism is characterised by the increasing domination of the political by the economic. The bourgeoisie is explicitly and primarily concerned to vouchsafe its hold over both levels of society. Only coincidentally and then usually inadvertently, does it insist that its culture per se be the culture of all citizens. Rather, its life style and values -- which guarantee after all its exclusivity -- are accorded piecemeal significance through general consumption patterns and the attempts of the petite bourgeoisie to emulate practices which might secure social mobility (cf. Sahlins, 1980).

When the domination of the ruling class over the economic and political is secure, culture remains unproblematic and assimilation

of minorities the norm. But under conditions of crisis such as the recent New Zealand economic recession and Maori political activism the position of the bourgeoisie comes in for scrutiny and 'dominant culture' is also challenged. In this instance it is necessary to speak of ruling ideology rather than ruling culture (pace Connell, 1977a). Racialisation and ethnic categorisation of migrant labour sanction discrimination and are utilised in political rhetoric to divide the working class. Minorities, or at least their deviant members, are said to comprise a threat to the "New Zealand way of life", synonymous with the values and beliefs of the bourgeoisie.

Unlike kin-based, pre-capitalist societies in which the economic, political and cultural domains are typically intertwined, both Marxism and Capitalism cling to a stereotypical 'museum' notion of culture set aside from daily life, divorced from economic necessity and political power. In New Zealand capital tends to exclude minorities systematically from economic control and political participation as part of its struggle with the working class. At the same time, the welfare State propounds an ideology of egalitarianism which underwrites the individualism strategy (Giddens, 1973) of class structuring employed by capital. Human rights legislation guarantees every citizens access to employment, housing, resources and services irrespective of race, ethnicity or religious affiliation. Such a policy coincides with the denial by political conservatives of the existence of structural inequality and thus the need for positive discrimination.

Since social affairs and culture are treated as having little relevance for economic or political institutions, "multiculturalism" is espoused as an official State policy. Ethnic diversity is

encouraged in those sectors which do not directly challenge ruling class hegemony: 'elective' courses in education, fashion, religion, the arts and entertainment. Such diversity is considered to be impractical (Sahlins, op cit.:167ff) in the more important operations of commerce, industry, banking and government. Not unexpectedly then, organisation on the basis of shared racial or ethnic identity for a greater share of economic or political power, as the Maori Mana Motuhake party or land-rights movement have done are labelled "separatism" and "apartheid" by the ruling class and their political representatives. In consequence structural processes which sustain the Polynesian position in the political economy generate a fundamental contradiction. The so-called enlightened encouragement of ethnic diversity in the cultural sphere in conjunction with its prohibition in the economic and political spheres acts to legitimate paternalist racialisation, discrimination and minority group marginalisation as a separate fraction of the working class. Uncritical acquiescence to the social construction of ethnic/racial diversity as restricted to cultural activities by the migrant 'communities' themselves serves to sustain capital's control over the indigenous workforce and migrant labour. The extent to which such diversity begins to encroach upon dominant economic and political institutions⁽¹⁾ constitutes a new and unprecedented challenge to the bourgeoisie. As Cohen (1974a:xvi) has remarked, the symbolic activities I have called social dramatizations

(1)For instance, the urban marae as a new political base for Maori community organisation and consciousness, and the emergence of Maori agricultural cooperatives, investment trusts and international business ventures. It is perhaps instructive that the recent controversy between Maori International company executives and local Rotorua Maoris centres on the conflict between capitalist practices aimed at profit and their threat to customary Maori values.

comprise part of the cultural universe of ethnic groups which, though formally non-political, may become politicised in the course of social action.

Given the conditions which pertain in New Zealand, it is not expedient for most groupings within the Polynesian social category to organise for greater political and economic power on the basis of ethnic identity. Instead, their organisation tends to be patterned after the voluntary association which is aimed at self-help and public charity, and centred around symbolic activities in the 'private' domain (Eidheim, 1969). Whether private or public, formal or informal, for Cook Islanders these activities usually involve ceremonial, ritual and performative social dramatizations which in turn mediate a complex of ideological issues relating to their position in the wider society. In consequence these symbolic activities become loaded with additional meanings and techniques from those in the islands. Some of these problematic meanings are handled tacitly within the aesthetic codes or double entendre of the events themselves, while others are specified in dramaturgical discourse. Irrespective of their precise form, Cook Islander dramatizations are contexts of reflexivity and improvisation within which they experience, evaluate, feel and act out a variety of responses to their day-to-day life as Cook Islanders in New Zealand. (2)

(2) I reject the notion that such dramatizations are mere "enactments" of a formula, pattern or set of rules pre-existent and independent of the performance itself. Similarly, Bourdieu (1977:114ff) criticises the logicalism of Structuralism which abstracts form from performance. Performance and creativity are dialectically related to Structure, an understanding which is crucial to the way I am employing the concept of improvisation, both in performance and in daily life.

As Cohen has recently suggested,

the study of sociocultural change becomes the analysis of the creation or transformation of dramatic forms -- their production, direction, authentication, techniques and performance (p1 156)....[Techniques such as] music, dance, dress, poetry, rhetoric and commensality (1981: 207ff).

In addition one must consider the transformation which such dramatic events may occasion in relations between participants in the performance and their own social relations as well as alter contexts situated in the wider society. The remainder of this chapter sets out to explore Cook Islander dramatizations and their 'political' significance for both the ethnic community and New Zealand society generally.

Dramatizations as Contexts of Reflexivity and Improvisation

A context of reflexivity and improvisation is a bounded sequence of symbolic action, delimited in space, time and relations set aside from ordinary purposeful social activity (cf. Cohen, 1981:156). Within such dramaturgical contexts Cook Islanders think about, experience and act out what it means to be a Cook Islander in New Zealand. Individual participants have the opportunity to do so in response not to the 'objective conditions' of their existence, but

to the practical interpretation which he produces of those conditions, and the principle of which is the socially constituted schemes of his habitus (Bourdieu, 1977:116).

My primary focus in this chapter is how these dramaturgical performances (symbolic contexts in their own right) address problems emergent in the wider society. I shall consider the dialectic between cultural performance, structural position and the daily improvisations of Cook Islanders. For this purpose, I must elaborate

briefly on the notions of context and performance, and how participants and external contexts may be affected by such symbolic dramatizations.

A context is a matrix of elements (eg. objects, actions, symbols and identities) and their interrelationships which taken together constitute a particular framework of meaning and action (Kapferer, 1979a:3-4). Workplace, home and leisure activities are examples of everyday contexts. I follow Turner's distinction between ritual and ceremony (1967:95): rituals are symbolic activity having to do with social transitions and are at least intended to be transformative, while ceremonials are symbolic activity dealing with social states and thus are confirmational. I am here broadening his use of "religious behaviour" to symbolic activity so as to be able to speak of the entire range of dramatizations in which Cook Islanders engage. This distinction between kinds of dramatization can be juxtaposed with the distinction I made between performance and real life or social contexts, to generate the following analytic model which I use in this chapter:

	dramatic context	social context
transformative dramas		
confirmational dramas		

For a transformation to occur during a ritual-like performance, the contextual elements and their relations must be incorporated and altered.

In everyday life we move with relative ease from one context to another. We wear different hats, play various roles and accede to prescribed social behaviour whereby basic institutions are reproduced with minor modifications from day to day. Most contexts -- traffic codes, production -- are heavily overlaid by necessity, though there is still room for individual responsibility and improvisation. In contending from the outset that structures determine human practice but themselves are contingent upon the decisions and actions of social actors, I mean to indicate this basic dialectic and the means by which separate contexts and the social order generally are reproduced but may be transformed.

Similarly, participants and audience may move into and out of performance contexts without a transformation taking place. Symbolic dramatizations are often confirmational, even though they may contain important transcendent moments. But only occasionally is there a rearrangement of constitutive elements and their relations in the ritual, much less in the wider social structure. The catalyst to a transformation taking place is when certain inconsistencies, ambiguities or contradictions appear and must be confronted (Kapferer, Op cit.:5) I suggest this is likely to occur when alternative meanings are made to clash in the dramaturgy, or when two or more external contexts which are incongruent meet within the performative event. On the other hand, ceremonies or confirmational dramas can shift from one context to another without effecting a transformation of one in terms of the other. In this instance it is perhaps a misnomer to call them 'transcendent' though they usually if indirectly are confirmational of the external order. Often by engaging in such dramas, participants are in effect transported sideways to an alternative context of meaning and action

from that which they are used to, or even from that set down by the dominant class or culture. When such dramtizations end, participants return to their daily lives with prior contexts re-established as before, though there may be significant consequences for the way they behave in that everyday world. In situations of rapid urbanisation or social change, migrant minorities become skilled in moving back and forth between these parallel contexts of meaning, especially if their marginal position continues for long.

Rituals and similar symbolic dramatizations have transformative consequences for contexts and identities outside their performative setting. For Cook Islanders there are contexts which are essentially defined by shared ethnic identity, and those defined and dominated by bourgeois, Pakeha society. Sometimes these contexts undergo dramatic change through symbolic as well as political action. Whether this is true of any Cook Islander performative events in New Zealand, which particular contexts outside the drama are affected and how these transformations come about in the performance are issues which I intend to explore. I am interested to discover the extent to which contexts of action and meaning in the wider society are addressed in ethnic dramatizations, whether they are transformed or confirmed, and how they deal with issues within the ethnic community itself.

Cook Islanders in Auckland engage in a variety of social dramatizations which have different purposes and significance for their daily lives and for their identity as Cook Islanders (Figure 1) There are rituals which are under the control of the Church and its leadership and at the other extreme those dramatizations which are at the periphery of formal community control, such as

Figure 1

Some Typical Cultural Dramatizations of
Cook Islanders in Auckland

EVENT

Church events

Sunday services ——— Uapou fellowship
 |
 Mortuary sequence
 funeral-family-apare-eva-headstone service unveiling

Family and/or Island functions

Wedding ——— Haircutting ——— 21st Birthday

Social/leisure occasions

Tere party performances, cultural groups & competitions sports — socials & private parties

ORGANISATION

Church (ekalesia)

Family (hōpu tangata)

Island association (enua)

Sports/culture groups

SETTING

Church/sacred area

Church hall

Church/church hall

Church hall or
Community hall

Church hall or
community hall

Community hall or
private venue

weekend socials (dances) and drinking parties. Events such as haircuttings, which Cook Islanders call family occasions, fall between religious and secular activities. Interestingly enough, they are ritual-like in organisation and purpose, but ceremonial (confirmational) in result. In this chapter I will consider three of the most important Cook Islander social dramatizations. The first, the uapou (hymn festival) is a church event while the pakotianga rauru (haircutting) rite is a family event at which church and lineage elders are invited to officiate. Finally, I shall examine visiting tere-party culture troupe performances which combine family, enua and social/dance in one and are of paramount significance in the maintenance of the ethnic community in New Zealand.

The Uapou

The term uapou means to strive or struggle, to work hard or study intensely (Savage, 1962:427). It also refers to occasions when a group of church members gather together to sing hymns, deliver spontaneous speeches on selected Scripture texts and make donations to the work of the Church. An uapou may take place immediately following a worship service, though they are often held as a separate event. In the islands most local churches hold an uapou as part of Christmas week festivities, and during the Cook Islands Congregational Church annual prayer week in January. The uapou can be held as a part of an apare (wake) during a funeral sequence. The largest uapou is the annual three-day conference of the national Uapou Fellowship in New Zealand, when congregational delegations from all over the country come together for study, singing, worship and dance-items.


The purpose of most uapou is to strengthen participants in their faith, their knowledge of the Bible and their practical skills as churchmen. It is also an occasion in which groups and individuals compete in making monetary donations to the church, a purpose for which the uapou was introduced by the early missionaries. The upaou is an evangelistic as well as a diachonal tool. Potential converts and new church members are invited to participate in preparing hymns for the event, and coached in readying responses to pre-selected biblical questions which they stand and read on the day of the event.

The uapou as a happening is hardly as pedantic as I have made it sound. The essence of the proceedings is humour, competition and celebration. Participants in the uapou are always seated in groups for the duration of the event, ranged against one another in a spirit of friendly rivalry. Usually the groups are organised on the basis of island of origin, village or by ekalesia (congregation). An individual holds many of these identities simultaneously, and must decide in which group to participate based on the nature of his present social commitments, the nature of the event itself, the immediate dramaturgical opportunities which present themselves and estimate of future interests.

The uapou can be a rather large and grand occasion, as seen in the following diagram of the annual Uapou Fellowship convention in Auckland in the middle of 1980 (Figure 2). On this particular occasion the audience was arranged by ekalesia from different locations through New Zealand, each having the women seated in front and the men at the rear. There are also usually a large number of small children and a few mapu (young adults) present who may not take an active part. They play outside the hall or sit

FIG. NO. 2

SETTING AND ACTION FLOW FOR THE N.Z.
UAPOU FELLOWSHIP CONFERENCE, May, 1980



around the periphery, and are expected not to make a nuisance of themselves.

The uapou is typically arranged into four episodes which flow together with little interruption. There is an opening rite including prayers or a worship service. Then an orometua (pastor) or tiakono (Elder) stands at the head table and sets the context for the chosen scriptural texts, which he puts in the form of questions to be answered. When he is finished, he invites speakers from each group in clockwise fashion to stand and reply. A sort of competition develops between individual speakers as more seasoned orators enter the fray. Speakers are judged informally by onlookers on who has the most style (mana), the most clever answer, who displays the best command of the Bible and old legends, or which speaker can most subtly disparage the efforts of the person preceding him without causing affront. The cumulative performances of any group's orators can bring prestige to the entire group. The minister or Elder closes the first part of the uapou with a brief homily of his own in which he draws together the best responses from the congregation and concludes with his own authoritative summary of what the scriptural text means.

The next episode of the uapou combines competitive singing, spontaneous dancing and monetary donations. Each group has a tutara (leader) who is a choir director/composer cum teacher. During the singing, he leads by example from the front of the group, exhorting his members to sing more lustily and clowning with the other groups. In his position he comes in for considerable good-humoured banter from onlookers. In this second episode the groups perform again in a clockwise manner, singing ute (ballads) and imene (hymns) created specially for the occasion. Groups not

competing are expected to place monetary contributions in a central basket to "show their appreciation" for the efforts of the performing group. While one group is singing, listeners shout rude comments, gesture and approach the donation basket waving currency they hold high for all to see. Many girls and older 'mamas' often dance up to the donation basket, and then move over to the front of the performing party in a meleé of swaying hips, laughter and singing. Sometimes men from other groups slip over to join the men at the rear of the performing group, but almost never do they dance with the women since such implicit sexual gestures are not considered appropriate for a church activity. The event concludes when all the songs are sung. The amount raised is announced from the head table⁽³⁾ after which a benedictory prayer is said and all are farewelled.

The uapou is an important context of reflexivity and performance of Cook Islander identity, though primarily attended by faithful church members and proselytes. The Church is still the principal institution for providing leadership training, encouragement of community participation and a customary status ranking. It sees itself as charged with the tupuanga (growing up) of people as Cook Islanders into positions of responsibility in the guidance of the people. Active church members often play important leadership roles in their kopu tangata, life crisis rituals, enua functions and in the activities of sports and culture groups. Thus, the issues and contexts addressed in the uapou

(3) A small uapou attended by some 150 people from five different ekalesia in 1980 raised approximately \$1500. The amount of \$10 per person was the typical monetary donation given at such ceremonies and performative events during my fieldwork, though most people also gave some sort of food contribution as well.

are those of most widespread interest and urgency to the ethnic community per se.

