



THE HANGZHOU INCIDENT OF 1975:
THE IMPACT OF FACTIONALISM
ON A CHINESE PROVINCIAL ADMINISTRATION

by

Keith Forster B.A. (Monash) M.A. (La Trobe)

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SUMMARY

The Hangzhou Incident of July 1975 was an outstanding example of the cumulative, debilitating effects of factionalism on a Chinese provincial administration. It has, however, remained inadequately explained and largely misunderstood. Contemporary observers have tended to portray the unrest in Hangzhou as an outburst of wage demands by the city's industrial workers, but have not made clear why an issue of national dimensions manifested itself so violently there. They have also failed to accurately locate the trouble in the context of provincial affairs in the decade 1966-75.

This thesis sets out to provide a more satisfactory explanation of this extraordinary event by tracing its origins back to the upheavals of the early years of the Cultural Revolution. It draws on previously unavailable source material to outline the development of factional struggles between 1966-9 and to their eruption in a more virulent and dangerous form in the early and mid 1970's. The thesis also relates provincial developments to national trends. This approach enables the otherwise sudden and sensational decisions of July 1975 to be seen in their correct perspective. It also helps explain the fragility of the compromise which these decisions in Hangzhou represented.

Prominent factional leaders of the mid 1960's, with their base of support among large numbers of Hangzhou's industrial workers, accumulated positions of power within the provincial and municipal party structures during the years 1973-4. From there they revived and strengthened horizontal

and vertical factional links to apply the maximum amount of pressure on the provincial leadership. The deliberate sabotage of industrial production for political ends, which necessitated the despatch of large numbers of troops to key factories to mediate between warring groups and allow production to resume, was one tactic in this policy of destabilisation.

When the authority and power of the party leadership in Zhejiang and Hangzhou appeared on the verge of collapse, the central authorities intervened. Even a disunited national leadership realised that support for its subordinates took precedence over factional loyalties. The local party and mass leaders who did not appreciate these priorities suffered the consequences. Hangzhou in July 1975 proved that, in a crisis, the necessity for order prevailed over the forces of instability and insubordination.

STATEMENT

This thesis contains no material published elsewhere except where reference is made in the text. It is not and has not been used for the award of any other degree or diploma in any university and is the sole work of the author. The author consents to the thesis being available for photocopying and loan if accepted for the award of the degree.

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This doctoral thesis has taken ten years to reach completion. Numerous intermissions have broken its continuity and many disruptions have added to the delay in its presentation.

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My major regret in presenting this thesis is that my parents have not lived to witness its completion. They would have been proud of their eldest son. Many of my friends have continuously urged me to see the job through to the end, including my Chinese friends in Hangzhou. I am glad that I have not disappointed their faith in me.

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ABBREVIATIONS

AS	- <u>ASIAN SURVEY</u>
BR	- <u>BEIJING REVIEW</u>
CC	- CENTRAL COMMITTEE
CNA	- <u>CHINA NEWS ANALYSIS</u>
CQ	- <u>CHINA QUARTERLY</u>
CCP	- CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY
CYL	- COMMUNIST YOUTH LEAGUE
CS	- <u>CURRENT SCENE</u>
FEER	- <u>FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC REVIEW</u>
FBIS/CHI	- FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE. <u>DAILY REPORT. CHINA</u>
FBIS/CR/PSMA	- FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE. <u>CHINA REPORT. POLITICAL, SOCIOLOGICAL AND MILITARY AFFAIRS</u>
HMC	- HANGZHOU MUNICIPAL COMMITTEE
HMMCH	- HANGZHOU MUNICIPAL MILITIA COMMAND HEADQUARTERS
HMRC	- HANGZHOU MUNICIPAL REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEE
HMWC	- HANGZHOU MUNICIPAL WORKERS' CONGRESS
HZRB	- <u>HANGZHOU RIBAO</u>
I & S	- <u>ISSUES & STUDIES</u>
NPC	- NATIONAL PEOPLE'S CONGRESS
PR	- <u>PEKING REVIEW</u>
PLA	- PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY
RMRB	- <u>RENMIN RIBAO</u>
SCMM	- UNITED STATES CONSULATE-GENERAL (HONG KONG). <u>SELECTIONS FROM CHINA MAINLAND MAGAZINES</u>

- SCMP - UNITED STATES CONSULATE-GENERAL
(HONG KONG). SURVEY OF CHINA MAINLAND
PRESS
- SWB/FE - BBC. SUMMARY OF WORLD BROADCASTS.
PART THREE. THE FAR EAST.
- URS - UNION RESEARCH INSTITUTE (HONG KONG).
UNION RESEARCH SERVICE
- ZPC - ZHEJIANG PROVINCIAL COMMITTEE
- ZPMD - ZHEJIANG PROVINCIAL MILITARY DISTRICT
- ZPRC - ZHEJIANG PROVINCIAL REVOLUTIONARY
COMMITTEE
- ZJRB - ZHEJIANG RIBAO
- ZPS - ZHEJIANG PROVINCIAL SERVICE
- ZPTUC - ZHEJIANG PROVINCIAL TRADE UNION COUNCIL

INTRODUCTION

The startling events of 1975 in Hangzhou, when large numbers of troops were ordered into the city's factories, attracted my attention in that year when I was researching a topic for a doctoral thesis. The opportunity to work in Hangzhou which arose late in 1976 was one my wife and I readily grasped. We lived in the city, teaching English at Hangzhou University, from January 1977 until September 1979. During this time, through daily readings of newspapers, my familiarity with the Chinese language steadily improved. Local newspapers were then off-limits to foreigners, so that I kept up with provincial developments through listening to the radio.

Gradually, through conversations with Chinese friends and visits to factories and communes in Hangzhou, I built up some impression of the pattern of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution in Zhejiang, and Hangzhou in particular. Guided tours and discussions at industrial plants cited frequently in 1975 were of especial assistance. However, the barriers of suspicion and secrecy continually rose before me. The most significant development occurred in February 1979 upon return from six weeks' leave in Australia. The authorities of Hangzhou University informed me that my request to read local newspapers had been approved by Beijing.

Elated, but fully aware that approval granted can also be withdrawn, I began an evening programme of regular reading of Hangzhou Daily. I chose the municipal newspaper ahead of the provincial Zhejiang Daily because of its greater

concentration on affairs confined to the city where the incident had occurred. Additionally it reprinted major articles carried in its sister newspaper. Because of time limitations I was forced to narrow the time-span and a glance at articles carried in 1975 quickly revealed their generality. The campaign against the Gang of Four and their followers in Zhejiang, which commenced in October 1976, led to an outpouring of articles, tendentious in tone but rich in detail, concerning events of the previous ten years, the last three in particular. Facts and dates were selectively and progressively published requiring reintegration like the scattered pieces of a jigsaw puzzle.

Reference to events of an earlier date were checked as far as possible against contemporary issues of Hangzhou Daily. Upon my return to Australia I supplemented my notes by a thorough combing of the British, American and Hong Kong monitoring services. Experience had taught me that the vagueness of Chinese propaganda in the decade of the Cultural Revolution extended to the local press. Thus the content of provincial broadcasts almost matched what native citizens could read in their newspapers. However in the two-year campaign against the Gang of Four, which basically closed at the end of 1978, the provincial newspapers carried a far more detailed discussion and analysis of events in the Cultural Revolution than was broadcast and monitored overseas. Herein lies the value of my source material.

Because of the paucity of information in the West about this major incident, and the inaccuracy of much of it, the

presentation of this topic requires little justification. Articles emanating from Taiwan and Hong Kong, while conveying certain important information, tended to suffer from a blinkered anti-communism which distorted and simplified reality. Reference to the incident in secondary literature written in the West located it in the immediate context of the campaign launched by Mao in 1975 to study the theory of the dictatorship of the proletariat. Such commentators over-emphasised economic factors associated with wage demands and radical efforts to narrow differentials, disregarding other longer-term political factors. Discussion of the weaknesses and strengths of the available literature forms the contents of the first chapter of the thesis.

Chapter one also examines the Chinese interpretation of the incident. Maoist radicals and their opponents naturally viewed it from entirely different perspectives. However the desire by both sides not to disclose too much detail about what was an embarrassing affair for the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the Chinese political system as a whole, has ensured that the incident remains largely undiscussed. Perhaps the Chinese authorities have not made a final decision about events which, while occurring in the 'ten years of turmoil', took place when Deng Xiaoping had taken charge of the Central Committee (CC). Whatever the reasons, my attempts to discuss the issue on brief trips to Hangzhou in 1982 and 1984 proved fruitless.

This thesis argues that the incident requires historical location in the context of the factionalism of the Cultural

Revolution. The term faction as used in the following pages refers to organised, coherent groupings operating in the political system with their own programme, policies and relationships, in defiance of the Leninist organisational principles theoretically espoused by the CCP. Factionalism in the Cultural Revolution began in the mass organisations and spread to the civilian party structure and then to the People's Liberation Army (PLA). When mass leaders joined the CCP in the 1970's and gained positions in the bureaucracy, they introduced mass factionalism into the system, complicating and exacerbating the divisions among officials. This overlap gave its special characteristics to the institutionalised factionalism of the mid 70's, differentiating it from the more spontaneous factionalism of the early years of the Cultural Revolution.

Chapter two traces the origins of factional groupings in Zhejiang and Hangzhou to the power-seizure phase of the Cultural Revolution in January 1967. With the leaders of the CCP Zhejiang Provincial Committee (ZPC) standing firmly united against the attacks of the rebels, and the latter divided as to which leaders of the committee merited support and which required repudiation as capitalist-roaders, a political stalemate ensued. When the local military leaders were ordered by the central authorities to support one rebel organisation in its attempt to overthrow the legally-constituted administration, they demurred and actually escorted their civilian colleagues to the safety of the barracks.

The officially recognised Maoist organisation, the Zhejiang Provincial Revolutionary Rebel United Headquarters

(Zhejiang sheng geming zaofan lianhe zong zhihuibu), decided to hold a mass rally to humiliate and attack Jiang Hua, first secretary of the CCP ZPC. Its rival group, the Red Storm Provisional Headquarters, (Hongse baodongpai linshi zhihuibu) allegedly backed by members of the provincial political elite, broke up the meeting, allowing Jiang to escape the intended harsh treatment. Under instructions from Zhou Enlai and with the probable agreement of Mao, Jiang was flown to the comparative safety of Beijing. This event, more than any other, triggered the rift between United Headquarters and Red Storm which characterised the following two years of the Cultural Revolution in Zhejiang.

The rebels, together with the PLA and 'revolutionary leading cadres', were to form a Maoist-inspired trinity of forces brought together to replace the defunct party committees. United Headquarters, with the blessing and backing of the Cultural Revolution Group led by Chen Boda and Jiang Qing, claimed recognition as the 'core' of this proposed revolutionary alliance of rebels. Red Storm refused to grant United Headquarters this status. The ambiguous stance adopted by the centre toward Jiang Hua gave credence to Red Storm's credentials as a revolutionary organisation. However, from February 1967 onward, United Headquarters became known as a 'rebel' group while Red Storm was called the 'conservative' organisation. Recent Chinese propaganda has argued that because both groups were indistinguishable they both deserve the label 'rebel'. This thesis retains the original nomenclature for the sake of clarity while recognising much of the

validity of present claims.

The failure of the local military forces garrisoned in Hangzhou to support the rebels resulted in Beijing's decision to despatch main force Unit 6409 (the 20th Army) from Jiangsu province to take military control of Zhejiang in March 1967. Together with personnel of the Zhejiang Provincial Military District (ZPMD) and Air Force and Naval units stationed in the province, the PLA carried out 'support the left' activities as directed by Mao and Lin Biao. However the freedom given to the military to decide which mass organisation was 'revolutionary' and therefore deserved its support, often worked to the detriment of United Headquarters. Only the Air Force units proved reliable allies. Naval and Military District forces tended to support Red Storm while the 20th Army acted in a somewhat neutral fashion, disciplining the anarchic behaviour of both mass organisations.

Mass factionalism thus spilled over into the armed forces. Additionally, each major group attempted to gain support from the veteran cadres of the defunct CCP ZPC by targeting some and praising and defending others. Only those allowed to 'pass the test' by United Headquarters reappeared on the political stage by the time Mao convened the CCP 9th Congress in April 1969. But continuing controversy over the status of Jiang Hua and several of his subordinates kept the mass organisations at loggerheads, implicating the PLA. In August 1967 leaders of the military district were dismissed and replaced by commanders of the 20th Army, reinforcing central control over Zhejiang.

Major incidents in the factories of Hangzhou and such provincial towns as Wenzhou, Jinhua, Xiaoshan and Zhuji in the summer of 1967 inflamed factional antagonisms even further. Mao Zedong visited Hangzhou for one day in September 1967 to observe the situation at first hand. During his provincial tour he called for unity among the two major organisations but his call went unheeded in Zhejiang. In December 1967 Mao, to break the deadlock, issued instructions partially rehabilitating Red Storm as an 'old rebel organisation which has committed mistakes'. This compromise probably pleased neither party. United Headquarters was forced to deal with an old rival it had fought bitterly against over the previous year. Red Storm, while seemingly justified in its refusal to kneel to United Headquarters, was placed in an unequal, tainted position.

A further two months of hard bargaining were required, under the direction of an impatient centre, before the two groups finally signed an agreement in February 1968. This permitted the formation of the Zhejiang Provincial Revolutionary Committee (ZPRC) the following month. Because the clauses which allotted a certain number of places on the standing committee to representatives of Red Storm were not honoured, the agreement soon broke down. The newly established political authority struggled to gain legitimacy and respect throughout 1968. Ridiculed by remnant influential officials of the old power structure, and unrecognised by Red Storm, it was powerless to discipline opposition forces which openly defied its edicts. The summer of 1968 witnessed further armed struggles, especially in the troubled southern port-city

of Wenzhou.

Throughout the two years of chaos and strife up until the end of 1968, supporters of Jiang Hua both in Zhejiang and Beijing strove for his inclusion in the new political leadership. Their efforts contributed greatly to destabilisation in Zhejiang. They eventually failed but not before they had further divided United Headquarters and Red Storm. It was not until November 1968, when Jiang Hua was publicly criticised by name in a series of polemical articles, that his future was sealed, temporarily at least.

After the 9th Congress of 'unity and victory' a further attempt was made to unite the two mass organisations, which in effect entailed their demobilisation. An agreement to this effect was announced in May 1969 under the supervision of the provincial authorities. But it is probable that behind the outward professions of reconciliation and mutual trust, both groups maintained at least an informal organisational structure which operated underground. They also appealed to sympathetic party officials to guard their interests. A substantial number of Red Storm activists refused to accept the terms of the agreement and travelled to Beijing to lodge their complaints. The military officials and veteran cadres who now dominated the Zhejiang administration, as exemplified in the reconstituted CCP ZPC elected in January 1971, remained wary of these unruly, unpredictable mass groups and kept them at arm's length.

The upsurge of factional activities following the demise of Lin Biao and his provincial supporters forms the subject of Chapter three. Once again the central authorities in Beijing

were forced to take temporary control of Zhejiang through their emissary Xu Shiyou, commander of the Nanjing Military Region. Xu conducted the purge of the provincial leadership and selected two veteran cadres to head the party committee in Zhejiang. Tan Qilong and Tie Ying had both served in the PLA 3rd Field Army in 1949, Tan having worked in Zhejiang in the early post-Liberation years. Tie had served in the strategically important Zhoushan island chain from 1965-72.

In 1972 and 1973 Tan and Tie rehabilitated some leading pre-Cultural Revolution officials and placed them in key positions in the bureaucracy. They released members of Red Storm languishing in gaol. The new provincial leadership also initiated an investigation of the deeds of leaders and members of United Headquarters back in the stormy days of the late 1960's, and their relations with the disgraced military cadres. Other military officials were transferred to Zhejiang from the Nanjing Military Region to thoroughly purge the ZPMD of its allegiance to Lin Biao.

The achievements of Tan and Tie soon came under threat with a renewed bout of leftism coming in the wake of the CCP's 10th National Congress in August 1973. In the reformation of the pre-Cultural Revolution mass organisations on the eve of the Congress, leaders of the former rebel mass organisations gained representation in the Zhejiang Provincial Trade Union Council (ZPTUC) and Communist Youth League (CYL) Executives. On the former body they were balanced by the election of veteran trade union leaders and model workers of the 1950's and 1960's. A female worker who had belonged to Red Storm

was chosen chairperson of the ZPTUC while a member of the old United Headquarters became secretary of the provincial CYL committee.

Three former prominent leaders of United Headquarters had gained official posts of some substance at this time. They were Zhang Yongsheng, a former student of the nationally-famous Zhejiang Academy of Fine Arts, Weng Senhe, a worker at the large Hangzhou Silk Dyeing and Printing Complex, and He Xianchun, a former worker at the Hangzhou Heavy Machinery Factory. All three had acquired a great deal of notoriety in the Cultural Revolution. Zhang had established ties with Jiang Qing and become active in the arts' world; Weng, who had changed sides from Red Storm, led and participated in violent struggles; and He became involved with armed detachment of workers which took the place of the smashed public security apparatus in enforcing order in Hangzhou.

In 1973 Weng and He were elected vice-chairmen of the ZPTUC. In addition He retained his position as chairman of the Hangzhou Municipal Worker's Congress (HMWC). He also held the post of deputy secretary of the CCP Hangzhou Municipal Committee (HMC). Zhang had been a vice-chairman of the ZPRC since 1968. In 1974 he was placed in charge of the provincial educational system while Weng, as a member of the political work group of the CCP ZPC, took charge of the Mao Zedong Thought propaganda teams.

When the anti-Lin Biao anti-Confucius campaign commenced in early 1974 Zhang, Weng and He were ready to swing into action. Encouraged by Wang Hongwen in Beijing and tolerated or condoned in their activities by certain cadres of both

provincial and municipal committees, the radical leaders found themselves in an environment in which they thrived. In a series of mass meetings, rallies and demonstrations they were able to recreate the excitement of the early days of the Cultural Revolution. Their solid body of supporters in the factories of Hangzhou were mobilised into contingents of the urban militia led by the ZPTUC and directly responsible to the civilian party leadership, not to the PLA. He Xianchun and an associate took charge of the Hangzhou Municipal Militia Command Headquarters (HMMCH). The substantial number of industrial workers drafted into the militia in Hangzhou acted as an armed strike force for use against opponents in the factories, as well as to substitute for the PLA and public security forces in guard duty and social control. This deliberate intimidation, both in and outside the work-place, had disastrous effects on industrial production.

Zhang, Weng and He, together with their allies in the bureaucracy also gained control of the group established to direct the anti-Lin Biao anti-Confucius campaign. For a while it seemed to replace the CCP ZPC as the source of ultimate authority in Zhejiang. Additionally, at a four-month conference of the CCP ZPC, ZPRC and the party committee of the ZPMD, the rebels coordinated a campaign of vilification and confrontation against Tan, Tie and a deputy political commissar in charge of political work in the military district. The administration seemed powerless before these tactics and could only watch helplessly as production stalled, social order deteriorated and government became paralysed.

In July 1974 the Central Committee acted to bring the

campaign to an end before the economy suffered even greater damage. The Zhejiang authorities took considerable time to rein in the destructive activities of the rebels but they achieved some initial success by September. Yet the situation remained highly volatile, and with the militia continuing to create disturbances, Beijing called both its representatives in Zhejiang as well as the factional leaders to a conference in the capital starting in November.

The assertion of central control over Zhejiang, coupled with the backing for the provincial authorities against those who sought to overthrow it, forms the basis of chapter four of this thesis. It appears as if a decision to disband the urban militia command was taken early in 1975 so as to remove a major source of instability from the Zhejiang political scene. Mao Zedong spent the Chinese New Year in Hangzhou. He was accompanied by Deng Xiaoping in greeting foreign dignitaries. Deng could use the opportunity to investigate the situation for himself in briefings with the provincial leadership. The peasant leader and Politburo member, Chen Yonggui, arrived in April to address a provincial meeting on agriculture. In his speech Chen uttered some stern words about the dangers of continued factionalism. However, normalisation had clearly not been reestablished when, at the end of June, the central leadership despatched two senior members of the Politburo, vice-chairman Wang Hongwen and Ji Dengkui, to resolve matters. They brought with them a delegation from the CC Organisation Department and the Ministries of Machine Building and Light Industry.

After a three week investigation the two central leaders decided upon recommendations which were submitted to the Politburo. This body made three major decisions which were then relayed back to Zhejiang for implementation. First, a major reshuffle of the provincial and municipal party leadership, and that of the military district, was announced. Cadres who had been compromised too greatly for involvement in factional disturbances were demoted or transferred. The rebel leaders and their supporters were banished, sent to the countryside, or enrolled in study classes. Replacements were brought in from other provinces to assume leading positions.

Second, the central leadership decided upon sending at least 10,000 soldiers of the three services into the factories of Hangzhou to pacify workers and supervise the resumption of normal production. Outside troops, uninvolved in the lengthy and bitter local squabbles, were brought in.

Third, the investigation of industrial problems in Hangzhou resulted in conclusions summed up as a model to be emulated. Known as the 'eight factories' experience', it guided the restoration of order in the factories and the criticism and discipline of unruly workers.


Chapter four concludes by noting that in spite of the compromises which had been made by both groups in Beijing to rescue the authority of the CCP ZPC, the decisions of July 1975 contained the seeds of their own destruction. Military occupation of factories was only a short-term solution to the unrest, and the new leadership installed in Zhejiang was at best a compromise comprised of different factional groupings.

When the Gang of Four launched its counter-attack on Deng Xiaoping at the end of 1975 his supporters in Zhejiang came under renewed pressure. The legitimacy and correctness of the decisions made under Deng's aegis were therefore questioned and openly challenged by the time Mao died in September 1976. The chapter also briefly outlines the renewed factional upheavals of 1976 ending with the arrest of the Gang of Four in October. Its followers in Zhejiang were dismissed and the rebel leaders arrested and gaoled.

The study concludes that the Hangzhou Incident of 1975 had its roots in the factional struggles which had erupted at the beginning of the Cultural Revolution. Complicated and compounded by events of the early and mid 1970's, the trouble came to a head in 1975. Both influenced by and reacting upon factionalism at the centre of Chinese politics, problems in Zhejiang could not be solved without consensus in Beijing. When this occurred the provincial leadership felt secure in handling its anarchic opponents. When consensus broke down, as it so often did in the years 1972-6, the provincial authorities were rendered helpless and indecisive in the face of attacks on their legitimacy. The Hangzhou Incident illustrates once again the weaknesses and strengths of the centralised nature of the Chinese political system. It also provides further evidence that the Cultural Revolution, in Zhejiang province at least, spanned a tumultuous decade in the history of the People's Republic.

杭州市区交通图

铁路和火车站





Chapter One

CONTEMPORARY EXPLANATIONS

In July 1975 the world was alerted to the existence of serious problems in Hangzhou, the capital of the eastern Chinese province of Zhejiang. The open admission by the authorities that they had sent large numbers of soldiers of the PLA into the city's factories was a clear sign that something was amiss. Another indication was the series of important meetings held in late July at which major changes to the Zhejiang provincial party and military leadership, as well as to the Hangzhou municipal party administration, were announced. Broadcasts monitored by the West referred to production difficulties, disunity among workers and the sabotage activities of unnamed 'evil people'.

In five articles it carried in the month from mid-July to mid-August, the national daily of the CCP CC, Renmin Ribao, alluded to trouble in major industrial units in Hangzhou. Without going into great detail these articles admitted that in the immediate past, production in these factories had lagged behind, railway freight in Zhejiang had failed to meet its targets and that soldiers were labouring beside industrial workers to restore production and assist in the provision of social welfare facilities. The reports made no mention of a leadership reshuffle nor did they specify, apart from vague references to unity and the overall situation (daju), the origins or causes of this state of affairs. Overall, Renmin

Ribao kept the incident extremely low-key.

Provincial broadcasts monitored from outside China were much more specific. The BBC, for example, picked up a series of programmes from the Zhejiang Provincial Service detailing changes in leadership personnel at the provincial and municipal levels. Extensive and detailed broadcasts described the military's role in industrial and agricultural production in Hangzhou municipality. Further reports concentrated on the restoration of production in the major factories named in the pages of Renmin Ribao. They presented a graphic picture of order restored from the brink of chaos and constantly referred to the need to obey and implement central directives. But on the question of who was responsible for the crisis in Hangzhou, the provincial broadcasts remained silent.

Errors and Misconceptions in Interpretation

Observers of Chinese affairs in Hong Kong and Taiwan, both Chinese and Western alike, quickly publicised the significance of the situation. Most commented on the almost unprecedented use of military force to settle a civil disturbance. This aspect, above all, put the incident into the headlines and raised questions about the stability and future of the country. Hangzhou, in its troubles, supposedly reflected in extremis, the general malaise of a regime beset ~~by leadership disunity and popular unrest. Some of the writers~~ differed in their interpretations of the causes of the strife and listed various immediate and long-term factors to substantiate their explanations. That different analysts viewed

the disturbance from different perspectives was entirely understandable, but less comprehensible were the basic factual errors propagated and repeated in these secondary accounts.

It is true that in the final years of the Maoist era the Chinese press was particularly secretive and prone to undue optimism and misleading exaggeration. The local press was inaccessible to foreigners and Hangzhou was apparently declared off-limits to Western journalists at the height of outside interest in its affairs.¹ Without a detailed knowledge of the politics of Zhejiang and given the paucity of primary data, factual errors or misinterpretations could be forgiven. However, the limited material which was available from mainland sources was not fully used or else was incorrectly understood. Facts were at a premium and this placed greater pressure on those reporting the event to get them right.

One Taiwan reference, for example, gave the wrong family-name of the PLA unit commander who led his troops into the factories even though it had been printed in the People's Daily.² Estimates of the numbers of troops sent into factories in Hangzhou varied from a low of 4,500-6,000 through 10,000 and up to several tens of thousands³ when Chinese sources themselves mentioned a definite minimum figure of 10,500 plus the likelihood of another 10,000 at least. It is little wonder that such basic errors as these have led to the incident being so little understood outside China.⁴

These observers also relied heavily on information gathered by Guomindang agents operating on the mainland, leaks to the diplomatic corps in Beijing from the Chinese

bureaucracy, impressions and stories related by overseas Chinese passing through Hangzhou in 1975, and sheer gossip and rumour. Yet all these unverifiable but often valuable sources added little to the sum of knowledge already gleaned and in some cases only served to confuse the issue. It is possible that the Chinese authorities deliberately misled China-watchers with selective releases of misinformation.

Otherwise it is difficult to account for the persistent and repeated accounts, which have gained acceptance in Western academic circles, that Deng Xiaoping personally visited Hangzhou in July 1975 to solve the outstanding problems. It is possible that Deng visited Hangzhou in the spring of 1975 if only to report to Chairman Mao Zedong who spent the Chinese New Year in his second-favourite Chinese city.⁵ Presumably, the leaders of Zhejiang would have been in regular contact with both Mao (allowing for his state of health) and Deng concerning major issues of provincial administration.⁶ But Deng did not supervise the leadership changes or personally investigate conditions in Hangzhou's factories in July.⁷ This task was performed by CCP CC vice-chairman Wang Hongwen⁸ and Politburo member Ji Dengkui.⁹

Other examples of speculation proved equally misleading. Butterfield and Goodstadt, in appraising the changes made to the local leading bodies, put forward the proposition that the new appointees, being on closer terms than their predecessors with the first secretary of the CCP ZPC, Tan Qilong, would help forge a greater sense of leadership unity. While it was certainly true that the new commander of the ZPMD had fought with Tan in the 1940's,¹⁰ there is no evidence that

other incoming leaders would alleviate the chronic dissension in the CCP ZPC.¹¹

In their search for causes to explain the Hangzhou incident several observers noted the campaign launched by Mao in 1975 to study the theory of the dictatorship of the proletariat and restrict bourgeois rights. Karl Marx had used the term bourgeois rights in his pamphlet Critique of the Gotha Programme to describe inequalities in distribution built into the structure of socialist society, or the first stage of communism. Mao commented, in directives released in February 1975, that the eight-grade wage scale practised in Chinese industry was an example of bourgeois rights which should be restricted. But he remained typically silent on the policy consequences of his statement, merely noting that 'we should do more reading of Marxist-Leninist works.'¹²

The two major articles published in the campaign by Yao Wenyan and Zhang Chungqiao,¹³ while issuing warnings against the use of material incentives, offered no specific suggestions entailing policy changes. More detailed discussions went no further than to support the existing system and calling for a gradual reduction in individual income differentials.¹⁴ However certain Taiwan sources drew the unjustifiable conclusion that a wholesale adjustment to the industrial wage structure was carried out leading to widespread discontent among workers.¹⁵ Labour unrest over wages, they then concluded, was a major reason for the trouble in Hangzhou.¹⁶

It is highly likely and understandable that sectors of the industrial working class would have resented or even

resisted any attempt to abruptly alter the wage system. This would have applied in Hangzhou as in other industrial centres across the country. But as this thesis will demonstrate, Hangzhou's troubles stemmed from essentially political causes. Industrial production dropped sharply in the years 1974-6 primarily due to factional fighting and the subsequent high rate of absenteeism on the shop-floor. This was part of a deliberate strategy of sabotage and destabilisation. The resultant slump in output would then reflect badly on the performance of the provincial and municipal party leadership. Naturally, workshop conditions would have deteriorated if machinery lay idle or damaged and logistic staff were unable or unwilling to cook meals or run creches. Intimidation and threats kept many workers away from their units and those who did attend worked in a very insecure environment.

The factual errors pointed out above, committed as a result of misreporting of the Chinese press, are inexcusable. False guesses and assumptions based on an inadequate knowledge of the affairs of Zhejiang, due partly to insufficient source material, are more understandable. This thesis, basing itself largely on articles written in the local press, supplemented by knowledge gleaned from visits to major industrial plants in the years 1977-9, sets out to correct the distortions and falsehoods passed as truth which characterise writings on this topic. The author also had the unprecedented experience of living and working in Hangzhou, during which time various facts were brought to his attention.

The remainder of this chapter summarises the explanations provided by the national and local Chinese press at the time. It also examines the reports from Hong Kong and Taiwan and assesses their strengths and weaknesses. A comprehensive review of the Hangzhou incident, based on all the material available, is not presented until chapter four of this thesis. It is only after tracing the roots of the problem back to the beginning of the Cultural Revolution that the event can be fully interpreted and satisfactorily understood.

Reports from Beijing

Reports that problems existed in Hangzhou appeared in the Chinese national press in mid-July 1975. A Xinhua release of 13 July¹⁷ surveyed six major factories in the city, the Hangzhou Iron and Steel Mill (Hangzhou gangtiechang), the Hangzhou Silk Printing and Dyeing Complex (Hangzhou sichou yinran lianhechang), the Hangzhou Oxygen Generator Factory (Hangzhou zhiyangjichang), the Hangzhou No.1 Cotton Dyeing and Printing Mill (Hangzhou diyi mianfangzhi yinranchang), the Hangzhou No.2 Cotton Mill (Hangzhou dier mianfangzhi-chang), and the Zhejiang Hemp Mill (Zhejiang mafangzhichang). They were described as important units in the metallurgy, machinery and textile branches, producing producer and consumer items for the national market. Their goods also supplied foreign customers.

Although the article was packed with the Marxist rhetoric and slogans characteristic of the times, it also

reflected genuine concerns about lagging production. It attributed such difficulties to the 'interference of bourgeois factionalism', 'the crimes of Liu Shaoqi and Lin Biao in splitting the revolutionary ranks' and sheeted home the blame on 'bad people sabotaging stability and unity'. The report referred to the need to strengthen unity among workers and tighten discipline in the workplace so as to ensure the quantity and quality of output.

Efforts to revive production were taking place, as the article noted, at the height of Hangzhou's oppressively muggy summer.¹⁸ Nevertheless provincial and municipal leaders were praised for investigating conditions in these enterprises and listening to opinions and suggestions while toiling alongside the workers. Their example had apparently rubbed off on cadres in the enterprises who had joined shifts to participate in labour.

Two weeks later another Xinhua report received front-page coverage in the People's Daily.¹⁹ It described in greater detail the situation in one of the six plants mentioned above - the Hangzhou No.1 cotton dyeing and printing mill. The article repeated references to the detrimental influence of bourgeois factionalism and mistaken thinking on production schedules. It also mentioned that workers were participating in voluntary labour and study classes while some had been selected to form a theoretical contingent of over one hundred members.

It was evident that disunity in this factory was not confined to the ranks of blue-collar workers. Administrative

staff were afflicted by the same complaint. The article cited the case of two leading cadres in the mill's repair and maintenance section who had been at loggerheads, producing deleterious effects in their workshops. They had allegedly forgotten their differences by throwing themselves into a major renovation project. By soliciting the views of workers and actively encouraging them to make an input into the decision-making process, the party branch of this section was able to solve outstanding problems. It also sent cadres to perform the dirtiest tasks, such as cleaning machinery, with ordinary labourers.

The People's Daily did not mention that troops of the PLA were working alongside factory employees in Hangzhou until nearly two weeks after the announcements on the local radio station. On 2 August, the day after Army Day, it reported the presence of commanders and fighters of an unnamed unit stationed in Zhejiang in several Hangzhou factories.²⁰ They had gone, reported the newspaper, to 'take part in productive labour, strengthen the unity between military and citizens and promote the development of the fine situation in revolution and production.' It commended two officers - the unit's commander, Li Guangshan, a national military hero, and a former Red Army regimental commander - for taking part in labour at the Silk Complex and No.1 Cotton Mill respectively.

The article also detailed some of the activities of the PLA personnel. They propagated 'important directives of Chairman Mao and the Party CC' by holding discussions with the workers. They also undertook such tasks as cooking and bringing meals to the workshops, and cutting the hair and

washing the clothes of employees. The workers repeatedly expressed the appropriate gratitude for such acts of kindness.²¹

Another Xinhua report, of 9 August, examined the situation in the Jinhua railway sub-bureau of Zhejiang.²² Jinhua is an important railway and provincial town on the line from Shanghai to Guangzhou via Zhejiang, Jiangxi and Hunan provinces. Hold-ups at its freight-yards would have serious repercussions for the movement of goods in eastern and southern China. The article revealed that in the second quarter of 1975 incoming and outgoing freight had doubled in quantity compared to the amount which had been transported in the first quarter. The reason for this startling increase, made deceptively impressive by the depths to which figures had previously plummeted, was ascribed to the 'revolutionary unity' of leading groups at various levels.

Both cadres and workers in the sub-bureau said or did nothing detrimental to unity. Veteran cadres and their youthful colleagues promoted in the Cultural Revolution worked side by side in perfect harmony. The Party organisations in the sub-bureau made arrangements for cadres to go to the front line to labour and concern themselves with the workers' livelihood. Cadres also visited workers' homes and paid attention to service at work-canteens. The message spelt out very clearly in the report was that production could not run smoothly when workers or cadres became embroiled in arguments or resorted to mutual recriminations and attacks.

Five days later, in a laudatory piece on the Hangzhou Gear-Box Factory,²³ the implied lesson of the Jinhua railway sub-bureau experience was repeated in positive terms. What

distinguished the gearbox plant from its six sister factories mentioned in the report of 14 July was that it had met its production targets in the first half of 1975. Ever since 1968 the factory had achieved outstanding results with production increasing at an average annual rate of 21%. It had thus become a model unit and an advanced enterprise in learning from the nationally famous Daqing oil-field.

The factory had succeeded firstly, claimed the article, because of its determination not to weaken or deviate from the leadership of the CCP. Such tendencies had not occurred even in the campaign against Lin Biao and Confucius of the previous year. All attempts to sow dissension in the ranks of cadres and workers had failed. Although the leaders were of different generations they studied and joined in labour together. Workers observed discipline, met state targets and actively refuted and exposed political fallacies by writing wall posters (dazibao).

The above five articles thus described positive and negative examples among Hangzhou's industrial units. They stressed the primacy of production tasks and emphasised the importance of unity, strong leadership, and discipline to achieve them. While the People's Daily was vague on the causes of the unrest in Hangzhou, attributing it to such all-embracing deviant behaviour as factionalism, the admission of military involvement hinted at the seriousness of the trouble ~~and the possibility of armed clashes between opposing groups~~ in the city's factories.

Reports from Hangzhou

Provincial broadcasts monitored outside China provided a vivid contrast to the blandness which characterised the material appearing in Beijing.²⁴ Since 1974 they had hinted strongly at the stormy nature of the anti-Lin Biao anti-Confucius campaign conducted in Zhejiang and especially the provincial capital. A brief review of the six months or so from the end of 1974 until mid-1975 reveals some of the after-effects of this campaign and the gradual process of recovery. The broadcasts described the efforts to make up for lost time in production, reestablish social order and strive to achieve initial successes in the grand scheme of the four modernisations announced in January 1975. Amidst concern for the economy and political stability, a new campaign to study the theory of the dictatorship of the proletariat was launched which temporarily distracted provincial leaders from their course, but they quickly returned to it by mid-year.

That the hectic, destabilising campaign of 1974 had disrupted production was tacitly admitted by November of that year. On 4 November 1974 the authorities in Zhejiang convened a meeting²⁵ which demanded that cadres change their style of work and go down to the grassroots to rediscover reality. Further meetings of 18 and 28 November held by the municipal and provincial leaderships respectively²⁶ urgently called for the utmost effort to fulfil annual production tasks. The reports from these meetings also spoke of a 'new leap' in the economy for 1975. Leaders of the CCP HMC responded to these

exhortations by heading a group of 200 cadres to take part in productive labour in the city's factories. They listened to 'workers' demands and opinions on improving their work.'²⁷ Their provincial civilian and military comrades, not to be outdone, led 1,300 cadres to work at the Hangzhou railway yards on 6 and 7 November.²⁸

A shortfall in industrial production was apparently not the only issue of concern in Zhejiang in that year. At the traditional annual meeting held prior to the Chinese New Year to laud relations between the Army and local citizens, the provincial military leadership criticised its performance in 1974. Political Commissar Li Bincheng of the ZPMD pledged that in 1975 'We will strive to play a more effective role in maintaining social order and in implementing government decrees.' Li also stated that, the troops stationed in the province should strive to overcome 'shortcomings and mistakes' in their work. On behalf of the CCP ZPC, deputy-secretary Lai Keke reciprocated this humble approach by promising that the party authorities would do a better job of supporting the army than in 1974.²⁹ These speeches implied tensions in civilian-military relations in the previous year.

The failure of local troops to satisfactorily maintain social order and implement government decrees may have led to the transfer of outside troops to Zhejiang at about this time. A report of January 1975 specifically mentioned the presence in Zhejiang of a battalion from Luoyang, Henan province.³⁰

In the same month the political department of the ZPMD issued a circular³¹ criticising such 'reactionary fallacies' as 'the gun should command the Party' and 'the Army is something

special'. Given the extent to which civilian and military authority overlapped and intertwined in Zhejiang, it seems likely that these words alluded to local military disobedience of central, not provincial directives.

A series of important developments in national politics in the early months of 1975 were to have tremendous repercussions in Zhejiang. From 8-10 January the 10th CC held its second plenum at which Deng Xiaoping was appointed a member of the politburo standing committee and vice-chairman of the CC. At the 4th National People's Congress (NPC) convened from 13-17 January Deng was elected senior Vice-Premier of the State Council to the hospitalised and ailing Premier Zhou Enlai. Shortly afterward it was made known that Deng had added a senior military post to his party and government responsibilities - that of Chief of Staff of the PLA. The radical theoretician and Shanghai leader Zhang Chunqiao balanced Deng's well-known pragmatism by becoming second Vice-Premier and Director of the General Political Department of the PLA.³²

Zhou Enlai, in his report to the 4th NPC announced the ambitious but vague plan for the accomplishment of the four modernisations by the end of the century. It was Deng Xiaoping who set about putting flesh on the bare bones by convening a series of conferences in the fields of industry, military affairs, planning, science and technology, and agriculture. He set up and supervised a think-tank, comprising theoreticians and professional experts, to prepare three major documents which reflected his developmental strategy. They were completed by October 1975.

Meanwhile, Mao had signalled, by his absence from the capital while the important deliberations of January had taken place, that he did not fully endorse these proceedings. While the provinces were still discussing the documents of the 4th NPC Mao launched a campaign in the realm of theory. It began with an editorial in the People's Daily of 9 February 1975 discussing the meaning of the era known as the dictatorship of the proletariat and China's similarities to, and differences from, a capitalist economic system. However Mao had previously commented on the need for 'stability and unity' and the importance of developing the economy. Thus the radical implications of the theoretical campaign could be obscured, submerged or paid mere lip-service to, in the euphoria generated by the four modernisations.

Throughout 1975 the Chinese media carried, alongside articles exploring ways to restrict bourgeois rights and press on with the Maoist 'continuous revolution', reports extolling production increases, industrial discipline and promoting economic policies designed to foster efficiency and profit, not social equality. The propaganda publicising the ideals of the four modernisations had to be dressed up in a Maoist garb but nevertheless it was clear that two sets of voices were speaking in Beijing. This debate may have been healthy for the political system but it certainly puzzled provincial politicians who looked to the centre for policy guidance. The contradictions between Maoist rhetoric and reality became glaringly obvious.

The CCP ZPC did not respond to the 9 February editorial announcing a new study campaign until 25 February. On that

date it held a conference at which Tan Qilong delivered a report.³³ From the tenor of his remarks it is obvious that Tan believed that the campaign was to be merely an exercise that carried no practical policy consequences. He cited the reforms of the Cultural Revolution as examples of restricting bourgeois rights and then finished his speech with a ringing call to fulfil the tasks announced at the 4th NPC.

Tan Qilong and the CCP ZPC, under guidance from the Party centre, soon returned the focus of their attention to economic matters. At the end of March a provincial conference on industry was called.³⁴ The study campaign merited only passing mention. Terms in the Chinese political lexicon reflecting a new direction and different perspective on the ideological front made their appearance. The conference pointed out that

we must continue to eliminate the pernicious influence of Lin Biao's splittist line, strengthen revolutionary unity, oppose bourgeois factionalism, strengthen proletarian Party spirit and persist in the principle of grasping revolution and promoting production.

It also called for a strengthening of Party leadership and put forward the view that

It is necessary to step up efforts to educate Party members and the masses in Party concept [sic] and in the sense of organisational discipline ...

The use of the term 'bourgeois factionalism' signified Deng Xiaoping's counter-attack on the ideological battlefield.

Agriculture was the next sector of the economy to receive attention.³⁵ The remarkable feature of the speeches and editorials published during this seventeen-day 'learn from Dazhai' conference was their dramatic shift in emphasis after the address delivered by Chen Yonggui on 15 April. In his

opening address on 1 April Tan Qilong delivered some hard-hitting warnings to his audience. He repeated Mao's dictum of 1959, which had been quoted by Yao Wenyuan in his major article published the previous month, that empiricism presented the main danger in the ideological realm. Tan also cited some sentences from Zhang Chunqiao's lengthy tract published on that same day which directed a blunt warning to those who wanted to get off the revolutionary bus on its way forward. Zhang had written: 'It's dangerous to stop half-way! The bourgeoisie is beckoning to you. Catch up with the ranks and continue to advance!'³⁶

Zhejiang Daily published two editorials as a follow-up to Tan's opening remarks which continued in this radical, belligerent vein. The first, dated 3 April, described the learn from Dazhai movement as a 'profound socialist revolution' and claimed that revisionists constantly attempted to turn it into a production movement. It warned leading cadres not to forget theoretical issues while they busied themselves in their daily routine. The second editorial reiterated Tan's warning, which he had taken from Yao's article, about the dangers of empiricism.³⁷

Deputy-secretary of the CCP ZPC Chen Weida delivered the main report to the conference on 6 April³⁸ but the highlight of the proceedings was certainly the appearance of the legendary Chen Yonggui in Zhejiang. Chen spent two days visiting model brigades and places of interest in the company of Tan Qilong and Chen Weida before addressing the conference. In his instructions to local cadres responsible for agriculture, Chen struck an entirely different note from that evident in

Tan's opening speech. He urged his listeners

to study conscientiously Chairman Mao's important instruction on the question of theory, adhere to the Party's basic line, relentlessly criticise capitalism, vigorously build socialism, strengthen proletarian Party spirit, resolutely overcome bourgeois factionalism, promote stability and unity, do a good job in socialist revolution and socialist construction, ...

Chen's 'important report' to the conference, in which he pointedly elaborated on this theme, was heard via wired broadcasts throughout the counties of Zhejiang.³⁹

At the closing session of the conference on 17 April Tie Ying, secretary of the CCP ZPC and Tan's deputy in Party, government and military posts, made a summing-up report.⁴⁰ Some of Tie's most direct statements, as with those of Tan and Chen Yonggui, were not broadcast over the provincial radio. Tie concentrated his fire on bourgeois factionalism. He stated that

the root of bourgeois factionalism lies with the Lin Biao anti-Party clique; it is the poison of the splittist line of Lin Biao and a reflection among the cadres and people of the corrosion of bourgeois rights.

Tie demanded that

Leading groups at various levels must take the lead in overcoming bourgeois factionalism, and strengthening proletarian Party spirit and revolutionary unity.

The contrast in emphasis and language between Tan's opening address, and Tie's closing report was striking and significant. Clearly, Chen's arrival had occasioned the shift. Most probably he conveyed instructions to this effect from Beijing.

The Zhejiang Daily editorial summarising the achievements of the conference⁴¹ reflected the tension and ambiguity

in central propaganda. It requested criticism of both bourgeois rights and bourgeois factionalism, the targets of Jiang Qing's radical mobilisers and Deng Xiaoping's economic reformers respectively. Additionally, capitalist tendencies were now defined as the personal corruption of officials. An editorial published the very next day,⁴² however, focused attention back on the issues of primary concern to Deng. Zhejiang Daily wrote optimistically of a 'new situation' on the industrial and communications front in the province and it asked leading cadres to 'strengthen their proletarian party spirit and combat bourgeois factionalism in order further to promote stability and unity.'

An observer of the Chinese political scene therefore had an ample amount of material to refer to, both from national and provincial sources, once the events of July 1975 hit the headlines. The anti-Lin Biao anti-Confucius campaign of 1974 in Zhejiang had affected production, weakened social order and undermined relations between army and government, and army and citizenry. Disunity in the leadership continued to plague the province. All these problems were openly admitted or clearly implied in provincial reports readily available to foreign journalists or academics.

The format and interests of the publications in which many of the writings about the Hangzhou incident appeared did ~~not lend themselves to in-depth, comprehensive discussion of~~ what was in many ways a provincial issue. Newspapers and weekly magazines by their very nature emphasise immediate, sensational issues at the expense of longer-term more

pedestrian concerns. However the failure of many analyses discussed below to locate the Hangzhou incident in the context not only of national politics but against the background of provincial affairs in the ten years of the Cultural Revolution, considerably weakened the value of their explanations and conclusions.

Outside Interpretations

Western journalists residing in Hong Kong quickly understood the importance of what was occurring in Hangzhou. The New York Times correspondent Fox Butterfield filed a report⁴³ relating news of the despatch of PLA troops into the city's factories and the replacement of key officials in the military and civilian administration. Butterfield argued that the broadcasts from Hangzhou, openly admitting trouble, reflected Beijing's confidence that the situation had been brought under control. The use of troops, he wrote, was a warning to other troubled areas that the central authorities would not tolerate disorder.

Leo Goodstadt, in four consecutive articles published in August and September 1975⁴⁴ drew conclusions similar to those of Butterfield.

The lesson of Hangzhou [he wrote] was supposed to be that the entire central leadership, with Mao's blessing, had decided to use the city as an example of their common determination to tolerate no use of arms or mobs to seize power locally or to intimidate local leaders.⁴⁵

Goodstadt claimed that the authorities would not have used troops 'if genuine differences of opinion about policy or

Maoist principles' had caused the strife. Instead, he argued, Beijing placed the blame on 'individuals whose stars had waned since the end of the Cultural Revolution' and who were causing trouble to achieve their 'self-serving ambitions'.⁴⁶

Goodstadt's articles illustrate that he had traced the signs of instability in Hangzhou and Zhejiang as far back as May 1975. He noted evidence of freight hold-ups and concern for public security along the railway lines which had resulted in a public announcement on the issue.⁴⁷ Goodstadt also guessed that the leadership reshuffle had commenced at the end of May, giving as his reason the fact that 'Hangzhou Radio showed signs then of being placed abruptly under new management'.⁴⁸ These observations enrich the value of his contributions.

However Goodstadt is mistaken in isolating power struggles from differences over policy or ideology. The events of 1975 cannot be understood without placing them against the backdrop of the problem of succession to the aging and infirm Mao and the dying Zhou. The radical mobilisers and the economic reformers both held strong convictions about the future direction Chinese socialism should take and the kind of policies required to reach that goal. The ambivalence in central propaganda had made this dispute abundantly clear.

That factional disputes involved both political and economic matters was clearly recognised by the idiosyncratic Hong Kong weekly China News Analysis in two successive issues published in September 1975.⁴⁹ The author traced

the roots of the Hangzhou incident to the disputes of the previous year involving the urban militia. He also viewed it in the context of strikes and absenteeism among China's industrial workers. The journal perceptively noted that Chinese articles published at this time suggested that the factionalism of 1974-5 differed from that which had resulted from the spontaneous emergence of two mass organisations in the early days of the Cultural Revolution.⁵⁰ But it did not elaborate upon this observation. The author nevertheless related the interests of sections of the working class to the policies of different groupings within the Chinese leadership. He concluded that 'the body politic itself has weakened' and that factional strife represented real dangers to the continuation of the socialist system in China.

Other commentators also predicted, on the basis of their understanding of the Hangzhou incident, the imminent collapse of the communist regime.⁵¹ These prophecies came from the extreme-left and the ever hopeful propagandists on Taiwan. An article by Jun Xing in a Trotskyist journal published in Hong Kong⁵² attributed the incident in Hangzhou to worker discontent with frozen wages, forced 'voluntary' labour and poor living and working conditions. The workers of the city, he argued, were rebelling against their exploitation by the CCP, against inequalities in living conditions between officials and themselves, and against the falseness of the propaganda which contrasted so starkly with the reality which surrounded them.

Jun Xing argued that the constant resort to political

campaigns only served to disrupt production, resulting in increased pressure on workers to make up for the losses in subsequent production drives. The pattern had recurred in the summer of 1975 with even radical ideologues such as Yao Wenyuan stressing unity so that China could safely navigate the political storm. PLA soldiers, unskilled in modern industrial techniques, could contribute little to productive labour in the factories to which they had been sent, stated Jun. Their mission was of an entirely different nature - to suppress dissidents and malcontents.

Another analysis of the event, in Issues and Studies, concentrated on the incident as the most conspicuous example of labour unrest in China.⁵³ Li ascribed this unrest to a serious reduction in agricultural and industrial production which he attributed to natural disasters and political and social disruption. He instanced the campaign against Lin Biao and Confucius in 1974 as an example of this disruption. Workers and peasants, he contended, had responded to economic hardship by going out on strike, deliberately 'going slow' or by opposing requisition policies. The erosion of discipline in the Cultural Revolution had enabled workers to free themselves from party control and press their economic demands. The CCP was faced with no option but to tighten discipline, reassert its leadership and subjugate the rebellious workers.

Thus Li, like Jun Xing, saw Hangzhou as a serious manifestation of a general malaise among China's workers and within the political system itself. However their

reasoning could not explain why, if gripes about wages and working conditions had driven the workers to such extreme action, the most severe outbreak of dissatisfaction had occurred in Hangzhou.⁵⁴ Their preconceptions about the nature of Communist rule led them to interpret the incident deductively when what was required was inductive thinking. Hangzhou did reveal certain generalities about the Chinese system but not those preconceived, simplistic notions held by writers such as Li and Jun.

Other observations on the incident from Taiwan sources were no less virulently anti-Communist than those presented by Li Ming-hua. But they had the advantage of examining both economic and political factors to explain the event. One publication⁵⁵ charted a series of explosive confrontations beginning in October 1974 which had involved workers, the PLA, party authorities and public security forces. It alleged that a 'cadre of the Jiang Qing faction' had manipulated workers' demands in order to overthrow the provincial leadership and seize power. The compilers of the charts detailed strikes, riots, the burning down of two factories and the arrest of hundreds of workers. They also referred to a CC document of March 1975 concerning Zhejiang and the presence of work teams from the municipal authorities in factories of Hangzhou.

Issues and Studies⁵⁶ also cited the CC Document, but the conclusions it drew illustrate a complete misinterpretation of several vital points. These errors were due to a lack of knowledge of events which had taken place in Zhejiang in 1974 and highlight the importance of thorough

background research into the 1975 incident. The biographical sketch in Issues and Studies had the advantage of access to the material provided by revelations in the initial post-Mao period when the campaign against the Gang of Four was in full swing. Yet deficiencies and generalisations continued to abound.

While certain disclosures made in these Taiwan references were inaccurate or exaggerated, others perhaps underestimated the gravity of the situation in Hangzhou. Chapter three of this thesis reveals that armed clashes had begun well before October 1974 and that the worst of the trouble had passed by the end of that year. It substantiates with names, dates and places, the struggles that occurred and the response of the local and central authorities to contain the violence and factional strife. Chapter four makes full use of the CC Document which was in itself an extraordinary admission, even making allowances for hyperbole, of the breakdown of administration in Zhejiang and Hangzhou in particular.

Perhaps the most comprehensive review of the Hangzhou incident was contained in the 1976 edition of the Yearbook of Chinese Communist Affairs (Zhonggong nianbao).⁵⁷ The six-page section devoted to the issue did not cover any real new ground but at least it was, overall, factually accurate. It explained the occurrence as a major eruption of worker discontent against changes in the wage structure and a perceived lowering in living standards. To suggest, however, as the authors did, that workers enrolled in the militia were demanding wage rises, is bordering on the

absurd.⁵⁸

The Yearbook quotes a marvellous story which is possibly apocryphal, but is well worth repeating all the same. While Wang Hongwen was in Hangzhou in July 1975 he addressed many gatherings of workers. One day, after he had requested that workers not raise wage demands, a member of the audience stood up and said:

Comrade Vice-chairman aren't you presently on grade 2 of the Central Committee scale? Think back to what grade you were on at the number 7 textile mill in Shanghai. Was it the 17th or 18th? You rebelled against Chen Pixian and Cao Diqu [1st Secretary and Mayor respectively of Shanghai at the outbreak of the Cultural Revolution] and rose to become party secretary of the municipality. In the last two years you've done even better and risen to grade 2 of the Central Committee! But you ask us not to raise the question of wages and improvement in grades. What kind of work style is this. OK. So we don't raise the issue and all eat from the same pot. What do you think of that?

Wang's expression, on listening to these sentiments, would undoubtedly have been worth beholding.

What the above attempts to describe and analyse the Hangzhou incident lack, apart from access to the local press, is a feel for the conditions on the ground. This could only come from actually visiting Hangzhou, and foreign journalists and diplomats were allegedly forbidden from doing just that in mid 1975. The brief account of a short stop-over in Hangzhou by a Canadian exchange-student, David Zweig, even though it occurred six months later, in January 1976, therefore adds an important insight into our knowledge of events.

Zweig⁵⁹ was permitted to tour the Hangzhou Silk

Complex, one of the major industrial units mentioned in articles in the People's Daily, discussed above. He noticed signs of past troubles including a wall poster attacking a former leader of the factory named Weng Senhe.⁶⁰ Zweig's apparently nervous hosts told him that less than 100 soldiers had entered the mill the previous year.⁶¹ They also claimed that no deaths had occurred, presumably in confrontations between PLA and workers, and the army's task had been to restore production lost due to absenteeism. Zweig argues somewhat tentatively that a 'revolutionary rebel' such as Weng Senhe had come under attack from Deng and his supporters in 1975, and

Probably finding himself outmanoeuvred in the committee [of the factory] and perhaps demoted ... had taken the fight to the workers, to the militia and to the streets. He also had friends at the city, provincial and Central Committee levels.

Weng was therefore arrested for the sake of stability and the need to revive production.

Zweig's hypothesis is sound but unfortunately his timing is astray. Weng certainly did play a major role in the events of Zhejiang and Hangzhou from 1973-5 but the recruitment and mobilisation of his constituents occurred in 1974, not 1975. Not only did Weng have friends, who shall be named in a later chapter of this thesis, in high places, he himself was a provincial leader of some stature and responsible for certain key departments. Zweig makes reference to another leader at the Silk Complex - a colleague of Weng's - and also notes that the wall poster criticised the role of the public security forces in the affair. In

fact this other leader had been secretary of the party committee and chairman of the revolutionary committee of the mill and, additionally, deputy director of the municipal public security bureau, all on Weng's nomination. His part in these events will also be outlined in this thesis.

Overall, the literature available on the important Hangzhou incident of 1975 is disappointing for its factual inaccuracies, political distortions, over-emphasis on wage disputes, and vague generalisations. If Hangzhou was an extreme manifestation of problems existing in the Chinese political system, the above explanations do not show why they appeared in this particular city. Wage disputes caused dissatisfaction among Chinese workers but they were not the reason for military intervention in the factories of Hangzhou and wholesale changes to the leadership of the city and the province.

The following chapters attempt to come to grips with the essence of the question through an intensive analysis of provincial politics, centred on the capital Hangzhou, from 1967 until 1976. Chapter two discusses the formation, development and formal dissolution of the two mass organisations established in January 1967. It also deals with the impact of mass factionalism upon the civilian and military hierarchy in the turmoil of these years. The third chapter of this thesis examines the reemergence and regrouping of old factional opponents brought to life in the political campaign of 1974. A thorough review of the politics of Zhejiang in these years coupled with an

examination of the province's response to key central initiatives, prepares the ground for an analysis of the Hangzhou incident in chapter four. This chapter also explains the reactions to the decisions of July 1975 by the principal political figures involved to understand why compromise, not resolution, characterised central intervention in Hangzhou.

NOTES

1. Taiwan sources claim variously that Hangzhou was closed to all foreign and overseas Chinese tourists from April or May 1975 until the situation was brought under control. Other sources contradict this assertion. One academic claimed that 'Visitors to China during this period reported that there was little evidence of the disturbances and that travel to the popular scenic spots of Hangzhou was, generally speaking, not interrupted.' J.B. Starr, 'China in 1975: "The Wind in the Bell Tower"', AS, 16:1 (1976), p.50.
2. 'Tan Qilong - The Dominant Influence in Hangzhou Labor Turmoil', I & S, 12:2 (1976), p.103 which refers to Li Guangshan as Zhang Guangshan.
3. Leo Goodstadt, 'Hangzhou: City in crisis', FEER, 15 August 1975, p.25; World Anti-Communist League, China Chapter, Asian People's Anti-Communist League, Charts concerning Chinese Communists on the Mainland, (hereafter cited as Charts), 34th Series (April, 1977), p.4; 'Tan Qilong - First Secretary of the CCP Qinghai Provincial Committee' (hereafter cited as 'Tan Qilong (2)'), I & S, 14:3 (1978), p.110. The latter article makes the ridiculous claim that only 40 soldiers of the ZPMD entered nine factories when Chinese sources plainly stated that the number was 4,500.
4. An account published in Taiwan listed the Hangzhou Gearbox Works Hangzhou chilunxiangchang as one of the factories worst affected by what it described as strikes. 'Cong Hangzhou gongren kangbao dao "Tiananmen shijian"', Zhonggong nianbao 1976, (Taipei, 1976), 5:103. The Chinese press made it abundantly clear, however, that this factory was an outstanding example of a unit which continued to meet its production targets amidst the trouble which surrounded it.
5. On 16 January 1975 Mao met the West German political leader Franz Josef Strauss in Hangzhou with Deng in attendance. It is unclear when Mao left Hangzhou to return to the capital. Goodstadt states that Mao left as late as April. See 'Hangzhou: City in crisis', p.24. It is highly unlikely that Jiang Qing accompanied Mao on his southern journey, as alleged by Goodstadt.
6. Several articles claimed that both Deng and Wang Hongwen visited Hangzhou in the spring of 1975 to review the situation. See Fox Butterfield, then based

in Hong Kong, in the New York Times, 29 July 1975, pp.1, 6; L. Goodstadt, 'Controlling social tension', FEER, 1 August 1975, p.30 who contends that Wang 'failed to restore order'. He then goes on to state, 'Foreign visitors have been told that ... Deng ... personally visited Hangzhou to thrash out problems with the municipal authorities'. 'Controlling social tension', p.30; 'Tan Qilong', p.103; Charts, p.4 which asserts that both Wang and Deng failed in their missions.

7. It seems that Goodstadt was responsible for promoting this falsehood. 'Hangzhou: City in crisis', pp.24-5. See also Charts, p.4, although with this exception, Taiwan sources knew better. Secondary sources have repeated the guess as fact. See J. Van Ginneken, The Rise and Fall of Lin Biao (N.Y., 1977), p.310; B. Brugger, China: Radicalism to Revisionism 1962-1979, (London, 1981), p.183.
8. This was correctly pointed out in 'Tan Qilong', p.103, and 'Cong Hangzhou gongren', 5:103.
9. Reported in a speech by a secretary of the CCP ZPC in December 1976. See Chen Zuolin, 'Dalan sirenbang Zhejiang you xiwang', RMRB, 18 December 1976, p.3. The Taiwan English-language journal Issues & Studies indicated Ji's role in 1977 and pointed out that in holding a supporter of the Gang of Four responsible for the trouble, Ji aroused the gang's indignation. See 'Ji Dengkui - a member of the CCP CC Politburo', I & S, 13:10 (1977), pp.70-3.
10. The commander, Zhang Wenbi, had held the post of director of the political department, East Zhejiang column of the New 4th Army, in 1945 when the column was evacuated by sea to Jiangsu at the end of the anti-Japanese war. Tan had been political commissar of the column.
11. See New York Times, op. cit.; 'Hangzhou: City in crisis', p.25. Goodstadt adds that the commander of the Nanjing Military Region, under whose jurisdiction the ZPMD came, lent Tan two political cadres 'to ensure tight control of his troops'. He is probably referring to two political commissars of the ZPMD. Wu Shihong was appointed to this post in July 1975 but the other, Li Bincheng, former political commissar of the Nanjing Artillery troops, had arrived in Hangzhou in June 1974. It should be noted that the then commander of the Nanjing Military Region, Ding Sheng, was dismissed as a follower of the Gang of Four in 1976, while the region's first political commissar was Zhang Chungqiao. The newly-appointed 1st Secretary of the CCP HMC, Zhang Zishi, the son of Kang Sheng, transferred from Shandong province where Tan had been 1st secretary until the

outbreak of the Cultural Revolution. Zhang, however, had been one of the cadres who had joined the rebels to overthrow veterans such as Tan. Their relationship, therefore, may have been anything but warm.

12. See Marx, Engels and Lenin on the Dictatorship of the Proletariat, (Beijing, 1975), p.2, translated from RMRB, 22 February 1975.
13. Yao Wenyuan, On the Social Basis of the Lin Biao Anti-Party Clique (Beijing, 1975); Zhang Chunqiao, On Exercising All-Round Dictatorship over the Bourgeoisie (Beijing, 1975).
14. See Zhong Shi, 'Wuchanjieji zhuanzheng he zichanjieji faquan', Hongqi, 9 (1975), p.55.
15. See Charts, p.4 which claims that in April 1975 the central authorities issued a document simplifying the wage structure to three grades with sharp differences between them. Another article claims that factories and mines in various places changed the eight-grade scale to five, three or two grades 'seriously lowering the already poor standard of living.' 'Cong Hangzhou gongren', 5:101. Observers inside China reported quite a different story. The Times' correspondent in Beijing, David Bonavia, visited a coal mine and was informed that while wages were under discussion, no changes had occurred. The Times, 15 July 1975, p.7. A Canadian student in Beijing at this time was told that attempts to change the wage system were confined to raising the lowest grade and lowering the highest. Strong opposition had prevented any reduction in grade eight. David Zweig, 'The Beida Debate on Education and the Fall of Deng Xiaoping', CQ, 73 (1978), p.150. Given the extreme conservatism of wage policy in the Maoist era, the accounts by Bonavia and Zweig ring true. The Taiwan Central News Agency alleged that in February 1975, during a talk in Shanghai, Jiang Qing had demanded that individuals earning high incomes take a 'voluntary' reduction. CNA (Taipei), 3 July 1975, SWB, FE/4949/BII/8. This is not to deny that workers had real grievances over their pay and work conditions. Radio Moscow cited Western reports of wall posters in Hangzhou expressing dissatisfaction regarding this issue. Radio Moscow, 22 May 1975, ibid., FE/4916/BII/18.
16. This explanation has also been uncritically accepted as the truth by Western academics. See, for example, T. Saich, 'Workers in the Workers' State: Urban Workers in the PRC', in D.S.G. Goodman (ed.), Groups and Politics in the People's Republic of China (University College Cardiff Press; Cardiff, 1984), p.159. If complaints over wages caused, or were a major factor behind the Hangzhou incident, it is unclear why the trouble did not erupt on a similar

scale all over China. Goodstadt tries to plug this weakness by suggesting that Hangzhou had a higher percentage of its residents engaged in industrial production than cities such as Beijing or Shanghai. Additionally, he speculated, its citizens lacked a sense of community, coming from different places, while urban facilities such as housing were in short supply. L. Goodstadt, 'Beneath the "Water Margin"', FEER, 19 September 1975, p.14. Although a brave foray into the field of urban sociology, Goodstadt's hypotheses appear fanciful.

17. RMRB, 14 July 1975, p.1.
 18. The high temperatures in Hangzhou at this time were frequently commented on in provincial reports. July is normally the hottest month in Hangzhou. Its most famous attraction, the West Lake, contributes to the suffocating humidity in that month. The lake is surrounded by hills on three sides and warm moisture rises from its surface and remains suspended over the city. Having experienced the dreadful summer of 1978 when the highest temperature ever recorded in Hangzhou of 39.9° occurred, the author can almost comprehend the effect of such heat on steel workers or textile operatives.
 19. RMRB, 28 July 1975, p.1.
 20. Ibid., 2 August 1975, p.3.
 21. That friction also occurred between military personnel and workers was admitted by Politburo member and Vice-Premier Li Xiannian. He reportedly told the leader of a visiting Japanese delegation in early September that such 'minor incidents' were 'natural' because they were both 'trying to increase production as much as possible.' Kyodo report, 3 September 1975, BBC. SWB, FE/4999/A3/2.
 22. RMRB, 10 August 1975, p.1.
 23. Ibid., 15 August, p.1. Sections of this article appeared in SWB, FE/4988/BII/1-2. Zhejiang Daily had published an editorial in a similar vein on 13 July 1975 entitled 'Adhere to Party spirit and principle - learn from the comrades of the Hangzhou Gearbox Works'. ZPS, 13 July 1975, SWB, FE/4959/BII/6-7. This factory, and the Hangzhou No.2 cotton mill are actually situated in the county town of Xiaoshan, south-east of Hangzhou, across the Qiantang river in Shaoxing district.
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24. A phenomenon which was commented upon by a Hong Kong periodical. CNA, 1013 (12 September 1975), p.3. I do not agree that the difference in detail revealed any discrepancies but it is true that the stark contrast of the two sources added to the difficulty in

interpreting them.

25. ZPS, 7 November 1974, SWB, FE/4759/BII/8-9.
26. ZPS, 21 November 1974, ibid., FE/4768/BII/29-30 and ZPS, 30 November 1974, ibid., FE/4775/BII/15.
27. ZPS, 9 November 1974, ibid., FE/4761/BII/11.
28. ZPS, 8 November 1974, FBIS/CHI, 218 (1974), G2-3.
29. ZPS, 4 January 1975, SWB, FE/4799/BII/1-3.
30. ZPS, 10 January 1975, ibid., FE/4806/BII/2. It was perhaps this report and intelligence accounts that led to Goodstadt's claim that 'public security squads ... drafted in from northern China' appeared on the streets of Hangzhou in July. 'Controlling social tension', p.30. Taiwan observers correctly pinpointed Li Guangshan, mentioned in the 2 August People's Daily article, as commander of the 1st Division of the 1st Army. However they seemed confused as to the prior location of this Army, placing it variously in Xuchang, Zhejiang ('Tan Qilong', p.103), or Wuhan ('Tan Qilong (2)'), p.110. Zhonggong nianbao correctly located the division in Xuchang, Henan province, under the Wuhan Military Region. 'Cong Hangzhou gongren', 5:103.
31. ZPS, 13 January 1975, ibid., FE/4815/BII/14.
32. After Deng's second rehabilitation in July 1977 it was disclosed that Mao had appointed Deng to take charge of the daily work of the CCP CC perhaps as early as January 1975. Certainly that year witnessed the full blossoming of Deng's undoubted talents which had seemed under constraint since his return to office in April 1973.
33. ZPS, 1 March 1975, SWB, FE/4848/BII/19-21. The CCP HMC standing committee had discussed the editorial in mid-February. ZPS, 14 February 1975, FBIS/CHI, 33 (1975), G1.
34. ZPS, 26 March 1975, ibid., FE/4869/BII/3-4.
35. The CCP ZPC issued a notice on 14 March stating that the meeting would take place in the last ten days of the month. ZPS, 14 March 1975, FBIS/CHI, 55 (1975), G1-2. Eventually the conference lasted seventeen days. Perhaps the date was put back to accommodate Vice-Premier Chen Yonggui's inspection of the province which commenced on 12 April.
36. Zhang, pp.18-19. Tan's speech, ZPS, 1 April 1975, SWB, FE/4872/BII/3-5. The broadcast version did not include Tan's citation from Zhang's article. However

it appeared in the fuller version published in HJRB, 3 April 1975.

37. ZPS, 3 April 1975, FBIS/CHI, 68 (1975), G5-6; ZPS, 9 April 1975, *ibid.*, 70 (1975), G1.
38. ZPS, 7 April 1975, *ibid.*, 68 (1975), G4-5.
39. ZPS, 15 and 16 April 1975, SWB, FE/4881/BII/17-18. The text of Chen's speech was not broadcast over the wireless at all. It did not appear in the Zhejiang Daily until 28 April 1975. Chen's frankness, especially regarding bourgeois factionalism, was apparently not considered appropriate for foreign ears and eyes. The published text, which will be discussed in chapter four of this thesis, makes even clearer the shift in direction occasioned by Chen's visit. Bourgeois factionalism superceded bourgeois rights as the principal target of provincial propagandists.
40. ZPS, 22 April 1975, SWB, FE/4886/BII/7; HZRB, 22 April 1975 from which the following quotations are taken.
41. ZPS, 22 April 1975, SWB, FE/4887/BII/3-4.
42. ZPS, 23 April 1975, *ibid.*, FE/4893/BII/18.
43. New York Times, *op. cit.*
44. *Loc. cit.*; and 'Hangzhou, and crises still to come', FEER, 29 August 1975, pp.27-8.
45. 'Hangzhou, and crises still to come', p.28.
46. 'Controlling social tension', p.30; 'Hangzhou: City in crisis', p.25.
47. 'Hangzhou: City in crisis', pp.24, 25. Goodstadt is most probably referring to the railway-commune joint defence meeting convened by the ZPRC and ZPMD in early June 1975. The meeting claimed an increase in the number of freight cars loaded and unloaded, and a speed-up in turn-around since the beginning of the second quarter of 1975. It noted particularly the situation in Jiangshan county, Jinhua district, bordering Jiangxi province, in the south-west of Zhejiang. Members of the PLA and public security forces were patrolling the tracks around the clock to prevent sabotage by 'class enemies'. Peasants working alongside the railway lines remained vigilant as they farmed. ~~The meeting directed all localities to 'make sure that railway transportation is smooth and free of obstructions, reaching all destinations safe and on time.'~~ ZPS, 4 June 1975, SWB, FE/4923/BII/9-10. Compare this detail with the sparseness of the People's Daily article of 10 August 1975, cited above.

48. 'Hangzhou: City in crisis', p.25. The B.B.C. monitoring service noticed strange behaviour of the provincial service on 30 May 1975. The station went off the air for most of the day from 10 am until 9 pm. During this period only short broadcasts, relaying programmes from Beijing, were heard. SWB, FE/4922/BII/20. Goodstadt may be correct in stating that leadership changes were under way before July but his evidence is suspect. At a rally on broadcasting work in September 1975, well after the incident and after Goodstadt's article had appeared, another explanation for the strange behaviour of the provincial radio service was suggested. Such pronouncements as 'Bourgeois factionalism must never be allowed to interfere with broadcasting work', and exhortations to all departments to ensure that 'broadcasting goes on persistently at all times and under all circumstances', suggest that radical demagogues may have tried unsuccessfully to seize control of the station in late May. See ZPS, 16 September 1975, *ibid.*, FE/5012/BII/3-4. Thus, rather than signalling a change in management, Zhejiang radio's erratic behaviour on 30 May may have represented preventative action by the provincial authorities to stop control of the station slipping out of their hands.
49. CNA, 'Factionalism, Part I: Political Aspects', 5 September 1975; 'Factionalism, Part II: Economic Aspects', 12 September 1975.
50. The two most prominent examples from the Chinese provinces cited by China News Analysis were Jiang Lan, 'Wage a resolute struggle against bourgeois factionalism', Heilongjiang Provincial Service, 13 August 1975, SWB, FE/4987/BII/1-3 and the editorial of Nanfang Ribao (Guangzhou) Guangdong Provincial Service, 18 August 1975, *ibid.*, FE/4992/BII/5-7.
51. Goodstadt wisely cautioned that 'The problems of Hangzhou should not be over-dramatised, any more than the problems of other Chinese cities which have provided tasty fare for a variety of anti-Chinese propaganda sources.' 'Controlling social tension', p.30. And, 'There is a dangerous temptation to see Hangzhou as a massive crisis indicative of a breakdown of law and order throughout China.' 'Hangzhou: City in crisis', p.25.
52. Jun Xing, 'Hangzhou fasheng le shenmo shi?', 15 August 1975 in Shiyue Pinglun, October 1975, pp.9-10. The article was translated in parts under the title 'Behind the Ferment in Hangzhou', in Intercontinental Press, 13:41 (1975), pp.1584-5.
53. Li Ming-hua, 'Observations on the Recent Labor Unrest in Mainland China', I & S, 11:10 (1975), pp.2-15.

54. This criticism could be levelled at S. Andors, Politics, Planning and Management, 1949 to the Present (London, 1977), pp.234-5 who dismisses the view that wage disputes caused the trouble. He believes that workers' complaints were directed at collective welfare facilities and the failure of some cadres to participate in collective labour. Andors refers to the heat, harsh working conditions, intense production schedules and poor eating facilities, sanitary conditions and family problems. But the workers of Hangzhou were not alone in experiencing these harsh conditions.
 55. Charts, 31st Series (April 1976), p.18; 34th Series (April 1977), p.4.
 56. 'Tan Qilong (2)', pp.110-111.
 57. 'Cong Hangzhou gongren', 5:100-105.
 58. In fact the workers who were enrolled in the militia received material privileges, a practice against which their fellow workers strongly objected. 'Tan Qilong (2)', p.110 asserts that as late as February 1975 the two original mass organisations of the Cultural Revolution were striving for leadership of the urban militia. Later chapters of this thesis will show that 1/ the militia had been disbanded by this time and that 2/ the two factions of 1974-5 were in some crucial way different from the mass organisations of 1967-9.
 59. Zweig, pp.140-159.
 60. He was the cadre named in Charts, p.4. See above, p.24.
 61. During my first visit of 12 January 1977 I was told that the number was about 50 to 60. Both figures are certainly an under-estimation. The first report from Hangzhou announcing the intervention of troops in large industrial enterprises specifically stated that 6,000 soldiers had occupied four factories, one of which was the Silk Complex. ZPS, 21 July 1975, SWB, FE/4967/BII/5. Therefore it is logical to assume that, as the mill was one of the worst trouble-spots in the city, it received at least its quota (1,500) of the 6,000 soldiers.
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Chapter Two

FACTIONALISM AND COMPROMISE, 1966-9

This chapter examines the formation of the two provincial mass organisations at the time of the January 1967 power seizure in Shanghai. It analyses the major issues of contention between them and the effect this often violent confrontation had on provincial politics in the period from 1967 to 1969. Mass factionalism embedded itself into the very marrow of the political system, producing serious consequences for the administration of Zhejiang. It sucked the civilian and military members of the provincial elite into its vortex destabilising an established and tested power structure. Local political groups sought protection and support from superiors and allies at the centre of the Chinese system. These central officials in turn capitalised on connections in the province both to secure their own positions and influence events at the lower levels.

