

ANTI-INTELLECTUALISM IN CLASSICAL ATHENS

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Guy Gilbert Olding

Discipline of Classical Studies, in the
Centre for European Studies and General Linguistics, at the
University of Adelaide, South Australia.

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Fig. 1: The youthful Herakles attacks his tutor Linos, c.480 BC
(Munich, Museum Antiker Kleinkunst 2646 (J371) ~ ARV² 437.128;
reproduced from Beck, F.A.G., *Album of Greek Education*, pl. 5, no. 26
& p. 13).

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ABSTRACT

This thesis examines the phenomenon of anti-intellectualism in Athens between c.450 and c.380 BC. Existing scholarship rarely does more than touch upon this subject and more involved studies tends to focus on individual aspects of Athenian society while ignoring the whole. Moreover, there is often a surprisingly uncritical approach to the sources. My object is to describe, analyse and explain the forms and significance of anti-intellectualism coherently and critically. This is not intellectual history but a history of social attitudes.

I examine the most prominent and interesting instances of negative characterisation of intellectuals; the apparently deliberate avoidance of intellectual techniques in certain genres; criticism of the intellectual process; and direct attacks, verbal and legal, that were made against individual intellectuals. It will be found that the ascription of certain characteristics and practices to intellectuals depends on the recognition or imputation of traits (which may then be generalised to the whole class), and their rationalisation in terms of common beliefs about human behaviour. This process can produce contradictory images: intellectuals can be depicted as avaricious *and* unworldly, cunning *and* impractical, and so on. This provides an approach to the implicit principles that underlie Athenian social, legal and political institutions.

Athenians' disquiet with the results of the intellectual process was persistent but rarely vehement, extreme or even explicit. No alternative means to truth was articulated. This was partly due to the lack of authoritative institutions, such as inspired prophets or a doctrinal religion, apart from the classical Greek state. Anti-intellectual phenomena are largely an effect of the failure of a world-view, which is convenient to call 'unsophisticated', to come to grips with the methods and claims of new intellectual techniques. The unsophisticated mind is perfectly able to reason but is direct, concrete, unanalytical, holistic and moralising. In this sense, anti-intellectualism is justifiable in its own terms.

This work contains no material which has been accepted for the award of any other degree or diploma in any university or other institution and, to the best of my knowledge and belief, contains no material previously published or written by another person, except where due reference has been made in the text.

I give consent to this copy of my thesis, when deposited in the University Library, being available for loan and photocopying.

16/11/03

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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

1.1 - Introduction

When the Thirty Tyrants came to power in Athens at the end of the Peloponnesian War, one of the new laws that they drafted, with the ostensible object of re-establishing the ‘ancestral constitution’, was one that made it illegal ‘to teach the art of words’.¹ This was, presumably, part of their program to eliminate the practice of sycophancy, an abuse connected with radical democracy², but Xenophon claims that Kritias intended the law to be an insult directed against Sokrates. Sokrates was brought before Kritias and Charikles and they forbade him to hold conversation with young men, to ask questions to which he already knew the answers, or to discuss topics involving ‘cobblers, builders and metal workers’ which he was accustomed to use as illustrations when examining subjects such as justice and holiness.³ In this incident we have an example of the association of late-5th century intellectual practice with ‘the art of words’, sycophancy, and with the notion that discussion of this kind might have an adverse effect on those who are, as Charikles says, ‘so young that they lack wisdom’.⁴ These associations will be familiar to anyone who has read Plato’s account of Sokrates’ trial. What is particularly interesting in this case is that these views are exhibited not by an unreflective or uneducated bigot but by one such as Kritias. He was a regular attendee of intellectual gatherings in the last decades of the 5th century⁵ and wrote a number of descriptive and analytical tracts, for example, on the constitutions of Sparta and Thessaly. Though it may not be strictly appropriate to count him among the sophists, as Hermann Diels does in *Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*, as there is no evidence that he ever took students, he was, nevertheless, part of the classical intellectual movement. A scholiast on Plato describes him as “an amateur among philosophers, a philosopher among amateurs”.⁶ Nor was he unique in this among the Thirty Tyrants: Charmides and

Aristoteles also associated with Sokrates and other intellectuals (see Chapter 4.4 B3). It is this contradiction, the co-existence of high education and intellectual refinement with hostility towards intellectuals or aspects of the intellectual process, that inspired me to investigate the phenomenon of anti-intellectualism in classical Athens.

This thesis will examine anti-intellectual attitudes and behaviour in Athens from the second half of the 5th century to the early decades of the 4th century BC. It will focus particularly on (1) the negative themes and characteristics that are imputed to intellectuals; (2) the individuals and groups who made these attacks and expressed these sentiments; and (3) the beliefs underpinning these sentiments.

There is particular interest in the appearance of anti-intellectualism at this time and place in history, the focus of the revolution and explosion in intellectualism after its origin in 6th century Ionia. This is a history of *social attitudes to thought* rather than a history of ideas. The ultimate object of this thesis is to make a contribution to the understanding of Athenian society. Its broader interest is in the light it casts on the relations between intellectualism (which can include education in general, refined aesthetic taste, empirical research, an inclination for theorisation and belief in the value of logical argument) and mass culture, a relationship that preoccupies modern societies.

To my knowledge, there is no full-length study that focuses on anti-intellectualism as a phenomenon in its own right in this period. The works that touch upon it tend to deal with one aspect of Greek society rather than the whole, and many of them lack coherence or methodological rigour. These tendencies are epitomised in the common preoccupation with the impiety trials of prominent philosophers that are supposed to have occurred in Athens between

c.438 and 399 BC. This illustrates a focus on the religious reaction to intellectualism while largely ignoring its other forms (see Chapter 1.4). Also, the information for most of these trials is too unreliable to be used in any meaningful analysis. I believe that most of them are without historical foundation and that the sources are the products of ancient scholars' faulty historiographical methods (see Appendix A).

Though I dismiss one doubtful extreme manifestation of a social phenomenon this does not, however, invalidate the search for its manifestations elsewhere. This thesis will proceed by discussing the most important and most interesting individual instances of anti-intellectual actions and sentiments in the target period: this is intended to make the subject matter clear and easy to control in analysis. It will include a broad survey of the appearances of intellectuals in Old Comedy, both particular plays that focus on intellectuals and individual intellectuals who appear repeatedly. Following comedy is an instance of doubtful status, Diopithes' so-called anti-astronomy decree. Then there will be chapters analysing anti-intellectual characters and motifs from Attic tragedy, oratory, and a specific instance of an anti-intellectual attack in Kleon's speech in Thukydides' Mytilene debate. There will be descriptions of two specific actions against individuals, the trial of Nikomachos, the legal expert, and of Sokrates, and a reconstruction of the lost tract, Polykrates' *Accusation of Sokrates*. The last section surveys some artistic evidence.

Chapter 3 examines an interesting feature of classical culture, the tendency to assimilate traditional mythological figures into contemporary debates. Chapter 4 analyses the case studies together with some additional data from sources too diffusely spread to warrant individual discussion in Chapter 2. The object is to establish the substance of sentiments and actions directed against intellectuals and intellectualism and to examine the attitudes and beliefs that underpin them.

Chapter 5 characterises and identifies individuals who attacked intellectuals or intellectualism, and the dispositions that characterised them.

Assessment of the evidence for the supposed impiety trials will appear in Appendix A. Appendix B will consider the nature and extent of basic education in Athens, which will contribute to an understanding of social attitudes towards the value of learning in general.

I shall not be examining intellectuals' own suspicions of the abuses of learning, except to allude to them in Appendix B. This topic belongs to intellectual rather than social history. For this reason also I shall not be dealing specifically with Athens' Spartan sympathisers, such as Kritias. Spartan imitators, a different group, are virtually unattested in Athens after the battle of Tanagra in 457 BC.⁷ It is an unfortunate necessity that limitations of space prevent an examination of Sparta herself.

1.2 - Definitions

I shall propose ‘working’ definitions of ‘intellectual’ and ‘anti-intellectual’ for the sake of convenience. The nature of the subject matter and the example of existing studies suggest that these need not, nor can, be anything other than rough guides. Frank Vatai observes the awkwardness of the situation, commenting that, while scholarly works on intellectuals abound, standard definitions do not. Instead, each writer postulates a definition suitable for the purpose at hand and makes use of earlier definitions wherever they seem useful and appropriate.⁸

A1. What are intellectuals?

Anti-intellectualism is, obviously, a reaction against intellectuals and/or *intellectualism* (see below), so it seems appropriate to proceed with a definition of these. Max Weber provides the oldest clear attempt to describe intellectuals (appended to an incomplete tract dealing with the concept of the ‘nation’). They are a group whose peculiar abilities give them special access to cultural values and who therefore gain control over the cultural community.⁹ This does not imply that the group is in any sense cohesive – he describes them as “an unbrotherly aristocracy”.¹⁰ Edward Shils’ inverted description of what ordinary life is *not* interested in leads to a definition of intellectuals as ‘an inquiring minority seeking communion with symbols more generalised than the immediate and the particular’. This embraces the ideas of commitment to investigation, particularly concerned with underlying meanings and matters of transcendent significance. Intellectuals also show a propensity to ‘externalise this quest’ in discourse, discussion or action.¹¹ Weber’s and Shils’ definitions both agree on the peculiarity of intellectuals’ interests and their faculties for discerning and communicating them. However, Weber’s definition applies best to *pre-intellectuals* whose claim to authoritative access to truth rests on ‘extra-rational’ grounds. These may be loosely called ‘priests, prophets and poets’. This is due to his use of a *cultural* criterion: according to Weber, intellectuals’ ‘special qualifications’ are any culturally sensitive faculties, deriving from their

specialised study of traditions or occupancy of a traditional role - 'religious prophets and teachers, sages and philosophers, jurists and experimental artists, and finally the empirical scientist'.¹² One difficulty with this use of this cultural criterion is that it implies acceptance of existing cultural conditions, whereas any person, intellectual or not, can be dissatisfied with them. As intellectuals' peculiarity may consist in their ability to add, reorder or reappraise accepted modes of thought – often in quest for an underlying consistency or significance - it is unsurprising that they may be prone or feel obliged to express dissent, whether it be social, cultural or scientific.¹³ In fact, they are often characterised by eccentric behaviour and propensity to criticise political, religious and social norms.

Intellectuals' overriding characteristic is their use of peculiarly *intellectual processes*: abstraction and definition with emphasis on consistency and thoroughness, which leads towards identification of the significant and transcendent meanings, and the explicit belief that argumentation and proof can sway disputes and coerce belief.¹⁴ A cultural definition would include as intellectuals many - 'prophets, priests and poets' – who are not necessarily associated with intellectual processes as such and, on the other hand, would exclude those whose areas of special interest have little cultural content, such as scientists and mathematicians, despite their involvement with what are undeniably intellectual activities. Hence, I prefer to define intellectuals in terms of their methods rather than their relationship to cultural conditions. They deal with ideas and methods of thought, finding in them not just utilitarian value as tools, which any person (the 'intelligent') might use, but consider them valuable and significant for their own sakes or for the insights that they might provide.¹⁵ They are inquirers who pursue meanings beyond the obvious, particularly those that can be applied as widely as possible, and seek links between seemingly unrelated objects, ideas and phenomena. In doing so they use and defer to the force of rational argument and defence. They believe that problems *can* be described, understood and solved.¹⁶ This definition could well use the term *λόγος* that combines the notion of both words and thoughts. Taking as the

defining characteristic of intellectuals the combination of self-conscious abstraction and discourse, I might coin the term λογουργοί, ‘word-and-thought-workers’. By the nature of the particular faculties and capabilities defining this group, these will be an élite in both mental aptitude and education. For most of world history the latter has been dependent on qualifications of wealth and birth.¹⁷ While one of those whom I shall examine, the legal officer Nikomachos, was not an intellectual as such, as an ‘expert’ he is a manifestation of ‘the man of knowledge’ with whom the ordinary person was most familiar.¹⁸

A2. Intellectuals in the classical period

The emphasis on and self-consciousness about the consistency and rigorousness of demonstration that defines intellectuals appears first in Parmenides in the first half of the 5th century. His philosophical poem is the earliest surviving example of sustained logical argument in which each successive point of argument follows from its predecessor.¹⁹ The subject of his investigation is the nature of ‘what is’, a process that presumes a conscious attempt to separate transcendent (‘real’) nature from the particular, that is, to define its essence. Parmenides believed that he must follow the course of his inquiry and adhere to its conclusion, even if this conflicted with popular belief, his preconceptions or even the evidence of his own senses:

ἀλλὰ σὺ τῆσδ’ ἀφ’ ὁδοῦ διζήσιος εἶργε νόημα
μηδέ σ’ ἔθος πολύπειρον ὁδὸν κατὰ τήνδε βιάσθω,
νωμᾶν ἄσκοπον ὄμμα καὶ ἠχῆεσαν ἀκουήν
καὶ γλῶσσαν, κρῖναι δὲ λόγῳ πολύδηριν ἔλεγχον
ἐξ ἐμέθεν ῥηθέντα.

“...Do not let custom, based on much experience, force you along this road, directing unobservant eye and echoing ear and tongue; but judge by reason the battle-hardened proof which I have spoken...”

(fr. 7.2-6, tr. Barnes, J., *Early Greek Philosophy* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1987)).

The explicit use of reasoning as a means to understanding and the acknowledgement of the coerciveness of argument appear regularly in works of

the late 5th and 4th centuries, in, for example, Gorgias, the Hippocratic works and Plato.²⁰

Precise identification of ‘intellectual’ with some Greek term is unnecessary for the purposes of this thesis and may in fact be impossible. Aristophanes’ Sokrates’ says that the Cloud-goddesses sponsor all manner of supposed experts:

πλείστους αὐται βόσκουσι σοφιστάς,
Θουριομάντεις, ἰατροτέχνας, σφαγιδονυχαρργοκομήτας·
κυκλίων τε χορῶν ἄσματοκάμπτας, ἄνδρας
μετεωροφένακας,
οὐδὲν δρῶντας βόσκουσ’ ἀργούς, ὅτι ταύτας
μουσοποιούσιν.

“They nourish a great many sophists, diviners from Thurii, medical experts, long-haired idlers with onyx signet rings, and tune bending composers of dithyrambic choruses, men of high-flown pretension, whom they maintain as do-nothings, because they compose music about these Clouds.”
(Aristoph. *Cl.* 331-4, tr. Henderson, Loeb).

This is not simply colloquial short-hand, as the *Dissoi Logoi*, a sophistic tract written in c.400 BC (§1.8) (in Doric dialect, hence, admittedly, not Athenian), is similarly imprecise:

[τῷ αὐτῷ] ἀνδρὸς καὶ τᾶς αὐτᾶς τέχνας νομίζω κατὰ
βραχὺ τε δύνασθαι διαλέγεσθαι, καὶ [τὰν] ἀλάθειαν τῶν
πραγμάτων ἐπίστασθαι, καὶ δικάζεν ἐπίστασθαι ὀρθῶς, καὶ
δαμαγορεῖν οἷόν τ’ ἡμεν, καὶ λόγων τέχνας ἐπίστασθαι,
καὶ περὶ φύσιος τῶν ἀπάντων ὥς τε ἔχει καὶ ὥς ἐγένετο,
διδάσκειν.

“I believe it belongs to the same man and to the same skill to be able to hold dialogue succinctly, to understand the truth of things, to plead one’s court-cases correctly, to be able to make popular speeches, to understand argument-skills, and to teach about the nature of all things, how they are and how they came to be.”
(*Dissoi Logoi* 8.1)

The writer brackets together specialists - dialecticians, researchers, forensic and deliberative rhetoricians, natural philosophers and teachers - which 4th century

and modern language would distinguish.²¹ Even less precise are the comedians who bracket all manner of experts, including diviners and even musicians. In spite of the passage above, Aristophanes tends to focus on philosophers and scientists in particular, particularly in *The Clouds* in the person of Sokrates, an exception to the general vagueness.²²

It may, nevertheless, be instructive to glance at some Greek words that modern English would recognise. ‘Sophist’ is one such term, referring to the ancient teachers in ‘higher education’, especially rhetoric, though the Greek σοφιστής means simply ‘wise man’, and includes poets whom I would not count as intellectuals.²³ Φιλόσοφος is widely enough understood though its meaning in Greek is broader than the English ‘philosopher’, for instance, ‘natural scientist’.²⁴ Μετεωρολόγος appears in the second half of the 5th century, referring to astronomers and those who study the weather (‘high’ things).²⁵ This and related words are often derisive in tone, as this Euripidean fragment shows:

τίς τάδε λεύσσω θεὸν οὐχὶ νοεῖ,
 μετεωρολόγων δ’ ἑκάς ἔρριψεν
 σκολιάς ἀπάτας; ὧν ἀτηρὰ
 γλώσσ’ εἰκοβολεῖ περὶ τῶν ἀφανῶν
 οὐδὲν γνώμης μετέξουσα.

“Who, perceiving these things, is unconscious of God, and has cast far away the specious lies of μετεωρολόγοι? Whose ruinous tongues babble about obscurities devoid of sense?”
 (Eur. fr. 913 (N), tr. Olding)

Comparable to μετεωρολόγοι are those who investigate ‘the things in the air and beneath the earth’ (τὰ μετέωρα καὶ τὰ ὑπὸ γῆς or similar). In Plato’s *Apology* Sokrates gives this as the stock allegation against all philosophers and scientists in the broadest sense. It is certainly derogatory.²⁶ Perhaps the term μετεωρολόγος suggests not just ‘thoughts of high things’ (indicative of the general focus and the popular view of Greek science,

apparently particularly concerned with rare and disquieting phenomena normally ascribed to divine influence²⁷) but also ‘high thoughts’ in the sense of arrogance.

B. Anti-Intellectualism

Now that intellectuals and intellectualism have been examined, however cursorily, it is easier to gain a perspective on anti-intellectualism. It is a reaction against and rejection of their individual characteristics (such as their peculiar behaviour) and defining characteristics (such as their dedication to discourse and deference to the force of argument). Morton White in his “Reflections on Anti-intellectualism” distinguishes two threads to anti-intellectualism, which match these two sets of characteristics. Firstly, there is the ‘anti-intellectual’ who believes that there is a contrast between the intellectual and the practical man; he is hostile to the intellectual *qua* intellectual. Secondly, there is the ‘anti-intellectualist’ who is opposed to, sees fault with, or disputes the primacy of the intellectual *process*. The anti-intellectualist believes that there are other or better means to discovering truth, perhaps ‘championing the heart and hand over the head’.²⁸ This second group can be further divided: the ‘super-rationalists’ whose claim to access to truth rests on a particular faculty for insight (this may include many of Weber’s intellectuals as ‘controllers of cultural symbols’, see above). As this faculty is inborn and incapable of being taught this group is, by definition, exclusive. It is typical of pre-intellectual societies. The second division comprises the ‘sub-empiricists’, those who operate on intuition, ‘gut feeling’ and ‘common sense’ – by definition, this faculty is held common to all and is the antithesis of élitism and exclusivity. This is typical of post-intellectual times, part of the reaction against it, such as Romanticism in the 18th century.²⁹

It should be observed that anti-intellectualism in classical Greece or anywhere is never anti-wisdom or anti-intelligence as such. Wisdom is only ever good, and intelligence is usually assessed according to its usefulness.³⁰

1.3 - Chronological and Geographical Scope

This thesis examines the social history of the city-state of Athens on account of the desirability of focusing on one political and social entity and the scarcity of other sources. Moreover, as the available sources are overwhelmingly Athenian, using them for the social history of other cities raises a new set of methodological issues.

The classical period is typically conceived of as beginning with the Persian Wars and ending with the death of Alexander, neatly divided into two by either Athens' defeat in the Peloponnesian War in 404 BC (for political history) or the death of Sokrates in 399 (for intellectual history). The period that I shall consider is the mid-5th century to the early 4th century BC, selected on the basis of the nature of the source material and my own personal preference. Athens' defeat in 404 BC is certainly a watershed in inter-state politics, yet the trends of internal politics, external policy, thought and culture that existed in the 5th century were not thereby ended. Victor Ehrenberg argues this in his work on Athenian sociology, *The People of Aristophanes*. A coherent unit in social history can be found in the seventy years from the 450s to the 380s. Athens' imperialistic phase began with the expulsion of the Persians from the Aegean region; the same mentality is in evidence in the first decades of the 4th century when Thrasyboulos and Konon acted to re-establish Athens' naval power. It is the King's Peace in 386 BC that marks a fundamental change in Greek war and politics, as foreign influence on Greek affairs was formally recognised. In Athens' internal political development the effective abolition of property qualifications for office and the introduction of pay for service for certain public duties in the mid-5th century made the constitution a radical democracy, and this constitution continued to operate into the next century. The 380s also mark a change in the style of Athenian oratory, the surviving manifestation of political, constitutional and legal practice, in its relationship to the state. Speeches before c.380 BC tend to be private in nature; this is not to say that they are without political significance but that the orators whose works survive were generally those not directly involved in politics,

whether by choice or compulsion.³¹ After the first quarter of the 4th century trained orators attain a more self-conscious public role and could be represented as a political class apart from ordinary citizens. For instance, Demosthenes was able to disparage his opponent Aischines as ‘aloof’ on account of his failure to address the Assembly often, implying that his skills entailed public obligations.³² The new prominence of orators and the value attached to their speeches, increasingly being considered worthy of publication, may have coincided with a new conceptual status of rhetoric itself³³, itself related to another change in the 380s: the establishment of philosophical and rhetorical schools of higher learning, notably those of Plato and Isokrates.³⁴ In other areas of cultural expression, 450-380 includes all of Attic Old Comedy and the bulk of extant tragedy. Regular re-performance of tragedy - when plays were separated from the conditions in which they were written – is also a feature of the 380s.³⁵ The coherence of this period is reflected in art as well: John Barron’s examination of Greek sculpture describes a period with these same chronological parameters, 450-380 BC.³⁶ In political mentality and constitutional arrangements there is little or no break at the end of the 5th century; in cultural products – oratory, comedy, tragedy, art – there is continuity until the 380s. These conditions and cultural forms are not necessarily direct influences on intellectual history but they do reflect a coherent social period in Athens.

The lives and literary production of a number of authors whose works contain much information relevant to this thesis, such as Plato, Xenophon and Isokrates, overlap this thesis’ end-point of 380 BC. Their testimony is relevant and useful where it reflects pre-380 conditions.

1.4 - Literature Review

This particular topic has not, to my knowledge, been dealt with as a whole before. The studies that come closest tend to start with the intriguing series of impiety trials of intellectuals that are supposed to have occurred in the last decades of the 5th century. Hence, they focus on the sociology of Greek religion and intellectual freedom rather than on anti-intellectualism itself.

A. Intellectuals in classical Athens

Few scholars deal with intellectuals *as a class* in classical Greek society, despite the extensive biographical and doxographical scholarship devoted to individual philosophers, scientists and rhetoricians and their schools. Frank Vatai's *Intellectuals in Politics in the Greek World: From Early Times to the Hellenistic Age* is one of very few works of any length that deal with intellectuals as a class, aiming to examine the nature of their political involvement. (He concludes that, in general, their role was limited to propagandist functions for established political figures.³⁷) His introduction contains a useful survey of modern scholarship on intellectuals, to which I have already referred (see Chapter 1.2).

The Pythagoreans are perhaps the only exclusive intellectual group that enjoyed sustained influence anywhere in the Greek world before the end of the Classical period. However, their influence was confined to southern Italy and ended in the middle of the 5th century, so they fall outside the scope of this thesis.

Pythagoreans seem to have had little or no influence in Athens in the period of this thesis.³⁸

The most famous individual intellectual victim of persecution is Sokrates, whose life and death have been examined and discussed at length on countless occasions. The paucity of biographical information has limited and discouraged examination of other intellectual figures: one of the relatively few examples is *Anaxagoras and the Birth of Physics* by Daniel Gershenson and Daniel

Greenberg, a historian and a physicist. This book deserves a brief comment for two reasons. Firstly, its subject late classical and modern authorities frequently characterise as a quintessential intellectual: aloof, unorthodox, preoccupied with theory instead of practical matters, and persecuted for his beliefs by the reactionary masses and by political and religious interests. Secondly, its authors apply rigorous criteria for selecting biographical and doxographical evidence and draw general conclusions on the formation and validity of the traditions about Anaxagoras (p. 329-54). One cardinal criterion by which they assess data is its extent or degree of separation from what it purports to describe, on the grounds that data's reproduction and introduction into new contexts inevitably introduces error.³⁹ Though this principle is important and reasonable it is, perhaps, rather mechanically applied. They do not recognise the possibility that early sources can sometimes be extracted from late. For instance, writers of the Roman age, such as Plutarch and Diogenes Laertios, identify some Classical and Hellenistic authors - Stesimbrotos of Thasos, Hermippos, Satyros and Hieronymos - as sources for Anaxagoras' life. While these citations are isolated from their original contexts and their authority is reduced accordingly, they do at least deserve to be placed in their original chronological stratum with its implicit reliability. Moreover, Gershenson and Greenberg should concede that late authors *may* be able to draw reasonable conclusions from earlier sources if they do not wish to invalidate their own scholarship.

B. Literature on anti-intellectualism

Vilfredo Pareto's pioneer sociological work from the late 19th century is perhaps the first attempt to find a place for anti-intellectual behaviour and sentiments in social theory. His starting point is the observation that trends in different parts of society, such as economics, politics and social phenomena, such as a sense of liberty, seem to coincide: hence, societies are really systems of social relations. Pareto emphasises the non-logicality of most human behaviour, which is usually disguised by the habit of projecting false rationalisations and explanations onto actions and events.⁴⁰ He analyses changes in society in terms of six tendencies,

two of which are of interest here: 'Class I', the 'instinct for combinations', and 'Class II', the 'persistence of aggregates'. The first is creative and innovative and is characterised by criticism of conventions in social arrangements and modes of thought; it tends to operate by manipulation. Class II is characterised by pragmatism and conservatism, valuing traditional structures; it has a tendency to resort to force.⁴¹ Since people who exhibit Class I residues identify their anti-traditionalism with reason (if erroneously), Class II residues tend to be hostile to reason, its practitioners and champions. When these latter residues strengthen and seek to assert themselves, they make reason itself a target of their attacks, claiming that it is at odds with reality and that the claims of intellectualism as a road to truth are inferior to those of intuition or tradition.⁴² Pareto includes a brief discussion of the condition of Classical Athens in the light of his theory; he even helpfully provides a graph of the intensity of Class II residues in the Athenian mentality plotted against a chronological axis!⁴³ Pareto's model is useful as a descriptive tool in considering anti-intellectualism as a social phenomenon. However, it provides no analytical basis, as he denies that there are causes to the waxing and waning of residues.⁴⁴ His theory does not allow social phenomena to be either predicted or usefully explained. *Any and all* phenomena are consistent with both the action *and* inaction of 'residues' – it is therefore impossible to detect either their presence or absence. Furthermore, Pareto pays insufficient attention to variations between different societies: a society's perception of conservatism or innovation itself may depend on its attitudes to existing social structures or beliefs.⁴⁵

Otherwise, manifestations and foundations of anti-intellectualism are not treated with any thoroughness except in modern contexts. These studies are usually inspired by topical concerns, such as the anti-intellectual dimension of the 1950s McCarthyist anti-Communist movement. This is clear in Richard Hofstadter's *Anti-Intellectualism in American Life*, a book that is avowedly a personal and somewhat impulsively arranged examination of aspects of American culture, for which anti-intellectualism is the vehicle and unifying theme. As Hofstadter's explicit concern is with his contemporary social environment, it is unsurprising

that the subject matter deals with the development of various American institutions, character-types and social tendencies, such as state-funded education or the rise of charismatic non-institutional religious movements. The value of this work consists in the guidelines it offers for selection of material and analysis.

Sociological scholarship of Classical Greece occasionally touches upon anti-intellectualism. One of the more prominent is K.J. Dover's *Greek Popular Morality in the Time of Plato and Aristotle*, a source book for late-5th to 4th century Greek morals. Victor Ehrenberg's *The People of Aristophanes: A Sociology of Old Attic Comedy* sets out to study Athenian society through the medium of comedy, with the justification that, of all ancient genres, it provides the most complete and accurate reflection of its social background. L.B. Carter's *The Quiet Athenian* is a discussion of an aspect of Athenian political and social behaviour, quietism. It does not, however, set out its methodological principles in any one place and is therefore of limited use as a practical model.

There are a number of works that deal specifically with the persecution of intellectuals in classical Athens. An early study touching on this subject is A.B. Drachmann's *Atheism in Pagan Antiquity* (Chicago: Ares Publishers, 1977, originally 1922), which deals with the fairly narrow topic of outright atheism. Though emphasising the paucity of the sources, he concludes that this was a very rare phenomenon, confined to the upper classes and philosophers, not actively suppressed unless public and flagrant or coinciding with times of particular social disturbance.⁴⁶ However, there is a defect in his scholarship in his willingness to accept tradition as evidence without proper concern for its foundation. This is most obvious in the case of Protagoras, whose persecution – late classical sources say that the Athenians burned his books and forced him to flee in fear of his life - Drachmann admits to be unsupported by contemporary evidence but nevertheless takes for granted on the basis that the supposed cause – Protagoras' religious agnosticism – is genuine. That Drachmann believes, on the one hand, that Protagoras' philosophy offended the public sufficiently to have him accused of impiety but, on the other hand, that his orthodoxy in religious observance is

confirmed by his continuing public stature as a respected philosopher, is an extraordinary example of doublethink about Greek religious attitudes, which seems to be motivated by a desire to preserve the integrity of apparently contradictory sources.⁴⁷

The first extended study focusing on intellectuals' persecution as a whole in the Classical period is Eudore Derenne's *Les Procès d'Impiété: Intentés aux Philosophes à Athènes au Vme au IVme Siècles Avant J.-C.* The introduction, consisting of a brief discussion of the scope of the Greek concept of impiety (ἀσέβεια), indicates its parameters (p. 9-12). Derenne focuses on gathering evidence and making it coherent: in this he largely draws upon the work of earlier scholars such as John Burnet and A.E. Taylor.⁴⁸ However, while the content of data is often reasonably and fully appraised, he follows Drachmann – and ignores the caveats of Burnet – in failing to appraise their contexts and general reliability. Gershenson and Greenberg launch a powerful attack on his methods. On his discussion of Anaxagoras' prosecution they write: "We have an excellent instance of how a mass of fabricated and unfounded legends can create a completely false impression, in this case that the fifth and fourth centuries were a time when freedom of thought was constantly infringed upon at Athens".⁴⁹ Derenne is able to suggest that a colourful detail, Protagoras' death by drowning, may have been invented to illustrate the workings of divine justice, but this degree of criticism is atypical.⁵⁰

E.R. Dodds' work *The Greeks and the Irrational* is a standard text on the traditional, instinctive, non-rational foundations of Greek religion and thought. Its object is to explore the irrational components of ancient Greek mentality, especially relating to their religious experience, in opposition to the extreme rationalism that scholarship hitherto ascribed to it (p. 1). As such, it is an invaluable basis for studying the attitudes and beliefs underlying anti-intellectualism in the Classical period. However, in his chapter on 'Rationalism and Reaction in the Classical Age', which deals with the same period and subject as this thesis, he commits the same error in certain details as Drachmann and

Derenne, accepting evidence without considering its reliability. Dodds also displays looseness in supporting his thesis. Derenne's book includes a chapter on the atheist poet Diagoras of Melos on the basis, which is not unreasonable, that, even if he was not a philosopher himself, his atheism caused him to be popularly associated with that group. Dodds' belief in an Athenian anti-intellectual reaction leads him to cite Diagoras among 'the leaders of progressive thought' in order to increase the number of victims, as though Diagoras' personal atheism was *really* the same as intellectualism.⁵¹ Moreover, Dodds' focus on religion means that other manifestations of anti-intellectualism are virtually absent from his account. He barely touches upon public oratory, an important source for public attitudes.

Martin Ostwald's *From Popular Sovereignty to the Sovereignty of Law: Law, Society, and Politics in Fifth Century Athens* is a comparatively recent book that addresses this need for diverse approaches, claiming as its premise and point of distinction from other similar works recognition of the fact that the relationship between Athenian νόμοι and democracy has manifestations and repercussions in all areas of public life (p. xix). Ostwald devotes considerable space to identifying the different social groups in which certain sets of attitudes existed, such as the conservatism of the 'democratic establishment' but – though it is valuable and perhaps attaining the status of a cardinal work in Athenian social, political, legal and religious matters - he makes the familiar error of relying upon the unsupported traditions of intellectuals' persecutions. This is not from a lack of awareness of the nature of the evidence but, like Drachmann, he considers that late traditions in fact constitute evidence of missing contemporary evidence.⁵²

One of the few works to engage solidly with "the evidence for prosecution and persecution of intellectuals...in the hope of reconstructing sources and traditions underlying the statements of extant authors" is K.J. Dover's article "The Freedom of the Intellectual in Greek Society".⁵³ His concern is with historiography, which he discusses pointedly and effectively, highlighting the weaknesses in the evidence that others books, such as I have cited, use uncritically. Robert Wallace, in "Private Lives and Public Enemies: Freedom of Thought in Classical Athens"

concludes that Athenians viewed the interests of the state as overriding personal freedom.⁵⁴ This is not new (for instance, in Drachmann, above) but he reaches it with far more critical examination of the evidence.

The standard accounts are usually (1) incautious in their use of evidence, which undermines their factual basis or (2) focus on particular manifestations of Greek social attitudes (particularly religious sentiment), with little consideration given to other areas where these may appear or (3) make little attempt to examine anti-intellectualism as such, the motivation and underlying beliefs of those who espoused views or engaged in activities hostile to intellectuals as a whole or individually. I approach the subject differently for two reasons. Firstly, I consider that a significant body of evidence traditionally used to substantiate the existence of hostility towards intellectuals is seriously misrepresented and exaggerated. A number of the impiety trials said to have been launched against prominent intellectuals fail to meet any reasonable standards of historical certainty and others are so bereft of detail that, even if true, the data is worthless for sociological or historical purposes. This is the point made by Dover and Wallace (above). Secondly, the different areas in which anti-intellectual sentiments might be made manifest are rarely related directly to this topic in order to form a coherent whole. This thesis will proceed by drawing together studies from different areas, including modern theories relating to intellectuals and anti-intellectualism, and to ancient Greek society, religion and politics.

C. Literature on aspects of Athenian society

As mentioned, works on the hostile treatment of intellectuals in Athens tend to focus on ancient Greek religious sentiments, a consequence of starting with the supposed impiety trials. Perhaps the first work to emphasise the centrality of religion to ancient states and society was N.D. Fustel de Coulanges' *La Cité Antique* (1864). Martin Nilsson is one of the outstanding scholars in the origin and development of Greek religion, his cardinal work being *Geschichte der Griechischen Religion (A History of Greek Religion)* (Munich, 1961); these make

little or only passing reference to anti-intellectual phenomenon. E.R. Dodds' *The Greeks and the Irrational* has already been discussed. The issue of Athenians' (in)tolerance in religious matters is significant as it relates both to allegations of impiety that are, as we shall see, regularly imputed to intellectuals (the existence of allegations is not the same as persecution and indictment, of course) and to the freedom afforded to thought and expression that facilitates intellectual activity. In the many works that examine Athenian religious attitudes there is considerable divergence of opinion about their concept of what constituted impiety and the degree of tolerance afforded to unorthodoxy. David Cohen's chapter "The Prosecution of Impiety in Athenian Law" in his *Law, Sexuality, and Society: The Enforcement of Morals in Classical Antiquity* (Cambridge, 1991) contains a useful survey of previous scholarship. Cohen aims to use religion as a control for his other material on sexual ethics rather than to give a full discussion of impiety legislation. His contribution is a succinct but thorough discussion of the legal and common meanings of ἀσέβεια. He argues that, while impiety trials in Athens were exceptional, Sokrates' was not an aberration but consistent with the intolerance of deviation characteristic of most ancient societies (p. 211-16).

The relationship between a society's attitudes and political system has long been the subject of study. Probably the first examination of a society in which a substantial number of inhabitants were also effective political participants and 'makers of fashion' – as was the case in Athens – was Alexis de Tocqueville's study of contemporary America, *De la Democratie en Amerique*. Athenian democracy has been subjected to a variety of interpretations; it is important to this thesis that it establishes whose beliefs the political system expresses. Ronald Syme's analysis of Roman politics, drawing on Robert Michel's 'Iron Law of Oligarchy', has led to the ready assumption that all political systems are 'really' oligarchies of one kind or another. However, more recent scholarship has tended to argue that the form of Athenian social and political phenomena is due to the popular basis of their public institutions. Josiah Ober singles out the so-called 'Iron Law of Oligarchy' for attack in his "Public Speech and the Power of the People in Democratic Athens". He emphasises the lack of acceptable

contemporary evidence for the contention that Athens functioned as an oligarchy, and reinforces this with observations on the practical operation of her constitutional and legal systems.⁵⁵ This article draws heavily on his full work, *Mass and Élite in Democratic Athens: Rhetoric, Ideology, and the Power of the People* (Princeton, 1989) which examines the functioning of the Athenian political system in order to explain the position of élite leadership in relationship to its popular constituency. Other important works along similar lines are Frank Frost's "Pericles, Thucydides, Son of Melesias, and Athenian Politics Before the War" and Moses Finley's "Athenian Demagogues".⁵⁶ Seager, in "Élitism and Democracy in Classical Athens", argues that the anti-élitism of the democracy was institutionalised and self-perpetuating.⁵⁷

1.5 - Methodologies

A historical method will be preferred to sociological analysis. The principle that I use to select and analyse information is based on two considerations, already alluded to. First is the necessity of establishing the social coherence of the period. Second is the principle that the attitudes and beliefs of any given society can be manifested in any and all of its activities and products. However, different social contexts will affect the meaning of material, so it is necessary to take social structures into account when analysing beliefs, sentiments and attitudes.

A. Sources, their intention and reception

I shall consider not just the content of any given source but its significance at the time it was produced, the intention of its producer and its meaning for its recipients. The next section (Chapter 1.6) will provide detailed discussion of the various sources, their provenance, the authors' intentions, and the audience's expectations and influence. Histories of social attitudes and thought inevitably focus on literary sources. In this period these include poetry (especially drama) and prose: oratory, history, and philosophical, political and scientific tracts. While these are almost invariably produced by the educated and leisured classes, they can provide information about the beliefs and attitudes of other groups. The task in this section is to consider, in general terms, whose attitudes a given text represents: is it the author's intention simply to promulgate his own opinion or does he aim to reflect the attitudes of his audience? In the latter case, who makes up his audience and what does the situation demand?

A text is a frozen moment in the history of thought and attitudes: if nothing else, it indicates that a certain view *could* exist. An author's attempt to express a view or to allude to some fact or concept does presuppose his belief that it is communicable to and comprehensible by others. However, in terms of analysis, a statement cannot be understood from its words alone without reference to its context and, while its context can make it meaningful, it does not necessarily

supply the author's reason for making it. Does he refer to an existing attitude to affirm, attack, allude to or mock it, or does he propose something entirely new? A statement's 'intended illocutionary force' needs to be considered.⁵⁸ This can be understood in terms of its linguistic and social context, though complicated by the author's possible use of allusion, humour, irony and his use and avoidance of certain issues.⁵⁹ Authors may present or modify their attitudes depending on the occasion's purpose and precedents, and the audience's composition and ability to respond. Material produced for official purposes will tend to represent abstracted and sharpened versions of the values of the ruling class. (In Athens this is the general citizenry, adopting some version of traditional aristocratic standards.) Where a writer seeks to appeal to and identify himself with his audience's beliefs, as in popular genres such as comedy and legal oratory, the beliefs and values invoked and assumed will probably be those of his envisaged audience. Where he is trying to persuade his audience, such as in polemic, political and philosophical tracts and other forms of oratory, the values may not be the same. The effort that an author puts into persuasion will suggest the degree to which the audience does *not* accept his views.

The nature of an author's audience is the other important element. For official and state-sanctioned genres, such as funeral speeches, public inscriptions, drama, speeches delivered in the Assembly and law-courts, the audience is probably representative of the whole citizen body, present out of a desire to participate in community events, to influence proceedings, from a sense of duty, or curiosity. The audience's expected role (to receive passively or to make an assessment in either a public capacity or in terms of their own enjoyment), composition (for instance, an assembly representing the state or a private individual) and power (such as reward in the theatre, or punishment in the law-court) are controls on a text's conformity to beliefs other than the author's own and suggest the degree to which the author could feel himself bound to their attitudes.⁶⁰

Occasionally information on an audience's reaction to particular work exists. For instance, it is known that the original version of Aristophanes' *Clouds* came third

out of three, whereas Ameipsias' *Konnos*, which also included an appearance by Sokrates, not to mention a 'Chorus of Thinkers', came second.⁶¹ A more immediate phenomenon is θόρυβος ('tumult', 'clamour'), indicating an offence to the sensibilities of a section or the whole body of listeners. This was a recognised characteristic of large assemblies since the early Classical period.⁶² Isokrates says that anyone wishing to address the Assembly had 'to deal with the mob and take abuse'.⁶³ Crowd disturbance could prevent people from speaking altogether, as happened in the Assembly during the trial of the generals after the battle of Arginousai. Litigants would sometimes abandon a case midway, which presupposes that they were able to know when a jury was against them.⁶⁴ In the first scene of *The Acharnians* Aristophanes depicts interjections and abuse as though they were a normal part of Assembly proceedings. He also provides a colourful picture of crowd behaviour and its effect on speakers in the proud self-description of the comic super-juror Philokleon. While the picture is obviously exaggerated Aristophanes must have expected his audience to recognise it:

ἦν γοῦν ἡμεῖς θορυβήσωμεν,
 πᾶς τίς φησιν τῶν παριόντων·
 “οἶον βροντᾶ τὸ δικαστήριον,
 ὦ Ζεῦ βασιλεῦ.”
 κἄν ἀστράψω, ποππύζοντα
 κἀγκεχόδασίν μ' οἱ πλουτοῦντες
 καὶ πάνυ σεμνοί.
 καὶ σὺ δέδοικάς με μάλλιστ' αὐτός·
 νῆ τὴν Δήμητρα, δέδοικλας. ἐγὼ δ'
 ἀπολοίμην εἰ σὲ δέδοικα.

“For when we are raging loud and high
 In stormy, tumultuous din,
 O Lord! O Zeus! say the passers-by,
 How thunders the Court within!
 The wealthy and great, when my lightnings glare,
 Turn pale and sick, and mutter a prayer.
 You fear me too: I protest you do:
 Yes, yes, by Demeter I vow 'tis true.
 But hang me if I am afraid of you.”
 (Aristoph. *Wasps*. 622-31, tr. Rogers, Loeb).

The scripts of comedies presuppose that the audience was prone to make interjections.⁶⁵ The rhetorician Alkidamas also provides evidence of audiences' influence. In *On the Writers of Written Speeches* or *On the Sophists* he emphasises the speaker's need to accommodate and exploit the mood and desires of his audience.⁶⁶ Andokides, in *On the Mysteries*, invites interruption from anyone who disagrees with the facts of his speech or wants him to expand on them (§55, 70). There is even, rather surprisingly, an instance of a published speech of Demosthenes (albeit dating after 380 BC) recording his change in tack on account of listeners' reactions.⁶⁷ Crowd heckling is particularly likely at moments of high drama and crisis but, if such interjections were not in fact normal, some evidence of actual disruption of normal procedure would be expected. Of this there is none, with the exception of a probably apocryphal story about Euripides' *Danae*. According to Seneca, the audience was so outraged at one character's immoral statements that Euripides had to come out on stage to calm them and assure them that the character would be punished.⁶⁸

B. The necessity of contemporaneity

In considering sources for research into the history of thought, Gershenson and Greenberg establish two conditions for accepting information. (1) Data should come from sources that can be regarded as well informed, such as participants, observers, or those consciously in contact with a direct tradition. (2) The data should be internally consistent.⁶⁹ In research into social attitudes, consistency is a less important requirement but the first, proximity, is vital. I prefer those sources that are contemporary to the attitudes and events they describe or were written within living memory: oral information that is not formalised in some way (such as through connexion to ritual) is rarely reliable once the line of transmission exceeds three generations.⁷⁰ Information that appears in late sources may be true but should not be used as sole evidence, only, perhaps, as illustration. My reservations about the usefulness of sources written later than three generations after the events they describe are due to two considerations. First, as will be discussed thoroughly in a later section (Chapter 1.6 D), there is ample evidence

for the inadequacy of ancient historiographical methods. Secondly, even if the information that late sources provide is accurate, their representation of events and sentiments and their meaning and force are, at best, plausible reconstructions. A later writer's information and skills in analysis may or may not be acceptable but, in either case, he does not have the same authority to relate and pass judgement as does a contemporary. A good example of this is the oratorical style of Gorgias; though he was an outstandingly successful speaker in his own time, critics as close to his time as Aristotle, not to mention those of the Roman age and modern day, denigrate his style.⁷¹ While a tract can provide information on its social and intellectual, political and historical background, the difficulty is always that it can only be properly understood in relation to this background.⁷² No text can be freed from its cultural, social and chronological milieu for any meaningful social analysis.

C. Cultural milieu

As understanding the social context of any given source is important, it is useful to bear in mind the general character of this society. Philip Esler discusses the Mediterranean 'common culture' pithily in "Reading the Mediterranean Social Script" in *The First Christians in Their Social Worlds: Social-Scientific Approaches to New Testament Interpretation*. Though considerable variation is to be expected across geographical and chronological fields, there are certain common features. The primary social unit in ancient Mediterranean society is the kinship group in which an individual finds his identity and to which he owes his loyalty.⁷³ The primacy of social entities beyond the individual is also evident in the operation of the foremost social value, honour, an index of worth that functions in terms of public approval or disapproval. Honour can come passively through ascription (for instance, from birth) or be gained actively from outside one's kinship group in almost any kind of social interaction. This means that relations are basically evaluative and competitive. The conception, typical of pre-industrial societies, that goods, including honour, exist only in finite quantities

enhances the sense of competition. One person's gain is, necessarily, another's loss.⁷⁴

1.6 – The Nature of the Sources

This section will consider in more detail the relevant sources and the conditions of their production that will affect their interpretation. The governing issues are (1) the officialness of the forum, (2) the intention of the author, and (3) the expectations and influence of the recipients. Naturally, the objectivity of data is most secure when it does not relate to the writer’s argument, so he has no reason to exaggerate, diminish or misrepresent it. This is clearest where the data is not stated at all but is assumed or supplied inadvertently: “when a source answers our questions without intending to do so”.⁷⁵

A. Official genres

Official genres are those that the state deliberately produces or sanctions, such as laws, decrees, treaties and ostracisms. These represent the will of a sizeable proportion of citizens but, as they are manifested in forums that heighten awareness of civic and political responsibility, the views they represent are not simply individual will writ large.

The most solemn and formularised of the state’s cultural products is the funeral speech (ἐπιτάφιος). Six of these survive: these are by Perikles⁷⁶, Gorgias⁷⁷, Lysias, Plato through the mouth of Sokrates in *Menexenos*, Demosthenes and Hypereides. Perikles’ is a part of Thoukydides’ history; Gorgias’, Lysias’ and Plato’s probably should be considered forms of rhetorical and/or philosophical *epidexeis*.⁷⁸ All six presumably adhere to the accepted form and so are legitimate sources from which to discuss the genre. Thoukydides describes the manner in which they were delivered:

ἐπειδὴν δὲ κρύψωσι γῆ, ἀνὴρ ἡρημένος ὑπὸ τῆς πόλεως ὃς
 ἂν γνώμη τε δοκῆ μὴ ἀξύνετος εἶναι καὶ ἀξιώσει προήκη,
 λέγει ἐπ’ αὐτοῖς ἔπαινον τὸν πρέποντα.

“But when the remains have been laid away in the earth [in the Athenian public cemetery], a man chosen by the state, who is regarded as best

endowed with wisdom and is foremost in public esteem, delivers over them an appropriate eulogy.”
(Thuc. 2.34.6, tr. Forster Smith, Loeb).

It is clear that they served to represent the state at its most self-aware and abstracted level. The speaker represents the state (selected by the *Boule*⁷⁹), not himself or his own programme. The audience is not judging, as the speech is not competing with others⁸⁰, nor it is a passive recipient but is emotionally and socially involved, even in its own actions, when it is invited to give laments and is then dismissed.⁸¹ The speech is a rite, the traditional structure and content comprising moral and patriotic exhortation. Indeed, speakers emphasise their obligations and adherence to traditional forms.⁸² The Athenians were aware that this institution was unique in Greece, which doubtless increased their patriotic feeling and sense of self-reference. In fact, praise of the city regularly accompanies or even exceeds praise of the fallen.⁸³ The sentiments invoked in funeral speeches are rarefied versions of Athenian popular attitudes. There is, however, some scope for variation in tone and subject and speakers could make political points, such as Perikles’ attack on quietism and Gorgias’ implicit criticism of wars between Greeks.⁸⁴

Military orations are similar to funeral speeches, a production by a representative of the state in a circumstance that is, by definition, patriotic, often exhorting their listeners with generalised references to their supposed national values and characteristics, heightened by a contrast with their enemies. Of course, as these exist exclusively in history writing, they should be treated in terms of their contexts. For instance, Demosthenes’ exhortation to his troops at Pylos, telling them not to be too clever in calculating the odds against them, should be understood in terms of the Athenians’ military position, not their patriotic principles (see Chapter 5 n. 54). Official decisions and funeral and military speeches are useful for understanding the explicit and abstracted forms of Athenian public values, the things that Athenians believed that they believed in.

B. Semi-official public genres

B1. Tragedy and comedy

Tragic theatre is the main source for understanding intellectual development and conditions in 5th century Athens and the main vehicle for their introduction into the public sphere; comic theatre is the main source for social and political concerns.⁸⁵ Athenian drama is a semi-official genre in the sense that it was produced in a forum that was largely official or ceremonial and was regarded as an intrinsic part and expression of the state. Public officials selected the playwrights who were almost always Athenian citizens, and chorus-members who were Athenian-born by law. The costs were furnished by the city, both directly and through wealthy citizens' liturgies.⁸⁶ By c.410 BC the state Theoric fund enabled poor citizens to attend, a practice that the late 4th century orator Demades described as 'the glue of the democracy'.⁸⁷ The prominence of drama in Athenian social, political and cultural life is suggested by a number of incidents. Phrynichos' *The Sack of Miletos* was banned as too distressing a reminder of a recent disaster⁸⁸; Sokrates contends, apparently seriously, that comedians were partly to blame for his reputation as a specious sophist⁸⁹; and Sophokles was selected for a number of responsible public positions, such as general and imperial treasurer, though in the opinion of his peers, including Perikles and Ion of Chios, he was without military or administrative ability.⁹⁰

As a source for social attitudes, drama requires particular treatment. Direct reference to historical subject matters in tragedy is rare, the usual method being to employ mythological subject matter and an elevated and allusive style. The identification of allusions to real figures or situations can only be speculative.⁹¹ Comedy, on the other hand, is especially sensitive to and representative of popular attitudes. To be relevant, comedians must deal with matters in the audience's common experience. Their mockery of prominent and influential figures (praise is confined to dead paragons in particular fields, such as poets in

Aristophanes' *Frogs*) means that they *must* be especially well qualified to represent the public interest. This kind of humour, based on the psychological need to denigrate the powerful, presupposes the perspective of 'the ordinary man'.⁹² That this capability to attack any- and every-one with impunity took place in a state-sanctioned forum underlines the principles of freedom of speech and accountability of the mightiest to the ordinary man, which are important, if not necessary, components of the democratic state.⁹³

Though popular opinion was, in all likelihood, the major factor in the allocation of choruses to playwrights and of the prizes in competition (comedians reprove the audience, not the judges, for their failures⁹⁴), drama need not be a simple reflection of popular attitudes. Poets were regarded (or, at least, regarded themselves) as specially qualified to criticise and lead opinion on public matters. It is the premise of Aristophanes' *Frogs* in which Dionysos ventures into the underworld in order to bring back Euripides to advise the Athenians. The term 'tragedian-teachers' (τραγωδοδιδάσκαλος) is used by 5th century comedians (possibly satirically) and 4th century prose writers (clearly seriously).⁹⁵

A particular sentiment can be interpreted as representing the playwright's own interest if it is explicitly represented as such - as happens in comedy, especially in the *parabasis*, the core of the play⁹⁶ - or if it is unconnected to the dramatic situation, or if it recurs and is developed in a number of the playwright's works over a period of time.⁹⁷ Otherwise, deriving social attitudes from the utterances made in plays, like interpreting statements from any individual, can only be understood in terms of the speaker's predicament, character and emotional condition.⁹⁸ In tragedy most characters are heroic and therefore 'writ large', which may distort the values they express. For instance, Aias' suicide is an extreme but intelligible reaction to the Greek fear of dishonour.⁹⁹ The situation on the stage cannot be used as evidence for historical reality but the underlying picture necessary to make it coherent can.¹⁰⁰ This is particularly clear in comedy as it relies on the observers' recognition of something familiar. Humour can come from exaggerating conventional behaviour and beliefs, like the pious self-

importance of Aristophanes' jurymen in *The Wasps* (e.g. 373ff.), or by defying or perverting them, displaying lust, cowardliness, self-indulgence and self-interest in place of accepted virtues.¹⁰¹ Comic remarks about a real individual or particular views must have enough relevance to popularly held views of that person to be, at least, comprehensible, even if audience members disagreed or had no opinion. Inconsistency is only to be expected and will not contradict anything previously uttered. Neither comedy's dramatic requirements nor use of invective place any value on logic.

B2. Oratory

Like drama, legal and political oratory have official occasions, a part and product of Athenian institutions of law and government. The surviving examples of oratory from the 450-380 BC period come from Antiphon¹⁰², Lysias, Andokides, Isokrates and Isaios, though the last two worked mainly later.¹⁰³ These speeches mostly belong to legal cases. Apart from the speeches that historians provide, the only examples of deliberative oratory in this period are Andokides' *On the Peace* (*opus* 3) and Lysias' *Against the Subversion of the Ancestral Constitution* (*opus* 34). The second of these may not actually have been delivered but Dionysios of Halikarnassos, albeit writing in the 1st century BC, describes it as a good specimen of Lysias' deliberative style and designed for use in a real debate.¹⁰⁴ Andokides' *On the Return* is a legal speech though it was delivered before the Assembly.

Popular audiences acting in a self-consciously official capacity assess both forensic and deliberative oratory. The speaker has powerful incentives to conform to and espouse the values of his audience. He is competing with other speakers on the same occasion and concerning the same subject: he will always be conscious of the need to sway more people than his opponents.¹⁰⁵ He also perceives the audience's reaction directly and is aware that this may have enormous and personal ramifications on his reputation, influence, wealth or even life. These controls may not be as strong for political as legal speeches, as the

former may aim to lead popular opinion, the decision of the Assembly need not affect the speaker as profoundly as the decision of a court, and the decision's meaning may not be as clear-cut: a proposal can be well-regarded even if it is not accepted, or successful in a way not intended. For example, Nikias' attempt to dissuade the *demos* from launching the Sicilian Expedition succeeded in further encouraging it.¹⁰⁶ In general, however, no-one delivering a political or legal speech would ignore or offend his listeners' sensibilities, and it can be assumed that speakers, especially litigants, would pay lip service, at least, to common values.¹⁰⁷ Some intellectual writers in the 4th century criticise the democratic process for this reason.¹⁰⁸ The necessity for public approval is illustrated by the known failure of speeches with an arrogant and unconciliatory tone. In particular, Xenophon's avowed object in writing a version of Sokrates' defence speech is to explain his surprising *μεγαληγορία* ('arrogance' or 'boastfulness').¹⁰⁹

A speaker's chance of success naturally improves if he can appeal to popularly accepted values and beliefs. Firstly, he can attempt to invoke such beliefs in support of his argument. Secondly, he can attempt to identify himself with these ideals or some other likable quality and to portray his opponent as representing their antithesis. This projection of character is called *ἠθοποιία*.¹¹⁰ A particularly notable instance of this is Kleon's speech in the Mytilene debate, as supplied by Thukydides: Kleon identifies himself with self-evident proofs, patriotism and traditional morality and implies that his intellectual opponents epitomise the opposite (see Chapter 2.5).

Given that the audiences of official genres were generally the same as the citizens who sanction them, one would expect them to reflect popular values and beliefs. Some of these genres do, however, exhibit higher levels of abstraction, sophistication and artificiality than others; this difference is particularly notable in comparing political and epideictic oratory with forensic.¹¹¹ The degree of competition and 'officialness' may be important factors in this. A speaker in an advisory role or a non-competitive situation may feel greater freedom to lead opinion rather than to follow it. High-mindedness, such as occurs in moments of

patriotic self-congratulation, will encourage the expression of sentiments that may be at odds with everyday attitudes or belied by actual behaviour. One example of this is the relationship between public and private morality: in Perikles' funeral speech, a military oration by Nikias and a speech delivered to the Assembly by Alkiabides tolerance of private behaviour is championed as a characteristic virtue of Athenians. However, in combative oratory the two tend to be identified, private behaviour represented as evidence for public morals.¹¹² In addition, official and public genres are quite often witnessed by non-citizens: foreigners could read inscriptions and attend dramatic festivals and state funerals. These genres will, therefore, have a high degree of self-consciousness; they comprise 'the official line' with a view not only to the beliefs of their own citizens but with an eye on outsiders.

C. Private genres

Genres not produced for formal or ceremonial occasions include political, philosophical, scientific, historical and biographical tracts, and some poetry. The interest of both the author and the audience is personal: a desire for intellectual stimulation; exploration or justification of political or philosophical views; aesthetic appreciation or simple entertainment. Generally speaking, the author has more control than he would for public genres: he is less constrained by conventional modes of presentation and by his audience's approval or disapproval. It is the mode of personal expression, so it is characterised by a considerable degree of self-assertion; polemicism and partisanship are common. It is subject to conditions different from public works and is subject to different methods of analysis: the most important factor is the authorial intent.

C1. Authorial intent

Classical Greek political, scientific, philosophical and biographical works exist in diverse forms: dialogues, biographies, open letters, fictional speeches and tracts. They instruct, persuade and justify through exposition and praise, balanced with

attacks on opponents, with the object of propagating particular views. This means that such tracts are not necessarily concerned with the legitimacy of data or validity of interpretation. For instance, while Xenophon's *Memorabilia* defends Sokrates by giving an account of his life, it includes at least some 'illustrative fiction'. The most obvious of these is Sokrates' discussion with the younger Perikles that assumes the military situation of the 370s.¹¹³ The extension of this practice is that a subject, whether an individual, a group, or a principle, can become an unreal and formalised image, a super-conformist to ideals of behaviour and a super-representative of 'correct' beliefs. Partisan writers may, therefore, not deal with questions of true or false facts but with 'higher' truths, the potential rather than the actual.¹¹⁴

Biographical and scientific tracts may seem unusual inclusions in this category but, in practice, they almost invariably have some polemic function. The earliest discrete prose biographies (from the 390s) are Plato's and Isokrates' *apologia* and *encomia*, usually embodying certain principles of behaviour or thought.¹¹⁵ The method of biographical writing is selective and partial. The object is, if not to deliver praise or blame, then at least to illuminate an individual character.¹¹⁶ Scientific tracts can be non-polemical, summarising a researcher's work, but some of them seem to be written not to discuss data and theories disinterestedly but to assert the writer's thesis while attacking others'. A Hippocratic writing, *On Regimen in Acute Diseases* (Περὶ διαίτης ὀξέων), explicitly responds to another tract, the *Knidian Sentences*. Another gives advice to its listeners:

Ταῦτ' ἐνθυμηθέντα διαφυλάσσειν δεῖ ἐν τοῖσι λόγοισιν· ὅτι ἂν δέ τις τούτων ἀμαρτάνῃ ἢ λέγων ἢ ἐρωτῶν ἢ ὑποκρινόμενος... ταύτη φυλάσσοντα δεῖ ἐπιτίθεσθαι ἐν τῇ ἀντιλογίῃ.

"When you have considered these questions, you must pay careful attention in discussions, and when someone makes an error in one of these points in his assertions, questions, or answers... then you must catch him there and attack him in your rebuttal."

(ps.-Hipp. *On Disease I* 1, tr. Potter, Loeb).

Others envisage questions being posed by ‘my opponent’ (ὁ τάναντία λέγων). Such phrases suggest that they were delivered in a competitive atmosphere before substantial audiences.¹¹⁷ Scientific works provide evidence for the conditions under which intellectual practices proceeded in ancient Athens. Medicine, at least, was a respectable interest for cultivated men, such as Sokrates’ doctor associates Eryximachos and his father Akoumenos, and its form of speech was well enough known to be parodied on the comic stage.¹¹⁸

History is descriptive rather than polemic but the authorial intent – the historians’ view of the function of history – will affect the interpretation of their material. Herodotos’ chief interest seems to be that of the storyteller. He does not emphasise causes in his analysis of events but prefers to focus on describing the tendencies of human experience. His moral, political and religious views are all conventional. For instance, there is the commonplace of Greek thought that excess in one direction is likely to swing suddenly to its opposite, which Herodotos refers to in the story of how Amasis, the king of Egypt, broke an amicable alliance with the Samian tyrant Polykrates because he seemed to be too successful.¹¹⁹

Thoukydides’ object can be seen in the emphasis that he gives to providing an account that is both useful and timeless. He emphasises his efforts to provide accounts that are full and accurate, especially apparent in his digression to supply the ‘real’ story of Athens’ tyrannicide heroes.¹²⁰

Ἐκ δὲ τῶν εἰρημένων τεκμηρίων ὁμῶς τοιαῦτα ἂν τις νομίζων μάλιστα ἅ διήλθον οὐχ ἁμαρτάνοι, καὶ οὔτε ὡς ποιηταὶ ὑμνήκασι περὶ αὐτῶν ἐπὶ τὸ μείζον κοσμοῦντες μᾶλλον πιστεύων, οὔτε ὡς λογογράφοι ξυνέθεσαν ἐπὶ τὸ προσαγωγότερον τῇ ἀκροάσει ἢ ἀληθέστερον, ὄντα ἀνεξέλεγκτα καὶ τὰ πολλὰ ὑπὸ χρόνου αὐτῶν ἀπίστως ἐπὶ τὸ μυθῶδες ἐκνευικηκότα... τὰ δ’ ἔργα τῶν πραχθέντων ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ οὐκ ἐκ τοῦ παρατυχόντος πυνθανόμενος ἤξιῶσα γράφειν οὐδ’ ὡς ἐμοὶ ἐδόκει, ἀλλ’ οἷς τε αὐτὸς παρήν καὶ παρὰ τῶν ἄλλων ὅσον δυνατόν ἀκριβεῖα περὶ ἐκάστου ἐπεξεληθῶν... ὅσοι δὲ βουλήσονται

τῶν τε γενομένων τὸ σαφές σκοπεῖν καὶ τῶν μελλόντων ποτὲ αὐθις κατὰ τὸ ἀνθρώπινον τοιούτων καὶ παραπλησίων ἔσεσθαι, ὠφέλιμα κρίνειν αὐτὰ ἀρκούντως ἔξει. κτῆμά τε ἐς αἰεὶ μᾶλλον ἢ ἀγώνισμα ἐς τὸ παραχρήμα ἀκούειν ξύγκειται.

“However, I do not think that one will be far wrong in accepting the conclusions I have reached from the evidence which I have put forward. It is better evidence than that of the poets, who exaggerate the importance of their themes, or of the prose chroniclers, who are less interested in telling the truth than in catching the attention of their public, whose authorities cannot be checked, and whose subject matter, owing to the passage of time, is mostly lost in the unreliable streams of mythology... And with regard to the factual reporting of the events of the war I have made it a principle not to write down the first story that came my way, and not even to be guided by my own general impressions; either I was present myself at the events which I have described or else I heard of them from eye-witnesses whose reports I have checked with as much thoroughness as possible... It will be enough for me, however, if these words of mine are judged useful by those who want to understand the events which happened in the past and which (human nature being what it is) will, at some time or other and in much the same ways, be repeated in the future. My work is not a piece of writing done to meet the taste of an immediate public, but was done to last for ever.”

(Thuc. 1.21.1, 22.2, 22.4, tr. Warner, Penguin)

Thoukydides' thesis is that human and political behaviour function according to certain universal psychological principles. This inclines him to use generalised statements of individual and national psychology to interpret events.¹²¹ There are many examples of this that are important in this thesis, especially his portrait of Kleon in the Mytilene speech.

Xenophon's interest in history seems to be mainly in its value as a source for moral explication. He frequently refers or alludes to the principle that one's moral behaviour will be repaid in concrete terms, for instance, memorably ascribing the decline in Sparta's fortunes in the 4th century to divine retribution on account of their impious seizure of the citadel of Thebes, 'as though some *daimonion* were leading them on'.¹²² He also shows particular interest in individual characters – Sokrates, Agesilaos, Kyros the Great, Kyros the usurper, and the pen-portraits of the leaders of the Ten Thousand in the *Anabasis* – as

though personal qualities were intrinsically important and influential in the formation of events.¹²² This has the consequence that his material should be selected for its moral illustrative value rather than its objective importance.¹²⁴

C2. Audiences and their influence

An audience's influence comes from the author's dependence on its approval. The authors of private or semi-private genres were probably less dependent than were those of official and public genres but would, nevertheless, not ignore their sentiments. These sentiments may have varied according to their composition.

Intellectuals may have delivered such tracts as public lectures to the Athenian general public. This may have been a form of publication or useful for them to establish their credentials, to attract patrons and students, and to attack intellectual and professional rivals. The rhetorician Alkidamas clearly delivered speeches with the object of advertising his oratorical ability.¹²⁵ Some medical tracts, dating to c.400 BC, seem to have had a lay audience¹²⁶ and Kleon in his Mytilene speech describes those in the Assembly as 'regular lecture-goers',¹²⁷ though this comment may be exaggerated as it favours his argument. Whatever the freedom of ordinary citizens to attend such occasions, their presence would depend on their personal interest and leisure, factors related to their standard of education and wealth. The leisured class was doubtless over-represented. Most of the evidence for intellectual forums reveals that they comprised small select groups, friends and guests, often meeting at a private house. The Sokratics, at least, regarded group learning as desirable, gathering together to read books and listen to speakers.¹²⁸ In 5th century vase paintings book scrolls are almost always depicted in social situations, explicit or implied (see figs. 2 & 3) though, of course, social interaction is a characteristic of this genre.¹²⁹ Such gatherings could tackle even lengthy works, as Isokrates suggests when, in the text of his *Antidosis*, he recommends that it be read in stages (§12). This kind of audience could not reward and punish those who addressed them, as jurors and Assembly-goers could, but it is clear that speakers would make some effort to accommodate

them. In Plato's *Phaidros* the title character says that Lysias gladly went over his speech with him several times and finally lent it to him. In the *Parmenides* Zeno gives a reading from his book in the house of his host Pythodoros, and then engages in a discussion with those present. The 'Eleatic guest' of *The Sophist*



Fig. 2: A group of youths with scrolls (cup, Berlin, Staatliche Mus. F 2549; reproduced from Beck, F.A.G., *Album of Greek Education*, pl. 15, no. 79).



Fig. 3: A youth reading from a scroll to another (*chous*, London, British Museum E525; reproduced from Beck, F.A.G., *Album of Greek Education*, pl. 15, no. 80).

volunteers to expound his views either in a speech ‘as though an *epidexis*’ or through discussion.¹³⁰ Thucydides criticises contemporary chroniclers (λογογράφοι) precisely for their preoccupation with crowd-pleasing, whether he means the general public or small groups of aristocrats.¹³¹ Such private readings presumably saw authors ‘bounce’ ideas off friendly audiences with a view to improvement, as Isocrates describes himself doing with his *Panathenaikos* in the second half of the 4th century (§200-65). The resultant published tract would doubtless reflect their tastes and attitudes to some extent.

D. Late literary sources

As mentioned above, the basic methodological principle of this thesis is to prefer material written within three generations – that is, one generation of living memory - of the subject described. Unformalised information is rarely reliable over more than three generations (see Chapter 1.5 B). However, much relevant material only appears in works from later periods. The habits of ancient scholars need to be taken into account when interpreting their writings.

The first determinant of a late datum’s reliability is the question of its ultimate origin. Where this is unclear the datum should be accepted only with caution. To ascribe it to ‘tradition’ still begs the question as to its reliability. Ancient writers do not normally name their sources and, when they do, it is usually with the intention of distancing themselves from the information.¹³²

Many ancient writers use their sources without appreciation of their nature and context. This can occur within only a few generations of the original publication. Biographical information on literary figures can be fancifully derived from their own writings: for instance, Hermippos’ statement that Thucydides was related to the Peisistratids may be an inference from the historian’s debunking of the tyrant-slayers’ heroism.¹³³ A common form of misuse is to interpret comic references as though they are unambiguously related to historical events. For example, the mid-late 4th century historian Ephoros uses Aristophanes

uncritically to supplement his account of the causes of the Peloponnesian War.¹³⁴ A fragment of Theopompos, Ephoros' contemporary, describes Kleon appearing before the Assembly long after he was due, wearing garlands, and then dismissing it so that he could entertain some guests, the Assembly then dispersing amid laughter. Plutarch inadvertently exposes this as a scene taken from comedy when he gives the direct quote that preserves the metre of Kleon's words.¹³⁵ Euripides' popularity as a target of comic invective is reflected in later authors, such as the 3rd century BC Satyros who records that the women of Athens conspired to kill him, clearly imagining that Aristophanes' *Thesmophoriazousai* was based on fact.¹³⁶

Scholarly mechanics, in particular, the use of editions of excerpts as well as or in place of original texts, may have caused or encouraged the uncritical tendencies of ancient scholarship. Collections of certain types of material came into use before the end of the Classical period. For instance, Spartans' characteristically pithy sayings were a recognised genre by the early 4th century and, as their historical contexts virtually end c.300 BC, they probably existed in literary collections by then.¹³⁷ Plutarch mentions that he made collections of illustrative material on topics that interested him.¹³⁸ Apart from literary taste, physical considerations doubtless encouraged excerption: the awkwardness of scrolls may have led ancient scholars to have important passages noted as they came across them and copied out into separate editions for ease of reference. It is not known how widespread excerpted editions were but their use could affect the reliability of the information that ancient writers reproduce. The principle of the original selection will clearly affect the nature of material available. To use excerpted material for reference without the original text freshly in mind, even if the reader and the editor are the same, means that it is, by definition, decontextualised, which can obscure and confuse the point of the information. Significant and incidental items presented, when side by side, may appear to have equal weight. Moreover, editors may have been tempted to add supplementary material without distinguishing it from the original item.¹³⁹

Ancient writers also show a tendency to misrepresent data and ‘enhance’ it with fictional elements in order to make it meet their requirements, conscious or unconscious. The desire to engage the reader’s interest is obvious. Examples of the alteration of material to increase its interest or illustrative value can be seen in miniature the collections of apophthegms in Plutarch’s corpus. A remark originally attributed to one historical figure may appear in the mouth of another or lose its context altogether; an anonymous remark may be supplied with ‘improved’ context for better effect. For instance, the Spartan Dienekes’ comment before the Battle of Thermopylai that if “the Medes’ arrows blot out the sun we will be able to fight in the shade” is transferred to the more famous Leonidas.¹⁴⁰ Another phenomenon is the tendency to view behaviour and events as conforming to certain patterns. This is particularly obvious in biographical writing: famous individuals are regularly connected to other famous individuals; strange and memorable incidents illustrate individuals’ characteristic convictions; similar individuals have similar experiences; and strange and ironic deaths are the norm.¹⁴¹ The existence of such motifs suggests that late writers were prone to filter and arrange information according to their presuppositions: the regularity with which philosophers are said to have been persecuted for impiety is an instance of this patterning that is of particular relevance to this thesis.¹⁴² The last tendency that is important in understanding authors’ use of material is their intellectual need to identify causes and meanings. In their discussion of the tradition of Anaxagoras’ trial Gershenson and Greenberg describe the typical analytical methods of ancient historiography. This consists in the identification and description of an event’s (1) plausible explanation, (2) ‘deeper’ explanation, usually revolving around political or personal motives, and (3) ensuing events. In other words, ancient scholars show a tendency to supply missing information on the basis of ‘historical probability’ in order to produce a historical account that is comprehensive and plausible. This means that comprehensive detail is no guarantee of authenticity. In fact, when later and later authors provide more and more detail for some incident (as is the case for data about Protagoras’ supposed persecution) or accounts that differ markedly from one another (as is the case for Anaxagoras’ supposed trial) it may be that none of them had much or any definite

information to start with.¹⁴³ Of course, the tendencies I have outlined here exist for all writing but the danger to objectivity and historical accuracy is increased when the author is separated from the original historical context and is faced with a dearth of information.

E. Reproduction of original form

In the case of genres whose original production was for a live audience, such as oratory and drama, it is worth pausing to consider the accuracy with which published manuscripts reproduce the original. That alteration could and did occur is clear. There is one known instance of a play being rewritten, Aristophanes' *Clouds*.¹⁴⁴ The only two political speeches that can be checked against one another, Aischines' *On the Embassy* and Demosthenes' *On the False Embassy*, exhibit considerable discrepancies. Aischines replies to comments not found in Demosthenes¹⁴⁵, and corresponding comments are scrambled.¹⁴⁶ Notwithstanding Thucydides' famous assertion of his effort to reproduce speeches accurately¹⁴⁷, which it is rather perverse to reject, and the general principle that particular items in history writing need to be interpreted in their context¹⁴⁸, the only instance where a speech in a history can actually be checked against its official form (Tacitus' version of Claudius' address to the Senate, which was published on a tablet at Lyons) shows that it is only an extremely loose paraphrase. Even though an official published copy was available and the event was hardly out of living memory, Tacitus evidently had little intention of or interest in recording the speech in anything other than its basic outline.¹⁴⁹ This may be indicative of the quality of material reproduced by ancient historians in general.

For a writer to alter a speech or play after its presentation would not be seen as damaging his reputation. The degree and kind of alteration depend on the intention in publication. It might be for re-performance outside Athens (in the case of plays)¹⁵⁰, for the writer's own satisfaction, to advertise his skills, as a model for others' use, for political or philosophical persuasion and encouragement, or for connoisseurs of the genre. From the perspective of social

history, changes are more likely to increase a work's level of conformity to popular attitudes than decrease it.¹⁵¹ As it happens, things that we might expect to disappear in rewriting for publication - such as drama's topical and local references (which would not interest non-Athenians) or oratory's false arguments - abound in surviving works. This implies that, generally, the extent of alteration was not great.¹⁵²

F. Physical evidence

Physical evidence will have a small role to play in this thesis, for instance in portrayals of intellectuals in art (Chapter 2.9). It is subject to the same interpretative considerations as literary evidence: the context, the author's intent and the audience's influence and interpretation. There are, of course, different components to context, such as the physical relationship of inscriptions and art to civic and governmental sites; the material from which objects are made (bronze is an enduring and distinctive medium reserved for a few types of notices, such as conviction for treachery, presumably thought to be of particular official concern)¹⁵³; and expense (only the state or the wealthy can have commissioned statues whereas vases were cheap enough for their paintings to be subject to popular taste).

Artistic association can suggest the significance ascribed to portrayed figures, institutions and activities. For instance, in a mural in the Kerameikos Theseus was depicted with personifications of Demos and Democracy, emphasising his status as supposed founder and guardian of popular political power.¹⁵⁴ These depictions can also suggest the popularity of these beliefs or institutions. The sudden increase in vase paintings of Theseus in the late 6th century, coinciding with Kleisthenes' democratic reforms, suggests that his identification as an Athenian national hero representing the new (or reinvented) political order may be part of a deliberate policy.¹⁵⁵ Another example from the same time is the increase in the depiction of writing, writing materials and schoolroom scenes - these things may also have been associated with the democratic constitution.¹⁵⁶

It is doubtless significant that vase paintings' subjects frequently refer to aristocratic society, particularly athletic, equestrian and symposium scenes. Initiatives in art probably came mainly from the wealthy who would have the greatest ability to commission special works that could establish new standard forms. However, this influence was not exclusive and the decline in the number of commissioned works implies that the strength of the connexion decreased over time.¹⁵⁷ Pottery is widespread and cheap and therefore fairly responsive to a popular market. Many new scenes on vases seem to be inspired by topical and public events, such as the performance of new poems and plays.¹⁵⁸

CHAPTER 2: CASE STUDIES

2.1 – Attic Old Comedy

Intellectuals as individuals and a class are no more or less subject to mockery and abuse from Athenian comedians than are other groups. This section will, firstly, survey the plays that featured intellectuals or had intellectualism as a prominent theme. Secondly, the characteristics that comedy ascribed to intellectuals will be analysed. This characterisation will reveal how comedians and audiences regarded intellectuals and will suggest the basis and ‘logic’ of anti-intellectual sentiments and their strength in the Athenian population. Comic poets were doubtless all firm believers in the importance of poetry in civic life and for understanding the nature of things but this is not to say that they necessarily objected to intellectuals’ own claims to discovering truth. Aristophanes may be the only true anti-intellectualist, who viewed the intellectual process as having limited comprehension and being, therefore, potentially dangerous.

A. The comedies

A1. Comedies featuring intellectuals

The only complete example of a comedy revolving around intellectualism and a particular intellectual is Aristophanes’ *Clouds*. It was originally produced in 424/3 BC. Following its poor reception, it was rewritten between 420 and 417 but there is no evidence that this version was ever performed.¹ To avoid having to pay the debts incurred by his horse-mad son Pheidippides, the aging rustic Strepsiades decides that his salvation lies in the ‘Worse Argument’ (Ἡττων Λόγος) which is able to override all other arguments. This is taught in the Thinktank (Φροντιστήριον) of Sokrates and Chairephon. Pheidippides

refuses to enter the Thinktank, fearing that its asceticism will be incompatible with his upper-class lifestyle. Strepsiades himself applies but, though Sokrates introduces him to the divine Clouds, the patrons of thinkers, seers and bad poets, he is unable to grasp Sokrates' teachings - touching on such diverse subjects as astronomy, geometry, cartography, analysis of poetic structures, etymology, meteorology and cosmology (he argues that Zeus does not exist and has been replaced by the Vortex ($\Delta\hat{\iota}\nu\omicron\varsigma$)). Strepsiades returns to Pheidippides, this time persuading him to enter the Thinktank, and Sokrates presents him with a contest between the two modes of education, the prudish and boy-obsessed Better Argument who advocates traditional poetry and gymnastics, and the sophistic, hedonistic and amoral Worse Argument.² The latter wins the contest and takes Pheidippides away as a student. This so transports Strepsiades that he beats off two creditors himself with a mishmash of Sokrates' dialectic and theories. However, the newly intellectualised Pheidippides has lost his deference to his father. He 'proves' that father beating is moral and goes on to threaten to beat his mother. At this Strepsiades revolts; calling Sokrates and his associates atheists, he sets fire to the Thinktank; the inmates either flee in terror or perish in the flames.³ In the person of Sokrates is represented every kind of rhetorician, scientist, astronomer and etymologist and he displays the characteristics of self-neglect, greed, speciousness, arrogance, uselessness and atheism.

Given that the text of *The Clouds* was extensively revised from its original performance, it is appropriate to describe briefly the changes, particularly as these relate to its reception. (1) It is possible that Strepsiades' education in the Thinktank was completed. (a) After Pheidippides' initial point-blank refusal to enter the Thinktank – and the *Hypothesis* makes no suggestion that the play's beginning is substantially different - his reintroduction and the relative ease with which he is persuaded to become a student are awkward.⁴ (b) In the surviving version Strepsiades does actually seem to advance somewhat under Sokrates'

teaching and (c) even after Pheidippides' education, it is Strepsiades who sends the creditors packing – these could be relics from the original. (d) While Plato's Sokrates blames Aristophanes for his reputation as a busybody, for being a specious cosmologist and for enabling the weaker argument to defeat the stronger, he does not blame him for originating the charge of corrupting the young.⁵ A further reason for thinking that Strepsiades was educated is connected to the original ending: (2) The burning of the Thinktank is certainly new, though it is not clear whether or not the original included any act of violence against the philosophers.⁶ Aristophanes' style typically has the comic hero's scheme succeed and finishes with an exaggerated and spectacular triumph. Strepsiades' disposal of his creditors fulfils the first half of this; perhaps the climax was for him to use his new powers in argument to trounce Sokrates. The motif of students of rhetoric refusing to pay their teachers and daring them to sue is a standard of later Classical times.⁷ (3) Chairephon's role in the original is uncertain; some references to him in the surviving version imply that he is a prominent character, even Sokrates' equal, but he nowhere appears.⁸

The earliest comedy known to have featured intellectuals or intellectualism is Kratinos' lost *Οἱ Πανόπται* ('The See-Alls'), possibly dating to 435-32 BC.⁹ It apparently depicted the natural philosopher Hippon describing the sky as an oven, on account of which he was called impious.¹⁰ The 'See-Alls' are presumably Hippon's disciples or associates: they were described as having "two heads at once and eyes past computation" and being "holders of others' opinions, memory aids that forget".¹¹ Other details are unknown.

Ameipsias' *Κόννος* was produced in 423 BC, winning second prize in the Dionysia after Kratinos' *Ἡ Πυτίνη* ('The Wine-flask') and beating Aristophanes' *Clouds*.¹² The title character is the Olympic prize-winning singer and lyre-player who was sufficiently prominent to be abused by comedians as

clapped-out and dissipated.¹³ ‘Konnos-minded’ (ΚΟΝΝΟΦΡΟΣΙΝ) means foolish; the ‘vote of Konnos’ refers to something worthless.¹⁴ The subject of the play is unknown but it included intellectuals in some central role: there was a ‘Chorus of Thinkers’ (ΦΡΟΝΤΙΣΤΑΪ) (though this word may not actually have been used and other non-intellectual experts of various kinds were at least mentioned in the play).¹⁵ Athenaios’ comment that Protagoras was absent from the chorus implies that it was made up of other intellectuals who were mentioned by name.¹⁶ One of these is Sokrates whom Ameipsias mocked for his pride and beggarly appearance (fr. 9). Sokrates did, in fact, attend Konnos’ classes.¹⁷ The object may have been to satirise Konnos as a sophistic poet, as Euripides frequently was (see especially D1 below).

Eupolis’ lost *Οἱ Κόλακες* (‘The Flatterers’) satirised the exploitation of Kallias the son of Hipponikos. It was victorious in the competition of 421 BC.¹⁸ Plato’s image of Kallias’ house in the *Protagoras* may be drawn from this play. Eupolis described Chairephon as a toady and Protagoras giving a physiological justification for drinking (Eupolis fr. 180, 157, 158). However, while Sokratic literature makes Kallias notorious for his addiction to sophists¹⁹, Eupolis’ flatterers, who comprise the chorus²⁰, are characterised by insincerity, talkativeness and greed, not their intellectual pretensions. This is shown particularly in the following lengthy fragment from the *parabasis*, probably encapsulating the play’s central point:

“But now we will tell the manner of life which flatterers (κόλακες) lead; listen then, for we are clever gentlemen (κομψοὶ ἄνδρες) in all emergencies. In the first place, another man’s slave is our attendant usually, but he’s mine for a little while. Then I have these two nice coats which I interchange continually, the one for the other, when I go out to the market. And when I spy a simpleton who is rich, I fasten upon him at once. And if the rich blighter chances to say anything, I loudly praise him and express my amazement, pretending delight in his words. Then we go to dinner, one

of us in one direction, another in another – all to get a barley-cake not our own. There the flatterer must at once begin his witty chatter (χαρίεντα πολλὰ... λέγειν) or be chucked out at the door. I know that that happened to the blackguard Acestor; for he uttered an outrageous jest, and the slave led him out the door – with a collar on – and handed him over to Oeneus.”

(fr. 172, tr. Gulick, *Athenaeus: 'The Deipnosophists'*, 236e-237a, Loeb)²¹

The intellectuals mentioned may not have had a significant role, as the fragments, which are reasonably extensive, only mention them in passing and in the third person. This implies that they were not differentiated from the other flatterers, which included the tragedians Acestor and Melanthios.²² Aristophanes' *Ωραι* ('Seasons') mentioned both Chairephon and Kallias but in separate fragments (fr. 583, 584). Like Eupolis, he makes Kallias' parasites prostitutes and flatterers rather than intellectuals specifically.

Kratinos the younger, though normally counted as a playwright of Middle Comedy, must have started his career before the end of the 5th century, as the title character of one of his plays, *Theramenes*, died in 404/3. According to Diogenes Laertios he satirised Pythagoreans at least twice, in *Ἡ Πυθαγοριζούσα* ('The Pythagorean Women', though the title varies slightly in different sources) and *Οἱ Ταραντίνοι* ('The Tarentines'). In the second of these, he describes their rhetorical subtleties:

ἔθος ἐστὶν αὐτοῖς, ἄν τιν' ἰδιώτην ποθὲν
 λάβωσιν εἰσελθόντα, διαπειρώμενον
 τῆς τῶν λόγων ῥώμης ταραττεῖν καὶ κυκᾶν
 τοῖς ἀντιθέτοις, τοῖς πέρασι, τοῖς παρισώμασιν,
 τοῖς ἀποπλάνοις, τοῖς μεγέθεσιν, νουβυστικῶς.

“They test their novices' vocabulary
 By trying to pose and puzzle the unwary
 With brainfuls of these ends, antitheses,
 Digressions, balances, and sublimities.”
 (fr. 7, tr. Edmonds *FAC II*)

There are some other comedies that may have featured intellectuals but too little remains of them to be useful. One is Strattis' Ζοπύρος Περικαιομένος ('The Burning of Zopyros'), written c.396 BC.²³ The title character could be one of two contemporary intellectuals. One is a physiognomist, subject of the story (doubtless apocryphal) that he analysed Sokrates' character from the features of a bust.²⁴ The second is Zopyros of Herakleia, a Pythagorean poet and war engineer. He may have had a hand in anti-Athenian operations in both Magna Graecia and Miletos in the later part of the Peloponnesian War, so it is possible that he was familiar to the Athenian public whom Strattis addressed.²⁵

Another play is Theopompos' Τεισαμενός. The title character is probably the same as the influential legal officer who proposed the decree for the revision of Athens' laws in 403 BC.²⁶ In *The Acharnians*, twenty-four years earlier, Aristophanes had linked this name with Phainippos (Τεισαμενοφαινίππος) – perhaps the same as the secretary to the *Boule* in 423 BC - abusing them as young men who evade responsibility and waste public pay while in Thrace (on military service?).²⁷ The scholiast says that Teisamenos was abused as a foreigner and a contemptible slave, standard attacks against those in responsible positions.²⁸ Legal officers are administrative specialists. They are occasionally ridiculed in comedies as an odious influence: a statute-seller (ὁ ψηφισματοπώλης) is among the parasites that come to Cloud-Cuckoo Land and, in *The Frogs*, Hades invites Nikomachos the legal secretary (ὁ ἀναγραφεύς) to commit suicide.²⁹

A2. Comedies with intellectualism as a theme

Aristophanes' *Frogs* (405 BC) has Dionysos coming to the underworld to bring back Euripides to advise Athens in the last period of the Peloponnesian War. It

features an extended contest between Aischylos and Euripides, representing the old and new styles of poetry - and everything else. Euripides is securely identified with the 'new education', as he produces instruments to measure verses, and is blamed for making Athenians chattering, litigious and amoral.

Aristophanes' *Ekklesiazousai* (c.392 BC) sees a woman, Praxagora, install a gynaeocracy at Athens and establish a utopian society, including communal meals and the abolition of private property and exclusive marriage. This new state strikingly resembles the one described in Plato's *Republic*, even though this is unlikely to have been published until several years afterwards.³⁰ Though Aristophanes nowhere even alludes to any specific individuals or proposals, it is hard to imagine that he was not parodying contemporary social and political theories. For instance, the chorus calls Praxagoras' proposals φιλόσοφος, a word whose inconvenience to the metre suggests that it was used quite deliberately.³¹

A number of lost plays had education as their theme, such as Aristophanes' *Οἱ Δαιταλεῖς* ('The Banqueters'), in which a modest son (Σώφρων) is contrasted to a profligate son (Καταπύγων), who is lazy and indulgent and has picked up the fashionable new speech of the sophists but does not know Homer.³² Kallias' *Ἡ Γραμματικὴ Θεωρία* or *Τραγωδία* ('The Grammatical Play' or 'Tragedy') had a song in which the alphabet and systematically arranged syllables sung.³³ Nothing else is known about this play – perhaps it was used as a teaching aid in schools or, if a performed comedy, an equivalent to Monty Python's *Galaxy Song*. The title of Kratinos' *Οἱ Χείρονες* ('The Cheirons') also suggests that it involved education, though the fragments revolve around Perikles and Aspasia. A fragment of Plato's *Αἱ Σοφισταὶ* ('The Sophists') (before c.403 BC) expresses a sentiment that is

optimistic and confident in the capacity of reason, typical of the 5th century intellectual movement: “For Promethean [foresightful] is the mind of man” (Προμήθειος γάρ ἐστὶν ἀνθρώποις ὁ νοῦς) (fr. 145). However, its remains do not mention philosophers, sophists or scientists and its ‘wise men’ include the flautist Bakchylides.³⁴

Even though the fragmentary condition of Attic comedy makes broad conclusions difficult, it is striking how few comedies seem to make any substantial mention of intellectuals. It will also be noticed that many of these do not seem to distinguish between intellectuals and other kinds of experts (Chapter 1 n. 22).