In turning to a discussion of the ideological content of the uapou I stress that it is an occasion where participants act out their own specific understandings of what it means to be a Cook Islander churchman in New Zealand. In so doing they tacitly respond to those external institutions, categorisations and experiences which often threaten to undermine their faith or the cultural forms that give expression to it. Ideological concerns over external contexts which challenge the hegemony of the Church over the lives of Cook Islanders can be discerned in the homilies and responses to the minister's scriptural questions. But external contexts are also addressed implicitly in the unique amalgam of religious and popular songs and irreligious dancing within a church setting where Cook Islanders spontaneously embrace and improvise aspects of their ethnic identity. I propose to discuss the oratorical rhetoric, setting and dramaturgy of the uapou, before attempting to consider whether the uapou is transformational or confirmational, how it accomplished its 'work' and how it mediates between the participants, the ethnic community and the society at large.

The oratory communicates at two levels: the explicit content of the speeches and the implicit form of the message. In regard to the latter speakers stand while others remain seated, assuming a stance of authority. When they are done, they sit and another takes their place. It is impolite to stand and interrupt one who has the floor, no matter how long or inept his speech may be. An orator who wishes to insure the attention of everyone present comes to the centre to speak. Part of being an effective leader is being

a forceful speaker, commanding space, taking authority by risking and standing out. The ethos is egalitarian, set in stylistic constraints of politeness and respect. Anyone can speak. Indeed, the upaou is one setting in which women often surpass men in public performance⁽⁴⁾. Youth as well as older people, new members as well as old can speak. The challenge is to accomplish a successful presentation before one's peers. There is a formal hierarchy with the orometua at the head table, and deacons flanked around. But ideally, anyone may aspire to leadership by efficacious performance.

Certain themes within the oratory are consistent with the customary ethos of the uapou itself, while others clearly reveal that ideological work is being done. Usually the minister and Elders stress in the speeches metaphors of striving together, helping one another and supporting the work of the Church. As one Elder stated, the uapou is "Christian endeavour" which joins people in a common purpose. Individual's monetary donations are a tangible sign of their faith and commitment to the Church. Uapou oratory is seldom aimed expressly at contexts outside the Cook Islands community. On the other hand, there are familiar problems addressed which deal with biblical texts and matters of faith which all participants understand relate to matters in the ethnic community or concerns stemming from experiences of New Zealand society generally. This is to be expected, since many speakers are engaged in ethnic organisations outside the Church where these matters are felt, and they take their moral and

(4) The popular image of the placid, compliant Polynesian woman is a false stereotype, albeit a convenient one for the likes of tourism promoters and factory managers. Cook Islands women are the backbone of practical enablement of most feasts, rituals and other community activities. They are forceful debaters and exert considerable political influence in groups, at home and through the "coconut wireless" (gossip network).

political responsibilities seriously.

Two common oratorical themes are illustrative. One has to do with the issue of cooperative support rather than selfish individualism. The other centres on obedience to authority and upright moral behaviour. These rhetorical targets constitute points of danger and threat, points where ideology is always articulated in the social order. They are recognised as problem areas not only for the uapou assembly, but for the Church and Cook Islanders in New Zealand generally. The first is aimed at "bad Cook Islanders" who are not supporting the church or other community activities sufficiently. Such people are said to be "dropping away" and so "cutting themselves off". The second theme is aimed at the mapu who do not attend church as much as in the past, show disrespect for elders and parents, and lag in their support for Cook Islands institutions. These topics concern Cook Islands community leaders greatly, and are stressed at almost every ritual, ceremonial and performative event.

To illustrate, an orometua posed the following question at one recent uapou gathering : "E aa i te mana o te Ovi?" (What is the power of the Serpent? ie. Devil). Audience responses emphasized the craftiness of Satan, and were based on contemporary examples as well as biblical references. In the 1980 Uapou Fellowship conference, the theme of the first question was from Colossians admonishing children to obey their parents and wives to obey their husbands. The second question from Judges dealt with temptations, and the necessity of standing firm in the faith before the blandishments of other 'gods'. These same questions were used as the basis of the songs which the ekalesia from around the country composed for the occasion.

Underlying the public discussion of community problems are developments in the wider New Zealand society, for example low wages and the need to save money, soaring housing costs, alternative leisure pursuits for youth, escalating juvenile school drop-out rates, young Polynesian unemployment, violent crime and gang membership. I reiterate that people respond to their interpretation of the world constituted in the midst of their own experiences, rather than to 'objective reality'. Many Cook Islands leaders are tacitly aware that structural determinants and the actions of the "wealthy" lie behind many of their community problems. Most consider that a low profile of ethnic solidarism and accomodation are the most appropriate and effective strategies at present. More to the point, they are cognizant of pressures from politicians, employers, the welfare bureaucracy and the media that Polynesians themselves solve their problems which they have created. Those causing trouble in New Zealand society are precisely those deviant individuals who have drifted away from the control of their extended families, the Church, their cultural traditions and "their own community". According to ruling ideology, it is up to the elders to maintain order and control "their people".

One may thus more readily appreciate the treble entendre underlying the theme of the prodigal son chosen for the overall image of the 1980 Uapou Fellowship convention: E tuaru au i aere mai ki te 'are o taku Metua (I will arise and go to the house of my Father). Explicitly, it is a direct admonition to mapu who stray morally to mend their ways and return to their families and the Church. At another level, it is also a sentimental metaphor with a subtle status claim attached. The meeting was held in Auckland and hosted by the PIPC church at Edinburgh Street.

Historically, this church was the 'parent' from which came all the other twenty ekalesia founded since the Second World War. The theme reminded everyone of the pre-eminence of Edinburgh Street. At another level, the prodigal son theme constituted a call tinged with pathos to those Cook Islanders who have strayed away from their relatives and friends in the community in New Zealand, a call for them to return 'home' and help. As one woman Elder said,

I think this uapou we're doing is because we live so far away from each other. And it is an opportunity to get together for the Cook Islands people.

From the ideological content of uapou discourse, I turn to a consideration of the ordering of space, the arrangement of participants and audience in the performative setting, and the media by which symbolic action takes place. I am restricting my attention to the nature of the dramatization's effect on audience and participants, and whether it is affirmative or transformational of contexts external to itself. With respect to any performative event it is necessary to consider shifts in spatial configuration and aesthetic media in relationship to each other. The uapou like many Cook Islands rituals and ceremonies belies any simple audience/actor distinction. For analytic clarity, I differentiate those audience members who are passively or actively engaged, and likewise those performers who are passively or actively engaged in the principal symbolic action:

		Involvement	
actor		passively engaged	actively engaged
	audience	passively engaged	actively engaged

By definition, performers are always closer to the action than audience, but who plays these different roles and in what relation to the action may change in any episode, sometimes quite suddenly. The medium of symbolic action is augmented by spatial arrangements to alter the relationship of all the participants to that action, sometimes whether onlookers wish it or not. Principal actors are particularly well-placed to work such shifts, as when Cook Islands orators move to the centre of the uapou arena, or amongst the listening groups thus incorporating them directly into the action.

In the uapou such manoeuvres heighten the dramaturgical process begun at the outset, casting all participants in the role either of passive or active actors. By the end of the uapou there is longer any 'audience' per se. The properties of drama, particularly centring on the oratory of the first episode, create an interlude of intense reflexivity within engagement. This mood is highlighted by the circular seating of the groups ranged around a head table of authoritative orators. The spatial arrangements in each episode and their conjunction with symbolic media progressing from the more reflective (oratory) to the more engaging (song, dance) incorporate participants more and more into the action, thus facilitating the evangelistic goal of the uapou.

The uapou has little consequence for dominant New Zealand institutions or contexts directly. But it does create ethnic community leaders and staunch church members, and their position in the community is of vital interest to the State and Capital. The uapou is therefore crucial for generating and training these ethnic leaders. In the dramaturgy of the event participants are changed progressively through the episodes. In the beginning they are taught moral precepts and churchmanship through the preaching and prayers of the orometua and by their own scriptural homilies.

In the second episode they become passive actors in the speechmaking, and finally involved actors at the conclusion, demonstrating their faith in songs, dancing and donations. In this final episode there is a subtle change of action and spatial definition. Instead of distinct groupings (the ekalesia) participants who have been listening to the various singing groups stand to shout jibes of humour and encouragement, walk to the centre to make their ostentatious donations, and then hurry over to dance and sing with the performing group. In a swirl of action spatial boundaries between separate groups break down as the actors move back and forth across the centre of the arena. All participants are swept up in the transition toward the celebrative communitas (Turner, op cit.) of the final dancing and singing.

Properties inherent in song and dance as media augment the effects of these spatial shifts (cf. Langer, 1953; Kapferer, 1979a, 1983) since they tend to create what Artaud (in Hanna, 1979) calls a "tyranny of involvement". Indeed, the second episode of hymn singing accomplishes greater involvement partly because of its contrast with the mood of introspection of the first episode. There are usually two kinds of songs performed. The first round are called ute and the second imene tuki. The former are by and for the youth, and the latter for older participants. Ute are often composed around a contemporary tune or t.v. program. Imene tuki are based on customary but nonetheless familiar and rhythmic hymns. An ute is a ballad that tells a story, often of love or heroism. The imene tuki (lit. thrusting hymn) is considered to date from missionary times and perhaps before. Some say it takes its name from the grunting sounds the men make as they sing. Most Cook Islanders are at least vaguely aware of the sexual innuendos

embodied in this song form, the women's dancing and the energetic shoulder movements of the men as they rhythmically tuki (grunt/thrust) at the end of each refrain. In this sense the second episode of dancing, song, hilarity and ostentatious waving of currency 'works' dramaturgically precisely because it overturns the formalism, the serious mood and the moralism of the first episode⁽⁶⁾.

For a similar reason, the final episode of the uapou -- the announcement of total donations, the closing homily and prayer -- reaches a state of all-encompassing fellowship. The moment of dénouement is achieved through transcending community divisions and concerns over deviant behaviour, and focussing on the unity of the congregation under God's loving care. The individual monetary donations, which were previously mundane wages, are transformed into a symbol of the corporate fruitfulness of the congregation. The effect of this transition is heightened by the fact that not only have members of competing groups moved back and forth during the hymns and dancing, but in the closing episode they are often seated with friends in other groups.

The uapou is essentially a confirmational or affirmative dramatization which incorporates transitions in the status of participants to faithful churchmen and community leaders within a context which at the same time allows them to 'rebel' through joking activity at the moralism of the church and their own construction as 'responsible community leaders'. The significance of the event for the Cook Islands community is that diverse

(6) Note that the people engaged in these slightly risqué antics are church elders, congregational stalwarts and aspiring youth leaders: pillars of the community. Clerics rationalise that permitting such activities encourages people to donate and participate in church functions. There is evidence from early missionary writings that people retained traditional world-views and employed similar behaviour to 'rebel' against the constraints of the church and European civilisation.

groupings and competing interests are unified in the event, and this network of supportive individuals and congregations continues after the uapou finishes. The uapou also serves to reiterate the central role of the Church in the lives of migrants, reaffirms the place of churchmen as community leaders and gives assurance that urgent ideological issues of ethnic group continuity have been dealt with.

The culturally specific form and style of the uapou from which stem much of its emotional appeal, constitute an effective dramatic context of reflexivity and improvisation regarding Cook Islander identity. In terms of its effects on external contexts the uapou as an ideological vehicle has direct significance for those increasingly limited contexts already controlled by the Church or its leaders: Sunday services, baptisms, weddings, funerals and the enua associations. The uapou is essentially affirmative of these external contexts of meaning and action within the ethnic community. It does not transform or directly address contexts or institutions in the wider society, nor does it have a major impact on those many families avoiding participation in the reciprocity system, nor the structural determinants of that avoidance activity. Indeed, since the uapou reproduces trained 'community leaders' and authenticates their role in a form acceptable to the State and capital, and since it largely locates the blame for their social predicaments on Cook Islanders themselves, the uapou is essentially affirmative of the dominant social order.

The Pakotianga Rauru (Haircutting) Ritual

The pakotianga rauru is a ritual in which a small boy's long hair is publically cut. It contains instructive dramatic properties and demonstrates some important themes central to Cook Islands culture in New Zealand. Some elders claim it replicates traditional initiation practices, which is dubious in view of historical accounts. More likely it is a missionary invention which in New Zealand has become more complex and more popular than the rite as practised in the islands (Baddeley, personal communication, 1981; MacKenzie, personal communication, 1983).

More Cook Islanders attend a haircutting annually than most other ritual or performative events except tere-party performances and weekend socials (1981 fieldwork survey). The ritual has gained in popularity and been transformed due to a combination of its utilitarian value to its sponsors and its aesthetic appeal to participants. The ritual also takes account of issues and individuals not directly engaged in the performative event itself. Part of the ideological and social significance of the haircutting is whether and how it addresses these wider contexts. Yet, the most important reason for considering the haircutting is that hair has become an important symbol of minority alternative values and political radicalism among Polynesian activists in New Zealand.

While the haircutting occurs as a dramatic unity with few breaks, certain episodic sequences can be discerned on the basis of shifts in symbolic activity and mood (see Loomis, 1983). The opening episode is comprised of an elaborate welcome by the orator (called the 'emcee') to the assembled kin, friends and special guests. The welcome cuts short extraneous movement and talk, marks the start and defines those present as an audience. The orator --

usually an invited church Elder -- explains the significance of the event and the procedure to be followed. An orometua offers a prayer for the success of the haircutting, and an imene may be sung.

In the second episode the boy's hair is cut. The procedures by which this is accomplished are carefully orchestrated and imbued with a complex of symbolic meanings. Everyone present has the opportunity to cut a strand of the child's hair, which has been tied with hundreds of ribbons. The person doing the cutting comes forward when his name is called, hands over his donation to a close relative assisting and cuts off a ribboned strand of hair with scissors handed to him by the boy's mother. Everyone called brings an envelope of cash, usually \$10-20, which they sometimes place on the white sheet tied around the boy's neck. Or they may place cash directly in the boy's hands so he ends the rite holding a large roll of bills, envelopes cascading down the white sheet and colourful gifts stacked about him. In any case there is a clear homology between his hair and the gifts, the one being a form of compensation for the other. The orator calls out names from a list of numbered invitations, the order of which has been agreed upon previously by the sponsoring family. When there are no more guests who wish to make a cut (and a donation), a close male relative -- usually FB or MB -- comes forward and trims the boy's hair so the is 'respectable' in appearance.

In the third and concluding episode the master of ceremonies thanks everyone for their generosity on behalf of the sponsoring family, the boy is formally presented to the assemblage, a prayer (pure kai) is said and then everyone rushes to the heavily-laden tables to help themselves to food. The familiar three-stage model of the life crisis ritual (Van Gennep, 1960:65ff) will be apparent to the reader. Usually the close kin on F's and M's tua (sides)

join the boy and honoured guests at the head table. After everyone has eaten, there are brief speeches. During these, representatives of the host family express their appreciation to guests for their help and gifts. The orator then concludes by thanking everyone and dismissing the audience. At this point, people again rush the tables to bundle up the surplus food to take home with them.

I now turn to unpacking some of the ideological themes common to haircuttings, how they are linked to symbolic meanings of hair and cutting, and then consider how these are underscored through spatial arrangements and aesthetic media of the dramatization. I begin with status-ranking of guests, then gift-giving and feasting, and finally the cutting of the hair itself which is, after all, the central activity of the ritual.