When Mao Zedong and his supporters in Beijing called for the overthrow of provincial authorities in January 1967, the rebels in Zhejiang responded but failed in their attempt to seize power. The CCP ZPC under the leadership of 1st secretary Jiang Hua, like many of its counterparts across the country, drew on all its experience, economic and political resources, legitimacy as the local representative of the CCP, and patronage, to prevent the rebels

from gaining power. Throughout 1966 Jiang Hua and his colleagues improvised a running strategy, which although ultimately unable to preserve their authority, largely contributed to the bitter antagonism which broke out among the rebels. The close links between the party committee and the local military hierarchy also ensured that when Mao and Lin Biao ordered the latter to support the rebels against Jiang, the PLA hesitated and even resisted the command.

Into the vacuum created by the breakdown of party authority in Zhejiang the central authorities were forced to send outside military forces, unattached to the Zhejiang military-civilian complex. Jiang Hua lost his position but not his influence. Subordinates rallied to his cause and influential central figures protected him from the humiliations suffered by other leading provincial figures. The ambiguity of Jiang's position contributed further to the antagonism between the two mass organisations. United Headquarters, which had hoped to publicly disgrace Jiang, was thwarted and Red Storm, which had protected him, flaunted its action as proof that it was the true Maoist group in Zhejiang.

Ultimately Jiang Hua suffered public criticism by name but this open denunciation did not occur until the end of 1968. In the intervening period the failure of the centre to make clear its stand toward him infuriated United Headquarters and gave Red Storm the revolutionary credentials its rival refused to recognise. Once Mao had settled on a three-way alliance, or Revolutionary Committee, to

replace the old power structure, rebel groups battled for recognition so that they could appoint representatives to their side of this unstable trinity of army, veteran cadres, and mass representatives. A precondition to the formation of the three-way alliance was a 'revolutionary grand alliance' of mass organisations. That this alliance did not occur in Zhejiang until February 1968, despite intense pressure from Beijing and the local military, illustrates the bitterness of the relations between the two groups.

Violent clashes had erupted between the mass organisations in the summer of 1967 implicating local military and party leaders, militia, peasants and centrally-directed 'support the left' troops. Repeated delays to the formation of an alliance of rebels meant that the three services of the military, as well as garrison troops, were increasingly involved in factional disputes and forced to take sides. The question of which cadres of the old party committee would receive recognition as 'revolutionary leading cadres' and be permitted to join the three-way alliance also aroused intense disputes. That so few senior cadres betrayed Jiang Hua to join the new power structure is a testament to the loyalty he had acquired from his subordinates over the years.

The ZPRC was finally established in March 1968 but by no means did this signal the end of factional struggles in the province. From its inception the committee was viewed as a factional body, unrepresentative of major interest groups in Zhejiang. Red Storm did not acquire representation on this body or on the Hangzhou Municipal

Revolutionary Committee (HMRC). Nor was the promise for its members to sit on the committees of the Worker, Peasant and Red Guard Congresses, honoured. It therefore adopted a hostile attitude toward all these organisations and actively boycotted them and worked to undermine their authority. Generally speaking, the cadres and military officials who supported Red Storm remained outside the new power structure and expressed their dissatisfaction in ways which weakened the legitimacy and authority of these bodies.

The solution to the continued instability in Zhejiang, which manifested itself in violent scenes in the summer of 1968, was to assert military control over schools and colleges, rusticate social dissidents and come to terms with the alienated mass organisation, Red Storm. One month after the April 1969 9th Congress of the CCP which seemed to signal the conclusion of the Cultural Revolution, the two mass organisations finally signed another truce which enabled members of Red Storm to appoint representatives to revolutionary committees and mass organisation congresses. The two groups formally disbanded in May 1969. Yet the decision taken in that month did not mean that the problem of factionalism had been solved. On the one hand it reappeared in the formal, decision-making structure, and on the other it went underground to establish new personal ties whose strength and importance threatened to weaken all remnants of Leninist organisational principles in the Party.

Jiang Hua and The Cultural Revolution, 1966-7

When the Cultural Revolution erupted in 1966, Jiang Hua¹ had led the CCP ZPC since 1954. He had proved himself a loyal servant of Beijing in Zhejiang. In 1957-8 Jiang conducted a purge of opponents of central policy and of his rule within the provincial leadership, charged them with localism and expelled them from the CCP.² He enthusiastically supported the Great Leap Forward³ as well as the policies of reconstruction which followed it.⁴ Jiang was the perfect example of the provincial politician in the pre-Cultural Revolution days, as described by the leading writer of this phenomenon. He

is a man eminently sensitive to shifting winds from Beijing. Although jealous of provincial interests, he is careful to tailor his articulation of those interests to the prevailing policy line. He emphasises the primacy of national interest and shapes provincial policy according to central directives. When the provincial politician errs, it is more likely by going too far in implementing "infallible" central policies than by opposing them.⁵

In his study, Teiwes carried out a comparative correlation of socio-economic factors to personnel stability in China's provinces and concluded that Zhejiang ranked fourteenth as 'basically stable'.⁶ Although two long-serving senior members of the provincial secretariat were promoted out of Zhejiang at the beginning of 1966 Jiang still retained the nucleus of an experienced team. His deputy, Li Fengping, had worked in the province since 1949 as a political/judicial generalist, with a short intermission from 1963-6 in Anhui. The other members of the

secretariat were: Wu Xian, who had also led the CCP HMC and was in charge of planning; Cao Xiangren, a deputy-minister in the 1st Ministry of Machine Building until his transfer to Zhejiang in 1959 perhaps to curb Jiang's enthusiasm for the Great Leap Forward; Chen Weida, a close ally of Jiang's who had assisted him eradicate the influence of Zhejiang 'localists' in 1957-8; and Lai Keke who had transferred to Zhejiang in 1960 from Shandong province where he had once been dismissed, allegedly for connections with the Gao Gang-Rao Shushi conspiracy of 1953.⁷ Another prominent member of the provincial elite, and together with Chen Weida an intimate supporter of Jiang Hua, was Chen Bing, who had been director of the CCP ZPC propaganda department since 1957.

Between November 1965 when Yao Wenyuan published his attack on Hai Rui dismissed from office until the 11th plenum of the 8th CC in August 1966 when the programmatic document of the Cultural Revolution drawn up under Mao's guidance was officially endorsed, Mao Zedong spent much of his time in Hangzhou.⁸ Jiang allegedly used his contacts in Shanghai - he was a member of the East China Bureau of the CCP located in that city - to discover the strategic importance of Yao's article. He then ordered the Zhejiang Daily to reprint it on 24 November, 1965, well before most other provincial newspapers. A Red Guard publication charged Jiang with political speculation⁹ but such initiative certainly exemplified Jiang's ability to forecast trends and trim his sails accordingly.

The same Cultural Revolution source also claimed that

Jiang obtained an advance draft of the May 16 circular which enabled him, in collaboration with the noted theorist Hu Qiaomu, to instruct Chen Bing to publish three articles under the pen-name of Xin Wenbing. These articles attacked the 'three family village' writing team of Beijing operating under Peng Zhen's aegis.¹⁰ However, the most sensational accusation levelled at Jiang was that he ordered Lu Jianguang, director of the provincial public security department, together with public security officials from Beijing, to spy on Mao. They allegedly emptied Mao's wastepaper baskets for any scraps of information, eavesdropped on his conversations, bugged his residence and tapped his telephone calls.¹¹

It is possible that in the highly volatile political atmosphere of 1966 Jiang resorted to unorthodox measures to prevent the ground under his feet from opening up into a bottomless pit. Established party rectification and disciplinary procedures, which had generally been adhered to over the previous twenty years,¹² seemed to be fast becoming irrelevant. Officials such as Jiang could only improvise when the rules of the game were ignored or no longer applied. The situation demanded an innovative response, one which Parris Chang has appropriately described as 'strategies for survival'.¹³

The initial strategies pursued by provincial officials such as Jiang have been described by Chang as evasion and diversion, deception and containment. They proved successful to varying degrees until the 11th plenum, after which provincial leaders were placed in unviable positions. They then dug

deep to summons all the resources at their disposal to stave off destruction. They looked to their military allies to prop them up, lobbied in Beijing, tried to buy the support of workers and peasants by blatant cash hand-outs, attempted to infiltrate the new power structure and resorted to outright repression. Chang concludes, admiringly,

The fact that it was the use of military forces that finally brought down the recalcitrant well-entrenched provincial Party leaders attests to the remarkable effectiveness of their survival strategies.¹⁴

The first strategy of evasion and diversion referred to the ruse of dismissing subordinates in the provincial propaganda and education systems. Undoubtedly Chen Bing, whom Jiang had appointed to the key position of director of the provincial Cultural Revolution Group, assisted his chief in providing some sacrificial victims in the propaganda department. Lin Danqiu, a deputy-director of the department and also party secretary of the provincial Writer's Association, seems to have been one prominent example. His disgrace was announced at the end of July 1966.¹⁵ Jin Tao, director of the CCP HMC propaganda department died on 30 September 1966 at the age of 53, most likely as a result of persecution.¹⁶

Between June and July 1966 the provincial leadership, in line with central directives, despatched work teams to educational institutions. Early in June Mao had warned against such a practice. Shortly afterwards Liu Dan, first deputy-secretary and vice-president of the prestigious Zhejiang University, became the first prominent scapegoat of

the Cultural Revolution in the province. He was dismissed at a rally held on 22 June attended by Cao Xiangren.¹⁷ Liu had allegedly suppressed students who pasted up wall posters by investigating their class background and excluding those lacking revolutionary credentials from participating in the Cultural Revolution.¹⁸ Liu also supposedly ignored instructions from the CCP ZPC to mobilise students on the campus. It is more likely, however, that Liu had the backing of his superiors in brandishing the prestige of the CCP and forbidding anyone from tarnishing it.

The second strategy of survival outlined by Chang involved news management or deception. Provincial authorities thereby hoped to convince the public, and restless students in particular, that they supported the aims of the Cultural Revolution. On 26 June 1966, before an audience of 10,000 CCP members and a full turnout of Party leaders from the county level and above, as well as PLA units, Jiang Hua delivered an oration on Mao Zedong thought.¹⁹ Jiang waxed eloquently on his theme and explained the significance of the Cultural Revolution as an ideological and political class struggle against representatives of the bourgeoisie in the Party and bourgeois intellectuals. Jiang issued a warning to those who waved the red banner only to oppose it, a warning of breath-taking hypocrisy.

After the appearance of Red Guards on the streets of Hangzhou in August 1966²⁰ the CCP ZPC held rallies to welcome both local and outside Red Guards. On 10 and 13 September Jiang and his deputy Li Fengping addressed meetings of the 'young generals' to solicit their suggestions

concerning the provincial authorities' implementation of the Cultural Revolution.²¹ Jiang and his committee apparently received approval for their performance but from that time Jiang made no further public appearances in a leadership capacity in Zhejiang.

The next approach to which Jiang had recourse concerned delegating authority to his subordinates both within the ZPC and the military leadership of the ZPMD. The interlocking nature of the civilian and military bureaucracies in the provinces on the eve of the Cultural Revolution has been previously noted.²² Jiang Hua, in addition to his party position, held the post of 1st political commissar of the ZPMD. His subordinate, political commissar Long Qian, also served as a member of the CCP ZPC standing committee. The commander of the ZPMD, Zhang Xiulong, like Jiang, had long experience serving in Zhejiang. But it was not only at the top of the provincial hierarchy that the two bureaucracies overlapped. At the district, county and commune levels civilian and military leadership coexisted on intimate terms, a feature of momentous importance when the rebels left the relative safety of provincial capitals to unseat 'local emperors' in towns and villages.

At the provincial congress of activists in the study of Mao Zedong thought held in October 1966, it was the ZPMD which sponsored the meeting. Commander Zhang Xiulong and political commissar Long Qian, together with Wu Xian, who represented the CCP ZPC, and Wang Zida, mayor of Hangzhou, addressed the activists.²³ Perhaps Jiang hoped that by keeping a low profile he could hold on to the reins of

power more effectively.

Simultaneously, Jiang was apparently attempting to convince his old superior Tan Zhenlin²⁴ to intercede on his behalf. According to articles published after his downfall, Tan used his wife to relay instructions to a 'Zhejiang delegation of veteran conservatives'. The delegation had arrived in Beijing in October 1966 to report that the situation in Zhejiang was similar to that existing on the eve of the anti-Rightist movement of 1957.²⁵ Tan also plotted with Jiang Hua to convince the central authorities to back Jiang's continuation in power, reported these sources.²⁶

By the end of 1966 the Cultural Revolution was spreading into the workforce as students entered factories and offices to establish ties and incite opposition to the authorities. They also tried to liaise with peasants on the suburban communes around major cities. Alarmed by this development, the provincial power-holders set out to coopt workers and peasants into their camp. They realised that legitimate grievances existed among certain sections of the community regarding wages, working conditions and the lack of job opportunities. Such groups as temporary and contract workers, demobilised soldiers, educated youth in the countryside, apprentices, and the urban unemployed had been especially disadvantaged by the economic strategy adopted in the wake of the failure of the Great Leap Forward.²⁷

It is most probable that local party committees were encouraged by their superiors to cave in to demands of a

monetary nature or pay the dissidents expenses to take their complaints to Hangzhou or further afield to Beijing. This placed the rebels in a dilemma, as the following account reported from the port-city of Ningbo revealed.²⁸ When the rebels initially rose up they were accused of sabotaging production and were suppressed. Later, party leaders incited some workers to leave their posts and lodge complaints with the authorities in Hangzhou, Shanghai and Beijing. Production was disrupted, wages and allowances increased and subsidies issued. By these measures the power-holders, charged the rebels, aimed to bankrupt the treasury and place pressure on the Central Committee to rein in the Red Guards. Consequently the rebels requested their fellow-workers to return to the production-line, fulfil their quotas and settle economic grievances at a later date. To this end, bank funds were frozen and certificates which had been issued to permit free travel around the country were cancelled. The irony of rebels defending the status quo against the insubordinate activities of local party officials exemplified the essentially conservative nature of many power seizures that occurred across China.

Other instances of economism received publicity in mid-January 1967. The party committee of Shaoxing county, east Zhejiang, issued 500,000 to 600,000 yuan in supplementary wages, allowances and incentives and authorised back-payments to peasants who had worked on state capital construction projects. Kaihua county in Jinhua district of central Zhejiang, reallocated 620,000 yuan in resettlement

funds immediately following the broadcast of 9 January from Shanghai announcing the power seizure in that city.²⁹ In the countryside, state forests were turned over to collectives resulting in indiscriminate felling of trees. Lumber was then sold on the black market and forestry workers were provided with travel subsidies to desert their posts.³⁰

Rebel groups also succumbed to the lure of money and gifts. Even as late as January 1967 they accepted from the CCP ZPC 2,000 yuan in cash, bicycles and two motor vehicles. In a grand display of self-sacrifice they returned all these emoluments - except for one motor car which they retained for their use.³¹

In response to a CC circular of 11 January 1967 denouncing economism and demanding a cessation of all such practices, the Zhejiang rebel groups issued an urgent notice.³² This document gave some indication of the intense struggle then in progress in the province. It accused the power-holders of provoking peasants to reject state requisition policies and fight among themselves. Commune collective funds were being distributed to individual peasants, who had also withdrawn large sums from banks and credit cooperatives. The rebels directed groups such as rusticated educated youth, who had taken advantage of the breakdown in social order and had flooded into the cities, to return to the countryside. Requests to local military and militia forces to protect mass organisations, and not beat and detain their members, revealed clearly the attitude of the powerful rural armed forces toward the rebels.

The first prominent example of a power-seizure in Zhejiang occurred at the offices of Zhejiang Daily, then located in downtown Hangzhou. On 30 December 1966 the rebels stormed the building and closed down the newspaper. It reappeared on 10 January 1967, the event being celebrated at a large rally in the city.³³

On 16 January political power at the city's largest silk mill, the Hangzhou Silk Dyeing and Printing Complex³⁴ changed hands. The events leading up to this seizure illustrate well the difficulties faced by rebels in their work places. At the beginning of December 1966 only 45 workers in the complex had committed themselves to the rebel cause. The party leadership attacked them as rightists and to protect their positions suddenly admitted more workers into the CCP and trade union. By the middle of December the rebels had attracted enough workers to hold their first meeting, and by the time they convened a second meeting, the party leaders felt sufficiently threatened to disrupt it. It seems as if the older and more skilled workers and technicians generally supported the party and tended to join what were later called 'conservative mass organisations'. But they were overwhelmed by the rebels who, through a combination of cajolement and intimidation, finally formed an alliance. However, their first object on seizing power was anything but revolutionary - they issued the call ~~which had been popularised by Zhou Enlai to 'grasp revolution and promote production'~~.³⁵

Rebellion in factories and offices was only a side-show compared to the challenge of removing the CCP ZPC from

power. With the successful overthrow of the Shanghai municipal authorities in mid-January 1967, the central authorities issued a call to 'proletarian revolutionaries' to 'form a great alliance to seize power from those in authority who are taking the capitalist road'. But the problem of deciding which provincial leaders were following the capitalist road remained one for the local rebels to thrash out, and it proved an imponderable one in Zhejiang, as elsewhere in China.

The rebels of Zhejiang convened a mass rally in Hangzhou on 25 January at which leaders of the CCP ZPC including Jiang Hua and Chen Weida were paraded and denounced.³⁶ After the rally broke up Chen apparently fled to the safety of the ZPMD headquarters situated at Qingbo Gate in the south-west of downtown Hangzhou. Once the largest rebel organisation of the provincial alliance, the Zhejiang Provincial Revolutionary Rebel United Headquarters (United Headquarters) discovered Chen's presence in the PLA's building, its members laid siege to it provoking a major confrontation.

The local PLA had already received orders signed by Mao that they end their false neutrality in the Cultural Revolution and intervene to support the left. Like their counterparts garrisoned in other provincial capitals, the ZPMD leadership was reluctant to support the anarchic ~~behaviour of youth whom they viewed as misguided and~~ immature, particularly when it was directed against their old comrades and colleagues in the ZPC. Repeated central directives³⁷ had forbidden provincial authorities from storing

'black material' on rebels in military headquarters under the pretext of transferring confidential documents and files for safe-keeping. Chen Weida had evidently defied this edict with the knowledge and complicity of the ZPMD leadership.

The CC decision regarding this incident³⁸ fully supported United Headquarters' action in storming military headquarters. It placed responsibility for the clash on the ZPC and some leaders of the ZPMD. It demanded that the children of high-ranking cadres who had also sought refuge in the building be handed over to United Headquarters for punishment. The central authorities also ordered leaders of the ZPC and ZPMD to make thorough self-criticisms (shenke jiantao) before the masses. The ZPMD was again commanded to

firmly stand on the side of the revolutionary left, firmly support the great alliance of the proletarian revolutionaries, and firmly support the revolutionary rebels' struggle to seize power so as to facilitate deepening of the class struggle and the all-round unfolding of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution in Zhejiang.

United Headquarters, for its part, was requested to leave the building it had occupied and to unite with other 'proletarian revolutionaries'. This incident undoubtedly sealed Chen Weida's fate and seriously undermined the centre's confidence in the civilian and military leadership of Zhejiang.

The ZPMD's blatant defiance of central directives and unashamed backing for the ZPC also infuriated the rebels.

On 27 January the Zhejiang Daily and Hangzhou Daily published a joint editorial clamouring for the purging of 'capitalist-roaders' from the ranks of the military. Entitled 'What are a small handful in the Zhejiang Military District up to?' the editorial was accompanied by an item excoriating the District leaders as 'bastards' (hundun) and 'tools of the bourgeois dictatorship'.³⁹ The ferocity of this language, accompanied by the continued rebel attacks on arsenals and other disruptive activities,⁴⁰ undoubtedly frightened the ZPMD's subordinate command, the Hangzhou garrison command, into passing a resolution on the same day, expressing support for the rebels.⁴¹

Further attacks on party leaders continued with wall posters directing their venom against Wang Pingyi, secretary of the CCP HMC.⁴² In a series of exchanges between Wang and several of his subordinates on the standing committee of the CCP HMC including mayor Wang Zida⁴³ and deputy secretary Guan Qi, an acrimonious and vituperative debate ensued. Insults and insinuations about past political activities, especially as they related to loyalty to Mao over major policy initiatives launched by the Chairman, were freely traded on the walls of the municipal offices. Wang Pingyi seems to have defended himself with great endeavour.⁴⁴

However the main target of the rebels remained Jiang Hua. Their campaign to unseat him climaxed in early February 1967. On one day in the first week of that month, United Headquarters convened another rally to publicly castigate and humiliate Jiang. The other major mass organisation, the Red Storm Provisional Headquarters (Red

Storm) disrupted and broke up the meeting⁴⁵ allowing Jiang Hua to escape a frightening ordeal. Zhou Enlai, most probably with Mao's approval, despatched an aircraft to Hangzhou to fly Jiang back to the relative safety of Beijing.⁴⁶

It is well-known that Zhou protected a large number of leading cadres under seige in the Cultural Revolution. Jiang's status as a minority nationality, as well as his connections with the Maoist cause dating back to the struggles on the Jinggang mountains in the 1920's, undoubtedly worked in his favour. Whatever the reasons, Red Storm's effrontery in rescuing Jiang, and the centre's ambiguous attitude toward criticism of him,⁴⁷ contributed greatly to the subsequent upheavals in Zhejiang. United Headquarters was thwarted in its efforts to completely destroy Jiang politically. Red Storm perceived Zhou's action as central endorsement for its claims to represent the genuine Maoist rebels in Zhejiang. The centre, in turn, remained non-committal, although the Cultural Revolution Group clearly favoured the credentials of United Headquarters. Jiang Hua's position remained undetermined while the two mass organisations began a lengthy violent struggle to acquire legitimacy and influence.

It is true that the battle for political survival fought by provincial leaders such as Jiang ultimately ended in defeat. They were essentially on the defensive against Mao who could change the rules and bring in political actors from outside the system to alter the balance of power, as Parris Chang argues. However, this study of

Zhejiang shows that officials like Jiang could land some telling blows to their opponents before they were counted out. The legacy of their tenacity and ingenuity in adversity was a province rent by division. This had long-term repercussions in Zhejiang. Even after Jiang's departure from the province into temporary political oblivion, the rebels could cry out in exasperation, 'The ghost of Jiang Hua still haunts Zhejiang Province.'⁴⁸

The confrontation between United Headquarters and Red Storm in February 1967 was the major contributing factor to the bitter enmity which from that time onward characterised relations between the two organisations. The social composition of the two groups also contributed to their differences. Red Storm's strength centred on the campus of the oldest tertiary institution in Hangzhou - Zhejiang University. The students and teachers at Zheda formed the academic elite of Zhejiang. It is possible that leaders of the CCP ZPC were directly involved in the establishment of Red Storm.⁴⁹ United Headquarters, on the other hand, seems to have recruited heavily from among the younger workers of Hangzhou's major industrial plants clustered in the outer northern suburb of Banshan. These factories, such as the Silk Complex, the Zhejiang Hemp Mill, and the Hangzhou Oxygen Generator Plant, all employed large numbers of workers.

Disunity, February-July 1967

Faced with mounting pressure from veteran leaders of the CC Military Affairs Commission and the State Council the Cultural Revolution Group was forced to distance itself from the chaos which was engulfing China. What later became known as the 'February adverse current',⁵⁰ inaugurated an interval of moderation and consolidation. Zhejiang also experienced a period in which the policy towards cadres relaxed and the striving for unity momentarily subdued factional antagonisms.

But editorials published by Zhejiang Daily in February⁵¹ reflected the divisiveness within the ranks of the rebels. They foisted the blame on the party authorities for this state of affairs, but in proclaiming the necessity for an alliance, placed conditions on those eligible to join. These conditions were deliberately worded so as to exclude Red Storm, which was rejected as a rightist organisation using leftist slogans to confuse people. Red Storm's call for a united front was spurned and its continued struggle against other rebel groups censured.

On 14 February United Headquarters and 30 other rebel groups in Hangzhou issued a proposal for unity as a preliminary step to seizing power.⁵² It advocated the establishment of a preparatory group which would make suggestions on how to convene a congress. This congress would unite the workers of Hangzhou, where United Headquarters' strength lay, as the first step, in moves to achieve the unity of workers, peasants, cadres and students across the

province. The proposal also recognised that without the support of the PLA all talk of power-seizures was idle.

Continued squabbles among United Headquarters and Red Storm, the solidarity of the provincial leaders, and the reluctance of the local military to support United Headquarters, finally snapped the patience of the central authorities. Probably in February 1967⁵³ the Central Military Commission ordered the troops of the 20th Army (Unit 6409) stationed in Jiangsu province to march to Zhejiang to assume military control of the province in conjunction with the ZPMD. A joint editorial of 17 February welcomed the intervention of main force units which apparently also resulted in the recognition of United Headquarters as the authorised representative of proletarian revolutionaries in the province.⁵⁴

Recognition of United Headquarters certainly represented a set-back for Red Storm. But sections of the military, local troops under the ZPMD in particular, apparently continued to back it. Thus the factional differences between the mass organisations spilled over into the PLA. This encouraged Red Storm to fight on against United Headquarters, confident in the expectation that its cause had a future. Civilian cadres were also drawn into the conflict. Stated simply, those cadres who were opposed by United Headquarters, such as Jiang Hua and Chen Weida, found that Red Storm came to their assistance. Those cadres who were supported by United Headquarters, such as Lai Keke and Wang Zida found that Red Storm was aligned against them. These alliances were based on mutual ties of convenience and protection.

At this juncture, the spring planting season intervened to draw attention away from factional struggles. It also provided United Headquarters with an opportunity to display its administrative talents. It issued an urgent notice on 14 February⁵⁵ demanding that peasants 'must not take up any of the time set aside for production' to participate in the Cultural Revolution. The rebels also rebuked rural cadres who refused to assume their responsibilities and sabotaged collective production by persisting in offering monetary incentives to peasants.

That the CCP ZPC no longer existed as a decision-making body was made clear at the end of February. It was the ZPMD which issued a circular and convened a conference on agricultural production at which two of its leaders, as well as a representative of the rebels, made reports.⁵⁶ The summation delivered by Guo Zhuoxian, deputy-commander of the ZPMD, clearly indicated the view of the Cultural Revolution held by the military. Guo described it as a revolutionisation in an individual's thinking gained through studying Mao's works.⁵⁷

Initial moves to bring about an alliance of rebels, excluding Red Storm, achieved an initial breakthrough in March when a Congress of Hangzhou's revolutionary rebels and workers took place in the city.⁵⁸ The main stumbling block to a provincial alliance remained, however, United Headquarters' insistence that it form the 'core' of this alliance and Red Storm's equally strong determination that it enter on its own terms as an equal partner. An editorial in Zhejiang Daily of 20 April⁵⁹ firmly rejected any concessions to 'conservative' organisations. It insisted that the 'staunch

revolutionary left' form the nucleus of a militant alliance.

The newspaper defined the two groups as 'revolutionary' and 'conservative', the names by which United Headquarters and Red Storm were known for the rest of the Cultural Revolution. It also argued, somewhat unconvincingly, that the quarrel between the two did not concern power but revolved around two diametrically opposed political lines, thereby attempting to associate Red Storm with Liu Shaoqi and the representatives of the 'bourgeois reactionary line'. A struggle to win the allegiance of the people was underway, admitted the paper, between the proletarian revolutionaries and the old party authorities using the conservative groups as their mouthpieces.

While the rank and file of these conservative organisations were merely asked to examine their positions

the small number of chieftains of these organisations who persist in their mistaken viewpoints must be exposed, criticised and repudiated so that they can be isolated.

Only then would they be allowed to rejoin the ranks of the revolutionaries.

The editorial also expressed the fear, well-founded as it eventuated, that United Headquarters would be ordered to form an alliance by administrative fiat. It rallied its members to 'resolutely resist' such pressure. However as early as June 1967⁶⁰ it appears that Beijing was meeting with representatives of both mass organisations as well as military officials to force concessions from both sides. That the military did not take a unified stance on the question of the 'core' of the revolutionary alliance was

suggested at a rally held three days after the publication of the 20 April editorial. The representative of the 5th Air Force publicly aligned his unit with the United Headquarters' position but another PLA representative merely proclaimed general support for proletarian revolutionaries.⁶¹

As the hot summer of 1967 approached, relations between the rebels and PLA deteriorated. A Zhejiang Daily editorial of 13 May⁶² asked the rebels to fully support the PLA in its 'three support and two military' assignment. (support agriculture, industry and the left; military training of students and military control of administration.) It excused the main force unit's unfamiliarity with local conditions as being due to the brevity of its intervention in provincial politics. Overall, stressed the editorial, the PLA had achieved much and it exhorted the rebels;

Do not say anything that will harm the prestige of the PLA. Do not do anything that will harm the unity between the Army and the people. If we find that some of the comrades in the PLA have shortcomings or mistakes, we should, with sincerity and goodwill, present our viewpoints (on an appropriate ?) occasion and in an appropriate way to help them improve themselves.

The delicacy of the phrasing could not obscure the fact that United Headquarters had reason to be less than fully satisfied with the performance of the military up until this time.

In a reversal of the Military Affairs Commission order of 6 April which had deprived local military officials of a great deal of their civil authority, on 6 June Beijing directed the rebels to stop fighting and empowered the PLA

to enforce this edict.⁶³ United Headquarters convened a huge rally, attended by PLA representatives and a crowd numbered at 200,000, to express its support.⁶⁴ The following day, 11 June, United Headquarters issued an urgent notice⁶⁵ which reflected the gravity of the situation. It stated that the power struggle and attempts to arrive at an alliance of rebels and the three-way alliance of cadres, PLA, and mass representatives had reached a critical stage. The notice referred to a 'big bloody battle' against the old ZPC and ZPMD leadership. According to United Headquarters

Using power which they still hold [the party authorities] fabricated lies and resorted to such vicious means as awarding work points and mobilising means of transport to deceive and incite large numbers of peasants to leave their production posts to go to cities to participate in violent struggles, to encircle and attack the revolutionary left, and to sabotage state properties ...

The resultant clashes had 'seriously undermined production, the worker-peasant alliance, and the great proletarian cultural revolution'.

United Headquarters requested the peasants to return to their communes, direct their wrath at the power-holders rather than at the rebels and reject the economic measures dangled before them by these power-holders to lure them into the cities to fight with the rebels. The notice also asked United Headquarters' members to observe the guide- lines of the 6 June general order and treat the peasants as misguided dupes rather than as enemies.⁶⁶ Reports from within China and from foreign sources confirmed that peasant

bands had descended on Hangzhou and other cities in Zhejiang to fight against the mass organisations.

A broadcast from the Soviet Union claimed that guerrilla units led by members of the ZPC and ZPMD had attacked Hangzhou from the mountains killing six people and wounding another 150.⁶⁷ Hong Kong sources related accounts of railway workers in Jinhua, central Zhejiang, fighting with rocks, clubs and hand grenades against PLA units. They also alleged that six people had been killed and fifty injured when unnamed assailants had opened fire on Maoist rebels in a Hangzhou factory.⁶⁸ An East European wire service spoke of tens of thousands of peasants invading Hangzhou and throwing their victims into the Qiantang river.⁶⁹ A Central Committee document of July specifically mentioned Zhejiang as a province where local PLA units, called People's Armed Forces Departments, responsible for training the militia and having close links to civilian party officials, had incited peasants to attack cities. They had also interfered with the movement of trains and boats and apparently received preferential treatment for such actions.⁷⁰

United Headquarters seemed in a most vulnerable position. Its strength lay among the younger workers and students of Hangzhou although it faced competition from Red Storm for the allegiance of these groups. Outside the provincial capital, however, United Headquarters faced the combined forces of entrenched local party officials in league with their military colleagues, who were able to muster a sizeable fighting force composed of peasant-militia. In the

countryside rebellion against capitalist-roaders was described as an anti-Party, anti-communist insurrection to be mercilessly crushed. Even the main force units ordered to 'support the left' felt a natural aversion to disorderly conduct and often did little to actively protect their supposed rebel allies.

In their frustration the United Headquarters' members directed their ire at the PLA. An editorial of 12 June⁷¹ warned the rebels to remain vigilant against the guile of power-holders who goaded them into committing 'more errors' by striking out at the military. The editorial lavishly praised the Army for its political skills, organisation and discipline, assistance in economic work, and efforts to raise the 'revolutionary consciousness' of the rebels. It also pledged that mass organisations would place even greater trust in their PLA protectors. What United Headquarters really desired was greater freedom from military control, as the reference in the conclusion of the editorial to the central orders of 28 January and 6 April, curtailing the power of the PLA, indicated.⁷²

Zhejiang Daily publicised, clearly for the benefit of other military units, the praiseworthy deeds of a unit of the 5th Air Force in distinguishing between revolutionary and conservative groups.⁷³ This squad had arrived at a chemical works in Hangzhou in March 1967 when the class struggle was at its most acute. It was welcomed by members of United Headquarters who seemed to be in the minority and on the defensive. The factory leaders supported the conservative group and tried to convince the PLA unit to do

likewise.

According to the report the military personnel relied on three criteria to reach their decision of whom to back. The third criteria mentioned was to judge each group not by the class background of its members but by its actual performance in the Cultural Revolution. From this differentiation of United Headquarters and Red Storm we may assume that class elements outside the socialist mainstream, social dregs, and desperadoes made up a greater percentage of the former group's membership than the latter's. The other outstanding feature revealed by this story was the impossibility of the PLA's task in such circumstances. Complete outsiders to the complex nature of industrial relations and modern production and in an alien environment, they could not objectively decide the relative merits of the two contending parties. Political allegiances determined by their superiors had prejudged their choice.

Firm control over United Headquarters continued in June 1967.⁷⁴ Two outstanding issues were the rectification of the work-style of the organisation's leadership and the 'liberation' of cadres to establish one of the preconditions for the establishment of revolutionary committees. The cadre question was discussed in editorials published in June and July.⁷⁵ Many cadres, it was announced, were victims of the 'bourgeois reactionary line'. They should be allowed to rejoin the ranks of the revolutionaries after self-criticism and meritorious contributions, including the denunciation of fellow cadres. Nevertheless the rebels were warned to beware of cadres abusing this policy of leniency

to sneak back into positions of influence.

Many people clearly opposed this shift in policy altogether but they were informed that an individual should be judged by his life's work and not be condemned merely for mistakes he may have committed in the early stages of the Cultural Revolution. With policy in Beijing being formulated on the basis of the arbitrary dictates of a leader and his retinue, who could find justification for any position in the writings of Mao, it is little wonder that the erratic and sudden changes of course caused consternation and confusion for those expected to implement them.

In Zhejiang the failure to convince the rebels of the correctness of this turnaround was manifest in the absence of all leading cadres of the defunct administration from the provincial scene. Meanwhile, supporters of Jiang Hua remained active in defence of their old boss. In February 1967 they had apparently published a document entitled 'Jiang Hua as reflected in the series of inner-Party struggles'⁷⁶ to press his claims for consideration as a loyal subordinate of Mao and worthy of retention in the proposed new power structure. The political repercussions of this audacious step continued to make themselves felt in mid-year.

The second issue which received prominence at this time concerned the question of work-style. The leading ~~personnel of both United Headquarters and the Hangzhou~~ Workers Revolutionary Committee held meetings in July⁷⁷ to study the regulations of the Shandong Provincial Revolutionary Committee⁷⁸ which had set standards of

behaviour and made certain demands on its members. Both organisations passed eight point resolutions on the issue. The most interesting point in United Headquarters' resolution was that calling on its members to 'welcome and accept criticism and supervision and listen to those who hold different views and once opposed them and committed mistakes'. This resolution could only refer to Red Storm and revealed the pressure being exerted on United Headquarters to make concessions for the sake of unity.

It was not only the rebels who were taking stock at this time. The PLA also held a meeting⁷⁹ to review its contributions which, it decided, were positive. It boasted that it had correctly identified the revolutionary left and had not deviated from supporting it despite the activities of conservative organisations backed by the old power-holders. However the military did at least admit that it would inevitably make mistakes.

A week later the Wuhan incident erupted. In response to Jiang Qing's strident slogan 'attack by reasoning, defend by force', which encapsulated her response to local military suppression of rebel organisations, her followers in Zhejiang proclaimed that in relation to violence 'first we oppose it; secondly we are not afraid of it'. Using the kind of sophistry which characterised much of the polemics of the Cultural Revolution, the Zhejiang Daily put forward the argument that 'To defend by force is to ensure that an attack by peaceful means can be successfully carried out.'⁸⁰ With the PLA under political siege for its insubordination in Wuhan, the stage was set for an open test

of strength between the two rival mass organisations in Zhejiang and their military allies.

Provincial rallies to criticise Liu Shaoqi, 'China's Khrushchev' on 19 and 22 July⁸¹ were followed by a rally to denounce the leaders of the CCP HMC, including Wang Pingyi.⁸² Cadres were encouraged to break from their former superiors and publicly denounce them. A representative of United Headquarters launched a blistering attack on capitalist-roaders in the Party, government and the Army in the presence of PLA delegates, ensuring that political tempers would be frayed to breaking point.

Violence in the Summer of 1967

During the month of August 1967 a series of violent incidents occurred in Zhejiang. Although United Headquarters could claim some successes in these confrontations, they all took place in or around Hangzhou. Outside the provincial capital, particularly in Jinhua and Wenzhou its forces and allies suffered overwhelming defeats, and were only saved from annihilation by the intervention of main force units. Red Storm and other adversaries of United Headquarters demonstrated the strength of support of their organisations despite the removal of their sympathisers in the leadership of the ZPMD at that time. Although United Headquarters had the supposed advantage of being recognised as the Maoist revolutionary organisation in Zhejiang it seemed to fight a constant battle for survival against enemies on all sides.

The first publicised outbreak of violence erupted at the Hangzhou Silk Complex on 31 July 1967.⁸³ Wu Fengying, who had been honoured as an advanced silk worker in 1965, was seized on her way home from work. She was incarcerated in a warehouse where for two hours she was beaten with cigarette ends. Her tormentors then tied her to a bed, stuffed a dirty rag in her mouth and violated her body with the clubs. After two hours of this treatment she died. Five other women who belonged to the Red Storm faction were also seized. They included Wang Dongying and Sun Sunmei who were thrashed to the screams of: 'CCP members must be beaten. It serves them right if they die'. Similar atrocities occurred at the Zhejiang Hemp Mill,⁸⁴ on 16 August, and the Hangzhou Glass Factory,⁸⁵ on 19 August.

Perhaps United Headquarters' greatest victory outside Hangzhou occurred at the neighbouring county town of Xiaoshan on 26 August 1967. The previous day Zhejiang Daily carried an article which charged the disgraced party leaders with continuing to incite peasants to attack cities.⁸⁶ Probably in retaliation for such provocations, truckloads of workers from factories such as the Hangzhou Iron and Steel Works⁸⁷ launched a raid on Xiaoshan. Led by Xia Genfa,⁸⁸ a worker at the Hangzhou Oxygen Generator Plant and also a leader of the Hangzhou Workers' Revolutionary Committee, the contingent struck at Xiaoshan before moving on to neighbouring Zhuji county to repeat the performance.

A first-hand account of what happened has been recorded by a participant in the Xiaoshan affair.⁸⁹ Wang claimed that many people were murdered in cold blood and others

cruelly tortured. An insight into the reason for the assault is provided by Wang's denial that she had participated in an attack on the Iron and Steel Mill instigated by former ZPC leaders. Most likely such a raid had occurred and if six workers had lost their lives, as Wang reveals, it is little wonder that their work-mates were determined to revenge their deaths. Wang, by proudly admitting that she was a member of the factory's militia and a recognised crack shot, only adds to suspicion that the assault on Xiaoshan was not unprovoked.

Wang stated that early in 1967 the workers of her mill split into two factions with United Headquarters seizing power and forcing its opponents out of the factory gate.⁹⁰ On the evening of 25 August she and a fellow-worker were on duty as medical orderlies at the county hostel, a job probably arranged for her by the local party authorities. That night the hostel was surrounded and the front door kicked in. Those inside were ordered to come out with their arms raised and then escorted to the railway station where Wang lost contact with her comrade. Later she learned that this woman was mistaken for her and killed.

Wang did not fare much better. She was beaten and interrogated so that she would confess her responsibility for the death of the steel workers, but she did not yield. Her captors smashed her fingers with a shifting-spanner to make sure that she would never be able to use a rifle again. They apparently wanted her to implicate the leaders of the ZPMD in the bloodbath at the steel mill but Wang refused, even though she was wounded in the backside with a bayonet.

The above incidents in which United Headquarters

blitzed its enemy, were not publicised at the time. Much later after the event they were branded 'counter-revolutionary incidents',⁹¹ and castigated in the local press. The only battles which made the headlines at the time of their occurrence were those which resulted in losses for United Headquarters, which manipulated the media to gain sympathy for itself and to censure its opponents. No subsequent public condemnation has been published concerning these cases of violence, the most sensational of which occurred at Jinhua and Wenzhou.

On 3 August trouble broke out at Jinhua.⁹² The provisional supreme organ of power (Zhejiang sheng linshi lingdao jigou)⁹³ and United Headquarters held a joint press conference on 8 August⁹⁴ to denounce those responsible for the incident. The former body issued a notice holding the local party authorities in Jinhua, together with PLA units garrisoned in the town, responsible for summoning peasants into Jinhua to smash the rebels. The provincial authorities requested United Headquarters' opponents to abandon their organisation, the Jinhua Workers' Revolutionary Rebel Headquarters (Jingongzong), and its 'handful of bad leaders', so that the latter could confess their crimes and reform themselves with a view to rejoining the revolutionary ranks.

This lenient policy reflected a recognition of political reality. Without a massive commitment of main force troops against the local military, a step which courted the danger of an escalation in violence, the provincial leaders in Zhejiang could do nothing but compromise with their nominal subordinates. Although the representative of the new power-

brokers in Zhejiang adopted a tough line in his speech at the press conference, words were no substitute for deeds, and Jingongzong was undoubtedly fully aware of the strength of its position.

The notice of the provincial authorities was transmitted to Jinhua the next day and had to be carried the four kilometers from the Normal College into town by students of the Jinhua 2nd Headquarters. The college appears to have been this group's stronghold but it must have been a lonely and isolated place in a sea of peasant reaction. Fighting continued on 10 August with the Zhejiang Daily encouraging the rebels. An editorial of the next day somewhat plaintively rebuked Jingongzong for challenging the hegemony of United Headquarters, which it described as 'the core organisation of Zhejiang's revolutionaries who have the resolute support of the province all along'.

At a rally on 13 August the divisions within the military over its commitment to United Headquarters were made clear. A representative of the proletarian revolutionaries, in praising the PLA's role in 'supporting the left' pointedly mentioned Unit 7350 but not Unit 6409. This was a conspicuous omission. The commander of the Air Force unit, Bai Zongshan, returning the compliment, pledged the Air Force's assistance to the beleaguered revolutionaries in both Jinhua and Wenzhou. Resistance to troops, despatched most probably from Hangzhou to quell the insurrection continued until 24 August. On the afternoon of that day a celebration rally could safely be held in Jinhua. On 25 August supporters of the 2nd Headquarters ventured out from

the city to stage demonstrations in two towns on the outskirts of Jinhua. Resistance had finally crumbled to the superior fire-power of outside military units which had acted more to restore order and secure obedience to provincial authority than to enter the lists for United Headquarters.

Opposition in the isolated southern port city of Wenzhou proved an even more difficult proposition to subdue than Jinhua. There was no rail link to Hangzhou, communications being either by boat from Ningbo, rail/road from Jinhua, or road from Hangzhou. As with Jinhua the rebels faced a well-entrenched civilian/military alliance backed by armed forces, including the militia, and a population resentful of and hostile to outsiders. The mass organisation manipulated by the local elite, the Wenzhou Revolutionary Rebel General Headquarters (Wenlianrong) cleverly chose its name to make it appear as the local branch of United Headquarters (Lianrong). The latter's followers were in fact grouped in an organisation called the Wenzhou Worker's General Headquarters.⁹⁵

On 14 August 1967 United Headquarters issued a statement condemning the suppression of its comrades in Wenzhou. Three days later it called a rally attended by 100,000 people, including Nan Ping, the newly-installed head of the Military Commission. The rally followed the instructions issued by Zhou Enlai on the previous day ordering the ZPMD to disarm Wenlianrong and go to the aid of the encircled rebels in Wenzhou. The provisional supreme organ of power accordingly issued its own circular in response to Zhou's

order. Zhejiang Daily's near-hysterical prose indicated the parlous state in which the rebels found themselves.

Assisted by comrades from Shanghai and Beijing, and backed up on the ground by two units under direct orders from the central military command, the situation was restored. By 19 August an editorial of Zhejiang Daily could report good news to its readers. On 20 August, at a rally held in Wenzhou, the commander of the units supporting the left directed the rebels to concentrate their hatred against the local party leader Wang Fang⁹⁶ and to differentiate between a 'handful of bad leaders' and the 'hoodwinked masses'. Wang Fang was accused of manipulating Wenlianrong from behind the scenes and secretly instructing it to sabotage production. Representatives of United Headquarters and rebels in Beijing, Shanghai and Wuhan also spoke at the rally, indicating both the gravity of the incident and the rebels' efforts to liken it to the insubordination of local forces in Wuhan.

An editorial of 21 August, however, admitted that a titanic battle continued in the city and its environs. Although it claimed that Wenlianrong as an organisation had collapsed, its leaders were still actively resistant. Wenlianrong's strength lay among the workers concentrated in the port, transport, construction and other industries. They had evidently stopped work, cutting off the city from the rest of the country. The rebel supporters of United Headquarters did not escape all blame for the continued upheavals. Under the supervision of the PLA some of them were herded into study classes. To join a study class was

often a euphemism for undergoing incarceration and interrogation.

The impact of the Jinhua and Wenzhou episodes reverberated across the province. At a meeting of the Hangzhou Worker's Revolutionary Committee held late in August accusations were heard that the 'party persons in authority' in these cities had 'wrecked' the Cultural Revolution in the areas under their jurisdiction. Further outbreaks of armed struggle were reported from Wenzhou in September and October, proof that the situation remained highly volatile. United Headquarters may have won some victories but it had also suffered major losses. By the beginning of September, the central authorities moved to restore order by empowering PLA units to defend themselves if attacked.

Concurrent with the fighting and mutual recriminations of August, rallies and editorials also preached unity.⁹⁷ They pointed out that the enemy took advantage of divisions to weaken the rebels. An olive branch was proffered to Red Storm by Zhejiang Daily in an article putting forward the view that 'all forces that can be brought together should be united'. But the sticking-point remained the condition that any alliance should have United Headquarters as its 'core'. The other approach adopted in the editorials which reflected United Headquarters' position was to attempt to separate the membership of Red Storm from its leadership and thereby weaken the organisation. As one editorial stated condescendingly:

Most of the hoodwinked masses are our class brothers. When they rise to rebel, we should resolutely support them. When they make progress, which may be very insignificant, we should appear to be pleased and give them a clapping. We should never stand in their way, ... much less attack them.

The dilemma faced by those espousing unity was to hit upon a successful method to achieve it. Unity of the two mass organisations at the top entailed risks of dissent at the grassroots and threats of boycott. Unity from the bottom, factory by factory and school by school, promised to be a tortuously slow process. The latter approach was exemplified by the announcement amid great fanfare, on 25 August 1967, of the establishment of a revolutionary committee at the Zhejiang Fine Arts College,⁹⁸ Hangzhou Daily and other units where Red Storm may not have gained great support.⁹⁹

Simultaneously with this attempt to build revolutionary committees from the grassroots, Beijing persisted with its efforts to impose an umbrella-style agreement on the two organisations. Apparently, two documents were signed in August, perhaps under duress, for local opinion did not seem ready for major concessions. Zhejiang Daily upheld the status of United Headquarters, enumerating its achievements and praising its steadfastness under pressure. To sweeten the message for Red Storm the paper was willing to concede that all organisations, no matter what their size or when they had rebelled, deserved equal treatment.¹⁰⁰

Equality, that is, under the hegemony of United Headquarters.

By the end of August, following the harrowing month of fighting, the rebels moved to patch up their relations with the military. The latter reciprocated. At a series

of rallies which continued in September 1967,¹⁰¹ an atmosphere of mutual self-criticism and feigned modesty prevailed. On 31 August, commander Bai Zongshan asked the proletarian revolutionaries of United Headquarters to criticise the mistakes made by members of his Air Force unit in implementing the policies of the Cultural Revolution. A representative of the rebels responded by saying that

When we were under suppression and persecution, you came to our rescue and helped us to stand up, rebelled against the handful of party persons in authority taking the capitalist road and against the bourgeois reactionaries, and gained victories one after another.

He revealingly omitted any reference to the other two branches of the armed services. The rebel representative then requested the Air Force personnel to 'make higher and more strict demands on the proletarian revolutionaries and help them to get rid of their selfishness.'

Bai in return publicly committed Unit 7350 to United Headquarters' demand for recognition as the 'core' of any alliance. Xiong Yingtang, commander of Unit 6409 made no such pledge on behalf of the ground troops, at another rally held on 1 September. On this occasion Zhang Yongsheng read out a pact of solidarity with the PLA on behalf of United Headquarters.

The rebels' indiscipline, factionalism and anarchy was compared unfavourably with the discipline and order displayed by the military. They were ordered to recall wandering students from other provinces and emulate the behaviour and work-style of the armed services. A resolution of United Headquarters adopted on 5 September stated that

the revolutionary masses were

not allowed to use any pretext to slander or put blame on the military organisations. There is no excuse for them to encroach upon the various kinds of weapons, equipment and supplies belonging to the PLA.¹⁰²

With the Beijing-based "May 16 Group"¹⁰³ exposed and other members of the Cultural Revolution Group quickly distancing themselves from their former colleagues, repudiation of ultra-leftism became the main task for the rebels.¹⁰⁴ United Headquarters had thus lost ground politically and could only lick its wounds and brood over its misfortune.

Moves toward unity, September 1967 - March 1968

The overriding source of instability remained, as it had done since February 1967, the antagonism between the two mass organisations. Unity required compromise. Yet United Headquarters remained adamant that it would not accept its arch-rival into an alliance unless Red Storm recognised its superior claims to represent the proletarian revolutionaries in Zhejiang. Red Storm stood equally firm in its refusal to grant this recognition. Stalemates of this kind were not limited to Zhejiang and in September 1967 Mao Zedong toured several provinces in north, central and east China to break the logjam.

Mao spent one day in Hangzhou on 16 September. Only a very brief excerpt of his talk with Nan Ping is available.¹⁰⁵ Mao objected to the practice of forcing cadres to kneel and wear dunce's-caps as inappropriate and

recommended instead the policy of unity-criticism-unity. In a later talk in Jiangxi province Mao predicted that the cadres of Zhejiang, who included military officials, would not stand for the continuation of such treatment.¹⁰⁶

From the knowledge he had acquired on this tour Mao extrapolated certain major issues which the central authorities released as an official notice in October 1967,¹⁰⁷ incorporating extracts from the chairman's verbal directives. The theme of the document was its emphasis on unity. Mao declared that 'there was no fundamental conflict of interest within the working class' and therefore no need for it to split into two irreconcilable factions. Mao attributed the disunity to three factors - the infiltration of 'bad people' into mass organisations, the sabotage activities of capitalist-roaders trying to protect themselves, and thirdly the influence of anarchist thinking.

If both sides strove for common ground on major issues and left minor matters aside, stated the chairman, unity was possible. But this depended, as Mao realised, on one side abandoning its claim to represent the nucleus (hexin) of the revolutionary great alliance.¹⁰⁸ This undermined the position consistently maintained by United Headquarters since February and dealt a savage blow to its ambitions. But all was not lost. Mao's discussions about unity clearly only applied to organisations described as 'revolutionary', begging the question of whether an organisation such as Red Storm qualified.

Another question requiring close attention concerned the cadres. Mao believed that the majority were good, and

that after being allowed time to admit and correct their past errors, they, or some of them, should be allowed to resume public life. He viewed this question as having a crucial bearing on the realisation of the triangular relationship which would replace military rule in the provinces. As for the military, Mao suggested the setting-up of study classes to educate military cadres. They would begin with members of the People's Armed Forces Department, who had directed and led the suppression of the rebels in the towns and villages across China.

Mao's directives soon bore fruit. The formation of the ZPRC was still six months away but the intervening period witnessed the reemergence of several important civilian cadres from the old provincial and municipal administrations. They provided some leavening of the overwhelming military presence in the province. The combined weight of the local PLA and the central authorities bore down inexorably on the two mass organisations to produce an uneasy, unstable compromise between them in February 1968. Splits appeared in the military also as the consequences of support for one or another faction bit into the external harmony displayed by the armed forces. All these factors ensured that the establishment of the ZPRC meant not only the solution to certain problems but also the beginning of many others.

Wang Zida, the deputy head of the old CCP HMC and mayor of Hangzhou was apparently one of the first senior cadres to break with his colleagues and throw in his lot with the new order. On 24 August 1967 he published an article in a newspaper run by United Headquarters calling

Jiang Hua, although not by name, the 'biggest royalist in Zhejiang' and urged, 'Overthrow XX, liberate Zhejiang'.¹⁰⁹ Upon the formation of the preparatory committee of the HMRC on 25 October 1967, Wang appeared as its leader and was eventually elected chairman of the HMRC in December.¹¹⁰ Qiu Qiang, a deputy-secretary of the CCP HMC before the Cultural Revolution also reemerged at this time.¹¹¹

It was not until the end of the year that provincial-level cadres were 'liberated'. Secretary of the old CCP ZPC, Lai Keke, and a member of its standing committee, the former trade union leader, Shen Ce, had both come under attack from Red Storm and had therefore received the protection of United Headquarters. A long-time colleague of Jiang Hua, Wu Xian, had also been permitted to join the provisional leadership of the province.¹¹² A leading non-party figure in Zhejiang and brother of Lu Xun, former governor Zhou Jianren, also reappeared. He was undoubtedly trotted out to gain respectability and credibility for the new administration among the people of the province.¹¹³

Meetings to set up the Zhejiang Workers' Congress and congresses to represent peasants and Red Guards took place over the next few months. Rallies, conferences and meetings proclaimed the virtue of unity as revolutionary committees were set up in various grass-roots units. By late October it was claimed that 90% of the factories and enterprises in Hangzhou had brought the two mass organisations together. The spurious nature of revolutionary committees hastily put together in August was revealed by the case of Hangzhou University. It announced an alliance of the two factions,

supposedly one precondition for electing a revolutionary committee, two months after the latter committee had been inaugurated.¹¹⁴

Clearly the provincial leadership was anxious to please its superiors in Beijing by declaring the establishment of the ZPRC. Somewhat prematurely, it convened a rally on 30 November¹¹⁵ which declared that 'The revolutionary great alliance is being continuously developed and consolidated, and revolutionary leading cadres have already stepped forward.' It boasted that

Conditions are fully ripe for establishing the Red political power - the Zhejiang Provincial Revolutionary Committee. To form it as soon as possible is the common aspiration of the 30 million people of the Province.

No alliance was possible without a breakthrough in the negotiations between Red Storm and United Headquarters. In early December 1967 it was Mao Zedong who personally intervened to push these talks forward. Mao's comments on Red Storm formed the basis of the central notice¹¹⁶ disseminated across the country. Mao appraised Red Storm thus:

The Red Storm of Zhejiang, unlike the Million Warriors of Hubei, is an old rebel faction which has made mistakes. It has a lot of mass support. It seems that the principle to be adopted toward it is one of help, criticism and unity.

The central document directed that 'It is not proper to adopt a policy of exerting pressure and imposing absolute exclusion against the masses of such organisations'. It realistically admitted that

the use of methods such as high pressure, exclusion, power seizure by one faction

alone, etc, cannot solve this kind of contradiction.

Rather, Beijing proposed the formation of study classes containing members of both factions, taking as their theme 'struggle against self and criticise revisionism' (dousi pixiu). They would criticise the mistakes of groups such as Red Storm and urge them to voluntarily correct them. Additionally, the provincial decision-makers could reserve a quota for them in the revolutionary committees.

The compromise suggested by Mao probably pleased neither side. United Headquarters was now forced to negotiate with its hated rivals, albeit from a position of superiority. It would undoubtedly have adopted a supercilious air toward its 'mistaken' enemy. Red Storm, on the other hand, had secured endorsement, however qualified, from the great leader himself. Yet it is unlikely that it would be very forthcoming when it came to discussing and confessing the errors it had allegedly committed. Red Storm had no real alternative but to sit down at the conference table, but knew full well that its signature was required on an agreement before the establishment of the ZPRC could take place. Therefore it had a vested interest in holding out for maximum concessions.

In response to this central notice, United Headquarters arranged a major rally in Hangzhou attended by 200,000 people.¹¹⁷ Zhang Yongsheng read out Mao's instructions and urged compliance with them. Representatives from Red Storm at Zhejiang University attended the rally and promised their adherence to the terms of the notice. Their spokesman

said:

We used to fight shoulder to shoulder with the proletarian revolutionaries of the Provincial Revolutionary Rebels' Joint General Command. However in the storms of the great 'January revolution' and at the crucial stage of the revolution, anarchism in our minds asserted itself and was taken advantage of by the Party capitalist-roaders. We became separated from Chairman Mao's revolutionary line and committed mistakes of orientation and line. This greatly damaged the Proletarian cultural revolution in Zhejiang. It greatly pains us to think of this and we are ashamed of ourselves.

An editorial of Zhejiang Daily¹¹⁸ now differentiated between Red Storm and conservative or reactionary organisations. However it seemed to accuse 'the old rebel faction which has committed mistakes' of 'petty-bourgeois fanaticism',¹¹⁹ perhaps because of Red Storms' popularity with students and teachers in Hangzhou. The editorial also warned that 'rightists' would seek to take advantage of the atmosphere of conciliation to cause trouble. Among them were certainly a proportion of Red Storm members who were unhappy at the prospect of kowtowing to United Headquarters.

From 29 November until 6 December, during which time Mao's comments about Red Storm were made public, a conference jointly sponsored by United Headquarters and the ZPRC preparatory committee took place, attended by 10,000 people.¹²⁰ Chen Liyun, political commissar of Unit 7350 delivered the major address. He claimed optimistically that the situation in Zhejiang was excellent with the prestige of United Headquarters riding high. A considerable number of cadres were resuming work and personal grudges should not

determine which cadres were 'liberated'. Chen emphasised that political power was the key question and it was announced that the establishment of the ZPRC was 'imminent'. The shortcomings evident in the preparatory committee - presumably the absence of Red Storm representatives - would 'gradually be corrected', he asserted. Zhang Yongsheng delivered a report summing up the past year's events of the Cultural Revolution in Zhejiang.

Despite the sanctity surrounding Mao's directives and undoubted pressure from Beijing, the road towards unity was a minefield of grudges and jealousies which threatened progress all the way. The urge by both groups to form the nucleus of the alliance was obviously strong as an editorial of Zhejiang Daily observed:¹²¹

Why can they not overcome their own mountain-stronghold mentality or their own contingent? [sic] Some of them even dream of returning to their own stronghold, of commanding their own contingent and of starting 'civil war' again ...

If political power was the issue, as Chen Liyun had stated, then both groups hoped to get their share of it in the distribution of quotas to mass representatives for seats on revolutionary committees.

A further editorial¹²² complained that some people ignored the opinions of the military as to the composition of the ZPRC. These people, who were not named, thought only of their own interests and fame, and believed that they could exert enough muscle to intimidate others. However this behaviour, warned Zhejiang Daily, would lead to their downfall, no matter what their capabilities or past achieve-

ments may have been. It is difficult to know towards which faction this stern warning was directed, but it may well have been to certain members of Red Storm who refused to concede to United Headquarters its greater claims for representation on the ZPRC.

Whether the military in Zhejiang held a unified view towards the two major mass organisations is debatable. Unit 7350 had shown a distinct and open sympathy for United Headquarters, a commitment not shared by the Army and Naval units supporting the left. In late October 1967, the Air Force unit held a meeting¹²³ at which harsh words about the behaviour of some rebels were heard. They were rebuked for indulging in sectarianism and stressing the 'core' mentality. To overcome these shortcomings the unit had held study classes and maintained extensive contacts with the rebels to 'train' their leaders.

Leaders of the Naval and Army forces attended the meeting to extend congratulations to the Air Force for its contributions in the Cultural Revolution. Xie Zhenghao, commander of the Naval units,¹²⁴ commended Unit 7350 for its firm stand on the side of the proletarian revolutionaries. Political Commissar Nan Ping of ground force Unit 6409 went even further in stating that the Air Force had proved itself the most resolute in the work of 'three supports and two militaries'. But this display of inter-service harmony probably obscured a latent tension between the units which was reflected in other reports.¹²⁵

Thus the hostility between United Headquarters and Red Storm had shaken the unity of the PLA units in Zhejiang.

Distrust between the military and rebels added to the tension. As the new year of 1968 commenced, greater efforts to overcome disunity and forge the basis for the establishment of the ZPRC were made. The central authorities exerted even greater pressure to obtain their way by summoning military leaders to Beijing for discussions and study. They also held representatives of the mass organisations under virtual confinement in the capital until they could reach an agreement. This approach eventually won out when, on 16 February 1968, amidst great rejoicing, the terms of an alliance were agreed to and signed.

The theme of central and provincial propaganda during the early months of 1968 focused on the evils of factionalism. PLA units were ordered to 'support the left, not any faction' in a demonstration of neutrality or evenhandedness (yi wanshui duanping) between the two major groups.¹²⁶ To set an example to the rest of Zhejiang, Nan Ping and Chen Liyun published a joint article in People's Daily¹²⁷ praising the deeds of a Li Wenzhong, a national model in implementing this new course. For its part Zhejiang Daily released a series of ten editorials between 4 January and 22 February¹²⁸ denouncing factionalism of any sort.

The general thrust of the argument in these editorials made it clear that the question of power preoccupied the minds of the two factions. They had rebelled against the old party authorities after Mao and his close followers had issued the call to arms. They had fought each other, and the military, back and forth across the province for twelve months. Now when all the pieces were being put back together

they did not want to miss out on their share of the new world.

With negotiations under way and positions on revolutionary committees and the three Congresses (Worker, Peasant and Red Guard) up for grabs, compromise would mean an admission of guilt or weakness. The editorials revealed that both sides strove to maximise the number, position and seniority of their representatives in the new power structure. Both argued, as the basis of their respective claims, over which faction had played the major role in the Cultural Revolution. If this disputation continued, warned one editorial, the old party authorities would instigate civil war and in the resultant confusion infiltrate the ranks of the revolutionaries and regain power.

Members of Red Storm had, according to one editorial, become 'so arrogant and conceited that they even have refused to admit their mistakes' and 'put on airs of self-styled old rebels and genuine revolutionaries'. Zhejiang Daily forecast all too accurately that if Red Storm went away from the talks dissatisfied it would not afford recognition to the ZPRC but would instead work for its overthrow. This was why both groups took a 'pragmatic attitude' towards central instructions. They complied with those that suited them and boycotted those that did not. The question of cadres was one case in point. It was obviously in the interests of both Red Storm and United Headquarters that only cadres who shared their views, and with whom they could cooperate on the revolutionary committees, be allowed to reemerge. This certainly contributed to the footdragging in implementing

central policy. The return of one unsympathetic cadre meant to each mass organisation, solace to its enemy.

The one leading cadre opposed by United Headquarters who had been permitted to join the new provisional hierarchy was Wu Xian. At a mass rally held on 19 January 1968,¹²⁹ Wu delivered a report on factionalism. He stated that it was necessary to distinguish between factional disputes and the struggle between the two lines. Wu's words reflected a fear on the part of the authorities that a blanket denunciation of factionalism could imply that the genuine and principled differences between Maoists and the supporters of China's Khrushchev fell into the category of factional disputes. Whether this fine distinction convinced his listeners was another matter.

On 7 February 1968, the Provincial Revolutionary Rebel Joint General Committee, probably the name given to the body comprised of members of United Headquarters and Red Storm which had been established to work out the terms of the proposed alliance, convened a rally to attack factionalism.¹³⁰ Eleven days later an editorial in Zhejiang Daily proclaimed the signing of an agreement in Beijing on 16 February.¹³¹ It admitted that central intervention had forced the two groups to the conference-table. Rueing the fact that 'strife for supremacy has brought us misery' Zhejiang Daily urged each side to refrain from statements and actions detrimental to what was clearly a fragile alliance. The editorial also warned against the sabotage activities of Guomindang agents while at the same time declaring optimistically that 'from now on the road is

smooth'.

That the road was anything but smooth quickly became apparent. Within days of the announcement Zhejiang Daily acknowledged that 'Some people have even engaged in factionalism after being united' or were preparing for 'civil war'.¹³² An outstanding feature of post-unity factionalism, divulged a further editorial¹³³ was that those who promoted unity were now being maligned as revisionists. Undoubtedly that organisation which had minimised its losses in the agreement would uphold it while its opponents would seek to undermine it. These controversies forced the HMRC to issue an urgent notice on 29 February 1968¹³⁴ demanding compliance with the agreement, which, it observed, faced opposition from both the right and the extreme left.

It took the two organisations until 1 March to call a rally to celebrate the agreement¹³⁵ but mutual suspicions continued. An editorial¹³⁶ referred to the fact that both sides were trying to build up their numbers, were demanding revisions and supplementary articles to the agreement, and were holding secret meetings and recruitment drives in the countryside. They were informed bluntly that they must accept the document 'even if they did not understand the reason for ... restrictions' contained in it. Dissatisfied members of Red Storm apparently branded upholders of the agreement 'Right deviates who want to become officials' and were suppressing those who stood in their way. The members of United Headquarters who preferred confrontation to consensus argued that 'The worst thing that could happen to us in this struggle is to have ourselves end up as veteran rebels who

have made mistakes'.¹³⁷ They thus openly voiced their bitterness at Mao's partial rehabilitation of Red Storm.

Despite the possibility that the agreement between United Headquarters and Red Storm could break down at any moment, the central authorities pushed on with their plans to set up the ZPRC,¹³⁸ obviously believing that any agreement was better than none. Only seventeen counties out of a total of 67 in Zhejiang had formed revolutionary committees by mid-March and their real nature was open to question if any credence is placed in a Red Guard document concerning Ninghai county in Ningbo.¹³⁹ Nevertheless after protracted, supervised negotiations in Beijing, a delegation from Zhejiang, composed mainly of military officials, met central leaders on the night of 18 March to report on the successful outcome of their talks.¹⁴⁰

The leader of the Cultural Revolution Group, Chen Boda, chaired the meeting and made the concluding speech. Other speakers included Zhou Enlai, Jiang Qing, Kang Sheng and Xu Shiyou, commander of the Nanjing Military Region. The leaders of Red Storm and United Headquarters, Fang Jianwen and Zhang Yongsheng, made verbal pledges on behalf of their respective organisations. Zhou Enlai made it clear that the impetus behind the negotiations had come from the centre and Mao in particular. Of all the speakers Zhou alone appeared familiar with the details of the situation in Zhejiang.

The Premier was critical of the PLA's tendency to interfere in matters which were best left to others to settle. He mentioned the past mistakes of the ZPMD, and of

individual members of the military control commission, and pointedly referred to the study classes which had been held to educate the military on the desirability of adopting a neutral stand towards factions.¹⁴¹ Xu Shiyou also raised the issue of PLA neutrality toward the mass organisations in his brief talk.

Zhou declared that finalisation of the membership of the ZPRC entailed the dissolution of the two mass organisations. The only two factions which existed now, he stated, were the proletarian revolutionaries and bourgeois or petty-bourgeois factionalists. He ordered the closure of liaison stations maintained by Red Storm and United Headquarters in the counties of Zhejiang as well as in other major urban centres outside the province. Local groups would solve their own problems without interference from headquarters, was his unambiguous message.

In line with Mao's pronouncement that the Cultural Revolution represented a continuation of the class struggle between the CCP and Chiang Kaishek's Guomindang, Zhou pointed out the strategic importance of Zhejiang. Kang Sheng, in the conspiratorial style he had perfected, laboured this fact, urging the rebels to be on the lookout for Guomindang agents.¹⁴² Provincial propaganda later elaborated on Kang's warnings ad nauseum.

Another topic raised by Zhou, on which Jiang Qing launched a diatribe which was meant to convince her listeners of the decadent, feudal nature of culture in Zhejiang, was the custom of women playing the roles of men in the local Shaoxing opera.¹⁴³ After Jiang referred to the fact that

Lu Xun and Zhou himself came from Shaoxing - Zhou's father had been born in the ancient town - Zhou retorted drily, and no doubt sarcastically, 'I shall never return to Shaoxing and such places'.¹⁴⁴

These issues were all of secondary importance compared to the major problems which had exercised those present for months - the composition of the ZPRC. Zhou Enlai announced that it would comprise 94 members, 50 of whom would come from Hangzhou. Red Storm would nominate ten representatives to the committee and would have three members on its standing committee. One vice-chairman, stated Zhou, would come from the ranks of the workers. He stated, however, that the final make-up of the committee had not been decided upon. With joint investigation by those responsible, cadres could be added in a 'principled way' to achieve 'gradual perfection'.

In the six days which transpired between this meeting and the inaugural rally celebrating the formation of the ZPRC the agreement to include representatives of Red Storm fell through. The final list of fifteen members of the standing committee included eight military representatives, five cadres and only two mass representatives, both from United Headquarters.¹⁴⁵ Red Storm was represented neither on the standing committee, nor, most probably on the ZPRC itself. It is little wonder then that Red Storm felt betrayed by the failure to honour an agreement signed in front of central leaders. It thus embarked on a further campaign of opposition to show that Zhejiang politics could not regain any semblance of stability without recognition of its presence and appreciation of the level of the support

it enjoyed.

Further instability and violence, March - August 1968

An editorial published on the day of the formation of the ZPRC set the tone for the propaganda that was released over the following months. While a succession of editorials and speeches criticised factionalism, they differed markedly in intention from those published in January and February 1968. This previous period was now redefined as the 1968 'spring current', and was seen as having its roots in the 1967 'February adverse current'. Media broadsides were directed against attempts by the former power-holders to obtain admission to the reconstituted administration, and at Red Storm's active denigration of, and opposition to, the ZPRC. Such a propaganda onslaught further inflamed factional tensions. In the summer of 1968 violence flared again leading to a military crackdown on the rebels. A series of criminal trials, the appearance in Hangzhou of a municipal social order command to take over public security duties, and the formation of Mao Zedong Thought propaganda teams from amongst soldiers and industrial workers, highlighted the second half of the year. It was not until May 1969 that the major factions were brought together again to sign an agreement which supposedly marked the dissolution of the two mass organisations of the Cultural Revolution.

Any hope held by the authorities that Red Storm would meekly accept its ouster from the ZPRC and other representative bodies was soon dashed. The two factions fought it

out, wrote the Zhejiang Daily, while the capitalist-readers looked on with satisfaction. The class enemy had begun infiltrating the revolutionary committees under the guise of revolutionary slogans or abused them as 'committees of factions'.¹⁴⁶

To divert the rebels from their endless squabbles the 1st plenum of the ZPRC, which met from 25-31 March,¹⁴⁷ mapped out a strategy to destroy Tan Zhenlin's reputation in Zhejiang for his alleged responsibility in plotting the February 1967 reaction to the January power-seizures. Because of Tan's close connections with Zhejiang and the old CCP ZPC, this strategy had the obvious advantage of implicating Jiang Hua as Tan's subordinate and supporter.

Rallies held in April 1968¹⁴⁸ put this plan into action. The first was held on 4 April and attended by 100,000 people. An editorial published on the same day, entitled, 'Resolutely overthrow the number one Party person in authority in Zhejiang taking the capitalist road' blamed Jiang and his cohorts for the current state of disunity among the rebels. It pointed out that

In attacking the handful of capitalist-readers in Zhejiang the revolutionary masses should immediately stop the struggle among themselves and unite as one to chop off the sinister hands and smash the sinister line.

A principal target at these rallies was Xue Ju,¹⁴⁹ former deputy secretary-general of the CCP ZPC. Xue was blamed for spreading the rumour that Jiang Hua was a member of Chairman Mao's Headquarters and disseminating articles in praise of Jiang and other former leaders of the province.

Red Storm was one of the convenors of a rally of 100,000 people held on 15 April, illustrating that efforts to keep it in the political mainstream continued. A former secretary of the ZPC secretariat, Lai Keke, in his summation speech, demanded the exposure of all capitalist-roaders in Zhejiang.

Concurrent with the rallies Zhejiang Daily issued five editorials in April,¹⁵⁰ the topics of which were devoted to discrediting the old provincial administration and propagating the revised definition of factionalism. During the same month, People's Daily and Liberation Army Daily published a joint editorial defending proletarian factionalism. A Red Flag commentary entitled 'Factionalism must be subjected to class analysis', most probably written by Chen Boda, pursued a similar line of argument.¹⁵¹ Instead of factionalism as such coming under fire, these polemics limited their criticisms to 'bourgeois factionalism'. Squabbles of early 1968, which had at the time been described as unprincipled, had retrospectively been interpreted as principled political struggles.

Opponents of the newly-established ZPRC were categorised as class enemies in the media campaign whipped up by the provincial press. In some areas,¹⁵² it admitted, power had remained in the hands of party officials. Unnamed evil leaders were actively falsifying documents and spreading rumours aimed at discrediting the PLA and the ZPRC. The paper took a swipe at mass leaders who refused to recognise past errors or to confess to conservative tendencies. However it asked others to refrain from attacking their 'class brothers'.

The second editorial in the campaign commented on the different tactics employed by capitalist-roaders, which certainly had infuriated and nonplussed the new regime. They varied from overt opposition, defensive counter-attacks, covert schemes to manipulate front-men in their service, or reliance on their reputations among the people. Weariness from prolonged involvement in the exacting drama of the Cultural Revolution and a desire to hold on to gains already achieved, contributed to the passivity and listlessness apparent when tested by the schemes of the enemy, noted a further editorial.

The first editorial referred to above, indicated that the cultural revolutionaries of United Headquarters had gone almost completely onto the defensive. While allowances are necessary for the exaggerated tenor of the writing, a commentator in Hong Kong perceptively remarked at the time that Zhejiang 'seemed to be defending the 'rebels' against the 'conservatives'.¹⁵³ 'Bad leaders' of mass organisations - a probable reference to prominent personnel in such groups as Red Storm and Wenlianrong - were apparently maligning their opponents in United Headquarters as 'rightists engaged in subversion'.

The 'class enemy' had also fired off salvos at the 'revolutionary cadres' who had denounced their colleagues to win favour from the military and rebels so as to join the 'three-way alliance'. In a clear reference to officials such as Lai Keke, the editorial claimed that the class enemy accused them of being 'rightists masquerading as leftists'. Cadres who had been rescued and protected by the rebels were

being incited to turn on their saviours. While admitting that they had not always behaved impeccably, the editorial stated that the negation of the rebels and their contributions would mean negating the Cultural Revolution itself.

These reports about the state of the Cultural Revolution in Zhejiang revealed the strength of the opposition to the new arrangements as well as the continued splits within the ranks of the 'revolutionary rebels'. Red Storm undoubtedly rejected its 'conservative' tag and fought to either achieve equal recognition with United Headquarters or to defeat it politically and physically. As a consequence, it seems as if the military leadership was becoming impatient with the endless bickering which characterised 'great democracy' and was prepared to resort to administrative and coercive measures to bring about order. Against the might of the PLA, the rebels would eventually be forced to yield.