B. Characteristics of intellectuals

B1. Beggarliness

Sokrates and those attached to him are depicted as though they live like beggars. Sokrates and his companions in Aristophanes’ *Thinktank* are ill fed (Aristoph. *Cl.* 175, 416), wear threadbare cloaks and go about without shoes (103, 363, 718, 858). Their living conditions are filthy and insect-ridden (694ff.). They avoid exposure to open air (198-9), forego wine and exercise (417) and never shave, bathe or use ointment (836-7). They are frequently described as dirty.³⁵ In *The Birds* laconisers are described as ‘Socratifying’ (σωκρατέω), the context clearly referring to their toughness, unwashed appearance and rejection of comfort (1282). This view of Sokrates is not unique to Aristophanes. Ameipsias’ *Konnos* gives a colourful description of these characteristics:

Α· Σώκρατες ἀνδρῶν βέλτιστ’ ὀλίγων, πολλῶν δὲ
ματαιόταθ’, ἤκεις
καὶ σὺ πρὸς ἡμᾶς; καρτερικὸς γ’ εἶ, πόθεν ἂν σοὶ χλαῖνα
γένοιτο;

...

τουτὶ τὸ κακὸν τῶν σκυτοτόμων κατ' ἐπήρειαν
γεγένηται.

B: οὗτος μέντοι πεινῶν οὕτως οὐπόποτ' ἔτλη
κολακεῦσαι.

“A: Sokrates, with a few men you are wisest but among many the most foolish, do you come before us? You are indeed hardy – where can you get a decent cloak? [Your bare feet] are an insult to cobblers.

B: At any rate he goes hungry rather than endure to flatter.”
(fr. 9, tr. Olding)³⁶

In addition to their dirtiness and meagre lifestyle, they are also distinguished by pale skin and a sickly complexion. Paleness is normally associated with women, an indoor lifestyle (the ‘cobblers’ that Praxagora’s women in disguise are mistaken for) and poor health.³⁷ It may also refer to being covered in dust from the practice of drawing diagrams on the ground.³⁸ In *The Birds*, when Peisthetairos drives Meton, the town planner, engineer and astronomer, out of Cloud-Cuckoo Land, the verb he uses to threaten violence is σποδεῖν, which also has the meaning ‘to beat dust off’ (Aristoph. *Birds* 1016). Aristophanes refers to philosophers as ‘nightmares’ or ‘fevers’ (ἡπίαλοι, πυρετοί) on account of their bad colour and, in *The Clouds* the inmates of the Thinktank have a distinctive pallor.³⁹ Indeed, Pheidippides’ skin becomes pale as a consequence of his education.⁴⁰ Chairephon is almost proverbial for his bad complexion, a ‘box-wood’ yellow, as well as being thin and weak, half-dead (ἡμιθνής), a ‘child of night’ (νυκτὸς παῖς), a bat (νυκτερίς) and a blood-drinker, presumably also alluding to an ugly or anaemic appearance.⁴¹ It is significant that all these references to beggarly and sickly intellectuals are confined to Sokrates and his immediate associates, Chairephon or the inmates of the fictional Thinktank. This indicates that the image was specific but sufficiently powerful for Aristophanes, at least, to use it to characterise the whole philosophic tribe and to imply that it was a result of intellectual practices, the neglect of material concerns.

B2. Luxury and aristocratic elegance

A co-existing and contrasting image is that of the aristocratic intellectual, elegant and affected in appearance. This is a standard image of 4th century comedy, doubtless coinciding with the appearance of more organised schools of philosophy with their upper class students and patrons, but it is less common before then.⁴² When, in Aristophanes' *Wasps*, Bdelykleon drills his father in behaviour appropriate for a symposium of upper class sophisticates (σοφοί) (1196), the party he ends up at includes Antiphon, presumably the sophist and speechwriter (1301). The *Clouds*' dependents include 'lazy-long-haired-onyx-signet-ring-wearers' (σφαγιδονυχαργοκομήτας). Long hair signifies laconism and the affected dandyism of Athens' aristocratic youth.⁴³ A different effect of intellectualisation is to make people, especially the young, prone to sensual indulgence. An example is the Profligate Son of Aristophanes' *Banqueters* who claims that his education in rhetoric is appropriate for a gentleman (καλοκαγαθεῖν). At school he learns to eat and drink expensively but 'to keep pleasant and polite'.⁴⁴ Self-indulgence and pretentiousness are, of course, stock comic criticisms.

B3. Laziness

The beggarliness of intellectuals may reflect their neglect of material concerns and normal social values but it is also related to the belief that their researches and debates are a function of their disinclination to do proper work. Those whom the *Clouds* protect include idlers.⁴⁵ There are a number of references to the time-wasting of Sokrates and his friends in idle and pretentious talk. Eupolis explicitly contrasts intellectual activities with self-support:

μισῶ δὲ καὶ [τὸν] Σωκράτην, τὸν πτωχὸν ἀδολέσχην,
ὃς τᾶλλα μὲν πεφρόντικεν,
ὀπόθεν δὲ καὶ φαγεῖν ἔχη τούτου κατημέληκεν.

“And Socrates, the impecunious babbler, *him* I hate,
The man who studies everything save how to fill his plate.”
(Eupolis fr. 386)

In Aristophanes’ *Frogs* the chorus criticises Euripides’ sophistic poetry as resulting from his wasting time in over-subtle discussion:

χαρίεν οὖν μὴ Σωκράτει
παρακαθήμενον λαλεῖν,
ἀποβαλόντα μουσικὴν
τά τε μέγιστα παραλιπόντα
τῆς τραγωδικῆς τέχνης.
τὸ δ’ ἐπὶ σεμνοῖσιν λόγοισι
καὶ σκαριφησμοῖσι λήρων
διατριβὴν ἀργὸν ποιεῖσθαι,
παραφρονοῦντος ἀνδρός.

“So it isn’t stylish to sit
beside Sokrates and blabber away,
discarding artistry
and ignoring the most important things
about the tragedian’s craft.
To spend one’s time fecklessly
on pretentious talk
and nit-picking humbug
is to act like a lunatic.”
(Aristoph. *Fr.* 1491-8, tr. Sommerstein, Aris & Phillips)

B4. Instruments, books and theories

Much fun is made of the tools, objects and methods of intellectuals’ practices. Instruments and books are part of their comic paraphernalia. Sokrates’ Thinktank is full of scientific devices, for astronomy, geometry and land measuring (Aristoph. *Cl.* 201ff.). Meton comes to Cloud-Cuckoo Land proposing to plan

out the city with his ‘air-rods’ (κανόνες ἀέρος).⁴⁶ The most ‘modern’ of the tragic poets, Euripides, Aristophanes also depicts as having a predilection for devices and instruments; in his competition with Aischylos in *The Frogs*, Euripides produces compasses and scales with which to measure verses. He (and also Agathon) are depicted swinging or rolling onto stage on pieces of machinery, which may suggest a preoccupation with ostentatious mechanical theatricality.⁴⁷

Books are an item associated not with intellectuals themselves but with those who use specialist knowledge for their own purposes. Euripides is especially associated with them: his plays and verses are their ‘concentrated essence’; they do not have weight compared to Aischylos’.⁴⁸ Several of the parasites who come to Cloud-Cuckoo Land, including an obfuscating oracle-monger, a commissioner and a statute-seller, carry books and introduce themselves reading from them or use them as props to their self-interested claims. Peisthetairos, Cloud-Cuckoo Land’s founder, greets the last parasite with: “What new wicked book’s this?!” (τουτὶ τί ἐστὶν αὖ κακόν, τὸ βιβλίον;).⁴⁹ This fragment shows how a book could be viewed as representing intellectualism at its worst:

τοῦτον τὸν ἄνδρ’ ἢ βιβλίον διέφθορεν
ἢ Πρόδικος ἢ τῶν ἀδολεσχῶν εἷς γέ τις.

“A book’s spoiled him, or Prodicus, or if not,
some-one at any rate of the chattering lot.”
(Aristoph. fr. 506)

Books appear to be fairly widely available in Athens towards the end of the 5th century. Their novelty value may not be sufficient to explain comic references to them. Rather, they mark out pompous people, representing and emphasising, if only humorously, their peculiar knowledge and self-interested activities.⁵⁰

Intellectuals’ theories are also used for comic effect. It is, in fact, possible to

identify, at least in Aristophanes, specific doctrines and interests of particular intellectuals, such as the ‘primary element’ of Diogenes of Apollonia and the double arguments of Protagoras. The scene with Pheidippides and the Better and Worse Arguments resembles Prodikos’ *Choice of Herakles*.⁵¹ The Vortex (Δίνοϛ) with which Sokrates replaces Zeus in *The Clouds* is a term that was widespread in contemporary cosmological theory. It was certainly known outside scientific circles, indicated by a joke - similar to *The Clouds* but in a non-intellectual context - in *The Wasps*, and possibly by Euripides’ use of the term in a prayer in the *Alkestis*.⁵² Aristophanes’ *Birds* explicitly refer to Prodikos’ cosmology when they are seeking their own foundation myth for Cloud-Cuckoo Land.⁵³ Kratinos’ ‘See-Alls’ are mocked for their techniques for perception, analysis, reasoning and mental skills, which, the fragments emphasise, are expected to fail.⁵⁴

There is some element of parody in these references, for instance, Sokrates’ students in the Thinktank are introduced bent over to ‘search the darkness below Tartaros’ while simultaneously studying astronomy with their arseholes (Aristoph. *Cl.* 192ff.) while Sokrates himself measures flea’s feet (144ff.), theorises about the humming of gnats’ intestines (156ff.) and investigates the heavens while suspended in a basket (171, 218ff.). Parody of the metaphors used in cosmological theory is probably the point of Aristophanes’ and Kratinos’ depictions of Sokrates, Meton and Hippon describing the heavens as an oven (πνιγέϛ). Pherekrates has a god, referring to the manner in which sacrifices reach heaven, comparing the sky to a chimney (καπνοδόχη).⁵⁵ However, it is more common for intellectual theories and techniques to be decontextualised and reduced to jargon. The presumption seems to be that they are inherently silly, implying that ordinary people found them incomprehensible, implausible and useless⁵⁶ and intellectuals’ solemn faith in their value stupid, pretentious and laughable.

B5. Neologisms, verbosity and skill in argument

Philosophy and new sciences in all areas naturally develop new terminology. Many intellectuals worked on the study of language itself. Prodikos' particular interest is in distinguishing near-synonyms. In Plato's *Hippias Major*, Sokrates assumes that his interlocutor Hippias is likely to lecture on the components of speech and, in the *Kratylos*, that language studies are the field of 'the clever' (οἱ δεινοί).⁵⁷ Aristophanes parodies such linguistic studies in Sokrates' discussion about correct genders (Aristoph. *Cl.* 658ff.) and mocks new coinages and pseudo-technical words through incongruous or excessive usage. For instance, δυστοκέω, 'to have difficulty in child-birth', largely confined to Hippocratic works, Aristophanes uses metaphorically to describe the Athenians' difficulties over the Alkibiades question.⁵⁸ Innovation in general, and rhetorical affectation and philosophical speech in particular, he parodies by adding the ending -ΚΟΣ to colloquial words to create mock technical-sounding adjectives. Sokrates uses this form, for instance, asking Strepsiades "Do you have good mnemonic (μνημονικός)?" (Aristoph. *Cl.* 476). Strepsiades avoids it (using μνήμων - §484) until he is inspired by Sokrates' teaching: "I've got a fraudulent (ὑποσπερητικός) scheme for dodging interest!"⁵⁹

In addition to their use of technical jargon, intellectuals are distinguished by their verbosity. Pejorative terms for empty and pointless talk are regularly attached to them. They speak and teach 'babble' (λαλία) and 'empty talk' (ἄδολεσχία), for instance, Sokrates, his Worse Argument, Prodikos and intellectuals in general (Aristoph. *Cl.* 931, 1485, *Fr.* 1492, fr. 506). One of Eupolis' characters says, "Take him in hand, philosopher, and teach him how to babble" ([ἄλλ'] ἄδολεσχεῖν αὐτὸν ἐκδίδαξον, ὦ σοφιστά) (fr. 388). 'Babbling' was a

general characteristic ascribed to intellectuals. A term for a spurious claimant to knowledge is ἀλαζών, meaning ‘blusterer’, ‘boaster’ or ‘imposter’. This (and other forms of the same word) is used throughout *The Clouds* (e.g. §102, 449, 1492) and is applied to Meton when he arrives in Cloud-Cuckoo Land, proposing to measure the air, square the circle, and to plan out the city in the air (Aristoph. *Birds* 1016), and to Protagoras who ‘plays the charlatan with the heavens’ (Eupolis fr. 157).⁶⁰ ‘Tongue’ (γλῶττα) is almost an epithet for intellectuals. It seems to refer to both their verbosity and rhetorical skills. This is one of the gods that Sokrates and Euripides swear by.⁶¹ Sophists, specifically Gorgias and his ‘son’ Philip, are called ‘tongue-bellies’ (γλωττογαστόρες), gathering vast quantities of food through their skill in speaking.⁶²

Intellectuals’ most widely identified skill and vocation is in rhetoric. They can be depicted as experts in near-irresistible argument. It is this ability, to make the Worse Argument defeat the Better, that Strepsiades seeks from Sokrates and that the Clouds offer to teach. When the two Arguments contest, the Worse in fact succeeds in converting the Better. The intellectualised Pheidippides ‘almost convinces’ his father that father-beating is moral (Aristoph. *Cl.* 1437-9). *The Clouds* also provides parodies of various methods of argument. Sokrates’ denial of Zeus’ existence has a lengthy ‘proof’ that includes naturalistic explanations of meteorological phenomena and arguments from analogy, for instance, asserting that thunder originates in the Clouds when they are sodden, like indigestion (Aristoph. *Cl.* 367ff.). Strepsiades himself provides an etymological argument, pointing out the ‘similarity’ of βροντή (‘thunder’) and πορδή (‘fart’) (394). Kratinos the younger describes Pythagoreans testing the laymen with technicalities of argument (fr. 7).

Again, Aristophanes dominates the sources but it is clear that intellectuals were identified with verbosity and techniques of persuasion. By themselves these were

regarded as peculiar and amusing but also potentially dangerous, argument considered a method for promoting self-interest rather than discovering truth.

B6. Immorality

There are various forms of immorality that comic intellectuals practice, facilitate or induce in others. These tend to form a standard list of fairly specific abuses: impiety, greed, justification of self-interest and self-indulgence, physical debilitation and sexual corruption.

In *The Clouds* Sokrates practises petty theft.⁶³ This is only one instance of the theme that intellectuals are greedy and grasping. This is the point of Eupolis' charge:

δεξάμενος δὲ Σωκράτης, τὴν ἐπίδειξιν [ἄξιας]
Στησιχόρου πρὸς τὴν λύραν οἰοχόην ἔκλεψεν.

“Sokrates now received the lyre, and like a school boy ranter,
Scuttled through his Stesichoros - and nabbed the whole decanter.”
(Eupolis fr. 395)

The ‘tongue-bellies’ Gorgias and Philip, have already been mentioned. Greed may be implicitly connected to intellectuals’ laziness but it is also a stock charge levelled against any- and everyone. Eupolis’ *Οἱ Κόλακες* shows the greed and indulgence of the race of flatterers, at least some of whom are intellectuals, Protagoras and Chairephon (fr. 180). Intellectuals can also be mercenary in selling their skills: Aristophanes’ Sokrates accepts payment and Antiphon was criticised for greed and for writing legal speeches without regard for the case.⁶⁴

Comedians repeatedly associate intellectuals with religious unorthodoxy. The earliest reference to an intellectual in comedy is Kratinos’ allegation that Hippon was impious (fr. 167). In *The Clouds* Sokrates makes his first appearance

suspended from the crane, the normal means by which gods appear in plays. He constantly rejects normal gods and worships Chaos, the Clouds, Tongue, Respiration and Air.⁶⁵ Strepsiades at one point refers to Sokrates as ‘the Melian’, presumably a reference to Diagoras of Melos, the infamous atheist – after the date of *The Clouds*’ revision he was forced to flee Athens after mocking the Eleusinian Mysteries.⁶⁶ Strepsiades justifies his arson of the Thinktank by saying that the philosophers ‘most of all, have done injustice to the gods’ (μάλιστα δ’ εἰδὼς τοὺς θεοὺς ὡς ἠδίκουν).⁶⁷ In Aristophanes’ *Birds* there is a sarcastic reference to Sokrates ‘spirit-leading’ (ψυχαγωγεῖν), which introduces a parody of Odysseus’ sacrifice in the underworld (1555). As the preceding scene has Prometheus, an open god-hater, telling Peisthetairos how to usurp Zeus, the reference may imply that Sokrates is provocatively impious.⁶⁸ In *Οἱ Κόλακες* Eupolis says of Protagoras:

ὄς ἀλαζονεύεται μὲν ἀλιτήριος
περὶ τῶν μετεώρων, τὰ δὲ χαμάθεν ἐσθίει.

“With heavenly things he plays the charlatan,
Yet eats the things of the earth, the wicked man.”
(Eupolis fr. 157)

It seems that Protagoras is both arrogant in pontificating about the heavens and wicked for, in part, his disregard for the conventional practice of leaving crumbs that fall to the floor to heroes and the departed.⁶⁹ This may also allude to his greed, being unable to resist picking up fallen food. Aristophanes represents Euripides’ plays as notorious for their religious unorthodoxy, which are assumed, at least humorously, to represent his own view.⁷⁰ He associates Euripides and Agathon with emblems of intellectualism and represents them swearing by strange and sophistic gods: Aither, the Rolling Tongue (γλώττης στρόφιγξ), and by Intelligence and Sharp-Scenting Nostrils (καὶ ξύνεσι καὶ μυκτῆρες ὄσφραντήριοι).⁷¹

Intellectuals' facilitation of immoral behaviour is the starting point of *The Clouds*, Strepsiades' belief that learning the Wrong Argument can help him escape his creditors. It is a common use of rhetorical skills to make specious arguments to cover up and justify theft (Aristoph. *Cl.* 177-9, 498) and every excess (1043-82), to escape prosecution (434-5) and invalidate old laws and justice on the grounds that they are inconsistent with 'natural' principles (1039-42, 1421-9). Adultery can be justified by analogy to Zeus' behaviour (1080-2 cf. 904-6). The climax of *The Clouds* is the father-beating episode (1320ff., 1391ff., 1437-9), which Aristophanes represents as characteristic of the New Education: the Better Argument reviles the Worse as a 'parricide' even before their contest.⁷² An unknown speaker from another Aristophanes play identifies corruption with books or *some* intellectual, as though they and their influence are all the same (fr. 506, see above).

Aristophanes suggests that one effect of intellectualism is that it reduces physical strength, resilience and resistance to sensual pleasures. He represents intellectualised youths as being sensitive to heat and cold, demanding warm clothes, fine food and being addicted to hot baths (Aristoph. *Cl.* 987, 991 cf. 1073; B2 above). Intellectualism is associated with effeminacy and sexual abnormality. The pale complexion associated with intellectualism, apparently associated with an indoor lifestyle, poor health and a lack of physical resilience, is also characteristic of women.⁷³ It may therefore also suggest effeminacy. One of Aristophanes' 'assembly women' claims that womanish men become the best speakers (Aristoph. *Eccl.* 112-3). In Kratinos' *Οἱ Πανόπται* some one 'has become a paederast' (fr. 163), which, given the theme of the play, may be due to intellectual influences. Sokrates' Better Argument claims that his opponent will induce 'Antimachos' faggotry' (καταπυγούσῳνη) in Pheidippides (Aristoph. *Cl.* 1022-3) and the student in the Thinktank describes Sokrates as 'picking up a

διαβήτης from the palaistra and robbing him' - διαβήτης has the double meaning of 'compass' and 'homosexual'. The point of the joke is that Sokrates disguises his thievery by his interest in research, so it need not reflect entirely on his supposed proclivities.⁷⁴

It seems that intellectualism, in fact, encourages self-indulgence and self-interest. As such, intellectualism is regarded as potentially dangerous. The strength of hostility to intellectuals is also enhanced by a sense that they are hypocritical, as they are believed to claim to be high-minded and above material concerns.

B7. Arrogance and exclusivity

Self-importance, pomposity, aloofness, arrogance and disdain - like greed - are imputed to practically everyone in comedy and intellectuals are no exception. When Meton arrives in Cloud-Cuckoo Land he is shocked that he is not immediately recognised.⁷⁵ Sokrates is pompous and condescending (as well as irreligious) addressing Strepsiades as 'mortal' (ὦ 'φήμερε). He is described as wearing a 'holy expression' (σεμνοπροσωπεῖς) and using 'holy words' (σεμνοὶ λόγοι).⁷⁶

Intellectuals also form an exclusive group. Strepsiades' initiation into the Thinktank, parodying the prayers and rites of mystery cults, suggests this, even apart from any implication of irreverence. Strepsiades says that he feels as though he was entering the oracular cave of Trophonios. The studies carried out by Sokrates and his pupils are 'mysteries'.⁷⁷

C. Anti-intellectuals in comedy

Comedy functions in part by exploiting popular images for the sake of humour. We can see this being applied to anti-intellectuals as much as to intellectuals. Strepsiades is a character cast entirely in terms of an antithesis of intellectuals. He displays an innate inability to comprehend the Thinktank's objects or methods of research and persistently interprets everything in the most unsophisticated, archaic and literal (and usually obscene) way possible. When he is shown a map he conceives of it not as a representation but concrete reality: when Athens is pointed out to him he looks for the jurors; when Sparta, he is alarmed at its nearness (Aristoph. *Cl.* 207-17). On being told that Zeus does not exist he demands to know *who* is responsible for the phenomena ascribed to him and he understands Sokrates' answer, Vortex ($\Delta\tilde{\iota}\nu\omicron\varsigma$), to be a divine usurper (365ff., 826-8). Later he identifies a pot (also $\delta\tilde{\iota}\nu\omicron\varsigma$) with this same god (1473-4). It is clear that Aristophanes intends him to be an object of laughter as much as Sokrates. It is not clear that he is especially representative of the elderly or the peasant class: he is quite exceptionally uncomprehending.⁷⁸ He may not be the only representative of unreflective anti-intellectualism to be satirised. The fragmentary remark that someone's moral corruption is due to 'a book *or* Prodikos *or* some other chatterer' (Aristoph. fr. 506, see above) is so vague and undefined that it may be intended to be ludicrous, mocking compulsive and simplistic prejudices against learning on the assumption that it *must* have bad effects.

Pheidippides is a young man, perhaps 18-20 years old. Despite his father's rustic origin, he fully identifies himself with upper class young bloods, devoted to sport and other aristocratic social activities. His initial refusal to have anything to do with the Thinktank is because he believes that it is incompatible with his lifestyle: it will ruin his complexion and destroy his standing amongst his peers.⁷⁹

Aristophanes presents other representatives of aristocratic – or, at least, traditional – virtues as opponents of intellectualism, the Better Argument in *The Clouds* and Aischylos in *The Frogs*. None of these are exempt from mockery themselves: they are an unreflective, boy-obsessed prude on the one hand and an irascible bombast on the other. In fact, neither of them has any real response to intellectual methods and arguments. The Better Argument cannot refute his opponent's arguments for self-interested immorality. Aischylos affects to be above trading debating points with Euripides but does respond to his criticisms in kind (*Fr.* 1006ff.); his victory is simply due to Dionysos' whim. In both cases, the debate on the merits and demerits of intellectualism are subordinated to the comic value of the scenes.⁸⁰

Peisthetairos is a conventional comic hero, an ordinary Athenian citizen, critical of the flagrant self-interest and litigiousness of contemporary Athens, content with democracy and traditional virtues but ready to exploit a situation to his own advantage.⁸¹ His hostility to Meton is directed against his pomposity (he is identified with charlatans (ἄλαζόνας) (*Birds* 1016)) and, if he is viewed as part of the succession of visitors to the new city, his desire to profiteer from others' credulity.

D. Conclusion

Intellectuals named most frequently in comedy or represented on the comic stage are native Athenians, Sokrates, his friend Chairephon, and the astronomer Meton. Prominent foreign intellectual figures like Protagoras, Hippon, Prodikos and Gorgias are only mentioned occasionally and it is not certain that any of them were ever actually depicted on the stage. This presumably reflects the audience's familiarity with them. However, even foreign intellectuals who resided more or less permanently in Athens, such as Anaxagoras⁸² and Lysias, are never

mentioned. An intellectual's suitability for comic caricature seems to be partly a function of his (potential) influence and integration in the official life of the city.

D1. The ascription of intellectual characteristics

The tendency to identify a full set of behavioural patterns and beliefs with particular characteristics accounts for comedians' readiness to bestow intellectual characteristics on unlikely candidates, the tragic poets Euripides and, to a lesser extent, Agathon. The depiction of them using devices, instruments and books and swearing 'by Tongue' has already been mentioned. Their poetic style was described as 'babbling'.⁸³ Euripides uses subtle, technical and sophistic language and indulges in pseudo-scientific cosmological theorising⁸⁴ and he is often connected to Sokrates who, it is alleged, provided him with his clever and babbling tragedies and made him pretentious.⁸⁵

Α· τί δὴ σὺ σεμνὴ καὶ φρονεῖς οὕτω μέγα;
Εὐριπίδης ὡς γυνή· ἔξεστι γὰρ μοι· Σωκράτης γὰρ
αἴτιος.

“‘Why this great solemnity and disdain?’
Euripides (as a woman): ‘It is appropriate for me: Sokrates is the reason.’”
(Kallias fr. 15, tr. Olding)⁸⁶

Euripides also spreads the negative qualities of intellectualism: the central charge made against him in *The Frogs* is that he encouraged chatter, criticism, lack of deference to authority and immoral behaviour (949ff.). His plays supposedly spread atheism (Aristoph. *Th.* 450-2). Euripides' Hippolytos' justification for oath breaking - “My tongue swore, not my heart” – is represented as a sentiment that Euripides seriously subscribed to. Aristophanes twice throws it against him.⁸⁷ His most enthusiastic supporters are the intellectualised Pheidippides and, in the underworld, robbers, rascals and parricides.⁸⁸

D2. Comedians as anti-intellectuals

Aristophanes' assertion that *The Clouds* breaks new ground (534ff.) may, in fact, have some substance, as it is the only comedy that certainly made an individual intellectual or intellectualism its central theme. References to intellectuals from other comedians are comparatively rare, which is striking as we might expect Hellenistic collections of information from comedies (κωμωδοῦμενοι) and interest in philosophers' lives to preserve a reasonably representative sample. As mentioned above, it is possible to identify some specific theories of certain intellectuals in Aristophanes' plays. Overall, this strongly suggests that his interest in intellectuals as individuals was atypical.⁸⁹

Many characteristics that Aristophanes identifies in common with other comedians - laziness, greed, self-interestedness and self-importance - are stock imputations that are made against all comic targets. This suggests that intellectuals were generally conceived to exist in the same category as other distinct groups and socially odious influences. Aristophanes picks up certain points that other comedians appear to ignore, such as identifying intellectuals with scientific devices, books and neologisms and teaching rhetoric.⁹⁰ Curiously, although other comedians associate intellectuals with impiety and arrogance, Aristophanes seems to be the only one to express concern about intellectualism's capacity for moral corruption. Intellectual studies encourage a sense of superiority and bestows skills in argumentation that facilitate the pursuit of gross self-interest. This does not mean that Aristophanes denied the ability of the intellectual process to investigate matters usefully but that he thought that it was prone to abuse and that its rejection of meaningful things, such as physical development, poetic truth, and religious convention, was dangerous.

D3. Comic audiences as anti-intellectuals

The comparative rareness with which intellectuals appeared in comedy and the lack of depth of their characterisation suggests that the Athenian audience was relatively uninformed and uninterested in 'modern' intellectualism. They are not strongly distinguished from other kinds of experts and their nuisance value is conceived in much the same terms as other socially odious groups: arrogance, greed and so on. Irreligion is, perhaps, their only characteristic feature. The audience's lack of familiarity with intellectual may explain *The Clouds*' lack of success.⁹¹ As the *Hypothesis* indicates that the ending of the play is new, it is also possible that the audience regarded it as being in poor taste – the original perhaps showed Strepsiades' comic triumph over morality and even religion (see A1 above). The success of *The Frogs*, by contrast, may have been due to its patriotism, nostalgia and satire of the familiar.

2.2 - Diopieithes' Decree

καὶ ψήφισμα Διοπείθης ἔγραψεν εἰσαγγέλλεσθαι τοὺς τὰ θεῖα μὴ νομίζοντας ἢ λόγους περὶ τῶν μεταρσίων διδάσκοντας, ἀπεριδόμενος εἰς Περικλέα δι' Ἀναξαγόρου τὴν ὑπόνοιαν.

“And Diopieithes brought in a bill providing for the public impeachment of such as did not believe in gods, or who taught doctrines regarding the heavens, directing suspicion against Pericles by means of Anaxagoras.”
(Plut. *Per.* 32.2, tr. Perrin, Loeb)

Diopieithes' decree, apparently part of a concerted attack upon Perikles, is a striking instance of anti-intellectual sentiment and action. It forms the centerpiece of many discussions of the attitudes of Greek religion and towards intellectuals. A number of scholars consider that it is the basis of most, if not all, Athenian impiety trials.⁹² There are, however, reasons for doubting that the 'decree' is what it purports to be. I contend that it is probably not a decree but, nevertheless, *some* remnant from the late-5th or early-4th century. Its status will clearly affect its significance.

Plutarch is our only source.⁹³ The lack of any other references is surprising in view of the interest in Anaxagoras' trial shown by ancient authors, the Hellenistic Satyros, Sotion, Hermippos, Hieronymos and Diodoros.⁹⁴ It could be that Plutarch erred in connecting the decree to Anaxagoras' trial⁹⁵ but, even so, there is no mention of it in references to Diopieithes either. All we know for certain is that Plutarch had access to some datum that he thought reasonably credible. It is worth noting that he both begins and ends his account of the trials of Perikles' associates with expressions of uncertainty.⁹⁶

The connexion of Diopieithes' name to the decree suggests that it was linked to a man of this name from the outset. The name is uncommon within the forty years either side of the start of the Peloponnesian War so the most likely candidate is the oracle-monger who is mentioned several times in Old Comedy. Misattribution seems unlikely in view of his comparative lack of prominence.⁹⁷

The comedians refer to Diopeithes' oracle-mongering and his mad and frantic fits of anger.⁹⁸ Scholiasts call him a 'rhetor' and 'bribe-taker', which suggests that he was active politically.⁹⁹ There are, in fact, decrees proposed by a Diopeithes datable to the first years of the Peloponnesian War. One is the 'Methone decree', the other requires that anyone found in the Piraeus after a certain time of night be executed.¹⁰⁰ These figures' public profiles, activities (converging on the 420s), and reporters' failure to distinguish them imply that they are the same man. Their general characteristics are also consistent with a proposer of Plutarch's anti-astronomy 'decree'. He sounds like a religious fanatic and political opportunist.

The problem with accepting Diopeithes' decree at face value rests with its phrasing. The expression τὰ μετάρσια is unique in Plutarch's usage¹⁰¹, so it is probable that he is reproducing the language of his source. What, then, is the identity of his source? It is often assumed that Diopeithes' decree was preserved in the Hellenistic Krateros' *Collection of Decrees* (Ψηφισμάτων Συναγωγή).¹⁰² However, μετάρσιος is an Ionic and poetic word, unattested in Attic prose before Theophrastos (c.300 BC); τὰ μετέωρα is usual.¹⁰³ Plutarch's source is, therefore, unlikely to be the text of a decree. It could be a post-Classical paraphrase of a genuine decree. This, however, introduces the imponderable factors of the accuracy of reproduction of both its phrasing and its context – the propensity of commentators and excerptors to introduce errors and of ancient scholars to draw unwarranted conclusions has already been canvassed (Chapter 1.6 D).

A solution can be found in the term μετάρσιος. As indicated above (n. 103), while unattested in 5th century Attic prose, it is not unusual in poetry. This suggests that Diopeithes' decree's ultimate source may be a comedy. It has already been noted that the comedians refer to Diopeithes several times and that ancient writers, including Plutarch, are capable of incautious use of comedy as a historical source.¹⁰⁴ A playwright could have selected Diopeithes as the mouthpiece for a 'decree' on account of his personality and profession or, indeed, for the sake of a joke on his name, which means 'Zeus-truster'.¹⁰⁵ It is, moreover,

possible that Plutarch has misidentified two different Diopieithes, the oracle-monger for the mid-century comedian.¹⁰⁶ Of course, if the 'decree' did appear in a comedy we might expect to find a reference to it in the comic scholia on Diopieithes, at least two of which derive their information from *κωμωδοῦμενοι*.¹⁰⁷ Another possibility is that Diopieithes the seer composed the 'decree' himself as an anti-astronomer ditty or mock decree.

In summary, as the wording of Diopieithes' decree is unlikely to be Plutarch's own paraphrase, it probably reproduces the language of his source - but this is unlikely to be a Classical Attic decree, which would not use the expression. The 'decree' either came to Plutarch in a paraphrase, or was in poetic form from the start. Given the known appearance of Diopieithes in comedy and the known scholarly habits of ancient writers, a source in Attic Old Comedy is plausible.

The 'decree' cannot be taken as evidence of strong anti-intellectual sentiment spread across the whole citizen body as it could were it a genuine decree. As it may well be a sentiment put into the mouth of the comic Diopieithes or expressed by Diopieithes himself, it is evidence for the existence of dislike of intellectualism, specifically astronomy, on the grounds that it rejects traditional religious beliefs. This sentiment also assumes that the issue comes within the city's jurisdiction. It can be taken as the genuine opinion of an individual seer with a penchant for self-advertisement and/or a parody of his attitude that a popular audience was expected to recognise.

2.3 - Tragedy

As one of the most impressive presentations of the anti-intellectual theme, Aischylos' *Prometheus Bound*, falls outside the chronological scope of this thesis, I shall be focusing on the plays of Euripides. Euripides' connexion with contemporary intellectuals is part of his traditional biography and may be exaggerated (Chapter 2 n. 82 & 86). Attempts to identify references to particular historical incidents are disprovable more often than they are provable. Nevertheless, his undoubted interest in intellectual novelties makes it likely that he was sensitive to views towards intellectualism in general, positive and negative. His plays provide evidence for what he expected his audience to find comprehensible as criticism of intellectuals.

Euripides' plays sometimes have characters that seem to be deliberately cast in the roles of contemporary intellectuals. Most notable are Palamedes and Amphion from the *Palamedes* and *Antiope* (which are lost, so my comments depend on a large measure of conjecture), and perhaps also the title character of the *Medeia*. He depicts these figures being subjected to various forms and degrees of hostility. In addition Euripides' characters will sometimes comment on aspects of new methods of thought and new beliefs. It can be assumed that views expressed in plays are at least, comprehensible to the audience. Sentiments which (a) are irrelevant to the character and situation or (b) appear in a number of different plays over a period of time can be assumed to be those with which the playwright himself had particular concern (Chapter 1.6 B1).

A. Attacks on intellectuals

A1. Palamedes

Palamedes is a Greek culture hero, regularly described as σοφός, proverbial for his wisdom and inventiveness. He is traditionally credited with a series of innovations and improvements, including the alphabet, arithmetic, military

logistics, beacons, astronomy and gaming with dice.¹⁰⁸ Euripides produced his play *Palamedes* in 415 BC, along with *The Trojan Women* and the lost *Alexander* and *Sisyphos*, the tetralogy taking the second prize. In the *Palamedes* he seems deliberately to categorise the title character with contemporary sophists. A fragment has Palamedes listing his innovations, using the terms ἄφωνα and φωνήεντα to describe his contributions to literacy (fr. 578 (N)). These terms are probably quite technical, as they do not appear again until Plato and Aristotle.¹⁰⁹

Versions of Palamedes' death show considerable variation. The constant theme is that he is a wise man and a technical innovator who was killed unjustly, the murder committed or contrived by Odysseus, motivated by some sort of grudge. Euripides seems to have had Odysseus forging a letter that purported to show that Palamedes was conspiring with the Trojans. Odysseus acted as prosecutor and Agamemnon and the whole Greek army found Palamedes guilty and executed him.¹¹⁰ Apart from any actual evidence produced, Odysseus' case against Palamedes consists in blackening his character with allegations of deviousness, speciousness, greed and self-interest.

A fragment, probably spoken by Odysseus attempting to overcome Agamemnon's initial resistance to the possibility that Palamedes could be a traitor¹¹¹, alleges that superior abilities, such as Palamedes', will naturally be turned towards self-interest. The implication is that this may be dangerous to others. In this case, Palamedes' increased ambition has apparently led him to commit treachery.

Ἀγάμεμνον, ἀνθρώποισι πᾶσιν αἰ τύχαι
μορφὴν ἔχουσι, συντρέχει δ' εἰς ἓν τόδε·
τούτου δὲ πάντες, οἳ τε μουσικῆς φίλοι
οἷοι τε χωρὶς ζῶσι, χρημάτων ὑπερ
μοχθοῦσιν, ὅς δ' ἂν πλείστ' ἔχη σοφώτατος.

“Agamemnon, to all men fortunes
 have a shape, and it converges in this one thing:
 for the sake of this all men, both lovers of the arts
 and those who live without such things, toil
 for money, and whoever has most is wisest.”
 (Eur. fr. 580 (N), tr. Olding & D.A. Hester)

Palamedes’ pride in his intellectual skills may have led him to damage his own case in the eyes of his judges. His claim that he discovered vowels and consonants, which has already been cited, is only part of a longer list that focuses on the many benefits that have come from his invention of writing (fr. 578 (N)). Though an appeal to one’s character, abilities and benefactions is a conventional tactic of defence, it can also indicate arrogance. The following could be an example of this:

στρατηλάται τᾶν μυρίοι γενοίμεθα,
 σοφός δ’ ἂν εἷς τις ἢ δύο’ ἐν μακρῷ χρόνῳ.

“Ten thousand of us could become generals but only one or two wise in a long time.”
 (Eur. fr. 581 (N), tr. Olding)

On the basis of the surviving fragments, Palamedes seems to be entirely innocent of the charges and insinuations made against him; his worst offence is tactlessness and an inclination towards self-importance. Odysseus is motivated by a desire for petty revenge and is quite exceptionally unscrupulous, villainous and self-serving, even beyond the amoral pragmatism that is typical of his character in other tragedies, such as Sophokles’ *Philoktetes* and Euripides’ *Hekabe*.¹¹² It does not appear that Euripides expected or intended his audience to sympathise with Odysseus or to rejoice at Palamedes’ death. The play is not an instance of anti-intellectualism but it provides examples of the kinds of accusations that could be made against an intellectual figure (arrogance and an exaggerated capacity to pursue self-interest). Evidently, Odysseus was able to exploit pre-existing suspicion and resentment of Palamedes’ creativity and virtuosity. The Greek chiefs’ implication in Palamedes’ death (Eur. fr. 588 (N)) indicates that the case against him was persuasive. Even if the forcefulness of Odysseus’

personality and his rhetorical skills were important factors, the accusations must have been at least superficially plausible.¹¹³

The other aspect of anti-intellectualism that appears in the *Palamedes* is the contrast that is implied to exist between wisdom and inventiveness on the one hand and cunning on the other. Palamedes' cultivated intellectual skills failed to anticipate danger or to protect him from Odysseus' deviousness. In fact, he was unable even to realise the potential for abuse that existed in his own invention, writing, Odysseus' forgery proving decisive in his conviction and death.¹¹⁴

A2. Zethos and Amphion

Euripides' lost play *Antiope* was produced in c.409 BC along with *The Phoenician Maidens* and the lost *Hypsipyle*.¹¹⁵ Hyginus, who explicitly cites Euripides as his source, provides a basis for reconstructing it.¹¹⁶ The story revolves around the twin brothers Zethos and Amphion, their rescue of their mother Antiope and punishment of her persecutors, Lykos, the usurper king of Thebes, and his consort Dirke. The chief interest for the purpose of this thesis lies in the difference between the two brothers' lifestyles and interests. Though Amphion is mentioned in the earliest Greek poetry, and a fragment of Hesiod specifically refers to the magical powers of his lyre-playing - charming stones to move of their own accord to fortify Thebes¹¹⁷ - Euripides is the first writer known to identify him as an contemplative inquirer. He is also apparently the first to suggest a contrast and tension between Amphion's lifestyle and Zethos' physicality and belief in conventional virtues. This debate seems to have become famous as it is alluded to by a number of later authors, for instance, Horace (*Ep. I* 18.40-44).

Amphion seems to have arrived on the stage after the first choral ode, before Zethos, to sing a cosmogenic hymn. This probably included the fragment, "I sing of Air and Earth, the mother of all".¹¹⁸ As with Palamedes' use of technical language, this quasi-scientific cosmology has the effect of introducing Amphion

as representative of sophistic and scientific thought. Later in the play Amphion hears Antiope's tale of Zeus' transmogrification and assault but rejects it on rationalistic grounds (fr. 210). This scepticism about accepted mythical beliefs is another hallmark of contemporary intellectualism.¹¹⁹ A reference to 'double arguments' (δισσοὶ λόγοι), whatever its context, also alludes to this.¹²⁰

After Amphion has sung his hymn Zethos arrives on stage. According to Horace he is on his way to go hunting:

nec tua laudabis studia aut aliena reprehendes,
nec, cum venari volet ille, poemata panges.
gratia sic fratrum geminorum, Amphionis atque
Zethi, dissiluit, donec suspecta severo
Conticuit lyra. Fraternalis cessisse putatur
moribus Amphion...

“Again, you will neither praise your own tastes, nor find fault with those of others, nor when your friend would go a-hunting, will you be penning poems. ‘Twas so that the brotherly bond between the twins Amphion and Zethus parted asunder, till the lyre, on which the stern one looked askance, was hushed. Amphion, ‘tis thought, yielded to his brother’s mood...”
(Hor. *Ep. I* 18.39-44, tr. H.R. Fairclough, Loeb)

As the fragments of the play actually focus on mundane agrarian activities (fr. 188), it is possible that Horace differed from Euripides in giving Zethos an aristocratic pastime. In any case, it is the obvious contrast between their respective occupations that provokes Zethos to open the famous debate. His attack in the first place seems to be directed against Amphion's music (fr. 184, 187) but is basically against the contemplative life. ‘Music’ refers to intellectual and aesthetic cultivation in general.

Zethos criticises Amphion's reflective and cultured occupations as being physically debilitating:

...ἀμελείς ὦν [σε φροντίζειν ἐχρήν·]
ψυχῆς φύσιν [γὰρ] ὦδε γενναίαν [λαχῶν]
γυναικομίμῳ διαπρέπεις μορφώματι...
κοῦτ' ἂν ἀσπίδος κύτει

[καλῶς] ὁμιλήσειας οὐτ' ἄλλων ὑπερ
νεανικὸν βούλευμα βουλευσαίό [τι].

“You are neglecting what you should not;
the gods bestowed on you a noble nature,
yet you make yourself conspicuous in a womanish shape.
... You could not take your place in battle with the hollow shield,
Nor offer vigorous counsels on behalf of others.”
(Eur. fr. 185, tr. Carter, L.B., *The Quiet Athenian*, p. 165)

[Amphion responds:] τὸ δ' ἀσθενές μου καὶ τὸ θῆλυ σώματος
κακῶς ἐμέμφθης...

“You reproach me for weakness and an effeminate appearance...”
(Eur. fr. 199, tr. Carter, p. 168)

That is, Zethos alleges that Amphion's lifestyle is physically debilitating; he may connect intellectual inquiry to self-indulgence. Babble (λαλία), which, we have seen, is a derogatory byword for discourse and argument in comedy, is one kind of this pleasurable idleness.

κόσμος δὲ σιγῇ στεγανὸς ἀνδρὸς οὐ κακοῦ·
τὸ δ' ἐκλαλοῦν τοῦθ' ἡδονῆς μὲν ἄπτεται,
κακὸν δ' ὁμίλημ', ἀσθενές δὲ καὶ πόλει.

“A decent reticence shows well in a man of worth.
This idle prattling is all pleasure;
it is a bad companion, and the city is weakened by it.”
(Eur. fr. 219 (N), tr. Carter, p. 166)

κακῶν κατάρχεις τήνδε μούσαν εἰσάγων
ἀργὴν φίλοινον χρημάτων ἀτημελῆ.

“It is the beginning of evil if you introduce this Muse that is lazy, wine-loving, and careless about money.”
(Eur. fr. 184 (N³), tr. Snell, B., *Scenes from Greek Drama*, p. 82)

ἀνὴρ γὰρ ὅστις εὖ βίον κεκτημένος
τὰ μὲν κατ' οἶκους ἀμελία παρῆς ἔῃ,
μολπαῖσι δ' ἥσθεις τοῦτ' ἀεὶ θηρεύεται,
ἀργὸς μὲν οἴκοις καὶ πόλει γενήσεται,
φίλοισι δ' οὐδείς· ἡ φύσις γὰρ οἴχεται,
ὅταν γλυκείας ἡδονῆς ἥσσω τῆς ἦ.

“Any man of substance and property
 who neglects the affairs of his house,
 running after the pleasures of music and dance,
 will be useless to both his house and his city,
 and no good to his friends. It ruins his
 nature when he gives way to pleasure.”
 (Eur. fr. 187 (N), tr. Carter, p. 164)

Zethos specifically attacks Amphion’s ‘wisdom’ as inducing corruption of men’s nature:

πῶς γὰρ σοφὸν τοῦτ’ ἔστιν, ἥτις εὐφυᾶ
 λαβοῦσα τέχνη φῶτ’ ἔθηκε χείρονα;

“How can something be wise, an art that takes a man with a noble nature
 and make him worse?”
 (Eur. fr. 186 (N), tr. Olding)

Zethos repeatedly emphasises that Amphion possesses a noble nature (φύσις, γενναῖος) (fr. 185, 186, 187). The Athenian audience, though mostly non-aristocratic in birth themselves, would certainly identify this with worthy qualities and behaviour. These qualities are physical and political; proper occupations are reasonable self-interest to sustain oneself and one’s family, and devotion to the welfare of one’s city (fr. 187).

ἄλλ’ ἐμοὶ πιθοῦ·
 παῦσαι μελωδῶν, πολέμων δ’ εὐμουσίαν
 ἄσκει· τοιαῦτ’ ἄειδε καὶ δόξεις φρονεῖν,
 σκάπτων, ἀρῶν γῆν, ποιμνίοις ἐπιστατῶν,
 ἄλλοις τὰ κομψὰ ταῦτ’ ἀφείς σοφίσματα,
 ἐξ ὧν κενοίσιν ἐγκατοικήσεις δόμοις.

“Be persuaded by me,
 cease singing, and adorn the art
 of war; you will seem to be wise if you sing of such things,
 digging, tilling the land, tending the flocks;
 leave to others these affected subtleties,
 which will cause you to live in a destitute house.”
 (Eur. fr. 188 (N), tr. Olding)

Zethos is an apologist for traditional aristocratic interests: hunting, concern with lineage, physical development, decent ambition and expectations of public service. He also assumes that men are responsible for their own preservation and prosperity: this requires them to have the ability to earn a living and to defend themselves from threats from nature and from human enemies, within and without one's own city.¹²¹

To babble and be silly, idle and poor may be ridiculous and contemptible but really only affects the individual. However, Zethos' thought is preoccupied with the individual's (especially if he is distinguished by birth) responsibility to the state (especially fr. 187, 219). In this regard, indulging in idle pleasures and failing to maintain physical fitness are not simply the individual's concern but have moral and civic dimensions. He identifies military training and agriculture as appropriate pastimes. Amphion states that Zethos is 'praising dangers' (τὰ κινυδεύματα ἀνείτ'), which he connects to political leadership (fr. 194 (N)). This further indicates that Zethos is advocating zealous involvement in public affairs, perhaps even in the encouragement of personal ambition as a means to serve the state. Amphion's defence of specialised cultivation of one's particular interests suggests that Zethos had attacked this as amounting to irresponsible self-indulgence:

λαμπρός θ' ἕκαστος κάπι τοῦτ' ἐπείγεται
νέμων τὸ πλεῖστον ἡμέρας τούτῳ μέρος,
ἴν' αὐτὸς αὐτοῦ τυγχάνει κράτιστος ὄν.

"Each shines in and pursues that, and gives the greatest part of the day to that in which he is best."

(Eur. fr. 183 (N), tr. Olding cf. Hor. *Ep.* I 18.39)

τοιόσδε θνητῶν τῶν τάλαιπῶρων βίος·
οὔτ' εὐτυχεῖ τὸ πάμπαν οὔτε δυστυχεῖ.
[εὐδαιμονεῖ τε καὶθις οὐκ εὐδαιμονεῖ.]
τί δῆτ' ἐν ὄλβῳ μὴ σαφεῖ βεβηκότες
οὐ ζῶμεν ὡς ἥδιστα μὴ λυπούμενοι;

“Such is the life of the wretching, struggling mortals:
 Not always fortunate, neither unfortunate;
 Sometimes prosperous, then again out of luck.
 When life is so full of uncertainties,
 Why should we not get as much enjoyment as
 We can, and avoid misery?”
 (Eur. fr. 196 (N), tr. Carter, p. 167)

Aristotle cites the first of these two fragments in the context of selfishness – if this is what Zethos had asserted that specialisation of interests amounts to, then this again suggests his belief in the primacy of the interest of the state and the desirability of a physically and politically active life.¹²² He views intellectual pastimes as pleasures that distract from public obligations. They deprive the individual of the experience necessary for active participation in public decision-making. Physical and moral debilitation also deprive the individual of the energy for ‘vigorous debate’ (νεανικόν βούλευμα) central to political life (fr. 185). This vigour consists in energy and determination but also a certain vehemence, a non-aristocratic quality but one that is necessary for participation in democratic debate, particularly as the Athenian audience would imagine it.¹²³

If Horace followed the *Antiope*, it seems that Zethos won the debate, Amphion acquiescing for the sake of fraternal harmony. Euripides’ object in this is at least partly technical: the story of the brothers’ rescue of Antiope and their vengeance on Dirke and Lykos cannot be advanced if disunity persisted.¹²⁴ However, it is Amphion who appears in the better light in the long run. When Antiope appears, having escaped from Lykos and Dirke, Zethos refuses to receive her, believing her simply to be a runaway slave. Amphion, by contrast, reserves judgement.¹²⁵ In the final confrontation with Lykos it is Amphion who speaks, implying that, by that stage, he is the brothers’ spokesman.¹²⁶ It may be that Amphion’s deference to Zethos in itself shows the superiority of his cultivation: he knows when to suppress pride for the sake of higher interests. His technical ability is also ultimately vindicated, receiving the gods’ sanction when Hermes appears at the end of the play and prophesises, in accord with the standard tradition, that Amphion will build the walls of Thebes by moving stones with the music of his

lyre.¹²⁷ Euripides' *Antiope* seems to give a more positive assessment to intellectual (or, at least, cultivated non-physical) skills than does the *Palamedes*. Its importance lies in its identification of a contrast between intellectualism on the one hand and certain qualities and activities traditionally assumed to be desirable, either in their own right or as a component of wider public responsibilities.

A3. Medeia

Medeia is usually depicted in ancient sources as a witch with great magical ability. For instance, one of her earliest citations, in the *Epic Cycle*, refers to her rejuvenation magic.¹²⁸ Euripides, however, in his play of 431 BC, significantly downplays this aspect. She does not allude to magic when she gleefully refers to its most infamous (ab)use, Pelias' death, and the means that she considers for committing murder are the conventional ones, fire, sword or poison.¹²⁹ Instead, her main skill is in her cunning. Euripides has characters repeatedly describe her as 'wise' (σοφή, sometimes the masculine σοφός). Aigeus refers to her mind and her being wise (φρενός, σοφός) as positive qualities, and Jason to her 'subtle intelligence' (νοῦς λεπτός). After Medeia has murdered Kreon and his daughter a messenger criticises the abuses of 'those of mortals who seem to be wise and crafters of polished speeches' (τοὺς σοφοὺς βροτῶν δοκοῦντας εἶναι καὶ μεριμνητὰς λόγων), terms that also invoke the qualities of contemporary intellectuals.¹³⁰ It is not true that Euripides makes Medeia their representative but it is significant that he prefers to emphasise her mental skills over her traditional abilities in magic.

Medeia delivers a famous speech in which she bemoans the suspicions held against those with a reputation for intelligence. Some scholars have conjectured that this refers to Anaxagoras' supposed exile from Athens, on account of Euripides' supposed connexion with him and the play's date in the 430s.¹³¹ However, the speech's presence is explicable simply in dramatic terms as Medeia's rhetorical tactic designed to extract a concession from King Kreon who

has just explicitly voiced his fear of her as a wise woman (σοφή) (285). Medeia says as much after he has gone (368-9). The speech is significant as a list of imputations that could be made to intellectuals:

φεῦ φεῦ.
 οὐ νῦν με πρῶτον ἀλλὰ πολλάκις, Κρέον,
 ἔβλαψε δόξα μεγάλα τ' εἴργασται κακά.
 χρῆ δ' οὐποθ' ὅστις ἀρτίφρων πέφυκ' ἀνήρ
 παῖδας περισσῶς ἐκδιδάσκεισθαι σοφούς·
 χωρὶς γὰρ ἄλλης ἧς ἔχουσιν ἀργίας
 φθόνον πρὸς ἀστῶν ἀλφάνουσι δυσμενῆ.
 σκαιοῖσι μὲν γὰρ καινὰ προσφέρων σοφὰ
 δόξεις ἀχρεῖος κοῦ σοφὸς πεφυκέναι·
 τῶν δ' αὖ δοκούντων εἶδέναι τι ποικίλον
 κρείσσων νομισθεῖς ἐν πόλει λυπρὸς φανῆ.
 ἐγὼ δὲ καὐτῇ τῆσδε κοινωνῶ τύχης·
 σοφῆ γὰρ οὔσα, τοῖς μὲν εἰμ' ἐπίφθονος,
 [τοῖς δ' ἡσυχαία, τοῖς δὲ θατέρου τρόπου,
 τοῖς δ' αὖ προσάντης...]

“Ah me!

Not now for the first time, Kreon, but often
 my reputation has wrought great wickedness to harm me.
 The man who is intelligent should never have
 his children taught to be cleverer than others.
 For they will have idle knowledge,
 and will earn the spite and jealousy of others.
 If you bring new knowledge to fools,
 you will be thought to be useless and not wise:
 and if your fame exceeds those formerly
 thought intelligent, you will be wretched in the city.
 I share in this lot.
 For since I am wise, I seem odious to them,
 or spiritless or having strange manners,
 or am an obstacle...”

(Eur. *Med.* 294-305, tr. Olding)

Medeia describes the public suspicion and odium that come from providing radical advice, affronting traditional authorities, having strange behaviour and interests, and possessing knowledge without obvious practical benefit. She presumes that ‘most people’ are *anti-intellectuals*. Their dislike is founded on the identification of ‘the wise’ as a distinct group whose habits are strange and

therefore suspect and whose authoritative statements are felt to challenge the *status quo*. They do not propose any alternative means of discovering truth but doubt the usefulness of intellectualism. This attitude amounts to *anti-intellectualism* but of an implicit and unarticulated kind. The fact that Medeia sways Kreon indicates that her complaint about the treatment of intellectuals was superficially plausible. However, the audience members are unlikely to have sympathised with her on this account in view of her deviousness, murderousness and the extremity of her revenge. They would regard it as an instance of a skill being turned towards self-interest.

A4. The Bacchants

Euripides' *The Bacchae* (407/6 BC), though composed in Macedonia, was doubtless intended for an Athenian audience.¹³² The most prominent theme of the play is the difference between kinds of wisdom. Wisdom is nowhere criticised; on the contrary, it is frequently praised.¹³³ The issue is, rather, the correctness of thought. Danger comes not so much from errors in reasoning but from misplaced confidence in intellectual acuteness. Pentheus' downfall (his psychological problems notwithstanding) is due to his failure to comprehend the truth of the new religion. He is not an intellectual but his thought is characterised by exceedingly unimaginative rationalism. He understands the cult as a purely social phenomenon. He regards Bacchic worship as a simple pretext for licentious behaviour (e.g. 218, 224) and assumes that the Maenads must be motivated by hope of some gain (257, 473). He focuses on the importance of charismatic leadership even before meeting Dionysos (233ff., 352ff.). When he interrogates Dionysos he ignores the possibility that the cult might have mystical aspects, preferring to concentrate on reductionist questions about its origin, nature and intent (465ff.). For Pentheus (as for Amphion in the *Antiope*), the story of Dionysos' birth from Zeus' thigh is ludicrous, even doing violence (ὄβρις ὑβρίζειν) to his understanding of the gods.¹³⁴ Dionysos and his followers repeatedly observe that Pentheus' comprehension is limited and his self-confidence is misplaced.¹³⁵ They link his ignorance to impiety (490, 502ff., 890).

The chorus of Bacchantes makes explicit the contrast between true wisdom on the one hand and arrogant irrationality that is blind and destructive to divine things on the other. Their ideal is the ‘life of quiet contemplation’ (ὁ δὲ τᾶς ἡσυχίας βίωτος καὶ τὸ φρονεῖν...) (389-90), which they contrast with ‘unbridled mouths and lawless folly’, its ‘end-result is misfortune’ (ἀχαλίνων στομάτων ἀνόμου τ’ ἀφροσύνας τὸ τέλος δυστυχία) (386-7). They assert that:

τὸ σοφὸν δ’ οὐ σοφία,
 τό τε μὴ θνητὰ φρονεῖν
 βραχὺς αἰὼν· ἐπὶ τούτῳ
 δὲ τίς ἂν μεγάλα διώκων
 τὰ παρόντ’ οὐχὶ φέροι; μαι-
 νομένων οἶδε τρόποι καὶ
 κακοβούλων παρ’ ἔμοιγε φωτῶν.

“Wit is not wisdom
 and thinking non-mortal thoughts
 sees a short life. In this case,
 who would pursue great things
 while losing what is near to hand?
 The ways of such men *I* call mad
 and evil-thinking.”
 (Eur. *Bac.* 395-402, tr. Olding).

After Pentheus has fallen under Dionysos’ control they comment:

ἀπευθύνει δὲ βροτῶν
 τοὺς τ’ ἀγνωμοσύναν τιμῶν-
 τας καὶ μὴ τὰ θεῶν ἀξον-
 τας σὺν μαινομένῳ δόξα.

“And it [the divine] strictly corrects of mortals,
 those, who honouring senselessness
 and not exalting the divine,
 with a mad notion.”
 (Eur. *Bac.* 884-7, tr. Olding).

Dionysos further shows this contrast:

ῥαδίως γὰρ αὐτὸν οἶσω, κἄν πνέων ἔλθῃ μέγα.
πρὸς σοφοῦ γὰρ ἀνδρὸς ἀσκεῖν σῶφρον' εὐοργησίαν.)

“With ease will I endure him, even if he comes breathing arrogance. For what a wise man does is to exercise self-controlled gentleness of temper.”
(Eur. *Bac.* 640-1, tr. Seaford, Aris & Phillips)

The wisdom that the Bacchants pursue is that which is appropriate to mortals, in contrast to the presumptuous wisdom of the rash and arrogant.¹³⁶ For the Bacchants wisdom consists in knowing the god:

τὸ σοφὸν οὐ φθόνῳ
χαίρω θηρεύουσα,
τὰ δ' ἕτερα μεγάλα φανερά τ' ὄντ' ἀεὶ,
ἐπὶ τὰ καλὰ βίον
ἡμαρ εἰς νύκτα τ' εὐαγοῦντ'
εὐσεβεῖν, τὰ δ' ἔξω νόμιμα δίκας ἐκβαλόν-
τα τιμᾶν θεούς.

“I do not hunt for cleverness jealously, but for these other things, great and manifest, enduring always, that lead life towards the fine things, to be reverent by day and into night, and to honour the gods, casting out customs that are unjust.”
(Eur. *Bac.* 1005-10, tr. Olding)

The danger to be had from succumbing to intellectual arrogance is in rejecting beliefs about religion. Both Teiresias and the chorus say that subjecting traditional beliefs and customs to intellectual analysis and rationalisation is tantamount to attacking them:

οὐδὲν σοφιζόμεθα τοῖσι δαίμοσιν.
πατρίους παραδοχάς, ἅς θ' ὀμήλικας χρόνῳ
κεκτῆμεθ', οὐδεὶς αὐτὰ καταβαλεῖ λόγος,
οὐδ' εἰ δι' ἄκρων τὸ σοφὸν ἠϋρηται φρενῶν.

“We do not exercise cleverness in the eyes of the gods. Ancestral traditions, and those which we have obtained as old as time, no argument will throw them down, not even if wisdom is found through utmost thought.”
(Eur. *Bac.* 200-3, tr. Seaford, Aris & Phillips).

Καταβαλεῖ (202) may allude to the destructive agnostic logic of sophistic literature in general, perhaps to Protagoras' *Refutations* (Καταβαλλόντες) in particular.¹³⁷ On the contrary, knowledge is traditional and universally available.

οὐ
 γὰρ κρείσσον ποτε τῶν νόμων
 γινώσκειν χρῆ καὶ μελετᾶν.
 κούφα γὰρ δαπάνα νομί-
 ζειν ἴσχυον τόδ' ἔχειν,
 ὅ τι ποτ' ἄρα τὸ δαιμόνιον,
 τὸ τ' ἐν χρόνῳ μακρῷ
 νόμιμον ἀεὶ φύσει τε πεφυκός.

“For things greater than our customs
 we should not know and be concerned about.
 For it takes little effort to realise
 that whatever is divine has strength
 and that what has been law for a great time
 is eternal and has been founded on nature.”
 (Eur. *Bac.* 890-7, tr. Olding)¹³⁸

σοφὰν δ' ἀπέχειν πραπίδα φρένα τε
 περισσῶν παρὰ φωτῶν·
 τὸ πλῆθος ὃ τὸ φαυλότερον ἐνόμισε χρῆ-
 τὰ τε, τόδ' ἂν δεχοίμαν.

“But it is wise [for a man] to hold his heart and mind apart from
 those presuming to be more than mortal.
 What the humble masses
 believe and adopt, I would accept.”
 (Eur. *Bac.* 428-31, tr. Olding).

B. Euripides' criticisms of intellectualism

Criticisms of intellectuals revolve around their laziness, uselessness, arrogance, apathy and (conversely) political interference. These are encapsulated in Medeia's complaint but also appear in the other plays cited.

There is no criticism of wisdom and intelligence as such. These things tend to be represented in positive terms as a kind of prudence, related to the restraint that is

at the centre of Greek morality. Everyone can possess this quality of restraint, the humble as well as the clever and powerful. Intellectualism, the ability to analyse, calculate and argue, is usually represented negatively. It is often portrayed as inadequate in its inability to come to grips with the *real* world (including the divine) and over-confidence in one's intellectual powers induces an arrogant refusal to accept reality and to ignore correction. *Medeia*'s chorus of Korinthian women, when they hear about the murder of Jason's bride and Kreon, highlight this contrast between wisdom as prudence on the one hand and wisdom as increased capacity for destructiveness on the other:

οὐδ' ἂν τρέσας εἶποιμι τοὺς σοφοὺς βροτῶν
δοκοῦντας εἶναι καὶ μεριμνητὰς λόγων
τούτους μεγίστην μωρίαν ὀφλισκάνειν.

"...And I would say without any fear that those mortals who seem to be clever and crafters of polished speeches are guilty of the greatest folly."
(Eur. *Med.* 1225-7, tr. Kovacs, Loeb).

The difference between intellectually based skill and morality is also asserted in general terms in Sophokles' *Ode to Man*: 'possessing resourceful skill, man moves now to evil, now to good' (*Ant.* 365ff.). In particular, the excessively intelligent have an increased ability to pursue their self-interest. This allegation is made against Palamedes (Eur. fr. 580) and is the natural conclusion to be drawn from *Medeia*'s cunning.

The uselessness of intellectual theories for practical purposes is a theme that appears regularly. The downfalls of Palamedes and Pentheus show the failure of wisdom and rationalism in the face of unexpected events and unscrupulous attacks.¹³⁹ It is a widespread assumption, not just in Euripidean tragedy, that, in practical situations, clever speakers can and will argue to make the untrue convincing and only the passing of time can distinguish between the sincere and the self-interested.¹⁴⁰ Hence, intelligence and eloquence do not necessarily help to discover the truth. This sentiment is a commonplace but it is worth noting that

it appears especially in plays that are concerned with the nature of wisdom, such as *The Bacchae*, *Palamedes* and *Antiope*.¹⁴¹

Intellectual insight is also not useful for assessing men's worth. Orestes, after considering the noble character of Elektra's peasant husband and observing that achievements in particular areas are not accurate indices of men's characters, criticises 'the foolish who wander around full of empty opinions (ΚΕΝΩΝ ΔΟΞΑΣΜΑΤΩΝ)' (Eur. *El.* 383-5). This is the only occasion in the play in which the idea of assessing character according to assumptions about nature or nurture is raised. It may well represent Euripides' own editorial comment on the inaccuracy and futility of theories compared to practical observation.

A number of Euripides' plays, notably *Herakles*, *Hekabe* and *Hippolytos*, depict characters brought down by innate irrational impulses; they sometimes claim that irrational elements have more influence over their behaviour than reason.¹⁴²

Individual characters often assert that virtue cannot be learned. Early in the *Hippolytos* the title character says that prudence (τὸ σωφρονεῖν) comes from nature (φύσις), that is, not from teaching (79-80). Later, Theseus complains that human inventiveness has yet to find a means to induce virtue:

ΘΗΣ. ὦ πόλλ' ἀμαρτάνοντες ἄνθρωποι μάτην,
 τί δὴ τέχνας μὲν μυρίας διδάσκετε
 καὶ πάντα μηχανᾶσθε κάξευρίσκετε,
 ἐν δ' οὐκ ἐπίστασθ' οὐδ' ἐθηράσασθέ πω,
 φρονεῖν διδάσκειν οἷσιν οὐκ ἔνεστι νοῦς;
 ΙΠΠ. δεινὸν σοφιστὴν εἶπας, ὅστις εὖ φρονεῖν
 τοὺς μὴ φρονοῦντας δυνατός ἐστ' ἀναγκάσαι.

Thes: "O foolish mankind, so often missing the mark, why do you teach crafts numberless and contrive and invent all things when there is one thing you do not understand and have not hunted after, how to teach the senseless to be sensible!"

Hipp: "That is a formidable expert you mention, who is able to force insensate fools to show sense..."
 (Eur. *Hipp.* 916-22, tr. Kovacs, Loeb)

Most famous of these instances are Medeia and Phaidra. Medeia before killing her children speaks of her conflict:

...νικῶμαι κακοῖς.
καὶ μανθάνω μὲν οἷα τολμήσω κακά,
θυμὸς δὲ κρείσσων τῶν ἐμῶν βουλευμάτων,
ὅσπερ μεγίστων αἴτιος κακῶν βροτοῖς.

“I am overcome by evil. Now, I learn what wickedness I am steeling myself to do: but passion is more powerful than my reason; passion which is the cause of the greatest evil to mortals.”
(Eur. *Med.* 1077-80, tr. Olding cf. 1056-7)

This is the earliest explicit distinction between sense and passion.¹⁴³ Phaidra, in her famous speech, observes that, for most people, acting on one’s judgment is obstructed by indolence and more immediate pleasures.¹⁴⁴

...ἤδη ποτ’ ἄλλως νυκτὸς ἐν μακρῷ χρόνῳ
θνητῶν ἐφρόντισ’ ἢ διέφθαρται βίος.
καὶ μοι δοκοῦσιν οὐ κατὰ γνώμης φύσιν
πράσσειν κάκιον· ἔστι γὰρ τό γ’ εὖ φρονεῖν
πολλοῖσιν· ἀλλὰ τῆδ’ ἀθρητέον τόδε·
ἂ χρηστ’ ἐπιστάμεσθα καὶ γινώσκειν
οὐκ ἐκπονοῦμεν, οἱ μὲν ἀργίας ὑπο,
οἱ δ’ ἡδονὴν προθέντες ἀντὶ τοῦ καλοῦ
ἄλλην τιν’. εἰσὶ δ’ ἡδοναὶ πολλαὶ βίου,
μακραὶ τε λέσχαι καὶ σχολή, τερπνὸν κακόν,
αἰδῶς τε. δισσαὶ δ’ εἰσὶν, ἡ μὲν οὐ κακή,
ἡ δ’ ἄχθος οἴκων. εἰ δ’ ὁ καιρὸς ἦν σαφής,
οὐκ ἂν δὴ ἦσθην ταῦτ’ ἔχοντε γράμματα.

“...I have pondered before now in other circumstances in the night’s long watches how it is that the lives of mortals have been ruined. I think that it is not owing to the nature of their wits that they fare badly, since many people possess good sense. Rather, one must look at it this way: what we know and understand to be noble we fail to carry out, some from laziness, others because they give precedence to some other pleasure than honor. Life’s pleasures are many, long talks and leisure, a pleasant bane, and modest restraint. Yet they are of two sorts, one pleasure being no bad thing, another a burden upon houses. If propriety were clear, there would not be two things designated by the same letters.”

(Eur. *Hipp.* 375-87, tr. Kovacs, Loeb)

Characters sometimes complain that their intelligence is not useful as a guide to happiness and may even enhance their suffering. Orestes, preparing himself to hear of disasters, says that the perceptive suffer more than others because they are more sensitive (Eur. *El.* 292-4). A fragment from the *Antiope* - Antiope herself may be the speaker - is an ironic reflection of Amphion's dedication to the cultivated arts:

φρονῶ δ' ὃ πάσχω, καὶ τόδ' οὐ μικρὸν κακόν·
τὸ μὴ εἰδέναι γὰρ ἡδονὴν ἔχει τινὰ
νοσοῦντα, κέρδος δ' ἐν κακοῖς ἀγνωσία.

"I am aware of what I suffer, and this is no small evil:
for not knowing has a certain diseased pleasure,
and ignorance is an advantage among evils."
(Eur. fr. 205 (N), tr. Olding)

This kind of knowledge allows one to recognise misfortune but not to avoid or alleviate it.¹⁴⁵ It should be noticed that this complaint is made by those who are in the midst of suffering and are therefore - rather self-indulgently - inclined to view any realisation as bad.

Euripides portrays the view that intellectualism is not useful in understanding the gods. The Bacchantes advocate simple acceptance of divine experience without attempting to subject it to intellectual scrutiny, claiming that this is true wisdom (e.g. *Bac.* 425-32, 890-6). They expect that an 'unquestioning adherence to the gods' demands' will give them an untroubled life (1001-2). Both Teiresias and the Chorus of Bacchantes associate attempts to subject the divine to too close analysis with attacks upon it (201-3, 890-7). Intellectual analysis in fact distracts from gaining true understanding (395ff.). A fragment, though unfortunately neither the speaker, play nor context are known, displays the attitude that things of divine origin are beyond intellectual description and analysis, and to attempt to do so is futile, foolish and somehow destructive:

τίς τάδε λεύσσω θεὸν οὐχὶ νοεῖ,
μετεωρολόγων δ' ἑκάς ἔρριψεν
σκολιάς ἀπάτας; ὧν ἀτηρὰ
γλώσσ' εἰκοβολεῖ περὶ τῶν ἀφανῶν
οὐδὲν γνώμης μετέχουσα.

“Who, perceiving these things, is unconscious of God,
and has cast far away astronomers'
specious lies? Whose ruinous
tongue, devoid of sense, babbles about obscurities.”
(Eur. fr. 913 (N), tr. Olding)

A notion to which Euripides' plays often return is that the divine is not susceptible to mortal comprehension. Hippolytos' hunting companion expresses the hope, but not the certainty, that 'gods *ought* to be wiser than men'.¹⁴⁶ In *The Bacchae* Agaue complains that 'gods *ought* not to be like men in their anger'.¹⁴⁷ Euripides' characters' statements of their beliefs are frequently qualified as pious hopes, often precisely to underline the apparent failure of the universe or the gods to meet mortal expectations.¹⁴⁸ Many of Euripides' plays seem to be based on the assumption that the universe has no rational order that can be understood by human inquiry. This is not the same as religious conservatism, as he sometimes also shows traditional belief to be inadequate, most notably in regard to faith in the gods' concern for morality.¹⁴⁹

C. Conclusion

Euripides' plays often refer to the negative aspects of intelligence and intellectual inquiry: contemplation is useless; over-confidence in one's mental powers can mask dangers and induce destructive arrogance. The criticisms of intellectualism that he reproduces tend to occur when it has been separated from moral restraint and modesty. These themes may have appealed to him for their dramatic usefulness but their persistence in his plays suggests that they were a personal conviction. Intellectuals themselves he tends to represent sympathetically, especially Amphion and Palamedes. Even Medeia's complaint to Kreon is supposed to be plausible and so must have some justification to it. It seems that

Euripides had little time for anti-*intellectual* attitudes but was inclined towards anti-*intellectualism*. It is not clear, however, that he had any articulated alternative to intellectualism in mind. As a basis for determining personal behaviour he often draws a contrast between the humble (φαῦλοι) and the intelligent (σοφοί) where he emphasises the former's superiority in social virtues, such as honesty, hard work, orderliness and resolve.¹⁵⁰ This returns to the centrality of modesty and restraint in moral behaviour.

The Athenian audience presumably found Euripides' criticisms of intellectuals and intellectualism plausible but the fact that they rarely rewarded his plays. Insofar as it is possible to infer one play's reception from the performance of the whole tetralogy, it may be significant that *Medeia's* tetralogy came last in its competition (see its *Hypothesis*). This suggests that the Athenians were not overly sympathetic to Euripides' portrayal of intellectual characters and themes, whether or not his plays endorsed, condemned, or reserved judgement about them. The issue must have been too unfamiliar, too intellectually daunting or too distasteful for the Athenian audience. Instead, their interpretation of Euripides' depiction of intellectual themes operated at the most basic level, as though it was a statement of his own personal commitment. His supposed association with contemporary intellectuals and their practices appears throughout comedy, especially in Aristophanes' *Frogs*, and in his legal contest with Hygiainon.¹⁵¹

2.4 – Anti-Intellectual Motifs in Oratory

Attic oratory shows a tendency to avoid characteristics associated with intellectualism, such as the use of itemised data, knowledge that is obviously derived from critical research, the use of extended chains of reasoning and abstractions. Evidence is almost invariably concrete, not abstract, complete in itself, and its meaning is generally assumed to be self-evident. It is apparent that speechwriters are disinclined to present information and arguments in forms that might seem to be above the listeners' heads. Moreover, they often attempt to cast themselves in the character of ordinary, private citizens who are unskilled and inexperienced in speech. These tendencies are especially pronounced in legal oratory; political oratory is somewhat more abstract and epideictic oratory even more so (Chapter 1.6 B2).

A. Disavowal of preparation and skill in speaking

Something as simple as a prepared speech is regularly the subject of attack in debates. Along with skill in speaking, preparation is assumed to be unfair and indicative of innate deviousness, meddlesomeness and litigiousness.

καὶ δεῖ με, περὶ ὧν οὗτος ἐπιβεβουλευκῶς ἤκει, ἅμ' ὑμῖν
τοῖς διαγνωσομένοις περὶ τοῦ πράγματος ἀκούσαντα καὶ
περὶ τῆς πατρίδος καὶ περὶ τῆς οὐσίας ἀγωνίσασθαι.

“So I am obliged, on a charge which this man has carefully planned against me before coming here, and which I have only heard at the same moment as you who are to decide the case, to defend myself against the loss of my native land and my possessions.”

(Lys. 7.3, tr. Lamb, Loeb)

οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἐκ πολλοῦ χρόνου ἐπιβουλεύσαντες καὶ
συνθέντες...

“For they [the prosecution] have schemed and contrived over much time...”
(And. 1.6, tr. Olding)

Speakers seem to go to some effort to use a style that mimics spontaneity. This habit is evident even in Isokrates, the greatest exponent of highly worked oratory, who occasionally includes expressions of hesitation and uncertainty in his work.¹⁵² In Plato’s *Phaidros* Sokrates comments on the haphazard arrangement of ‘Lysias’ written *paignion*.¹⁵³ Speeches that are prepared are even condemned: Alkidamas, in support of his argument for the superiority of extempore speaking, comments that many speeches that have been elaborately prepared before delivery, are, in fact, composed in order not to appear artificial (*Soph.* 13). A fragment of a rhetorical treatise, tentatively dated to the early 4th century, in fact recommends the use of phrases of common speech in preference to those that are obviously written.¹⁵⁴ In Aristophanes’ *Knights* ‘Paphlagon’ (representing the demagogue Kleon) attacks those who practice their speeches for days and fancy themselves as ‘mighty speakers’ (348-50). However, particular terms describing those with cultivated skill in oratory or professional speech-writers, ῥήτωρ and λογογράφος, are rarely used with negative tones before the appearance of the ‘professional’ orator-politician after the period of this thesis.¹⁵⁵

In legal oratory speakers regularly call their opponents interfering men (πολυπράγμων), in particular, alleging that they are clever (δεινός), powerful (δυνατός), and prepared (παρασκευή) speakers, terms almost invariably negative in tone.¹⁵⁶ The corollary is that the speaker presents himself as private (ιδιώτης), quiet (ἥσυχος), inexperienced (ἄπειρος), unskilled (ἀδύνατος) and uninterfering (ἀπράγμων). For instance:

Εβουλόμην μὲν, ὦ ἄνδρες, τὴν δύναμιν τοῦ λέγειν καὶ τὴν ἐμπειρίαν τῶν πραγμάτων ἐξ ἴσου μοι καθεστάναι τῇ τε συμφορᾷ καὶ τοῖς κακοῖς τοῖς γεγενημένοις... οὐ δέ με

δεῖ σωθῆναι μετὰ τῆς ἀληθείας εἰπόντα τὰ γενόμενα, ἐν τούτῳ με βλάπτει ἢ τοῦ λέγειν ἀδυνασία. πολλοὶ μὲν γὰρ ἤδη τῶν οὐ δυναμένων λέγειν, ἄπιστοι γενόμενοι τοῖς ἀληθέσιν, αὐτοῖς τούτοις ἀπώλοντο, οὐ δυνάμενοι δηλώσαι αὐτά...

“I could have wished, gentlemen, that my powers of speech and my experience of the world were as great as the misfortune and the severities with which I have been visited... While now that my life depends on my giving a truthful account of the facts, my case is prejudiced by my inability to speak. Poor speakers have often before now been disbelieved because they spoke the truth, and the truth itself has been their undoing because they could not make it convincing...”
(Ant. 5.1-3, tr. Maidment, Loeb)¹⁵⁷

Sokrates in Plato’s *Apology* also subscribes to this *topos*. He defends himself against the allegation of being an accomplished speaker, associating his unadorned and unprepared manner with plain speaking.

οὐ μέντοι μὰ Δία, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, κεκαλλιεπημένους γε λόγους, ὥσπερ οἱ τούτων, ῥήμασί τε καὶ ὀνόμασιν, οὐδὲ κεκοσμημένους, ἀλλὰ ἀκούσεσθε εἰκῆ λεγόμενα τοῖς ἐπιτυχοῦσιν ὀνόμασιν· πιστεύω γὰρ δίκαια εἶναι ἃ λέγω, καὶ μηδεὶς ὑμῶν προσδοκησάτω ἄλλως...

“Not, [by Zeus], however, men of Athens, speeches finely tricked out with words and phrases, as theirs are, nor carefully arranged, but you will hear things said at random with the words that just happen to occur to me. For I trust that what I say is just; and let none of you expect anything else.”
(Pl. *Ap.* 17b-c, tr. Fowler, Loeb)

Ρήματα, with which he identifies practiced speech, can particularly signify words and phrases that are trite or insubstantial.¹⁵⁸ Accusations of skilled speech were so predictable that a speaker could even anticipate and rebut them (for instance, *Lys.* 7.12). Similarly, claims to be ‘quiet’, to ‘mind one’s own business’ and to be inexperienced in speaking could also be anticipated and derided as hackneyed defences.¹⁵⁹ However, it is uncommon for the fiction of speakers’ lack

of skill to be broken. References to speechwriters do not appear in oratory until after the 380s and then only rarely.¹⁶⁰

To take on the persona of inoffensiveness and inexperience is a function of *ethopoiia*. *Ethos* is 'the totality of characteristic traits'; the practical use of *ethopoiia* is as a tool of persuasion in making the speaker plausible to and accepted by his audience, for instance, by seeming to be wise and prudent, having good character, or epitomising their values and interests.¹⁶¹ The acknowledged master of this technique was Lysias, though all professional speechwriters employ it to some extent.¹⁶² The practice of adopting a character for public speaking was well enough known to be satirised: in Aristophanes' *Acharnians*, when Dikaiopolis has to defend himself, he dresses up in rags (383ff.). Speakers regularly purport to be 'ordinary men' who are speaking from necessity, not preference, and say that any skill they show is due to their native eloquence and the simple, sincere conviction of truth. Speakers apologise for having prepared arguments and engaged expert help or, more often, they deny it outright. These claims are unlikely to have fooled anyone and are, occasionally, quite incongruous and disingenuous. In *On the Mysteries* Andokides professes uncertainty about how to proceed (§8) though he had already delivered at least one speech in his defence, *On the Return*. Lysias, when prosecuting Erastosthenes, claimed to lack experience (ἀπειρία) and never to have taken anyone to court either himself or on another's behalf (Lys. 12.3). That is to say, the audience not only accepted a dramatic fiction that concealed expert participation in rhetoric but participated in it.¹⁶³

B. Avoidance of the appearance of special knowledge or research

Information that is obviously the result of special research is not unknown in oratory. In order to disprove Agoratos' claim to have been involved in the

assassination of the oligarch Phrynichos Lysias cites decrees several years old; Andokides' argument for the completeness of Athens' revision of laws in 403 BC includes evidence from several decrees and laws.¹⁶⁴ However, these instances are exceptional. Arguments that could make use of specific research usually fail to do so. Discussion of particular laws tends to focus on suppositions about their encapsulation of community standards or 'the lawgiver's' or 'your' intentions. Though speakers often refer to Solon's reform of Athenian law, its nature is not discussed, rather their purpose is to assert that he was the best of lawgivers.¹⁶⁵ When they do provide evidence the authority they invoke is their listeners' own knowledge or a respected traditional source such as 'our fathers'. For instance, when Lysias wanted to emphasise the probability that his client's wealth had been exaggerated, he named five people who were commonly thought to be rich but turned out not to be. The examples are not supported by evidence of their wealth but are introduced with the statement that "I have been told by my father and other elderly people that..." (ἀκήκοα γὰρ ἔγωγε καὶ τοῦ πατρός καὶ ἄλλων πρεσβυτέρων...). There are many other examples of a speaker calling upon the listeners' collective memory for his evidence.¹⁶⁶

References to historical events are framed in terms of the listeners' own knowledge. They are almost invariably to familiar subjects and usually allusive. Isokrates refuses to 'waste time relating disasters from other states', preferring instances fresh in the audience's mind, that is, Athens' two oligarchic revolutions (Isoc. 20.10). The Sicilian Expedition is 'the disaster' in which Nikias was involved; Athens' defeat at Aigospotamoi is 'the disaster', 'when your ships were destroyed' and 'the final battle'.¹⁶⁷ The use of the familiar can be seen also in the exploitation of rumour as evidence: the pseudo-Andokidean *Against Alkibiades*¹⁶⁸ claims that the cause of Kimon's ostracism was not the discrediting of his pro-Spartan policies or his lack of enthusiasm for the democracy but outrage at his incestuous relations with his sister (4.33). This scandal's

persistence in the public memory is shown by a comic reference to it almost thirty years after Kimon's death.¹⁶⁹ Where historical evidence is provided the detail is usually greatly compressed and abbreviated. Orators are aware of this and usually explain that detail is unnecessary, too much work, or likely to bore the listeners. For example, Andokides abbreviates his description of the state of the Athenian empire during the Peace of Nikias:

...καὶ Χερρόνησόν τε εἶχομεν καὶ Νάξον καὶ Εὐβοίας
πλέον ἢ τὰ δύο μέρη· τὰς τε ἄλλας ἀποικίας καθ'
ἕκαστον διηγείσθαι μακρὸς ἂν εἴη λόγος.

“... We held the Chersonese, Naxos and more than two parts of Euboeia: while to mention the other settlements individually would take a long speech.”

(And. 3.9, tr. Olding)

Explicit abbreviation is frequent: Lysias mentions Nikias' achievements but is disinclined to itemise them, or the individual names and qualities of the victims of the Thirty Tyrants.¹⁷⁰ Otherwise, historical evidence that is explicated is often extremely simplified. Andokides conflates the beginning and end of the Persian Wars (1.107-8). Both Alkibiades' apologists and denigrators massively simplify his and his family's involvement in the religious scandals of 415 BC.¹⁷¹

References to Persia's relations with Greece are confined to platitudes about Greece's unity in times of overt danger and Persia's attempts to promote disunity.¹⁷² Perhaps the only instance of serious historiographical research in legal oratory comes from the mid-4th century, where Apollodoros, prosecuting Neaira, uses Thoukydides for background on the traditions and laws concerning Athenian citizenship. Even so, the source is hidden.¹⁷³ The overwhelming tendency is for debates that could be aided by historical research to ignore it.¹⁷⁴

Although the Oxyrhynchos rhetorical tract sanctions the use of poetic quotes and allusions - at least, the text itself includes quotes from Homer, Sophokles and

Euripides – and these do occasionally appear in non-legal or reconstructed speeches, they do not occur in real legal speeches until after c.380 BC.¹⁷⁵ After this speakers do use poetic quotes for the purpose of emphasis, illustration or evidence but instances are still rare and are usually apologised for, framed in terms of the audience’s own knowledge or accompanied by emphasis on the poet’s traditional high status and value. Speakers seem to be cautious about appearing élitist, over-educated or snobbish. For example, Demosthenes derides Aischines for having ‘obviously looked up’ a poetic quote instead of using one he would have known anyway.¹⁷⁶

The habit of speakers to cite the familiar in preference to the unfamiliar, to avoid showing signs of special research, to simplify detail and to invoke the audience as witness to their assertions, implies an assumption that the audience is, in fact, already familiar with the details of the matters under discussion. What the audience apparently ‘knows’ - with the provision of no evidence or evidence that is compressed or allusive - includes the obscure, such as the outcome of a particular private trial¹⁷⁷, a private citizen’s character¹⁷⁸, or details of events decades earlier. In *On the Murder of Herodes* it suits Antiphon’s argument to establish that false accusations and unsolved crimes are common: he cites the assassination of Ephialtes, an attempted murder of a man by his child-slave who was identified only by chance, and the false charges of embezzlement brought against the *hellenotamiai*. This survey is completed with the comment:

ταῦθ’ ὑμῶν αὐτῶν ἐγὼ οἶμαι μεμνήσθαι τοὺς
πρεσβυτέρους, τοὺς δὲ νεωτέρους πυνθάνεσθαι ὥσπερ ἐμέ.