If ideology addresses itself to ambivalences or emergent contradictions, then one major problem is the status-ranking of the audience and the authority of leaders. I have argued elsewhere (Loomis, 1983; n.d. 1) that the increased popularity of the haircutting in New Zealand stems from the fact that it is a dramatization initiated and controlled by the immediate family of the boy. It places demands for assistance on a remarkably wide range of bilateral kin within a sector of the Cook Islands reciprocity system. Thus, beginning with the ritual and usually lasting throughout the boy's life, an 'action grouping' or kindred (cf. Freeman, 1960; Baddeley, 1978) is constituted which funnels resources to the boy and his immediate family. I suggest that this kindred is not as ephemeral as Baddeley has contended, and may in fact be part of a larger set of continuing activities by which the kopu tangata as an ongoing 'corporation' is reproduced -- in Baddeley's terms, how occasions which call together ego's kopu tangata₂ serve to maintain and strength the kopu tangata₄

(Ibid.:144ff). Nevertheless, the problem immediately is what one orator called this "big, happy family" must somehow be activated to help the boy and status-ranked in relation to one another to function as an effective kopu tangata. The audience is ordered on the basis of kinship proximity, line of descent from a traditional tao'anga (title), extent of participation in family affairs and contemporary relationships such as whether one is a neighbour or workmate.

Special guests are also allocated a position in the status hierarchy and situated centrally to the symbolic action. They are often important in the family's day-to-day world outside the ethnic community, such as work, the neighbourhood, and seeking assistance from local politicians, solicitors, and public service officers. These guests are effectively incorporated into putative kinship relations in the kopu tangata by means of the haircutting. In consequence the potential is there for the development of effective patron-client relationships bridging into some of those same day-to-day contexts. It is difficult for an employer, landlord or welfare officer to maintain a strictly formal or contractual relationship with the host family when he has been treated with such public deference, to say nothing of having been informally adopted as one of the family⁽⁷⁾.

Of equal importance to the status-ranking of the participants is the authority of the elders, and this problem centres around

(7) See Sahlins (1965) on the distinction between generalised, balanced and negative reciprocity. Unlike many community elders, families seldom go out of their way to recruit European guests who are 'strategically placed' in New Zealand society. The sociological brokerage model often falls prey to a gregarious voluntarism. Families may invite a Papa'a not calculating some utilitarian value, but because of some pre-existing close relationship. Sometimes these relationships turn out to be helpful for Cook Islanders in external contexts.

the recurrent debate over whether the haircutting is 'traditional'. Cook Islanders themselves argue about the rules, content and procedures of the ritual, and who will define what they are doing as authentic. These arguments can encompass significant conflicts of political or economic interests among various factions. They also indicate points at which the ethnic organisation is under threat from outside societal developments.

With respect to the haircutting in New Zealand, both dimensions of the problem are related. Church and community leaders, along with those who claim to be tumu korero (culture authorities) engage vociferously in the debate over haircutting tradition (see Loomis, 1983). In so doing they address two ideological problems stemming from their perceptions of a decline in their prestige and authority. The first has to do with elders' waning influence over the mapu. The second has to do with competing institutional status recognition in New Zealand society, thus less respect for elders in most external contexts other than "cultural" ones. Elders struggle to retain a position of social standing largely within ethnic associations, and through the reciprocal obligations they build up over a period of time. They also vie among themselves for who will be recognised as an authority. This can mean not only occasional veiled disparagement of other elders, but speaking out during rituals and performances against youth dropping out and families who are not supporting their fellow Cook Islanders with their presence and resources.

After status and authority, another important ideological theme in the haircutting centres on the practice of gift-giving. The essence of Cook Islands culture is selfless giving. It is also the key to the unity of Cook Islanders wherever they happen to reside. Money, gifts and participants arrive from all over New

Zealand and even from the islands for the haircutting. Giving gifts to kin, friends and strangers alike without counting the cost or reason is "love in action". Because Cook Islanders find themselves surrounded by a society that places a premium on self-interest and competitiveness, the customary norm of largess emerges in the haircutting as an ideological issue juxtaposed overagainst 'deviant' Cook Islander practices which mirror some of the perceived negative values of the host society. The giving of tikero (money envelopes) and the mounting stack of gaily-wrapped presents around the boy are potent symbols of the efficacy of communal assistance and a condemnation of selfishness. They also communicate against the backdrop of dominant culture of class the subordination of the material to the moral; and in the gifting the moral and the material in a secular transubstantiation become the equivalent of one another.

During real life crises, the community of reciprocity constitutes "our insurance policy" as one recently-bereaved widow expressed it. The 'good' Cook Islander makes repeated, generous contributions on every occasion throughout his life, relying on the obligations he builds up to support him ten-fold when he himself is in need. Thus, both the symbolic act of prestation, and the oratory about it, emphasise the propriety of giving in the Cook Islands way versus the Papa'a way. At the same time, the haircutting highlights the continual threat to the existence of the reciprocity system (and to the separation of the moral from the material) in New Zealand. Families failing in their obligations are prime targets, precisely because they are acting on temptations many feel to break free of the burden of obligations and go their own way. Yet, it is usually only implicit in the oratory that economic recession and class exploitation pressure more people to

migrate to New Zealand further burdening the reciprocity system, limiting resources available to the ethnic community and forcing families to cling to what little they have.

The theme of ample giving in the face of economic deprivation is particularly apparent in the feasting. Providing abundant food for guests to eat and take home is both customary and of critical importance to the family who wishes to sponsor a good haircutting. In some respects the feast is the family's return gift for the generosity of the guests. The abundance and variety of food communicate the love and selflessness of the sponsoring family. It also signifies the strength of the combined kopu tangata and the extent of their love for the boy that they are able to gather together such huge amounts of food. Once again, the ideological messages communicated by the feasting need to be attended to. This supportive kindred stands as an ideal to be emulated in contrast to those who are fragmenting or which lack sufficient resources to be generous. Everyone wishes to avoid putting on a "cheap haircutting" (Loomis, n.d. 1), a sure sign of which is not providing sufficient food. The large amount and variety of food carefully arranged in piles on the tables communicates abundance, the power of corporateness. And when helpers come sweeping in as stocks are running low with more food, both the generosity of the sponsors and the value of unity are dramatically underscored. The food and feasting together (see Cohen, 1981:211-212; "commensality") address the potential for fragmentation of the reciprocity system and enact a moment of *communitas* all can enjoy together precisely because the threat is so real.

The act of cutting the boy's hair is imbued with even more obtuse symbolic significance which can only be grasped in respect to their external referents. I have dealt with these at greater

length elsewhere (Loomis, n.d.1). The avowed purpose of the ritual is to facilitate the transition of the boy to the status of a young man. He is usually the mataiapo (first-born male) of the immediate family, and thus destined to lead his kopu tangata. Some boys are also in line for a lineage title, and their haircutting is that much more important. In either case the kindred joins together to demonstrate their support for the boy. Cutting his hair symbolises he is, as one orator stated, not a "girl" anymore. Each person making a cut and leaving a gift takes away a strand of his hair, to remind him of the occasion and to symbolise his ongoing concern for the boy's welfare. In metaphoric fashion -- though Cook Islanders do not use this image -- the kindred is bound together by the boy's locks of hair. Customarily at least, the head was tapu and the hair the locus of mana. In this sense participants share vicarious power through the boy, which is pragmatically their corporate power as a united kopu tangata. Dialectically, the boy becoming a man is at the same time the empowerment or rebirthing of the community, though the contemporary meanings of cutting the hair in the New Zealand context contradict this possibility as I demonstrate below.

Tacitly, the haircutting deals with anomalies arising from contexts elsewhere in the ethnic community's life as well as the larger social order. In the oratory elders often take the opportunity to "hit the people hard" as one said, over the fact that for instance many mapu are missing. The boy having his hair cut thus becomes a symbol of all Cook Islander youth, and the cutting -- done by kin and friends in relatively formal European attire -- is an enactment of the ethnic community's establishing control over him. A control which is, it will be

remembered, insisted upon by the State and capital. The ritual act as well as the pressures from the ruling class need to be seen against the upsurge of interest by many Polynesian youth in reggae music, wearing Rastafarian-style 'dreadlocks' and more recently bop/break dancing in the streets in defiance of European norms of propriety. In the instance of some Maoris the dreadlocks are a political statement of ethnic pride and a demand for land rights, but most wear such styles as a symbol of their rejection of dominant ideology.

But the haircutting act is important to the dominant class because of its social control motif. Conservative politicians, business leaders and the media continue to point to Polynesian gangs, unemployed youth (who have dropped out of school) and criminals as deviants who threaten the established order, and for whom the 'extended family' and ethnic community are ultimately responsible for policing. Thus cutting the boy's hair is addressed to these problematic external pressures which threaten Cook Islander status and advancement in New Zealand, and by which they seek once again to establish themselves as 'good Polynesians'.

Let me now turn briefly to the spatial arrangements and aesthetic media of the haircutting. The principal medium throughout the ritual is oratory, set within various dramatic acts. As drama, the oratory and accompanying characterisations and gestures heighten the reflexive, ideological functions so integral to the haircutting as presently constituted. Nonetheless, where it manages what Shechner (1976) calls a balance of efficaciousness (ritual) and entertainment (theatre), the ritual has the potential to work a fundamental transformation on participants and certain external contexts.

The orator begins and concludes each episode, calls out the names of people invited to make a cut and maintains a running monologue of jokes and encouragement. In such a starring role

he is in an advantageous position from which to communicate ideological propositions with little direct opposition. He is also well-placed, due to popular ambivalence over the definition of a "proper" ritual, to orchestrate proceedings and attribute meaning to the dramatic action more or less as he chooses. He acquires additional prestige for a well-produced haircutting.

During the first two episodes, the focus of symbolic action is on the boy, shifting to the group's communal feast during the final scene. The invariably large crowd of several hundred, sitting around row upon row of tables laden with sumptuous food is certainly an impressive sight. But it is the boy to whom everyone pays attention, and to whom much of the oratory is addressed. Usually, he is seated behind and above the head table at the front of the hall. His mother stands beside him with the scissors, and others from the immediate family are nearby helping with gifts. Grandparents are likely to be seated at the head table. The boy's father and others help with practical matters behind the scenes. The orator stands ahead and slightly to one side, himself a mediator between these initially passive actors and the passive audience.

In the first episode there is little visual movement. The spatial arrangements formally separate the main parties to the action: the wider kopu tangata, the boy and sponsoring family and the emcee. Most participants are thus detached from direct engagement, able to reflect on the ritual discourse but also keenly anticipating the next scenes. The mood of anticipation is heightened by the boy's appearance. He sits on a raised chair, sometimes on a stage at the front of the hall, covered in a white sheet as in a barber's shop. Other than this, his location and appearance highlight his liminal state. The boy in effect

enters the ritual already in a supermundane status and is progressively introduced back into the world of men by the cutting. In the beginning his best European-style clothes, bought specially for the occasion, are hidden by the white sheet. His long hair is tied in hundreds of white or blue ribbons, giving him an asexual, ethereal appearance not unlike an angel. He sits atop a 'throne' covered with an assortment of colourful, handmade tivaevae (bedspreads), iti (delicate lace pieces) and other gifts. His marvelous appearance is enhanced both by the mounting pile of presents and the deference with which his mother and her assistants treat him.

In the first episode by way of speeches, singing and praying the rite is set within a framework of oneness under God's protection. In the second episode the boy's 'actual' family and the audience of 'potential' kin are gradually united -- indeed, operationalised -- by the shared acts of prestation and cutting. The separation between the two is subsumed as participants take on the role of his own immediate family. That is, they engage in ordinary 'parently' acts toward him: speaking soothingly to him, giving him financial support, cutting his hair and later sharing a meal with him. A change of status also occurs dramaturgically by intervening into his ritual space. By the sequence of such individual acts, the entire audience is transformed spatially and imaginally into active participants, becoming his larger family both symbolically and by the establishment of reciprocal obligations.

In the third episode the assembly, including European guests, is further transformed into a united kindred by taking food together, another mundane activity lifted to symbolic

proportions in the rite. The central transformations of the status of the boy and his wider family are facilitated by the conjunction of various spatial re-arrangements and symbolic actions in which everyday contexts -- particularly the nuclear family itself -- enter into and are utilised in the drama at key transcendent moments (cf. Kapferer, 1979a). If the orator has been particularly successful in marking these turning-points, such as the final trimming of the boy's hair and his formal presentation to the kopu tangata, then the meal will be an occasion of true *communitas* and the closing benediction and farewell an emotionally intense moment.

The haircutting is generally successful as a catalyst to the transformation of potential reciprocal relationships within , and sometimes outside, the Cook Islands community into an actualised, 'temporary' action grouping constituted with reference to the boy. The ritual effects an important, continuing change in the boy's home context and also in certain specific relationships in the wider society. Certain European and Polynesian guests may by their participation enter into a continuing relationship of mutual support with the boy and his family, though this is usually only sporadic and seldom includes helping him meet his ritual obligations to others.

The haircutting furthermore illustrates the way in which external contexts inadvertently enter into and alter the customary meanings and mystificatory rhetoric about this being a 'traditional' ritual. Here external contexts meet at the particular juncture of the cutting of the boy's hair, revealing fundamental contradictions in the stated meanings of the symbolic action. The practical consequence of the ritual is to confirm those very institutions

which shape the lives of Cook Islanders in New Zealand.

For instance, Cook Islander parents' sanctification of the schooling context as the avenue to financial security, along with granting primacy to European public dress standards, is directly responsible for generating a certain amount of confusion in the symbolic meanings of the ritual. The boy is clearly too young (ie. five or six years of age) to be initiated into manhood. The problem stems from parents wishing to avoid their child being shamed by wearing long hair at school, and so insisting his locks are cut when he is still an infant. Many Cook Islands community leaders support parents in what seems a sensible adaptation of custom, thus altering the significance of the haircutting, particularly when set against various ideological issues arising from contemporary developments in New Zealand society such as Polynesian youth wearing long hair as a 'political' sign.

This stylistic capitulation is symbolic of a wider Cook Islander acceptance of the ruling class Pakeha dominated social order, particularly those contexts having to do with employment, housing, education and services from the State. In contrast the wearing of dreadlocks and Afro cuts by some Polynesian youth is perceived by the ruling class as a defiant sign of deviance and separatism. Few Cook Islands youth wear such styles, though many enjoy listening to reggae music with its polemical references to Black pride and oppression. And more recently bop/break dancing which is borrowed from American Blacks, is a competitive demonstration of skill and a rare chance to gain esteem before the whole populace, and has been quickly labelled in New Zealand a "Polynesian" activity. Cook Islander youth would certainly come under heavy pressure from their elders

and parents if they adopted such hair styles, though many have become aficionados of the break/bop dance.

So we return full circle to the ritual of cutting the boy's hair at this particular historical juncture in New Zealand. It is a drama which people enter into cognizant if not of their marginal position, then of the more painful consequences of it, including the stereotypical attitudes and discrimination of many Europeans. In the ritual Cook Islanders come dressed in middle class, European dress for the most part. They come to establish control over this 'dangerous' youth. Dangerous because he is a symbol of each rising generation which must be taught custom and respect for the elders. Dangerous because as a symbol of problem youth in New Zealand⁽⁸⁾, he threatens the accomodation and patronage relations which Cook Islanders have achieved..

The haircutting is essentially a confirmational dramatization, though its effects on two external contexts -- the Cook Islands community and the wider social order -- are in fact a direct contrast and the reason why the ethnic 'category' has been reproduced as an effective force. Granted the obvious social control consequences of the rite which suit the interests of both State and capital (ideological themes of which most participants are aware from their daily experience) the haircutting has also to do with the empowerment of the Cook Islands community.