From 9-31 May 1968 the ZPRC held a lengthy conference of CCP members,¹⁵⁴ effectively excluding most of the rebels who were not members of the party from participation. The meeting attempted to effect a reconciliation between Red Storm and United Headquarters by issuing advice to both groups. To the former organisation it counselled; 'Revolutionary mass organisations that have taken the wrong side must handle their own mistakes correctly', and to the latter, the meeting enjoined it to treat its rivals correctly. Only in this way, urged the conference, could an alliance be formed. These words indicated, if nothing else, the total breakdown of the agreement signed in February and already made worthless by events since March.

Yet the interaction between unity and disunity continued. On 26 May 1968, in an unprecedented display of unity, the two daily newspapers of Hangzhou, which were sympathetic to the cause of United Headquarters, published a joint editorial with Red Storm's newspaper of the same name, and the Zhejiang Red Guard and Hangzhou Worker. The editorial seemed optimistic about the prospects for unity and declared that the struggle to achieve victory in the Cultural Revolution was approaching a climax.¹⁵⁵ In a further gesture of reconciliation in June, Zhejiang Daily republished an article originally carried in the Red Storm.¹⁵⁶

Reconciliation of the two mass organisations was not the only major issue that confronted the new power-holders in Zhejiang in mid 1968. During the May session of the ZPRC an editorial concerning the rehabilitation of cadres appeared.¹⁵⁷ It repeated Mao's injunction that 90% were good or comparatively good and stated that those 'liberated' by the proletarian revolutionaries formed the core and the backbone of the revolutionary committees. The editorial urged vigilance against those cadres who disguised themselves as 'revolutionary cadres who have committed mistakes' (shades of Red Storm!), but in fact defended the mistakes they had made and tried to recant recent self-examinations. However the editorial adopted a lenient tone toward such cadres, merely cautioning them to reconsider their attitudes and realise that those people who praised them really wanted to harm them, while those who were severe with them only wanted to help them. It is debatable whether cadres would have appreciated, or responded to, such exercises in

sophistry.

To distract United Headquarters and Red Storm from issues which divided them, and to direct their energies against individual targets of hatred, the authorities organised the resumption of rallies to denounce Tan Zhenlin, this time by name, in late May.¹⁵⁸ They were followed by intensified attacks on Jiang Hua and his supporters.¹⁵⁹ United Headquarters obviously hoped that by linking Jiang with Tan, it could demonstrate the formers' responsibility for the disunity which had plagued Zhejiang since February 1967. Denunciation of Tan opened a breach. An editorial of 28 June warned Red Storm indirectly that it too would suffer if the capitalist-roaders remounted Zhejiang's political stage. Jiang Hua, pointed out another editorial, had worked in the province since liberation and his influence and power were not easily eradicated. Zhejiang Daily, in an attempt to frighten the rebels out of their wits warned them not to underestimate Jiang:

We absolutely cannot consider [Jiang] a dead tiger. He is still very much alive; he is still snarling and spitting away with bared fangs and unsheathed claws. He is ... testing the wind and waiting for an opportune moment to jump on the revolutionary masses.

Further editorials observed that Jiang's supporters had bound their fate inextricably with their masters,¹⁶⁰ and that many people apparently believed that Jiang could survive the rebels' efforts to bring him down.¹⁶¹

Evidence of organised opposition to the new provincial administration had emerged to give some substance to the hysterical outburst of Zhejiang Daily. In June 1968 cadres



in departments of the old CCP ZPC and HMC sympathetic to Red Storm pasted up wall posters attacking the provincial leadership. One particular poster, entitled 'Arise and charge into the storm' openly advocated a bloody struggle against the new hierarchy of Zhejiang.¹⁶² Even more daring was an open letter, published on 6 July, denigrating the ZPRC, the PLA and, by implication, Mao Zedong.

Zhejiang Daily later published an article quoting extensively from the letter.¹⁶³ It apparently made three major points, all unflattering, about the nature of political power in Zhejiang. Firstly it alleged that 'The power of the provincial revolutionary committee is usurped by counter-revolutionary double-dealers'. The letter referred to the members of the three-way alliance - cadres, mass representatives and PLA - respectively as 'true capitalist-roaders', 'clowns' and 'pawns', and 'counter-revolutionary double-dealers'.

Secondly the dissidents described the ZPRC as an 'illegal faction committee' which they would smash in order to become 'masters of the Zhejiang political stage'. In the meantime they refused to recognise, support or join the revolutionary committee. The authors of the Zhejiang Daily article distinguished this approach from that adopted by Red Storm who, it claimed, 'have a deep feeling they wield power and become [sic] masters.'

Finally, the letter accused the authorities of exercising 'bourgeois dictatorship' and substituting coercion for the extensive democracy supposedly practised in the Cultural Revolution. It described the attitude taken toward Red Storm

as 'suppression of the old rebels and the masses of the people'. Apart from openly claiming that central orders intensified 'suppression of the masses' the letter-writers allegedly supported trouble-makers who were later put on trial in August 1968 and proclaimed, in relation to further trouble which had erupted in Wenzhou, 'South Zhejiang is the world of Wenlianzong'. While the letter certainly reflected the opinions and feelings of opponents of United Headquarters, Zhejiang Daily, by October 1968, was at pains to dissociate Red Storm from sharing its sentiments. This charitable interpretation may have been dictated more by political reality than concern for the truth.

Letters vilifying the PLA were one thing; assaults on its camps quite another. Therefore in July 1968, the military, under central instructions, decided to crack down on all outbursts and exponents of disorder. On 3 and 24 July the central authorities issued two notices to quell disturbances in Guangxi Autonomous Region and Shaanxi province respectively.¹⁶⁴ But their message had national relevance. They denounced the disruption to railway traffic, storming of PLA units and clashes with soldiers by Red Guards and revolutionary rebels. The notices referred to those responsible as counter-revolutionaries and ordered the military to spare no effort in suppressing them. Other anarchic activities which were occurring in Shaanxi included the looting of state property, burning down of public and private buildings, refusal to obey central directives, broadcasting from unauthorised radio stations and raids on state prisons and labour farms to release inmates. Mao,

in a meeting with Red Guard leaders on 28 July, expressed his disillusionment with their performance.¹⁶⁵ An editorial of People's Daily¹⁶⁶ in early August attacked the 'theory of many centres' (duo zhongxin lun), and demanded obedience to central discipline and disavowal of anarchistic or individualistic tendencies. However, central directives were one thing and compliance another.

The coastal city of Wenzhou, which had caused a massive headache to the military authorities in 1967, and more than a few cracked skulls to members of United Headquarters foolish enough to have ventured down there, reported further violence in July 1968.¹⁶⁷ An editorial of Zhejiang Daily in late July revealed that

A series of serious political incidents in the areas of south Zhejiang at present indicate the frenzied, last-ditch struggle desperately carried out by the handful of class enemies after an even sharper class struggle.

On 18 July Mao Zedong apparently issued personal instructions to the authorities in Zhejiang to suppress the insurrection. Mao's directives were hailed in a large rally held in Hangzhou on 25 July. Those responsible for the trouble were accused of opposing the PLA and striving to undermine its unity. Calls to the proletarian revolutionaries to back the PLA 'no matter what time and no matter what circumstances' were made. The authorities promised lenient treatment to members of fighting factions who desisted, while threatening punishment of the ringleaders.

The bad elements of the two different groups [elaborated one editorial] must be dealt with separately by the masses

of the respective groups. At the same time, the bad elements who have sneaked into an organisation must be strictly separated from the masses of the same organisation.

No distinction was drawn between the rival organisations. Sanctions would be applied mercilessly, and equally, to them both.

The 'counter-revolutionaries' of Wenzhou had apparently engaged in the same disruptive activities which were described in the two central documents concerning Guangxi and Shaanxi. They had ignored all orders to stop. Reports made particular mention of outsiders and rusticated educated youth 'now loafing in cities' causing disturbances in places such as Wenzhou. They were directed to return to their own localities. To supplement the central notices and Mao's directives, and as a display of its determination to deal firmly with unruly behaviour, the ZPRC issued a notice on 5 August. An editorial of the same day admitted that the instigators of the trouble, described colourfully as 'black talons', had 'performed quite outstandingly'. They had spread the 'reactionary theory of many centres' and succeeded in splitting the 'proletarian Headquarters'.

Words turned to action in August. The ZPRC despatched Mao Zedong Thought propaganda teams to Wenzhou early in the month, despite expressing little confidence that they would succeed. The first teams, numbering 4,000, were apparently composed of PLA soldiers and 'proletarian revolutionaries',¹⁶⁸ from United Headquarters. The inclusion of members of this faction in the teams, given the history of confrontation in Wenzhou the previous year, was certainly a most provocative

act. United Headquarters viewed its mission as entailing working

together with the local proletarian revolutionaries to eliminate the renegades, blast the lid off the class struggle, propagate the revolutionary fighting call of the Headquarters headed by Chairman Mao, stop struggle by force and help local proletarian revolutionaries realise the revolutionary great alliance.

United Headquarters' interference in a local disturbance clearly went outside the guidelines that had been laid down for it by Zhou Enlai in March 1968.

This first, faction-based contingent to leave for Wenzhou undoubtedly faced a hostile reception. It was later reinforced by a brigade from Hangzhou municipality of the newly-established worker-peasant propaganda team, which departed the provincial capital by train for Wenzhou on 25 August. This brigade also left determined to 'lift the lid of class struggle in southern Zhejiang'. Reaching Jinhua it transferred to motor transport for the remainder of the journey to the isolated city. However on 26 August, as the brigade passed through Qingtian county, home of the famous soapstone of Zhejiang, it was met by forces organised by Wenlianrong. A major confrontation took place in the afternoon of that day which did not, however, prevent the brigade from reaching its destination, where it was greeted by 80,000 soldiers and civilians. That same evening a large rally, attended by 10,000 people, was held in the city.

Representatives of Wenlianrong attended but three of its leaders, Yao Guoling, Wu Zhixiang, and Zhang Weisen were criticised and detained by the military.

At the end of August the occupying forces - or so they must have been seen by local residents, a view deliberately encouraged by local party leaders such as Wang Fang - sent out a team of 500 people to visit three communes and 50 enterprises and units in order to disseminate the Central Committee's notices of July. Because of the strength of Wenlianzoneg in the area around Wenzhou, the propaganda teams did not dare venture outside the city. But they had been entrusted with propagating central and provincial directives and needed to contact local officials. One example of an ingenious way around this dilemma was publicised in the press. A propaganda team detachment went to the Wenzhou Chemical Works which sold ammonia to 1,000 cadres for production teams and brigades. When the agents arrived to buy their fertiliser they were treated to lectures by members of the propaganda teams. Only in mid-October did propaganda team detachments venture into district towns on the outskirts of Wenzhou.

In early September 1,700 reinforcements to the propaganda teams arrived by ship, the port finally having been reopened. At a rally that evening to welcome them the PLA leader mentioned that a Wenzhou Pacification Area (suijingqu) had been established, a further indication of the gravity of the problem. One of the two main force units stationed in Wenzhou had been replaced since 1967, perhaps because of the animosity it may have provoked by crude handling of an obviously delicate problem.

By the end of September the local Party leader Wang Fang, together with his deputy, was named in an editorial

published by Zhejiang Daily. They were described as the agents of Liu Shaoqi in Wenzhou who, together with the leaders of Wenlian-zong mentioned above, had carried out 'ferocious class revenge with savage hatred on the proletarian revolutionaries' for the purpose of preventing the establishment of a revolutionary committee in the district and municipality. In this endeavour Wang and his accomplices had clearly achieved notable success. The revolutionary committees in Wenzhou were not established until early December and factional differences delayed the formation of the last county revolutionary committee in Wenzhou district until July 1969.

The deliberate and careful strategy of attacking the leaders of Wenlian-zong, but not the organisation itself, was obviously based on a realistic appreciation of the support that it had built up in the city and district. Wang Fang and his colleagues had capitalised on Wenlian-zong's strength and the parochialism of the citizens of Wenzhou to muster stern opposition to outside interference in its affairs.

In the months leading up to Wenzhou's red-letter day, a series of rallies, parades and meetings were held in the city. By November Wang Fang had also been linked publicly with Tan Zhenlin and Jiang Hua. A report of December revealed that 31,900 people had been enrolled in study groups in the city. The provincial leadership illustrated the importance it attached to the reestablishment of order in Wenzhou by sending a high-powered delegation to attend the inauguration of the revolutionary committees on 3

December. Nan Ping, Lai Keke, Zhou Jianren and Zhang Yongsheng attended and listened to the by now ritual denunciation of Wang.

The provincial authorities obviously felt that they had the situation under control because in early December the Hangzhou brigade of the propaganda team returned to the provincial capital. It left behind contingents from Shaoxing and Jinhua to carry on the work. An article published at this time revealed the difficulties which had confronted these outsiders when they had first arrived in the hostile environment three months before. The 'class enemies'

were filled with deadly fear and hate when the team came to southern Zhejiang Province. They framed the team with all the crimes that they could dream up and cursed the team in foulest language [sic].¹⁶⁹ They resorted to despicable means to disrupt the relationship between the masses and the propaganda team in an attempt to transform southern Zhejiang into their independent kingdom.

Even at the end of 1968, however, efforts to indoctrinate the people in Wenzhou in the 'correct' history of the Cultural Revolution had met with little success.

The imposition of order, August - December 1968

It was at the second enlarged plenum of the ZPRC, held from 17-29 July,¹⁷⁰ that the major decisions concerning Wenzhou and terminating the Cultural Revolution in the province had been made. 240 delegates attended, including members of the HMRC and responsible personnel from counties and major industrial units and schools across the province.

The meeting expressed optimism about the situation in Zhejiang and also examined the performance of the ZPRC. A five-point resolution encapsulated the decisions taken by the plenum.

The first resolution stated that the meeting 'voiced constructive criticism' of the failings of the ZPRC leadership and 'strong criticism of and willingness to help members of the Revolutionary Committee who diverged from Mao Zedong's Thought.' Another resolution repudiated those who had expressed pessimistic views about the state of affairs in Zhejiang, and declared that the class enemy had become desperate. Resolution four demanded that both mass organisations desist from mutual provocation and expel bad elements from their ranks as a precondition to forming an alliance. Torturing of political opponents was forbidden, as was interference in the internal affairs of the PLA.

The resolution concluded with a ringing cry to win total victory in the Cultural Revolution. It was clear that Beijing expected positive action to this end. The luxury of endless debate and interminable disputes over the finer points of right and wrong was to be enjoyed no longer by the mass organisations. They would conform or face the consequences.

The show of force by the military in southern Zhejiang was backed up by a series of trials which began in August 1968. Their purpose was to impose harsh sentences on anti-social elements who had taken advantage of the prevailing lawlessness to commit various kinds of criminal acts. The trials also dealt with trouble-makers of a political kind

who had worked to undermine the new power structure and refused to accept its authority. In particular, those people who persisted in provoking factional struggles were severely punished. At the time of the trials in Hangzhou, a new public order group comprised of industrial workers made its first appearance. Additionally, propaganda teams made up of soldiers, cadres, peasants and workers were sent into major educational institutions to pacify the students. The youthful proletarian revolutionaries had little option but to accept their fate.

The most sensational trial was that of Nie Minzhi, Xia Liangchang and Peng Zhangxun.¹⁷¹ Peng was a PLA soldier who was described as having a 'dubious' family background, Nie a cadre, and Xia was referred to as a swindler, extortionist and rapist. They had apparently caused a great deal of trouble over the previous two years. The trio had joined unspecified mass organisations - most probably Red Storm or Wenlianzoneg - and in the autumn of 1967, as the Cultural Revolution had entered a phase of consolidation and moderation, they had plotted to disrupt moves toward unity. Nie, Xia, and Peng had organised forces in mountainous and isolated areas to bring down United Headquarters and its military and civilian allies.

Nie had posed as a correspondent and the office-secretary of a certain leader in the central government. With these credentials, he convened meetings of mass organisation leaders to 'use the village to encircle the cities' from armed bases. The common ground shared by these dissidents was their opposition to the reorganisation of the

military control commission, which had taken place in August 1967, and support for Jiang Hua whom they claimed was still protected by the Central Committee. Even after the formation of the ZPRC in March 1968 they had allegedly schemed to establish an 'armed independent regime' in the mountains in conjunction with leaders of local mass organisations.

The article speculated as to how the three villains could have been so active and have built up so much influence, how they could have coordinated their activities so closely, and how they had become so popular and important 'as to be able to issue directives, receive reports and talk about the situation at gatherings of thousands'. The proceedings of these meetings had been printed and extensively disseminated. Zhejiang Daily also wondered why the arrest of these three ringleaders had not brought about a cessation of 'criminal activities' especially in south Zhejiang, and why they had been openly defended after their arrest. The newspaper did not have many convincing answers to these seemingly rhetorical questions but it is clear that such an organised resistance force, backed up by officials with power and influence, would pose enormous problems for the relatively inexperienced and far from united new administration. The report confirmed that the Cultural Revolution lacked support in the countryside and that the peasants and grass-roots cadres had remained loyal to their old leaders and patrons.¹⁷²

Further trials took place in Hangzhou in which sentences ranging from ten years' imprisonment to the death

penalty were handed down.¹⁷³ They were also conducted in provincial centres¹⁷⁴ with editorials supporting the tough penalties being imposed.¹⁷⁵ At the later trials in Hangzhou a new organisation called the Hangzhou Social Order Command Headquarters (shehui zhian zhihuibu) was mentioned. Members of this organisation acted in the capacity of policemen and prison warders, escorting the arrested suspects to their trials. A leader of United Headquarters, He Xianchun, a worker from the Hangzhou Heavy Machinery Factory, and Xia Genfa, a worker at the Hangzhou Oxygen Generator Plant, had organised and now led this contingent.¹⁷⁶ Such groups appeared in other Chinese cities in 1968. Their duties apparently included patrolling the streets, undertaking registration duties and carrying out security work to protect factories and government installations. These tasks had previously been the responsibility of the dismantled public security forces, whose functions had also been taken over by the PLA. Presumably the social order command would thereby relieve the military from some of its commitments.¹⁷⁷

The first publicly-reported exercise undertaken by the social order command took place in early August 1968.¹⁷⁸ On 6 August, because of discord between factions in the Hangzhou No.1 Cotton Printing and Dyeing Mill¹⁷⁹ and the refusal of the leaders of one faction to obey a ceasefire order and form an alliance, the social order command was instructed to intervene. The workers had disregarded the presence of PLA troops and orders from the HMRC to stop the fighting. This latter body called on the new strike force to move into the factory on the afternoon of 7 August.

After the social order command issued eight open letters in rapid succession without producing any effect, it sent in Peoples' Guards (renmin jingwei) to 'awaken' the resisters. In thirteen hours they had brought the situation under control and by the afternoon of 8 August production had returned to normal.

While the social order command dealt with industrial disturbances and problems of law enforcement, the propaganda teams concentrated their attention on students and disturbances in the localities. On 20 August the ZPRC decided to establish worker-peasant propaganda teams and the first units were formed three days later.¹⁸⁰ A 'suitable number' of cadres supplemented and undoubtedly led the workers and peasants who comprised the bulk of the membership. Their assignment was to 'play a leading role in helping places and units where the class enemies are making trouble'. The ZPRC's decision also requested local PLA units to organise teams and assign cadres and troops to assist them. Four brigades from Hangzhou, Shaoxing, Jiaying and Jinhua were established made up of a total of 10,000 members, and they were very quickly despatched to southern Zhejiang.¹⁸¹ The previous section of this chapter has described the activities of the propaganda teams in Wenzhou.

Propaganda teams moved into the key tertiary institutions of Hangzhou - Zhejiang University, Hangzhou University, Zhejiang Agricultural College and Zhejiang Medical College - on 7 and 9 September 1968.¹⁸² On 7 October a further group entered other institutions and government departments responsible for propaganda, education and health.¹⁸³ A

substantial proportion of students clearly did not welcome this intrusion. They took the position that this action negated the role played by the Red Guards in the Cultural Revolution and that it was interference in their internal affairs. The Red Guards threatened to interrogate and pressurise their newly-arrived supervisors, while teachers quit in disgust.¹⁸⁴

At Hangzhou University the propaganda team consisted of 350 workers. One member, aged 57, was illiterate and had never spent a day at school in his life. It is not surprising that the students resented such people running their colleges. The authorities, however, remained steadfast. 'Resistance to the team is resistance to the headquarters of Chairman Mao', they declared.¹⁸⁵

Unfortunately the Red Guards were slow to realise that their usefulness as a battering-ram to knock down the gates of Jiang Hua's provincial stronghold had ended. The anarchy and factionalism they had displayed when Beijing demanded a restoration of order had sullied their reputation. A political work conference held in October 1968 to discuss the progress of the propaganda teams affirmed the contributions of the Red Guards in the early and middle stages of the Cultural Revolution, but pointedly made no reference to their role in its later stages.¹⁸⁶ At a second conference convened in December, reports of continued resistance to the teams appeared.¹⁸⁷ The students, however, remained unruly to the bitter end. Their former leader Zhang Yongsheng, in his changed role as a member of the leadership hierarchy, demonstrated his desertion of the Red Guards'

cause by delivering a report to this conference, thereby condoning the activities of the propaganda teams.

By the end of September 1968 the forces of law and order seem to have crushed most of the remaining resistance to their rule. Criticism of Jiang Hua resumed and the general situation was declared stable.¹⁸⁸ But a chilling report that was published in October¹⁸⁹ must have caused some consternation. It painted a picture of an alienated, restless urban populace which had serious implications for social order and the ability of the new regime to extract compliance from its citizenry.

Termination of the Cultural Revolution

The victors of the Cultural Revolution pronounced the verdict on their defeated foe at the 12th plenum of the 8th CC held in October 1968. What concerned Zhejiang most directly at this plenum was its judgment of those issues and events which had contributed most to the creation of factionalism in the province. Above all this involved an assessment of the 'February adverse current' of 1967. The communique of the meeting declared that this 'current' had been

directed against the decisions of the 11th Plenary Session of the Eighth Central Committee, against the great proletarian cultural revolution and against the proletarian headquarters. The Plenary Session holds that the shattering of the "adverse February current" and the sinister trend last spring [1968] to reverse the correct verdict on the "adverse February current" was an important victory for Chairman Mao's proletarian revolutionary line.¹⁹⁰

The decisions of the CC's 12th plenum were discussed at a marathon session of the ZPRC party members held from 8 November until 21 December 1968. A five-point resolution was published at the conclusion of this meeting.¹⁹¹ The first resolution outlined the significance of the CC plenum while the second summed up the history of the Cultural Revolution in Zhejiang. It praised the 'general orientation' of the proletarian revolutionaries with the 'workers as the main force' and forbade criticism of their performance 'under any pretext' or any attempt to distort the history of the Cultural Revolution. The resolution also commended the PLA for its achievements in the 'three supports and two militaries'.

The third resolution denounced three erroneous trends which had occurred during the course of the Cultural Revolution - the February 1967 'adverse current', the spring 1968 revival of this rightist 'adverse current', and the May 1968 opposition to the 'three reds' (that is, opposition to Mao, the PLA and revolutionary committees). The Congress concluded that some members of the ZPRC, including members of its standing committee, had been involved in plotting the February 1967 'reversal of verdicts' and had later tried to cover up their involvement in the conspiracy. These people allegedly included former secretary of the CCP ZPC Wu Xian¹⁹² who had been prominent a year previously in a moderate phase of the Cultural Revolution. They were expelled from the ZPRC, but the struggle against these tendencies, it was declared, was not finished.¹⁹³

While the Congress sat, the process of destroying

Jiang Hua's reputation and his political supporters continued. Further efforts were also made to lure Red Storm into endorsing the new status quo. Concurrently, 'purification of the class ranks' (qingli duiwu) intensified as the authorities sought to purge cadres with supposedly suspect pasts as a prelude to rebuilding the CCP in Zhejiang.¹⁹⁴ Military domination of the province became institutionalised as the PLA spread its tentacles into all aspects of civilian life.

On 5 November the leading capitalist-roaders of the CCP ZPC and HMC were led onto the platform at a large rally in Hangzhou to listen to a recitation of their alleged crimes.¹⁹⁵ Ten days later the first officially-endorsed critique of Jiang Hua's political record was published in the Zhejiang Daily. United Headquarters, which had waited almost two years for this event, may have felt a sense of relief as well as satisfaction that its struggle had not been completely in vain. However the number and vehemence of the commentaries published against Jiang and the February 'adverse current' indicated that the war to convince the people of Zhejiang, and the rebels of Red Storm in particular, was far from won.

A series of editorials and rallies on this theme continued into December 1968.¹⁹⁶ Jiang Hua was understandably described as the focus of the struggle in Zhejiang during the Cultural Revolution, and he was held personally responsible for manipulating public opinion about his status over the previous two years. Even the unambiguous declaration of the 12th plenum had apparently met with a

certain amount of resistance or incomprehension. The crux of the issue, admitted the Zhejiang Daily, was political power. Jiang's supporters had opposed the establishment of the ZPRC and then had refused to accept its authority. They had set up their own alternative political structure. These facts proved, according to the newspaper, that

Jiang Hua is still around, and his ambitions are not dead. Some of his accomplices have only felt the threatening breath of the East Wind and have not yet been frozen stiff. The ghost of Jiang Hua still haunts Zhejiang Province.

Some people, warned a further article,

are spreading rumours and attacking and resisting the Zhejiang Provincial Revolutionary Committee, which has the personal approval of our great leader Chairman Mao. Creating discord between army-men and citizens, they are attempting ... to turn the areas and departments under their leadership into watertight independent kingdoms.

Apparently the old CCP ZPC cadre school in Hangzhou remained a bastion of support for Jiang. An editorial of 10 November¹⁹⁷ claimed that the capitalist-roaders in the school had 'recently' issued an appeal to reverse the verdict handed down on Jiang and his colleagues. The editorial appealed to 'comrades' who had supported the wrong side in the Cultural Revolution, and had not changed their stand, to do so or else they would find themselves in trouble.

Throughout these months devoted to winding down the Cultural Revolution and tying up loose ends, Red Storm resisted the pressure which was exerted on it to join the revolutionary committees. It rejected the terms of

entry laid down by the military and United Headquarters. On the first anniversary of Mao's directive which had partially rehabilitated Red Storm, Zhejiang Daily published an editorial to commemorate the occasion.¹⁹⁸ The editorial made it clear that the struggle between the two mass organisations had never really ceased in Zhejiang. Whenever a makeshift alliance had been knocked together at the top, the focus of contention shifted back to each individual factory, college or commune. To flatter Red Storm, the editorial stated that it too had played its part in the downfall of Jiang Hua and that representatives from its membership would help strengthen the three mass congresses and revolutionary committees.

All the bickering about the status of Red Storm now seemed resolved with the term 'revolutionary mass organisation' being used to describe it. Yet it seems United Headquarters could not accept it as an equal. Turning to the members of this organisation, Zhejiang Daily praised them for doing their utmost to pursue the policy of 'helping, criticising and allying' with Red Storm. Once again the members of Red Storm were expected to submit to this condescending treatment and 'In no circumstance should they regard the help and criticism given by their comrades as suppression and refuse to accept it'. The newspaper requested both groups to discard factional and sectarian ideas and submit to Mao's calls for unity and discipline. But old habits apparently died hard.

Editorials of December 1968¹⁹⁹ revealed that the purification of class ranks was meeting strong opposition.

Veteran cadres and long-serving Party members undoubtedly objected to youthful rebels examining their past records and subjecting them to interrogation, an exercise which often degenerated into abuse and torture. For the new phase of reconstruction these cadres had attempted to seize the initiative. They had coined the phrase, 'Revolutionaries can be relied on in revolution but conservatives are to be relied on in purification.' The 'conservatives' also argued, with some justification, that purification could have been carried out without the Cultural Revolution, thereby questioning the necessity and utility of two years of chaos.

Overall, however, cadre policy in this period aimed at 'narrowing the target of attack'. Apart from making scapegoats of several officials whose records contained question marks which could easily be made to appear sinister, and purging Jiang Hua's remaining outstanding followers,²⁰⁰ the authorities urged caution.²⁰¹ They prohibited the obtaining of evidence under duress and directed, 'never let a single bad element escape or harm a good element by mistake'. They stressed that different cases required different treatment on the basis of an individual's behaviour and attitude to his mistakes. Cadres were the key to the creation of the three-way alliance, lectured the Zhejiang Daily, and it asserted that even capitalist-roaders should be allowed to resume work so long as they had not betrayed the party, and after they had repented for their errors and undergone an appropriate period of 'reeducation'. It is not surprising that people wondered aloud what all the two

years of fuss had been about.²⁰²

The "revolutionary alliance", May 1969

Renewed efforts in 1969 to root out factional opposition to the ZPRC and finally bring about the long sought-after alliance of the two mass organisations met resistance and disinterest. Ironically, this opposition was categorised as a leftist deviation and those upholding it as 'regal isolationists'.²⁰³ The belief that leftist mistakes were less serious than those of the right, because they involved issues of method, not political line, was rejected.²⁰⁴ In a harsh warning to members of United Headquarters and Red Storm who were holding out against unity of the mass organisations, Zhejiang Daily stated that they faced the possibility of becoming revisionists.²⁰⁵

It was the 9th Congress of the CCP, held from 1-24 April 1969 which placed fresh urgency on the necessity for unity. 10,000 study classes containing 200,000 participants had been held in Hangzhou starting on 16 April, to educate their members about the latest policy direction which had been decided upon in Beijing.²⁰⁶ Party members of the ZPRC held a Congress from 9-31 May²⁰⁷ to study the documents of the 9th Congress and attempt to finally resolve the outstanding issue of Red Storm's participation in the provincial power-structure.

The provincial congress took place in two stages. From 9-13 May, 1,000 delegates attended, while from 14 May the number was increased to 7,000. But the most important event

occurred on 26 May when a meeting was held to welcome Red Storm's decision to return to the fold.²⁰⁸ Convened jointly by the ZPRC and HMRC the meeting announced the inclusion of Red Storm representatives in the standing committees of the Worker, Peasant and Red Guard Congresses, the HMRC and its standing committee, and a recommendation to the ZPRC that its representatives join this body.

The report revealed that the ZPRC and HMRC had discussed the issue many times but that differences over interpretation of the contentious February 1967 events had prevented a decision from having been made. The Central Committee had issued instructions in 1969 to settle the matter which had led the two revolutionary committees to hold study classes for members of Red Storm. After the 9th CCP Congress, Red Storm's standing committee had studied the question and drawn up a namelist based on the original agreement of February 1968. This had been accepted by its opponents and the authorities, and was a testimony to its perservance.

The speeches which were delivered at the meeting took unity as their theme. In the words of Wang Zida, chairman of the HMRC, 'Unity means force, unity means weapons and unity brings us victory.' Deputy-commander of the ZPMD, Wan Zhenxi stated that Red Storm's participation in the provincial leadership was 'required by the revolution and by the circumstances' and declared that it was the 'common ~~desire and pressing demand~~ of the people of Zhejiang. Wan addressed remarks to members of both organisations. To Red Storm he expressed the hope that it would be modest, prudent and vigilant against those who sought to wreck this hard-won

unity. Wan urged United Headquarters to 'take the initiative' in uniting with Red Storm.

Spokesmen of the two sides contributed the appropriate rhetorical flourishes and the report pictured the 'fighters' of both groups studying 'happily together' and encouraging each other. A joint editorial of Zhejiang Daily and Hangzhou Daily²⁰⁹ to mark the occasion claimed that while United Headquarters had given way on trifling matters - a reference to the inclusion of Red Storm delegates on the revolutionary committees and three congresses - it had stood its ground on matters of principle. It is clear that United Headquarters and Red Storm remained embroiled in disputes over their respective roles in the Cultural Revolution and arguments as to which group had proved to have taken the correct stance on important issues and occasions. Prospects for real and sustained unity seemed slim while such debates raged.

Additionally a portion of Red Storm members refused to accept the agreement and actively campaigned to undermine it. Qiu Honggen recounts the visit of 200 members of his organisation to Beijing in June 1969 to complain about the details of the settlement. They found little sympathy from Chen Boda and Yao Wenyan who arranged for the delegate to be escorted back to Hangzhou. On 11 August the group was confined in a military barracks and ordered to hold a 'study class'. Qiu describes in detail the interrogation, deprivation and torture that he suffered for the next three and a half years.²¹⁰

As well as the eruption of dissension within the ranks of Red Storm concerning the terms of the alliance, it is

apparent that the agreement did not result in the dissolution of the two organisations as was intended. Outwardly, the two groups 'pulled down their flags' and discontinued their formal organisational structures. But factional alliances continued in a different form.²¹¹ They went underground and drew on links and relations forged in the Cultural Revolution for mutual protection and support. The two factions may have ceased operating as United Headquarters and Red Storm but the factional alignments remained as firm and clear-cut as before.

Nevertheless, Red Storm members did join the leadership bodies in May 1969,²¹² giving them added legitimacy. Its leaders were constrained, to some extent, by participation in the decision-making process. Disillusionment set in, however, and complaints such as 'it is a loss to be a cadre' and 'it will be harmful to oneself if one is firm in one's stand' soon made themselves heard.²¹³

The Cultural Revolution in Zhejiang thus ended with the PLA firmly in control of provincial affairs. It was a military leadership whose loyalties lay firmly with its masters in Beijing, and Lin Biao, in particular.²¹⁴ The 5th Zhejiang provincial Congress²¹⁵ of the CCP which met from 20-28 January 1971²¹⁶ endorsed the dominance of the military over the civilian wing of the party. Of the six secretaries and deputy-secretaries appointed to the CCP ZPC five wore the red star of the PLA, the only exception being Lai Keke: two members represented the 20th Army (1st secretary Nan Ping and secretary Xiong Yingtang), one the 5th Air Force

(secretary Chen Liyun) and two the Navy (deputy-secretaries Xie Zhenghao and Chai Qikun).

None of the five military secretaries of the re-structured CCP ZPC had held a political post in the province prior to the commencement of the Cultural Revolution. The only civilian secretary, Lai Keke, was the sole survivor of the 1966 ZPC secretariat and the least familiar of the old provincial elite with conditions in Zhejiang. The province had thus acquired a leadership both inexperienced in civilian administration and overwhelmingly 'outsiders' to local affairs.²¹⁷ By comparison the ZPRC executive, which had been handpicked by central leaders in 1968, seemed more representative of and more attuned to the interests of Zhejiang. Of the other seven members of the thirteen-strong ZPC standing committee, at least two came from the military, two were veteran cadres and only two represented the mass organisations. They were both women, Hua Yingfeng and Jiang Baodi. Thus United Headquarters did not succeed in gaining a place for its leader Zhang Yongsheng on the standing committee, perhaps because he had not yet become a member of the CCP.²¹⁸

The Cultural Revolution had traversed a bumpy road in Zhejiang. At its conclusion by the end of 1968, the central authorities may have obtained the compliance of the province to the Maoist programme but they had achieved it at a tremendous cost. The few members of the old administration to display their loyalty to the new order owed their positions to factional groups and military backing. United Head-

quarters, which had slavishly followed the somersault policy directives of Mao and the Cultural Revolution Group, discovered that its loyalty was not repaid when the forces of order moved in to end the turmoil. Red Storm, which had defied central directives, ultimately gained almost as much as its rival organisation.

Factionalism had marked the course of the Cultural Revolution and it was its legacy to the Chinese political system. From the central to the local level, personal ties largely replaced democratic centralist principles and organisational discipline. When the struggle for political ascendancy was made more urgent by the question of succession which hung over the CCP as the 1970's progressed, factionalism debilitated the political process to an even greater extent. How this occurred forms the subject of the following chapter. An explanation of the factional struggles of 1972-4 provides the backdrop to an understanding of the Hangzhou incident of 1975, in which eight years of conflict found partial resolution.

NOTES

1. For a biographical sketch of Jiang Hua see 'Jiang Hua - President of the Supreme People's Court', I & S, 16:7 (1980), pp.85-88. The whereabouts of Jiang's birthplace seems to have caused a great deal of confusion. Taiwan authorities claim that he was born in Hubei province. Klein and Clark state that it was Shandong province. See D.W. Klein and A.B. Clark (eds), Biographic Dictionary of Chinese Communism, 1921-1965 (Cambridge, Mass, 1971), VOL.I, p.173. Jiang was in fact born in Jianghua county, Hunan province from which place he took his name, a fact well known to citizens of Zhejiang. For written proof see the interview with Jiang Hua reminiscing about Mao Zedong's frequent visits to Zhejiang, in which the interviewer notes Jiang's Hunan accent. ZJRB, 26 December 1983, p.3. Another fact about Jiang not previously published is that he is a Yao nationality - Jianghua county being a Yao autonomous county in the south of Hunan. Jiang's status as a national minority was to give him added protection in the Cultural Revolution.
2. See the documents compiled in Current Background, 487 (10 January 1958), pp.1-57.
3. See Jiang Hua, 'Renqing xingshi, jiakuai jianshe', ZJRB, 6 November 1958, pp.1, 3; 'Maintain Uninterrupted Revolution, Maintain High Speed', Hongqi, no. 21, (November 1959), translated in Joint Publications Research Service, 1098-D (4 January 1960), pp.29-32.
4. See the charges against Jiang Hua published in the Cultural Revolution. ZPS, 7 July 1968, SWB, FE/2823/B/12-14; ZPS, 7 July 1968, ibid, FE/2824/B/9-10; 'Down with Jiang Hua', ZPS. 15 November 1968, ibid, FE/2928/B/3-4; 'The bankruptcy of Jiang Hua's independent kingdom' ibid, FE/2983/B/11-15.
5. F. Teiwes, 'Provincial Politics in China: Themes and Variations', in J. Lindbeck (ed), China: Management of a Revolutionary Society (Seattle, 1971), p.146; see also P. Chang, Power and Policy in China, 2nd enlarged ed. (University Park, Pennsylvania, 1978), p.44 who basically agrees with Teiwes but adds that 'through their control of the flow of information, provincial officials often enjoyed a great deal of autonomy and were in a good position to evade central supervision.' (p.45). In his study of Fujian province for the period 1949-66 Victor Falkenheim comes to the same conclusions as Teiwes. See V.C. Falkenheim, 'Provincial Leadership in Fujian: 1949-66', in R. Scalapino (ed), Elites in the People's Republic of China (Washington, 1972), pp.199-244, esp. p.204. See also D.S.G. Goodman, 'The Provincial First Party

Secretary in the People's Republic of China, 1949-78: A Profile', British Journal of Political Science, 10:1 (1980), p.43.

6. Teiwes, pp.116-189.
7. Shen Weicai, 'From a capable member of the Gao-Rao anti-party alliance to a loyal follower of the gang of four', HZRB, 17 August 1977. Lai was thus the only member of the secretariat who had suffered the ignominy of demotion and a major setback in his career.
8. Mao visited Hangzhou at least once every year between 1953 and 1966, and sporadically thereafter until his last visit in 1975. He was present in December 1957 when Jiang Hua launched his savage attack on the governor of Zhejiang and other leading officials. Mao wrote the important paragraphs published separately as 'Where do correct ideas come from?' in Hangzhou and the May 16 circular of 1966 was drawn up at an enlarged meeting of the politburo standing committee in the city. It was from Hangzhou that Mao set out on his train journey to foil Lin Biao's alleged attempts to assassinate him. It is little wonder, then, that Mao called the beautiful lake resort-city his second home. See the reminiscences of Jiang Hua, op. cit., and Wang Fang, 'Zhongshi xuexi, shanyu xuexi', ZJRB, 23 December 1983, p.1. Wang, then working in the Zhejiang public security bureau, escorted and guarded Mao on every trip he made to the province in the years 1956-66.
9. 'Down with Jiang Hua!', Wenge tongxun, no. 16 (July 1968) in SCMP, 4230 (1 August 1968), p.3.
10. Ibid, p.4.
11. Ibid, pp.2-4. To cover his tracks Jiang, according to this document, expelled 180 personnel from the public security bureau. This incredible charge is repeated without the hair-raising detail in 'Down with Jiang Hua', ZPS, 15 November 1968, op. cit. In March 1968, at a meeting between central leaders and a delegation from Zhejiang, Jiang Qing made similar allegations against Jiang Hua. At the same meeting, Zhou Enlai added that his correspondence had been opened and referred to evidence provided by the new leader of Zhejiang Nan Ping, and by former governor Zhou Jianren. The Premier went on to demand the destruction of the security/judicial apparatus in Zhejiang. SCMP, 4182 (21 May 1968), pp.4-5. These denunciations apparently triggered a witch-hunt in the public security department resulting in the death of at least one detective in June 1968. He probably died under interrogation designed to force a confession implicating Jiang Hua. HZRB, 11 August 1978. Jiang's successor as 1st secretary of the CCP ZPC, Nan Ping, repeated these charges at the CCP 5th Zhejiang provincial Congress

held in January 1971. One month later, at a national conference of public security bureaux, Zhou Enlai, in a remarkable volte-face, rebuked all such insinuations against the Zhejiang public security bureau and by implication, Jiang Hua, stating that 'we can't say that spies exercised dictatorship over us'. To support his position, Zhou quoted Mao as puzzling; 'some people say that the Zhejiang public security organs have gone rotten. I've stayed in Hangzhou many times and nothing has happened. How can this be explained?' Zhou's remarks were quoted by Tie Ying in his report to the 6th Zhejiang provincial congress of the CCP. HZRB, 7 June 1978. During the campaign to weed out followers of Lin Biao and the Gang of Four in Zhejiang, Shen Ce, a member of the pre-Cultural Revolution CCP ZPC standing committee who had been 'liberated' as a 'revolutionary leading cadre' in 1967 was charged with trying to frame Jiang Hua for this crime. HZRB, 26 July 1978.

12. See F.C. Teiwes, Politics and Purges in China: Rectification and the Decline of Party Norms, 1950-65 (N.Y., 1979).
13. P. Chang, 'Provincial Party Leaders' Strategies for Survival during the Cultural Revolution', in Scalapino, pp.501-39. The following paragraphs owe much to the argument outlined in Chang's article. For a description of the strategies pursued by the power-holders in Sichuan province, see T.J. Mathews, 'The Cultural Revolution in Szechwan' in The Cultural Revolution in the Provinces, Harvard East Asian Monographs, 42 (Cambridge, Mass., 1971), pp.97-109.
14. Chang, 'Provincial Party Leaders' Strategies', p.537. 'The cohesion of the ruling group' also contributed immeasurably to the success of this resistance. Teiwes, 'Provincial Politics in China', p.157.
15. ZPS, 27 July 1966, SWB, FE/2230/B/18-19. Lin died on 4 December 1981, aged 75. See ZJRB, 18 December 1981.
16. HZRB, 11 June 1978.
17. ZPS, 23 June 1966, SWB. FE/2197/B/3-5.
18. For a valuable discussion of this important issue, see G. White, The Politics of Class and Class Origin: The Case of the Cultural Revolution, Contemporary China Papers, 9 (Canberra, 1976).
19. Jiang Hua, 'Hold aloft the great red banner of Mao Zedong's thought and carry on the Great Cultural Revolution through to the end', ZPS, 27 June 1966, SWB, FE/2201/B/10-13.
20. Their first recorded appearance in Hangzhou seems to

- have occurred on 23 August. See ZPS, 23 August 1966, SWB, FE/2250/B/10-11; ZPS, 24 August 1966, ibid, FE/2253/B/6-7.
21. ZPS, 10 September 1966, ibid, FE/2266/B/6-7; ZPS, 13 September 1966, ibid, FE/2268/B/6.
 22. See H.W. Nelsen, 'Military Forces in the Cultural Revolution', CQ, 51 (1972), pp.448-54.
 23. ZPS, 7 October 1966, SWB, FE/2294/B/6-8.
 24. Tan Zhenlin had served as leader of the CCP ZPC from 1949 until his transfer to Jiangsu in 1952. By the time of the Cultural Revolution he was an important national leader and exercised responsibility for agricultural affairs. For details of Tan's career, see 'Tan Zhenlin - A Maoist "Liberated" Cadre'. I & S, 10:6 (1974), pp.101-5, and the memorial speech by Hu Yaobang, ZJRB, 6 October 1983, p.2.
 25. ZPS, 28 June 1968, SWB, FE/2814/B/17-18.
 26. ZPS, 3 June 1968, ibid, FE/2790/B/18-19; ZPS, 30 May 1968, ibid, FE/2786/B/10-11; ZPS, 10 November 1968, ibid, FE/2924/B/24-5; ZPS, 19 November 1968, ibid, FE/2933/B/3-4; speech of Jiang Qing, 21 March 1968, SCMP, 4166 (29 April 1968), p.2.
 27. See M. Oksenberg, 'Occupational Groups in Chinese Society and the Cultural Revolution', The Cultural Revolution in 1967 in Review, Michigan Papers in Chinese Studies, No. 2 (Ann Arbor, 1968), pp.1-44.
 28. Ningbo regional service, 13 January 1967, SWB, FE/2368/B/12-14. For a description of similar events in Shanghai, see A. Walder, Zhang Chungqiao and Shanghai's January Revolution, Michigan Papers in Chinese Studies, No. 32 (Ann Arbor, 1978), esp. chs. 5-6, 8.
 29. Xinhua, 20 January 1967, SWB, FE/2372/B/29.
 30. Urgent notice of 1 February 1967 issued by eight rebel groups, ZPS, 3 February 1967, ibid. FE/2386/B/3-6.
 31. ZPS, 16 January 1967, ibid, FE/2369/B/10.
 32. 'Urgent Notice on striking down counter-revolutionary economism in the countryside', 20 January 1967, SCMP, 3878 (13 February 1967), pp.7-11.
 33. ZPS, 11 January 1967, URS, 46:8 (27 January 1967), pp. 125-7. Zhejiang Daily apparently remained in the hands of supporters of one rebel faction until 1969 when, beginning from 1 October of that year, it was designated the official organ of the ZPRC. ZPS, 30 September 1969, SWB, FE/3194/B/11-12.

34. Construction of this mill began in 1956 and it commenced production in 1960. In 1977 it employed 4,700 workers in three workshops, operating 536 reeling machines and 623 looms. Visit, 12 January 1977.
35. ZPS, 26 January 1967, SWB, FE/2381/B/33-4.
36. ZPS, 25 January 1967, ibid, FE/2376/B/21-2. The report does not mention names but people who attended the rally informed me that Jiang and Chen were the principal leaders indicted.
37. Dated 5 October 1966, 16 November 1966, and 14 January 1967.
38. 'Zhonggong zhongyang, guowuyuan, zhongyang junwei guanyu Zhejiang zuijin fasheng shijian de jue ding', 30 January 1967, CCP Documents of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, 1966-67 (Hong Kong, 1968), pp.219-23.
39. Criticism group of the ZPMD Logistics Department 'Those who try to destroy the Great Wall will themselves meet destruction - an exposure and criticism of the sworn followers, agents, and lackeys of Lin Biao and the gang of four in Zhejiang in opposing and destabilising the Army', HZRB, 14 September 1978. Hangzhou Daily criticism group 'We must become the Party's tool for public opinion, not a trumpeter for factionalism', ibid, 28 September 1977.
40. Wang Xianyu and Guan Guodong (ZPMD Political Department), 'Attacking the Party and destabilising the Army will not succeed', ibid, 4 April 1979.
41. Reported by J. Domes, 'The Role of the Military in the formation of Revolutionary Committees, 1967-68', CQ, 44 (1970), p.130.
42. Wang, a native of Sichuan, had joined the CCP in 1938, and had been a long-serving member of the municipal party committee. At the outbreak of the Cultural Revolution he headed the CCP HMC secretariat and was first political commissar of the Hangzhou Garrison. He died of cancer on 18 June 1970 at the age of 58, persecuted to death, it is alleged, by his tormentors, including his former deputy Wang Zida. HZRB, 11 April 1978, pp.1, 2.
43. Because his birthplace was in Ningbo, Wang was apparently known by his enemies as the Ningbo shangren (Ningbo businessman). Natives of Ningbo are nationally-renowned for their business acumen and many capitalist concerns in Shanghai were once owned and run by Ningbonese. Because of his support for the rebels in the Cultural Revolution, Wang, a veteran cadre, acquired a second unflattering name, the 'Ma Tianshui

of Hangzhou', after the veteran cadre in Shanghai who threw in his lot with Zhang Chunqiao and Yao Wenyan in that metropolis.

44. Shi Guangzu, 'Recalling a battle by Comrade Wang Pingyi with that other agent of the gang of four in Hangzhou', HZRB, 21 April 1978; Chen Xia (secretary of the CCP HMC secretariat at the beginning of the Cultural Revolution and at the time of writing), 'Crimes must be accounted for; the poison cleared away', *ibid.*, 10 April 1978.
45. Qiu Honggen (a prominent member of Red Storm who at the time was a student at Hangzhou's most prestigious secondary school, called the 'Learn from the PLA Middle School' (Xuejun zhongxue), 'See the wolfish ambition of Lin Biao and the gang of four from my two detentions', *ibid.*, 26 November 1978.
46. Tragically for Jiang, he left Hangzhou a widower. His wife, Wu Chonglian, President of the Zhejiang Supreme Court since January 1955, could not stand the intense political and physical pressure exerted on her by the rebels and committed suicide on 19 January 1967. ZPS, 6 November 1978, SWB, FE/5971/BII/13-14. Tan Zhenlin and Jiang Hua attended the memorial service for Wu in 1978. The report commented that 'we are finally able to redress the injustice done to her and clear her name.'
47. The public naming of leaders in the official press required approval from the centre. Approval to name Jiang Hua was not forthcoming until November 1968. In May 1968, at a meeting with Zhang Yongsheng, leader of United Headquarters, Jiang Qing asked him, 'Since other top capitalist-roaders of the province have been named, why is Jiang Hua not named?' She went on to confidently assert: 'What you have to do is just to give us a ring.' But clearly it was not that simple. See Huoju tongxun, no. 1, July 1968 translated in SCMM, 622 (6 August 1968), p.10. Chen Boda had not hesitated to name Jiang, Li Fengping, Chen Weida and Chen Bing as the leading capitalist-roaders in Zhejiang at a meeting in Beijing held in March 1968. See SCMP, 4182, p.12. But Chen, by mentioning Jiang by name, was not conforming with central policy. See *ibid.*, p.2. Finally, after Jiang was named in the provincial press, his supporters argued that 'for Zhejiang Daily to print a person's name means nothing'. ZPS, 9 December 1968, SWB, FE/2953/B1/13-15. Jiang was never, so far as I am aware, named in Central Committee documents.
48. ZPS, 19 November 1968, SWB, FE/2933/B/4.
49. Kao Ch'ung-yen, Zhonggong renshi biandong, 1959-69 (Union Research Institute; Hong Kong, 1970), p.674.

50. The most authoritative articles on the meetings held in Beijing on 13 and 16 February 1967, which witnessed these verbal clashes, were written by Ji Xizhen, 'A Great Struggle to defend the Party's principles', RMRB, 26 February 1979, pp.2,4; and the same author's 'The Beginning and the end of the "February counter-current" of 1967', from Shidai Baogao, no. 1, (1980) in FBIS / PSMA, 105 (15 August 1980), pp.17-62 (uncompleted). On 14 November 1971, after the downfall of Lin Biao, Mao Zedong rehabilitated those involved.
51. ZPS, 5 February 1967, SWB, FE/2389/B/15-17; ZPS, 10 February 1967, ibid., FE/2392/B/11-13.
52. ZPS, 14 February 1967, ibid., FE/2394/B/21-2.
53. Unit 6409 certainly arrived in Zhejiang before May 1967, the date given by H.W. Nelsen, The Chinese Military System: An Organizational Study of the Chinese PLA (Boulder Co., 1977), p.130, and well before late August 1967 as claimed by the editor of Current Scene. See 'Revolutionary Committee Leadership - China's Current Provincial Authorities', CS, 6:18 (18 October 1968), p.3. The presence of the political commissar of Unit 6409, Nan Ping, was mentioned by the Zhejiang provincial radio as early as March 1967. ZPS, 27 March 1967, SWB, FE/2437/B/23.
54. ZPS, 17 February 1967, SWB, FE/2396/B/17-18. Unit 7350 (the 5th Air Force) had responded to Mao's order to support the left in January 1967. See Chen Liyun and Bai Zongshan (political commissar and commander respectively of this unit), 'Yi, "dousi, pixiu" wei gang, jianjue zhichi wuchan jieji gemingpai', RMRB, 25 October 1967, p.2. The Zhejiang Provincial Military Control Commission was set up in March 1967. See, ZPS, 11 September 1979, SWB, FE/6225/BII/9. David Goodman has incorrectly dated the establishment of the Zhejiang military control commission from 30 January 1967 when the CCP CC issued its document on the incident at the headquarters of the ZPMD, cited above in footnote 38. D.S.G. Goodman, 'The Provincial Revolutionary Committee in the People's Republic of China, 1967-1979: An Obituary', CQ, 85 (1981), pp.56,57.
55. RMRB, 16 February 1967 in SCMP, 3887 (27 February 1967), pp.10-13.
56. ZPS, 28 February 1967, SWB, FE/2406/B/24-5; ZPS, 2 March 1967, ibid., FE/2410/B/2-3; Domes, 'The Role of the Military', pp.130-1.
57. The thesis that the military, represented by Lin Biao, viewed the Cultural Revolution more in ideological terms while the Cultural Revolution Group saw it as essentially a struggle for power is argued by H.Y. Lee,

The Politics of the Chinese Cultural Revolution
(Berkeley, 1978).

58. ZPS, 27 March 1967, SWB, FE/2437/B/23.
59. ZPS, 20 April 1967, ibid., FE/2449/B/12-14.
60. 'Zhonggong zhongyang tongzhi', 24 June 1967, CCP Documents, pp.465-7.
61. ZPS, 23 April 1967, ibid., FE/2448/B/16.
62. ZPS, 13 May 1967, SWB, FE/2467/B/14-16.
63. 'Zhonggong zhongyang, guowuyuan, zhongyang junwei, zhongyang wenge xiaozu guanyu yanzhi wudou xingxiong feifa daibu ji qiangjie pohuai de tongling', 6 June 1967, CCP Documents, pp.461-4.
64. ZPS, 11 June 1967, SWB, FE/2490/B/7-8.
65. Ibid., B/4-7.
66. An editorial of 14 June reiterated this last point. ZPS, 14 June 1967, ibid., FE/2499/B/9.) Peasants had apparently been told that the United Headquarters was a reactionary organisation. Communist China Yearbook, 1968 (Hong Kong, 1968), p.434.
67. Radio Moscow, 1 June 1966, SWB, FE/2481/C/1. Zhejiang Daily later published an article accusing Tan Zhenlin of setting up a guerrilla unit in the Siming mountains, Yuyao county, east Zhejiang where communist guerrillas had fought both the Guomindang and Japanese before 1949. ZPS, 20 November 1968, ibid., FE/2933/B/7-8.
68. Communist China Yearbook, p.433.
69. Czechoslovak Press Agency (CTK), 12 June 1967, SWB, FE/2491/C/1.
70. 'Zhonggong zhongyang guanyu jinzhi tiaodong nongmin jin cheng wudou de tongzhi', 13 July 1967, CCP Documents, pp.473-6.
71. ZPS, 12 June 1967, SWB, FE/2492/B/8-9.
72. United Headquarters was apparently aiming to secure the replacement of the leaders of the ZPMD and Military Commission, Zhang Xiulong and Long Qian, with military leaders more sympathetic to their cause. Weng Senhe, Hangzhou's first rebel worker from the Hangzhou Silk Complex who switched sides from Red Storm to United Headquarters early in 1967, met Zhang Chunqiao in Shanghai in June 1967 to discuss ways of attaining this objective. Zhejiang Daily editorial, 'Smash the

- gang of four, suppress the counter-revolutionaries', reprinted in HZRB, 31 December 1976.
73. ZPS, 21 June 1967, SWB, FE/2500/B/8-9.
74. From 14-24 June United Headquarters convened a symposium to study Mao's works. ZPS, 25 June 1967, ibid., FE/2508/B/12.
75. ZPS, 27 June 1967, ibid., FE/2508/B/13-14; ZPS, 11 July 1967, FE/2520/B/15.
76. ZPS, 19 November 1968, ibid., FE/2933/B/3; ZPS, 15 November 1968, ibid., FE/2928/B/2.
77. ZPS, 12 July 1967, ibid., FE/2520/B/13-15.
78. 'Shandong geming weiyuanhui guanyu renzhen zhuanbian zuofeng de ruogan guiding', 7 June 1967, Hongqi, 10 (1967), p.65; Hongqi commentator, 'Fangzhi zichan-jieji sixiang xiudu', ibid., pp.63-4.
79. ZPS, 13 July 1967, SWB, FE/2529/B/15-16.
80. ZPS, 10 August 1967, URS, 48:18 (1 September 1967), pp.255-8.
81. ZPS, 19 July 1967, 23 July 1967, SWB, FE/2531/B/12-13.
82. ZPS, 25 July 1967, ibid., B/10-11; Shi Guangzu states that on 8 July 1967 Wang was forced to write another self-examination which was displayed as a wall poster in Hangzhou. Loc. cit.
83. Hua Meisheng, 'Beating, smashing and looting is sheer counter-revolutionary activity', HZRB, 22 June 1977; Yang Lingen (widower of Wu Fengying), 'An accusation written in blood and tears', ibid.; Hangzhou public security bureau criticism group, 'An extremely ferocious counter-revolutionary gang', ibid., 23 June 1967; Hangzhou silk bureau criticism group, 'Iron-clad proof of Weng Senhe and He Xianchun ganging up to usurp power in the silk industry', ibid., 30 June 1977; meeting at Hangzhou Silk Complex, ibid., 14 December 1977.
84. Gao Zhixian, 'The evil lackey who sold himself to the bitter end to the gang of four', ibid., 26 June 1977. This mill is another major industrial unit in Hangzhou. Chapter four of this thesis devotes further attention to it. Construction of the mill began in 1950 and finished in 1953. In 1978 it had 6,200 workers in charge of 11,000 spindles and 676 weaving machines. Visit to Zhejiang Hemp Mill, 3 December 1978.
85. Ibid., 5 December 1977, p.3. Forty people were beaten up by members of United Headquarters.

86. Communist China Yearbook, p.434; ZPS, 26 August 1967, SWB, FE/2557/B/20-1.
87. In a visit on 27 May 1979 I was told that 500 workers from this mill had participated in the attack, two of whom had just been arrested. The Hangzhou Iron and Steel Mill was built in 1958 and in 1979 it employed a staff of 12,619 in its 11 sub-plants.
88. Xia was to reappear in 1974 as a leader of the urban militia. On 16 April 1979 he received a two-year suspended death sentence for his crimes in the Cultural Revolution. HZRB, 17 April 1979.
89. Speech by Wang Baozhen, worker at the Hangzhou No. 2 Cotton Mill at a meeting of the factory's workers on 3 December 1977. Ibid., 5 December 1977; ibid., 3 December 1977; He Naimin, 'While there's life, struggle with Lin Biao and the gang of four does not cease', ibid., 14 November 1978.
90. Apparently, a total of 1,000 workers in Xiaoshan lost their jobs and had their wages stopped. When the local trade union council agreed to grant them loans to survive, the chairman was placed in gaol as punishment. He Naimin, op. cit.
91. See ZPS, 10 February 1979, ibid., FE/6045/BII/12-13.
92. The following description of events at Jinhua is based on 'The "August 3" Incident in Jinhua area', URS, 48:18 (1 September 1967), pp.247-55; ZPS, 11 August 1967, SWB, FE/2542/B/4-5; ZPS, 14 August 1967, ibid., FE/2546/B/13; ZPS, 19 August 1967, ibid., FE/2549/B/12-13; ZPS, 26 August 1967, ibid., FE/2557/B/18-19; Communist China Yearbook, p.434.
93. This was the first mention in Zhejiang of this body. Its establishment probably followed the reshuffle of the leadership of the ZPMD and the Provincial Military Control Commission. Later described as the 'two reorganisations', it led to the 'cruel persecutions of Long Qian, Zhang Xiulong and other leading comrades of the Zhejiang Military District'. ZPS, 11 September 1979, SWB, FE/6225/BII/9-10. Zhou Enlai, in a speech of 17 September 1967 to Red Guards made an announcement regarding this matter. URS, 49:7 (24 October 1967), p.91. In his explanation of the dismissal of the leaders of the Henan Provincial Military District in July 1967, Parris Chang put forward the view that their purge resulted from an inability to distinguish 'genuine proletarian revolutionaries' from false ones. P.H. Chang, 'The Revolutionary Committee in China, Two Case Studies: Heilungkiang and Honan', CS, 6:9 (1 June 1968), pp.13-14. However, a more serious mistake than this triggered central action in Zhejiang. Former commander Zhang Xiulong and political commissar

Long Qian had probably been held at least partly responsible for the January 1967 incident at ZPMD headquarters (see above pp.52-4). The centre's loss of confidence in their loyalty had resulted in the despatch of main force unit 6409 under its commander Xiong Yingtang and political commissar Nan Ping to assume military control of Zhejiang in conjunction with air force and naval units, and the ZPMD. Zhang and Long had, however, managed to retain their posts which included leading positions on the provincial military control commission. As early as April 1967 their positions came under challenge.

94. The five-day gap between the event and the press conference may have occurred due to the change in provincial leadership causing a temporary hiatus in decision-making. Or it may have been as a result of a cut in communications between Jinhua and Hangzhou.
95. The following description of events in Wenzhou is based on ZPS, 18 and 19 August 1967, SWB, FE/2549/B/12-18; ZPS, 20 August 1967, ibid., FE/2552/B/10-11; ZPS, 21 August 1967, ibid., FE/2557/B/17-20; ZPS, 28 August 1967, ibid., FE/2558/B/5-6; ZPS, 5 September 1967, ibid., FE/2571/B/5; Communist China Yearbook, p.434; Y.S. Chien, China's Fading Revolution: Army Dissent and Military Divisions, 1967-68. (Hong Kong, 1969), pp.50-1.
96. Wang was not publicly named at the time but it is clear from accusations made against him in 1968 that he was the party official to whom speakers at the rally referred. At the beginning of the Cultural Revolution Wang was deputy-governor of Zhejiang. For a sketch of his career, see 'Wang Fang - Newly Appointed Secretary of the CCP Zhejiang Provincial Committee', I & S, 19:8 (1983), pp.67-71. Appendix E (1) of this thesis.
97. URS, 48:15, pp.208-17.
98. The leader of United Headquarters, Zhang Yongsheng, graduated from this renowned college in 1966 and was elected chairman of its revolutionary committee. The college had led the way in resuming classes on 14 July 1967. URS, 48:13 (15 August 1967), pp.181-2.
99. ZPS, 25 August 1967, SWB, FE/2562/B/9-10.
100. ZPS, 17 August 1967, ibid., FE/2549/B/9-12.
101. URS, 48:25 (26 September 1967), pp.353-65; ZPS, 1 September 1967, SWB, FE/2567/B/10-12; ZPS, 10 and 11 September 1967, ibid., FE/2581/B/13.
102. ZPS, 5 and 7 September 1967, ibid., FE/2571/B/5; ZPS, 12 September 1967, ibid., FE/2569/B/10. On

- 25 September the first in a series of trials conducted by military tribunals took place. Four criminals were summarily tried and two executed on charges of murder, arson and spying for the USA and Taiwan. ZPS, 26 September 1967, ibid., FE/2580/B/3-4.
103. See B. Burton, 'The Cultural Revolution's ultra-leftist conspiracy: the "May 16 Group"', AS, 11:11 (1971), pp.1029-1053.
104. They were ordered to study Jiang Qing's speech of 5 September, representing her climbdown on the utility of violence, and Yao Wenyuan's article, 'Comments on Tao Zhu's Two Books' published in Hongqi. See ZPS, 21 September 1967, SWB, FE/2580/B/9-10.
105. Mao Zedong sixiang wansui, (1969), (Taipei, 1974), p.682.
106. SCMP, 4070 (30 November 1967), p.9.
107. Zhonggong zhongyang tongzhi, 7 October 1967, CCP Documents, pp.545-556.
108. The day after Mao's visit to Hangzhou Zhejiang Daily published an editorial repudiating the slogan 'I want to be at the core' previously upheld by United Headquarters. ZPS, 17 September 1967, SWB, FE/2574/B/12-14.
109. Hou Zheng, 'Analyse the black article written by that former principal responsible person of the Hangzhou Municipal Party Committee', HZRB, 4 October 1978.
110. ZPS, 25 October 1967, SWB, FE/2605/B/19-20; ZPS, 21 December 1967, ibid., FE/2654/B/9-10.
111. ZPS, 7 October 1967, ibid., FE/2591/B/17.
112. The three senior cadres attended a rally held to prepare for the formation of the ZPRC. ZPS, 30 November 1967, ibid., FE/2637/B/8.
113. He appeared at a rally on 6 December 1967 in his capacity as vice-chairman of the NPC. ZPS, 6 December 1967, ibid., FE/2647/B/9-10. Zhou, 1897-1984, was born in Shaoxing. For an obituary, see ZJRB, 7 August 1984. Zhou, a united front cadre, and Lai Keke, a relative newcomer to Zhejiang and a cadre who had been purged in the past and may have decided that he had nothing to lose by joining the proletarian revolutionaries, both fit Frederick Teiwes' generalisations about the kind of officials who joined the new order. See F.C. Teiwes, Provincial Leadership in China: The Cultural Revolution and its Aftermath (Ithaca, N.Y., 1974), pp.35-7.

114. ZPS, 28 October 1967, SWB, FE/2607/B/1.
115. ZPS, 30 November 1967, ibid., FE/2637/B/8.
116. 'Zhonggong zhongyang, guowuyuan, zhongyang junwei, zhongyang wenge xiaozu guanyu zhengque duidai fanguo cuowu de lao zaofanpai de tongzhi', 2 December 1967, CCP Documents, pp.623-6.
117. ZPS, 10 December 1967, SWB, FE/2645/B/8-9.
118. ZPS, 8 December 1967, ibid., FE/2646/B/9-10.
119. Zhou Enlai, in a talk he gave early in 1968, allegedly described Red Storm as 'a bit too far to the "Left"', but recommended 'help and protection' for it. SCMP, 4139 (15 March 1968), p.4.
120. ZPS, 1 and 6 December 1967, SWB, FE/2647/B/9-10.
121. ZPS, 15 December 1967, ibid., FE/2658/B/13.
122. ZPS, 18 December 1967, ibid.
123. ZPS, 28 October 1967, ibid., FE/2612/B/13-14.
124. One naval unit stationed in Zhejiang had sent boats up the Changjiang (Yangzi) river to Wuhan in October to support the left. ZPS, 9 November 1967, ibid., FE/2619/B/11-12.
125. See ZPS, 24 November 1967, ibid., FE/2638/B/13-14 which accused the capitalist-roaders of spreading rumours designed to weaken unity between the units and between the PLA and citizenry. See also ZPS, 28 November 1967, ibid., FE/2637/B/8-9 summarising a report from Liberation Army Daily in Beijing concerning a small unit, probably of the 20th Army, which had chosen the wrong side among two factions on a commune, due to the influence of 'old thoughts and conventions'. Nelsen contends that political friction between Units 7350 and 6409 served as a proxy battle between the two mass organisations. The Chinese Military System, p.137.
126. Liberation Army Daily published an editorial to this effect on 28 January 1968, in SCMP, 4114 (8 February 1968), pp.14-16. From 14-25 February Unit 6409 held a conference to discuss the implications of this new policy direction. ZPS, 25 January 1968, SWB, FE/2691/B/14; 27 January 1968, ibid., FE/2685/B/10.
127. RMRB, 22 January 1968, p.3.
128. Apart from the fourth and sixth editorials, all were monitored and translated to various extents by the BBC. ZPS, 4 January 1968, SWB, FE/2663/B/7-9; ZPS, 16

- January 1968, *ibid.*, FE/2673/B/5-6; ZPS, 17 January 1968, *ibid.*, FE/2675/B/10-11; ZPS, 21 January 1968, *ibid.*, FE/2679/B/3-4; ZPS, 8 February 1968, *ibid.*, FE/2697/B/17; ZPS, 13 February 1968, *ibid.*, FE/2707/B/14-15; ZPS, 15 February 1968, *ibid.*, FE/2707/B/13-14; ZPS, 22 February 1968, *ibid.*, FE/2708/B/16-17.
129. ZPS, 19 January 1968, *ibid.*, FE/2679/B/11-12.
130. ZPS, 7 February 1968, *ibid.*, FE/2695/B/16.
131. ZPS, 18 February 1968, *ibid.*, FE/2702/B/8-10. China News Analysis claims that the two organisations had signed a twelve-point agreement in January 1968 but that 'the local branches paid no heed and went on with their angry squabbles'. CNA, 731 (1 November 1968), p.2.
132. ZPS, 22 February 1968, SWB, FE/2708/B/16-17; ZPS, 25 February 1968, *ibid.*, FE/2709/B/20.
133. ZPS, 29 February 1968, *ibid.*, FE/2712/B/5-6.
134. *Ibid.*, B/6-7.
135. ZPS, 1 March 1968, *ibid.*, FE/2716/B/14.
136. ZPS, 11 March 1968, *ibid.*, FE/2721/B/2-3.
137. ZPS, 13 March 1968, *ibid.*, FE/2724/B/12-14.
138. In a speech on 2 February 1968 Zhou Enlai stated that Beijing hoped to establish the ZPRC in February 1968. SCMP, 4154 (8 April 1968), p.2.
139. Dated 11 March 1968 in *ibid.*, 4167 (30 April 1968), pp.17-19. It accused the former director of the county Bureau of Culture and Education of ordering the murder of two Red Guards in July 1967. He had later established a 'bogus' revolutionary committee. The document paints a picture of rebel impotence when confronted by a local official who could mobilise peasant support and defy central directives at will.
140. SCMP, 4182 (21 May 1968), pp.1-12.
141. Mao had received the members of the study class of Unit 7350 in January 1968. ZPS, 28 January 1968, SWB, FE/2683/B/19. In February he had received PLA activists from the 'support the left' units. ZPS, 20 February 1968, *ibid.*, FE/2704/B/6.
142. Chen Boda charged the 'capitalist-roaders' of Zhejiang with being Guomindang agents. SCMP, 4182, p.11.
143. Shaoxing or Yue opera is one of the favourite forms of

entertainment for southern Chinese, far exceeding the popularity of Beijing opera. Jiang poured out a further torrent of abuse on this subject in May, in a talk with Zhang Yongsheng. SCMM, 622, pp.7-9. Jiang Hua was attacked for promoting Shaoxing opera. ZPS, 29 June 1968, SWB, FE/2814/B/18-19; ZPS, 10 July 1968, ibid., FE/2826/B/14-16.

144. Zhou Enlai cleverly gained his revenge near the end of the proceedings when he suddenly brought up Jiang Qing's murky past. He asked those present, rhetorically, 'What evidence do we have to accuse her of being a spy?' SCMP, 4182, p.11. Evidence to this effect had surfaced in the Cultural Revolution and evidently gained some currency.
145. This breakdown of the standing committee of the ZPRC was made by Domes, 'The Role of the Military', pp. 131-2; see also RMRB, 28 March 1968; ZPS, 24 March 1968, SWB, FE/2733/B/2-4. Domes classified the ZPRC as a revolutionary committee 'practically created by ... other military units' and Zhejiang as a province where the revolutionary committee was formed only 'after new commanders ... had been appointed who enjoyed the support of the Central Authorities ...'. Domes, pp.142,143. Zhang Yongsheng, leader of United Headquarters was elected a vice-chairman although he did not appear at the celebration rally. The other mass representative was a woman, Hua Yinfeng, a child-bride and national labour model from a state pig farm in Jinhua. She was also elected as a vice-chairman of the ZPRC. Hua was probably an example of those labour models, described by Teiwes, as more conservative, more attuned to working with established authority, and better able to adjust to the process of rebuilding the political system, than their rebel colleagues. Teiwes, Provincial Leadership in China, p.41. For a list of known members of the standing committee of the ZPRC, see Appendix B.
146. ZPS, 24 March 1968, SWB, FE/2730/B/15-17; ZPS, 26 March 1968, ibid., FE/2733/B/4-7.
147. ZPS, 2 April 1968, ibid., FE/2741/B/14-16. While this plenum was in session the dismissal of acting chief of the PLA General Staff, Yang Chengwu, was announced by Lin Biao in Beijing. Yang's dismissal ushered in a renewed period of leftist upsurge across China.
148. ZPS, 5 April 1968, ibid., FE/2744/B/3-6; ZPS, 15 April 1968, URS, 51:11 (7 May 1968), pp.131-2; ZPS, 16 April 1968, ibid., pp.134-7; ZPS, 18, 19 April 1968, SWB, FE/2755/B/6.
149. For details of Xue's political career, see 'Xue Ju - Newly Elected Governor of Zhejiang', I & S, 19:10

- (1983), pp.82-7, Appendix E (2) of this thesis.
150. ZPS, 2 April 1968, SWB, FE/2740/B/11-13; ZPS, 15 April 1968, URS, 51:11, pp.132-4; ZPS, 16 April 1968, ibid., pp.138-9; ZPS, 21 April 1968, SWB, FE/2755/B/6; ZPS, 28 April 1968, URS, 51:11, pp.139-42.
 151. PR, No. 19 (10 May 1968), pp.3-4; the Red Flag commentary appeared in RMRB on 27 April 1968. See SCMM, 635 (2 December 1968), pp.35-7. See also the joint editorial of People's Daily, Liberation Army Daily, and Red Flag of 1 May 1968 in SCMP, 4170 (3 May 1968), pp.1-3.
 152. Problems in the rural areas of Zhejiang were revealed in an editorial of late March. See ZPS, 27 March 1968, SWB, FE/2738/B/17-18.
 153. CNA, 731, p.3. The writer dated this trend in June but I believe that it was apparent as early as April. One could argue that the whole course of the Cultural Revolution witnessed such a process, in Zhejiang at least.
 154. ZPS, 31 May 1968, SWB, FE/2794/B/4-5.
 155. ZPS, 26 May 1968, ibid., FE/2782/B/13-14. Exactly one year later to the day Red Storm and United Headquarters signed an agreement which outwardly dissolved the two mass organisations.
 156. ZPS, 25 June 1968, ibid., FE/2808/B/12-13.
 157. ZPS, 14 May 1968, ibid., FE/2776/B/8-9.
 158. ZPS, 20 May 1968, ibid., FE/2777/B/4; ZPS, 30 May 1968, ibid., FE/2786/B/10-11; ZPS, 3 June 1968, ibid., FE/2790/B/18-19. At a meeting held in Beijing on 27 March 1968, Jiang Qing had maligned Tan as a traitor. Ji Xizhen, 'Yichang hanwei', p.2.
 159. ZPS, 13 June 1968, SWB, FE/2798/B/4; ZPS, 27 June 1968, ibid., FE/2810/B/23-4; ZPS, 28 June 1968, ibid., FE/2814/B/17-18.
 160. See ZPS, 5 July 1968, ibid., FE/2817/B/16-17.
 161. ZPS, 7 July 1968, ibid., FE/2823/B/12-14; ibid., FE/2828/B/18-20.
 162. Qiu Honggen, op. cit. Factional fighting in the factories of Hangzhou flared up again. United Headquarters' leaders at the Hangzhou Silk Complex deliberately started a fire in the mill's boiler-room on 9 July 1968 causing damage estimated at 20,000 yuan and injuring several people. HZRB, 17 April 1979.