“I imagine that the older men among you remember these things yourselves, and the younger to have heard of them, as I have.”
(Ant. 5.71, tr. Olding)

The attack by the slave Antiphon describes as ‘recent’ but the other two incidents are some time ago. The details of the *hellenotamiai* scandal are unknown but Antiphon’s phrasing implies that the incident was known as a story rather than through the jury’s personal experience: it happened ‘once’ (ποτέ), and ‘they say’ (φασίν) that one of those involved had the name Sosias (Ant. 5.69-70). The murder of Ephialtes occurred about forty-five years before Antiphon’s speech. Though Aristotle names the assassin as Aristodikos of Tanagra, uncertainty clearly existed which enabled Antiphon to attempt to involve the jurors as witnesses.¹⁷⁹ Moreover, speakers provide information with the assertion that to do so is unnecessary: in a legal speech Isokrates interrupts his lengthy narrative of Athenian history and Alkibiades’ actions with the disingenuous statement that ‘there is no need to speak at length’ about Alkibiades and his opponents (Isoc. 16.8). These examples show that speakers’ habits of abbreviation, simplification and invoking popular memory as witness - even in the same breath as supplying the relevant information - are a conscious oratorical technique intended to frame evidence in terms of the audience’s own experience. Failure to do so, skipping over information without flattering one’s listeners that they know it anyway, appears to have been poorly received. At least, Andokides does this in his *On the Return* (e.g. §21), which was unsuccessful.

C. Absence of abstract reasoning from oratory

Having noted speechwriters’ reluctance to show signs of research and cite evidence in systematic form, it is unsurprising that public speeches rarely use generalised principles - such as psychological generalisations on human behaviour in a given situation - or abstract reasoning. By contrast, fictional and reconstructed speeches often contain these. Antiphon’s *Tetralogies*, for instance, contain the generalised statements that it is difficult to detect a crime committed by a clever man, and that excessive behaviour is characteristic of youth and

restraint of maturity (in this case cited in order to be denied).¹⁸⁰ Euripides' and Thoukydides' speeches use generalisations and theorisations widely, but their incidence may be exaggerated by dramatic requirements, compression and the authors' intellectual interests.¹⁸¹ Fictional and reconstructed speeches are doubtless often written precisely to provide examples and explore abstract ideas.

In real legal speeches generalisations and arguments from the abstract are very rare. The few instances tend to be confined to cases with an admitted dearth of actual evidence.¹⁸² Antiphon is unusual in the frequency with which he uses generalisations in his legal speeches, for instance, 'it is desirable to avoid danger but, if it cannot be avoided, a clear conscience is the next best thing'¹⁸³; 'crimes are normally planned secretly and the victim, being ignorant until too late, would naturally use his last breaths to accuse them'¹⁸⁴; the political generalisation that 'stable laws are best'¹⁸⁵; and 'to act with swift anger denies judgement', a sentiment that finds company in the fictional and reconstructed speeches of Gorgias, Thoukydides and Plato.¹⁸⁶ Speeches that contain generalisations are, in fact, conspicuous by their failure. Antiphon's (failed) defence against a charge of treason includes the argument that a speechwriter such as he would have greater interest in supporting democracy than oligarchy.¹⁸⁷ Andokides' (failed) *On the Return* employs several generalised principles to advise his listeners how they should regard him: 'men suffer both good and bad fortune and errors are almost inevitable'; 'to risk one's life and property for the public benefit is more deserving of recognition than normal public service'; and the remarkable sophism that 'men's bodies should not be penalised for the errors of their opinions'.¹⁸⁸ In his speech *On the Mysteries* ten years later, which did succeed, he avoids generalisations even where they might be useful.¹⁸⁹ In Plato's version of Sokrates' *Apology*, a famous example of a speech that did not sway its listeners, he says that he expects his explication of the beliefs underlying his behaviour to make little impression on the jury and so – patronisingly - he proposes to give them

concrete examples of his conduct, which they ‘honour more’ (ὁ ὑμεῖς τιμᾶτε, ἔργα).¹⁹⁰ Although each of these cases certainly involved wider issues than the style of the defendant, it can be concluded that Athenian juries did not favour arguments that used non-concrete evidence.¹⁹¹

Denigration of the intellectual qualities that value word-use, explicit methods of argumentation, generalisation, calculation and technical terms is rare in real oratory. Where it does appear it is part of a speaker’s protestation of inexperience and lack of skill in speaking. For instance:

οὐ γὰρ δίκαιον οὐτ’ ἔργω ἀμαρτόντα διὰ ῥήματα
σωθῆναι, οὐτ’ ἔργω ὀρθῶς πράξαντα διὰ ῥήματα
ἀπολέσθαι· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ῥῆμα τῆς γλώσσης ἀμάρτημά
ἔστι, τὸ δ’ ἔργον τῆς γνώμης.

“For it is not right that a man who has erred in his action be saved by words, nor that a man who has acted properly be destroyed by words; for a word is the sin of the tongue but the act [is the sin] of one’s understanding.” (Ant. 5.5, tr. Olding; cf. Thuc. 4.86.6)

This suggests that Athenian jurors and Assembly-goers were not interested in examination of the theoretical aspects of gaining and communicating knowledge. Criticism of these things is almost entirely confined to fictional and reported speeches, whose audiences probably comprised the educated classes. For instance, in Antiphon’s *Tetralogies* an apology is made for a subtle argument and blame is passed to his opponent for making it necessary.¹⁹²

D. Conclusion

Attic oratory contains little or no evidence of criticism of intellectuals as such but it does show a distinct preference for ordinary and patriotic values and for the

systematic avoidance of certain characteristics of sophisticated techniques of argument.

The Athenian public's rejection of intellectualism is most evident in the existence of the motif of the quiet, ordinary man and unsophisticated speaker. This persona is partly a rhetorical technique that enables a speaker to place himself on the level of his audience, to avoid the appearance of superiority, litigiousness, or deviousness. It is inconceivable that listeners were completely credulous and unaware of the existence of speechwriters and their methods, so this persona is a fiction that audiences supported in order to make the mode of public discourse conform to and reflect their ideals. Chief among these ideals is the principle of egalitarianism that underpins the administration of justice and the democratic state.

On a psychological level, this persona presupposes the existence of the belief that ordinary Athenians regarded speech that is direct and unadorned as evidence of sincere personal conviction and an uninterfering nature, but also that truth ought to be simple, straightforward, concrete and self-evident. Intellectual techniques that can contribute to debate include the systematic presentation of evidence, the use of generalisations and abstract reasoning, and complex argument such as the use of subsidiary proofs as components of a wider proof. However, while these appear in speeches for non-popular audiences (Chapter 1.6 B2), speeches delivered to mass audiences show a marked tendency to avoid them. Instead, they employ evidence that is concrete, conventionalised and exists in the domain of popular knowledge, or is presented as though it does. For example, available historiography is ignored in favour of versions that are dramatic, engaging and agreeable to the listeners.¹⁹³ The strategy that speakers commonly employ seems to involve the audience as witnesses and to flatter their knowledge. They seem to be wary of appearing to have superior knowledge, as would happen with

arguments and evidence that are not 'known by everyone'. The 'you all know' motif, which orators employ widely, is inclusive, obviates the need to support assertions with evidence and is fundamentally egalitarian. The conclusion is that Athenian audiences believed that an argument that required a detailed and complex proof was inherently specious - the association of ἔργα with truth and concrete actions, and λόγοι with specious words is a pervasive commonplace of Greek popular thought¹⁹⁴ – and that they resented the use of intellectual techniques, as though it amounted to a claim to superiority.

2.5 – Kleon's Mytilene Speech

In 427 BC, the fifth year of the Peloponnesian War, Athens' ally Mytilene revolted, carrying most of Lesbos with her. When the revolt had been suppressed the Athenian Assembly voted a harsh punishment on Mytilene, the execution of the entire male population and enslavement the women and children. Afterwards, regret set in and the issue was reopened the next day. Thucydides provides two speeches purportedly from the second debate, the first by Kleon, the most influential figure in Athens at the time (3.36.6), the second by an otherwise unknown figure, Diodotos, the son of Eukrates. Kleon urged that the Athenians uphold their original decision; in the course of his argument he makes a notable attack on intellectuals and their methods, and he criticises the very process of deliberation. The fact that Diodotos spends a third of his speech justifying his right to speak and clearing the eloquent from suspicion before addressing the matter at hand indicates the strength of Kleon's attack.¹⁹⁵ From these speeches some conclusions can be drawn about the form, basis and extent of anti-intellectual and anti-intellectualist attitudes in Athens in the public sphere.

Kleon identifies his opponents as 'the clever', 'the cleverest' and 'those who speak well', using terms such as δεξότης, ξυνετωτέρος, σοφώτερος and τοῦ καλῶς εἰπόντος. One of Thucydides' three uses of ῥήτωρ appears in Kleon's mouth.¹⁹⁶ Later he refers to intellectuals explicitly, comparing the Assembly's attitude in listening to these clever speakers to that when they listen to the displays of sophists, Thucydides' only direct reference to this class.¹⁹⁷ He reinforces his opponents' status as clever intellectualised speakers by contrasting them with ordinary men and implying that their values conflict. His own argument is, he claims, grounded in statements of conventional principles concerning human behaviour.

πάντων δὲ δεινότατον εἰ βέβαιον ἡμῖν μηδὲν καθεστήξει
 ὦν ἂν δόξη περὶ, μηδὲ γνωσόμεθα ὅτι χεῖροσι νόμοις
 ἀκινήτοις χρωμένη πόλις κρείσσων ἐστὶν ἢ καλῶς
 ἔχουσιν ἀκύροις, ἀμαθία τε μετὰ σωφρονσύνης

ὠφελιμώτερον ἢ δεξιότης μετὰ ἀκολασίας, οἳ τε φαυλότεροι τῶν ἀνθρώπων πρὸς τοὺς ξυνετωτέρους ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πλεον ἄμεινον οἰκοῦσι τὰς πόλεις.)

“But quite the most alarming thing is if nothing we have resolved upon shall be settled once for all, and if we shall refuse to recognize that a state which has inferior laws that are inviolable is stronger than one whose laws are good but without authority; that ignorance combined with self-restraint is more serviceable than cleverness combined with recklessness, and that simpler people for the most part make better citizens than the shrewd.”
(Thuc. 3.37.3, tr. Forster Smith, Loeb)

His statement that ‘bad laws that are stable are better than good laws without authority’ is a maxim developed from the widely accepted notion that old and stable laws are best (see below) and that consistency, even in error, is better than inconsistency in pursuit of perfection. That ‘ignorance in combination with prudence is better than cleverness in combination with recklessness’ derives from the assertion, which is self-evident, that prudence is superior to recklessness; and that ‘the ordinary are better citizens than the clever’ is not much different. His proof that the Mytileneans have committed injustices and do not deserve compassion depends on further commonly accepted generalisations: justice consists in doing good to one’s friends and harm to enemies (3.40.3) and that excessive prosperity provokes insolence.¹⁹⁸ Such statements are what 4th century rhetorical manuals call ‘maxims’ (γνώμῃαι), ‘expressions of an individual opinion about general matters of human conduct’. These are particularly convincing when they are ἔνδοξοι, that is, when they do not require supplementary proof: they are self-evident, conforming to the listeners’ pre-existing beliefs.¹⁹⁹ All of Thucydides’ speakers employ maxims but Kleon particularly uses those that express conventional thought. Kleon’s argument therefore accords with accepted moral principles or, at least, it has this appearance.²⁰⁰ More particularly, he expresses personal conviction in and close identification with these principles. This means that his public character (*ethopoia*) harmonises with and even epitomises generally accepted notions. Kleon is not just defending a particular policy, the punishment of the

Mytileneans, but identifies himself as the embodiment of ordinary people's beliefs, and represents intellectual speakers as their antithesis.²⁰¹

Kleon's protest against reopening yesterday's debate is that overturning the decision will reduce the authority of Athens' laws (νόμοι). The Mytilenean decision was a decree, not a law, but his language suggests that he views, or seeks to imply, that all νόμοι - institutions and customs - are under threat. Moreover, this alludes to the contemporary intellectual debate over the relationship between νόμος and φύσις. Kleon's phrasing implies that he views an issue larger than a single decree is at stake and that his opponents are the same as the intellectuals, rhetoricians and philosophers who dissect and criticise νόμοι at whim.²⁰² That unchanging laws are good and necessary for a city to prosper is a commonplace of Greek thought. Public speeches, both real and invented, assume that traditional laws and practices are best, a platitude at which speakers presumably expected their audiences to nod sagely.²⁰³ Comedians joked that Athenians changed their laws recklessly: the comedian Plato says that because of this no-one knows what city they are in, and one of Aristophanes' 'Assembly women' says that the Assembly 'legislates as though drunk'.²⁰⁴ Aristocratic writers such as Plato express discomfort with the 'rapid corruption of written laws and customs'.²⁰⁵ This desire to examine, criticise and tamper with established laws Kleon explicitly associates with his opponents and their desire to prove their own cleverness:

οἱ μὲν γὰρ τῶν τε νόμων σοφώτεροι βούλονται φαίνεσθαι τῶν τε αἰεὶ λεγομένων ἐς τὸ κοινὸν περιγίγνεσθαι, ὡς ἐν ἄλλοις μείζοσιν οὐκ ἂν δηλώσαντες τὴν γνώμην, καὶ ἐκ τοῦ τοιοῦτου τὰ πολλὰ σφάλλουσι τὰς πόλεις· οἱ δ' ἀπιστοῦντες τῇ ἐξ ἑαυτῶν ξυνέσει ἀμαθέστεροι μὲν τῶν νόμων ἀξιούσιν εἶναι, ἀδυνατώτεροι δὲ τὸν τοῦ καλῶς εἰπόντος μέμψασθαι λόγον, κριταὶ δὲ ὄντες ἀπὸ τοῦ ἴσου μάλλον ἢ ἀγωνισταὶ ὀρθοῦνται τὰ πλείω. ὡς οὖν χρή καὶ ἡμᾶς ποιοῦντας μὴ δεινότητι καὶ ξυνέσεως ἀγῶνι ἐπαιρομένους παρὰ δόξαν τῷ ὑμετέρῳ πλήθει παρανεῖν.

“The latter [the more shrewd] always want to show that they are wiser than the laws, and to dominate all public discussions, as if there could never be weightier questions on which to declare their opinions, and as a consequence of such conduct they generally bring their states to ruin; the former [the more humble], on the contrary, mistrusting their own insight, are content to be less enlightened than the laws and less competent than others to criticise the words of an able speaker, but being impartial judges rather than interested contestants they generally prosper. Thus, then, we ought to act and not be so excited by eloquence and combat of wits as to advise the Athenian people contrary to our own judgment.”
(Thuc. 3.37.4-5, tr. Forster Smith, Loeb)

The attitude that interference in established laws is bad and is a particular habit of the clever has the corollary that the best citizens are those who defer to the laws. Kleon calls this quality *ἀμαθία*, not so much ignorance as intellectual diffidence.²⁰⁶ He emphasises its value by saying that when it is combined with *σωφροσύνη* it is better than *δεξιότης* combined with *ἀκολασία* - implying that *ἀμαθία* is associated with *σωφροσύνη* and *δεξιότης* with *ἀκολασία*.²⁰⁷ The contrast is thereby formed between the intelligent, whose arrogance makes them inclined to interfere recklessly, and ordinary men who uphold the state by prudently deferring to its established institutions.

Kleon suggests that intellectual speakers could only want to speak from motives of self-gratification and selfish advantage (*εὖ ἀντιληψονται* is a metaphorical reward). It is the city, not they, that will have to endure the consequences of their bad advice. These the most fundamental (and hackneyed) charges that can be brought against a politician.²⁰⁸

... κέρδει ἐπαιρόμενος τὸ εὐτρεπὲς τοῦ λόγου ἐκπονήσας παράγειν πειράσεται. ἡ δὲ πόλις ἐκ τῶν τοιῶνδε ἀγώνων τὰ μὲν ἄθλα ἑτέροις δίδωσιν, αὐτὴ δὲ τοὺς κινδύνους ἀναφέρει.

“[He,] incited by gain, will by an elaborate display of specious oratory attempt to mislead you. But in contests of that kind the city bestows the prizes upon others, while she herself undergoes all the risks.”
(Thuc. 3.38.2-3, tr. Forster Smith, Loeb)

ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν καὶ τότε πρῶτον καὶ νῦν διαμάχομαι μὴ μεταγνῶναι ὑμᾶς τὰ προδεδογμένα, μηδὲ τρισὶ τοῖς ἀξυμφορωτάτοις τῇ ἀρχῇ, οἴκτω καὶ ἡδονῇ λόγων καὶ ἐπεικεία, ἀμαρτάνειν... οἳ τε τέρποντες λόγῳ ῥήτορες ἔξουσι καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις ἐλάσσοσιν ἀγῶνα, καὶ μὴ ἐν ᾧ ἡ μὲν πόλις βραχέα ἡσθέισα μεγάλα ζημιώσεται, αὐτοὶ δὲ ἐκ τοῦ εὖ εἰπεῖν τὸ παθεῖν εὖ ἀντιλήψονται...

“Therefore, I still protest, as I have from the first, that you should not reverse your former decision or be led into error by pity, delight in eloquence, or clemency, the three influences most prejudicial to a ruling state... As to the orators who charm by their eloquence, they will have other opportunities of display in matters of less importance, and not where the city for a brief pleasure will pay a heavy penalty while they themselves get a fine fee for fine speaking.”

(3.40.2-3, tr. Forster Smith, Loeb)

An accusation that is more specific to clever speakers' rhetorical expertise is their addiction to the sound of their own voices. They cannot resist speaking at any and every opportunity; they are concerned only with opportunities for display and therefore treat serious occasions frivolously. This attacks not only the motives and techniques of Kleon's intellectual opponents but also the validity of debate, as the Assembly is, in his view, equally addicted. He describes Assembly-goers as 'holding a festival of oratory' (ἀγωνοθετοῦντες), being 'watchers of words and hearers of deeds' (οἵτινες εἰώθατε θεαταὶ μὲν τῶν λόγων γίγνεσθαι, ἀκροαταὶ δὲ τῶν ἔργων) and admiring speakers as though they were at an exhibition of sophists. Clever speeches make people judge important matters on purely aesthetic grounds, which distract from the actual with the possible and impede accurate and sensible judgement.²⁰⁹

Kleon argues that intellectual reasoning is an impediment to action. He explicitly contrasts the necessity of action with the 'excitement of eloquence and combats of wits' (3.37.5). The phrase just cited, 'you are watchers of words and hearers of deeds', throws λόγοι into a contrast with ἔργα. As λόγοι have just been associated with deception (τὸ εὐτρεπὲς τοῦ λόγου) (3.38.2), this emphasises that their contrast with ἔργα is between the doubtful and specious on

the one hand and the certain and factual on the other. This invokes an antithesis that is a commonplace of Greek popular thought.²¹⁰ It also has an impact upon the interests of justice. In his evocation of moral principles Kleon argues that, since retribution is a vehicle for justice, delay for deliberation and reconsideration produces injustice by lessening one's anger at injury and therefore reducing the strength of one's vengeful reaction.²¹¹

The danger that comes from allowing the clever to speak on serious matters is not confined to their frivolity and inaction. Their desire to prove their cleverness means that they are inevitably drawn to argue *against* the immediately apparent. Whereas Kleon's beliefs are grounded in self-evident and conventional beliefs, he anticipates that his rivals will argue against them. For instance, he asserts that anyone opposing him will have to argue that the Mytileneans' injuries are, in fact, beneficial to Athens.²¹² The ambiguous phrases he uses to describe their arguments express his belief in intellectual discussion's perversity. They argue *παρὰ δόξα*, meaning both 'against what seems best' and 'against expectation' (3.37.5), and against *τὸ πᾶνυ δοκοῦν*, both 'altogether our view' and 'the universal opinion of men' (3.38.2). Kleon believes that clever speakers' interference will affect not just an individual decree but matters that are concrete, universal and self-evidently true.²¹³

The general theme of Kleon's speech is that intellectual speakers are inherently irresponsible and dangerous to the state. Their desire to display their skills induces them to participate in every occasion for public speaking, though it may not be appropriate. Their urge for inquiry leads them to examine and criticise everything. Their need to prove their cleverness leads them to argue against the accepted. Anti-intellectuals view these urges as potentially damaging to the stability and authority of the state's institutions and its ability to make effective policy. Instead, they believe that traditional moral and political institutions should be deferred to and should be above scrutiny and criticism. They believe that intellectual analysis confuses the meaning of observed facts and the dictates of

accepted opinion. This view of understanding is separate from reasoning and discussion.²¹⁴

The exigencies of defending the previous day's decision required Kleon to provide a rationale for it, to restore the anger under which the Athenians had acted (3.36.2), and to justify the policy of deterrence based on revenge.²¹⁵ His case would also be strengthened if he could ascribe the reopening of the debate to someone's self-interest and lack of patriotic fervour. However, it was not necessary for him to categorise these people as intellectualised clever speakers. Either he genuinely believed that their methods, interests and view of the world were fundamentally at odds with those of ordinary citizens and the state, or he was trying to exploit suspicions about them that already existed latently in the minds of the Assembly-goers. His use of conventional notions of justice, political stability and patterns of human behaviour suggests that he believes that his conclusion is the extension of the sentiments of ordinary people. The fact that they had not reached it yet themselves he ascribes to their weakness, failure to come to grips with their own interests, and their addiction to oratorical displays. The final vote in the debate was narrow, so it is likely that Kleon's attack on intellectual methods did, in fact, strike a chord with the listeners (3.49.1).

The first three chapters of Diodotos' speech reply to Kleon's attack on debate and the supposed characteristics of clever speakers. This indicates the force and plausibility of his argument, though Diodotos focuses on the damage done to the democratic process rather than the validity of the intellectual approach (3.42-44).

Kleon's and Diodotos' speeches not the only ones that were made in the Mytilene debate (3.36.6). The fact that it is these that Thucydides provides must be deliberate and advised. He introduces Kleon with a personal comment, which is atypical of his method, saying that he was, at that time, both the most forceful (or 'violent') and persuasive of the citizens.²¹⁶ Thucydides gives no other Athenian demagogue (a non-aristocratic politician) such a detailed portrait or even, for that matter, a speech.²¹⁷ It may be that he intends Kleon to be the exemplar and

representative of all demagogues and to imply that his anti-intellectualism is typical of that class.²¹⁸

Kleon also represents a change in Athenian political vision. It has long been recognised that Kleon's speech contains echoes of Perikles.²¹⁹ Whereas Perikles' speeches represent the unity of reason and emotional dynamism of Athens at her height, the Mytilene debate shows the bifurcation of these qualities. Diodotos is explicitly concerned with calculating self-interest (3.44.1-2). Kleon is violently emotional and reactive. Kleon highlights the negative aspects of Perikles' quality of reason: submission to the seductiveness of *λόγοι*, accepting this in place of *ἔργα*, and irresponsible enjoyment of the aesthetic over the practical.²²⁰ The Mytilene debate is an illustration of the condition of Athens' political leadership and public decision-making. One aspect of this was based upon unreflective reaction to the immediate and concrete and the acceptance of traditional views, in this case the bald fact that Athens has been wronged and was entitled to exact retribution (3.38.1, 39.1-6, 44.2-4), and suspicion of methods that rejected or modified these things.

2.6 - The Trial of Nikomachos

Nikomachos was brought to trial in 400/399 BC, the same year as Sokrates and Andokides.²²¹ A prosecution speech written by Lysias survives, in fact the only source for the trial.²²² The specific charge seems to be embezzlement (κλοπή): Lysias says that many other men have already been executed for this crime and that a conviction will deter others from thieving public funds (Lys. 30.23, 25). Another possibility is malfeasance (ἄδίκητον), depriving the state of income. This would add force to Lysias' criticisms of Nikomachos' delays and having compiled the wrong documents.²²³ However, the speech proceeds by vilification and insinuation, so the actual charges are unclear. Much of this invective is standard but it tends to revolve around his abuse of his position as an ἀναγραφεύς²²⁴, a legal secretary involved in the transcription and revision of Athens' laws and calendar of sacrifices from 410 BC, of which a number of marble fragments have been discovered.²²⁵ The exact function and powers of the ἀναγραφείς are uncertain but, at very least, they sought out and collected laws, 'writing them up' in public and/or transcribing them for Athens' central archive, the Metroön, which was established in the last decade of the 5th century. This implies that they were also able to discriminate between laws that conflicted with one another or overlapped.²²⁶ Nikomachos' function makes him a publicly recognised technical expert who used analytic techniques according to the application of certain underlying principles. This means that he can intelligibly be considered to be a representative of intellectualism, if not an intellectual in his own right. The imputations that Lysias makes against him are useful evidence for the nature of anti-intellectualism.

Nikomachos was not the only ἀναγραφεύς but it appears that he had a certain prominence.²²⁷ His tenure was exceptionally long, from 410 to 399, including a reappointment after the removal of the Thirty Tyrants.²²⁸ His prosecutor viewed him as solely responsible for the transcription of laws and sacrifices, and does not mention any other reason for acting against him, though speakers often cite personal animosity in order to avoid being called sycophants.²²⁹ Aristophanes

mentions him in *The Frogs*, produced early in 405 BC. Towards the end of the play Pluto, as he sees Dionysos and Aischylos off, asks them to invite Nikomachos, along with several others, to join him by committing suicide (1504-14). Most of those mentioned at the same time occupied prominent political, military or administrative positions. Kleophon was one of Athens' most influential democratic politicians in the last years of the Peloponnesian War. Adeimantos was an associate of Alkibiades and possibly related to him; though he had been disgraced in the religious scandals of 415 BC, at the time of performance he held a senior military command. The πορισταί were public officials in charge of tribute.²³⁰ That Nikomachos was associated with these figures suggests his prominence in the public eye.

Whatever the formal charge, Lysias' imputations amount to, first, disdain of the principle of public accountability and, second, impiety. He alleged that Nikomachos exercised more power than he was entitled to, his first commission taking six years when the *demos*' decree allowed four months, his second four years when he was allocated one month (§2, 4, 29). He has refused to submit to the official scrutiny (εἴθυναί) required of all public officers (§3-5). His treatment of the laws is reckless, giving different laws to plaintiffs appearing in the same cases (§3). The most infamous example was at the end of the Peloponnesian War when he supplied the oligarchic partisans on the *Boule* with a law that enabled them to dispose of Kleophon by stacking his trial (§11-13). Lysias falls short of accusing Nikomachos of conspiracy but says that he wished to please the oligarchs.²³¹ He alleges that Nikomachos, as an ἀναγραφεύς, inscribed and erased laws at whim (§2, 5), ignoring his directions and assuming supreme authority over the whole law code (αὐτὸν ἀπάντων κύριον ἐποίησατο) (§4). He corrupted the laws of Solon and assumed the position of lawgiver himself (§2, 26, 28). In short, he treated the foundations of the state according to his own whim and the limitations on his power with contempt. This is reinforced by the insinuations that he belonged to a shadowy and exploitative clique (§25-27, 31-35), having doubtful citizenship, which, if true, would mean

that the integrity of government was usurped (§2, 5-6, 27, 29), and by his supposed financial irresponsibility (§19-22)

Nikomachos' alleged anti-democratic attitudes and behaviours are effects of arrogance, based upon a sense of intellectual superiority. In fact, the allegation that Nikomachos took bribes and embezzled funds is probably an attempt to provide a plausible explanation for his alleged activities (§2, 26 cf. 27). It is hard to believe the statement that Nikomachos was able to refuse to submit to εὔθυναι for the six years after his original appointment in 410 (§5), and even harder to believe that he could then be re-appointed in 403. His long term of office without official scrutiny is more likely to be a consequence of the *demos*' expectation that the work of recodifying the laws and the sacrificial calendar would not take long. The officials undertaking the work were probably appointed on the assumption that they would be examined when they finished.²³² If so, the criticism of this aspect of Nikomachos' behaviour is, therefore, based on a deliberate misrepresentation of or a failure to understand the nature of his work.

The prosecutor's attitude towards Nikomachos' work on the schedule of sacrifices reveals more clearly the tendency to hold experts responsible for the unwanted results of their methods. Lysias insinuates that Nikomachos has attacked traditional sacrifices (§18-19) and been impious (§17 cf. 25), even calling him a 'temple-robber' (ἱερόσυλος) (§21).

πῶς δ' ἂν τις εὐσεβέστερος γένοιτο ἐμοῦ, ὅστις ἀξιῶ
 πρῶτον μὲν κατὰ τὰ πάτρια θύειν, ἔπειτα ἃ μᾶλλον
 συμφέρει τῇ πόλει, ἔτι δὲ ἃ ὁ δῆμος ἐψηφίσατο καὶ
 δυνησόμεθα δαπανᾶν ἐκ τῶν προσιόντων χρημάτων;

“And how could a man show greater piety than mine, when I demand, first that our sacrifices be performed according to our ancient rules, and second that they be those which tend to promote most the interests of the state, and finally those which the people have decreed and which we shall be able to afford out of the public revenue?”

(Lys. 30.19, tr. Lamb, Loeb)

Lysias emphasises that the sacrifices that Nikomachos has altered or rejected are those sanctioned by the *demos* and tradition. However, he implies that these sacrifices have a hierarchy: the ancestral, the expedient, and those that are popular and financially viable. The sacrifices that he is particularly concerned to defend are the ancestral ones, recorded on the oldest tablets (κύρβεις) and stelai (§18, 20, 21). He refers to these in terms that emphasise their antiquity and co-existence with the country, for instance ἐκ τῶν γεγεννημένων (§18 cf. 17, 21, 25). This allegation may not be mere oratorical embroidery as it is consistent with the restoration of the surviving inscription of sacrifices.²³³

The prosecutor's emphasis on the regulations' antiquity and his insistence that proper observance is necessary to ensure the prosperity of the state (§18-19 cf. 25, 30) reveals a traditionalist attitude towards religion. The work on sacrificial regulations can hardly have avoided some systemisation of practices as the *anagraphais* found them: selecting, rejecting and altering sacrifices, on the basis of their views about the rites' underlying meaning, object, and conformity to standard forms. It is just Nikomachos' disregard for antiquity and accepted practice that, in the prosecutor's view, disqualified him from making these kinds of decisions:

καίτοι, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί, περὶ εὐσεβείας οὐ παρὰ
Νικομάχου χρῆ μανθάνειν, ἀλλ' ἐκ τῶν γεγεννημένων
σκοπεῖν.

“But of course, gentlemen of the jury, we are not to be instructed in piety by Nicomachus, but are rather to be guided by the ways of the past.”
(Lys. 30.18, tr. Lamb, Loeb)

The outcome of the trial is unknown but the condition of the inscription associated with Nikomachos' work gives a hint. An extensive area of the inscription was erased and re-inscribed. Lysias does not mention any such wholesale erasure, though it would have supported his case to do so (§2, 5 etc.). Indeed, as the contents of the surviving inscription are consistent with the prosecutor's stated preference for the information from the ancient tablets and

regulations (§17, 21), it is likely that the erasure and rewriting took place after the trial.²³⁴ This implies that Nikomachos was condemned – whatever the formal charge was - and his codification work was reversed. He is, in fact, not heard of again.

If the prosecution was successful, it illustrates the strength of the suspicion that could exist towards a technical expert and his methods. (There may well have been a political aspect to the trial (§31 cf. 7-8) but this is not relevant for current purposes.) Nikomachos' alleged recklessness while in authority may have been thought to come from a sense of intellectual or technical superiority but there is no blatant anti-intellectual imagery used in the speech. Lysias does not identify Nikomachos with intellectuals, though he does suggest that he and his cronies who prey upon the state are 'powerful speakers' (τῶν δυναμέμενων λέγειν) (§24), an imputation perhaps comparable to Kleon's association of his 'clever speaker' opponents with intellectualism. However, the hostility towards his apparent interference in laws and religious procedures is probably the prosecutor's and jury's interpretation of the results of his codification work, which is an intellectual process. Although this was commissioned by the *demos* in the first place and there is no evidence that Nikomachos would have attempted to defy any direct order (§21), his work may have provoked disquiet in the Athenian community. The necessity of repealing old laws that conflicted with or duplicated new laws would expose changes in Athenian institutions – hitherto thought to be ancient and immutable - and thereby make the state seem discontinuous and unstable. It may be significant that the most trenchant assertions of the value of stable laws and the evil of legislative change appear in the 4th century, after this realisation of the existence and extent of change (and the psychological shock of the abuses of the oligarchic governments in 411 and 404/3 BC).²³⁵ The rejection of some sacrifices, especially ancient ones, for whatever reason - in this case, probably intellectual consistency - would conflict with conventional ideas about human relationships with the gods. These intellectual practices could be easily interpreted as causing recklessness, the presumption of superiority over ordinary citizens and the institutions of the state,

and criminal disregard for the religious integrity and safety of the state. The allegations presuppose that tampering with state practices and institutions on the basis of intellectual scrutiny is to undermine them, and that the authority of religious observances consists in their antiquity and form rather than any other quality that intellectual scrutiny might be able to identify.

2.7 - The Trial of Sokrates

In 399 BC Sokrates was indicted on charges of impiety and corrupting the young; the jury found him guilty and voted for his execution. This incident is the most famous attack on an intellectual figure in classical history. The issues of importance for this study are the form that the attack took, its meaning for negative views of intellectuals or the intellectual process, and the nature of the Athenians' involvement.

The information available on Sokrates' trial amounts to the indictment, the identity of the three prosecutors, Meletos, Anytos and Lykon, and the charges to which Plato and Xenophon refer explicitly or implicitly. Of additional interest is the speechwriter Polykrates' *Accusation of Sokrates*, probably written within ten years of the trial; it will be treated as a separate item of evidence in the next section.²³⁶

A. The formal charges

τάδε ἐγράψατο καὶ ἀνωμόσατο Μέλητος Μελήτου
Πιτθεὺς Σωκράτει Σωφρονίσκου Αλωπεκῆθεν· ἀδικεῖ
Σωκράτης, οὗς μὲν ἡ πόλις νομίζει θεοὺς οὐ νομίζων,
ἕτερα δὲ καινὰ δαιμόνια εἰσηγούμενος· ἀδικεῖ δὲ καὶ
τοὺς νέους διαφθείρων. τίμημα θάνατος.

“This indictment and affidavit are sworn by Meletus, the son of Meletus of Pitthos, against Socrates, the son of Sophroniscus of the deme Alopece: Socrates is guilty of refusing to recognize the gods recognized by the state, and of introducing other new divinities. He is also guilty of corrupting the youth. The penalty demanded is death.”

(D.L. 2.40, tr. R.D. Hicks, Loeb)

Diogenes names his source as the 2nd century AD collector Favorinus who claimed to have found the document in the Metroön in Athens. This is not

implausible. The wording is almost identical to Xenophon's in the *Memorabilia* and practically identical to that in his *Apology*. Plato does not claim to quote the charge exactly.²³⁷ It is significant that the apologists do not deny the legitimacy of any of the charges.

A1. Religious charges: refusing to acknowledge the gods of the city

Exactly what the charge of 'refusing to acknowledge the gods of the city' consists in is somewhat obscured by the wide range of meaning of νομίζειν. Essentially, it means 'to recognise by customary practice', including 'to worship' and 'to believe'.²³⁸ Sokrates' prosecutors apparently believed that his offence consisted in unbelief. This is clearly the meaning of the exchange between Sokrates and Meletos that Plato depicts as taking place in the trial.

ἐγὼ γὰρ οὐ δύναμαι μαθεῖν, πότερον λέγεις διδάσκειν με νομίζειν εἶναί τινας θεούς, καὶ αὐτὸς ἄρα νομίζω εἶναι θεούς, καὶ οὐκ εἰμί τὸ παράπαν ἄθεος οὐδὲ ταύτη ἀδικῶ, οὐ μέντοι οὐσπερ γε ἡ πόλις, ἀλλὰ ἐτέρους, καὶ τοῦτ' ἔστιν ὃ μοι ἐγκαλεῖς, ὅτι ἐτέρους· ἢ παντάπασί με φῆς οὔτε αὐτὸν νομίζειν θεοὺς τοὺς τε ἄλλους ταῦτα διδάσκειν.

Ταῦτα λέγω, ὡς τὸ παράπαν οὐ νομίζεις θεοὺς.

Ω θαυμάσιε Μέλητε, ἵνα τί ταῦτα λέγεις; οὐδὲ ἥλιον οὐδὲ σελήνην ἄρα νομίζω θεοὺς εἶναι, ὥσπερ οἱ ἄλλοι ἄνθρωποι;

Μὰ Δί, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί, ἐπεὶ τὸν μὲν ἥλιον λίθον φησὶν εἶναι, τὴν δὲ σελήνην γῆν.

Αναξαγόρου οἶει κατηγορεῖν, ὦ φίλε Μέλητε, καὶ οὕτω καταφρονεῖς τῶνδε καὶ οἶει αὐτοὺς ἀπείρους γραμμάτων εἶναι, ὥστε οὐκ εἰδέναι, ὅτι τὰ Αναξαγόρου βιβλία τοῦ Κλαζομενίου γέμει τούτων τῶν λόγων; καὶ δὴ καὶ οἱ νέοι ταῦτα παρ' ἐμοῦ μανθάνουσιν, ἃ ἕξεστιν ἐνίοτε, εἰ πάνυ πολλοῦ, δραχμῆς ἐκ τῆς ὀρχήστρας πριαμένοις Σωκράτους καταγελᾶν, ἐὰν προσποιῆται ἑαυτοῦ εἶναι, ἄλλως τε καὶ οὕτως ἄτοπα ὄντα. ἀλλ', ὦ πρὸς Διός, οὕτωςί σοι δοκῶ οὐδένα νομίζειν θεὸν εἶναι;

Οὐ μέντοι μὰ Δία οὐδ' ὀπωστιοῦν.

Sok: 'For I am unable to understand whether you say that I teach that there are some gods, and myself then believe that there are some gods, and am not altogether godless and am not a wrongdoer in that way, that these, however, are not the gods whom the state believes in, but others, and this is what you accuse me for, that I believe in others; or you say that I do not myself believe in gods at all and that I teach this unbelief to other people.'

Mel: 'That is what I say, that you do not believe in gods at all.'

Sok: 'You amaze me, Meletus! Why do you say this? Do I not even believe that the sun or yet the moon are gods, as the rest of mankind do?'

Mel: 'No, by Zeus, judges, since he says that the sun is a stone and the moon earth.'

Sok: 'Do you think you are accusing Anaxagoras, my dear Meletus, and do you so despise these gentlemen and think they are so unversed in letters as not to know, that the books of Anaxagoras the Clazomenian are full of such utterances? And forsooth the youth learn these doctrines from me, which they can buy sometimes (if the price is high) for a drachma in the orchestra and laugh at Sokrates, if he pretends they are his own, especially when they are so absurd! But, for heaven's sake, do you think this of me, that I do not believe there is any god?'

Mel: 'No, by Zeus, you don't, not in the least.'

(Pl. *Ap.* 26c-e, tr. Fowler, Loeb cf. *Euthph.* 3b)

Sokrates' apologists do not deny that disbelief in the gods was an offence, nor do they deny Meletos' contention that naturalistic rationalisation of phenomena traditionally thought to be divine was irreligious. Rather, they dispute that Sokrates indulged in these practices or held these beliefs. It seems that such speculation indeed was generally considered to be impious.²³⁹ Plato's Sokrates comments that studying 'the things in the air and the things beneath the earth' and 'not believing in the gods' (ὅτι τὰ μετέωρα καὶ τὰ ὑπὸ γῆς, καὶ θεοὺς μὴ νομίζειν) was an allegation commonly (and therefore plausibly) made against philosophers.²⁴⁰ Aristophanes made the same connexion in *The Clouds* decades earlier. Indeed, Plato names him specifically as one of Sokrates' 'original accusers' who had for years been disseminating false impressions of him through malice, ignorance or irresponsibility.²⁴¹ Diopieithes' 'decree' and a fragment from an unknown Euripides play similarly assume that astronomy is

connected to atheism, affirming that the association was, at least, intelligible.²⁴² Meletos clearly considered – or believed that the jury considered – that astronomy and naturalistic rationalisation of divine phenomena were activities characteristic of intellectuals, and that these things were evidence of or led to atheism.

Sokrates' apologists and his detractors – the comedians and the rhetorician Polykrates – indicate that Sokrates was famous for criticising traditional stories and being prepared to discard those that failed to meet certain criteria. His apologists emphasise that his overriding criterion was belief in the morality of the gods themselves. When Plato's *Euthyphro* justified the indictment of his own father by citing the precedent of Zeus' punishment of Kronos, Sokrates comments that Meletos' accusation of impiety is due to his rejection of just such immoral stories.²⁴³ Athenians may have interpreted such a sceptical attitude towards myths as tantamount to rejecting the gods, as though it was a denial of their divinity.²⁴⁴

While there is no reason to think that failure to participate in public worship was a crime at Athens²⁴⁵, popular understanding about the condition of Sokrates' belief would have been based on perceptions of his religious activity. His apologists repeatedly emphasise his piety, his punctiliousness in religious observance and the fact that this was demonstrated in public view.²⁴⁶ A fragment from a Hypereides speech, dating to the second half of the 4th century, says, "Our ancestors punished Sokrates for his words...".²⁴⁷ The context is unknown but it implies that he was punished for what he believed or advocated, not for any particular act or omission. Plato depicts Sokrates asking Meletos to specify whether he was supposed to deny some or all gods – this is a dangerously leading question if there were in fact any that might leap to the listener's or reader's mind.²⁴⁸ It is therefore hard to believe that he did, in fact, fail to make sacrifices or

conspicuously ignore any god.²⁴⁹ However, even if he was punctilious in his observances, the charge that he failed to acknowledge the gods could be an interpretation of his expressed beliefs about the nature of sacrifices or the manner in which he *made* them. Xenophon's story that Sokrates asked the Delphic oracle how he should best honour the gods indicates that he did not accept tradition as sufficient basis for practice.²⁵⁰ He also departed from accepted belief when he asserted that a sacrificer's moral state (εὐσέβεια) was more important to the gods than his generosity in sacrifice, that ascribing good fortune to luck is atheistic, and that sacrifices in themselves may not be of any interest or use to the gods.²⁵¹ Sokrates' 'refusal to acknowledge the gods of the city' could therefore refer to unorthodox beliefs about religious practice and unconventional modes of observance as much as to his professed belief.²⁵² If this were the case, it is not surprising that Sokrates' apologists do not highlight it. The prosecutors and jurors identified belief in the gods with acknowledgement of them: uncritically accepting divine phenomena, such as the planets, and the traditional stories told by the poets, and adhering to traditional observances. They may also have identified the various forms of acknowledgement, so that unorthodox behaviour in one aspect was assumed to be tantamount to rejecting all aspects.

A2. Religious charges: introducing new gods

Plato and Xenophon assume, in both their own voices and through the mouths of others, that Sokrates' *daimonion* is the central basis for the accusation of 'introducing new gods'.

καί μοι λέγε, τί καὶ ποιῶντά σέ φησι διαφθείρειν τοὺς νέους;

Ἄτοπα, ὦ θαυμάσιε, ὡς οὕτω γ' ἀκούσαι. φησὶ γὰρ με ποιητὴν εἶναι θεῶν, καὶ ὡς καινοῦς ποιῶντας θεούς,

τοὺς δ' ἀρχαίους οὐ νομίζοντα, ἐγράψατο τούτων αὐτῶν ἔνεκα, ὡς φησιν.

Μανθάνω, ὦ Σώκρατες· ὅτι δὴ σὺ τὸ δαιμόνιον φῆς σαυτῷ ἐκάστοτε γίνεσθαι. ὡς οὖν καινοτοῦντός σου περὶ τὰ θεῖα γέγραπται ταύτην τὴν γραφήν, καὶ ὡς διαβαλῶν δὴ ἔρχεται εἰς τὸ δικαστήριον, εἰδὼς ὅτι εὐδιάβολα τὰ τοιαῦτα πρὸς τοὺς πολλούς.

Euthph.: "...Now tell me, what does he [Meletos] say you do that corrupts the young?"

Sok: "Absurd things, my friend, at first hearing. For he says I am a maker of gods; and because I make new gods and do not believe in the old ones, he indicated me for the sake of these old ones, as he says."

Euthph.: "I understand, Socrates; it is because you say the divine monitor keeps coming to you. So he has brought the indictment against you for making innovations in religion, and he is going to court to slander you, knowing that slanders on such subjects are readily accepted by the people."
(Pl. *Euthph.* 3a-b, tr. Fowler, Loeb)

τούτου δὲ αἴτιον ἔστιν ὃ ὑμεῖς ἐμοῦ πολλάκις ἀκηκόατε πολλαχοῦ λέγοντος, ὅτι μοι θεῖόν τι καὶ δαιμόνιον γίνεται, ὃ δὴ καὶ ἐν τῇ γραφῇ ἐπικωμῶδῶν Μέλητος ἐγράψατο· ἐμοὶ δὲ τοῦτ' ἔστιν ἐκ παιδὸς ἀρξάμενον φωνὴ τις γιγνομένη, ἣ ὅταν γένηται, ἀεὶ ἀποτρέπει με τοῦτο ὃ ἂν μέλλω πράττειν, προτρέπει δὲ οὐποτε...

Sok: "But the reason for this [lack of participation in the state], as you have heard me say at many times and places, is that something divine and spiritual comes to me, the very thing which Meletus ridiculed in his indictment. I have had this from my childhood; it is a sort of voice that comes to me, and when it comes it always holds me back from what I am thinking of doing, but never urges me forward."
(Pl. *Ap.* 31c-d, tr. Fowler, Loeb)

καινά γε μὴν δαιμόνια πῶς ἂν ἐγὼ εἰσφεροίμι λέγων ὅτι θεοῦ μοι φωνὴ φαίνεται σημαίνουσα ὃ τι χρὴ ποιεῖν;

Sok: "As for 'introducing new divinities,' how could I be guilty of that merely in asserting that a voice of God is made manifest to me indicating my duty?"

(Xen. *Ap.* 12, tr. Todd, Loeb)

διετηθύλτο γὰρ, ὡς φαίη Σωκράτης τὸ δαιμόνιον ἑαυτῷ
σημαίνειν· ὅθεν δὴ καὶ μάλιστα μοι δοκοῦσιν αὐτὸν
αἰτιάσασθαι καινὰ δαιμόνια εἰσφέρειν.

Xen.: “Indeed, it had become notorious that Sokrates claimed to be guided by ‘the deity’: it was out of this claim, I think, that the charge of bringing in strange deities [most] arose.”

(Xen. *Mem.* 1.1.2, tr. E.C. Marchant, Loeb)

Sokrates’ *daimonion* may have been popularly understood as an aspect of intellectual irreligion. Meletos’ mention of it in his prosecution speech and Sokrates’ lengthy descriptions, both in his defence and elsewhere in his apologists’ works, imply that it was fairly widely known but little understood. Plato’s Sokrates acknowledges that the ‘divine voice’ was an unusual, even unique, phenomenon.²⁵³ Xenophon insists that it was no different from – even superior to – accepted ‘signs’ and other forms of divine contact, which also implies that there was something unconventional about its form.²⁵⁴ However, Xenophon was not present at the trial; his speculation that the *daimonion* was *most likely* the basis of the charge indicates that he did not really know how the prosecutors supported the accusation and believed that there may have been other reasons.²⁵⁵ The use of the plural (θεοί, δαιμόνια) in the indictment indicates that Meletos believed or sought to imply that there was more to the accusation than the *daimonion* alone.²⁵⁶ The phrase καινὰ δαιμόνια probably means ‘new divine things’ as much or more than ‘new gods’, which accords with the view that Sokrates’ offence consisted in his supposed religious attitudes and practices in general rather than worshipping new gods as such. Sokrates’ apologists speak as though it refers to both the peculiar form of his divine contact, his *daimonion* and to ‘new gods’.²⁵⁷

In *The Clouds* Aristophanes depicts Sokrates as denying the existence of conventional gods, instead swearing by emblems of science and rhetoric - Chaos, Tongue, Air, Respiration and the Clouds (Chapter 2.1 B6). Strepsiades’ literal-

mindedness causes him to suppose that denying Zeus means that he has been overthrown by Vortex, as Zeus overthrew Kronos (380-1, 826-8, 1474). This is a parody of the simplistic personification of the naturalistic theories with which intellectuals replaced gods as the causes of various phenomena. Sokrates' prosecutors may have suspected or sought to imply that this was true, that his denial of conventional gods was 'proved' by the existence of at least one replacement, his *daimonion*.

Sokrates' prosecutors' and jurors' belief that he was impious is based on a popular interpretation of intellectuals' proverbial activities, that the adoption of naturalistic explanations for divine phenomena left no room for traditional gods. Sokrates is the only intellectual accused of 'introducing new gods' but it may represent a view that science is really a substitute religion that the destruction of real religion makes necessary, as Aristophanes had implied. This also highlights the belief that religious innovation and/or private religion could be offensive and even dangerous. Athenian religious experience was usually public and communal and cults' maintenance and mediation was a state responsibility.²⁵⁸ Sokrates' talk about the *daimonion* and giving his friends advice on the basis of its authority may have had the appearance of proselytising a non-traditional cult.²⁵⁹ Suspicion about Sokrates' religious condition may have been furthered by his association with some individuals who were guilty of flagrantly irreligious acts. Alkibiades and Kritias were implicated in the impiety scandals of 415 BC; less famously, Aristodemos 'the dwarf' refused to make sacrifices, pray or use divination.²⁶⁰ There is, however, no clear evidence that this issue was raised in the trial.

B. Corrupting the young

Common usage of the phrase 'corruption' indicates that it includes impiety, violence, sensuality, immodesty, dishonesty, disrespect for elders and so on – in

general, a lack of restraint of desires and passions.²⁶¹ According to Plato, Meletos alleged that Sokrates' irreligion, which itself came from his astronomy and naturalistic speculation, caused the corruption of the young:

ἢ δῆλον δὴ ὅτι κατὰ τὴν γραφήν, ἣν ἐγράψω, θεοὺς διδάσκοντα μὴ νομίζειν οὐδὲ ἡ πόλις νομίζει, ἕτερα δὲ δαιμόνια καινά; οὐ ταῦτα λέγεις, ὅτι διδάσκων διαφθείρω; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν σφόδρα ταῦτα λέγω.

Sok: ““Or is it evident, according to the indictment you brought, that it is by teaching them not to believe in the gods the state believes in, but in other new spiritual beings? Do you not say that it is by teaching this that I corrupt them?”

Mel: ‘Very decidedly that is what I say.’”

(Pl. *Ap.* 26b, tr. Fowler, Loeb, and Pl. *Euthph.* 3a-b, quoted in A2 above cf. Pl. *Ap.* 24c-27e)

Xenophon also reproduces an exchange in which Sokrates scores some points off Meletos on the issue of his alleged influence on the young (*Ap.* 19-21). However, Plato's version barely addresses the corruption charge and seems to have the object of (a) making Meletos contradict himself on the religious issue and (b) showing that he had not given thought to what ‘corruption of the young’ really meant. Both points would substantiate the general Socratic contention that few people really know what they profess to know. It may be Plato's intention to combine this point with a rebuttal of what, in his view, was the central aspect of the corruption allegation, Sokrates' supposed impiety.²⁶² However, the charge of corruption is not, indeed, dependent on irreligion. The two points are indeed separated (τε... καὶ) at Pl. *Ap.* 24b-c. It is more accurate to say that the corruption charge revolved around the issue of political and social inculcation, education to ‘make the young better’.²⁶³ Xenophon's account of the trial indicates that he viewed corruption as consisting in the destruction of one's moral disposition (of which piety is only a part) and resistance to physical pleasures (see n. 261 above). Apart from physical and practical education, such as basic

literacy and numeracy, education in the wider sense, the inculcation of moral and social virtues, was traditionally viewed as coming from learning traditional poetry and from involvement in the political and social life of the city. This is the attitude of Sokrates' prosecutors. When invited to indicate those responsible for bettering the young, Plato's Meletos says that it is the laws; when pressed to name individuals he says that the jurors, the senators and the Assembly-goers are all beneficial.²⁶⁴ The implication is that he believed that Sokrates interfered in this process. Xenophon reinforces this interpretation, depicting Meletos as saying that the corrupted are 'those who prefer to obey Sokrates rather than their parents'.²⁶⁵ In the *Gorgias* (c.390 BC) Plato has Sokrates speculating that the charge of corruption might be brought against him:

ἐὰν τέ τις με ἢ νεωτέρους φῆ διαφθείρειν ἀπορεῖν
ποιοῦντα, ἢ τοὺς πρεσβυτέρους κακηγορεῖν λέγοντα
πικροῦς λόγους ἢ ἰδίᾳ ἢ δημοσίᾳ, οὔτε τὸ ἀληθές ἔξω
εἰπεῖν, ὅτι δικαίως πάντα ταῦτα ἐγὼ λέγω, καὶ πράττω
τὸ ὑμέτερον δὴ τοῦτο, ὧ ἄνδρες δικασταί, οὔτε ἄλλο
οὐδέν· ὥστε ἴσως, ὃ τι ἂν τύχω, τοῦτο πείσομαι.

"...[I]f anyone alleges that I either corrupt the younger men by reducing them to perplexity, or revile the older with bitter expressions whether in private or in public, I shall be unable either to tell the truth and say – "It is on just grounds that I say all this, and it is your interest that I serve thereby, gentlemen of the jury" – or to say anything else; and so I daresay any sort of thing, as luck may have it, will befall me."
(Pl. *Gorg.* 522b-c, tr. Lamb, Loeb).

Sokrates readily admits that he examined poets, artisans and politicians, exposing the lack of depth and consistency in their knowledge. This implicitly criticised their ability to educate the young. He also denied that the young's most immediate and personal influences, their own fathers, relatives and acquaintances, were qualified either.²⁶⁶ Rather, he advocated that the young should be taught by experts. The most memorable example of this is Xenophon's story that Anytos'

grudge against Sokrates was due to his suggestion that Anytos' son should receive an education not restricted to the family business of tanning.²⁶⁷

The prosecutors suspected that the education that Sokrates offered the young induced corruption also on account of its method and content.²⁶⁸ Plato depicts Sokrates shortly before his trial commenting on the hostility that existed towards novel intellectual teaching:

Αθηναίοις γὰρ τοι, ὡς ἔμοι δοκεῖ, οὐ σφόδρα μέλει, ἂν
τινα δεινὸν οἴωνται εἶναι, μὴ μέντοι διδασκαλικὸν τῆς
αὐτοῦ σοφίας· ὃν δ' ἂν καὶ ἄλλους οἴωνται ποιεῖν
τοιούτους, θυμῶνται, εἴτ' οὖν φθόνῳ, ὡς σὺ λέγεις, εἴτε
δι' ἄλλο τι.

“For the Athenians, I fancy, are not much concerned, if they think a man is clever, provided he does not impart his clever notions to others; but when they think he makes others to be like himself, they are angry with him, either through jealousy, as you say, or for some other reason.”
(Pl. *Euthph.* 3c-d, tr. Fowler, Loeb)

Anytos repeated this view in his speech: “...[Anytos said] that if I were acquitted your sons would all be utterly ruined by practising what I teach...”.²⁶⁹ Sokrates thinks that his ‘first accusers’ corruption charge consists in ‘teaching others the things’ that he was supposed to practice and believe in: naturalistic speculation, atheism and deviousness in speech.²⁷⁰ He introduced his associates to intellectual interests and methods and encouraged them to scrutinise accepted beliefs critically. His associates therefore became less inclined to defer to these beliefs, were encouraged to challenge them themselves and were equipped with the intellectual tools necessary to do so. Sokrates alluded to this last point in his reference to the behaviour of the rich young men who adopted his method of cross-examining traditional authorities for their own entertainment:

Πρὸς δὲ τούτοις οἱ νέοι μοι ἐπακολουθοῦντες, οἷς
μάλιστα σχολή ἐστίν, οἱ τῶν πλουσιωτάτων, αὐτόματοι
χαίρουσιν ἀκούοντες ἐξεταζομένων τῶν ἀνθρώπων, καὶ
αὐτοὶ πολλάκις ἐμὲ μιμοῦνται, εἶτα ἐπιχειροῦσιν ἄλλους
ἐξετάζειν· κᾶπειτα, οἶμαι, εὐρίσκουσι πολλὴν ἀφθονίαν
οἰομένων μὲν εἶδέναι τι ἀνθρώπων, εἰδότες δὲ ὀλίγα ἢ
οὐδέν.

“And in addition to these things, the young men who have the most leisure, the sons of the richest men, accompany me of their own accord, find pleasure in hearing people being examined, and often imitate me themselves, and then they undertake to examine others; and then, I fancy, they find a great plenty of people who think they know something, but know little or nothing.”

(Pl. *Ap.* 23c, tr. Fowler, Loeb cf. 21c-22d, 33b-c).

Meletos insisted that Sokrates' corruption of youth was deliberate though it is not clear what his motives were supposed to be.²⁷¹ Sokrates' apologists repeatedly insist that he did not accept payment.²⁷² This is something that the prosecutors did not even allege, certainly not holding back on account of shame, as Sokrates implies (Pl. *Ap.* 31c), but probably because they viewed it as irrelevant to the issue of his responsibility.

In summary, it was alleged that Sokrates corrupted the young by undermining their respect for their fathers and other traditional authorities and by replacing traditional education with a process of intellectualisation that destroyed moral certainty and enhanced individuals' abilities to practice destructive argumentation and to realise gross self-interest.

C. Informal charges

C1. Rhetoric

Sokrates' accusers warned the jurors to beware of Sokrates' 'clever speech':

μάλιστα δὲ αὐτῶν ἐν ἐθαύμασα τῶν πολλῶν ὧν
ἐψεύσαντο, τοῦτο, ἐν ᾧ ἔλεγον ὡς χρὴ ὑμᾶς εὐλαβεῖσθαι,
μὴ ὑπ' ἐμοῦ ἐξαπατηθῆτε, ὡς δεινοῦ ὄντος λέγειν.

“But I was most amazed by one of the many lies that they told – when they said that you must be on your guard not to be deceived by me, because I was a clever speaker.”

(Pl. *Ap.* 17a, tr. Fowler, Loeb).

It is the premise of Aristophanes' *Clouds* that Sokrates teaches devious skills in rhetoric that could be used to evade justice. Sokrates argues that ‘making the weaker argument stronger’ was an easy allegation to make against philosophers, so it was clearly a popular supposition.²⁷³ This is not a baseless imputation but a reasonable interpretation of the negative dialectic that Sokrates (and some of his associates) used, demanding that their interlocutors’ statements withstand thorough intellectual scrutiny and often reducing them to nonsense.²⁷⁴ Even in his defence speech Sokrates employs some conspicuously subtle arguments. He refutes Meletos’ assertion that he corrupts the young knowingly on the basis that this would be against his own best interests, and then the accusation that he induces corruption by arguing that, if he believed in divine things (which Meletos admits in his allegation that he introduced new gods) then he cannot be an atheist and, therefore, cannot corrupt on account of irreligion.²⁷⁵ This style of argument, eschewing concrete examples and using generalisations and theorisations, inverts the practice of real legal oratory (Chapter 2.4 C).

C2. Political issues

Plato and Xenophon record that the prosecutors were unable to provide instances of ‘corrupted youth’ to substantiate their allegation, though they did produce witnesses of some kind.²⁷⁶ However, when they insist that Sokrates should not, in any case, be held responsible for anyone, as he never contracted to teach, they

tacitly admit that he did have associates who could be considered corrupt.²⁷⁷ Indeed, Xenophon provides a lengthy refutation of Sokrates' responsibility for Kritias, the oligarchic tyrant, and Alkibiades, the impious egomaniac.²⁷⁸ This indicates that their association with Sokrates was genuine and could damage his reputation. Their place in the case against Sokrates is connected to the involvement of political issues. The prosecutors could easily have alleged that Sokrates attacked the democratic constitution. It is known that he criticised the democratic practice of sortition on the eminently élitist ground that it excludes those best qualified to rule.²⁷⁹ Kritias and Alkibiades could have furnished examples of the political effects of Sokrates' teaching, the arrogance, violence and immorality that it could induce. There was no procedural bar to material outside the specific charges at least being cited, not even the amnesty of 401 BC.²⁸⁰

Sokrates did not himself participate in public business beyond that directly required, military service and service on the *Boule*.²⁸¹ Xenophon emphasises that Sokrates and his closest associates were not interested in success in the Assembly or the courts precisely to differentiate them from Kritias and Alkibiades.²⁸² Sokrates could, therefore, perhaps have been accused of making men reluctant to involve themselves in civic affairs, contrary to democratic ideology (see n. 159 above).

It is, however, not certain that any of these political issues were raised at the trial. The evidence comes entirely from Xenophon's *Memorabilia*, which seems to respond to Polykrates' *Accusation of Sokrates* rather than to the speeches that were actually made (see Chapter 2.8). Isokrates is able to deny Polykrates' association of Sokrates and Alkibiades outright.²⁸³

D. Conclusion

The prosecutors claimed that Sokrates was odious or even dangerous to the state for reasons deriving from his intellectual qualities. They either believed this themselves or thought that the jurors were receptive to the notion. Impiety was the major component of the prosecution. Plato's Sokrates' remark that Meletos would not have got a fifth of the votes without Anytos' and Lykon's support is not evidence that the religious charges were trivial; elsewhere, in fact, Plato uses 'impiety' as shorthand for the whole prosecution.²⁸⁴ Sokrates was thought to be irreligious on account of his supposed naturalistic speculations about heavenly bodies and perhaps also for his scepticism about traditional stories and unorthodox religious beliefs and practices. Teaching astronomy was presented as a cause of his 'corruption of the young' (see section B above). Another was in making young men inquiring and sceptical and equipping them with sophisticated methods of argument that they could then use to ridicule and insult traditional authorities and ordinary people (see section C above). The prosecutors may also have used points that Sokrates' apologists avoid or only allude to. For instance, it is known that Sokrates rejected the egalitarian premise of the democratic constitution on account of his belief in the necessity of superior intellectual training. His own comments in his trial may also have forced the jury to conclude that, whatever his intentions, he was criminally reckless in disavowing responsibility and showed a complete lack of concern for the abuse of his methods by 'corrupted youth'.²⁸⁵

The voting in the trial is recorded, which allows an estimate of the degree to which the jury found the sentiments invoked by the prosecutors convincing. The guilty vote had a fairly narrow majority: 281 to 220, 56% of the total.²⁸⁶ Moreover, this came after Sokrates' famously unconciliatory speech.

Xenophon's *Apology* was written precisely to explain Sokrates' μεγαληγορία (§1). In Plato's *Apology* Sokrates refers to the jurors not by the conventional term δικασταί, which he reserves for those who voted for his acquittal and the judges in the underworld, but by the phrase ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναίοι. This is a subtle but pointed belittlement that reflects on their ability to make a judgement.²⁸⁷ The jurors' disturbances (admittedly, supplied by Sokrates' apologists) also usually come in response to his more arrogant and trenchant comments.²⁸⁸ (Arrogance, as the sections on other genres have shown, is itself a characteristic regularly ascribed to intellectuals on account of the sense of superiority that their cultivated skills gives them.) The prosecutors' focus on the negative characteristics of intellectuals and intellectualism²⁸⁹ – such as the 'obvious' connexion between astronomy and atheism and devious rhetorical skill – shows that they believed that these motifs existed in the public mind. It was not sufficient for them, however, to identify Sokrates as an intellectual: his offence lay in the actualisation of his beliefs and techniques. The bare success of the prosecution (with, it must be said, considerable help from the defendant) indicates that, while the average Athenian juror may have recognised anti-intellectual motifs he was not dominated by them.

2.8 - *Polykrates' Accusation of Sokrates*

Polykrates was an Athenian who turned to professional speech writing after being left impoverished after the Peloponnesian War.²⁹⁰ His *Accusation of Sokrates* (Κατηγορία Σωκράτους) seems to have been published as a *paignion* or for the purpose of advertising his rhetorical skill (essentially the same thing).²⁹¹ Its date of composition falls between 393 BC, as it referred to the rebuilding of Athens' walls²⁹², and before c.390 BC, the date of Isokrates' *Bousiris*, which refers to it. The place of composition may have been outside Athens; indeed, if he fled when the Thirty Tyrants came to power, he was absent at the time that Sokrates was tried.²⁹³ There is no particular reason to suppose that the *Accusation* reproduces any of the actual speeches made at the trial. If anything, Polykrates would have aimed to 'improve' on them by introducing new material and more sophisticated and plausible arguments. The *Accusation* must have been sufficiently influential and creditable for Isokrates (in the *Bousiris*) and probably Xenophon (in the *Memorabilia*), and possibly other Sokratics as well, to believe that it deserved a response. As Polykrates was himself Athenian and either published the tract at Athens or did so intending to return there, the tract can be considered to be a reflection of Athenian attitudes.

Polykrates' tract must have been in the form of a speech, as some later writers mistook it for one that was actually delivered at the trial.²⁹⁴ The mouthpiece is often assumed to be Anytos, to whom Libanios addresses himself in his *Apology of Sokrates* - at least some ancient writers thought that Anytos, in fact, composed it.²⁹⁵ However, others refer to Polykrates as the speechwriter for Meletos or both Meletos and Anytos.²⁹⁶ This uncertainty probably means that a speaker was not actually specified.

There are a few direct references to the *Accusation*, found in Isokrates' *Bousiris* and the scholia on Aelius Aristides' *For the Four*. However, reconstructing it largely depends on inferences drawn from Xenophon's *Memorabilia* and Libanios' *Apology of Sokrates*. Though Sokrates had three prosecutors Xenophon

refers to ‘accuser’ in the singular, so it seems that he was referring to one exemplar as representing them all. Moreover, Xenophon responds to items that definitely appeared in Polykrates’ tract: the example of Alkibiades as Sokrates’ student and the quote from *The Iliad*.²⁹⁷ Libanios has enough similarities to both the *Memorabilia* and what is known of Polykrates to make it fairly certain that he referred to it. Naturally, the caveats in using Libanios as a source are the same as for using any non-contemporary writer. Data he provides may be his own inference and elaboration rather than something that he knows. Despite his known antiquarian interests, he must be assumed to be writing with the outlook of his own time. For example, the concerns he expresses about freedom of speech and conscience are probably due to the events of the 4th century AD, possibly a veiled defence of Julian.²⁹⁸ Moreover, as it is contrary to his attested habits as a writer to adhere rigidly to one tract, he may invent charges to respond to. However, it is admissible to suppose that Libanios is referring to Polykrates where he responds to a specific point as though it was laid out before him; sometimes he mentions ‘Anytos’ or ‘the accuser’ specifically.²⁹⁹

The ‘contract’ that Libanios makes early in his speech looks like a deliberate mirroring of the general charges made against Sokrates:

διορίσασθαι δέ, ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι, καὶ αὐτὸς ὥσπερ καὶ οὗτος
βούλομαι. ἐὰν [δ’] ἐπιδείξω Σωκράτην οὐδενὶ πάποτε
διδάσκαλον γενόμενον οὔτ’ ἀδίκου κλοπῆς οὔτε ἀπάτης
οὔτε ἱεροσυλίας οὔτε ἐπιπορκίας οὔτ’ ἀργίας οὔθ’
ὑπεροψίας τῶν νόμων οὔτε δήμου καταλύσεως, ἀπάσης δὲ
σωφροσύνης καὶ δικαιοσύνης ἡγεμόνα καὶ πάντων ὑμῖν
εὐνοῦστατον καὶ γεγενημένον καὶ ὄντα, πείσατε Ἄνυτον
ἐγκαλύψασθαι.

“Like Anytus, men of Athens, I too should like to make a stipulation. If I demonstrate that Socrates never taught anybody theft or deceit or sacrilege or perjury or idleness or contempt of the laws or subversion of the democracy, but always was and still is a leader in temperance and justice, and of all men the most loyal friend to yourselves, then tell Anytus to hide his head in shame.”

(Lib. *Ap.Soc.* 13, tr. Russell, *Libanius: Imaginary Speeches*).

The last of these charges seems to be Polykrates' chief accusation against Sokrates, that he attacked the institutions of Athens' democratic constitution and the political equality of ordinary citizens:

Ἀλλὰ νῆ Δία, ὁ κατήγορος ἔφη, ὑπερορᾶν ἐποίει τῶν καθεστώτων νόμων τοὺς συνόντας λέγων, ὡς μῶρον εἶη τοὺς μὲν τῆς πόλεως ἄρχοντας ἀπὸ κυάμου καθιστάναι, κυβερνήτη δὲ μηδένα ἐθέλειν χρῆσθαι κυαμευτῶ μηδὲ τέκτονι μηδ' αὐλητῇ μηδ' ἐπ' ἄλλα τοιαῦτα, ἃ πολλῶ ἐλάττονας βλάβας ἀμαρτανόμενα ποιεῖ τῶν περὶ τὴν πόλιν ἀμαρτανομένων· τοὺς δὲ τοιούτους λόγους ἐπαίρειν ἔφη τοὺς νέους καταφρονεῖν τῆς καθεστῶσης πολιτείας καὶ ποιεῖν βιαίους.

“But, said his accuser, he taught his companions to despise the established laws by insisting on the folly of appointing public officials by lot, when none would choose a pilot or builder or flautist by lot, nor any other craftsmen for work in which mistakes are far less disastrous than statecraft. Such sayings, he argued, led the young to despise the established constitution and made them violent.”
(Xen. *Mem.* 1.2.9, tr. Marchant, Loeb)

μισόδημος, φησὶν, ἐστὶ καὶ τοὺς συνόντας πείθει τῆς δημοκρατίας καταγελᾶν.

“‘He hates the people’, says the prosecutor, ‘and encourages his associates to ridicule the democracy.’”
(Lib. *Ap.Soc.* 53, tr. Russell, *Libanius: Imaginary Speeches*).

...Σωκράτην ὁ φάσκων αὐτὸν συμβεβουλευκέναι τοῖς νέοις ζητεῖν ὅπως ἡ πόλις δουλεύσει.

“Anytus, who asserts that Sokrates advised the young to look for ways of enslaving the city...”
(Lib. *Ap.Soc.* 55, tr. Russell, *Libanius: Imaginary Speeches*).

Polykrates alleged that Sokrates used Homer and Theognis as authorities in encouraging his followers to despise ordinary people and democratic government. This included citing the scene in *The Iliad* in which Odysseus arrested a panic in the Greek camp by ‘speaking gently’ to the chiefs but bullying common soldiers.³⁰⁰

ταῦτα δὴ αὐτὸν ἐξηγεῖσθαι, ὡς ὁ ποιητῆς ἐπαινοίη
παίεσθαι τοὺς καὶ πένητας.

“This passage, it was said, he explained to mean that he [the poet] approved of chastising common and poor folk.”

(*Xen. Mem.* 1.2.58, tr. Marchant, Loeb; cf. *Lib. Ap.Soc.* 93)

From Theognis, a very pro-aristocratic poet, Polykrates alleged that Sokrates quoted that ‘poverty makes a man powerless’ to suggest that the wealthy could legitimately claim superiority over the poor.³⁰¹ Polykrates apparently anticipated the objection that there was no evidence that Sokrates sought power himself, saying that “he did not want the position himself, but encouraged others”.³⁰² He refers instead to the ambitions of Alkibiades and Kritias (see below).

Not only, according to Polykrates, was Sokrates anti-democratic in attacking the legal and political rights of ordinary men but he also attacked conventional morality. This included both standard moral beliefs, such as the wrongness of theft or lying, and the norms of social relations, such as the authority of one’s parents. His political and moral arguments encouraged self-interested, socially destructive and lawless behaviour among his followers. The superiority of one’s intellect he identified as justifying superiority to social and political conventions.

Ἀλλὰ Σωκράτης γ’, ἔφη ὁ κατήγορος, τοὺς πατέρας
προπηλακίζειν ἐδίδασκε, πείθων μὲν τοὺς συνόντας ἑαυτῷ
σοφωτέρους ποιεῖν τῶν πατέρων, φάσκων δὲ κατὰ νόμον
ἐξεῖναι παρανοίας ἐλόντι καὶ τὸν πατέρα δῆσαι,
τεκμηρίῳ τούτῳ χρώμενος, ὡς τὸν ἀμαθέστερον ὑπὸ τοῦ
σοφωτέρου νόμιμον εἶη δεδέσθαι.

“‘But’, said his accuser, ‘Socrates taught sons to treat their fathers with contempt: he persuaded them that he made his companions wiser than their fathers: he said that the law allowed a son to put his father in prison if he convinced a jury that he was insane; and this was proof that it was lawful for the wiser to keep the more ignorant in gaol.’”

(*Xen. Mem.* 1.2.49, tr. Marchant, Loeb)

Ἀλλὰ Σωκράτης γε, ἔφη ὁ κατήγορος, οὐ μόνον τοὺς πατέρας, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους συγγενεῖς ἐποίει ἐν ἀτιμίᾳ εἶναι παρὰ τοῖς ἑαυτῷ συνοῦσι, λέγων, ὡς οὔτε τοὺς κάμνοντας οὔτε τοὺς δικαζομένους οἱ συγγενεῖς ὠφελούσιν, ἀλλὰ τοὺς μὲν οἱ ἰατροί, τοὺς δὲ οἱ συνδικεῖν ἐπιστάμενοι... ἀναπείθοντα οὖν τοὺς νέους αὐτὸν, ὡς αὐτὸς εἶη σοφώτατός τε καὶ ἄλλους ἱκανώτατος ποιῆσαι σοφούς, οὕτω διατιθέναι τοὺς ἑαυτῷ συνόντας, ὥστε μηδαμοῦ παρ' αὐτοῖς τοὺς ἄλλους εἶναι πρὸς αὐτὸν.

“But,” said his accuser, “Socrates caused his companions to dishonour not only their fathers, but their other relations as well, by saying that invalids and litigants get benefit not from their relations, but from their doctor or their counsel... Thus by leading the young to think that he excelled in wisdom and in ability to make others wise, he had such an effect on his companions that no one counted for anything in their estimation in comparison with him.”

(Xen. *Mem.* 1.2.51-52, tr. Marchant, Loeb)

Specifically, Sokrates apparently advocated a calculating amoral egotism among the intellectual élite, those with superior powers of understanding and argument:

ἔφη δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶν φίλων αὐτὸν λέγειν, ὡς οὐδὲν ὄφελος εὖνους εἶναι, εἰ μὴ καὶ ὠφελεῖν δυνησονται· μόνους δὲ φάσκειν αὐτὸν ἀξίους εἶναι τιμῆς τοὺς εἰδότας τὰ δέοντα καὶ ἐρμηνεύσαι δυναμένους...

“[And he said that] of friends too he [Sokrates] said that their goodwill was worthless, unless they could combine with it some power to help one: only those deserved honour who knew what was the right thing to do, and could explain it.”

(Xen. *Mem.* 1.2.52, tr. Marchant, Loeb)

Libanios also refers to allegations that Sokrates attacked traditional social values and advocated immorality:

Ὁ αὐτὸς τοίνυν ἔστι μοι λόγος καὶ περὶ τοῦ μέμφεσθαι, φησὶν, αὐτὸν τῶν ἔθῶν τισι τῶν παρ' ἡμῖν.

“My argument is the same with regard to the prosecution’s assertion that Sokrates criticizes some of our habits.”

(Lib. *Ap.Soc.* 80, tr. Russell, *Libanius: Imaginary Speeches*)

ἤδεσαν γὰρ τὰ τε ἄλλα ἃ πρὸς ὑμᾶς νῦν διήλθον καὶ περὶ τῶν λοιπῶν ἃ δίδειμι, τοῦ τε κλέπτειν καὶ τῆς ἱεροσυλίας καὶ τῆς ἀπάτης. ταυτὶ γὰρ οὐκ εἰσάπαξ ἠγεῖτο δεινὰ καὶ τοῖς νόμοις ἐναντία· γίνεσθαι γὰρ αὐτοῖς παρὰ τῶν πολέμων τὸν καιρὸν. καὶ στρατηγὸς ἀμείνων ὁ κλέπτων τοῦ δεδιότος μὴ διὰ κλοπῆς νικήσῃ... τί οὖν ἠδίκηκε Σωκράτης ἢ Μέλανθος ὡς ἐνίκησε λέγων... ἢ τὸν Ὀδυσσεῖα φάσκων ἐπὶ τῆ τοῦ Παλλαδίου τιμηθῆναι κλοπῇ... διδάσκει γὰρ, φησὶν, ἐπιορκεῖν... εἰ τοίνυν Σωκράτης ἐπιορκεῖν καὶ κλέπτειν καὶ βιάζεσθαι καὶ τᾶλλ' ἃ φησιν Ἄνυτος ἐδίδασκεν...

“They all know what I have just told you, and what I am now going to tell you, about trickery, sacrilege and deceit. Socrates did not believe that these were absolutely bad and contrary to law, because there is a place for them in war, and a general who uses a trick is better than one who is afraid to use trickery in order to secure victory... So was Socrates wrong either to tell the story of Melanthus' victory... or to relate how Odysseus was honoured for stealing the Palladium?... ‘Socrates’, says the prosecution, ‘teaches perjury’... So if Socrates had taught perjury and theft and violence, and the others that Anytus says...”

(Lib. *Ap.Soc.* 103, 105, 109, 112, tr. Russell, *Libanius: Imaginary Speeches*)

Melanthos was an Athenian hero who famously won a battle through deception.³⁰³ Odysseus' theft of the Palladion was a necessary condition of the Greeks' capture of Troy. It is consistent with Plato's depiction of Sokrates' methods if he used examples like this to show that deception and theft could be justified under certain circumstances and, therefore, that morality consists in a principle rather than particular actions. Polykrates seems to have contradicted this and re-asserted conventional moral values. In the case of Odysseus, he argued that his theft was, in fact, punished, and by the gods no less. This emphasises that Sokrates' attitude towards such actions was immoral and impious.

ὅτε τοίνυν ἔφασκεν Ὀδυσσεῖα διὰ τὴν ἱεροσυλίαν τὰ καὶ τὰ πεπονθέναι, τὰ μὲν ἐν γῆ, τὰ δὲ καὶ ἐν θαλάττῃ, καὶ τὰ μὲν ἐν τῇ κομιδῇ, τὰ δὲ οἴκοι, τότε τούτοις ἅπασιν τὸν Ὀμηρον ἠλαυνε. πῶς; ὅτι πᾶς τις ὁμολογήσειεν ἂν ἐγκώμιον ἐκείνῳ τοῦ πολυπλανοῦς ἀνδρὸς τὴν Ὀδύσειαν πεποιῆσθαι... τῷ μὲν οὖν Ὀμήρῳ ποιεῖν ἐπήλθεν εἰς ἄνδρα

θαυμαστὸν ἔπαινον, Ἄνυτος δὲ ὄν ἐκεῖνος τὰ τε ἄλλα
γενναῖον ἠγείτο καὶ μόνον ἐπιθεῖναι τῷ μακρῷ πολέμῳ
τέλος, πάντων ἀθλιώτατον ἀποφαίνει καὶ τὸν αὐτὸν ἀσεβῆ
καὶ κακοδαίμονα.

“When he [the prosecutor] alleged that Odysseus had undergone various sufferings on account of his sacrilege – on land, at sea, on his journey, and at home – he was criticising Homer. How? Because everyone would agree that Homer composed the *Odyssey* as an encomium of that great wanderer... Thus Homer came to compose a marvellous encomium on a ‘man’, whereas Anytus represents this hero, whom Homer thought to be noble and solely responsible for bringing the long war to an end, as the most miserable of mankind, impious and ill-starred.”

(Lib. *Ap.Soc.* 123, 125, tr. Russell, *Libanius: Imaginary Speeches*)

Polykrates alleged that, in addition to citing mythological examples, Sokrates argued that verses from famous poets justified the rejection of accepted moral principles. He apparently exploited Hesiod to support his attack on conventional morality in favour of self-interest, and Pindar for the use of violence as a means to achieve one’s ends.³⁰⁴

...Ἡσιόδου μὲν τὸ Ἔργον δ’ οὐδὲν ὄνειδος, ἀεργίην δέ τ’
ὄνειδος· τοῦτο δὴ λέγειν αὐτὸν ὡς ὁ ποιητῆς κελεύει
μηδενὸς ἔργου μήτ’ ἀδίκου μήτ’ αἰσχροῦ ἀπέχεσθαι, ἀλλὰ
καὶ ταῦτα ποιεῖν ἐπὶ τῷ κέρδει.

“[F]or example, Hesiod’s line: ‘No work is a disgrace, but idleness is a disgrace’ [*W&D* 309]. He was charged with explaining this line as an injunction to refrain from no work, dishonest or disgraceful, but to do anything for gain.”

(Xen. *Mem.* 1.2.56, tr. Marchant, Loeb cf. Lib. *Ap.Soc.* 86)

Οὕτω καὶ περὶ Πινδάρου διαλέγεται δεδοικῶς αὐτοῦ τὴν
διδαχὴν καὶ φοβούμενος μή τις τῶν νέων ἀκούσας ὡς
ὑπερτάτη χειρὶ βιάζεται τὸ δίκαιον ἀμελήσας τῶν νόμων
ἀσκῆ τῷ χεῖρει.

“He [Sokrates] is alarmed by his [Pindar’s] teaching, and fears that some young man, hearing that ‘justice is forced by hand superior’ [fr. 169] may disregard the laws and practice the use of his two fists.”

(Lib. *Ap.Soc.* 87, tr. Russell, *Libanius: Imaginary Speeches*)³⁰⁵

Polykrates apparently insinuated that Sokrates was particularly obsessed with the young. In addition to the references already quoted³⁰⁶:

νέοι δὲ πατέρων τε πρότερον ἄγοντες ἐκείνον, ὡς λέγεις,
καὶ πρεσβυτέρων ἀδελφῶν ὑπερορῶντες καὶ καθάπερ ὑπὸ
γόητος ἐλκόμενοι τοῦ Σωκράτους τί πλεον ἂν ἐζήτησαν
τοῦ νεῦσαι τὸν ἄνθρωπον;

“Those young men who, as you say, think more of Sokrates than of their fathers, those younger brothers who despise their elders, and have fallen victims to Sokrates’ magic – what would they have needed more than a simple nod from the man?”

(*Lib. Ap.Soc.* 102, tr. Russell, *Libanius: Imaginary Speeches*)

εἰ γὰρ ἂ μὴ κρύπτει, φησί, Σωκράτης, οὕτως ἂν εἴη
βλαβερά, τίς ἂν εἴη καὶ τί συμβουλευοί ἂν μόνους ἔχων
τοὺς ἔραστάς;

“If what Sokrates does not hide is so damaging,’ he argues, ‘what must he be like, what advice must he give, when he has his lovers on their own?’”

(*Lib. Ap.Soc.* 114, tr. Russell, *Libanius: Imaginary Speeches*)

Ὅταν δὲ λέγῃ τοῖς μὲν νέοις αὐτὸν διαλέγεσθαι, τοῖς
πρεσβυτέροις δὲ οὐκ ἐθέλειν, ψεύδεται... ὅμως φησὶν
αὐτὸν φεύγειν μὲν τοὺς ἄνδρας, θηρεύειν δὲ τὴν νεότητα.

“When Anytos says that Sokrates conversed with the young but would not converse with the old, he is lying... He nevertheless alleges that Sokrates avoided adults and chased after the young.”

(*Lib. Ap.Soc.* 117, tr. Russell, *Libanius: Imaginary Speeches*, slightly modified)

Not only did Sokrates’ magnetic attraction for the young undermine traditional familial ties, but it increased the influence of his political and ethical teaching over the most impressionable and energetic component of the state. Polykrates implies that Sokrates’ interest was prurient.

None of Sokrates’ apologists deny his exploitation of traditional poets. Polykrates considered the manner of his use to be scandalous:

Ἐφη δ' αὐτὸν ὁ κατήγορος καὶ τῶν ἐνδοξοτάτων ποιητῶν
ἐκλεγόμενον τὰ πονηρότατα καὶ τούτοις μαρτυρίοις
χρῶμενον διδάσκειν τοὺς συνόντας κακούργους τε εἶναι
καὶ τυραννικούς...

“Again, his accuser alleged that he selected from the most famous poets the most immoral passages, and used them as evidence in teaching his companions to be tyrants and malefactors...”
(*Xen. Mem.* 1.2.56, tr. Marchant, Loeb)

Ἡσιόδου, φησίν, [ἔπη] καὶ Θεόγνιδος καὶ Ὀμήρου καὶ τῶν
Πινδάρου μελῶν, τοὺς δὲ ποιητὰς τούτους καὶ δόξης καὶ
τιμῶν τετυχηκέναι παρά τε τοῖς ἄλλοις καὶ ὑμῖν, τούτων,
φησί, τῶν ἀνδρῶν ἐπιλαμβάνει καὶ τῶν εἰρημένων οὐκ
ὀλίγα δείκνυσι πονηρῶς ἔχοντα.

“‘Hesiod’, he says, ‘and Theognis and Homer and Pindar’s lyrics – and these poets have always enjoyed honour and glory everywhere, and especially here in Athens – these are the men he attacks, alleging that a lot of their sayings are bad.’”
(*Lib. Ap.Soc.* 62, tr. Russell, *Libanius: Imaginary Speeches*)

It seems that Polykrates objected to Sokrates' use of traditional poets³⁰⁷ on two counts. The first is that Sokrates used them, the most respected authorities, in support of his anti-democratic and immoral views. Polykrates presumably proceeded from the common assumption that the poets were above criticism. He would hardly suggest that any ‘worst passages’ existed. He must therefore have alleged that Sokrates was also guilty of misrepresenting the poets. This would accord with Libanios' statement that Sokrates actually attacked their authority by attributing objectionable sentiments to them. This is the second objection. These allegations are inconsistent but this need not have undermined their force.³⁰⁸

The result of all of Sokrates' political and ethical teachings could be seen in his two most notorious associates, Kritias and Alkibiades. He was the source of their unbridled ambition, egotism, destructiveness, and their contempt for ordinary men, democracy and conventional morality.

Ἄλλ' ἔφη γε ὁ κατήγορος, Σωκράτει ὁμιλητὰ γενομένῳ
Κριτίας τε καὶ Ἀλκιβιάδης πλείστα κακὰ τὴν πόλιν

ἐποιησάτην... εἶτα εἰ μὲν τι ἐπλημμελησάτην, τούτου
Σωκράτην ὁ κατήγορος αἰτιᾶται;

“But his accuser argued thus. Among the associates of Socrates were Critias and Alcibiades; and none wrought so many evils to the state... For their wrongdoing, then, is Socrates to be called to account by his accuser?”
(*Xen. Mem.* 1.2.12, 26 tr. Marchant, Loeb; cf. *Lib. Ap.Soc.* 136ff, 150)

Σωκράτους δὲ κατηγορεῖν ἐπιχειρήσας, ὥσπερ ἐγκωμιάσαι
βουλόμενος Ἀλκιβιάδην ἔδωκας αὐτῷ μαθητὴν, ὃν ὑπ’
ἐκείνου μὲν οὐδεὶς ἤσθετο παιδευόμενον, ὅτι δὲ πολὺ
διήνεγκε τῶν ἄλλων ἅπαντες ἂν ὁμολογήσειαν.

“And when your [Polykrates’] purpose was to accuse Socrates, as if you wished to praise him, you gave Alcibiades to him as a pupil who, as far as anybody observed, never was taught by Socrates, but that Alcibiades far excelled all his contemporaries all would agree.”
(*Isoc.* 11.5, tr. van Hook, Loeb)

Polykrates’ line of reasoning was that intellectual training was unnecessary for achievement in public service and, in at least two instances, actually produced elements destructive to the state. He provided counter-examples to these ambitious anti-democratic egotists:

Καὶ διεξήκει τοὺς τοῖς σοφισταῖς οὐ συγγενομένους ὡς
ἀγαθοὺς ἄνδρας γεγενημένους, τὸν Μιλτιάδην, τὸν
Θεμιστοκλέα, τὸν Ἀριστείδην...

“He also gave us a list of men who did not associate with sophists, and described them as good men: Miltiades, Themistocles³⁰⁹, Aristides.”
(*Lib. Ap.Soc.* 155, tr. Russell, *Libanius: Imaginary Speeches*)

Polykrates further praised Athenian statesmen, in particular Theseus and Solon, distinguished for deferring to the political legitimacy of the *demos*.³¹⁰ He mentions the contemporary figures Thrasyboulos and Konon favourably, including a reference to the latter’s rebuilding of Athens’ walls.³¹¹ The object of these digressions seems to be to highlight Sokrates’ anti-democratic attitudes and to make him seem unpatriotic as well as socially destructive.

The scholiast on Aelius Aristides says, and Libanios implies, that Polykrates accused Sokrates of indulging in talk and thereby making men idle and useless.³¹² This may be an aspect of the political charges, as another statement apparently quoted from Polykrates is that 'Sokrates does not come forward to speak'.³¹³ While ordinary Athenians may have associated enthusiastic involvement in public affairs as evidence of an interfering and litigious nature, it also had positive value as a high-minded patriotic sentiment. Polykrates may have alleged that Sokrates undermined the democracy by persuading people to withhold from participating in public business.³¹⁴ However, the defence that Libanios offers to the charge of laziness assumes that the allegation relates to economic rather than political issues, so Polykrates may have accused Sokrates of encouraging simple laziness. This would accord with the charge that is familiar from comedy.³¹⁵ It could also be that Libanios deliberately chose to focus on the economic aspect of the accusation in order to trivialise it.