(8) During 1983 and early 1984, the problem of young Polynesian "street kids" was constructed as a cause célèbre by the welfare State, conservative politicians and the media. These were young teenagers who had apparently rejected the authority of their parents and the school, and had banded together to wander the streets living as they wished and surviving as they might. They became a focus of attention in the continuing ideological pressure on various 'ethnic communities' to control their people. In March 1984 some Cook Islands community leaders were reported in the press as recommending that Cook Islands street kids should be sent back to the islands.

In this sense it stands as a corporate improvisation in the face of existing economic and political conditions and as such a potential threat to the status quo.

It seems likely that the haircutting rite as practised today is the transformation of an earlier missionary-induced ceremony by which the long-haired 'heathen' and his savage ways was converted and 'civilised' symbolically by having his hair cut. Converts to the L.M.S. missions were known as "short-hairs" by unregenerate factions who remained in the bush (Loomis, 1984). Certainly in today's dramatization there is this Samson-like theme which matches dominant ideology and is not out of harmony with the public presentation which Cook Islanders make as good citizens, church-goes and hard workers.

But it is a transformation of the colonial rite because by a circuitous route it is a drama of empowerment and thus 'traditional'. Customarily, the head was the locus of mana, and the hair tapu because of its potency. But Freud and Hallpike (1969) go astray in focussing only on the immediate symbol of the hair and its cutting (signifying castration, impotency and control), without paying attention to the wider social and performative context within which the cutting occurs. In fact the dramatization incorporates cutting and distributing hair, giving and receiving gifts as well as feasting. The young boy becoming a man is highly potent sexually, economically and politically -- a potency which must be constrained. Young men -- as missionaries and ruling class alike know -- threaten the community in their potency which is a dual power of creativity and destruction. The drama of cutting and distribution of his hair transforms power that is dangerous into potency which

is productive because it is regenerated as in the basic live-die-live sequence of the seasons or resurrection. In a form of secular eucharist the distribution of the locks of hair is a distribution of his potency, his potential fruitfulness among the community whereby he is integrated or reordered in the community. But also the community is appropriating the boy's (rising generation's) potency and, in the distribution of hair, of gifts, of money and of food, revitalizing itself. The distribution of the potent hair becomes a symbol of gifts, money, food and other resources of the community which in drama after drama reconstitutes the reciprocity system which is the potency of the community in adversity. So that at the conclusion of the haircutting the social significance has been to reiterate and acknowledge, however tacitly, acquiescence to dominant ideology at the same time the kopu tangata has been reconstituted at a wider range and the network of lasting reciprocal obligations strengthened.

The Tere-party Culture Troupe Performance

The tere-party is a group of people who travel together to the islands or to New Zealand to visit kin and friends, to see the sights and to raise funds for some charitable purpose, usually through a series of culture-troupe performances. I am here concerned primarily with those groups, usually four or five annually which travel from the islands to New Zealand to raise funds for church halls, community buildings and similar projects back in the islands.

The typical tere-party performance varies little in format or style from that presented by semi-professional troupes for

tourists or civic functions. The crucial distinction is that tere-party entertainment occurs within a Cook Islander-defined and controlled dramatic context, with a Cook Islander audience who have gathered together expressly to give a welcome of aro'a (love), feasting, oratory and financial support to the visitors. Besides the common interests underlying the occasion and the composition of the audience, the tere performance also relies upon and recreates a different aesthetic code and set of symbolic meanings from that of similar dramatizations in contexts external to the Cook Islands community in which bourgeois, European culture dominates.

Throughout their tour the tere-party serves as a catalyst to the gathering of a sequence of intra-ethnic groupings, some more formally organised and persistent than others within the existing Cook Islander kinship and reciprocity network in New Zealand. This network itself is constituted on the basis of shared interests (Cohen, 1974a, 1974b) lodged in a variety of ascribed and chosen identities including kinship pirianga (connectedness), oire (village), district or enua (island), ekalesia (congregation) affiliation or any combination of these.

The performance-event is comprised of a number of episodes, characterised by specific motifs, spatial configurations and forms of symbolic action. First, there is the kaikai (feast) which begins with the honorary seating of guests, a welcome and prayers and concludes with a series of oratorical exchanges between speakers from the host group and the tere-party. The second episode is the tere-troupe performance, arranged into component aitamu (items) of action songs, drum dances, imene (hymns) and sometimes a nuku (pageant). The event concludes with the announcement of the total amount donated for the evening, final speeches of appreciation,

and a closing prayer. Most such events are held in church or community halls, usually crowded with Cook Islanders and a few Papa'a guests.

The tere-party performance takes its appeal from the effectiveness with which it transforms participants' identities and relationships and transcends contexts of meaning and action outside the ethnic community. In so doing it permanently alters a few specific external relationships with invited guests. But the real world of class-divided, Pakeha-dominated New Zealand society is waiting when the drums and dancing stop.

The tere-party performance is transcendent and popular because it is essentially a joke, albeit a serious one. The entire event has the effect of revealing what Mary Douglas called the 'joke in the structure,' in this case a tragicomic joke: Cook Islanders perceive themselves not as the people that discriminatory stereotypes make them out to be. They are forced to acquiesce to these categorisations because of their economic and political powerlessness, and the 'official' restriction of ethnic diversity to cultural activities. The tragedy is that the performance has no lasting transformative effect on their marginal position, nor on New Zealand society. To the extent that the Church insists on equating Cook Islander identity with law-abiding citizenship, worship attendance and upright moral behaviour, it also helps maintain Cook Islanders' position. For this reason the joking in the performance is also against moralistic, straight-laced forms of Christianity and its representatives.

The essence of the performance is comedy. Comedy, as Kapferer (1983) states is an attack on form, especially on limiting form. This is the role of the humour, spoofs, inuendos and obscenities which punctuate the second episode of dance and mime.

They highlight the joke in both the structure of the performance and in the wider social order. The performance itself takes place within a "play/frame" (Handelman and Kapferer, 1972) in which it is permissible to question and challenge meanings and identities from the safe domain of 'as if'. In a similar vein as rituals of rebellion (Gluckman, 1954, etc.) such performances have an important political function.

The comedy points the finger at the ludicrousness of the contradiction which Cook Islanders are caught up in from day to day, by subverting the meanings which legitimate the hegemony of the dominant class and its culture, and by announcing that it is possible for the duration of the performance to enact an alternative, Cook Islander identity. As comedy, the tere-party performance is both destructive and creative of delimiting forms, with respect both to paternalist racism and any static notion of ethnic identity in New Zealand. They are essentially very important dramatic contexts of reflexivity and improvisation of what it means to be a Cook Islander and how to manage in New Zealand Society.

Ideology and Conflicting Interests in Tere Performance Discourse

There is an important epistemological distinction to be made between ideology and culture, as I have previously argued. Ideology is that argumentative, value-oriented body of reflexive discourse which comes into play at those junctures of daily existence where the 'normal social world' is threatened, either in part or in its entirety by some alternative and thus dangerous perspective.

In light of the phenomenological nature of drama as a discursive, reflexive medium it is not surprising that during

the first episode of the performance with its flamboyant oratory, ideological presentations come to the fore as conflicting interests. During such moments, it is possible to perceive the contexts and central issues addressed by the rhetoric as well as the social identities of the main protagonists. Anyone can speak after the feast, but it is usually community leaders holding designated, recognised positions who do so. One set of speakers represent the hosts and another the visitors. Various clergy or deacons may speak on behalf of the Church or the Kumiti Akaaere Tere (Travelling Party Enablement Committee) who organises the visit. Broadly, the issues addressed include people's church involvement and moral behaviour, relations between the islands and New Zealand, and Cook Islanders' support for community activities. When special guests are present, contexts in the wider New Zealand society may be alluded to obliquely, but these are more forcefully dealt with in later episodes.

Perhaps I can best illustrate what transpires in the opening episode with reference to a tere-party from Arorangi village on Rarotonga which visited New Zealand between February and April, 1980 and raised \$40,000 for a new Sunday School hall. Most local groups which played host to the fifty-member tere did so because they had close bonds of kinship or an obligation to return a favour to Arorangi. Or they wished to establish a kaio'u (debt) with Arorangi in anticipation of some future project or tour of their own. Orators often emphasised past relations between the two groups. The evening also marked in effect the cancellation of one debt, and the establishment of a new obligation on Arorangi as they received the gifts.

Emphasis on unity and mutual assistance between the tere

and their hosts is a standard theme of oratory. But unity is also an ideological issue precisely because of the increasing potential for conflicts between Cook Islanders in New Zealand and those in the islands. On more than one occasion, speakers during the visit of the tere emphasised the support and love shared between hosts and guests, often to suppress disgruntlement over some supposed wrong done by one group to the other. For instance, Taru Moana the principal orator for the tere based his unity message each evening on a well-known pe'e (poetic chant) which was among several he 'owned' as va'a tuatua (spokesman; lit. talking mouth) for the local ariki. This particular pe'e centred on a legend of how a mountain near Arorangi village came to have a flat top. Demonstrating the customary versatility of orators and the malleability of tradition, he skillfully and humorously changed the legend's import each evening to show how host and visitor had been closely interrelated since time immemorial. He usually stated that at some stage the mountain exploded or was cut off by a god or the Arorangi people themselves. In the process pieces flew across the sea to the island of his hosts, linking them in perpetuity.

Aitutaki island has a similar legend, but its version holds that their warriors defeated Arorangi and stole the top of their mountain. On the evening Aitutaki hosted the tere, the opposing versions became the cause of an acrimonious exchange between several orators over the relative status of the two groups. Aitutaki's claims to speak for all Cook Islanders in New Zealand in certain civic and cultural contexts and other contemporary conflicts of interest were thinly-veiled in the emotional speeches. An orometua and the Aitutaki chairman had to intervene diplomatically to calm matters so that the performance

and donations could commence.

The emphasis of elders in Auckland on the propriety of continuing community participation by Cook Islanders stems, of course, from their perceptions of flagging support from mapu and families. A main concern in their speeches is to reinforce the identity and polity of the ethnic community. This in turn leads to complaints about their role in increasing the burden of obligations upon fewer stalwarts. More and more the elders find themselves on the horns of a dilemma, with their support waning.

Contexts outside the Cook Islands community are seldom addressed directly in the oratory of the tere-party performance. Neither are many prepared in everyday life to blame their bosses. Europeans generally or economic conditions for their predicament (1981 fieldwork survey). Even so, it is unusual for there not to be a few honoured guests representing such outside contexts. Europeans are shown deferential treatment by elders and audience alike, seated with the tere members for the feast or at the head table among the leaders.

European guests typically invited to attend include clergymen, local politicians, welfare officers, bosses and colleagues from work, neighbours, landlords, schoolmates and the occasional anthropologist. As representatives of the wider society, they are often alluded to and incorporated into the symbolic action of the performance. As a coherent event, the tere-party performance has the potential for establishing or reinforcing patronage relations with these 'significant others' outside the immediate setting of the performance and the ethnic community. Involvement in Cook Islands cultural activities helps create mutual respect and friendship beyond formal institutional roles. How the

dramatization mediates these relations and relates to external contexts is the subject of the final section.

Spatial Arrangements and Symbolic Forms as Modes of Transcendence and Transformation

Spatial configurations of audience and actors manoeuvred according to performance rules have the potential for working with aesthetic media throughout the drama not only to augment ideological content but to accomplish a transformation in its own and external contexts. I stress that the potential is there, and that such lasting changes in social relations do sometimes occur. But the performance event is more typically transcendent only for the duration of the drama itself though it has important consequences for how Cook Islanders re-engage in New Zealand society afterwards.

The preliminary episode is one of feasting and oratory. Here the spatial arrangement of participants according to customary codes is only partially effective in supporting the ideological concerns of orators. Tere-party members and hosts sit at rows of tables for the feast as what I have termed an active audience. They are addressed from the head table by their leaders, who in turn play roles as passive and active actors. But there is usually a large contingent of passively-involved onlookers around the periphery who are beyond the frame of symbolic action. These people drift in and out of the business of the episode, sometimes causing considerable disruption. They are particularly likely to become restive during the lengthy after-dinner speeches as they wait their turn to eat. Skilled orators recognise this problem, and play to the peripheral onlookers, broadening the boundaries of the action by continually redefining marginal participants as part of the active audience.

Though the first episode can be an important prelude, it is during the second episode that the real transcendence of the tere-party performance occurs. It is also where the most important contextual effects outside the ethnic community are generated. The typical performance is designed to have maximum emotional impact on the audience. The leaders modify the format accordingly as the tere moves from one group to another in keeping with accepted aesthetic codes. In the case of Arorangi there was the opening hymn by the entire troupe, and then the beginning action-songs by both men and women. Next came several drum dances, a dance by the older 'mamas' and so on.

For the performance per se, there is a major rearrangement of the space in which the symbolic action takes place. The tables of the feast are put aside, and chairs arranged about the hall in concentric circles. Aisles are left for people to come forward and make donations during the performance. From the beginning of the second episode, the way the space is set defines the audience as active spectators, which is conducive to their making generous donations and entering the dancing as the night goes on.

Though the combined media of dance, drumming and song, the audience is swept up inexorably into the opening action. There are no longer any mere onlookers. When the drums and slit gongs boom out and the nuku (performing team) sweeps forward down the hall wearing their shell necklaces, headresses and grass skirts, the audience often literally leaps to its feet to voice its appreciation. From that moment, people are constantly jumping up from the periphery to make donations and engage in the dancing themselves. Young and old, men and women alike enter in and out of the dance sequence as the impulse takes them. As the evening

wears on, people around the sides press in closer and closer to be involved.

Within the milieu of this constantly shifting series of action-songs, drum dances and 'fun' items, the performance reaches a transcendent denouement which is momentarily transformative of all participants, and sometimes establishes important new relationships with outsiders who are guests. From the first drum beat, another world is evoked. A world of powers, skills and legendary heroes, of sensuality and the smell of physical exertion that is a Cook Islander world improvised and recreated in implicit contradistinction to New Zealand bourgeois culture. These competing worlds of values and identities in turn become explicitly juxtaposed in the presence and personhood of the honoured guests whose treatment in the drama is the primary 'political' work of the performance.

The dansic celebration subsumes competing contexts from everyday life, setting them aside and rendering them virtually invisible and forgotten -- thus impotent. The tere performance in this sense is the exact converse of the haircutting, and more reflexive regarding external contexts than either it or the uapou. In the throes of this alternative world created in the conjuncture of spatial encirclement and artistic inclusion, individual participants are changed. By this I mean that their identities and roles defined in external contexts of work, home and even ethnic associations are altered. For the duration of the performance post office cleaners, factory hands and Church deacons become skilled dancers, sensuous maidens and clowns.

Let me illustrate how such transformations may occur. Following the feast, Papa'a guests are seated together in front

of the audience. This is understood by Cook Islanders to be a position of honour. Unknown to the guests, however, it is also the 'hotseat'. It places them in full view of the Cook Islander audience and within easy reach of the performers. As if this were not enough, the contribution bowl is placed directly in front of them, and they are expected to get up and donate often.

During the first action-songs, audience and performers usually maintain a decorum of distance. But during the drum dances, featuring evocative and frenetic movements by young men and women, artists often break formation and move over to gyrate within inches of guests, female dancer to male onlooker and male dancer to female onlooker. The dramatic effect is hilarious, at least to Cook Islanders. The comic transition is heightened by the fact that until now, the zone around the guests has been sacrosanct and detached from the swirl of the symbolic action. The guests are in a separate space, untouchable, respected and aloof -- as Europeans are considered to be in the mundane world of New Zealand society.