163. Zhejiang Provincial Workers Congress and Hangzhou Municipal Revolutionary Trade Union Council, 'Smash the criminal plot to subvert the Red political power', ZJRB, 11 October 1968, SCMP (Supplement - S), 239 (29 November 1968), pp.17-21. Other critics attacked the ZPRC from the left using such slogans as 'election by the whole people', and demanded the smashing of the state organs. They maligned the revolutionary committees as committees of the Guomindang. ZPS, 15 July 1968, SWB, FE/2828/B/16-18. These attacks, and the way in which they were phrased, seemed to owe their rhetoric to the programme of the Hunan ultra-leftist group Shengwulian. For statements of its position see Classified Chinese Communist Documents: A Selection, (Taipei, 1978), pp.269-73; China: The Revolution is Dead - Long Live the Revolution (Montreal, 1979), pp.153-70.
164. 'Notice of the Central Committee, State Council, CC Military Affairs Commission and Cultural Revolution Group', 3 July 1968, Chien, pp.295-7; 'Notice of *ibid*', 24 July 1968, *ibid.*, pp.297-300.
165. Wansui, (1969), pp.687-716.
166. RMRB, 5 August 1968, p.1.
167. The following paragraphs are based on ZPS, 7 July 1968, SWB, FE/2823/B/12; ZPS, 26 July 1968, *ibid.*, FE/2840/B/8-9; ZPS, 26 July 1968, *ibid.*, FE/2835/B/12-13; ZPS, 27 July 1968, *ibid.*, FE/2846/B/17; ZPS, 28 July 1968, *ibid.*, FE/2834/B/16-17. Polish Press Agency (PAP), 28 July 1968, *ibid.*, FE/2835/B/16; ZPS, 8 August 1968, *ibid.*, FE/2846/B/20; ZPS, 9 August 1968, *ibid.*, FE/2856/B/14-15; ZPS, 25 August 1968, *ibid.*, FE/2862/B/8-9; ZPS, 28 August 1968, *ibid.*, B/9-10; ZPS, 31 August 1968, *ibid.*, FE/2865/B/36; ZPS, 4 September 1968, *ibid.*, FE/2870/B/3-4; ZPS, 6 September 1968, *ibid.*, FE/2883/B/28; ZPS, 28 September 1968, *ibid.*, FE/2889/B/24-5; ZJRB, 11 October 1968, SCMP (S), 239, pp.14-16; ZPS, 15 October 1968, *ibid.*, FE/2908/B1/10; ZPS, 4 November 1968, *ibid.*, FE/2926/B1/3; ZPS, 18 November 1968, *ibid.*, FE/2930/B/3; ZPS, 27 November 1968, *ibid.*, FE/2949/B1/10; ZPS, 1 December 1968, *ibid.*, B1/2-3; ZPS, 5 December 1968, *ibid.*, B1/7; ZPS, 6 December 1968, *ibid.*, B1/3-6; ZPS, 8 December 1968, *ibid.*, B1/6-7; ZPS, 17 December 1968, *ibid.*, FE/2955/B/8-9; ZPS, 14 July 1969, URS, 56:9 (29 July 1969), pp.127-8; CNA, 731, p.5; Qiu Honggen, *op. cit.*
168. Propaganda teams composed of 'proletarian revolutionaries' had left Hangzhou for Ningbo, Shaoxing, Jiaxing and Jinhua on 5 July. ZPS, 6 July 1968, *ibid.*, FE/2824/B/11.

169. Given the incomprehensibility of the Wenzhou dialect to even the natives of the surrounding districts of Zhejiang, the propaganda teams would have needed to rely on interpreters to understand the abuse!
170. ZPS, 31 July 1968, SWB, FE/2839/B/16-18; ZPS, 1 August 1968, ibid., FE/2841/B/11. See also the ZJRB editorials, ZPS, 21 July 1968, ibid., FE/2835/B/15-16; ZPS, 24 July 1968, ibid., B/13-15.
171. ZPS, 10 August 1968, ibid., FE/2846/B/12-17.
172. An editorial of Zhejiang Daily of 19 July 1968 analysed a similar phenomenon in Zhuji county, Shaoxing district. It asked: 'In earlier periods of the great proletarian cultural revolution in Zhuji county, why was resistance so powerful? Why was the struggle by force so serious? Why were the conservative forces so strong?' One reason it supplied was that 'The cobras who hide themselves under the cloak of old Party members, old cadres, old revolutionaries and old guerrillas have remained in their own localities for more than a decade or even several decades.' ZPS, 19 July 1968, ibid., FE/2832/B23.
173. ZPS, 17 August 1968, ibid., FE/2852/B/16-18; ZPS, 31 August 1968, ibid., FE/2863/B/7-8.
174. ZPS, 11 September 1968, ibid., FE/2872/B/6-7; Bulgaria News Agency (BTA), 16 October 1968, ibid., FE/2908/B/10.
175. ZPS, 13 and 16 September 1968, ibid., FE/2877/B/14-16, 17-18. On 9 and 26 September 1968 the ZPRC issued further notices against 'counter-revolutionary' activity. Qiu Honggen, op. cit.
176. The CCP HMC Propaganda Department criticism group, 'The new-born counter-revolutionary He Xianchun', HZRB, 20 June 1977.
177. H. Nelsen, 'Military Bureaucracy in the Cultural Revolution', AS, 14:4 (1974), p.378. These worker provosts apparently made themselves very unpopular by their abuse of power and excessive use of force. 'China's Revolutionary Committees', CS, 6:21 (6 December 1968); p.13.
178. ZPS, 14 August 1968, SWB, FE/2850/B/9-10.
179. Established in 1897 it is the oldest cotton mill in Hangzhou. After liberation three mills joined together to become known as the No. 1 cotton mill, and when a dyeing plant was added in 1959, it had 6,200 employees on the payroll. In September 1977 the dyeing mill was placed under separate management, leaving 4,649 employees remaining on the payroll. Visit to No. 1

cotton mill, 1 April 1979.

180. ZPS, 20 August 1968, SWB, FE/2856/B/17-18; ZPS, 24 August 1968, ibid., FE/2859/B/40.
181. ZPS, 24 August 1968, ibid., FE/2862/B/8. These four districts had advanced furthest along the road to unity. By late August 1968 Hangzhou municipality and Shaoxing and Jinhua districts had established revolutionary committees. Jiaxing formed its committee on 16 September. The southern districts of Lishui, Taizhou and Wenzhou lagged considerably behind their northern counterparts, as did the eastern districts of Ningbo and Zhoushan Islands.
182. ZPS, 25 August 1968, ibid., FE/2862/B/10-11; ZPS, 7 and 9 September 1968, ibid., FE/2883/B/28.
183. ZPS, 7 October 1968, ibid., FE/2904/B/11.
184. ZPS, 30 August 1968, ibid., FE/2869/B/36-8.
185. ZPS, 20 September 1968, cited in CNA, 731, p.5.
186. ZPS, 19 October 1968, SWB, FE/2910/B/5-6.
187. ZPS, 28 December 1968, ibid., FE/2966/B/6.
188. ZPS, 27 September 1968, ibid., FE/2887/B/7; ZPS, 30 September 1968, ibid., FE/2895/B/15-17.
189. ZPS, 13 October 1968, ibid., FE/2904/B/4-5.
190. Important Documents on the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution in China, (Beijing, 1970), p.186.
191. ZPS, 21 December 1968, SWB, FE/2960/B/8-11.
192. That this resolution was directed chiefly at Wu Xian was revealed in 'Zhonggong zhejiang shengweihui de pohuai yu chongjian', Zhonggong nianbao, 1971 (Taipei, 1971), 3:19.
193. An editorial celebrating the first anniversary of the establishment of the ZPRC, which was published on 23 March 1969, bore out this prediction. It declared that one of the major struggles in Zhejiang since November 1968 had concerned the elimination of the influence of the February 1967 'adverse current'. ZPS, 23 March 1969, SWB, FE/3034/B/1-3.
- ~~194. The first prominent victims in Zhejiang were deputy-governor Ren Yili who had, prior to liberation, allegedly betrayed members of his party branch, and a certain Yu who had crossed over to the enemy in 1929 and become a special agent. Jiang Hua allegedly knew about these senior cadres' past but defended them with the words, 'giving oneself up is justified~~

- and reneging is no crime'. ZPS, 11 July 1968, *ibid.*, FE/2823/B/11-12.
195. ZPS, 6 November 1968, SWB, FE/2926/B1/3.
196. ZPS, 15 November 1968, *ibid.*, FE/2928/B/1-5; ZPS, 16 November 1968, *ibid.*, FE/2929/B/10-11; ZPS, 18 November 1968, *ibid.*, FE/2931/B1/1; ZPS, 18 November 1968, *ibid.*, FE/2930/B/3; ZPS, 19 November 1968, *ibid.*, FE/2933/B/3-6.
197. ZPS, 10 November 1968, *ibid.*, FE/2924/B/24-5; see also ZPS, 29 October 1968, *ibid.*, FE/2921/B1/1.
198. ZPS, 2 December 1968, *ibid.*, FE/2942/B/12-13.
199. ZPS, 7 December 1968, *ibid.*, FE/2949/B1/8-9; ZPS, 9 December 1968, *ibid.*, FE/2948/B/6-8.
200. A further rally to denounce Xue Ju was held on 6 December. ZPS, 6 December 1968, *ibid.*, FE/2949/B/9.
201. See the editorials of Zhejiang Daily, ZPS, 13 December 1968, *ibid.*, FE/2957/B1/3-5; ZPS, 15 December 1968, *ibid.*, FE/2955/B/6-7.
202. See ZPS, 25 December 1968, FE/2960/B/11-13.
203. See ZPS, 10 April 1969, *ibid.*, FE/3051/B1/11; ZPS, 20 April 1969, *ibid.*, FE/3063/B/2-3.
204. ZPS, 10 May 1969, *ibid.*, FE/3075/BII/5.
205. ZPS, 16 May 1969, *ibid.*, FE/3082/BII/4-5.
206. ZPS, 22 April 1969, *ibid.*, FE/3064/B1/2.
207. ZPS, 17 May 1969, *ibid.*, FE/3081/BII/2-5; ZPS, 1 June 1969, *ibid.*, FE/3096/B/4-5.
208. ZPS, 27 May 1969, URS, 56:9, pp.120-123.
209. ZPS, 27 May 1969, SWB, FE/3086/B/10-13.
210. Qiu Honggen, *op. cit.*
211. See CCP HMC Organisation Department Criticism Group, 'A Gang who caused "earthquakes" every day', HZRB, 17 September 1977.
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212. Jiang Baodi, a silk worker at the Hangzhou spun silk fabric Mill appeared as a member of the standing committee of the ZPRC at the end of May. A Navy commander, Xie Zhenghao, later joined the ZPRC also as a vice-chairman. ZPS, 1 August 1969, SWB, FE/3145/B/1-2. He was almost certainly a supporter of Red Storm.

213. ZPS, 28 July 1969, URS, 56:9, pp.124-6; ZPS, 13 August 1969, SWB, FE/3159/B/4-5.
214. Zhejiang's three most powerful party/military leaders, Nan Ping, Chen Liyun and Xiong Yingtang all owed their rapid rise to political prominence to Lin Biao. Their acknowledgement of this fact was noted by China News Analysis in 1968 and 1969. See CNA, 731 p.2; 746 (28 February 1969), p.3. However controversy and dissatisfaction apparently continued within Zhejiang's military elite over the August 1967 'two reorganizations'. In January 1969, a conference was convened in Beijing to try and clear up the issue but it apparently ended in a stalemate. Former commander of the ZPMD, Zhang Xiulong, did not resume work for nearly ten years. From April 1976 until his retirement in August 1980 Zhang held the post of commander of the Hubei Provincial Military District. The purged political commissar of the ZPMD, Long Qian, also ended his career in another province. From 1973 until his death in 1979, Long held the posts of deputy political commissar and then political commissar of the Henan Provincial Military District, and standing committee membership of the CCP Henan Provincial Committee. Both Zhang, Long and their subordinates, who had suffered as a result of the August 1967 decision, were fully rehabilitated in September 1979 on the instructions of the CC Military Affairs Commission.
215. There has been considerable confusion over the number of provincial party congresses held in Zhejiang. After Liberation the party held a congress in Hangzhou in March 1950 which was named the 1st Zhejiang provincial congress of the CCP. Further congresses were convened in July 1956 (2nd), December 1959 to January 1960 (3rd), January 1971 (4th) and then in May 1978 which naturally would have been the 5th. However, sometime in 1977 or 1978 the provincial authorities decided that the first congress had in fact been held in July 1939 in Pingyang county, Wenzhou District. See ZJRB, 21 June 1981. Therefore the congress of May 1978 was numbered the 6th and all the others adjusted accordingly, making the January 1971 the fifth, not the fourth as it was called at the time. The suggestion that the Gang of Four had been responsible for this past neglect of the pre-liberation congress is therefore clearly ludicrous.
216. HZRB, 31 January 1971.
- ~~217. Even by Goodman's definition of 'outsider', the Zhejiang provincial elite in 1968, and even more so in 1971, was dominated by outsiders. Goodman, 'The Provincial Revolutionary Committee', p.77.~~
218. For a list of the members of the standing committee of the CCP ZPC, see Appendix C. Scalapino's breakdown

of the career profile of the three full secretaries in Zhejiang into two military personnel and one party administrator is incorrect. See R.A. Scalapino, 'The CCP's Provincial Secretaries', PoC, 25:4 (1976), p.27. The PLA's representation on the CCP ZPC secretariat was well above the national average as computed by Goodman. See 'The Provincial Revolutionary Committee', p.71.

Chapter Three

RENEWED DISORDER, 1972-4

The previous chapter of this thesis has outlined the origin and development of the antagonism between the two mass organisations of Zhejiang. Both vied for recognition as the sole Maoist proletarian revolutionary group in the province. Both ultimately failed to achieve this goal. In the process they engaged in two years of fierce confrontation that engulfed the military forces, which had been given the near-impossible task of deciding which side really represented the left. Both mass organisations sought to win over military allies to their cause. However the PLA units in Zhejiang failed to reach a consensus on this highly sensitive and critical issue.

Because of the failure of United Headquarters and Red Storm to achieve hegemony over the mass movement, the only viable and sensible alternative left open was to force them to the conference-table. But such questions as the terms of the alliance and judgment on the rights and wrongs of past events delayed reconciliation and also sabotaged agreements almost as soon as they were signed. Unity of the two organisations was also a prerequisite to a three-way alliance of military, civilian cadres and mass representatives brought together to form revolutionary committees.

Therefore both groups were expected to make concessions not only on matters of principle but also on questions concerning the number and seniority of their delegates to the new

organs of power.

Although leaders of both mass organisations played a very minor role on the executives of the revolutionary committees and the reconstituted party committees they did acquire token representation on these bodies. Factional loyalties and memories of past battles remained strong even while a measure of normalcy returned to the political scene. Mutual ties and associations which had been forged between both mass organisations and various military and civilian cadres assumed increasing importance. Factionalism had become an integral part of the political system.

This chapter discusses the factional politics of the years 1972-4 following the demise of Lin Biao in 1971. With the removal of Lin's military followers in 1972, a new provincial leadership was installed in Zhejiang. Apart from expunging the influence of their predecessors these new arrivals implemented a programme of economic restoration under the direction of Beijing. They also brought back prominent former leaders of the pre-Cultural Revolution party committee to supply extra administrative talent. United Headquarters' personnel came under pressure for their past associations with the discredited military leadership.

However, beginning in 1973 disagreements over the pace and extent of the reforms which had been put in place across China threatened the unity of the central leadership. Mao had clearly been shaken by Lin's defection and had allowed Zhou Enlai to introduce policies designed to stimulate the economy and strengthen social and political order. But he was not prepared to countenance complete rejection of the

ideals of the Cultural Revolution. Therefore in 1973-4 he mobilised a renewed commitment to the objectives of the Cultural Revolution and thereby revived memories of events which had badly divided the CCP and would continue to do so.

This renewed radical thrust triggered off the re-emergence of mass organisation leaders who had entered the political fray in the turmoil of the mid 1960's. Many activists of the Cultural Revolution had been admitted into the CCP in the intervening years but their career prospects were blocked and threatened by the increasing number of older cadres returning to their posts after 1972. The desire to uphold and continue the policies and goals of the Cultural Revolution thus clashed with the equally determined efforts to modify and adulterate them. With central leaders looking for support in the provincial administrations, increased volatility was introduced into an already unstable situation. Zhejiang was one province highly vulnerable to external pressure; factional bitterness ran deep and the new leadership had not had enough time to consolidate its authority.

Beginning in 1973 the pre-Cultural Revolution mass organisations, the Womens' Federation, the Trade Union Council and the CYL were reformed. Leaders of the rebel workers of the Cultural Revolution joined trade union councils, while former Red Guards were elected to posts in the CYL. Then in 1974 urban militia commands were established in large towns and cities under trade union leadership and responsible to municipal party committees, rather than to the provincial military district and its subordinate commands. Rebel leaders in Hangzhou were able to

draft thousands of factory workers into armed contingents whose activities gave substance to their bid to build up a powerful strike force capable of taking the offensive to the streets. They also antagonised PLA leaders who resented the militia's usurpation of its public security, patrol and guard duties.

In 1968 the mass organisations had been controlled and supervised by the military. In 1974 former mass organisation leaders had attained positions in the established power structure without a concomitant knowledge of or respect for traditions associated with bureaucratic power. They therefore posed a much greater threat to the provincial leadership by their ability to both destabilise it from within and apply pressure from outside the system. With conflicting signals being flashed from Beijing, the Zhejiang provincial party leadership in turn had no option but to mobilise all the forces at its disposal for its own defence.

The intensity of the conflict in Zhejiang built up to dangerous levels in 1974. Outside manipulation from central leaders weakened the authority of the provincial administration to cope with anarchic forces. Zhejiang became a testing ground for the resolution of disputes which had implications for the country as a whole but whose specific form was shaped by local events. It was only when, in 1975, central leaders realised the danger of continued instability in Zhejiang and acted in concert to check it, that the Zhejiang problem was resolved. But compromise prevented effective implementation of this decision, as chapter four of this thesis will illustrate.

A new provincial leadership, 1972

The party, government and military leadership of Zhejiang was heavily implicated in the Lin Biao affair. Chen Liyun, secretary of the CCP ZPC, 1st vice-chairman of the ZPRC, and political commissar of the ZPMD and the 5th Air Force had apparently committed his unit to Lin's faction. Chen had also become an inner member of the 'special fleet' controlled by Lin's son Lin Ligu, which had been assigned the task of assassinating Mao and his close advisers.

After Mao had initiated criticism of Lin's supporters among the central military leadership at the 2nd plenum of the 9th CC, held at Lushan from August to September 1970, Chen's unit came under open scrutiny. A report of January 1971¹ pointed out that

Last year, some 'three support and two military' personnel of these units did not fully understand the new situation, which had emerged as a result of the new leap forward in socialist revolution and construction.

The report further indicated that the party committee and leading organs of the 5th Air Force 'have carried out an education movement ... to guard against arrogance and self-complacency and to promote modesty and prudence.'

During his tour of southern provinces in August/September 1971, Mao stopped in Hangzhou from 3-10 September. He apparently already suspected Chen of involvement in the Lin Biao conspiracy.² Lin's aeroplane crashed on 13 September and one week later Chen was arrested for isolated examination.³ Investigation of the plot allegedly revealed

that Chen's 5th Air Force had been cultivated as a 'basic strength' of the Lin Biao group with the 20th Army stationed in Zhejiang counted as an 'auxiliary strength'.⁴ The central authorities therefore despatched the commander of the Nanjing Military Region, Xu Shiyou, to Hangzhou to take charge of the purge of Lin's followers in the military.⁵

First secretary Nan Ping and commander of the ZPMD Xiong Yingtang, who were also political commissar and commander respectively of the 20th Army, had clearly been compromised by revelations concerning the Lin Biao incident. Xu therefore was probably also charged with the responsibility of recommending a new leadership to Beijing. He chose a veteran cadre Tan Qilong,⁶ who had headed the CCP ZPC in the early fifties, to replace Nan as 1st party secretary, chairman of the ZPRC and 1st political commissar of the ZPMD. As Tan's deputy Xu selected the surprise choice of Tie Ying,⁷ then political commissar of the strategically important Zhoushan island base located off the coast of Zhejiang.⁸ It appears that the central authorities did not appoint a new commander of the ZPMD to replace Xiong. In fact this post was vacant until July 1975. Dai Kelin, a 3rd Field Army veteran who had been deputy-commander of the military district since 1966, and who had sided with the Maoist forces in the Cultural Revolution, may have assumed the title of acting commander in the intervening three years.

Tan had worked as the head of both the Zhejiang and Shandong provincial party committees before the Cultural Revolution. After his reemergence in 1969 he had been appointed to Fujian as secretary of the provincial party

committee. He therefore had ample experience in provincial administration and had spent five years working in Zhejiang from 1949-54. The central authorities clearly recognised that Zhejiang required an infusion of personnel who had some familiarity with its administration and socio-economic situation. Not only had the purged leaders replaced by Tan and Tie been military cadres, they had also been complete outsiders to the province.

Tie's meteoric rise, on the other hand, is not so easily explained. He had no previous experience in non-military affairs and his military status did not make him an automatic choice for a provincial-level appointment. Perhaps his prior work in various posts in the Nanjing Military Region and his handling of rebel activities in the Cultural Revolution had brought him to Xu's notice.

Following the meeting of April 1972 convened by Zhou Enlai, the Central Committee issued a document dated 25 April 1972⁹ announcing the reshuffle of the Zhejiang leadership. At the May Day rally of 1972 held on 30 April, Tan and Tie made their first public appearances in Hangzhou since their appointments. Nan and Xiong also attended the rally and were listed first and third in the provincial hierarchy, shadowed by Tan and Tie as second and fourth respectively.¹⁰ It was to be Nan and Xiong's last appearance in Hangzhou,¹¹ and a humiliating departure from public life.

The influence of Lin Biao and Cultural Revolution leftism on the administration of Zhejiang certainly extended beyond Chen Liyun, Nan Ping and Xiong Yingtang. For the

remainder of the year Tan and Tie led a concerted campaign, which had been initiated in Beijing, to criticise revisionism (Lin Biao) and rectify the style of work (pixiu zhengfeng). A deputy-political commissar of the ZPMD, Xia Qi,¹² who had been sent to Zhejiang from the Nanjing Military Region in late 1970, led the campaign against leftism in the local military.¹³

In December 1972 the CCP ZPC held a work meeting at Mt Pingfeng, on the south-west outskirts of Hangzhou, to assess the progress of the pixiu zhengfeng campaign. Lai Keke, who now ranked third on the provincial party committee behind Tan and Tie and had joined the Maoist cause in the Cultural Revolution, was forced to answer for his past stand and actions. Lai apparently admitted that he had committed errors under the influence of Lin Biao's ultra-leftist line and said, at the meeting, 'I can never repudiate or reverse the verdict on this.'¹⁴

The meeting also decided to allow former leading members of the CCP ZPC to resume work. They included Chen Weida, former secretary of the pre-Cultural Revolution secretariat, who was appointed deputy-secretary of the CCP ZPC. Chen had been named in a Central Committee document of January 1967 for disobeying central edicts. He had taken party files and documents containing 'black material' about rebel leaders and fled to the safety of ZPMD headquarters in Hangzhou. ~~The resultant confrontation between the military and United Headquarters had helped spark off the bitter two-year dispute between the two mass organisations in Zhejiang.~~

The other most prominent cadre 'liberated' at this time was Chen Bing. Both Chen's had been loyal lieutenants of Jiang Hua in Zhejiang from 1957-66. Chen Bing had been a member of the old CCP ZPC standing committee and head of its propaganda department. Jiang had also appointed him leader of Zhejiang's Cultural Revolution Group in 1966. He had disappeared from view in the turmoil of events in 1966-7 and reemerged at this time as a member of the standing committee of the CCP ZPC.¹⁵ A former deputy of Chen's in the propaganda department, Shang Jingcai, also resumed work as a leading member of the political work group (zhengzhi gongzuo zu),¹⁶ the Cultural Revolution replacement for the old provincial propaganda and organisation departments. Undoubtedly other middle and higher-ranking bureaucrats returned to their desks under this planned and coordinated programme.

To accommodate the large numbers of officials returning to office the authorities decided to restore aspects of the pre-Cultural Revolution bureaucratic structure. In the Cultural Revolution the bureaucracy had been somewhat simplified, with departments and bureaux being amalgamated. Early in 1973 the HMRC moved to replace the all-embracing groups (zu) with the former more specialised systems (kou). This reform had the added advantages of providing extra places for officials returning to work after an enforced six-year absence and placing these veterans in positions of seniority above their younger colleagues who had emerged from the mass movement.¹⁷

Tan Qilong and Tie Ying not only began the settlement

of accounts with Lin Biao's military followers and leftist civilian cadres such as Lai Keke, but they directly confronted the former leaders of United Headquarters, Zhang Yongsheng, Weng Senhe and He Xianchun. These former rebels and their supporters were apparently forced to confess responsibility for armed struggle and attacks on military barracks in the years 1967-8. Simultaneously, and in a move which would further revive old passions, a leader of Red Storm was released from prison.¹⁸ It appeared that the history of these tumultuous years was in the process of being rewritten, and the balance sheet redrawn.

Zhang Yongsheng had not played a very active role in provincial politics since the demobilisation of the Red Guards and wind-down of the Cultural Revolution at the end of 1968. He remained vice-chairman of the ZPRC, chairman of the Zhejiang Red Guards Congress, and chairman of the revolutionary committee at his alma mater, the Zhejiang Fine Arts College (Zhejiang meishu xueyuan). This prestigious institute, where the famous painter Pan Tianshou had once served as president, had been relocated outside Hangzhou in December 1970.¹⁹ This move was considered essential to the so-called revolutionisation in the arts. The college was also suitably renamed the Zhejiang Worker-Peasant Fine Arts Institute to improve its proletarian credentials and image.

Zhang presumably moved to the countryside with the college, a factor which probably accounted for his less frequent public appearances in Hangzhou. The college resumed its classes at Nanbao brigade, Yinzhu commune in Tonglu county, approximately two hour's drive south-west from

Hangzhou. Nanbao brigade, under its secretary Li Jinyong, seems to have achieved a measure of fame in the years 1969-70 as an advanced unit in the study of Mao's thinking as well as in production.²⁰ Zhang most likely was responsible for the regular publicity about this brigade after his 'rustication'.²¹

Zhang's colleague, Weng Senhe, had started working at the Hangzhou Silk Complex as a screen printer in 1963 after a year working at the Hangzhou Chemical Fibre Plant.²² At an early stage of the Cultural Revolution, Weng switched his allegiance from Red Storm to United Headquarters and when his mill established a revolutionary committee on 31 March 1968, he was elected vice-chairman. He later became a standing committee member of the ZPRC and an alternate member of the CCP ZPC at its fifth congress in 1971.

The third member of the trio, He Xianchun, had been a lowly-paid worker at the Hangzhou Heavy Machinery Factory at the outbreak of the Cultural Revolution. He became chairman of the Hangzhou Revolutionary Workers Committee (gegonghui), later renamed the Hangzhou Workers Congress (gongdaihui) and was instrumental in the establishment of the municipal social order command, whose activities were referred to in the previous chapter. He had also become vice-chairman of the HMRC sometime before 1971.²³ He Xianchun was in addition to these posts, a standing committee member of the ZPRC and probably an alternate member of the CCP ZPC.

After the flight of Lin Biao, but before the re-organisation of the provincial leadership was announced,

the three former rebel leaders and their leftist civilian allies apparently claimed that they were 'sufferers of Lin Biao's line' and 'heroes in opposing Lin Biao'. They described the discussion of such issues as the attack on the military barracks and raids on Xiaoshan and Zhuji carried out in 1967 as 'counter-revolutionary'. They saw, correctly, that criticism of the left implied negation of the Cultural Revolution, and fiercely objected.²⁴

The arrival of Tan and Tie in April 1972 apparently resulted in the three rebels coming under pressure to admit responsibility for their past excesses. Weng Senhe allegedly promised to turn over a new leaf while Zhang and He reined in their enthusiasm. They later went to ground, going away on fishing trips or entering hospital on that common complaint perhaps best described as 'politicitis'.²⁵ 1972 was clearly not a good year for the ex-rebel leaders and they could only hope to sit things out and wait for better times.

Overall then, Tan Qilong and Tie Ying, backed by Xu Shiyou in Nanjing took the offensive after their arrival in Hangzhou. Policy initiatives from Beijing helped them set about restoring the provincial economy and normalising party and social life. Zhou Enlai led the way in instituting a whole range of policies, relating to the economy, cadres and intellectuals. Their general thrust was directed against the leftism of the Cultural Revolution. In key editorials and articles published under his direction or reflecting ideas that he advanced in important unpublished speeches, Zhou tentatively suggested a restoration of

certain pre-Cultural Revolution policies.²⁶ But after he proposed a systematic critique of leftist ideology²⁷ Mao balked. On 17 December 1972, in a talk with unknown listeners Mao categorised Lin as an 'ultra-rightist, revisionist, splitter, schemer and intriguer, and traitor to the Party and the country.'²⁸

Leftist revival and the reconstitution of mass organisations, 1973

It seems to have been Wang Hongwen's visit to Hangzhou in January 1973 that paved the way for resurgence of the Cultural Revolution radicals in Zhejiang. Wang most probably left Beijing with a brief to explain to provincial leaders such as Tan and Tie Mao's sudden change of mind regarding the nature of Lin Biao's political errors.²⁹ In speeches he delivered at factories such as the Hangzhou Silk Complex and other units in Hangzhou and Jiaxing - a city midway between Shanghai and Hangzhou - Wang questioned the correctness of the pixiu zhengfeng campaign of the previous year.

Wang claimed that the movement had gone too far ('gaole kuodahua'), had suppressed a faction and become 'entangled in old historical scores'. He brazenly announced that he had come to 'pour some cold water on this'. Wang met Weng Senhe on his visit to the silk complex and allegedly encouraged him to prepare for further battles.³⁰ Wang and Weng had both achieved notoriety for their exploits in the Cultural Revolution. Both had rebelled

very early against the party leadership in their respective textile mills and both had played major roles in the leadership of workers' organisations in the cities of Shanghai and Hangzhou. Wang had already achieved high political office and undoubtedly provided an inspiration to Weng to do likewise. Wang's belief that the rebels had to gain positions of power would also have struck the right chord with Weng and his associates.

The upshot of Wang's visit, apart from the devastating impact it would have had on the new provincial leadership, was a gradual redirection of propaganda in line with Mao's wishes. On occasions, however, it appeared highly unconvincing, reflecting both the confusion in the minds of local officials and their reluctance to fall into line. A commentary in Zhejiang Daily of January 1973 stated that 'swindlers like Liu Shaoqi' sometimes appeared leftist in their actions but actually they were extreme-right. However the examples given to substantiate the argument were clearly all policy deviations to the left.³¹

The PLA in Zhejiang seemed equally confused or reluctant to go along.³² The abruptness of the 180° turn necessitated the despatch of large numbers of cadres to the grass-roots to clarify the position with local officials.³³ No doubt they were bemused to learn that Lin Biao had opposed the Cultural Revolution. Even as late as August 1973, on the eve of the 10th Congress of the CCP it was admitted that some people still did not understand the substantive reasons behind the campaign against Lin.³⁴

Before the convention of the party's National

Congress the provincial party committees had the task of choosing delegates as well as reconstituting the pre-Cultural Revolution mass organisations - the Trade Union Council, the CYL, and the Women's Federation. All three bodies had become defunct in 1967, the former two being replaced, to some extent, by the Workers Congress and Red Guards Congress. However membership of the Workers Congress was generally restricted to worker rebels of the Cultural Revolution who tended to be younger, less-skilled workers. Veteran workers had lost a body to represent their interests. Red Guards Congresses also attracted a certain type of political activist and did not cater for students whose skills were academic or professional.

Of the three bodies it was the struggle for control of the Trade Union Council which galvanised the contending parties into greatest activity in Zhejiang. In April 1973 the Central Committee issued directives to 'rectify and cleanse' the workers' congresses as a prelude to the reestablishment of the Trade Union Councils. Weng Senhe and He Xianchun who were influential figures in the provincial and municipal workers' congresses (gongdaihui) apparently wished to structure the trade union council (gonghui) on the basis of the existing bodies. They proposed the purely superficial measure of removing the character dai from the organisations under their control, otherwise leaving their membership and leadership intact. They boycotted meetings of the preparatory group established by the ZPC to convene the provincial trade union congress because, according to Weng, 'at the moment we

certainly can't get much out of it'. At the Hangzhou Cable Factory He Xianchun tried to implement the window-dressing change favoured by He and Weng, only to succeed in dividing the workers present at the meeting.³⁵

Weng and He may have delayed the convocation of the trade union congress by their tactics of non-cooperation but they could not prevent its eventual opening. In April 1973 the ZPC convened a forum of the preparatory group³⁶ at which veteran union leaders apparently criticised Weng and He's factional schemes.³⁷ Three months later, in July 1973, 1,600 delegates and 100 invited representatives filed into the opening session of the 6th provincial congress of the ZPTUC. The delegates had been selected from four specific groups - activists of the Cultural Revolution and pixiu zhengfeng movement, model workers, advanced producers, and members of the Mao Zedong Thought propaganda teams. 30% of the delegates were female, 25% young workers and 70% of the total came from the industrial work force.

If delegates from the four categories received equal representation at the congress, the number of Cultural Revolution activists would not have been great. Tan Qilong, in the opening speech to the Congress, stressed the importance of unity among the working class.³⁸ But this appeared to be a unity, as Tie Ying stressed in the closing address, based on a clear recognition of right and wrong. Tie stated firmly that

We must strive to unite not only with comrades who share our views but also with those who hold different views.

We must also work on uniting with those who formerly opposed us and have since been proved wrong.³⁹

Tie, in referring to those who 'have since been proved wrong', was clearly firing a salvo at Zhang, Weng, He and the old United Headquarters organisation. The verdict on the events of 1967-9 had clearly been reversed to the benefit of Red Storm. Tie's division of the working class of Zhejiang into clearly delineated groups was a stark reminder of the impact of the factionalism which had been engendered in the Cultural Revolution.

The lack of unity at the congress was revealed by the fact that it was a naval cadre and not a trade union leader who delivered the main report. To assuage the feelings of the former rebels Chai Qikun, deputy-secretary of the CCP ZPC, mentioned in his report that since the Cultural Revolution a large number of advanced workers had been admitted into the CCP, and that many had been promoted to leading positions at various levels. However the real test of their power came in the election of the provincial trade union leadership. The delegates elected a committee of 120, 30% being women, which elected a 27-strong standing committee. This body in turn elected an executive consisting of nine members, a chairman and eight vice-chairmen.

Of the nine executive members details of the identity and probable allegiance of eight are known. Jiang Baodi, apparently known as Hangzhou's Wu Guixian, after the female textile worker from Xian who rose to become an alternate member of the Politburo of the CCP 10th CC and later Vice-Premier of the State Council, was elected

chairman of the ZPTUC. She had belonged to the Red Storm faction but in what capacity is unknown. Jiang may have been more amenable to manipulation by party leaders than other leaders of the organisation. She was also a standing committee member of both the CCP ZPC and ZPRC and an alternate member of the CCP 9th and later 10th CC.

The two senior vice-chairmen were veteran trade union officials, Xu Wanzhen and Chen Yousheng. Xu was the sister-in-law of Chen Weida, whose wife, Xu Wenhua, was at that time party secretary of the Foreign Languages Department of Hangzhou University. Xu Wanzhen had been vice-chairman of the pre-Cultural Revolution ZPTUC as well as executive member of the All-China Federation of Trade Unions. Chen Yousheng was a boiler expert who had been selected as a model worker in the Great Leap Forward.⁴⁰ He had been a delegate to the 2nd and 3rd NPC. Another veteran model worker who was elected vice-chairman was 'Red diving engineer' Yao Xingen, like Chen a product of the Great Leap Forward.⁴¹

Of the remaining five vice-chairmen, two, Guo Zhisong and Fang Jianwen, had been leaders of the former Red Storm organisation. Fang had led the Red Storm delegation to Beijing in March 1968 for talks with the central leaders prior to the formation of the ZPRC. Guo was to play a prominent but publicly unheralded role in the factional disturbances of 1973-4. Weng Senhe and He Xianchun were both elected vice-chairmen, and were listed sixth and eighth respectively. The remaining vice-chairman, Zhao Jingtang, certainly did not belong to Weng and He's group

as he was reelected to the position at the 7th provincial congress which was held in August 1978.⁴² By this time all former United Headquarters' leaders had been arrested.

If, as Chinese propaganda later claimed, Weng and He used their positions as vice-chairmen of the ZPTUC as a base to launch their assault on the provincial authorities, it was not due to their numerical strength on its executive. Through superior tactics and force of personality they may have outmanoeuvred their opponents. Nevertheless it was the apparent inability of the provincial and municipal authorities to prise the HMWC away from the iron grip of He Xianchun that spelled danger. He and his cohorts successfully resisted the tide of converting their organisation back to a trade union council and maintained it as a launching-pad for future activities.

The CYL congresses of Hangzhou and Zhejiang convened in April and May 1973. They also became battlegrounds of contention between Red Guard leaders of the former United Headquarters and Red Storm mass organisations. A report of February 1973⁴³ specified the categories from which delegates would be selected for the forthcoming congresses. They included a certain percentage of female representatives, little red soldiers, national minorities and qualified sons and daughters of 'dubious elements' who could be educated. Members of the leading groups, added the report, should be carefully screened and selected after repeated consultations. They should have made significant contributions since the Cultural Revolution in the economic, cultural or military fields and most would not

leave their posts after election to positions of responsibility. A certain percentage of the new leadership should have had previous experience in CYL work but their average age would be low with a fixed number of females gaining leadership posts.

From 10-14 March the CCP ZPC held a preparatory meeting to make concrete arrangements for the congresses.⁴⁴ Tie Ying addressed the sixty people present and stressed the bond between the League and the CCP. He almost certainly raised the issue of unity, as an editorial of Zhejiang Daily,⁴⁵ published on the same day as the above report, stated unambiguously

We must take into consideration the situation as a whole and overcome bourgeois factionalism while upholding the Party spirit of the proletariat.

The editorial enjoined the delegates to strive for unity whether their fellow-delegates shared their views or not, and 'even with those who formerly opposed us and have since been proved wrong in practice.' Tie Ying later repeated these exact words in his closing address to the Trade Union Congress giving credence to the assumption that the editorial reflected the spirit of his address to the CYL preparatory meeting.

The 5th provincial congress of the CYL opened on 16 May 1973 and closed one week later.⁴⁶ 1,432 delegates, 44% of whom were women, as well as Red Guard observers attended the opening ceremony. Tan Qilong delivered the opening address in which he asked his listeners to adhere to the general orientation of the pixiu zhengfeng campaign.

Wu Peisheng, who was elected the first of four secretaries, made a report entitled 'Strive to train the younger generation into successors to the revolutionary cause of the proletariat.' The Congress elected a committee of 103 members and 15 alternate members whose average age was 23.2 years. It in turn chose a standing committee of 15. Its executive of four secretaries and four deputy-secretaries included two women.⁴⁷

Little is known of the backgrounds of the members of this executive. Wu Peisheng was also vice-chairman of the Jiangshan county cement works in southern Zhejiang and a member of the ZPC. His factory had received a certain amount of publicity since 1970, particularly for its study of Marxist philosophy.⁴⁸ Two deputy-secretaries, Teng Zhu and Liu Ying, were former members of Red Storm but only Liu survived reelection to the executive of the 6th CYL Committee elected in August 1978.⁴⁹ Overall, only three of the eight secretaries were reelected at the following congress, perhaps an indication that they had been affiliated with Zhang, Weng and He's faction.

The third mass organisation to reconstitute itself was the Women's Federation. After the district branches held their congresses, in many cases the first they had ever convened,⁵⁰ the provincial meeting took place from 12-17 August 1973, just prior to the 10th Congress of the CCP. Over 1,000 delegates attended, most of whom, according to reports, were of peasant and worker origin. After listening to speeches and reports by Tan Qilong, Chai Qikun, Tie Ying and Chen Bing, all men, the women elected a committee

of 120 and it selected 21 women to comprise its standing committee. The executive consisted of a chairwoman and seven vice-chairwomen. Vice-chairman of the ZPRC and a member of the CCP ZPC, Hua Yinfeng was elected chairwoman.⁵¹ Although she had previously belonged to United Headquarters, like Jiang Baodi she had probably not been an influential or active member of this mass organisation and certainly presented no threat to the party leadership of Zhejiang.

The reports of the mass organisation congresses and other articles published prior to the 10th Congress devoted considerable space defending the achievements of the Cultural Revolution. They referred to the induction of young people and special groups such as women into the CCP and their promotion to positions of authority.⁵² Other media releases specifically praised policy achievements in the fields of rural health and education. New tertiary educational procedures and problems concerning the rustication of educated youth were discussed, while the correctness of their general orientation was affirmed. The perennial issue of cadre participation in manual labour also received attention.

Published side by side with these reports were articles extolling the achievements of the pixiu zhengfeng campaign and others describing the implementation of pragmatic economic policies. A model in this endeavour was the Hangzhou Iron and Steel Works. Sometime in 1968 a team from Chen Liyun's Unit 7350 had entered the factory to take over its management.⁵³ The air force personnel found that they lacked the expertise to run it properly. The mill

may well have been one of those observed by Tie Ying after his transfer to Hangzhou in 1972 where production had ceased, machinery had rusted up and its grounds had become overgrown with weeds.⁵⁴

By autumn 1972 the mill had recovered enough to send exhibits to the Guangzhou Trade Fair.⁵⁵ A Xinhua report of June 1973⁵⁶ attributed the production increases which had occurred in the first half of the year to persistent and sustained efforts to overcome splits and factionalism among the workers. The article attacked 'swindlers like Liu Shaoqi' for trying to divide the workers, and 'class enemies' who schemed to 'redefine classes' (chongxin huafen jieji) and who stated privately that 'if they unite we've had it' (tamen lianheqilai, women jiu yao daomeile). This last comment revealed more than the rest of the lengthy article about the tenuous nature of the solidarity of the workers in the mill.

Overall, the balance in propaganda⁵⁷ probably reflected the equilibrium in the national leadership between the forces of order and those favouring mobilisation. A shift in favour of the one group benefited those provincial groups which had attached themselves to its fortunes. These provincial politicians were then able to take advantage of their patrons' strength to bolster their own position and weaken that of their local opponents. While it proved difficult to deliver a knock-out blow, both sides persisted with this aim in mind.

In Zhejiang, Tan and Tie had the backing of the Nanjing Military Region commander Xu Shiyou, and Zhou Enlai.

After his recall to office in April 1973 Deng Xiaoping acted as a loyal deputy to Zhou. Tan and Tie's principal opponents Zhang Yongsheng, Weng Senhe and He Xianchun had ties with Jiang Qing and Wang Hongwen on which they could draw. At the provincial level Tan and Tie could count on the loyalty of Xia Qi and other military leaders of the ZPMD, rehabilitated cadres, veteran trade union leaders and workers, and probably the support of former Red Storm militants whose endorsement may have proved more a liability than an advantage. Zhang, Weng, and He could call on thousands of young factory workers in Hangzhou as well as college students who had formed the bulk of United Headquarters in the mid 60's. Additionally they could win over 'revolutionary leading cadres' such as Lai Keke, Wang Zida and Shen Ce who had come under suspicion in the pixiu zhengfeng campaign. They had maintained the HMWC as their organisational base. The contest between the two sides was about to be joined and it promised to be a more even and harder fought battle than that of the 1960's.

Prelude, August 1973 - January 1974

A flurry of radically-inspired articles from the central propaganda department appeared in the lead-up to the 10th Congress of the CCP. Professor Yang Rongguo's reassessment of Confucius appeared early in August and was closely followed by the letter from Zhang Tiesheng of Liaoning province denouncing the reforms to the higher education system instituted earlier in the year. In re-

printing Zhang's letter Zhejiang Daily published further letters of solidarity including one from two students of the Foreign Languages Department at Hangzhou University.⁵⁸

Further assaults on the 'revisionist education line' received great publicity after the Congress.⁵⁹ The theme of 'going against the tide' (fan chaoliu) revived memories of the slogan 'rebellion is justified' which had been popularised in the early days of the Cultural Revolution. In Hangzhou two prominent cases were publicised to discredit the traditional philosophy of competition and discipline in the classroom.⁶⁰ One incident occurred at Yanan Rd No. 2 primary school in April 1974. The other took place in June 1973 at the May 7th Arts School, situated near Hangzhou University.

The latter story, as related over four years later, concerned a child actor who apparently contracted schizophrenia due to the pressure exerted on him to achieve. His father was influential in the city's arts circles. He wrote a series of articles accusing his son's martial arts' teacher of murder and the school's party secretary of being an 'unrepentant capitalist-roader' and a 'representative of the bourgeois restorationist counter-current.' The teacher was later detained for fourteen months and tortured both physically and mentally. The party secretary was removed from his post and eventually gaoled after he refused to cooperate with those who wished to gain political capital out of the affair. Zhang Yongsheng and a leading cadre of the CCP HMC intervened to keep the issue before the public. Controversial incidents of this nature were allowed to

escalate and they contributed to the turbulent political atmosphere which was building up in Zhejiang.

Wang Hongwen, in his report on the revision of the CCP statutes at the 10th Congress had praised the trend of 'going against the tide' and the revelation of cases involving 'going through the back door' (zou houmen) - obtaining privileged treatment by relying on personal contacts - as manifestations of a revolutionary spirit. One delegate at the Congress who would have savoured the tenor of Wang's remarks was Weng Senhe. Weng's selection as a delegate from Zhejiang had apparently aroused differences of opinion among his fellow-workers at the silk complex.⁶¹ But Zhang Chunqiao and Wang Hongwen were apparently keen to secure Weng's selection and they exerted pressure on Tan Qilong to this end.⁶²

On 24 August, the opening day of the National Party Congress, a wall poster appeared in the courtyard of the CCP HMC offices in downtown Hangzhou. It was signed by a group of 'new office-worker cadres' and criticised both the provincial and municipal authorities. The thrust of the complaint was that in the pixiu zhengfeng campaign of 1972-3 the signatories had been 'swept back to camp' (dasao huiying),⁶³ probably to the factories from whence they had been promoted. They demanded their jobs back and assembled in the building occupied by the HMWC to form a study class. To further press their complaints the group apparently moved into the HMC offices to harass leading cadres, forcibly occupied the meeting room of the HMC standing committee, and seized documents. They believed that such pressure would force

the authorities to respond to their gripes. The Workers' Congress took up this cause and convened a meeting of its leadership at the New China Theatre in the centre of Hangzhou. It decided to organise a delegation (pujing konggao-tuan, shangfangtuan) to convey the complaints of the disgruntled cadres to Beijing.⁶⁴

This initial move quickly brought results. On 4 October 1973 Wang Hongwen, now vice-chairman of the CCP CC, telephoned Zhang Yongsheng and encouraged him to launch an attack on the leaders of the ZPC and prepare for a lengthy battle. Wang informed Zhang that 'several problems have emerged in Zhejiang.' Zhang sprang into action and assembled his supporters. They formulated a sixteen-character guiding slogan: 'grasp the initiative, struggle on the spot, spread our influence, open up prospects.'⁶⁵

Wang Hongwen then telephoned Tan Qilong on 16 November. He instructed Tan to dissuade the cadre delegation from leaving Hangzhou for Beijing, but also asked him to offer a self-criticism on behalf of the provincial party committee for the 'excesses' committed in the previous eighteen months against the former rebels. Wang also requested Tan to support the general principle of 'going against the tide'. Tan, Tie and most members of the standing committee supposedly refused and did not relay Wang's suggestion that Tan make a self-criticism. Nevertheless, news of Wang's instructions soon reached Zhang Yongsheng, having been leaked by a member of the CCP HMC standing committee. A senior member of Tan's executive, Lai Keke, whiteanted Tan's stand by writing a report to Wang expressing sympathy for

the 'fighters going against the tide' and lashing his senior colleagues for their political outlook and performance.⁶⁶

The divulgence of personal communications between party leaders for political ends soon became a common occurrence in Zhejiang. Factional loyalties superceded party discipline with enormous consequences for Tan's leadership in the province. Wall posters soon appeared on the streets accusing Tan of trying to change and conceal 'vice-chairman Wang's directives'. A group 300-strong led by Zhang, Weng and He then gathered on Mt. Pingfeng to plan their next moves. They summoned Tan and other leaders to the mountain for questioning. For four and a half days Tan and his colleagues were forcefully interrogated (jiudou), and two municipal officials were kidnapped and brought before the rebels. This occupation of Mt. Pingfeng was a flagrant act of rebellion against the provincial leadership which seriously weakened its authority and credibility. Zhang's aim was to 'haul out restorationist forces' and discover which party leaders were prepared to desert Tan. He found several, such as Lai Keke, who were ready to join forces with him. Wang Zida, first secretary of the CCP HMC and a standing committee member of the CCP ZPC wrote to the ZPC demanding that Tan and Tie 'make lofty self-criticisms' and added that 'this is the key question at the present time.'⁶⁷

One specific charge levelled against Tan related to remarks he had inadvertently made in June 1972. During an inspection tour with Tie Ying of Fuyang county, adjacent to Hangzhou, Tan had commented, as he drove through the

countryside, on the slowness of development since his previous visit back in 1954. He said:

the tea-bushes on both sides of the road are thinly scattered and the ground is not even; I've been away from here for eighteen years and there hasn't been much of a change.

Tan's remarks were circulated throughout Zhejiang and their real meaning increasingly distorted. Tan was then charged with the heinous crime of negating the Cultural Revolution as well as the achievements the seventeen years before it.⁶⁸

The principal issue at stake for the rebels on Mt. Pingfeng was, in the words of Weng Senhe, power. He stated bluntly that 'It's already been seven to eight years of the Cultural Revolution, and recently what have we got, organisationally? We must get back leadership power!' He Xianchun threatened that 'we won't leave the mountain until we've solved this problem of organisation.'⁶⁹

The leaders of this rebellion against the CCP ZPC had formed a close association in the old United Headquarters mass organisation which stretched back to the beginning of the Cultural Revolution. Their factional enemies who included activists from the former Red Storm group tended to support the provincial leadership. The two groups which emerged in 1974, however, while apparently having their roots in the divisions of 1966-9, were formed specifically in relation to the Mt. Pingfeng rebellion. One became known as the 'on the mountain' faction and the other, the 'foot of the mountain' group. Zhang, Weng and He led the 'on the mountain' faction of rebels. Guo Zhisong, a vice-chairman

of the ZPTUC, led the latter faction. Some old rebels may have wavered between the two sides. The political fall-out from the occupation of Mt. Pingfeng soon spread across the whole province. This sensational incident helped trigger off a series of events which eventually forced Zhejiang before the attention of the whole country in July 1975.

To further destabilise the political environment in Zhejiang, and Hangzhou in particular, Zhang Yongsheng and Weng Senhe managed to secure the release from prison of murderers and arsonists who were then enrolled into the paramilitary forces they were building in the city's factories. Two workers from Weng's silk mill who had been involved in a vicious assault on six female fellow-workers in 1967, came up for their third trial of the case in August 1973. For five days from 14-18 August, Weng's supporters held demonstrations and sit-ins at the offices of the municipal party and government authorities and disrupted court proceedings. When the verdict was handed down in October and one culprit was released, having already served more than his total term of sentence, he was hailed as a returning hero in celebrations held at the silk complex. He was also compensated with six years' back pay.⁷⁰ This ostentatious reminder of such incidents could only have served to reactivate past cleavages among the work-force. But it seemed an important part of Zhang, Weng and He's strategy.

After the success of their revolt on Mt. Pingfeng, the rebel trio visited factories in Hangzhou to gather support and test the strength of their opponents. Weng went to the 54 year-old Red Flag Paper Mill in December 1973 in order to

provoke work stoppages by calling on workers not to work for the 'wrong political line'. Those who did so he denigrated as 'lambs'.⁷¹ On 17 December the three militant leaders appeared at the Hangzhou Iron and Steel Mill. This factory was an obvious target because of the publicity which had surrounded it earlier in the year. Zhang, Weng and He repeated their demand that workers evaluate the political views of their leadership before contributing their labour. However they apparently met strong resistance from workers of an opposing faction who unceremoniously showed them the factory gates.⁷² The Hangzhou Gear Box factory in Xiaoshan made it clear that Weng was not welcome by warning him that he might not leave the site unharmed, thereby ensuring that he did not appear at all.⁷³

In January 1974 the HMWC, headed by He Xianchun, convened a rally in Hangzhou's Exhibition Square, situated at the northern terminal of Yanan Rd, one of the city's main thoroughfares. The rally was held to celebrate the seventh anniversary of Shanghai's 'January storm', thereby reviving memories of those heady days. The former rebel leaders of United Headquarters mounted the rostrum once again and were joined by their sympathisers on the CCP ZPC and HMC. After the speeches a parade took place which apparently turned into a demonstration against the provincial leadership. The later admission⁷⁴ that the authorities' plea to call off the day's events had gone unheeded was an illustration of the contempt in which they were held by the rebels, and a manifestation of their powerlessness before such recalcitrance.

The campaign against Lin Biao and Confucius: opening shots

At the end of 1973 Mao Zedong expressed displeasure with the work of the Politburo and the Military Affairs Commission. Wang Hongwen conveyed Mao's remarks at a meeting on 29 December in which he quoted Mao as saying that 'If revisionism does emerge in China, everybody should watch out.'⁷⁵ In a further speech on 14 January to a central study class,⁷⁶ Wang vigorously defended the Cultural Revolution. He admitted that whether it was good or bad remained a controversial matter. Some believed it to have been 'necessary and timely' while others viewed it like a 'dark night', a 'ravaging flood and a savage beast', 'thunder in the clear sky of an early morning', and even 'a great misunderstanding, very reactionary in nature'.

Those who held the latter view, stated Wang, opposed progress, desired restoration and planned to take revenge for the sufferings they had endured. Others, while supporting the Cultural Revolution in principle, opposed the way in which it had been carried out. They frowned on great democracy or the 'four greats' - speaking out freely, airing views fully, holding great debates, and writing wall posters. Wang argued that to oppose the Cultural Revolution was to attempt to restore capitalism and practise revisionism. He advocated the slogan of 'going against the tide' to rekindle the spirit of rebellion.

Wang touched on two other important themes - discipline in the PLA⁷⁷ and the status of young cadres. He claimed that obedience to orders was conditional on their

conformity to Marxism-Leninism Mao Zedong Thought. Soldiers should rebel against orders contradicting these principles. But as Wang reduced the essence of Marxism to the maxim 'to rebel is justified', the permissible scope for disobedience seemed alarmingly broad. Concerning the question of young cadres who had been promoted during the Cultural Revolution Wang defended them and advocated the appointment of young officers to senior military commands. Otherwise, he opined, the 'traitors, enemy agents and capitalist-roaders will return and the new-born things of the Cultural Revolution will be abolished.'

Wang's resolute defence of the Cultural Revolution heralded the anti Lin Biao anti Confucius (pilin pikong) campaign of the same month. Two CC documents⁷⁸ which were distributed in mid-January contained a list of recommended references to study and tried to link the thoughts of Lin with the classical analects of Confucius. The first mass rallies occurred in Beijing on 24 and 25 January and involved troops of the Beijing units and office cadres in central departments. Jiang Qing, Yao Wenyuan and two close associates of Jiang at Qinghua University, Chi Qun and Xie Jingyi, (daughter of the deceased Minister of Public Security Xie Fuzhi) made speeches. Premier Zhou Enlai attended and was supposedly forced by the circumstances to make a self-criticism.⁷⁹

Jiang Qing further committed herself to the campaign by establishing a model unit in the PLA. She sent Chi and Xie as her personal emissaries to an anti-chemical warfare company (fanghualian). Stationed at Huzhou, a city in

Zhejiang, situated north of Hangzhou, the company came under the command of the 20th Army (Unit 6409). Chi and Xie delivered a letter from Jiang as well as 200 copies of a booklet compiled at Beijing and Qinghua Universities and now prescribed reading for the campaign.

The Beijing envoys arrived in Huzhou on 15 January and returned to the capital a week later to report back to Jiang.⁸⁰ They brought back letters from the anti-chemical warfare company, the 20th Army's party committee and the party committee of the Nanjing Military Region led by Zhang Chunqiao (1st political commissar) and Ding Sheng (commander). The letters expressed thanks to Jiang for her concern and pledged their determination to live up to her expectations. They were released as a CC document on 25 January 1974.⁸¹ The anti-chemical warfare company subsequently received immense coverage in the national and provincial press and its members became prominent speakers at meetings and rallies subsequently held in Zhejiang.⁸²

As the leadership in Zhejiang prepared to implement central directives and launch the campaign in the province it faced daunting prospects. The new rebel faction could find ideological and political legitimacy for their actions in the calls which had been issued by radical central leaders to 'go against the tide', promote new cadres and defy politically unacceptable orders. Wang Hongwen had already provided direct encouragement and now Jiang Qing had established a model military unit in Tan Qilong's backyard. The rebels had a solid organisational base in the HMWC and certain influence in the ZPTUC. They had highly-placed

allies in the CCP HMC and could try to isolate Tan and Tie in the CCP ZPC. But in order to better confront the authorities and especially the military, they required an armed force and this they were about to create in the Hangzhou Municipal Militia Command Headquarters (HMMCH).

On 29 September 1973 a joint editorial of the People's Daily and Liberation Army Daily had appealed for a build-up of urban militia forces along the lines of contingents that had been experimented with in the Cultural Revolution. Stories which were published alongside the editorial described the activities of the urban militia in Beijing, Shanghai, and Tianjin. In these cities the militia had three major tasks - to participate in class struggle, carry out patrol and guard duties, and to defend the population in times of war.⁸³ The first task suggested the political sympathies of the urban militia, the second aimed at ousting public security bureaux and PLA guards from duties they normally carried out, and the third task implicitly challenged the PLA's right to sole possession and use of modern armaments.

The significance of the Shanghai experience in running the militia (under Wang Hongwen's direction) related to several points. First, Wang and Ni Zhifu, who commanded the Beijing urban militia, did so because they held the post of chairman of the municipal trade union council or workers' congress. The urban militia was composed mainly of industrial workers and thus came under union leadership. Second, the urban militia commands were responsible to the municipal party committees (and ultimately to provincial party committees where relevant), not to the military districts

which had normally organised and trained such forces. Finally, Shanghai emphasised an ongoing programme of political education and study for the enlisted workers so they could raise their political awareness.⁸⁴

The factional nature of the urban militia which was established in Hangzhou in February 1974 added a further element of division to the city's working class. It certainly created a feeling of resentment toward those work-mates who were regularly absent from the shop-floor but continued to draw full pay and subsidies for their militia service. The establishment of a party branch in the militia command enabled it to recruit new party members who for various reasons could not join the CCP at their own factories. The militia thus served as a springboard to launch the careers of several controversial figures in Hangzhou.

The campaign in Zhejiang: mobilisation phase

The pilin pikong campaign in Zhejiang ran both in the public domain and behind the scenes. Developments which occurred backstage influenced the direction taken by the campaign as did the directives emanating from Beijing. From the time of the first mobilisation rally, which was held in Hangzhou in early February 1974, until mid-year when the CC issued a document reining in the movement, the rebels seem to have virtually seized power from the ZPC. In the second half of the year Tan Qilong, with the backing of the central authorities, shifted the focus of attention onto the ailing economy. Despite a few final passing shots from the rebels,

he managed to bring the campaign to a conclusion in November, although the flames had already died down by August.

At the opening rally of 2 February 1974,⁸⁵ attended by 10,000 people, an orderly atmosphere prevailed. Tan Qilong presided, Chen Weida and Chen Bing relayed central directives, and Chai Qikun delivered a report on behalf of the ZPC. Chai advocated the seemingly contradictory policies of simultaneously strengthening party leadership while giving 'free rein to the masses'. He suggested linking the campaign with the 'realities of class struggle' in the province - a euphemism that often obscured behind-the-scenes personal vendettas and character assassination. In the long-practised tradition of Chinese political campaigns, Chai proposed the establishment of experimental points and the training of backbone elements.⁸⁶

Four days after this rally, the provincial-level mass organisations held an oath-taking rally attended by provincial civilian and military leaders.⁸⁷ The moderateness of this gathering can be gauged from the praise directed toward Jiang Qing's model anti-chemical warfare company for its contributions to farm-work in Zhejiang. Although militant slogans were shouted, the singing of the PLA's 'three rules for discipline and eight points for attention' enforced a disciplined atmosphere. One ominous note for the provincial party leaders was the open suggestion that they play a more active role in the campaign.

In stark contrast to these rallies, a day later, on 7 February, the Worker's Congress held a militant rally in Exhibition Square attended by 30,000 workers.⁸⁸ Slogans of

the Cultural Revolution such as 'It is right to rebel against reactionaries' rang in the air in a 'fervent atmosphere of unity and militancy.' The leadership of the ZPC did not attend although members as well as 'responsible comrades' of the ZPRC, probably referring to Zhang Yongsheng and Weng Senhe, did appear. Leaders of the CCP HMC also attended. Factories in Hangzhou, including Weng's silk complex, sent along representative to address the gathering while others, including the Iron and Steel Works and the Zhejiang Hemp Mill, submitted written statements. The speakers stressed that the campaign should concern itself with concrete issues, otherwise it could 'possibly go astray and deviate from the orientation.' He Xianchun, in his closing speech, appealed to the city's workers to become the main force in the campaign and to 'go against the tide'. A deputy-secretary of the HMC allegedly attacked the leaders of the provincial party committee by name for 'not talking about the basic line' and asserted that 'the rightist trend in Zhejiang comes from the responsible comrades of the ZPC'.⁸⁹ The proceedings ended with a march through the streets of Hangzhou.

A further mobilisation rally took place on 9 February 1974 for 500 members of the provincial Mao Zedong Thought propaganda teams stationed in propaganda, cultural and education departments.⁹⁰ It was sponsored by the political work group of the ZPRC headed by Shen Ce, a 'revolutionary leading cadre' liberated with Lai Keke in 1967. Shen apparently appointed Weng Senhe a member of the political work group at about this time and allowed him to assume charge of the provincial office responsible for the propaganda

teams. These posts gave Weng access to campuses where he could display his oratorical skills to great effect.⁹¹

On 13 February 80,000 tertiary and secondary students, Red Guards, teachers, and propaganda team members, assembled in Exhibition Square. They listened to a responsible member of the CCP ZPC demand a ruthless retaliatory strike at the 'bourgeois counter-attack to settle old scores and to restore its influence'. The anti-chemical warfare company was now hailed as an example in resisting the trend to stifle the 'new-born things' of the Cultural Revolution.⁹² This theme was picked up three days later when the ZPC called a meeting of provincial-level cadres. The meeting 'criticised the Rightist trend of thought of negating the great proletarian cultural revolution, linking the rightist trend closely with the current struggle between the two lines in our province.'⁹³

What these vague and threatening references meant was spelled out at a conference on schistosomiasis [!] which was held in late February. The following passage was included in the broadcast relaying details of the conference:

In certain localities and units in Zhejiang some persons obstinately maintaining the bourgeois reactionary stand have adopted all possible means to reverse history, turned facts upside down, and have engaged in all sorts of activities to turn back the wheel of history and restore the old order and capitalism. They have negated all instructions issued by Chairman Mao during the great proletarian cultural revolution, and have overturned the brilliant decision endorsed by Chairman Mao and the Party Central Committee on handling the question of the great proletarian cultural revolution, in a vain attempt to reverse the correct verdicts passed on them and to launch counter-attacks in retaliation. In addition they also have endeavoured to strike at the newly emerging

forces and have opposed such things as the revolution in education, literature and art, and health work, the 7th May cadre schools and work regarding educated young people settled in the countryside.⁹⁴

He Xianchun, in his capacity as vice-chairman of the ZPTUC, chaired a further lively rally in Hangzhou on 2 March 1974 which was sponsored by the HMWC and attended by 30,000 of the city's workers. Leaders of the ZPC including Tan and Tie Ying were present.⁹⁵ It was to prove Tie's last public appearance in Hangzhou for one year.⁹⁶ Before party and mass leaders who had gathered from across the province, Tan and Tie experienced the humiliation of listening to open criticism of their leadership. Wall posters had appeared on the streets written 'with clear-cut viewpoints, in a vivid and militant style, and carrying great powers of conviction.'⁹⁷

Perhaps in order to stem the rising tide of the political campaign, the media began to refer to the need to concentrate on the task of spring planting. Such a tactic had proved successful in February-March 1967, when the rebels were attempting to seize power from party committees, but it did not have the same impact in 1974. Although the provincial authorities issued a directive and convened a conference on the subject in response to a People's Daily editorial of 3 March,⁹⁸ the issue was subsumed by the quickening pace of the campaign.

Zhang Yongsheng who was the mastermind behind the rebel strategy, drew on his contacts in the Hangzhou Daily and commissioned them to produce articles and commentaries which publicised 'advanced units' in the pilin pikong campaign. On the evening of 15 February 1974 Zhang called

a meeting of these journalists and instructed them to promote models such as Nanbao brigade. The following day, two leading members of the CCP HMC and the editor-in-chief of the newspaper visited the brigade for an inspection and on 18 February met Zhang at the brigade's office in the countryside. Zhang and one of the municipal party leaders then allegedly enumerated the crimes of the CCP ZPC, HMC and county party officials. The moderate trend of 1972-3 was now castigated as the 'two negations and one reversal' (liangfou yidao) - the negation of the Cultural Revolution, the negation of 'new-born things', and the reversal of the wheel of history.

Zhang and the Hangzhou delegation returned to the provincial capital the next day and immediately called a meeting to disseminate the brigade's experience. At the end of February the Hangzhou Daily featured a page one article accompanied by an editorial which indirectly accused the provincial, municipal and county authorities of smothering such models as Nanbao. From 22 February to 5 March 1974 a series of reports and commentaries, wrapped up in the esoteric language of historical allusion and analogy, directed a barrage of accusations at the party leadership.⁹⁹ The 2 March meeting already mentioned above lauded Nanbao for 'standing upright against heavy pressure from above'.¹⁰⁰

On 15 March the People's Daily directed a thinly-disguised blast at the policy of rehabilitating cadres who had been disgraced in the Cultural Revolution.¹⁰¹ This radical upsurge in the campaign certainly made itself felt in Zhejiang. When the ZPC convened a second rally on 21

March 1974 great changes had occurred in the provincial leadership since February.¹⁰² At the 2 February mobilisation rally ZPC leaders had spoken and issued directives. On 21 March the audience heard different voices. Zhang Yongsheng presided over the rally and both Weng Senhe and He Xianchun were featured speakers. To understand how mass organisation leaders who were not members of the ZPC standing committee could dominate a party-sponsored function it is necessary to analyse important developments which had occurred backstage since the beginning of the year.

Rebel tactics: 1. Party recruitment and cadre promotion

One important measure taken by the rebels was to place supporters in important party and government posts in the municipal administration of Hangzhou. It was at the municipal rather than at the provincial level that they experienced least opposition, and from some quarters passivity or even active encouragement. The rebels could also work on the gains that they had already made. Simultaneously they also could attempt to paralyse the operation of party branches by disruptive activities and then allow the besieged leaders to take the blame for the resultant economic failures. Thus Zhang, Weng and He elaborated a two-pronged strategy of infiltration accompanied by confrontation.¹⁰³ The rebels had thus learned the lesson from the early years of the Cultural Revolution that ultimately all power resided in the Party, not in the mass organisations.

To make a breakthrough on this front the rebels singled

out three administrative sections (kou) of the HMRC. The restoration of kou which had taken place early in 1973 was now maligned as a 'product of restraining oneself and restoring the rites' and an example of liangfou yidao. Supporters of the 'on the mountain' faction demanded the abolition of three kou - industry and communications, finance and trade, and planning - which had been carved out of the Cultural Revolution production command group (shengchan zhihui zu). These three particular kou were singled out because many of the old shengchan zhihui zu's cadres had formerly been rebels themselves. Additionally its leadership sympathised with their plight and they were able to obtain the support of two secretaries of the HMC. On 4 and 7 February 1974 the leaders of this old production command group convened meetings of its former cadre staff to prepare for a takeover. Immediately after the second meeting a delegation, carrying the seal of the old zu, converged on a meetingplace of the ZPC to obtain the authorisation from a secretary of the HMC for the changeover. He refused and the cadres immediately declared a strike beginning at 9pm that evening in the offices of the three kou. He Xianchun arrived to congratulate them on their bold stand.

The next day, 8 February 1974, a notice appeared on the front gate of the offices of the HMC compound notifying all staff of the strike. It lasted five days. Wall posters on the streets and letters expressed solidarity with the action. Two secretaries of the HMC applied pressure on the municipal authorities to capitulate. This they did on 12 February and the three kou were disbanded and replaced by

one zu which was reinforced by the appointment of fifteen cadres nominated by the 'on the mountain' faction. Xia Genfa, a close ally of He Xianchun and vice-chairman of the Hangzhou Oxygen Generator Plant's revolutionary committee, became a deputy leader of the restored production command group. The hapless leaders of the three kou who had been deserted by their superiors, were shunted aside and placed under investigation. Some were sent to undertake supervised labour. With a precedent set, a series of similar personnel changes swept the province, spreading up to ZPC offices and down as far as factory, squad, and shift leading groups.¹⁰⁴

This humiliating cave-in extracted from the HMC, which had most probably referred the issue - considering the gravity - to the ZPC for instructions, helped undermine the credibility of the Hangzhou administration and its functionaries. The rebels came to the realisation that their tactics of destabilisation and confrontation were proving spectacularly successful. Furthermore, they were meeting only limited, ineffectual opposition. Therefore on 19 March 1974 the rebels presented a list of officials (guan-yuan qingdan) containing 60 names to the HMC. The list had been drawn up after Weng Senhe had drafted a document entitled 'Recommendations on Solving the Problems of Zhejiang'. The list demanded posts for members of Weng's faction ranging from membership of the Hangzhou party standing committee through to departments under its jurisdiction. An accompanying ultimatum allowed the HMC three days in which to agree.

By 28 March the HMC had capitulated and 50 'new-born

forces' were appointed to the leading groups of its three major zu, thirteen offices (ban) and six bureaux (ju). Nine joined the standing committee of the CCP HMC.¹⁰⁵ The appointment of He Xianchun as deputy-secretary of the CCP HMC was later graphically described in the following words. The standing committee met with second secretary Wang Xing¹⁰⁶ in the chair.

[Wang] servilely asked He Xianchun. 'Will we put you in Lao He?' He Xianchun had the nerve to say: 'that would be best.' In the future I might be working at the provincial level but to have a position in the municipality as well would be good.' [Wang] said, 'Fine. Declare Lao He deputy party secretary of the municipal committee. He [Xianchun] also said: 'promoting me without Weng Senhe is no good. Put him down as well.' [Wang] said: OK. Declare Weng Senhe deputy party secretary of the municipal committee.¹⁰⁷

In fact all 300 rebels who ascended Mt. Pingfeng received certificates of accreditation and, without exception, meteoric promotion.¹⁰⁸ One department pinpointed for close attention was the municipal public security bureau. In March 1974 the rebels called another meeting at Mt. Pingfeng and plotted to gain control of this crucial 'organ of the proletarian dictatorship'. A deputy director and ten section heads (chuzhang) were included on the name-list of 60 positions. Huang Yintang, a close confidant of Weng Senhe's at the Hangzhou Silk Complex became deputy-director and later, after the director was driven out of his office, effective head of the bureau. Thus a rebel who had spent time in a public security gaol in the early days of the Cultural Revolution, had turned the tables on his

former prosecutors. Huang, who had only just joined the CCP, immediately became a member of the public security bureau's party committee. He apparently acquired the habit of roving around with blank detention forms and arrest warrants in his pocket.¹⁰⁹

This unorthodox promotion of cadres and the unusual measures used to recruit party members were known as the 'two rushes' (shuangtu) - rush admission into the party and rush promotion of cadres (tuji fazhan dangyuan, tuji tibo ganbu). The rebels were most probably taking advantage of Article 12 (5) of the CCP statutes passed at the 10th Congress in 1973 which favoured 'getting rid of the stale and taking in the fresh'.¹¹⁰ However they seemed to take this policy to extremes by their methods. Two approaches which were favoured in Zhejiang were called 'flying across the sea', (feiguohai) and 'appointment from above' (shangduluo). The former method circumvented established procedures by allowing candidates who faced opposition in their work-place, to join at other units. The workers' congress and militia headquarters' party branches proved ideal for this purpose. In units where party secretaries sympathetic to the rebels, ran branches, they simply appointed new members in a flagrant breach of party rules.¹¹¹

It was later claimed that in 1974 in Hangzhou alone, 8,000 new CCP members were admitted to the party illegally and 3,000 cadres promoted by these highly unorthodox means.

Included amongst these new party members and 'helicopter' cadres were hooligans and thugs, vandals, criminals and those with a family grudge (shichoufenzi). Some people

entered the party one day and were promoted as officials the next. Some were appointed secretaries of party committees before they had joined the CCP.¹¹² The most trusted of Zhang, Weng and He's followers joined the pilin pikong small groups (xiaozu) which conducted the 1974 campaign and assumed temporary leadership over party committees. For example He Xianchun was appointed deputy-leader of the Hangzhou pilin pikong small group to CCP HMC second secretary Wang Xing.

The CCP ZPC seemed powerless to stop this blatant breach of party statutes and cadre regulations. Weng Senhe, in his own inimitable style, used an analogy to describe the despatch of new cadres into positions of power; 'Just as a hen produces chicks so we must send out batch after batch.'¹¹³ Zhang Yongsheng established a test case at his institute, the Zhejiang Fine Arts College. On 19 May 1974, which was the sixth anniversary of his meeting with Jiang Qing in Beijing, he wrote her a pledge (juexinshu). In one month he appointed ten people to the pilin pikong small group in the college and then reorganised its party committee, assuming the post of party secretary himself.¹¹⁴

A report of 30 June 1974¹¹⁵ referred to the light industrial sector (which included the textile industry) as a model in carrying out the policy of inducting new members into the CCP 'in accordance with the provisions of the new party constitution.' These newcomers were described as 'advanced proletarian elements who have emerged from class struggle and the struggle between the two lines', and 'have become imbued with the revolutionary spirit of daring to go

against the tide.' The people called them 'revolutionary young tigers', added the article, and they worked 'closely together with veteran party members'. It would certainly require an enormous leap in the imagination to reconcile such a contemporary account of the recruitment of CCP members with the detailed and specific allegations which were published three and four years later, and have been drawn on above.

2. The urban militia

The second method adopted by the rebel leaders to exert pressure on the leadership of Tan and Tie involved the establishment of the Hangzhou municipal militia command. This took place on 14 February although the public announcement did not appear until eight days later.¹¹⁶ The notice in the Hangzhou Daily stated that the formation of the command headquarters had been decided upon by the CCP HMC and approved by the ZPC. The Hangzhou urban militia would base itself on the experience of its counterpart in Shanghai, particularly in relation to participation in class struggle, added the notice.

The local press, in trying to explain why party leaders had consented to the establishment of the urban militia later claimed that they had been coerced into giving their approval. The Hangzhou Daily asserted that on 14 February 1974 Weng Senhe and a group of his followers had gone to the office of the ZPC and 'like poisonous snakes entwined themselves around the leaders of the ZPC and ordered them to answer

questions, listen to ideas, express their opinions and forced them to sign things'. Additionally, the rebels had allegedly assaulted PLA guards on duty at the building and then accused their victims of starting the fracas. They had departed the scene with Xia Genfa telling a Xinhua reporter: 'If the ZPC doesn't recognise its mistakes, in three days the working class of Hangzhou will give it something to go on with.'¹¹⁷

All fifty-nine counties and municipalities in Zhejiang established militia commands. Hangzhou's urban militia had a paper strength of 50,000 men. It was mobilised 10,000 men/times (renci) and detained 1,000 people. In the twelve months or so of its existence it was involved in thirteen major factional fights in the city. The HMMCH ran at least three detention centres, charmingly named 'processing factories'. There it confined, interrogated and tortured its victims using such methods as forcing people to stand on one leg for extended periods of time (jinji duli) or stand in the sun, hanging them by the fingers, and inflicting savage beatings. Some internees suffered permanent incapacitation while others died. Wearing cane hats and armed with steel truncheons fashioned from five tonnes of steel piping which had been requisitioned from the Hangzhou Iron and Steel Mill, the militiamen soon became a common and feared sight on the streets of Hangzhou.