It would naturally advance Polykrates' case if he could establish precedents for the punishment of dangerous intellectuals. Libanios mentions some representatives from the standard 'victims of intellectual persecution' list: "Let him speak of your anger against the sophists - Anaxagoras, Protagoras, Diagoras. He will thereby enable me to ask a question again...".³¹⁶ It is clear that Polykrates did not cite these instances but Libanios introduced them for the sake of rhetorical effect – 'let him speak (λεγέτω)' - and completeness according to contemporary historical belief. A reference to the ostracism of Damon probably did appear in Polykrates' tract as Libanios cites it as a separate item, a specific point that 'he' made.

Δάμων δέ, εἰ μὲν ἠδίκηει, καλῶς ἐκβέβληται· εἰ δ' ἐσυκοφανεῖτο, κρείττων ἦν μὴδ' ἐκείνον τοῦτο παθεῖν ἢ δι' ἐκείνον καὶ Σωκράτην. καίτοι φησὶν ἐπ' ἐλάττωσι αἰτίαις ἐξελαθῆναι τὸν Δάμονα, ἔτι δὲ μὴδὲ ὑπὸ τῶν ἐχθρῶν αἰτίαν τοῦ καταλύειν τὸν δῆμον λαβεῖν, ὥσπερ τὸν νυνὶ κρινόμενον.

“As to Damon, if he did wrong, he was justly exiled. If he was falsely accused, the best thing would have been for him not to suffer this at all, not for Sokrates to suffer it because of him. Yet Anytus tells us that Damon was banished for lesser charges, and that none even of his enemies laid on him the charge of subverting the democracy, like the present defendant.”
(*Lib. Ap.Soc.* 157, tr. Russell, *Libanius: Imaginary Speeches*)

To judge from this, Polykrates did not make out the case against Damon clearly but alluded to him in order to establish a precedent for punishing intellectuals harshly while arguing that Sokrates constituted an even greater threat to the state. The circumstances of the ostracism are very obscure. The only other sources are the Aristotelian *Athenian Constitution*, which gives as the cause his influence over Perikles, and Plutarch, who cites Athenian suspicion of his intellectual talent.³¹⁷ Libanios' statement that 'Anytos' did *not* accuse Damon of subverting the democracy makes it unlikely that Polykrates referred to his influence on Perikles, especially as he probably adhered to the popular opinion of Perikles as the pre-eminent democratic statesman, if only for rhetorical purposes, and therefore above criticism. Instead, he may have emphasised Damon's status as an intellectual as the *reason* for his punishment while downplaying his actual political involvement.³¹⁸

Conclusion

It seems that Polykrates made four charges against Sokrates. (1) Criticism of Athens' egalitarian democratic constitution on the basis that it was inefficient and discriminated against those best qualified to rule, that is, the intelligent. (2) Criticism of conventional and divinely sanctioned morality on the grounds that accepted moral rules were inconsistent. Instead he promoted the political and ethical superiority of intellect. His focus on teaching the young weakened traditional family structures. (3) His examination and use of the poets and traditional stories was slanderous and damaged their authority. (4) He refused to earn his own living and set an example of idleness for others.

Xenophon does not impute any religious charges to 'the accuser' and is uncertain of the basis for the 'new gods' charge (*Mem.* 1.1.2). Libanios only alludes to religion, though contemporary touchiness about the issue may have made him reluctant.³¹⁹ This strongly suggests that Polykrates did not raise religion except, perhaps, as part of refuting Sokrates' contention that theft was not always wrong: he argued that Odysseus' theft of the Palladion from Troy gave him many years of suffering (see above).

The four criticisms are anti-*intellectual* rather than anti-*intellectualist*. They focus on the arrogance and anti-social self-interest that come from intellectual cultivation rather than providing a critique of the intellectual process. §1 certainly contains an element of political partisanship but Polykrates' implicit analysis of Sokrates' supposed views revolves around the notion that the intellectually superior *must* consider themselves to be superior in general and are hence anti-egalitarian and desire to rule their inferiors. §4 is an attack on a characteristic that was widely ascribed to intellectuals. §2 and §3 come close to *anti-intellectualism*, as they hold that Sokrates perversely used critical techniques designed to find truth in order to misrepresent it: if critical analysis produces Sokrates' unwelcome conclusions, then critical analysis is faulty. Polykrates' implicit position would be that the ethical import of traditional stories, conveyed by the poets, was self-evident and their value was accessible through simple right-minded awareness. However, Polykrates seems to view Sokrates' abuse of myths and the poets as a result of his own pernicious nature rather than as an intrinsic defect of the intellectual process.

A congruence with the themes of attack found in Sokratic literature in general is unsurprising – Polykrates seems to have influenced the terms and content of the Sokratic debate. It is more interesting to note the congruence with earlier sources, such as Aristophanes' *Clouds*, in the themes of intellectuals' laziness, arrogance, attractiveness to the young, and their inclination to attack and discredit traditional authorities.

2.9 - Intellectuals in Art

Images that are relevant to this study - intellectuals with negative characteristics – are rare. In the first place, there was probably little interest in depictions of intellectuals at all before the establishment of semi-formal schools with a titular founder to revere. It is therefore unsurprising that such depictions as exist convey positive rather than negative attributes. There are, however, a few examples of depictions of intellectual-types that are either unflattering, satirical or include features that conform to some of the characteristics ascribed to intellectuals in literary sources, though it may be difficult to establish what their significance, if any, is.

A. Individual intellectuals

A1. Sokrates and the Sokratics

There are two types of portrait-bust of Sokrates, one of which, on stylistic grounds, seems to derive from an original belonging to 380-360 BC (fig. 4). Its identification is almost certain from its Silenos-like appearance which his apologists refer to.³²⁰ It was most likely commissioned by members of this same group. Its notable characteristics are its ugliness and impression of hardness: its broad features and short neck, in particular, suggest a thickset and muscular physique.³²¹ There is another image that could be a portrait of Sokrates: a relief from Pompeii showing a man with a bald head, bulging eyes, thick lips and pot belly, in conversation with a woman (Diotima?) (fig. 5). The image may well derive from a classical original, as the staff that Sokrates (?) leans on is a rare feature in Hellenistic art.³²²

Sokrates' portraits reflect both the positive (presumably it was his admirers who commissioned them) and, ironically, the negative aspects of his character and habits. The relief portrait of Sokrates with a woman suggests the ideal leisured




Fig. 4: Portrait bust of Sokrates, 380-360 BC (reproduced from Richter, G.M.A., *The Portraits of the Greeks*, p. 200, fig. 160).



Fig. 5: Relief depicting Sokrates (?) with a woman, from an original dating to the 4th century BC? (reproduced from Zanker, P., *The Mask of Sokrates*, p. 36-38, fig. 23).



Fig. 6: *Skyphos* showing Silenos as a paedagogue (the boy is on the other side of the vase) (Bari, Museo Nazionale R 150; reproduced from Beck, F.A.G., *Album of Greek Education*, pl. 53 no. 276a).




Fig. 7: Bust of Antisthenes, from an original dating to the 3rd century BC? (reproduced from Richter, G.M.A., *The Portraits of the Greeks*, p. 88, fig. 51).



Fig. 8: Palamedes, second from the right, in the underworld, c.440 BC (New York Metropolitan Museum 08.258.21, *ARV* 1086.1; reproduced from Carpenter, T.H., *Art and Myth in Ancient Greece*, no. 124).

life of the Athenian citizen, devoted to discussion³²³, but it also alludes to the comic representation of intellectuals as chattering, lazy and, possibly, effeminate. Comedians emphasise the perversity in social standards and behaviour of Sokrates and his associates, especially their hardiness and lack of concern for their appearance, which, in comic terms, are functions of their beggarliness, laziness and disregard for comfort. Though comic descriptions of Sokrates tend to ignore his physiognomy³²⁴, the standard comic satyr-like mask that the actor probably wore may, in fact, have resembled him.³²⁵

There are two ways in which Sokrates' unflattering image could have been canonised in the artistic tradition. Firstly, it conformed to the image of the mythical wise satyr Silenos, best known as tutor to the child Dionysos. Vase-paintings of silenoi or satyrs as paedagogues existed as early as c.450 BC (fig. 6).³²⁶ Secondly, it emphasises the importance of reality (thought and ethics) over (physical) appearance. Sokrates usurped the traditional aristocratic principle that virtue equates to physical beauty, and so perhaps came to epitomise the philosophical principle that qualities are not to be found in superficial manifestations.³²⁷

There is another portrait bust of one of Sokrates' notoriously unconventional companions, Antisthenes. It shows a man who is hardy and unkempt but suggests a noble and commanding character (fig. 7). This accords with the ostentatious frugality and uncompromising disposition that the literary sources describe. However, these literary sources may, in fact, be just what the sculptor was working from. The bust's style suggests a Hellenistic origin. Though it may preserve beliefs about his appearance and character from the classical period it cannot be taken as independent evidence.³²⁸

A2. Palamedes

There are two known depictions of Palamedes. The first is a lost Polygnotos painting from Delphi, probably dating to within a few years of 450 BC. It is

known from Pausanias' description.³²⁹ It showed Odysseus surrounded by those whom he had killed or wronged: Palamedes, Thersites, the two Aiantes and Meleager. Palamedes plays dice, one of his characteristic inventions, with Thersites. Pausanias remarks that he is beardless. This is a characteristic of youth, which is unlikely in view of Palamedes' influence in the Greek army. It could be associated with effeminacy, one of the motifs of intellectualism (see Chapter 2.1 B6 and Chapter 4 n. 91).

On a calyx dating to c.440 BC a figure is identified as Palamedes by an inscription (ΠΑΛΑΜΕΔΕΣ [sic]) (fig. 8). In this portrait-type he is not characterised by any distinctive intellectual features, such as Sokrates' beggarliness and ugliness or the beardlessness of Polygnotos' Palamedes. Rather, he is depicted as a victim. He is an exhausted and haggard figure, on the verge of collapse, an effect heightened by the immobility of Persephone, seated adjacent. He leans on an oar, which refers to the tradition found in the *Kypria* that Odysseus murdered him by drowning (Paus. 10.31.1-2), or possibly signifying the messages that his brother Oiax wrote to his father on oarblades, throwing them into the sea. The accompanying figures indicate that he is located in the underworld: Hades, Persephone, Hermes, and Theseus and Peirithoös stuck to their stone chairs (not actually depicted).³³⁰ The overall theme is of sins against the gods and their punishment: trapped Theseus and Peirithoös, Herakles standing over them, not yet moving to free them, implying that he is still contemplating their fate; in the lower zone of the calyx Apollo and Artemis shoot down Tityos, a giant who assaulted Leto, and Zeus and Hermes attack an unidentified giant.³³¹ Palamedes is, it seems, a victim of injustice. This is not an anti-intellectual portrait but one that reminds the viewer that intellectuals could provoke resentment and acts of hostility.

There is a conspicuous difference in the quality of the figures on the calyx: some are poorly executed whereas others (Palamedes, Meleager, Theseus and Peirithoös) effectively convey their emotions and have a certain tragic grandeur. This suggests that these images are not the vase painter's own innovation but

came from some influential earlier depiction. This would mean that the tragic representation of Palamedes was an established one.³³²

B. Generalised intellectuals

The practice of public (social/political) caricature first appears in c.485 BC: on an ostrakon, cast against Kallias the son of Kratias, a figure of a Persian is drawn on




Fig. 9: *Askos* depicting an intellectual? c.440 BC (Paris, Louvre, G610; reproduced from Dasen, V., *Dwarfs in Ancient Egypt and Greece*, pl. 38.1).

the reverse.³³³ Non-commissioned vases are similar in that they give scope to human imagination. They also represent what a potter thinks will be popular. There are many vase paintings that are definitely caricatures of some kind. There is, perhaps, one that might represent an intellectual.³³⁴ It is on an *askos*, dating to c.440 BC, showing a man with an enormously exaggerated, bulging balding head atop a spindly wasted body; his mouth is open (fig. 9). His staff and cloak indicate that he is an Athenian citizen but there are no other identifying features.³³⁵ On the opposite side of the *askos* a stalking lion is painted, with an expression of keen focus and rippling muscles.

The bigheaded figure must represent a type rather than an individual. He is middle-aged, which is also typical of intellectuals, though not the dangerously intellectualised rich youths that Aristophanes refers to. Men with malformed and large heads are not uncommon in Attic art but most conform to a stock image that is certainly intended to represent congenital dwarfs.³³⁶ Otherwise, it is associated with repulsiveness and ignobility, such as Thersites' 'pointed' head.³³⁷ The figure on the *askos* is otherwise distinguished by an open mouth, exceptionally wizened body, and his juxtaposition with the lion. The open mouth suggests discourse. He has no interlocutor or audience - perhaps soliloquy is intended to make him seem self-absorbed or contentious. His body is diminutive beyond what is necessary to emphasise the disproportion of his head; it is exceptionally hollow-chested and the ribs almost seem to show. His entire weight rests on his staff. The intention may be to represent physical weakness, poor health, old age or, perhaps, some quality of his personality: by the Hellenistic period emaciation was associated with envy.³³⁸

There is no obvious connexion between the man and the lion but it is hard to believe that none was intended. The association of an animal, the man's speech and his disfiguration may mean that the man represents Aesop, though there is no Aesopian fable that the scene clearly relates to.³³⁹ The most obvious relationship between the two figures is the contrast in their physique and movement. The lion's strength emphasises the man's weakness; the man's lack of movement and self-absorption contrasts with the lion's focus and dynamism. Lions are usually associated with leadership, nobility, bravery and violent action³⁴⁰; the man may represent the antithesis of these qualities.

The painting is not high quality and has no dedication. It is not a special commission: some potter produced it either for his own satisfaction or in expectation of a sale. It is an isolated expression of a certain amused contempt for such men, who chattered endlessly for their own satisfaction, and implies that this was associated with physical neglect and inaction.

CHAPTER 3 – THE ASSIMILATION OF MYTH

A remarkable feature of classical culture is its persistent habit of presenting itself through traditional subjects. These seem to be the preferred medium for representing and interpreting contemporary images and concerns. In this light, it is perhaps not remarkable to find mythical and legendary figures being assimilated into the debate about the status of intellectuals and value of intellectualism. The possibility that Sokrates' embodiment of the qualities of wisdom and ugliness – antithetical in traditional Greek thought - was interpreted through the figure of Silenos has already been mentioned (see Chapter 2.9). This chapter is concerned with figures that some classical authority identified with persecuted intellectuals or who are placed in opposition to intellectuals.¹ For the sake of economy, marginal figures, such as Kadmos and Oedipus, will be omitted. There is also the extraordinarily adaptable character of Odysseus. In sources from the mid-5th century he sometimes resembles a kind of sophist, speaking with subtle eloquence and operating according to a moral code that is untraditionally abstract and individualist. He also often resembles an amoral demagogue whose only interest is in meeting the demands of *realpolitik*. His involvement in the prosecution of Palamedes is exceptionally self-interested; he is ready to plant evidence, misrepresent the truth and stir up irrational prejudices order to achieve his own ends.²

Evidence for mythical traditions is available from Athens in the c.450-c.380 BC period, for instance, from Sophokles, Euripides and Antisthenes. However, it is necessary also to draw it from the whole Greek world and from other periods, both to establish the nature of a tradition, and because, in many cases, these myths are not actually recorded until comparatively late.

A. Aias as an anti-intellectual

Aias is a traditional heroic figure who was assimilated into the classical debate on the value of intellectualism. His inarticulateness and preference for action over

reflection makes him a model anti-intellectual, especially in contrast to Odysseus who, if not an intellectual, is typically represented as eloquent, reflective and morally flexible. Antisthenes, in particular, exploits and develops this theme in his model speeches, *Aias* and *Odysseus*, which purport to have been delivered on the occasion of the award of Achilles' arms.

The implicit characterisation of Aias and Odysseus as representatives of, respectively, physical prowess and intellect appears at the beginning of the classical tradition. In *The Iliad* Aias is pre-eminent for his strength and size. He is immovable in battle, though a slightly negative air is apparent when Homer likens him to an ass in his stubbornness (ὄνος νωθής).³ In the debates of the Greek chiefs Odysseus is always the most ready and articulate speaker whereas Aias is as good as silent. In battle Aias' speech becomes intemperate bluster: at any rate, Hektor insults him as a 'babbling' and a 'braggart' (ἀμαρτοπέξ, βουγάτε).⁴ There are occasions where Aias and Odysseus can be compared directly. When they go together to plead with the obdurate Achilles to end his self-imposed exile, Odysseus speaks for eighty-two lines, Aias for only nineteen. Aias' speech, moreover, begins with the blunt statement that they may as well go as Achilles' mind is clearly made up. This not only suggests his lack of faith in the efficacy of discussion but, as it effectively makes Achilles' decision for him, shows Aias' lack of subtlety and rhetorical skill.⁵ At Patroklos' funeral games Aias and Odysseus compete in a wrestling match. Aias is described according to his physical attributes, size and weight, while Odysseus is distinguished by his cunning tactics. Neither can defeat the other.⁶

The chief conflict between Aias and Odysseus is in the tradition that they contested for the arms of the dead Achilles. The award goes to Odysseus, an apparent contradiction of Aias' universally acknowledged and traditional status as a warrior second only to Achilles.⁷ This incident serves to highlight the differences in their characters. In *The Odyssey* it is the basis for an episode that illustrates Aias' inflexible pride, his preference for action and rejection of eloquence. Odysseus encounters Aias' shade in the Underworld and makes a

conciliatory speech but Aias is still bitter and snubs him, ‘turning away without a word’.⁸ The existence of a debate between the two preceding the making of the award is attested in art from the late 6th century (e.g. fig. 10). It may have




Fig. 10: The award of Achilles' arms (c.480 BC), showing the vote, Aias' distraught reaction, and the violent aftermath (London, B.M., E69, *ARV* 369.2, reproduced from Carpenter, T.H., *Art and Myth in Ancient Greece*, no. 330).

appeared in Aischylos' lost play *The Judgement of Arms* (Ὀπλῶν κρίσις), to judge from a fragment in which Odysseus is taunted as the son of Sisyphos.⁹

The development of the story of the award of Achilles' arms into an explicit comment on the status of intellectualism starts with Pindar. Although he treats the subject a number of times, the fact that these appear in separate poems, commissioned on different occasions for different patrons, means that they do not necessarily represent consistent conceptions of the event. However, he repeatedly represents Aias as being unfairly deprived of due acknowledgement and Odysseus as pursuing his self-interest through devious exploitation of λόγος.

Pindar claims to be - and, as far as is known, is - the first person to make a direct attack upon Odysseus.¹⁰ In this, he makes Odysseus and Aias represent opposite ends of the λόγος/ἔργον division with its assumed ethical value judgement (see Chapter 4.3 B2).

Pindar's *Seventh Nemean* attributes Aias' failure to win Achilles' arms to the Greek chiefs' lack of perceptiveness (§23-7). Odysseus' devious skill in any speech he may have made is not directly cited as the cause of their misapprehension but it does immediately follow Pindar's criticism of Homer, whose eloquence, he asserts, has magnified Odysseus' fame out of proportion to his sufferings. The medium of the deception is σοφία (§23). The σοφοί are those who value the eternal, not the immediate (§17-8), and therefore understand that repute comes from immortalisation in poetic words (§12-8 cf. 8.32-9). Odysseus and Homer are simultaneously guilty of this: Homer is a σοφός on account of his poetic skill, Odysseus on account of his interest in λόγοι.¹¹ Pindar's suspicion of the 'wise man's' capacity for deception also appears when he uses the unusual term μαθών ('learned'), rather than σοφός, to refer to the man who is able to make intelligent criticism of poetry.¹² He wishes his listeners to be conscious that, while eloquent words are the best preservers of deeds, they are also subject to abuse: men should not be so stupid as to accept them

uncritically. Homer's complicity in Odysseus' deviousness has exaggerated Odysseus' λόγοι over his ἔργα, while Aias' ἔργα did not receive just acknowledgement as he lacked λόγοι, both his own during the debate and later immortalisation through poetry.¹³ Pindar almost seamlessly joins human stupidity with false eloquence, either poetic or oratorical.¹⁴

In the *Eighth Nemean* Pindar focuses more strongly on Odysseus' guilt in depriving Aias of Achilles' arms. He omits all other elements that traditionally play a part in the decision, such as Athena's influence and the corruption of the voters.¹⁵ He describes Aias as 'ungifted in speech (ἄγλωσσος) though bold in heart, overtaken by [Odysseus'] cunning falsehood (αἰόλος ψεῦδος)' (§24-5). As Pindar regularly calls epinician poetry γλῶσσα, Aias being ἄγλωσσος probably refers to his lack of commemoration as much as his lack of articulateness.¹⁶

Sophokles' *Aias*, probably dating to the 440s BC, focuses on Aias' self-destruction as a function of his rigid adherence to the dictates of honour. This does not suggest a comment on contemporary intellectualism but it does continue the tradition of Aias' characterisation as inflexible and determined to manifest his moral disposition in action. He alludes to this just before his suicide: "But it avails not to make idle moan: now for the deed, as quickly as I may".¹⁷

Antisthenes' *Aias* and *Odysseus* purport to be the speeches in which the heroes asserted their claims for Achilles' arms.¹⁸ These speeches conspicuously draw out the two heroes' epitomisation of negative and positive attitudes towards intellectualism. Like Homer's depiction of Odysseus' and Aias' embassy to Achilles, Aias' inarticulateness is obvious, if only in the shortness of his speech. His manner is simple, direct and abrupt. He begins with a surprisingly tactless assertion, which he repeats several times, that the judges are not, in fact, capable of making a decision, as their knowledge of the incident in question, the rescue of Achilles' body and armour, comes from speeches (λόγοι) not from personal

experience of the events (ἔργα). If they had this direct experience then he would not have to speak at all; without it they are ignorant and are mere holders of opinions (δοξασταί) (§1, 4, 7-8). He goes out of his way to assert his belief in the uselessness of words. Words are ineffective in real situations like war – ‘it is impossible to contradict the enemy’. Only actions are effective (§7). He also says that judgement ought to be immediate; discussion should be abandoned if the response to an issue is not obvious (§8). This implies that he holds the belief that comprehension should be based on self-evident meaning and that decisions should be immediate – and, therefore, unreflective - responses. Odysseus’ speech is that of a rhetorician: tactful, emphasising his unity with the listeners while isolating Aias from them, and justifying his actions, which Aias had described as shameful.¹⁹

Odysseus’ failure to address Aias’ criticisms of λόγοι may suggest that Antisthenes is using Aias as a mouthpiece for his own views. He is known to have disputed the validity of theoretical constructs, such as Plato’s Forms, and all but the simplest logical propositions.²⁰ Aias’ assertion that ‘it is not possible to contradict (οὐδ’ ἀντιλέγειν) the enemy’ - echoes Antisthenes’ stated view that all contradiction is impossible.²¹ His unwillingness to bandy with subtle arguments and his preference for proof by action is illustrated in the anecdote (certainly apocryphal) that he responded to Parmenides’ arguments for the impossibility of movement by walking away.²² Aias’ assertion that only experts in the relevant field should make judgements is distinctly Sokratic (§4). Odysseus also represents some views that are typical of Sokratic thinkers. He argues powerfully that his actions, though shameful, are valuable because they are directed entirely and effectively towards the interests of the Greek army. This recalls Sokrates’ discussions about the ‘true meaning’ of virtues such as courage.²³ However, if Antisthenes’ object is philosophical, it is strange that he has Odysseus completely ignore Aias’ comments about the nature of knowledge. He prefers to focus on the issue of the debate, in which he triumphs completely. It may be that Antisthenes’ object is rhetorical as much as anything, though he is happy to exploit philosophical material in the process.²⁴

In the works of these writers, from Homer to Antisthenes, Aias is consistently the epitome of action and directness. He has no skill with words and distrusts them. He represents an extreme brand of traditional heroic and aristocratic morality that focuses on deeds rather than disposition and on public approval rather than personal conscience. Sophokles and Antisthenes imply that he lacks mental sophistication and cannot comprehend abstract concepts. He is unable to grasp Odysseus' cunning as anything other than self-interest, cowardice and an innate love of deviousness.²⁵ Pindar and Antisthenes seem to use Aias to allude to the problem of the relationship between words and facts. Though the epic tradition has Agamemnon refer the judgement to Trojans, perhaps precisely to avoid creating disunity in the Greek camp²⁶, Pindar, Sophokles and Antisthenes prefer to put the decision in the hands of the Greek chiefs. As these are the very people best qualified to know Aias' character and achievements, this adds poignancy to his defeat.²⁷ This also implicitly questions the validity of knowledge that comes from words alone and the usefulness of discussion in making decisions.

B. The trial of Palamedes

Palamedes' death is mentioned in a number of works before the period of this thesis, including the lost epic *Kypria* and an Aeschylean tragedy. To the 450-380 period belong lost tragedies by Euripides (see Chapter 2.3 A1) and Sophokles, and Gorgias' philosophical-rhetorical tract *Palamedes*.²⁸ There is another rhetorical tract called *Odysseus: Against Palamedes for Treason*. The manuscript attributes this to Alkidamas but its authorship and date are doubtful.²⁹

Palamedes' traditional status as a wise man and an inventor from at least the beginning of the classical period has already been referred to.³⁰ In the last decades of the 5th century references to him seem to become slightly more frequent, which may reflect heightened interest in the status of intellectuals. His particular brand of intellectualism, practical innovation - Plato even emphasises that the mathematics that tragedy ascribes to him are self-evident³¹ - does not

develop. The thing that changes towards the end of the 5th century is the emphasis that sources give to the negative aspects of his intellectualism.

It is at this time that Palamedes' name is used as a byword for brilliance. Eupolis refers to Alkibiades as 'Palamedes' for his innovation in calling for a chamberpot while drinking (fr. 385). In Aristophanes' *Frogs* the dead Euripides receives this appellation when he gives the exceptionally perverse sophistic advice that, if the Athenians are failing to prosper by following the good advice of competent men, then they should follow the bad advice of the bad (§1451). Plato in the *Phaidros* uses the name Palamedes to refer to a rhetorician who teaches techniques designed to persuade listeners at odds with the truth.³² These instances are clearly sarcastic but they differ from the other nickname given to the exceptionally clever, 'Thales'. Aristophanes bestowed this on Meton and Sokrates on account of their pompous theorising.³³ By contrast, we see that Palamedes' name was associated, firstly, with a novelty in dissolute behaviour and, secondly, with twisted sophistic reasoning. This may mean that comedians viewed Palamedes as representing the kind of over-clever self-indulgence characteristic of Athens' dissolute youth.

The literary evidence suggests that there was increased interest in Palamedes' trial towards the end of the 5th century. With this came exploration of the criticisms that could be made of such a figure. These revolve around the potential danger of his abilities and suspicion that his apparent abnormal aloofness is, in fact, evidence that he is concealing the worst aspect of normal behaviour, self-interest. In a fragment of Euripides' *Palamedes* someone, presumably Odysseus, suggest to Agamemnon that a man's intelligence can be measured from his wealth. Gorgias also believed that Palamedes' 'artfulness, cleverness and resourcefulness', which imply his ability to achieve his aims, could be alleged to his discredit.³⁴ The versions of his trial emphasise that greed is, of course, a predictable allegation, which serves to underline its very plausibility.³⁵ Certainly, Palamedes' awareness of his intellectual talents makes him sound arrogant. It is conventional for him to be represented through a catalogue of his inventions and

benefactions. He does this himself.³⁶ He emphasises the value of his intelligence, saying that “Ten thousand of us could become generals but only one or two a wise man in a long time”.³⁷ In Gorgias’ speech, Palamedes says that his blameless life and benefactions should be sufficient to have him acquitted.³⁸ Moreover, he is ‘not unknown’ and that if he is executed then this will damage the reputation of the Greeks as a whole.³⁹ He also claims that being acknowledged as wise is sufficient honour for him, which puts him above ordinary temptations, the desire for money and honour from wealth and show, and that, in any case, he is incapable of or disinclined to commit crime: “For it is impossible for one applying himself to the latter [invention] to apply himself to this sort of thing”.⁴⁰ It is not clear whether he means that his devotion to research fully occupies his time or strengthens his moral restraint. In either case, there is a certain pomposity apparent. It is easy to imagine that his very defence could provoke resentment as much as gratitude.⁴¹ Alkidamas’ character Odysseus also alleges that Palamedes is arrogant, supercilious and presumptuous. He uses a variety of words to refer to Palamedes’ intellectual characteristics - δεινός (§4), φιλόσοφος (§4, 12), φρόνημα, διάνοια, σοφιστής (§12), φιλοσοφείν, καταμαθεῖν (§22). These are used sarcastically, which presupposes that they were normally subjects of praise. Odysseus is insulting Palamedes’ claim to them rather than denigrating their value as such.⁴² His allegation that some of Palamedes’ inventions were plagiarised is also a manifestation of a lack of integrity that is based on self-importance.⁴³

There is no real evidence that the validity or usefulness of the intellectual process was attacked in any of these representations of Palamedes’ trial. Perhaps the closest is Alkidamas’ Odysseus’ attempt to undermine Palamedes’ status by alleging that some of his inventions are useless, amoral and corrupting. These authors may have sought to imply that his downfall lay in intellectualism’s effects on his character: arrogance and tactlessness, which alienated his judges. In Euripides’ version, it seems that Palamedes was also brought down by his inability to anticipate the motives and actions of a less sophisticated but unscrupulous man, Odysseus (Chapter 2.3 A1).

The various versions of Palamedes' death agree that Odysseus was the instigator or senior conspirator.⁴⁴ The form that his death takes in epic poetry and art is drowning, whereas tragedy prefers to have him executed by the Greek army after an unfair trial.⁴⁵ Odysseus' motive in the earliest version, from the *Kypria*, is the grudge he bore on account of Palamedes having exposed the madness that he feigned to avoid going to Troy.⁴⁶ The other theme is Odysseus' jealousy of Palamedes. Sokrates comments to Euthydemos:

Τὰ δὲ Παλαμῆδους οὐκ ἀκήκοας πάθη; τοῦτον γὰρ δὴ πάντες ὑμνοῦσιν ὡς διὰ σοφίαν φθονηθεὶς ὑπὸ τοῦ Ὀδυσσεύος ἀπόλλυται. Λέγεται καὶ ταῦτα, ἔφη.

“And have you not heard the story of Palamedes? Surely, for all the poets sing of him, how that he was envied for his wisdom and done to death by Odysseus.”

“Another well-known tale!”

(Xen. *Mem.* 4.2.33, tr. Marchant, Loeb)

Gorgias' Palamedes' also supposes that jealousy is the motive (§3).

Unfortunately, these sources do not elaborate the reason, probably because Odysseus' motives do not really influence the themes and action of the various versions.⁴⁷ It does not seem that Odysseus, in any of these depictions, expressed hostility towards intellectuals as such or suspicion of intellectualism. If anything, he felt out-competed in his own field, cleverness. However, when he spoke against Palamedes in his trial he made considerable efforts to provoke just such suspicions in the minds of the judges, focusing on Palamedes' cleverness, arrogance and doubtful morality.

Euripides (see Chapter 2.3 A1) and Gorgias especially identify Palamedes with contemporary intellectualism. Gorgias makes him a mouthpiece for a discussion of the nature of knowledge and opinion based on considerations of probability. The dramatic possibilities that his trial offered clearly appealed to tragedians and rhetoricians. The reason that this legendary incident became popular towards the end of the 5th century must have been the increasing prominence of intellectual

figures and the existence of criticism about intellectualism's effects on character and its usefulness as a tool. The main impetus for assimilating Palamedes into contemporary attitudes about intellectuals' status seems to have come from the Sokratics. Both Plato and Xenophon refer to him in their *Apologies*. Apart from anything else, this is a strong indication that Sokrates himself did so in his trial:

παραμυθεῖται δέ τί με καὶ Παλαμῆδης ὁ παραπλησίως
ἐμοὶ τελευτήσας· ἔτι γὰρ καὶ νῦν πολὺ καλλίους ὕμνους
παρέχεται Ὀδυσσέως τοῦ ἀδίκως ἀποκτείναντος αὐτόν...

“And I get comfort from the case of Palamedes, also, who died in circumstances similar to mine; for even yet he affords us far more noble themes for song than does Odysseus, the man who unjustly put him to death.”

(Xen. *Ap.* 26, tr. O.J. Todd, Loeb)

The significance that Xenophon gives the allusion is probably the same as that which most of the jurors would have understood: Sokrates' attempt to integrate himself into the motif of a wise man overcome by forces beneath his notice, jealousy and treachery. This meaning also exists in Plato though there seems to be a certain backhandedness in the reference.⁴⁸ Diogenes Laertios and the *Hypothesis* to Isokrates' *Bousiris* claim that Euripides' *Palamedes* was intended to castigate the Athenians for Sokrates' conviction.⁴⁹ This is obviously chronologically impossible and is therefore unlikely to have been invented within a few generations of the occasion. For the incorrect conclusion to have been drawn, however, the play must have had at least a superficial similarity to the case of Sokrates: a wise benefactor accused on a trumped-up charge motivated by a petty grudge, his judges too imperceptive or jealous to appreciate his value, or deceived by a cunning prosecutor, or having their sensibilities offended by his defence speech. There are, in fact, a couple of points common to *Palamedes* and Plato's *Apology*: both defendants list their benefactions and assert that their comrades would be lucky to get another such adviser as they. Euripides may have formalised these motifs in Plato's mind. Gorgias may also have contributed to the Sokratics' use of the Palamedes motif. Xenophon virtually quotes Gorgias'

Palamedes in his *Apology*: “for Nature, with a vote which is clear, casts a vote of death against every mortal on the day on which he is born”.⁵⁰

C. Amphion and Zethos

Early descriptions of Amphion focus on the magical aspects of his musical abilities, in which he resembles Orpheus. Otherwise, he and his brother Zethos are fairly conventional founder-heroes of Thebes (see Chapter 2.3 n. 117). The way that Euripides in the *Antiope* makes Amphion a representative of intellectualism and draws out the implicit tension between his life and Zethos’ conventional belief in civic duty and physical pursuits seems to be original. This has been examined in detail in the section on tragedy. Zethos criticises Amphion’s pastimes as physically and morally debilitating, implying that the latter follows upon the former. The potential moral laxities that Zethos ascribes to him include a quintessentially intellectual indulgence like ‘babbling’ but also conventional and mundane peccadilloes, such as wine bibbing. He himself represents traditional aristocratic interests: hunting, physical development, decent ambition and expectations of public service, which would be comprehensible and admirable to the Athenian audience (see Chapter 2.3 A2).

D. Tantalos

There is some evidence that Tantalos was associated with intellectualism in its aspect of impiety. One traditional version of his punishment has a huge stone suspended above his head.⁵¹ In Euripides’ *Orestes* (408 BC) Elektra refers to this tradition (§5-7) but later she describes Tantalos’ punishment using an image that immediately calls to mind Anaxagoras’ model for the dynamics of the heavenly bodies:

μόλοιμι τὰν οὐρανοῦ
μέσον χθονός [τε] τεταμέναν
ἀιωρήμασιν
πέτραν ἀλύσει χρυσέαισι,

φερομένην δίναισι
βῶλον ἐξ Ολύμπου,
ἴν' ἐν θρήνοισιν ἀναβοάσω
γέροντι πατέρι Ταντάλω...

“I wish I could go to that rock
strung in suspense between sky and earth
by golden chains, the whirl-borne
glebe that came from Olympus,
to cry in lamentation to old father Tantalos...”
(Eur. *Or.* 982-5, tr. West, Aris & Phillips)

Euripides' familiarity with this theory is not surprising, nor is his decision to allude to it. Meletos' allegation that Sokrates taught that heavenly bodies were metal and earth implies that he expected that ordinary Athenians had at least vaguely heard of Anaxagoras' theory, even if they were not clear who the author was.⁵² Euripides' description of Tantalos' stone as 'whirling' recalls the term δῖνος, widely-known in 5th century cosmological speculation (see Chapter 2.1 B4). Tantalos' offence is usually said to be murder and cannibalism but Euripides instead refers to his 'flagrant tongue' after being admitted to the gods' company.⁵³ The detail of this offence is not specified and is therefore as shocking as the audience's imagination allowed. Were the reference placed after Elektra's allusion to Anaxagorean cosmology it could well suggest an intellectual-type impiety. As it comes before it would more likely have called to the audience's mind one of his traditional verbal crimes: his request to Zeus to be allowed to live like the gods, revealing the gods' table talk or perjuring himself about the theft of Zeus' prized watchdog.⁵⁴

This may not amount to anything more than an example of the Athenians' familiarity with contemporary scientific theories, except that the name Tantalos is elsewhere attested as a nickname for intellectuals. Some late writers actually ascribe Anaxagoras' cosmological theory to him.⁵⁵ Another intellectual to whom Tantalos is connected is Prodikos. In Plato's *Protagoras* Sokrates introduces Prodikos with a reference to *The Odyssey*, Odysseus seeing Tantalos in the Underworld.⁵⁶ This may allude to any of Tantalos' characteristics, such as his

fame or wealth – or to his status as a notorious offender of the gods.

Contemporary sources do not explicitly say that Prodikos was regarded as being religiously unorthodox but the references do tend in that direction. The birds in Aristophanes' play of that name refer to Prodikos as though he is the pre-eminent author of cosmological theories.⁵⁷ He is known to have proposed that the gods originated when ancient humans deified, first, the things that nourished them, and then technical innovators. Contemporary reaction to this theory is not known. However, for someone to interpret it as impious would be unsurprising in view of Diopetithes' and Meletos' attacks on rationalistic explanations of heavenly bodies (see Chapters 2.2 & 2.7 A1). For what it is worth, Prodikos is well represented on late atheist lists.⁵⁸

E. Herakles and Linos

Herakles, the most important Greek culture hero, is the exemplar of strength, resilience and cunning and, through his labours, a benefactor of mankind. He also has a negative aspect: the boor, glutton and violent carouser.⁵⁹ This second aspect appears in his relationship with Linos, the legendary teacher and inventor, specialising in music and writing.⁶⁰ Literary references to Linos are few before the Hellenistic period but he appears in Attic art a number of times from the beginning of the Classical period. These seem to represent him in the guise of an Athenian schoolmaster, an image perhaps connected to the establishment of schools around the Greek world c.500 BC (see Appendix B). Though vase paintings often depict Herakles playing the lyre, another theme makes him an unenthusiastic pupil: a *skyphos* (c.455 BC) shows a resentful-looking Herakles, followed by the old woman Geropso carrying his lyre, coming to Linos' lesson late while, on the other side, the model student Iphikles is already studying.⁶¹ Several vases from the first half of the 5th century show Herakles killing Linos, clubbing him with a lyre or a table (e.g. fig. 1, from c.480 BC). Apparently this was Herakles' revenge for being beaten as a poor student.⁶² The popularity of this scene is doubtless due to its potential for dramatic action; the presence of a major culture hero; the opportunity for portraying young men in the flower of youth;

and the attraction of presenting a rather novel institution, the schoolroom, through a traditional medium, myth. There is no sentiment of hostility to intellectuals or the value of learning as such, but there may be a certain appeal in the depiction of gleeful revenge against the strictures of the schoolmaster.

E. Conclusion

This chapter has illustrated how mythical figures were adapted to represent 5th century anti-intellectual sentiment. Aias and Zethos are notable anti-intellectuals. Amphion, Palamedes, Tantalos and Linos are, in one way or another, identified with contemporary intellectuals who were criticised, attacked or punished on account of their intellectual attributes or habits. Most of these 'mythological intellectuals', including Prometheus (beyond the scope of this thesis), seem to be presented with a certain amount of sympathy. The exception is Tantalos, who is a straightforward offender of the gods. His case differs from the others in the sense that his outrage against the gods - improperly witnessing or revealing their secrets - is a crime of the most fundamental kind. In psychoanalytic terms, it represents a universal curiosity about the incomprehensible, untouchable and ineffable, for which punishment is a psychological necessity.⁶³

Such myths may provide an insight into the suppositions and preoccupations of the ancient Greek mind. Instances of the downfall of the intellectual-type hero are a sub-category of the well-known theme of the benefactor-hero who is cast down from the pinnacle of success. This motif may express unconscious concerns about aspects of human relations. In a competitive honour-based society such as Greece status attaches to conspicuous achievement (see Chapter 1.5 C). This has two corollaries: (1) Subsequent failure is equally or more conspicuous. The belief that a fall from exceptional prosperity is virtually inevitable can be seen in many stories, such as those that Herodotos is fond of relating (see Chapter 1.6 C1). (2) As goods are finite in quantity, status is always gained at others' expense, which inevitably provokes feelings of resentment and jealousy. It is therefore not

surprising that Greek culture displays a profound fear of humiliation after conspicuous achievement.

The reverse may also be true: myths can highlight a preoccupation through overstated affirmation of the opposite, 'protesting too much'. In this case, these myths really express a subconscious desire to see one's superiors cast down. The sympathetic tone and sense of injustice found in their retelling may be due to a self-consciously civilised morality, which is perhaps to be expected in myths' literary versions.⁶⁴ The fate of the mythical 'intellectuals' may manifest these preoccupations, including discomfort with the idea of outstanding superiority.

CHAPTER 4 – THE ESSENCE OF ANTI-INTELLECTUAL ATTACKS AND THEIR UNDERLYING ASSUMPTIONS

Chapters 2 and 3 canvassed the most significant and striking examples of hostility to intellectuals and intellectualism. This chapter will draw out the common themes that emerged and suggest explanations in terms of Athenian political and social beliefs.

4.1- Uselessness

A. Penuriousness

In the period that this thesis covers there are two images of the intellectual, the beggarly ascetic and the luxuriating aristocrat. The appearance of such contradictions is not surprising. Each probably has some basis in fact but the public imagination justifies them, either consciously or unconsciously, as manifestations of intellectuals' characters and the effects of their activities and beliefs. The significance of the aristocratic image in terms of Athenian social, moral and political beliefs will be discussed in a later section (Chapter 4.3). Here I shall examine the image of the intellectual that is unwashed, half-starved, poorly clad and neglectful of physical comfort, and the beliefs that relate to it.

The comedians are largely responsible for representing intellectuals with the characteristics of beggars. It is distinctive especially of Sokrates and his associates. Sokrates himself was notorious for his dirtiness, unkempt appearance, wearing only one cloak and going about barefoot. In addition, his comic acquaintances all seem to suffer some kind of physical debilitation: his friend Chairephon is sickly and his students are ill fed and pale skinned. Pheidippides immediately associates the Thinktank with the bad pallor of its inhabitants and fears that he too will lose his colour should he enter; this, indeed, happens. A beggarly appearance of some sort was certainly true of Sokrates and Chairephon and others among their associates not mentioned in comedy.¹ Aristophanes took

this distinctive characteristic from the individual representative of intellectualism most conspicuous in Athens and applied it to the whole class. Sokrates bestows his personal appearance on those around him as though it was a natural effect of associating with him. This tendency of comic representation can be seen in other contexts as well: Euripides' and Agathon's slaves adopt their masters' pompous language.²

The penurious intellectual is not entirely confined to Aristophanes' Sokratics. One component of the caricature of the bigheaded man on the *askos* is the exaggerated frailness of his body (fig. 9, see Chapter 2.9). In *The Republic* Plato has Sokrates quote a comic line or proverb that criticises philosophers as 'the subtle thinkers that are still beggars'. This is cited as an example of the 'ancient quarrel between philosophy and poetry', so it presumably originally referred to intellectuals other than the Sokratics. If not, it would be a peculiar piece of self-reference and would undermine the force of the quarrel's supposed antiquity.³

The attribution of this image to intellectuals as a group comes from the tendency to view appearance as an actualisation of internal disposition. In non-intellectual contexts the threadbare cloak is the emblem of the tragic suppliant and all kinds of beggars and parasites, especially in comic exaggeration.⁴ It represents someone who is utterly without resources. An intellectual wearing a threadbare cloak is, therefore, someone who is incapable of supporting himself, and the reason will be sought in the beliefs and behaviours that distinguishes him from others. As we shall see in following sections, this represents the beliefs that intellectuals are lazy, incapable of identifying and acting for their own self-interest, or lacking in self-respect.⁵

B. Laziness

Both comic and rhetorical invective accused Sokrates of laziness, saying that he prefers to spend his time chattering rather than working.⁶ Those whom Aristophanes' Cloud-goddesses protect include idlers.⁷ Euripides' Medea, in her

famous speech, cites laziness as one of the insults that the wise could expect to receive, an imputation that is clearly meant to be understood as facile but plausible.⁸ Zethos accuses Amphion of it when he says that he ‘introduces some absurd art, useless, idle, wine-loving, careless of wealth’.⁹ This emphasises that intellectuals’ laziness depends on the interpretation of their activities as basically self-indulgent and unproductive.

Poverty was (and still is) often despised as though it is the result of laziness.¹⁰ This attitude was doubtless particularly strongly held in the leisured and self-made classes. It may also have existed more widely as an abstract value. In his funeral speech Perikles asserts that, in Athens, there is no shame in poorness, only in failing to make efforts to alleviate it (Thuc. 1.40.1). Athens actually had a law proscribing ἀργία. Unfortunately, it is very obscure, but its existence is attested from the mid-5th to the mid-4th centuries. It was credited variously to Drakon, Solon and Peisistratos. The definition of ἀργία is unclear (there may not have been one), as is the law’s intention; it probably meant that men could be required to show that they had some means of supporting themselves.¹¹ Its ascription to various pre-democratic lawgivers suggests that it was not voted by the Assembly and so may not have represented the popular will but its antiquity would have given it authority.¹² It implies that the behaviour that it proscribed, laziness, was an offence against an behavioural standard - for instance, self-supporting activity – that was commonly identified with the socially desirable.

The ubiquity of the belief that intellectuals are lazy suggests the existence of a deep-seated supposition that work without tangible results is not *real* work. A disinclination to earn a living implies a readiness to gain one’s sustenance elsewhere, which is, by definition, at others’ expense. This accounts for the motifs of the intellectual as a thief, con man and parasite, which are otherwise inconsistent with the motif of his asceticism. It appears most explicitly in Aristophanes’ *The Clouds* and *The Birds* and Eupolis’ *The Flatterers*. Self-interest and greed are standard allegations against anyone but there might be a

particular barb of hypocrisy against intellectuals who were supposed to claim to eschew material interests or to possess superior moral standards.

The aristocratic ideal of leisure may, perhaps, have reduced negative views of the non-productive life.¹³ However, even members of the leisured class could be called lazy if they failed to maintain their estate and were unable or reluctant to contribute to the welfare of the community. This is the basis for many of Zethos' criticisms of Amphion.¹⁴ As most of Sokrates' associates would not have needed to work, this interpretation also makes sense of Polykrates' allegation that he encouraged people to be idle.¹⁵

Intellectualism can itself sometimes be represented as the antithesis of action. The neglect of bodily concerns that is apparent in the image of the penurious intellectual suggests the existence of a contrast between the mental and the physical. At its simplest level the antithesis of thought and action is based on an unsurprising association of lengthy reflection and discussion with a lack of resolution and dynamism. Lysias presumably attempts to reflect a common, if high-minded, attitude towards disputatiousness in his Olympic speech:

...ἐγὼ δὲ ἦκω οὐ μικρολογησόμενος οὐδὲ περὶ τῶν
ὀνομάτων μαχούμενος. ἠγοῦμαι γὰρ ταῦτα ἔργα μὲν εἶναι
σοφιστῶν λίαν ἀχρήστων καὶ σφόδρα βίου δεομένων,
ἀνδρὸς δὲ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ πολίτου πολλοῦ ἀξίου περὶ τῶν
μεγίστων συμβουλεύειν...

“...I have not come here to talk trivialities or to wrangle over words: I take that to be the business of utterly futile professors in straits for a livelihood; but I think it behoves a man of principle and civic worth to be giving his counsel on the weightiest questions...”
(Lys. 33.3, tr. Lamb, Loeb)

Antisthenes' Aias repeats this when he attacks the value of argument in his speech for the arms of Achilles (*Aias* 8). This antithesis is one that Thoukydides returns to several times in order to reject it. He expresses explicit disapproval of the inversion of ethical and behavioural norms that took place during the

Korkyrian revolution, one of which was that ‘cleverness in everything came to be regarded as inactivity in everything’.¹⁶ Thoukydides’ Kleon apparently regarded the contrast as a commonly accepted fact and attacked his opponents for preferring words to action (see Chapter 2.5). The opposition between words-thought and reality-action is a central feature of Thoukydides’ history. In his view it characterises the fundamental difference in the protagonists’ modes of thought and behaviour. The unity of thought and action was, in his view, a traditional value¹⁷, displayed by the Athenians at their height under Perikles’ leadership (Thuc. 2.40.2-3). Its opposite, for the purposes of political analysis, he identified particularly with Spartans and Athenians under the demagogues. The normal and unintellectualised view of the world rejects the idea that rigorous self-conscious thought can make a positive contribution towards action.¹⁸

C. Impracticality

C1. Intellectualism is associated with self-neglect

Penuriousness comes not just from laziness but from a failure to recognise and pursue one’s legitimate self-interest. This is the explanation for the case of intellectuals who are undeniably engaged in *some* activity, yet fail to advance themselves in areas that are conventionally considered desirable, such as wealth and honour. Aristophanes and Eupolis noticed that Sokrates and other intellectuals were devoted to studying everything except how to put food on their plates.¹⁹ Outside the comic stage Anaxagoras became the stock example of intellectual impracticality, the first instances appearing at the beginning of the 4th century. Plato’s Sokrates compares Anaxagoras’ behaviour to the mercenary spirit exhibited by Hippias of Elis:

τῶν γὰρ προτέρων περὶ Ἀναξαγόρου λέγεται πολλὴ ἀμαθία
κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον. τοῦναντίον γὰρ Ἀναξαγόρα φασὶ
συμβῆναι ἢ ὑμῖν· καταλειφθέντων γὰρ αὐτῷ πολλῶν
χρημάτων καταμελήσαι καὶ ἀπολέσαι πάντα -οὕτως αὐτὸν

άνόητα σοφίζεσθαι -λέγεται δὲ καὶ περὶ ἄλλων τῶν παλαιῶν ἕτερα τοιαῦτα.

“For the earlier sophists of the school of Anaxagoras must have been very ignorant to judge from what is said, according to your [Hippias’] view; for they say that what happened to Anaxagoras was the opposite of what happens to you; for though much money was left to him, he neglected it and lost it all; so senseless was his wisdom. And they tell similar tales about others among the ancients.”

(Pl. *Hipp.Maj.* 283a, tr. H.N. Fowler, Loeb)

Aristotle repeats this to illustrate what is apparently a common contention that practical and theoretical wisdom are different:

διὸ Αναξαγόραν καὶ Θαλῆς καὶ τοὺς τοιοῦτους σοφοὺς μὲν, φρονίμους δ’ οὐ φασιν εἶναι, ὅταν ἴδωσιν ἀγνοοῦντος τὰ συμφέρονθ’ ἑαυτοῖς, καὶ περιττὰ μὲν καὶ θαυμαστὰ καὶ χαλεπὰ καὶ δαιμόνια εἰδέναι αὐτούς φασιν, ἄχρηστα δ’, ὅτι οὐ τὰ ἀνθρώπινα ἀγαθὰ ζητοῦσιν.

“This is why people say that men like Anaxagoras and Thales ‘may be wise but are not prudent’, when they see them display ignorance of their own interests; and while admitting them to possess a knowledge that is rare, marvellous, difficult and even superhuman, they yet declare this knowledge to be useless, because these sages do not seek to know the things that are good for human beings.”

(Aristot. *E.N.* 6.7.5, 1141b, tr. H. Rackham, Loeb)

It seems that Anaxagoras (if not Thales) became a stock example to illustrate the contrast between the pursuit of knowledge and wealth. This also appears in the tradition of his relationship with Perikles, where Perikles’ magnanimity is contrasted with Anaxagoras’ inability to look after himself.²⁰ Plato and Aristotle are both reasonably early authorities, so they represent a genuine early tradition about Anaxagoras.²¹

C2. Intellectualism cannot provide protection

There was a widespread attitude that intellectuals were incapable of protecting themselves. This derives from the beliefs that intellectual pursuits prevent one

from gaining experience of the real world or that the process of intellectual comprehension is actually an obstruction to anticipating and dealing with unexpected and brutal attacks. Plato's Sokrates and Gorgias' Palamedes cite their inexperience as a defence in their trials.²² Palamedes, especially in Euripides' play, is an outstanding exemplar of the latter, the wise man brought down by the unexpected, Odysseus' unanticipated vindictiveness and treachery, whether by drowning in the epic tradition or by judicial murder in tragedy. Kallikles in Plato's *Gorgias* is a mouthpiece of demagogic extremism but is himself aristocratic in background.²³ He asserts his view that philosophers are incapable of defending themselves, as their devotion to impractical studies means that they have no idea of how the real world works, illustrating this by quoting Euripides' Zethos' criticisms of Amphion.²⁴ Thoukydides comments that, in the Korkyraian revolution, the intelligent were overwhelmed by their intellectual inferiors' audacity and readiness to abandon moral standards. The intelligent were inhibited by their own intellectual self-confidence. This is the same quality that Perikles himself had praised when reassuring the Athenians of their superiority.²⁵

There are a number of examples in myth of the wise being brought down by powerful and unpredictable events; apart from Palamedes there are Prometheus, Kadmos and Oedipus. This notable incidence suggests the existence of a cultural motif. Both Sokrates' apologists refer to Palamedes in their *Apologies*, a strong indication that Sokrates himself did so in his trial (see Chapter 3 B). The fact that these representations are generally sympathetic to the victims indicates that the motif is not consciously hostile to intellectuals as such. It does, however, imply a co-existent deep-seated belief that wisdom and rationalism are not useful when faced with unexpected events and unscrupulous and powerful attacks.

C3. Intellectual innovations are useless

The Thinktank of Aristophanes' *Clouds* is full of philosophical theories and inventions. Though much humour comes from Strepsiades' lowbrow interpretations, most comes from the inventions' novelty, silliness (apparently

inherent) and utter uselessness. This motif appears particularly in comedy. Apart from *The Clouds*, Kratinos mocks those with ‘memory-aids that forget’ (fr. 162). It also appears in other genres, such as Alkidamas’ rhetorical tract in which Odysseus accuses Palamedes, mocking his pride in his inventions, such as dice and gaming boards.²⁶

Of all intellectual occupations none seemed to be more useless, unprofitable or pretentious than cosmological speculation. The expression ‘to investigate the things in the air and beneath the earth’ is a commonplace that describes intellectuals’ activities. It is always derogatory in tone.²⁷ Their impracticality and inapplicability to real concerns was made proverbial in the story of the stargazer who fails to see a well at his feet and falls in. Plato and Diogenes tell this of Thales but ‘Aesop’ does not specify and so made it general in application.²⁸ The belief in the uselessness of investigation and theorising is underlined by the motif that engaging in these activities is a license for self-importance; intellectuals value ideas and theories for their own sake, whereas ‘right-thinking’ people ‘know’ that they have no useful application. Herodotos suggests this when he ascribes naturalistic explanations of the flooding of the Nile to ‘certain Greeks wishing to become noted for their cleverness (σοφία)’.²⁹ The ‘implausible’ theory, that it is due to melting snow, is elsewhere ascribed to Anaxagoras.³⁰

C4. Intellectualism is inadequate as a means to truth and as a basis for judgement

The inadequacy of intellectualism as a means to truth has two aspects: its ability to reach the truth and its ability to communicate it. The characteristics of public oratory suggest that intellectual habits in argument were commonly regarded not as helping reveal the truth but as obscuring it, presumably for reasons of self-interest. Truth was supposed to be straightforward and self-evident (see Chapter 2.4 C). The same attitude appears in Thoukydides’ Mytilene debate, in which Kleon suggests that the Athenians’ understanding and response to their situation should be immediate, based on an instinctive response to self-evident facts. He claims that those who oppose him, the clever speakers, desire to discuss

everything at length not because this will improve their understanding but simply for the sake of it. In fact, he alleges, allowing debate militates against understanding and effective decision-making because their arrogance obliges them to prove their cleverness precisely by arguing *against* the instinctive and self-evident (Thuc. 3.37.3-38.1). Those who criticise intellectuals' failure to prosper and to defend themselves suggest that the reason is an inability to understand the real world and the dangers that may confront them. This theme is particularly prominent in Euripides' plays (see C2 above and Chapter 2.3 B).

Intellectuals' inability to communicate meaningfully is apparent in the popular image of them as 'babblers'. They talk about obscure things in obscure language. This is particularly prominent in Aristophanes' mockery of their verbosity and use of neologisms. Of course, there is an irony here as these habits of speech are intended to be tools to aid comprehension. Plato emphasises this disjunction between philosophers' and ordinary people's speech as a function of their different levels of comprehension, most memorably in the allegory of the cave in *The Republic*.

D. Conclusion

The characteristics ascribed to intellectuals tend to be expressions of their supposed beliefs and behaviour. Sokrates' well-known beggarly appearance is attributed to all his associates, real or imagined. In a curious but typical inconsistency, it is associated with both physical resilience (in Sokrates) and physical debilitation (in his fictional students). Intellectuals' disinclination to engage in real work and the unproductiveness of the activities that they do engage in are 'proved' by this image, even if only a few intellectuals were, in fact, conspicuously poor. Intellectuals themselves recognise the logic that the philosophical life causes penuriousness: Sokrates and Antisthenes both imply, though with opposite causal links, that it is impossible to pursue both material interests and philosophy.³¹ Plato's Sokrates asserts that austerity is necessary to free the mind from material and emotional distractions.³² If the products of

intellectualism are regarded as useless or non-existent then devotion to intellectual studies itself appears to be either a cover for laziness and/or evidence that intellectual training excludes training in practicalities. These beliefs are characteristic of the anti-intellectual.

The impracticality associated with intellectuals is a variant on their laziness and uselessness but differs in that it assumes that they are *attempting* to engage in useful and practical activities. Intellectualism may be useless in the sense of being frivolous, trivial and distracting but the anti-*intellectualist's* objection is founded on his belief that it cannot achieve what its proponents and adherents claim and may be worse. Intellectuals' social and moral destructiveness are usually said to come from actions made with a lack of judgement rather than wickedness.

4.2 - Irreligion

A. Traditional religious attitudes

Most Athenians believed that myths were true or, at least, *believed* that they believed them to be true.³³ Certain individual intellectuals' trenchant criticism of the inconsistencies and immorality in myths and traditional poetry indicates that uncritical acceptance, not scepticism, was the norm.³⁴ That certain things relating to the divine were impenetrable to human comprehension was normal of the Greek attitude. It appears throughout the classical period and was even pronounced by some who were interested in astronomical and mythological investigation, such as Xenophanes, Gorgias and a Hippocratic author.³⁵ The view that inquiry into the divine may not be proper is stated by Andokides in *On the Mysteries*, a situation where he was on trial for impiety and would not express anything other than super-conventional religious sentiments. Herodotos, whose religious views seem to be traditional, and Sokrates, whose views were, agree with him.³⁶

Athenians' religious ideology was focused on the state, and was conservative and hostile to innovation. New deities were admitted to the civic cult very infrequently and, it seems, only in response to particular crises. The introduction of Asklepios to Athens from Epidauros in response to the plague is the most obvious example.³⁷ The granting of land for a shrine to Bendis for resident Thracians in 433 BC had political implications, as it coincided with an alliance with Thrace's king Sitalkes. Even so, it still required the sanction of the oracle at Dodona.³⁸ The parochial nature of the civic cults is emphasised in Lysias' *Against Andokides*. He asserts that, though Andokides and Diagoras of Melos had offended against the gods of Athens, the former's impiety was worse because he was Athenian himself.³⁹ Lysias also claims that other Greeks refuse to accept impious foreigners, which implies the existence of a belief that religious concerns transcends individual states. However, his object is to emphasise Andokides' infamy and it is clear from his language that the behaviour of 'other Greeks' is a

rhetorical invention that he has difficulty substantiating - 'they said' (φασι) that they do this.⁴⁰ This again shows that religion was usually focused on the particular state.

Failure to maintain traditional religious practices could be viewed as endangering the state by damaging its relationship with the gods. Lysias alleges this of Nikomachos' work on the calendar of sacrifices, even though it must have had official sanction at some point⁴¹, and the interest of the state is implicit in the accusation made against Sokrates, that he 'failed to acknowledge the gods of the city'. While Sokrates' apologists defend his faith, punctiliousness and the orthodoxy of his *daimonion*, they do not dispute that the religious charges were legitimate. They implicitly agree that the state is justified in proscribing certain religious practices, presumably considered an act of self-defence. This is underlined by the fact that it was clearly feasible for a person to escape prosecution. Diagoras of Melos was able to flee Athens to safety and Sokrates' friends assume that he could do the same. It was the responsibility of the offended party, in this case, the state, to punish those who harmed it.

However, the principle of the state's need for protection against religious unorthodoxy may have existed more as an abstract principle than a genuine popular sentiment. It seems to be expressed mainly by litigants in circumstances where it might benefit their case, which suggests that it is made more in the hope of provoking an extreme and uncompromising attitude in the jury rather than in expectation of finding sympathy.⁴² Although Sokrates and Nikomachos were convicted, at least partly on the grounds of defending the state's relationship with the gods, Andokides was acquitted on the same general charge, and before a jury of initiates into the Mysteries, who might therefore have been somewhat more conservative than usual.⁴³ Though religious unorthodoxy and criticism was probably considered offensive it was probably also generally tolerated. Criticism of traditional poets and myths was not new and was practiced by at least some distinguished figures, such as Pindar.⁴⁴

B. The weakening of traditional religion

The decline of automatic deference to traditional religious pieties, if not a phenomenon originating in the late 5th century, doubtless seemed to contemporaries to be accelerating and attaining new extremes. Thucydides vividly describes an increase in immoral and irreligious behaviour in Athens at the time of the great plague, including reckless disregard for the sanctity of oaths and proper disposal of the dead.⁴⁵ Particular incidents made an impact on the public mind. In c.417 BC the poet Diagoras of Melos exposed and mocked the Eleusinian Mysteries, on account of which he was forced to flee Athens. In 415 there were a number of extraordinarily flagrant acts of impiety in the profanation of the Mysteries and the mutilation of the Hermai (Chapter 4.3 D). Some clubs engaged in deliberately offensive, strange and possibly irreligious practices. Some ate food set aside for sacrifices; the 'Devil-worshippers' (κακοδαίμονισταί) made a practice of flouting religious conventions by feasting on unlucky days. One of their number, the poet Kinesias, gained notoriety for befouling a shrine of Hekate, presumably during the drunken riot that typically formed the climax of a symposium. These incidents are referred to in legal speeches and comedies as well-known and deplorable acts.⁴⁶ There was also a growth in the popularity of foreign cults. Aristophanes' *The Seasons* (Αἱ Ὠραὶ) mocked the strange (ξενικοί) gods, particularly Sabazios and Isis, and the Athenians' readiness to adopt them. Their cult practices were often quite unlike those of traditional Athenian religion. Their leaders could be foreign and female, they admitted male citizens, slaves and women on an equal basis, and engaged in orgiastic rituals.⁴⁷ If Aristophanes criticised the new cults - he depicted these gods being rounded up, put on trial and deported - it is clear that many other Athenians embraced them.⁴⁸ There was a change in many people's religious sentiments and needs that loosened traditional religious attachments and made their cults seem less satisfactory.

All genres frequently and repeatedly connect intellectuals and intellectualism to impiety. The most famous is, of course, Sokrates. His trial for impiety was

preceded by a long period of half-joking, half-serious criticism for his supposed irreligion by the comedians. The allusion to Anaxagoras in Euripides' version of Tantalos' punishment in *Orestes*, and the allusion to Tantalos in Plato's introduction of Prodikos in the *Protagoras*⁴⁹ show that the theme was spread across genres and classes. Impiety consists in the supposed rejection of phenomena traditionally considered to be divine: heavenly phenomenon, traditional stories and the conventions of religious observance.

B1. Astronomy and cosmological speculation

There are many examples to show that astronomy and cosmological speculation were popularly considered to be a central part of intellectual inquiry and that they were especially associated with atheism. Most indicative of general opinion is that at Sokrates' trial Meletos bases his accusation of atheism on the assumption that Sokrates had provided naturalistic explanations for the sun and moon. Sokrates and his apologists deny that he engaged in such activities; they agree that 'teaching the things in the air and the things beneath the earth and not to believe in the gods' was popularly imputed to philosophers and that it would be tantamount to denying their divinity.⁵⁰ In Aristophanes' *Clouds* Sokrates replaces Zeus with a cosmological theory. There are many other references that confirm that such activities were not associated with Sokrates alone but were proverbial of intellectuals in general and were considered to be discreditable. The comedian Eupolis calls Protagoras sinful (ἄλιτῆριος) for 'blustering about the things of the heavens' (fr. 157). Allegations that atheism somehow derives from astronomy and which do not appear to be directed against any individual intellectual are Diopeithes' 'decree', whether it is a genuine opinion or a satire of one, and the fragment from Euripides' play that attacks μετεωρολόγοι.⁵¹

B2. Rejection of traditional myths

The practice of criticising myths and the poets who convey them is particularly associated with intellectual freethinkers. Intellectual analysis of traditional stories

deals with four issues: (1) interpreting myths so that they illustrate aspects of the development and behaviour of humans and the divine and natural worlds, (2) criticising their plausibility, (3) criticising their morality, and (4) examining poetic methods. Protagoras and Prodikos, for instance, used allegorical interpretations of myths in order to make observations about human nature.

Sokrates' apologists and attackers both ascribe to him the habit of criticising myths and traditional poetry. Meletos and Polykrates claim that this is part of his impiety and his method of corruption.⁵² Euripides placed the same rationalising techniques in the mouths of characters in his tragedies, though not only intellectual-type figures. Euripides' exploitation of this technique was, for comic purposes, assumed to be sufficient evidence of his own atheism.⁵³

There is no evidence that the practice of criticising traditional poets and myths was new, necessarily offensive, or illegal. However, the Greeks regarded myths, especially those encapsulated in the most ancient poetry, as an important component of cultural education and moral development. They were felt to sanction and underpin moral conventions. Hence, criticism of traditional stories and poets could be viewed as undermining accepted morals (see Chapter 4.3 C).

B3. Unorthodox religious practice

Sokrates and a number of his associates questioned and rejected conventions of religious observance. They may have either refused to make sacrifices altogether or did so in modified forms. Xenophon depicts Aristodemos 'the dwarf' expressing doubt that the gods had any use or interest in sacrifices. Plato represents his own brother Adeimantos criticising the apparently widely held view that divine favour could be secured in proportion to the lavishness of one's devotions. Aristippos mocks the popular rationale for offering prayers and sacrifices, saying that if gods were really concerned for our welfare then, like doctors, they would give us what we need and not what we want.⁵⁴ These unorthodox practices seemed to have been recognised, at whatever level, in

popular genres. Eupolis has some comic character describe Protagoras as ‘sinful’ partly on the basis of his disregard for the conventional piety of leaving crumbs that fall to the floor.⁵⁵

Intellectuals’ identification of various forces and principles as influences in the universe could be felt to necessitate the rejection of the city’s customary gods and to prove that intellectuals did so. Aristophanes depicts Sokrates insisting that the Clouds are the only gods, and that Δῖνος has replaced Zeus as the driving force of the cosmos. It seems that Aristophanes intended Strepsiades’ simple-minded interpretation of this as the replacement of old gods with new ones to be funny (Chapter 2.1 C). Meletos in his indictment of Sokrates seems to follow the same idea in all seriousness. At least, while the charge that he ‘introduces new gods’ or ‘divine things’ might be founded on the unconventionality of his private *daimonion*, it may refer to all the religious innovations and unorthodoxies that could be imagined of Sokrates (Chapter 2.7 A2).

C. Impracticality in religion is impiety

Intellectualism was widely regarded as being particularly concerned with speculation about the nature of the universe. It is here that its errors are greatest and gravest. Impracticality – miscomprehension or incompetence that results in inappropriate action - in religion is one form of impiety. This can be seen in Nikomachos’ work on the calendar sacrifices. His work clearly involved preferring some rites and rejecting others, presumably according to some generalised conception of their function, the relationship between the city and the gods, and their consistency with standards of practice. His prosecutor – and, apparently, jury – felt that the result was inconsistent with proper religious observance, as Nikomachos’ method ignored at least one fundamentally important aspect of sacrifices, their antiquity (Chapter 2.6).

D. Conclusion

Anti-intellectuals regarded criticism of divine phenomena as characteristic of intellectuals. The inherent obscurity of the divine could make attempts to scrutinise it seem arrogant and futile. In particular, intellectual analysis depends on searching for transcendent meanings underlying particular manifestations, and separating attendant causes from contingent. It is therefore inevitable that intellectuals will reject peculiarities in individual phenomena. To view intellectual scrutiny of and theorisation about the divine as irreligious presupposes that rejecting one aspect - such as part of a myth, the form of a particular sacrifice, or the divinity of the heavenly bodies – is to reject the whole. The anti-intellectual considers manifestation and essence to be identical. This is shown most clearly in Meletos' supposition that Sokrates' supposed astronomy means that he denies divinity to the sun and moon and therefore all divinity (Chapter 2.7 A1). They prefer to accept the face value of data as constituting their entire meaning.

4.3 - Immorality

Intellectuals could be represented as holding immoral beliefs and perpetrating immoral acts. As with their other purported characteristics, depictions vary from light-hearted to earnest. Apart from irreligion, discussed in the previous section, this immorality commonly includes thievery, parasitism and greedy exploitation. Even worse acts are imputed to some of those allegedly influenced by intellectualism, particularly the ‘rich young men with time on their hands’, as Sokrates calls them⁵⁶, such as violence, evasion of justice, disrespect for elders, and hostility towards the democratic constitution. In general, the immorality associated with intellectualism consists in (A) rejection of normal standards of behaviour; (B) abuse of abilities, especially with the object of evading justice; (C) explicit justification of gross self-interest; and (D) corruption of the young.

A. Rejection of normal standards of behaviour

Eccentricity is commonly ascribed to intellectuals in both ancient and modern times. It may, in fact, be attendant on or symptomatic of the intellectual disposition, relating to a sense of personal separateness and providing an impetus for questioning accepted opinion. Both intellectuals’ sympathisers and detractors may regard such eccentricities as characteristic and related to their peculiar activities and convictions. Sokrates explicitly recognised that his neglect of his own interests is not rational according to normal standards of behaviour.⁵⁷ However, denigration of eccentricity is most common in popular genres. The Thinktank of Aristophanes’ *Clouds* represents intellectuals as forming an exclusive society of eccentrics. It is virtually certain that there was no literal parallel in Athens but it is a metaphorical representation of Sokrates’ separation from normal society.⁵⁸ Aristotle cites the example of Anaxagoras to highlight commonly held views about ‘normal interests’:

ἔοικε δὲ καὶ Ἀναξαγόρας οὐ πλούσιον οὐδὲ δυναστήν
ὑπολαβεῖν τὸν εὐδαίμονα, εἰπὼν ὅτι οὐκ ἂν θαυμάσειεν εἴ
τις ἄτοπος φανείη τοῖς πολλοῖς· οὗτοι γὰρ κρίνουσι τοῖς
ἑκτός, τούτων αἰσθανόμενοι μόνον.

“Anaxagoras again does not seem to have conceived the happy man as rich or powerful, since he says that he would not be surprised if he [the happy man] were to appear a strange sort of person in the eyes of the many; for most men judge by externals, which are all that they can perceive.”
(Aristot. *E.N.* 10.8.11, 1179a, tr. H. Rackham, Loeb)

...καὶ Ἀναξαγόρας μὲν ὁ Κλαζομένιος ἐρωτηθεὶς τίς ὁ
εὐδαιμονέστατος, “οὐθείς” εἶπεν “ὦν σὺ νομίζεις, ἀλλ’
ἄτοπος ἂν τίς σοι φανείη.” τοῦτον δ’ ἀπεκρίνατο τὸν
τρόπον ἐκεῖνος ὁρῶν τὸν ἐρόμενον ἀδύνατον
ὑπολαμβάνοντα μὴ μέγαν ὄντα καὶ καλὸν ἢ πλούσιον
ταύτης τυγχάνειν τῆς προσηγορίας, αὐτὸς δ’ ἴσως ᾤετο
τὸν ζῶντα ἀλύπως καὶ καθαρῶς πρὸς τὸ δίκαιον ἢ τινος
θεωρίας κοιωνοῦντα θείας, τοῦτον ὡς ἄνθρωπον εἰπεῖν
μακάριον εἶναι.

“...[A]nd Anaxagoras of Clazomenae when asked, ‘Who is the happiest man?’ said, ‘None of those whom you think, but he would seem to you an odd sort of person.’ But Anaxagoras answered in this way because he saw that the man who put the question supposed it to be impossible to receive the appellation ‘happy’ without being great and beautiful or rich, whereas he himself perhaps thought that the person who humanly speaking enjoys bliss is he that lives by the standard of justice without pain and in purity, or participates in some form of divine contemplation.”
(Aristot. *E.E.* 1.4.4, 1215b, tr. H. Rackham, Loeb cf. Cic. *Tusc.* 5.39 (115) cf. 5.36 (103-105))

The offence that Aristotle envisages is to sensibility rather than morality. Such inversions of normal standards would probably be thought of as contemptible or amusing. However, they might also provoke hostile reactions, as though they constituted an attack on conventional standards. These include intellectuals’ purported attitudes towards accustomed social relations, such as between fathers and sons, and men and women, and their behaviour that might display (and therefore justify) a lack of moral and physical restraint.

A1. Criticism of accustomed social categories

One social hierarchy that some intellectuals questioned is the value of birth in determining status and moral worth. For instance, Antiphon disputed the notion that Greeks and barbarians were intrinsically different and Lykophron highlighted the ambiguity of the term 'nobility'.⁵⁹ However, the evidence for the penetration of such views into the public sphere comes almost entirely from Euripides' plays⁶⁰ and it is not clear that they were considered to be offensive or were, indeed, directly connected to intellectuals.

The existence of at least some women in intellectual circles or the existence of the theoretical principle of female emancipation might imply that intellectualism promoted the inversion or abandonment of a basic aspect of the social structure. Pythagorean societies had admitted women since their inception.⁶¹ Sokrates and some of his associates seem to have acknowledged that women had more intellectual and moral potential - and, therefore, potential freedom - than Athenian standards usually admitted. Sokrates' theory of virtue allowed that women could seek and possess it as well as men. His interlocutors are reluctant to accept this, which indicates the novelty of his thought.⁶² His apologists depict him having apparently serious discussions with women, such as Aspasia (see below), Diotima (whether or not she is historical), and Theodote.⁶³ Some of his followers, especially Aristippos and Plato, may also have had serious intellectual contacts with women and allowed them exceptional freedom. However, the information is scanty, the sources are usually very late and the data relates to after 380 BC in any case. It is possible that the information is exaggerated or apocryphal, perhaps precisely on account of the supposition that philosophers have peculiar habits.⁶⁴

In the *Ekklesiazousai* (c.392 BC) Aristophanes connects gynaecocracy with radical social and economic engineering, which ultimately results in a communistic society. This invites the possibility that he is parodying contemporary intellectual social and constitutional proposals. In particular,

φιλόσοφος is what the Chorus call Praxagora's proposals.⁶⁵ It is atypical of his method to refrain from explicitly naming the object of his attack, which suggests that he is not mocking any particular intellectual but is alluding to the inversion of male and female roles as typical of intellectual proposals.⁶⁶ It may be that (1) the women of the play represent intellectuals (on intellectuals' effeminacy, see A2 below) or (2) Aristophanes is inverting the logic of intellectual proposals; the social inversion of the *Ekklesiazousai* creates radical new laws instead of radical new laws creating a new social order.

Kratinos the younger wrote a comedy called *The Pythagorean Women* in the late 5th or early 4th centuries. Nothing of the content of the play is known but Kratinos presumably mocked Pythagorean practice as the Athenian public would understand it.

The most famous example of the association of intellectual talents with female empowerment is Aspasia. Contemporary and near-contemporary sources, comedies and philosophical works, mention her several times. These sources provide evidence for her intelligence and skill in rhetoric, which certainly represents intellectual interests. There is undoubtedly considerable irony and misrepresentation in all or most of these sources but they must have some basis. According to a fragment of the 5th century comedian Kallias, Aspasia taught Perikles public speaking (fr. 21). Three Sokratic authors also refer to her possessing expertise in several areas. Plato says that she composed Perikles' funeral speech and taught rhetoric to Sokrates. Even if Plato intended to denigrate Perikles or Athenian political ideology, as seems likely, Sokrates' interlocutor Menexenos takes his comments at face value; in fact, it is he who guesses that it is Aspasia to whom Sokrates refers. This implies that Aspasia did, in fact, have some intellectual reputation.⁶⁷ Aischines of Sphettos says that she also enabled Lysikles, a lowly sheep-dealer, whom she married after Perikles' death, to become a successful politician.⁶⁸ Aischines' belief in her intellectual ability appears more forcefully in his dialogue *Aspasia* where he depicted her engaging Xenophon and his wife in a dialectical examination. Though it only survives in

an incomplete Latin paraphrase, there is no hint of irony.⁶⁹ Xenophon refers to Aspasia as an expert on matchmaking and on a husband's education of his wife.⁷⁰ He seems to hold a conventionally high opinion of Perikles' articulateness and statesmanship⁷¹, so his remarks, unlike Plato's, can be taken at face value and imply that Xenophon genuinely considered her to be intelligent and well-educated. His focus on her contribution to matters appropriate to women is typical of his trivialisation: he recognises her intelligence but locates it at the most basic level possible.⁷² The natural conclusion from these sources is that Aspasia was indeed well known as articulate, educated and intelligent.⁷³ There is also the intriguing datum that Aspasia was prosecuted for impiety (see Appendix A). This may not be a historical fact and its existence need not be connected to or prove her intellectual status but it is a motif frequently associated with intellectuals and their adherents.

Sources on Aspasia direct their attention overwhelmingly towards her supposedly improper influence on Perikles. Aristophanes alleges that she kept prostitutes and that Perikles launched the Peloponnesian War in revenge for their abduction by Megarians.⁷⁴ Other comedians refer to her as Queen Omphale, Helen and Deianeira.⁷⁵ These are, respectively, a mythical dominatrix, a lustful warmonger and a man-destroyer. The Sokratic authors provide less jocular invective. Antisthenes says that Perikles was uncontrollably besotted with her.⁷⁶ Plato's remark that she was the real author of Perikles' funeral speech is certainly intended to insult Perikles and to criticise the development of Athenian politics and morality under the democracy.⁷⁷ There were rumours that Athens' involvement in the war between Samos and Miletos was due to her influence.⁷⁸ She was clearly widely supposed to have had excessive and improper influence over Perikles, an inversion of the Greek view of a woman's proper place in personal relations and in the state. Her intellectual talents were a component of this inversion, as Plato and the comedian Kallias suggest, though the most trenchant invective, unsurprisingly, prefers to focus on Perikles' weakness and Aspasia's aggressive sexuality.

A2. Lack of moral and physical restraint

Intellectuals and their adherents were often depicted as engaging in behaviour that was at odds with, even outrageous to, standards of decorum and moral continence. The motif of intellectual's laziness has already been examined, an eccentricity that could be viewed as socially damaging by encouraging parasitism, weakening the state and providing a theoretical justification for self-indulgence (Chapter 4.1 B). Two other intellectual characteristics will be considered, greed and sexual deviancy.

Greed takes several forms. The image of the intellectual as reveling in luxury appears in comedy (Chapter 2.1 B2) but also in non-popular sources. Prodikos and Hippodamos were familiar figures in Athens.⁷⁹ In the *Protagoras* Plato implies that Prodikos was notorious for his luxuriousness: Sokrates first sees him delivering a lecture while still in bed, wrapped up in 'a great many sheepskins', in a room that Kallias used to use as a treasury. In addition, Sokrates' reference to Tantalos invites the association of Prodikos with a mythical figure who was famous for his oriental luxury.⁸⁰ Aristotle says that Hippodamos was well-known for his long hair, jewelry and overdressing.⁸¹

Comedy regularly depicts intellectuals engaging in exploitation and thievery. The comedians' treatment of Kallias' exploitation by parasites has already been referred to, and so has Aristophanes' depiction of Sokrates engaging in petty theft.⁸² Intellectuals were also known for their fee taking: Antiphon was notorious for accepting money for any case; Aristophanes says that Hyperbolos paid a talent to become an effective speaker and he depicts Strepsiades paying Sokrates for having educated Pheidippides.⁸³ Sokrates' apologists' trenchant and repeated denials that he accepted payment suggest that the practice was normal.⁸⁴ This has some basis in fact, as intellectuals or, at least, the most famous of them, could command exorbitant fees for tuition: Zeno, Protagoras and Gorgias charged one hundred minai and Prodikos fifty drachmai. Their wealth from teaching was almost proverbial.⁸⁵ Prodikos seems to have been particularly calculating and

mercenary, catering to his clientele to the extent of offering different programmes of lectures at different rates.⁸⁶ The sources for this information are mainly those wishing to denigrate the practice of teaching for pay, for example, Plato and Isokrates but, even when they wish to mock how little a common sophist's wisdom is worth, the figure they give, 'less than ten minai', is still significant – in the mid-4th century this could buy a house.⁸⁷

Greed implies all-consuming self-interestedness, particularly offensive and damaging in an ancient belief system in which goods are finite in quantity (see Chapter 1.5 C). This motif contrasts with that of intellectuals' supposed blindness to their own self-interest (Chapter 4.1 C1). Working for pay could also attract contempt by offending the Greek sentiment that a man should work for himself. Dependency on others was felt to limit personal freedom. Aristotle expresses this principle as 'the free man does not live on another'.⁸⁸

However, while intellectuals - including the comic Sokrates – could be depicted as greedy, thieving and parasitic, this was not such a forceful image that Sokrates' prosecutors used it to attack him. They apparently did not allege that he accepted money for teaching. Sokrates' apologists evidently found this more discreditable than did the Athenian public.⁸⁹ This is a function of their class.

Another form of immorality strongly associated with intellectualism is sexual deviancy in various forms. One image of the intellectuals is of physical weakness and effeminacy. This appears on both on the comic and tragic stages: Euripides' Zethos' criticises Amphion for his 'womanish shape'. (γυναικόμιμον μὀρφώμας) (fr. 185).⁹⁰ Polygnotos depicted Palamedes as beardless in his mural at Delphi in the mid-5th century, though this was not the only image of Palamedes (see fig. 8).⁹¹ These representations imply that intellectual occupations encourage devotion to indulgent pleasures that are weakening and distract men from developing their physical strength and resilience, necessary for them to take up active roles in society. Intellectuals' supposed effeminacy is as an externalisation of the process.

This process saw the association of intellectualism with the inversion of conventional gender roles. Aspasia is the most prominent example (see A1 above). Comedians suggest that intellectuals had a preference for homosexuality and sexual perversion, though this seems to be a component of their moral debilitation rather than an ascribed characteristic in its own right.⁹² There is no evidence that Sokrates' prosecutors viewed 'corruption of the young' as including sexual corruption. This prurient interpretation appears soon afterwards, however, possibly on account of the erotic overtones in Plato's works. Polykrates describes Sokrates' young companions as his 'lovers' whom he 'chased after'.⁹³ Plato himself depicts a critic of intellectualism, Kallikles, saying that over-indulgence in philosophy turns one into an 'old man whispering (*ψιθυρίζων*) with youths in a corner', which seems to carry a similar implication⁹⁴

In the Greek view sexual perversity has two aspects. Firstly, it consists in excessive indulgence. This implies a lack of restraint in other areas of life, which potentially endangers the welfare of others and the state.⁹⁵ Secondly, it inverts the accepted hierarchy that associated superior status with dynamism. For instance, while homosexuality is not odious in itself, homosexual conduct was expected to conform to the conventional hierarchies in age and citizen-status. Failing to observe these was regarded as discreditable. Hostility towards the inversion of the superior-older-active versus inferior-younger-passive hierarchy, for whatever reason, can be seen in Xenophon's attack on Meno for having a *paidika* who was his elder, and the existence of the Athenian law providing that a citizen who prostituted himself - that is, placing himself in the position of a dependent - could be deprived of many of his citizen rights.⁹⁶

The motifs of greed and sexual perversity are stock criticisms, well known from comedy and oratory. They are certainly represented as characteristic of intellectuals. Concerns about their abnormal behaviour tend to be confined to mundane infractions such as greed and so on. They do not aim to overturn society but their teaching does tend to erode morals.

B. Abuse of abilities

It was a norm of Greek thought to associate intelligence with ability. This combination was generally viewed positively and was often connected to moral sensibility: to be good is to be good at something or in performance of a particular role. In practical usage is rarely easy to distinguish σοφία and σωφροσύνη.⁹⁷ However, the opposite view also exists: as self-interest is a basic determinant of human behaviour, exceptional ability also means that one possesses exceptional capacity to realise one's goals. Examples of this belief appear particularly in tragedy and philosophy, genres that purport to make serious observations on human character. Sophokles' famous *Ode to Man* in the *Antigone* expresses extraordinary confidence in man's capacity to tame his environment through his intellectual power but also recognises its potential for abuse. The term he uses, δεινός, is ambiguous, meaning both 'wonderful' and 'terrible'.⁹⁸ Xenophon explicitly separates the notions of efficacy and morality when he argues that Sokrates was not responsible for Kritias' and Alkibiades' immorality. He claims that they associated with Sokrates to learn his skills but rejected his model of moral continence: Sokrates' philosophy and the model of his behaviour did not of themselves develop moral sensibility.⁹⁹

There are examples of mythical intellectual-types who used or were apparently believed to be able to use their exaggerated abilities to achieve their own ends. Euripides' *Medeia* clearly employs her special knowledge and this enhances her capacity to exact revenge. She exhorts herself to 'scheme with all her skill'.¹⁰⁰ The various representations of Palamedes' trial also show this belief in the statements that a man's skill can be measured from his wealth, and that greed is a plausible motive for his supposed treachery.¹⁰³ The view that intellectual skills could be abused in this way must be at least superficially plausible for Odysseus, Palamedes' accuser, to use it, apparently successfully. These examples show what were plausible allegations against the type.¹⁰²

The effect of this view is that ordinary people will act to defend themselves against the threat posed by intellectual ability. Evidence for this exists in the same genres. In Euripides' *Medeia* King Kleon explicitly cites his fear of Medeia's anger with her capacity for harming him, being a wise woman (σοφῆ), as his reason for acting first by banishing her (282-91). This appears as a social and political phenomenon in the Korkyrian revolution, the less intelligent attacking those whom they regarded as their intellectual superiors, fearing their abilities. Though this is not Athens the context is Thoukydides' description of tendencies that he believed to be universal.¹⁰³

B1. Intellectualism and rhetoric

The ability to exploit skill in argument is a particularly notorious supposed abuse of intellectualism. This belief is evident in both humorous and serious contexts. In Athens rhetoricians were certainly the most visible segment of the intellectually trained, so it is unsurprising that intellectuals were commonly assumed to possess and teach rhetorical skills. In particular, 'making the weaker argument defeat the stronger' was proverbial of specious sophistic rhetoric. The contest between the Better and Worse Arguments in Aristophanes' *Clouds* suggests this and Sokrates' apologists defend him against the assumption, which was obviously widespread, that he and every philosopher was a clever speaker and taught rhetoric.¹⁰⁴ In popular usage the expression 'to philosophise' (φιλοσοφεῖν) can mean 'to be thoughtful' but also to indulge in idle and evasive argument:

καὶ ἐγὼ μὲν ᾧμην φιλοσοφούντας αὐτοὺς περὶ τοῦ
πράγματος ἀντιλέγειν τὸν ἐναντίον λόγον· οἱ δ' ἄρα οὐκ
ἀντέλεγον ἀλλ' ἀντέπραττον, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἀντέλεγον, ἵνα
τὸν ἑμὸν λόγον εἰδεῖη Πολυκλῆς...

"And also I thought it was for the mere theory of the thing that they took up the argument in opposition: but I found they were not arguing but acting against me, and the purpose of their argument was to enable Polycles to know my argument."