In the performance context as defined by Cook Islanders, the mapu as the artistic intensification of those values so intimidating to bourgeois Europeans confront the guests as symbolic identities. They do so body to body, a mode of communication in which Cook Islanders excel, moving into and shattering the bounds of the separate spatial world of the guests. This is understood immediately by the Cook Islander audience as a direct challenge to the Papa'as to enter into the alternative world of Cook Islander meanings, symbols and skills where they are in turn powerless and disadvantaged. Metaphorically, it is at the same time a challenge to the hegemony of the bourgeois-dominated

social order. Furthermore, the invitation by the dancers is put to the guests as one which, as the standard joke goes, "they can't refuse". Most guests, no matter what their social status in New Zealand society, respond to the public pressure and do attempt to dance, much to the amusement of the audience. Everyone knows Europeans cannot dance "our way". The challenge provides the opportunity for the performers to heighten the embarrassment of the guests by dancing closer to them and flaunting their sensuousness and skills even more, again to the delight of the onlookers. Similar challenges are made by some of the corpulent, older 'mamas' later in the evening when they perform their comic routines, grinding and bumping their ample hips at the European guests.

The guests usually try to look as though they enjoy the performance, understand the hilarity all around them and accept the challenges with equanimity. Often they are embarrassed, if not frightened out of their wits. On one occasion during the visit of another tere party, a group of brawny middle-aged men performed a warrior legend, thrusting their spears in the faces of visiting candidates for local council (and their pelvic regions in the direction of the wives). The guests and their spouses were clearly more than a little nervous until the lead dancer -- a seventeen stone fork-lift driver -- grinned amicably and the dancers all ran off the floor.

On the same evening, I witnessed an accidental slip of the thin veil of propriety around the performance when the sexual innuendo so essential to the humour of the dance items suddenly became explicit. An item was performed featuring a man dancing about the hall, holding aloft a large, wooden Tangaroa statue

similar to those sold to tourists in the islands⁽⁹⁾. The icon sported an intimidating penis. For a few moments the dancer chanted with passionate fervour, "Tangaroa, you are my god! Tanaroa, you are my father!" first in Cook Islands Maori and then in English so the visitors could understand. Some the guests looked visibly uncomfortable as he waved the effigy in front of them. When the item had concluded, he laughed self-consciously and ran to hand the statue to an older woman who was kneeling at the rear of the dance area. She reached out nonchalantly and took the figure, grabbing the penis as she did so. Too late, she realised her 'mistake' -- that is, her immodest conduct as defined in the eyes of Europeans. The Cook Islanders present erupted in hysterics, at one of the members having been caught out and at the revelation of the competing value system kept hidden from the guests.

This is what I mean when I suggest that the culture-troupe performance like other dramatic events is an important context of reflexivity and improvisation. The Europeans shifted nervously in their seats, suddenly aware of the incongruity between the two codes of morality and humour, grinning sheepishly as the audience observed their discomfiture with evident delight. The woman meanwhile tried to recover her composure by shifting the statue out of sight as quickly as possible. As she did so, she once again grabbed the offending appendage, setting the Cook Islanders off in renewed gales of laughter and the guests shrinking further in their seats.

Sometimes the stereotypes about New Zealand society and overt

(9)In a classically Freudian move early missionaries first forbid the continued carving of these statues because of their sexual explicitness, and then subsequently permitted their reappearance sans genitalia! Thanks to a recent resurgence of interest in authentic culture in the Cooks (and an eye to the tourist trade) such statues have had their penis restored.

Cook Islander cynicism about Papa'as may be flaunted in the performance itself. In 1980 the Cook Islands National Arts Troupe stopped in Auckland on its way to the Pacific Arts Festival in Papua New Guinea to give a show for Cook Islanders. During one item, three men strumming guitars and ukeleles in a typical islands scene were approached by a fair-haired man in a straw hat and garish flowered shirt. The man was obviously a European tourist par excellence. He told the men he was "looking for a good time" (ie. sexual relations) and could the men teach him to dance. apparently to be able to attract (or satisfy) a local girl.

The men proceeded to try to teach the 'tourist' with exaggerated difficulty, amid guffaws from the audience over the expected ineptitude of the Papa'a in dancing and by inuendo, in more intimate matters as well. Finally, the visitor exclaimed that he thought he had the right idea. Once again the men began strumming their instruments, but this time instead of stumbling around the stage like a wounded chicken, the stranger launched into a skillful display of Cook Islands dancing. The spectators roared in delight at having been so successfully been taken in. The master of ceremonies explained when the laughter had died down that the man was actually a Cook Islands Maori born and raised in Rarotonga. The spoof relied on stereotypes of the Papa'a tourist -- his appetites and ineptitudes in dance and sexual relations -- which onlookers could immediately recognise and ridicule. And then confusing them with the unexpected: creating the impossible anomaly of a European dancing well! Then this tension was resolved by revealing the 'truth' about the man, in consequence reaffirming the shared typifications about Europeans and the self-identity of Cook Islanders and their values in the process.

At a deeper level and with respect to the underlying joke within the wider social structure, the man symbolises all Cook Islanders, His true identity is thus a double inversion in which he comes to epitomise the Polynesian in New Zealand who is constantly forced to akapapa'a (act European). But he is in cognito, a different identity awaiting the acceptable context to emerge and improvise an alternative mode of sociality and humanness.

Conclusion

In this chapter I set out to examine the role of what I termed public dramatizations by Cook Islanders and the significance such events have for the maintenance of ethnic identity and coping with their structural position in New Zealand society. In particular I focussed on what I called contexts of reflexivity and improvisation within performative settings, whether they were transformative or confirmatory in their own right, and their impact on contexts of meaning and action in the ethnic community and the social order at large. I attempted to show the way in which ideology, spatial arrangement and symbolic media may work together to facilitate the underlying aim of the drama.

Out of the range of rituals, ceremonies, performances and weekend social dances in which Cook Islanders engage in New Zealand I selected the uapou, the pakotianga rauru and the tere-party culture troupe performance as representative of the variety of such events, and also as of greatest significance to contemporary ethnic identity (social category) and organised relationships (social force) with the wider social formation.

The uapou is essentially a church-controlled event which is in its enactment affirmative of those who engage in it, and other the contexts which they represent within the Cook Islands migrant

community. Through the transcendent moment of dance, song and donations in the final episode it establishes an internal unity of competing groups, enables its evangelistic motif, and reiterates moralistic ideologies fundamentally supportive of the Church and its leaders. It also rehearses clear norms of love, material support and family unity to be emulated by all Cook Islanders. It does this in juxtaposition to dominant stereotypes regarding deviant Polynesians, and in the final event results in affirmation of the existing social order and their position in it.

The haircutting rite sets out to facilitate the transformation of a boy into manhood and family leadership, and rearranges kinship reciprocity obligations around him for his support throughout his life. The project of the drama at this level is enabled at the transcendent moment of the actual cutting, as audience become actors united in their mutual aro'a and 'parentage' of the boy. I argued that the haircutting did facilitate lasting alterations in relationships between Cook Islanders and certain European guests present in their day-to-day settings. In particular their new patronage relations and putative kinship obligations have important effects on the way they interact after the event. I also suggested that that act of cutting the boy's hair was, in light of contemporary ideological issues of social control of 'deviants' and youth, an important gesture 'community responsibility' for the boy which suited both the requirements of the State and the public presentation by Cook Islanders of themselves as an acceptable population. At a deeper structural level, however, I argued that the cutting and distribution of hair/gifts/money/food was an act of regeneration of the community and the reciprocity system in particular that stood as a

major corporate improvisation by the migrant community and thus a potential threat to the status quo.

Tere-party performances are packed with a multiplicity of symbols, metaphors and ideological themes some of which I have been able to consider here. I have tried to identify the rhetorical and aesthetic means by which these are managed within the dramatization itself along with the political ends to which they are directed. As an essentially cultural response to their immediate community relations and to their structural position in the political economy of New Zealand, the tere-party performance is in essence a ludicrous comedy that skillfully reveals the joke within the structure. It is at once an artistic, forceful and yet 'subversive' display of alternative cultural meanings to those of bourgeois European society, which is one reason for its popularity among Cook Islanders and why it is such an ordeal for guests.

The culture troupe presentation may permanently transform certain contractual/formal arrangements into patron-client relations, similar to the pakotianga rauru. But its improvisation of a 'virtual world' of alternative values and identities transcends the dominant social order outside only for the duration of the event itself. As such, however, the performance and participation as an actor in it does have a lasting effect on individual Cook Islanders since by subjecting bourgeois, ruling class categorisation and structural hegemony to ridicule, it subverts their power to ultimately determine their social existence. The performance inspires the practical manoeuvres of Cook Islanders in day-to-day life by which they employ a variety of continually re-created personae to respond to the structured relations which shape their lives.

Conclusions

A few years ago a Maori academic, Pat Hohepa, issued a call for the re-examination of the focus and political implications of New Zealand social research on minorities:

For a long time the Maori people and now the rest of the Polynesians, have been the focus of research, the 'problem' area, the visible minorities for academic and administration climbers looking for a topical foothold. Pakeha ways, on the other hand, are not studied to any extent. The implication here is that majority ways are superior and majority standards are correct and need no critical scrutiny. A cold reappraisal of the total majority-minority situation of this country is needed not only because of its intrinsic value in enhancing understanding and mutual tolerance, but also as a basis for much needed reforms, and majority situations must include majority standards (Hohepa, 1972).

Hohepa was perfectly correct, though his majority-minority model is open to criticism. Academia and the welfare bureaucracy have tended to pay attention to the "problem" of 'racial minorities' which they helped construct to the neglect of the political economy and class relations.

That is why I stated in the Introduction that this study is not solely about Cook Islanders and their problems, but about New Zealand society. It has to do with understanding the development of dependency between New Zealand and her South Pacific neighbours, the importance of labour migration for post-war industrial expansion, the emergence of a distinctive Polynesian/migrant fraction of the working class through processes of racialisation and ethnic categorisation, and the crucial role of the bourgeoisie and the State in reproducing a fragmented working class at the economic, political and ideological levels. I rejected notions of monolithic "Pakeha society" or

"dominant culture" as inadequate to account for contemporary social realities. A study of Cook Islanders in New Zealand provides a key to understanding broader structural developments and emergent class relations which encompass the entire social field. Advanced capitalist societies are class societies and a wholistic analysis which would not reify social constructions of 'race' and 'ethnicity' must at some point seek to locate the social formation in the world division of labour and examine the political economy and class relations.

Migrant labour theory is a valuable tool from which to begin the analysis of New Zealand society, and the position of Cook Islanders in particular. Its main drawback is that as presently articulated, it cannot systematically account for the position of all migrants in the political economy nor of succeeding generations. For this purpose, I have expanded upon the notion of 'social categorisation,' borrowing from previous anthropological research and Poulantzas (1978), to show how all Cook Islanders are socially constructed as part of the 'Polynesian' racial category and also as an ethnic identity by ruling ideology. I then demonstrate how ethnic ideology communicated through various rituals, ceremonies and performances reiterates this distinction as a distancing manoeuvre. And finally, that through formal social organisation and individual improvisations in daily practice, Cook Islanders as a 'social category' of multiple class memberships maintain themselves as a 'social force' inspite of diverse and conflicting internal interests. The entire second half of the thesis is devoted to the 'ethnic community' as social force, beginning with formal social organisation, then individual practices in marriage and social networks, and finally dramatizations of reflexivity and improvisation.

From the outset, I was critical of objectivist determinism -- as Bourdieu labelled it -- which does not place an important priority in analysis on the dialectic between structure and practice. That is, that the social structures which are constituted in economic necessity mirrored at the political and ideological levels are 'determinative' of the perceptions and behaviour of social actors. But at the same time, the very existence of the social order is not an abstraction, but contingent upon the real, historical often irrational and uncalculating practices of individual subjects in a dialectical relationship. This is not to fall prey to subjectivism nor the 'anthropological problematic' but to confront the complex nuances of social existence beyond the subjectivist-objectivist dichotomy.

From this perspective, I examined the range of organised and individual Cook Islander improvisations in relations of production, the struggle for accommodation and ideological racialisation for dealing with the problems of day-to-day existence and even the underlying structure of domination, however informally and subtly. I paid particular attention to various symbolic dramtizations which constitute ideological and aesthetic addresses to contexts of meaning and action in the ethnic community and the wider social order. While most are confirmatory of their existing roles and organisation as well as the status quo in New Zealand class relations, I suggested (a) that the haircutting was both affirmatory and a potential challenge to the present social structure since it expanded the reciprocity system and thus further empowered the ethnic community as a 'social force', (b) that the enua hall movement and Maori radicalism based on expanding the cultural institutions' influence into the political and economic

may have significant implications for the ethnic identity and possible cultural reinterpretation by second generation Cook Islanders, and (c) that the tere-party performance was of major importance 'politically' among Cook Islanders not due to the overt articulation of interests, but in poking fun at the 'joke in the structure' and thus subverting the force of ruling ideology.

* * *

Cook Islanders will hopefully appreciate the joke in the subtitle of this thesis, which really only works in Maori language. The image upon which it is based came to me while I was rehearsing with the Aitutaki Enea association for our nuku (pageant) presentation as part of a festival to raise funds for a new Auckland Presbyterian manse late in 1983. Somehow, I had been persuaded to play the part of the missionary John Williams. Swallowing my misgivings about some of the difficulties I thought the early missions had created for Cook Islands culture and social organisation, I decided to enter into the spirit of the play with as much earnestness and enthusiasm as my fellow thespians.

It was apparent from the outset that our version of early missionisation was a romanticising of what actually took place. After a few practice sessions, I discussed early accounts I had seen with one of the group leaders, emphasising my concern about inaccuracies, but also my disappointment with the clowning and hilarity with which those playing the etene (cannibals, savages) portrayed their early and ostensibly honoured ancestors upon Williams' arrival. I was assured that it was all in good fun. On the night they would act differently.

During subsequent rehearsals, I was fascinated with the etene in our nuku, especially the rowdy humour with which they enacted the roles of benighted heathen and their sudden conversion after the miraculous healing of Ariki Tamatoa's daughter by the teacher Papehia. Every night, one older woman in particular with hair hanging in her eyes would crawl about the floor on all fours, growling and sometimes holding a sandal in her mouth, trying to frighten the messengers of God. Her antics never ceased to evoke gales of laughter from actors and onlookers. I was also intrigued with the sudden childish obedience they showed toward the missionaries after their conversion.

It eventually occurred to me that there were really three plays going on inside our nuku, all simultaneous and at different levels. First of all, there was the nuku story itself, an overtly propagandistic, idealised version of the arrival of the missions, including Aitutaki's claim to be the first island in the Cooks to welcome the Gospel. Secondly, in the midst of the moralising and the melodrama -- indeed, using it as a comic medium -- the Aitutakians took occasion to laugh at themselves and their forebears. Which in reality was a manifestation of their awareness of contemporary racist typifications of Polynesians as "ignorant savages" and as constituting threats to decent New Zealand society. There was great enjoyment in having a permitted setting for roaring and growling, brandishing spears and generally scaring the hell out of the Papa'a.

