



**THE EISENHOWER ADMINISTRATION AND DEVELOPMENT IN
LATIN AMERICA AND SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA**

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ABSTRACT

This thesis examines the response of the Eisenhower administration to development in Latin America and sub-Saharan Africa. First, it analyses why Eisenhower initially relied on the free enterprise system to meet demands for development in the two regions, and whether agreement on this issue existed within the administration. It argues that until the late 1950s, Eisenhower's grand strategy for maintaining national security determined the administration's policies towards development in Latin America and sub-Saharan Africa. Within this strategy, Eisenhower restricted economic assistance to the nations on the periphery of the Soviet bloc. From 1953 to 1957, other individuals within the administration argued that the United States should extend economic assistance to meet development needs in both regions. They asserted that American interests in the regions could not be attained without the extension of development assistance. These individuals attempted to change the administration's policies towards development in the two regions but they lacked authority within Eisenhower's formal and informal systems of policy formulation. Second, this thesis analyses why the Eisenhower administration began to extend resources to promote development in Latin America and sub-Saharan Africa from 1958. It argues that this change in policy came as a result of the work of C. Douglas Dillon. Dillon wanted to extend assistance to both regions to promote democracy and prevent totalitarianism. He did not believe that Soviet subversion posed the only threat to American interests in the less developed regions. A number of factors enabled Dillon to change the administration's approach. He held authority within the administration and shared many of Eisenhower's and John Foster Dulles' views. The President and his secretary trusted his judgement and Dillon's ideas were supported by influential individuals within the public sphere. The changing political situations in Latin America and sub-Saharan Africa also helped Dillon to change the administration's policies towards development in both regions. This work supports the conclusion of revisionist historians that Eisenhower was an active President, but it questions whether this activism can be viewed in a positive light.