Contingents of militiamen, some bearing arms, were also ferried around in trucks. Some were sent out to infiltrate crowds gathered before wall posters. Anyone who pasted up a poster which contained unflattering remarks about the

militia would have a chalk mark applied to his back so that he could be identified, detained and beaten. Other militiamen in civilian clothes, carrying concealed iron clubs, beat anyone who expressed reservations about the militia. A demobilised soldier at the Hangzhou automobile engine plant was thrashed and permanently crippled for expressing his views about the use of physical violence.

He Xianchun, as chairman of the HMWC, automatically became commander of the HMMCH. He later handed over this position to his deputy Xia Genfa. The old militia units in factories which had been commanded and trained by the ZPMD were scrapped. He's militia recruited 'fighters going against the tide' as its backbone in a policy designed to build a countervailing armed force to the PLA. He Xianchun expressed the view that 'at the moment a group of old rightists hold all military power' and that 'we can't give power over the militia to the ZPMD'. He was advised not to report back to leaders of the ZPC because 'you don't know when they will approve'.¹¹⁸ With the ZPC on the defensive and the municipal authorities either unwilling to resist the rebels, or in collusion with them, the stage was set for a series of incidents which seriously disrupted public order and further polarised the city's working class.

Even before the establishment of the militia the rebels had incited their followers to provoke the PLA who were responsible for guarding public institutions in Hangzhou. By these actions Weng and He aimed to prove an urban militia was indispensable to the maintenance of social order. In December 1973 roving bands insulted and beat PLA guards

outside provincial offices, hotels and gaols. Some soldiers had their collar tabs and insignia torn off and their hats knocked off their heads. One such incident resulted in injuries to twenty-three soldiers. Not one military personnel, it was later claimed, retaliated against these provocative acts.¹¹⁹

The militia aimed to put into operation Weng Senhe's maxim that 'since ancient times every victory of a political group has been accompanied by suppressing its opponents'. On 20 February 1974, two days before the public announcement of the establishment of the HMMCH appeared in the Hangzhou Daily, the militia had its first taste of action in the downtown area of the provincial capital. Apparently opponents of Weng and He gathered at three hostels near the commercial centre of Hangzhou. He and Xia despatched militiamen to investigate, which resulted in the disruption of public transport movements and social order. At 5pm on the same day He and Xia issued an urgent notice ordering the militia to clear its opponents out of the hostels. Workers from twelve factories were mobilised and a large-scale violent confrontation ensued. Bystanders were also injured in the melee. Property valued at 100,000 yuan was damaged or smashed in two hostels. So that the defendants could not contact their comrades for reinforcements, allies of the militia in the Telecommunications Bureau jammed the telephone lines.¹²⁰

The next major incident occurred on 17 March 1974. Details are scanty but it was claimed that several hundred people were apprehended and several score wounded. The

militia sent a telegram to Wang Hongwen putting its side of the story and he replied expressing his support.¹²¹ After these initial skirmishes the municipal party authorities moved to exercise some control over the militia's activities. In early April the CCP HMC convened a meeting to discuss political work in the militia.¹²² Representatives expressed their determination to fight to defend the pilin pikong campaign and to study Shanghai's experience in running the urban militia. The view that the party should command and lead the militia 'absolutely' was an obvious swipe at the PLA. As if to further demonstrate that the military had no role to play in the operations of the HMMCH, no PLA representative was present at the meeting. The formalistic pledge to combine productive labour with military training already contained a very hollow ring.

Wenzhou, in south Zhejiang, where bloody clashes had occurred in 1967 and 1968, had most probably established an urban militia command earlier than Hangzhou.¹²³ The militia in Wenzhou organised a rally in May 1974. The report of the meeting stated that the city's militia command had been set up 'amidst a fierce struggle between the two classes and two lines'. It had devoted the previous two months to close scrutiny of the model command in Shanghai. It had also, continued the account

mobilised the militiamen, with industrial workers as the main force, resolutely to implement the series of important instructions issued by the Party Central Committee headed by Chairman Mao, participate actively in class struggle in society, and fight against the sinister activities of a handful of class enemies aimed at undermining the movement to criticise

Lin Biao and Confucius. By so doing [it has] safeguarded State property and the peoples' lives, fully demonstrating the mighty power of the dictatorship of the proletariat. The people's masses [sic] have ardently lauded them as "iron fists for smashing the enemy" and "Red sentries who protect the people."

Representatives of the PLA were in attendance in Wenzhou.¹²⁴

To celebrate the 12th anniversary of the people's militia in China, 2,000 militiamen rallied at the Hangzhou Sports Stadium on 19 June 1974.¹²⁵ Tan Qilong praised the work of the militia in Hangzhou, Ningbo and Wenzhou, Zhejiang's three largest cities. He Xianchun, introduced as a member of the standing committee of the ZPRC, vice-chairman of the HMRC and secretary of the municipal militia command headquarters' party committee delivered a report entitled 'Grasp well the criticism of Lin Biao and Confucius and do a good job in carrying through militia work organisationally, politically and militarily'. He stressed again the subservience of the militia to the party. The occasion also marked the first public appearance of a new political commissar of the ZPMD, Li Bincheng, who had formerly been political commissar of the Nanjing Artillery Units.

If, in response to public outrage at its excesses, the civilian and military authorities tried to bring the militia under control in the second half of 1974, they were not very successful. On 11 August 1974 another major incident occurred, this time at the Hangzhou Iron and Steel Mill. It is claimed that on 10 August Zhang, Weng and He, together with their supporters in the mill, held a meeting at Weng's retreat on Santai (Three Steps) mountain, in the south-west

hills of the West Lake district of Hangzhou to discuss ways of dealing with their troublesome opponents there.¹²⁶ It was decided to seize Zhang Jifa, an active and capable leader of this opposition, and word that Zhang was to launch an offensive must have reached the group on santai mountain.

The next day, 11 August, Zhang Jifa and some of his fellow-workers hung a large banner outside the Overseas Chinese Hotel on Hubin, a road running parallel to the east bank of Hangzhou's West Lake. The banner contained a brief message directed against the proceedings of a lengthy provincial conference which had just drawn to a conclusion in the city. The urban militia, which must have been tipped off, arrived in full battle-dress to arrest those who were reading the banner. When Zhang led his group forward to resist, a fight developed. The scuffle must have reached an inconclusive end because the militia apparently pursued Zhang and his supporters all the way back to the mill which was located in the northern suburb of Banshan. A fire then broke out which burned down the mill's auditorium. Each side blamed the other for starting it. Whoever was responsible, this incident further inflamed factional antagonisms and contributed to the atmosphere of lawlessness in Hangzhou.¹²⁷

However, when 2,000 militiamen assembled in Hangzhou on 29 September 1974 to celebrate the 16th anniversary of Mao's call to build up the militia, a more moderate tone seemed to prevail.¹²⁸ Although it was stated that the urban militia continued to grow in size and strength, the themes of discipline and unity received some prominence. Apart

from singing the PLA's 'three rules and eight points' the militia was asked to pay attention to its internal unity and to relations with the city's citizens. When the central leaders finally intervened at the end of 1974 to restore order to Zhejiang, and Hangzhou in particular, one of the most difficult tasks that they faced was to dissolve the urban militia.

3. Pressure on the PLA

The third string in the rebel's bow, along with the 'two rushes' and the formation of the urban militia, concerned the PLA and the initiative once again came from Beijing. At a meeting on 5 March 1974 Jiang Qing spoke disparagingly about the leaders of the military, following which the slogan 'knock down the big warlords' appeared in the streets of the capital and elsewhere, seriously affecting order in the army.¹²⁹ Wang Hongwen and Zhang Chunqiao elaborated on Jiang's theme in speeches to military cadres shortly afterward. Wang claimed that revisionism persisted in the PLA and that in case of war only the militia could be relied upon. In a speech at General Staff Headquarters he suggested that

It is necessary to suppress continuously the Rightist ideology, to mobilise the masses to make exposures, and open the lid on the top echelon. It's difficult but not too difficult. This time we must make a resolution: we must open up the lid, smash it if it cannot be opened, and blow it open if it cannot be smashed.¹³⁰

With Wang's encouragement, Zhang, Weng and He did their best to 'blow open the lid' in Zhejiang. Their direct

targets were the leading political cadres of the ZPMD, Xia Qi, Tie Ying and Tan Qilong but ultimately they seemed to be aiming, on Wang Hongwen's and Zhang Chunqiao's behalf, at national figures such as Xu Shiyou and Zhou Enlai. Xu had probably sent Xia Qi to the ZPMD in December 1970 to counter the influence of Lin Biao's 'sworn followers and agents'. In 1972, after the arrival of Tan and Tie, Xia and Tie in particular had most likely mounted a witch-hunt against leftist military cadres and their rebel allies. Now it was their turn to feel the heat of the political blow-torch.

Xia Qi may well have actively resisted the formation of the urban militia in Zhejiang. A commentary which was broadcast over the provincial radio on the eve of the publication of the People's Daily's 29 September 1973 editorial, seemed to emphasise the more traditional view of the militia as a production and military force.¹³¹ This contrasted strongly with the radical position which was enunciated in the editorial on the following day. In October 1973 the ZPMD, under the direction of the CCP ZPC, called a meeting to discuss the new orientation in militia work. A deputy-commander to Xu Shiyou in the Nanjing Military Region attended to issue instructions. Xia Qi delivered a mobilisational report to an audience which was composed of representatives of county-level PLA units.

The summary of the meeting's proceedings and the editorial published in Zhejiang Daily were unremarkable except for the effort to place class struggle in context and thus lessen its prominence. The editorial stated that

It is essential to train, transform and build the people's militia in the course of the three revolutionary movements particularly in class struggle and the struggle between the two lines.¹³²

Furthermore, in a speech at the end of 1973 reviewing the year's activities in the military, Xia Qi emphasised that the most important task during the previous twelve months had been the pixiu zhengfeng campaign. He paid tribute to the leadership of the Nanjing PLA Units and the CCP ZPC over the ZPMD but made no mention of the CCP CC.¹³³

Jiang Qing's choice of the anti-chemical warfare company in Zhajiang to carry the banner of the campaign against Lin Biao and Confucius in the military posed serious problems for Xia Qi. From early February 1974 articles appeared almost daily praising the company for its activism.¹³⁴ Jiang's interest in the company was shortly matched by Wang Hongwen's renewed intervention in provincial affairs. From 16 to 19 March 1974 he telephoned the Zhejiang leadership each day to inquire about armed struggle which had erupted in Wenzhou. Due to a misunderstanding or deliberate misinterpretation, Wang's directives to the ZPMD to bring the situation under control resulted in three charges being levelled at the provincial military leaders. First they were accused of failing to collect weapons from the warring groups, secondly of having fabricated Wang Hongwen's directives, and thirdly of having acted as the 'back-stage boss to local brigands' (tufei heihoutai) in Wenzhou.¹³⁵

It was against this backdrop that Zhang, Weng and He appeared on 21 March 1974 as the principal speakers at a major rally convened by the provincial party committee. Their

confrontational style of politics had already achieved some success. They had coerced the authorities, especially the Hangzhou party leadership, into agreeing to the appointment of their cronies to responsible party posts. They had set up a militia command with He Xianchun in charge. And they now had an opportunity to apply further pressure to Tan, Tie and Xia.

The latter two leaders had already lost the right to attend public engagements while Tan seemed to have gone along with the campaign perhaps in the hope of blunting it. As a provincial first secretary he really had no option but to implement central policy. At the same time he would certainly have sympathised with Tie and Xia's plight as they had undoubtedly acted with his blessing and support.

The agenda at the rally of 21 March was devoted to criticism of the ZPMD leaders.¹³⁶ Tan, who spoke first, was clearly in an extremely awkward position. He

expressed his determination to plunge into the struggle together with the broad armymen and people [sic] and make severe criticism of the reactionary ideological tide of attempting to restore capitalism.

These words suggested that Tan was being forced to commit himself more actively to the campaign, perhaps to the extent of dissociating himself from the actions and position of his subordinates Tie Ying and Xia Qi.

The atmosphere of the meeting was militant and defiant. It demanded of leading cadres that they lead the way in 'making disclosures and criticism' so that they could render 'new meritorious service to the people'. Shouts and cries

reminiscent of the Cultural Revolution mass rallies echoed across the square. A 'very sharp and acute struggle' existed over the assessment of the Cultural Revolution, stated the report, and the meeting demanded repudiation of any tendency to negate its 'great successes and achievements'. Apart from Weng Senhe and He Xianchun, the 2nd secretary of the CCP HMC and head of its pilin pikong small group, Wang Xing, was another of the major speakers. Some semblance of moderation was heard in the references to the need to differentiate between the two kinds of contradictions and the perfunctory acknowledgement of the necessity to make arrangements for the economy. Yet the mood of the rally was summed up in the following sentence of the monitored report:

It is required to exert continuously the revolutionary spirit of going against the tide and display a firm stand and the true colours of one's flags [sic] when dealing with questions of principle about the proletarian cultural revolution.¹³⁷

This rally was the prelude to the opening, on 26 March 1974, of a joint meeting of the CCP ZPC, ZPRC and the party committee of the ZPMD, called the triple joint plenum (sanquanhui). It is claimed that CC document No. 17 of 1974 authorised the formation of triple committees in the provinces to promote unity among party, government and military leaders.¹³⁸ The experience of Zhejiang illustrates that if this was indeed the intention, it went badly wrong. From the time of its opening until its closure in early August 1974, after a marathon sitting lasting, with interruptions, for 133 days, the sanquanhui became a forum for the airing of bitter personal grudges and wild accusations. The CCP

ZPC seems to have temporarily lost its authority to a small group directing the pilin pikong campaign known as the double criticism small group (shuangpi xiaozu). Tan Qilong probably headed this group, but among his deputies were He Xianchun and perhaps Zhang Yongsheng and Weng Senhe. It was perhaps membership of this powerful leading group which gave the three rebel leaders real political power in Zhejiang.¹³⁹

The sanguanhui selected an investigation group under the leadership of the radical cadre Shen Ce to examine the verdicts which had been passed on Lin Biao's supporters and their rebel allies by a special case group in 1972. It also set up small groups in the ZPMD to direct the political campaign in place of party committees. Military cadres were summoned for questioning, cadres' personal files examined, and records of meetings, archives and documents relating to defence preparations perused.

Zhang and Weng apparently toured military units denouncing their commanders as revisionists and calling on the troops to break the master-serf relationship which they claimed characterised relations between officers and men. They also asserted that the PLA was politically unreliable and that the urban militia would be used to put down any military insurrection. The militia further provoked the military by attacking its offices, occupying cadres' hostels, cutting off the supply of food and water to units stationed in Hangzhou as well as transport and communication links, and firing on army camps. 'Fighters going against the tide', 'legalists', 'innovators' (gexinpai), criminals, and people

with suspect class backgrounds all mounted the platform of the sanquanhui to 'blow the lid off' the party committee of the ZPMD.¹⁴⁰

In order to escape the severe harassment Xia Qi fled to a hospital.¹⁴¹ Wang Hongwen ordered him back to the forum on pain of dismissal. On 7 April 1974 events took another turn for the worse for Xia. On that day the Hangzhou Daily published an article entitled 'Struggle to the end with the bourgeois restorationist forces' (Tong zichan jieji fubi shili douzheng daodi).¹⁴² Wang Hongwen telephoned the sanquanhui, then in session, and in referring to Xia Qi left the two characters 'comrade' (tongzhi) off his name. The rebels seized upon the omission to declare that Xia's case had become one involving an antagonistic contradiction. He was suspended from his positions, subjected to isolated interrogation from a special case group, and made the object of attack at meetings which continued over the next five months. The rebels labelled Xia a 'representative of restorationist forces', a 'class enemy who has wormed his way into the PLA' and a 'revisionist'. Wang Hongwen later confessed, tongue in cheek, 'Ah! I wasn't careful when I phoned, and left off the two characters "comrade". You went a bit far'.¹⁴³ [!]

The struggle to rein in the campaign, April - June 1974

On 8 April 1974, the day after these major developments, the ZPC and ZPRC held another rally to report on the progress of the pilin pikong campaign.¹⁴⁴ Its main purpose

was undoubtedly to denounce Xia Qi, or, in the words of the report, to peel off all outer layers so as to 'get down to the bottom of class struggle'. Zhang Yongsheng again acted as chairman with Tan Qilong, deputy-secretary Chai Qikun and Weng Senhe the principal speakers. The meeting reported glowingly on the general situation and praised the masses for overcoming obstacles to keep up the momentum of the campaign. Nevertheless, there were indications that the opponents of the three rebel leaders were putting up resistance. Reference to the 'sabotage and disturbance of class enemies',¹⁴⁵ and the attempt to distinguish between the 'partisanship of the proletariat' and the 'factionalism of the bourgeoisie' provided evidence to this effect. The rebel faction was also very sensitive and resistant to any mention of its past involvement in incidents which had occurred over five years previously.

That the campaign had adversely affected industrial and agricultural production was evidenced by the meeting's appeal to production workers to 'make revolution in the off-duty hours'. The People's Daily had issued an editorial on this same subject on 10 April.¹⁴⁶ The Zhejiang authorities did not outwardly respond until 20 April when they called a telephone meeting at which Tan, Zhang and Weng all spoke.¹⁴⁷ They urged leading cadres at all levels to correctly handle the relationship between revolution and production, to strengthen party leadership and the unity of cadres and citizens. More importantly, given the threat to stability posed by the sanquanhui, the meeting declared:

Meetings which can be postponed, should be postponed. Meetings which can be brought to a conclusion for the time being should be brought to a conclusion for the time being. Meetings which cannot be brought to a conclusion right away should be brought to a conclusion in a few days.

This short report monitored by the BBC only hinted at discontent about the direction the political campaign had taken. But apparently Tan may have finally taken the fight up to the rebels. Mao's statement of 1967 concerning the need for unity among the working-class was quoted and emphasis attached to the importance of attaining targets set in the five-year plan.¹⁴⁸

An article published well after the event by a participant at the meeting claimed that criticism was directed against factional fighting and the militia's activities. According to Chen Xia, the CCP ZPC subsequently issued a series of directives attempting to rein in the campaign. They included a request to bring it to an end in basic production units ('the key points of the movement are at and above county-level offices'), to stop the indiscriminate public naming of leading cadres without the approval of relevant party committees, to steer away from the obsession with personalities and power struggles ('don't haul out representatives of restorationist forces at all levels') and to focus attention back on the economy. However, Wang Xing, the leader of the municipal pilin pikong small group, personally brought out a document rebutting these directives point by point. He described the restrictions and regulations laid down by the ZPC as 'setting rules and regulations',

and 'binding hands and feet'. The practice of naming cadres continued unabated and renewed emphasis on economic affairs was described as 'pitting revolution against production.'¹⁴⁹

Whatever the manoeuvrings which went on behind the scenes they seemed to do little to restrain the rebels. On 26 April 1974 the ZPC and ZPRC held yet another conference¹⁵⁰ at which the political rhetoric reached a new peak of fervour and extravagance. Tan Qilong was not present at all, or if so, he did not speak. Zhang Yongsheng presided, with Weng Senhe, Shen Ce, He Xianchun, Chen Bing, the peasant philosopher Jiang Ruwang,¹⁵¹ and the former Red Storm leader and deputy-secretary of the Zhejiang CYL Liu Ying all featured as speakers. The consensus of opinion which emerged from this meeting was that the campaign was 'raging like a prairie fire throughout the province', although the struggle remained 'protracted, complex and arduous'. The speakers vent their spleen on the 'bourgeois forces of restoration' who intrigued and conspired, caused sectarianism and division, tried to strangle 'new-born things' and even slandered the 'great leader of the proletariat with bitter animosity'. The presence of Liu Ying, however, perhaps foreshadowed a move toward reconciliation between the two antagonistic mass groups.

This impression was reinforced at a symposium sponsored by the ZPTUC and the HMWC on 29 April 1974, just prior to May Day.¹⁵² Chairwoman of the ZPTUC Jiang Baodi presided, and the main speakers were Zhang Yongsheng, Hua Yinfeng and He Xianchun. He Xianchun repeated Mao's dictum concerning the unity of the working class and representatives of major

industrial plants in Hangzhou, including Weng's silk complex, the iron and steel mill, and the oxygen generator plant attended and spoke. The urban militia and the propaganda teams also supplied speakers. However the very next day, on 30 April, 600 workers of the propaganda teams were despatched to government departments and tertiary institutions to 'strengthen further worker leadership over the various fields of the superstructure'.¹⁵³ By this means Weng Senhe may have been deliberately entangling worker and student factional disputes, aggravating both in the process.

After a hiatus in May when there is no evidence of public meetings or rallies having taken place in Zhejiang, the pilin pikong campaign resumed in June 1974. At a meeting which was organised by the ZPC and ZPRC and sponsored by the political work section of the ZPRC in the beginning of that month,¹⁵⁴ further evidence that Zhang, Weng and He had acquired enormous influence within the provincial leadership emerged.¹⁵⁵ He Xianchun presided over the meeting while Zhang and Weng were the principal speakers after Tan Qilong and deputy-secretary Chai Qikun. The meeting expressed satisfaction at the development of the campaign over the previous months but cautioned that 'the struggle is still acute and complicated'. It also warned the audience not to become complacent 'In the face of the excellent situation'.

Because the meeting had been held to exchange opinions among bureaucratic departments and industrial units as

to how they had conducted the campaign, six unnamed units introduced their experiences. They focused on four major issues; the role of party committees and leading cadres in

mobilising the masses, the target of attack, the differentiation between the two kinds of mistakes committed by cadres, and the importance of building up Marxist theorists from among the rank and file of workers. Speakers admitted that differences of opinion existed between the people as well as between cadres and that it was necessary to 'carry out more patient and meticulous ideological education among them'.

A new school to educate and train classes of cadres and theorists from the working class of Zhejiang did in fact open in Hangzhou on 5 June 1974.¹⁵⁶ Called the Zhejiang Workers' Political School, it enrolled 220 students in its first semester. The ZPTUC, with the approval of the ZPC, had organised the school and set it the task of producing 'experts for the Party who can write as well as fight'. Zhejiang had modelled its school on a similar institution in Shanghai. The criteria for selection to study at the school included possessing 'a high awareness of the struggle between the two lines, ... [courage] to go against the tide and ... [being] activists in revolutionary mass criticism'. Weng Senhe, as a 'responsible person' at the school, made a speech at the opening ceremony which was attended by Tan Qilong and Jiang Baodi among others.

The rebels realised that a disastrous slump in industrial production in Zhejiang would discredit the provincial leadership, and that the longer they kept up their tactics of destabilisation the greater the deleterious effects on the economy. At a conference called on 13 June to report on the campaign it was asserted that the campaign had

actually promoted industrial and agricultural production. However there were signs that a wind-up of the radicalism of the first half of 1974 was imminent. The sanquanhui temporarily closed its doors on 9 June almost two months after the ZPC had issued instructions to this effect. The reckless optimism concerning the economy was diluted by the request to the people of the province to apply their 'revolutionary enthusiasm' to productive endeavour. The list of achievements in the campaign which were enumerated at the conference read like a valedictory notice on the mass movement.¹⁵⁷

The rebels, nevertheless, were not going to succumb without a final outburst of militancy. A belligerent 24 June 1974 editorial of Zhejiang Daily¹⁵⁸ advised party leaders to discard their perfunctory approach to the pilin pikong campaign and make up their minds whether to 'carry out reforms or to maintain the old, whether to advance or to retrogress, and whether to make revolution or to restore the old order'. The editorial commented:

The broad revolutionary masses have risen up in rebellion against a handful of capitalist-roaders within the Party and have dared to go against the tide. Why have some comrades regarded this as "offending one's superiors and creating havoc"? Why have some comrades felt themselves incompatible with new things and new cadres that have emerged in the great proletarian cultural revolution while always thinking of the old? In every major struggle between the two lines, why do some comrades fail to understand the struggle in the beginning, stand opposed to the masses, and fail to take a step forward until others remind them to do so?

A further militant rally whose participants were

'filled with angry sentiments and hatred for the common enemy' took place on 30 June.¹⁵⁹ The rally agreed to praise the leading cadres who, in increasing numbers, had 'stood at the forefront of the struggle, boldly led the movement, and fought together with the masses.'¹⁶⁰ A full complement of provincial and municipal leaders as well as PLA commanders heard Tan Qilong, Chai Qikun and Weng Senhe lambast those leaders, presumably Tie Ying and Xia Qi, who had not earned the above plaudits.

Although the Central Committee issued a document on 1 July 1974, strongly denouncing certain trends which had emerged in the campaign, the rebel activists in Zhejiang remained defiant and insubordinate. At a mass meeting held by the ZPC on 5 July¹⁶¹ the rebels occupied centre stage and seemed to thumb their noses at the spirit of the CC document. While acknowledging the necessity to strengthen party leadership over the campaign, to study the central document, devote attention to the economy, stop 'exchanges of experience' and obey labour discipline, the speakers, who included He Xianchun, directed leading cadres to continue to give the campaign their highest priority. Furthermore a Zhejiang Daily editor's note openly contradicted a crucial argument in the 1 July CC directive when it stated that

Practice in the movement to criticise Lin and Confucius over the past six months shows that where Party organisations have vigorously grasped criticism of Lin Biao and Confucius and have followed the correct ideological and political line, industrial production has increased and the situation in both revolution and production is excellent.¹⁶²

The implications of this assertion were potentially explosive

for Tan Qilong when figures for provincial industrial production were compiled. Production shortfalls would, on the one hand, cause him trouble with the central authorities for the failure to meet targets set in Beijing, and on the other hand would prove to the satisfaction of his local opponents and their radical mentors that he had failed to successfully implement the campaign, if the logic of the above argument was accepted.

Central efforts to end the campaign

The Central Committee document of 1 July 1974,¹⁶³ which had been treated with such levity by the rebel leaders in Zhejiang, lamented the shortfalls in key production targets. It also subjected two key slogans of the campaign to analysis. The equation of 'going against the tide' with rebellion against party leadership was singled out for critical discussion. Most cadres, argued the circular, were good and to arrest or beat them even if they had made mistakes did not conform with party policy. The CC ordered officials who had deserted their posts to return to work and urged workers to go back to their factories.¹⁶⁴ The other slogan adjudged erroneous was one which had been enthusiastically espoused by Weng Senhe - 'don't work for the wrong political line'. The document also urged a greater commitment to production, strict observance of discipline, and a prohibition of 'exchanges of experience' and factional disturbances. However its most severe strictures were reserved for leaders who had abandoned their responsibilities in the

face of difficulty, who implemented party policy selectively, or who, worse still, instigated or supported factional violence which resulted in social disorder. These pointed remarks were directed not only at rebel leaders such as Zhang, Weng and He, but probably also at cadres such as Tan Qilong, who ultimately had to bear responsibility for the disorder in Zhejiang.

This clear expression of support for provincial administrations, accompanied by a blunt order to concentrate on industrial production was certainly good news to a first secretary like Tan Qilong and a stern warning to the rebels to fall into line or face the consequences. To regain control over the provincial administration and check the anarchic behaviour of the rebels, Tan's first step was to reassert the authority of the ZPC over the shuangpi xiaozu, the urban militia and the municipal workers' congress. All three bodies had come under the domination of Zhang, Weng and He, and had been a constant source of trouble to Tan. A meeting which was called by the ZPC and ZPRC on 9 July 1974¹⁶⁵ declared in decisive terms that 'All fields and organisations should work under the centralised leadership of Party committees'. Tan Qilong spoke on the desirability for unity to supercede 'bourgeois sectarianism' so that everyone could devote their energies to their work. It was announced that agricultural production targets had been met in the first half of the year, but industrial production figures did not rate a mention, which was a clear indication of trouble in this sector.

Requests by the 1 July Central Committee document as

well as the provincial mass meeting of 5 July to end revolutionary 'exchanges of experience' (chuanlian) seemed to go unheeded at the last major rally of the campaign on 22 July.¹⁶⁶ With 100,000 people in attendance, the peasant-philosopher Jiang Ruwang described the steps taken by the peasants of his brigade to cultivate worker-peasant theorists and to link the past with the needs of the contemporary class struggle. However central orders could not be defied indefinitely.¹⁶⁷

On 7 August 1974 the provincial sanquanhui finally came to an end, after months of bitter debate and controversy. The sanitised report which was issued to sum up the lengthy meeting¹⁶⁸ urged 'leading cadres who have made mistakes' to 'handle correctly the mass criticism, conduct seriously self-criticism, correct their mistakes courageously and reinforce their spirit to work hard.' It referred to 'bourgeois factionalism' within the ranks of the masses and asked those mistaken people to recognise their errors. It is unclear to which faction this message applied. The final point of the communique set out in specific terms the hegemony of the party over all other organisations:

The movement to criticise Lin Biao and Confucius must be carried out under the centralised leadership of the Party committees. Military sub-district commands and people's armed forces departments are the military departments of local Party committees. Trade unions, associations of poor and lower-middle peasants, women's federations, communist youth leagues, militia units and Red Guard organs are the mass organisations led by the Party.

The ZPC convened a meeting on 13 August to press home this

message.¹⁶⁹ It also discussed the respective roles and relations between new and veteran cadres. The former, instructed the meeting, 'should be given opportunities to work and their role should be brought into full play' while their older colleagues had an obligation to help them.

Two internal reports were produced by the sanquanhui. One, compiled on the basis of the investigation of Xia Qi by the special case group, concluded that his problem had involved an antagonistic contradiction. The second report 'a summary of the 133 days' proceedings, requested that the CC 'hold a relevant meeting at the appropriate time to solve the problem of the Nanjing Units.' Wang Hongwen and Zhang Chunqiao had previously directed that the sanquanhui would solve the question of which headquarters Zhejiang took its orders from - Beijing or Nanjing. Weng Senhe stated bluntly in August 1974:

With [Xia Qi] in the ZPMD representing the right deviationist wind to reverse correct verdicts, there's still that big chief in Nanjing. Every wind to reverse verdicts in Zhejiang has been tied up with Nanjing ...; principally it is [Xia] and his chief in Nanjing - the root is that big commander.

Weng was clearly referring to Xu Shiyou, and his responsibility for events in Zhejiang between 1967 and 1973. Jiang Qing went one step further in linking Xu to Zhou Enlai.

Tan, Tie and Xia were denied the right to submit dissenting reports. However, they drafted a joint letter to the CC, State Council and Military Affairs Commission setting forth their views, much to the displeasure of the rebel leaders. Wang Hongwen then ordered the provincial

military leaders to Beijing and sorrowfully rebuked them for expressing disagreement with the sentiment of the san-quanhui.¹⁷⁰

Nevertheless, by the latter half of 1974 the pilin pikong campaign had run out of steam. Mao Zedong, who had approved the CC Document of 1 July, assisted in the re-direction which had been outlined in the document by warning the radical leaders of the Politburo not to form a small faction.¹⁷¹ Later in the year he referred to the need for stability and unity and building up the economy.¹⁷² Deng Xiaoping, who had assumed much of the administrative responsibilities from the ailing Zhou, played down the significance of the campaign in an informal talk to overseas Chinese on the 25th anniversary of the People's Republic.¹⁷³

In his speech on National Day 1974 Tan Qilong was also looking ahead. New tasks required new slogans and Tan introduced a quintet which received a great deal of publicity over the following twelve months. They called for emphasis on the political line, unity, the overall situation, policy, and discipline.¹⁷⁴ The People's Daily editorial of 28 November 1974 sounded the swan song to the campaign,¹⁷⁵ as mounting economic problems took up all the time of provincial leaders.

The balance-sheet

Overall, the three rebel leaders, Zhang Yongsheng, Weng Senhe, and He Xianchun could feel highly satisfied with their year's work. Although they had failed to topple the

provincial leadership they had rocked it to its foundations with their tactics of destabilisation and confrontation. Working from their organisational base in the HMWC they had mobilised their supporters in the factories of Hangzhou and drafted them into the urban militia under their domination. Simultaneously they had pressurised the municipal party authorities, in coordination with allies who held responsible positions on the CCP HMC, to appoint colleagues to important posts in the city. In the tense and volatile atmosphere generated by the pilin pikong campaign, and taking advantage of the opportunities provided by the establishment of a small group to guide the movement, the rebel leaders struck at the heart of provincial power, rendering it virtually impotent for several months. Encouraged by their perceptions of the shifting balance of power in Beijing and protected by national figures such as Wang Hongwen, they took advantage of their unique position in a provincial political system as both mass organisation leaders and party members with certain responsible posts, to operate both from outside and within the institutional framework.

When the radical leaders in Beijing lost the initiative in mid 1974, their underlings in Zhejiang could not sustain their assault and were forced to retreat. But retreat did not mean submission. Another round of mobilisation politics could easily witness a resurgence of the anomic activities which had caused so much havoc in the first six months of 1974. The solution to the problems of factionalism and administrative paralysis in Zhejiang rested with the central authorities, but while they were divided over policy direct-

ion and split politically, no decisive initiative was possible. It was Deng Xiaoping who, in 1975, took up the challenge of ridding the Chinese political system of factionalism and the most prominent exponents of confrontational politics in the provinces. However, the enormity of the task forced Deng to make major concessions to his opponents, as the case of Zhejiang clearly shows.

The next chapter of this thesis describes the continuing factional struggles in Zhejiang in the first half of 1975, leading up to the decisive intervention by the central authorities in July 1975. Although the decision to send in the PLA to the factories of Hangzhou was belated recognition of the extent to which order had deteriorated in the city, it was also, as this chapter has illustrated, something of an anti-climax. Its symbolic value as a warning to rebel groups in other provinces and cities in some respects exceeded its real impact on the politics of Zhejiang. The previous six months had witnessed an erosion of the rebels' position. The decisions made in July 1975 capped off this trend. A thorough and unswerving implementation of these decisions depended, however, on a political will which was not determined in Zhejiang. The issue had assumed a national dimension and implicated central leaders whose prestige was affected by its outcome. Provincial interests, in this context, took very much a back seat.

Weng Senhe's silk complex: a model

To conclude this chapter it is instructive to briefly

examine Weng Senhe's Hangzhou Silk Printing and Dyeing Complex which Weng built up as a model unit in establishing a militia unit and promoting the 'two rushes'. The controversies which erupted within the factory as a result of these policies caused massive disruption to production, the consequences of which reverberated across the city. The divisions and tensions which were aggravated amongst the mill's work-force eventually provided the justification for the intervention of the PLA, if only to provide physical security to the workers on the shop-floor.

Weng Senhe used his work unit to set the pace for the 'two rushes' and the formation of a new militia outfit.¹⁷⁶ From March to July 1974, 97 employees at the factory were admitted into the CCP and 166 people rush-promoted into leading positions, including ten party members who joined the standing committee of the factory's party committee. Huang Yintang, a close confidant of Weng Senhe and a core member of the 'on the mountain' faction, became first secretary of the party committee shortly after his admission into the CCP. Huang was also appointed deputy-director of the municipal public security bureau, a deputy party secretary of the HMMCH and vice-chairman of the detective office (zhenpoban) which was set up jointly by the public security bureau and the militia command.

As Huang's deputy in the silk mill Weng chose an allegedly notorious gambler who became first deputy-secretary. This person had started work at the factory in 1965 and apparently shared Weng's view that spending one's life performing repetitive, mundane tasks left a lot to be desired.

He seized the opportunity provided by the Cultural Revolution to bring excitement into his life by participating in raids and assaults with his fellow-workers. In the 'two rushes' of 1974 he was admitted into the CCP and, as well as acquiring a party position, he became battalion commander (yingzhang) of the militia battalion organised by Weng Senhe. He formed a special detachment (biedongdui) which carried out nocturnal raids on the houses of workers opposed to Weng's faction. In eight months during 1974, this detachment raided and looted the flats of ten workers.¹⁷⁷

A third member of Weng's team in the mill who became known as Weng's right-hand man and capable accomplice (deli bangxiong) was appointed deputy-secretary of the party branch in the weaving workshop after joining the CCP in 1974. Before the Cultural Revolution this man had been disciplined for a misdemeanour and sentenced to work on a state farm under supervision. In the turmoil engendered by the Cultural Revolution, he had stolen his personal file to obtain redress for this conviction.

Weng Senhe was acutely aware of the fact that the rebels had suffered (chi kutou) in the years 1967-8 because they had not succeeded in obtaining real power.¹⁷⁸ The road to power, he realised, was through the CCP. 80% of the crash admissions into the party at the mill, and 88% of the crash promotions, were members of Weng's group. His opponents, by their own admission, attempted the same tactics but were less successful. Weng changed all the heads and their deputies from the factory level down to the workshops. Only two out of twenty-two section chiefs retained their

posts. Twenty-one of his followers were sent out to staff important positions in the municipal organisation department, the provincial and municipal public security bureaux, and the silk bureau.¹⁷⁹ Weng boasted that 'the feudal prime ministers surrounded themselves with high officials; anyone who has followed me must get a post'. (zaixiang shenbian qipinguan, gen wo shangde dou yao anpai weizi)

Membership of the militia battalion at the silk complex was deliberately restricted to supporters of Weng Senhe. Apparently Weng set a rule that no third generation worker, party member, or worker who had not missed a day's work in eight years (since 1966) could join. Whether these restrictions effectively excluded any applicant is difficult to assess. Three released criminals and ten hooligans (liumang) joined the battalion, as well as rebels who had participated in violent clashes in the 1960's. A deputy platoon leader called Sun Tianmu was a convicted murderer who was working in the factory under supervision. Weng appreciated the fact that his hatred of the system would be strong. Another murderer was appointed a squad leader.

The militia at the mill established its own disciplinary group (guanjiaozu) which in 1974 seized, beat, locked up and tried in its own kangaroo court (gongtang) twenty-three people accused of slandering Weng. Amongst them was a woman named Shen Qiyong. When Weng Senhe was on the rampage in the first half of 1974 Shen and twenty-six fellow workers mailed a letter to the CCP CC in Beijing complaining about his methods of appointment. The letter was returned to Zhejiang and the twenty-seven signatories seized. Shen was

placed in prison for nineteen days while others spent up to eight months in confinement.

One of the principal reasons for the amount of discontent in factories such as the silk complex related to the priveleged treatment which was extended to members of the militia. For example, one-fifth of the militiamen at the silk complex were absent from the production line for extended periods, living downtown in the HMMCH on guard duty, or running errands for the militia commands' leaders. The remaining militiamen were often placed on standby in preparation for an assignment. During these prolonged periods of absence from the mill they not only received full pay but extra allowances. One day's work for the militia was rewarded with three days' rest. A stint of guard duty resulted in overtime pay, while active service was rewarded with free evening meals in the factory canteen. Those workers who stuck to their posts were abused as 'little lambs', 'Confucianists' and 'restorationists' and were compared unfavourably to the 'tigers', 'Legalists' and 'fighters against the tide' who formed the backbone of the militia.

It was the discontent, resentment and antagonism resulting from this discrimination that contributed more to the slump in industrial production than wage demands or gripes over poor work facilities. If a sizeable percentage of the work force was absent for considerable lengths of time and many other workers were threatened or harassed on the job, it is little wonder that production plummeted, factional fights erupted and feelings of personal security disappeared. The provision of welfare and other essential services would

also have been affected. The wages of those workers who were not members of the militia remained unchanged and thus at a comparative disadvantage to the wages of their younger, more militant work-mates. Ultimately, then, political rather than purely economic factors were behind the decision to send in soldiers of the PLA in July 1975. The military not only assisted in maintenance and repair work but they provided an environment in which normal production activities could resume, and workers could carry on their duties free from the disturbances that had plagued the mill for at least eighteen months.

NOTES

1. ZPS, 17 January 1971, SWB, FE/3596/BII/1.
2. Hua Fang, 'Lin Biao's Abortive Counter-Revolutionary Coup d'Etat', BR, No. 51 (22 December 1980), pp.23-5.
3. CCP Zhejiang Provincial Committee, 'The great banner of Chairman Mao will always guide the people of Zhejiang in their victorious advance', HZRB, 8 September 1977. Chen Liyun had made his last public appearance in Zhejiang at the CCP 5th Zhejiang Provincial Congress in January 1971.
4. CCP CC Documents, zhongfa (1972), No. 4, (13 January 1972), in Classified Chinese Communist Documents, p.178.
5. Tie Ying, 'Get mobilised and strive to realise the general tasks of the new period', (report to the 6th Zhejiang Provincial Congress of the CCP, 25 May 1978), HZRB, 7 June 1978. During the first few months of 1972 a conspicuous campaign to 'learn from Jiangsu, Xu's bailliwick, was mounted in Zhejiang. See ZPS, 5 February 1972, FBIS/CHI, 34 (1972), C9-11. A Little Red Soldier Mao Zedong Thought propaganda team, led by provincial cadres from Jiangsu, toured Zhejiang from 26 January to 10 February 1972. ZPS, 27 January 1972, SWB, FE/3905/BII/16; Jiangsu Provincial Service, 2 March 1972, FBIS/CHI, 44 (1972), C3.
6. For details of Tan's career, see 'Tan Qilong', op. cit., 'Tan Qilong (2)', op. cit.
7. For details of Tie's career see 'Tie Ying - Chairman of the Zhejiang Provincial Advisory Commission' I & S, 20:10 (1984), pp.84-92, Appendix E (3) of this thesis. At the time of his appointment Tie would have been in his mid to late 50's, not in his 60's as implied by one source, which states Tie's age in 1977 to have been 67. See E.A. Wayne, 'The Politics of Re-staffing China's Provinces', Contemporary China, 2 (1978), p.136. A Hong Kong source estimated correctly that in 1979 Tie was 'over 60', thereby placing him, in 1972, in his late 50's. Dongxiang (HK), 16 September 1979, in FBIS/CR/PSMA, 32 (9 November 1979), p.17.
8. Tie has recently described how, on one day at the end of March 1972, his secretary relayed an urgent notice from the Central Committee summoning him to Beijing. After his arrival in the capital by special jet, Tie attended a meeting chaired by Zhou Enlia. He was told that he and Tan had been assigned to work in the CCP

ZPC with a brief to restore production. Tie Ying, 'Zhou zongli jiao wo zuo jingji gongzuo', ZJRB, 9 January 1985, p.3. The first recorded appearance made by Tie Ying in the Cultural Revolution was at a rally on 15 February 1969 in Hangzhou. ZPS, 16 February 1969, SWB, FE/3005/B/8-9. As late as January 1972 Tie ranked only 6th among PLA leaders from Ningbo and Zhoushan. ZPS, 12 January 1972, FBIS/CHI, 14 (1972), C1-4.

9. CCP, ZPC, 'The great banner', op. cit.
10. HZRB, 1 May 1972. Taiwan sources, denied access to Zhejiang newspapers, dated Tan's first appearance at September 1972 and his appointment to the party, government and military posts as beginning in May 1973, one year after it actually took place. 'Tan Qilong (2)', pp.109-110. These factual inaccuracies further prove the indispensability of local newspapers to the study of provincial politics.
11. In 1979 Xiong achieved further notoriety when his twin sons, Xiong Ziping and Xiong Beiping, were arrested for leading a gang of thugs and pack-rapists. Both were tried and convicted, Ziping being executed and Beiping receiving a two-year suspended death sentence. They had carried on their crimes from May 1974 until August 1978. Aged 27 at the time of their trial, Ziping had worked at the Hangzhou Oxygen Generator Plant and Beiping at the Hangzhou Heavy Machinery Plant. One of United Headquarters' leaders, He Xianchun, had also worked at the latter plant while the oxygen generator plant had experienced violent scenes in the Cultural Revolution, one of which has been referred to in the previous chapter. The trial was widely publicised in China as a warning to senior cadres to tighten up discipline of their children. See RMRB, 15, 16, 18 November 1979. The case also received publicity in the western world. See, The Herald (Melbourne), 16 November 1979.
12. Xia Qi made his first public appearance in Zhejiang in December 1970. See ZPS, 22 December 1970, SWB, FE/3569/BII/10-12. He may have been transferred there by Xu Shiyou in order to keep a check on Lin Biao's followers in the ZPMD. Xia was not the only military cadre transferred to Zhejiang at this time. A deputy-commander named Liu Ang appeared with Xia in December 1970. Both were made members of the standing committee of the ZPC. Another new deputy-political commissar, Yang Jilin, appeared in this capacity in October 1972.
13. Xia made speeches on this theme at a provincial militia meeting and at an Army Day reception in 1972. ZPS, 20 June 1972, *ibid.*, FE/4026/BII/1; ZPS, 1 August 1972, *ibid.*, FE/4059/BII/1-2.

14. Shen Weicai, 'From a capable member of the Gao-Rao anti-party alliance', op. cit.
15. Chen Weida and Chen Bing reappeared at a funeral service for a dead colleague with Chen Weida delivering the obituary speech. Funeral services became popular occasions to announce the return to office of a rehabilitated official. See ZPS, 23 December 1972, SWB, FE/4179/BII/11. Jiang Hua also reappeared at a funeral service which was held in Beijing on 28 July 1973 for a former deputy-governor of Zhejiang, Feng Baiju. In the following month Jiang was elected an alternate member of the CC at the CCP's 10th National Congress. In January 1975 he was appointed President of the Supreme Court at the 4th NPC, a post he retained until his retirement in 1983. During the eight years he held this office, Jiang presided over the 1980-1 trial of the Gang of Four and the military officers associated with Lin Biao. The propriety of Jiang sitting at this trial remains open to grave doubt. After all, he had lost his position as first secretary of a provincial party committee largely due to the actions of the followers of those who faced him in court. His wife had committed suicide under pressure from the same followers of the accused. Jiang would have been less than human if he did not relish the occasion as one to gain revenge on those responsible for his political disgrace and his wife's death.
16. ZPS, 14 January 1973, *ibid.*, FE/4197/BII/4. One writer has observed a pattern behind cadre rehabilitation at this time. See Hong Yung Lee, 'The Politics of Cadre Rehabilitation since the Cultural Revolution', AS, 18:9 (1978), pp.944-6.
17. This aspect of the change was openly admitted in Hangzhou Municipal Industry and Communications Bureau criticism group, 'Smashing the systems (kou) and restoring the groups (zu) was a counter-revolutionary farce', HZRB, 23 November 1977.
18. Qiu Honggen was released in January 1973 due, in his own words, to the 'direct concern of the responsible comrades of the ZPC'. Qiu Honggen, op. cit.
19. ZPS, 26 September 1971, FBIS/CHI, 196 (1971), G4-5.
20. See ZPS, 11 November 1969, SWB, FE/3230/B/6-10 for a report concerning the first provincial congress of activists in the study of Mao Zedong Thought. Nan Ping in his closing speech, conferred the title of advanced unit on Nanbao. At a provincial agricultural work conference held in February 1970 Nanbao was cited as accumulating experience worth emulating in not counterposing production against revolution. See ZPS, 21, 28 February, 1 March 1970, *ibid.*, FE/3320/B/2-14. See also ZPS, 21 January 1970, *ibid.*, FE/

3289/BII/10.

21. In May 1971 the brigade's party branch was praised for upholding the policy of cadres participating in manual labour. ZPS, 10 May 1971, *ibid.*, FE/3697/BII/3-4. The CCP HMC listed Nanbao as an advanced unit in studying the history of the 'struggle between the two lines' at a work meeting it held in September 1971. ZPS, 17 September 1971, *FBIS/CHI*, 196 (1971), C6-7. In November of the same year the brigade was named an advanced unit in learning from Dazhai. ZPS, 25 November 1971, *ibid.*, 236 (1971), C2. In April 1972 *Zhejiang Daily* published an article written by the brigade party branch opposing egalitarianism in distribution on the communes. ZPS, 16 April 1972, *ibid.*, 78 (1972), C1-3. The following year Nanbao was praised for fighting natural disasters. ZPS, 2 June 1973, *ibid.*, 109 (1973), C6-7.
22. Visit to Hangzhou Chemical Fibre Plant, 27 January 1978; 'Hangzhou Factory sabotaged by the "Gang of Four"', *China Reconstructs*, July 1977, pp.38-43.
23. ZPS, 23 June 1971, *SWB*, FE/3723/BII/2-3.
24. CCP HMC propaganda department criticism group, 'We must settle accounts with Lin Biao's line', *HZRB*, 14 August 1978.
25. *Ibid.*; Zhejiang provincial core criticism and study class, 'An outpost position to plot and seize power', *ibid.*, 19 July 1977. It is true that neither Zhang nor He appeared at the National Day celebrations in 1972. *HZRB*, 1 October 1972. But Zhang was present at a rally in Hangzhou held on 30 December 1972. ZPS, 31 December 1972, *SWB*, FE/4187/BII/1-4. It seemed to be a fairly common occurrence in Zhejiang, that political leaders under attack found it convenient to change their environment by resting and recuperating in the comparative peace and comfort of a hospital. The Zhejiang Hospital, situated opposite the Botanic Gardens in the tranquil West Lake district of Hangzhou, which is mainly reserved for cadres and foreigners would have treated many such cases in the decade of the Cultural Revolution.
26. For example Luo Yang 'Correctly understand and handle the relationship between politics and vocational work', *Hongqi*, no. 4 (1972), *SCMM*, 727 (1 May 1972), pp.9-16; 'Chengqian bihou, zhibing jiuren', *RMRB* ed., 24 April 1972, p.2; 'Strive for new victories', *RMRB*, *Hongqi*, *Jiefang Junbao* joint ed., 1 October 1972, *SCMP*, 5234, (12 October 1972), pp. 140-7; Long Yan, 'Wuzhengfuzhuyi shi jia makesi zhuyi pianzi de fangeming gongju', *RMRB*, 14 October 1972, p.2.

27. Wang Ruoshui (then editor of Renmin Ribao), 'The greatest lesson of the Cultural Revolution is that the personality cult should be opposed', Mingbao Yuekan (HK), no. 2 (1 February 1980), in FBIS/CR PSMA, 66, p.92.
28. Wang Zhaokun (zhubian), Zhonggong dangshi 170ti wenda (Shenyang, 1984), pp.309-11; Zhonggong jiangxi shengwei dangxiao dangshi jiaoyanshi, Zhonggong dangshi baiti jieda (cengdingben), (Nanchang, 1983), pp.380-1. This switch in categorisation of Lin from an ultra-leftist to ultra-rightist was noticed by H. Bradsher, 'China: The Radical Offensive', AS, 13:11 (1973), p.990.
29. Apparently as late as June 1972 Mao had considered Lin's mistakes to have been those of an ultra-leftist. Wang Ruoshui, op. cit.
30. Chen Zuolin (deputy-secretary of the CCP ZPC), 'Dalan sirenbang, Zhejiang you xiwang', (excerpts from a speech at the 2nd National Conference on Learning from Dazhai in agriculture), HZRB, 18 December 1976; 'Smash the gang of four', ibid., 31 December 1976; 'A Gang who created earthquakes', ibid., 17 September 1977; CCP HMC Propaganda Department criticism group, 'The Gang of Four's fiendish hatchet-man Weng Senhe', ibid., 7 December 1977; CCP ZPC, 'Report on the examination concerning Weng Senhe', 19 June 1977, Document of the CC of the CCP, Zhongfa (1977) No. 37, I & S, 14:11 (1978), p.110; visit to Hangzhou Silk Complex, 12 January 1977; 'We must settle accounts', op. cit., 14 August 1978.
31. ZPS, 20 January 1973, SWB, FE/4203/BII/3-4.
32. ZPS, 26 February 1973, ibid., FE/4234/BII/7-8.
33. ZPS, 5 March 1973, ibid., FE/4247/BII/10-11; ZPS, 24 February 1973, ibid., FE/4235/BII/17.
34. ZPS, 6 August 1973, ibid., FE/4369/BII/19-20.
35. ZPTUC, 'Trade unions controlling the party was a plot to seize power', HZRB, 29 March 1977; Zhejiang province core criticism and study class, 'The gang of four were the ringleaders in sabotaging the revolutionary unity of Zhejiang's working class', ibid., 22 January 1977.
36. ZPS, 28 April 1973, SWB, FE/4285/BII/5-7.
37. 'Trade unions controlling the party', op. cit.; 'The gang of four were the ringleaders', op. cit.
38. ZPS, 3 July 1973, SWB, FE/4342/BII/6-9.

39. ZPS, 10 July 1973, *ibid.*, FE/4350/BII/2-4.
40. See *ZJRB*, 27 January 1960, *SCMP*, 2207 (2 March 1960), p.28; Zhou Jianren, 'Work Report of the Zhejiang Provincial People's Council', 18 February 1960 in *ZJRB*, 6 April 1960, *SCMP*, 2281 (21 June 1960), p.25.
41. *Ibid.*
42. *HZRB*, 29 August 1978.
43. ZPS, 9 February 1973, *SWB*, FE/4221/BII/16-17.
44. ZPS, 19 March 1973, *ibid.*, FE/4251/BII/2-3.
45. ZPS, 19 March 1973, *ibid.*, FE/4261/BII/1-2.
46. District (*diqu*) congresses preceded it. Hangzhou's municipal congress opened on 24 April. ZPS, 4 May 1973, *ibid.*, FE/4293/BII/11-12. Jinhua and Lishui districts opened at this time. *Ibid.* Zhoushan, 26-30 March 1973, Ningbo, 29-30 March 1973. ZPS, 9 April 1973, *ibid.*, FE/4295/BII/4. Jiaxing, Taizhou, Wenzhou and Shaoxing district congresses were held between 20 April and 9 May. ZPS, 13 May 1973, *ibid.*, FE/4308/BII/19.
47. ZPS, 16 May 1973, *ibid.*, FE/4299/BII/5-7; ZPS, 24 May 1973, *ibid.*, FE/4309/BII/4-10.
48. At a meeting convened by the ZPRC in September 1970, the cement works was hailed as an advanced unit in the 'creative study and application' of Mao's philosophy. ZPS, 15 September 1970, *ibid.*, FE/3490/BII/12-13. It was probably Wu who went to Beijing in October 1970 for a national conference on this subject. ZPS, 1 November 1970, *ibid.*, FE/3526/BII/8-10. In September 1971 the plant was again praised for its study of the history of the struggle between the two lines in the CCP. ZPS, 17 September 1971, *FBIS/CHI*, 190 (1971), C6-7. The cement works was also a model in reestablishing a trade union branch.
49. ZPS, 19 August 1978, *ibid.*, FE/5901/BII/11. Liu Ying died of illness in 1980 at the age of 37. Teng Zhu was a graduate of Zhejiang University, the base of Red Storm's support in the years 1966-9.
50. ZPS, 14 July 1973, *ibid.*, FE/4351/BII/13-14 (Zhoushan, Shaoxing, Ningbo, Jinhua districts); ZPS, 24 July 1973, *ibid.*, FE/4363/BII/13-15 (Hangzhou, Jiaxing, Lishui, Taizhou, Wenzhou).
51. *HZRB*, 13, 18 August 1973.
52. For example a report of 16 May stated that 'in recent years' 470,000 young people had joined the CYL

- and 28,000 CYL members had been admitted into the CCP. Tan Qilong mentioned in his speech to the 5th Congress of the provincial Women's Federation that 100,000 women had joined the CYL since the Cultural Revolution, 10,000 had entered the CCP (these round figures were later revised to 140,000 and 12,000 respectively) and 5,000 female cadres had been promoted to positions of leadership at and above commune level. Of the 330,000 young people who had been sent from cities to either border regions, the countryside of Zhejiang, or the outskirts of Hangzhou, 19,580 from Hangzhou had joined the CYL, 770 the CCP and 8,000 were working in leadership positions. ZPS, 16 May 1973, SWB, FE/4313/BII/20; ZPS, 12 August 1973, ibid., FE/4375/BII/17-18; ZPS, 12 August 1973, FE/4381/BII/14; ZPS, 4 May 1973, ibid., FE/4280/BII/8-13.
53. ZPS, 24 September 1968, ibid., FE/2885/B/20; visit to Hangzhou Iron and Steel Mill, 27 May 1979.
 54. Tie Ying, 'Zhou zongli jiao wo', op. cit.
 55. Ibid.; visit, op. cit.
 56. RMRB, 13 June 1973, p.1; CNA, 941 (23 November 1973), pp.4-5.
 57. One acute observer of Chinese politics believes that 'There seems to have been an understanding at the centre that both sides in the "debate" pursued from 1973 to 1976 should have equal access to the media'. L. Dittmer, 'Basis of Power in Chinese Politics: A Theory and an Analysis of the Fall of the "Gang of Four"', World Politics, 31:1 (1978), p.54, fn.66. This observation is, I believe, entirely correct.
 58. ZPS, 13 August 1973, SWB, FE/4374/BII/1-2. For Zhang Tiesheng's letter see RMRB, 10 August 1973, p.1.
 59. A fifth year primary school girl student, Huang Shuai led the fray. See her letters in RMRB, 28 December 1973, p.1; 11 February 1974, p.1.
 60. HZRB, 16 February 1978; 'The unjust case of "Hangzhou's Ma Chenfu" has been cleared up'. Ibid., 9 January 1978.
 61. Visit to Silk Complex, 12 January 1977.
 62. A staff member of the CCP ZPC later claimed that in December 1972 Zhang had told the ZPC leaders that Weng Senhe 'was the first among the workers throughout the country who rose and rebelled during the great cultural revolution and that one should come to see his history!' In the summer of 1973 Wang Hongwen told

Tan that in electing workers to the Zhejiang delegation for the 10th Congress 'It's necessary to take history into consideration; even if it is somewhat difficult, we must strive for his election.' Exposure by Wang Hongyi. 7 February 1977. 'Document of the CCP CC', zhongfa (1977), No. 37, I & S, 15:1, p.110. See also 'Hangzhou Factory sabotaged', op. cit., p.40; Shen Chuyun (party secretary, Hangzhou Silk Complex), 'Suqing sihai, hangsilian you dabu qianjinle', RMRB, 17 May 1977, p.2 (speech at the National Conference on Learning from Daqing in Industry). Shen Chuyun, who after Weng Senhe's arrest and disgrace, was elected party secretary of the silk complex in October 1977 (HZRB, 20 October 1977), was later promoted to the post of deputy party secretary of Hangzhou's shangcheng district. In 1985 she has been disciplined for wasting 13,000 yuan of state funds in a five-day orgy of wining and dining. ZJRB, 7 February 1985, p.1. Ironically, one of the charges against Weng Senhe was that he misappropriated state funds to entertain his cronies. But he was only able to spend 7,181 yuan over a period of eighteen months.

63. According to Wang Hongwen, in a report he delivered to a Central Study Class on 14 January 1974 rumours had been circulating, concerning veteran and younger cadres; 'old marshalls must return to their posts; little soldiers must go back to their barracks'. Wang said that Mao had changed this couplet to read, 'old marshalls return to the line; little soldiers are promoted.' Classified Chinese Communist Documents, p.76.
64. 'An outpost position', op. cit.; 'A gang who created', op. cit.
65. 'The gang of four were the ringleaders', op. cit.; HZRB, 14 August 1978.
66. CCP HMC propaganda department criticism group, 'A loyal follower of the gang of four in Hangzhou', *ibid.*, 21 October 1977; Zhou Feng (secretary of the CCP HMC), 'Completely dig out the secret traitor who opposed the party and caused trouble', *ibid.*, 24 October 1977; ZPS, 21 May 1977, SWB, FE/5522/BII/16. Lai sent a second report on 9 December 1973 distancing himself from the provincial leadership and extolling Wang. *Ibid.*
67. Chen Xia (secretary of the CCP HMC), 'Crimes must be accounted for, the poison must be cleared away', HZRB, 10 April 1978.
68. Kong Xianlian (in 1972 secretary of the Fuyang county party committee), 'How did the political rumour about "there has been no change in Zhejiang for eighteen years" get about', *ibid.*, 26 November 1977; *ibid.*,

19 November 1977.

69. Several commentators have commented on the importance of the power struggle between the veteran cadres and the youthful rebels in anticipation of the passing of Mao and Zhou from the political scene. See K. Lieberthal, 'China in 1975 - The Internal Political Scene', PoC, 24:3 (1975), p.4; J. Domes, 'The "Gang of Four" - and Hua Guofeng: Analysis of Political Events in 1975-76', CQ, 71 (1977), p.478, who linked power politics with policy disputes; P. Chang, 'Who Gets What, When and How in Chinese Politics - A Case Study of the Strategies of Conflict of the "Gang of Four"', Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs, 2 (1979), pp.30-6, who concluded that the struggle for power was at the heart of the matter; P. Chang, 'The Anti Lin Biao and Confucius Campaign: Its Meaning and Purposes', AS, 14:10 (1974), pp.876-7, wrote that promotion of young cadres was the key plank of the radicals. L. Dittmer, 'Bases of Power', op. cit. and '"Line Struggle" in Theory and Practice: The Origins of the Cultural Revolution Reconsidered', CQ, 72 (1977), p.711 underestimated the organisational achievements of the radicals between 1973 and 1976. He wrote that

The subtle contest between Zhou Enlai and the radicals [1973-5] involved functional rift, policy friction and power cleavage between those chiefly concerned with economic production and those chiefly concerned with mass participation and continued cultural revolution, but the radicals were unable to mobilise sufficient mass support to prevail - partly because of Zhou's own skill at mobilising support, partly perhaps because the radical constituency had been rusticated and the provincial leadership was well entrenched and capable of denying the licence necessary for radical organisation.

In Zhejiang, at least, Zhang, Weng and He mobilised considerable mass support. That they did not prevail may have been due more to national forces outside their control than to their own inadequacies. However Dittmer's analysis of the 'shallowness' and 'narrowness' of the gang of four's political experience did apply with even greater validity to their followers in Zhejiang. See 'Bases of Power', pp. 40-48.

70. Hua Minsheng, op. cit.; Yang Lingen, op. cit.; 'An extremely ferocious counter-revolutionary gang', op. cit., RMRB, 15 April 1979, p.1.

71. Visit to Red Flag Paper Mill, 12 March 1978. Established in 1919 the mill, in 1978, employed a staff of 2,200.
72. Visit, 27 May 1979; HZRB, 27 August 1978; K. Forster, 'A Story from Hangzhou', Eastern Horizon, 18:12 (1979), pp.42-4.
73. Visit to Hangzhou Gearbox Plant, 17 July 1977; 'Dizhi "sirenbang" jianchi xue daqing', HZRB, 10 April 1977, pp.1-2.
74. Chen Xia, op. cit.; 'An outpost position', op. cit.
75. Wang Ruoshui, op. cit., p.93.
76. Wang Hongwen, 'Report to the Central Study Class', op. cit.; pp.64-82. 14 January was the seventh anniversary of Shanghai's 1967 power seizure by the cultural revolutionaries.
77. At the end of 1973 Mao ordered the transfer of most commanders of military regions. This mostly involved a direct swap; for example Xu Shiyu transferred from Nanjing to Guangzhou while Ding Sheng moved in the opposite direction. In the process the commanders did not retain their provincial first secretaryships. Deng Xiaoping is credited with supervising an apparently smooth operation. A circular of the CCP ZPC and ZPRC of 17 December 1973 requested all PLA units in Zhejiang 'on their own initiative [sic] to ask local Party committees for instructions and report to them on their work and consciously accept the centralised leadership of the party'. ZPS, 18 December 1973, SWB, FE/4492/BII/3.
78. CCP CC Documents zhongfa (1974) no. 1, 18 January 1974, Classified Chinese Communist Documents, pp. 755-87; CCP CC Documents zhongfa (1972) no. 2, 22 January 1974, *ibid.*, pp.788-9.
79. Zhonggong dangshi 170ti wenda, p.313; Wang Ruoshui, p.93; CCP CC zhongfa (1976), no. 24, 10 December 1976, Zhonggong nianbao, 1977 (Taipei, 1977), 5:16.
80. CCP, CC Document, zhongfa (1977), no. 37, I & S, 14:8 (1978), pp.92-3; Hangzhou Garrison criticism group 'Iron-clad proof of attacking the party and destabilising the army', HZRB, 10 March 1977. Jiang Qing allegedly saw off her messengers with the following words: 'I am fond of firing canon shots. I am a gunner; I manufacture canons and canon balls and I have some artillery batteries. Now I am shooting you out as canon balls; you are going to open fire.'
81. CCP, CC Document, zhongfa (1974), no. 3, 25 January 1974, in Classified Chinese Communist Documents,

pp.675-80.

82. See HZRB, 2, 4, 10 February 1974; Xinhua, 5 February 1974, SCMP, 5553 (14 February 1974), pp.128-31; ZPS, 7 February 1974, URS, 76:1 (2 July 1974), p.3; RMRB, 9 February 1974, p.2 (wholly devoted to articles by officers and men of the company); ZPS, 17 February 1974, SWB, FE/4539/BII/27-8; ZPS, 2 March 1974, *ibid.*, FE/4545/BII/22; ZPS, 8 March 1974, FBIS/CHI, 50 (1974), C1-2; ZPS, 24 May 1974, SWB, FE/4612/BII/5-6; ZPS, 8 July 1974, *ibid.*, FE/4648/BII/10-11; Guangming Ribao, 20 July 1974, SCMP, 5679 (20 August 1974), pp.57-61; ZPS, 14 September 1974, *ibid.*, FE/4707/BII/9; ZPS, 27 January 1975, FBIS/CHI, 21 (1975), G1-2.
83. 'Banhao minbing', RMRB, 29 September 1973, p.1; 'Zai Maozhuxi geming luxian zhiyin xia jinyibu jiaqiang minbing jianshe', *ibid.*, pp.1-2.
84. Yang Yong (deputy Chief of Staff of the PLA), 'Report to the National Militia Conference', Xinhua, 8 August 1978, SWB, FE/5890/BII/1-3; J.C.F. Wang, 'The Urban Militia as a political instrument in the power contest in China in 1976', AS, 18:6 (1978), pp.548-52; CNA, 940 (16 November 1973), pp.5-7.
85. ZPS, 3 February 1974, URS, 75:14 (17 May 1974), pp. 177-81; HZRB, 3 February 1974.
86. An article of 1 February which was published in the Zhejiang Daily sanctioned the formation of special contingents who would be drawn principally from among workers, peasants and soldiers. ZPS, 1 February 1974, SWB, FE/4530/BII/1-2. According to sources in Taiwan the CCP CC issued an eight-point directive in February prohibiting armed struggle, the 'exchange of revolutionary experience', and other activities which had been popularised by the Red Guards in the Cultural Revolution. China News Agency (Taipei), 4 July 1974, *ibid.*, FE/4646/BII/11-12.
87. ZPS, 7 February 1974, URS, 76:1, pp.2-5.
88. ZPS, 8 February 1974, *ibid.*, pp.5-8.
89. 'A loyal follower of the gang of four', *op. cit.*; Zhou Feng, *op. cit.*; 'An outpost position', *op. cit.*
90. ZPS, 11 February 1974, SWB, FE/4532/BII/13-14.
91. For example on 19 April 1974 Weng visited the campus of Hangzhou University and delivered a speech praising Zhang Tiesheng, the Liaoning student who had handed in the blank examination paper in 1973. Briefing at Hangzhou University, 19 May 1978.

92. ZPS, 14 February 1974, SWB, FE/4533/BII/12-14.
93. ZPS, 17 February 1974, ibid., FE/4539/BII/27-8.
94. ZPS, 27 February 1974, ibid., FE/4544/BII/17.
95. HZRB, 3 March 1974; ZPS, 3 March 1974, URS, 76:1, pp.8-10.
96. Tie has recently described this experience when he was 'deprived of the power (quanli) to work'. Tie Ying, 'Zhou zongli jiao wo'.
97. Hangzhou Daily criticism group, 'The principle of the party nature of a proletarian newspaper is not easily twisted', HZRB, 22 November 1977.
98. ZPS, 9 March 1974, FBIS/CHI, 49 (1974), C3-5; ZPS, 11 March 1974, ibid., 52 (1974), C1-2; 'Pilin pikong gaohao chungeng', RMRB, 3 March 1974, p.1.
99. HZRB, 28 February 1974; Hangzhou Daily criticism group, 'We must become a tool of the Party, not a trumpeter for factionalism', ibid., 28 September 1977.
100. ZPS, 3 March 1974, URS, 76:1, p.8. Nanbao featured prominently in the media throughout 1974, but not always as a model of radicalism. A Zhejiang Daily article in April attempted to reassure cadres who believed that attention to production tasks would reduce enthusiasm for the pilin pikong campaign. ZPS, 12 April 1974, FBIS/CHI, 75 (1974), G1-2. The brigade's secretary spoke at a provincial rally commemorating the 32nd anniversary of Mao's 'Yanan Talks'. ZPS, 24 May 1974, SWB, FE/4612/BII/5-6. A representative of the brigade addressed a meeting to open a film festival featuring films on learning from Dazhai in agriculture. ZPS, 30 June 1974, ibid., FE/4642/BII/5. See also ZPS, 13 July 1974, FBIS/CHI, 139 (1974), G2-3 for a further report on the brigade's activities in the pilin pikong campaign.
101. 'Zai pi "keji fuli"', RMRB, 15 March 1974, p.1.
102. CNA, 959 (10 May 1974), p.6 first observed this phenomenon at the 20 April conference discussed below. But the rise to prominence of the rebel leaders had occurred a month previously.
103. This was commented upon by Tie Ying in a lecture he gave in 1980. Tie Ying, 'Gongchandangyuan yao wei sihua jianshe de weida shiye er xianshen', ZJRB, 31 May 1980, pp.1-3. He said in part, 'A few years back, Zhang Yongsheng, Weng Senhe, He Xianchun and their ilk - while roundly cursing the Communist Party - exhausted every means to worm their way into our party'. Translated in ZPS, 31 May 1980, FBIS/CHI,

- 108 (1980), 08.
104. 'Smashing the kou', op. cit.; Chen Xia, op. cit., Tie Ying, 'Get mobilised', op. cit.
105. 'The gang of four's fiendish hatchet-man, op. cit.; 'Report on the Examination concerning Weng Senhe', CCP CC Document (1977) no. 37, I & S, 15:1, p.111.
106. Wang Xing was first identified in May 1959 as party secretary of the Xinanjiang hydro-electric engineering bureau. Construction of the Xinanjiang hydro-electric power station, a major capital construction project in Zhejiang, commenced in April 1957 and was completed three years later. Zhou Enlai visited the construction site in 1959 and Hua Guofeng the operating station in 1971. Visit to Xinanjiang, 4 September 1977. From October 1962 until September 1964 Wang was deputy-governor of Zhejiang. In December 1973 he reappeared as 2nd secretary of the CCP HMC. After the reorganisation of the municipal leadership in July 1975 he was transferred to Guangxi and later criticised for his cooperation with the 'agents' of the gang of four in the HMC.
107. Chen Xia, op. cit. There is no evidence that Weng Senhe ever held the post of deputy-secretary of the CCP HMC. Perhaps He, and Wang, were joking.
108. 'The new-born counter-revolutionary', op. cit.
109. Hangzhou Municipal Public Security Department criticism group, 'An extremely ferocious counter-revolutionary gang', HZRB, 23 June 1977. In November 1967 Huang had blindfolded a policeman on duty and taken him to the hills surrounding Hangzhou where he had framed him on political charges. For this act he was detained by the public security bureau. Hangzhou Silk criticism group, 'Iron-clad proof of Weng Senhe and He Xianchun ganging up to usurp power in the silk industry', *ibid.*, 30 June 1977.
110. 'Constitution of the CCP', PR, no. 35-36 (7 September 1973), p.29.
111. 'The new-born counter-revolutionary', op. cit.; 'The gang of four's fiendish hatchet-man', op. cit.; 'An extremely ferocious counter-revolutionary gang', op. cit.; 'Report on the examination', op. cit.; 'A gang who created trouble', op. cit.
112. A worker at the Hangzhou Silk Complex was appointed to a district 'detective and destroy' (zhenpo) office in the Gongshu district of Hangzhou. This office had been established in April 1974 jointly by the public security bureau and the urban militia command. Its job was supposedly to investigate and crack crimes

- such as theft. The worker could not wait for the public notification of his appointment before rushing off to assume his duties. He then appointed himself deputy-chief of the district public security bureau for good measure. 'An extremely ferocious gang', op. cit.
113. Hangzhou Garrison criticism group, 'A black model in establishing a "second armed force"', HZRB, 20 April 1977.
 114. Zhejiang Fine Arts College criticism group, 'The pipedream of the gang of four and the mongrel of Zhejiang', *ibid.*, 23 January 1977. Zhang also took over control of the provincial revolution-in-education group from where he could popularise the 'two rushes' in educational institutions throughout Zhejiang. RMRB, 2 December 1977. For a further report on the activities of the College in the pilin pikong campaign, see ZPS, 24 August 1974, FBIS/CHI, 166 (1974), G6-8.
 115. ZPS, 30 June 1974, FBIS/CHI, 135 (1974), G3-4.
 116. HZRB, 22 February 1974.
 117. Hangzhou Oxygen Generator Plant, 'Resolutely suppress the ringleaders of beating, smashing and looting', *ibid.*, 21 June 1977; ZPMD Logistics Department criticism group, 'Rise to power and positions, and fall to destruction amid chaos,' *ibid.*, 9 April 1977.
 118. *Ibid.*, 31 December 1976, 5 April 1978, 14 August 1978, 17 April 1979; 'The new-born counter-revolutionary', op. cit.; 'A black model', op. cit.; 'Resolutely suppress', op. cit.; '"Struggling for truth" - recalling the heroic deeds of CCP member Zhang Jifa in struggling against the gang of four', HZRB, 7 November 1978; Xinhua, 13 January 1978, SWB, FE/7515/BII/15-16.
 119. 'Iron-clad proof of attacking the party', op. cit.
 120. 'Resolutely suppress', op. cit.; HZRB, 17 April 1979; *ibid.*, 16 November 1977, 17 December 1977; Gao Zhixian, op. cit.
 121. CCP HMC propaganda department criticism group, 'A loyal follower', op. cit.; HZRB, 17 April 1979.
 122. ZPS, 8 April 1974, SWB, FE/4574/BII/19-20.
 123. See ZPS, 18 November 1973, *ibid.*, FE/4458/BII/10-11 which referred to militia activities at the Wenzhou Scissors Factory. The report stated that the militia contingent, under the 'unified leadership of the municipal party committee', carried out street patrols

armed with rifles and machine-guns and participated in class struggle - a euphemism for factional fighting - in the city.