The third 'play' was less apparent, hidden beneath the surface but visible in eyes and expressions and voice inflections. This third play was deeply serious, in which lethal mockery and mimicry were directed not at themselves, but at the nuku itself and all it

conveyed: being forced to acquiesce to the discipline of leaders, the moralistic domination of the Church and wider European society. Some of the spontaneous banter and improvised joking during the rehearsals had a bitter, cynical bite. I saw a striking similarity between the nuku and other performative events such as rituals, the tere-party performances and indeed the little day-to-day improvised roles which I had witnessed throughout my fieldwork. Such dramatizations are not only central to this analysis but to the existence of the Cook Islands community in New Zealand. I will, aside from this brief personal account, allow the joke of the counterfeit savage to stand in view of the 'political' import of joking behaviour for Polynesians. Kia maroiroi taku iti tangata katoatoa.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

A Rarotongan orometua (clergyman) illustrated attitudes toward non-supportive absentee kin with a case from Mangaia some years ago. It has the qualities of a parable since one hears a similar theme often when individuals speak of wayward overseas kin:

Two brothers both went away to Tahiti at the same time. One kept in touch regularly with his kopu tangata and returned shortly. He was warmly welcomed and accepted back into the family. Some time later, he died and the family needed someone else to take over the leadership of the family. His older brother, the mata'iaipo (first born) was the natural choice. But he had by now been away for many years. He had never written nor sent assistance of any kind or taken any interest in the affairs of the kopu tangata. Some people even believed he was dead.

Then one day, the man returned to Mangaia. Rather than being welcomed, he was held at a distance and treated as a manuiri (outsider) by his relations. The wife of his deceased brother refused even to see him. Some of the older metua (elders) argued that he should be forgiven, since he was the rightful head of the family, but to no avail. His genealogical rank was no excuse for his neglect; it made matters worse since he should have made even greater efforts to help his kin.

The orometua added that such things still go on today, even among church members. People say "What right have these manuiri got to come back and try to wriggle their in an grab land!" This about their own relatives. People are so jealous over land, he says. But after all, it is just the customary effort of families to preserve their rights and get more land for their increasing number of offspring at the expense even of their close relations.

* * *

A case with which I became personally familiar during my fieldwork in the islands in 1981 involved a woman from Rarotonga in her late fifties whom I shall called 'Vaine'. Her efforts to obtain land and build a house, and her machinations to protect other land rights which she did not appear to immediately need are illustrative of several points in the foregoing discussion.

Vaine's kopu tangata in Avatiu was unenthusiastic about her initial request to be given a quarter acre of her own, but she finally gained their support for a partition order in 1964 after

sending gifts and a visit back home. Since she and her sister are descendants of an outer-islander with indirect claims to the Rarotonga land, they had to make greater than usual contributions to kin-group functions. They also tried to make a good impression by travelling back to the islands seven or eight times since their emigration to New Zealand, though the expenses had been a serious burden on their household budgets. Both Vaine and her sister had worked for years in a central city factory and her husband worked in a warehouse. She and her husband saved frugally and made the kopu tangata in New Zealand and the islands their top priority. They never bought a car, and only purchased a minimum of inexpensive furniture and clothing.

Finally, the family agreed to hold a uipa'anga kopu tangata and her request for land was granted. At the time, Vaine planted a row of palm trees to mark the boundary of her property since she wanted to make sure her rights could not be disputed in the future. Her brother was given the section on the other side so she did not bother planting anything there.

Construction of the house should have begun in 1975 when Vaine and her husband had saved up enough for a first installment on the construction costs. That year they sent \$500 and another \$800 the next year, requesting that a distant kinsman who was a builder and lived on the next property do the work. In 1978 they inquired about his progress on the house, and were told it was virtually finished. They were shocked, according to Vaine, when they asked how much was needed to complete the job and the builder said he had as yet receive no money.

Vaine was angry about being cheated and wanted to return at once to Rarotonga and hire a local lawyer to get her money back. But her husband dissuaded her, saying it would be better in the long run if they did not cause trouble. However, to make sure the same thing did not happen again, she asked her boss at work to hold the receipts she got for postal money orders which she continued to send for the completion of the house. In 1978 her boss recorded \$600 sent, but Vaine was certain she had sent another \$500 for which she failed to get a postal order receipt.

Her husband died in 1979, and she received several thousand dollars in donations from relatives and friends whom she had supported over the years as is the Cook Islands custom. A year later, with the house in Avatiu still only a shell, she decided to invest a large portion of these same funds and fly to the islands to make sure personally that the house was finished. This trip took place three months before

her scheduled holiday visit with friends, and required all her finances plus the savings of her working daughter.

On her Christmas trip, she brought another \$800 which she had saved or borrowed in the meantime, mostly to be spent on furnishings for the house. Her brother and several boys friendly with her daughter were importuned into doing the labour. She and her family strictly avoided her kinsman neighbour on the other side of the palms (the erstwhile builder) during her stay since she considered him a thief.

Vaine was not financially destitute in New Zealand, but it would be a mistake to consider her one of the minority of affluent petite bourgeois Cook Islanders. She owned a dilapidated cottage in the inner city on which she spent little in repairs. Her priorities lay elsewhere. By extensive involvement in church, her islands political party, enua (island) association and kopu tangata donations, she intentionally placed herself in a position to obtain extensive support when her husband died and to insure the strongest claims to her land in the islands.

While her efforts to secure a section and build a house in Avatiu were taking place, Vaine was also pressing claims to family land on the other side of the island. This was her traditional ngati (lineage) land and her mother's family home. She and two other sisters had rights to the house and surrounding land. But her older sister who lived in the house was believed by Vaine to be trying to push she and her other sister out, and keep the house and land for herself.

Vaine was furious, and mapped out plans with her sister in Auckland on how they could hold onto their land rights. She was confident because of her political activities, and because of all the gifts and financial support she gave to the ariki of the district over the years. Her other sister kept careful genealogical records, studying and adding to them continuously. This sister on a number of occasions provided Rarotongan lawyers with material to use in their cases against her sister, and to 'correct' the records of claims held by the Land Court in Avarua. On one occasion she even travelled to the islands herself and appeared in the Court to reinforce her claims. Each time she went back, Vaine's sister made a point of going to the family marae in the bush and clearing it of undergrowth in order to subtly point up the neglect of the local kin and cement her claims to being a responsible, helping kinswoman.

Vaine's Avatiu house was all but completed in 1981, so during

her stay she turned her attentions to the danger to her other land rights from the older sister. Before Christmas day arrived, she delivered cards to two mata'iapos (titled heads of sub-lineages) who had influence in her mother's ngati and would carry weight in a family meeting. One was the head of the sub-lineage controlling the land on which her mother's house was situated. She did not include money with the cards since in this case there was no reason to do so. It would have been construed as a bribe, and offense taken. Instead, the cards were simply a reminder of past assistance she had given, an acknowledgement of her loyalty to the leader and an implicit claim on his support. In most Cook Islands gifting there may not be a specific immediate or future objective in mind with the prestation, but it is understood as an open-ended claim on the other person, a kaio'u (debt) which can be called in when needed. In this sense more or less all gifting is an 'investment'.

Vaine had no idea what she would do with the extra land or house if her claims were recognised. Perhaps she would build another house nearby. It did not matter, as long as she maintained and even expanded the shares of land in the islands which were rightfully hers.

APPENDIX B

Case Studies in Cook Islander Housing
Problems - 1980

(Sources: Maori and Island Affairs Office, Auckland;
Cook Islands Government Office, Parnell)

Table 1 - Ages of Applicants for Assistance

<u>Age Cohort</u>	<u>MIA Cases</u>	<u>CI Gov. Office</u>	<u>Total</u>
15-19	1	0	1
20-24	4	3	7
25-29	7	8	15
30-34	4	6	10
35-39	3	10	13
40-44	5	6	11
45-49	2	4	6
50-54	3	4	7
55-59	2	4	6
60-64	2	2	4
65+	2	1	3
N.A.	-	2	2
Total	37	50	87

Table 2 - Occupations of Applicants

<u>Occupation</u>	<u>MIA Cases</u>	<u>CI Gov. Office</u>	<u>Total</u>
Factory worker	10	19	29
Domes. Purp. Benefit	4	8	12
Unempl. Benefit	6	3	9
Pensioner	1	4	5
Housewife	4	1	5
Sickness Benefit	1	2	3
Machinist	-	4	4
Laundry	-	2	2
Mechanic	-	2	2
Railroad	1	1	2
Freezing Worker	1	-	1
Manure worker	1	-	1
Other	8	4	12
Total	37	50	87

Table 3 - Residence of Applicant

<u>Location</u>	<u>MIA Cases</u>	<u>CI Gov. Office</u>	<u>Total</u>
Otara (S. Auck.)	5	9	14
Grey Lynn (Cent)	5	8	13
Mangere (S. Auck.)	5	4	9
Sandringham (Mid)	4	3	7
Manurewa (S. Auck.)	1	3	4
Otahuhu (Mid)	1	3	4
Other Central	7	10	17
Other S. Auck.	1	2	3
Other Middle	5	8	13
Other suburbs	3	-	3
Total	37	50	87

Table 4 - Island Origin of Applicant

<u>Island</u>	<u>MIA Cases</u>	<u>CI Gov. Office</u>	<u>Total</u>
Rarotonga	10	13	23
Aitutaki	7	11	18
Mangaia	5	5	10
Atiu	3	7	10
Penrhyn	4	4	8
Manihiki	-	6	6
Pukapuka	3	-	3
Mauke	1	1	2
Other	4	3	7
Total	37	50	87

Table 5 - Length of Time in New Zealand

<u>Time in Years</u>	<u>MIA Cases</u>	<u>CI Gov. Office</u>	<u>Total</u>
0-2	9	2	11
3-5	12	15	27
6-10	6	20	26
11-15	4	4	8
16+	2	7	9
N.A.	4	2	6
Total	37	50	87

Table 6 -

Type of Problem by Residence of Applicant (MIA and CI Gov. Office combined)

<u>Problem</u>	<u>Central</u>	<u>South</u>	<u>Middle</u>	<u>Other</u>	<u>Total</u>
Eviction:					
Housing Corporation	-	2	1	-	3
Private landlord	10	3	7	-	20
Forced/prefer to buy:					
MIA/Housing Corporation	-	7	-	-	7
Private	1	2	6	-	9
Seeking Housing Corp. unit for lower rent	9	11	5	1	26
Inadequate residence conditions	6	3	4	-	13
Need help with services, repairs, etc.	-	2	-	-	2
Other (health, marital)	2	2	2	-	6
	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>
Totals	28	33	25	1	87

Appendix C

Three Case Studies of Network-serials

Since class position is the most reliable indicator of patterns of social interaction in personal networks among Cook Islanders, I include three cases, each a woman in a different class position. While the cases are not necessarily representative of all Cook Islanders in similar positions, they do illustrate the way in which some of the practices observed and conclusions drawn from the analysis of network data are constituted in the day-to-day activities of specific individuals.

Dorothy -- Bourgeois class

Dorothy is one of a small number of Cook Islanders to have attained a position of relative affluence, due at least in part to an impressive combination of beauty and brains. At the time of the network-serial she was in her mid-thirties. She had been born in Rarotonga of a Cook Islander mother and a French/Spanish father. The family was well-known in the southern islands for their small business activities. Dorothy had lived more than half her life in New Zealand.

She completed secondary school and a degree at the Auckland Technical Institute before working for a frozen food firm and then a textile company. In both instances she held a salaried position because of her qualifications. She married a Pakeha New Zealander who owned his own business, in which she was soon made a director. Shortly after their marriage, they moved to a modern home with sea views in one of the wealthy eastern suburbs. They also built an expensive summer home on the coast several hours drive south of Auckland. At the time of the weekend network-serial, Dorothy was a sales representative with a large corporation, a position which

took her out of the country several times each year. Some months earlier, her husband had died and she was only gradually beginning to re-establish the regular pattern of her life.

* * *

On Friday morning, Dorothy rose at 7:30 a.m. and had breakfast alone. By 9 o'clock she was at her company's head office, discussing a business matter with her divisional manager, Bill (36, European, middle class). A number of similar business activities continued until lunch, when she went out to eat with Nikki, a consultant (24, European, bourgeois) and then went to view her recently opened office.

In the middle of the afternoon Dorothy left work and travelled to South Auckland to attend a staff meeting at the radio station where she hosted a weekly show for Cook Islanders. A number of people were present, all Europeans including the station director, Gary (50, European, bourgeois) and the manager, Jack (38, European, middle class). About 4:30 in the afternoon they adjourned to the staff lounge for cocktails, and then Dorothy went to dinner at her parents' home. Her mother and father are both in the mid-50s and middle class.

Some time after the meal, Malcolm (36, European, middle class) who was a friend from work, arrived and they all had drinks before going out. About 8:30 p.m. they arrived at Samoa House in the central city for a meeting of the Pacifica women's group. It was a special social occasion to raise funds for the group's charitable projects. The gathering was mostly women from various Pacific Islands and their husbands, ranging in age from late twenties to their sixties. Most were working class people with a scattering of middle class Polynesians and a few European spouses. Dorothy was back at home and in bed

by 1:30 a.m.

Saturday morning she slept in late because of the engagement the previous night, had breakfast and then did the housework. Around 2 o'clock in the afternoon her aunt Jane (55, Rarotongan, working class) dropped by with another woman whom Dorothy calls 'aunty' though she is not certain of the exact kinship relation. The woman is in her mid-fifties, also from Rarotonga and working class. They had come by for drinks and to listen to music of some Cook Islands groups Dorothy had tapes of. They had brought along a distant cousin, Robert (29, Rarotongan, middle class) who was a parttime insurance salesman.

These people left later in the afternoon, and about seven in the evening Malcolm stopped by to take Dorothy to dinner at her parents' home. With Malcolm were a sales representative named John (47, European, middle class) and his friend Mike (42, European, middle class) who was a car salesman. They drove over to her parents' house where they met Dorothy's sister (24, Rarotongan, middle class) who is a sales assistant in a duty free shop. She had invited along her friend Joh (35, Samoan, working class) who is a general hand in a factory. After dinner, they all went to the airport to see her father off on a trip to the Cook Islands on business. About 9:00 p.m. they stopped in a South Auckland hotel for drinks. Afterwards they went back to her mother's house for late supper, and then Dorothy went home and went to bed.

She was up early the next morning, Sunday, talking on the phone to the manager of a gun store named Chris (28, European, middle class). She was anxious to arrange to pick up the gun she needed that day for the shooting championships at her gun club. After breakfast, she drove by the shop and then out to the gun club. About a hundred

people were there to watch or take part, mostly middle class and bourgeois Europeans though there was one other Cook Islands woman. After competing and lunch at the club, she returned home and had a rest. At five she took a birthday present to the home of Patty (60, part-Samoan, bourgeois) who was a local politician living in the same suburb. Patty's husband Bob (45, European, bourgeois) is a business consultant. Dorothy was home by 7:30 p.m. when Malcolm came by for dinner. They listened to music for awhile, then Malcolm left and Dorothy was in bed by 10:30.

Monday it was back to an early breakfast and on the job by nine. After a few preliminary matters which needed attending to, she had a long conversation with a retired Cook Islands couple (65, Mauke, working class) who had come to see her about the possibility of their neice getting a job with her company. Dorothy inquired about the girl's qualifications and experience, and said she would make arrangements for an application and interview. At ten, she stopped in at the office of her insurance agent (45, European, middle class) to talk over settling some family insurance matters. At eleven she was back in the office to meet another client on a business matter.

She had lunch at her desk taking care of some further paper work. Around 1 o'clock, another client (55, European, middle class) came to see her. Then she went to the office of the organiser of an international charity (40, European, middle class) to discuss plans for a promotional project involving her company. By three o'clock Dorothy was back in her office for an hour more paper work. She and Malcolm left work together about five to view a new show at one of the city art galleries. After that they stopped to visit Joe (80, European, middle class) about his experiences as a Land Registrar in Rarotonga for many years. At 8:30 p.m. Dorothy again stopped in to visit her friend Patty, this time to discuss some proposed activities for the Pacifica women's group of which they were both members. She went home

and had dinner alone around 9:30 p.m. and then dropped into bed exhausted.