(Lys. 8.11-12, tr. W.R.M. Lamb, Loeb).¹⁰⁵

It has already been observed that intellectuals display a propensity for using sophisticated arguments where professional speech-writers would avoid them.¹⁰⁶ An example from tragedy comes from Euripides' *Hippolytos* in which the title character threatens to break his oath to Phaidra with the justification that 'my tongue, not my mind, swore' (§612). This line became infamous as an example of immoral and impious sophistry: Aristophanes refers to it a number of times as epitomising Euripides' cleverness in pursuing self-interest, and Hygiainon, Euripides' opponent in an *antidosis* trial, used it in an attempt to denigrate him in the eyes of the jury.¹⁰⁷

B2. Rhetorical skill enables the evasion of justice

Athenians could view skill in speech and sophisticated forms of argument as enabling misrepresentation and persuasion contrary to the truth; intellectual skills could damage honest and effective communication. The opposition of thought and speech to concrete reality and actions – λόγῳι and ἔργα - is a commonplace of Greek thought that has already been mentioned. The contrast appears implicitly as early as Homer in the contrast between Odysseus and Aias.¹⁰⁸ The popular thread of this contrast influences all Greek literature until the 4th century BC. It is conceptually simple, recognising a difference between appearances and concepts on the one hand and reality and action on the other. It displays an ethical colouring, favouring action and mistrusting intelligence, especially when it is combined with skilled speech.¹⁰⁹ Deeds, the popular conception assumes, are real and wholly knowable while words are false. This is found at least since the time of Solon, who blames human suffering on deviousness and arrogance - "For you look at a man's tongue and his wily word, but you do not see the deeds that he does."¹¹⁰ Euripides' plays in which there is criticism of intellectuals, *Antiope* and *Palamedes*, contain similar, probably commonplace, observations of the disjunction between words and deeds and the greater truth of the latter (fr. 206, 583). Sokrates in his trial explicitly – and condescendingly – refers to it when he provides his jurors not just with an

explanation of his philosophy but ‘what you will honour more, deeds’.¹¹¹ The popular thread is unsophisticated, not recognising that λόγοι may be necessary to comprehend ἔργα, unlike the ‘literary thread’, which regards the two as differing but positive aspects of human experience, and the ‘philosophical thread’, which treats λόγοι as the vehicle and essence of truth and belittles ἔργα as changeable and delusive.¹¹²

It is a commonplace that barely needs illustration that eloquence can give falsity the appearance of wisdom and make truth appear unconvincing. It is the assumption of Euripidean tragedy, for example, that clever speakers argue to make the untrue convincing, so that there is no means to distinguish the sincere from the self-interested except the passing of time.¹¹³ The unstated assumption is that the truth *ought* to be straightforward and self-evident. Orators observe that words can seem more real than facts.¹¹⁴ The subtle and unscrupulous speaker who is willing and able to persuade his listeners at odds with the truth is a recognised character that appears throughout classical Athenian sources. Public commentators, such as orators and comedians, repeatedly blame them for social and political problems. This is a motif, a facile identification of the symptoms of political and legal institutions’ shortcomings with their cause, comparable to modern complaints about lawyers’ duplicity and self-interestedness. Such reservations, expressed by individual critics and perhaps believed on some level by ordinary Athenians, did not override the institutional need for clever and sophisticated speakers or, in fact, popular enjoyment of them. Public recognition of their political role, however, does not appear until the second half of the 4th century.

The ability to persuade contrary to the truth creates the possibility that wrongdoing can go unpunished, if the perpetrator is sufficiently clever and articulate. Athenian concern with the abuse of ability in speech can be seen in instances that are unconnected with intellectuals. In forensic speeches it is a common motif for a speaker to maximise the ramifications of his opponent’s

injustice by alleging that his skills in speech potentially endanger the security of the state and its citizens.

καίτοι τοῦτο ἅπαντες ἐπίστασθε, ὅτι οὐχ ὅταν τοὺς μὴ δυναμένους λέγειν κολάζητε, τότε ἔσται παράδειγμα τοῦ μὴ ὑμᾶς ἀδικεῖν, ἀλλ' ὅποταν παρὰ τῶν δυναμένων δίκην λαμβάνητε, τότε πάντες παύσονται ἐπιχειροῦντες εἰς ὑμᾶς ἐξαμαρτάνειν. νῦν δ' ἀσφαλῶς αὐτοῖς ἔχει τὰ ὑμέτερα κλέπτειν. ἐὰν μὲν γὰρ λάθωσιν, ἀδεῶς αὐτοῖς ἔξουσι χρῆσθαι· ἐὰν δὲ ὀφθῶσιν, ἢ μέρει τῶν ἀδικημάτων τὸν κίνδυνον ἐξεπρίαντο, ἢ εἰς ἀγῶνα καταστάντες τῇ αὐτῶν δυνάμει ἐσώθησαν.

“Yet you are all aware that it is not by chastising men who are not able to speak that you will make an example to deter men from wronging you, but that by doing justice upon those who are able you will cause everyone to cease attempting to commit offences against you. But at present they find it quite safe to rob you. For if they are not detected, they will be able to enjoy their booty without fear; while if they are caught, they either buy off the prosecution with part of their ill-gotten gains, or save themselves, on being brought to trial, by their own ability.”
(Lys. 27.5-6, tr. Lamb, Loeb)¹¹⁵

Of course, it is in every speaker's interest to allege that his opponent is especially devious, and almost necessitated by the supposition that, if the speaker is right and truthful, then his opponent is, by definition, wrong and lying. However, their listeners clearly accepted – or, at least, did not reject - the relationship between rhetorical skill and deviousness.

Comedy explicitly connects abuse of rhetorical skill with intellectual training. This is the starting point of Aristophanes' *Strepsiades*' dealings with the Thinktank, his self-interested and immoral desire to escape from his creditors. In particular, the Cloud-goddesses encourage him by saying that their eloquence ensures success in the law-courts and politics.¹¹⁶ Antiphon was mocked in comedy for providing legal speeches regardless of the cases' morality.¹¹⁷ However, popular genres, like comedy and oratory, tend to attribute clever and devious speech not to intellectuals themselves but to sycophants and unscrupulous politicians. Unlike most intellectuals, they were particularly visible

in public forums and had an apparently obvious and easy-to-understand interest in public success.

B3. Avoidance of sophisticated speech

As I discussed in the section *Anti-Intellectual Motifs in Oratory*, speeches delivered to popular audience generally avoid conspicuous ‘subtleties of speech’, and those that use them often fail. Moreover, speakers generally cast themselves as inexperienced, implying that this is proof of honesty, and claim that their opponent is skilled and therefore devious (Chapter 2.4 A). This suggests that the majority of Athenian citizens did not tolerate the use of abstractions and complex arguments, at least in serious forums, and associated truth with unvarnished speech, concreteness and self-evident meaning.

The belief in the deviousness and self-interest of subtle speech pervades other genres as well. In Aristophanes’ *Wealth* Poverty argues that a society of super-affluence is unsound but Chremylos brushes off her points with the statement ‘Even if you convince me you won’t convince me’ (§600). The humour of this scene is in the disjunction between the hero’s determination to achieve his desires and the persuasiveness of any objections. To reject an argument essentially *because* it is persuasive is rank anti-intellectualism. It is also illogical but does suggest there existence of two assumptions. (1) It is human nature to seek its own advantage, so any talent will, apparently, be exploited to this end. (2) Speech that is clever and subtle cannot accurately represent the truth, which must be simple, straightforward and immediately apprehensible. The effect of this logic, connecting intellectualism to the ability to satisfy one’s desires and presenting it as a method by which to evade justice, is to create the position in which, perversely, a lack of mental and/or rhetorical skill is itself proof of one’s truthfulness, ordinary desires and interest in fair dealing. It is inconsistent with the motif of the intellectual who is unable to defend himself (Chapter 4.1 C2).

B4. Intellectual innovations are amoral

There is some evidence that inventions and innovations were identified as amoral and criticised for this reason. This line of attack is particularly exploited by Alkidamas in his *paignion* in which Odysseus speaks against Palamedes, the archetypal inventor. He says that Palamedes' beacons are an advantage to the enemy; his gaming boards and dice bestow false honour and bring out the worst in people.¹¹⁸ Intellectuals occasionally criticise other intellectuals on the same grounds, that their theories and inventions are unconcerned with morality. This is the basis on which Sokrates and Aristippos object to mathematics, and it is reminiscent of Antisthenes' hostility to book-learning.¹¹⁹ These criticisms presuppose that invention ought to be directed towards moral improvement. This sentiment is held by intellectuals who are concerned with the basis and means of moral inculcation and does not appear in popular genres. Popular thought seems more inclined to assess inventions, like intelligence, according to their practical use.¹²⁰ Perhaps the only criticism of an innovation in moral terms in a popular genre comes from Euripides' *Palamedes*. It is implicit in the irony that the evidence against Palamedes, the inventor of writing, seems to have taken the form of a written letter.¹²¹ This poignant irony does not exist in the epic tradition in which Odysseus' treachery consisted in drowning Palamedes.

C. Explicit justification of immorality

In addition to displaying strange and immoral behaviour, intellectuals could be supposed to argue directly against conventional morality. In particular, Aristophanes and Polykrates associate Sokrates with the disintegration of traditional moral behaviour.

Intellectuals' supposed readiness to undermine conventional morality is a misunderstanding or misapplication of their practice of examining and analysing customs and laws. In the second half of the 5th century intellectuals identified the contrast between νόμος and φύσις as an analytical tool. The familiar methods

are to expose inconsistencies in conventional beliefs, traditional stories providing a wealth of mutually incompatible material, or to compare conventions with precedents supposedly found in Nature (φύσις). This technique is widely attributed to many intellectuals and their associates, including Thrasymachos, Euthyphro and Kallikles.¹²² The principle and methods were well enough known to appear in popular genres. They are evoked or implied in serious contexts in tragedy and history¹²³ and appear as a charge directed against intellectuals. Polykrates alleged that Sokrates attacked conventional morality, teaching ‘theft, deceit, sacrilege, perjury and idleness’, apparently by citing examples from traditional stories and poets to undermine accepted moral principles (Chapter 2.8). Comic reflection of these techniques appear in Aristophanes’ *Clouds* where arguments of various kinds are used to conceal and justify theft, proselytise new gods, and to justify the abandonment of restraint in satisfying excessive desires. Pheidippides, after being ‘intellectualised’ by Sokrates, cites an example from the animal world as justification for an act of gross immorality:

σκέψαι δὲ τοῖς ἀλεκτρούνας καὶ τᾶλλα τὰ βοτὰ ταυτί,
ὡς τοὺς πατέρας ἀμύνεται· καίτοι τί διαφέρουσιν
ἡμῶν ἐκεῖνοι, πλὴν γ’ ὅτι ψηφίσματ’ οὐ γράφουσιν;

“Consider fowls and those other animals, how they retaliate against their fathers; and after all, what difference is there between them and us, except that they don’t propose decrees?”

That his basic desire is justification of self-interest is revealed in the next line, where Pheidippides refuses to follow his own argument where it would inconvenience him:

τί δῆτ’, ἐπειδὴ τοὺς ἀλεκτρούνας ἅπαντα μιμῆι,
οὐκ ἐσθίεις καὶ τὴν κόπρον κἀπὶ ξύλου καθεύδεις;
Οὐ ταυτόν, ὦ τᾶν, ἐστίν, οὐδ’ ἂν Σωκράτει δοκοίη.

STR: “Well, then, if you’re following the example of fowls in everything, why don’t you also eat the dung and sleep on a wooden perch?”

PH: “It’s not the same thing, my good man, nor would Sokrates think it was.” (Aristoph. *Cl.* 1427-32, tr. Sommerstein, Aris & Phillips)¹²⁴

Both the unsophisticated, and the intelligent and unscrupulous interpret the notion that laws and customs are conventional and non-absolute to imply that they are arbitrary, inferior and without force. The dissemination of the notion of the νόμος/φύσις contrast has two effects. Firstly, techniques and language with which immoral behaviour can be justified are made available. Secondly, it implies that laws and conventions are not stable and can be altered and abandoned at will, even without intellectual justification.¹²⁵

Belief in intellectual immorality derives from two tendencies of unsophisticated thought. (1) A tendency to assess things in ethical terms, for instance, the ethical colouring of the commonplace λόγος/ἔργον distinction. (2) The limitation of unsophisticated thought in distinguishing concepts from particular instances. This conceptual difficulty has already been noticed, for example, in relation to religion: to deny that a planet is a god could be interpreted as denial of the existence of gods (Chapter 4.2 B2). Another example is the inability of Antisthenes' Aias to see virtue in the effectiveness of Odysseus' dishonorable tactics, which included masquerading as a beggar and robbing a temple in order to secure the Palladion for the Greek army (Chapter 3 A). Polykrates alleged that Sokrates cited Odysseus' theft of the Palladion or Melanthios' deception as examples of the appropriateness of theft and lying (Chapter 2.8). This is presumably his interpretation of Sokrates' attempts to transcend the limitations of particular instances in the search for definitions. Rejecting specific moral dicta in the interests of isolating their meaning had the appearance of rejecting morality wholesale. Plato's Sokrates' even admits that this practice might induce a state of moral confusion in his subjects.¹²⁶

D. Corrupting the young

The extravagance and arrogance of young men towards their elders is a perennial complaint. The last decades of the 5th century, however, do seem to have unusually blatant evidence of the restiveness and ambition of young men. Irresponsible wealthy youths are frequently identified as a socially odious group,

especially represented in the person of Alkibiades.¹²⁷ Common usage of the phrase ‘corruption’ indicates that it consists in a lack of moral and physical restraint (Chapter 2.7 B). Contemporary commentators, both serious and frivolous, regularly represent these as characteristics of intellectuals’ young associates. Aristophanes’ plays assume that old men were particularly at risk of ridicule and prosecution from sharp talking, sophistic, self-interested, unrestrained and hedonistic young men. Pheidippides of *The Clouds* and the ‘Profligate Son’ of *The Banqueters* are the explicit results of intellectual influence, and ‘modern youths’ were the particular subjects of comic mockery of new modes of speech reflecting modern technical vocabulary.¹²⁸ This is certainly a comic exaggeration but it must have some kernel of truth, if only in what the audience supposed ‘modern youth’ to be like. Sokrates, both in and after his trial, provides an example of the belief that moral confusion could be induced by intellectualisation. Sokrates’ prosecutor Anytos asserts that that Athenians’ sons would be ‘ruined by practising what Sokrates taught’, and Meletos specifies that the cause is his teaching of scepticism about the gods.¹²⁹ Polykrates’ tract cites the infamous Kritias and Alkibiades as examples of the bad influence of Sokrates’ teaching, though there is not enough information to reconstruct this charge in any detail (see Chapter 2.8).

The suspicion that intellectualisation could damage the morals of the young is not confined to ordinary people and democratic partisans. Xenophon’s story of Kritias and Charikles barring Sokrates from questioning the young implies that aristocrats and oligarchs suspected that intellectual training could erode moral sensibility or provide the intellectual and rhetorical tools for so doing.¹³⁰ Even some intellectuals and their apologists admit that their techniques could be imitated and abused, for example, Plato’s and Xenophon’s Sokrates and Plato’s Gorgias, though they dispute whether they should be held responsible for this.¹³¹

The belief that intellectualisation induced moral and political corruption in fact had some foundation. Firstly, intellectuals and rich young men were known to associate with one another, a result of the former’s professional interests and the

latter's enthusiasm for new ideas, whether from genuine interest or a fashion for novelty. Plato provides colourful illustrations of this aspect of Athenian intellectual society.¹³² Secondly, these rich young men perpetrated some notoriously flagrant acts of impiety and violence. For example, of the twenty-seven named men connected to the religious scandals of 415 BC for whom further biographical information exists, eight are known to have intellectual affiliations, including connexions with Prodikos, Protagoras, Hippias and Sokrates. These are Axiochos, the doctors Akoumenos and Eryximachos, Alkibiades, Phaidros, and Plato's relatives Kritias, Charmides and Adeimantos. This is a notably high proportion.¹³³

Intellectualism could be suspected of obstructing and undermining moral education provided by traditional institutions (see below). Intellectuals appeared to replace normal moral inculcation, revolving around physical development, learning traditional poetry, correct religious observance, and involvement in the activities of the state with physical neglect, hyper-criticism of poetry and religion, and quietism.¹³⁴ It will be noticed that this corruption of the young generally has political implications. This will be examined in more detail in the next section.¹³⁵

E. Conclusion

Though there is evidence that some intellectuals rejected accepted social arrangements in word or deed, the evidence that this aroused hostility rather than amusement or contempt is limited. They were viewed as eccentrics rather than subversives. Suspicions about their bad moral influence derive from the supposed social effects of eccentricities (such as their laziness supposedly leading to parasitism) and the psychological tendency to apply moral criteria to amoral phenomena, such as theories and inventions. These suppositions appear most prominently in comedy and tragedy, genres that represent intellectuals to popular audiences. Intellectualism could be used for immoral goals in its form of rhetorical skill, which could be exploited to deceive, to evade justice and to justify immoral behaviour. While these themes appear throughout ancient

Athenian sources they seem, however, to be associated with the devious and ambitious rather than with intellectuals themselves. Aristophanes' *Clouds* was Sokrates providing intellectual tools to Pheidippides¹³⁶ to facilitate Strepsiades' achievement of immoral self-interest but this depiction failed to gain the audience's appreciation. He may have drawn a connexion between intellectuals and immoral behaviour that the audience did not recognise. Before Sokrates' indictment, intellectuals' 'corruption of the young' is not a strong theme. Plato's *Apology* does not attribute it to Sokrates' 'original accusers' (see Chapter 2.1 n. 5) and mentions of intellectuals and intellectualism are largely absent from oratory, despite its preoccupation with avoiding their characteristics.

4.4 - Anti-democracy and Disloyalty to the State

There were some Greek intellectuals and literati, such as Protagoras and Herodotos, who expressed support, however qualified or platitudinous, for democratic states.¹³⁷ However, there is evidence that such figures were more readily associated with anti-democratic sentiments, on account of (A) their exclusivity, (B) their own backgrounds, preference for wealthy company and instances of direct involvement in anti-democratic activities, (C) intellectualism's supposed facilitation of anti-democratic practices, and (D) their supposed undermining of the basis of the city-state.

A. Intellectuals are exclusivist

A1. Intellectuals and intellectualism are mysterious

The probable effect of intellectuals' abnormal behaviour in setting them apart from society has already been suggested. It seems that many of them were regarded as mysterious and tending towards exclusivity. Aristophanes' Thinktank presupposes just such an exclusive society. Strepsiades' induction into the Thinktank parodies various cult initiations. When Strepsiades sees Pheidippides after his education is complete they have not seen one another for some time, so it seems that the students of the comic Sokrates are imagined not having contact with the outside world.¹³⁸ Plato's Sokrates also uses the Mysteries humorously as a metaphor: when he discusses a certain sophist's 'hidden opinions', he checks that none of the 'uninitiated' are listening. He describes Euthydemos' and Dionysiodoros' method of rhetoric obfuscation as Korybantic dancing.¹³⁹ Their practices are reminiscent of comic depictions of smart young men using neologisms and sophisticated arguments that are barely comprehensible to ordinary people. When Sokrates visits Kallias' house in Plato's *Protagoras* he introduces some of the distinguished intellectual guests with quotes from Odysseus' entry into the underworld.¹⁴⁰ The Pythagoreans are the only intellectual group actually known to have practised initiation but they had little or

no presence in Athens; indeed, it is virtually certain that there were no philosophical schools in Athens before the 380s.¹⁴¹ The image of intellectuals' mystery-like exclusivity is an ironic representation of reality rather than its reflection, but it does suggest the existence of a popular view that intellectuals were secretive and their knowledge was esoteric.

A2. Exclusivity is undemocratic

Such exclusivity was an anathema to Athenian democratic ideology. Groups were suspected of undermining the unity of the state and secrecy was inimical to the open dealing that democratic ideology requires. Orators assume that belonging to a political group is a damaging accusation. A speaker will often represent his opponent as solely responsible for all wrongs but it is not unusual to claim that he has shadowy and sinister associates.¹⁴² Clubs – *ἐταιρεία* and *συνωμοσία* – were a familiar feature of Athenian social life but their inner workings were obscure to ordinary people. They were distinguished by a generally aristocratic tone, the extreme loyalty of their membership and their secrecy.¹⁴³ Each of these represents a potential challenge to democratic ideology. Moreover, drinking clubs' characteristic climax of lawless rioting naturally resulted in transgressions of social and religious conventions, apart from any desire that they may had to reinforce group unity. Alkibiades' mockery of the Mysteries is probably an example of this. Such acts were considered to be typical of clubs, to judge from Andokides' and Thoukydides' accounts of the mutilation of the Hermai.¹⁴⁴ Such aristocratic and secretive groups were popularly thought of as ready to engage in impious and lawless acts, not necessarily viewed as politically motivated, but displaying, as Thoukydides says, 'undemocratic contempt for laws'. Occasionally, they could be suspected of being revolutionary. The mutilation of the Hermai was felt to presage an oligarchic coup; clubs were, in fact, instrumental in the overthrows of the democracy in 411 and 404 BC.¹⁴⁵

The example of aristocratic clubs is significant in serving to illustrate the concern of Athenian democratic ideology for openness and egalitarianism. In this

framework of belief, exclusivity is anti-democratic and secrecy is tantamount to conspiracy. The image of intellectuals' associations resembles this conventional but suspicious and potentially anti-democratic institution, though there is little direct evidence that intellectuals, anti-democratic activities and exclusive clubs were linked in the Athenian mind. Actively anti-democratic clubs certainly included some members of intellectual circles, such as Antiphon and Kritias.¹⁴⁶ In his *Accusation of Sokrates* Polykrates emphasises that Sokrates preferred to converse with his intimates 'in secret', clearly implying that the subject of his conversation was scandalous or dangerous.¹⁴⁷

B. Intellectuals' oligarchic and aristocratic associations

Ordinary Athenians were not necessarily uninterested or excluded from the company of intellectuals (Chapter 1.6 C2). However, intellectuals typically either were or mixed with the aristocratic and wealthy, classes who were often suspected of harbouring anti-democratic sympathies. The connexion between the intellectual and wealthy classes (not implying a distinction) comes from the reciprocal desires of (a) men of wealth and leisure to dabble in intellectual novelties and of the ambitious to be trained in rhetorical techniques and (b) intellectuals' own personal preference and desire to realise the value of their talent. This relationship effectively (though not necessarily) functioned to impose a property qualification for admission to intellectual society.¹⁴⁸

B1. Intellectuals' associates

Aristocrats and the wealthy have the education and leisure for cultivated intellectual interests that incline them to seek the company of intellectuals. The works of the Sokratic authors, most notably Plato's *Protagoras* and *Parmenides* and Xenophon's *Symposium*, show the enthusiasm of Athens' wealthy to meet and hear distinguished orators and sophists. Sokrates' own associates include 'rich young men with time on their hands'.¹⁴⁹ Those who paid sophists for instruction were usually well off.¹⁵⁰ Though Plato's comments suggest that few

were genuinely interested in acquiring knowledge or new intellectual techniques, there is no reason to suppose that the general picture is substantially false. Kallias, son of Hipponikos, from a famously wealthy family, was notorious for his patronage of intellectuals. Plato suggests that Kallias' behaviour was excessive in degree but not unique.¹⁵¹ In particular, rhetorical training was considered to be the prerequisite for political success and was therefore sought by the politically ambitious (see below).

Many intellectuals wished to profit from their skills. With few exceptions, those who wished to be educated had to pay for it, even if they were motivated only by interest for interest's sake.¹⁵² The evidence for their fee-taking from both popular and exclusive sources has already been cited (Chapter 4.3 A2). Xenophon depicts Antiphon as providing a rationale, if one were needed: wisdom is valuable and its possessors are therefore entitled to realise its value.¹⁵³ The result is that the wealthy and leisured were over-represented among intellectuals' associates.

B2. Intellectuals' background and disposition

Intellectuals' apparent preference for wealthy company may be motivated by personal inclination – snobbery - as much as financial considerations. One popular image of intellectuals is their aristocratic appearance, elegant and affected. Comedy, especially Aristophanes' *Thesmophoriazousai* depicts Agathon as being notorious for his effeminate beautification and overdressing. The dependents of the Cloud-goddesses include 'lazy-long-haired-onyx-signet-ring-wearers' (σφαγιδονυχαργοκομήται), a term suggesting leisure and luxury.¹⁵⁴ In *The Wasps* Aristophanes makes Antiphon (presumably the same as the sophist and oligarch) a member of a sophisticated symposium. The élitism of both Antiphon and Agathon appears again in an anecdote related by Aristotle. When Antiphon had delivered his defence against treason for his role in the oligarchy of the Four Hundred, Agathon praised his speech; Antiphon replied that he would rather satisfy one man of good taste than any number of ordinary people.¹⁵⁵

Though many intellectuals certainly taught for money, this does not mean that they were necessarily without means themselves or were compelled to teach those of whom they did not approve. Many had distinguished backgrounds, most notably Andokides, whose family claimed descent from Hermes and Odysseus, and Kritias and Plato, who were descended from Kodros, the last king of Athens.¹⁵⁶ Xenophon lists Kritias' 'pride in his birth' as one of the factors that encouraged his destructive immorality.¹⁵⁷

It is also possible that the 'democratic establishment' of ordinary citizens, democratic traditionalists and demagogic politicians, such as Kleon, were suspicious of foreign intellectuals' political influence. Intellectuals who were itinerants or metics generally had aristocratic and wealthy patrons; Kallias, the son of Hipponikos, is the most prominent example. This may have been felt to give them excessive and improper influence and undermine the fundamental political distinction between citizen and foreigner.¹⁵⁸ Athenians' sensitivity about the integrity of the citizen base appears in comedians' and orators' preoccupation with allegations of foreign and slave birth.

However, the existence of popular Athenian disquiet about 'sinister alien intellectual influences', though plausible, is largely conjectural. The distribution of comic citations provides the clearest evidence of which intellectuals were known to the Athenian public. Foreigners such as Protagoras, Prodikos and Gorgias are mentioned occasionally but are far exceeded in frequency and depth of characterisation by Athenians (Chapter 2.1 D). Aspasia is the only intellectual-type who is represented as a political intriguer (see Chapter 4.3 A1). The outstanding example of intellectual influence on the political sphere is Perikles and his intellectual associates, which his enemies are said to have used as a means to attack him. However, not only are many of the attacks on intellectuals¹⁵⁹ but also the strength and existence of Perikles' associations with them are of doubtful historical veracity. The theme is first emphasised by 4th century philosophers and rhetoricians pushing ideological barrows about the

relationship between statesmanship and education.¹⁶⁰ Once this pattern was established it became a self-perpetuating historical myth founded on exaggerated beliefs about Perikles' intellectual interests and the tendency to identify the most prominent individual of the age with its perceived characteristics, in this case, cultural advancement.

B3. Intellectuals' political inclinations

The series of infamous and violent anti-democratic episodes at the end of the 5th century were perpetrated by men whose ranks include not only many recipients of the 'new education' but also a number intellectuals and marginal intellectuals themselves. The intellectual associations of the participants in the scandals of 415 BC and their possible anti-democratic ramifications have already been mentioned (Chapter 4.3 D). Most famous of the intellectuals involved in directly anti-democratic activities are Antiphon, the renowned sophist and rhetorician¹⁶¹, whom Thουκυδίδης says was mainly responsible for the oligarchic revolution of 411, and Kritias, who appears in several Platonic dialogues and was later described as 'an amateur among philosophers, a philosopher among amateurs'.¹⁶²

Archeptolemos, the son of Hippodamos, who had been granted Athenian citizenship, was sufficiently prominent in the oligarchy of 411 to be afterwards condemned for treachery along with Antiphon.¹⁶³

As a young man Aristoteles sought the company of distinguished intellectuals, such as Parmenides and Zeno (Pl. *Parm.* 127d). He was active under the democracy as a general and *hellenotamias* but became a member first of the Four Hundred and then the Thirty Tyrants. He seems to have been particularly ready to make deals with Sparta. In 411 he was one of those who planned to turn the Piraeus over to the Spartans rather than relinquish power and, in 404, he was a member of the embassy that went to Lysander to request a garrison for Athens.¹⁶⁴

Theramenes, a moderate oligarch active in the Four Hundred and the Thirty Tyrants, has some intellectual associations. His contemporaries credit him with possessing considerable intelligence as well as rhetorical skill. Aristophanes, in *The Frogs*, depicts Euripides, a poet with strong intellectual associations, claiming that the ‘clever’ (ὁ κομψός) Theramenes is his creation, and Dionysos agrees that he is ‘a man who is indeed wise and clever in all things’.¹⁶⁵ Thukydidēs describes him as ‘a man not incapable in either speaking or understanding’.¹⁶⁶ Aischines of Sphettos, in a passage attacking sophists’ supposed tendency to corrupt their pupils, says that Theramenes was Prodikos’ student; there must have been at least some connexion between the two.¹⁶⁷

Charmides, Kritias’ cousin and an associate of Sokrates, was one of the Ten in charge of the Piraeus under the Thirty Tyrants. Xenophon actually depicts Sokrates encouraging him to involve himself in public affairs.¹⁶⁸

Erasistratos, one of the Thirty Tyrants, is probably the same as the friend of Kritias and Sokrates in the pseudo-Platonic dialogue *Eryxias*. He is also probably the nephew of the late 5th century aristocratic politician Phaiax.¹⁶⁹

Though the *demos* commissioned Nikomachos’ work in transcribing the laws and calendar of sacrifices, and he had friends ‘in the government’, presumably influential politicians¹⁷⁰, he was or, at least, could be plausibly represented as being, implicated in anti-democratic activities. Lysias alleges that when the oligarchic conspirators wanted to get rid of the democratic politician Kleophon they induced Nikomachos to produce a law providing for a trial before the Boule that was, at that time, dominated by pro-oligarchs.¹⁷¹ He further implies that Nikomachos was part of a larger group that exploited the state.¹⁷² Lysias does not develop the theme, possibly wary of the damage that he could do his client’s case if he was himself an oligarchic sympathiser (Chapter 2.6).

Sokrates himself was accused of criticising the institutions of democracy, in particular, the principle of popular participation in government regardless of the

virtue of the individuals (Chapter 2.7 C2). Other acquaintances of Sokrates who probably had aristocratic backgrounds and oligarchic inclinations are Thoukydides son of Melesias, Aristeides son of Lysimachos¹⁷³ and, of course, his intimates, including Antisthenes, Plato and Xenophon.¹⁷⁴

These examples may not prove anything more than the oligarchic sympathies and interest in intellectual novelties of Athens' wealthy classes. However, they do show that there was a substantial basis for the suspicion that intellectuals or intellectualism were related to anti-democratic attitudes.

C. Intellectualism can facilitate anti-democratic practices

It was argued above that there was a belief that cultivated skill in rhetoric could facilitate evasion of justice (Chapter 4.3 B2). Political decisions, like legal decisions, were made before large assemblies following debate. Similarly, a suspicion may exist that a speaker could use his cultivated abilities to misrepresent his policy for ulterior motives. In private legal cases the damage from corrupt decisions could be bad enough; in deliberative forums the state could reap disaster were bad counsel to prevail.¹⁷⁵ This concern is, however, infrequently expressed in real oratory.

The specious and self-interested orator is a widely-attested figure, indicating that the type was familiar to the Athenian mind. In comedy appear the ambassadors to the Persian King in Aristophanes' *Acharnians*, Kleon, Demosthenes and Nikias in *The Knights*, and the Statute-seller in *The Birds*. Hermippos accuses Perikles of using words to cover his cowardly reluctance to fight (fr. 47) (an interesting contrast to his Thoukydidean speeches). However, in comedy politicians tend to be pompous blusterers rather than intellectually sophisticated rhetoricians, whereas it is smug young men who practice devious rhetoric.

Legal oratory shows the tendency to criticise cultivated skill in rhetoric, apparently with the intention of presenting oneself as modest, straightforward and

quiet and one's opponent as calculating, disdainful and litigious. In political oratory the denigration of rhetoric skill was less common. Speakers were more likely to try to create an image of shrewd and energetic public interest, where intelligence and articulateness would be advantages. Instead of criticising their opponents' rhetoric skill, speakers tend to focus on their honesty. Lysias, in his speech *Against the Subversion of the Ancestral Constitution of Athens*, accuses the supporters of Phormios' proposal for a moderate property qualification as an attempt to deceive the *demos*, and further claims that they are really aiming at seizing other people's property.¹⁷⁶ Such assertions are partly motivated by a speaker's practical desire to seem plausible, but also by the rhetorical necessity that, if his proposals are just or pragmatic, then his opponent can only be wrong and, given that the interest of the state is at issue, must also be immoral, self-interested and unpatriotic.¹⁷⁷

The Assembly-goers themselves have a psychological interest in participating in the belief that orators are immoral and their skilled speech is devious; it enabled them to explain to themselves how they could make bad decisions. Orators and historians accuse the Athenians of being ready to blame others' supposed deceptions for its mistakes.¹⁷⁸ This is particularly illustrated in the violent blame that was directed against the orators (and oracle-mongers) who had persuaded them to launch the Sicilian Expedition when they learned of its destruction in 413 BC, and against those who had orchestrated Alkibiades' exile when he returned to Athens in triumph in 407.¹⁷⁹ Even if the allegation of 'deceptive eloquence' is hackneyed, as Thoukydides' Diodotos remarks, it still indicates that the Athenian Assembly-goers believed that the risk was intelligible.¹⁸⁰ It may also have flattered a self-image of 'manly simplicity'.¹⁸¹

There are actually few clear examples of especially skilled orators deliberately and directly misleading the Assembly. Thoukydides provides most of them, for instance, Alkibiades – whose rhetorical skills had gained notice as early as 427 BC in Aristophanes' *Banqueters*¹⁸² – supported Athenian intervention in Sicily with the specious assurance that the Athenians' enemies would not attack while

their navy was away on the basis that they had not done so when they were fighting the Persians in the eastern Aegean in the second quarter of the 5th century.¹⁸³ There is also some irony in his observation that Sicilian politics is weak on the grounds that self-interested Sicilian politicians use persuasive speeches as a tool.¹⁸⁴ In 411 BC the central argument offered by the oligarchic conspirators (including Antiphon and Theramenes, whose intellectual and rhetorical qualifications have already been discussed) in support of adopting an oligarchic constitution was the false promise that Athens could then expect to receive Persian support.¹⁸⁵

It is Kleon who is the mouthpiece for the view that cultivated rhetoric is more than a vehicle for self-interest and dishonesty but is intrinsically a bad medium for public policy-making, as orators try to be over-clever, encouraged by the Athenians themselves, who are irresponsibly addicted to frivolous novelties.¹⁸⁶ This sentiment, that a lack of verbal restraint is, in some way, inopportune, is not unique to Thucydides' Kleon. Euripides' anti-intellectual character Zethos contrasts it with 'decent reticence' (κόσμος σιγῆ). This is an ideal of behaviour that seems to be almost proverbial, suggesting deference to legitimate authorities, especially of children to their parents and women to their husbands or, in Zethos' mouth, of the citizen to customs and laws.¹⁸⁷ This coincides with Kleon's view that the love of one's own voice and rhetorical cleverness – the comedians identify 'babble' (λαλιά) as a prominent motif of intellectuals - is a pleasure that, used in serious forums, can damage the state.

D. Intellectualism subverts the integrity of the state

Some intellectuals may have suggested in their behaviour or in their expressed views adherence to the principle of non-involvement in the duties of the state and/or the idea that the city-state was not the natural or ideal type of community.

Energetic participation in the civic life of the state was an admirable patriotic principle (Chapter 2 n. 159). There were many intellectuals who involved

themselves in public life, including, most notably, the Seven Wise Men, recognised by popular tradition.¹⁸⁸ No Athenian with his eyes open can have failed to notice the foreign intellectuals who came to Athens as ambassadors on behalf of their own cities (see Chapter 6 F). Indeed, one of the focuses of anti-intellectual hostility is at their ‘interference’: Kleon’s fulminations cannot be directed at products of his own imagination for him to remain a credible politician. However, the opposite characteristic was also assumed to be typical of intellectuals: a lack of interest in civic life and even an aggressive rejection of the principle of participation.

Information about early intellectual quietists is scarce, usually dependent on late sources and often influenced by later intellectual agendas.¹⁸⁹ Euripides’ *Antiope* contains the earliest explicit antithesis between active public life and quiet philosophical life. Zethos criticises men such as his brother for their lack of interest in their own reputation, wealth, or the condition of their family or city. People with such lack of ambition for distinction he thought unable to help either themselves or their friends.¹⁹⁰

Sokrates in Plato’s *Apology* and *Gorgias* freely cites his lack of ambition in public life and ignorance of political and legal customs and procedure as evidence of his devotion to the philosophic life. His wording indicates that he assumes that his attitude will be regarded as abnormal.¹⁹¹

By the early 4th century Anaxagoras had become a model of philosophic quietism in the Athenian intellectual tradition, if not in the public imagination.¹⁹² In Plato’s *Hippias Major* Sokrates flatters Hippias’ belief in the value of his public service by comparing him to a number of wise quietists, Pittakos, Bias, Thales and Anaxagoras.¹⁹³ Even though the first three of these certainly were not quietists, Aristotle confirms that Anaxagoras, at least, had no interest or skill in politics on account of his intellectual interests.¹⁹⁴ The growth of this theme in intellectual circles was probably due to the influence of those who sought to diminish the value of Anaxagoras’ theories and methods, such as the Platonists,

and to the tendency of the 4th century educational debate to contrast his theoretical interests with the pragmatism of his supposed pupil, Perikles.¹⁹⁵

Plato casts the character Kallikles as a direct critic of the contemplative life. If he is a brutal demagogue he also seems to represent the standards of aristocratic orthodoxy.¹⁹⁶ He expresses the opinion that indulging in philosophy beyond superficial acquaintance is a distraction from the vital process of gaining practical experience of civic life and human nature. It therefore makes participation in public life impossible:

ἐὰν γὰρ καὶ πάνυ εὐφυῆς ἦ καὶ πόρρω τῆς ἡλικίας φιλοσοφῇ, ἀνάγκη πάντων ἄπειρον γεγονέναι ἐστίν, ὧν χρηὲς ἔμπειρον εἶναι τὸν μέλλοντα καλὸν κάγαθόν καὶ εὐδόκιμον ἔσεσθαι ἄνδρα. καὶ γὰρ τῶν νόμων ἄπειροι γίνονται τῶν κατὰ τὴν πόλιν, καὶ τῶν λόγων, οἷς δεῖ χρώμενον ὁμιλεῖν ἐν τοῖς συμβολαίοις τοῖς ἀνθρώποις καὶ ἰδίᾳ καὶ δημοσίᾳ, καὶ τῶν ἡδονῶν τε καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν τῶν ἀνθρωπείων, καὶ συλλήβδην τῶν ἡθῶν παντάπασιν ἄπειροι γίνονται. ἐπειδὴ οὖν ἔλθωσιν εἰς τινα ἰδίαν ἢ πολιτικὴν πρᾶξιν, καταγέλαστοι γίνονται, ὥσπερ γε, οἶμαι, οἱ πολιτικοί, ἐπειδὴ αὐτοὶ εἰς τὰς ὑμετέρας διατριβὰς ἔλθωσι καὶ τοὺς λόγους, καταγέλαστοί εἰσι... ὅταν δὲ δὴ πρεσβύτερον ἴδω ἔτι φιλοσοφοῦντα καὶ μὴ ἀπαλλαττόμενον, πληγῶν μοι δοκεῖ ἤδη δεῖσθαι, ὧς Σώκρατες, οὗτος ὁ ἀνὴρ. ὃ γὰρ νῦν δὴ ἔλεγον, ὑπάρχει τούτῳ τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ, κἂν πάνυ εὐφυῆς ἦ, ἀνάδρῳ γενέσθαι φεύγοντι τὰ μέσα τῆς πόλεως καὶ τὰς ἀγοράς, ἐν αἷς ἔφη ὁ ποιητὴς τοὺς ἄνδρας ἀριπρεπεῖς γίγνεσθαι, καταδεδυκότι δὲ τὸν λοιπὸν βίον βιώναι μετὰ μεираκίων ἐν γωνίᾳ τριῶν ἢ τεττάρων ψιθυρίζοντα, ἐλεύθερον δὲ καὶ μέγα καὶ νεανικὸν μηδέποτε φθέγξασθαι.

“However well endowed one may be, if one philosophizes far on into life, one must needs find oneself ignorant of everything that ought to be familiar to the man who would be a thorough gentleman and make a good figure in the world. For such people are shown to be ignorant of the laws of the city, and of the terms which have to be used in negotiating agreements with their fellows in private or in public affairs, and of human pleasures and desires; and, in short, to be utterly inexperienced in men’s characters. So when they enter upon any private or public business they make themselves ridiculous, just as on the other hand, I suppose, when public men engage in your

studies and discussions, they are quite ridiculous... But when I see an elderly man still going on with philosophy and not getting rid of it, that is the gentleman, Socrates, whom I think is in need of a whipping. For as I said just now, this person, however endowed he may be, is bound to become unmanly through shunning the centres and marts of the city, in which, as the poet said, 'men get them note and glory' [Hom. *Il.* 9.441]; he must cower down and spend the rest of his days whispering in a corner with three or four lads, and never utter anything free or high-spirited." (Pl. *Gorg.* 484c-e, 485d, tr. W.R.M. Lamb, Loeb)

Kallikles assumes that ambition to participate as a citizen of a community is the natural inclination and obligation of any man who possesses certain distinctions. 'Whispering in a corner' may refer to a lack of boldness.¹⁹⁷

Polykrates repeats this view in his allegation that Sokrates taught men to be idle and useless (Chapter 2.8). As Sokrates' associates mainly belonged to the leisured class, this charge probably does not refer to their inability to support themselves but to a failure to engage in public activities appropriate to their station. One such public duty that the democratic state imposed was the payment of liturgies, which some of Sokrates' associates, Krito and Charmides, did, in fact, claim to be harassed about.¹⁹⁸ The kind of political involvement that Sokrates did claim to engage in, informally encouraging men towards intellectual reflection¹⁹⁹, was – or, at least, could have been viewed as being – suspicious and secretive as it took place outside the bounds of public scrutiny and accountability (see A2 above).

The refusal to engage in public affairs may seem to indicate an inability or unwillingness to help either oneself or one's friends. Apart from laziness or an excessive preoccupation with one's own affairs (see Chapter 4.1 D), this may result from the rejection of concern for reputation (ambition for which was considered normal and desirable as it supplied the state with wealthy, physically strong, courageous and morally upright citizens²⁰⁰), or a refusal to identify one's own interests with those of the community, an anathema to the typical Greek view.

Even if enthusiasm for public affairs was an embarrassment in forensic speeches and comedy, it existed as a high-minded patriotic sentiment in Athenian democratic ideology. The attitude existed that quietism eroded communal responsibility for the state's prosperity and survival. The quietist image was ascribed to intellectuals and its plausibility was enhanced by the belief that it was a natural consequence of their other supposed characteristics, such as laziness, preoccupation with useless activities and rejection of normal standards of behaviour. With this reasoning, intellectuals could therefore be a burden on and a danger to the state. This is not a criticism of the value of intellectualism as such but of its incompatibility with the life proper to the citizen.²⁰¹

Intellectuals could be suspected of a lack of patriotism. The influence of foreign intellectuals may not have been great (see B2 above) but patriotism seems to be an aspect of Meletos' accusation against Sokrates, that he 'failed to acknowledge the gods of the city and introduced new gods'. The weakening of traditional pieties could be connected, at least in part, to intellectual activities, and it is intelligible that this could be viewed as undermining the integrity of the state.²⁰²

The belief that justice and security depended on the integrity of the state was natural and self-evident to standard Greek thought. It is attested or implied in classical and pre-classical poetry and by at least some sophists, most notably Protagoras.²⁰³ However, the growing awareness, especially in intellectual circles, of the diversity of human behaviour and the consequences of this for understanding the basis of human institutions, epitomised in the νόμος/φύσις contrast²⁰⁴, could provide a basis for rejecting the sanctity and existence of the state as a whole. Euripides refers to this in fragments that express the sentiment that 'human nature is one's true fatherland'.²⁰⁵ Otherwise, there is little or no evidence from this period that any intellectuals actually criticised the state as such.²⁰⁶

4.5 – Summary of the Essence and Underlying Assumptions of Anti-Intellectual Motifs

Many of the disreputable characteristics ascribed to intellectuals were stock motifs imputed to any and everyone. Comedians and orators tend to assume that everyone is personally unpleasant, dangerous to the state and driven by the basest possible motives. A number of intellectuals' characteristics are simply amusing or contemptible, such as their impracticality, unusual personal appearance and preoccupation with useless theories and inventions. These things are not necessarily linked but there seems to be implicit rationalisation for many of them. For instance, beggarliness is 'proof' of intellectuals' laziness and impracticality, and their supposed rejection of accepted behaviour means that they 'must be' motivated by the only other intelligible standard, gross self-interest.

A number of intellectuals' supposed characteristics are intelligible representations of their known habits. For instance, laziness and verbosity are unsurprising interpretations of their extended discussion and debate. Some motifs contradict one another: intellectuals are said to be both beggarly *and* addicted to material comfort, disinterested in money *and* greedy, impractical *and* shrewdly calculating. This emphasises that, although intellectuals could be identified as a group, the various unfavourable motifs are not aspects of a standardised image but are functions of intellectuals' generic and individual features in terms of Athenian suppositions and preoccupations.

Some of these suppositions are obvious. For instance, work is supposed to be productive. Self-interest, especially for fulfilling the most basic desires, such as wealth, sensual gratification and power, is supposed to be the fundamental human motivation.

A belief is evident in the sanctity of social and political norms for which intellectualisation induces a disposition to disregard. Proper moral behaviour was assured by adherence to laws, accustomed practices, correct religious observance,

and deference to one's elders. Intellectuals' propensity for inquiry and their apparent readiness to reject things could indicate that they considered themselves above these traditional guides and restraints on behaviour. In the political sphere, Athenian nervousness about threats to the egalitarian basis of the constitution helps to explain their hostility to those who claimed to possess special talents. Athens' democratic constitution, which was substantially in place by the mid-5th century, was based on the assumption that ordinary citizens were the legitimate exercuters of political power and decision-making. For anyone to transcend the norm or exhibit excessive individuality could be considered dangerous to the state and its citizens. For instance, the author of *Against Alkibiades* comments that prudent men are (that is: 'you, the citizens, should be') always on their guard against those who grow too great, as it is from among these that tyrants arise; he claims that the institution of ostracism exists just to enable the removal of those who were more powerful than the magistrates and laws.²⁰⁶ Those influenced by intellectualism are one such dangerous group. They could be viewed as possessing a dangerous shrewdness, the rhetorical tools with which to deceive the *demos* and, especially, an undemocratic sense of superiority. Kleon in his Mytilene speech, Nikomachos' prosecutor and Polykrates accuse their respective opponents of treating accepted customs and the law with disdain. Popular genres do not distinguish intellectuals from other threats to democracy but their peculiarities did provide a rationalisation for this belief. They are comically represented as exclusivist and doubtless were; they did mostly associate with oligarchs and aristocrats and were occasionally involved in attempts to overthrow the democracy themselves.

Arrogance explains a number of intellectuals' odious characteristics. This is evidenced in their ostentatious appearance (such as Agathon's and Hippodamos' affectedness and Sokrates' and Antisthenes' beggarliness), abnormal behaviour (Sokrates' fellow soldiers on the Potidaian campaign interpreted his refusal to wear warm clothes as disdain for those who did²⁰⁷), and claims to be benefactors, to have high moral standards and to possess special insight (such Palamedes and Sokrates in their trials²⁰⁸). Intellectuals' repeated self-justifying response is to say

that their critics are jealous (φθόνος).²⁰⁹ To accuse intellectuals of arrogance is a reaction against their pride in their specialised skills and their claim to possess peculiar authority. This was felt to create a disposition to ignore traditional authorities and practices in favour of their own comprehension. Modesty in thought and behaviour was considered to be the desirable social characteristic, lowering men's expectations reducing dangerous ambitions, and making them more useful to the state.

Athenians exhibit a psychological supposition about the nature of truth and understanding. Oratorical habits, in particular, make it clear that subtle speech and complex forms of argument were, by definition, associated with deceit. Truth is supposed to be straightforward and the meaning of data self-evident. Intellectualism, which presumes that superficialities are inadequate for comprehension, runs counter to this belief.

The belief that intellectual inquiry may not be *wholly* successful in its aims does not constitute anti-intellectualism; the belief that there are *other or better means* to truth and decision-making does. In modern times this tends to come from humanist and romantic reactions to the lack of emotion and spirituality in modern life and the scientific movement. In classical Athens it comes from the belief that meaning is obvious and self-evident and that intellectual inquiry is likely to miss *real* meaning. The attitude seems to be that intellectualism is *literally inadequate* as a means of understanding and as a basis for action. To have mistaken faith in one's powers of comprehension can be a cause of destruction.

CHAPTER 5: THE ANTI-INTELLECTUALS

From the case studies presented in Chapter 2 I shall now examine those who spoke and acted against intellectuals and intellectualism. Plato's Sokrates claimed that those who were particularly annoyed with him were those whom he had questioned in order to test their knowledge. These were the traditional and technical experts of Greek society, the politicians, craftsmen and poets.¹ This implies that the hostility towards Sokrates was the result of disputes over the basis of knowledge.

Plato's analysis is misleading in two respects. Firstly, the evidence as a whole suggests that the critics of intellectualism actually focus on the narrowness of its comprehension and its supposed effects on personal behaviour and the attitudes it induces. They are motivated by a desire to protect these things – good use of reason, morality, religion, and civic institutions – more than by a sense of affront to their authority. Secondly, the sporadic nature of the direct attacks on intellectuals and intellectualism suggests that anti-intellectuals are better identified as expressions of various dispositions rather than the interests of particular groups. These dispositions may appear in those who belong to different groups. Here I shall divide them into groups and describe their main proponents for the sake of ease.

A. Cultural disposition

There are three poets who can be securely identified as critics of intellectuals and intellectualism: Euripides, Aristophanes and Meletos. There may, therefore, be some basis to Plato's contention that this group felt threatened by intellectual criticism.² In *The Republic* Plato refers to the 'ancient quarrel between poetry and philosophy'. Unfortunately, he does not elaborate what poetry's claims in this dispute consist in. His criticisms of poets' ignorance - dependence on divine inspiration and the inaccuracy of their technique of poetic representation (μίμησις) - do not enable them to be reconstructed.³

Poets do not seem to have had an articulated basis for their knowledge (something that Plato makes much of)⁴ though they do presume to have some kind of authority - comedians, at least, make explicit the claim that poets are advisers and teachers of men through their criticism and exhortation (Chapter 1.6 B1). Their authority seems to derive unconsciously from their controlling relationship with cultural material, which is based upon skills in articulation and the creation of emotionally and psychologically significant effects.⁵ They have a sense of possessing special sensitivity to and appreciation of transcendent and human concerns.⁶

Poetry may not have had an explicit basis for its authority but it is plausible to suppose that new intellectual practices eroded its credibility. Intellectuals had been criticising poetry and traditional stories over issues of accuracy and morality since the late 6th century.⁷ This is consistent with Greek traditions of competitiveness and individuality, in fact visible in poets' criticism of one another⁸, so it does not indicate that there was antagonism between two groups as such. However, the development of intellectualism imposed new standards in analysis, emphasising consistency and searching for inner meanings. Poetry's inability to stand up to this kind of scrutiny would therefore damage its credibility. Anti-intellectuals reflect this process in their complaints that intellectuals trivialise and 'corrupt' poetry. Aristophanes alleged this of Euripides and Sokrates, and Polykrates of Sokrates.⁹

A1. Euripides

Euripides, Aristophanes and Meletos are not uniform in either their attitude towards intellectuals or their objections to intellectualism. Euripides' representation of intellectuals, especially Amphion and Palamedes, is fairly sympathetic, portraying them as victims of unfair suspicion and attacks. His plays reveal his familiarity with current intellectual theories and issues. His contemporaries noticed this and often connected him to intellectual figures,

especially Sokrates, and with scientific novelties, atheism and self-interested rhetorical subtlety.¹⁰ However, Euripides' dramatic assessment of *intellectualism* is harsh. He repeatedly represents human reason as failing in its attempts to comprehend the universe and he often contrasts the unreliability of the clever with the simple integrity, judgement and true understanding of ordinary men. For instance, in the *Andromache*, the Chorus says that:

πνοαὶ δ' ὅταν φέρωσι ναυτίλους θοαί,
κατὰ πηδαλίων διδύμα πρᾶπίδων γνώμα
σοφῶν τε πλῆθος ἀθρόον ἀσθενέστερον
φαιλοτέρας φρενός αὐτοκρατοῦς.

“When swift breezes are hurtling sailors along,
a double intelligence at the helm
and a throng of wise men conjoined is not as effective
as a lesser mind with full authority.”
(Eur. *Andr.* 479-82, tr. Kovacs, Loeb)

In *Ion* the title character says that he ‘would wish an honest humble man to be his friend rather than a cleverer knave’.¹¹ Simple faith in and of the ‘humble man’ and his acceptance of traditional religious practice is depicted in *The Bacchae*: “Whatever the mass, the ordinary people, have taken as normal, and practice it, this I would accept”.¹² Though this sentiment may be a democratic platitude, its repetition and the fact that many of the instances are barely relevant to their dramatic context means that it may, therefore, represent a view close to Euripides' actual opinion.¹³

A2. Aristophanes

Though it is difficult to judge from the evidence, Aristophanes seems to be far more interested than others in intellectuals and more inclined to distinguish them as a group from other ‘experts’, such as musicians and oracle-mongers.¹⁴ In his plays it is possible to identify particular sophists' theories and styles, such as those belonging to Protagoras, Diogenes of Apollonia and Prodikos, suggesting that he was interested in intellectuals as individuals and had some

grasp of their thought (Chapter 2 B4). His interest in intellectuals is especially evident in the particular attachment he shows for *The Clouds*. He protests at his audience's lack of perception and appreciation of it and reworked it over a period of years.¹⁵ The fragments of other comedians mention intellectuals comparatively infrequently and provide little specific information. They do not seem to distinguish them from other types of expert or social nuisance.¹⁶ Contemporaries seem to have noticed Aristophanes' preoccupation: Kratinos depicts a clever dick saying that he is 'euripidaristophanising' (εὐριπιδαριστοφανίζων) (fr. 342), which suggests that Aristophanes was thought to share Euripides' notorious interest in modern cleverness.¹⁷ Plato agrees, citing Aristophanes alone among the comedians for having mocked Sokrates.¹⁸

Aristophanes' interest is not, however, very good-natured. In *The Clouds* (at least in the revised version) he has the Thinktank burned down, Sokrates and his associates fleeing and perhaps dying (which accords with the evidence equally well).¹⁹ His references to Sokrates elsewhere are also fairly unfriendly.²⁰ Plato also suggests that Aristophanes and Sokrates were particularly at odds. He names him as one of Sokrates' 'original accusers'.²¹ As a character in Plato's *Symposium* he is the only person who does not applaud Sokrates' speech but instead tries to make some comment (212c). He barely exchanges words with Sokrates until the symposium's end, when Sokrates spends a good portion of the rest of the night arguing with him and Agathon that comedy and tragedy are the same skill, a suggestion that the poets evidently resisted until overcome by tiredness.²²

Aristophanes' familiarity with intellectual methods is also apparent in his parodies (Chapter 2.1 B5). The theme of his criticism of intellectualism is that it is trivialising and non-holistic: it misses true meaning on account of its preoccupation with details. This is particularly apparent in his criticism of Euripides' supposed debasement of tragedy through his adoption of Sokrates' habit of idle and pretentious nit-picking.²³ Aristophanes' most fervent

objections to the new intellectualism are to its supposed impiety and the encouragement and facilitation it gives to the pursuit of amoral self-interest. While Euripides tends to focus on the negative effects of intellectualism for the individual, Aristophanes seems more concerned with its wider social effects.

A3. Meletos

Sokrates' prosecutor Meletos was a young man at the time of the trial, apparently obscure, though Plato's Sokrates is able to describe his appearance even before the preliminary hearing of his trial.²⁴ In his defence speech, he alleges that Meletos is acting 'on behalf of the poets'.²⁵ There are a number of references to poets called Meletos ranging from c.424 to c.391 BC, particularly from comedies, though it is guesswork to identify all or any of these with Sokrates' accuser.²⁶ The earliest citation to a poet Meletos is from Aristophanes' *The Farmers* (fr. 117). This man would be too old to be Sokrates' prosecutor (who was 'young' (νέος), whatever that means exactly, in 399) but it could refer to his father who had the same name.²⁷ There is some slight evidence that Sokrates' Meletos was connected to the Eumolpids. A member of this family may have had a particular interest in prosecuting Sokrates on account of the implication of many of his associates in the impiety scandals of 415 BC; in 408 they had agitated against the recall of Alkibiades.²⁸

The justification he offered to prove that Sokrates was guilty of impiety and corrupting the young is the view, which was apparently widely held, that the naturalistic speculations ascribed to intellectuals were innately irreligious and undermined the influence of traditional morality-forming institutions. This reveals an attitude of religious and educational conservatism, a conviction that traditional beliefs and practices are beyond criticism. While there is probably considerable truth to his suspicion that intellectual scrutiny damaged the strength of inherited culture, he appears to lack comprehension of the meaning and object of intellectual analysis, that criticism is not necessarily an attack.

There is the interesting possibility that Sokrates' prosecutor is the same as the Meletos who took part in the prosecution of Andokides. Andokides' trial also revolved around religious issues and took place at around the same time as Sokrates', probably a few months before.²⁹ On the face of it, it seems unlikely that two different men with the same uncommon name would both launch separate impiety proceedings within a few months of each other.³⁰ The temptation to identify the two is increased by the survival of a prosecution speech from the trial, Lysias' *Against Andokides*. The other two prosecutors are Kephisios and Epichares; as the speaker refers to Kephisios he must be either Meletos or Epichares³¹ but Epichares seems to have attacked Andokides' use of the amnesty³², something that does not appear in Lysias' speech as we have it and seems alien to its pervasively religious theme. Hence, Meletos is the man most likely to have delivered it.³³ Whatever the speaker's identity, he was probably also connected to the Eumolpids.³⁴ As it is intrinsically likely that a speech-writer would make an effort to represent the (public) character of his client – something that Lysias was an acknowledged master of – the language of *Against Andokides* might contain a hint to the speaker's personality.³⁵ It does, in fact, employ a relatively high proportion of non-forensic words and also, as Dover says, "adopts and exploits the most primitive religious fears, prejudices and beliefs". This accords with what one might expect of Sokrates' prosecutor; not a regular speaker but a fervent advocate of religious conservatism.³⁶ Andokides' prosecutor emphasises the tribulations that Andokides has endured since his crime, in order to suggest that the gods' interest in seeing him suffer is proof of his offences against them. The inevitability of divine justice is a commonplace of Greek religious and moral thought but the speaker seems to gloat over Andokides' misfortunes, describing their hideousness and lack of respite in detail.³⁷ The speaker says that he views Andokides' crime as utterly without mitigation.³⁸ He adheres to the conventional moral principle 'do good in order to receive good' but he extends this to argue that refraining from punishing impiety itself invites punishment from the gods.³⁹ His statements that men can and should be the agents of divine retribution suggests that he is motivated by a sense of personal outrage.⁴⁰ His

assertion that those who ordered the recall of exiles are themselves guilty of impiety suggests an exceptionally trenchant view of religious morality⁴¹, particularly as it effectively damns the whole *demos*, including the jurors themselves. Overall, the speaker shows an exceptionally zealous and unreflective adherence to traditional religious thought. He has the intellectual forcefulness to drive principles to their natural conclusion but lacks the disposition or sophistication to engage in reflection about their meaning.⁴² Given the nature of the case, Lysias may have judged that uncompromising religious conservatism, even beyond that actually held by the majority of jurors (Andokides was acquitted), would be effective in persuading them. His arguments and sentiments suggest a mode of thought similar to those brought against Sokrates.

There is one substantial objection to identifying the two men: the Leon of Salamis affair. The Thirty Tyrants summoned Sokrates and four other men, including Andokides' Meletos (And. 1.94), to arrest Leon - probably the general who was active in the later part of the Peloponnesian War⁴³ - illegally, an act that led to his execution. Though Sokrates, in Plato's version of his defence, and Plato and Xenophon in their own voices mention this incident, at no point do they refer to any involvement by Sokrates' prosecutor.⁴⁴ For the two men to be the same it is necessary to explain how Sokrates and Plato and the unsubtle Xenophon could either be ignorant of the fact - which is implausible⁴⁵ - or choose to omit it - which is almost as unlikely.⁴⁶

In short, in view of their fervent religious orthodoxy, unreflective thought, and possible Eumolpid links, the identification of Andokides' and Sokrates' prosecutors as the same man seems probable - except for the extraordinary failure of Sokrates, his apologists and any other ancient source to mention his involvement in the death of Leon of Salamis. A possible solution is to suppose that Andokides' prosecutor is father (or some other relation) to Sokrates' prosecutor. This would account for the similarity of their backgrounds and

apparent community of interest but also for the failure of ancient sources to identify the two.

The common feature of these three poets' view of intellectualism is the belief that its methods are reductionist, destroying real content by focusing on trivial details while missing true meaning.⁴⁷ However, Aristophanes and Euripides seem to differ from most of their fellow poets in their greater interest in intellectuals and intellectual issues. In particular, they are capable of criticising intellectual methods. This interest and level of criticism distinguish them from their peers and militate against the likelihood that they were part of a general poetic anti-intellectualism. Meletos seems to have little knowledge or comprehension about intellectuals' activities and the nature of intellectual analysis. He seems to have more in common with unsophisticated anti-intellectuals, who are comparatively uninformed about intellectual methods and are concerned mainly with its effects on moral, religious and civic consciousness.

B. Civic disposition

The civic disposition is concerned with threats to the state. It views intellectualism as reducing the authority of its institutions with its incessant criticism, and reducing deference to them by encouraging arrogance. Kleon is the most explicit example of this disposition.

Kleon's father Kleainetos was wealthy on account of his prosperous tanning business and Kleon is himself invariably referred to as a tanner.⁴⁸ The first notice of Kleon's involvement in public affairs is his attack on Perikles at the beginning of the Peloponnesian War⁴⁹ and, after Perikles' death, he became the most influential politician in Athens. The chief concerns of his policy seem to be maintenance of Athens' pre-eminent position through upholding her empire, and economic issues, such as proposing or approving a wealth tax and raising the allies' tribute.⁵⁰ These things suggest that his view of effective government consists in the primacy of patriotism and pragmatism. Though sources are

almost uniformly hostile to Kleon there is one favourable reference to him, from a mid-4th century legal speech, which describes him as a distinguished general and statesman. Clearly, the speaker, who was connected to Kleon, expected the jurors to remember him with approval.⁵¹

Thoukydides depicts Kleon as espousing views hostile to intellectual (specifically rhetorical) sophistication. He represents orators as preoccupied with exercising their skills in speaking and perversely clever arguments, which means that they cannot resist participating in public debate where their methods can only confuse issues and be destructive to the state. He associates intellectual modesty with security and cleverness with reckless instability. This instability is a function of the arrogance and agnosticism of intellectual criticism, which he emphasises with an allusion to the contemporary distinction between νόμος/φύσις.⁵² He rejects the notion that principles other than those of conventional morality can determine policy.

Such rhetorical and intellectual habits may not be phantoms in Kleon's imagination: the Mytilene debate took place in the same year as Gorgias' visit to Athens in which his rhetorical displays made him a celebrity.⁵³ His extant speeches are characterised by extremely sophistic arguments, abstruse subject matter and a preoccupation with verbal games. To Kleon this may have epitomised intellectualised public speaking's frivolity, perversity and self-indulgence. His Mytilene speech may represent an attempt to resist its entry into public business.⁵⁴

Kleon's Mytilene speech shows his efforts to identify himself with constancy, patriotism and conventional morality, which are the accepted values and beliefs of ordinary men. His criticism of popular addiction to rhetorical novelties instead of these things implies that he, in fact, represents a higher level of commitment to patriotic principles than ordinary men do themselves. This ostentatious devotion to and identification with the *demos* is a prominent characteristic of Kleon in all sources. Thoukydides hints at this quality in Kleon

as he only ever depicts him in public situations, never in private nor his private thoughts.⁵⁵ In Aristophanes' *Knights* 'Paphlagon' claims to be the lover and 'watchdog' of the *demos* and the enemy of the wealthy.⁵⁶ This comedy won first prize in 424 BC, just after Kleon had captured the Spartans on Sphacteria and was at the height of his success, so Aristophanes' caricature cannot simply have been insulting but must have struck at reality. Kleon was also notorious for having used the familiar form of address – "χαίρειν" - in an official dispatch to the Assembly.⁵⁷ Plutarch records an anecdote that Kleon cut himself off from his friends on the grounds that they were detrimental to a democratic political career.⁵⁸ The traditionalism of Kleon's political sentiments is further suggested by the prominence of the elderly among supporters.⁵⁹ On the whole, Kleon appears to have identified himself with democratic institutions and the attitudes of ordinary (especially elderly) men and their sentiments to an extraordinary degree.⁶⁰ The fact that Kleon is the only demagogue for whom Thucydides provides a portrait suggests that he is supposed to represent all demagogues (Chapter 2.5).

Kleon's fervent commitment to the *demos* and the institutions of state is illustrated by his hostile relationship with Aristophanes whom he accused before the *Boule* of having insulted the *demos* and its officials⁶¹:

αὐτὸς τ' ἑμαυτὸν ὑπὸ Κλέωνος ἄπαθον
ἐπίσταμαι διὰ τὴν πέρυσι κωμῳδίαν.
εἰσελκύσας γάρ μ' εἰς τὸ βουλευτήριον
διέβαλλε καὶ ψευδῆ κατεγλώττιζέ μου
κάκυκλοβόρει κᾶπλυνεν, ὥστ' ὀλίγου πάνυ
ἀπωλόμην μολυνοπραγμονούμενος.

"And I know about myself, what I suffered at Kleon's hands because of last year's comedy. He dragged me into the council chamber and began slandering me, telling glib-mouthed lies about me, roaring at me like Cycloborus, bathing me in abuse, so that I very nearly perished in a sewer of troubles."

(Aristoph. *Ach.* 377-82, tr. Sommerstein, Aris & Phillips).

ἐγὼ δὲ λέξω δεινὰ μὲν, δίκαια δέ.
 οὐ γάρ με νῦν γε διαβαλεῖ Κλέων ὅτι
 ξένων παρόντων τὴν πόλιν κακῶς λέγω.
 αὐτοὶ γάρ ἐσμεν οὐπὶ Ληναίῳ τ' ἄγών,
 κοῦπω ξένοι πάρεισιν...

“...What I have to say will be shocking but it will be right. This time Cleon will not allege that I am slandering the city in the presence of foreigners; for we are by ourselves and it’s the Lenaean competition, and there are no foreigners here yet...”

(Ibid. 501-5)

The second comment makes it unlikely that the first is Aristophanes’ invention.

The scholiast says that the incident refers to Kleon’s reaction to Aristophanes’

Babylonians:

“...[F]or he made a mockery of officials picked by sortition and by election and of Cleon, while there were foreigners present... For this reason Cleon was angry and laid a charge against Aristophanes before the people for wrongdoing (ἀδικία), claiming that Aristophanes had acted with intent to insult (εἰς ὕβριν) the people and the *Boule*.”

(Schol. on Aristoph. *Ach.* 378, tr. Atkinson, J.E., “Curbing the Comedians: Cleon versus Aristophanes and Syracosius’ Decree”, *CQ* n.s. 42, 1992, p. 56-57.)

It is not clear that Kleon invoked a specific law. He may have acted on the general principle that it was unacceptable ‘to wrong’ the *demos* – both ‘wronging’ and *demos* are vague terms. That the accusation was made before the *Boule* implies that the procedure was an impeachment (εἰσαγγελία). The certain instances of εἰσαγγελία in the 5th century were for extraordinary situations felt to threaten the state and the democratic constitution.⁶² This suggests the kind of offence that Kleon felt – or wished to imply – that Aristophanes had committed. Kleon’s charge need not have been frivolous or motivated by a sense of personal affront. Aristophanes’ emphasis on the role of foreigners suggests that his offence lay in having impugned the reputation and dignity of the state as a whole. The Old Oligarch asserts that the *demos* did not tolerate mockery of itself (2.18). This is factually false but it could be based upon occasional incidents, like Kleon’s impeachment of Aristophanes.⁶³

C. Religious disposition

One group that Plato does not make reference to in *The Apology* when enumerating philosophy's enemies is religious authority. This is perhaps surprising in view of the regularity with which intellectuals are criticised for impiety. However, it is consistent with the dominance of poets in the transmission of cultural material and the role of the Athenian state in mediating religion.

C1. Diopeithes

The most trenchant non-poet to criticise intellectualism for its irreligion is Diopeithes the seer. Assuming that his 'decree' represents his own views in some sense, even if put into his mouth by some comedian, he is an historical figure who believed - or could be represented as believing - that scientific investigations into the heavens encouraged atheism and that this should be punished.

As the name Diopeithes is uncommon it is likely that the few references around the time of the Peloponnesian War are to the same person. There is some information relating to political activity. Two decrees ascribed to a Diopeithes appear early in the war. They are consistent with the imperial and naval interests of the Athenian democracy. One is the 'Methone decree' dating to c.430 BC, which regulated tributary payments. A late anecdote describes another decree requiring that anyone found in the Piraeus after a certain time of night be executed.⁶⁴ The datum, whose point is that Diopeithes himself broke it, cannot be traced with certainty any earlier than Aelian but the decree is consistent with Thoukydides' description of the Athenians' attitude in 429/8 BC after the Peloponnesians' successful surprise attack on Salamis.⁶⁵

A comic scholiast says that Diopeithes was Nikias' *hetairos*, which implies some balance of shared political orientation and friendship (Nikias was notoriously

superstitious and may have had both personal and professional reasons for cultivating a good seer).⁶⁶ In 397 BC Diopeithes is in Sparta, still dabbling in politics. It is he who produces the oracle warning of the dangers of ‘a lame kingship’ to undermine Agesilaos’ claim to be king.⁶⁷ He may have fled Athens when prosecuted for his inadvertent infraction of the Piraeus decree or during the Athenians’ persecution of oracle-mongers after the failure of the Sicilian Expedition.⁶⁸ Diopeithes’ religious conservatism does not exclude political radicalism. Athenians were well aware that oracles could be used for political purposes.⁶⁹

Diopeithes was not, by any means, the only seer (μάντις) or oracle-monger (χρησμολόγος) (the two are virtually synonymous) involved in public affairs.⁷⁰ However, the criticism of naturalistic speculation ascribed to him implies religious conservatism and a lack of intellectual sophistication that is unusual for oracle-mongers and seers. Their skill was a combination of learning and special insight; in practice many of them seem to have belonged to the same intellectual movement as sophists, scientists and philosophers.⁷¹ Many could be described as ‘theological sophists’, given to rationalising and interpreting the origins and functions of the divine as metaphors or in terms of natural phenomena. In Plato’s *Euthyphro* the title character is a religious interpreter who both takes myths and traditional practices seriously and adheres to the novel sophistic notion that the same moral principles apply to both gods and men. In the *Kratylos* he is cited as a source for etymological analyses of the gods’ names.⁷² In Euripides’ *Bacchae* Teiresias has a similar role, providing rationalistic explanations for Dionysos’ origins based on etymological analysis.⁷³ Diopeithes is atypical of this class; indeed comic references to his frantic fits of anger suggest that he was unusually fanatical.⁷⁴

C2. Nikomachos’ prosecutor

Nikomachos’ prosecutor’s anti-intellectualism seems to revolve around a conviction that it is necessary to preserve the sanctity of the state’s institutions

and religious practices. He is particularly concerned to defend Athens' traditional rites and he insists that any interference in them is impious. His objection to interference with the laws of the state is a commonplace but shows a similar conservatism. His attitude on these issues may be enhanced by his apparently aristocratic background and oligarchic inclination - at least, Nikomachos had alleged that he had been one of the Four Hundred, and his silence about his own activities under the Thirty is conspicuous and suggestive.⁷⁵ His attitude may be similar to Plato's, who found the restored democracy's 'rapid corruption of both written laws and customs' distressing and a sign of bad government.⁷⁶ It need not be supposed that Nikomachos' apparent preference for popular sacrifices (Chapter 2.6) would make him popular. In fact, if he was convicted, as seems probable, this would illustrate the Athenians' conservative sentiments and protectiveness towards their institutions.

Of course, Nikomachos' prosecutor need not have had any particular confidence that the jurors would share his sentiments. Lysias' speech was delivered before a normal jury⁷⁷ and he refers to a previous hearing before the *Boule*.⁷⁸ This is the procedure for an impeachment (*εἰσαγγελία*) against a public official, a method that Antiphon and Demosthenes describe elsewhere. It is different from impeachment for treason but has important similarities. Firstly, the case was launched on the prosecutor's own initiative, not as a part of an automatic review (*εὔθυναι*). Secondly, unlike a *γραφή*, the prosecutor would not have faced a penalty if he had failed to secure one fifth of the jurors' votes.⁷⁹ This means that the prosecutor probably felt particularly strongly about Nikomachos' offence and that the sentiments that the speech expresses might represent his own more than might otherwise be the case.

The lack of anti-intellectual action by any specifically religious group is due to Greek religion's lack of doctrine, dogma or sacred texts that required conscious maintenance and defence. Aristophanes and Meletos and, to a lesser extent, Euripides, are the most trenchant critics of intellectual irreligion. This is

indicative of the role of traditional stories, provided by the poets, in transmitting religious knowledge. Nikomachos' prosecutor's desire to protect traditional sacrifices emphasises religion's focus on practice rather than belief.

Moreover, classical Athens did not have any particular institution of religious authority. This was divided between priests who administered rituals and had custodianship of designated gods' shrines and sacred objects; seers who were available for consultation; oracle-mongers who would interpret oracles as private individuals; *exegetai*, specialist authorities in points of ancestral and sacred law⁸⁰; and the *demos* itself. None of these bodies could act unilaterally and only the *demos* had executive power. The oldest priesthoods were the preserve of certain aristocratic families but the newer cults were open to all able citizens, a feature presumably connected to Athens' political development. The state had ultimate responsibility in religious issues, for instance, subjecting priests to an annual audit.⁸¹

A figure who might claim to have religious authority is the prophet with charisma and a direct connexion to the divine. Such figures are conspicuously absent from Athenian – and, indeed, Greek - society at this time. The figure of Dionysos in Euripides' *Bacchae* is perhaps the only example.⁸²

Religious conservatism – even to the point of fanaticism – is part of the Athenian democratic milieu. However, the Athenians were not so reactionary that they meted out punishment for any accusation of impiety. This is shown by the case of Andokides, who was certainly technically guilty. However, the fact that the accusation of impiety is thrown against intellectuals repeatedly (both humorously and seriously) indicates that at least some Athenians believed it and many more could find it plausible.

D. Moral disposition

D1. Aias

The mythical figure of Aias, apart from epitomising bravery, directness and inarticulateness, displays in his various manifestations the constant feature of concern for traditional virtues. This can be inflexible and excessive in degree. Sophokles' *Aias* focuses on the hero's self-destruction as a function of his extreme adherence to the dictates of honour. His concept of personal and moral value revolves around public approval or disapproval (Chapter 3 A). Antisthenes draws out this aspect of Aias' mentality even more forcefully. He says that he could not bear to have a bad reputation and can only understand Odysseus' actions in these terms, shameful and deceitful (§2-5). Odysseus responds by observing Aias' childish pleasure at public praise, repeating the theme of his traditional externalised system of value.⁸³ Aias is unable to comprehend different approaches to the same ends. He is the antithesis of intellectualism that attempts to find meaning transcending the immediate and concrete, in this case a fixed code of behaviour based around simple principles and maxims.

Apart from Aias, concern with intellectualism's effect on moral development tends to combine the aspects of culture, the state and religion cited above.

D2. Anytos

Anytos, like Kleon, was wealthy on account of the large tanning factory established by his father, Anthemion. Anthemion was self-made man, as Plato implies in the *Meno* when he snidely praises his industry.⁸⁴ He also says that the education that he gave Anytos was 'good, as the Athenian people think', doubtless a disparaging reference to his success in business.⁸⁵ Sokrates' description of Anytos as prosecuting him 'on behalf of the artisans' is probably intended to belittle the importance of his concerns.⁸⁶

Anytos' earliest known participation in public affairs is his generalship in 409/8 BC, where he was engaged in an unsuccessful attempt to relieve Athenian forces at Pylos.⁸⁷ His social milieu was distinguished: he was hereditary guest-friend to the Thessalian aristocrat Meno and associated with Lysimachos, son of the distinguished conservative statesman Aristeides.⁸⁸ Late sources provide an anecdote about him being or aspiring to be Alkibiades' lover.⁸⁹ Anytos' milieu was reflected in his political inclinations, similar to Theramenes, favouring a moderate restriction of the franchise.⁹⁰ However, his political prominence, which lasted for several years, was a result of his opposition to the Thirty Tyrants and his role in the democratic restoration.

Though Meletos was the author of the indictment against Sokrates and, according to Plato's and Xenophon's *Apologies*, took the leading part in the trial, it has been suggested that Anytos was the real instigator of Sokrates' trial.⁹¹ The presumption is, essentially, that Anytos was too important (and busy?) to spend his time supporting other people's cases. It is, at least, certain that he was not an apparatchik or a sycophantic hack. He must have had a genuine interest in the trial and would have been aware that involvement in the case would reflect on his public image.

The Sokratics' representation of Anytos focus on his concern with intellectualism's effect on people's moral condition. They create the impression that he believed that Sokrates' influence was responsible for 'corrupting the young' in some way. Xenophon claims that their dispute (reducing it to the level of a personal grudge and snobbishly emphasising Anytos' non-aristocratic background) originated in Sokrates' comments about Anytos' son's education, at which Anytos took offence.⁹² Plato provides a portrait of Anytos in the *Meno*, the dramatic date of which seems to fall between the amnesty and Sokrates' trial.⁹³ The subject of the dialogue is whether 'virtue' – moral continence and the ability to make moral judgements - can be taught. Anytos is apparently introduced as an apologist for the value of traditional education, which 'any Athenian gentleman' had received himself and would recommend

(92e-93a). This consists in physical training and, by implication, contact with such ‘gentlemen’ in the course of normal involvement in city life. He regards famous Athenian statesmen as outstanding exponents of this upbringing. When Sokrates points out that these men showed no ability to confer their virtue on their own sons, Anytos abruptly departs in anger, with the parting comment, ‘I believe that you are too apt to speak ill (κακῶς λέγειν) of people’ (94e). This must be interpreted as Plato’s version of his complaint against Sokrates, that Sokrates was denigrating Athens’ traditional political heroes.⁹⁴ That Sokrates’ criticism revolved around the issue of education implies that Anytos understood Sokrates’ criticism of traditional education to mean that he was actually advocating the new education offered by the sophists. In fact, this apparent conflict is (Plato’s) Anytos’ own creation, as the first opinion he offers in the *Meno* is the trenchant assertion that sophists are ‘blights and corruption’ who do their pupils more harm than good.⁹⁵ He implies that they operate according to their own self-interest, monetary payment. Their students are misled and their relatives and cities are blind to sophists’ danger and neglect their duty of protecting the young.⁹⁶ Plato depicts Anytos’ sentiment as sheer prejudice, as he has Anytos claim ‘to know’ what sophists are like even though he admits he has, in fact, not had any contact with them.⁹⁷ The only comment attributed to him in Plato’s *Apology*, that ‘the Athenians’ sons would be utterly ruined by practising what Sokrates taught’ (29c), reinforces the view that his hostility towards Sokrates was due to the supposed deleterious effect of the new education.

Anytos’ action against Sokrates can also be understood in political terms. The focus of Anytos’ policy at the time of Sokrates’ trial was fervent support for the amnesty that had been established after the defeat of the oligarchic remnant in Eleusis in 401 BC. The seriousness attached to upholding the amnesty can be seen in another incident, when the politician Archinos persuaded the *Boule* to execute without trial a man who was ignoring its terms, as a deterrent to others.⁹⁸ Isokrates praises Anytos, along with Thrasybulos, for his enforcement of the amnesty, in spite of large personal losses.⁹⁹ This comes from

a legal speech delivered to a popular audience shortly after the amnesty's establishment and therefore attests to the policy's popularity and Anytos' identification with it. Anytos' involvement in Andokides' defence at almost the same time as Sokrates' trial on virtually the same formal charge, impiety, also implies that this was his overriding concern. The significant difference between Andokides' and Sokrates' cases that might induce Anytos to defend one but attack the other was the amnesty. Andokides' offences occurred in 415 BC, before the amnesty, but there is no reason to suppose that Sokrates desisted from his characteristic activities after 401 BC.¹⁰⁰ In fact, the chronological markers in Plato's *Meno* could be deliberately placed evidence of the opposite.¹⁰¹ Sokrates' criticism of traditional ethical principles, conventional religious practices and attacks on Athens' political heroes and constitution may have seemed to be directly aimed at encouraging the young to regard morality and the institutions of the state with contempt.¹⁰² There is little evidence that Anytos raised constitutional issues as such in Sokrates' trial (Chapter 2.7 C2). Anytos may actually have agreed with some of his criticisms of democratic practice, to judge from his oligarchic and aristocratic inclinations. However, his belief that intellectualisation induced violence, lawlessness and immorality, as had happened during the rule of the Thirty Tyrants, overrode this ideological view.

D3. Lykon

Lykon is an obscure figure. Plato says that he was acting 'on behalf of the orators (ρήτορες)'.¹⁰³ Almost all other information on him comes from the scholion on that passage:

...Λύκων μέντοι πατήρ ἦν Ἀυτολύκου, Ἴων γένος, δήμων
 Θορίκιος, πένης, ὡς Κρατῖνος Πυτίνη, Ἀριστοφάνης
 Σφηξίν, Ἐμπολις δ' ἐν Φίλοις καὶ ἐπὶ τῇ γυναικὶ Ροδία
 κωμωδεῖ αὐτόν, ἐν δὲ τῷ πρώτῳ Ἀυτολύκῳ εἰς ξένον,
 Μεταγένης δ' Ὀμήρῳ εἰς προδότην -

καὶ Λύκων ἐνταῦθί που
...προδοῦς Ναύπακτον ἀργύριον λαβῶν
ἄγαλμ' ἀγορᾶς ξενικὸν ἐμπορεύεται.)

“...Lykon, however, was the father of Autolykos, of Ionian family, of the deme Thorikos; poor, compare Kratinos in *Pytine* [fr. 214], Aristophanes in *The Wasps* and, in *The Friends*, Eupolis [fr. 295] ridicules him on account of his wife Rhodia, and in the first *Autolykos* [fr. 61] as being a foreigner, and Metagenes in *Homer* [or *The Hostage?*] [fr. 10] as a traitor:

‘And Lykon is somewhere there.
...Having betrayed Naupaktos and taken money,
he buys a foreign ornament of the agora.’”
(Schol. on Pl. *Ap.* 23e (Greene, *Scholia Platonica*, p. 422), tr. Olding)

It is far from certain that the scholiast is correct in connecting the various items to Sokrates' prosecutor. He may simply have gathered all available information on men of that name from ΚΩΜΩΔΟΥΜΕΝΟΙ: scholia on Aristophanes' *Wasps* (1169) and *Lysistrata* (270) contain the same data. However, it must be said that comic invective directed at Lykon from the 420s to the 400s, whether this is one or several men, has a certain consistency. Apart from the imputation of foreign birth, which is standard, he is said to be poor, effeminate, and to have a promiscuous wife.¹⁰⁴ The fragment of Metagenes preserved in the Platonic scholion strongly suggests that at least one Lykon had an active public career, especially the mention of Naupaktos, which probably refers to the Spartans' expulsion of the Messenians from Naupaktos after Aegospotami.¹⁰⁵ In addition, a Lykon belongs to the upper-class symposium to which Bdelykleon sends his father in Aristophanes' *Wasps*. The other guests include the oligarchs Antiphon and Phrynichos (1301).

It is not known what his contribution to Sokrates' prosecution was. However, the scholiasts' identification of him with the father of the famous athlete Autolykos, though it may be only supposition, does raise an intriguing possibility.¹⁰⁶ The Thirty Tyrants executed Autolykos in order to gratify the Spartan commander whom he had insulted.¹⁰⁷ Battle casualties and the amnesty would have prevented Lykon from avenging himself on those who actually

committed the murder but he may have blamed Sokrates as ultimately responsible for their immoral and violent disposition.

This identification would make Sokrates' prosecutor the same as the Lykon whom Sokrates meets in Xenophon's *Symposium*. This identity is, on the face of it, unlikely, as Xenophon gives no indication of any friction between the two. The reverse, in fact, is true; Lykon's departing words compliment Sokrates as a gentleman.¹⁰⁸ It is also Xenophon's habit, at least in his historical writing, to omit uncomfortable information rather than explain or excuse it, for instance, failing to mention Sparta's *détente* with the Persians in the *Hellenika*. On the other hand, refraining from providing information is, in fact, consistent with his practice when he assumes that his readers do not require it. In the *Hellenika* he rarely introduces his characters and leaves many Spartan institutions unexplained.¹⁰⁹ Another of his habits is to give credit where he feels it is due. For instance, though Xenophon almost totally ignores the Theban Epameinondas, he praises him implicitly for his attempts to prevent factionalism in the cities of Achaea and, explicitly, for the quality of his military leadership.¹¹⁰ It may be that Xenophon views Lykon, Sokrates' prosecutor, as basically genteel and urbane, and is prepared to recognise this out of magnanimity. In particular, he might be intending to imply that Lykon's later hostility to Sokrates was a result of the misdirection of one of his positive qualities, his intense affection for his son, which is a conspicuous theme of *The Symposium*.¹¹¹ If this man is the same as Sokrates' prosecutor, his parting comment, to call Sokrates a gentleman, has considerable poignancy. Of course, this is, like most of Lykon's biography, conjectural.

D4. Polykrates

Polykrates, the author of the *Accusation of Sokrates*, gained success as a speechwriter at Cyprus, perhaps having fled there from Athens when the Thirty Tyrants took power (see Chapter 2.8). As a rhetorician he was well regarded: his contemporary Jason of Pherai reckoned him second only to Gorgias¹¹² and

later critics esteemed him highly, though criticising his joking manner.¹¹³ His *Accusation of Sokrates* may not have been entirely serious¹¹⁴ but later authorities were able to mistake it for the actual prosecution speech (see Chapter 2.8).

Polykrates' attack on Sokrates was certainly concerned with the political effects of his teaching. He explicitly cited Alkibiades and Kritias as examples of the results of his teaching, whereas Athens' most distinguished statesmen, Miltiades, Themistokles and Aristides, had been without intellectual mentors. However, the main burden of his tract falls on Sokrates' corrupting influence. His criticism of conventional morality, abuse of poets, and emphasis on intellect as the basis for superiority undermined young men's deference to accepted authorities and induced a destructive calculating amoral egotism (Chapter 2.8). Polykrates emphasised Sokrates' magnetic attraction for the young.¹¹⁵

Polykrates' defence of Athens' political institutions and empire-building statesmen is founded on sheer patriotism and platitudes about political equality within the democracy. This is consistent with the theme of his other known writings, which include an *Encomium of Thrasyboulos* and, according to Josephos, an attack on Sparta, which may have focused on her constitution:

καὶ γὰρ ἔθνῶν τινες καὶ τῶν ἐνδοξοτάτων πόλεων
ῥυπαίνειν τὴν εὐγένειαν καὶ τὰς πολιτείας ἐπεχείρησαν
λοιδορεῖν...τὴν δὲ Λακεδαιμονίων Πολυκράτης...