124. ZPS, 21 May 1974, *ibid.*, FE/4609/BII/3-4.
125. ZPS, 20 June 1974, *ibid.*, FE/4637/BII/8-9. See also ZPS, 19 June 1974, *ibid.*, FE/4634/BII/13 for a brief report of the forum held by the militia on the day preceding the rally.
126. In April 1974 Zhang Jifa, a demobilised soldier, who had once worked in Beijing guarding important buildings, had obtained a record of Wang Hongwen's telephone calls to Zhang Yongsheng. Supporters of Zhang Yongsheng in the mill would apparently pat their pockets and boast that 'we've got access to the highest authorities; in here we've got Vice-chairman Wang's phone call to Zhang Yongsheng.' Part of the transcript read: 'the current situation is very favourable to you and I hope you do big things. But don't create the impression that you are reversing the verdict on X and X' [a reference to Lin Biao's purged military followers in Zhejiang]. After Zhang Jifa got hold of these documents he decided to take them to Beijing to pass them to people he knew who had contacts amongst the central leadership. When Zhang's enemies discovered his intentions they attempted to track him down. Zhang boarded a train in Hangzhou for the national capital and after doubling back on his tracks to shake off his pursuers, he arrived in Beijing on 7 May 1974. He passed on the material to central 'leading comrades' and then returned to Hangzhou. Together with 80 work-mates he later pasted up a wall poster in Hangzhou denouncing his factional enemies. 'An extremely ferocious counter-revolutionary gang', *op. cit.*; HZRB, 27 August 1978; 'Struggling for the truth', *op. cit.* Perhaps Zhang was another leading member of the 'foot of the mountain' faction. For his efforts in standing up to Zhang, Weng and He Zhang Jifa was elected vice-chairman of the ZPTUC at its 7th Congress in August 1978. There he joined Guo Zhisong and Fang Jianwen, other prominent mass organisation enemies of Zhang, Weng and He.
127. 'Struggling for the truth', *op. cit.* Zhang was eventually arrested on 2 September and charged with arson. For the next fourteen hours he was interrogated and cruelly tortured by the militia. They even threatened to throw him into a coke oven at his factory. Zhang was held for four months and three days in which period he was tortured seventeen times, suffering broken ribs and a fractured arm, kidney damage, a punctured eardrum, severe concussion and astigmatism to the right eye. *Ibid.* See K. Forster, *op. cit.* The Hangzhou Daily also carried a partisan

yet vivid eye-witness account of what happened on that day and of the kind of treatment that the militia dealt out to its enemies. Li Longbiao was a worker at the Hangzhou Worker-Peasant Bean Products factory. His father, Li Baoxing, was a worker at the Zhejiang Hemp Mill where factional differences seemed particularly sharp. In August 1974 the elder Li fled the mill out of fear for his personal safety because he had apparently joined the factional group opposed to Weng and He and was known to them. On the day of the fire the younger Li went to the Iron and Steel Mill in search of his father, which suggests that Weng and He's opponents had made it something of a base. Li Longbiao was seized by the militia and taken to its headquarters. There he was recognised as Li Baoxing's son and accused of arson. After a shocking beating Li was incarcerated in a secret prison and held there for a month. For a further month and a half he was kept in solitary confinement before his release in late October 1974. Li, who was only 35 at the time, emerged a physical wreck. At the time of writing he continued to suffer from severe concussion, damage to his nervous system, incontinence and he had become a paraplegic. Li Longbiao, 'How He Xianchun and company cruelly persecuted me', HZRB, 21 June 1977, p.3.

128. ZPS, 30 September 1974, SWB, FE/4721/BII/9-10.
129. CCP CC zhongfa (1976) no. 24, Zhonggong nianbao, 1977, 5:17. For the claim that Jiang's speech caused serious repercussions in Zhejiang, see Ji Yangwen, 'A shocking display of opposing the party and throwing the army into chaos', HZRB, 9 February 1977.
130. CCP CC zhongfa (1977), no. 37, I & S, 14:8 (1978), pp.93-5, 99.
131. ZPS, 28 September 1973, URS, 73:1 (2 October 1973), pp.8-10.
132. ZPS, 18 October 1973, SWB, FE/4431/BII/4-8.
133. ZPS, 21 December 1973, ibid., FE/4492/BII/10-11.
134. CNA, 974 (20 September 1974), p.6 commented on this media attention.
135. Ji Yangwen, op. cit.; ZPMD Logistics Department criticism group, 'Those who try to destroy the Great Wall will themselves be burned', HZRB, 14 September 1978; ibid., 31 December 1976. At a public rally in June 1974 a leader of these brigands, Yao Guoling, was denounced and paraded before the masses. Weng Senhe chaired the rally with Zhang Yongsheng as one of four speakers. Provincial and municipal civilian and military party leaders attended. Ibid., 25 June 1974.

Interestingly, Yao had led the Wenzhou mass organisation Wenlianzoneg which had given the local supporters of United Headquarters a thorough trouncing in 1967 and again in 1968, before the military had suppressed it. See chapter two, p.105. Qiu Honggen was another old foe of Weng Senhe who joined Yao in the dock in June 1974. He had apparently written signed letters to Beijing exposing the activities of Hangzhou urban militia and been arrested once more. Qiu proudly remembered his defiant attitude at the rally - holding his head high and smiling - in contravention of regulations for a prisoner's demeanour on such an occasion. Qiu Honggen, op. cit.

136. 'Rise to power and position', op. cit.
137. ZPS, 23 March 1974, URS, 75:14, pp.181-4.
138. Agence France Presse (AFP), 24 June 1974, FBIS/CHI, 123 (1974), E1-2.
139. This small group apparently derived its legitimacy from Mao himself, as articles published after the arrest of the Gang of Four used the ancient phrase, 'jian tianzi yi ling zhuhou' (order everybody about in the name of the emperor) to describe its power.
140. HZRB, 31 December 1976; Ji Yangwen, op. cit.; 'Those who try to destroy', op. cit.; 'ZPMD links up criticism', op. cit.
141. Tie Ying recounts that he was dragged into 'criticism and struggle halls' although he was ill. 'wo ... daizhe bing bei lashang pidou huichang'. 'Zhou zongli jiao wo', op. cit.
142. 'We must become a tool', op. cit.; Hangzhou Daily criticism group, 'A poisonous weed to attack the party and destabilise the army', HZRB, 10 October 1978.
143. Zhai Diaoshi, 'Expose and criticise the gang of four's heinous crimes in opposing the army in Zhejiang and throwing it into chaos', *ibid.*, 1 February 1977; 'Those who try to destroy', op. cit. Foreign travellers observed posters in Hangzhou at this time denouncing Xia Qi. AFP, 9 July 1974, FBIS/CHI, 133 (1974), E1. Various sources alleged that sometime in 1974 - the dates vary from April to June - the CC issued a document No. 18 permitting criticism of cadres by name. See A. Chan and J. Unger (eds), 'The Case of Li Yizhe', Chinese Law and Government, 10:3 (1977), pp.20-1, 65 fn.11 who dated it in April 1974. Dittmer, 'Bases of Power', p.57, fn. 75 dated the directive on 18 May 1974 after Mao's comments of 5 May in which he had said: 'I see nothing wrong with posting big-character posters in the streets, and if foreigners want to read them, fine; if the Chinese want to read

- them, even better.' AFP dated the directive in late May. AFP, 19 June 1974, FBIS/CHI, 120 (1974), E1-2. J.B. Starr wrote that the CC 'was reported to have approved' such a policy on 13 June. J.B. Starr, 'China in 1974: "Weeding through the old to bring forth the New"', AS, 15:1 (1975), p.9.
144. ZPS, 10 April 1974, URS, 75:14, pp.184-7.
145. A Hong Kong periodical reported in September 1975 that in the middle of 1974 'posters appeared in Hangzhou, signed by the city's militia command, condemning an illegally set up provincial militia command'. CNA, 1013, p.4. Perhaps such an organisation had been formed by Zhang, Weng and He's opponents with the covert approval of the ZPMD leaders.
146. 'Zhua pilin pikong cu gongye shengchan', RMRB, 10 April 1974, p.1.
147. ZPS, 22 April 1974, SWB, FE/4585/BII/11.
148. CNA, 959 (10 May 1974), p.6.
149. Chen Xia, op. cit.
150. ZPS, 28 April 1974, SWB, FE/4589/BII/1-2; CNA, 959, p.7.
151. Jiang Ruwang was party secretary of the Jinjian brigade in Jiangshan county southern Zhejiang. Apparently Kang Sheng was responsible for promoting the brigade as a model for the study of philosophy (Mao Zedong Thought) by peasants. Beijing Home Service, 15 January 1970, SWB, FE/3285/BII/2. In August 1970 Jiang published an article in the People's Daily which was accompanied by an editorial commentary. ZPS, 20 August 1970, ibid., FE/3462/BII/1-7. This was followed up by publicity in Zhejiang to popularise Jinjian brigade's experience. ZPS, 13 September 1970, ibid., FE/3483/BII/9-10; ZPS, 15 September 1970, ibid., FE/3490/BII/12-13; FE/3493/B/5; ZPS, 27 September 1970, ibid., FE/3497/BII/17; ZPS, 1 November 1970, ibid., FE/3526/BII/8-10. On 9, 12, and 13 April 1971 the People's Daily published a three-part article about the brigade. Xinhua, ibid., FE/3659/BII/8-17. In May 1971 the brigade's party branch was praised for its cadre participation in manual labour. ZPS, 10 May 1971, ibid., FE/3697/BII/3-4. For further media coverage of the brigade, see ZPS, 23 November 1973, ibid., FE/4464/BII/12-13; ZPS, 28 February 1974, FBIS/CHI, 47 (1974), C6-7. In March 1974 Jiang and three co-writers published a letter which appeared on page one of Zhejiang Daily concerning the study of philosophy by workers, peasants and soldiers. ZPS, 13 March 1974, SWB, FE/4558/BII/7-8; Xinhua, 1 April 1974, FBIS/CHI, 64 (1974), G1-2. A Jinjian

representative spoke at a film festival propagating Dazhai. ZPS, 29 June 1974, SWB, FE/4642/BII/5. Jiang made regular appearances in the pilin pikong campaign, ZPS, 24 July 1974, FBIS/CHI, 144 (1974), G2-3, and contributed articles to the provincial press. ZPS, 1 September 1974; SWB, FE/4699/BII/14-16. The publicity about Jiang and the brigade continued into 1975, ZPS, 17 February 1975, FBIS/CHI, 35 (1975), G2-4, ZPS, 26 December 1975, SWB, FE/5100/BII/8-11 and 1976, in the criticism of Deng Xiaoping. ZPS, 2 June 1976, *ibid.*, FE/5230/BII/7-8. During 1976 Jiang apparently obtained a responsible position in the Zhejiang Broadcasting Administration Bureau. ZPS, 26 October 1977, *ibid.*, FE/5657/BII/7. He came under strong criticism in October 1977 for his support of the leftist cause. ZPS, 18 October 1977, *ibid.*, FE/5647/BII/5-6; ZPS, 20 October 1977, *ibid.*, FE/5667/BII/9-10. Sometime after the downfall of the Gang of Four, Jiang was arrested and imprisoned for a supposedly immoral and decadent life-style.

152. ZPS, 30 April 1974, *ibid.*, FE/4597/BII/12-13.
153. ZPS, 30 April 1974, *ibid.*, FE/4603/BII/20.
154. ZPS, 6 June 1974, *ibid.*, FE/4625/BII/13-15.
155. It was later alleged that Wang Hongwen had instructed the CCP ZPC in June 1974 to allow Zhang, Weng and He to attend its standing committee meetings. CCP CC Document Zhongfa (1977) No. 37, I & S, 15:1, p.110; 'Hangzhou Factory sabotaged', pp.40-1; Bian Wen, 'What was Wang Hongwen up to in meddling in Zhejiang's affairs?', HZRB, 5 December 1976. Although they would not have had the right to vote or perhaps even speak, their mere presence would have unsettled the party leadership and added greatly to the trio's political standing in the province. Therefore if this allegation was true it would help explain the prominence enjoyed by Zhang, Weng and He in 1974.
156. ZPS, 8 June 1974, *ibid.*, FE/4624/BII/2-4. Beijing published an editorial on this subject at the end of June. 'Zai douzheng zhong peiyang lilun duiwu', RMRB, 28 June 1974, p.1. The rebels also ran their own newspaper (the Zhejiang Worker) and magazines.
157. ZPS, 15 June 1974, SWB, FE/4631/BII/13-14. This impression was further reinforced by a photographic exhibition on the campaign which opened on 21 June 1974 at the Exhibition Building in Hangzhou. Tan Qilong cut the ribbon after Weng Senhe had delivered a speech at the opening ceremony. ZPS, 21 June 1974, *ibid.*, FE/4637/BII/17-18.
158. ZPS, 24 June 1974, *ibid.*, BII/21.

159. ZPS, 2 July 1974, *ibid.*, FE/4644/BII/9-10.
160. After a lengthy absence during the campaign, deputy-secretary of the CCP ZPC Lai Keke had reappeared at the 13 June conference. Another member of the ZPC standing committee, Meng Chaoyu, also resumed public activities in June 1974.
161. ZPS, 8 July 1974, *ibid.*, FE/4648/BII/10-11.
162. ZPS, 7 July 1974, *ibid.*, BII/8. The editor's note was appended to an article reporting a 19% increase in industrial production in Jiande county for the first six months of 1974 over the corresponding period for the previous year. Jiande is situated south-west of Hangzhou municipality. In 1970 it was acclaimed as a model in party consolidation and building. ZPS, 2 February 1970, *ibid.*, FE/3299/BII/9-10. This was later elaborated as an example of implementing the Maoist concepts of 'crack troops and simplified administration' (*jingbing jianzheng*). ZPS, 13 February 1971, *ibid.*, FE/3613/BII/7-8. See also ZPS, 4 September 1971, *FBIS/CHI*, 171 (1971), C5-6 for a report on the county's worker-peasant May 7th cadre school. In 1974 Zhang Yongsheng apparently established a test case in amalgamating county-level party, government and military power in Jiande. He also tried to integrate urban militia units with the People's Armed Forces Departments. See CCP HMC party school 3rd study class, 'Strip off the disguise, restore its original features', *HZRB*, 5 August 1977. The county also mastered the 'two rushes' and apparently obtained Wang Hongwen's consent to continue with its reforms when Wang visited Hangzhou in July 1975. Jiande county party committee criticism group, 'A gigantic fraud - dissecting the so-called "simplifying the troops, streamline the administration" in Jiande county', *ibid.*, 24 September 1977. See also 'We must become a tool', *op. cit.* Wang Zida and Wang Xing, 1st and 2nd secretaries of the CCP HMC assisted Zhang Yongsheng in establishing a test-case in Jiande. *Ibid.*, 5 April 1978. Wang Xing would have built up contacts in the county during his years working at the Xinanjiang power plant, which is located in Jiande.
163. CCP CC Document *zhongfa* (1974), No. 21, in Classified Chinese Communist Documents, pp.612-6. On 1 June 1974 Zhou Enlai had entered a hospital in Beijing from which he was never to reemerge, except for brief public appearances at major functions such as the 4th NPC in January 1975. *Xinhua*, 12 February 1984 in *ZJRB*, 13 February 1984, p.3. Thus Deng Xiaoping most probably played a major role in drafting this document.
164. In a visit to the Hangzhou Oxygen Generator Plant I

was informed that in 1974 one of its cadres had fled to Xinjiang to escape the urban militia. Visit, 4 June 1978.

165. ZPS, 11 July 1974, SWB, FE/4655/BII/23-5.
166. ZPS, 24 July 1974, FBIS/CHI, 144 (1974), G2-3.
167. An editorial of 28 July 1974 called for the momentum of the campaign to be kept up during the oncoming busy farming season, but it was the last shot as the forces of moderation took over. ZPS, 28 July 1974, SWB, FE/4667/BII/33. A conference held from 20-28 July indicated that moves were afoot to bring the propaganda teams which were controlled by Weng Senhe, under closer party leadership. ZPS, 30 July 1974, FBIS/CHI, 149 (1974), G2-6.
168. ZPS, 10 August 1974, SWB, FE/4682/BII/16-18.
169. ZPS, 16 August 1974, *ibid.*, FE/4687/BII/9-10.
170. Ji Yangwen, *op. cit.*; 'Those who try to destroy', *op. cit.*; Tie Ying, 'Get mobilised and strive to realise', *op. cit.* A sanquanhui also opened in Hangzhou on 15 May 1974, and in prefectures and counties across the province, paralysing the work of party committees. 'A gang who created trouble', *op. cit.*
171. Mao's remarks, made on 17 July 1974 at a Politburo meeting read, 'Nimen yao zhuyi ne; buyao gaocheng siren xiaozongpai ne'. CCP CC zhongfa (1976), No. 24, Zhonggong nianbao, 5:7.
172. In October 1974 Mao called for stability and unity within the Party and army. See Chan and Unger (eds.), 'The Case of Li Yizhe', p.65. In November he issued instructions on the economy. CCP CC zhongfa (1977), No. 37, I & S, 15:5 (1979), p.86.
173. Jiushi Niandai (HK), December 1974, FBIS/CHI, 238 (1974), E4-5.
174. ZPS, 30 September 1974, SWB, FE/4720/BII/5-6.
175. 'Jixu gaohao pilin pikong', RMRB, 28 November 1974, p.1. The Zhejiang authorities immediately followed suit. ZPS, 30 November 1974, SWB, FE/4775/BII/15.
176. The following information concerning the silk complex is drawn from; Hangzhou Garrison investigation group, 'The epitome of the "second armed force"', HZRB, 20 May 1977; Hangzhou Silk Dyeing and Printing Complex printing and dyeing workshop criticism group, 'Judge the "two rushes" from three examples', *ibid.*, 4 July 1977; Hangzhou Silk Complex Party Committee, *ibid.*, 14 March 1978; 'Hangzhou Factory sabotaged', *op. cit.*;

Shen Chuyun, 'Qingchu "sihai"', op. cit.; visits to Hangzhou silk complex, 12 January 1977, 7 November 1977, 11 November 1977.

177. As late as October 1974 Weng and He set up a similar detachment in the silk bureau and over the next six months it seized and locked up twenty people and forced them to join a 'militia study class'. 'Iron-clad proof', op. cit.
178. Weng was later reported to have said: 'One talk of Zhang Chunqiao's impressed me greatly. He said: "who says the rebels can only destroy but can't hold on to power." When I read this I felt as good as if I had just eaten an icy-pole on a hot day. With these words as our gospel we thought of holding onto power (zuo tianxia) all day long when moving around, eating, holding meetings and in our dreams'. 'The gang of four's fiendish hatchet-man', op. cit.
179. The first deputy-secretary of the party committee and first vice-chairman of the revolutionary committee in the silk bureau was appointed by Weng Senhe. Weng's appointee actually took charge of the bureau when the secretary was shunted aside in the pilin pikong campaign. This man's father had apparently worked for the Guomindang police force and had been responsible for the murder of CCP members. In 1951 he was executed. The son concealed his family history and in the Cultural Revolution posed as a 'sufferer' (shou yazhe) to join the rebel forces. When the party branch in his unit was reformed in 1969 he joined the CCP and apparently became its group leader. In 1970 he was expelled from the party for concealing his father's record. But in 1974 after joining the occupiers on Mt. Pingfeng, Weng and He sent him to the silk bureau as a 'liaison man' and he rejoined the party in April 1974. Control of the bureau provided Weng with another avenue, in addition to the militia, to bypass regulations in admitting new party members. CCP HMC Organisation Department and Silk Bureau criticism groups, 'Look at the organisational basis of counter-revolutionary bourgeois factionalism from a black model,' *ibid.*, 12 August 1977; 'Iron-clad proof', op. cit.

Chapter Four

CENTRAL INTERVENTION, 1974-5

With the conclusion of the campaign against Lin Biao and Confucius in late 1974 the central authorities had a freer hand to devote to solving problems in areas such as Zhejiang. This chapter outlines the efforts made by Beijing to bring factional squabbles to an end first by negotiation and then, when that approach failed, by the transfer of officials and disciplinary action against Zhang Yongsheng, Weng Senhe and He Xianchun. The process of central intervention, which began in November 1974, culminated in the spectacular deployment of the PLA in July 1975 and the major overhaul of the provincial civilian and military leadership. This chapter further establishes that the factionalism of the dimensions which had destabilised Zhejiang for eight years required a solution which was beyond the ability of local leaders to provide. Until Mao and his senior colleagues resolved to take decisive action, the fires of factional conflict would continue to smoulder.

July 1975 should thus be seen as the denouement of a series of events dating back to 1967. Their cumulative effect impacted most severely in 1974-5, almost destroying effective administration in Zhejiang. However, the decisive steps taken under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping to restore the authority of the provincial party leadership did not touch the source of the trouble but only some of its worst manifestations. When renewed trouble arose after the death

of Zhou Enlai and the second purge of Deng early in 1976, Zhejiang's problems flared again, albeit in a somewhat milder form. Even today, a decade after Hangzhou made the international news headlines, Deng Xiaoping has not been completely successful in rooting out factionalism from the political scene in Zhejiang, although virtually all of the principal participants in the Hangzhou incident have departed the stage either in disgrace or retirement, whether voluntary or otherwise.

Steps towards resolution, November 1974 - June 1975

The previous chapter of this thesis has described how, in the latter half of 1974, a crisis in key industrial sectors alerted the centre to the danger of continuing a destabilising political campaign. It therefore decided to bring the upheavals of earlier in the year to an end. Mao Zedong had approved of this course - with what amount of enthusiasm it is difficult to judge - but beginning in October 1974 he absented himself from Beijing to spend the rest of the year in Changsha. Mao's absence from the capital meant that he became even more dependent on the advice of those few senior colleagues such as Deng Xiaoping and Wang Hongwen who were allowed access to him. Perhaps this helps explain his somewhat erratic fluctuations from espousal for moderation and economic development to a renewed commitment to yet another potentially unsettling political campaign.¹

In November 1974 the CC ordered the major participants

in the factional struggles in Zhejiang to report to Beijing to join a study class. Weng Senhe left Hangzhou in a most unrepentant frame of mind. He found himself under heavy pressure for his behaviour but he taunted his accusers with his achievements in placing subordinates in key posts and dared them to try and undo his work. Weng stated defiantly: 'as long as the "two rushes" are secure I'm willing to go to jail'. (zhi yao "shuangtu" baolao, wo ningyuan zuolao)² He Xianchun also attended the meeting. He was concerned that the 'two rushes' would be one of the major topics for discussion and that such activities which breached party statutes would be proscribed.³

Negotiations proved long and difficult. It appears that they lasted for two months, until January 1975, and that an assessment of the performance of the Hangzhou militia was another item high on the agenda. He Xianchun apparently attempted to prove to the central authorities that the continued existence of the urban militia was essential to the maintenance of public order in Hangzhou. Taking advantage of the death of his mother to return to the provincial capital to make arrangements for her funeral, He plotted with his supporters on the CCP HMC to mobilise the militia, while the central conference was still in session, to deal with incidents which were manufactured for this end. All told, ten such incidents, which had as their raison d'etre glorification of the militia and deliberate incitement of its opponents, occurred at this time.

The most serious incident involved armed fighting and arson at the Hangzhou Cable Factory on 3 December 1974.⁴

Instead of helping fight the fire, the urban militia contingents under Xia Genfa's direction, piled on more furniture to fuel the blaze and seized anyone trying to put it out. A report was then submitted to Beijing stating that the militia had in fact performed meritorious service in stopping fighting at the factory and bravely putting out the fire. The militia was praised for upholding discipline under trying circumstances. Factional supporters of the militia in the Telecommunications bureau again jammed the telephone lines to the factory so that their opponents could not make any outside contact. To get to the bottom of the event the CC summoned the leaders of the CCP HMC, Wang Zida and Wang Xing, to the capital for an explanation. However Beijing was unlikely to obtain an objective account of the incident from cadres who had already openly sided with He Xianchun.

It seems as if Wang Hongwen played a central role in the deliberations in Beijing. He was not slow to express his likes and dislikes concerning the various factional leaders.⁵ But even Wang could not completely protect Weng Senhe and He Xianchun from the consequences of their actions, especially as the prevailing mood in the Politburo seemed to have shifted against the radicals. Wang informed Weng that although he shared his views, 'I'm not the Political Bureau'.⁶ He apparently had to cheer up a disconsolate He Xianchun with the words 'You must try and win credit'.. (zhengqi).⁷

Before the opening of the conference, the CCP ZPC had submitted a report to the CC entitled 'Guanyu zhengque chuli tuji fazhan de dangyuan he tuji tibo de ganbu de

qingshi baogao' (A report requesting instructions on how to handle the rush induction of party members and the rush promotion of cadres) and the CC issued a document approving the suggestions that it contained.⁸ The CC also issued directives to bring an end to factional confrontations and to curb the power of the urban militia. However the directives seemed less than decisive. Rather than forbidding the 'two rushes' outright, the central authorities requested 'deferral' of the process. Weng and He promptly defied this edict by continuing to pack committees and vital posts with their nominees. Weng Senhe revealed the contempt in which he held directives not to his liking by remarking after one central instruction was relayed forbidding armed struggle: 'If we took any notice of all the rules in the world we'd perish; the same with their seven or eight points. I'll take the rap.' (tingle fofa yao esan, tingle wangfa yao dasan, guan ta gitiao batiao, wo fuze).⁹

Further violent incidents shook the city of Hangzhou as the discussions continued in Beijing. The Hangzhou Silk Brocade Mill¹⁰ manufacturer of the silk portraits of Chairman Mao Zedong which once adorned the homes of people all over China, was the scene of three major fights in December 1974. In one incident twenty-two people were wounded, seven so seriously that two and a half years later they could not work.¹¹

In the same month the militia allegedly provoked a violation of traffic regulations to test the resolve of the police and to shake public confidence in the municipal public security bureau. On 3 December 1974, the day of the arson

at the cable factory, a vehicle which had been despatched to the factory by the militia command went through a red light. On its way back a policeman stopped the car to warn the driver. While the policeman was standing on the bumper-bar (chetou) berating the driver, the latter suddenly sped off causing the policeman to fall off the car. Apparently Weng and He's supporters in the militia accused the public security bureau of 'intentionally opposing' it and they launched assaults on the bureau's offices. Hooligans caused an uproar on public transport vehicles, thus interfering with the flow of traffic. Other larrikins, in a coordinated action, overturned public security patrol cars and fired on traffic control boxes with air-guns. The public security bureau, in response to this serious challenge to social order, despatched a large number of cadres and policemen onto the streets in a display of force.

Weng and He reacted cleverly to this unexpected show of resistance by the law enforcement agencies. They wrote letters of consolation to the bureau for the insults and hardship it had suffered and sent along token gifts of appreciation. They also, on the other hand, convened meetings to isolate a so-called group of 'class enemies' in the bureau, to further destabilise it. Other supporters of the rebels working in the CCP HMC main office disrupted meetings of the ZPC standing committee. The strategy aimed to further convince the central leaders that the urban militia had become indispensable to the maintenance of public order in Hangzhou.¹²

A further bloody skirmish took place at the Hangzhou

East Wind Silk Mill.¹³ There were over twenty silk mills in Hangzhou under the overall direction of Weng Senhe, who had assumed responsibility for the industry from his position as a member of the standing committee of the ZPRC. His supporters at the East Wind Silk Mill, as in other industrial units, pushed to change their leadership. Weng's subordinates in the municipal silk bureau apparently recommended to Weng that the party secretary of the East Wind be encouraged to retire so that a younger man could take his place. Weng's appointee aroused such differences of opinion among the work-force that the militia was mobilised to deal with it.

The militia arrived on one night in November 1974 to recruit workers to build defence lines for a forthcoming battle at the nearby Silk Brocade Mill. One truckload of men were assigned to seize two opponents of the militia from their flats, which were probably situated in the grounds of the brocade mill. Workers of the East Wind mill showed up in support of their comrades and fought off the militia contingent. When this was reported to the acting head of the city's silk bureau, a crony of Weng's, he became enraged and reportedly instructed; 'the stronghold of the restorationist forces is the East Wind Mill. They must be annihilated.' On the evening of 13 November 1974, six truckloads of militiamen converged on the East Wind mill but again they were beaten off. Weng Senhe, upon hearing news of this second humiliating setback, allegedly said; 'this group at the East Wind mill are dumb; your bats and clubs haven't drawn blood (chisule)'; 'the old cadres

fought their way up in a hail of bullets, so we must fight our way up with cane hats and iron clubs' (lao ganbu shi kao qianglin danyu dachulai de, women jiu yao kao tengmao tiegun dachulai). Weng dismissed his subordinates with the parting words that if they did not crush this opposition, they need not bother to come back to him for further advice.

The writer of the article describing these events, Wu Rongtao, then related what occurred on the evening of 3 January 1975. Wu was at home when, late that night, over twenty men appeared at his door brandishing iron clubs. They trussed him up and threw him blindfolded and gagged onto the floor of a vehicle, before speeding out of the city proper. Out on the deserted highway they hauled Wu out of the car, covered his head with his padded jacket and commenced to savagely beat, stab and kick him. Wu's assailants left him unconscious at a T-intersection on the highway in the expectation that he would be run over and killed.

However Wu managed to come around and crawled to a nearby factory. There he contacted his unit which sent out three cars to rush him to hospital. He had wounds to the head, rump and leg. The next day, when his opponents at the mill found that he had not died from the vicious beating, they claimed that Wu had gone to the industrial district of Banshan to 'exchange experience' (chuanlian) and had been detained and wounded by people who objected to his interference in their internal affairs.

Several factors stand out in this obviously subjective account. Firstly the savagery of the measures which were resorted to in order to deal with one's opponents, testified

to the bitterness of the factionalism among sections of the working class in Hangzhou. Secondly, Wu and his supporters must have dished out their fair share of violence to warrant such a planned and remorseless revenge. Thirdly, as Wu himself commented at the end of his story, because this incident was not an isolated occurrence, some workers in the factories of Hangzhou felt that their lives were precarious and often refused to go to work for fear of retribution from their enemies. Finally the incident revealed the ineffectualness of the measures taken by the central authorities to curb factionalism in Hangzhou, as the new year of 1975 began.

Factional strife among workers had been incited by mass organisation leaders and overtly or covertly encouraged, condoned or ignored by party leaders. The example of Zhang Jifa provided further evidence of how party leaders protected favoured factional groupings. The previous chapter related how Zhang, a leading opponent and a most able organiser of the anti-Zhang-Weng-He forces at the Iron and Steel Mill had been arrested on 2 September 1974. The militia had treated him with SS-style brutality. With the assistance of Li Kechang,¹⁴ at the time party secretary of the iron and steel mill, and due to the persistent protests of his co-workers to the provincial and municipal authorities, Zhang was finally released in early January 1975. After his release, the urban militia pursued Zhang all over Hangzhou but Li Kechang, through his contacts in the bureaucracy, arranged for his safe passage to Shanghai for medical treatment.¹⁵

Apart from their approval of the ZPC report concerning the 'two rushes', the central authorities early in 1975 issued instructions concerning the urban militia of Hangzhou. From the evidence culled in the local press more than two years after the event, it is difficult to decide whether Beijing actually dissolved the militia command or whether it banned the organisation, and if so, how effective these measures were in practice. Certainly Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai differed in their approaches to this thorny problem. Mao, it is claimed, 'decided in early 1975 that the militia should not get involved in local strife between the two factions' in places such as Zhejiang and Yunnan. The Premier went much further in questioning the need for militia commands at all as he believed that they only duplicated the work of PLA military sub-districts and county-level people's armed forces departments, which had previously been responsible for organising and training the militia.¹⁶

Mao may have made his comments about the urban militia to Deng Xiaoping after his arrival in Hangzhou in early January 1975. Mao had come to the city to rest and celebrate the Chinese New Year which in 1975 fell on 11 February. The Central Committee issued a document in relation to Hangzhou's urban militia command which was approved by Mao,¹⁷ but whether it went further, at that stage, than reiterating Mao's vague comments, is uncertain.

It appears that the issue had not been resolved by the time the CC Military Affairs Commission held an important enlarged meeting from 24 June until 15 July 1975. Deng Xiaoping and Ye Jianying, both vice-chairmen of the commiss-

ion, delivered reports to this lengthy conference.¹⁸ Deng's speech to the commission on the penultimate day, contained withering blasts against factionalism within the PLA, its poor discipline and refusal to obey orders. He proposed the transfer of cadres who had become entrenched in their localities and had been involved in local factional conflicts.¹⁹ Deng also implicitly supported Zhou's position regarding the urban militia commands by instructing that they 'should be settled once and for all, militia details be abolished and the militia should remain under the control of the military regions, the provincial military districts and its subdistricts, and the people's armed forces [departments] ...'.²⁰

The CC and State Council decision of 24 July 1975 regarding Zhejiang differentiated between organisations or individuals merely engaged in factional activities and those organisations which had been formed and manipulated (caozong) or infiltrated (hunjin) by bad people (huairen). The centre ordered the dissolution (jiesan) of the former type but the much harsher, more final step by banning (qudi) the latter;²¹ while dissolution left open the possibility that an organisation could regroup, banning it did not. The absence of any direct reference to the militia command in the 24 July decision enabled Zhang Yongsheng and He Xianchun to argue, when the political pendulum had swung their way once again in 1976, that Beijing had not banned their 'second armed force' and that therefore they were free to reestablish it.²² Other sources claimed that the militia command had been dissolved, but not banned, earlier

in 1975.²³ It is possible therefore that Zhang and He's argument had some substance.

Whatever the decision arrived at in Beijing, and whenever it went into effect, it did not prevent Zhang Yongsheng from keeping the issue on the boil. Apparently the central directive did request that the militia commands throughout Zhejiang hand in their weapons. In response, Zhang set off for Jinhua in central Zhejiang and incited the local militia to resist this command. As a result it is claimed that fighting persisted in this vital transport centre for a further three months. Armed struggle apparently paralysed the local administration, brought industrial production to a halt, closed shops, held up traffic, suspended postal and communication services and caused personal injury and death.²⁴ It is little wonder that the People's Daily and the provincial media, as has been pointed out in chapter one of this thesis, were most concerned about the flow of railway freight through Jinhua in the first quarter of 1975.

It is highly likely that the CC decision on strengthening work on the railways, issued on 5 March 1975, was partly a response to the disruption created in Jinhua by Zhang Yongsheng and the town's militia. Deng Xiaoping, in a speech of 5 March 1975 to provincial party secretaries responsible for industry, devoted much of his attention to factionalism in the railway system.²⁵ Deng deplored the alarmingly high rate of accidents experienced on the railways in the previous year, a more than eight-fold increase on the number which had occurred in 1964. He attributed this increase to disregard for rules and

regulations and warned that those 'bad men' who 'fished in troubled waters' in order to make a name for themselves (shengguan facai) would be severely dealt with. Clearly it was to this CC document and Deng Xiaoping's speech that the Zhejiang authorities reacted somewhat belatedly in late May/early June by convening a railway-commune joint defence meeting, as described in the first chapter of this thesis. The three months which elapsed between Deng's speech and the provincial response was probably the time required to restore order in the railway system in Zhejiang.

It was, therefore, in the context of Deng's caustic remarks about the harm being caused by factional disputes that Chen Yonggui came to Hangzhou in April 1975. Although he was gravely ill at this time, Zhou Enlai apparently called Chen and Ji Dengkui to his bedside to enquire about events in the province prior to Chen's departure for the south.²⁶ One of the model brigades that Chen Yonggui visited in Zhejiang before he addressed the provincial meeting on Dazhai was the Shangwang brigade of the Hongshan commune, Shaoxing county, south-east of Hangzhou.²⁷

Chen's address to the conference consisted of three sections.²⁸ He reserved the core of his message for the concluding sentences of the third part of his lengthy speech. In a direct and frank manner Chen targeted bourgeois factionalism in Zhejiang. He lambasted those people who had ignored central directives. These people, stated Chen

don't criticise Lin, nor Confucius, don't work, don't go to work and don't study the theory of the dictatorship of the proletariat; instead they link up, cause splits, and undermine the dictatorship

of the proletariat. If they continue in this way they will commit even greater mistakes.

Chen made it clear that the people who were involved in bourgeois factionalism included members of leading groups, members of the CCP, and those who hoped to become officials by causing trouble. He challenged his audience with the question, 'Will you give [power] to them?' Not only were these people intent on gaining power, argued Chen, but they took advantage of disturbances to graft and embezzle public funds.²⁹ Chen praised the agricultural units he had visited for their practical achievements in building socialism. After all, said Chen in his earthy style, even those who engaged in bourgeois factionalism needed to eat. The message for the rebel leaders in Zhejiang could not have been clearer. It was Chen's speech that occasioned the dramatic shift in provincial propaganda which has been noted in chapter one of this thesis.

The directness and authority of Chen's words indicated that he was speaking on behalf of Deng Xiaoping, who had assumed control of the day-to-day affairs of the Central Committee at Mao's request.³⁰ Mao had stood by Deng in spite of a bitter dispute the latter was carrying on with Jiang Qing at the meetings of the Politburo.³¹ Deng had made it clear that the discussion on bourgeois rights which had been initiated in February 1975 by his radical opponents was completely irrelevant to the realities of China's backward economy.³² Even Mao had rebuked Yao Wenyuan for his one-sided attention to the dangers represented by empiricism, which had been Yao's way of cautioning veteran cadres who

neglected political theory. The chairman also repeated an earlier warning of July 1974 about a 'gang of four', while simultaneously making unspecified criticisms of Deng's abrasiveness and impulsiveness.³³

Despite Mao's criticism, Deng's crusade to 'rectify' the CCP and all fields of work, especially those related to the economy, continued unabated. In a speech at a forum on the iron and steel industry at the end of May 1975³⁴ he rallied his supporters to stand fast against factionalism. Repeating earlier demands that discipline be enforced in the workplace, Deng advised factory officials to withhold pay from absentee workers and order those who refused to work out of the factory gates. Just over a month later, in a speech to a study class in Beijing³⁵ Deng once again hammered home his message concerning factionalism. On this occasion he focused his attention on the question of building up provincial party committees which were neither weak, lazy nor lax (ruan, lan, san). Deng alerted party members to the extreme danger of supporting factional groups, which, in his view, differed in nature from the allegedly spontaneous factions that had emerged in the early stages of the Cultural Revolution.

For Deng, the trouble in Zhejiang exemplified all the shortcomings that he had enumerated in his speeches of the first half of 1975: weak party leadership, entrenched factionalism which had drawn party leaders into its iron grip, complete disregard for discipline in the work-place³⁶ and the involvement of the PLA in local strife. Zhejiang was thus an ideal province for Deng to test his political

resolve and that of his colleagues on the CC Politburo. Zhejiang had waited in vain for over a year to obtain a solution to its problems. By July 1975 conditions favoured decisive action.

Action, July 1975

Either on 30 June or 1 July 1975 two emissaries of the central leadership arrived in Hangzhou. Their brief was to assist the provincial leadership to try and solve the chronic problems which had plagued the administration for well over eighteen months. The two central leaders were Wang Hongwen and Ji Dengkui.³⁷ The choice of Wang was not surprising as he was most probably responsible for party affairs in East China. As the previous chapter of this thesis has demonstrated, he had maintained a close interest in the affairs of Zhejiang for some considerable time. However Wang's familiarity with the situation in the province was more than offset by his partisanship. Ji Dengkui was an outsider with no particular ties to the province. His relative objectivity would presumably compensate for and balance Wang's open partiality for the 'on the mountain' faction.

The two central leaders immediately embarked on a series of inspections of industrial and agricultural units in and around Hangzhou.³⁹ They also consulted with the provincial authorities with a view to reorganising the CCP ZPC, HMC and ZPMD leadership. Wang and Ji brought with them a large delegation of central officials from three

relevant departments. The delegation comprised investigation groups from the CC Organisation Department, which would have investigated the legality and appropriateness of the 'two rushes', from the Ministry of Light Industry, which was responsible for the large textile mills in Hangzhou, and from the First Ministry of Machine Building which was in charge of such factories as the gear-box plant and the oxygen generator plant.⁴⁰ While the members of these central departments received a certain amount of publicity in the local press, the names of Ji and Wang were never once mentioned.⁴¹ Nevertheless the city's citizens were well aware of their presence.⁴²

Prior to the arrival of Wang and Ji, the provincial and municipal authorities had despatched work groups into the factories of Hangzhou. This move may have been decided on at the conference that had been held earlier in the year in the national capital. Point two of the CC and State Council decision of July 1975 specifically endorsed this decision of the local authorities and warned against 'any class enemies taking advantage of shortcomings and mistakes by the work groups (gongzuo zu) or work teams (gongzuo dui) to weaken party leadership.'⁴³ The admission that the work groups (teams) had committed errors may have referred to the tendency by some of their members to support one faction against another in a particular factory, worsening, rather than alleviating the situation. This warning may have been specifically directed at the local military, which had undoubtedly contributed personnel to these work teams.

At the meeting convened by the CCP ZPC on 22 July to

announce the reshuffled provincial leadership, it was announced that 'comrades from the PLA' who had helped in the work of the CCP ZPC and ZPRC in the 'three supports and two militaries' had now returned to their barracks on the instructions of the CC.⁴⁴ Small groups of military personnel had performed such duties in factories around Hangzhou since 1967. They had been ordered to choose sides in factional disputes and had become embroiled in factory politics for eight years. Clearly, they had lost all credentials as a neutral force, compelling the provincial leadership to withdraw them before the arrival of military units free from such entanglements and associations.

After more than a fortnight's investigation Wang, and possibly Ji, returned to Beijing on 17 July 1975 to report to the Politburo. On that same day the central leadership approved a report from the CCP ZPC on the subject of the reorganisation of its standing committee.⁴⁵ Wang returned to Hangzhou on 19 July⁴⁶ in preparation for the announcement of the leadership shake-up on 22 July. On the same day as Wang's return PLA troops started moving into four key factories in and around Hangzhou. Two days later, on 24 July, the Central Committee and State Council released their joint decision concerning Zhejiang. It was these events that attracted world attention and gained Hangzhou a fame and notoriety that has never been fully explained.

Three major meetings were in fact held on 22 July.⁴⁷ The first involved 8,000 office cadres working under the CCP ZPC, who listened to Tan Qilong and Tie Ying convey instruct-

ions from Beijing as well as from 'the responsible comrades of the Centre' - a certain reference to Wang Hongwen and Ji Dengkui. 15,000 cadres from offices of the CCP HMC and grass-roots units in Hangzhou attended another gathering addressed by their new leaders, Zhang Zishi and Chen Wenshu. Jiang Baodi, chairwoman of the ZPTUC and a standing committee member of the CCP ZPC was also present. Both meetings discussed three major issues of contention; the selection and promotion of cadres, bourgeois factionalism, and the state of the economy. Party members and cadres of the ZPMD attended the third important meeting which was held on 22 July and heard a speech and directives from their newly-appointed commander and political commissar. The assembled troops pledged to resolutely 'accept the centralised leadership of the Party'.

Decisions. 1: Leadership changes

The first question which had been decided by the central authorities concerned the reconstruction of the provincial leadership in Zhejiang. From a standing committee composed of sixteen members the ZPC's executive was pruned by three to thirteen. However the total number of secretaries (including deputy-secretaries) was increased by one from six to seven and in particular the number of full secretaries (excluding the first secretary) from one to three. (See Appendix D for a list of members of the CCP ZPC standing committee before and after the decision of July 1975). The remaining members of the standing committee were

reduced from ten to six. Of the original sixteen members only six, of whom four were of secretary status, retained their places in the new leading body. The rest were either demoted or transferred.

Despite his failure to have kept factionalism in check, Tan Qilong retained the confidence of the central authorities and his post as first secretary of the CCP ZPC. However point one of the seven point decision of 24 July seemed to imply a certain reservation about Tan's leadership:

The CCP Zhejiang Provincial Committee, the Zhejiang Provincial Revolutionary Committee and the Party Committee of the Zhejiang Provincial Military District headed by Tan Qilong are to carry out the correct line and the instructions of the Party Central. The Party Central has confidence in them. The shortcomings and mistakes which have cropped up in their work can only be corrected through well-intentioned criticism and assistance.⁴⁸

Strangely, Tan's appearance on 22 July was one of the last that he made in Zhejiang. After September 1975 Tan disappeared from public view in the province for good, although he continued to hold all his provincial posts. Perhaps illness prevented Tan from actively participating in politics in 1976. The sole indication in that year that he did in fact continue to occupy the leading position in Zhejiang could be gleaned from a list of provincial leaders who attended Zhou Enlai's funeral on 15 January 1976.⁴⁹

Following his harrowing experience in the pilin pikong campaign of 1974, Tie Ying had been allowed to return to public duty in February 1975, possibly as a result of a decision made at the Beijing conference on Zhejiang which had been held in late 1974 through to the beginning of 1975.

Chapter one of this thesis has cited Tie's strong endorsement, in his concluding speech to the provincial Dazhai conference, of Chen Yonggui's denunciation of 'bourgeois factionalism' earlier at the same conference. In July 1975 Tie retained his posts as deputy to Tan in the CCP ZPC, ZPRC, and party committee of the ZPMD. This was despite the reference to his 'problem' (wenti) in the central decision of 24 July. Point three of this document read:

Comrade Tie Ying's problem is one of contradictions among the people and should be solved through the method of unity-criticism-unity.⁵⁰

Thus the centre's treatment of Tie in the 'decision', far from being severe, as one Taiwan source has suggested,⁵¹ was in fact a strong rebuff to the rebels who had attempted to obtain a much harsher verdict on Tie.⁵²

Of the other two full secretaries of the CCP ZPC one was the longest-serving provincial secretary left in Zhejiang, and the other was a newcomer to the province. Very early in the Cultural Revolution Lai Keke had thrown in his lot with the new order. He had been rewarded with selection as vice-chairman of the ZPRC in 1968 and deputy-secretary of the CCP ZPC in 1971. Lai had kept a very low profile in the pilin pikong campaign despite his initial enthusiasm for the philosophy of going against the tide. In July 1975 he was promoted from the post of deputy-secretary to full secretary of the ZPC,⁵³ most probably with the backing of Wang Hongwen. The other new secretary was Zhang Wenbi, whom the central authorities had also appointed as the new commander of the ZPMD. During the

Cultural Revolution Zhang had served as political commissar of main force Unit 6408 which had been stationed in Anhui province. From October 1972 he had become Minister of Water Conservancy and Electric Power but had not been re-appointed to this position at the 4th NPC in January 1975. Perhaps the centre had by that time already marked down Zhang for the highly sensitive and demanding job in Zhejiang.

Two naval cadres, Xie Zhenghao and Chai Qikun, were removed from their posts as deputy-secretaries of the CCP ZPC in July 1975. Their removal eliminated the final two provincial military secretaries who had become intimately involved in 'support the left' work during the Cultural Revolution. Xie had also served as chairman of the Shaoxing district revolutionary committee. He made his final recorded appearance in Hangzhou in early July 1975 and reappeared in December of the same year as deputy commander of the East China Fleet. Chai Qikun had held the additional key post of chairman of the Ningbo district revolutionary committee. He had played a highly visible and active role in the pilin pikong campaign and after May 1975 did not reappear in any leadership position. Perhaps Chai, like Lai Keke, had failed to express solidarity with Tan and Tie's leadership when it had come under heavy attack late in 1973, but, unlike Lai, could not depend on the protection or support of a central leader of the stature of Wang Hongwen. Disregarding political considerations, both Xie and Chai, as military officials, fell victim to a conscious attempt to civilianise the provincial leadership.

To join Chen Weida, who was one of only six members retained on the revamped CCP ZPC standing committee, Beijing appointed as additional deputy-secretaries two civilian cadres. Military representation on the secretariat was thereby reduced from three out of six to two out of seven.⁵⁴ The most senior of the three deputy-secretaries was Luo Yi, who was transferred from Shanghai where he had been a standing committee member of that city's revolutionary committee. Zhang Chunqiao, 1st secretary of the CCP Shanghai Municipal Committee, had once appointed Luo responsible member of Shanghai's culture and education group (wenjiaozu).⁵⁵ Luo had worked in the executive of the national CYL in the fifties and early sixties. His promotion to Zhejiang was most probably at the suggestion of Wang Hongwen and the radical mobilisers who were grouped around Jiang Qing. The most junior of the three secretaries, Chen Zuolin, was another newcomer to Zhejiang. Nothing is known of Chen's background except that he had been transferred from Henan province, the home-base of Ji Dengkui. It is thus possible to see Chen Zuolin as an appointee of Ji.

Interestingly, of the six secretaries of the ZPC (excluding Tan) only Zhang Wenbi and Chen Weida were not appointed to the additional positions of vice-chairmen of the ZPRC. Zhang obviously had enough on his plate as commander of the ZPMD and his omission from a government post was perhaps an attempt to keep military interference in the administration to a minimum. The failure to appoint Chen to this position may have reflected a fear on the part of the Beijing radicals that his intimate knowledge of, and

lengthy experience in, the Zhejiang administration could impede their possible future takeover of the province.

Only two other members of the ZPC standing committee survived the July shake-up. They were Chen Bing and Jiang Baodi, who could certainly not be counted as friends of the three rebel leaders. The remaining eight standing committee members, of whom at least four were military officials, were removed from this leading body. One member, Zhu Quanlin, chief of staff of Unit 6409, made his last public appearance at the beginning of April 1975 which suggests that he and the rest of his unit, the 20th Army, were transferred from Zhejiang sometime in the first half of 1975.⁵⁶ If the transfer of the 20th Army did indeed occur, then a major factor for instability in the province had finally departed the scene. Unit 6409 had made too many enemies and had become too closely involved in factional politics and the provincial administration for too lengthy a period to be trusted as a reliable instrument in suppressing factional groups. Still less did it retain any credibility as a neutral force when the centre decided to move troops into the factories of Hangzhou.

Another military cadre who was dropped from the ZPC standing committee was deputy political commissar of the ZPMD, Xia Qi. Xia had experienced even greater tribulations than Tie Ying in 1974, having been suspended from his posts and charged with the most serious offences. Although Xia lost his party post in July 1975, the assessment which was made of him in the CC document, as with the comments relating to Tie Ying, amounted to a partial rehabilitation. Point

three of the decision stated, immediately following the appraisal of Tie, that

As long as he does not persist in his mistakes or continue along the incorrect line, even Comrade Xia Qi should be helped according to the principles of "learning from past mistakes to avoid future ones" and "cure the illness to save the patient." In this way we can distinguish right from wrong and unite the comrades so as to achieve solidarity within the Party.⁵⁷ [my emphasis]

The dropping of Xia Qi from the ZPC standing committee was, however, more than balanced by the dismissal of his persecutors, chief amongst whom was Shen Ce.

Of the four additional members to the standing committee of the CCP ZPC, three were outsiders to Zhejiang. The only new appointee who had previously worked in the province was Lu Jianguang, who had been director of the provincial public security bureau prior to the Cultural Revolution. Lu had apparently established such a fearsome reputation that the Red Guards had dubbed him Lu the king of hell (Lu yanwang). His comeback would have been expected, in Deng Xiaoping's eyes, to have stiffened the resolve of the demoralised, ineffectual public security forces and to have placed a certain amount of fear into the hearts of the rebel warriors. A PLA cadre, Wu Shihong, in addition to joining the ZPC standing committee, was also appointed a political commissar of the ZPMD. Together with his colleague Feng Ke, a small grey-haired civilian cadre from north China who was aged in his 60's,⁵⁸ Wu's political background remains a mystery.

The third and final outsider to Zhejiang to be

appointed to the standing committee was Zhang Zishi, son of Kang Sheng.⁵⁹ He also replaced Wang Zida as first secretary of the CCP HMC. Wang and his deputy Wang Xing had turned a blind eye to the factionalism in the city since the end of 1973. On behalf of the CCP HMC, they had meekly given in to the extraordinary demands and ultimatums which Zhang, Weng and He had submitted in 1974 and they had allowed the prestige and authority of the municipal administration to decline to a dangerously low level. Because the central and provincial leaderships judged that both men could no longer play any useful role in Zhejiang, they were transferred out of the province. Wang Zida was transferred to a post in Guangxi Autonomous Region while Wang Xing left for Sichuan province,⁶⁰ after their final known public appearances in Zhejiang in April 1975. Zhang Zishi had himself rebelled in the early stages of the Cultural Revolution. At that time he had been a minor official in Shandong province. While his rapid promotion to Zhejiang may thus have been acceptable to both Wang Hongwen and Ji Dengkui, it is doubtful whether Deng Xiaoping would have expressed any enthusiasm.

Zhang Zishi's deputy as second secretary of the CCP HMC was Chen Wenshu who most likely was picked out by Ji Dengkui from his party secretaryship of Anyang district in Henan province. Overall, the CCP HMC leadership experienced an even more extensive restructuring than its provincial superior: of a total number of seven secretaries and deputy-secretaries, only one or two retained their posts after the July 1975 overhaul. This startling fact

demonstrated the complete lack of confidence which was shown by the centre in the administration of one of China's major cities.⁶¹

The personnel arrangements which were decided upon in July 1975 did not in any way signal a decisive victory for Deng. He may have rid Tan of troublesome subordinates but some of their replacements, judged by their performances in the radical upsurge of 1976, proved little better, and in some cases, worse. The influence of the radicals in matters of appointment proved greater, in this instance, than has often been recognised. For Wang Hongwen and his radical colleagues in the Politburo, the readjustment of Zhejiang's leading group provided them with an opportunity to strengthen their influence in a province in which they had taken a close interest. Zhejiang, both economically and politically, was an important province in east China and the sympathies of its leadership could prove valuable in a succession crisis in Beijing. Ironically, in the light of later developments, the radicals, although they were placed on the defensive ideologically and politically by the Hangzhou incident of 1975, were able to secure significant gains in the organisational (personnel) field. Deng Xiaoping, perhaps because of his lack of influence in east China, was unable to press home his ideological and political victory by appointing a leadership group that would fully implement his line and policies. However, this feature of central intervention only became clear following another year of political instability.

If the radical central leaders exercised substantial

input into the appointments to the reconstituted party leadership in Zhejiang and Hangzhou, they could not save the three rebel chiefs, Zhang Yongsheng, Weng Senhe and He Xianchun from severe punishment. Weng Senhe was arrested on 9 July 1975 on the direct orders of Ji Dengkui and detained indefinitely. He was charged with embezzling 7,100 yuan in cash and 600 kilograms worth of grain coupons (liangpiao) between 1970 and July 1975. Additionally Weng was accused of squandering state funds to the tune of 140,000 in his fourteen-month stay at a villa on santaishan between 1974 and 1975.⁶²

In the numerous meetings which were held in the months after Weng's arrest to denounce bourgeois factionalism, Weng was not criticised by name. But at one meeting in particular, convened by the CCP HMC in October 1975, it was made abundantly clear who was the target of attack.⁶³ Wang Hongwen found it politically expedient to publicly dissociate himself from Weng during his investigations in Hangzhou. Four months later, however, when the radical mobilisers had somewhat regained the initiative in the see-sawing inner-party struggle, Wang could express his real feelings about Weng Senhe's arrest. In November 1975 Wang was lamenting that 'he's been nabbed and we can't do anything about it' (meiyou banfa, bei tamen zhuazhule). In the radical comeback of 1976 Wang spoke out openly on Weng's behalf and by mid-year was questioning the authenticity of the evidence which had been compiled on Weng.⁶⁴ Zhang Chungqiao also spoke out for Weng. In February 1976 he said to Lai Keke in Beijing; 'No matter what Weng Senhe is

like now, we must affirm his past achievements' (Weng Senhe buguan xianzai zenmo yang, dan ta guoqu de lishi yao chengren ta).⁶⁵ These remarks by important central leaders most probably encouraged Weng's wife to write to the CCP ZPC requesting a review of her husband's case.⁶⁶ No decision was made at that time but in April 1976 Zhang Chungqiao allegedly crossed out Weng's name from a CC document which listed political figures who were to come under public criticism.⁶⁷

Weng's close associate, He Xianchun, fared somewhat better. He was sent to a cadre school in Yin county, Ningbo district on 7 August 1975. Although He had been 'sent down' to labour it seems that he spent a considerable portion of his stay in the countryside touring and sightseeing. He had been ordered to join a study class arranged by the CCP HMC party school which ran a cadre school in Jinlu brigade, Yinjiang commune. Yin county was close enough to the city of Ningbo for He to keep in close touch with developments in Hangzhou.⁶⁸ By August 1976 he had returned to the provincial capital and appeared at the funeral service held for Mao Zedong on 18 September 1976.⁶⁹ Although he had been disciplined, He Xianchun had not lost his official posts, further evidence of the incompleteness of the attempt to destroy the careers of factional leaders in July 1975.

He Xianchun may have made a mockery of disciplinary procedures by his antics but he could not prevent the dissolution of his entrenched power base, the municipal worker's congress. The organisation was disbanded in line with the spirit of the 24 July decision of the central

authorities. On the day the crest of the HMWC was to come down, He apparently encouraged his young colleagues to look ahead with optimism but after three months' study in Beijing, by National Day 1975 they had become very disconsolate.⁷⁰ With both the urban militia command and the worker's congress dissolved, and some of the Mao Zedong Thought propaganda teams temporarily disbanded, three major sources of instability in Hangzhou had departed the political stage, thereby weakening the organisational base of factionalism.

Zhang Yongsheng, the remaining member of the notorious rebel trio, was also sent to the countryside to labour.⁷¹ But his new home was well away from Zhejiang, in Xipu brigade, Zunhua county, Hebei province, near Tianjin. Zhang's punishment had originally been more severe but Wang Hongwen had allegedly said to the ZPC leaders: 'If Zhang Yongsheng dies down there what will you do?' Wang's warning caused the provincial leadership to mitigate its sentence and Zhang may well have avoided the extreme rigours of farm life. Early in 1976 he was transferred to Tianjin. At a centrally-convened meeting in February 1976 Wang Hongwen visited the Zhejiang delegation and rebuked the provincial leadership for its treatment of Zhang. Zhang Chunqiao stated bluntly to either Tan Qilong or Tie Ying; 'If you want to topple Zhang Yongsheng, first we must topple you. Then it will be fair.' He also made his preferences known in no uncertain terms by informing the leaders from Zhejiang that 'I support Zhang Yongsheng all the way.'

In March 1976 Zhang Yongsheng was summoned to Beijing and lodged in a high-class hostel. Wang Hongwen enjoined him to rest and recuperate from his stint of manual labour so that he would be in a fit state to resume his struggle with the 'capitalist-roaders' of Zhejiang. To bolster Zhang's confidence Wang declared that Mao had confidence in him. After Zhang complained that the provincial authorities in Zhejiang had persecuted him, Wang ordered Tan and Tie, then in Beijing, to come to Zhang's residence to listen to a two-hour tirade from their youthful protagonist. Additionally Wang, Jiang Qing and Zhang Chunqiao personally received Zhang twice, on 28 March and 3 April 1976. From his haven in Beijing, Zhang allegedly tried to exert remote-control influence over affairs in Zhejiang. He received a stream of visitors and reports which turned into a two-way flow back to Hangzhou. It appears, however, that Zhang's subordinates were experiencing difficulty in keeping up the morale of their faction, leading to outbreaks of internal bickering, mutual suspicion, indecision, and a yearning for an end to the constant struggle. Zhang encouraged them by pointing out that ebbs in a movement were inevitably superceded by high tides and that victory would certainly fall to them one day.

Events seemed to vindicate Zhang's prediction. By July 1976 the 'two rushes' leading group which Zhang had established in 1974 at his unit, the Fine Arts College, had been restored. A document reversing the original decision of 1975, which had dissolved the group, had also been prepared. From the time of his summons to Beijing in March

1976, Zhang hoped to return to Zhejiang. Only the arrest of the gang of four thwarted his intentions. However, even as late as 19 October 1976 Zhang was continuing to despatch documents to Hangzhou and striving for his recall to the province.

2: The despatch of troops into the factories of Hangzhou

On 19 July 1975, the same day that Wang Hongwen returned to Hangzhou from Beijing, troops of the PLA moved to occupy four large factories which had been seriously affected by factionalism. This momentous decision may have been taken at the CC Military Affairs Commission plenum which had closed on 15 July. This body may have recommended this course of action to the Politburo meeting of 17 July. The first four factories to come under military occupation were Weng's Silk Complex, the No. 1 and No. 2 cotton mills, and the Zhejiang Hemp Mill.⁷² 6,000 men of an unnamed PLA unit stationed in Zhejiang (possibly the 1st Army) went by groups into the four mills. The first report concerning military intervention made it clear that factional fighting had disrupted production and damaged plant and premises. It depicted soldiers and their officers performing such jobs as repairing a damaged roof, cooking meals, cutting hair, and washing clothes. Medical teams treated workers while propaganda workers relayed central instructions and held study classes for the members of the contending groups.⁷³

Reports about the four mills which were monitored at

this time revealed something of the trouble which had plagued them for months. The Hangzhou Silk Complex reported⁷⁴ an improved situation from the beginning of July. Before then, according to the broadcast, bourgeois factionalism had split the party and workers, and production and social welfare facilities had been adversely affected. The broadcast described damage to the mill's power facilities, the breakdown of a boiler, shortages of raw materials, a shortage in nursing staff in the factory's creche and a lack of variety in food supplied in the canteen. Reports of 27 July 1975 commenting on the situation at the hemp mill and the two cotton mills made no mention of the presence of PLA troops in these factories.⁷⁵ But they did mention the CC document of 24 July especially in relation to its focus on cadre policy, party spirit (as against factionalism) and the need to boost production. At the No. 1 cotton mill cadres had made household calls to inform workers of central directives and probably to cajole them into returning to work.

On 22 July 1975, the same day as the CCP ZPC, HMC and ZPMD held meetings of their office staff to convey central instructions, Zhang Wenbi led 4,500 cadres and troops of the military district into other factories in the city, including the Hangzhou Silk Brocade Mill.⁷⁶ The ZPMD also assigned personnel to help with the summer harvesting and the sowing of autumn crops. Only a skeleton office staff remained in the offices of the ZPMD headquarters, the political and logistics departments and the Hangzhou garrison. While the broadcast announcement of the despatch of the first contingent of 6,000 troops had been held back for

two days, this follow-up disclosure was delayed three days. In order to drum up support for the decision among the populace, Zhejiang Daily accompanied the second announcement with an article entitled 'Learn from the PLA'.⁷⁷

The article called on citizens to emulate the PLA

in strengthening the sense of organisation and discipline, strictly carrying out the three main rules and eight points for attention and obeying orders in every activity. We must follow the PLA in consciously promoting stability and unity.

Points four, six, and seven of the CC decision of 24 July related directly to the PLA.⁷⁸ Beijing strongly condemned any 'words or deeds' which weakened or sabotaged the relations between the army and government, army and people or affected the military's internal unity. The CC decision particularly called on the military to smash any 'despicable conspiracy' by the 'class enemy' to split its ranks. Together with the public security and militia forces, the army was commanded to suppress any counter-revolutionaries who disrupted production, caused traffic accidents, incited armed struggle, obstructed movements (ganrao yundong) or who carried out counter-revolutionary propaganda and insurrections (baodong). The PLA was also ordered to crush all proven murderers, arsonists and water poisoners. Those who resisted would be arrested and punished. If public order in Hangzhou and the rest of Zhejiang had collapsed to the extent that was suggested in the document - or to anywhere approaching it, making allowances for a certain amount of exaggeration and rhetorical flourish - the cities of the province would not

have been pleasant places to reside in 1974-5. Or as the 'decision' drily phrased it, such disturbances would have disrupted social order and jeopardised the security of state property and people's lives.

In the last few days of July 1975 the centre committed more troops to the factories of Hangzhou. On 28 July, Air Force units stationed in Zhejiang despatched soldiers to five factories⁷⁹ including He Xianchun's old unit, the Heavy Machinery Factory, and the Hangzhou Oxygen Generator Plant, the base of He's subordinate, Xia Genfa.⁸⁰ They performed such tasks as unloading and transporting raw materials, cleaning up factory grounds and dining halls, and holding discussions with the workers. At the oxygen generator plant the soldiers directed their powers of persuasion toward young workers and demobilised PLA soldiers,⁸¹ while veteran workers in turn looked after and gave advice to young PLA soldiers. This euphemistic prose probably implied tension between the military and the industrial proletariat, a tension that resulted in the incidents later referred to by Li Xiannian in his talk with Japanese guests in early September 1975.

On 31 July 1975 Li Guangshan led the first division of the 1st Army into six factories. Five of the six units concerned, the silk complex, the No. 1 and No. 2 cotton mills, the hemp mill and the oxygen generator plant had already received military 'guests', an indication of the extent of the difficulties which were confronting the PLA. The sixth factory, the Hangzhou iron and steel mill, was also another unit with long-standing, major and difficult

(lao, da, nan) problems. While the People's Daily article, referred to in chapter one of this thesis, had described the social welfare duties performed by the soldiers, the Xinhua report from Hangzhou⁸² referred to more production-oriented tasks such as servicing and repairing machinery, recycling scrap metal, and taking warehouse inventories. The soldiers also showed films, gave theatrical performances and propagated central instructions.

Naval units joined their two sister services in agricultural and industrial assignments in August 1975.⁸³ The troops of one squad worked in an uncovered workshop of the Red Flag Paper Mill⁸⁴ in the blistering heat. Others cleaned up the grounds and helped out in the canteen. Even the Nanjing Military Region allocated seventy-two cadres at and above regimental level to lead several thousand troops into Hangzhou's factories, including the iron and steel mill.⁸⁵ Soldiers from the military region had also played a role over the previous six months in regimenting the behaviour of students and teachers of the city's colleges and schools.⁸⁶

Chinese accounts thus admitted that the number of soldiers involved in this exercise was large indeed. It is likely that at least 30,000 troops were committed, and possibly more. Their main function seems to have been to stop the fighting, provide a safe environment in which workers could resume production, and cater to their immediate welfare and leisure requirements. Herein lay the real significance of the military occupation. Soldiers could not run modern industrial plants but they could provide the

minimum conditions in which production could carry on and workers could devote their main energies to their jobs.

The preface of the 24 July decision had referred to the evil trend of economism (jingjizhuyi yaofeng) in Zhejiang. Point seven of the document stipulated that unresolved wage disputes would come under 'further study and consultation'.⁸⁷ During the final years of the Maoist era, the CCP was loathe to recognise the validity of wage demands, but this study has demonstrated that differences on the shop-floor derived primarily from political rather than economic factors and that economic grievances stemmed mainly from the tensions that had been caused by factional disputes.

It is uncertain how long the PLA troops remained in occupation of the factories of Hangzhou. A Xinhua report of late August 1975 stated that the 4,500 soldiers and cadres of the ZPMD continued to work in the city's industrial enterprises.⁸⁸ By mid-October 1975, the military had focused its attention on three major issues; the subordination of the Army to the Party, the need to strengthen both its internal unity and relations with the government and citizenry, and the resumption of its control over the training of the militia.⁸⁹ In September 1975, on the seventeenth anniversary of the establishment of the people's militia, Wu Shihong, political commissar of the ZPMD, spoke about the necessity to 'eradicate the influence of bourgeois factionalism in the contingents of the people's militia.' He emphasised once again the traditional view of the militia as a 'labour organisation as well as a military organis-

ation' working for the development of the socialist economy.⁹⁰

3: The 'eight factories' experience'

Some factories in Hangzhou had suffered greater disruption to production and more severe disunity among their employees than others. From Ji and Wang's report, seven factories were singled out for special attention. Another unit, the Hangzhou Gear-box Works was hailed as a model worthy of emulation. The lessons to be drawn from the positive experience of the gear-box works and the negative experience of the other seven plants were summed up and became known as the eight factories' experience. (bage gongchang de jingyan) Apart from the gear-box works the units included the silk complex, the oxygen generator plant, the hemp mill, the silk brocade mill, the iron and steel mill, the No. 1 cotton printing and dyeing mill and the No. 2 cotton mill. The provincial leadership widely publicised the example of the eight factories throughout Hangzhou for the remainder of 1975.⁹¹

The gear-box factory was praised as a unit that had kept factional squabbles outside its gates. To learn from this plant meant, in the words of one report, to 'go all-out to build socialism.' Issues which had been raised by the radicals such as bourgeois rights received little attention in this factory. In words which could have come straight from the mouth of Deng Xiaoping, young workers at the gear-box factory were informed that 'it is essential

to have high political consciousness and a sound material foundation in order to do away with bourgeois rights and realise communism.'⁹² Other factories and industrial units were urged to study the plant's policy of building a strong, united leading group which saw its main task as working for socialism.⁹³

The Hangzhou Silk Complex probably provided the litmus test for the success of Deng's assault on bourgeois factionalism. By late August 1975 the provincial radio could report minor production increases, enhanced unity among the mill's cadres, a certain level of harmony among its work force, and the unfolding of a campaign to 'scathingly criticise bourgeois factionalism and all anti-Marxist fallacies'.⁹⁴ Weng's followers had been placed under supervision in study classes and their behaviour had been repudiated at criticism meetings. Production in August 1975 exceeded that of July by 43.29%, and was ahead of the monthly target.⁹⁵ However, rather than reflecting a high output, per se, this figure indicated the depths to which production had previously sunk.

A Xinhua report of the following week⁹⁶ attributed the turnaround in production to the CC decision of July. It asserted that workers and cadres had come to reject erroneous slogans which had been put forward by 'some bad individuals'. These 'bad individuals' had mistakenly claimed that factional contradictions or contradictions between new and old cadres had replaced class contradictions, and had tried to establish their 'independence' from the Party by weakening, shaking off or opposing its leadership.

A Xinhua report of October 1975 announced that although the mill had overfulfilled its production targets in September, the employees at the mill had not stopped for a holiday even on National Day.⁹⁷

On 4 October 1975 the Zhejiang Daily editorial department invited leading cadres of factories in Hangzhou to a meeting to discuss the silk complex's progress. The participants enthusiastically praised the mill for its achievements. Therefore, on 6 October, the newspaper featured an article calling on all industrial and mining enterprises in the province to correctly understand and absorb the reasons for the mill's rejuvenation because the lesson to be learnt applied equally to them.⁹⁸ The provincial public security bureau believed that the mill's struggle against bourgeois factionalism contained lessons for it as well.⁹⁹

Another factory which had experienced production difficulties as a result of factional disturbances was the Hangzhou No. 1 Cotton Printing and Dyeing Mill. Following the arrival of troops in July 1975, it organised a discussion of the CCP constitution and party building principles for its employees.¹⁰⁰ Production rose in July and August 1975 as the disruptive elements in the mill were disciplined and isolated in study classes.¹⁰¹ This situation continued into October.¹⁰² Its sister mill in Xiaoshan, the No. 2 cotton mill, also conducted education in the principles of, and procedure for admitting new members into the CCP.¹⁰³

Other factories among the octet joined in the chorus of glad tidings. The oxygen generator plant declared

unspecified production increases in August 1975¹⁰⁴ while the brocade mill reported a staggering 100% increase in output in the first half of August over the same period of the previous month.¹⁰⁵ Workers formerly at loggerheads had made up their differences. Shifts were commencing on time, and young workers remained at their posts for the entire eight hours for which they were paid. Such reports provided valuable insights into the level of discipline which had previously been upheld at these factories.

The situation at the iron and steel mill seemed to take longer to improve. However by October 1975, superficially amazing production increases of 200% in one month were receiving great publicity.¹⁰⁶ The workers of one shift recorded the highest output which had been achieved in the rolling mill since 1966.¹⁰⁷ Significantly, none of these reports mentioned the eighth factory of the group, the Zhejiang Hemp Mill. We can only assume that trouble persisted in this important enterprise.

For the celebration of National Day in 1975 a 29-strong delegation from five of the eight factories - the gear-box factory, silk complex, No. 1 cotton mill, hemp mill and oxygen generator factory - went to Beijing to report directly to central leaders. They toured factories in the capital before returning to Hangzhou on 11 October. 100,000 people welcomed them back. It was announced that industrial production for the third quarter of 1975 had increased 9.1% over the previous quarter and 7.3% over the corresponding period in 1974. Figures for September 1975 were 8.6% above those for August.¹⁰⁸

Consolidation, August - December 1975

By 9 August 1975 the overall situation appeared sufficiently secure for the CCP ZPC to convene a work conference under the guidance of Wang Hongwen and Ji Dengkui.¹⁰⁹ Wang may have been forced to jettison Weng Senhe for the moment, but apparently he had attempted to keep factional cleavages on the boil in his talks at various industrial enterprises. At a meeting which was convened at the iron and steel mill, Wang had asked every participant to state which faction they belonged to before making a speech. When one man declared that he considered himself above all else a metallurgical worker and a CCP member, Wang thereupon designated him a member of the anti-Weng faction.¹¹⁰ In supposed contrast to this subjective approach, Ji Dengkui had expressed satisfaction at being informed, on his visit to Shangwang brigade, that there were no factions among the brigade's peasants.¹¹¹

The main theme of the August work conference concerned the questions of party leadership and the unity of the working class. Deng's instructions regarding the establishment of strong, unified and militant leading groups, which put daring first (ganzi dangtou) and had the will to overcome bourgeois factionalism, were conveyed. Participants at the conference visited the Silk Complex to see for themselves the rapid changes that had occurred since Weng's arrest. The 'two rushes' came under close scrutiny as did the party's class line in the period of socialism.¹¹² In the euphoria which had been generated by the decisive

handling of long-term problems in Zhejiang, delegates were reminded that 'The struggle has not yet come to an end.'

The success of the consolidation programme in Zhejiang depended heavily on the maintenance of the detente that had allowed the decisions of July 1975 to receive endorsement from the Politburo. But unity at the centre was temporary and fragile. In August 1975 cryptic comments by Mao Zedong on the classic novel Water Margin, warning of the danger of capitulationism, were published in the Chinese press. Despite the possibility that they were directed at him, Deng Xiaoping pressed ahead with his programme of all-round adjustment and economic development. In August, September and October he was busy overseeing the preparation of three documents which encapsulated his basic position. Called the 'three poisonous weeds' by his radical opponents, the documents were entitled 'On the General Programme of Work for the Whole Party and the Whole Country', 'Some Problems in Accelerating Industrial Development' (or the '20 Points') and 'On Some Problems in the Fields of Science and Technology'.¹¹³ Deng listened to reports on the progress of these papers and issued instructions¹¹⁴ to guide the labours of his subordinates, who included Hu Yaobang and Hu Qiaomu.

In addition to proposing policies that directly contravened those inspired by the Cultural Revolution, the 'General Programme' and '20 points' in particular conducted an open debate with the radical mobilisers. The two documents took up many issues which had been raised in the campaign to study the theory of the dictatorship of the

proletariat and especially in the major articles published by Zhang Chunqiao and Yao Wenyuan. Scorn and vitriol were heaped on rebel factional leaders and it was clearly on men such as Weng Senhe that Deng's 'gunners' trained their literary artillery. While radical theoreticians were labelled 'sham Marxist political swindlers', people such as Zhang Yongsheng, Weng and He Xianchun were described, although not by name, as 'unreformed intellectuals and "bold elements"'. .

These people are politically ignorant and unexperienced [sic] in production. Yet, they make the most noise, pointing their fingers and calling the shots, accusing people and singing a high sounding tune, but never working out concrete problems. All the time they label people as "reviving tradition", "falling backward", "conservative forces", "pulling the cart without looking at the road" or "suppressing the revolutionary zeal of the cadres and the broad masses."¹¹⁵

Deng's basic stand was summed up in two short sentences:

'Revolution is liberating the productive forces. Revolution is promoting the development of productive forces.'¹¹⁶

With Tan Qilong sidelined, or on leave due to illness or some other reason, Tie Ying took up the cudgels for Deng Xiaoping in Zhejiang. On 1 September 1975 the CCP ZPC called a meeting of provincial and municipal office cadres to convey central directives.¹¹⁷ In his address, Tie affirmed the correctness of the political line and the policies adopted at the work conference which had been held in the preceding month. But implementation, he noted, had been uneven. Tie pointed out that a 'resolute struggle must be waged against bourgeois factionalism', and he equated

this evil with revisionism and capitalism.¹¹⁸ In a further distortion and cooptation of the language of political campaigns, Tie declared that the theoretical study campaign should serve 'as the guide in achieving profound understanding of the vital significance of the struggle against bourgeois factionalism'.

A Zhejiang Daily editorial of 14 September¹¹⁹ strongly urged maintenance of this momentum. It applauded the changes that had occurred 'in places and units where the leadership is strong and instructions are vigorously popularised and implemented.' Units with this kind of leadership acted in accordance with the motto which had been popularised by Deng Xiaoping of 'placing daring above everything else'. They 'resisted factionalist activities', united former enemies and pushed production ahead. But, stated the editorial, development was uneven and the pace of progress insufficiently rapid.