Tuaine -- Middle Class

Tuaine is a nineteen-year old, born in Auckland of a Rarotongan father and a New Zealand Papa'a mother. Her parents are now divorced, and her paternal grandmother whom she calls "mother" adopted her several years ago as her own daughter. An older brother lives in Sydney, while her younger brother has been adopted by her grandmother's sister and lives in a nearby inner city suburb.

Recently Tuaine completed her Seventh Form university entrance qualification. In spite of record unemployment particularly affecting Polynesian young women, she took a night typing course and with the assistance of a Cook Islander uncle who works in a government department, managed to secure a government clerk-typist position. The job plus wages from a weekend job as a cleaner in a motel means her income is already higher than that of her grandmother, who has been working as a stitcher in the same shoe factory for twenty-two years.

Like Dorothy, Tuaine is apa Maori. From her mother, she inherited fair skin and striking blue eyes. From her father, shining blue-black hair. Though she is in no doubt that she is a Cook Islander, she has had to make a conscious decision about her ethnic identity, helped along by pressure from her aunt to help lead the kopu tangata when she grows older.

* * *

The wind-up alarm clock jangled beside her bed at 6:15 a.m. and Tuaine awoke and clumped sullenly to the bathroom for a shower. She returned to her room a few minutes later, turned on her radio to a popular rock-and-roll station and then hurried back to the

kitchen to iron her outfit for the day on top of the wooden counter. She took three eggs from the refrigerator and placed them in a pot of water on the stove, plugged in the coffee jug and then hurried out to dress. Moe her grandmother, had left a half an hour earlier for the shoe factor. Tuaine shouted to her second cousin, Apii, who lives with them and works with Moe to get up or she would be late.

A few minutes later Tuaine rushed back into the kitchen, now transformed into the appearance of a chic Queen Street secretary. She wore a black dress/suit, high heels and her long, black hair was brushed back in the Farrah Fawcett-Majors style popular at the time. Placing some old newspaper on the table, she put down saucers, salt, butter and a bowl of sugar. She didn't bother with silverware, since all three of the women eat with their fingers in the Cook Islands fashion unless they are at some European function. Apii came out wearing a flowered skirt and helped set the table. The phone rang, and Tuaine muttered under her breath as she ran to answer it. The man on the phone was a cousin who promised to bring over some wood he had put aside from a factory job so he could repair their front veranda on the weekend. Tuaine and Apii quickly ate the meal of eggs, coffee and buttered toast and then ran to catch their bus, leaving the dishes in the sink until their return.

Tuaine arrived at work about 7:30 a.m. and went immediately to her post at the counter to receive public inquiries, since it was her turn that day. As business was slow, she chatted with her friend Patricia (18, European, middle class), a clerical worker like herself. By 8:30 a.m. a number of field officers and staff had arrived and were arranging their work for the day. Aside from a couple of apprentice officers, most were aged between 30 and 50, were European males and all twenty or so were middle class.

Among the clerks, one was Maori, one Indian, several Europeans and the controlling clerk was an older Maori woman who had been in the office for years. All twelve clerks were women.

During the day, most of the people Tuaine dealt with were Europeans, with about 10% being inquiries from Polynesians. At the morning tea break, she sat and talked with Patricia, Carolyn (26, European, middle class) and three field officers: Bob (35, European, middle class), Jim (24, European, middle class) and Ian (53, European, middle class). Just before noon, she had a conversation about some work matters with the office controller (Maori, 38, middle class).

At noon she went with Patricia, Hannah (17, Maori, working class) and Jenny (19, European, middle class) for lunch at a nearby government cafeteria. As it is located in a different department for their own, they are not really supposed to eat there, but the meals are so cheap they reckon it is worth the chance of getting found out. For the remainder of the day, Tuaine worked at the counter and carried out filing duties, stopping around the middle of the afternoon for another tea break with the usual crowd. She finished around 4:30 in the afternoon, though she had told her grandmother she would have to work late. Instead, she spent the next hour with several friends from work at their regular pub nearby. Besides Patricia, Hannah, and Jim there was Steve (29, European, middle class) and his wife Anne (28, European, middle class) who worked as a telephone receptionist and Dave (26, European, middle class). Tuaine reflected that she really had two sets of friends -- workmates who are mostly Papa'as whom she seldom saw elsewhere except for the occasional drink at the pub, and young Cook Islanders her own age with whom she spends most of her leisure time on weekends and at home. She tries to keep them separate since they don't fit in

with each other. She left the pub alone and caught a bus to near her home to visit her friend Mata (16, Cook Islander born in New Zealand, working class). Mata's parents run a small dairy in the inner city.

After talking awhile, Mata accompanied Tuaine home where Apii and Moe had cleaned the house and prepared the evening meal. They all ate and talked and then Moe asked for some things from the shops. The three girls quickly volunteered to walk up the steep hill together to buy the items. After their shopping, they stopped by a snack-bar where there is a pool table, video games and where the King Cobras gang hangs out. The gang is made up of Polynesian young men, mostly Niueans and Cook Islanders born in New Zealand, and several were at the snack-bar. They also met two sisters they knew from Aitutaki island (16, working class). Both girls sewed hessian bags at a factory in the area. They also met Titera (18, Manihiki island, working class) who used to live on their street, and she walked home with them. They sat watching t.v. until nearly midnight, and then the visitors left and the three women went to bed.

Saturday morning, Moe rose early to clean and sweep the house again with a coconut whisk-broom. Around eight o'clock she called to Tuaine to wake up because her younger brother (13, Rarotongan, working class) had arrived and needed looking after. There had been difficulties at home again, and he had recently gotten into trouble with the juvenile authorities. This was the second or third time he had run away from Tuaine's aunties home. She gave him something to eat, and then they went with Moe's cousin Tai (55, Cook Islander, working class) to pick up the wood from his factory. When they returned, Tuaine hurried out to her parttime motel job. She met the owner (48, European, middle class) and his son (25, European, bourgeois) who also owned a squash court centre. She spent the morning and early afternoon cleaning with her friend Vanessa

(19, Maori, working class) who works during the week as a keypunch operator. Several of Tuaine's Cook Islands friends who have jobs also hold a parttime job during evenings or on the weekend as well.

Tuaine returned home about 1:30 p.m. and had lunch, and then walked down the hill with her brother and her first cousin Tai (21, Rarotongan, working class) to watch a football match. Tai also works in a shoe factory and is the son of Moe's younger brother, who lives back in Rarotonga and keeps an eye on the family land. Apii was drafted by Moe to help prepare food for the annual conference of the Democratic Party, which was held at a hall next to the football grounds. Tuaine took no part in the preparations and did not attend the convention. At the game, she watched Tai play a team which had a few Samoans she knew from school and church. Tai's team were mostly Niueans, Maoris and Cook Islanders from the central city area. Afterwards, she went into the clubhouse and spoke to some of the players and visitors, including Ina (19, Rarotonga, working class) and his wife (18, Rarotongan, working class) both born in New Zealand and distant cousins of hers.

After the game, she and Tai and Epi walked home where Moe and Apii were cleaning dishes and cooking the evening meal. Epi's adopted mother arrived to take Epi home and everyone had a meal. Then Moe, Apii and Tuaine got cleaned up and dressed for a dance, sponsored by the Demo Party at the same hall where they had held their meeting that day. When they arrived, most of the crowd were also beginning to gather and an islands band was playing Cook Islands and Tahitian music. The crowd of a few hundred were mostly Cook Islanders with the occasional Papa'a guest. The three women and some Mangaianans they knew and Epi's adopted mother (Moe's Z) bought drinks and sat at the same table for most of the evening. Tuaine, Apii and some of their girlfriends danced together the popular Cook

Islands dances, and once in awhile a boy asked her to dance.

Not long after the dancing began, two younger European men from Tuaine's work arrived with their wives. She had sold them tickets at work when they had expressed interest in attending their first Polynesian function. They came over to meet Tuaine's mother and friends and to talk awhile before finding their own table. During the evening Tuaine danced with each of the men once or twice, but remained with her own Cook Islands friends. Later in the evening, she was quite embarrassed when it became obvious the European guests had had too much to drink. The two men gave up trying to dance "islands style" and began jumping and cavorting around the floor like clowns. She felt they had made fools of themselves and her before her friends, and put everyone else off from having a good time.

When the social was over shortly after midnight, Tuaine and Apii went in a taxi to pick up their friend Lydia (18, Rarotonga, working class). They all went to the Reefcomber nightclub located in an older inner city area. "The Reef" is primarily a Cook Islander club of somewhat dubious reputation which swings into action each weekend after all the social dances sponsored by sports clubs and enua close. The girls stayed until past 4:00 a.m., drinking heavily and dancing with a number of men, after which they walked home and went to bed.

Sunday everyone slept in. The phone rang about 10:30 a.m. and Moe got up to answer it. It was Tuaine's boss at the motel wanting to know where she was. Tuaine washed and dressed quickly in her working smock and hurried out the door. She saw the same people at the motel and a few European guests, and later in the afternoon walked home with her friend Vanessa and her brother Epi who had walked up to meet her. Though his mother had come the night

before to drag him home, he had protested and Moe had asked her sister to let him stay the weekend. The remainder of the afternoon, Tuaine and Apii watched t.v. , joined later by Moe who had attended the local PIPC service at Edinburgh St. Toward evening the two girls walked up to the shops again to buy a few grocery items and a newspaper and then returned home for a meal. They watched t.v. again and then all went to bed early.

Monday morning Tuaine and Apii got up late, so they had to skip breakfast and hurry to catch their bus. Tuaine's brother went with her, promising to go straight to school after he escorted her to work though Tuaine worried he had other plans. When she arrived at work, she and Patricia talked for awhile and then began their clerical duties. At tea break, Ian and Wayne spoke appreciatively about how they enjoyed the dance on Saturday night. Tuaine was upset at their behaviour, but said nothing to them. Later she and Patricia and Hannah went for lunch at their usual cafeteria, and spent the day working with the usual staff.

Tuaine finished work early and went home with the intention of painting the veranda floor which Tai had repaired. There had been considerable home renovation and an influx of middle class Europeans into her neighbourhood in recent years, and she and Moe had begun to make occasional attempts to repair their old cottage. Most of their cash, however, had been going back to Rarotonga to pay for a cement block house on family land which they were hoping to use on their holidays and rent out the rest of the time.

Instead of painting, Tuaine put some potatoes on the stove to boil and sat in the lounge cutting a new dress pattern. Her brother arrived about 4 o'clock, insisting he had been at school all day. Apii arrived soon after and Tuaine read the newspaper she had brought. When Moe got home, they ate dinner. At 6:30 Tuaine and Apii walked

up to the PIPC church hall for their regular weekly rehearsal with the cultural dance troupe of which Tuaine is a member. There are four women and seven men, mostly from Takitumu on Rarotonga, ranging in age from 17 to their early 20s. All have jobs, most in factories but one or two work in offices downtown. The leader is a woman in her late 40s from Rarotonga (middle class) who is a housewife and does community volunteer work. The group performs and earns money by appearing at weekend socials and other community functions. When the rehearsal ended, Apii and Tuaine rode home on the bus and immediately went to sleep.

Tereapii -- Working Class

Apii and her friend Phil rent a small, two-bedroom house in a run-down part of the inner city. Apii is twenty-two and was born in Aitutaki. She has lived in New Zealand 14 years, half that time in a timber town several hours drive south of Auckland. Most of her immediate family still live there. Apii works at a hospital as a cafeteria assistant, earning about half the average national income. Previously she was a factory machinist, but only having completed Third Form schooling meant little job advancement. Still, with Phil working at the Post Office as a handler, they manage to make ends meet by sharing rent and the food budget with enough left over for the occasional weekend social. They have a few items of second-hand furniture, a couple of mattresses on the floor for guests and their only "luxury" -- a relatively inexpensive new stereo set they bought on hire purchase.

On the weekend of her network-serial, Apii's sister Tungane and her two children had arrived from out of town to spend a few days. The weekend before, five people had come to stay including her older brother and his Papa's wife from down south. Apii and Phil were always

happy to welcome friends and relatives for a brief stay, even though people usually had to sleep on the floor. Phil is gay, often adopting a female name among close friends. Tungane instructs her children to call him "Nanna" or "Aunty" as they do Apii. In spite of being the youngest daughter, Apii is a boistrous, out-going woman who makes friends easily and commands a considerable degree of authority in the kopu tangata. The rest of the family often came to her for advice or help with personal troubles, and her brothers and sisters usually relied on her to deal with their strict mother when quarrels arose. Apii had been back to Aitutaki twice since migrating to New Zealand, fewer times than either Tuaine or Dorothy. Almost all of her domestic, leisure and work contacts are with Cook Islanders or other Polynesians, unlike the other two women.

* * *

Apii rose shortly before 7 o'clock Friday morning, dressed quickly and left immediately for work since she was late. Walking along the main street toward the hospital, she met Teokotai (34, Cook Islands, working class) also on her way to work at the hospital cafeteria. Tai is a distant relative of Apii's and born in Manihiki. Although they walk quickly, they are late for their shift.

The staff of the cafeteria and dietary department are mostly Polynesians, with several Europeans who are specialised dieticians and supervisors. A Chinese woman is the head of the department. There are two Samoans and one Maori, but the rest of the twenty or so workers are Cook Islanders. Most were previously friends or related by kinship prior to obtaining the position at the hospital, and used such contacts to gain access to the job to begin with. All the staff are aware of the authority ranking and income differences between the various positions which seems divided along racial lines. According to Apii, tensions do exist between the Papa'as and

Polynesians, the former calling the latter "coconuts" and "bananas" to their faces and at times being blatantly abusive. The Polynesians give back in turn, including joking in their own languages and sticking to themselves rather than mixing with the Europeans, or at least most of them. Apii's immediate boss is a European woman whom she does not get on with very well. But she stands up for herself, Apii says, and seldom gets called names.

As Apii began work, she chatted with Kimi (22, Cook Islands, working class) who is another girlfriend from Mangaia training to be a diet cook. She spent the early part of her shift working alongside Tere (23, Cook Islands, working class) who is a friend from childhood on Aitutaki. They work at similar jobs so have a chance to talk most of the day.

The kitchen staff took their tea break at about ten a.m. after all the meals had been served to hospital patients. For forty-five minutes the Polynesians talked and played cards. Besides Kimi there were twelve others in that particular group, including two Samoans. Two of the Cook Islanders are in their late fifties and the rest in their twenties and early thirties. Several are from Rarotonga, but two are from Aitutaki, two from Mangaia and one from Atiu island.

Around 10:45 a.m. two storemen came in with their orders -- David (23, Samoan, working class) and John, (33, Manihiki, working class). They stood around talking for awhile with Apii and some of the others, and then all went about their chores. She chatted with Taaka (35, Manihiki, working class) at their work-bench preparing the noon meal, and later spoke with Trudy (37, European, working class) and Nita (40, Maori, working class) about some meal preparation matters. She had fun joking with several Papa'a meal orderlies who came soon to get the meals for the patients, and

then went to lunch. She sat with Kimi, and was joined by Tere (36, Mangaia, working class) and Tearurui (28, Aitutaki, working class).

By 4:00 p.m. they were again working intensely to prepare and send out meals, and by five she was done. She walked home with Tara (26, Atiu, working class) who is a cafeteria assistant like herself, and Metua (34, Mangaia, working class). They had stayed behind briefly to help with clearing up, and then did some window shopping as they walked along. When she got home, Tungane had the meal ready and they ate when Phil arrived from his Post Office job. After the meal, everyone sat around talking and having a few drinks and playing cards, but Apii soon became tired and went to bed early.