“Various authors have attempted to sully the reputation of nations and of the most illustrious cities, and to revile their forms of government... Polykrates [attacked] Lacedaemon...”
(Polykrates *FGH* 597F1) ap. Josephos *Ap.* 1.220-21, tr. Thackeray, Loeb)¹¹⁶

Polykrates may have had reason to be a fervent partisan of the democracy. In the *Meno* Plato comments that the Theban politician Ismenias had ‘recently come into the fortune of Polykrates’.¹¹⁷ This is usually explained as an

expression for a large sum of money, referring to Polykrates of Samos, similar to ‘the riches of Tantalos’.¹¹⁸ However, as it is atypical of Plato to introduce a proverb so abruptly, the expression may refer to the particular occasion of Ismenias’ sudden wealth.¹¹⁹ According to Isokrates’ rather condescending remarks, Polykrates was obliged to take up speech writing and teaching on account of some unwarranted reversal of fortune.¹²⁰ The Oxyrhynchos Historian indicates that Ismenias was prominent in the Theban faction that was hostile to Sparta and supported Athenian democratic exiles.¹²¹ It is possible that Ismenias’ ‘wealth of Polykrates’ came from the Athenian in an attempt to secure Theban support for the Athenian exiles.¹²² If this conjecture is true, it provides a background for his commitment to Athens’ democratic constitution beyond simple patriotism. His attack on Sokrates would come from the perspective of the patriot and the democratic partisan but is rationalised through the belief, either sincerely his own or one that he thought would be plausible, that intellectual influence would induce moral corruption.

E. Conclusion

The different focuses of hostility towards intellectualism – cultural, civic, religious and moral - depend on the particular individual’s interest. They tend to be different aspects of the same conception of social and civic integrity, conceived in the broadest terms. Those who act or speak against intellectuals and intellectualism do so not from a conscious community of interest but because they view themselves as the legitimate leaders of the community: poets and aristocrats or aristocratic aspirants such as Anytos. Critics of intellectualism seem to share the same general belief that it attacks traditional institutions, either deliberately or recklessly, through its incessant scrutiny and criticism. Intellectuals’ desire to analyse and criticise accepted beliefs and practices presupposes that they enjoy a sense of superiority to these things, that their minds can penetrate, improve and even reject. The arrogance that this encourages can lead to socially and politically destructive behaviour.

Anti-intellectuals can be divided into two categories according to their relative intellectual sophistication. Aristophanes and Euripides are well informed about the contemporary intellectual movement. Though the tendency of their plays is to criticise intellectuals' peculiar and even destructive behaviour they are also aware of the content of intellectualism. They show this in criticisms of its inadequacy and parodies of its methods of argument. In addition, neither of them are one-eyed critics. Euripides generally presents intellectuals in a sympathetic light and their attackers as excessively devious and self-interested (such as Odysseus in the *Palamedes*) or unimaginatively traditionalist (such as Zethos in the *Antiope*). Aristophanes does not refrain from mocking anti-intellectuals and non-intellectuals, such as the Better Argument, the extraordinarily unsophisticated and literal-minded Strepsiades, the sport-obsessed aristocratic youth Pheidippides in *The Clouds*, and Aischylos in *The Frogs*.¹²³ These characters are compulsive in their hostility, unreflective and uninformed about intellectualism, and are basically self-indulgent themselves. In general, Euripides and Aristophanes are anti-*intellectualists*, chiefly concerned about usefulness of intellectual methods and the effects of adopting them.

The other anti-intellectuals are distinguished by their less sophisticated views of the action of intellectualism. They regard it as only destructive, and focus on its results rather than its methods. Sokrates' Meletos (and Andokides' prosecutor) and Nikomachos' prosecutor display this view in regards to religion, that any kind of analysis that implies criticism is illegitimate. Similar attitudes are apparent in Aias' rejection of Odysseus' moral flexibility, Kleon's rejection of flexibility in the principles that underpin policy, and the view that examining the basis for morality undermines its force. This hostility is unreflective and reactive. It is illustrated particularly in Plato's portrait of Anytos and Aristophanes' fragment 490 - "A book's spoiled him, or Prodicus, or if not, *some-one* at any rate of the chattering lot" (Chapter 2.1 B4) – the conviction that intellectualism *must* be responsible for corruption.

This anti-intellectualism exists in the belief in the simple integrity and true understanding of the ordinary man. This pervades popular genres but takes the form of supposedly self-evident platitudes rather than being clearly asserted. Orators and playwrights presuppose the sentiments and psychological presuppositions of ordinary citizens – such as the beliefs that truth is straightforward, meaning is directly derivable from manifestation, and that abnormal behaviour is probably really self-interested – but rarely explicate them. Kleon is unusual in his explicit appeal to and identification with the standards of ordinary unreflective Athenians.

CHAPTER 6 – CONCLUSION

This thesis set out to give an account of the phenomenon of anti-intellectualism in Athens between c.450 and c.380 BC. It has described a number of incidents that involved hostility towards intellectuals; the negative characteristics and behaviours ascribed to them; and the apparently systematic avoidance of the appearance of intellectualism in certain genres and institutions. The ultimate aim was to describe the sentiments and principles that underpinned these phenomena.

I have differentiated this study from previous scholarship by (a) providing a broad and socially cohesive account rather than focusing on any one aspect; (b) confining the study to a particular social period; and (c) by rigorous application of the rules of evidence.

A. Intellectuals and intellectualism in Athenian society

The first point that emerges is that, while anti-intellectual sentiments existed in the various forms outlined above, ancient Athenians do not seem to have been preoccupied with intellectuals or intellectualism. The negative sentiments that they hold are generally latent rather than explicit. The sources assume that intellectuals were popularly considered to be eccentric but direct hostility is rare. It tends to appear in the expression of platitudes about democratic egalitarianism, the wisdom and integrity of the common man.

The Athenians were, in general, apathetic towards intellectuals and ignorant about them. Popular genres do not distinguish between intellectuals of different kinds. Aristophanes' most frequently cited exponent of intellectual novelties is not a scientist or a philosopher at all but the tragedian Euripides. The lack of distinction is most pronounced in the person of Sokrates, whom both Aristophanes and his prosecutors represent as a scientist, astronomer and rhetorician. His apologists are preoccupied with distinguishing him from sophists, which must reflect their view of the broadness of the popular

conception.¹ Moreover, the intellectuals most frequently referred to in popular genres are all Athenian citizens: Sokrates, Chairephon and Meton and 'modern' poets like Euripides and Agathon. Non-Athenians are only occasionally mentioned and then with little or no development. This suggests that the most important factor in their fame or notoriety was their intimacy with Athenian life, not their intellectual influence.

Explicit criticism of intellectuals and intellectuals is uncommon. As we have seen, Aristophanes and Euripides' interest seems to have been atypical and was itself a cause for mockery by others (see Chapter 5 A). Where criticism appears it conspicuously fails to whip up any particular hostility. Aristophanes' *Clouds* came last in its competition; Kleon's Mytilene speech failed; the circumstances and results of other intellectual persecutions and prosecutions, such as Nikomachos, Aspasia, Damon, are unclear. Sokrates' trial is the only certain instance of an attack on an intellectual that found significant support in the Athenian *demos* and, even then, the vote against him was only just enough to secure his conviction.

It is equally certain that the Athenians did not regret this. The tradition that the Athenians were filled by remorse after Sokrates' death and persecuted or executed his prosecutors is certainly false, at least in the case of Anytos. Diodoros of Sicily says that Anytos was executed without trial (14.37.7). Diogenes Laertios says that Antisthenes incited some Thracian youths to drive him out of the city and, when he came to Pontic Herakleia, he was banished from there as well.² According to Themistios, the Herakleans stoned him to death and his grave could still be seen (20.239c). Contemporary sources, however, are silent about a violent and disgraceful end to Anytos' life and career and, in fact, suggest the opposite. (a) He still held political influence several years later in the lead-up to the Korinthian War.³ (b) Lysias' *Against the Corn-dealers* calls an Anytos, a *sitophylax*, as a witness. The speech dates to 386 BC, well after Sokrates' trial. Given the rarity of the name and the presumption that the witness is distinguished, this is unlikely to be anyone

else.⁴ (c) Xenophon refers to Anytos' death but says nothing about the details.⁵ The sources for the exile or execution of Meletos and Lykon are also very late.⁶ It is barely conceivable that Sokrates' apologists and successors would fail to mention these events if they were true. On the contrary, in the second half of the 4th century the public speakers Aischines and Hypereides refer to Sokrates' execution with approval, not regret, reproach or qualification.⁷ The story that Euripides remonstrated with the Athenians for Sokrates' execution in the *Palamedes* is exposed as a myth by the observation that Euripides died first.⁸

B. Characteristics ascribed to intellectuals and intellectualism

The contrast between the man of wisdom and the man of action appears from the beginning of Greek culture. It is implied in the difference between Homer's Nestor (who is too old to fight and devotes himself to providing advice) and his younger peers, and between Odysseus and Aias in the award of Achilles' arms (see Chapter 3 A). However, the contrast between the contemplative and active lives is made first explicit in classical Athens in Euripides' *Antiope*. In most sources, it is personal eccentricities, especially uselessness, preoccupation with argument and theorising, arrogance and religious unorthodoxy that distinguish intellectuals. These reflect the superficiality of Athenian public awareness. Criticism of the usefulness and ramifications of the intellectual process is confined to a few outspoken individual critics (see Chapter 5). It is rare for intellectuals to be associated with genuinely dangerous practices.⁹ For instance, while the popular genre of oratory shows that there was a common preoccupation with the deviousness of cultivated speech, it was rarely connected to intellectualisation. It was more usual for blame to be placed on the individual's self-interestedness and arrogance. It is individual critics, such as Aristophanes and Polykrates, not the public, who identify a link between intellectualisation and political and social danger. Popular genres, comedy and tragedy, do associate intellectual education with the erosion of moral fortitude and sensibility but, even so, they focus on corruption of the most mundane kind: laziness, self-indulgence and a lack of physical resilience.¹⁰ The view that intellectual influence could

damage the integrity of the state does not seem to have made an impact on the public mind before Sokrates' trial. Polykrates may have been the first to cite explicitly and to canonise the examples of Alkibiades and Kritias as men whom intellectualisation had encouraged towards violence and political subversion.¹¹

Implicit rationalisations developed to reinforce and explain the ascription of these characteristics. That these are rationalisations rather than analyses is clear from the contradictions that appear. For instance, intellectuals' inability to tend to their own interests is explained by their preoccupation with research and is proved by the belief that their theories have no practical application. This is inconsistent with belief in their grasping nature, mercenary behaviour and suspicion that they will turn their abilities to their own benefit. Characteristics do not necessarily represent the whole group but are ascribed to it from a particular exemplar. For instance, those associated with Sokrates take on his physical characteristics. Intellectuals not connected to him are characterised as greedy and luxuriating (Chapter 2.1 B2 and 4.3 A2).

A number of these motifs set the pattern for the characterisation of intellectuals in later times. The theme of 'corrupting the young' appears in the 4th century accusations made against the mythical figure of Palamedes¹², the dead Anaxagoras¹³, Aischines' opponent Demosthenes (directly citing Sokrates' example)¹⁴, and in the Byzantine reference to Prodikos' execution.¹⁵

Palamedes' conviction, apparently by an abuse of his own invention of writing¹⁶, is the first instance of the theme of intellectuals as victims of their own cleverness. There are the late-attested anecdotes of Euathlos refusing to pay his teacher Protagoras, and Teisias Korax, the latter occasion supposedly giving rise to the expression 'a bad egg from a bad crow'.¹⁷ This tendency is an aspect of the motif common in ancient biography in which great achievement is almost inevitably followed by a sticky end.¹⁸

C. The context of anti-intellectualism

C1. Pythagoreans

The Pythagoreans were perhaps the most famous intellectual group in the Greek World in the 5th century, having established a long-lasting school and exercising considerable influence in at least one city, Kroton.¹⁹ There is some evidence that Aristophanes, at least, viewed their example as important to understanding the position of intellectuals in Athens. *The Clouds* seems to allude to them a number of times. At one point Sokrates swears ‘By Respiration, by Chaos, by Air’ (μὰ τὴν Αναπνοήν, μὰ τὸ Χάος, μὰ τὸν Αἶρα), an oath that is almost identical to the first line of a work attributed to Pythagoras (οὐ μὰ τὸν ἀέρα τὸν ἀναπνέω).²⁰ The student who admits Strepsiades to the Thinktank calls Sokrates ‘Himself’ (αὐτός), which may allude to Pythagorean practice, though it is also the normal way a slave would refer to his master.²¹ The Thinktank is an exclusive cult-like institution, apparently peculiar to the Pythagoreans²², and its burning at the end of *The Clouds* recalls the revolt against them in Kroton in c.450 BC.²³ The Pythagorean tradition may therefore form part of the historical context against which anti-intellectualism in Athens should be understood, particularly Aristophanes’ view of Sokrates. There is a tradition, though only attested in late sources, that the Pythagoreans were exclusive and tyrannical.²⁴ Against this interpretation, it must be said that there is little evidence of Pythagorean influence in Athens before the Peloponnesian War and none during it, which is unsurprising, as their main bases in Greece, Thebes and Phleious, were Spartan allies.²⁵ The Athenian audience may have found Aristophanes’ allusions, if this is what they are, rather obscure and unimportant.

C2. Gorgias’ visitation

Gorgias’ visit to Athens as an ambassador in 427 BC may be the ultimate cause of Kleon’s outburst against clever speakers in the Mytilene debate in the same year (see Chapter 5 B). Apart from Kleon, however, the Athenian reaction to

Gorgias and his oratorical skills seems to have been either admiration or comic mockery.

C3. Intolerance in Athens? 401-399 BC

Sokrates' conviction may be the only certain instance of a trenchant popular reaction against an intellectual but this period, one or two years after the amnesty of 401 BC, has a striking number of incidents that imply that the Athenians were taking some action to rid themselves of potential 'enemies of the state' of various kinds.

In 400/399 BC there were a number of indictments involving religious issues: Sokrates, Andokides and Nikomachos. Euthyphro's action against his father for impiety may be historical as well.²⁶ The first three of these also involve the authority of the *demos*. The charges against Sokrates, religious unorthodoxy and corrupting the young, all seem to relate to the integrity of the state (see Chapter 2.7). One of the themes of Nikomachos' prosecution is that he had disdained democratic controls on his office (see Chapter 2.6). Andokides' original offence was connected to a possible oligarchic conspiracy.²⁷

One group which the Athenians seem to have tried to purge in 399 BC comprised suspected oligarchs and Spartan sympathisers. They sent a force of cavalry to serve the Spartan general Thibron in Asia with the hope, according to Xenophon, of ridding themselves of those implicated with the Thirty Tyrants.²⁸ At around the same time a vote of exile *in absentia* fell against Xenophon himself, probably also on the grounds of philolaconism.²⁹

Intellectuals may also have felt threatened by the Athenians' intolerance of potential enemies of the state at this same time. All of Sokrates' closest associates, except Antisthenes, departed from Athens after his death.³⁰ According to Hermodoros (an Academician - Cicero implies that he was a younger contemporary of Plato³¹), Plato and a number of others who joined Eukleides at

Megara left Athens after Sokrates' execution because they were 'alarmed at the cruelty of the tyrants'.³² This must refer to those such as Anytos, the same as the 'certain men in authority' whom Plato says prosecuted Sokrates.³³

This apparent intolerance in Athens may have been due to increasing estrangement from Sparta, which would eventually break out in the Korinthian War, and a desire to uphold the integrity of the state. This is particularly evident in Anytos' and Archinos' actions in upholding the terms of the amnesty (see Chapter 5 D2). Athens' defeat in the Peloponnesian War may also have provoked sensitivity about religious issues. The Athenians made lavish sacrifices but were defeated by the Spartans who, the author of the Platonic *Alkibiades II* notes, were frugal in their observances.³⁴ This contradicted the traditional back-scratching conception of the relationship between men and the gods (see Chapter 4.2). It may have caused uncertainty and sensitivity about religious practice. In this atmosphere, critical examination of religious principles may have seemed highly provocative.³⁵ Even if there was a widespread belief that the administration of religion needed reform – as must have been the case for Nikomachos to have received his commission – it is almost certain that, in such an area, no changes would please everyone and may have pleased no-one.³⁶

However, if there was an intolerant and suspicious mood in Athens in 401-399, it was surprisingly muted and unimpassioned. It did not amount to a witch-hunt. Sokrates was convicted by only a narrow majority, even after a notoriously unconciliatory speech, and Andokides was acquitted. In the *Seventh Letter* Plato says that while men took the opportunity to attack their enemies during the revolutions (the Thirty Tyrants and the restoration), the returned democratic exiles 'exercised no little moderation'.³⁷ His comment that Sokrates' trial occurred 'by some chance' (κατὰ δέ τινα τύχην) also suggests that it was not connected to wider events.³⁸ Hermodoros' datum about the departure of Plato and others from Athens doubtless records a genuine tradition of the Academy but the 'cruelty of the tyrants' may be its own explanation of events, which would naturally portray its founder's actions as reasonable, consistent, and high-minded

and those of his purported opponents as the opposite. Hermodoros' datum is not strong evidence that intellectuals were, in fact, subject to real persecution at Athens. The Sokratic diaspora is explicable simply on personal grounds: a combination of a sense of personal revulsion, the loss of the group's magnetic core, the fact that many of Sokrates' associates were not from Athens in the first place, and the members' mutual antagonism.³⁹ In addition, connecting Isokrates' relocation to Chios to the antagonism of the restored democracy, as some do, is pure conjecture.⁴⁰

D. Social and political suppositions

The implicit rationalisations of intellectuals' real or supposed behaviour highlight some of the preoccupations and unstated presuppositions of Athenian thought. The most trenchant and damaging allegation made against intellectuals is that their practices undermine accepted morality and Athens' egalitarian-democratic constitution. These appear in the following suppositions about intellectuals:

- (1) Confidence in one's intellectual power induces a sense of superiority, manifested in the disposition to subject accepted institutions to criticism (cf. Chapter 1.2 A1), and leads to arrogance.
- (2) Intellectuals ignore physical activity, are irreligious and prefer exclusivity and secretiveness.

These highlight Athenian beliefs about the nature of morals and the state.

- (1) Social and political stability and security depend upon a high degree of conformity, deference to accepted customs and like-mindedness (*ὁμόνοια*).
- (2) Excessive individualism or arrogance threatens this unity and conformity. This is particularly the case for Athens with a constitution predicated on the principle of democratic egalitarianism (see Chapter 4.4 C).

- (3) Behaviour that does not admit of conventional explanation must be motivated by self-interest (see Chapter 4.5).
- (4) Moral development is a function of physical development, knowledge of traditional poetry, correct religious observance, and immersion in the social and political life of the state (see Chapter 4.3 D). It depends on habit rather than reason (see below).

E. Anti-Intellectualism

The intellectual method is to examine and comprehend phenomena by separating, distinguishing and rearranging their components, and stripping away the unnecessary to isolate inner qualities that possess transcendent meaning. It is based on these propositions:

- (1) The convictions that phenomena *can* be understood by intellectual analysis, and that argument is coercive, potentially overriding common sense, accepted opinion and even the evidence of one's own senses (see Chapter 1.2 A2).
- (2) The belief that influences can be separated into the contingent and the necessary, and the former treated as meaningless for the purposes of analysis.⁴¹
- (3) The belief that meanings may transcend particular manifestations.

As such, it is inherently concerned with rejecting the traditional and the obvious in the pursuit of the novel and the hidden. Anti-intellectualism is the belief that this process is inadequate as a means to knowledge and destructive if rigorously adhered to. This belief was common in classical Athens but is based on unconscious sentiments rather than positive assertion of any alternative means to truth. The psychological presuppositions that reject the intellectual method are:

- (1) The belief that truth is simple, straightforward and concrete, and that subtlety is devious and unreal.⁴² This is especially conspicuous as an oratorical motif.

- (2) The belief that meaning cannot be separated from manifestation; this follows from (1). The unsophisticated mind may concede that there are such things as 'higher truths' or 'inner meanings' but will not reject or modify its understanding of individual manifestations.
- (3) The tendency to view analyses in ethical terms. The process of description can be misunderstood to imply prescription, as though recognising a distinction amounts to making a value judgement. We have seen instances where moral significance is imputed to the contrasts of νόμος/φύσις and λόγος/ἔργον.
- (4) The inability to distinguish necessary from contingent causes. A consistent criticism of intellectual analysis is its apparent failure to take all factors into account.

Those disputing the validity of the intellectual method - *anti-intellectualists* - implicitly claim to have access to knowledge by means that are comparable or superior to intellectualism. The basis for anti-intellectualists' understanding is of two kinds: super-rationalism and sub-empiricism (see Chapter 1.2 B). Super-rational knowledge is inborn or inspired. Claimants to this are virtually absent from Greek culture of this period. Even oracles required interpretation by learned skill (Chapter 5 C2). The psychological presuppositions suggested above belong to common conviction and ordinary thought, which are characteristic of sub-empiricism. This judges that intellectualism, as a means to knowledge and basis of decision making, is inferior to common knowledge and instinctive reaction. This consists in the acceptance of convention, faith in intuition, and a belief in the self-evidence of meaning. It does not necessarily champion an alternative *method* of attaining understanding but objects to methods that produce conclusions conflicting with convention and gut feeling.

One effect of the faith in gut feeling and convention is to encourage suspicion of any specialised skill or other claims to superiority. Many objections to intellectualism presuppose the psychological need of 'the ordinary man' to denigrate those who are important, influential and talented or who believe

themselves to be.⁴⁴ In the Athenian political sphere this is manifested in the assertion of democratic sentiments and hostility towards intellectualism's supposed negative influence on social and political institutions.

Beliefs about the basis of moral behaviour further highlight the inferiority of intellectual skill in the common view. Reason and intelligence were often conceived of as components of ability and moral sensibility but this attitude was neither universal nor unquestioned. There are always intelligent and rational people conspicuous by their failure to act morally. The contrast between the honest unskilled and the devious skilled is a motif of legal oratory. A similar contrast appears in tragedy, between goodness and intelligence (σοφία, νοῦς, διάνοια, τὸ δεινόν). For example, Sophokles' Neoptolemos, the epitome of upright idealistic honour, says to Odysseus: 'If they [my intentions] are good, that is better than being clever (σοφός)'.⁴⁵ The unfavourable view of intellect in relation to morality is due partly to the suspicion that talent will be turned to serve self-interest (see Chapter 4.3 B), and partly to the widespread belief that human reason is less powerful than emotions and passions.⁴⁶ The triumph of innate irrational impulses is a particularly prominent theme in a number of Euripides' plays (see Chapter 2.3 B). The explicit recognition of a distinction between passion (ἐπιθυμία) and sense, first appearing in the mouth of Euripides' Medea⁴⁷, coincides with the growth of intellectualism. It may be a by-product of greater awareness of the individual's ability to understand and influence events, leading to simultaneous increases in senses of intellectual power and human deficiency.⁴⁸ Common Greek thought tended to conceive of virtue (ἀρετή) as consisting precisely in the control of these destructive passions. Plato's Sokrates, when advancing his own theory, specifically cites this as 'the popular sense'.⁴⁹ In this non-intellectual conception of moral control the role of reason is less obvious than the development of modesty and physical hardiness.⁵⁰

Sub-empiricist anti-intellectualism becomes explicit in the form of traditionalism. The inculcation of practical and moral knowledge and the prosperity of the state

were considered to come from learning traditional stories and adhering to correct religious observances. Plato depicts Meletos and Anytos giving an unreflective – but probably quite typical – analysis of those who were responsible for improving the youth: the laws and all of the citizens, or at least those serving the state, their knowledge inherited from earlier generations and equally available to all citizens.⁵¹ The hostility to Nikomachos' codification may have been due to the sense that he was attacking the foundation of the city, its continuity with the past (see Chapter 2.6). Unsophisticated minds tend to conceive of the past as a discrete entity attached to but separate from the present: past events are integrated into established patterns that are recurrent and therefore non-particularised. The exposure of discontinuity or irregularity can be disquieting in the extreme.⁵²

Anti-intellectualism offers three responses to intellectualism: (1) to destroy it utterly; (2) to contain it, believing that it may have some use but resenting its involvement in affairs that do not concern it; (3) to invade intellectuals' territory and replace them and their methods.⁵³ The last of these is irrelevant to Athens of this period, as there were no intellectual institutions before the 380s BC and no articulated anti-intellectualist philosophy to replace them with. Only a true fanatic might suggest the first option but there is little evidence for these in Athens. Diopieithes may be the only example in this period. The second option accords most with the variety of anti-intellectualism found in Athens, viewing intellectuals as eccentric but generally not harmful, provided that they did not interfere in traditional concepts of religion and morality and the upbringing of the young.

F. Consequences for Athenian society

The tension between recognition of intellectualism's usefulness and suspicion of its arrogance and facilitation of self-interest explains the existence of hostility towards it in public forums, for instance, in ordinary Athenians' contradictory attitude towards rhetorical skill. On the one hand, Greek society traditionally regarded eloquence highly, evident in the oldest Greek literature, such as

Homer's depiction of Odysseus and Nestor. In classical Athens sophisticated speeches, whether legal, political, scientific or philosophical, could be popular with lay audiences (Chapter 1.6 C2). Moreover, Athens' democratic institutions, governed by large assemblies, were explicitly recognised as encouraging the development of rhetorical techniques.⁵⁴ On the other hand, the characteristics of oratory show that Athenians did not like, at least in serious public forums, speeches that were prepared or cultivated, specialised knowledge or explicit use of complex forms of argument. They resolved this tension by ignoring the existence of cultivated speakers, preferring the persona of ordinary men, and demanding that information be framed in terms of popular experience (see Chapter 2.4 B). Public institutions admitted - and even demanded - the use of certain intellectual techniques but required that they conform to popular egalitarian platitudes and common conceptual methods.

The nature of Greek public institutions had a direct effect on the participation of intellectuals in public life. A number of cities in the 450-380 BC period used distinguished intellectuals in public roles. The Pythagorean Archytas was a leading figure in Taras, a democracy, and held the position of *strategos* seven times.⁵⁵ Melissos was a general for Samos.⁵⁶ Gorgias of Leontini, Prodikos of Keios and Hippias of Elis all served as ambassadors (presumably their skill in speaking was a factor in their selection).⁵⁷

From Athens there are Damon⁵⁸ and Thoukydides who held a generalship in the 420s before writing his history.⁵⁹ The Athenians occasionally commissioned experts for specific purposes, such as Protagoras and Hippodamos in the foundation of Thouria.⁶⁰ In general, however, there is a conspicuous absence of intellectuals - or even near-intellectuals - in the public life of Athens. Those who were interested in public affairs but avoided direct involvement, at least under the democracy, include Antiphon, Kritias, Sokrates, Plato and Isokrates.⁶¹ Moreover, their specialised contributions often seem to have been rejected or abandoned after their introduction. Nikomachos' work on codifying laws and calendar of

sacrifices is the outstanding example (Chapter 2.6). Meton's calendar was probably never adopted.⁶²

An irony exists in the relationship between Athenian public life and intellectual activity. The traditional Greek practice of making decisions in large assemblies may have been the critical factor in the development of intellectualism in the first place. This encouraged the development of sophisticated methods of discourse and rigorous proof.⁶³ Yet these same institutions, dominated, in the democratic state, by ordinary citizens with unsophisticated mindsets, directly inhibited the meaningful involvement of intellectuals in public life.

The general absence of intellectuals from Athenian public life and explicit intellectual techniques from popular institutions reflects the democratic state's demand that it be approached on its own terms. But while Athens' democracy may have been uncomfortable for or repellent to many intellectuals there is little indication that the reverse was true. Though 401-399 BC may have seen intolerance towards religious unorthodoxy and political dissent in Athens, this was an unusual occurrence and there is little evidence that intellectuals were actually persecuted (see C3 above). Their lack of involvement in public life may be due to another common characteristic of intellectuals, intransigence. They often show an unwillingness to compromise their style or proposals and prefer withdrawal to dealing with the difficulties of politics.⁶⁴

G. Consequences for the history of thought

The domination by ordinary people of the behaviour of public institutions may have had an influence on the history of thought. It may have affected, firstly, the style of intellectual argumentation and, secondly, intellectuals' mode of engagement with society.

G1. Presentation of intellectual material

It seems that public presentation was a common practice for intellectuals in order to advertise themselves and their work. Public lectures and epideictic speeches seem to have attracted significant audiences. Individuals such as Empedokles, Gorgias, Prodikos, Hippias of Elis, Lysias and Antisthenes presented speeches on public occasions throughout Greece.⁶⁵ From a slightly later time comes Aristotle's anecdote that most of the audience at Plato's lecture *On the Good* came simply because of the title and were completely uninformed about the subject or Plato's methods.⁶⁶ A number of the Hippocratic tracts, the only substantial complete scientific works that survive from this time (c.400 BC), show signs that they were intended to be delivered to lay audiences. The author of *On the Art* explicitly assumes that a normal audience will be inexpert (§1, 2). Doctors may have addressed the Athenian Assembly.⁶⁷ These presentations were, moreover, often competitive. In addition to the orators mentioned above, a number of the Hippocratic tracts show rhetorical flourishes and refer to 'my opponents' and to earlier discussions.⁶⁸

Public interest in new intellectual work and the opportunity for open scrutiny and criticism are not bad things. One consequence of the practice of public presentation is that intellectual work may have become popularised. At least some intellectuals complained that the crowd-pleasing tendencies of other experts detracted from their seriousness and accuracy.

γνοίη δ' ἂν τόδε τις μάλιστα παραγενόμενος αὐτοῖσιν
 ἀντιλεγουσιν· πρὸς γὰρ ἀλλήλους ἀντιλέγοντες οἱ αὐτοὶ
 ἄνδρες τῶν αὐτῶν ἐναντίον ἀκροατέων οὐδέποτε τρίς
 ἐφεξῆς ὁ αὐτὸς περιγίνεται ἐν τῷ λόγῳ, ἀλλὰ ποτὲ μὲν
 οὗτος ἐπικρατεῖ, ποτὲ δὲ οὗτος, ποτὲ δὲ ᾧ ἂν τύχη
 μάλιστα ἢ γλώσσα ἐπιρρυεῖσα πρὸς τὸν ὄχλον. καίτοι
 δίκαιον ἔστι τὸν φάντα ὀρθῶς γινώσκειν ἀμφὶ τῶν
 πρηγμάτων παρέχειν αἰεὶ ἐπικρατέοντα τὸν λόγον τὸν
 ἑωυτοῦ, εἶπερ ἔοντα γινώσκει καὶ ὀρθῶς ἀποφαίνεται.

“The best way to realise this [doctor’s imperfect understanding] is to be present at their debates. Given the same debaters and the same audience, the same man never wins in the discussion three times in succession, but now one is victor, now another, not he who happens to have the most glib tongue in the face of the crowd. Yet it is right that a man who claims correct knowledge about the facts should maintain his own argument victorious always, if his knowledge of reality and if he set it forth correctly.”
(ps.-Hipp. *On the Nature of Man* 1, tr. W.H.S. Jones, Loeb)

Ἐκ δὲ τῶν εἰρημένων τεκμηρίων ὅμως τοιαῦτα ἂν τις νομίζων μάλιστα ἃ διήλθον οὐχ ἁμαρτάνοι, καὶ οὔτε ὡς ποιηταὶ ὑμνήκασι περὶ αὐτῶν ἐπὶ τὸ μείζον κοσμοῦντες μᾶλλον πιστεύων, οὔτε ὡς λογογράφοι ξυνέθεσαν ἐπὶ τὸ προσαγωγότερον τῇ ἀκροάσει ἢ ἀληθέστερον, ὄντα ἀνεξέλεγκτα καὶ τὰ πολλὰ ὑπὸ χρόνου αὐτῶν ἀπίστως ἐπὶ τὸ μυθῶδες ἐκνενηκηκοτα...

“However, I do not think that one will be far wrong in accepting of the conclusions I have reached from the evidence which I have put forward. It is better evidence than that of the poets, who exaggerate the importance of their themes, or of the prose chroniclers, who are less interested in telling the truth than in catching the attention of their public, whose authorities cannot be checked, and whose subject matter, owing to the passage of time, is mostly lost in the unreliable streams of mythology...”
(Thuc. 1.21.1, tr. R. Warner, Penguin)⁶⁹

It may be possible to dismiss these as the complaints of those who were not able to succeed in public forums. However, the focus on ‘competitive publishing’ seems to have had certain effects on the methods of scientific and philosophical proof. Ancient scientific and philosophical tracts may use data from common experience without systematic collection or analysis, and to use this for superficial corroboration of theories, not as their basis. Theories were judged more by their economy, logical consistency and ability to cope with philosophical problems, which are testable by rhetoric, not by their empirical support or predicative value.⁷⁰ The value of experimentation and observation in medicine and science were widely (if not universally) recognised but were rarely practised. For instance, the human anatomy described in *On the Sacred Disease* is not just inaccurate but actually disprovable by its own observational techniques.⁷¹ The tracts show a wealth of speculation but also dogmatism, vagueness, over-theorisation and lack of self-criticism, as well as a preoccupation with

undermining alternative theories on points of argument. These habits of scientific method can be accounted for if public presentation with a more-or-less competitive intent were the norm. Self-scrutiny and systematic arrangement of evidence are not attractive to lay audiences.⁷²

The effect of the popularisation of scientific and philosophical work on the history of thought is imponderable. As an ancient equivalent to publication it certainly would have had an impact upon its propagation. It need not have influenced scientific and philosophical methods but the possibility that it did certainly exists. The incentive to do so was the need to establish intellectual credibility in rhetorical tests against opponents, and success was often measured in the number and wealth of patrons and students that this method attracted.

G2. Disengagement with society

The opposite effect can be seen in those intellectuals who rejected the necessity or desirability of framing their work for the public.⁷³ Quietist and private intellectuals had always existed but this disposition was formalised in the establishment of permanent schools in Athens in the 4th century. Even if their object was to train statesmen, they generally kept their intellectual work to themselves. In the case of Plato's Academy, even its inmates seem to have been unclear about their mentor's ideas.⁷⁴ From the middle of the classical period many intellectuals sought recognition in non-democratic states. They were drawn to the courts' congenial aristocratic and cultural tone, and the ambitious were attracted by the perceived ease of influencing one man with wide-ranging powers instead of the many citizens of a democracy. In practice, these intellectuals almost invariably failed either to contribute to or transcend practical politics. They mainly functioned as either propagandists or apologists for their patrons.⁷⁵

The recognition of intellectualism's practical irrelevance to public policy in Athens can be seen in the last decade of the 4th century. When Demetrios of Phaleron, the Macedonian-supported pro-intellectual despot, was expelled and

the democracy was restored, Theophrastos and others fled and the politician Sophokles of Sounion had a decree passed to prevent the establishment of new philosophical schools. The same democracy, however, quickly reversed this decision. The proscription of intellectuals was an aspect of anti-Macedonian sentiment rather than a reaction against intellectuals themselves. The Athenians decided that the benefit to be had from philosophers' presence outweighed their actual danger.⁷⁶

In Athens in mid-classical period anti-intellectualism flourished as good-humoured mockery of intellectuals and their characteristics, real or imagined. Direct attacks on them were rare and found wide support only in times of exceptional civic stress when their practices seemed – with some justification – to be directly inimical to the state. The most influential manifestation of anti-intellectualism, in public debate, was unconscious, resulting from traditional and unsophisticated habits of thought. Ordinary Athenians' unfamiliarity with the methods, meaning and intentions of intellectualism accounts both for their fascination with it in harmless forums, such as Euripidean tragedy and public lectures, and their suspicion of it when applied to serious matters, such as religion, moral inculcation, or political and legal debate. In general, they were not overly occupied with intellectuals and did not take them very seriously as either good or bad influences. Thukydidēs' Perikles' characterisation of Athenians as 'lovers of wisdom'⁷⁷ may be true but they were not faithful adherents to wisdom's most rigorous and self-conscious form. The fact that anti-intellectualism was generally so mild does, however, attest to the truth of another of Perikles' statements, that Athenians did not become annoyed at their neighbours for doing things as they pleased.⁷⁸

APPENDIX A – TRIALS AND FICTIONS

A. The Ostracism of Damon

Damon was a music theorist, the earliest known. He experimented with harmonies, inventing the ‘relaxed Lydian’ mode¹, and was interested in music’s psychological and ethical effects.² Plato describes him as a follower of Prodikos, and Isokrates refers to him as a σοφιστής.³ He was popularly considered to be a teacher or adviser of Perikles: Plato the comedian calls him Perikles’ ‘Cheiron’. This becomes a standard datum in sources from the mid-late 4th century.⁴ It is possible that he married into Perikles’ family; in *On the Mysteries* Andokides mentions an Agariste, the same name as Perikles’ mother, ‘who had previously been married to Damon’, implying that this man was well known.⁵

The event of his ostracism is of interest as an example of popular action against an acknowledged and well-known intellectual. Four ostraka reading ‘Damon son of Damonides’, dated to after 450 BC, have been discovered.⁶ The literary evidence comes from pseudo-Aristotle, Plutarch and Libanios.

πρὸς δὴ ταύτην τὴν χορηγίαν ἐπιλειπόμενος ὁ Περικλῆς τῇ οὐσίᾳ, συμβουλευσάντος αὐτῷ Δαμωνίδου τοῦ Οἰηθεν (ὃς δόκει τῶν πολλῶν εἰσηγητῆς εἶναι τῷ Περικλεῖ, διὸ καὶ ὠστράκισαν αὐτὸν ὕστερον)...

“So as Perikles’ means were insufficient for this lavishness [to match Kimon’s], he took the advice of Damonides of Oa (who was believed to suggest to Perikles most of his measures, owing to which they afterwards ostracised him)...”

(Ps.-Aristot. *P.A.* 27.4, tr. Rackham, Loeb, slightly modified)

τῷ δ’ ὠστράκῳ πᾶς ὁ διὰ δόξαν ἢ γένος ἢ λόγου δύναμιν ὑπὲρ τοὺς πολλοὺς νομιζόμενος ὑπέπιπτεν· ὅπου καὶ Δάμων ὁ Περικλέους διδάσκαλος, ὅτι τὸ φρονεῖν ἔδokei τις εἶναι περιττός, ἐξωστρακίσθη.

“But as for the penalty of ostracism, this could be inflicted upon anyone who was regarded as standing above the common level in prestige, in birth, or in eloquence. It was for this reason, for example, that Damon, Pericles’

teacher, was ostracised, because he was considered to be a man of extraordinary intellectual power.”

(Plut. *Arist.* 1.7, tr. Scott-Kilvert, Penguin)

ὁ δὲ Δάμων ἔοικεν ἄκρος ὦν σοφιστῆς καταδύεσθαι μὲν εἰς τὸ τῆς μουσικῆς ὄνομα πρὸς τοὺς πολλοὺς ἐπικρυπτόμενος τὴν δεινότητα, τῷ δὲ Περικλεῖ συνῆν καθάπερ ἀθλητῆ τῶν πολιτικῶν ἀλείπτῃς καὶ διδάσκαλος. οὐ μὴν ἔλαθεν ὁ Δάμων τῆ λύρα παρακαλύμματι χρώμενος, ἀλλ’ ὡς μεγαλοπράγμων καὶ φιλοτύραννος ἐξωστρακίσθη...

“Now Damon seems to have been a consummate sophist, but to have taken refuge behind the name of music in order to conceal from the multitude his real power, and he associated with Pericles, that political athlete, as it were, in the capacity of rubber and trainer. However, Damon was not left unmolested in this use of his lyre as a screen, but was ostracized for being a great schemer and a friend to tyranny...”

(Plut. *Per.* 4.2, tr. Perrin, Loeb)

Ορῶν δὲ τῶν ἐν λόγῳ δυνατῶν ἢ τῷ φρονεῖν διαφερόντων ἀποχρώμενον εἰς ἓνια ταῖς ἐμπειρίαις τὸν δῆμον, ὑφορώμενον δ’ αἰεὶ καὶ φυλαττόμενον τὴν δεινότητα καὶ κολούοντα τὸ φρόνημα καὶ τὴν δόξαν, ὡς δῆλον ἦν... τῷ Δάμωνος ἐξστρακισμῷ...

“He [Nikias] saw that the people, upon occasion, served their own turn with experienced men of eloquence or surpassing ability, but ever looked with suspicious and cautious eyes upon such powers, and tried to abate the pride and reputation to which they gave rise. This was manifest in their...ostracising Damon...”

(Plut. *Nic.* 6.1, tr. Perrin, Loeb)

Libanios, writing in the 4th century AD, almost certainly refers to an allegation contained in Polykrates’ *Accusation of Sokrates* that Damon was exiled on account of being an intellectual though no-one had accused him of subverting the democracy.⁷ If this argument is Polykrates’ then this would be the earliest known literary source.

While it is possible that Perikles had two advisers, Damonides and Damon, both from Oa, both ostracised, it is more economical to assume that one man has been

confused. The form shown on the uncovered ostraka is obviously to be preferred.⁸

That Damon was ostracised implies that he had a significant public profile that a large number of citizens (not necessarily a majority) disliked or thought was a potential danger to the state. The date of the ostracism must fall after c.450 (from the ostraka) and probably before c.430 BC (ten years before the dramatic date of Plato's *Laches*, if this can be trusted, which mentions him still living in Athens).⁹ It could even have occurred after Perikles' death in 429 BC. It is notable that no source actually connects Perikles with the event - Plutarch even mentions it separately from his account of the attacks on Perikles' associates.¹⁰ In fact, none of the literary authorities have any details: as reasons they mention resentment of his behind-the-scenes political influence and intellectual talents. Polykrates apparently denied that Damon had attempted to 'subvert the democracy' in order to exaggerate the seriousness of Sokrates' offence. In general terms, however, it is unlikely that Damon's perceived offence was anything other than some affront to Athenian democratic sentiments, either in his character or actions. It is possible that Polykrates' tract is the source for pseudo-Aristotle and Plutarch or, at least, that it served to formalise the datum. This would account for the late sources' lack of detail and their failure to ascribe any direct political involvement to Damon. Their likely belief that Perikles must have been the *real* reason for any action, combined with Polykrates' probable emphasis on Damon's intellectual characteristics (advising, great scheming, eloquence) as the 'cause' of the ostracism, would lead them to assume that he was suspected of *indirect* political influence.¹¹

Damon's intellectual activities may have provoked resentment and hostility in their own right. His intellectual interest in music, combined with political influence, whether his own or through Perikles, may have been thought to be an insidious danger to the state. In Greece music was a communal and pervasive activity. It was an integral component of education and was considered to affect the emotions, behaviour and even moral disposition, therefore social conditions.¹²

Damon wrote a tract called *To the Areopagites*, which may suggest political or constitutional interests (DK 37B2). However, little can be said about his ostracism except the fact that it happened. The sources' notion that it was connected to his intellectualism may depend on Polykrates.

B. Aspasia

All aspects of Aspasia's life are poorly attested and depend on successive generations of comic, political or ethical interpretation.¹³ Her identification as an intellectual has been considered above (Chapter 4.3 A1). Antisthenes, Aischines of Sphettos and Plutarch are the sources for her trial.¹⁴

Ἀντισθένης δ' ὁ Σωκρατικὸς ἐρασθέντα φησὶν αὐτὸν Ἀσπασίας δις τῆς ἡμέρας εἰσιόντα καὶ ἐξιόντα ἀπ' αὐτῆς ἀσπάζεσθαι τὴν ἄνθρωπον, καὶ φευγούσης ποτὲ αὐτῆς γραφὴν ἀσεβείας λέγων ὑπὲρ αὐτῆς πλείονα ἐδάκρυσεν ἢ ὅτε ὑπὲρ τοῦ βίου καὶ τῆς οὐσίας ἐκινδύνευε.

“Antisthenes the Socratic says that when in love with Aspasia he [Perikles] would go in and out of her house twice a day to greet the wench, and once, when she was charged with impiety he, while pleading in her behalf, wept more tears than when his life and property were endangered.”
(Antisth. fr. 35 (Caizzi) ap. Athen. 589e, tr. Gulick, Loeb).

Περὶ δὲ τοῦτου τὸν χρόνον Ἀσπασία δίκην ἔφευγεν ἀσεβείας, Ἑρμίππου τοῦ κωμωδοποιοῦ διώκοντος καὶ προσκατηγοροῦντος ὡς Περικλεῖ γυναῖκας ἐλευθέρων εἰς τὸ αὐτὸ φοιτώσας ὑποδέχοιτο... Ἀσπασίαν μὲν οὖν ἐξητήσατο, πολλὰ πάνυ παρὰ τὴν δίκην, ὡς Αἰσχίνης φησὶν, ἀφιᾶς ὑπὲρ αὐτῆς δάκρυα καὶ δεηθεὶς τῶν δικαστῶν...

“About this time also Aspasia was put on trial for impiety, Hermippus the comic poet being her prosecutor, who alleged further against her that she received free-born women into a place of assignation for Pericles... Well, then, Aspasia he begged off, by shedding copious tears at the trial, as Aeschines says [fr. 25 (Dittmar)], and by entreating the jurors...”
(Plut. *Per.* 32.1, 3 tr. Perrin, Loeb)

There is no particular reason to connect this charge to intellectualism but impiety is frequently alleged against intellectuals for all manner of supposed infractions and unorthodoxies (see Chapter 4.2). Sexual offences are a stock accusation against any woman who stepped out of her accepted role. Possibly Aspasia was supposed to have engaged in some religious activity normally debarred to immoral women.¹⁵ Both aspects of the charge seem to be chosen for their ability to denigrate. Regardless of the charge's substance and the prosecutor's intention, any indictment would involve Perikles, as Aspasia, being a foreigner and a woman, would require representation, and would therefore inevitably become a test of his authority.¹⁶

The most plausible date for a peak in hostility towards Aspasia, whatever form it took, is 438/7 BC. (1) It was rumoured that Athens' involvement in the Samian War was due to her influence over Perikles.¹⁷ This conflict may have been particularly unpopular in Athens as it was protracted and with high casualties, concerned a petty border dispute and could be viewed as having increased Perikles' arrogance.¹⁸ (2) Philochoros fixes the accusations against Pheidias (which are certainly historical) to the archonship of Theodoros in 438/7 BC.¹⁹ Diodoros and Plutarch, who probably both follow Ephoros, imply that the prosecutions of all Perikles' associates took place at around the same time (though Diodoros does not mention any trial of Aspasia).²⁰ (3) Hermippos was active before 435 BC.²¹

However, the fact that Plutarch names a comic poet as prosecutor suggests the possibility that the ultimate source is actually a comedy.²² It is typical of comic invective to make crude sexual interpretations of innocuous events. Plutarch himself is far from asserting his confidence in the historicity of the incident. He attaches qualifiers to all information about Aspasia except her father's name, her city of birth and Perikles' devotion. His account of Perikles' associates' trials both begins and ends with expressions of uncertainty. Indeed, the statement that Perikles shed tears *for the first time* at the grave of his son Paralos further suggests that Plutarch is doubtful about the story of his histrionics at her trial.²³

Of course, Aischines' and Antisthenes' references, made within living memory, must have *some* basis. Aischines' *Aspasia* seems to have revolved around Sokrates recommending her to Kallias as a teacher for his son. He may have referred to Perikles' tears in order to illustrate the devotion she could inspire.²⁴ A comic scene could have served this purpose almost as well as a historical incident, Aischines (or Sokrates) not thinking it necessary to specify that Hermippos' accusation took place on the comic stage not in a court of law. There is even less reason for believing that Antisthenes was objective, as his references to her are uniformly bitter and derogatory. She may have represented many things that he despised or was sensitive about: he hated pleasure, which she, as a woman, embodied; he championed self-control, which she eroded in others, notably Perikles; and he, debarred from civic rights as a half-Athenian, may have resented the enrolment of her son by Perikles as a citizen. He probably had no reservations about exploiting existing attacks on her.²⁵

In summary, Aspasia's trial shows the characteristics of comic invective but this neither proves nor disproves its historicity. If nothing else, the charge of impiety (legal, comic or philosophic) is another instance that demonstrates the association of the usurpation of traditional roles (a woman who exercised intellectual and political power) with the rejection of beliefs felt to underpin the state (religious practice).²⁶

C. Anaxagoras

Anaxagoras' trial seems to be the product of faulty historiography. The only source within memory of the probable date²⁷ is Plato, defending Sokrates against Meletos' assertion that he taught atheistic astronomy.

Αναξαγόρου οἶει κατηγορεῖν, ὧ φίλε Μέλητε, καὶ οὕτω καταφρονεῖς τῶνδε καὶ οἶει αὐτοὺς ἀπείρους γραμμάτων εἶναι, ὥστε οὐκ εἰδέναί, ὅτι τὰ Αναξαγόρου βιβλία τοῦ Κλαζομενίου γέμει τούτων τῶν λόγων;

“Do you think you are prosecuting Anaxagoras, my dear Meletus, and do you so despise these gentlemen and think they are so unversed in letters as not to know that the books of Anaxagoras of Clazomenae are full of such utterances?”

(Pl. *Apol.* 26d, tr. Fowler, Loeb)

This comment looks like it refers to a hypothetical trial introduced for the sake of argument. Apart from this, no authority earlier than the 3rd century BC mentions the incident.

Περὶ δὲ τῆς δίκης αὐτοῦ διάφορα λέγεται. Σωτίων μὲν γὰρ φησὶν ἐν τῇ Διαδοχῇ τῶν φιλοσόφων ὑπὸ Κλέωνος αὐτὸν ἀσεβείας κριθῆναι, διότι τὸν ἥλιον μύδρον ἔλεγε διάπυρον· ἀπολογησαμένου δὲ ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ Περικλέους τοῦ μαθητοῦ, πέντε ταλάντοις ζημιωθῆναι καὶ φυγαδευθῆναι. Σάτυρος δ' ἐν τοῖς Βίοις ὑπὸ Θουκυδίδου φησὶν εἰσαχθῆναι τὴν δίκην, ἀντιπολιτευομένου τῷ Περικλεῖ· καὶ οὐ μόνον ἀσεβείας, ἀλλὰ καὶ μηδισμού· καὶ ἀπόντα καταδικασθῆναι θανάτῳ... Ἑρμιππος δ' ἐν τοῖς Βίοις φησὶν ὅτι καθεῖρχθη ἐν τῷ δεσμοτηρίῳ τεθνηζόμενος. Περικλῆς δὲ παρελθὼν εἶπεν εἴ τι ἔχουσιν ἐγκαλεῖν αὐτῷ κατὰ τὸν βίον· οὐδὲν δὲ εἰπόντων, “καὶ μὴν ἐγώ,” ἔφη, “τούτου μαθητῆς εἰμι· μὴ οὖν διαβολαῖς ἐπαρθέντες ἀποκτείνητε τὸν ἄνθρωπον, ἀλλ' ἐμοὶ πεισθέντες ἄφετε. καὶ ἀφείθη· οὐκ ἐνεγκὼν δὲ τὴν ὕβριν ἑαυτὸν ἐξήγαγεν. Ἰερώνυμος δ' ἐν τῷ δευτέρῳ Τῶν σποράδην ὑπομνημάτων φησὶν ὅτι ὁ Περικλῆς παρήγαγεν αὐτὸν ἐπὶ τὸ δικαστήριον, διερρηκτότα καὶ λεπτόν ὑπὸ νόσου, ὥστε ἐλέφ μάλλον ἢ κρίσει ἀφεθῆναι. καὶ τὰ μὲν περὶ τῆς δίκης αὐτοῦ τσαῦτα... καὶ τέλος ἀποχωρήσας εἰς Λάμψακον αὐτόθι κατέστρεψεν.

“Of the trial of Anaxagoras different accounts are given. Sotion [fr. 3 (W)] in his *Succession of the Philosophers* says that he was indicted by Cleon on a charge of impiety, because he declared the sun to be a mass of red-hot metal; that his pupil Pericles defended him, and he was fined five talents and banished. Satyrus in his *Lives* says the prosecutor was Thucydides, the opponent of Pericles, and the charge one of treasonable correspondence with Persia as well as of impiety; and that sentence of death was passed on Anaxagoras by default.... Hermippus [fr. 30 (W)] in his *Lives* says that he was confined in the prison pending his execution; that Pericles came forward and asked the people whether they had any fault to find with him in

his own public career; to which they replied that they had not. ‘Well,’ he continued, ‘I am a pupil of Anaxagoras; do not then be carried away by slanders and put him to death. Let me prevail upon you to release him.’ So he was released; but he could not brook the indignity he had suffered and committed suicide. Hieronymus [fr. 41 (W)] in the second book of his *Scattered Notes* states that Pericles brought him into court so weak and wasted from illness that he owed his acquittal not so much to the merits of his case as to the sympathy of the judges. So much then on the subject of his trial... At length he retired to Lampsacus and there died.” (D.L. 2.12-15, tr. R.D. Hicks, Loeb)

πρὸς δὲ τούτοις Αναξαγόραν τὸν σοφιστὴν, διδάσκαλον ὄντα Περικλέους, ὡς ἀσεβοῦντα εἰς τοὺς Θεοὺς ἔσυκοφάντου· συνέπλεκον δ’ ἐν ταῖς κατηγορίαις καὶ διαβολαῖς τὸν Περικλέα, διὰ τὸν φθόνον σπεύδοντες διαβαλεῖν τὴν ἀνδρὸς ὑπεροχὴν τε καὶ δόξαν.

“Furthermore, they [Perikles’ enemies who had already accused Pheidias] falsely accused the sophist Anaxagoras, who was Pericles’ teacher, of impiety against the gods; and they involved Pericles in their accusations and malicious charges, since jealousy made them eager to discredit the eminence as well as the fame of the man.” (D.S. 12.39.2, tr. Oldfather, Loeb)²⁸

Later sources continue in this vein. Josephos says that the Athenians only narrowly failed to condemn him to death for his assertion that the sun was a red-hot stone (*Ap.* 2.265). Plutarch mentions the incident a number of times, in most detail in his *Life of Perikles*:

“And Diopieithes brought in a bill providing for the public impeachment of such as did not believe in gods, or who taught doctrines regarding the heavens, directing suspicion against Pericles by means of Anaxagoras. The people accepted with delight these slanders... and he [Pericles] feared for Anaxagoras so much that he sent him away from the city.” (Plut. *Per.* 32.1-3, tr. Perrin, Loeb)²⁹

I have cited these accounts of the trial to highlight their considerable divergence. They do not agree on the exact charges brought against Anaxagoras; on the identity of the prosecutor; on whether the case actually came to trial; on the nature of Perikles’ involvement; on the outcome of the trial or on Anaxagoras’ ultimate fate. Plutarch is not himself clear about his end. In one place he says that

Anaxagoras was honoured at the end of his life³⁰; in another that he starved, or almost starved, on account of Perikles' neglect, which implies that he believed that he lived in Athens until a very advanced age.³¹

Modern scholars respond to these discrepancies in one of three ways. Firstly, they find reasons for preferring one version to the others: for instance, Derenne and Frost prefer Sotion, and Woodbury argues for Satyros.³² Secondly, they attempt to reconcile the inconsistent information. For example, they suggest that the two different prosecutors, Thoukydides and Kleon, worked together.³³ For a case to have more than one prosecutor is not unusual but it would be surprising in this instance given the radical difference in Thoukydides' and Kleon's backgrounds. There have also been attempts to argue that there were two separate trials.³⁴ There is also no ancient evidence to support this. This solution requires a considerable edifice of conjecture to be sustained: the existence of an unattested amnesty c.445/4 BC, the assumption that Anaxagoras' '30 years' in Athens³⁵ were not continuous, and that his residency at Lampsakos was fairly short, even though he had sufficient impact to be commemorated with a holiday.³⁶

The third option is to conclude that the sources' inconsistencies indicate that none of them actually had access to definite information, apart from the belief that Anaxagoras was subject to an accusation of impiety. All other details seem to come from the writer's view of 'historical probability'. The introduction of Perikles into the trial is due to a combination of his supposed friendship with Anaxagoras with the desire to identify a 'real' motive, which *must* be Perikles' enemies' attempt to discredit him.³⁷ The prosecutors' identities derive from Perikles' political opponents, varying according to whether the writer pictured the trial occurring early (Thoukydides) or late (Kleon) in Perikles' career. Anaxagoras' fate also seems to vary according to the date ascribed to the trial. If it is placed early, he is exiled, if late in his life the trial results in his exile, death, suicide, exile and recall, or acquittal. The charge of Medism may derive from Anaxagoras' Ionian origins or his retirement to Ionia. Even the one consistent detail, the charge of impiety, may simply be an inference from his well-known

naturalistic astronomy.³⁸ All these are plausible reconstructions based on historical probability, an accepted method of ancient historiography.³⁹

It is, in fact, certain that Anaxagoras was not executed: Alkidamas, his younger contemporary, says that he retired, apparently comfortably, to Lampsakos.⁴⁰ As this city was a member-state of the Delian League in c.438 BC, this makes it even less likely that he was escaping a trial or a death sentence.⁴¹

Belief in the Anaxagoras' impiety trial must have some origin. Plato's *Apology* is the likely source. Ancient scholars, desperate for biographical information and fond of the romantic, took Plato's hypothetical remark to refer to an actual event. Such a misunderstanding would be easy to make if data on Anaxagoras and his theories were available as excerpts and were therefore decontextualised (see Chapter 1.6). The divergences in the accounts of his trial do not disprove its existence but they do cast considerable doubt upon it and render its details too unreliable for use.

D. Protagoras

It is said that Protagoras' statement of agnosticism in his *On the Gods* provoked such a hostile reaction in Athens that his books were gathered together and burned and he was banished and forced to flee in fear for his life. However, the fact that the sources become more elaborate and detailed over time suggests the intervention of writers' imaginations.⁴² These stories have no contemporary corroboration. The opposite is true: in the *Meno* Plato has Sokrates comment that Protagoras died with his high reputation intact. This cannot be ironic, as Sokrates' interlocutor is Anytos, who would not let such a remark pass unchallenged. Plato's datum makes Protagoras' persecution impossible.⁴³

As in the case of Anaxagoras, this historical myth seems to have originated in a misunderstanding of a frivolous remark. The 3rd century BC philosophical satirist Timon of Phleious said that:

ἔθελον δὲ τέφρην συγγράματα θείναι,
 ὅτι θεοὺς κατέγραψ' οὐτ' εἰδέναι οὔτε δύνασθαι
 ὅποιοί τινές εἰσι καὶ οἳ τινες ἀθρήσασθαι,
 πᾶσαν ἔχων φυλακὴν ἐπεικείης. τὰ μὲν οὐ οἱ
 χραίσμησ', ἀλλὰ φυγῆς ἐπεμαίετο, ὄφρα μὴ οὕτως
 Σωκρατικὸν πίνων ψυχρὸν πότον αἶδα δύη.

“They made up their minds [literally: ‘they wished’] to make ashes of his books because he put it in writing that he did not know nor could he perceive what or who the gods are. His words were cautious and reasonable. When this did him no good he made a run for it, hoping to avoid the cold drink of Socrates and a trip to Hades.”
 (DK 80A12 ~ Timon of Phleious fr. 5 (Diels), tr. M.J. O’Brien in Sprague (ed.), *The Older Sophists*)

The burning of Protagoras’ books, if historical, would be the earliest use of this measure as an official punishment but, as the Athenians had practiced deletion of written records from the 5th century, the idea is not actually anachronistic. However, Timon’s remark seems to be an adaptation of a comment from the 4th century Aristoxenos. “Aristoxenus in his *Historical Notes* affirms that Plato wished (θελήσαι) to burn all the writings of Democritus that he could collect, but that Amyclas and Clinias the Pythagoreans prevented him, saying that there was no advantage in doing so, for already the books were widely circulated.”⁴⁴ This would explain Timon’s use of the term ‘they wished’ (ἔθελον), which is an odd way to refer to a historical event. The sentiment may have appealed to him for use as a piece of colourful satirical invective.⁴⁵ Timon’s statement that Protagoras fled Athens to avoid execution may simply be designed to cast his departure in a discreditable light. The detail, found in later sources, that he was ‘pursued across the seas’⁴⁶ is probably an inference from Philochoros who says that he drowned sailing to Sicily.⁴⁷

There is no reference to any actual proscription against Protagoras before Cicero.⁴⁸ Libanios refers to actions against Anaxagoras and Protagoras but this seems to be a hypothetical statement, not a response to a comment in Polykrates’ *Accusation of Sokrates*.⁴⁹

Like Anaxagoras, Protagoras' offence of impiety was probably an inference from his famous statement of agnosticism. Aristotle's datum that Euathlos prosecuted Protagoras should be taken seriously but there is no reason to connect it to an impiety charge, as Diogenes Laertios does. Other sources give the information that Euathlos' and Protagoras' dispute was over fees.⁵⁰

E. Prodikos

ἐν Αθήναις κόνειον πιὼν ἀνέθανεν ὡς διαφθείρων τοὺς νέους.

“He [Prodikos] died in Athens from drinking hemlock, on the grounds that he had corrupted the young.”
(DK 84A 1, tr. Olding)

This comes from the *Suidas* (s.v. Πρόδικος) and a scholiast on Plato (*Rep.* 600c), very late sources without great reputations for reliability. We have seen evidence that Prodikos could be regarded as corrupting, greedy and irreligious, but these comments seem to be good humoured (from comedy) or oblique (from Plato).⁵¹ Otherwise, he seems to have been held in wide respect in his own lifetime.⁵² There is no other evidence that he was persecuted. The *Suidas*' statement is surely an error for Sokrates.⁵³

F. Euripides

The existence and circumstances of Euripides' trial for impiety are uncertain. There are two sources. First, Satyros (3rd century BC) in a fragment says “...He was prosecuted by Cleon the demagogue in the action for impiety mentioned above...”.⁵⁴ What was ‘above’ is, unfortunately, lost. Second, a 3rd century AD list of subjects for rhetorical exercises includes the item that “Euripides, having represented Herakles as mad, in a play, at the Dionysia, is on trial for impiety” (*P.Oxy.* 2400). The other items on the list are historical, so the author, at least, thought that the Euripides incident was real. It is well known that Euripides'

contemporaries viewed him as religiously unorthodox, something that is evident both in comedy and his *antidosis* trial.⁵⁵ It is also not implausible that Kleon would choose to launch such a prosecution, as the case of Aristophanes illustrates.⁵⁶ However, the only evidence that he was actually prosecuted for impiety remains the two Hellenistic data and no great weight can be placed on these. Satyros, in particular, is notoriously credulous and uncritical (see Chapter 1.6). Euripides' religious unconventionality is a standard component of his biography in ancient (and, indeed, modern) scholarship but seems to derive solely from statements made by characters in his plays.⁵⁷

G. Diogenes of Apollonia

ἦν δὲ τοῖς χρόνοις κατ' Αναξαγόραν. τοῦτον φησιν ὁ Φαληρεὺς Δημήτριος ἐν τῇ Σωκράτους ἀπολογία διὰ μέγαν φθόνον μικροῦ κινδυνεύσαι Αθήμησιν.

“And he lived in the time of Anaxagoras. In his *Apology of Sokrates* Demetrios of Phaleron [fr. 91 (W)] says that this man was almost in danger in Athens because of great jealousy.”
(D.L. 9.57, tr. Olding).

The identity of ‘this man’ is more likely to be Diogenes than Anaxagoras: in Diogenes Laertios' usage οὗτος always refers to the subject of that chapter, in this case, Diogenes; moreover, the comment would be far more appropriate in the section on Anaxagoras.⁵⁸ However, the source, Demetrios, is arguing in support of his thesis that the Athenians were always jealous of talent. In the absence of corroborative evidence he may be suspected of misrepresenting or inventing data to support his thesis.⁵⁹

APPENDIX B - ATHENIAN ATTITUDES TOWARDS EDUCATION

Attitudes towards education need not be connected to attitudes towards intellectualism. Education is generally taken to consist in learning practical skills and moral restraint, not critical skills or methods of argument or inculcating a desire for the pursuit of knowledge for its own sake. Indeed, intellectualism is frequently attacked through characterisation as impractical and lack of moral restraint. There is little evidence from classical Athens for the existence of an attitude that education is unnecessary or undesirable. Nevertheless, a glance at Athenian attitudes towards education in basic intellectual tools, and these tools' availability, will be indicative of wider social attitudes.

Xenophon remarks that, in Greece, literacy was considered to be the principle function of schooling.⁶⁰ For the sake of simplicity, literacy and, to a lesser extent, numeracy will be assumed to be the basic intellectual tools. It is certain that literacy plays a fundamental role in the development of intellectualism. The recording of information permits systematic analysis of data. It also exposes inconsistencies that would normally be hidden by 'structural amnesia', the consensus of common culture. This process encourages critical focus on causes and meanings rather than acceptance of manifestations as they stand. The use of writing allows the development of complex forms of argument and the communication of ideas outside established institutions. However, as the precise relationship between writing and intellectualism is uncertain, it is preferable to say that literacy is a precondition and facilitator of intellectualism, not its cause.⁶¹

To assess attitudes towards general education I shall consider (A) the prevalence of literacy and illiteracy in Athens, (B) the existence of facilities for the acquisition of literacy and (C) the ideological dimensions of this skill. The nature of the sources demands that the focus is on the inhabitants of the city of Athens

where basic education is probably significantly higher than in the countryside⁶², on men rather than women⁶³, and on 'ordinary' people rather than the social élite (where we would expect greater leisure and higher cultural standards to encourage a higher level of education in general). Evidence is rarely unambiguous and proof must be inferential.

A. The prevalence of literacy in Athens

Greek culture was the first in which literacy was not confined to administrative or religious élites. This does not mean that it was actually widespread.

Contemporary sources, however, seem to assume that ordinary men have basic education, even when they are specified to be uncouth and uneducated.

Aristophanes introduces Strepsiades, Athens' most notable anti-intellectual, going over his accounts.⁶⁴ There is no indication that his numeracy is unusual but, like his marriage to an Alkmaionid, it is a dramatic necessity and need not, therefore, represent the norm. A proverb connected to the Athenian soldiers from the Sicilian Expedition describes them as being 'either dead or teaching letters'.⁶⁵ This suggests chiefly that teaching was an occupation suitable for slaves (see section E below) but also that an ordinary soldier could not implausibly be literate.

Other evidence implies that a significant proportion of the Athenian *demos* was minimally literate, at least knowing their letters, or that there were enough literates to cater for illiterates without undue inconvenience. Spelling games appear occasionally in drama. In Euripides' *Theseus* an illiterate herdsman describes the letters on the side of a ship offstage. In Sophokles' *Amphiaraus* letters were shown through dance; Achaios had satyrs spell out Δ-Ι-Ο-Ν-Υ-Σ-Ο written on a cup; in Kallias' *Grammatical Play* the alphabet and syllables were sung in systematic order.⁶⁶ The dramatists clearly expected that at least

some of the audience would be able to understand such spelling games and that they would not try the patience of too many people unreasonably. Euripides' dramatic device must have been successful as Agathon and Theodektes imitated it.⁶⁷ The audience may have gained some pleasurable satisfaction from understanding these games if literacy was, in fact, fairly novel and typically basic.⁶⁸

Orators occasionally presume that their listeners have some level of literacy and numeracy, or are sitting next to someone who does. Perikles makes calculations out loud.⁶⁹ In the mid-4th century a speaker openly ponders whether he could have explained matters more clearly if he had brought a blackboard into court, only dissuaded, he claims, by the consideration that those furthest away would be unable to read it.⁷⁰ These instances are few and brief and so do not really reflect on popular literacy - they do not require that the listeners actually needed to follow the speakers. The speakers may have intended to flatter the jurors' concentration and education.

Members of the intellectual class also assume that basic literacy is fairly widespread. In their frequent discussions about education intellectuals and literati, such as Protagoras, Sokrates and Xenophon, imply that it was customary for parents, where able, to have their children educated.⁷¹ Plato cites a proverb, "They can't read or swim" (μήτε γράμματα μήτε νεῖν ἐπίστωνται) to describe utter uselessness, though it is not clear that this was actually held in wide currency.⁷² In his trial Sokrates suggests that jurors would be familiar with Anaxagoras' book but this assertion need not be taken at face value as it favours his argument; he may also be indulging in irony.⁷³

The institutions of the democratic state seem to be predicated on the assumption that literacy was widespread, though in no case is the data clear-cut. Almost all

official positions, including secretariats and those involved in drafting laws and treaties and administering taxes, were filled by lot.⁷⁴ It is possible that candidates were not truly representative of the whole population but limited to those who put themselves forward. However, we would expect to have heard about any serious restriction. The method of ostracism voting presupposes that citizens can write names. Dumps of pre-prepared ostraka have been found, for instance, 191 votes against Themistokles in only 14 hands. These may, but need not have been, produced to accommodate illiterate voters.⁷⁵ Plutarch's anecdote that a man who was 'unlettered and a complete bumpkin' asked Aristeides to write his own name on an ostrakon, if it has any basis in actual practice, does show that ostraka could be written by someone other than the voter.⁷⁶

Announcements by heralds were the traditional method of proclaiming and disseminating official information⁷⁷ but public inscriptions were also clearly important. Some inscriptions had symbolic rather than practical value, such as treaties, memorials⁷⁸ and records of traitors.⁷⁹ Much of it, however, is of immediate and practical use, such as military service lists, laws and penalties. This implies that at least some people found them useful to consult. Moreover, official inscriptions carry the formulas 'so that anyone who wishes may read' or 'that all may know'.⁸⁰ Inscriptions were altered from time to time, not only by official decree, which could be symbolic, but also illegitimately for private ends, for instance, in the alteration of hoplite and cavalry rolls.⁸¹ This further emphasises their information was practical and meaningful.

The evidence from legal procedure is less clear than for political procedure: written materials were used but were not necessary. Written evidence had no particular authority.⁸² The use of witnesses and sworn statements was normal. Written depositions were not required until 378/7 BC and, even then, private professional scribes would have been available.⁸³

There are only a few instances of actual illiteracy: from Euripides' *Theseus*, referred to above; a fragment of a Kratinos comedy (fr. 122); and Plutarch's anecdote about Aristeides' ostracism. The paucity of examples is consistent both with illiteracy being usual (not normally being worthy of comment) and unusual. The instance suggests that illiteracy was not shameful but the point of the anecdote is to prove Aristeides' dignity and integrity, so that the peasant's illiteracy may be an embellishment rather than a necessary detail. In fact, Cornelius Nepos' version, predating Plutarch's by a century and a half, does not mention it.⁸⁴

B. The availability of education

While teaching may have occurred at home or informally elsewhere, schools are the only forum for elementary education that ancient authorities mention. Both literary and pictorial evidence indicates that, by the early 5th century, schools existed in a number of different places in Greece. There was a school in Chios before 494 BC, Astypalaia in 496-484, Eretria or Erouthrai in Sophokles' lifetime, and in Mykalessos in Boiotia in 413.⁸⁵ Kleokritos the herald, attempting to reconcile the Athenians' warring democratic and oligarchic factions, cites their attendance at the same schools as something that unites them as a people.⁸⁶

The schools at Chios and Astypalaia mentioned above had considerable numbers of pupils - 120 and 60. Astypalaia is a small island; Thoukydides comments that Mykalessos was a small town but it still had several schools. It is likely that most well off families and probably many more humble ones sent their boys there. Vase paintings show that their curriculum included learning to read and write.⁸⁷ Ordinary teachers were often poorly paid; if this was a function of

students' family's wealth, it implies that a significant number of students' parents were poor (on pay, see section E below).

Regardless of the Athenians' attitude towards education, they did not consider that it needed or deserved regulation or subsidisation. By 345 BC the state had legislated to control schools' hours and morals but not their method or content. A late source ascribes to Solon a law for compulsory education in letters but the lack of early corroborative evidence makes this doubtful in the extreme.⁸⁸ The only other evidence for a state's involvement in education is Diodoros' claim that Charondas of Katana legislated at Thouria to provide state-paid teachers and to make learning to read and write compulsory.⁸⁹ If such laws did exist at Thouria (there is no corroborative evidence) then Protagoras, who drafted the constitution, was most likely responsible (Charondas lived a hundred years before Thouria's foundation).⁹⁰

Books were generally available by the end of the 5th century. There are a number of references to bookstalls and sellers in contemporary sources.⁹¹ Xenophon refers to a shipwreck on the coast of Asia Minor in which books are the cargo, though he does not indicate the ship's origin or destination.⁹² Attitudes towards functional literacy and towards books need not be related.⁹³ Aristophanes makes books part of the paraphernalia of the parasitic, greedy, corrupt and pretentious claimant to specialised knowledge but seems to be alone in this (see Chapter 2.1 B4). On the other hand, the (probably idealised) evidence of vase paintings is that books were associated with gnomic sayings, hymns and lyric and epic poetry.⁹⁴

C. Ideological dimensions of literacy

There is no direct evidence for the reasons why the Athenian parents who sent their children to school did so. They may have believed that their children (or

they themselves) could thereby gain prestige, that there would be practical and material advantage, that it was a component of civic responsibility, or that it would be useful for cultural reasons such as gaining familiarity with traditional poetry.⁹⁵ The belief that literacy could be a tool for self-education is attested: Sokrates assumes that the avid book-collector Euthydemus must want to learn some skill, to be a doctor, or an engineer, surveyor, astronomer or rhapsode. Rhetorical manuals and model speeches, such as Antiphon's *Tetralogies*, probably filled a similar need. However, this is likely to have been insignificant next to oral instruction.⁹⁶ The sentiment that 'self-improvement' is necessary or desirable was also probably much weaker than in modern times. A sense of immediate economic advantage may not have been as strong either, given the relative lack of careers for which literary skills were necessary. Even advocates of literacy did not suggest that its lack could prevent anyone from making a living.⁹⁷

Explicitly asserted views of education are positive, at least for the traditional curriculum. A character in a Kratinos play comments:

ἀλλ' μὰ Δί' οὐκ οἶδ' ἔγωγε γράμματ' οὐδ' ἐπίσταμαι,
ἀλλ' ἀπὸ γλώττης φράσω τοι· μνημονεύω γὰρ καλῶς.

"No, by Zeus, I neither know nor understand letters,
but from word of mouth I shall tell you: for I remember well."
(Kratinos fr. 128, tr. Olding; possibly dating to 439-37 BC (Edmonds *FAC I* p. 61 n. b))

Although this fragment is without context, the speaker's insistence on the quality of his memory has a slightly defensive air and implies that literacy was, in fact, the norm. The Sausage-seller of Aristophanes' *Knights*, whose qualifications as a politician are grotesquely inverted, says that he is barely literate, not illiterate. This is not as a comment on general education but on public expectations about the quality of political leadership.⁹⁸

There is some evidence that the Athenians associated writing with democracy. The writing down of laws is an important step in separating law from the interests of rulers. An increased emphasis on ordinary men's ability to administer and scrutinise public affairs in a democratic government may well encourage the use of writing for public notices and record keeping and, hence, a greater emphasis on the value of literacy. The depiction of writing and writing materials on Attic pottery and literary references to the first schools start around 500 BC, shortly after the establishment of Athens' democratic constitution, implying an association between the two.⁹⁹ In the late 5th century Euripides made explicit the sentiment that written laws enabled men without resources or influential friends to uphold their rights, putting this into the mouth of Athens' 'democratic' founder Theseus (see Chapter 1.6 F):

οὐδὲν τυράννου δυσμενέστερον πόλει,
ὅπου τὸ μὲν πρῶτιστον οὐκ εἰσὶν νόμοι
κοινοί, κρατεῖ δ' εἰς τὸν νόμον κεκτημένος
αὐτὸς παρ' αὐτῷ· καὶ τόδ' οὐκέτ' ἔστ' ἴσον.
γεγραμμένων δὲ τῶν νόμων ὃ τ' ἀσθενῆς
ὁ πλούσιός τε τὴν δίκην ἴσην ἔχει,
ἔστιν δ' ἐνισπεῖν τοῖσιν ἀσθενεστέροις
τὸν εὐτυχοῦντα ταῦθ', ὅταν κλύη κακῶς,
νικᾷ δ' ὁ μείων τὸν μέγαν δίκαι' ἔχων.

“There is nothing more hostile to a city than a tyrant. In the first place, there are no common laws in such a place, and one man, keeping the law in his own hands, holds sway. This is unjust. When the laws are written both the powerless and the rich have equal access to justice, and it is possible for the weaker man to address the same words to the fortunate man whenever he is badly spoken of, and the little man, if he has right on his side, defeats the big man.”

(Eur. *Suppl.* 429-37, tr. Kovacs, Loeb cf. Gorg. *Pal.* 30)

When written laws are explicitly or implicitly contrasted to the unwritten, the former are always superior¹⁰⁰ but 'unwritten laws' were not, in fact, disallowed

as a basis for prosecution until 403/2 BC. Even then, speakers invoke them when expedient.¹⁰¹ As such, Theseus' sentiment is not much more than a platitude. Other evidence is thin and unconvincing. In Euripides' *Palamedes* the title character praises letters for, among other things, settling disputes.¹⁰² As his dramatic motive is apologetic his sentiment cannot be assumed to represent the views of the audience who would, moreover, be aware that his words had a certain ironic hollowness in view of his fate.

There is little or no evidence that the sentiment linking literacy and democracy was a real ideology, or that there were regulation or subsidies for education, or that any democratic statesman actually concerned himself with literacy. If the belief existed that it contributed to democratic life then it was not viewed as a state concern. The first known advocate of state-subsidised universal education is the constitutional theorist Phaleas of Chalkedon (c.400 BC), if this is what his 'equality of education' means. The first Athenian to do so is Plato, a noted anti-democrat, in *The Laws*.¹⁰³ Moreover, there is no particular reason to suppose that conditions in non-democratic constitutions discouraged literacy. One of the first-attested schools was in oligarchic Chios.¹⁰⁴ In Athens, the Peisistratids' policy seems to be based on recognition of the authoritative status of writing: they wrote down Homer epics, collected oracles, erected maxim-bearing Hermai around Attika and (according to a late and probably anachronistic source) maintained a public library. The erection of statues of scribes, unique in Greek sculpture, on the Acropolis at the same time also suggests official acknowledgement of the status of writing.¹⁰⁵

D. Negative attitudes

There is some evidence for a tradition of a sinister aspect to writing. In Aischylos' *Suppliants* King Pelasgos says that the Argives' decision regarding the

Danaids is the utterance of a free tongue, no mere written tablet: the implication is that the latter lacks the force of personal conviction.¹⁰⁶ Where writing has implicit authority, apparently recognised as early as the Peisistratids, it can be abused. Before the 4th century BC written letters are consistently associated with treachery and murder. Homer relates Proteus' attempt to have Bellerophon killed by giving him tablets with a 'deadly message'. He repeatedly uses adjectives that emphasise the wickedness of writing (if that is what it is): 'baneful signs'.¹⁰⁷ In tragedies and histories letters are tools of conspiracy and treachery with striking regularity. Some versions of Palamedes' death have him convicted by means of a forged letter (presumably the first ever), and Euripides' Hippolytos also meets his death on account of Phaidra's false accusations contained in a letter.¹⁰⁸ A written text is fixed and exists independent of its utterer, which makes it immune to cross-examination or punishment. Moreover, one reason to commit a message to writing, as Antiphon comments, is to keep its messenger ignorant of its contents.¹⁰⁹ Writing is the ideal vehicle for lies and secrecy.

Outright criticism of writing seems to be confined to intellectuals themselves, ironically enough. Plato's passage in the *Phaidros* is well known but not unique. The criticisms do not focus on writing's social, political or legal dangers but rather on its intellectual effects. They express reservations about the seductiveness of frivolous learning, the corrupting effect of foreign ideas, the written word's inadaptability and inability to respond to questioning, its inability to impress its lessons on the reader, and the damage it causes to memory.¹¹⁰

E. The status of teachers

In modern societies elementary teachers are usually the first and most visible representatives of learning and intellectual activity that the general public encounters, so their social status can be a useful index of the popular view of intellectualism.¹¹¹ In the Greek cultural tradition there are a few distinguished teacher-figures: the centaur Cheiron is the archetypal teacher of heroes, his wisdom comprising especially hunting and medicine and certain gnomic maxims¹¹²; Linos is a more 'modern' and cultivated figure (see Chapter 3 E). In classical Athens elementary teachers were regarded with contempt. Soldiers from Sicilian Expedition are described as 'either dead or teaching letters', that is, as good as slaves.¹¹³ This does not reflect on the status of education as such but seems to derive from the conventional association of working for someone else with servile status.¹¹⁴ The earliest responsibility for children's upbringing, at least in well-off families, fell to *παιδαγωγοί* who were, in fact, slaves and, it seems, usually completely uncultivated and useless for anything else.¹¹⁵ An important index of social value is wealth. Elementary teachers were often poorly paid, especially when compared to specialists in athletics, wrestling, riding, medicine and rhetoric. This may, of course, reflect the wealth or lack thereof of pupils' families as much as their own status.¹¹⁶

F. Conclusion

General education, including basic literacy and numeracy, was probably customary in classical Athens. Completely uneducated figures are conspicuous by their rarity. When they appear they are described specifically as poor and rustic, as though the writer expected the audience to need an explanation. This is a standardised image but it may reflect fact.¹¹⁷ Literacy seems still to have been something of a novelty in the 5th century, to judge from the spelling games in

tragedy, but the general assumption existed, not least in the institutions of the democratic state, that most citizens at least knew their letters. In practical terms, there must have been a 'critical mass' of literates in the population at large, enough to read and write such documents as were needed and to explain them to those who could not. If there is little evidence that literacy was regarded as necessary and desirable outside the educated élite, evidence for the uselessness of literacy is no stronger.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 1

1. λόγων τέχνην διδάσκειν - Xen. *Mem.* 1.2.31.
2. Xen. *Hell.* 2.3.12; ps.-Aristot. *A.P.* 35.2-3.
3. Xen. *Mem.* 1.2.33-37.
4. *Ibid.* 1.2.35.
5. Kritias appears in Plato's dialogues *Charmides*, *Protagoras*, *Timaios*, *Kritias* and the spurious *Eryxias*. I argue that identifying the character of this name in the *Timaios* and *Kritias* with the tyrant's grandfather relies on a perverse reading of the texts. See my unpublished paper, *The Identity of Kritias in Plato's Atlantis Dialogues*, presented at the 2001 Classical Association conference in Manchester.
6. Schol. on Pl. *Tim.* 21a.
7. Plutarch describes Kimon's laconising friends, led by one Euthippos, dying fighting recklessly to prove their loyalty to Athens (Plut. *Cim.* 17.2-5, *Per.* 10.2). Thoukydides may allude to this incident when he mentions that, before the battle, the Spartans had received encouragement from Athenian anti-democrats and that the Athenians themselves suspected an anti-democratic plot (1.107.4, 6 cf. ps.-Aristot. *A.P.* 26.1). On laconisers, see Dover, K.J., "Eros and Nomos (Plato, *Symposium* 182a-85c)", *BICS* 11, 1964, p. 30-42.
8. Vatai, F.L., *Intellectuals in Politics in the Greek World*, p. 1.
9. Weber, M., *Economy and Society* (ed. & tr. G. Roth & C. Wittich) (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press (2nd ed.), 1978), p. 926, and Weber, M., *From Max Weber*, p. 176.
10. Weber, M., *From Max Weber*, p. 355.
11. Shils, E., "The Intellectuals and the Powers", P. Rieff (ed.), *On Intellectuals: Theoretical Studies, Case Studies* (Garden City: Doubleday & Co., 1969), p. 26.
12. H.H. Gerth & C. Mills, "Introduction" in Weber, M., *From Max Weber*, p. 51.
13. Feuer, L.S., "What is an Intellectual?", A. Gella (ed.), *The Intelligentsia and the Intellectuals* (London: SAGE Publications Ltd, 1976), p. 47-48. This is the premise of Durkheim's essay "L'individualisme et les intellectuels", *Revue bleue*, 4e série, 10, 1898, p. 7-13 (translated by M. Traugott in Durkheim, E., *On Morality and Society*, ed. R.N. Bellah, Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1973, p. 43-57). Cf. Pareto's model of the innovative Class I 'instinct of combinations' (see Chapter 1.3).
14. This is not to say that these notions do not exist in 'primitive' (e.g. pre-literate) societies - the difference appears to be of explicit rigorosity, complexity and self-consciousness (Lloyd, G.E.R., *Magic, Reason and Experience*, p. 59-60, 124). Similarly, intellectualism does not exclude irrational elements, something that Greek thought might have been particularly prone to (the thesis of Dodds, E.R., *The Greeks and the Irrational*, ch. 6 cf. Weber, M., *From Max Weber*, p. 35-36).
15. Hofstadter, R., *Anti-Intellectualism in American Life*, p. 27.
16. Cf. Weber, M., *From Max Weber*, p. 139.

17. Aristotle would identify them – fr. 85 (Rose) ap. Stob. 4.29c 52, quoted in Vatai, F.L., *Intellectuals in Politics in the Greek World*, p. 3.
18. Hofstadter, R., *Anti-Intellectualism in American Life*, p. 34-36, 428 cf. 26-27.
19. Lloyd, G.E.R., *Magic, Reason and Experience*, p. 69.
20. Parmenides (see Lloyd, G.E.R., *Magic, Reason and Experience*, p. 69-71). Gorgias *Helen* 2; he describes λόγος as a 'powerful master' (§8). 'Hippokrates' e.g. *On the Art* 11. In Plato's earliest works e.g. *Gorg.* 454c, 479b ff., 497b, 498e-499b, 503c-d, 509e, *Rep.* 499a. Cf. Schiappa, E., *The Beginnings of Rhetorical Theory in Classical Greece*, p. 122-24; Lloyd, G.E.R., *Magic, Reason and Experience*, p. 101.
21. Schiappa, E., *The Beginnings of Rhetorical Theory in Classical Greece*, p. 70, 76.
22. Carey, C., "Old Comedy and the Sophists", F.D. Harvey & J. Wilkins (eds.), *The Rivals of Aristophanes*, p. 429.
23. Kerferd, G.B., "The First Greek Sophists", *CR* 64, 1950, p. 8-10, and Kerferd, G.B., "The Image of the Wise Man in Greece in the Period before Plato", G. Verbeke (ed.), *Images of Man in Ancient and Medieval Thought* (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1976), especially p. 18-23.
24. Pl. *Ap.* 23d cf. 'Brahmans' – Plut. *Alex.* 59, 64.
25. *Gorg. Hel.* 13.
26. Pl. *Ap.* 23d also e.g. 18b; Aristoph. *Cl.* e.g. 188-94; ps.-Hipp. *Anc. Med.* 1.23-24. The term φυσικός, meaning 'natural philosopher', is not attested before the late 4th century (e.g. Aristot. *Metaph.* 1005a31-34, 1037a15, 1062b30, 1067a5, *E.N.* 1142a15, *Pol.* 1335b1; D.S. 15.48.4, 15.50.3; Plut. *Them.* 2.4, *Nic.* 23.3) though it is commonly applied to early figures, particularly those associated with the Ionian school. Specific individuals so named include Xenophanes (Strabo 14.1.28), Anaxagoras (Strabo 14.1.36; Plut. *Per.* 6.3), Demokritos (Aristot. *Metaph.* 1078b19-20), Archelaos (Strabo 14.1.36; Plut. *Cim.* 4.9) and Melissos (Plut. *Them.* 2.3 cf. *Per.* 26.2 'the philosopher'). For terms such as λογογράφος and ῥήτωρ, see Chapter 2.4 & n. 155.
27. Lloyd, G.E.R., *Magic, Reason and Experience*, p. 32.
28. White, M., "Reflections on Anti-intellectualism", *Daedalus* 91, 1962, p. 457.
29. *Ibid.* p. 464-65.
30. E.g. *Gorg. Pal.* 30 cf. 25; Antisth. *Od.* 14 cf. 3, 8; Plut. *Alex.* 7 cf. Edmunds, L., "Thucydides' Ethics as Reflected in the Description of Stasis (3.82-83)", *HSCP* 79, 1975, p. 80 and Hofstadter, R., *Anti-Intellectualism in American Life*, p. 24-25.
31. Antiphon and Isokrates generally avoided direct involvement in public life, despite their interests and ambitions (Thuc. 8.68.1; Isoc. 5.81, 12.10-11, *Ep.* I. 9, *Ep.* VIII. 7). Lysias was a metic and hence debarred from participation, though, like Antiphon, he composed political speeches for others (D.H. *Lys.* 16, 31-32; the authorship of the only surviving one, *Against the Subversion of the Ancestral Constitution of Athens* (opus 34) has been doubted, though there are no technical reasons to do so - Dover, K.J., *Lysias and the Corpus Lysiacum*, p. 194). Andokides is the exception to this general observation

but none of his surviving speeches are on issues of public concern unless they involved him directly. The speeches of 'career politicians' do not survive; Plato's comment that their writings were to be found in their decrees implies that they were not normally published (*Phdr.* 257e-258a). The outstanding example is Perikles, none of whose speeches existed, at least by Roman times (Quintilian *Inst.* 3.1.12, 12.2.22, 12.10.49; Plut. *Per.* 8.5; Connor, W.R., "Vim Quamdam Incredibilem: A Tradition Concerning the Oratory of Pericles", *C&M* 23, 1962, p. 23-33). All that remain are some of his *bon mots*, for example, in Stesimbrotos of Thasos (*FGH* 107F9) and Aristophanes (*Cl.* 849). The speeches that Thoukydides supplies in Perikles' name must be understood in the context of the history, though they presumably conform to the normal conditions of political oratory.