Simultaneously, the party authorities kept up a sustained attack on those responsible for the upheavals of the previous period. Students and staff at Zhang Yongsheng's Fine Arts College held a meeting to denigrate their disgraced party secretary.¹²⁰ Representatives from the college, as well as from Wang's silk complex and other factories and institutes in Hangzhou, mounted the platform at a criticism meeting which was sponsored by the CCP HMC on 23 August.¹²¹ Delegates of the silk complex also attended another criticism meeting organised by the HMRC on 9 September 1975.¹²²

In his speech to the rally of 11 October welcoming back the five factory delegation from its trip to Beijing

Tie Ying proposed extensive and in-depth criticism of bourgeois factionalism and popularisation of the silk complex's rapid restoration in fortunes.¹²³ Tie also used the formula which had been devised by Deng Xiaoping, of taking Mao's three directives (relating to theoretical study, stability and unity, and economic development) as the guiding principle or 'key link'. This slogan had been deliberately formulated in order to dilute the importance that the radicals had attached to the campaign to study the theory of the dictatorship of the proletariat and the campaign's attempts to justify, theoretically at least, the restriction of bourgeois rights. Deng, by contrast, wished to stress those directives of Mao's that related to unity and economic construction. In his adoption of Deng's interpretation of the three directives, Tie Ying, was not alone among China's provincial leaders. But it was a contentious issue and Tie had thereby revealed his hand.

In mid-October the CCP ZPC held an industrial conference which was attended by 480 people.¹²⁴ The delegates heard reports on the transformation of the Hangzhou silk complex and were urged to encourage and lead other industrial enterprises to catch up with the gear-box factory. The conference pointed out that control of a factory's leadership by 'genuine Marxists' and the 'working masses' would ensure the correctness of its ideological and political line. To overcome the influence of the 'two rushes', some enterprises were sponsoring lessons in the CCP constitution and training 'backbone elements' of Party branches and work teams in the rudimentaries of leadership. The conference also exhorted

party committees to protect their subordinate officials and to shoulder responsibility for mistakes on their behalf. It also demanded strengthening of 'business management', the establishment and improvement of rules and regulations, and devotion to the urgent production tasks remaining for 1975.

A progress report on industrial production in Hangzhou which was broadcast at the beginning of November continued to endorse the examples set by the silk complex and the gear-box works.¹²⁵ Party committees in the city's factories were devoting their energies to training shop-floor leaders, bringing into play the 'exemplary vanguard role of Party members, the role of veteran workers as backbone elements, and the role of Communist Youth League members and young workers as a shock force.' Heavy machinery factories had sent officials and workers to the gear-box plant for inspection, while the silk mills of Hangzhou had emulated the silk complex in restoring and raising production levels. The urgency of the race to meet annual targets, after the disruptions of the first half of the year, was indicated by the following passage in the report, which praised employees and leaders at many factories, who

persist in doing all they can within the eight hours and still make more contributions after the eight hours. They seek no personal fame or gain, fear no fatigue of getting dirty [sic], are unmindful about hours of pay, actively take part in voluntary labour, and strive to fulfil production tasks.

A mass meeting of 40,000 party members which was called by the CCP HMC on 22 November reviewed recent progress and

the arduous tasks that lay ahead.¹²⁶ In his report to the assembled CCP members, 1st Secretary Zhang Zishi hailed the achievements of the previous three months and announced that industrial production in the city in the third quarter of 1975 had increased by 21.4% over the preceding quarter. Zhang complimented the municipality's party organisations and citizens for their exposure and criticism of 'the crimes committed by individual bad elements and bourgeois factionalism'. Representatives of party members at both the silk complex and the oxygen generator plant addressed the gathering, obviously to keep up the pressure on rebels such as Weng Senhe, Huang Yintang and Xia Genfa. Zhang Zishi reiterated the correctness of the experience which had been accumulated by the silk complex.

But by the end of the year a pronounced shift in provincial propaganda had begun.¹²⁷ After his appearance in Hangzhou on 12 November 1975 Tie Ying again dropped from public visibility until his reemergence at the provincial memorial service for Mao Zedong, ten months later. At a meeting on Christmas Day 1975, at which the three most senior members of the ZPC secretariat, Tan Qilong, Tie and Lai Keke, were all conspicuous by their absence, Luo Yi, a protege of Zhang Chunqiao, delivered the principal speech.¹²⁸ Luo summed up 1975 as the year in which the provincial party committee had taken 'class struggle as the key link' and proposed a continuation of this political line for the coming year. Luo's words were a patent revision of the assessments which had been made only the previous month.

The 10,000 victory-reporting rally, which was convened

by the municipal authorities on 5 January 1976, confirmed this shift, albeit in somewhat less forthright terms.¹²⁹ Over 300 units in the municipality reported their production figures for 1975, and these figures showed that industrial production had risen by 30% in the final quarter of the year. However production successes in 1975 were now put down to the policy of taking class struggle as the key link and the criticism of revisionism and capitalism. Bourgeois factionalism had disappeared from the political lexicon. Production gains were viewed as contributing to the defence and development of 'the fruits of the Cultural Revolution'. For Hangzhou and the whole of Zhejiang, the orientation for 1976 henceforward revolved around class struggle. The campaign to 'criticise the right deviationist wind to reverse correct verdicts' (ie. Deng Xiaoping), which, in January 1976, spread to the campuses of major colleges and schools in Hangzhou operationalised this renewal of the politics of mobilisation.¹³⁰

In Zhejiang, one factor which perhaps mitigated the effect of the campaign of 1976 to reverse Deng's policies of mid to late 1975 resulted from the National Conference to Learn from Dazhai in agriculture. This conference had been held from 15 September until 19 October 1975 in Beijing and Shanxi province. The major speakers at the lengthy conference were Deng, Jiang Qing and Hua Guofeng and their speeches accurately reflected their respective views of socialism, not only as they pertained to the field of agriculture. Only Hua's report, favouring mechanisation and the strengthening of the powers and economic importance of the brigades

and communes at the expense of production teams in the three tiered collective structure, was published in China at the time.¹³¹ Taiwan sources reported that Jiang Qing, in her speech at the conference, had appealed for the class mobilisation of the peasants.¹³²

Deng Xiaoping addressed the conference on the opening day¹³³ and again in speeches of 27 September and 4 October 1975.¹³⁴ In these speeches, he pursued his theme of rectification or consolidation (zhengdun). Deng stated that Chairman Mao had talked about rectification in the PLA, localities, industry, agriculture, commerce, culture and education, science and technology and the arts. The key to the success of rectification, emphasised Deng, lay in the party and especially in its leading groups at the county level. Leading cadres had the duty to

discover a good young successor (hao miaozi) and promote him step by step, quickening the process somewhat, so that he stays on one grade for only a year or so.¹³⁵

On 29 October 1975 the CCP ZPC convened a meeting, which was attended by 5,000 office cadres and party members, to pass on the decisions which had been taken at the national conference. Luo Yi, who had led the Zhejiang delegation to Beijing and Dazhai for the conference, spoke about his impressions. Then Tie Ying, who seemed to have become acting head of the CCP ZPC, issued instructions on follow-up action.¹³⁶ Tie continued to hammer home the evils of bourgeois factionalism - a topic that was not mentioned by Luo Yi - and the dangers of capitalism, which he described

in terms of corruption and criminal offences. While Luo praised the open-door style of party rectification carried out in Xiyang county where Dazhai was located, Tie seemed to favour an in-house procedure which was undertaken behind closed doors and restricted to members of the CCP.

The major decision relayed to the provincial meeting concerned the despatch to the countryside of large numbers of office cadres organised in work teams. These teams would propagate the spirit of the national Dazhai conference. 100,000 people attended meetings in Hangzhou on 12 November 1975 to send off the first batch totalling 9,000 members.¹³⁷ In addition to bureaucrats, the teams contained workers, teachers and students. Tie Ying, in his speech at the rally, announced that the total number of cadres and other staff in Zhejiang who had been committed to the assignment would reach 30,000.¹³⁸ They would include several standing committee members of the ZPC.

Tie repeated the association which he had drawn between the criticism of revisionism and capitalism, and the elimination of bourgeois factionalism. More importantly, he ordered work team members to stay at their posts in the rural areas and forbade their work units from recalling them to the cities and towns. In his trip to Hangzhou in January 1976, David Zweig was told that 80% of the office cadres in Hangzhou had departed for the countryside, leaving only skeleton staffs behind to man the telephones. Zweig speculated that the younger 'rebel' cadres comprised the bulk of the work teams, effectively removing them from the locus of power in the province.¹³⁹ Perhaps the prolonged absence

from Hangzhou of younger cadres sympathetic to the rebel cause did serve to weaken the impact of the 1976 leftist upsurge in Zhejiang and deprive Zhang Yongsheng and He Xianchun of valuable and influential allies.

The leftist attack on the July 1975 decisions,
January - September 1976

Tie Ying's outspoken support for Deng Xiaoping's programme spelled political danger for him when Mao finally realised that Deng would renege on his promise of 1973 not to 'reverse the verdict' on the Cultural Revolution. An upsurge of radicalism on the campuses of Beijing in late 1975 led to an increasingly direct onslaught on Deng's policy initiatives of that year. The final section of this chapter describes how this campaign in Zhejiang openly targeted the decisions of July 1975 and worked to denigrate and undermine them. It offers further evidence of the fragility of the compromise which was arrived at in that month and how maintenance of this uneasy balance depended almost entirely on the state of play in Beijing. Zhejiang, buffeted and tossed by forces beyond its capacity to control, would find little peace until the struggle for power at the centre of Chinese politics had been resolved.

A preceding section of this chapter, in discussing the leadership changes which had been agreed on by the Politburo in mid-1975, has commented that Deng Xiaoping had failed to install a new leading body in Zhejiang that met his requirements or criteria for leadership. The hand of the radical

mobilisers was to be seen in several appointments. Of the new appointees, only Lu Jianguang, and perhaps Feng Ke would have satisfied Deng, and they were far from being the most senior members of the new provincial elite. The disappearance of Tan Qilong after September and more importantly of Tie Ying after November 1975, particularly when the latter had done his utmost between July and November to implement central instructions, further weakened the leadership of Zhejiang. Into the breach stepped men who were more in tune with the new direction being pursued by Beijing.

After his promotion in July 1975, Lai Keke had apparently left Zhejiang for Guangzhou to recover from an illness.¹⁴⁰ He returned to Hangzhou in January 1976 at a most politically opportune moment. He allegedly reported in writing to Wang Hongwen that 'because many leaders of the Zhejiang Provincial Committee are sick I have already started to take up some work.' Lai immediately called for a temporary freeze on all appointments and dismissals in the province and allegedly set aside the new leading group of the ZPC Organisation Department, which was probably headed by Feng Ke. However Lai's big chance to play a more active role in the province came in February 1976.

In that month the CC held a meeting in Beijing to set down the guidelines and parameters for the campaign to be launched against Deng. Hua Guofeng, in his newly-appointed capacity as acting Premier and replacement for Deng in directing the daily work of the CCP CC, delivered a speech on 25 February.¹⁴¹ Hua accused Deng of having dismissed young cadres and replacing them with unrepentant capitalist-

readers. In a direct reference to events in Hangzhou, he described Deng's exertions of July to September 1975 as a repression of the revolutionary masses and suppression of different points of view. Deng was now shouldered with the responsibility for forming factions and provoking conflicts such as the 'Hangzhou incident.'¹⁴²

Wang Hongwen visited the Zhejiang delegation to the national meeting and openly praised Lai Keke and criticised Tan Qilong and Tie Ying.¹⁴³ He then verbally appointed Lai to take charge of the CCP ZPC and Luo Yi to handle the daily administrative duties.¹⁴⁴ Lai and Luo drew up a summary of the ensuing discussion, which they entitled 'Our initial views on this discussion' (women canjia zuotanhui de jidian chubu kanfa). In this document they distanced themselves from responsibility for implementing the July 1975 decisions. Lai and Luo wrote that leaders such as Tie, who had loyally carried out central directives, had been influenced by a 'reactionary outlook' and had 'suppressed new-born socialist things'. Previous criticism of bourgeois factionalism was described as 'not stressing the principal contemporary contradiction', and 'arbitrarily raising issues to the plane of principle' (luan shanggang). The two newly-appointed leaders characterised the study classes, which had been held by the ZPC for some leaders of factional groups, as 'wrong', and 'hurting those comrades'. Clearly in criticising these decisions of 1975, Lai and Luo felt that they had central backing for their position.

Upon their return to Hangzhou Lai and Luo called a work meeting of the ZPC to inform its members of the new

leadership arrangements and the strategy for another potentially destabilising political campaign.¹⁴⁵ Apparently a certain leading cadre of the CCP HMC lobbied at this conference to collect signatures for a petition to be telegraphed to the CC, requesting that Tan and Tie return to Zhejiang to answer questions about the direction in which they had led the provincial committee during the latter part of 1975. This municipal leader also withdrew the self-criticism that he had made the previous July, confessing, only too truthfully, that 'I could only speak like that, otherwise I wouldn't have got through. There was no alternative.'¹⁴⁶ In the constant see-saw of political fortunes, the balance had once again tipped to the other side, flinging off or reseating its players in the process.

Lai and Luo focused their dissatisfaction regarding the 1975 arrangements on four major issues. They equated the criticism of bourgeois factionalism with the suppression of 'socialist new born forces'. Secondly, the study classes which were being held for the core members of the Zhang-Weng-He faction were described as being 'wrong from the guiding ideology down to their concrete methods'. Thirdly, the adjustment to leading groups which had been carried out in 1975 was seen as 'allowing people who haven't changed in the Cultural Revolution to grab power' and finally, the freeze placed on the 'two rushes' was characterised as attacking 'new cadres'.¹⁴⁷ The 'eight factories' experience' also came under fire as a 'revisionist model' and in a repetition of the tactics which had been used to such effect in late 1973, a follower of Weng Senhe from the silk complex led a

group to storm the work meeting and occupy the living quarters of representatives from the eight factories.¹⁴⁸

The 'reversal of verdicts' on the 'eight factories' experience' stemmed from Wang Hongwen's ambivalence on the matter. He had been instrumental, in conjunction with Ji Dengkui, for the establishment of the model in July 1975. Even in December 1975 and January 1976 he had continued to support it and requested that the CCP ZPC write a clearcut comment and issue it so that 'the situation will develop even better'. In February 1976 Wang seemed to fudge his position by pleading ignorance of developments which had occurred since his investigations in Hangzhou. In the following month Lai and Luo allegedly refused permission for Zhejiang Daily to publish the silk complex's production figures for February. News of this decision quickly spread around Hangzhou. Confidence in the direction in which the eight had been heading was thereby shaken and eventually completely shattered.¹⁴⁹

The most savage and comprehensive onslaught against the decisions of July 1975 appeared in an article which was published on the eve of the arrest of the Gang of Four. Written by Lai Keke on the basis of a speech which he had delivered on 28 September 1976, it appeared first in the Zhejiang Daily of 30 September. The article achieved such a notoriety that it was compared with the Liang Xiao Guangming Daily article of 4 October 1976, published under the instructions of Yao Wen Yuan, and designated a 'mobilisational order for a counter-revolutionary coup' and a 'clarion call to support the gang of four's plot to seize power.'¹⁵⁰

The background to the publication of Lai's article deserves mention. At a meeting of the standing committee of the ZPC on 25 September 1976 Lai Keke had allegedly suggested that the ZPC convene a criticism meeting against Deng Xiaoping before National Day. He volunteered to speak at such a meeting. However Lai supposedly refused to show the outlines of his speech to the standing committee for its approval. Such a meeting certainly did take place on 28 September¹⁵¹ with Tie Ying delivering the concluding speech on behalf of the ZPC. Lai Keke also addressed the gathering, together with Jiang Ruwang of Jinjian brigade, Wang Jinyou¹⁵² of Shangwang brigade, Li Jinrong of Nanbao brigade and representatives of offices and factories in the province.

Tie delivered a standard denunciation of the then arch-villain, Deng Xiaoping, but made it clear that the criticism should focus on Deng himself. He reaffirmed party leadership over the campaign so as to bring about the unity of cadres and masses. Tie stressed that

It is not allowed to establish ties and to build mountain-strongholds under any pretext and any form; it is not allowed to organise fighting groups.

The contents of Lai's speech did not appear in the local press. Apparently, he modified its contents for publication and then submitted it to the Zhejiang Daily without the knowledge of the ZPC.¹⁵³ It appeared in this newspaper on 30 September. On 8 October 1976 Lai posted a copy to Wang Hongwen, apparently unaware of Wang's arrest two days previously.¹⁵⁴

Lai did not pull any punches in his article.¹⁵⁵ He

accused Deng Xiaoping of having repeatedly issued instructions, in July, September and October of 1975, presumably to the Zhejiang party leadership, to

give a free hand in mobilising the people, criticise bourgeois factionalism and carry out a mass self-educational movement to overcome bourgeois factionalism. ... Deng Xiaoping used opposition to bourgeois factionalism as a pretext for reversing the verdict on the Cultural Revolution,¹⁵⁶ settling accounts with it in a vain attempt to bloodily suppress the proletarian revolutionary faction,¹⁵⁷ and unrestrainedly encircling and suppressing the revolutionary faction as he and Liu Shaoqi had done in the early days of the Cultural Revolution. He carried out a white terror and labelled a large group of revolutionary rebels 'anti-party elements' and 'counter-revolutionaries' in order to annihilate the proletariat's aspirations (zhiqi) and boost the arrogance (weifeng) of the bourgeoisie. How pernicious! (Heqi duye!)

The mass meetings which had been held between August and October 1975 to criticise bourgeois factionalism, complained Lai, had labelled some cadres and sections of the masses as

'anti-party, power-usurping restorationists', 'Song Jiang-type capitulationists',¹⁵⁸ and 'restorationists under the signboard of opposing restoration' - thus raising everything to the plan of principle (shanggang) and seriously confusing the two different kinds of contradictions ...

The establishment of study classes had also been an error, wrote Lai, and he requested the members of such classes to return to their units and positions, an instruction which in effect rehabilitated the followers of Zhang, Weng and He. If their original units no longer existed, continued Lai, in an obvious allusion to the dissolved HMMCH, HMWC and sections of the

Mao Zedong Thought propaganda teams, then appropriate work should be found for these study class members.

Turning his attention to the reorganisation of leading groups Lai attacked Deng for trying to associate the 'proletarian revolutionary faction' with Lin Biao, a charge to which they were clearly vulnerable and therefore ultra-sensitive. Lai argued that Deng had directed his fire at 'those revolutionary leading cadres who had united in the early stages of the Cultural Revolution' and had later played an active role in the pilin pikong campaign of 1974.¹⁵⁹ In Lai's opinion, Deng had viewed these cadres as thorns in his side (yanzhongding) and had set out to dismiss them so as to make way for the establishment of 'restorationist, capitalist leading groups'. Although the source of Zhejiang's problems since July 1975 had been Deng Xiaoping, responsibility for the implementation of this incorrect line, added Lai, rested with the ZPC.

Lai's comprehensive and withering critique of the July 1975 decisions made no direct mention of the PLA's role in the factories of Hangzhou. Perhaps the reference to the bloody suppression of the 'proletarian revolutionary faction' indicated Lai's view of this controversial decision. Lai Keke's article provides important first hand evidence of how a leading member of the losing side in the political struggles in Zhejiang viewed the events of July 1975. Deng Xiaoping had delivered a severe blow to the fortunes of the rebel faction and their allies in the CCP ZPC and HMC, but the fact that Lai had survived, and had actually been promoted in the major reshuffle of the provincial leadership, provided

eloquent testimony to the incompleteness of Deng's victory. Factors external to and larger than issues of a provincial nature determined such a settlement of the Hangzhou incident.

Aftermath, 1976-85

One western analyst of provincial affairs, writing in 1976, observed that problems in Zhejiang were rife and protracted, and that changes in its provincial party secretariat were 'likely to become ultimately necessary'.¹⁶⁰ This chapter has shown that the leadership arrangements decided upon in 1975, born out of compromise, were at best provisional and shaky. The arrest of the Gang of Four illustrated the truth of this assessment. Lai Keke and Luo Yi were removed from office as agents (dailiren) of the gang of four and their whole political careers subjected to a highly damaging analysis in which mud-slinging and name-calling featured prominently. Senior cadres who had been transferred from the province in 1975 such as Wang Zida and Wang Xing, and later in 1977 (Shen Ce) were ordered back to Zhejiang to account more fully for their past misdeeds.

Tan Qilong never returned to Zhejiang and in 1977 was appointed 1st secretary of Qinghai province in the backward north-west of China. Tan's transfer was a definite demotion but he bounced back again in 1980 when he was promoted to the vitally important province of Sichuan, initially as 2nd secretary of the provincial party committee and then as 1st secretary, replacing his illustrious predecessor Zhao

Ziyang. Tie Ying took Tan's place as 1st secretary of the CCP ZPC in March 1977 and held that position until March 1983, parting ways with Deng Xiaoping over major policy initiatives which were launched at the 11th CC's 3rd plenum in December 1978.¹⁶¹ A veteran cadre of the pre-Cultural Revolution ZPC, Wang Fang, was selected to replace Tie. As of March 1985, Tie continues to hold the largely honorific but high profile post of chairman of the Zhejiang Provincial Advisory Commission. Commander of the ZPMD, Zhang Wenbi, and Zhang Zishi, 1st secretary of the CCP HMC, disappeared from public life in April 1978 without explanation. Zhang Zishi later faced demands to give a full account of his activities in the Cultural Revolution rebellion in Shandong or face the possibility of death.¹⁶² He now lives in retirement in Hangzhou. In mid-1979 2nd secretary of the CCP HMC, Chen Wenshu, also lost his post. Thus, when Deng gained greater control over the power of appointment in the late 1970's, he did not hesitate to retire or dismiss cadres whom he had been forced to accept in 1975.

Leading party cadres may have lost their posts in the political fallout that followed the defeat of the radical cause in China, but at least they were spared the fate that befell the three rebel leaders Zhang Yongsheng, Weng Senhe and He Xianchun. In the initial months after the arrest of the Gang of Four, Zhang seemed to carry on his crusade against the Zhejiang party leadership with impunity from the relative safety of Beijing. It was probably a letter that he wrote in February 1977, criticising the leaders of the ZPC, that

stirred the authorities into action. Zhang was brought back to Zhejiang in March 1977 to listen to a torrent of abuse about his stormy career. He was not formally arrested until August 1978. On 4 April 1979 a bespectacled, shaven Zhang Yongsheng was sentenced to life imprisonment and permanent deprivation of his political rights.

Weng Senhe was among the first of the Gang of Four's rebel supporters to be publicly identified in the Chinese media. In December 1976, on the same day that Hua Guofeng named Weng in his speech to the 2nd National Conference on Learning from Dazhai in Agriculture, the CCP ZPC decided to arrest Weng, dismiss him from his posts and expel him from the CCP. Thus his eighteen month semi-legal detention had ended. Weng remained unrepentant at his trial, which was conducted in August 1978, and was sentenced to life imprisonment. Perhaps he could have considered himself fortunate to have escaped a harsher penalty.¹⁶³ He Xianchun deprived his enemies of their intended revenge when he committed suicide in prison in late 1976 or early 1977. Zhang and Weng, even after their imprisonment, were yet to face their harshest trial. In 1984 the two men, together with recalcitrant political activists and criminal recidivists were sent to the Qinghai salt-plains to labour in permanent internal exile.

Deng Xiaoping was correct in stating that the question of leadership would determine the success of his policies in Zhejiang. His failure to achieve this goal in July 1975 reflected the balance of power in the Politburo and his

need to compromise. Compromise at the centre meant instability in the province.¹⁶⁴ The Hangzhou incident of July 1975, as this study has shown, was the culmination of factional upheavals which had gone on for almost a decade and had resulted in the paralysis of administration in the province and the city itself.¹⁶⁵ The resort to the use of troops to quell factional disturbances was an admission that all other avenues to a settlement were closed. Even the radical central leaders did not openly dispute the necessity for this drastic step. They may have thrived in an environment of disorder but ultimately they did not wish to destroy the political system from which they derived as much benefit as their opponents. Hangzhou saw opposing political groups come together to save this system but simultaneously continue with their intense battle to exercise control over it. The ultimate losers were the people of Hangzhou and Zhejiang who were mobilised and manipulated to realise goals and ambitions which they were probably neither aware of nor consulted about.

NOTES

1. See Zhonggong dangshi baiti, pp.382-3; Zhonggong dangshi 170 ti, pp.315-6.
2. 'The gang of four's fiendish hatchet-man', op. cit.
3. 'The new-born counter-revolutionary', op. cit.
4. Ibid.; Zhou Feng (then deputy secretary of the CCP HMC), 'Completely dig out the secret traitor', op. cit.; HZRB, 16 November 1977; Chen Xia, op. cit.; HZRB, 17 April 1979.
5. Bian Wen, op. cit.
6. 'The gang of four's fiendish hatchet-man', op. cit.
7. CCP HMC party school study class. 'What credit did He Xianchun strive for?', HZRB, 26 June 1977.
8. Tang Yurui, *ibid.*, 8 December 1976, p.2.
9. 'The epitome of the "second armed force"', op. cit.; Hua Meisheng, op. cit.
10. The Hangzhou Silk Brocade changed its name to the East is Red Silk Mill (Dongfang hong) in the Cultural Revolution. It has recently renamed itself after its original owner Du Jingsheng. The mill was established in 1922 and in 1977 employed 1,800 workers. Visits to Mill, 22 February 1977, 24 September 1977.
11. 'Iron-clad proof', op. cit.
12. 'An extremely ferocious counter-revolutionary gang', op. cit.; Zhou Feng, op. cit.
13. Wu Rongtao (of the Hangzhou East Wind Silk Mill), 'Indignantly denounce Weng Senhe's towering crimes in suppressing the masses', HZRB, 13 June 1977.
14. Li Kechang (1923-84) was born in Shandong province. He joined the CCP in 1940 and came south into Zhejiang where he worked until his death on 29 October 1984. Li had lengthy experience in party work, and specialised in managing iron and steel mills. After the arrest of the Gang of Four his career suddenly blossomed under the patronage of Tie Ying. In October 1978 he appeared as secretary of the CCP HMC. HZRB, 15 October 1978. In 1979 he was promoted to standing committee membership of the CCP ZPC. ZPS, 8 November 1979, FBIS/CHI, 224 (1979), 04. In December 1979 he became deputy-governor of Zhejiang. RMRB, 24 December 1979. After the re-organisation of the provincial party and government

leadership in March and April of 1983, Li was elected vice-chairman of the Zhejiang Provincial People's Congress on 27 April 1983, whilst losing his standing committee membership of the ZPC. Xinhua, 27 April 1983, SWB, FE/7328/BII/3-4. See the obituary notice for Li Kechang, ZJRB, 3 November 1984.

15. 'Struggling for truth', op. cit.
16. HZRB, 21 November 1976 (report of a meeting on the topic of Hangzhou's militia held on 19 November 1976); Hangzhou Garrison criticism group, 'Chop off the evil hands of the gang of four who reached out for the people's armed forces', *ibid.*, 3 January 1977; 'A black model', op. cit. Yang Yong, 'Gaoju Mao zhuxi de weida qizhi, dali jiaqiang minbing jianshe', RMRB, 9 August 1978, p.2.
17. CCP ZPC, 'The great banner of Chairman Mao', op. cit.
18. Zhonggong dangshi baiti, p.387.
19. Deng Xiaoping, 'Jundui zhengdun de renwu', Wenxuan, (Beijing, 1983), pp.15-24.
20. Yang Yong, 'Gaoju Mao zhuxi'.
21. Zhonggong zhongyang, guowuyuan, 'Guanyu Zhejiang sheng wenti de jue ding', (hereafter cited as 'Decision') in Feiqing Yuebao, 18:11 (1976), p.85. This document has been translated in Chinese Law and Government, 10:1 (1977), pp.8-11, and I & S, 12:6 (1976), pp.102-5. Both translations suffer from varying degrees of inaccuracy and inadequacy. For example I & S translated jiesan as 'disband' and gudi as 'dissolved', thereby blurring the difference between the two terms, a difference that the document had been at pains to specify. Another organisation which clearly came under one of these two categories was the Hangzhou Municipal Workers' Congress led by He Xianchun. It was definitely not dissolved or banned with the HMMCH early in 1975. On the eve of May Day 1975, in conjunction with the ZPTUC, it held a meeting to discuss political theory. See ZPS, 1 May 1975, SWB, FE/4900/BII/10. The 24 July 1975 decision rectified this oversight and did implicitly ban the workers' congress.
22. 'A black model', op. cit.
23. 'The epitome of the "second armed force"', op. cit.; 'The new-born counter-revolutionary', op. cit. stated that the militia command lasted for ten months, which would date its disbandment in December 1974. However given the Chinese press's notorious proclivity for vagueness, this seemingly precise declaration does not exclude the possibility that the militia was wound up in January 1975. Dittmer claimed that the militia in

Zhejiang was 'officially disbanded in March 1975'. 'Bases of Power', p.53, fn.63. If Dittmer used the term militia to mean urban militia commands then he was perhaps correct. Clearly the militia itself was not dissolved in cities such as Hangzhou and Wenzhou.

24. HZRB, 14 August 1978.
25. Deng Xiaoping, 'Quandang jiang daju, ba guomin jingji gaoshangqu', Wenxuan, pp.4-7. This document was in fact CC zhongfa no. 9. (1975). See 'Document of the CCP CC', zhongfa (1977), no. 37, I & S, 14:11 (1978), p.104.
26. Chen Weida, 'We must hold up the red banner of Daqing raised by Chairman Mao', HZRB, 24 May 1977 (report to the Zhejiang provincial meeting on learning from Daqing in industry). Shen Chuyun, 'Qingchu "sihai" hangsilian you dabu qianjinle', ibid., 10 May 1977 (speech of 2 May 1977 at the national conference to learn from Daqing). Tie Ying recalled that 'a comrade who came to Zhejiang to help in rectification brought a verbal message from Premier Zhou'. 'Zhou zongli', op. cit. Tie was probably referring to Chen Yonggui as the bearer of this communication.
27. With Nanbao brigade, Shangwang and its party secretary Wang Jinyou, was the most famous brigade in Zhejiang. In 1966 Wang had travelled to Beijing to take part in the National Day celebrations. ZPS, 3 November 1970, SWB, FE/3526/BII/17-19. In January 1970 the brigade was cited as an advanced unit. ZPS, 22 January 1970, ibid., FE/3289/BII/10. Chen Liyun mentioned Shangwang, with Nanbao, in his report to an agricultural work conference in February 1970. ZPS, 21, 28 February, 1 March 1970, ibid., FE/3320/B/2-14. In May 1971 Zhejiang Daily published an article praising Wang Jinyou for his participation in manual labour. ZPS, 10 May 1971, ibid., FE/3697/BII/3-4. By October 1971 Xinhua had noted Wang's merits. Xinhua, 17 October 1971, ibid., FE/3817/BII/5-6. On 18 April 1972 Wang published an article in Zhejiang Daily entitled 'Persist in putting politics in command and do a good job in work remuneration' opposing distribution policies of the right and left. ZPS, 18 April 1972, FBIS/CHI, 78 (1972), C1. At a film festival on Daqing and Dazhai held in June 1974, a representative of Shangwang, among other units, attended and delivered a speech. ZPS, 30 June 1974, SWB, FE/4642/BII/5. Shangwang, with Nanbao and Jiang Ruwang's Jinjian brigade, were advanced units in Zhejiang in the movement to emulate Dazhai in agriculture. ZPS, 17 February 1975, ibid., FE/4843/BII/12-13. I taught and worked at the brigade for a fortnight in October 1977.
28. HZRB, 29 April 1975.
29. After his arrest in December 1976 Weng Senhe was accused

of just this crime.

30. Exactly when Deng replaced Wang Hongwen in this role is unclear. In his report to the 11th Congress of the CCP in 1977, the then chairman Hua Guofeng was somewhat vague, only revealing that Deng had taken on this task 'during Premier Zhou's grave illness.' Documents of the 11th National Congress of the CCP, pp.13-14. The communique of the 3rd plenum of the 11th CC in December 1978 was no more specific. See PR, 52 (29 December 1978), p.13. A Western observer has concluded from the evidence available to him at the time that Deng took over the work of the Central Committee in July 1975. K. Lieberthal, 'The Politics of Modernisation: CC Documents of the Mid 1970's', Chinese Law and Government, 12:1-2 (1979), p.3. It is highly probable that Lieberthal's date is too late in the year and that Deng had taken charge perhaps as early as January, upon his promotions at the 2nd plenum of the 10th CC and the 4th NPC. See Zhonggong dangshi baiti, p.387; Zhonggong dangshi 170 ti, p.317. With the publication of Deng's Selected Readings in July 1983 it was revealed that on 5 January 1975 he had been appointed vice-chairman of the CC Military Affairs Commission and Chief of Staff of the PLA. Wenxuan, p.1, fn.
31. 'Documents of the CC of the CCP', zhongfa (1977), No. 37, I & S, 15:2, pp.95, 97-8.
32. Deng had allegedly stated in March 1975 that, 'To restrict bourgeois rights, we also must have a material foundation, for without it, how can we do so?' Cited by Gong Xiaowen, 'Deng Xiaoping and the "20 Articles"', Xuexi yu pipan, No. 6 (1976), in Selections from People's Republic of China Magazines, 879 (12 July 1976), p.2. In June 1975, whilst in Shanghai, Deng commented on proposals to reduce income differentials by remarking; 'Why do we describe everything as bourgeois right? Isn't it right to receive more for more work done? Should this be called bourgeois right?' Ibid., p.5. See also Tang Tsou, 'Mao Tsetung Thought, the Last Struggle for Succession, and the Post-Mao Era', CQ, 71 (1977), p.514.
33. On 23 April 1975 Mao had added comments to a Xinhua despatch submitted by Yao Wenyuan, concluding with the following acid remarks: 'There are not many in our Party who really understand Marxism-Leninism. Some think they do understand, while in actuality they do not fully understand even though they think they are right and are always lecturing others. That is also a manifestation of ignorance of Marxism-Leninism. 'Document of the CCP CC', op. cit. I & S, 15:2, pp.95-6. At a meeting of the Politburo on 3 May 1975 Mao lectured both the gang and Deng on their respective shortcomings. Ibid., pp.96-7.

34. Deng Xiaoping, 'Dangqian gangtie gongye bixu jiejie de jige wenti', 29 May 1975, Wenxuan, pp.8-11.
35. Deng Xiaoping, 'Jiaqiang dang de lingdao, zhengdun dang de zuofeng', 4 July 1975, ibid., pp.12-14. One member of the audience was the party secretary of the Nanbao brigade in Zhejiang, Li Jinyong. See ZPS, 25 July 1976, SWB, FE/5273/BII/6.
36. In the first half of 1975 the Hangzhou Silk Complex fulfilled a miserable 18.5% of its yearly plan. Visit to mill, 12 January 1977.
37. 'The gang of four were arch-criminals in ruining Zhejiang', HZRB, 21 January 1977, states that Ji and Wang arrived in Hangzhou at the end of June 1975. See also Zhou Feng, op. cit.; Tie Ying, 'Get mobilised', op. cit. In a visit to the Hangzhou Silk Complex on 11 November 1977, I was informed that Ji arrived in the provincial capital on 1 July.
38. Jurgen Domes, in an article published in 1977 grouped Ji with Hua Guofeng and Wang Dongxing as members of what he termed the 'secret police left'. J. Domes, 'The "Gang of Four" and Hua Kuo-feng: Analysis of Political Events in 1975-76', CQ, 71 (1977), p.478.
39. Ji Dengkui initially concentrated on Weng Senhe's silk mill, visiting it eight times in nine days. Visit to silk complex, 11 November 1977. On 25 July he paid a visit to Shangwang brigade. Briefing at Shangwang, 19 October 1977. Wang Hongwen went to the Hangzhou Gear-Box Plant with Ji on 9 July. Visit, 17 July 1977. Wang also toured the Oxygen Generator Plant, (HZRB, 12 November 1976), the Hangzhou No. 2 Cotton Mill on 28 July (ibid., 9 November 1976), the Iron and Steel Mill (ibid., 11 November 1976) and the Changqing brigade in Hangzhou's Jianggan district on 23 July (ibid., 22 November 1976). Wang returned to the Silk Complex in August 1975. (visit, 12 January 1977).
40. HZRB, 28 November 1976; 'Judge the "two rushes" from three examples', op. cit.
41. For example, on 6 July 1975, deputy-secretary of the CCP ZPC, Xie Zhenghao, accompanied a leading member of the Ministry of Light Industry to the Silk Complex where they addressed a meeting of workers. HZRB, 7 July 1975. It is most likely that Ji Dengkui was also present. On 11 July Tie Ying went with this 'leading member', named Ying Zhangyuan, to the Zhejiang Hemp Mill where they, together with Zhou Feng, deputy-secretary of the CCP HMC, spoke to the assembled employees. Ibid., 12 July 1975.
42. Remarks made by Wang and Ji during their stay quickly circulated around the city. During one briefing, Wang

was told that Guo Zhisong, a leader of the 'foot of the mountain' group had always adopted the correct position. To this remark Wang allegedly expostulated; 'crap!' (pihua). Posters quoting Wang to this effect apparently aroused great merriment among the people of Hangzhou. During his tours of inspection Ji Dengkui warned the city's residents that if production did not return to normal they would be forced to drink the water of the West Lake to stay alive. Visit to Hangzhou No. 1 Cotton Mill 1 April 1979.

43. 'Decision', p.84.
44. HZRB, 23 July 1975. It is highly significant that the broadcast of the meeting monitored by the BBC did not mention this crucial fact. ZPS, 23 July 1975, SWB, FE/4967/BII/1-2. Once again it illustrates how the local authorities edited information before releasing it to the outside world. By contrast, the local press carried a more comprehensive coverage of such meetings. The surprising usage of the term 'three supports and two militaries' belies Harvey Nelsen's assertion that the phrase had been 'dropped from the official lexicon' in 1973. Nelsen, The Chinese Military System, p.142.
45. Zhonggong dangshi baiti, p.387. Chen Zuolin, secretary of the CCP ZPC, in a speech in December 1976 claimed that Mao had given his approval by circling the document. HZRB, 18 December 1976. But an article in Hongqi of January 1983 reported that in the middle of July 1975 Mao had an eye operation and for a while afterward was unable to read. Qiu Dexin and Xu Zhongyuan, 'Mao Zedong tongzhi de dushu shenghuo', (The Way Comrade Mao Zedong Studied), Hongqi 1 (1983), p.41; translated in SWB, FE/7255/BII/13-14.
46. Bian Wen, op. cit.
47. HZRB, 23 July 1975; ZPS, 23, 24 July 1975, SWB, FE/4967/BII/1-3.
48. 'Decision', p.84. A short biographical sketch of Tan which was published in Taiwan quoted from this document to support its assertion that 'In the power struggle in Hangzhou, ... Tan scored a triumph over his opponents'. 'Tan Qilong (2)', p.111. A Hong Kong observer has argued that Tan 'rather effectively settled worker disputes in Hangzhou.' Ting Wang, 'Leadership Re-alignments', PoC, 26:4 (1977), p.11. Perhaps Ting partly based this conclusion on wall posters which appeared on the streets of Hangzhou in May 1976 accusing Tan of having crushed the city's militia in July 1975. Taipei Home Service, 13 June 1976, SWB, FE/5237/BII/14-15. Earl Wayne has concluded with far greater justification, in his passing reference to the events of that time, that Tan's failure to control the factions in his province could have been viewed unfavourably by

- Beijing. Wayne, p.135.
49. RMRB, 16 January 1976, p.3.
 50. 'Decision', p.84.
 51. 'Tan Qilong (2)', p.110.
 52. Wayne has correctly interpreted Tie Ying's position thus: 'In 1975 Tie was apparently criticised for his views on how to handle severe factional problems but was cleared by the final orders from Peking ...'. Wayne, p.136. He has added that 'Tie represents the more order-oriented forces in Zhejiang' compared to Tan Qilong's 'hesitancy to be heavy-handed with "leftists" in the early 1970's.' Ibid. The previous chapter of this thesis has illustrated the truth of Wayne's incisive comments. Certainly the three rebel leaders in Zhejiang believed that they could manipulate Tan much more easily than military leaders such as Tie Ying and Xia Qi who were prepared to confront them and perhaps, in conjunction with the 'foot of the mountain' faction, to organise forces to stand up to the urban militia.
 53. 'Tan Qilong', p.108 states incorrectly that Lai's promotion had occurred in April 1973.
 54. Robert Scalapino has incorrectly described all four secretaries (including the first secretary) of the CCP ZPC in 1975 as military cadres. Scalapino, p.27. By Scalapino's own definition, neither Tan Qilong nor Lai Keke fit into this category.
 55. Chu Yang, 'Selling himself and frenziedly attacking the party', HZRB, 2 November 1977.
 56. See Wayne, p.136. It is most probable that the 20th Army swapped with the 1st Army which had been stationed in Henan province. Again, Ji Dengkui may have had a hand in this exchange of armies. An article from Taiwan claimed that the 20th Army, together with the 5th Air Force and local garrison troops, had secretly supported factional conflict in Zhejiang. See 'Tan Qilong', p. 103. This claim was undoubtedly correct.
 57. 'Decision', p.84. Although he may have remained suspended from his work, at least Xia was called 'comrade'. Xia did not reappear publicly in his post as deputy-political commissar of the ZPMD until June 1976. See ZPS, 16 June 1976, SWB, FE/5238/BII/5-6.
 58. In 1977 Feng Ke and my wife and I were often the only guests in the spacious dining-room of the Hangzhou Hotel. It appeared that Feng's living arrangements had suffered some inconvenience. He spoke with a Shandong accent and seemed a most courteous and genial man.

59. See the photograph of Zhang standing next to his mother at Kang's funeral in December 1975. HZRB, 22 December 1975, p.1.
60. Ibid., 5 April 1978.
61. In 1974, the leadership of the CCP HMC consisted of; Wang Zida (1st secretary), Wang Xing (2nd secretary), and deputy-secretaries Wang Shichuan (also 1st vice-chairman of the HMRC and a 'revolutionary leading cadre' of 1967), Zhou Feng (a deputy-secretary of the pre-Cultural Revolution CCP HMC who returned to office in 1970), Xu Shunian (perhaps a military cadre), He Xianchun and Qiu Qiang (also a deputy-secretary of the pre-Cultural Revolution HMC but one who along with Wang Zida espoused the Maoist cause in the Cultural Revolution. Well before July 1975 the central authorities had moved to restructure the municipal administration. Apart from Wang Zida and Wang Xing, who were transferred out of Zhejiang, Wang Shichuan and Xu Shunian also lost their posts and disappeared from public view in April 1975. He Xianchun was severely disciplined and Qiu Qiang did not play an active role in municipal politics again until 1976. After the arrest of the Gang of Four Qiu was dismissed as their 'agent' (dailiren) on the CCP HMC. Thus only Zhou Feng survived the July 1975 shakeup. To join the newly-appointed 1st secretary, Zhang Zhishi, 2nd secretary Chen Wenshu and Zhou Feng, Beijing appointed as deputy-secretaries, undoubtedly on the recommendation of the provincial leadership, Chen Xia, who returned to the position he had previously held in 1966, and Chen Anyu, another veteran cadre from Hangzhou. Both Chen's took up their posts in the first four months of 1975.
62. Ibid., 14 August 1978.
63. Ibid., 16 October 1975.
64. Bian Wen, op. cit. HZRB, 28 November 1976.
65. Ibid., 31 December 1976, 10 May 1977; RMRB, 17 May 1977, p.2; 'The gang of four's fiendish hatchet-man', op. cit.; 'Materials concerning Weng Senhe - the New-born counter-revolutionary', Document of the CCP CC, zhongfa (1977), No. 37, I & S, 15:1, p.109.
66. HZRB, 28 November 1976; Chu Yang, 'Selling himself', op. cit.
67. 'Hangzhou factory sabotaged', p.42; visit to Hangzhou Silk Complex, 12 January 1977.
68. 'The new-born counter-revolutionary', op. cit.; Yin county criticism group, 'What did He Xianchun do in Yin county?', HZRB, 5 July 1977; Jinlu brigade, Yinjiang commune, Yin county, 'Expose He Xianchun's

- foul performance when he was in the countryside', *ibid.*, 7 July 1977.
69. *Ibid.*, 19 September 1976.
 70. Zhejiang Trade Union Council criticism group, "'Trade unions controlling the Party" was a plot to seize power', *ibid.*, 29 March 1977; 'A gang who caused "earthquakes"', *op. cit.*
 71. The following paragraphs are based on, 'The new-born counter-revolutionary', *op. cit.*; 'The pipe-dream of the gang of four', *op. cit.*; HZRB, 24 March 1977, 14 August 1978; RMRB, 15 April 1979; ZPS, 3 March 1977, SWB, FE/5456/BII/6-7; CCP HMC Propaganda Department criticism group, 'Evidence of Zhang Yongsheng's remote-control attempt to usurp power', HZRB, 17 May 1977.
 72. The Zhejiang Hemp Mill employed 6,200 workers in 1978. It had gone into operation in 1953 after three years' construction. Visit, 3 December 1978.
 73. HZRB, 21 July 1975; ZPS, 21 July 1975, SWB, FE/4967/BII/5-6.
 74. ZPS, 21 July 1975, *ibid.*, BII/4.
 75. ZPS, 27 July 1975, FBIS/CHI, 148 (1975), G1-4.
 76. HZRB, 25 July 1975; ZPS, 25 July 1975, SWB, FE/4967/BII/6-7.
 77. ZPS, 25 July 1975, SWB, FE/4969/BII/1-2.
 78. 'Decision', pp.84-5.
 79. ZPS, 8 August 1975, SWB, FE/4979/BII/4-6. It is uncertain whether the unit referred to was the 5th Air Force of which the notorious Chen Liyun had once been political commissar. Surely the deputy political commissar of the unit mentioned in the report, a Chen Liyun, was not the same person? It is interesting to note that as late as 1976, Bai Zongshan, the commander of the 5th Air Force in 1967, was still present in Zhejiang. See ZPS, 16 May 1976, *ibid.*, FE/5213/BII/9. Bai's continued presence suggests that his unit had also remained in Zhejiang. The 5th Air Force had openly sided with United Headquarters in its battles with Red Storm during the years 1967-9. In 1971-2, because of Chen Liyun's implication in the '571' Lin Biao plot, the special group appointed by the CCP CC to investigate the affair concluded that the 5th Air Force had become one of Lin's most loyal military units. Hence, because of its past associations and heavy involvement in provincial factional politics, the unit could scarcely qualify as a neutral force in mediating between contending groups of workers in the factories of Hangzhou in 1975.

80. The Hangzhou Oxygen Generator Plant was set up in 1950 by amalgamating four repair workshops. From an initial workforce of 300 it had grown, by 1978, to employ a staff of about 5,000. It is a key unit in the metallurgical, chemical fertiliser and defence industries. Visit, 4 June 1978.
81. This was certainly a reference to workers such as Xiong Beiping, son of the former commander of the ZPMD Xiong Yingtang. The previous chapter of this thesis has noted the case of the twin Xiong boys (liangxiong) who were prosecuted in late 1979 for leading a gang of pack-rapists from May 1974 until August 1978. Xiong's brother Xiong Ziping worked at He Xianchun's heavy machinery plant. Taking advantage of the anarchy and turmoil of these years, and playing on their father's status as a (disgraced) leading cadre, the Xiong boys must have aroused great resentment among their fellow workers. The following excerpt from a People's Daily report of November 1979 described the behaviour of the twins:

Workers in the metal processing workshop [of the heavy machinery plant] who had seen Xiong Ziping commit all kinds of crimes with their own eyes said that Xiong did as he liked at home and ran wild in the factory. He was late for work every day and knocked off early and only did four things on the job: eat, sleep, behave like a lout and cause sabotage. Once a master worker wanted him to drive a vehicle but [Xiong] abused him, saying; 'Who do you think you are? Are you game to come here and order me around Pop?!' He started up the vehicle to hoist spare parts and barged about not only damaging lathes, but coming within an ace of causing serious accidents to other workers. Everyone said indignantly at the time: 'When rotten old Xiong charges into the melon-patch the melons can say their prayers; when he rushes into the factory it's we who have to look out!'

When local policemen came to detain Xiong Beiping at Qingbo Gate, where the family lived in the military compound of the ZPMD headquarters, Xiong said threateningly to the squad leader; 'My father will be back soon. If you run me in, you must reckon on the consequences.' RMRB, 18 November 1979. Although the national press did not report the liangxiong case until November 1979, Hangzhou Daily had carried an article on the subject one year earlier, without mentioning names. HZRB, 25 October 1978. A mimeographed newsheet from the Zhongshan University Red Star Group (Hongxing

xiaozu) in Guangzhou, dated 15 August 1982, went further than the national press in claiming that the gang rapes had occurred in the lodgings of the Xiong twins, that is in the military barracks. Hangzhou Daily had previously admitted this fact.

82. Xinhua, 2 August 1975, SWB, FE/4976/BII/5-6.
83. ZPS, 7 August 1975, ibid., FE/4981/BII/5-9.
84. Established in 1919 the Red Flag paper mill in 1978 employed 2,200 workers. Visit, 12 March 1978.
85. ZPS, 8 August 1975, SWB, FE/4981/BII/9-10.
86. Point seven of the CC decision of 24 July had directed students not to become involved in factional conflicts outside their campuses, nor to interfere in the socialist education movement (shehuizhuyi jiaoyu yundong) in factories and rural areas. 'Decision', p.85. This was one of the few indications that students and teachers had become embroiled in the factional struggles centred in Hangzhou's factories.
87. Ibid.
88. See Xinhua, 23 August 1975, SWB, FE/4993/BII/12-13.
89. ZPS, 14 October 1975, ibid., FE/5036/BII/12-13.
90. ZPS, 30 September 1975, ibid., FE/5026/BII/9-10.
91. I visited seven of the eight factories - the brocade mill twice and the silk complex three times - during my two and a half years in Hangzhou. I was able to question cadres about events of the previous years and speak to participants such as Zhang Jifa at the iron and steel mill and Shen Qiying and Shen Chuyun at the silk complex. The only mill of the eight that I did not visit was the Hangzhou No. 2 cotton mill situated in Xiaoshan. Four of the six factories which had suffered production losses in the years 1974-6 (the gear-box plant being an outstanding exception) provided me with the following figures: Zhejiang Hemp Mill - production losses of 66 million yuan (1974-6), equivalent to the cost of building two mills; Hangzhou No. 1 cotton printing and dyeing mill - production losses of 170 million yuan and profit losses of 54 million yuan, equivalent to the cost of 2 mills; Hangzhou Iron and Steel Mill - 1974-6 output equalled that of 1973. Labour productivity in 1973 equalled 10,500 yuan while in 1976 it had fallen to 4,300 yuan per capita. Profit losses for 1974-6 totalled 80 million yuan. Hangzhou Oxygen Generator Plant - 1974-6 production losses totalled 67 million yuan, equal to the cost of building one and a half mills of this size. In 1974 production dropped 62.7%

on 1973, in 1975 it was up 101.% on 1974, and in 1976 it dropped by 46.6% from 1975's figures.

92. ZPS, 15 August 1975, SWB, FE/4988/BII/2-3.
93. See ZPS, 2 August 1975, *ibid.*, FE/4981/BII/12; ZPS, 14 August 1975, *ibid.*, FE/4988/BII/3-4; ZPS, 21 August 1975, *ibid.*, FE/4993/BII/1-2; ZPS, 27 August 1975, *ibid.*, FE/4996/BII/10-12; ZPS, 6 September 1975, *ibid.*, FE/5006/BII/16-17.
94. ZPS, 22 August 1975, *ibid.*, FE/4993/BII/8-9.
95. ZPS, 2, 3 September 1975, *ibid.*, FE/5002/BII/2-3.
96. Xinhua, 10 September 1975, *ibid.*, FE/5010/BII/8-9.
97. Xinhua, 2 October 1975, *ibid.*, FE/5026/BII/2. On 30 September, Zhejiang Daily carried a lengthy article concerning the silk complex. It referred to the 'hauling out of bad people' (jiuchule huairen) at the plant and lambasted the evils of bourgeois factionalism. "Hangsilian" kaizhan "yixue sipi wudajiang" ziwo jiaoyu yundong jingyan', (The Hangzhou silk complex sets out its experience in the self-education movement of "one study, four criticisms and five emphases) ZJRB, 30 September 1975, in Xuexi Wenji, No. 5, 1975 (Hangzhou, 1975). pp.70-78. The 'one study' referred to the study of the theory of the dictatorship of the proletariat, the 'four criticisms' to criticism of revisionism, capitalism, concept of bourgeois rights, and bourgeois factionalism, and the 'five emphases' to the line, interests of the whole, party spirit, unity and discipline. The 'yixue sipi wudajiang' received great emphasis in the local press during these months. I am most grateful to David Zweig who very kindly mailed me photocopied extracts from Xuexi Wenji. The packet arrived on 29 May 1985 just in time for me to add comments on the contents to the footnotes of this chapter. I would also like to express my appreciation to David for his encouragement.
98. ZPS, 6 October 1975, *ibid.*, FE/5047/BII/25.
99. ZPS, 14 October 1975, *ibid.*, FE/5036/BII/13. See also ZPS, 19 September 1975, *ibid.*, FE/5017/BII/29 reporting a conference held by provincial departments in charge of silk production at which representatives of the Silk Complex, among other enterprises, conveyed news of their improved situation.
100. ZPS, 21 August 1975, *ibid.*, FE/4993/BII/5.
101. ZPS, 13 September 1975, *ibid.*, FE/5010/BII/9.
102. ZPS, 25 October 1975, *ibid.*, FE/5046/BII/2-3. I was

told in 1979 that over 100 men in the mill had joined the militia command in 1974 and had been absent from the shop-floor for over a year. At first they received their normal pay, but later, after strong resentment was voiced by their work-mates, their pay was stopped. Visit, 1 April 1979.

103. ZPS, 19 August 1975, SWB, FE/4990/BII/11.
104. ZPS, 21 August 1975, ibid., FE/4993/BII/4-5. In the 'two rushes' at this plant, 90 people were 'rush admitted' into the CCP and 120 'rush promoted' as cadres. Visit 4 June 1978.
105. ZPS, 26 August 1975, SWB, FE/4994/BII/17-18. Fifty workers at this mill had been rushed into the CCP. Visit, 24 September 1977.
106. ZPS, 27 October 1975, SWB, FE/5047/BII/18-19.
107. ZPS, 7 November 1975, ibid., FE/5062/BII/7-8. At this mill, a total of 134 people by-passed normal procedures to join the CCP or gain promotion as cadres. 250 workers joined the urban militia command and continued to receive their pay while absent from the mill. Visit, 27 May 1979.
108. HZRB, 29 September 1975, 12 October 1975; ZPS, 29 September 1975, SWB, FE/5026/BII/2-3; ZPS, 12 October 1975, ibid., FE/5034/BII/6-8. See also ZPS, 13 October 1975, ibid., FE/5038/BII/7-8. At the beginning of September 1975 Hangzhou had held a three-day celebration as good news on the industrial front in the city started to come in. See ZPS, 5 September 1975, ibid., FE/5006/BII/14-16.
109. ZPS, 10 August 1975, SWB, FE/4981/BII/1-5; Chen Zuolin, HZRB, 18 December 1976. Ji Dengkui, who was an active Vice-Premier of the State Council as well as a member of the CC Politburo, did not make any public appearances between 11 June and 29 August 1975. Much of this time, it is fair to surmise, he spent in Hangzhou or dealing with the 'Zhejiang problem'.
110. HZRB, 11 November 1976.
111. Briefing at Shangwang, 19 October 1977. In 1977, the brigade's secretary, Wang Jinyou, was lauded as a shining example of a cadre who had stood up to the Gang of Four and its followers in Zhejiang. It is true that in January 1976 Wang had published an article in the Zhejiang Daily entitled 'Taking class struggle as the key link, the old has taken on a new look', in which he castigated such slogans of 1974 as 'don't work for the wrong political line', and accused a 'group of swindlers' of 'practising retrogression under the guise of opposing restoration'. See ZJRB, 3 January 1976.

Unfortunately for Wang, he published another article on the very eve of the arrest of the 'gang' in which he savagely attacked Deng Xiaoping. Wang Jinyou, 'The General Programme' is iron-clad proof of Deng Xiaoping's reversal of verdicts and restoration', HZRB, 6 October 1976, p.2 (reprinted in edited form from the Zhejiang Daily). Even more ironically, the phrases that Wang used in his January 1976 article, had come directly from the same 'General Programme', which Wang nine months later viciously condemned. Wang's career blossomed in the intermediate post-Mao period. At the 6th Zhejiang Provincial Congress of the CCP in May 1978 he was elected to the standing committee of the CCP ZPC. But by 1979 his star had gone into at least partial eclipse.

112. The question of which classes to rely on in the period of the socialist revolution had apparently exercised Zhang Chungqiao's mind at this time. For example, on 14 October 1974 he had allegedly stated that 'Relying on the entire working class gives one the impression that there are no contradictions within the working class. That does not conform with dialectics.' In a speech on an unspecified date, possibly at the end of 1974, Zhang had remarked that 'We can only rely on the "Leftists" of the working class.' Furthermore, in February 1975, Zhang put forward the view that 'The veteran workers should also be subjected to class analysis.' Document of the CC of the CCP, Zhongfa, (1977) No. 37, I & S, 15:1 (1979), p.100. The references at the ZPC work conference to wholehearted reliance on the working class, and the repetition once again of Mao's 1967 statement that there was no fundamental conflict of interests within the working class, may have been an indirect rebuttal of Zhang's views.
113. See Chi Hsin, The Case of the Gang of Four, (Hong Kong, 1977), pp.203-38, 239-72, 277-86. For other drafts of the second and third programmatic documents see Chinese Law and Government, 12:1-2 (1979), pp.61-74, 112-126.
114. See Deng Xiaoping, 'Guanhu fazhan gongye de jidian yijian', 18 August 1975, Wenxuan, pp.28-31; Deng's comments of 26 September 1975 have been translated in Chi Hsin, pp.287-95.
115. 'Some Problems in Accelerating Industrial Development', 2 September 1975, in Chi Hsin, p.243. A Zhejiang Daily editorial of 23 August 1975 entitled 'Fangshou fadong qunzhong henpi zichanjieji paixing', (Give a free hand in mobilising the people to savagely criticise bourgeois factionalism), slammed 'several chiefs of bourgeois factions' as 'evil people' who 'frequently flaunt themselves as representing "the masses", strike a pose and make themselves out as "huge monsters" (pangran dawu)'. Xuexi Wenji, pp.63-6, quotation on p.65.

116. 'General Programme of Work for the Whole Party and the Whole Country', 7 October 1975, in *ibid.*, p.226.
117. ZPS, 5 September 1975, SWB, FE/5002/BII/1-2.
118. See 'Some Problems in Accelerating Industrial Development', dated 2 September 1975, the day after Tie's speech, which stated, *inter alia*, 'To continue practising bourgeois factionalism now is to practise revisionism and capitalism.' Chi Hsin, p.247. In the infamous article that he published on the eve of the arrest of the Gang of Four, Lai Keke called this equation 'theoretically absurd and politically reactionary'. Lai Keke, 'Turn grief into strength, concentrate our energies on thoroughly criticising Deng', HZRB, 1 October 1976, p.6.
119. 'Fayang zhengqi dingzhu waifeng chengsheng qianjin', (Foster the right spirit, put a stop to evil tendencies and advance victoriously), ZJRB, 14 September 1975, in Xuexi Wenji, pp.67-9; ZPS, 14 September 1975, SWB, FE/5010/BII/9-10.
120. ZPS, 23 August 1975, *ibid.*, FE/4993/BII/5.
121. *Ibid.*, BII/8.
122. ZPS, 11 September 1975, *ibid.*, FE/5010/BII/6-7. A further 'mass criticism meeting' was held on 14 October by the CCP HMC. ZPS, 16 October 1975, *ibid.*, FE/5044/BII/1. These meetings were not confined to Hangzhou. See ZPS, 27 October 1975, *ibid.*, FE/5047/BII/18 for reports of similar meetings in Taizhou district and Linhai county; ZPS, 22 October 1975, *ibid.*, FE/5047/BII/31 (Wenzhou) at which Chen Zuolin, a newly-appointed deputy-secretary of the CCP ZPC was introduced as holding the additional and unenviable position of 1st secretary of the Wenzhou district party committee. In November 1975 Chen led 6,000 cadres, students and teachers in a rubbish collective drive in Wenzhou, an indication of a collapse in government services during the previous period. ZPS, 22 November 1975, *ibid.*, FE/5072/BII/8.
123. ZPS, 12 October 1975, *ibid.*, FE/5034/BII/6-8; HZRB, 12 October 1975.
124. ZPS, 11 October 1975, *ibid.*, FE/5034/BII/8-10.
125. ZPS, 3 November 1975, *ibid.*, FE/5058/BII/1-2.
126. ZPS, 23 November 1975, *ibid.*, FE/5070/BII/15-16.
127. For example, at the beginning of December 1975 Wenzhou district announced production increases for October

(10.97% over September) and the first twenty days of November (a staggering 48% increase over October). It attributed the production slump early in the year to the 'interference of bourgeois factionalism' which had enabled 'a handful of class enemies [to engage] in sabotage for a long time.' That the former leadership had badly handled the crisis and even abdicated its responsibility was revealed in a stinging rebuke directed toward it: 'cowardice and flinching means giving up leadership and runs counter to the Party's basic line.' ZPS, 1 December 1975, *ibid.*, FE/5077/BII/10-11. Yet a mere two days later, a commentary which was published in the Zhejiang Daily concerning Wenzhou's economy, signalled an abrupt change in direction by stating simplistically that, 'once class struggle is grasped, all problems can be solved.' ZPS, 3 December 1975, *ibid.*, FE/5078/BII/9-10. No mention was made of bourgeois factionalism or the economic problems which had featured in the report of 1 December. The waning of Deng Xiaoping's star late in 1975 was thus clearly reflected in such sudden shifts in provincial propaganda.

128. ZPS, 26 December 1975, *ibid.*, FE/5100/BII/8-11.
129. ZPS, 6 January 1976, *ibid.*, FE/5108/BII/3-6.
130. See ZPS, 19 January 1976, *ibid.*, FE/5114/BII/13, for reports concerning the campaign at Hangzhou University and the Zhejiang Fine Arts College. ZPS, 13 February 1976, *ibid.*, FE/5138/BII/12 for a similar report from Xuejun middle school.
131. Hua Guofeng, Let the Whole Party Mobilise for a vast effort to develop Agriculture and build Tachai-type counties throughout the Country, 15 October 1975, (Beijing, 1975).
132. China News Agency (Taipei), 12 December 1975, *ibid.*, FE/5088/BII/16. See Domes, 'The "Gang of Four" - and Hua Guofeng', p.482 who argues that 'Hua and the Cultural Revolutionaries thus agreed on goals, but not on the methods of rural social policies.' This analysis of their differences could be extended beyond the realm of agriculture.
133. Zhonggong dangshi baiti, p.388.
134. Deng Xiaoping, 'Ge fangmian dou yao zhengdun', Wenxuan, pp.32-4.
135. Wenxuan, p.33. In a speech that he had delivered in August 1975 Deng had advocated the selection of cadres with practical experience aged in their forties and fifties, or even younger, to take up responsible positions. 'Guanyu guofang gongye qiye de zhengdun', *ibid.*, pp.25-6. Lai Keke and Luo Yi, in a document which they prepared in 1976, denounced the application

of Deng's 'theory of steps' (taijielun) to Zhejiang. Shen Weicai, op. cit. In a 1980 speech to an enlarged session of the Politburo, Deng recalled this speech of five years before. By this time Deng was ready to discard his earlier, cautious approach to the promotion of young cadres in favour of a more rapid process of advancement. At the same time he attempted to differentiate his position from the 'helicopter' or 'rocket' (two-rush?) policy advocated by Wang Hongwen. See Deng Xiaoping, 'Dang he guojia lingdao zhidu de gaige', 18 August 1980, Wenxuan, pp.283-4.

136. ZPS, 1 November 1975, SWB, FE/5053/BII/7-10. See also the Zhejiang Daily editorial, *ibid.*, BII/10-11. Wenzhou district and municipality held a similar meeting in November, at which Chen Zuolin spoke. ZPS, 11 November 1975, *ibid.*, FE/5072/BII/7.
137. ZPS, 14 November 1975, *ibid.*, FE/5065/BII/19-22.
138. According to Chen Zuolin, 40,000 cadres actually went to the countryside in late 1975. Chen Zuolin, HZRB, 18 December 1976.
139. Zweig, p.151, fn.21.
140. This paragraph is based on material published in Tang Yurui, op. cit.; Chu Yang, 'Thoroughly smash the gang of four's bourgeois factional set-up in Zhejiang', ZPS, 21 May 1977, SWB, FE/5522/BII/15-16; Shen Weicai, op. cit.; Chu Yang, 'Selling himself', op. cit.
141. Hua Guofeng's speech has been published by I & S, 14:6 (1978), pp.94-7. Hua was appointed to these posts on 21 and 28 January 1976. See Zhonggong dangshi 170 ti, p.319.
142. Jiang Qing also spoke at the conference, which seems to have run from about 20 February until early March 1976. For details of Jiang's 23 February and 2 March talks, see 'Documents of the CC of the CCP', I & S, 15:2 pp.96-9.
143. See note 140.
144. In the absence of Tan Qilong and Tie Ying from the political scene in 1976 Lai certainly assumed, and was seen to assume, leadership of the CCP ZPC. Whether this was due to Tan and Tie's ill-health, which had previously been referred to by Lai, or due to the more sinister political intentions of Wang Hongwen, remains a moot point. Certainly, if Tan and Tie were not well enough to resume duties, Lai was the natural choice to deputise for them as he was the next senior member of the ZPC standing committee. Similarly, Luo Yi, as the most senior civilian cadre after Lai Keke, would have been expected to stand in as Lai's deputy. With Tie's

return to public life to attend Mao's funeral service in Hangzhou, and from that time until Lai's purge in October 1976, the provincial press always listed Tie's name before Lai's, indicating correct seniority. However in a most improper but possibly deliberate gesture, Xinhua listed Lai before Tie in its round-up of provincial mourning ceremonies for Mao. See Xinhua, 20 September 1976, SWB, FE/5317/C/3-5. Hangzhou Daily continued to list both men in the correct order. See, HZRB, 19 September 1976. Although Tie did not appear in public during most of 1976, his health had apparently permitted him, by July at least, to take up his work again. See Chu Yang, 'Selling himself', op. cit.; CCP HMC Organisation Department criticism group, 'The crux of "hold tight to the question of organisation" was the seizure of power', HZRB, 27 March 1977; *ibid.*, 29 January 1977.

145. Zhou Feng, 'Expose and criticise the gang of four's towering crimes in forming cliques for their own end to usurp power', HZRB, 27 January 1977.
146. 'A loyal follower of the gang of four', op. cit.; Zhou Feng, 'Completely dig out', op. cit.
147. Chu Yang, 'Selling himself', op. cit.; Tie Ying, 'Get mobilised', op. cit.
148. Tie Ying, 'Get mobilised', op. cit.; Zhou Feng, 'Completely dig out', op. cit. Qiu Qiang, a deputy-secretary of the CCP HMC allegedly called the new leading group of six who had been appointed to the Zhejiang Hemp Mill in 1975 capitalist-roaders, and declared that the group should be dissolved. In response to this encouragement, rebels in the mill took away the group's seals of authority and locked up the mill's administrative offices so that it could not operate. By these measures the rebels hoped to obtain the recall of those cadres who had been transferred or demoted in July 1975. CCP HMC Organisation Department, 'The crux of ...', op. cit.
149. Tie Ying, speech of 22 November 1976, HZRB, 24 November 1976; *ibid.*, 28 November 1976; Bian Wen, op. cit.
150. Shang Jingcai, HZRB, 28 November 1976, pp.2-3; Shen Weicai, op. cit.; Shen Cai, 'A black flag to haul out "capitalist-roaders" at all levels - a criticism of the article of 30 September written by our province's agent of the gang of four', HZRB, 27 November 1977. Shang Jingcai spoke at the provincial criticism rally of 22 November 1976, which was held to denounce the agents and followers of the Gang of Four in Zhejiang, in his capacity as deputy leader of the leading group in the ZPC Propaganda Department. *Ibid.*, 24 November 1976. Shang later served as director of the Propaganda Department and then the provincial Health and Education

Department under the leadership of Tie Ying. In 1983 he was elected vice-chairman of the Zhejiang Provincial People's Congress and remains, today, an influential veteran cadre in Zhejiang, and a stout defender of Deng Xiaoping. I have reason to believe that Shen Weicai and Shen Cai were pen-names used by Shang Jingcai.

151. HZRB, 29 September 1976; ZPS, 29 September 1976, SWB, FE/5331/BII/7-10.
152. Wang Jinyou's article of early October 1976 was most probably based on his speech at this meeting. See footnote 111 above.
153. Tie Ying, HZRB, 24 November 1976. This claim is highly improbable. Tie clearly did not wish to accept responsibility for the publication of the article, as it was an embarrassing episode for him. The decision to publish Lai's article presumably could not have occurred without the consent of the CCP ZPC, of which Tie was the ranking cadre at that time.
154. Shang Jingcai, op. cit. Lai allegedly sent off the article to Wang in the hope of gaining kudos for himself (qinggong lingshang). Shortly after 8 October, Lai was summonsed to Beijing where, together with other provincial leaders, he was informed of the arrest of the four radical central leaders and shown the slip of paper allegedly handed to Hua Guofeng by Mao Zedong in April 1976, on which Mao had written the six characters 'ni banshi, wo fangxin' (with you in charge, I'm at ease). On 14 October 1976, at a meeting of the standing committee of the CCP ZPC, Lai expressed scepticism about the authenticity of the document, saying; 'I have seen the chairman's handwriting many times. That slip "with you in charge, I'm at ease" simply does not look like his own handwriting. Furthermore, why were we shown only a photoduplicated copy and not the original copy?' Why indeed! See Shen Weicai, op. cit.; Tie Ying, 'Get mobilised', op. cit.; and Li Yanwu, 'The downfall of the Lin-Jiang cliques - rise and fall of the ten culprits of the "Cultural Revolution"', Zhengming (HK), 37 (1 November 1980), in FBIS/CR/PSMA, 160 (30 January 1981), p.38.
155. Lai Keke, 'Turn grief into strength'. It is interesting to note that the words used by Lai in the beginning of the indented quotation cited below, 'give a free hand in mobilising the people, criticise bourgeois factionalism and carry out a mass self-educational movement' were the same as those used in the titles of the Zhejiang Daily editorial of 23 August 1975, cited above in fn.115, and the Zhejiang Daily article of 30 September 1975, cited above in fn.97.
156. Current political orthodoxy in China accepts this

argument by stating that in 1975 Deng attempted to restore the 'correct line' of the CCP's 8th Congress of 1956, which viewed the development of the economy as the principal task of the socialist revolution. See Zhonggong dangshi baiti, p.388. The section of the 1981 Resolution of the CCP CC which referred to this period stated that 'Comrade Mao Zedong could not bear to accept systematic corrections of the errors of the "cultural revolution" by comrade Deng Xiaoping'. Resolution on CCP History (1949-81), (Beijing, 1981), p.39.

157. Factionalism, for Lai, had apparently become an accepted feature of the internal workings of the CCP.
158. This was another example of the cooptation of slogans in order to neutralise them, turn them upside down, or render them meaningless.
159. Here, Lai was referring to himself and other provincial and municipal leaders such as Wang Zida, Shen Ce, and Wang Shichuan. With the exception of Lai, these officials had been dismissed or transferred in July 1975.
160. Scalapino, p.35. The provincial authorities also admitted at the time that factionalism had seriously afflicted cadres and citizens alike in Zhejiang. A report of a meeting which was held by the ZPRC in September 1976, included the following passage:

As for the differences of opinion and lack of mutual understanding among certain cadres and masses, ... these were instigated by capitalist-roaders like Liu Shaoqi, Lin Biao and Deng Xiaoping. It was necessary to do meticulous ideological and political work among these people and to urge them not to squabble endlessly over past grudges, but to unite to criticise Deng Xiaoping.

ZPS, 9 September 1976, SWB, FE/5313/BII/6-7.

161. For a more detailed discussion of Tie's opposition to certain post-3rd plenum policies see K. Forster, 'The Reform of Provincial Party Committees in China: The Case of Zhejiang', AS, 24:6 (1984), pp.625-9, in Appendix E (4) of this thesis.
162. Hu Yaobang, Speech of 9 November 1978, I & S, 16:6 (1980), p.100 in which he stated: 'Death will be the only road taken by Zhang Zishi, who is still insisting on mistakes and refuses to be educated.'
163. PR, No. 1. (1 January 1977), p.36; HZRB, 31 December 1976, 14 August 1978.

164. This point has been made by Dorothy Solinger in her study of factional politics in Yunnan province during the years 1967-80. Solinger writes that 'Local turmoil has been highest in those years when central leaders as a group have failed to settle decisively on one local leader or faction, either intentionally ... or because the central government itself has been severely divided (as in the mid-1970's).' D.J. Solinger, 'Politics in Yunnan Province in the Decade of Disorder: Elite Factional Strategies and Central-local Relations, 1967-1980', CQ, 92 (1982), p.660.
165. The CCP ZPC has reassessed many cases and incidents which occurred in the 'ten years of disorder' but it has up to now apparently avoided further mention of the July 1975 decisions. This is possibly due to the fact that the decisions were carried out under the general direction of Deng Xiaoping, but that the emissaries of the CCP CC were two politicians who have since been purged from the national political scene. In 1979, factory cadres at the No. 1 cotton mill told me that they continued to believe that the decisions taken four year's previously had been correct. But they spoke defensively and as if many people believed otherwise.

CONCLUSION

This thesis has been written in order to explain an important event in the decade of the Cultural Revolution. The only other comparable use of military force to suppress factional disorder during this period occurred in July 1967 in Wuhan, and the details of that incident have been closely examined and recorded.¹ The Hangzhou Incident has not been accorded such careful analysis. Factual errors and misunderstandings, due largely to the veil of secrecy with which the Chinese authorities covered the affair, have marred accounts by Western journalists and Chinese observers alike. Political prejudice has further limited our ability to grasp the essence of the dispute.

Overall, the tendency of the articles and commentaries published on the crisis in Hangzhou has been to attribute its causes to wage demands by dissatisfied workers. However this interpretation has provided little evidence that Hangzhou was significantly different in this respect from other major cities in China. One writer, Leo Goodstadt, has explained why an issue of national dimensions manifested itself so seriously in Hangzhou by stating that the proportion of its population engaged in industrial production exceeded that of other Chinese cities of this size. This reasoning seems highly questionable.

Alternatively, the incident in Hangzhou has been accurately portrayed as the climax to factional antagonisms in the city and Zhejiang province at large. However, due to

the lack of detailed and specific data, extending to knowledge of the factional allegiances of leading figures in the CCP ZPC, ZPMD and CCP HMC, such discussion has necessarily been based on informed guesswork of varying quality. In addition, the discussion has not located the source of factionalism sufficiently deeply in the complex, turbulent events of the Cultural Revolution. Therefore it appears as if the disturbances in 1975 sprang from the immediate context of the anti-Lin Biao anti-Confucius campaign of 1974. Whatever the approach, the literature on the subject fails to meet academically-acceptable standards of detail, accuracy and objectivity.

This thesis attempts to overcome these deficiencies by drawing on a previously unavailable primary source, the Hangzhou Daily. In the two-year propaganda war against the Gang of Four from 1976-8, a good deal of tendentious and polemical, yet valuable, information on the ten years of the Cultural Revolution in Zhejiang and Hangzhou was deliberately and carefully released in its pages. Allegations and charges made in these articles were checked wherever possible against material published at the time when the events in question had taken place; however in many instances this proved an impossible undertaking, so that certain claims must remain unverifiable and quite possibly exaggerated or distorted. To supplement the study of the provincial press, a comprehensive reading of monitored broadcasts from Hangzhou was also carried out.