The next morning Apii rose about 8:00 a.m., took a bath and had some toast and coffee. Then she travelled to South Auckland to attend the Seventh Day Adventist Church, which had a relatively large congregation of Cook Islanders, Niueans, Samoans and Maoris. The two pastors were Europeans, the senior cleric being named appropriately Rev. Faithful. Apii talked with several Cook Islands friends, male and female and most slightly older than she was (working class). Then she went off to church school, which was led by Henry (42, Aitutaki, working class). Rev. Faithful took the service that day, and afterwards she spoke to two other Cook Islands friends Raita and Paula, both in the mid-twenties and factory machinists, whom she had known since childhood in Aitutaki. The service was followed by a family gathering and another worship service at a cousin's home, also in Otara after which they had a brief meeting. Then it was back to the church for a mid-afternoon youth meeting and service with a mixture of young people from various Pacific Islands groups. Around five in the

afternoon, her cousins drove her back to her house in the central city.

At 6:30 p.m. another gay friend of Phil's and his Papa'a boyfriend (52, European, middle class) arrived with several bottles of liquor and mix. For the next couple of hours, Apii, Tungane and the others drank and played Cook Islands music tapes and sometimes danced. Then Phil's friend went with Apii and Tungane to a nearby social sponsored by an Aitutaki village to raise funds, leaving Phil to look after the Papa'a and Tungane's children. There were two to three hundred Cook Islanders at the dance, sitting at tables in groups and shouting over the live band to be heard, dancing occasionally between drinks. Two or three Europeans in their late twenties were present, middle class males married to Cook Islanders. Apii danced some and spent time with several small groups of friends. Half-way through the evening, she met up with John (22, Aitutaki, working class) who was visiting from Wellington and a distant cousin. Later she became friendly with Richard (22, Cook Islands, working class) who was playing in the band. They ended up going back to Apii's house together about two in the morning.

Sunday morning Richard left early and Apii slept until early afternoon. Later in the afternoon, after something to eat, she and Tungane and Phil drove over to see another sister and then returned home. They had a meal and then played cards until they had finished off the liquor from the night before.

On Monday Apii rose early, but since she was on the early shift she had to skip breakfast and walk quickly to work two miles away. She again spent time talking with early arriving Cook Islander friends and welcomed back Valerie (37, European, middle class) a dietician who had just returned from holiday and who is a good friend. At morning tea she just talked quietly with a couple of friends since she was feeling ill from all the drinking over the weekend. During the

break in the middle of the afternoon, she spent some time conversing with Kiria (35, Aitutaki, working class) who is a drummer with the Aitutaki Enea culture group. She finished work at five, and walked with Tu and Tai along their usual route home. After a meal and a bath, she came out and played a raucous game of eucree with Phil and Tungane and then went to bed about 10:30. Her sister and the children returned south the next morning.

Appendix D
Field-work Methods

I was engaged in field-work among Cook Islands people for sixteen months from January, 1980 until May, 1981. Most of my research was among Cook Islands migrants in Auckland, New Zealand, though I did interview Cook Islanders in several towns throughout the North Island.

For three months prior to beginning field-work activities, I spent my time studying the Rarotongan dialect with Cook Islands friends. I became sufficiently conversant in Cook Islands Maori to interview and survey older informants in their own language using Rarotongan as the lingua franca, though most were fluent in English. Many young Cook Islanders born in New Zealand had only a cursory knowledge of their parents' language.

Toward the end of my field-work, I spent eight weeks including Christmas holidays with my wife and children in the Cook Islands. My main reason for the trip was to travel with and observe the reciprocal visiting and gifting of Cook Islander acquaintances resident in New Zealand. I decided to go to the islands toward the end of my field-work, since my time was limited and I hoped by then to be conversant with the language and culture to make the most of my brief stay. In the end I believe the amount of data and quality of information I was able to gather proved the decision correct, though it would be an equally effective plan to spend more time immersing myself in islands' society which would have made my early months in Auckland more fruitful.

During the New Zealand field-work, I lived primarily in my own home, which was located in an inner city suburb with a substantial number of Cook Islanders and other Polynesians (the situation was changing dramatically; see Loomis, 1979, 1980, 1984c). However, I visited the homes of friends and Cook Islands elders regularly, and went on several extended trips with sports, culture and family groups. I also spent many evenings interviewing members of five selected families, and lived with them during the weekend I recorded their network serials.

Doing research in a complex society, among an ethnic population spread across a large metropolis, presents many logistical problems. Since my intention was to study Cook Islanders as a whole, rather than one island or one aspect of their culture, I chose to operate out of my own home/office. Clearly, I sacrificed a certain depth of involvement by experience with a few people to maintain the breadth of the study. Since my focus was also on New Zealand society and the forces bearing on Cook Islanders, having a base from which to keep in touch with wider developments proved useful. I also avoided, for good or ill, being unduly restricted by practical necessity and customary obligations within a limited network of kinship relations.

I went into the field with a design and outline of information I wanted to collect, which I modified occasionally during my study. Essentially, I had four

focii around which I ordered my investigations:

- a) the social organisation and culture of Cook Islanders in New Zealand;
- b) the individual and his networks;
- c) the interaction of Cook Islanders with dominant New Zealand institutions and structures; and
- d) Cook Islanders' links back with their home islands.

From the beginning of my field-work, I set out to involve myself in in as many of the ethnic community's institutions and activities as time allowed. As my network of contacts grew, I was invited to more and more haircuttings, weddings, funerals, culture-troupe performances, socials and the like which I recorded occasionally on film and tape recorder for transcription. I also interviewed participants and leaders, and noted down my own observations and reflections.

Quite early in my field-work, I sought out a number of recognised elders and young leaders for their accounts of Cook Islands social organisation and culture. As I became more familiar with community gatherings and the day-to-day lives of "ordinary" Cook Islanders, I began to understand internal conflicts among the populace and where real life experience diverged from the "official" picture I was often given.

Besides my own network of personal acquaintances, I gained some of my most valuable insights from the time I spent with the five case study families over time. I began with general interviews with all adult members

and then life histories. After this, I sat with the husband and wife of each household (and usually one or two children) and drew up a genealogical diagram of their kopu tangata. I then asked each household head to see that a budget book was filled in of income and expenses, as well as visitors and gifts, over a one month period early in my research. I again asked that such a budget be done toward the end of my field-work. As mentioned, in each case, I also stayed with each family over a long weekend and interviewed adults about their activities and networks.

It became apparent after not too many months that the status of young people (mapu) within the community and their plight in the wider social order were of real concern to elders and parents. This was particularly so with respect to non-church youth from families who did not or could not "look after them properly". I spent a good deal of time with the members of a sports club, went to rugby practice in season (where I did my own exercises and jogging) and mingled with their circle of young men and women friends. I attended many socials and got to know many of the young people of Aitutaki Enea well. However, I never addressed the "youth problem" directly in my field-work, particularly youth in gangs and "street kids". It is an area of study deserving of further investigation as the new generation of New Zealand-born Cook Islanders emerges.

I intentionally chose to avoid extensive involvement in political affairs or organisations. The 1978 elections with the fly-in voter furore over mis-use of funds were still fresh in people's minds, and there was much bitterness and suspicion between Demo and CIP supporters. I did, however, maintain close contact with the Consular Office in Auckland, whose staff were always willing to assist regardless of which party was in power.

As mentioned, during December, 1980 to the end of January, 1981 my family and I spent several weeks in the islands. Most of that time was spent on Rarotonga, living with neighbours in Auckland at their new home in Avatiu, and interviewing visitors, kin and government officers. I thought it important to observe the situation in outer islands, and spend a week each on Aitutaki and Atiu islands living with relatives of friends back in New Zealand. Nonetheless, because of the brevity of the visit and the narrow focus of my interest at that time, considerable research yet remains to be done on Cook Islanders' links with their home islands.

I left the random sample survey of 208 (2%) Cook Islanders until the end of my field-work for several reasons. Firstly, I did not want to make my first contact with people through such a medium or to have the image of such a survey as my first introduction to community leaders. Secondly, I reckoned that the sorts of issues which I wanted to investigate in such a survey could only be clarified after a period of extended field-work.

And thirdly, I believed that the contacts which I had already established by the end of field-work and familiarity with the language would facilitate the survey, which indeed turned out to be the case.

A number of friends agreed to assist voluntarily which made the survey possible, and language competence enhanced the quality of responses to questions. A copy of the questionnaire draft is attached below.

Finally, in deference to the efforts of my Cook Islands friends and a central motif of their culture, I should state that I put a considerable amount of work into learning how to dance. I suppose in part by intuition, I decided from early involvements in Cook Islands functions that this was essential. I had had earlier experience for several years in Chicago's West Side ghetto to suggest this would be a useful access door to gaining acceptance. I cannot say that I ever became a virtuoso performer, but my friends paid me the compliment of saying "you dance our way". At least I moved my knees in the right direction.

APPENDIX E

Cook Islands Community Survey

Feb.-March, 1981

Note: In the original research design, a major survey of some 5% (ca. 600) of Cook Islanders in the Auckland Urban Area was planned. The logistics and numbers involved required at least three paid assistants for eight weeks. However, due to restricted funds, by the last few weeks of my field work I had to carry out most of the interviewing myself. Three Cook Islander friends graciously volunteered to assist on a number of evenings, and we finally managed a survey of a population of 208 (2%). The sample was stratified on the basis of the 1976 Census with regard to age, gender and residential location. A census area unit of 10%+ Cook Islanders was included in a random selection of neighbourhoods to survey, of which 6 were eventually selected: 4 in South Auckland and 2 in Central Auckland.

Basic Information

Census Area Unit: _____
Ngutuare No. _____

- 1) Age last birthday: _____ 2) Sex: M _____ F _____
- 3) Marital status: a) never married _____ e) divorced _____
b) married _____ f) widowed _____
c) legally sep _____ g) not spec _____
d) living together _____
- 4) Ethnic identity of....
- a) self b) mother c) father d) mother spouse's e) father spouse's

- Full CIs Maori
- 75%CIM-25%European
- 50%CIM-50%Eur
- 25%CIM-75%Eur
- 75%CIM-25%Pacific Is.
- 50%CIM-50%Pac
- 25%CIM-75%Pac
- 75%CIM-25%NZ Maori
- 50%CIM-50%NZM
- 25%CIM-75%NZM
- Full European
- Full Maori
- Full Pac Is.
- Other
- No Resp.
- Not applicable

- 5) Country of birth of....
- a) self b) mother c) father d) mother spouse's e) father spouse's

- Cook Is.
- N.Z.
- Tahiti
- Other Pac. Is.
- Australia
- U.S.A.
- Britain-Europe
- Other
- Not Applic.

5) Island of birth of....

- a) self b) mother c) father d) spouse's mother e) spouse's father

Rarotonga
Aitutaki
Atiu
Manaia
Mauke
Mitiaro
Manuae
Swarrow
Palmerston
Manahiki
Rakahanga
Penrhyn
Nassau
Pukapuka
Not applic
No resp.

7) Level of schooling last attended by....

- a) self b) father c) mother

8) Your income last year before tax? (flash card of categories)

Occupational Mobility

1) Could you describe your.... (N.Z. Standard Classification of Occupations)

- a) present occupation _____
b) first occupation after age 15 _____
c) father's main life occupation _____
d) mother's main life occupation _____

2) Could you list the men and women fifteen years and over usually resident in this household, and their current employment status:

<u>Emp stat.</u>	<u>males</u>	<u>females</u>
self-employed		
wage-sal. earner		
unemployed		
relative assisting		
housewife		
student		
parttime work		
no resp.		

3) I would like to ask you to rank the following typical N.Z. jobs.... (flash card of 20 occupations)

- a) which three would you pick as the best jobs? reasons?
b) which three would you pick as the worst jobs? reasons?
c) Which job would you most like to have if there was nothing standing in your way?
d) How would you rank your chances of obtaining such a job?
- very good
fair
outside chance
not possible
no resp.

e) How would you rank your children's chances of obtaining such a job?

- very good
- fair
- outside chance
- not possible
- no resp.
- not applic.

f) What would be the main block or problem holding your child back from obtaining such a position?

Dwelling Tenure

1) Do you own this house, rent, or some other arrangement?

- a) own without mortgage
- b) own with mortgage
- c) own with 2+ mortgages
- d) free with job
- e) loaned
- f) free-living with kin
- g) rent/sharing rent
- h) not specified

2) If you had a choice, which would you prefer?

- a) own
- b) rent
- c) no resp.

3) If you own with a mortgage, what was the source of the mortgage?

- a) trading bank
- b) savings bank
- c) finance co.
- d) building soc.
- e) Housing Corp.
- f) Maori & Island Affairs
- g) solicitors funds
- h) insurance co.
- i) cash-other
- j) no resp.
- k) not applic.

4) What is your presently weekly mortgage payment (average)?

5) What was the amount of your initial deposit?

6) Source of deposit (see no. 3 above)?

7) Do you own any other real estate in N.Z.? Y___ No___ No resp___

8) If rent, how much do you pay weekly?

Residential History

1) What year did you first leave the Cook Islands?

2) What year did you arrive in New Zealand?

3) What was the primary reason for coming to N.Z.?

4) Where did you live when you first arrived? List each place lived in to present:

Location: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

- a) year moved
- b) who provided information
- c) reason moved
- d) who assisted you

- 5) If you have considered moving, what is the primary reason stopping you?

Island Links

- 1) How much money did you personally send back to the islands during this past year?
- 2) How often have you been back to the islands since coming to N.Z.?
- 3) Have you obtained a quarter-acre section in the islands from your kopu tangata?
- 4) Have you built your own house on your land in the islands?

Local Community Involvement

- 1) How often during the year do you attend church?
- 2) How often do you attend enua group activities?
- 3) How frequently during the year were you active in a sporting group?
- 4) " " " culture group?
- 5) How often this past year did you attend the following:

- a) Eva/funeral
- b) akatu te toka
- c) akaipoipo
- d) birthday in the kopu tangata
- e) baptism
- f) uipaanga kopu tangata
- g) graduation
- h) 21st birthday
- i) fund-raising project

- 6) What would you say the level of your community involvement is now compared to when you first came to N.Z.?

- | | |
|----------------|-------------------|
| a) much more | d) about the same |
| b) little more | e) almost never |
| c) less | f) no resp. |

- 7) Do you ever find that Cook Is. community assistance is a burden?
- a) yes
 - b) once in a while
 - c) never a problem
 - d) no resp

Home Life

- 1) What type of household is this?

- | | |
|-------------------|------------------|
| a) one family | e) multi-persons |
| b) family + other | f) non-family |
| c) two family | g) one person |
| d) two family + | h) no resp. |

- 2) How would you rate your children's knowledge of CIs. Maori?

- a) very well
- b) well
- c) little bit
- d) none
- e) no resp

- 3) How often do you teach family papaanga and customs at home?
- 4) What qualities do you look for in a marriage partner?
(list up to four)
- 5) Why do some Cook Islanders prefer to marry a Papa'a?
(list up to four reasons)
- 6) In a mixed marriage, which way should you fo in family and community activities: the Cook Islands side, the Papa'a side, a balance or what?
- 7) How do your children identify themselves in New Zealand?

problems and Class Beliefs

- 1) A high number of Cook Islanders in N.Z. are having difficulty with unemployment, housing, poor health and school. Who or what is the main cause of these problems?
- 2) What is the best place to go for help with housing problems?
- 3) How would you respond if someone were to say that Cook Islanders here should unite and work together to solve their problems?
 - a)strongly agree
 - b)agree pretty much
 - c)disagree
 - d)strongly disagree
 - e)no response

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