32. Aischines 3.220, also e.g. 3.169ff; Dem. 22.25-27; Hyp. 4.8; Ober, J., *Mass and Élite in Democratic Athens*, p. 107, 111. Πήτωρ is not used in a specialised sense and ῥητορικὴ does not appear at all before the 4th century (Schiappa, E., *The Beginnings of Rhetorical Theory in Classical Greece*, p. 67-68).
33. Schiappa, E., *The Beginnings of Rhetorical Theory in Classical Greece*, especially ch. 2.
34. Ehrenberg, V., *The People of Aristophanes*, p. 17-18.
35. 386 BC - Webster, T.B.L., *Potter and Patron in Classical Athens* (London: Methuen & Co. Ltd, 1972), p. 91.
36. Barron, J., *An Introduction to Greek Sculpture* (London: Athlone Press Ltd, 1981), ch. 5.
37. Vatai, F.L., *Intellectuals in Politics in the Greek World*, p. 130-32.
38. On Pythagoreans in Athens, see Chapter 4 n. 61 below. The interesting though obscure subject of the anti-Pythagorean reaction in Magna Graecia is outside the scope of this thesis. It is discussed elsewhere, for instance, in Edwin Minar's *Early Pythagorean Politics: In Practise and Theory* (Baltimore: Waverly Press Inc., 1942), ch. 4, and Vatai's *Intellectuals in Politics in the Greek World*, ch. 2.
39. Gershenson and Greenberg criticise this aspect of the method of Hermann Diels' *Doxographi Graeci (Anaxagoras and the Birth of Physics)*, p. xxii).
40. Powers, C.H., *Vilfredo Pareto* (Newbury Park: SAGE Publications, 1987), ch. 4.
41. Pareto, V., *Sociological Writings* (tr. D. Mirfin, introd. S.E. Finer), (London, 1966), p. 39.
42. *Ibid.* p. 63 and Pareto, V., *The Mind and Society*, IV, p. 1691 (§2340).
43. Pareto, V., *The Mind and Society*, IV, p. 1694-1702 (§2345-52).
44. *Ibid.* p. 1689 (§2338).
45. Powers, C.H., *Vilfredo Pareto* (Newbury Park: SAGE Publications, 1987), p. 157 cf. 81.
46. Drachmann, A.B., *Atheism in Pagan Antiquity* (Chicago: Aris Publishers, 1977), e.g. p. 12, 40, 146.
47. *Ibid.* p. 39, 41. On Protagoras' persecution and/or prosecution, see Appendix A (D).
48. Gomme, A.W., "Philosophers' Trials", *CR* 46, 1932, p. 65-66.

49. Gershenson, D.E. & D.A. Greenberg, *Anaxagoras and the Birth of Physics*, p. 420.
50. Derenne, E., *Les Procès d'Impiété*, p. 55.
51. Dodds, E.R., *The Greeks and the Irrational*, p. 189. There is little or no evidence that Diagoras' ridicule of religious beliefs and practices was based on reasoned arguments or philosophical considerations. His connexion with various 5th century intellectuals seems to be an invention of 4th century doxographical schematisation. See Woodbury, L., "The Date and Atheism of Diagoras of Melos", *Phoenix* 19, 1965, p. 178-211 especially p. 206.
52. Ostwald, M., *From Popular Sovereignty to the Sovereignty of Law*, e.g. p. 274, 279, 533. For criticisms of Ostwald's methods and conclusions on the status of law in particular, see the review by Robertson, N., *Phoenix* 43, 1989, p. 365-75.
53. Dover, K.J., "The Freedom of the Intellectual in Greek Society", first published in *Talanta* 7, 1976, p. 25-54, reprinted in Dover, K.J., *The Greeks and Their Legacy: Collected Papers (II): Prose Literature, History, Society, Transmission, Influence*, Oxford, 1988, p. 135-58; the quote is from p. 135.
54. Wallace, R.W., "Private Lives and Public Enemies: Freedom of Thought in Classical Athens", A.L. Boegehold & A.C. Scafuro (eds.), *Athenian Identity and Civic Ideology*, p. 127-55.
55. Ober, J., "Public Speech and the Power of the People in Democratic Athens", *The Athenian Revolution* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), p. 18-31 (first published in *PS: Political Science and Politics*, Sept. 1993, p. 481-85).
56. Frost, F.J., "Pericles, Thucydides, Son of Melesias, and Athenian Politics Before the War", *Hist.* 13, 1964, p. 385-99 and Finley, M.I., "Athenian Demagogues", *P&P* 21, 1962, p. 3-24.
57. Seager, R., "Élitism and Democracy in Classical Athens", F.C. Jaher (ed.), *The Rich, the Well-Born, and the Powerful*, p. 7-26.
58. Austin, J.L., *How To Do Things With Words* (Cambridge (Mass.): Harvard University Press, 1962), especially p. 98-131, referred to in Skinner, Q., "Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas", *History and Theory* 8, 1969, p. 46.
59. Skinner, Q., "Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas", *History and Theory* 8, 1969, p. 47, 49.
60. Cf. Dover, K.J., *Greek Popular Morality*, p. 5. On the composition of Athenian juries and the Assembly and their values, including a critical survey of earlier scholarship, see Todd, S., "Lady Chatterley's Lover and the Attic Orators", *JHS* 110, 1990, p. 146-73.
61. *Hypothesis* to Aristophanes' *Clouds*. Though prizes were awarded by judges, the audience's reaction doubtless influenced their decision, see n. 94 below.
62. Pindar *Pyth.* 2.87; Bers, V., "Dikastic *Thorubos*", *HPT* 6, 1985, p. 1 n. 1.
63. Isoc. 5.81.
64. The Arginousai trial - Xen. *Hell.* 1.7.12-13 cf. Aristoph. *Ach.* 37-39, *Eccl.* 399ff, 431ff; ps.-Dem. 45.6; Plut. *Arist.* 4.1. Bers, V., "Dikastic *Thorubos*", *HPT* 6, 1985, p. 4-6 & n. 17 and Calhoun, G.M., *Athenian Clubs in Politics*

- and *Litigation*, p. 123. Litigants abandoning their cases mid-trial, e.g. Ant. 4.4.1, 5.13; And. 2.15; Bers, p. 14-15. Other examples of audiences influencing speakers or attempting to do so - Aristoph. *Kn.* 651, 666; Thuc. 4.28.1, 3, 8.53.2, 86.2; Lys. 12.73; Pl. *Ap.* 32b; *Euthph.* 9b; *Rep.* 492b-c, *Prot.* 319c; Xen. *Mem.* 3.6, 7, *Hell.* 2.3.50; Aischines 1.34.
65. E.g. Aristoph. *Wasps* 74ff, *Lys.* 1219-20.
66. Alkid. *Soph.* 3, 22. The text of Alkidamas' *On the Sophists* can be found in Blass, F., *Antiphontis Orationes et Fragmenta* (Leipzig: Teubner, 1892), p. 173-205, and a translation in van Hook, LaRue, "Alcidamas versus Isocrates", *CW* 12, 1919, p. 91-94. Its date is c.380 BC though which side of this depends on whether it inspired or responds to Isokrates' *Panegyrikos* (380 BC). Van Hook dates it between 391-380 BC, that is, between Isokrates' *Against the Sophists* and *Panegyrikos* (ibid. p. 90 n. 15). Schiappa argues for the later date ("Did Plato Coin *Rhetorike*?", *AJP* 111, 1990, p. 461-63).
67. Dem. 57.63, 66; Bers, V., "Dikastic *Thorubos*", *HPT* 6, 1985, p. 11.
68. Bers, V., "Dikastic *Thorubos*", *HPT* 6, 1985, p. 7-8. On the interruption to the performance of the *Danae* (Eur. fr. 324 (N)) see Seneca *Ep.* 115.15. Plutarch preserves stories of audiences howling down offensive lines in Euripides' *Aiolos* and *Melanippe the Wise* (Plut. *Mor.* 33c, 756b-c); the first of these is attributed to Euripides' contemporary Antisthenes and so may have a factual basis but the other two incidents are not attested before Roman times and are therefore somewhat suspect.
69. Gershenson, D.E. & D.A. Greenberg, *Anaxagoras and the Birth of Physics*, p. 329.
70. Finley, M.I., "Myth, Memory and History", *The Use and Abuse of History*, p. 27.
71. E.g. Aristot. *Rhet.* 1404a. Schiappa, E., *The Beginnings of Rhetorical Theory in Classical Greece*, p. 95-100.
72. Gabba, E., "Literature", M. Crawford (ed.), *Sources for Ancient History*, p. 46.
73. Esler, P.F., *The First Christians in Their Social Worlds*, p. 24, 29-31.
74. Ibid. p. 25-28, 34-35, abbreviating Malina, B.J., *The New Testament World: Insights from Cultural Anthropology* (London: SCM Press, 1981), p. 25-55, 75-76.
75. Ehrenberg, V., *The People of Aristophanes*, p. 8.
76. Thuc. 2.35-46.
77. Gorgias *DK* 82B5a-6.
78. The *Menexenos* is an oddity, not least for chronological reasons: the speaker, Sokrates died years before some of the events he refers to (e.g. 245e). Though the Roman-age Philostratos says that Gorgias' funeral speech was delivered at Athens (*Vita Soph.* 1.9.5) it seems very unlikely that non-citizens would be invited to speak at such a patriotic occasion, though they could otherwise observe and participate (Thuc. 2.34.4, 36.4; Dem. 60.6, 13). It is possible that those who were selected to speak commissioned these speeches but the genre would naturally interest rhetoricians in any case. Gorgias often explored new arrangements in established genres with accustomed material and themes (Loraux, N., *The*

- Invention of Athens*, p. 226-27). The unreality of Lysias' speech appears in its reference to 'competitors' (§2) and in its apportionment of material: two thirds of the whole is spent praising Athenian ancestors but only one tenth on the purported occasion, lament and consolation together (Kennedy, G., *The Art of Persuasion in Greece*, p. 156-57).
79. Pl. *Menex.* 234b.
 80. Thuc. 2.34.6; Pl. *Menex.* 234b.
 81. Thuc. 2.46.2; Lys. 2.81; Pl. *Menex.* 249c; Dem. 60.37. Loraux, N., *The Invention of Athens*, p. 225.
 82. Thuc. 2.35.3; Gorgias *DK* 82B6.2-3; Dem. 60.1 etc. Kennedy, G., *The Art of Persuasion in Greece*, p. 154 and Loraux, N., *The Invention of Athens*, p. 226, 228.
 83. Dem. 20.141. Thucydides' description also implies that he did not expect his readers to be familiar with the institution (2.34). Loraux, N., *The Invention of Athens*, p. 2. Competitions in epideictic speeches took place at – if not forming part of – various festivals (Isoc. *Ep.* 1.6), including the Olympic, Pythian and Isthmian Games, and the most distinguished and ambitious rhetoricians would compete there, including Gorgias (*DK* 82B7-8a), Hippias of Elis (Pl. *Hipp.Min.* 364a), Lysias (opus 33) and Antisthenes (Hermippos fr. 34 (W)). Like the funeral speeches, the themes tend to be fairly formulaic. This does not exclude the use of diverse material (Hippias gave speeches on a variety of topics - Pl. *Hipp.Min.* 363c) but means that it will tend to be given a high-minded (especially panhellenic) slant (Kennedy, G., *The Art of Persuasion in Greece*, p. 166-67).
 84. Thuc. 2.40.2 cf. 2.60-64; Gorgias *DK* 82B5b. Cf. Loraux, N., *The Invention of Athens*, p. 223-30.
 85. Ehrenberg, V., *The People of Aristophanes*, p. 12.
 86. *Ibid.* p. 20-21.
 87. Demades ap. Plut. *Mor.* 1011b. Other authorities ascribe the Theoric Fund to Kleophon; they claim that it corrupted the Athenians (Aischines 2.76; ps.-Aristot. *A.P.* 28.3 cf. Plut. *Per.* 9).
 88. Hdt. 6.21.
 89. Pl. *Ap.* 18d, 19c.
 90. Perikles' and Ion's opinions of Sophokles' abilities (Ion of Chios *FGH* 392F6; note that Perikles and Ion saw eye to eye on little (*ibid.* F15, 16). Plutarch records an anecdote in which Sophokles recognises his own lack of expertise (*Nic.* 15.2). Sophokles' public positions: he was imperial treasurer (ἑλληνοταμίης) in 443/2 BC (*IG*² 1.202), general on at least one occasion (Ion *FGH* 392F6; Androtion fr. 38; Anon. *Vita* 9; Plut. *Per.* 8.5, *Nic.* 15.2) and one of the πρόβουλοι, a board of senior advisers established after the Sicilian Expedition (Aristot. *Rhet.* 3.18.6, 1419a). He was also a priest of an obscure deity Halon (Anon. *Vita* 11) and may have been involved in the introduction of Asklepios from Epidauros (*Etym.Magn.* s.v. Δεξιτών cf. Plut. *Numa* 4.6, *Mor.* 1103b). He may also have received heroic honours after his death (Anon. *Vita* 17; *Etym.Magn.* s.v. Δεξιτών) - for a cautious discussion and survey of scholarly opinions,

- see Connolly, A., "Was Sophocles Heroized as Dexion?" *JHS* 118, 1998, p. 1-21.
91. Ehrenberg, V., *The People of Aristophanes*, p. 27.
 92. Dover, K.J., *Aristophanic Comedy*, p. 32, 34-35.
 93. Ehrenberg, V., *The People of Aristophanes*, p. 26. On a few occasions, comic license was limited but the circumstances were exceptional (Atkinson, J.E., "Curbing the Comedians: Cleon versus Aristophanes and Syracosius' Decree", *CQ* 42, 1992, p. 56-64).
 94. E.g. Aristoph. *Cl.* 524-6, *Wasps* 1044-5; Eupolis fr. 392. (Note that, unless otherwise specified, comic fragments are numbered according to Kassel, R., & C. Austin (eds.), *Poetae Comici Graeci* (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1983-2001) (*PCG*) but texts and translations are from Edmonds, J.M., *The Fragments of Attic Comedy*, I (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1957-61).) Later writers also assert that popular approval is the normal basis on which prizes were given out (Pl. *Laws* 659a-b; Aristot. *Pol.* 3.6.4, 1281b; com. adesp. fr. 139). Comedians do also focus on their judges, exhorting them to be fair (that is, to give them the prize), but their bribes and threats are so overblown that they are clearly meant to be humorous (e.g. Aristoph. *Birds* 1101-17, *Cl.* 1115-30, *Eccl.* 1140-3, 1154-62; Pherekrates fr. 102).
 95. Kratinos fr. 276; Aristoph. *Th.* 88; Isoc. 12.168; Aristot. *Poet.* 4.13, 1449a. Cf. a funerary *stèle* of a comic poet, dating to c.380 BC, depicts him as serious and reflective, not jovial (printed in Webster, T.B.L., *Studies in Later Greek Comedy*, pl. 1 & p. 10).
 96. Though comic advice is often not serious, comedians often exhort their audiences to pay attention to their words (e.g. Aristoph. *Kn.* 503ff, *Wasps* 1015ff, *Cl.* 575ff; Kratinos fr. 211; Pherekrates fr. 84) and criticise them for failing to appreciate their contribution (e.g. Aristoph. *Kn.* 228, *Wasps* 1013, 1045-50, *Cl.* 518ff, *Fr.* 1-18, 676ff, 1109ff; Kratinos fr. 395 cf. Aristoph. *Wasps* 650-1) (Ehrenberg, V., *The People of Aristophanes*, p. 30-34).
 97. Decharme, P., *Euripides and the Spirit of His Dramas* (N.Y. & London: MacMillan, 1906), p. 20-21.
 98. Dover, K.J., *Greek Popular Morality*, p. 15-17.
 99. *Ibid.* p. 18 cf. Esler, P.F., *The First Christians in Their Social Worlds*, p. 25-28.
 100. Ehrenberg, V., *The People of Aristophanes*, p. 38-39.
 101. Dover, K.J., *Greek Popular Morality*, p. 19-22. Cf. Aristotle describes tragic characters as superior to normal men and comic characters as inferior (*Poet.* 1448a18).
 102. Whether Antiphon the rhetorician and Antiphon the sophist are the same or different men is a matter of dispute. The obvious conflation in later sources of the biographical details of several different individuals complicates the issue. Didymos (1st century BC) was the first to postulate the existence of two men of the same name in order to explain the differences in style and sentiment between Antiphon's speeches and philosophical tracts (ap. Hermogenes *Peri Ideos*). However, these works' different forms and objects are sufficient to explain their differences. References to 'Antiphon' before Didymos give no reason to suspect that there were two men; indeed,

- the rhetorician and the sophist have very similar characters and interests (Romilly, J. de, *The Great Sophists of Periclean Athens*, p. 130-31).
103. Isokrates' career extends to the mid-4th century but all his extant forensic speeches were delivered before c.383 BC.
 104. D.H. *Lys.* 32.
 105. Finley, M.I., "Athenian Demagogues", *P&P* 21, 1962, p. 12, 17.
 106. Thuc. 6.19.2, 24.2.
 107. Dover, K.J., *Greek Popular Morality*, p. 6.
 108. Pl. *Phdr.* 257e-258a cf. 272d ff., *Hipp.Maj.* 288a, *Menex.* 234c ff.; Isoc. 8.3-5.
 109. Xen. *Ap.* 1, 32. Another example is Andokides' exile and death-sentence *in absentia* after he delivered the notably arrogant *On the Return* (Philochoros *FGH* 328F149a). Kennedy, G., *The Art of Persuasion in Greece*, p. 150.
 110. On ἠθοποιία and its use, see Devries, W.L., *Ethopoia: A Rhetorical Study of the Types of Character in the Orations of Lysias* (Baltimore: John Murphy & Co., 1892) and Sattler, W.M., "Conceptions of *Ethos* in Ancient Rhetoric", *Speech Monographs* 14, 1957, p. 55-65.
 111. Dover, K.J., *Greek Popular Morality*, p. 10.
 112. Public and private morality are separated - Thuc. 2.37.2, 7.69.2. Alkibiades, in a speech to the Assembly, reproaches the Athenians for criticising his private behaviour (Thuc. 6.16.6). Lykourgos suggests that private misdemeanours should be treated sympathetically (fr. 5.1 (Loeb)). The identity of public and private morality e.g. *Lys.* 21.19, 31.23; *ps.-And.* 4.13 cf. *Lys.* 12.86 etc. Sokrates considered that his manner of life was his best defence (Xen. *Ap.* 3). This principle appears in more extreme forms in later forensic oratory: Aischines expresses the sentiment that privacy is a privilege accorded to those who do not seek a public role (1.195). Public morality could be conceived as even overriding private: Apollodoros claimed that he preferred to neglect his family rather than be unable to maintain a trireme for the city (*ps.-Dem.* 50.63 cf. Isoc. 7.26-27) (Seager, R., "Élitism and Democracy in Classical Athens", F.C. Jaher (ed.), *The Rich, the Well-Born, and the Powerful*, p. 17). In the mid-4th century Aischines employs or invents a memorable anecdote about Spartans to emphasise the necessity of good character in the political process:

"...When a certain man had spoken in the assembly of the Lacedaemonians, a man of shameful life but an exceedingly able speaker (μὲν αἰσχρῶς, λέγειν δ' εἰς ὑπερβολὴν δυνατοῦ), and when, we are told, the Lacedaemonians were at the point of voting in accordance to his advice, a man came forward from the Council of Elders...and vehemently rebuked the Lacedaemonians and denounced them in words like these: that the homes of Sparta would not long remain unravaged if the people followed such advisers in their assemblies. At the same time he called forward another of the Lacedaemonians, a certain man who was not gifted in speech, but brilliant in war and distinguished for justice and sobriety (ἄνδρα λέγειν μὲν οὐκ εὐφυᾶ, τὰ δὲ κατὰ πόλεμον λαμπρὸν

καὶ πρὸς δικαιοσύνην καὶ ἐγράτειαν διαφέροντα...) and he ordered him to express as best could the same sentiments that the former orator had uttered, 'In order,' he explained, 'that a good man may speak before the Lacedaemonians vote, but that they may not even receive into their ears the voices of proven cowards and rascals.'" (1.180-81, tr. Adams, Loeb)

113. Xen. *Mem.* 3.5. Momigliano, A., *The Development of Greek Biography: Expanded Edition* (Cambridge (Mass.) & London: Harvard University Press, 1993), p. 54.
114. *Ibid.* p. 46.
115. *Ibid.* p. 48-50.
116. The partially and selectivity of biography and its difference from history in its objects is made explicit in later periods (Polyb. 10.21.4-8; Plut. *Nic.* 1.5, *Alex.* 1.2) (Gabba, E., "Literature", M. Crawford (ed.), *Sources for Ancient History*, p. 41).
117. Ps.-Hipp. *Art* 5 cf. *Breaths* 10. Lloyd, G.E.R., *Magic, Reason and Experience*, p. 88-96.
118. On upper class interest in medicine, see Thuc. 2.48; Pl. *Smp. passim*, *Phdr.* 268a; *Tim.* 81e-87b; Xen. *Mem.* 4.2.10. On comic parodies of medical terminology, see Miller, H.W., "Aristophanes and Medical Language", *TAPA* 76, 1945, p. 74-84.
119. Hdt. 3.43. Also e.g. Menelaos' simple and loyal slave (Eur. *Hel.* 711-9). Collingwood, R.G., *The Idea of History* (London: O.U.P., 1946), p. 22-23.
120. Thuc. 1.20, 6.54-59. Gabba, E., "Literature", M. Crawford (ed.), *Sources for Ancient History*, p. 5, 8.
121. Collingwood, R.G., *The Idea of History* (London: O.U.P., 1946), p. 29-30.
122. Xen. *Hell.* 5.4.1, 6.4.3 cf. *Lac.Pol.* 14.7. Kelly, D.H., "Oral Xenophon", I. Worthington (ed.), *Voice into Text: Orality and Literacy in Ancient Greece* (Leiden, N.Y. & Köln: E.J. Brill, 1996), p. 162-63. Other examples of Xenophon's belief in moral retribution, see *Anab.* 3.1.22-23, 5.3.13, *Hell.* 3.4.18, *Ages.* 1.13 etc.
123. Cf. examples of leadership - Usher, S., *The Historians of Greece and Rome* (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1969), p. 97.
124. Cawkwell, G.L., "Introduction", *Xenophon: A History of My Times* (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books Ltd, 1979), p. 43-44.
125. Alkid. *Soph.* 31.
126. See n. 117 above.
127. Thuc. 3.38.7.
128. Sokrates and his acquaintances emphasise that learning comes from association (Xen. *Mem.* 4.2; Pl. *Ep. VII* 341b-d cf. *Phdr.* 275a ff.) and they would read books in one another's company on scientific and philosophical subjects for information and inspiration (Pl. *Phdo.* 97b, *Tht.* 143b-c; Xen. *Mem.* 1.6.14) (Kelly, D.H., "Oral Xenophon", I. Worthington (ed.), *Voice into Text: Orality and Literacy in Ancient Greece* (Leiden, N.Y. & Köln: E.J. Brill, 1996), p. 150-53). Aristotle mentions 'schools or other gatherings where men pursue learning jointly', apparently a normal part of society (Aristot. *Pol.* 5.11, 1313b). Diogenes Laertios describes Antisthenes

- inviting Plato to one of his lectures, suggesting that the occasion was private and social (3.35), and says that Protagoras read his *On the Gods* out at a private house, either Euripides' or Megakleides' (9.54).
129. Immerwahr, H.R., "Book Rolls on Attic Vases", C. Henderson (ed.), *Classical, Mediaeval and Renaissance Studies*, I, p. 36-37. There are few depictions of lone readers and these may be a consequence of the form and function of the medium, for instance, a lekythos (5th century?), which has a tall narrow area (Neuchâtel, M. Henri Seyrig; reproduced in Beck, F.A.G., *Album of Greek Education*, pl. 14 no. 77), and a funerary *stele* (425-400 BC) where an individual focus is not surprising (Grottaferrata; reproduced in Beck, pl. 9 no. 50).
130. Pl. *Phdr.* 227b, 228a-b, *Parm.* 127c-d, *Soph.* 217d-218a.
131. Thuc. 1.21.1, 22.4. See also Momigliano, A., "The Historians of the Classical World and Their Audiences: Some Suggestions", *Contributo alla Storia degli Studi Classici e del Mondo Antico*, VI, no. 1 (Rome: Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura, 1980), p. 361-76 (first published in *Annali della Scuola Normale Superiore di Pisa*, ser. 3, VIII, 1978, p. 59-75).
132. Gabba, E., "Literature", M. Crawford (ed.), *Sources for Ancient History*, p. 44.
133. Hermippos fr. 62 (W); Fairweather, J.A., "Fiction in the Biographies of Ancient Writers", *Anc.Soc.* 5, 1974, p. 238-39. On the subject of Classical writers' misuse of their sources in general, see especially Lefkowitz, M.R., *The Lives of the Greek Poets*, *passim* and Dover, K.J., "Anecdotes, Gossip and Scandal", *The Greeks and Their Legacy*, p. 45-52.
134. Diodoros, working from Ephoros, quotes Aristoph. *Peace* 603-6 at 12.40.6. Aristoph. *Peace* 609-11 is the basis of D.S. 12.39.1 & 3. Aristoph. *Ach.* 535-9 seems to be the basis of D.S. 12.39.4 (Dover, K.J., "The Freedom of the Intellectual in Greek Society", *The Greeks and Their Legacy*, p. 138).
135. Theopompos *FGH* 115F92 ~ Plut. *Nic.* 7.5 (cf. *Mor.* 799d); Robertson, D.S., "Cleon and the Assembly", *CR* 37, 1923, p. 165. In defence of Plutarch's credulity, he does preface the story with 'it is said'.
136. Satyros fr. 39 col. 10; Fairweather, J.A., "Fiction in the Biographies of Ancient Writers", *Anc.Soc.* 5, 1974, p. 245.
137. Pl. *Prot.* 342e-343a, *Phdr.* 260e; Aristot. *Rhet.* 2.21.8, 1394b. Tigerstedt, E.N., *The Legend of Sparta in Classical Antiquity*, II (Stockholm: Stockholm Studies in the History of Literature, Almqvist & Wiskell, 1965), p. 24-26.
138. Plut. *Mor.* 457d, 464f cf. 172c-e.
139. Mejer, J., *Diogenes Laertius and His Hellenistic Background* (*Hermes Einzelschriften* 40, 1978), p. 18-19, 83 and Gabba, E., "Literature", M. Crawford (ed.), *Sources for Ancient History*, p. 14.
140. Hdt. 7.226 ~ Plut. *Mor.* 225b. Tigerstedt, E.N., *The Legend of Sparta in Classical Antiquity*, II (Stockholm: Stockholm Studies in the History of Literature, Almqvist & Wiskell, 1965), p. 18 & p. 300 n. 11.
141. Fairweather, J.A., "Fiction in the Biographies of Ancient Writers", *Anc.Soc.* 5, 1974, p. 238, 256-70, and Lefkowitz, M.R., *The Lives of the Greek Poets* (London: Gerald Duckworth, 1981), *passim*.
142. Hansen, M.H., *The Trial of Sokrates*, p. 24.

143. Gershenson, D.E. & D.A. Greenberg, *Anaxagoras and the Birth of Physics*, p. 347-48. On Anaxagoras' and Protagoras' trials and/or persecutions, see Appendix A (C, D).
144. The surviving text of *The Clouds* refers to its own failure (524-6). Later authors cite quotes that do not appear in the surviving version (Aristoph. fr. 392-401), and the play's *Hypotheses* (Hellenistic in date) say that there was a second version that was never performed (Edmonds *FAC I*, p. 679-81). The original was performed in 424/3 BC, the rewriting probably took place between 420 and 417 (Dover, K.J., *Aristophanes: Clouds*, p. lxxx-xc). According to the philosopher Chamaeleon of Herakleia, writing c.300 BC, it was normal practice for dramatists to rewrite their unsuccessful plays (fr. 43 (W)).
145. Aischines 2.10, 86.
146. Ibid. §124, 156 ~ Dem. §175, 156. Dover, K.J., *Lysias and the Corpus Lysiacum*, p. 168-69.
147. Thuc. 1.22.1.
148. Kagan, D., "The Speeches in Thucydides and the Mytilene Debate", *YCS* 24, 1975, p. 71-78.
149. Tac. *Ann.* 11.24 ~ *ILS* 212, *CIL* 13, 1668; Wellesley, K., "Can You Trust Tacitus?", *G&R* n.s. 1, 1954, p. 13-26.
150. An export market for Athenian drama is not implausible in light of playwrights' travels. Aischylos visited Sicily towards the end of his life. Euripides went to Syracuse as an ambassador on a goodwill mission, suggesting that the Athenians thought he might get a favourable reception; anecdotes give Euripides fans throughout the Greek world: Syracuse (Aristot. *Rhet.* 2.6.20, 1384b & schol.), Sicily (Hermippos fr. 94 (W); Satyros *Vita Eur.* col. xix 1; Plut. *Nic.* 29.2-3), and Magnesia (Anon. *Vita Eur.* 22-23) (Stevens, P.T., "Euripides and the Athenians", *JHS* 76, 1956, p. 90-91).
151. Cf. Dover, K.J., *Lysias and the Corpus Lysiacum*, p. 170-71.
152. Todd, S., "The Use and Abuse of the Attic Orators", *G&R* 37, 1990, p. 167.
153. The first traitors so named are the Peisistratids (Lyk. 1.117, 119). Others include the Athenians who helped the Spartans occupy Eleusis in 506 BC (schol. on Aristoph. *Lys.* 273); Arthmios of Zeleia, the only one whose offence, attempted bribery of the Athenians and their allies on behalf of the Persians, was also inscribed (Dem. 9.41; Dein. 2.24-25); and Antiphon (Caecilius ap. ps.-Plut. *Mor.* 834b) (Ferguson, W.S., "The Condemnation of Antiphon", *Melanges Gustave Glotz*, I, p. 355). Cf. Thuc. 6.55.1; Isoc. 16.9.
154. Paus. 1.3.3; Stone, I.F., *The Trial of Socrates*, p. 208-9.
155. Webster, T.B.L., *Potter and Patron in Classical Athens* (London: Methuen & Co. Ltd, 1972), p. 82.
156. Immerwahr, H.R., "Book Rolls on Attic Vases", C. Henderson (ed.), *Classical, Mediaeval and Renaissance Studies*, I, p. 17.
157. Webster, T.B.L., *Potter and Patron in Classical Athens* (London: Methuen & Co. Ltd, 1972), p. 297-98, 300.
158. On poems and plays influencing vase painting designs, see e.g. *ARV*² 1046, 10; 1185, 1; Webster, T.B.L., *Potter and Patron in Classical Athens*

(London: Methuen & Co. Ltd, 1972), p. 90-91, 252, 266. Another example is Boreas (the north wind personified) who first appears on vases after the damaging of the Persian fleet by a storm at Artemision, e.g. *ARV*² 260, 9; 208, 150 (Berlin 2186); Webster, p. 254-55. Cf. Hdt. 7.189; Aristoph. *Wasps* 1124.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 2

1. See Chapter 1.6 & n. 144.
2. Note that the Arguments of both Aristophanes and Protagoras, which Aristophanes parodies, are called ἤττων and κρείττων λόγοι. The terms δίκαιος λόγος and ἄδικος λόγος appear in the *The Clouds' dramatis personae*, hypotheses and the scholia but not in the text (Dover, K.J., (ed.), *Aristophanes: Clouds*, p. lvii-lviii).
3. Kopff, E.C., "Nubes 1493ff.: Was Socrates Murdered?", *GRBS* 18, 1977, p. 116-20.
4. Cf. Dover, K.J., (ed.), *Aristophanes: Clouds*, p. xcv.
5. Pl. *Ap.* 19b-c; Norwood, G., *Greek Comedy* (London: Methuen & Co. Ltd, 1931), p. 215.
6. *Hypothesis* on Aristoph. *Cl.* & schol. on 543. Dover, K.J., (ed.), *Aristophanes: Clouds*, p. lxxxv.
7. Late sources give the story that Euathlos refused to pay his teacher Protagoras (Aul. Gell. *N.A.* 5.10.3-16; Apul. *Flor.* 18; D.L. 9.56 cf. Quintilian *Inst.* 3.1.10; εἶτα Πρωταγόραν Εὐάθλου τινὸς τῶν μαθητῶν συκοφαντήσαντος αὐτόν - schol. ad Cramer, *Anecdota Graeca e codd. manuscriptis Bibliothecae Regiae Parisiensis*, I, 172) (Derenne, E., *Les Procès d'Impiété*, p. 49-50). The same story is told of Teisias and Korax (Sext. Emp. *Adv.Math.* 2.96-99; Zenobios 4.82 (Leutsch & Schneidewin, *Corpus Paroemiographorum Graecorum*, I, p. 107); *Suidas* s.v. κακοῦ κόρακας κακὸν ὄον; no. 4 in Rabe, H., *Prolegomenon Sylloge* (Leipzig, 1931), p. 25ff.) (Forbes, C.A., *Teachers' Pay in Ancient Greece*, p. 18 & n. 45). Cf. Cicero alludes to the 'a bad crow from a bad egg' phrase (*de Orat.* 3.81).
8. Dover, K.J., (ed.), *Aristophanes: Clouds*, p. xcv, xcvi.
9. See commentary in Edmonds *FAC I* p. 72 n. a.
10. Kratinos fr. 167 (*PCG* – see Chapter 1 n. 94). On Hippon, see Guthrie, W.K.C., *A History of Greek Philosophy*, II, p. 354-58.
11. κρανία δισσα φορεῖν, ὀφθαλμοὶ δ' οὐκ ἀριθμητοί (Kratinos fr. 161); ἀλλοτριογνώμοις ἐπιλήσμοσι μνημονικοισί (fr. 162) cf. Edmonds *FAC I* p. 71 n. c.
12. *Hypothesis* to Aristoph. *Cl.* There are also a few references to a *Konnos* by Phrynichos, though no fragments exist. If he was prominent enough to feature in one comedy then he could have featured in two, or this could be a misattribution of Ameipsias' play (Edmonds *FAC I* p. 454 n. c).
13. Schol. on Aristoph. *Kn.* 534; Kratinos fr. 349; Aristoph. *Kn.* 534.
14. Com. adesp. fr. 371; Aristoph. *Wasps* 675 cf. Sommerstein, A.H., "Konnos' Figleaf?", *CQ* 33, 1983, p. 488-89.
15. Ameipsias *Konnos* test. ii (*PCG*). Other non-intellectual experts: Diopieithes the oracle-monger (Ameipsias fr. 10), probably the composer of the 'anti-astronomer decree' (see the detailed discussion in Chapter 2.2); a description of sacrificial method (fr. 7) is reminiscent of Hierokles, the pompous and self-interested priest from Aristophanes' *Peace* (1052ff.) (Carey, C., "Old Comedy and the Sophists", F.D. Harvey & J. Wilkins

- (eds.), *The Rivals of Aristophanes*, p. 420-21 cf. Dover, K.J., (ed.), *Aristophanes: Clouds*, p. li).
16. Athen. 218c ~ Ameipsias *Konnos* test. ii.
 17. Pl. *Menex.* 236a, *Euthd.* 272c, 295d.
 18. *Hypothesis* to Aristoph. *Peace*.
 19. Pl. *Ap.* 20a, *Prot. passim*; Xen. *Smp. passim*.
 20. Athen. 236c; Phryn. *Ecl.* 139; Edmonds *FAC I* p. 371.
 21. Other examples of these characteristics - Eupolis fr. 166, 165, 162, 174, 175, 179, 187, 190. 'Oineus', mentioned in fr. 172, refers to the pit in which the bodies of executed criminals were thrown (Gulick, C.B., *Athenaeus: 'The Deipnosophists'*, Loeb, III, p. 67, n. b).
 22. Eupolis fr. 172, 178. Carey, C., "Old Comedy and the Sophists", F.D. Harvey & J. Wilkins (eds.), *The Rivals of Aristophanes*, p. 425.
 23. For the date, see Edmonds *FAC I* p. 816 n. a.
 24. Förster, R., *Scriptores Physiognomici Graeci et Latini*, I, p. vii-xi.
 25. Sokrates' associate Phaido wrote a dialogue *Zopyros* (D.L. 2.105). Plato may have exploited the Herakleian Zopyros' Orphic poem *Krater* in the *Phaido* (Kingsley, P., *Ancient Philosophy, Mystery and Magic: Empedokles and Pythagorean Tradition* (Oxford: O.U.P., 1995), p. 143-160).
 26. And. 1.83; Lys. 30.28.
 27. Aristoph. *Ach.* 603. Phainippos' posts - Thuc. 4.118.11; *IG* i² 57.2, 70.5.
 28. Schol. on Aristoph. *Ach.* 603. A Teisamenos, perhaps the same man, is mentioned as early as the 430s (Kratinos fr. 111; on its date, see Edmonds *FAC I* p. 53 n. d). Others include the father of the tragedian Agathon (schol. Pl. *Smp.* 172a), a legendary king of Thebes (Hdt. 4.147, 6.52; Paus. 9.5.8) and two famous Spartan seers (Hdt. 9.33-35; Xen. *Hell.* 3.3.11).
 29. Aristoph. *Birds* 1035ff., *Fr.* 1506.
 30. For the resemblances between the *Ekklesiazousai* and the *Republic*, see Adam, J., *The Republic of Plato* (Cambridge: C.U.P., 1979), I, p. 345-64.
 31. Aristoph. *Eccl.* 571. Webster, T.B.L., *Studies in Later Greek Comedy*, p. 34 cf. the discussions in Ussher's and Rogers' editions of the play (respectively p. 154 and p. 297 n. c). Plato was not the only constitutional and legislative theorist in Athens. In *The Birds* Aristophanes depicts Meton proposing to map out the cloud-city with 'air-rods' (1016). Non-Athenians doubtless well known in Athens were the notoriously flamboyant Hippodamos of Miletos, who redesigned the Piraeus and planned the Athenian-sponsored colony of Thouria (see McCredie, J.R., "Hippodamos of Miletos", D.G. Mitten et al. (eds.), *Studies Presented to George M.A. Hanfmann (Fogg Art Museum. Harvard University Monographs in Art and Archaeology II)* (Mainz: Phillip von Zabern, 1971), p. 95-100) and Protagoras who wrote the city's constitution (Herakleides of Pontos fr. 150 (W); on the form Thouria, see Wade-Gery, H.T., "Thucydides the Son of Melesias", *Essays in Greek History*, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1958, p. 255 n. 1). Herodotos' Persian debate on constitutional forms (3.80-83) similarly suggests that such topics were part of the 'popular intellectual agenda' at this time. By the mid-4th century, drafting theoretical law codes was such a common practice that it was almost hackneyed (Isoc. 5.12; Aristot. *Pol.* 2.7, 1266a).

32. Aristoph. fr. 205, 233.
 33. Athen. 453c-e.
 34. Pl. Com. fr. 149; Carey, C., "Old Comedy and the Sophists", F.D. Harvey & J. Wilkins (eds.), *The Rivals of Aristophanes*, p. 425-26.
 35. Aristoph. *Cl.* 836-7, *Birds* 1554 cf. Pheidippides calls them 'earthborn' (γηγενεῖς) (Aristoph. *Cl.* 853).
 36. Edmonds' liberal translation is worth repeating (the pun in the last line does not exist in the Greek):

"A: O wisest of all when the company's small,
 And weakest of wit where it's big,
 You, Socrates, too? - a hardy one, you!
 Pray, how did you come by your rig?
 [And without any shoes?] You seem to misuse
 The cobblers; d'you think they don't matter?
 B: But nevertheless we must all confess
 That he'd rather grow thinner than flatter."

37. Aristoph. *Eccl.* 385-7, 432; Xen. *Oec.* 4.2. In vase paintings women are often painted white (I owe this point to A.G. Geddes). The same colour-coding may apply to social roles: on a Korinthian vase (c.550 BC) Tydeus stabs his wife Ismene after discovering her committing adultery with Periklymenos; Tydeus is painted black, Ismene and Periklymenos, a cowardly usurper of Tydeus' privileges, are both white (Dover, K.J., *Greek Homosexuality* (N.Y.: MJF Books, 1978), p. 106; Louvre E640, reproduced in Carpenter, T.H., *Art and Myth in Ancient Greece*, no. 269).
 38. Cf. Aristoph. *Cl.* 177; Pl. *Meno* 82b ff.; Plut. *Dion* 13.2.
 39. Aristoph. *Cl.* 103, 120, 718, 836-7, 1017, 1112, *Wasps* 1038 & schol., fr. 399.
 40. Aristoph. *Cl.* 1171.
 41. Aristoph. *Cl.* 504, *Birds* 1296, 1564, *Wasps* 1413, *Clouds A* fr. 393, fr. 584; Eupolis fr. 253; com. adesp. fr. 26 (Edmonds *FAC I*).
 42. Webster, T.B.L., *Studies in Later Greek Comedy*, p. 52.
 43. Aristoph. *Cl.* 332. See the note in Dover, K.J., (ed.), *Aristophanes: Clouds* on the components of this word. As 'onyx' can also mean 'fingernail', Aristophanes may be making a pun: if their 'seal' is their fingernail marks this could indicate poorness. Long hair distinguishes Athens' knights, including those who are certainly not adherents to the New Education (Aristoph. *Kn.* 578-80, *Cl.* 14, *Lys.* 561). It was a characteristic of the famous laconiser, Kimon (Ion of Chios *FGH* 392F12). It is referred to half-jokingly by Lysias' Mantitheus who requests of his jury 'Do not hate a man for wearing his hair long' (*Lys.* 16.18). On Spartans' long hair, see Hdt. 1.82, 7.208-9; Xen. *Lac.Pol.* 11.3 etc. Dionysos' 'perfumed ringlets' suggest effeminacy, possibly dandyism (cf. Dodds, E.R., *Euripides: Bacchae*, note to 235, 453-9).
 44. Aristoph. fr. 205, 225 cf. *Cl.* 977, 1044-54.
 45. Aristoph. *Cl.* 316, 332, 334, *Fr.* 1482-98. On the meaning of ὑργία, see Chapter 4.1, below.

46. Aristoph. *Birds* 999. Meton is also identified by the water clock that he erected in Kolonos (Aristoph. *Birds* 998; Phrynichos fr. 22).
47. Aristoph. *Fr.* 799-802, *Ach.* 407, 409, *Th.* 96, 265.
48. Aristoph. *Fr.* 943, 1386-99, 1409 cf. Pherekrates fr. 100.
49. Aristoph. *Birds* 974-1036. In a fragment of unknown context, someone threatens to stone booksellers to death (Theopompos fr. 79).
50. Denniston, J.D., "Technical Terms in Aristophanes", *CQ* 21, 1927, p. 117-18 cf. Whitehorne, J., "Aristophanes' Representations of 'Intellectuals'", *Hermes* 130, 2002, p. 28-29, 32-33. On books in Athens, see Appendix B.
51. Dover, K.J., (ed.), *Aristophanes: Clouds*, on 227-34 and Bowie, A.M., *Aristophanes: Myth, Ritual and Comedy* (Cambridge: C.U.P., 1993), p. 109-110.
52. Aristoph. *Cl.* 380, 829. Δῖνος in scientific theories - Antiphon *DK* 87A25 (~ fr. 97 Sprague); δῖνῆ - Empedokles *DK* 31B35 cf. B115; Demokritos *DK* 68B167 cf. A1, A67, A83; Leukippos *DK* 67A1. Aristophanes' change of the gender to improve the joke is hardly significant. Elsewhere in drama - Aristoph. *Wasps* 618; Eur. *Alc.* 244-5, see Ferguson, J., "ΔΙΝΟΣ in Aristophanes and Euripides", *CJ* 74, 1979, p. 357.
53. Aristoph. *Birds* 692ff.
54. Kratinos fr. 161, 162 cf. Edmonds *FAC I* p. 72 n. b.
55. Aristoph. *Cl.* 95-7 & schol., 1290-5, *Birds* 1001; Kratinos fr. 167; Pherekrates fr. 150.
56. Dover, K.J., *Aristophanic Comedy*, p. 114; Green, P., "Strepsiades, Socrates and the Abuses of Intellectualism", *GRBS* 20, 1979, p. 24-25.
57. Pl. *Hipp. Maj.* 285c-d, *Crat.* 424c. See also n. 109 below.
58. E.g. ps.-Hipp. *Epid.* 1.16, 3.17, *Aph.* 5.35; Aristoph. *Fr.* 1423. Miller, H.W., "Aristophanes and Medical Language", *TAPA* 76, 1945, p. 76.
59. Aristoph. *Cl.* 747, tr. Henderson, Loeb. Peppler, C.W., "The Termination -ΚΟΣ, As Used by Aristophanes for Comic Effect", *CJ* 31, 1910, especially p. 432-38, 441-42. On neologisms in comedy in general, see Major, W.E., *Aristophanes: Enemy of Rhetoric* (PhD Diss., Indiana University, 1996), especially p. 96-97, 106-7.
60. MacDowell, D., "The Meaning of ἀλαζών", E.M. Craik (ed.), *'Owls to Athens': Essays on Classical Subjects Presented to Sir Kenneth Dover* (Oxford: O.U.P., 1990), especially p. 287-89.
61. Aristoph. *Cl.* 424, *Fr.* 826-8, 892 cf. fr. 628A (Edmonds *FAC I*).
62. Aristoph. *Birds* 1694-1705. Denniston, J.D., "Technical Terms in Aristophanes", *CQ* 21, 1927, p. 120.
63. Aristoph. *Cl.* 179, 497, 1498 etc.
64. Sokrates - Aristoph. *Cl.* 98, 245-6, 1146-7. Antiphon - Pl. *Com.* fr. 110. Aristophanes' phrase 'as poor as Antiphon' may refer either to his greed or, ironically, to his wealth (*Wasps* 1270 plus note in Sommerstein, A.H., *Aristophanes: Wasps*; cf. Dover, K.J., (ed.), *Aristophanes: Clouds*, p. xxxiii-xxxiv). Aristophanes alleges that the politician Hyperbolos had to pay a vast amount of money to some sophist to become an effective speaker (*Cl.* 876).
65. Aristoph. *Cl.* 247ff., 365ff., 424, 627.

66. Ibid. 830. On Diagoras, see Chapter 1 n. 51. Other references to him in popular genres confirm his infamy e.g. Aristoph. *Birds* 1072; Lys. 6.17. Another candidate for a scientific or atheistic Melian might be Leukippos (D.L. 9.30) (Ferguson, J., “ΔΙΝΟΣ in Aristophanes and Euripides”, *CJ* 74, 1979, p. 358). However, there is no agreement as to his place of birth (see *DK* 67A1, 5, 9, 12, 33). His biographical details were obscure even in ancient times – Epikouros denied his very existence (D.L. 10.13).
67. Aristoph. *Cl.* 1508.
68. Strauss, L., *Socrates and Aristophanes* (Chicago & London: University of Chicago Press, 1966), p. 185-86. Ψυχάγωγειν and its cognates refer to ‘raising the dead’ (Eur. *Alc.* 1128; Pl. *Laws* 909b; Plut. *Mor.* 560f). Aischylos wrote a play called Ψυχάγωγοί, apparently referring to Odysseus’ journey into the underworld (Sommerstein, A.H., *Aristophanes: Frogs* (Warminster: Aris & Phillips Ltd, 1996), on 1266). The term is often also used in the sense of persuasion or delusion – Pl. *Tim.* 71a; Xen. *Mem.* 3.10.6; Isoc. 2.49, 9.10; Dem. 44.63; ps.-Dem. 59.55; Lyk. 1.33; com. adesp. fr. 199 (Kock *CAF III*). Dikaiarchos uses it to describe Pythagoras’ persuasion of magistrates of Kroton (fr. 33 (W)), so it may imply something about the action of philosophy. On the Pythagorean view of the motion of souls, see e.g. D.L. 8.30-32. Plato speaks of philosophy’s effects on the soul in similar terms though not using this word. Aristophanes may have sought to incorporate all these senses.
69. On the superstition, see Aristoph. fr. 320; Athen. 427e cf. D.L. 8.34; *Suidas* s.v. Πυθαγόρας; Edmonds *FAC I* p. 371 n. c.
70. Aristoph. *Th.* 450-51.
71. Aristoph. *Th.* 14, 43, 51, 272, *Fr.* 892-3.
72. Aristoph. *Cl.* 911 cf. *Wasps* 1039.
73. Aristoph. *Eccl.* 63-4 cf. 385-7, 428, 432; Eur. *Bac.* 457. On paleness, see n. 37 above.
74. Aristoph. *Cl.* 178 & n. 15 in Henderson, *Aristophanes: Clouds* (Loeb). It was noted above (n. 5) that Plato’s Sokrates did not blame Aristophanes for his reputation as a ‘corruptor of youth’.
75. Aristoph. *Birds* 997-8 cf. Phrynichos fr. 22.
76. Aristoph. *Cl.* 223-34, 363, *Fr.* 1496. For the spectrum of meanings attached to σεμνός Euripides’ *Hippolytos* is notable: ‘holy’, ‘pious’ (§99, 1364); ‘arrogant’, ‘pompous’ (§93, 1064).
77. Aristoph. *Cl.* 140, 143, 252-74, 506-8 & n. 20 in Henderson, *Aristophanes: Clouds* (Loeb).
78. Green, P., “Strepsiades, Socrates and the Abuses of Intellectualism”, *GRBS* 20, 1979, p. 17-22.
79. Aristoph. *Cl.* 119-20; Dover, K.J., (ed.), *Aristophanes: Clouds*, p. xxvi-xxvii.
80. Cf. Ehrenberg, V., *The People of Aristophanes*, p. 292, 294 and Dover, K.J., *Aristophanic Comedy*, p. 114-16, 183-84.
81. Sommerstein, A.H., *Aristophanes: Birds*, p. 3.
82. There is only one comic fragment that mentions Anaxagoras: Euripides is said to be his nursling (Ἀναξαγόρου τρῶφιμος) (Aristoph. fr. 676b

- (Edmonds *FAC I*). This fragment is doubly doubtful: Anaxagoras' name relies on an uncertain emendation, and Aulus Gellius in fact ascribes the fragment to Alexander of Aetolia (*N.A.* 15.20.8).
83. Aristoph. *Th.* 137-8, *Fr.* 91, 839, 954, fr. 392 cf. Plut. *Mor.* 45b. Denniston, J.D., "Technical Terms in Aristophanes", *CQ* 21, 1927, p. 115, 119.
 84. Aristoph. *Peace* 532-4, *Fr.* 775, 815 cf. Euripides' debate with Aischylos - *Fr.* 1141-8, 1163-6. His theorising - Aristoph. *Th.* 14-18.
 85. Aristoph. *Fr.* 1482-98, *Clouds A* fr. 392; Telekleides fr. 41-42.
 86. See n. 76 above for meanings of $\sigma\epsilon\mu\nu\acute{o}\varsigma$. For Euripides' and Anaxagoras' supposed connexion, see n. 82 above, and Gershenson, D.E. & D.A. Greenberg, *Anaxagoras and the Birth of Physics*, p. 343. The earliest critical account of Euripides' acquaintance with contemporary intellectuals and their theories is Paul Decharme's *Euripides and the Spirit of His Dramas* (1906); a recent one is David Conacher's *Euripides and the Sophists: Some Dramatic Treatments of Philosophical Ideas* (London: Gerald Duckworth, 1998).
 87. Eur. *Hipp.* 612 ~ Aristoph. *Th.* 275, *Fr.* 1471. Aristophanes has Euripides claim that Kleitophon, probably the same as the associate of Sokrates, Lysias and Thrasymachos, is his creation. According to a scholiast this man was ridiculed in comedy as idle ($\acute{\alpha}\rho\gamma\acute{o}\varsigma$) (Aristoph. *Fr.* 967 & schol.). On Kleitophon, see Chapter 4 n. 174.
 88. Aristoph. *Cl.* 1371ff., *Fr.* 773, 781.
 89. Carey, C., "Old Comedy and the Sophists", F.D. Harvey & J. Wilkins (eds.), *The Rivals of Aristophanes*, p. 430-31.
 90. Kratinos the younger has the Pythagoreans test laymen with rhetorical terms but they do not seem to teach them (fr. 7).
 91. Carey, C., "Old Comedy and the Sophists", F.D. Harvey & J. Wilkins (eds.), *The Rivals of Aristophanes*, p. 430-31.
 92. For example: Rudhardt, J., "La définition du délit d'impiété d'après la législation attique", *Museum Helveticum* 17, 1960, p. 92; Finley, M.I., *Democracy, Ancient and Modern* (London: Chatto & Windus, 1973), p. 84-85, 91; Connor, W.R., "The Other 399: Religion and the Trial of Sokrates", *Georgica, BICS* suppl. 58, 1991, p. 50 n. 10. Sokrates' trial certainly did not proceed under Diopieithes' decree. (1) This was a $\gamma\rho\alpha\phi\acute{\eta}$ not an $\epsilon\acute{\iota}\sigma\alpha\gamma\gamma\epsilon\lambda\acute{\iota}\alpha$ (Pl. *Euthph.* 2a, *Th.* 210d). (2) Decrees passed before the amnesty of 401 BC were vulnerable – Andokides' prosecutors skip past the point (Lys. 6.29) that Andokides made a central part of his defence. Sokrates' apologists do not suggest that the charges against him were legally improper (Derenne, E., *Les Procès d'Impiété*, p. 223, 236-39; Dover, K.J., "The Freedom of the Intellectual in Greek Society", *The Greeks and Their Legacy*, p. 147).
 93. J.H. Oliver's citation of a scholion on Aristoph. *Kn.* 1085 as the source is an error for Plut. *Per.* 32.2 (*The Athenian Expounders of the Sacred and Ancestral Law* (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1950), p. 16 n. 39).
 94. On Anaxagoras' trial (and its probable non-existence), see Appendix A (C).

95. Cf. Wade-Gery, H.T., "Thucydides the Son of Melesias", *Essays in Greek History* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1958), p. 260 and Woodbury, L., "Anaxagoras and Athens", *Phoenix* 35, 1981, p. 302.
96. Plut. *Per.* 31.1, 32.3. Henry, M.M., *Prisoner of History*, p. 73.
97. By comparison, Satyros' and Sotion's choices for Anaxagoras' prosecutor, respectively Thoukydides, the son of Melesios, and Kleon, seem to refer to Perikles' opponents depending on whether they envisaged the trial as occurring early or late in Perikles' career (Gershenson, D.E. & D.A. Greenberg, *Anaxagoras and the Birth of Physics*, p. 348). Incidentally, Diopieithes (the proposer of the decree) is called 'the diviner' in Ian Scott-Kilvert's translation of Plutarch's *Perikles* by Penguin. This epithet does not appear in the Greek.
98. Aristoph. *Kn.* 1085 & schol., *Wasps* 380 & schol., *Birds* 988 & schol.; Telekleides fr. 7; Phrynichos fr. 9; Ameipsias fr. 10.
99. Schol. on Aristoph. *Kn.* 1085, *Birds* 988.
100. Methone decree - *IG* i² 57 = Meiggs & Lewis *GHI* 65.4-5 (name restored). Piraeus decree - *Suidas* s.v. Διοπείθης, ἐπιτήδευμα & ὄψέ; Connor, W.R., "Two Notes on Diopieithes the Seer", *CPhilol.* 58, 1963, p. 116-17.
101. Unique apart from his reference to Theophrastos' book Περὶ Μεταρσίων (Plut. *Mor.* 292c). Plutarch also uses only one compound of μετάρσιος- μεταρσιολεσχία (*Per.* 5.1) (Dover, K.J., "The Freedom of the Intellectual in Greek Society", *The Greeks and Their Legacy*, p. 146).
102. Cobet, *Philologica et Critica*, *Mnem.* n.s. 1, p. 117. Other proponents include: Krech, *De Crateri Decrees ψηφισμάτων συναγωγῆ et de aliis locis apud Plutarchum ex ea petitis* (Berlin, Diss., 1888), p. 84ff.; Derenne, E., *Les Procès d'Impiété*, p. 22 n. 2; Mansfeld, J., "The Chronology of Anaxagoras' Athenian Period and the Date of His Trial, II", *Mnem.* ser. 4, 33, 1980, p. 25-26; and Hershbell, J., "Plutarch and Anaxagoras", *ICS* 7, 1982, p. 149. On Plutarch's use of Krateros, see Stadter, P.A., *A Commentary on Plutarch's Pericles*, p. lxix-lxx.
103. See n. 101 above. Diogenes Laertios gives the title as Μεταρσιολογικοί (5.44). Instances of μετάρσιος in 5th century literature: Soph. *Ant.* 1009, *Trach.* 786; Eur. *Alc.* 963, *Andr.* 1220, *Hec.* 499, *Hel.* 299, *Her.* 1093, *I.T.* 27; Aristoph. *Birds* 1383; Hdt. 7.188.3 (cf. verb μεταρσιόω at 8.65.6). In the form πεδάρσιος: Aischylos *Ch.* 846, *Prom.* 271, 710, 916; Aristoph. *Birds* 1197. Perhaps the only instance in Attic prose of even a compound of μετάρσιος that might precede Theophrastos is μεταρσιολέσχη in the spurious Platonic *Sisyphos* (389a) (the author could possibly be Aischines of Sphettos, active in the first half of the 4th century (D.L. 3.62 plus 2.60 & *Suidas* s.v. Αἰσχίνης).) On τὰ μετέωρα see Chapter 1.2 & n. 26.
104. Chapter 1.6 & n. 135. Implied by Dover, K.J., "The Freedom of the Intellectual in Greek Society", *The Greeks and Their Legacy*, p. 146-47.
105. It is standard practice of comedians to select proper names for their comic value, often quite facile. For example, Lysistratos is mentioned in Aristophanes' *Lysistrata* (1105) for no better reason than it is the masculine form of the heroine's name, 'disbander of armies'. Aristophanes also

- exploits place names e.g. *Ach.* 604ff., *Kn.* 899; and Carter, L.B., *The Quiet Athenian*, p. 85 n. 15. On Lysistratoi in comedy, see Major, W.E., *Aristophanes: Enemy of Rhetoric* (PhD Diss., Indiana University, 1996), p. 78.
106. *IG* ii 977 (name restored), dated to 452/1 BC.
107. Schol. on Aristoph. *Wasps* 380 & *Birds* 988. The latter cites the 1st century AD commentator Symmachos.
108. Palamedes' inventions: Stesichoros fr. 213 *PMG*; Aischylos fr. 180, 182 (N); Soph. fr. 438 (N); Gorg. *Pal.* 30; Eur. fr. 578 (N); ps.-Alkid. *Od.* 22-23, 27-28; Pl. *Rep.* 522d, *Laws* 677d; Polygnotos' painting – Paus. 10.31.1 etc. A corrupt fragment of Ion of Chios may describe him as a μάντις (*FGH* 392F2).
109. Pl. *Crat.* 393d-e, 424c, *Tht.* 203b; Aristot. *H.A.* 4.9, 535a32. Scodel, R., *The Trojan Trilogy of Euripides*, p. 91 n. 27. On intellectuals' language studies, see Chapter 2.1 B5.
110. For the various versions of Palamedes' death, see Chapter 3.
111. Scodel, R., *The Trojan Trilogy of Euripides*, p. 56.
112. Stanford, W.B., *The Ulysses Theme*, p. 108-15.
113. Cf. Webster, T.B.L., *The Tragedies of Euripides*, p. 176.
114. Scodel, R., *The Trojan Trilogy of Euripides*, p. 93, 105, 114, 116.
115. Schol. on Aristoph. *Fr.* 53.
116. *Hyg. Fab.* 8. This version is also very similar to Apollodoros' (*Bibl.* 3.5.5). For proposed reconstructions of the play, see Snell, B., *Scenes from Greek Drama*, p. 71-79; Webster, T.B.L., *The Tragedies of Euripides*, p. 205-11 and Carter, L.B., *The Quiet Athenian*, p. 163-72.
117. Hom. *Od.* 11.262-5; Hesiod fr. 96 (Loeb).
118. Αἶθρα καὶ Γαῖαν πάντων γενέτειραν αἰίδω - Eur. fr. 182a (N²), reassigned from 1023 (N) cf. Philostr. *Imag.* 1.10. Another unassigned fragment may also belong here:

ὄλβιος ὅστις τῆς ἱστορίας / ἔσχε μάθησιν, / μήτε
πολιτῶν ἐπὶ πημοσύνην μήτ' εἰς ἀδίκους πράξεις
ὀρμῶν, / ἀλλ' ἀθανάτου καθορῶν φύσεως / κόσμον
ἀγήρων, πῆ τε συνέστη / καὶ ὄπη καὶ ὄπως. / τοῖς δὲ
τοιούτους οὐδέποτ' αἰσχροῶν / ἔργων μελέδημα
προσίζει.

“Blessed is the one who has learned the methods of research, without impulse to hurt his fellows, or to any unrighteous dealing, but contemplating the ageless order of undying Nature, how it arose and whence: such men have no temptation to ugly deeds.”

(Eur. fr. 910 (N), tr. Carter, L.B., *The Quiet Athenian*, p. 163)

If it does not belong to Amphion then it certainly does to another man of the same type. It has been suggested that it refers to Anaxagoras though this seems to rest on poorly founded suppositions about his association with Euripides (see n. 86 above).

119. Of course, scepticism is not confined to intellectuals: Ion, brought up as a temple slave, makes the same objection to Kreousa's story (Eur. *Ion* 339ff.).
120. "Someone would set up double arguments about everything, were a wise man to speak." (ἐκ παντὸς ἄν τις πράγματος δισσῶν λόγων ἄγῶνα θεῖτ' ἄν, εἰ λέγειν εἶη σοφός) (Eur. fr. 189, tr. Olding). On the infamy of 'double arguments', see Chapter 2.1 B4, B5 & n. 2. It is likely that the speaker of fr. 189 is the chorus, attempting to pour oil on Amphion's and Zethos' dispute, so it need not imply a belief that debate is not capable of resolving issues (cf. Webster, T.B.L., *The Tragedies of Euripides*, p. 205).
121. Carter, L.B., *The Quiet Athenian*, p. 171-72.
122. Cf. Snell, B., *Scenes from Greek Drama*, p. 85-86.
123. Carter, L.B., *The Quiet Athenian*, p. 165-66.
124. Snell, B., *Scenes from Greek Drama*, p. 91-92.
125. Hyg. *Fab.* 6-8.
126. Page, D.L., *Select Papyri*, III, Loeb, no. 10; Webster, T.B.L., *The Tragedies of Euripides*, p. 208.
127. Snell, B., *Scenes from Greek Drama*, p. 92.
128. *Nostoi* fr. 2 (Loeb).
129. Eur. *Med.* 486-7, 378-85; Knox, B.M.W., "The *Medea* of Euripides", C. Segal (ed.), *Oxford Readings in Greek Tragedy* (Oxford: O.U.P., 1983), p. 283-85. Euripides does allude to her connexion with the divine and it becomes explicit at the end of the play when she appears in Helios' chariot (*ibid.* p. 280-81).
130. Eur. *Med.* 285, 320, 385, 539, 677, 529, 1225-6 cf. Knox, B.M.W., "The *Medea* of Euripides", C. Segal (ed.), *Oxford Readings in Greek Tragedy* (Oxford: O.U.P., 1983), p. 290.
131. E.g. Derenne, E., *Les Procès d'Impiété*, p. 16 n. 1 cf. n. 86 above.
132. Dodds, E.R., *Euripides: Bacchae*, p. xl.
133. E.g. Eur. *Bac.* 179, 186, 196, 390, 877-881, 897-901.
134. *Ibid.* 243-7. Dionysos also punished Semele's sisters for saying that the story was an invention (σόφισμα) (26ff.). Cf. Teiresias indulges in allegorical and etymological interpretations about the gods but is not punished (275-85, 292-7).
135. E.g. Eur. *Bac.* 268-71, 311-2, 332, 358, 480, 507, 655. Conacher, D., *Euripidean Drama: Myth, Theme and Structure* (University of Toronto Press, 1967), p. 74.
136. *Ibid.* p. 75-76.
137. Dodds, E.R., *Euripides: Bacchae*, on 201-3. Protagoras' *Refutations* was also known as *Truth* (Ἀλήθεια).
138. A desire for right-thinking and intellectual modesty appears also in the mouth of the chorus Euripides' *Hippolytos*: it 'would have belief neither rigid nor again false' (δόξα δὲ μήτ' ἀτρεκῆς μήτ' αὖ παράσημος ἐνείη) (1115).
139. The chorus of Euripides' *Andromache* asserts that real crises require resolute leadership rather than many wise advisers (479-82). This has nothing to do with dramatic situation but is introduced as one of several

examples of unsatisfactory joint responsibility, supposedly to reflect on Neoptolemos' poor judgement in taking Andromache as a mistress in addition to his wife. Its criticism of 'double intelligence' is primarily a reference to Sparta's dual kingship (471 cf. 445-52). If Euripides expected this statement to accord with his listeners' sentiments it was for this reason, not because it reflected their attitudes towards intelligence. The combination of this anti-Spartan attitude with a criticism of the value of 'too many wise men' – which has the tone of popular truism similar to 'too many cooks' – may simply be the association of two popular commonplaces.

140. Dodds, E.R., "Euripides the Irrationalist", *The Ancient Concept of Progress*, p. 83-84.
141. Eur. *Bac.* 268-9, fr. 583, 206 (N).
142. E.g. *Med.* 1333, *Hipp.* 141ff., 240, fr. 572, 840, 841. Dodds, E.R., "Euripides the Irrationalist", *The Ancient Concept of Progress*, p. 81-83.
143. Snell, B., *Scenes from Greek Drama*, p. 54.
144. For views on its interpretation, see *ibid.* p. 56-59 and Claus, D., "Phaedra and the Socratic Paradox", *YCS* 20, 1972, p. 235, 237.
145. Snell, B., *Scenes from Greek Drama*, p. 80-81.
146. σοφωτέρους γὰρ χρῆ βροτῶν εἶναι θεούς - Eur. *Hipp.* 120.
147. ὀργὰς πρέπει Θεοῦς οὐχ ὁμοιοῦσθαι βροτοῖς - Eur. *Bac.* 1348.
148. E.g. Eur. *Hipp.* 120, 1102-10, *Hec.* 488-491, *Bac.* 1348
149. Cf. Arrowsmith, W., "Euripides' Theatre of Ideas", E. Segal (ed.), *Euripides* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1968), p. 16-17.
150. See Chapter 5 A1.
151. On Euripides in comedy, see Chapter 2.1 & n. 86 above. On his supposed impiety, see Chapter 4.3 B1 & n. 107.
152. E.g. *Isoc.* 4.187; O'Sullivan, N., *Alcidamas, Aristophanes and the Beginnings of Greek Stylistic Theory*, *Hermes* 60, 1992, p. 53-54.
153. Pl. *Phdr.* 264b. Rowe, C.J., *Plato: Phaedrus* (Warminster: Aris & Phillips, 1986), p. 144-45.
154. "...And also if in speaking at the commencement of the address of ingratiation one appears to use common phrases and not written ones..." (καὶ αἶ κ' ἐν ταῖς λέξει ταῖς [κατ'] ἀρχὰς τῶν ἐφόδων καὶ μὴ γεγραμμέναις δοκῆι χρησασθαί [τις] ἀλλὰ ἰδιωτικαῖς...) (Grenfell, B.P., & A.S. Hunt (eds.), *The Oxyrhynchus Papyri*, III, no. 410.2-7, translation on p. 30).
155. On the pre-380 orators, see Chapter 1 n. 31. Thucydides has the earliest use of the term λογογράφοι, by which he means popular historians (1.21.1). In later usage it clearly refers to professional speechwriters. Alkidamas, canvassing a subject where a derisive tone would not be missed, uses the term without colour (*Soph.* 13, verb at §6; the components λόγος and γράφ- appear side by side throughout). It does not seem to acquire pejorative value until well into the 4th century when it is connected to irresponsible and profligate living, corruption and mercenary selling of skills (e.g. Pl. *Phdr.* 257c; Aischines 2.180, 3.173; Dem. 19.246, 250; Hyp. 3.3; Dein. 1.111). Isokrates apparently denied that he had ever been a

- λογογράφος, though the term could be Dionysios', of course (D.H. *Isoc.* 18). Λογογράφος could, however, still be used neutrally even at the end of the classical period: Demades and Aristotle refer to it as a respectable, though not distinguished, profession (Demad. 1.8; Aristot. *Rhet.* 3.12.2, 1413b). It is a serious overstatement to say that it was impossible to write speeches professionally and be a respectable citizen by the beginning of the 4th century (as Kennedy, G., *The Art of Persuasion in Greece*, p. 252). Ρήτωρ is another designation involving practiced skill in speaking and argument. Though it is attested before Athens' intellectual explosion in the mid-5th century (e.g. Aischylos *Suppl.* 248 cf. Hom. *Il.* 9.443) it does not seem to refer to a specialised field before the 4th century (Schiappa, E., *The Beginnings of Rhetorical Theory in Classical Greece*, p. 67-68). In oratory it is commonly neutral in tone (e.g. And. 3.1; Lys. 12.72; Alkid. *Soph.* 20, 34) but can be negative (e.g. Lys. 18.16) (Ober, J., *Mass and Élite in Democratic Athens*, p. 105). Thoukydides' three uses of ρήτωρ are all negative, whether coming from his own mouth or another's: he uses it to describe seedy political operatives, not statesmen (3.43.3, 6.29.3, 8.1.1). Thoukydides does not call Antiphon either ρήτωρ or λογογράφος though the names would certainly be appropriate. From the mid-4th century, when orators were more of a recognised class, a litigant might feel the need to excuse or defend to the jury his supporters who had this reputation (e.g. Dem. 32.31, 59.14-15; Hyp. 1.10-11, 4.11).
156. Ant. 5.3, 80; Lys. 12.86, 14.38, 30.24; Isoc. 21.5 etc. Cf. Ant. 2.2.1. Ober, J., *Mass and Élite in Democratic Athens*, p. 106.
157. Also e.g. Ant. 1.1ff., 3.2.1, 5.5, 80; Lys. 7.1, 19.2, 30.24, 31.4; And. 1.105 cf. Eur. *Hipp.* 986; Aristoph. *Eccl.* 152.
158. Major, W.E., *Aristophanes: Enemy of Rhetoric* (PhD Diss., Indiana University, 1996), p. 103-4.
159. E.g. Lys. 6.34, 26.3, 5. On quietism, see Connor, W.R., *The New Politicians of Fifth-Century Athens*, p. 175ff.; Lateiner, D., "The Man Who Does Not Meddle in Politics': A *Topos* in Lysias", *CW* 76, 1982-83, p. 1-12 and especially Carter, L.B., *The Quiet Athenian*, *passim*. Praise for enthusiastic involvement in public affairs (πολυπραγμοσύνη) and attacks on quietism do appear in certain circumstances, in expressions of high-minded patriotism. Athenian politicians do so when flattering the Athenians' supposed national character: Perikles, Kleon, Alkibiades, and Euphemos the delegate at Kamarina (Thuc. 2.37.1, 40.2, 63.2-3, 64.4, 3.40.4, 6.18.3-4, 7, 87.3). The speaker of the *Against Alkibiades* ascribed to Andokides (see n. 168 below) speaks of his zeal in public service to affirm his public-spiritedness (ps.-And. 4.41-42). The chorus in Sophokles' *King Oedipus* also praises it (881-2). Solon's law prescribing disenfranchisement for those who stand aloof during civil disturbances seems to be based on the belief that non-involvement could exaggerate the influence of small factions in the state and therefore encourage instability (ps.-Aristot. *A.P.* 8.5 cf. Plut. *Sol.* 20.1, *Mor.* 550c, 823f, 965d).
160. E.g. Is. 1.7; Aischines 1.94. Kennedy, G., *The Art of Persuasion in Greece*, p. 128.

161. Sattler, W.M., "Conceptions of *Ethos* in Ancient Rhetoric", *Speech Monographs* 14, 1957, p. 55-56, 59 cf. Chapter 1.6 B2.
162. D.H. *Lys.* 3, 8-9, 19. Kennedy, G., *The Art of Persuasion in Greece*, p. 133-40.
163. Ober, J., *Mass and Élite in Democratic Athens*, p. 175, 190.
164. *Lys.* 13.71-72 cf. Meiggs & Lewis *GHI* p. 263; *And.* 1.77ff. cf. Robertson, N., "The Laws of Athens, 410-399 BC", *JHS* 110, 1990, p. 63.
165. Pearson, L., "Historical Allusions in the Attic Orators", *CPhilol.* 36, 1941, p. 221-22.
166. *Lys.* 19.45, tr. Lamb, Loeb. Also *Ant.* 5.80; *Lys.* 6.50, 13.36-37, 43-48, 18.1-2, 25.25; *And.* 1.46, 69, 130, 2.26, 3.8-9; ps.-*And.* 4.33 etc. The motif also appears in comic, fictional and reported speeches e.g. *Aristoph. Lys.* 1138ff.; *Gorg. Pal.* 28, 31; *Xen. Hell.* 1.7.20, 2.3.30, 3.5.9-10, 4.8.4. Cf. Pearson, L., "Historical Allusions in the Attic Orators", *CPhilol.* 36, 1941, p. 218-19.
167. The Sicilian Expedition - *Lys.* 18.2-3. Aigospotamoi - *Lys.* 6.46, 13.5, 18.4; *And.* 3.21 etc. Other examples of historical allusions – *Lys.* 34.9; *And.* 2.7, 12, 3.31, 38; *Isoc.* 18.47; *Is.* 11.8, 48 etc. See Pearson, L., "Historical Allusions in the Attic Orators", *CPhilol.* 36, 1941, p. 225-26.
168. The *Andokidean Against Alkibiades*' general character is consistent with genuine pre-380 BC oratory. The speech purports to precede an ostracism vote that, it claims, will fall upon Alkibiades, Nikias or the speaker (§2). Plutarch gives details of such an occasion, in c.416 BC, when Alkibiades, Nikias and Phaiax were the most prominent – and hence the most vulnerable – politicians in Athens but the vote actually went to Hyperbolos (*Plut. Nic.* 11.1-7, *Alc.* 13.4-5). Contemporary sources refer to Hyperbolos' ostracism only briefly (*Thuc.* 8.73.3; *Pl. Com. fr.* 203 cf. *Theopompos FGH* 115F96b); see Connor, W.R., *The New Politicians of Fifth-Century Athens*, p. 79-84). However, this speech cannot have been made on the purported occasion as (a) the procedure gave no opportunity for speeches, (b) there was no formal field of candidates and (c) there is an anachronistic reference to the reduction of Melos and to Alkibiades fathering a son on one of the captives (§22), which can hardly have occurred before 415 BC. As the speaker takes the opportunity to criticise the inadequacy of legal trials and the ostracism procedure (§3-6, 9), he seems to have a wider legal and constitutional agenda. However, this does not mean that the speech was simply a literary exercise or cannot have been written until many years after the purported occasion. The discussion of ostracism procedure implies that it was still considered a functional procedure and the vitriol directed against Alkibiades implies that he was still influential. The speaker's biographical details (§1, 8, 35-38, 41-42) do suggest that he was a real public figure. These details do not accord with Andokides' life but do match Phaiax's. (Phaiax led an embassy to Sicily (*Thuc.* 5.4-5) and was acquitted in a trial at least once (schol. on *Aristoph. Kn.* 1377) (Fuqua, C., "Possible Implications of the Ostracism of Hyperbolos", *TAPA* 96, 1965, p. 172-74).) Plutarch in fact attributes *Against Alkibiades* to him (*Alc.* 13.2 cf. *Andokides*' anonymous biographer lists a *Defence Against Phaiax* among his works, perhaps a confusion for this speech – ps.-*Plut. Mor.* 835a).

169. Eupolis fr. 221. For the play's date, see Edmonds *FAC I* p. 388 n. e.
170. Lys. 18.3, 13.62. Other examples: Lys. 13.67 (in Loeb; §65 in the manuscript), 28.8; And. 2.15; Isoc. 16.7-8, 17.23, 18.10; Thuc. 1.68.3, 2.36.4, 4.59.2. Pearson, L., "Historical Allusions in the Attic Orators", *CPhilol.* 36, 1941, p. 212-13.
171. Lys. 14.42; Isoc. 16.7-8; Dover, K.J., *Greek Popular Morality*, p. 12.
172. A rare specific example of Greek-Persian relations is Andokides' reference to Athens' opportunistic alliance with the Persian rebel Amorges (3.29) (Pearson, L., "Historical Allusions in the Attic Orators", *CPhilol.* 36, 1941, p. 227). Another exception is Lysias' description of the events leading up to the oligarchic coup of 404: it is detailed and lacks an introduction in terms of the listeners' own knowledge (13.4ff.).
173. Ps.-Dem. 59.94-104 ~ Thuc. 1.128-33, 2.2-6. Dover, K.J., *Greek Popular Morality*, p. 11.
174. Finley, M.I., "The Ancestral Constitution", *The Use and Abuse of History*, p. 55-56.
175. For the Oxyrhynchos tract, see n. 154 above, lines 38ff., 103-7. Poetic quotes in reconstructed and non-legal speeches - Hdt. 7.161; Pl. *Ap.* 28c-d, 34d; Isoc. 4.159. The same is true of the quotation of oracles - Hdt. 5.92, 6.86. Mythological metaphors occasionally appear in legal speeches, e.g. Ant. 1.17; And. 1.129.
176. Dem. 19.250 also e.g. 243, 245; Aischines 1.141; Lyk. 1.101-2, 106. Ober, J., *Mass and Élite in Democratic Athens*, p. 172-73, 178-80. The use of poetic quotes in oratory post-380 BC may be due to the chances of preservation, the disposition of individual speechwriters, changes in public taste, or to the changing status of orators from relatively private individuals to having a semi-formal role in public affairs.
177. E.g. Lys. 18.14.
178. Appeals to common knowledge are frequently employed as proof of one's character. For instance:

Σκέψασθε δὲ καὶ μοι μνήσθητε, ὦ ἄνδρες· ταῦτα γὰρ οὐ μόνον μάρτυσιν ὑμῖν ἀποδείξω, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐξ αὐτῶν τῶν ἔργων ἃ τοῦτοις πέπρακται, ῥαδίως γνῶσεσθε ὅτι ἀληθῆ λέγω.

"And now I want your attention, gentlemen: I want you to cast your minds back; for I shall not use witnesses alone to prove the facts to which I am now coming; your own knowledge of how the prosecution have acted will itself show you at once that I am telling the truth."
(Ant. 6.41, tr. Maidment, Loeb)

ἐνθυμουμένους καὶ ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων καὶ ἐκ τῆς ἄλλης πολιτείας.

“...Let your reflections be guided by what I have told you and the whole tenor of my citizenship.”
(Lys. 7.30, tr. Lamb, Loeb)

- Such appeals appear in both real and fictional oratory throughout the Classical period (e.g. Lys. 7.6-7; And. 2.19, 20; Gorg. *Pal.* 15, 28-31; Xen. *Ap.* 3; Pl. *Ap.* 19d cf. 26d cf. Hdt. 6.136). In the law-courts it was sufficient for a speaker to convince the jury that he was inoffensive; in the Assembly, he had to portray himself as not only embodying popular standards and interests but as having the intelligence, knowledge and abilities to offer advice. Hence, deliberative speakers sometimes emphasise their birth, wealth and talents. For example: ‘I have the advantage in both means and birth of my opponents’ (Lys. 34.3). Alkibiades insisted that he is the best qualified for command and the most worthy of it (Thuc. 6.16.1). Also e.g. Gorg. *Pal.* 16; Aischines 1.179, 2.150, 3.174-75; Aristot. *Rhet.* 3.1.1, 1410b. Acceptance of proposals, especially if complex, delicate or important, might rest on the listeners’ trust as much or more than their understanding (Ober, J., *Mass and Élite in Democratic Athens*, p. 314-26). The emphasis on character defence and assassination indicates that Athenian public morality did not strongly differentiate between public and private conduct. For example, in the debate on the Sicilian Expedition (Thuc. 6.9-19), pseudo-Andokides’ *Against Alkibiades* and Lysias’ *Against Nikomachos* – Nikomachos had also tried to blacken his prosecutor’s name, calling him an anti-democrat (Lys. 30.7-8). Also e.g. Lys. 21.19, 31.22-23, 30.1; ps-And. 4.13; Aischines 1.30, 179 cf. Lys. 3.4; Ober, J., *Mass and Élite in Democratic Athens*, p. 126). See also Chapter 1 n. 112.
179. Ps.-Aristot. *A.P.* 25.4 & Plut. *Per.* 10.7. The 3rd century BC Peripatetic Idomeneus alleges that Perikles was responsible for Ephialtes’ death, a statement, according to Plutarch, with no credible source (*FGH* 338F8 ap. Plut. *Per.* 10.6). Diodoros says that the assassin was unknown (D.S. 11.77.6). Clearly, there was great uncertainty and many rumours on the matter. Andokides repeats Antiphon’s claim about the frequency of false accusations for the same tactical reasons but does not provide illustrations or authority (And. 1.7).
180. Ant. 2.1.1, 4.4.2. In non-Attic fictional speech, Gorgias’ *Palamedes* is full of them, for instance that ‘all men act either to pursue profit or to escape punishment’ (§19 also e.g. 1, 4, 6, 15-17, 20, 24-26, 34).
181. Cf. Finley, J.H., “Euripides and Thucydides”, *Three Essays on Thucydides* (Cambridge (Mass.): Harvard University Press, 1967), p. 50-53; Solmsen, F., *Intellectual Experiments of the Greek Enlightenment* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975), p. 143-151.
182. E.g. Lys. 3.4, 39, 44; Isoc. 21.5, 8, 17.
183. Ant. 6.1.
184. Ant. 1.28-29.
185. Ant. 5.14-15, 6.2 cf. Kleon in Thuc. 3.37.3, see n. 203 below.
186. Ant. 5.71-72 cf. Gorg. *Pal.* 35; Thuc. 3.42.2; Pl. *Ap.* 37a-b.
187. Ant. fr. B.1.2 col. II-III (Loeb).
188. And. 3.5-6 cf. Lys. 3.4, And. 3.18, 24-25.

189. And. 1.1, 6-7, 9, 24, 144-45.
190. Pl. *Ap.* 32a.
191. In general, see Dover, K.J., *Lysias and the Corpus Lysiacum*, p. 74-76.
192. Ant. 3.2.1-2, 3.4.2 also e.g. Thuc. 3.37-40, 4.10. Cf. Ober, J., *Mass and Élite in Democratic Athens*, p. 169. Kleon (Thuc. 3.38.4-5) and Andokides (3.35) assert that ‘words can seem more real than facts’ in order to criticise the Athenians’ lack of perceptiveness. Some intellectuals also toy with the notion (Gorg. *Pal.* 34-35; Antisth. *Aias* 1, 4, 7-8). It might seem surprising for the intellectual Palamedes and anti-intellectual Aias to agree on this but both characters are in the position of having their just claims challenged by an articulate and devious opponent (Odysseus). Cf. Gorgias in the *Helen* refers to astronomers ‘making the incredible seem true’ (§13).
193. Cf. Pearson, L., “Historical Allusions in the Attic Orators”, *CPhilol.* 36, 1941, p. 213, 228; Ober, J., *Mass and Élite in Democratic Athens*, p. 178-182. Of course, historical evidence is as liable to opportunistic manipulation as any other. Andokides’ thesis that Athenian democrats traditionally desired *homonoia* would have been weakened by mention of the Spartans’ involvement in the expulsion of the Peisistratids, so it is omitted (And. 1.106). In *On the Peace* he supports his argument that peace always benefited Athens with historical evidence that is seriously inaccurate, misplaced and confused but outside the memory of most of his audience (And. 3.3-6). There are other examples from epideictic speeches: in the *Panegyrikos* (c.380 BC), when it is necessary to Isokrates’ argument to represent Athens and Sparta as traditionally engaging in friendly rivalry, he describes the latter as hastening to Marathon while the former attacked the Persians as soon as they arrived (§85-87), rather different from Herodotos’ account. Later, Isokrates’ thesis that Greek disunity enabled Persia to regain naval hegemony makes it necessary to ignore the Athenian Konon’s service with a Persian satrap (§119) (Pearson, L., “Historical Allusions in the Attic Orators”, *CPhilol.* 36, 1941, p. 210).
194. Parry, A.M., *Logos and Ergon in Thucydides*, p. 48. See especially Chapter 4.3 B2 below.
195. Andrewes, A., “The Mytilene Debate: Thucydides 3.36-49”, *Phoenix* 16, 1962, p. 72.
196. Thuc. 3.37.3-5. ῥήτωρ - 3.40.3, see n. 155 above.
197. Gomme, A.W., *A Historical Commentary on Thucydides* (Oxford: O.U.P., 1956), on 3.38.7.
198. Thuc. 3.39.3-4; see Chapter 1.6 C1.
199. ἔνδοξοι γνώμαι – Aristot. *Rhet.* 2.21.2, 15, 1395a-b; ps.-Aristot. *Rhet.Alex.* 11, 1430b. Though these tracts belong to the second half of the 4th century, they describe, not invent, the form and nature of maxims and so need not be anachronistic. The rarity of generalisations in legal speeches, whether agreeing or disagreeing with accepted opinion, is discussed in Chapter 2.4.
200. Obviously, any speaker would do this if he could. Diodotos also exploits the traditional notion of retributive justice, differing from Kleon in identifying the audience’s friends and enemies not with Athenians and non-Athenians but with the Mytilenean *demos* and oligarchs (Winnington-

- Ingram, R.P., “*Ta deonta eipein: Cleon and Diodotus*”, *BICS* 12, 1965, p. 79). It is worth noting that Kleon’s imperial policy is, in fact, founded on the application of transcendent principles underlying justice, and the supposition that human behaviour ought to be rational. His assessment of the Mytileneans’ actions is based on the rational principle that the worse crime deserves the harshest punishment (3.39 especially 6, 3.40.1, 8) and that ‘reasonable calculation’ (κατὰ λόγον) rather than opportunism should be the basis of policy (3.39.4). Diodotos, on the other hand, proceeds from the basis that human actions are based on irrational desires (3.45). Kleon’s pragmatism does not mean that he is an intellectual hypocrite.
201. E.g. Thuc. 3.37.1, 38.1, 40.2. Andrews, J.A., “Cleon’s Ethopoetics”, *CQ* n.s. 44, 1994, p. 33-37.
 202. Winnington-Ingram, R.P., “*Ta deonta eipein: Cleon and Diodotus*”, *BICS* 12, 1965, p. 72. Thucydides has King Archidamos anticipate Kleon’s view that citizens should not presume to examine their institutions (1.84.3).
 203. Thuc. 1.71.3, 6.18.7 and n. 185 above. These protestations become even more common later in the 4th century (e.g. Isoc. 15.82; Aischines 1.6, 3.37; Dem. 20.104, 22.25, 24.5, 139-42; Lyk. 1.75 cf. Todd, S., “Lysias against Nikomachos”, L. Foxhall & A.D.E. Lewis (eds.), *Greek Law in its Political Setting*, p. 130). Cf. speakers often emphasise the supposed continuity of Athenian law from the time of Solon, though this is certainly factually false (Pearson, L., “Historical Allusions in the Attic Orators”, *CPhilol.* 36, 1941, p. 221-22).
 204. Pl. Com. fr. 239; Aristoph. *Eccl.* 137-9.
 205. E.g. Pl. *Ep. VII* 325d cf. Xenophon contrasts Sparta’s stability with the practices in all other states (*Lac. Pol.* 15.1).
 206. Andrews, J.A., “Cleon’s Ethopoetics”, *CQ* n.s. 44, 1994, p. 36.
 207. Winnington-Ingram, R.P., “*Ta deonta eipein: Cleon and Diodotus*”, *BICS* 12, 1965, p. 71-72.
 208. On the danger to democratic authority from bribe taking, see Ober, J., *Mass and Élite in Democratic Athens*, p. 331.
 209. Thuc. 3.38.4-7.
 210. Andrews, J.A., “Cleon’s Ethopoetics”, *CQ* n.s. 44, 1994, p. 38. On the λόγος/ἔργον contrast, see n. 194 above.
 211. Thuc. 3.38.1 cf. 39.6, 40.7.
 212. Thuc. 3.38.1. Winnington-Ingram, R.P., “*Ta deonta eipein: Cleon and Diodotus*”, *BICS* 12, 1965, p. 73-74; Andrews, J.A., “Cleon’s Ethopoetics”, *CQ* n.s. 44, 1994, p. 34-35.
 213. Andrews, J.A., “Cleon’s Ethopoetics”, *CQ* n.s. 44, 1994, p. 36-37.
 214. *Ibid.* p. 38-39.
 215. *Ibid.* p. 26.
 216. ...βιαιότατος τῶν πολιτῶν τῷ τε δήμῳ παρὰ πολὺ ἐν τῷ τότε πιθανώτατος... (Thuc. 3.36.6 cf. 4.21.3). πιθανός is a term that implies speciousness (Woodhead, A.G., “Thucydides’ Portrait of Cleon”, *Mnem.* ser. 4, 13, 1960, p. 298 & n. 2).
 217. He does provide a speech for the Syracusan demagogue Athenagoras after having described him in terms almost identical to Kleon (Thuc. 6.35.2).