The argument assembled in the previous pages of this thesis is that an understanding of the Hangzhou Incident of

1975 requires its location in the factional struggles which erupted in 1966-7 at the beginning of the Cultural Revolution. It was the leaders of the former Maoist mass organisation, United Headquarters, who, by their exploits in 1975, precipitated the decision to send in PLA troops in July 1975. The same rebel trio of Zhang Yongsheng, Weng Senhe and He Xianchun that had been involved in major violent incidents in 1967, organised and led the forces which destabilised the province so severely eight years later. Many of their factional opponents in the years 1973-5 had fought them bitterly in the late 1960's under the banner of the 'conservative' mass organisation, Red Storm. Key civilian and military party leaders, entangled in the factional struggles of the 1960's, found calls on their old allegiances difficult to resist in the mid 1970's.

Heightened instability at the centre of Chinese politics, as the problem of succession to the aging leadership of Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai became increasingly urgent, served to worsen the already volatile situation in Zhejiang. As the forces for order and normalisation, represented by Zhou and Deng Xiaoping, battled to increase production, encourage personal effort and liberalise foreign contacts, the radical mobilisers or Cultural Revolutionaries led by the Gang of Four, favoured renewed mobilisation and policies to achieve social egalitarianism. These two fundamentally opposed views of the nature and principal goals of the socialist state proved impossible to reconcile. The balancing role which was performed by Mao prevented a decisive victory for either side.

In periods when Zhou and later Deng gained the upper

hand, such as in the immediate aftermath of Lin Biao's death from late 1971 until the end of 1972, and for most of 1975, the success of provincial leadership was judged by criteria which had been operative before the Cultural Revolution. When mobilisation politics reappeared on the agenda, as in the period from late 1973 until mid 1974, different criteria applied. The unpredictability and suddenness of such changes in direction often left provincial leaders floundering. They felt insecure and uncertain of central direction. Tan Qilong and Tie Ying experienced such an environment between 1972 and 1976. Tie expressed his feelings about this state of affairs in the article which he published in January 1985, describing the vicissitudes of these four years.

It was a combination of fortuitous circumstances that enabled the central leadership to act decisively in July 1975 to lance the festering sore in Zhejiang. Deng Xiaoping had gained Mao's confidence and (not wholly unreserved) support to stabilise the country after the upheavals of the pilin pikong campaign. As part of his rectification strategy, Deng set out to strengthen party leadership in the provinces. Zhejiang would have immediately caught his attention as a province requiring a solution to its problems. Deng stated in speeches delivered in 1975 that those responsible for factionalism in the localities and the PLA would be dealt with promptly and severely. He clearly obtained Mao's consent to bring in fresh troops to Hangzhou to control armed fighting and industrial anarchy among groups of workers in the city.

While central intervention and the use of military force

was an open admission that Zhejiang could not deal with its own problems, the alternative was the complete breakdown of the provincial administration to the powers of confrontation and destabilisation. Even Wang Hongwen, who seemed to view Weng Senhe as his own disciple, was prepared to compromise to prevent such an occurrence. Zhang Yongsheng, Weng Senhe and He Xianchun, comparative novices in the Chinese political system, paid the price for not pulling back from the brink when warning signs had flashed a bright amber. On the other hand, Deng's victory in Hangzhou was not unqualified, and it was of very short duration.

Strangely, given the many descriptions of the organisational weaknesses of the Cultural Revolutionaries, it was in the appointments made to the reconstituted provincial and municipal power bodies that Deng was forced to compromise. Wang Hongwen and Zhang Chunqiao placed several officials sympathetic to the radical cause onto the standing committee of the CCP ZPC, making Tan Qilong's task to uphold the 'correct line of the Central Committee' a difficult and problematic one. When Deng's position weakened at the end of 1975, and eroded completely in the following year, the weaknesses of the 1975 compromise were fully revealed. The potential for the pendulum to swing back against the leadership of Tan and Tie soon made itself ominously felt.

Zhejiang's control over its own destiny had slipped from the hands of those officials who had been selected to guide it. Beijing alone retained the ability to deal with the problems which had accumulated since 1966-7, but only if it possessed the common resolve to so act. When central

leadership became directionless due to tensions and strains at the pinnacle of power, provincial problems threatened to deteriorate once again. This phenomenon existed in Zhejiang for most of the eighteen months between August 1973 and early 1975. Similar forces may well have been at work in other provincial administrations during this period but Deng, by making an example of Zhejiang, was choosing a province of particular interest to the radical mobilisers based in Shanghai.

Apart from enlarging our detailed knowledge of factional struggle in the decade from 1966-76, this thesis highlights other important features of the Chinese political system as it functioned in the Cultural Revolution. In the debate over the nature and extent of the decentralisation process which had taken place in the wake of the delegation of powers to sub-national units, two divergent views emerged in the early 1970's among leading Western observers of the relationship between central and local power.

Writers such as Parris Chang² argued that the centre's ability to secure compliance from the provinces had been greatly weakened by the turmoil of the Cultural Revolution. Chang asserted that provincial independence had grown considerably, accentuated by the expanded role of the PLA in political life at the provincial level. He concluded that the pre-Cultural Revolution command-subordinate relationship between centre and locality had given way to one characterised by negotiation, bargaining and manipulation. While conceding that Beijing retained the ultimate weapon of appointment and dismissal and the capability to use force if necessary, as in

Wuhan, Chang was of the opinion that such measures entailed a high political cost and were an admission that other ways to obtain compliance had failed.

Chang's article, however, did not really explain how the Cultural Revolution had brought about such a qualitative change in the nature of such tools of persuasion and coercion, some of which had been previously applied without the consequences that Chang predicted would eventuate. Nor did he convincingly show that the cost to the country of not dealing swiftly with local insubordination would far outweigh the dangers involved.

Frederick Teiwes³ and Victor Falkenheim⁴ have implicitly and explicitly challenged Chang's thesis. Falkenheim has argued that the system of administrative, fiscal and legal powers held by the centre remained largely intact despite the ravages of the Cultural Revolution. Teiwes has noted 'sweeping changes' in the relationship between centre and province, but he concluded, after an exhaustive study of appointments to provincial Revolutionary and Party Committees, that the centre was alert to the threat of centrifugal tendencies and was able to curb them by exercising its power of appointment. The provincial leadership, especially its strong military component, had in fact become less local than at any other time since the early post-liberation years.

Teiwes discussed in detail the changes which had occurred in this two-way interaction of centre and locality. First he pointed out the increased importance attached to personal ties within the CCP and within mass organisations for purposes of protection or benefit in a situation where

'the disgrace of powerful figures and erosion of authoritative institutions had become commonplace'.⁵ During the Cultural Revolution, asserted Teiwes, the centre of political activity 'seemed to shift to the provinces with Beijing frequently playing a mediating rather than a directing role'.⁶ But this did not result in regional fragmentation, he continued, and was partly the result of a conscious decision in Beijing to encourage mass spontaneity and local judgment of the performance of provincial leaders. It was also partly fortuitous, due to the disunity among the national leadership which resulted in an inability to formulate a set of clear-cut policies based on consensus. The vagueness of central directives provided little direction for provincial officials to deal with concrete policy problems.

Teiwes asserted, however, that the pre-Cultural Revolution situation in which 'provincial politics to a large extent involved balancing local tasks and available resources against central expectations'⁷ changed dramatically in the period 1967-73. The provincial elites faced new and formidable challenges:

Mao had created an environment in which skill in adjusting to contradictory signals and shifting power alignments became critical for survival.⁸

In the 1950's and 1960's an overcommitment to a particular set of policies could result in disgrace or dismissal once priorities shifted or a mass campaign was followed by a period of consolidation.

In the Cultural Revolution, a similar over-zealousness in pursuing radical policies, or forging too close an assoc-

iation with Lin Biao, ended in similar disgrace as the political winds shifted direction. But, in Teiwes' words, in both periods, 'circumspection remained an essential political tactic'.⁹

The political history of Zhejiang in the Cultural Revolution, as outlined in the previous chapters of this thesis, basically confirms the accuracy of Teiwes' generalisations. Tan Qilong survived in the years 1973-5, however precariously, because his political footwork was more certain than Tie Ying or Xia Qi's. In short, he was able to work under both Wang Hongwen and Deng Xiaoping.

The Hangzhou Incident of 1975, then, had its origins in the stalemate which arose between the mass factions in 1967. With factionalism spreading through the political system, authority in general was considerably weakened. Indecisiveness at the centre allowed the problem to go unchecked until its existence threatened the very fabric of provincial administration. When Beijing intervened, the situation was temporarily checked, but before long it deteriorated once again. By September 1976 Zhejiang stood on the brink of yet another descent into chaos.

NOTES

1. T.W. Robinson, 'The Wuhan Incident: Local Strife and Provincial Rebellion during the Cultural Revolution', CQ, 47 (1971), pp.413-38.
2. P. Chang, 'Decentralisation of Power', PoC, 20:1 (1972), pp.67-75. Chang had discerned such a trend in an earlier article entitled 'Mao's Great Purge: A Political Balance Sheet', ibid., 18:2 (1969), pp.10. For a similar position to that espoused by Chang, see H. Harding, 'China: The Fragmentation of Power', AS, 12:1 (1972), pp.1-15; and G. Feurtado, 'The Formation of Provincial Revolutionary Committees, 1966-1968: Heilungkiang and Hopei', AS, 12:12 (1972), p.1031.
3. Teiwes, Provincial Leadership in China.
4. V.C. Falkenheim, 'Continuing central predominance', PoC, 20A1 (1972), pp.75-83. See also Falkenheim, 'China's Revolutionary Committees', pp.14-15.
5. Teiwes, Provincial Leadership in China, p.4.
6. Ibid., p.9.
7. Ibid., p.134.
8. Ibid., p.135.
9. Ibid., p.136.

APPENDICES

- A. Biographical Sketches of Selected Party and Mass Leaders of Zhejiang and Hangzhou.
- B. The Standing Committee of the Zhejiang Provincial Revolutionary Committee, March 1968.
- C. The Standing Committee of the CCP 5th Zhejiang Provincial Committee, January 1971.
- D. The Standing Committee of the CCP Zhejiang Provincial Committee before and after the Reorganisation of July 1975.
- E. Published Papers: (in pocket at back of thesis)
 - 1. 'Wang Fang - Newly Appointed Secretary of the CCP Zhejiang Provincial Committee', I & S, 19:8 (1983), 67-71.
 - 2. 'Xue Ju - Newly Elected Governor of Zhejiang', I & S, 19:10 (1983), 82-7.
 - 3. 'Tie Ying - Chairman of the Zhejiang Provincial Advisory Commission', I & S, 20:10 (1984), 84-92.
 - 4. 'The Reform of Provincial Party Committees in China: The Case of Zhejiang', AS, 24:6 (1984), 618-36.

APPENDIX ABiographical Sketches of Selected Party and Mass Leaders
of ZhejiangBAI ZONGSHAN

白宗善

Commander, 5th Air Force (Unit 7350) stationed in Zhejiang, 1967-71.

CAO XIANGREN

曹祥仁

1914-75

Ambassador to Bulgaria, 1950-4; vice-minister, first ministry of machine building, 1955-9; secretary, CCP ZPC, 1959-Cultural Revolution (CR); delegate to 4th NPC, 1975; early in 1967, revolutionary rebels, probably from the Red Storm faction, stormed party provincial headquarters in Hangzhou demanding that Cao be handed over.

CHI QIKUN

柴启昆

PLA naval cadre; prior to CR director political department East China fleet; chairman, Ningbo district revolutionary committee, 1969-?; deputy-secretary CCP ZPC, 1971-5; prominent in campaign against Lin Biao and Confucius; seems to have disappeared from political scene after July 1975 rearrangement of Zhejiang leadership.

CHEN BING

陈冰

Director, CCP ZPC propaganda department, 1957-CR; member, standing committee CCP ZPC and head of its CR group, 1966; member, standing committee CCP ZPC, 1972-7; transferred to Ningxia and later to Tianjin; loyal and trusted lieutenant of Jiang Hua and one of the principal targets of United Headquarters.

CHEN LIYUN

陈励耘

Prior to liberation, cadre in 3rd Field Army; political commissar 5th Air Force until his detention in 1971; 1st vice-chairman ZPRC, 1968-71; secretary CCP ZPC, 1971; alternate member CCP 9th CC; purged as sworn follower (sidang) of Lin Biao in Zhejiang.

CHEN WEIDA

陈伟达

Political cadre in 3rd Field Army before liberation; deputy-

governor Zhejiang, 1958-64; secretary CCP ZPC 1959-CR; deputy-secretary CCP ZPC, 1972-8; 1st secretary CCP Tianjin municipal committee, 1978-84; member CCP 11th, 12th CC; in January 1967 fled to safety of ZPMD headquarters in Hangzhou and besieged by United Headquarters. With Chen Bing, the two provincial officials closest to Jiang Hua.

CHEN WENSHU

陈文书

Member, Henan provincial revolutionary committee, vice-chairman, Zhengzhou municipal revolutionary committee, 2nd secretary CCP Zhengzhou municipal committee, secretary CCP Anyang district committee, 1968-74; 2nd secretary CCP HMC and vice-chairman HMRC, 1975-9.

CHEN XIA

陈侠

Member, CCP HMC secretariat, 1962-CR; returned to office as deputy-secretary CCP HMC and vice-chairman HMRC, 1975; secretary CCP HMC 1977-81; chairman, standing committee Hangzhou Municipal People's Congress, 1981- .

DAI KELIN

戴克林

Officer in New 4th and 3rd Field Armies, 1939-49; deputy-commander ZPMD, 1966-75; member, standing committee ZPRC, 1968-75; member, standing committee CCP ZPC, 1971-5; one of the few local military leaders in Zhejiang seen to support the CR and also the newest arrival in Zhejiang on the eve of the CR.

FANG JIANWEN

方剑文

Leader of Red Storm faction; vice-chairman ZPTUC, 1973-82?; sentenced to two years' jail for involvement in a case of bribery of 2,000 yuan, 1983 (ZJRB, 2 August 1983).

GUAN QI

关器

Deputy-secretary CCP HMC, 1962-6; member, standing committee and later deputy-secretary CCP HMC, 1972-7; in 1977 denounced as the other agent of the Gang of Four on the CCP HMC.

HE XIANCHUN

贺贤春

- 1976/7

Prior to CR a worker at the Hangzhou heavy machinery factory earning a wage of 40 yuan per month; leading member of United Headquarters; chairman HMWC, 1967-75; organised and led Hangzhou social order command headquarters,

1968; member, standing committee ZPRC, 1970-6; vice-chairman, HMRC, 1974-6; deputy secretary CCP HMC, 1971?-6; vice-chairman ZPTUC, 1973-6; party secretary and commander HMMCH, 1974; deputy-leader Zhejiang small group to criticise Lin Biao and Confucius, 1974.

HUA YINFENG

华银凤

1932-

Model worker on state farm in Dongyang county, Jinhua district, prior to CR; member of United Headquarters; vice-chairwoman ZPRC, 1968-76; member CCP ZPC, 1971-6; chairwoman Zhejiang Provincial Womens' Federation, 1973-6.

HUANG YINTANG

黄荫堂

Worker/cadre at Hangzhou Silk Complex; party secretary/chairman revolutionary committee at silk complex, 1974-5; deputy-director Hangzhou public security bureau, 1974-5; deputy-party secretary HMMCH, 1974; close confidant and colleague of Weng Senhe; sentenced to two-year suspended death sentence April 1979.

JIANG BAODI

蒋宝娣

Prior to CR a silk operative at the New China Spun Silk Fabric Mill (Xinhua juanzhiwuchang); member of Red Storm faction; member, standing committee ZPRC, 1968-77; member, standing committee CCP ZPC, 1971-83; chairwoman ZPTUC, 1973-8?; vice-chairwoman ZPRC 1977-9.

JIANG HUA

江华

1906-

Participation in revolution dating back to Jinganshan period; mayor of Hangzhou, 1949-51; secretary CCP HMC, 1949-54; deputy-secretary CCP ZPC 1952-4; secretary and then 1st secretary CCP ZPC 1954-CR; secretary East China bureau of CCP, 1961-CR; 1st political commissar ZPMD, 1962/3-CR; alternate member 8th, 10th CCP CC; member 11th CCP CC; president, Supreme People's Court, 1975-83; member, standing committee CCP Central Advisory Commission, 1982- .

JIANG RUWANG

姜如旺

Party secretary Jinjian brigade, Jiangshan county, Jinhua district; national and provincial publicity as the 'peasant philosopher' of Zhejiang, 1970-6; responsible member Zhejiang Provincial Broadcasting Bureau 1976; arrested and jailed on charges of immorality after fall of Gang of Four.

LAI KEKE

賴 可 可

Official in Shandong 1949-53 and until 1961 after dismissal in 1953-4 as supporter of Gao Gang-Rao Shushi group; secretary-general CCP ZPC, 1961-6; secretary CCP ZPC May 1966-CR; reappeared as 'revolutionary leading cadre', November 1967; vice-chairman ZPRC, 1968-76; deputy-secretary CCP ZPC, 1971-5; secretary CCP ZPC, 1975-6; dismissed as agent (dailiren) of Gang of Four on CCP ZPC.

LI FENGPING

李 丰 平

Cadre of New 4th Army before liberation; director Zhejiang public security bureau 1949-?; deputy-governor Zhejiang, 1955-63; secretary CCP ZPC, 1957-63; secretary CCP Anhui provincial committee, 1963-6; secretary CCP ZPC, 1966-CR; under fire from United Headquarters for allegedly supporting Red Storm; secretary CCP ZPC, 1978-83; governor, Zhejiang, 1979-83; chairman, standing committee Zhejiang Provincial People's Congress, 1983- ; member CCP Central Advisory Commission.

LIU YING

刘 英

1943-80

Student at Zhejiang University at outbreak of CR; leading member Red Storm faction; deputy-secretary Zhejiang committee of CYL, 1973-80.

LONG QIAN

龙 潜

1910-79

Cadre in New 4th and 3rd Field Armies, 1939-49; 2nd political commissar ZPMD, 1965-7; standing committee CCP ZPC, 1966-CR; dismissed in August 1967 for failing to implement central directives; deputy-political commissar and political commissar Henan provincial military district, 1973-9; member, standing committee, CCP Henan provincial committee, 1979; rehabilitated September 1979.

LU JIANGUANG

吕 剑 光

Deputy-director Zhejiang public security bureau, 1955-?; director, Zhejiang public security bureau as of 1965-6; dubbed 'Lu the king of hell' by Red Guards; member, standing committees CCP ZPC, ZPRC, July 1975-8; deputy-minister Ministry of Public Security, 1978- .

LUO YI

罗 毅

Responsible positions in New Democratic Youth League and CYL, 1949-CR?; member, standing committee Shanghai municipal revolutionary committee, ?-1975; deputy-secretary CCP ZPC and vice-chairman ZPRC, July 1975-October 1976;

dismissed as other agent with Lai Keke of Gang of Four on CCP ZPC; later, working as cadre at Hangzhou Iron and Steel Mill.

NAN PING

南平

Cadre in 3rd Field Army at liberation; political commissar 20th Army (Unit 6409) stationed in Zhejiang, 1967-72; chairman ZPRC, 1968-72; 1st secretary CCP ZPC, 1971-2; political commissar ZPMD, 1967-72; member CCP 9th CC; dismissed as agent of Lin Biao in Zhejiang, 1972.

QIU HONGGEN

裘红根

Student of Learn from PLA middle school at outbreak of CR; activist in Red Storm faction; in 1973 a worker in the Hangzhou Lathe Factory.

QIU QIANG

邱强

Deputy-secretary CCP HMC prior to CR; 'revolutionary leading cadre', October 1967; vice-chairman HMRC, 1967-76?; deputy-secretary, CCP HMC, 1970-76?; leader Hangzhou criticise Lin and Confucius small group, 1974; dismissed as agent (with Guan Qi) of Gang of Four in CCP HMC and accused of commanding factional underground command centre (dixia zhihui zhongxin) working in league with Zhang Yongsheng, Weng Senhe and He Xianchun; nicknamed the 'mastermind' (zhiduoxing), after Wu Yong, the strategist in the Water Margin.

SHEN CE

沈策

Chairman ZPTUC 1957-?; member, standing committee CCP ZPC, ?-CR; 'revolutionary leading cadre', November 1967; member, standing committee ZPRC, 1968-75; leader of Zhejiang 'purifying the ranks' (qingli duiwu) leading group, 1968; member, standing committee CCP ZPC, 1971-5; leader CCP ZPC political work group (zhengzhi gongzuozu), 1971-5; group leader special case group investigating Xia Qi, 1974; transferred to Gansu province, 1977; severely criticised in the provincial press in 1978 for his role in the Cultural Revolution; elected as delegate to Chinese People's Political Consultative Committee 5th Zhejiang Congress, April 1983.

TAN QILONG

谭启龙

1912-

Cadre in New 4th and 3rd Field Armies, 1943-9; deputy-political commissar ZPMD, deputy-secretary CCP ZPC, vice-chairman Zhejiang government to Tan Zhenlin, 1949-52 (together known as the 'two Tan's of Zhejiang - Zhejiang

liangtan); secretary CCP ZPC, 1952-4; high political offices in Shandong province, 1954-CR; reappeared in 1969 and worked in Fujian province, 1969-72; 1st secretary CCP ZPC, chairman ZPRC, 1st political commissar ZPMD, 1972-7; 1st secretary CCP Qinghai provincial committee, 1977-80; 2nd and then 1st secretary, CCP Sichuan provincial committee, 1980-3 (retirement); alternate member CCP 9th CC; member CCP 10th, 11th, 12th CC.

TIE YING

铁 瑛

1910-

Officer in New 4th and 3rd Field Armies; worked in political/judicial area under Nanjing Military Region 1949-65; political commissar Zhoushan garrison 1965-72; secretary CCP ZPC, vice-chairman ZPRC, political commissar ZPMD, 1972-7; 1st secretary CCP ZPC, 1st political commissar ZPMD, 1977-83; chairman ZPRC, 1977-9; chairman, standing committee Zhejiang Provincial People's Congress, 1979-83; chairman, CCP Zhejiang Provincial Advisory Commission, 1983- ; alternate member CCP 10th CC; member CCP 11th, 12th CC.

WANG FANG

王 芳

Cadre in 3rd Field Army before liberation; deputy-director Zhejiang public security bureau 1951-5?; director, Zhejiang public security bureau and commander, public security forces, 1955-?; deputy-governor Zhejiang, 1964-CR; organised workers in Wenzhou city in south Zhejiang to resist onslaught of revolutionary rebels and dismissed as a capitalist-roader, 1968; reappeared in 1977 as member, standing committee CCP ZPC, 1977-8 and vice-chairman ZPRC, 1977-9; deputy-secretary CCP ZPC, 1978-83; vice-chairman, Zhejiang Provincial People's Congress, 1979-83; secretary, CCP ZPC and 1st political commissar ZPMD, 1983- ; member CCP 12th CC.

WANG PINGYI

王 平夷

1912-70

Deputy-secretary and secretary CCP HMC, 1955-CR; political commissar Hangzhou garrison, 1960-CR; denounced as capitalist-roader in CR and died as a result of persecution.

WANG SHICHUAN

汪 石川

'Revolutionary leading cadre', October 1967; 1st vice-chairman HMRC, 1967-75; deputy-secretary CCP HMC, 1970-5; removed from office in July 1975 and fate unknown.

WANG XING

王 醒

Party secretary Xinanjiang hydro-electric engineering bureau, 1959-?; deputy-governor Zhejiang, 1962-4; 2nd secretary CCP HMC and vice-chairman HMRC, 1973-5; leader

Zhejiang small group to criticise Lin and Confucius, 1974; dismissed in July 1975 and transferred to Guangxi autonomous region; returned to Hangzhou in 1978 to face criticism for his errors in the anti-Lin anti-Confucius campaign.

WANG ZIDA

王子达

Member of secretariat, CCP HMC, 1954-CR; mayor of Hangzhou 1962-CR: "revolutionary leading cadre", October 1967; chairman HMRC, 1967-75; vice-chairman ZPRC, 1968-75; 1st secretary CCP HMC, 1970-5; member, standing committee CCP ZPC, 1971-5; dismissed in July 1975; and transferred to Sichuan; returned to Hangzhou in 1978 to face criticism for his performance in CR.

WENG SENHE

翁森鹤

1937?-

Worker at Hangzhou synthetic fibre mill (huaxianchang), 1962-3; transferred to Hangzhou silk complex and worked as a screen printer, 1963-CR; initially active in Red Storm and then became a leading member of United Headquarters; member, standing committee ZPRC, 1970-5; alternate member CCP ZPC, 1971-5; vice-chairman ZPTUC 1973-5; member, party committee CCP ZPC political work group, 1974-5; chairman, provincial office of Mao Zedong Thought propaganda teams, 1974-5; detained, 9 July 1975; formally arrested 25 December 1976; sentenced to life imprisonment, 13 August 1978; sent to Qinghai for permanent internal exile, 1984.

WU XIAN

吴宪

Deputy-mayor of Hangzhou, 1949-55; secretary CCP HMC, 1954-62; mayor of Hangzhou, 1955-62; deputy-governor of Zhejiang, 1956-CR; secretary CCP ZPC, 1959-CR; appeared as 'revolutionary leading cadre', November 1967; purged from standing committee ZPRC, December 1968 as supporter of Jiang Hua.

XIA GENFA

夏根法

Worker at Hangzhou oxygen generator plant; organised and led Hangzhou Social Order Command Headquarters with He Xianchun, 1968; deputy-secretary and later secretary HMMCH, 1974-5; deputy-leader HMRC production command group, 1974-5; worked closely with Weng Senhe, He Xianchun and Huang Yintang during the years 1967-8 and 1973-5; sentenced with Huang to two-year suspended death sentence, April 1979.

XIA QI

夏琦

Deputy-political commissar ZPMD, 1970-79?; member, standing

committee, CCP ZPC, 1972-5; vice-chairman, standing committee Zhejiang Provincial People's Congress, 1979-83?; principal target with Tie Ying of rebels in 1974.

XIE ZHENGHAO 谢正浩

Chief of Staff East China fleet, 1964-CR; commander Zhoushan naval base, 1968; vice-chairman ZPRC, 1969-75; deputy-secretary CCP ZPC, 1971-5; removed from office in July 1975; deputy-commander, East China fleet, 1975-82; commander, East China fleet, 1982- .

XIONG YINGTANG 熊应堂

Officer in New 4th Army prior to liberation; commander, 20th Army when it moved to Zhejiang early in 1967; vice-chairman ZPRC, 1968-72; acting commander and then commander ZPMD, 1968-72; secretary CCP ZPC, 1971-2; dismissed with Nan Ping as agent of Lin Biao in Zhejiang and later apparently demoted and transferred to Sichuan as a military official in a main force unit.

XU SHUNIAN 徐树年

Vice-chairman HMRC 1967?-75; deputy-secretary CCP HMC, 1970-5; possibly commander of the Hangzhou garrison; dismissed from civilian posts in July 1975 perhaps for his failure to distance the local PLA from factional disputes.

XUE JU 薛驹

Deputy-secretary-general and deputy-director, general office CCP ZPC prior to CR; leading supporter behind the scenes of Jiang Hua, 1967-8 and attacked at mass criticism rallies; reappeared as member, standing committee and secretary-general CCP ZPC, December 1977; deputy-secretary CCP ZPC, 1979- ; vice-chairman Zhejiang committee of the Chinese People's Consultative Conference, 1979-83; Governor of Zhejiang, 1983- ; member CCP 12th CC.

YE RENDE 叶仁德

Worker/cadre at Hangzhou Iron and Steel Mill; activist in United Headquarters; vice-chairman revolutionary committee and member, standing committee of party committee at Iron and Steel Mill; member, standing committee ZPRC and alternate member CCP ZPC, during CR; sentenced to seven years' jail in January 1980 for 'crimes' in CR.

ZHANG WENBI

张文碧

Cadre in New 4th and 3rd Field Armies, 1938-49; worked in units under Nanjing Military Region, 1949-CR; political commissar Unit 6408 (12th Army) stationed in Anhui, 1965-72?; vice-chairman Anhui Provincial Revolutionary Committee and political commissar Anhui Provincial Military District, 1968-72; Minister of Water Conservancy and Electrical Power, 1972-4; commander ZPMD and secretary CCP ZPC, 1975-8; disappeared from political scene in 1978.

ZHANG XIULONG

张秀龙

Officer in 3rd Field Army before liberation; deputy-commander ZPMD, 1963-5; commander ZPMD, 1965-7; dismissed with Long Qian in August 1967 for failure to carry out central directives; commander Hubei Provincial Military District, 1976-80; deputy-commander Wuhan Military Region, 1978- .

ZHANG YONGSHENG

张永生

Student at Zhejiang Academy of Fine Arts and graduated in 1966; leader of United Headquarters; chairman, Zhejiang Congress of Red Guards, 1967-?; established and commanded student strike forces called the West Lake brigade (Xihu songdui) and Flying Tiger team (Feihudui), 1967; vice-chairman ZPRC, 1968-75; member CCP ZPC, 1971-5; party secretary Zhejiang Academy of Fine Arts, 1974-5; head, revolution-in-education leading group of ZPRC, 1974-5; sent to Xipu brigade, Zunhua county, Hebei province, August 1975-February 1976; recalled to Tianjin and then Beijing, February 1976-March 1977; ordered back to Zhejiang to face criticism, 2 March 1977; formally arrested, 13 August 1978; sentenced to life imprisonment, 4 April 1979; sent to Qinghai with Weng Senhe on permanent internal exile, 1984.

ZHANG ZISHI

张子石

Local official in Shandong province at the outset of the CR; rebelled in support of Wang Xiaoyu; 1st secretary CCP HMC, chairman HMRC, member, standing committee CCP ZPC and vice-chairman ZPRC, July 1975-May 1978; removed from office and pressured to answer for his past activities in Shandong.

ZHOU FENG

周峰

Member of secretariat of CCP HMC at outbreak of CR; vice-chairman HMRC 1970-81; deputy-secretary CCP HMC 1970-7; secretary CCP HMC, 1977-81; mayor of Hangzhou, 1981-3; transferred from Zhejiang, May 1983.

ZHOU JIANREN

周建人

1887-1984

Brother of Lu Xun; deputy-minister of Higher Education, 1954-8; Governor of Zhejiang, 1958-CR; reappeared in November 1967; vice-chairman ZPRC, 1968-75; member CCP 9th, 10th, 11th CC; vice-chairman 3rd, 4th, 5th NPC; resigned in 1980 due to old age.

ZHU QUANLIN

朱全林

Chief of Staff 20th Army, 1967-?; member, standing committee ZPRC, 1968-75; member, standing committee CCP ZPC, 1971-5; removed from civilian posts in July 1975.

ADDENDACHEN ZUOLIN

陈作霖

Vice-chairman ZPRC, 1975-9; secretary CCP ZPC, 1975-83; deputy-governor of Zhejiang, 1979-83; secretary CCP Zhejiang Discipline Inspection Commission, 1983- ; alternate member, CCP 11th, 12th CC.

GUO ZHISONG

郭志松

Vice-chairman ZPTUC, 1972-82?; leader of the 'foot of the mountain' faction, 1973-5.

TENG ZHU

滕铸

Activist in Red Storm faction; deputy-secretary CYL Zhejiang committee, 1973-82?; member, standing committee ZPRC.

APPENDIX BThe Standing Committee of the Zhejiang Provincial Revolutionary Committee, 24 March 1968

Chairman	Nan Ping
First Vice-Chairman	Chen Liyun
Vice-Chairmen	Xiong Yingtang Lai Keke Zhou Jianren Wang Zida Hua Yinfeng Zhang Yongsheng
Members	Zhu Quanlin Meng Chaoyu Dai Kelin Shen Ce Wu Xian? Wang Qi? Mo Xianyao?

Sources: RMRB, 28 March 1968.
Kao Ch'ung-yen Zhonggong renshi biandong, 1959-69
 (H.K., 1970), pp.670-1.
 ZPS, 24 March 1968, SWB/FE/2733/B/2-4.

APPENDIX CThe Standing Committee of the CCP 5th Zhejiang Provincial
Committee, January 1971

First Secretary	Nan Ping
Secretaries	Chen Liyun Xiong Yingtang
Deputy-Secretaries	Lai Keke Xie Zhenghao Chai Qikun
Members	Wang Zida Hua Yinfeng Shen Ce Dai Kelin Zhu Quanlin Meng Chaoyu Jiang Baodi

Source: HZRB, 31 January 1971.

APPENDIX DThe Standing Committee of the CCP ZPC before and after the Reorganisation of July 1975

	<u>BEFORE</u>	<u>AFTER</u>
First Secretary	Tan Qilong ⁴	Tan Qilong ⁴
Secretaries	Tie Ying ³	Tie Ying ³ Lai Keke ⁴ Zhang Wenbi ^{2,3}
Deputy-Secretaries	Lai Keke ⁴ Xie Zhenghao ^{1,3} Chai Qikun ^{1,3} Chen Weida ⁴	Luo Yi ² Chen Weida ⁴ Chen Zuolin ²
Members	Wang Zida ^{1,4} Shen Ce ^{1,4} Dai Kelin ^{1,3,4} Zhu Quanlin ^{1,3} Meng Chaoyu ^{1,3?} Jiang Baodi Zhou Jianren ^{1,4} Chen Bing ⁴ Xia Qi ^{1,3} Liu Ang ^{1,3}	Wu Shihong ^{2,3} Zhang Zishi ² Chen Bing ⁴ Jiang Baodi Feng Ke ² Lu Jianguang ⁴

Sources: Union Research Institute, Hierarchies of the People's Republic of China, March 1975 (Hong Kong, 1975).
HZRB, 23 July 1975, p.1.

Notes:

1. Transferred, dismissed or dropped.
2. Newcomers to Zhejiang.
3. Military cadre.
4. Pre-Cultural Revolution administrative experience in Zhejiang.

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THE REFORM OF PROVINCIAL PARTY COMMITTEES IN CHINA

The Case Of Zhejiang

_____ Keith Forster

During 1982 Deng Xiaoping took steps to reform the organizational structure of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and appoint to its leading bodies and departments officials more in tune with his pragmatic thinking and policies. The 12th Congress of the CCP, held in September 1982, represented a major milestone in this process. With the central organs consolidated, Deng and the Party leadership pushed on to the next administrative level—that of the province, autonomous region, and directly administered municipality (hereafter referred to as province). Early in 1983 Party committees at this level underwent extensive changes of personnel either through the convocation of Party congresses or, as in the majority of cases, through public announcements at meetings of Party cadres. Together with this high turnover of provincial Party officials went a reduction in standing committee membership, a lowering of the average age, and an infusion of technical and professional cadres into these decision-making bodies.

This article examines the professed reasons behind the changes, the criteria for selecting new personnel, and the procedure followed in this selection. It notes in particular the important role played by Deng Xiaoping in this reform of far-reaching consequence, a reform that Deng termed a “revolution.” For a case study, the article looks at the eastern seaboard province of Zhejiang, which Deng personally visited early in 1983 to oversee the restructuring of its administration. A detailed examination of one province may help throw light on some of the difficulties the reformers experienced in this undertaking. The extent of Deng’s success in appointing officials loyal to him provides some basis for assessing the likely outcome of the most complex and arduous reform, which

_____ Keith Forster teaches at Swinburne Institute, Melbourne, Australia, and taught at Hangzhou University from 1977 to 1979.

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began in winter/spring 1983-84—rectification of the CCP and a careful scrutiny of the capabilities and political tendencies of its 40 million members.

Deng's Model

Following his decisive victory over Hua Guofeng and the “whatever” faction at the Central Committee (CC) 3rd Plenum of December 1978 and the establishment of a new direction in Chinese politics, Deng, supported by policy initiatives, turned his attention to organizational issues. At the CC 5th Plenum in February 1980, Deng made his first major breach when four leading opponents, including Mao Zedong’s former bodyguard, Wang Dongxing, were forced to resign. Then at the 3rd Session of the 5th National People’s Congress (NPC) held in August–September 1980, Deng forced Hua out of his seat as premier on the pretext of reducing concurrent posts. In an authoritative speech at an enlarged meeting of the Political Bureau held on the eve of this NPC session, Deng outlined in detail his views on the leadership system, how it should be reformed, and what sort of people he favored gaining promotion and support.

Deng stressed in this speech that a large number of talented people who upheld the four fundamental principles (Party leadership, socialist path, dictatorship of the proletariat, Marxism-Leninism—Mao Zedong Thought), who possessed specialized skills and knowledge, and who were younger in age, were needed to implement the economic and political strategy.¹ While admitting that in 1975 he had condemned “rocket” or “helicopter” promotion, he now contended that the traditional method of step-by-step elevation based on seniority was also unsatisfactory. He suggested giving outstanding personnel a smooth run up the ladder, skipping rungs on the way. Thus it was not the principle of rapid promotion Deng opposed but the criteria on which this promotion was based. He had had no use for “rebels” and Cultural Revolution activists in 1975; in the 1980s he desperately required educated and professionally competent officials, and was prepared to bend the rules to cultivate them.

Deng asserted that the two most important criteria in assessing potential candidates were moral integrity (*de*) and ability (*cai*). The two most important factors in judging moral integrity were the person’s persistence in the socialist road and upholding of Party leadership, two of the four fundamental principles noted above. Realizing full well that large numbers of cadres would overtly and covertly resist his program, Deng called on Party committees and organization departments to liberate their think-

1. Deng Xiaoping, “Reform of the Party and State Leadership System,” August 18, 1980, *Deng Xiaoping Wenxuan* (Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1983), pp. 280-302.

ing, overcome obstacles, smash old conventions, and discover, train, and utilize outstanding talent.

How Deng himself had uncovered this kind of person was revealed in an article published in late 1982.² In July 1980, the month prior to the meeting of the Political Bureau at which Deng set out his position, the wily veteran was in Hubei province on an inspection tour. At an automobile plant near Wuhan, Deng met a man called Wang Zhaohuo, 38 years old and deputy-director of the factory. Wang had been an active member of party-led mass organizations in his youth and in 1965 had joined the CCP. He graduated from college in 1966 and commenced work at the automobile plant two years later. During the turmoil of the Cultural Revolution, Wang worked diligently in various sections of the factory and ignored the political campaigns going on around him. In 1976 he had boycotted the movement to criticize Deng. His performance, in Deng's eyes, met precisely the requirements he was formulating for political succession.

A year after this discovery, in July 1981, in a talk to provincial party secretaries after the CC 6th Plenum, Deng reiterated the necessity of selecting suitably qualified personnel.³ Otherwise, he claimed, disaster and chaos would ensue. This was an urgent and crucial matter in which veteran cadres had to set an example. Deng specifically mentioned the 600,000 university graduates from the years 1961-66 as a suitable pool from whom to choose successors. These people had specialized knowledge, good political records, and in the Cultural Revolution had remained indifferent to factional strife. In fact, many had come under attack, a sign of their attitude toward it, according to Deng. This group of graduates was aged around forty. Their credentials were impeccable.

Procedure and Criteria

Hu Yaobang, in his report to the CCP 12th Congress, reiterated his patron Deng's established criteria in selecting new leaders—that they be revolutionary, younger, qualified, and specialized. To this end he called on veteran cadres to withdraw from active duty and use their experience in an advisory capacity. In their place middle-aged and young cadres would work alongside some remaining elderly leaders so that when the latter retired, their younger colleagues could carry on the cause. Five categories of people would not be considered for promotion, warned Hu, and they would also be removed from any positions they still occupied:

2. *Beijing Wanbao*, October 1, 1982, in BBC, *Summary of World Broadcasts, The Far East (SWB/FE)* 7160/BII, pp. 3-5.

3. Deng Xiaoping, "The First Task of Veteran Cadres is to Select Middle-Aged and Young Cadres," July 2, 1981, in *Deng Xiaoping Wenxuan*, pp. 339-343.

rebels, factionalists and trouble makers left over from the "ten years of disorder," opponents of the line and policies set out at the 3rd Plenum, and violators of the law, or of party discipline. Hu urged older comrades to assist in ensuring a smooth transition.

The about-to-be-elected CC general secretary set out clearly the aim of this reform:

The main aim of reforming the system of leadership and leading organs of the Party and state is to eliminate such defects as over-concentration of power, proliferation of concurrent and deputy posts, organizational overlapping, lack of clear-cut responsibility, overstaffing and failure to separate Party work from Government work, and in these ways overcome bureaucracy and increase work efficiency.⁴

Ye Jiangying and Chen Yun, two of the oldest veterans in the CCP leadership, also addressed themselves to this vexing question of retirement in their speeches to the Congress. Although like Deng they did not set personal examples in making way for younger cadres, they both supported the concept in principle. Ye reassured the veterans that their past contributions would not be forgotten. Chen saw the role of remnant front-line leaders as one involving guidance, transference of experience, advice, and supervision over major issues.⁵

At the 1st Plenum of the newly elected 12th CC, Hu Yaobang returned to the theme of organizational reform. Its success, he argued, depended largely on the leading cadres' attitude toward it and the amount of work they were prepared to do to accomplish the assignment.⁶ The importance of the task was also proclaimed in the New Year's editorial, which listed administrative restructuring as one of the two major reforms for 1983.⁷

The procedure involved in restructuring provincial party committees could be deduced from a *Red Flag* editorial of July 1982.⁸ The editorial summed up the experience gathered from reform carried out at the central level. Some of the points referred to that are most relevant to this article included the method of establishing two leading groups within the body under reform, one to take charge of the reform itself, and the other to concern itself with routine work. Experience had shown, pointed out

4. Hu Yaobang, "Report to the 12th National Congress of the CCP," in *The Twelfth National Congress of the CPC* (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1982), pp. 70-73.

5. Speeches of Ye Janying and Chen Yun in *ibid.*, pp. 133, 136.

6. Hu Yaobang, "Speech at the 1st Plenum of the 12th CC," September 13, 1982, in *SWB/FE/7166/BII*, pp.1-4.

7. *Renmin Ribao* (RMRB), January 1, 1983, in *SWB/FE/7222/BII*, pp. 1-3.

8. Hongqi editorial department, "Sum up Experience, Persist in Reform," *Hongqi*, No. 14, July 16, 1982, in *SWB/FE/7098/BII*, pp.1-8.

the editorial, that the transition period should be as short as possible and that action should be taken to prevent any unit or individual from creating trouble or sowing confusion. While the size of the leading body would be fixed in advance, the choice of candidates required collective discussion with input from non-Party citizens. The editorial stated that veteran cadres must be allowed to play an active role in the selection process.

For reform at the provincial level, suggested Hu in his speech to the 1st Plenum in September 1982, the central authorities could assist by sending out officials from Beijing. Implicitly recognizing the obstacles that localities and loyal ties could place in the way of reform, Hu forwarded two reasons to back up his proposal. First, when difficulties arose in selecting the new leading group and awkward decisions had to be taken, the outside cadres could "help local comrades make up their minds and speak on their behalf." Second, the outside officials could "help local comrades listen to opinions from the broad masses and follow the mass line." The central figures have sufficient status to ensure that their voices carried plenty of weight. They would include members of the CC, Central Advisory Commission, Central Discipline Inspection Commission, and retired cadres of vice-ministerial or deputy-directorial rank.⁹

That the CCP leadership was indeed running into obstacles in implementing provincial leadership reform was illustrated by the Circular of the CC Organization Department issued in February 1983.¹⁰ The circular laid down five rules for cadres, reflecting the strength of opposition to Deng's reform. First, these regulations ordered cadres to remain at their posts and continue working, rather than resign or go on trips. Second, the circular exhorted officials to accept the decision of the organization and not interfere with personnel arrangements. Third, it forbade any attempt to boost personnel numbers to create new units in anticipation of a reduction (thus circumventing one of the purposes of reform). Fourth, those officials about to be demoted, retired, or shifted were asked to accept the decision gracefully and not oppose reform or disturb unity by practicing factionalism. Finally, the circular demanded strict adherence to state financial regulations, presumably to head off any misappropriation of funds by officials striving to create new departments or hire extra personnel.

Song Renqiong, then director of the CC Organization Department, in a speech in the same month, specified the requirements for new leaders in provincial Party committees.¹¹ Of the three leading cadres, one should be

9. Hu Yaobang, "Speech at the 1st Plenum."

10. CCP, CC, Organization Department, "Circular on Administrative Reform," in *SWB/FE/7270/BII*, pp. 2-3.

11. Song Renqiong, "Speech at the 2nd National Conference on the Work of Party Schools," February 22, 1983, in *SWB/FE/7270/BII*, pp. 2-3.

about 55 years of age; one-third of the standing committee members should also be about 55 and one-third should have a college education. The standing committee should include officials qualified in the fields of industry, agriculture, culture, education, science, technology, management, finance, and trade. Song made no mention of military expertise.

By the establishment of certain clearly defined guidelines, the issuance of regulations, the dispatch of officials from Beijing, and the experience accrued from reform at the center, Deng and his associates hoped to reduce and nullify opposition and achieve restructuring as quickly and painlessly as possible. However, more importantly, success relied on acceptance of the criteria put forward by Deng. Otherwise endless bickering over the suitability of an individual would hold up the process and allow local officials to use all their influence and connections to stall or even sabotage Deng's aims.

Opinion seemed to vary. The crucial issues were the relative weight to be attached to moral integrity and professional competence and how to define these two criteria. One article in *Red Flag* called for a detailed analysis of a proposed candidate's family background, social relations, personal history, and present performance as a prerequisite to selection.¹² Song Renqiong contributed a lengthy article on the subject in October 1982.¹³

While recognizing that political considerations alone could not determine a person's worth, Song wrote that strict political standards were the main prerequisite. He appeared to view the two criteria of political integrity and professional competence as two opposites that do not necessarily unite in one individual:

It is a pity that those who possess political integrity without professional competence can hardly take up an important post, although admittedly they are politically trustworthy; the professional competence of those who possess professional competence without political integrity is precisely enough to make them more self-seeking and wily. If we put them in important positions, they will constitute a grave danger to us.

Song believed that it was unrealistic to try and seek out "all-rounders" or "perfect men" to fill posts. However, he seemed to infer that while unobtainable, the concept in itself was not undesirable. This view directly contradicted Deng's assessment that generalist cadres were incapable of meeting China's needs and had to be replaced by specialists.

12. Zong Rong. "Be Sure not to Choose a Villain for a Job," *Hongqi*, No. 15, August 1, 1982, in SWB/FE/7117/BII, pp. 2-4.

13. Song Renqiong, "Build a Good Cadre Contingent . . .," *RMRB*, October 2, 1982, in SWB/FE/7159/BII, pp. 1-7.

From the whole tenor of the article, including the admission that his department had not performed its work satisfactorily in the past, it is highly unlikely that Deng would have looked at the department's prospects under Song with much confidence.¹⁴

A January 1983 article in *People's Daily* made it clear that Song's explanation of the relationship between moral (political) integrity and professional competence had probably served only to reinforce existing prejudices within the cadre ranks against their colleagues with intellectual or professional backgrounds.¹⁵ The author of this article commented that problems had arisen as to what relative emphasis should be placed on the two criteria and how to define moral integrity and professional competence. In principle, stated the article, it was recognized that there existed an abundance of qualified personnel from whom to draw, but when specific cases were discussed, individuals were rejected because they were not "ideal" or to the liking of those responsible for selection.

The article attempted to attribute such disputes to faulty comprehension of the criteria or the influence of old conventions and ideas. More seriously, it accused other cadres of suffering from leftist or factional influences. To clear up such confusion and at the same time make it clear that leftist deviations would not be tolerated, the article attempted to define both criteria.

Moral soundness, argued the writer, was reflected in a desire to serve the people, an ability to throw oneself headlong into the battle for modernization, adherence to the four fundamental principles, and acceptance of and enthusiasm for the goals set at the CCP 12th Congress. Although people who met these requirements might have various shortcomings, they were superior to obsequious "good old chaps" or vacillating "blades of grass on top of the wall" being blown around in the wind. They were also "much better than those who seek ease and comfort, pursue personal interests, resort to boasting and toadying, go with the tide, find fault with the Party and comrades and stay aloof from the main forces which are doing pioneering work."

Professional competence, explained the article, also needed to be understood correctly. Here it was defined as an ability to unite with and guide the people to effectively develop both material and spiritual modernization. Selection of cadres should concentrate on tertiary graduates educated since 1949 and those who had acquired specialized knowledge

14. At the July 1983 National Work Conference on Organizational Work, Song Renqiong no longer held the post of director.

15. "Correctly Comprehend and Carry out the Principle of Having Cadres who are Sound Morally and Competent Professionally," *RMRB*, January 14, 1983, in *SWB/FE/7335/BII*, pp. 9-12.

in their field through self-study. Their practical experience was proof of an adequate theoretical understanding, professional competence, and leadership ability.

Contrary to Song Renqiong's assertion that political integrity and professional competence stood in contradiction to each other, the article, in a resounding rebuke, claimed that unity did exist between the two criteria. It was impossible, argued the author, for a cadre to have one attribute without the other. Thus "red" and "expert" had become synonymous because "expert" now subsumed Deng's definition of "red" within itself. What was expert was red.

This important article also raised three other issues. First, it emphasized the necessity to treat intellectuals fairly and not mistake their commitment to science, their desire for privacy in their studies, and confidence in their own abilities for pride, arrogance, or disobedience. Second, those cadres who had made mistakes in the past still deserved consideration (unless of course they belonged to one of the five categories mentioned above). Third, merit, not favoritism, determined appointment, and merit accumulated through a totality of practice, not a single act.

The article's call for the elimination of factionalism left over from the Cultural Revolution and a warning about the possibility of the emergence of a new kind of sectarianism reflected very real fears on the part of the leadership. In his push for reform, Deng may have served not only to alarm and arouse previous allies or neutral elements, but more dangerously to throw them together with groups they had in the past opposed. Remnant Maoists, dissatisfied PLA officers, and cadres of the Cultural Revolution generation had no place in Deng's China. But the vast ranks of politically trained generalists of all ages whom the CCP had relied on to win the revolution and carry on socialist construction since 1949 were a mighty force. Their dissatisfaction, moreover, was the dissatisfaction of their families, friends, colleagues, and subordinates.

The Situation in Zhejiang

Before discussing in detail the way reform was undertaken in Zhejiang province, it is necessary to give some background to provincial politics prior to 1983. Tie Ying, first secretary of the CCP Zhejiang Provincial Committee (ZPC), had held that post since 1977. After the removal of Lin Biao's followers in 1972, Tie had been promoted from his post as political commissar of PLA units stationed on the Zhoushan Islands in the East China Sea to become deputy to Tan Qilong on the ZPC. When Tan was transferred out of Zhejiang following the arrest of the Gang of Four, Tie assumed all his posts and became the undisputed leader of the province.

At the CCP 11th Congress held in August 1977, Tie was elected to the CC, and then reelected at the 12th Congress. By then he had led the ZPC for five and a half years under the direction of Hua Guofeng and later Deng Xiaoping. Although the province's economic performance during that period had been very satisfactory,¹⁶ there were signs that Tie's position was not completely secure. With the liberation in 1977-78 of high-ranking cadres who had worked for many years in Zhejiang prior to the Cultural Revolution, Tie faced challenge from nominal subordinates who had greater administrative experience in the province, who had a far more extensive network of ties down through the bureaucracy, and who now returned as victims of the "ultra-left" line of the Cultural Revolution.

Among these veteran cadres, the most important were Li Fengping, Wang Fang, and Xue Ju. Li Fengping had been secretary of the ZPC and deputy to First Secretary Jiang Hua when the Cultural Revolution began. He returned to office with the same rank, under Tie Ying, at the 6th Congress of the CCP ZPC in May 1978. In December 1979 he became governor of Zhejiang. Li had experience in public security work in particular but had ranged over the whole field of general administration. Wang Fang¹⁷ had also specialized in public security work. At the time the Cultural Revolution erupted, he was deputy-governor of Zhejiang and first secretary of the extremely sensitive and isolated southern prefecture of Wenzhou. Wang reemerged in 1977 as deputy-secretary of the ZPC and soon broadened his involvement in many fields of activity, including government and military affairs. Xue Ju¹⁸ had been deputy secretary-general of the ZPC in 1966. He also reappeared in 1977, as deputy-secretary and secretary-general of the ZPC. All three men had outstanding records in resisting the Cultural Revolution, opposing the Maoist radicals and supporting the Party machine. For this they had been denounced and stripped of all power.

Li, Wang, and Xue stood as firm supporters of the increasingly influential veteran "capitalist-roaders" headed by Deng. They could act as his loyal watchdogs in keeping an eye on Zhejiang affairs. At the 12th

16. See Li Fengping, "Report on the Work of Government," April 22, 1983, in *Zhejiang Ribao (ZJRB)*, May 2, 1983. In this report to the 6th Congress of the Zhejiang Provincial People's Congress (ZPPC), Li revealed that Zhejiang's industrial output value had lifted the province from 15th to 10th rank in the years 1978-82. Agricultural production had also risen substantially.

17. For further information on the career of Wang Fang, see "Wang Fang—Newly Elected Secretary of the CCP Zhejiang Party Committee," *Issues & Studies*, 19:8 (August 1983), pp. 67-71.

18. For further information on the career of Xue Ju, see "Xue Ju—Newly Elected Governor of Zhejiang," *ibid.*, 19:10 (October 1983), pp. 82-87.

Congress, both Wang and Xue were promoted onto the CC while the older Li joined the Central Advisory Commission. These moves signified impending changes in the politics of Zhejiang.

Tie Ying had come under attack in the anti-Lin, anti-Confucius campaign of 1974 from radical mass leaders and was forced out of active participation in political life. During Deng's ascendancy in 1975, Tie resumed work but was again pushed aside in 1976 when the radicals launched another assault on Deng and his policies. Tie's treatment during these years indicated that he was certainly no friend of the Maoist rebels and their mobilizational style of politics involving confrontation and struggle. Neither was he a lawbreaker. But could Tie be described as an opponent of the policies and program of the 3rd Plenum, the great watershed in post-Mao politics?

Before tackling this important issue, it is worth noting the disadvantages and liabilities Tie already labored under. He was a relative newcomer in a province that does not take readily to outsiders. He could not match the breadth and depth of experience acquired by Li, Wang, and Xue over many years in Zhejiang. Although he had felt the wrath of the radicals in 1974 and perhaps again in 1976, Tie's career had prospered, rather than suffered, in the ten years of "chaos." Also, he was a career soldier at a time when cadres of this background were fast disappearing from civilian posts. Finally, there is evidence that Tie disapproved of some aspects of post-3rd Plenum policies and perhaps resisted their implementation.

In his speeches, reports, and articles since 1979, Tie has shown a tendency to repress any enthusiasm he may feel for the new direction in which Chinese politics is heading. Like other older military cadres, Tie probably opposes the undermining of Mao Zedong's status and prestige. He may be sympathetic to PLA complaints regarding its reduced role in Chinese political life. Tie displayed an obvious coolness for the central leadership under Deng in a March 1981 article, especially when compared to the effusive praise emanating from Xue Ju in an article published five days later.¹⁹

More important, at a work conference of the CCP ZPC held in October 1980, Tie Ying, in a speech on rural work,²⁰ said that while the responsibility system should be implemented throughout the province,

19. Tie Ying, "Unfold Thorough Propaganda and Education to Uphold the Four Fundamental Principles," *ZJRB*, March 5, 1981; Xue Ju, "Conscientiously Implement the Party's Line, Principles and Policies of the 3rd Plenum," *ibid.*, March 10, 1981.

20. Tie Hing, "Report on the Rural Economy," *Radio Zhejiang*, October 28, 1980, in *Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report, China (FBIS/China)*, 211, October 29, 1980, pp. O1-O4.

because the collective economy was quite firmly established in Zhejiang, it was not necessary to break up the collectives and fix output quotas at the household level. In remote and poor areas of the province that relied on state support, the household responsibility system would be permitted, said Tie. But he made it clear that these areas were few and the policy, if applied, was only to be a short-term expediency. Once the agricultural economy developed there, the peasants could return to the collective road with the production team as the basic unit.

Tie's remarks were fully in accord with the CC document of September 1980 that permitted the establishment of the household responsibility system in only the poorest one-third of production teams in China. However, Tie may have held a different view from Deng as to what constituted poverty in the Chinese countryside. Also, by emphasizing that Zhejiang's peasants had done well under the commune system, Tie was resisting the trend to find flaws in the system. He said that agriculture needed planning and leadership based on the three-tiered system of commune, brigade, and team. Household-based agriculture, he seemed to imply, was outside socialist collectivism and basically not applicable to an advanced area like Zhejiang. With the practice of the Chinese peasants going well beyond policy but receiving official endorsement post facto, and the thinking of the Chinese leadership continually shifting, Tie's position soon became untenable. Political developments had a tendency to leave many people in their wake, and Tie joined those left behind.

Another issue upon which Tie seemed to take issue with the Deng leadership concerned the caliber of CCP members admitted during the Cultural Revolution. In an article published in the national press in November 1982,²¹ Tie lumped together those who had joined the Party during the "ten years" with those who had joined since 1976. Both groups of new members had not received any systematic education in basic knowledge of the Party or rigorous training in inner-Party life, argued Tie. He also stated clearly that these 500,000 or so new CCP members, almost half of the Zhejiang Party membership, were superior to their senior colleagues in several ways. They were younger and in the prime of life, they had a higher educational standard, and they showed themselves more receptive to new influences. They had already established themselves as leaders at basic-level units and were an important source from which to choose leading cadres. Tie's view contrasted with Deng's preference for pre-Cultural Revolution graduates as the major source from which to select future leaders.

21. Tie Ying, "Use the Greatest Enthusiasm to Strengthen Education Among New Party Members," *RMRB*, November 17, 1982, in *SWB/FE/7190/BII*, pp. 11-12.

Tie Ying also expressed the opinion that the overwhelming majority of CCP members admitted during the Cultural Revolution had qualified according to the criteria of the time. As he explained, if they had not been recommended on the basis of "taking a clear-cut firm stand in the struggle between the proletariat and bourgeois headquarters and in the struggle between the two lines," the Party would not have accepted them. Although these CCP members remained under a cloud because of their past, Tie emphasized that "we should not over-emphasize these remarks at the expense of the actual performance of these comrades." This stand of Tie's put him in obvious confrontation with Deng's suspicion of, if not outright hostility towards, a large number of Party members admitted during the Cultural Revolution. It also made Tie a liability to Deng when the provincial branch of the Party was set the task of purging many of these members from its ranks.

REFORM IN ZHEJIANG

The above, then, is a brief outline of the situation faced by the central authorities when they approached administrative restructuring in Zhejiang. After the 12th CCP Congress, the CC sent a series of teams led by high-ranking officials to Hangzhou to discuss reform of civilian and military leading bodies. Minister of Defense Zhang Aiping, once commander of the Zhejiang Military District in the 1950s, arrived in December 1982 for talks on the PLA leadership. The 72-year-old Zhang pointed out that

only co-operation between old and new cadres and the succession of the new to the old can guarantee that our leading bodies at all levels are filled with a new and dynamic atmosphere at all times and that our revolutionary cause can be carried forward and developed.²²

The 5th Session of the 5th Zhejiang Provincial People's Congress (ZPPC) convened at around this time. In a speech given wide coverage by *Xinhua*, Tie Ying was forced to retract his earlier views on the responsibility system in agriculture at the household level. He admitted that heated disputes had occurred as to the advisability of instituting the system in developed agricultural regions, and the leadership had "had quite a few misgivings." But the enthusiasm with which the peasants had taken it up and the successes they had achieved had proved the leadership wrong. This demonstrated, said Tie frankly, that the leaders' minds were insufficiently "emancipated" and that only going out to see for themselves had convinced them of its suitability to conditions in Zhejiang.²³

22. Radio Zhejiang, December 2, 1982, in *SWB/FE/7204/BII*, p. 13.

23. Tie Ying, "Speech on the Responsibility System in Agriculture," *Xinhua* report, December 3, 1982, in *SWB/FE/7207/C*, pp. 6-7.

With the unannounced arrival of Peng Zhen in Hangzhou early in 1983,²⁴ pressure on Tie Ying was building. In January a lengthy ZPC work meeting began that clearly would determine Tie's fate. Tie Ying spoke to the work conference on the need for reform in 1983: "Success in reform requires our efforts to further emancipate 'left' influence and break outdated conventions, which are incompatible with the new situation." Tie particularly mentioned leadership reform "with emphasis on letting young cadres with sufficient education fill posts in such bodies while meeting the requirement that leading body members must be revolutionary."²⁵

Agriculture was another topic discussed at this meeting. One of Tie's deputies, Chen Zuolin, secretary of the ZPC and in overall charge of agricultural work, made a speech on this subject that was later given national publicity.²⁶ He reiterated Tie's confession the previous month that leftist thinking continued to influence work in this field, as manifested in a previous reluctance to implement the household-based contractual responsibility system. Chen revealed that it had not been until August 1982 that this opposition had been overcome. Opponents of the reform regarded it as a step backward in relation to the future of socialism in the Chinese countryside. Chen declared that three aspects of the commune system were regarded as crucial to collectivization and therefore inviolable by these antireformists. From the point of ownership, the three-tiered system of commune, brigade, and team was regarded as the only organizational form. Collective labor and payment according to number of work days were seen, respectively, as the sole form of labor organization and of remuneration. Household operations were equated with the small-scale peasant economy of pre-Liberation times. This position of the antireformers appeared to be very similar to that put forward strongly by Tie Ying in 1980 when he spoke against the applicability of household-based agriculture to Zhejiang.

More serious, Chen Zuolin explained that opposition to agricultural reform had placed the Party in conflict with the peasants: "In the past we failed to pay due respect to the initiative of the masses and always thought of bringing the practice of the masses into our orbit." Chen demanded the Party rid itself of leftist shackles, go out and learn what the peasants wanted, and adapt its thinking to the demands of the times and the

24. See Tie Hing's remark to a Xinhua reporter at the 6th NPC in *ZJRB*, June 21, 1983.

25. Radio Zhejiang, January 21, 1983, in *FBIS/China*, 25, pp. O8-O9.

26. Chen Zuolin, "Speech at the Work Conference of the ZPC," in *RMRB*, February 21, 1983, trans. in *FBIS/China*, 25, pp. O8-O9.

changing situation. While not stated openly, responsibility for these mistakes necessarily rested with Tie Ying.

Tie may have failed to keep up with changing events and attitudes, but statistics showed that provincial agricultural production had progressed most satisfactorily since 1976. Figures given at the 6th ZPPC in April 1983 show that during the years 1978-82, agricultural production had increased at an average annual rate of 11.5% compared to 4.4% over the previous 28 years. Grain production had risen at an annual average rate of 12.92% over the same period. Income from commune enterprises had trebled and average peasant income had increased 1.6 times to a level of 293 yuan over the same five years.²⁷

While economic statistics may have bestowed credit on Tie Ying's leadership, for Deng this was obviously insufficient. He demanded total ideological and political compliance and reassurances of future dependability. Thus Deng himself joined Peng Zhen, Jiang Hua (then chairman of the Supreme People's Court), and "other leading comrades of the central organs" in Hangzhou on February 13, 1983, to celebrate the Chinese New Year.²⁸ The commander of the Nanjing Military Region, under whose jurisdiction the Zhejiang Military District operates, was also present. Before an assembly that also included the provincial party, government, and military leadership, Tie Ying made his last major public appearance as first secretary of the ZPC.

It is most probable that Deng played a major supervisory role in finalizing and approving the names of the new standing committee members of the ZPC. A report from Shanghai, where Deng also visited in February, described how the veteran leader had perused the name list of candidates for the new municipal leadership in that city. Deng "also expressed concrete opinions" on readjusting the leadership, opinions that "were soon unanimously supported by the principal responsible comrades of the Party Central Committee."²⁹ A Hong Kong newspaper added further detail to this account of Deng's visit to Shanghai by quoting him as saying:

Competent and qualified people abound in Shanghai, but we must select younger people. . . . Some elderly comrades should stay on in their post [*sic*] for 2 to 3 years to pass on their experience to younger people and then they may work as consultants. They will still have a lot of work to do. However, we must depend on the young. We should not hang on to our posts forever.³⁰

Deng was thus proposing a transitional arrangement with certain reli-

27. *ZJRB*, May 2, 1983.

28. *Xinhua*, February 13, 1983, in *FBIS/China*, 31, pp. K7-K8; *SWB/FE/7261/BII*, p. 1.

29. Radio Shanghai, April 20, 1983, in *SWB/FE/7316/BII*, pp. 4-5.

30. *Wei Wei Bao* (Hong Kong), April 27, 1983, in *FBIS/China*, 86, p. W2.

able veteran cadres remaining in their posts to chaperone their younger colleagues through their political debut. When the ZPC called a meeting of provincial office party cadres and members of party committees at the prefectural and municipal level on March 11, 1983, to announce the new leadership, Tie Ying was not included among these reliable veterans. Wang Fang and Xue Ju assumed the posts of secretary and deputy-secretary, respectively, of the ZPC. Membership of the standing committee was reduced from eighteen to eleven with only Wang and Xue plus one other older cadre remaining to play "mother." In age specifications, the standing committee met the requirements of the central authorities, and four members, in contrast to only one on the preceding committee, had tertiary education.³¹

Propaganda from Beijing tried to emphasize the role of local initiative and discussion in the formation of the new leading body,³² but the provincial broadcast made it clear that the initiative had come from the top.³³ Li Fengping, in a written statement to the meeting, claimed that the "old comrades" had selected their successors,³⁴ but it is doubtful whether Tie Ying had figured prominently in these discussions. Unlike Li, he was not allotted a prominent place in the future of Zhejiang's politics.

Tie Ying was also present at the investiture ceremony and made a speech. Like Li, he called on veterans to support the new leadership but in markedly less enthusiastic terms. Wang Fang showed some deference to what he called "leading comrades" such as Tie and Li who had withdrawn to the second and third lines.³⁵ But events soon showed that some second and third line positions had more power and a higher status than others. At the 6th ZPPC held in April–May 1983, Li replaced Tie as chairman of its standing committee while Xue Ju replaced Li as provincial governor. Since Li is older than Tie by perhaps as much as ten years, this change was undoubtedly based on political considerations. Tie has become chairman of the Zhejiang Advisory Commission, and as a delegate to the 6th NPC in June 1983 received widespread publicity both in the national and provincial press.³⁶ But the veteran pre-Cultural Revolution ZPC cadres, Li Fengping, Wang Fang, and Xue Ju have emerged as Deng's stewards in Zhejiang, responsible for training and grooming reliable successors.

31. *RMRB*, March 24, 1983.

32. *Xinhua*, March 24, 1983, in *SWB/FE/7293/BII*, p. 3.

33. Radio Zhejiang, March 12, 1983, in *SWB/FE/7286/BII*, P. 4.

34. Radio Zhejiang, March 12, 1983, in *FBIS/China*, 53, pp. O2-O3.

35. *Ibid.*

36. *ZJRB*, June 10, 1983, June 12, 1983, June 22, 1983 (from *RMRB*, June 21, 1983); *Xinhua*, June 14, 1983, in *FBIS/China*, 117, pp. K7-K8.

Conclusion

Of the four criteria Deng drew up to assess the suitability of prospective candidates for promotion, two appeared to be objective and two to be more subjective. Age and academic qualifications, while outwardly based on objective considerations, were, however, subjected by Deng to political limitations. Younger people were required, but preferably not those educated and tested in the Cultural Revolution. Similarly, academic qualifications attained in this period could not compare with those earned in previous years. Professional skills were those needed for the four modernizations as defined by Deng, a modernization program that considered science and technology politically neutral, depended heavily on foreign trade and finance, rewarded skill and achievement with individual monetary incentive, and in rhetoric at least put a premium on efficiency, profit, responsibility, and productivity.

"Revolutionization" of leading cadres became synonymous with anti-Maoist, antileftist, pro-Deng sympathies. It meant a preparedness to follow Deng in whatever direction he steered China. It also demanded an ability to keep up with the steady and progressive abandonment of the goals of the Chinese revolution as set by Mao. Tie Ying could not satisfy Deng and lost his position.

Under the guise of objective criteria, Deng set out to rid the provincial bodies of all leaders not to his liking. In Zhejiang the goals set by Hu at the 12th Congress of eliminating overconcentration of power, the proliferation of concurrent and deputy posts, and the overlapping of Party and government work were only partly achieved. Many provincial leaders under Tie on the old ZPC standing committee found niches in the government hierarchy or remained as heads of departments under the ZPC. In their cases advanced age or lack of professional skills or educational qualifications did not prevent their continued activities on the front line of provincial politics. A few remaining factional leaders of the Cultural Revolution lost their posts, but the biggest loser was Tie Ying.

The reform of the Zhejiang party leadership demonstrates that political considerations took precedence over supposedly objective criteria in choosing successors. Deng has retained the services of trusted veterans to ensure that the present transitional arrangements prepare the ground for a secure, stable future. Whether this occurs may depend to some extent on the political strength of those Deng has alienated in his striving for administrative reform.

Postscript

On November 26, 1983, the 7th Congress of the CCP, Zhejiang province, opened in Hangzhou. The 680 delegates representing the more

then 1.1 million Party members deliberated for six days over the reports presented and elected a new ZPC. At its 1st Plenum, the ZPC elected a standing committee of 12, with Wang Fang being reelected secretary. Tie Ying retained some status, if not power, as chairman of the Zhejiang Advisory Commission.³⁷

There seemed to be some difficulty, and some difference of opinion, as how to assess the five and a half years that had passed since the previous provincial party congress. The ZPC plenum held on the eve of the Congress had made an overwhelmingly positive appraisal of developments during this time. In his opening address to the Congress, Tie Ying, as the person responsible for party work during most of this period, listed the achievements in some detail, although he did mention that shortcomings still existed in the work of the ZPC.³⁸

Newspaper reports before and during the Congress tended to divide this period into two stages—one beginning with the 3rd Plenum and the other “since the 12th Congress” or “especially this year,” this latter stage roughly coinciding with the change in provincial leadership, which was presented as a turn for the better.³⁹ Wang Fang, in his report to the Congress, also referred to “new victories since the 12th Congress.”⁴⁰

While allowing a certain amount of credit for the achievements of the past five years, Wang did not hesitate to point out the reverse side of the coin, and in no uncertain terms. First he noted resistance to Deng’s assault on the basic tenets of Maoism and to the numerous and far-reaching policy changes made in conformity with the slogan “Practice is the sole criterion of truth”:

During the previous five years many shortcomings and inadequacies existed in our work. After the shift of the center of our work [December 1978] our ideological and work levels were far removed from the demands of the four modernizations. We were complacent ideologically and in some questions insufficiently liberated in our minds. We were slow to see things and then did not act vigorously enough. We made many decisions but did not oversee and check on them. We paid insufficient attention to certain districts and areas of work which called for close attention. The phenomena of lack of division between party and government, and the party failing to keep its affairs in order, remained. We still have not thoroughly expunged impurities within the party in ideology, work-style, and organization. Weaknesses in ideological and political work, and weak, lax leadership, are still quite prevalent.

37. See reports in *ZJRB*, November 25, 26, 27, 1983; December 1 and 3, 1983.

38. See *ibid.*, November 4 and 27, 1983.

39. See *ibid.*, November 20 and 28, 1983.

40. Wang Fang, “Follow the Correct Road Determined at the 12th Congress and Initiate an Entirely New Phase in Socialist Modernization in Zhejiang,” *ibid.*, December 3, 1983.

It seems that in bringing home the blame to Tie, Wang was also protecting his own position by pointing out to his superiors that they could not expect short-term miracles in changing this situation.

Wang noted that in implementing the policies of the CC, the ZPC had been dilatory or even obstructionist in certain areas. He singled out two major policies for special mention, confirming the thrust of the analysis above. Regarding the responsibility system in agriculture production, Wang stated that "for quite a long time [the ZPC's] thinking was insufficiently liberated, its understanding lagged behind the masses." On the question of leadership reform, the ZPC's "understanding and performance had not met the demands of the CC."

This "understanding and performance" may have improved after Wang's replacement of Tie, but it is clear that resistance to reform remained strong. This becomes apparent in examining reform of the subprovincial leadership at the district/municipal level in the six months from March to September 1983. In at least three districts, seats remained vacant in the leading bodies, either illustrating a dearth of qualified personnel, or, more likely, revealing a complete inability on the part of the local authorities to agree on candidates and then gain the confidence and approval of the provincial leadership.⁴¹

The major problem remained, as at higher echelons in the Party, the veteran cadres. Wang Fang, in attending the inauguration of the new leading group in Jinhua District, called on these retiring cadres to genuinely and sincerely support the new leaders, not only to their faces, but also behind their backs. He also urged them to mobilize popular support for the new comrades.⁴² Most likely the veteran cadres would have had little trouble in sowing seeds of suspicion in the minds of a populace bemused to find forty-year-olds and younger suddenly catapulted into power, especially since the Communist Party had long promoted the idea that ability in leadership is associated with experience and years of service to the revolution. Tie Ying accompanied the delegation reforming the leadership in the traditionally troublesome southern districts of Taizhou, Lishui, and Wenzhou. He praised the contributions of the old cadres and, significantly, called for the eradication of factionalism and the development and consolidation of stability and unity.⁴³

Factionalism, and the lack of unity, remain problems in Zhejiang. At a meeting before the Congress, Wang Fang admitted that the ZPC Standing

41. See *ibid.*, June 4, 1983; July 17 and 19, 1983; August 22 and 25, 1983; September 2, 11, and 13, 1983.

42. *Ibid.*, July 19, 1983.

43. *Ibid.*, September 2, 1983.

Committee lacked a collective sense of commonality. *Zhejiang Daily* reported the meeting as recognizing that

whether the leading group can correct its ideological line, unite, bring its style of work up to the mark, and ideologically prepare for party rectification has a direct bearing on the success or failure of the rectification in the party and in its leadership.

The problem of purging rebels, factionalists, and "smash and grabbers" (*sanzhong ren*) of the Cultural Revolution was also discussed. Quite a few of these people were alleged still to be in the Party, still being promoted and used as cadres. Most were young and intelligent, outwardly in agreement with current policies but inwardly opposed to them, and with a change in the political climate, they could cause great disturbances. If not weeded out in the Party rectification, warned the meeting, they would remain like time bombs within the Party. Thus no leniency toward them was permissible.⁴⁴

Wang Fang repeated these warnings at the Congress. His lengthy recitation of defects inside the CCP in Zhejiang reinforces the impression that Party rectification poses enormous problems and possible dangerous repercussions for the present leadership in China:

Among CCP members and party cadres some comrades still have not escaped from the influence of factionalism; some combine factionalism with feudalist patriarchal concepts or "networks" based on common political and economic interests, seriously harming party unity and unification. Some comrades' revolutionary will has waned, bureaucracy is rife among them, they are not interested in the four modernizations, are unconcerned with the masses' hardships, and in their work wrangle with each other and pass the buck, lacking all responsibility. Some people cannot withstand the corrosion and inroads of capitalist ideas, individualism grows perniciously; they exploit their offices, seek personal gain, and even embark on the road of crime. There are also some comrades who lack understanding of the four basic principles and the line established since the 3rd Plenum. Some stand to the "left" and passively resist, others misinterpret from the right and advocate bourgeois liberalization. Apart from these serious impurities in thinking, style of work, and organization, at various levels and on many issues within party organizations there are problems of not being in conformity with the new situation and new tasks. Some grass roots party organizations have even got to the state of paralysis or semi-paralysis.⁴⁵

If this state of affairs is not confined to Zhejiang, party rectification promises to be a bitter, lengthy struggle for all involved.

44. *Ibid.*, November 1, 1983.

45. *Ibid.*, December 3, 1983.

Forster, K. (1983). Wang Fang-newly appointed secretary of the CCP Chekiang Provincial Committee. *Issues & Studies*, 19(8), 67-71.

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Forster, K. (1983). Hsueh Chü – newly elected Governor of Chekiang.
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