218. Andrewes, A., "The Mytilene Debate: Thucydides 3.36-49", *Phoenix* 16, 1962, p. 77.
219. Thuc. 3.37.2 ~ 2.63.2; 3.38.1 ~ 2.61.2 & 1.140.1; 3.40.4 ~ 2.6.2. Andrews, J.A., "Cleon's Ethopoetics", *CQ* n.s. 44, 1994, p. 27-33.
220. Wassermann, F.M., "Post-Periclean Democracy in Action: The Mytilenean Debate (Thuc. III 37-48)", *TAPA* 87, 1956, p. 32, 35.
221. At one point in the manuscript he is called Nikomachides; Harpokration also refers to Lysias' speech under this title (s.v. ἐπιβολή). On this and the date, see Todd, S., "Lysias against Nikomachos", L. Foxhall & A.D.E. Lewis (eds.), *Greek Law in its Political Setting*, p. 102-3.
222. Lysias *opus* 30. The speaker was not alone, so there may have been other prosecution speeches (Lys. 30.34).
223. Ibid. §2-4, 21, 25, 29. Robertson, N., "The Laws of Athens, 410-399 BC", *JHS* 110, 1990, p. 71-72.
224. Lysias gives Nikomachos several insulting and sarcastic titles but ἀναγραφεύς is the first one he uses (§2). This is the name of the position as it appears on the text of the decree (*IG* i³ 104 = Meiggs & Lewis *GHI* 86.5). The manuscript title - κατὰ Νικομάχου γραμματέως εὐθυνῶν κατηγορία - probably infers his position from the text (Todd, S., "Lysias against Nikomachos", L. Foxhall & A.D.E. Lewis (eds.), *Greek Law in its Political Setting*, p. 104).
225. Bibliographies of scholarship on the 're-codification' of Athens' laws can be found in Dow, S., "The Athenian Calendar of Sacrifices", *Hist.* 9, 1960, p. 292-93 and Robertson, N., "The Laws of Athens, 410-399 BC", *JHS* 110, 1990, p. 43 n. 1.
226. Todd, S., "Lysias against Nikomachos", L. Foxhall & A.D.E. Lewis (eds.), *Greek Law in its Political Setting*, p. 108, 128 cf. Robertson, N., "The Laws of Athens, 410-399 BC", *JHS* 110, 1990, p. 52-56.
227. The inscription gives only the title, not any individual names - see n. 224 above.
228. Lys. 30.2, 4, 16.
229. Cf. *ibid.* §8.
230. Sommerstein, A.H., *Aristophanes: Frogs* (Warminster: Aris & Phillips Ltd, 1996), notes to 678, 1505-7, 1512. The other figures referred to are Myrmex and Archenomos who are otherwise unknown.
231. ...καὶ τούτοις χαριζόμενος οἱ τὸν δῆμον κατέλυσαν... (Lys. 30.14) cf. Lysias associates Nikomachos with those 'who at that time joined in subverting the people' (οἵτινες τότε συγκαταλύσαντες τὸν δῆμον) (§9). Cf. Lys. 13.12ff. cf. Calhoun, G.M., *Athenian Clubs in Politics and Litigation*, p. 66.
232. Rhodes, P.J., "The Athenian Code of Laws, 410-399 BC", *JHS* 111, 1991, p. 89. The speech was probably delivered at an εἴσαγγελία, not an εὐθυναί, despite the evidence of the manuscript title, see n. 224 above and Chapter 5 C2.
233. Dow, S., "The Athenian Calendar of Sacrifices", *Hist.* 9, 1960, p. 291.
234. Robertson, N., "The Laws of Athens, 410-399 BC", *JHS* 110, 1990, p. 66, 73-74.

235. Todd, S., "Lysias against Nikomachos", L. Foxhall & A.D.E. Lewis (eds.), *Greek Law in its Political Setting*, p. 130. See Chapter 2.5.
236. The sources for Sokrates' trial are succinctly analysed in Hansen, M.H., *The Trial of Sokrates*, p. 4-15.
237. Xenophon gives εἰσφέρων instead of Diogenes' εἰσηγούμενος (*Mem.* 1.1.1). Cf. *Xen. Ap.* 10; *Pl. Ap.* 24b cf. 27c.
238. See especially the discussions in Hackforth, R., *The Composition of Plato's Apology*, p. 60-63; Tate, J., "Greek for 'Atheism'", *CR* 50, 1936, p. 3-5 and "More Greek for 'Atheism'", *CR* 51, 1937, p. 3-6; Cohen, D., *Law, Sexuality, and Society: The Enforcement of Morals in Classical Antiquity* (Cambridge: C.U.P., 1991), p. 207-15.
239. *Pl. Ap.* 23d, 26d; *Xen. Mem.* 1.1.11-15 cf. *Pl. Phdo.* 98c, 99b-c.
240. *Pl. Ap.* 23d cf. 18c, 19b.
241. *Ibid.* 18d, 19c cf. *Pl. Phdo.* 70c.
242. Chapter 2.2; *Eur. fr.* 913 (N), see Chapter 2.3 B.
243. *Pl. Euthph.* 6a cf. *Pl. Rep.* 376e-377a.
244. Tate, J., "Socrates and the Myths" *CQ* 27, 1933, p. 79-80. For Sokrates' scepticism about myths in comedy, see Chapter 2.1. In Polykrates' pamphlet: schol. on Aelius Aristides *For the Four (Orat. III)* 133. 16, 3.480 (Dindorf) cf. *Xen. Mem.* 1.2.56; *Lib. Ap.Soc.* 62ff., and see especially Chapter 2.8 below. This attitude is also consistent with Sokrates' reported view that convention should be adhered to in cases where no higher issues are at stake or the truth was impenetrable to the intellect, such as the gods' names and fantastic features of traditional myths; those who did so he called 'clever and laborious' (*Pl. Phdr.* 229c-230a cf. *Crat.* 400d-401a, *Laws* 886d).
245. (1) A reference in a mid-4th century speech to an infraction in sacrificial procedure indicates that this *could* be considered to be a crime of impiety (ἄσεβεια) (*ps.-Dem.* 59.116). The speaker's motive is to establish a precedent for punishing irregularities in ritual, so his representation of the case might not be accurate. He fails to mention the punishment even though stressing its harshness may have advantaged his case – it may therefore have been light or non-existent. (2) In Xenophon's Sokrates' conversation with Aristodemos 'the dwarf' there is no suggestion that the latter's unorthodox refusal to sacrifice, pray to the gods or use divination could provoke a prosecution (*Xen. Mem.* 1.4). (3) There is no evidence that the notoriously impious Kinesias was ever prosecuted. He defiled a shrine of Hekate (*Aristoph. Fr.* 366 & schol., *Eccl.* 330) and was a member of the 'Devil-worshippers' (κακοδαιμονισταί) (a parody of the respectable social clubs ἀγαθοδαιμονισταί - cf. *Aristot. EE* 3.6.3, 1233b) who 'mocked the gods and Athenian customs' (ὡς καταγελῶντες τῶν θεῶν καὶ τῶν νομῶν τῶν ὑμετέρων) by celebrating unlucky days (*Lysias fr.* 34 (Scheibe) ap. *Athen.* 551e-522b) (Dodds, E.R., *The Greeks and the Irrational*, p. 188). Contemporary comic poets called Kinesias ἄθεος (*Athen.* 551e e.g. *Strattis fr.* 18). Kinesias was certainly a well-known figure otherwise: he was a byword for cowardliness, sickliness and bad poetry (e.g. *Aristoph. fr.* 156; *Lys.* 21.20).

246. Xen. *Ap.* 11, 24, *Mem.* 1.1.2, 1.1.10, 1.1.20, 1.2.64, 1.3.1-4, 4.6 cf. 1.4, 4.7 cf. Pl. *Phdo.* 118a, *Phdr.* 279b-c; Theodektes ap. Aristot. *Rhet.* 2.23.13, 1399a7.
247. καὶ Σωκράτην οἱ πρόγονοι ἡμῶν ἐπὶ λόγοις ἐκόλαζον (Hyp. fr. 14, Loeb).
248. Pl. *Ap.* 26c.
249. I.F. Stone suggests a number of deities which Sokrates may have refused to worship on account of their association with egalitarian democracy: Hephaistos (popular with handiworkers), Zeus and Hermes of the Agora (connected to the city's commercial life), Peitho (an essential component of popular deliberation) and Democracy personified (*The Trial of Socrates*, p. 202-9). However, he provides no evidence that this was, in fact, the case.
250. Xen. *Mem.* 1.3.1.
251. Xen. *Mem.* 1.3.3; Aischines of Sphettos fr. 8a (Dittmar); Pl. *Euthph.* 14d-15a.
252. Connor, W.R., "The Other 399: Religion and the Trial of Socrates", *Georgica*, *BICS* suppl. 58, 1991, p. 53-55. In *The Birds* Aristophanes describes Sokrates engaging in a parody of Odysseus' sacrifice in the Underworld (1553-64), presumably alluding to his supposed irreligiousness.
253. Pl. *Euthph.* 3b, *Ap.* 31c-d, *Rep.* 496c cf. *Ap.* 33c; Burnet, J., (ed.), *Plato's Euthyphro, Apology of Socrates and Crito*, p. 16, 105.
254. Xen. *Ap.* 12-13, *Mem.* 1.1.3-5, 20. Xenophon also believed that the *daimonion* implied that Sokrates enjoyed some special favour, which provoked resentment.
255. Xen. *Mem.* 1.1.2.
256. Pl. *Euthph.* 3b; Xen. *Ap.* 12, *Mem.* 1.1.2; D.L. 2.40.
257. Especially Pl. *Euthph.* 3b; Xen. *Ap.* 24. See Hackforth, R., *The Composition of Plato's Apology*, p. 67.
258. The reluctance to give non-traditional cults official sanction does not mean that they were ignored. The first Bendis festival was well attended and the procession of citizens was 'as impressive as that of Thracians' (Pl. *Rep.* 327a, 354a). There are a few examples of prosecutions, later in the 4th century, of individuals for having 'introduced new gods'. (1) Ninos, a priestess of Sabazios, was convicted and executed. Demosthenes refers to her having led revels but is allusive (19.281 & schol., 39.2, 40.9). According to Josephos she was accused of 'having initiated people into the mysteries of a foreign god' (*Ap.* 2.37.267). Of course, he is writing four hundred years after the event, so his assertion that introducing a new god was actually an offence may not be accurate. (2) Theoris was a priestess convicted of ἀσέβεια apparently for supplying 'drugs and charms' (τὰ φάρμακα καὶ τὰς ἐπωδὰς) and was executed along with her whole family (Dem. 25.79; Philochoros *FGH* 328F60 ap. Harpokr. s.v. Θεωρίς cf. Plut. *Dem.* 14.4). That 'new gods' were involved is not entirely clear. (3) Phryne, Hypereides' mistress, was charged but acquitted of ἀσέβεια for 'introducing a new god', along with 'revelling in the Lykeion and gathering an illegal assembly of men and women' (Hyp. fr. 102-110 (Sauppe)). The charges, apparently quoting the prosecutor Euthias, appear in the

- anonymous Τέχνη τοῦ πολιτικοῦ λόγου (§215 - Spengel I, p. 390). The god was Isodaites (Hesych. s.v. Ἴσοδαίτης cf. Plut. *Mor.* 389a) (Cooper, C., "Hypereides and the Trial of Phryne", *Phoenix* 49, 1995, p. 305 n. 9).
259. E.g. Xen. *Mem.* 1.1.4. On the exclusivity of Athenian cults, see Garnsey, P., "Religious Toleration in Classical Antiquity", W.J. Sheils (ed.), *Studies in Church History* 21, 1984, p. 3-6 and Hansen, M.H., *The Trial of Sokrates*, p. 16, 25-26.
260. Derenne, E., *Les Procès d'Impiété*, p. 171. On Aristodemos, see n. 245 above.
261. E.g. Aristoph. *Cl.* 991-9, 1045ff., 1062-6, *Fr.* 1083-8; Xen. *Ap.* 19, *Mem.* 1.2.1-8, 64.
262. Cf. Hackforth, R., *The Composition of Plato's Apology*, p. 104-5 and Hansen, M.H., *The Trial of Sokrates*, p. 26. Impiety is the only charge that Plato mentions in the *Seventh Letter* (325c).
263. Pl. *Ap.* 24d-25a. Derenne E., *Les Procès d'Impiété*, p. 144-46.
264. Pl. *Ap.* 24e-25a.
265. Xen. *Ap.* 20.
266. Pl. *Ap.* 22a-c; Xen. *Ap.* 20, 29-31, *Mem.* 1.2.49, 51, 56-60 cf. Pl. *Prot. passim*, *Meno passim*, etc.
267. Xen. *Ap.* 29 cf. 20-21; *Mem.* 4.1-2; Pl. *Ap.* 20a-b, 25b etc.
268. Xenophon refers to 'those who both in speech and writing criticised Sokrates as a competent exhorter to virtue but an incompetent guide' (*Mem.* 1.4.1). They would have agreed that his error was in method rather than intention.
269. ...εἰ διαφευξοίμην, ἤδη ἂν ὑμῶν οἱ υἱεῖς ἐπιτηδεύοντες ἃ Σωκράτης διδάσκει πάντες παντάπασι διαφθάρησονται... - Pl. *Ap.* 29c, tr. Fowler, Loeb cf. Pl. *Meno* 90b-e, 91c, 92a-b, 92e-93a.
270. Pl. *Ap.* 19b.
271. Ibid. 25d.
272. Pl. *Euthph.* 3d, *Ap.* 19d-e, 23c-d, 33a-b; Xen. *Mem.* 1.2.6, 8, 26, 60 cf. 1.3.1.
273. Pl. *Ap.* 18b, 19b, 23d; Xen. *Mem.* 1.2.31; in comedy, see Chapter 2.1 B5.
274. Stone, I.F., *The Trial of Socrates*, p. 82-83.
275. Pl. *Ap.* 25c-26a, 27b-e.
276. Pl. *Ap.* 33d-34b; Xen. *Ap.* 19-20 cf. 26.
277. Pl. *Ap.* 33a-b; Xen. *Mem.* 1.2.8 cf. Pl. *Ap.* 30b.
278. Xen. *Mem.* 1.2.12ff. Alkibiades' controversial status, attracting both favourable and unfavourable assessments, appear well after his death (e.g. Lys. *Against Alkibiades I & II*; Isoc. *On the Team of Horses* and n. 283 below).
279. Xen. *Ap.* 20, *Mem.* 1.2.9; Aristot. *Rhet.* 2.20.4, 1393b; see *OCD*² s.v. 'Sortition'. Sokrates' companion Antisthenes expressed a similar view about election, that voting a man general did not make him one (fr. 169 (Caizzi)). The exclusiveness of the comic Thinktank has already been noted (see Chapter 2.1 B7) and his 'new gods' may have seemed to be the focus of a subversive coterie. Cf. Gregory Vlastos ("The Historical Sokrates and

- Athenian Democracy”, *Political Theory* 11, 1983, especially p. 498-502) argues that Sokrates was, in fact, a believer in Athens’ constitution. Sokrates may also have appeared to be an ostentatious supporter of Sparta. Aristophanes compares laconisers to Sokrates on account of their appearance and habits (*Birds* 1282), and Sokrates advocated modest sacrifices (*Xen. Mem.* 1.3.3), unlike Athenian lavishness but like the (victorious) Spartans (*ps.-Pl. Alc. II* 149b cf. *Plut. Mor.* 228d). Hence, his beliefs and practices could have appeared to be explicitly unpatriotic (Connor, W.R., “The Other 399: Religion and the Trial of Sokrates”, *Georgica, BICS* suppl. 58, 1991, p. 54-56).
280. Hansen, M.H., *The Trial of Sokrates*, p. 11-13.
281. *Pl. Ap.* 31c-32a; his military service (*Pl. Smp.* 219e ff. etc.); his presidency of the Prytany (*Pl. Ap.* 32b; *Xen. Hell.* 1.7.15).
282. *Xen. Mem.* 1.2.48 cf. 1.2.16, 39, 47. Derenne, E., *Les Procès d’Impiété*, p. 155-56. On quietism, see Chapter 2.1 B3 & Chapter 4.1 B. On Sokrates’ political interests, see Chapter 4 n. 199.
283. *Isoc.* 11.5. After Polykrates, the next connexion of Sokrates and Alkibiades outside Sokratic literature comes from Aischines (1.173) in 345 BC, and a fragment of an unidentified Middle or New Comedy (*com. adesp. fr.* 121 & 122 (Kock *CAF III*), see Chapter 4 n. 73). Specific details of their early relationship, such as Alkibiades protesting that Sokrates should receive his award for bravery, may have been unknown outside the Sokratic circle (*Pl. Smp.* 220e cf. *Antisth. fr.* 33 (Caizzi) - Plutarch implies that the incident was fairly public (*Alc.* 7.3)). It may be that Polykrates was responsible for popularising the connexion between the two.
284. *Pl. Ap.* 36a cf. *Ep. VII* 325b.
285. E.g. *Pl. Ap.* 19d-e; *Xen. Ap.* 17, *Mem.* 1.2.6-7.
286. *Pl. Ap.* 36a; *D.L.* 2.41.
287. Derenne, E., *Les Procès d’Impiété*, p. 161 n. 1.
288. Crowd disturbances at Sokrates’ description of his *daimonion*’s reliability and the proof it provides of his religious spirit (*Xen. Ap.* 14); at his account of Delphi’s oracle saying that ‘no-one is wiser than Sokrates’ (*Pl. Ap.* 21a; *Xen. Ap.* 15); at his claim to possess ‘some kind of human wisdom’ (*Pl. Ap.* 20e) and his determination to continue his accustomed activities (*Pl. Ap.* 30c). Sokrates also expected that his method of discourse would be unwelcome (*Pl. Ap.* 17c, 27b). The disturbances that Plato supplies in the cross-examination scene seem to be directed against Meletos (27c).
289. The religious and political aspects of the trial need not have been connected to intellectualism. Religion seems to be a sensitive issue around the time of Sokrates’ prosecution, to judge from the trials of Nikomachos and Andokides (Connor, W.R., “The Other 399: Religion and the Trial of Sokrates”, *Georgica, BICS* suppl. 58, 1991, p. 51-52). Sokrates’ expressed anti-democratic views and his association with prominent members of the recently defeated oligarchy could have been regarded as dangerous or offensive in their own right.
290. *Isoc.* 11.1 & *Hypothesis*: Πολυκράτης ὁ σοφιστής, ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἔλθων ἐπὶ τὸ σοφιστεῦν διὰ πενίαν, Ἀθηναῖος μὲν τὸ γένος, σοφιστεύων δὲ νῦν ἐν Κύπρῳ.

291. Isoc. 11.4.
292. Favorinus ap. D.L. 2.39.
293. Though Polykrates had established himself professionally in Athens by c.380 BC (Paus. 6.17.9), the *Hypothesis* to Isokrates' *Bousiris* says that he found success as a rhetorician in Cyprus (see n. 290 above). Evagoras of Salamis was an enthusiastic cultivator of migrants from mainland Greece (Isoc. 9.51ff. cf. And. 1.4; Lys. 6.28; Xen. *Hell.* 2.1.29). Polykrates may have fled there directly in 404. Isokrates indicates that he knew Polykrates only by repute in the *Bousiris* (§1-2), which was written c.390 BC (Jebb, R.C., *Attic Orators from Antiphon to Isaeus* (London: MacMillan, 1893), II, p. 95). Isokrates' surviving forensic speeches all date c.403-c.393 BC and all, with the exception of the *Aiginetikos*, concern Athenian cases to be heard in Athens. If Athens was his main place of business in this period it was probably also his residence, particularly as speech writing was his livelihood in the first part of his career. This implies that he left Athens for Chios - presumably for several years if he established a school there and managed to become involved in local politics (ps.-Plut. *Vita Orat. (Mor.)* 837b-c) - perhaps around 393. (To date Isokrates' relocation to Chios to c.403, as does Jebb (*Attic Orators from Antiphon to Isaeus* (London: MacMillan, 1893), II, p. 6 n. 2), is conjecture based on the assumption that the restored democracy was uncomfortable to a man of his supposed oligarchic associations. On his relationship with Theramenes, see Chapter 4.4.) It is likely, therefore, that Polykrates did not return to Athens until 393 at the earliest (cf. Morrison, J.S., "Meno of Pharsalus, Polycrates, and Ismenias", *CQ* 36, 1942, p. 78).
294. E.g. Hermippos fr. 32 (W); *Epistle of Sokrates XIV: Aischines to Xenophon* (in Malherbe, A.J., *The Cynic Epistles: A Study Edition* (Missoula, 1977)); Quintilian *Inst.* 2.17.4; Aelian *V.H.* 11.10; Themistios *Or. XXIII* 296c. Favorinus' criticism of its authenticity is based on its anachronism, not its form (see n. 292 above).
295. D.L. 2.38.
296. *Epistle of Sokrates XIV: Aischines to Xenophon* (see n. 294 above); *Hypothesis* to Isoc. *Bous.*; *Suidas* s.v. Πολύκρατης.
297. Xenophon's single 'accuser' - *Mem.* 1.2.9, 12, 26, 49, 51, 56-58. Polykrates' is the only anti-Socratic work known to have existed so early. Alkibiades as Sokrates' student (Xen. *Mem.* 1.2.12 ~ Polykrates ap. Isoc. 11.5); the quote from *Iliad* 2.188ff. (Xen. *Mem.* 1.2.58 ~ Polykrates ap. schol. on Aelius Aristides *For the Four (Orat. III)* 133. 16, 3.480 (Dindorf) cf. Hansen, M.H., *The Trial of Sokrates*, p. 9-11, 14-15). The relationship between Polykrates and Plato is problematic; see Humbert, J., *Polycratès, l'Accusation de Socrate, et le Gorgias* (Paris: Klincksieck, 1930) and comments by A.W. Gomme ("Philosophers' Trials", *CR* 46, 1932, p. 67) and E.R. Dodds (*Plato: Gorgias* (Oxford: O.U.P., 1959), p. 28-29).
298. Cf. Libanios *Letter 694*. These concerns appear also in his *On the Silence of Sokrates* (Russell, D.A., *Libanius: Imaginary Speeches*, p. 57).
299. Cf. Russell, D.A., *Libanius: Imaginary Speeches*, p. 17-18. Chroust assumes - unjustifiably - that, because Polykrates' and Libanios' tracts are both rhetorical in form, the latter must reflect the former directly (Chroust,

- A.H., *Socrates, Man and Myth*, p. 74). Hansen rejects the legitimacy of using Libanios altogether (*The Trial of Sokrates*, p. 9-10).
300. See n. 297 above. For a view of Sokrates' interpretation of the significance of the passage from *The Iliad*, see Stone, I.F., *The Trial of Sokrates*, p. 31-36.
301. Theognis 176-8 ~ Lib. *Ap.Soc.* 88. Chroust, A.H., *Socrates, Man and Myth*, p. 90.
302. Ἄλλ' αὐτὸς μὲν οὐκ ἔδειτο τοῦ σχήματος, ἑτέρους δ' ἐνῆκε (Lib. *Ap.Soc.* 49, tr. Russell, *Libanios: Imaginary Speeches*).
303. Schol. on Pl. *Tim.* 21b; *RE* s.v. 'Apatouria'.
304. Chroust, A.H., *Socrates, Man and Myth*, p. 89.
305. On the confusing history of this Pindaric quote or misquote, see Chroust, A.H., *Socrates, Man and Myth*, p. 89-90 and Russell, D.A., *Libanios: Imaginary Speeches*, p. 198 n. 65.
306. Xen. *Mem.* 1.2.9, 49, 52; Lib. *Ap.Soc.* 55.
307. The two poets, Homer and Hesiod, that Xenophon mentions is probably simply an abbreviated version of Libanios' four (Chroust, A.H., *Socrates, Man and Myth*, p. 88-89).
308. Cf. Lib. *Ap.Soc.* 98; Chroust, A.H., *Socrates, Man and Myth*, p. 87.
309. The education of Themistokles, whether he had had a mentor or whether his talent for statesmanship was innate, was a vexed question in intellectual circles by the late 5th century. The question was a philosophical debating point as early as Sokrates (Xen. *Mem.* 4.2.2). Like Polykrates, Thoukydides believed that his ability was a natural quality (1.138). The sources that supply him with mentors do not seem to be very reliable: Stesimbrotos of Thasos names Anaxagoras and Melissos despite chronological implausibility (*FGH* 107F1). Herodotos mentions a Mnesiphilos advising Themistokles before the Battle of Salamis; this man acquires great prominence in later sources, probably unjustified (Hdt. 8.57; Plut. *Them.* 2.3-4).
310. Lib. *Ap.Soc.* 73, 152.
311. Favorinus ap. Diog Laer 2.39; Lib. *Ap.Soc.* 160.
312. Schol. on Aelius Aristides *For the Four (Or. III)* 74ff.; Lib. *Ap.Soc.* 13, 127, 132 cf. Xen. *Mem.* 1.2.2.
313. Οὐ λέγει παρίων (Lib. *Ap.Soc.* 133 cf. Pl. *Ap.* 31d ff.).
314. Chroust, A.H., *Socrates, Man and Myth*, p. 82-83 cf. see Chapter 2.4 & n. 159 and Chapter 2.7.
315. Lib. *Ap.Soc.* 127-129. Aristophanes' Sokrates in *The Clouds* and the crowd of philosophers gathered in Kallias' house in Eupolis' *The Flatterers* are thieves and spongers (see Chapter 2.1).
316. Λεγέτω τοίνυν τὴν πρὸς τοὺς σοφιστὰς ὑμῶν ὀργὴν... – Lib. *Ap.Soc.* 153, tr. Russell, *Libanios: Imaginary Speeches*.
317. Ps.-Aristot. *A.P.* 27.4; Plut. *Arist.* 1.7, *Per.* 4.2, *Nic.* 6.1.
318. On Damon's ostracism and the supposed trials of Anaxagoras and Protagoras, see Appendix A. On Diagoras of Melos, see Chapter 1.4 & n. 51.

319. E.g. Lib. *Ap.Soc.* 11, 39, 43, 154, 162. Russell, D.A., *Libanius: Imaginary Speeches*, p. 19.
320. E.g. Pl. *Smp.* 215b, 221d-e; Xen. *Smp.* 4.19, 5.7.
321. Richter, G.M.A., *The Portraits of the Greeks*, p. 198-204; on dating, see p. 199.
322. Zanker, P., *The Mask of Socrates*, p. 36-38.
323. Ibid. p. 37.
324. Cf. Sokrates' widely spaced eyes may explain the Aristophanic description that he 'looks sideways' (Aristoph. *Cl.* 362).
325. Dover, K.J., (ed.), *Aristophanes: Clouds*, p. xxxii-xxxiii.
326. Zanker, P., *The Mask of Socrates*, p. 38 cf. Greifenhagen, A., "Kindheitsmythos des Dionysos", *MDAI(R)* 46, 1931, p. 33. Of course, to portray silenoi and satyrs as paedagogues may be intended to emphasise their uncouthness and lack of restraint. Some of the satyr-paedagogues are engaged in punishing their children: e.g. on a Greek cup, a satyr beats a boy (Beck, F.A.G., *Album of Greek Education*, no. 262, pl. 49). Paedagogues were notorious for their lack of education; they were typically a household's most useless slave. Perikles reputedly said that a slave who broke his leg had become a paedagogue (Stob. *Flor.* 4.209). Plato depicts Lysis' paedagogues as unable even to speak Greek properly (Pl. *Lys.* 208c, 223a cf. *Laws* 804c-d, 813d-e; ps.-Pl. *Alc. I* 122d; Xen. *Lac.Pol.* 2.1-2; Plut. *Them.* 12.3; D.L. 2.72).
327. Zanker, P., *The Mask of Socrates*, p. 38-39.
328. Antisthenes' appearance and character - Xen. *Smp.* 4.2, 37-38; Aelian *V.H.* 9.35; D.L. 2.36, 6.8, 6.13 cf. 6.6. The latest date for the invention of his portrait is c.200 BC, the floruit of the sculptor Phryromachos whose name, along with Antisthenes', has been found on a statue base from Ostia (Richter, G.M.A., *The Portraits of the Greeks*, p. 86-89).
329. Paus. 10.31.1-2. On date, see *OCD* s.v. 'Polygnotus'.
330. Jacobstahl, P., "The Nekyia Krater in New York", *MMS* 5, 1934, p. 128-29; on its date, see p. 119, 122.
331. Ibid. p. 132.
332. Ibid. p. 131.
333. O. 849; see Brenne, S., "'Portraits' auf Ostraka", *Ath.Mitt.* 107, 1992, fig. 7-8 & p. 173-77.
334. It could also be a stock comic character, the querulous old man, whether intellectual or not (Ghiron-Bistagne, P., *Recherches sur les acteurs dans la Grèce antique* (Paris: Société d'édition 'Les Belles Lettres', 1976), p. 149-51).
335. Zanker, P., *The Mask of Socrates*, p. 33.
336. Bigheaded men in vase paintings typically conform to a particular image: balding, bearded, with button-like noses and barrel chests. This reflects a genuine variety of dwarfism, achondroplasia, but the presence of further conventionalities show that this is a popular image of the dwarf in iconographic form (Dasen, V., *Dwarfs in Ancient Egypt and Greece*, p. 173 and Garland, R., *The Eye of the Beholder: Deformity and Disability in the Graeco-Roman World* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1995), p. 116). There are a few other examples of bigheaded balding men without dwarfish

- characteristics (e.g. Dasen, V., *Dwarfs in Ancient Egypt and Greece*, pl. 38.3, 49.2).
337. Hom. *Il.* 2.219. Thersites has an oversized head on a vase of comparatively late date (E196, *Catalogue of the Greek and Etruscan Vases in the BM, III: Vases of the Finest Period*, p. 165). A bigheaded man is depicted defecating (c.500 BC?) (Athens, NM, ACR 1073 in Dasen, V., *Dwarfs in Ancient Egypt and Greece*, pl. 38.2; *chous*, Dresden, Albertinum, ZV 1827).
338. Menander fr. 761; Horace *Ep.* 1.2.57; Luc. *Cal.* 5.13-15; Garland, R., *The Eye of the Beholder: Deformity and Disability in the Graeco-Roman World* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1995), p. 118.
339. Cf. Lissarrague, F., "Aesop, Between Man and Beast: Ancient Portraits and Illustrations" (tr. J.C. Gage), B. Cohen (ed.), *Not the Classical Ideal: Athens and the Construction of the Other in Greek Art* (Leiden, Boston & Cologne: Brill, 2000), [p. 138]. On Aesop's notorious ugliness, see [p. 135-36]. A cup painting of a bigheaded balding man in animated conversation with a fox is often identified with Aesop (Rome, Vatican, 16552; dating to c.450 BC; Dasen, V., *Dwarfs in Ancient Egypt and Greece*, pl. 38.4).
340. E.g. Aeschylus *Ag.* 717-36; Hdt. 5.92, 6.131, 7.180; Aristoph. *Kn.* 1037-44, *Fr.* 1431; Aristot. *H.A.* 1.1, 448b.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 3

1. In this chapter I make much use of Robert Graves' *Greek Myths*, though I rarely cite it specifically. I do not think that a distinction between myth and legend will be helpful: whatever the sources of traditional figures and themes, and the means by which they became the foundation of the culture, the end result is more or less the same.
2. On Odysseus' many facets, see Stanford, W.B., *The Ulysses Theme, passim*. Palamedes and Odysseus are both 'wise men' but the former's wisdom tends to be theoretical and inventive, the latter's a practical cunning. The Platonic *Second Epistle* represents a late-Classical or early-Hellenistic attempt to find a satisfactory division of functions between the two, connecting but contrasting them as representatives of wisdom and power respectively (311b).
3. Hom. *Il.* 11.558-9.
4. *Ibid.* 13.824.
5. *Ibid.* 9.225-306, 624-42.
6. *Ibid.* 23.700-36. Jebb, R.C., (ed.), *Sophocles: The Plays and Fragments: Ajax*, p. x-xi.
7. Most, G.W., *The Measures of Praise: Structure and Function in Pindar's Second Pythian and Seventh Nemean Odes*, *Hypomnemata* 83, 1985, p. 152.
8. Hom. *Od.* 11.563.
9. Aischylos fr. 175 (N). Pindar seems to allude to a debate (*Nem.* 8.25). There are early references to the contest for Achilles' arms in two poems of the Epic Cycle, the *Aithiopsis* and the *Little Iliad* (Jebb, R.C., (ed.), *Sophocles: The Plays and Fragments: Ajax*, p. xx) but a debate is not a necessary component of the dispute. The *Little Iliad* says that the Greeks sent spies to find out who the Trojans rated best and Athena prompted a Trojan girl to name Odysseus (fr. 2). Other authorities say that the choice was made by Trojan captives (Hom. *Od.* 11.547 & schol.; Philostr. *Her.* 720ff; Quintus Sm. 5.157ff; Tzet. *Posthom.* 485). Reasons given for Aias' failure to receive the arms, other than Odysseus' eloquence, are that the election was corrupt (Soph. *Aias* 1135-6 & schol. cf. 445-6 cf. Pindar *Nem.* 8.26); that Aias suffered from the envy of his inferiors (Pindar *Nem.* 8.21-5) or that the Greeks were stupid and easy prey for deception (Pindar *Nem.* 7.23-4) (Most, G.W., *The Measures of Praise: Structure and Function in Pindar's Second Pythian and Seventh Nemean Odes*, *Hypomnemata* 83, 1985, p. 152-53). Aias' rescue of Achilles' corpse appears in vase paintings from c.570 to c.480 BC. Remarkably, these do not include Odysseus. Perhaps he is omitted lest his presence alludes to subsequent divisiveness, detracting from the triumphant and tragic heroic pathos of Achilles and Aias (e.g. Exekias - *ABV* 145.18; O'Higgins, D.M., *Fifth Century Interpretations of Ajax*, p. 29-31). (On the whole, artistic representations of Aias are more positive than their literary counterparts. It may be that literature prefers divisive themes or that vase paintings reflect public taste more accurately (*ibid.* p. 30, 64).) From the late 6th century Aias' appearances in Attic art increasingly emphasise his dispute with Odysseus. The earliest of these (c.525-c.490 BC) depicts Odysseus speaking from a low platform while Aias listens, a calm and orderly debate (Naples Nat. Mus. 8108 (*ABV* 338.3)). Over time, the tone becomes more contentious and Aias

- more violent (e.g. fig. 10). The popularity of the debate scene may have a propagandist function, or have been inspired by Aischylos' tragedy. Douris' version of the voting scene (*ARV*² 429.26) may allude to contemporary Athenian practice with its inclusion of Athena and the onlookers appearing unarmed and in civilian clothes (O'Higgins, D.M., *Fifth Century Interpretations of Ajax*, p. 44-50). The democratic reforms at the end of the 6th century doubtless also created new interest in public debate as an institution.
10. Pindar *Nem.* 8.20-22; Stanford, W.B., *The Ulysses Theme*, p. 91-92. Pindar's object in exposing the falsehood of accepted tradition is to affirm the integrity of his own poetic art (O'Higgins, D.M., *Fifth Century Interpretations of Ajax*, p. 176). He elsewhere shows a readiness to reject traditional stories that are inconsistent with his views of the behaviour appropriate to heroes and gods, see Chapter 4 n. 44.
 11. Pindar *Nem.* 7.20-1. O'Higgins, D.M., *Fifth Century Interpretations of Ajax*, p. 125-29.
 12. Pindar *Nem.* 7.68. O'Higgins, D.M., *Fifth Century Interpretations of Ajax*, p. 143-44.
 13. Cf. Pindar *Nem.* 7.24-5.
 14. Unlike mortal men, divine beings do not make such mistakes; the Fates, whom Pindar mentions in the first line of the *Seventh Nemean*, are 'deep-thinking' (βαθύφρονες). On the interpretation of the *Seventh Nemean*, see Most, G.W., *The Measures of Praise: Structure and Function in Pindar's Second Pythian and Seventh Nemean Odes*, *Hypomnemata* 83, 1985, p. 149, 152-53, 156. In Pindar's *Fourth Isthmian*, which also deals with the contest for Achilles' arms, Odysseus triumphs on account of his 'skill' (τέχνη), presumably in words (§34-35b). Cf. the fragment of Aischylos' *The Judgement of Arms*, produced at around the same time, which includes the commonplace sentiment that 'true words are plain' (ἀπλᾶ γὰρ ἔστι τῆς ἀληθείας ἔπη) (fr. 176 (N)) (Caizzi, F.D., *Antisthenis Fragmenta*, p. 90-91).
 15. O'Higgins, D.M., *Fifth Century Interpretations of Ajax*, p. 174.
 16. Calabrese De Feo, M.R., "La Figura di Aiace in Pindaro", *ParPass* 215, 1985, p. 129. Pindar starts the *Eighth Nemean* with praise of Aiakos, ultimately one of the judges in the underworld, as 'best in hand and in judgement' (§8). This may imply that Pindar is characterising Aias and Odysseus as each representing only half of this ideal (O'Higgins, D.M., *Fifth Century Interpretations of Ajax*, p. 161).
 17. ἀλλ' οὐδὲν ἔργον ταῦτα θρηνεῖσθαι μάτην, / ἀλλ' ἀρκτέον τὸ πρᾶγμα σὺν τάχει τινί (Soph. *Aias* 852-3, tr. Jebb, C.U.P.).
 18. Antisthenes fr. 14 & 15 in Caizzi, F.D., *Antisthenis Fragmenta*; also in Blass, F., *Antiphontis Orationes et Fragmenta* (Leipzig: Teubner, 1892), p. 175-82. Translation in Rankin, H.D., *Antisthenes Sokraticos*, p. 155-71. Their date is unknown but Antisthenes' period of literary activity probably began around the end of the 5th century.
 19. Rankin, H.D., *Antisthenes Sokraticos*, p. 164-65.
 20. Antisth. fr. 44-50 (Caizzi).

21. Caizzi, F.D., *Antisthenis Fragmenta*, p. 90-91.
22. Antisth. fr. 160 (Caizzi). Rankin, H.D., *Antisthenes Sokratikos*, ch. 2. Parmenides is 60 or 70 years older than Antisthenes, so the story cannot be historical. In fact, the same action is ascribed to Diogenes the Cynic (D.L. 6.39).
23. E.g. Pl. *Lach. passim* and Polykrates' criticism of Sokrates for seeming to justify theft, impiety and so on (see Chapter 2.8).
24. Kennedy, G., *The Art of Persuasion in Greece*, p. 171-72.
25. Rankin, H.D., *Antisthenes Sokratikos*, p. 157; Stanford, W.B., *The Ulysses Theme*, p. 105. On Pindar's sympathy with traditional morality, see *ibid.* p. 94.
26. Schol. on Hom. *Od.* 11.547.
27. Jebb, R.C., (ed.), *Sophocles: The Plays and Fragments: Ajax* (C.U.P.), p. xv-xvi.
28. Sophokles' Παλαμήδης, Ναύπλιος Καταπλέων and Ναύπλιος Πυρκαεύς. Gorgias' *Palamedes*: DK 82B11; also Blass, F., *Antiphontis Orationes et Fragmenta* (Leipzig: Teubner, 1892), p. 159-74. Translation by G. Kennedy in Sprague, R.K., (ed.) *The Older Sophists* (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1972), p. 54-63.
29. Alkidamas' *Odysseus: Against Palamedes for Treason* (Ἀλκιδάμαντος Ὀδυσσεύς· κατὰ Παλαμήδους πρόδοσιος) is published in Blass, p. 183-93). The issues affecting its admissibility in this thesis are its date and provenance: if the author is indeed Alkidamas, probably active in Athens by the early 4th century, it can be considered admissible. The manuscript ascribes the tract to him: good reasons are needed to reject such evidence. *RE* s.v. 'Alkidamas' surveys the opinions: its own view is that the tract's 'primitivity and spiritlessness' ("Kunstlosigkeit und Geistlosigkeit") are inconsistent with what Alkidamas is expected to have produced. This is somewhat subjective. Stylistic considerations, however, do count against attribution to Alkidamas. Examination of *On the Sophists*, which is certainly genuine, combined with Aristotle's remarks in *The Rhetoric*, shows that four characteristics distinguish Alkidamas' style: excessive use of abstractions, unusual compounds, pleonasms, and redundancies (Aristot. *Rhet.* 3.3, 1406a-b; O'Sullivan, N., *Alcidamas, Aristophanes and the Beginnings of Greek Stylistic Theory*, *Hermes* 60, 1992, p. 32-42). These features are largely absent from the *Odysseus*.

Other reasons for rejecting its authorship are less cogent: (1) Alkidamas *would not* have written it. *On the Sophists* is largely concerned with an attack on literary compositions. (2) Its general style is more consistent with mid- than early-4th century rhetoric (*RE* s.v. 'Alkidamas' and Kennedy, G., *The Art of Persuasion in Greece*, p. 172-73).

(1) (a) Alkidamas indeed did produce literary compositions: *paignia* such as encomia of death and of a prostitute Naïs are known (Cic. *Tusc.* 1.48 (115); Athen. 592c; O'Sullivan, N., *Alcidamas, Aristophanes and the Beginnings of Greek Stylistic Theory*, p. 31). Aristotle's and Cicero's assessments of his

style must be based on *something* (Aristot. *Rhet.* 3.3, 1406a-b; Cic. *Tusc.* 1.48 (116)). (b) Alkidamas did not have any speeches published at the time he wrote *On the Sophists* (c.380 BC? – see Chapter 1.5 n. 66) and he implies that he did not intend to (§31-32). It is not a psychological impossibility for him to have written *Odysseus* at a later date (cf. §35) though this would place it after 380 and beyond the scope of this thesis. More importantly, it cannot be assumed that Alkidamas must have known and approved of the publication of any of his speeches. A student or spectator could have made notes that were written up and disseminated. This is what Sokrates' companions apparently did (e.g. Pl. *Tht.* 143a). (c) The most important point, however, is that Alkidamas' thesis in *On the Sophists* is persistently misrepresented. He does *not* attack literary compositions as such but their value *as preparation for practical oratory*. He says that speeches are only valuable insofar as they have practical use (§9-10, 28); that written speeches are slow in composition, inflexible in delivery and hence unable to take advantage of or defend against the unexpected (§3, 10, 18, 21-26, 33-34); that composition is easier than extemporaneous speaking and is therefore a meaner accomplishment and less valuable as training (§3-8, 15-17). He does deride the value of compositions, saying that “they are as wraiths, semblances, and imitations” (§27, tr. van Hook, *CW* 12, 1919, p. 91-94) but he does not deny them all value or a place in the world:

τὸ γράφειν ἐν παρέργῳ μελετᾶν οἰόμενος χρῆναι...
Ἴσως ἂν οὖν εἴποι τις ὡς ἄλογόν ἐστι κατηγορεῖν
μὲν τῆς γραφικῆς δυνάμεως, αὐτὸν δὲ διὰ ταύτης
φαίνεσθαι τὰς ἐπιδείξεις ποιούμενον, καὶ
προδιαβάλλειν τὴν πραγματείαν ταύτην, δι' ἧς
εὐδοκιμεῖν παρασκευάζεται παρὰ τοῖς Ἕλλησιν, ἔτι δὲ
περὶ φιλοσοφίαν διατρίβοντα τοὺς αὐτοσχεδιαστικούς
λόγους ἐπαινεῖν, καὶ προουργιαίτερον ἠγεῖσθαι τὴν
τύχην τῆς προνοίας καὶ φρονιμωτέρους τοὺς εἰκῆ
λέγοντας τῶν μετὰ παρασκευῆς γραφόντων.

ἐγὼ δὲ πρῶτον μὲν οὐ παντελῶς ἀποδοκιμάζων τὴν
γραφικὴν δύναμιν, ἀλλὰ χεῖρῳ τῆς αὐτοσχεδιαστικῆς
ἡγούμενος εἶναι, καὶ τοῦ δύνασθαι λέγειν πλείστην
ἐπιμέλειαν οἰόμενος χρῆναι ποιεῖσθαι, τούτους εἶρηκα
τοὺς λόγους...

...τοῦ δὲ γράφειν ἐν παιδιᾷ καὶ παρέργως
ἐπιμελόμενος εὖ φρονεῖν κριθεῖη παρὰ τοῖς εὖ
φρονοῦσιν.

“...I believe that writing should be practised as an ancillary pursuit...

“It may, perhaps, be alleged that it is illogical for one to condemn written discourse who himself employs it in the present written essay, and to disparage a pursuit through the employment of which he is preparing to win fame among the Greeks. Furthermore, it may be

thought inconsistent for a philosopher to commend extemporaneous discourses, thereby deeming chance to be of more worth than forethought, and careless speakers to possess greater wisdom than careful writers.

“In reply let me first say that I have expressed my views as I have, not because I altogether condemn the ability to write, but because I esteem it of lesser worth than extemporaneous speaking, and am of the opinion that one should bestow the greatest pains upon the practice of *speaking*...

“On the other hand, should he study written composition for amusement and as a pastime, he would be deemed by the wise to be the possessor of wisdom.”

(Alkid. *Soph.* 2, 29, 30, 35, tr. van Hook, *CW* 12, 1919, p. 91-94).

(2) The motifs supposedly characteristic of mid-4th century oratory are exaggerated in importance. (a) Kennedy says that to attack someone through his ancestors' character, as the author of *Odysseus* does (§12-17), is a 4th century phenomenon (*The Art of Persuasion in Greece*, p. 173). However, this practice appears in a speech dating to 411 BC, Antiphon's defence against treason: Antiphon says that his prosecutor has alleged that his grandfather was one of the bodyguards of the tyrant Peisistratos (fr. B.1.1, Loeb; also e.g. *Lys.* 30.2, 6, 27). (b) The *Odysseus* employs poetic quotes as evidence and authority (§24-25), something that is virtually non-existent in oratory until the mid-4th century. However, it should be noted that poetic evidence and allusions do, in fact, appear in reconstructed and epideictic speeches, the same category as the *Odysseus*, before 380 BC (see Chapter 2.4 & n. 175, 176).

As such, I consider that the ascription *Odysseus* to Alkidamas is doubtful, though not disproved. There is no particular reason for dating it to the mid- rather than the early 4th century. I shall refer to it for the sake of additional illustration but shall avoid citing it as sole evidence.

30. See Chapter 2.3 & n. 108. Homer mentions dice and draughts but does not name their inventor (*Il.* 23.88, *Od.* 1.107). A number of inventions credited to Palamedes are, unsurprisingly, attributed to others elsewhere (Aischylos *Prom.* 460; Hdt. 1.94, 5.58; Pl. *Phdr.* 274d; ps.-Alkid. *Od.* 23-26; Aristotle ap. Pliny *N.H.* 7.56 (192); Ephoros ap. Clem. Alex. *Strom.* 1.16.75; D.S. 3.67.1-2; Tac. *Ann.* 11.14; the inscription on the third Herm at the River Strymon, dating to c.476 BC – Aischines 3.185). These alternative traditions are not sufficient to indicate that conceptions of Palamedes' status changed markedly.
31. Pl. *Rep.* 522d.
32. Pl. *Phdr.* 261c-d. Apparently 'Palamedes' refers to either Alkidamas the rhetorician (Quintilian *Inst.* 3.1.10) or Zeno the Eleatic philosopher (D.L. 9.25).
33. Aristoph. *Birds* 1009, *Cl.* 180. Palamedes may also be appropriate to Alkibiades' drinking schedule, if the one to three mixture of wine and water is another of his inventions (Ion of Chios *FGH* 392F2).

34. Eur. fr. 580 (N); τεχνήεντά τε καὶ δεινὸν καὶ πόριμον - Gorg. *Pal.* 25 cf. 16.
35. Eur. fr. 580 (N); Gorg. *Pal.* 9, 15, 19; ps.-Alkid. *Od.* 2-3.
36. Eur. fr. 578 (N); Gorg. *Pal.* 30, 36.
37. Eur. *Pal.* fr. 581 (N).
38. Gorg. *Pal.* 27, 29, 31.
39. *Ibid.* 36.
40. τὸ γὰρ ἐκείνοις τὸν νοῦν προσέχοντα τοῖς τοιούτοις προσέχειν ἀδύνατον (*ibid.* 31, tr. Kennedy in Sprague, and §15, 16, 26).
41. *Ibid.* 32.
42. σοφιστῆς at ps.-Alkid. *Od.* 21 seems to be used in a hostile sense.
43. *Ibid.* 4, 22-26.
44. In other versions Odysseus is accompanied by Diomedes, Agamemnon and/or Sthenelos (e.g. *Kypria* ap. Paus. 10.31.1; ps.-Alkid. *Od.* 7; Servius *ad Aen.* 2.81; schol. on Eur. *Or.* 432). In *On Hunting* Xenophon insists that Palamedes was not killed by the usual suspects (1.11). His argument is that Odysseus and Diomedes would not have enjoyed the divine favour necessary to achieve their greatness if they had not behaved piously at all times. This indicates that he did not have any alternative tradition in mind, only his personal pious convictions. In *On Hunting* he is speaking in his own voice whereas, when he names Odysseus as responsible in the *Memorabilia* (4.2.33), it is in another's mouth as an item of popularly accepted evidence cited for the sake of argument.
45. See Chapters 2.3 and 2.9.
46. *Kypria* ap. Proklos *Chrest.* 1; also Apollod. *Ep.* 3.7; Philostr. *Her.* 10; Servius *ad Aen.* 2.81; Hyg. *Fab.* 105. In general terms, Hyginus accords best with what is known of Euripides' *Palamedes*, which implies that Euripides used the 'grudge' motivation as well (Scodel, R., *The Trojan Trilogy of Euripides*, p. 53).
47. Scodel, R., *The Trojan Trilogy of Euripides*, p. 54. The envy theme persists in later sources (e.g. schol. on Lykophron 384, 1093). The scholiast on Eur. *Or.* 432 says that Odysseus was jealous at Palamedes' skill at invention; this may derive from Aischylos. Servius says that, in addition to Odysseus' resentment at being brought to Troy unwillingly and shamefully, he was jealous that Palamedes had succeeded in provisioning the starving Greek army where he had failed. This may come from Sophokles' version, a fragment of which mentions Palamedes' relief of a famine (Servius *ad Aen.* 2.81; Soph. fr. 438 (N)) (Scodel, R., *The Trojan Trilogy of Euripides*, p. 52-53).
48. Pl. *Ap.* 41b. Lincoln observes that Plato integrates Palamedes, as an artificer, into his schema of the rivals of philosophy (Lincoln, B., "Socrates' Prosecutors, Philosophy's Rivals, and the Politics Discursive Forms", *Arethusa* 26, 1993, p. 238). Coulter contends that one level of meaning for *The Apology* is as a refutation of Gorgias and the principles contained in his *Palamedes* (Coulter, J.A., "The Relation of the *Apology of Socrates* to Gorgias' *Defense of Palamedes* and Plato's Critique of Gorgianic Rhetoric", *HSCP* 68, 1964, p. 269-303). Cf. Chroust, A.H., *Socrates, Man and Myth*, p. 216-218.

49. D.L. 2.44; for the *Hypothesis* to Isokrates, see Chroust, A.H., *Socrates, Man and Myth*, n. 207.
50. θάνατον μὲν γὰρ ἡ φύσις φανεραὶ τῆ ψήφῳ πάντων
κατεψηφίσατο τῶν Θνητῶν, ἥπερ ἡμέρα ἐγένετο - Gorg. *Pal.*
1 ~ Xen. *Ap.* 27; Chroust, A.H., *Socrates, Man and Myth*, p. 219. On Plato
and Gorgias, see n. 48 above.
51. *Nostoi* fr. 6 (Loeb) ap. Athen. 218b-c; Archilochos fr. 55 ap. Paus. 10.31.4;
Alkman fr. 79; Alkaios fr. 365; Pindar *Ol.* 1.56-7; Pl. *Crat.* 395d-e etc.
52. Sokrates' claim that his jurors would be familiar with Anaxagoras' book (Pl.
Ap. 26d) need not be taken at face value.
53. ἀκόλαστος γλῶσσα (Eur. *Or.* 10).
54. His request to Zeus to be allowed to live like the gods (*Nostoi* fr. 6 (Loeb) ap.
Athen. 218b). Revealing the gods' table talk (Apollod. *Ep.* 2.1; D.S. 4.74.1-2;
Ovid *Met.* 6.172-3 cf. Eur. *Or.* 9). Perjuring himself about Zeus' watchdog,
see J.G. Frazer, *Apollodorus*, Loeb, 1921, II, p. 154 n. 2 (on *Ep.* 2.1).
Aristarchos of Tegea, a tragedian active in the second half of the 5th century,
wrote a play entitled *Tantalos*. The only surviving fragment is the following
criticism of learning and oratorical skill for their uselessness. We can only
speculate that it may have referred to Tantalos, perhaps exhibiting the
pomposity of his knowledge:

καὶ ταῦτ' ἴσον μὲν εὖ λέγειν, ἴσον δὲ μὴ
ἴσον δ' ἐρευνᾶν, ἐξ ἴσου δὲ μὴ εἰδέναι.
πλέον γὰρ οὐδὲν οἱ σοφοὶ τῶν μὴ σοφῶν
εἰς ταῦτα γιγνώσκουσιν· εἰ δ' ἄλλου λέγει
ἄμεινον ἄλλος, τῷ λέγειν ὑπερφέρει.

“It is the same to say these things well, and not to do so is the same;
and it is the same to learn, and the same not to know;
for the wise do not know more than the ignorant
about these things: if one speaks better
than another, he excels [only] in speaking.”
(Aristarchos fr. 1 (N), tr. Olding)

55. D.L. 2.8; Eust. *Comm.Od.* 1700.60; schol. on Pindar *Ol.* 1.57 cf. Scodel, R.,
“Tantalus and Anaxagoras”, *HSCP* 88, 1984, p. 13-24.
56. Pl. *Prot.* 315c-d ~ Hom. *Od.* 11.582.
57. Aristoph. *Birds.* 692.
58. Willink, C.W., “Prodikos, ‘Meteorosophists’ and the ‘Tantalos’ Paradigm”,
CQ 33, 1983, p. 30-33. On Prodikos' theory, see Guthrie, W.K.C., *A History
of Greek Philosophy*, III, p. 238-41. The only contemporary allusion to
Prodikos' theory about the origin of the gods appears in Euripides' *Bacchae*
in the mouth of the seer Teiresias (275-85). In its context it is difficult to
imagine that the audience would interpret this as atheistic.
59. See Galinsky, G.K., *The Herakles Theme: The Adaptations of the Hero in
Literature from Homer to the Twentieth Century* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell,
1972).

60. Linos' innovations in writing and music - ps.-Alkid. *Od.* 25; D.S. 3.67.1; Tac. *Ann.* 11.14; Paus. 9.29.3.
61. Beck, F.A.G., *Album of Greek Education*, p. 10. Herakles coming to Linos' lesson – (Schwerin 708), *ARV*² 862.30 ~ Beck, pl. 4, no. 25 & pl. 6, no. 31. For humorous and serious versions of Herakles' education under Linos, see Alexis fr. 140; Philochoros *FGH* 328F207; Theokr. *Id.* 24; Paus. 9.29.3.
62. Diodoros says that Herakles had a 'sluggish soul' (τῆς ψυχῆς βραδυτῆτα) (3.67.2). The earliest literary reference, which does not supply an explanation, seems to be the 4th century ps.-Alkid. *Od.* 25. In addition to fig. 1, see Beck, F.A.G., *Album of Greek Education*, pl. 5-6, no. 27-29. There are other versions of Linos' death, including Apollo striking him down for competing with him in musical skill (e.g. Philochoros *FGH* 328F207; Paus. 9.29.3 cf. Hom. *Il.* 18.569-70).
63. Caldwell, R., "The Psychoanalytic Interpretation of Greek Myth", L. Edmunds (ed.), *Approaches to Greek Myth* (Baltimore & London: John Hopkins University Press, 1990), p. 377-78.
64. Cf. *ibid.* p. 354-55.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 4

1. The penurious intellectual in comedy, see Chapter 2.1 B1. In sympathetic sources - Sokrates (Pl. *Smp.* 174a, 215b, 220b, *Tht.* 143e; Xen. *Oec.* 11.3 etc.); Chairephon (Chapter 2 n. 41); Antisthenes (Chapter 2 n. 328); Aristodemos 'the dwarf' (Pl. *Smp.* 173b).
2. Aristoph. *Ach.* 396, *Th.* 39ff.
3. οἱ λεπτῶς μεριμνῶντες ὅτι ἄρα πένονται - Pl. *Rep.* 607c. On the 'ancient quarrel', see Chapter 5 A.
4. E.g. Soph. *O.C.* 555; Eur. *Suppl.* 97; Aristoph. *Ach.* 412ff., *Birds* 1418, 1421 cf. 1432, 1450-2.
5. This last point will be addressed in Chapter 4.3. For their ramifications for the state, see Chapter 4.4.
6. E.g. Aristoph. *Fr.* 1496-9; Eupolis fr. 386; Polykrates ap. Lib. *Ap.Soc.* 13.
7. Aristoph. *Cl.* 316, 332, 334.
8. Eur. *Med.* 296; see Chapter 2.3 A3 & B.
9. Eur. fr. 184 (N)). On this attitude, see Chapter 4.3.
10. E.g. Eur. *Her.* 592. Dover, K.J., *Greek Popular Morality*, p. 112.
11. Hdt. 2.177; Lys. fr. 10 (Scheibe); Dem. 57.32; Theophr. fr. 99 (Wimmer) ap. Plut. *Sol.* 31.2 cf. 17.1, 22.3, *Mor.* 221c; D.S. 1.77.5; D.L. 1.55; Pollux 8.42. Harrison, A.R.W., *The Law of Athens* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968), I, p. 79-80 and Wallace, R.W., *The Areopagus Council to 307 BC* (Baltimore & London: John Hopkins University Press, 1989), p. 62-64.
12. See Chapter 2 n. 185 & 203.
13. E.g. Xen. *Oec.* 4.2; Eur. fr. 216 (N).
14. Eur. fr. 185, 187, 188, 219 (N). Carter, L.B., *The Quiet Athenian*, p. 165.
15. See Chapter 2.8 cf. Chapters 4.3 & 4.4.
16. ...τὸ πρὸς ἅπαν ξυνετὸν ἐπὶ πᾶν ἀργόν... (Thuc. 3.82.4 cf. 3.82.2).
17. Edmunds, L., "Thucydides' Ethics as Reflected in the Description of Stasis (3.82-83)", *HSCP* 79, 1975, p. 74, 76.
18. Parry, A.M., *Logos and Ergon in Thucydides*, especially p. 82, 181; see Chapter 4.3.
19. E.g. Eupolis fr. 386 cf. Chapter 2.1 B3.
20. E.g. Plut. *Per.* 16.7.
21. Gershenson, D.E. & D.A. Greenberg, *Anaxagoras and the Birth of Physics*, p. 331, 335-36. Another classical intellectual who becomes an example of quietism and neglecter of his own affairs in Roman-age sources is Demokritos – Cic. *Tusc.* 5.39 (115), *de Fin.* 5.29 (87), *de Orat.* 3.56; Horace *Ep. I* 12.12; Philo *On the Contemplative Life* 14; D.L. 9.35.
22. Pl. *Ap.* 17c; Gorg. *Pal.* 4.
23. Dodds, E.R., *Plato: Gorgias* (Oxford: O.U.P., 1959), p. 13-14.
24. Pl. *Gorg.* 486b.
25. Thuc. 3.83.3-4, 2.62.4. Edmunds, L., "Thucydides' Ethics as Reflected in the Description of Stasis (3.82-83)", *HSCP* 79, 1975, p. 80.
26. Ps.-Alkid. *Od.* 22ff. cf. Eur. *Med.* 298-9.

27. Aristoph. *Cl.* 188-94; Pl. *Ap.* 19b, 23d; ps.-Hipp. *Anc.Med.* 1.23-24 cf. 'air-measuring' (ἀερομετρῆϊν) (Xen. *Oec.* 11.3 cf. Aristoph. *Birds* 995ff.), 'air-walking' (ἀεροβατεῖν) (Aristoph. *Cl.* 225, 1503).
28. Pl. *Tht.* 174a; D.L. 1.34, 2.4; Aesop – *Augustana Recension* no. 40, in *Babrius and Phaedrus* (tr. B.E. Perry), Loeb, 1965, p. 428.
29. Hdt. 2.20.
30. Anaxagoras ap. Aristotle *On the Rising of the Nile* fr. 248 (Rose); D.S. 1.38.4; Seneca *N.Q.* 4.2.17. The explanation cannot have been completely obscure as Aischylos (fr. 300 (N)) and Euripides (fr. 228 (N)) mention it.
31. Pl. *Ap.* 31b, *Phdr.* 229a; Xen. *Mem.* 1.6.2, *Smp.* 4.43-44.
32. E.g. Pl. *Phdo* 82e ff., *Phdr.* 250e-251a.
33. E.g. Pl. *Euthph.* 5e, *Phdr.* 230a.
34. Tate, J., "Socrates and the Myths" *CQ* 27, 1933, p. 74-80.
35. Scientists: Xenophanes *DK* 21B34; Gorg. *Hel.* 13; ps.-Hipp. *Anc.Med.* 1. Also by poets: Alkmaion fr. 1; Eur. fr. 795 (N) cf. Herakleitos *DK* 22B28. Dodds, E.R., *The Greeks and the Irrational*, p. 181.
36. And. 1.139; Hdt. 9.65.2 cf. 7.10; Xen. *Mem.* 4.7.6 cf. 1.1.6-9, 13.
37. Garnsey, P., "Religious Toleration in Classical Antiquity", W.J. Sheils (ed.), *Studies in Church History* 21, 1984, p. 3-4.
38. Official approval for non-Athenian gods: *IG* ii² 1283 (3rd century BC, referring to Bendis); *IG* ii² 337 (333/2 BC). The introduction of Ammon in the 370s may have been because his oracle could replace Delphi, then dominated by Athens' opponents (Garnsey, P., "Religious Toleration in Classical Antiquity", W.J. Sheils (ed.), *Studies in Church History* 21, 1984, p. 5 & n. 7). Of course, the official permission necessary for foreigners to own land (MacDowell, D., *The Law in Classical Athens*, p. 76) for the purpose of worshipping a foreign god does not mean that official permission was required to worship as such. The cult of Bendis was probably popular before its official adoption (Chapter 2 n. 258; on Bendis, see Ferguson, W.S., "Orgeonika", *Hesp.* suppl. 8, 1949, p. 130-63).
39. Lys. 6.17. On Diagoras, see Chapter 1 n. 51.
40. Lys. 6.16 cf. 54.
41. Lys. 30.18-19, 25, 30.
42. Especially Lys. 6.11, 13, 15-17, 33, 53, 30.18; Isoc. 16.6.
43. Lys. 6.50.
44. Pindar rejects stories of Herakles fighting the gods (*Ol.* 9.29-39) and Demeter eating the shoulder of Pelops (*Ol.* 1.25-27), saying that he does not like to attribute disgraceful acts to the gods (*Ol.* 1.52-3). Cf. Chapter 2 n. 244 and Chapter 3 n. 10.
45. Thuc. 2.53. His description of the reversal of moral behaviour in Korkyrian during its revolution is even more striking and is clearly intended to represent a general tendency (see n. 17 above).
46. E.g. Dem. 54.14-17, 39. Murray, O., "The Affair of the Mysteries", O. Murray (ed.), *Sympotica*, p. 157. On Kinesias, see Chapter 2 n. 245.
47. Aristoph. *Wasps* 9ff., *Birds* 873, 876, *Lys.* 388. Some of the impiety prosecutions in the 4th century involved cults with these characteristics, see Chapter 2 n. 258. Plutarch says that the charges against Theoris included

- 'teaching slaves to practice deceit', which could refer an attempt to alleviate their position (Plut. *Dem.* 14.4).
48. Especially Aristophanes fr. 578, 581.12-15; Cic. *Laws* 2.15.37; Strabo 10.471.18. *The Seasons* was produced no later than c.400 BC (see Edmonds *FAC I*). Half a century later 'establishment' criticism of the new cults persisted: Isokrates criticised his countrymen's ready and lavish adoption of foreign festivals while observing traditional rites perfunctorily (7.29-30), and Demosthenes, in a legal speech, mocked Aischines for having participated in his mother's Sabazios cult (18.259-61). For more detail on this topic, see Dodds, E.R., *The Greeks and the Irrational*, p. 188-94.
 49. The irony of Plato's reference does not reduce the possibility that Prodikos was seriously suspected of irreligion, even by Plato himself (see Chapter 3).
 50. Pl. *Ap.* 19b, 23d, 26b; Xen *Mem.* 1.1.11-15 cf. Sokrates' insulting nickname is 'the thinker' (ὁ φροντιστής), particularly referring to his useless (ἀνωφελεστάτος) interest in celestial matters (μετέωρος) (Xen. *Smp.* 6.6-7).
 51. See Chapters 2.2 and 2.3. Another example is the Hippocratic author who humourlessly cites cosmological speculation as a component of his rivals' intellectual frivolity (ps.-Hipp. *Anc.Med.* 1.23-24).
 52. See Chapter 2.7 & n. 244 and Chapter 2.8.
 53. Eur. fr. 210 (N) also e.g. *Ion* 435-51, *Her.* 1341ff., *I.T.* 391. Romilly, J. de, *The Great Sophists of Periclean Athens*, p. 144. On Euripides' supposed atheism, see Chapter 2.1.
 54. Sokrates, see Chapter 2.7; Aristodemos - Xen. *Mem.* 1.4.10-11; Pl. *Rep.* 364b ff.; Aristippos fr. 227 (Mannebach) & Guthrie, W.K.C., *A History of Greek Philosophy*, III, p. 495.
 55. Eupolis fr. 157. For the superstition, see Chapter 2 n. 69.
 56. Pl. *Ap.* 23c, 33b-c.
 57. Ibid. 31b. For discussion of Sokrates' eccentricities, see Chapter 2.1 & 4.1.
 58. Dover, K.J., (ed.), *Aristophanes: Clouds*, p. xli cf. Chapter 2.1 B7.
 59. Antiphon - *DK* 87B44; Lykophon *DK* 83B4. See Guthrie, W.K.C., *A History of Greek Philosophy*, III, p. 153-54.
 60. Ibid. p. 157-59.
 61. Women appear at the heart of Pythagoreanism: Pythagoras' wife Theano and daughter Arignote were prominent, for example. Whether or not they were significant intellectual figures in their own right is obscured by later writers' interpretations and can only be doubtful (Stob. *Ecl.* 1.10.13 cf. Luc. *Portraits* 18; D.L. 8.42-43; Iambl. *Vita Pyth.* 132; *Suidas* s.s.v.; Waithe, M.E., (ed.), *A History of Women Philosophers*, I (Dordrecht, Boston & London: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1987), p. 11-14; more critically, Hawley, R., "The Problem of Women Philosophers in Ancient Greece", Archer, L.J., S. Fischler & M. Wyke (eds.), *Women in Ancient Societies: An Illusion of the Night* (N.Y.: Routledge, 1995), p. 71-72, 77-79). According to Hermippos, the citizens of an Italian city (Kroton?) sent their women to Pythagoras for instruction (fr. 20 (W)). Periktione, the author of a tract whose dialect and style suggest that she was a mid-4th century Athenian, is the most likely candidate for a female Pythagorean in this period. To identify her with Plato's mother is, however, complete conjecture (cf.

- Waithe, M.E., (ed.), *A History of Women Philosophers*, p. 68-71). Some (male) Pythagoreans visited Athens, before and after the Peloponnesian War, at least: Sokrates' apologists depict him in conversation with Kebes, Simmias, Echekrates and Telauges (Pl. *Phdo.* 61d & schol.; D.L. 8.46; Dittmar, H., *Aischines von Sphettos* (N.Y.: Arno Press, 1976), p. 213ff., 290-92 and Burnet, J., (ed.), *Plato's Euthyphro, Apology of Socrates and Crito*, p. 6, 182-83).
62. Pl. *Ap.* 30a, *Gorg.* 470e, 515a, *Lach.* 186b, *Meno* 72d-73b cf. Xen. *Smp.* 2.9. Vlastos, G., "The Historical Socrates and Athenian Democracy", *Political Theory* 11, 1983, p. 508 & n. 19, 23.
 63. Diotimia, see Pl. *Smp.* 201d ff.; Theodote, see Xen. *Mem.* 3.9. Wender, D., "Plato: Misogynist, Paedophile, and Feminist", *Arethusa* 6, 1973, p. 84-87.
 64. Axiotheia of Philesia, according to Dikaiarchos, was inspired to join the Academy by reading Plato's *Republic*. She had to hide her sex to gain admission to his lectures but was still there in Speusippos' time (Dikaiarchos fr. 44 (W) ap. D.L. 4.2 cf. 3.46; Themistios *Or.* XXIII 295c). Dikaiarchos lived soon afterwards and is therefore a reasonably reliable source. The story, however, indicates that Plato's attitude towards women was less liberal than is often supposed (Swift-Riginos, A., *Platonica: The Anecdotes Concerning the Life and Writings of Plato* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1976), p. 185 cf. Wender, D., "Plato: Misogynist, Paedophile, and Feminist", *Arethusa* 6, 1973, p. 75-90; Pomeroy, S.B., "Feminism in Book V of Plato's *Republic*", *Apeiron* 8, 1974, p. 33-35 etc.). There is less reliable evidence for the Academician Latheneia of Mantinea: she is referred to in a letter of doubtful authenticity from the tyrant Dionysios to Speusippos (Athen. 279e; D.L. 3.46, 4.2). Aristippos is said to have educated his daughter Arete. She became a philosophical writer and may have led the Cyrenaic school; her son Aristippos, who certainly did, was famously known as the 'mother-taught' (μητροδίδακτος) (Strabo 17.3.22 (838); Clem. Alex. *Strom.* 4.19.122.1; Aelian *V.H.* 3.40; D.L. 2.72, 83, 86; Eusebios *P.E.* 14.18.32, 764a; Themistios *Or.* XXI 244b-c).
 65. Aristoph. *Eccl.* 571; see Chapter 2.1 A2.
 66. Notions of communistic and gynaecocratic societies exist in Greek culture independent of intellectual theorisation, most prominently the Amazons and Lemnian women (e.g. Hdt. 1.216, 4.104, 108; Eur. fr. 402, 653 (N); Isoc. 11.18 cf. Pherekrates fr. 200, see Ussher, R.G., (ed.), *Aristophanes: Ecclesiazusae* (Bristol: Bristol Classical Press & New Rochelle: Aristide D. Caratzas, 1986), p. xv). Aristophanes' *Ekklesiazousai* could have been inspired by Sparta's *syssitia* and notoriously libertine and man-dominating women (Millender, E.G., "The Teacher of Hellas": Athenian Democratic Ideology and the 'Barbarization' of Sparta in Fifth Century Thought (Diss., University of Pennsylvania, 1996), p. 215-72) - note that the comedy repeatedly mentions laconian shoes (269, 345-6, 508, 542) (Finegan, R., *Women in Aristophanes* (Amsterdam: Adolf M. Hakkert, 1995), p. 159-160). Another source could be the new cults of foreign deities, led by women and admitting initiates from all classes of society (see Chapter 4.2).
 67. Pl. *Menex.* 235e-236b. Henry, M.M., *Prisoner of History*, p. 32-40.
 68. Aischines *Sph.* fr. 23, 26 (Dittmar) cf. Thuc. 3.19.

69. Ibid. fr. 31.
 70. Xen. *Mem.* 2.6.36, *Oec.* 3.14.
 71. Xen. *Smp.* 8.39 cf. *Mem.* 1.2.41-46, 2.6.13.
 72. For a discussion, see Henry, M.M., *Prisoner of History*, p. 40-54.
 73. The modern notion that Aspasia was a part or even the leader of an intellectual *salon* is a fantasy, relying on the logic that (1) Perikles had intellectual associates who formed a group of some kind, (2) Aspasia was a significant influence on Perikles: therefore Aspasia was influential in this group of intellectuals. On (1), see n. 160 below. The conclusion that she was intimately involved with these intellectuals is pure supposition. Cf. Plut. *Per.* 24.3, which is probably based on the Sokratics' comments about her contribution to wifely education (Xen. *Mem.* 2.6.36, *Oec.* 3.14; Aischines *Sph.* fr. 31 (Dittmar)). A fragment, probably belonging to New Comedy, half-seriously brackets her with Sokrates as a teacher, though their students are implicitly assessed according to moral criteria:

σύγκρινον, ὃ 'τάν, Ασπασίαν καὶ Σωκράτην·
 τῆς μὲν γὰρ ὄψει Περικλέα, Κριτίαν δὲ τοῦ ἑτέρου
 μαθητήν.

“Judge, if you will, between Aspasia the courtesan and Socrates the sophist, and consider which of them trained the better men. You will find that Pericles the pupil of one and Critias the pupil of the other.” (Com. adesp. fr. 122 (Kock *CAF III*) ap. Alkiphron *Letters of Courtesans* 7.7, tr. Benner & Forbes, Loeb).

74. Aristoph. *Ach.* 527ff.
 75. Kratinos fr. 259; Eupolis fr. 267; com. adesp. fr. 704 cf. Eupolis fr. 294. In the *Dionysalexandros* Kratinos compares Perikles to Paris, both responsible for a great and destructive war; this might make Aspasia Helen (Edmonds *FAC I* p. 32-34; Henry, M.M., *Prisoner of History*, especially p. 26-27). Perikles' comment in his funeral speech that ‘a woman's best reputation is to be least spoken of’ (Thuc. 2.46.1) is a bit out of place and may possibly be intended to disarm criticism that she exerted too much influence.
 76. Antisth. fr. 35 (Caizzi).
 77. See n. 67 above.
 78. Theophrastos ap. Harpokr. s.v. **Ἀσπασία**; Douris of Samos *FGH* 76F65; Plut. *Per.* 24.1, 25.1. Frost, F.J., “Pericles, Thucydides, Son of Melesias, and Athenian Politics Before the War”, *Hist.* 13, 1964, p. 396.
 79. Prodikos – Aristoph. *Cl.* 360, *Birds* 692, fr. 506. Hippodamos - see Chapter 2 n. 31.
 80. Pl. *Prot.* 315c-e cf. Chapter 3 n. 56. Tantalos' wealth and love of luxury: *Nostoi* fr. 6 (Loeb) ap. Athen. 218b; Anakreon fr. 355 (Loeb *Greek Lyric II*); Eur. *Or.* 349-51; Pl. *Euthph.* 11e. Willink, C.W., “Prodikos, ‘Meteorosophists’ and the ‘Tantalos’ Paradigm”, *CQ* 33, 1983, p. 30-31, 33.
 81. Aristot. *Pol.* 2.8.1, 1267b.

82. See Chapter 2.1 & n. 63.
83. Aristoph. *Cl.* 876, 1145-6. Antiphon, see Chapter 2 n. 64.
84. Pl. *Ap.* 19d-e, 31b-c, 33a; Xen. *Mem.* 1.2.6, 1.6, *Ap.* 16-18 cf. Pl. *Meno* 92a.
85. Pl. *Prot.* 328b, *Meno* 91d, *Hipp.Maj.* 282b-e; Isoc. 15.155; ps.-Pl. *Alc. I* 122b; D.S. 12.53.2 etc. cf. Pl. *Ap.* 20a-b. Isokrates elsewhere says that Gorgias died with a moderate estate (13.7).
86. Pl. *Crat.* 384b; ps.-Pl. *Axiochos* 366c; Aristot. *Rhet.* 3.14.9, 1415b; schol. on Aristoph. *Cl.* 360 cf. Pl. *Meno* 91b.
87. Pl. *Ap.* 20b; Isoc. 13.3-4, 7, 15.155-56; ps.-Plut. *Mor.* 842c-d. Forbes, C.A., *Teachers' Pay in Ancient Greece*, p. 14-17. Ten minai for a house: ps.-Dem. 59.39.
88. Aristot. *Rhet.* 1.9.27, 1367a cf. Aischines 3.218, 3.170; Dem. 18.284; D.L. 2.123. Dover, K.J., *Greek Popular Morality*, p. 40 and Ober, J., *Mass and Élite in Democratic Athens*, p. 277-79. Receiving gifts had traditional high aristocratic status but was doubtless psychologically distinct from accepting payment (Strauss, B.S., "The Cultural Significance of Bribery and Embezzlement in Athenian Politics", *Ancient World* 11, 1985, p. 72-73). Cf. Chapter 2 n. 208.
89. See n. 84 above.
90. Chapter 2.1 B6.
91. See Chapter 2.9. Xenophon criticises Meno for having a mature man as his passive 'beloved' (παίδικᾶ) while being beardless himself. This shows that beardlessness, representing extreme youth, was feature of the non-man (Xen. *Anab.* 2.6.28; Dover, K.J., *Greek Homosexuality* (N.Y.: MJF Books, 1978), p. 87 cf. Theopompos *FGH* 115F225b). Agathon, one of the most notorious effeminate men in Athens, especially in Aristophanes' *Thesmophoriazousai* in which he is called upon to supply women's clothes for a disguise, was also beardless (Aristoph. *Th.* 191 cf. 219ff.). He was also the most sophistic poet next to Euripides but his effeminacy is a personal trait and not necessarily connected to his intellectual status. The comic fragment in which Euripides appears 'as a woman' may refer to intellectually induced effeminacy but could also represent the tragedian 'getting into character' (Kallias fr. 15 cf. Aristoph. *Ach.* 383ff., *Th.* 148ff.).
92. See Chapter 2.1. One intellectual recognised for his preference for sexual perversion is Ariphrades. His interests included dramatic and literary criticism (Aristot. *Poet.* 2.2.14, 1458b). Aischines of Sphettos (or one of his characters) says that Anaxagoras corrupted him (fr. 34 (Dittmar)). This corruption may have included sexual deviancy, as Aristophanes attacks him for practising cunnilingus for preference, an activity that seems to have been regarded as particularly disgusting (Aristoph. *Kn.* 1281ff., *Wasps* 1280-3 cf. on cunnilingus – Aristoph. *Peace* 883-5, *Eccl.* 129, fr. 926; Dover, K.J., *Greek Homosexuality* (N.Y.: MJF Books, 1978), p. 101-2).
93. Xen. *Mem.* 1.2.9, 49, 52; Lib. *Ap.Soc.* 55, 102, 114, 117.
94. Pl. *Gorg.* 485d. On the possible relationship between Plato's *Gorgias* and Polykrates, see Chapter 2 n. 297.
95. Dover, K.J., "Classical Greek Attitudes to Sexual Behaviour", *Arethusa* 6, 1963, p. 62, 64-65.

96. On Meno, see n. 91 above. On the Athenian law, see Aischines' *Timarchos*. Dover, K.J., "Classical Greek Attitudes to Sexual Behaviour", *Arethusa* 6, 1963, p. 68-69.
97. Dover, K.J., *Greek Popular Morality*, p. 102-4, 117, 121-25.
98. Soph. *Ant.* 332ff., especially 367-71.
99. Xen. *Mem.* 1.2.15.
100. φείδου μηδὲν ὦν ἐπίστασαι, Μήδεια, βουλευσούσα καὶ τεχνωμένη - Eur. *Med.* 401-2 cf. 807-8.
101. Eur. fr. 580 (N); Gorg. *Pal.* 9, 15, 19, 25; ps.-Alkid. *Od.* 2-4.
102. Pindar, in the *Seventh Nemean*, implies that it was Odysseus' σοφία that enabled him to claim a good reputation unjustly. His use of words such as 'he stole' (κλέπτει) (§23) indicates that he deprived Aias of Achilles' arms and good repute with conscious criminal intent (O'Higgins, D.M., *Fifth Century Interpretations of Ajax*, p. 133).
103. Thuc. 3.82.3 cf. Edmunds, L., "Thucydides' Ethics as Reflected in the Description of Stasis (3.82-83)", *HSCP* 79, 1975, p. 88.
104. See Chapter 2.7 C1; in comedy, see Chapter 2.1 B4, B5; in tragedy, see Chapter 2.3 n. 120. Aristotle says that 'men were justly disgusted with Protagoras' on this account but does not provide any context or cite particular evidence (Aristot. *Rhet.* 2.24.11, 1402a cf. D.L. 9.51).
105. Cf. Lys. 24.10; Dem. 48.49.
106. See Chapter 2.4 C.
107. Aristoph. *Th.* 275, *Fr.* 1471 cf. 101-2; Aristot. *Rhet.* 3.15.8, 1416a.
108. E.g. Hom. *Od.* 11.556-63; see Chapter 3 A.
109. Parry, A.M., *Logos and Ergon in Thucydides*, p. 15, 19-21.
110. εἰς γὰρ γλῶσσαν ὀράτε καὶ εἰς ἔπος αἰόλον ἀνδρός, εἰς ἔργον δ' οὐδὲν γιγνόμενον βλέπετε (fr. 10.7-8, tr. Olding. Parry, A.M., *Logos and Ergon in Thucydides*, p. 47-48, 53).
111. Pl. *Ap.* 32a.
112. Parry, A.M., *Logos and Ergon in Thucydides*, p. 15-16.
113. Dodds, E.R., "Euripides the Irrationalist", *The Ancient Concept of Progress* (Oxford: O.U.P., 1988), p. 83-84.
114. See Chapter 2.4 C & n. 192.
115. Also Ant. 5.80; Lys. 12.86, 30.24; And. 1.105; Isoc. 18.21; Is. fr. 22 (Scheibe) cf. ps.-Alkid. *Od.* 29; Isoc. 15.30; Aischines 1.173, 175; Dem. 22.4 etc.
116. Aristoph. *Cl.* 432-5 cf. 112-8, 1281-96; see Chapter 2.1.
117. See Chapter 2 n. 64.
118. Ps.-Alkid. *Od.* 27-28.
119. The amorality of mathematics: Sokrates (Xen. *Mem.* 4.7 etc.), Aristippos (fr. 151, 154A (Mannebach) ap. Aristot. *Metaph.* 996a; comm. Alex. Aphrod. cf. Aristot. *Metaph.* 1078a; Guthrie, W.K.C., *A History of Greek Philosophy*, III, p. 491-92). Antisthenes rejects book learning because the knowledge it gives is superficial (fr. 61, 62, 66, 70 (Caizzi)).
120. See Chapter 4.1 C4.
121. Scodel, R., *The Trojan Trilogy of Euripides*, p. 116.
122. Pl. *Rep.* II, *Euthph.* 6a, *Gorg.* 484b.

123. E.g. Aischylos *Eum.* 639-40; Eur. *Her.* 1317-9, *Ion* 442-51 cf. fr. 433, 840, 920 (N); Thuc. 5.105.2.
124. Also e.g. Aristoph. *Cl.* 177-9, 498, 814ff., 904-6, 1039ff., 1080-2, 1233ff., 1469-71, *Birds* 755-9, 1345-8. Tate, J., "Socrates and the Myths" *CQ* 27, 1933, p. 76-77, 79-80.
125. Romilly, J. de, *The Great Sophists of Periclean Athens*, p. 149, 151.
126. Pl. *Gorg.* 522b, *Rep.* 538c-539c.
127. E.g. Eur. *Suppl.* 231-7; Thuc. 6.12-13 cf. Thuc. 6.38.5; Plut. *Nic.* 11. Connor, W.R., *The New Politicians of Fifth-Century Athens*, p. 147-49 cf. Forrest, W.G., "An Athenian Generation Gap", *YCS* 24, 1975, p. 37-52. Alkibiades as the leader of youth – e.g. Aristoph. *Ach.* 716, fr. 205, 233; Lys. 14.45; Isoc. 20.21; ps.-And. 4.22 cf. 4.39; Plut. *Alc.* 2.6.
128. E.g. Aristoph. *Ach.* 679-92, 703-12, *Wasps* 946-7; see Chapter 2.1 B4.
129. Pl. *Ap.* 29c, 26b.
130. Xen. *Mem.* 1.2.31ff.
131. Sokrates - Pl. *Ap.* 23c-d; Xen. *Mem.* 1.2.15, 26-28 etc. Gorgias - Pl. *Gorg.* 456d-457c.
132. Pl. *Prot. passim*, also *Ap.* 19e-20b, 23c, 33b-c, *Soph.* 231d etc.
133. Axiochos (Pl. *Euthd.* 271a-b, 275a; ps.-Pl. *Axiochos*); Akoumenos and Eryximachos (Pl. *Smp. passim*, *Phdr.* 227a, 268a); Kritias, Alkibiades, Phaidros, Charmides and Adeimantos (e.g. Pl. *Charm. passim*, *Rep. passim*, *Prot.* 315e; Xen. *Mem.* 1.2.12ff., 3.6-7) (Ostwald, M., *From Popular Sovereignty to the Sovereignty of Law*, p. 540-50, especially p. 549).
134. A good illustration of the belief that simple familiarity with traditional poetry was sufficient to inculcate moral sensibility can be seen in Xen. *Smp.* 3.1.5-6. On the importance of correct religious observances and intellectuals' interference in them, see Chapter 2.7 and 4.2. Physical and moral conditions seem to be viewed as interdependent. Aristophanes especially says that modern youths are too fond of warm baths and lazy, unmanly, pale-skinned, effeminate, flirting, litigious, dishonest, immodest, disrespectful of elders and too weak to lift a torch (e.g. *Cl.* 991-9, 1045ff., 1062-6, 1112, 1171, *Fr.* 1087-8). Paleness is associated with indoor labour, effeminacy and physical weakness (see Chapter 2.1 B1). In Euripides' *Antiope* Zethos blames Amphion's reflective nature for making him too weak to carry a shield for his city (see Chapter 2.3 A2). Physical prowess is cited as evidence of a good and patriotic character (e.g. Aristoph. *Kn.* 1382-3, *Wasps* 1096-8; ps.-And. 4.42). Xenophon emphasises the piety and usefulness that come from physical activities like farming and hunting and explicitly contrasts these benefits with the education offered by the sophists (Xen. *Hunt.* 12-13 cf. *Mem.* 1.2.4, *Oec.* 5.8, 10, 12; *Cyr.* 1.6.17).
135. The oligarchic clubs active in attacking the democracy in 411 and 404 (including the likes of Antiphon and Kritias; see below) formed groups of young men to do their thuggery (e.g. Thuc. 8.65.2, 69.4; Xen. *Hell.* 2.3.23, 50, 55 cf. Aristoph. *Wasps* 342ff; Calhoun, G.M., *Athenian Clubs in Politics and Litigation*, p. 108-9).
136. Or perhaps Strepsiades in the original version, see Chapter 2.1 A1.
137. Pl. *Prot.* especially 322c-323c (Romilly, J. de, *The Great Sophists of Periclean Athens*, p. 214). Hdt. 5.66, 78.

138. Aristoph. *Cl.* 140, 143, 175, 254ff., 505ff., 964-5, 1131ff. Dover, K.J., (ed.), *Aristophanes: Clouds*, p. xxxiii, xli.
139. Pl. *Th.* 155e, *Euthd.* 277d. Green, P., "Strepsiades, Socrates and the Abuses of Intellectualism", *GRBS* 20, 1979, p. 15.
140. Pl. *Prot.* 315b-c. Willink, C.W., "Prodikos, 'Meteorosophists' and the 'Tantalos' Paradigm", *CQ* 33, 1983, p. 29.
141. On Pythagorean initiations - Aristotle fr. 192 (Rose) ~ Pythagoras *DK* 14A7. On Pythagoreans in Athens, see n. 61 above. Cf. late sources, which may or may not have a basis in fact, say that Antiphon set up a house for teaching rhetoric in Korinth (*DK* 87A3.18, 4.15, 5.6, 6.6).
142. E.g. Lys. 14.23, 30.25, 31-35; And. 2.4. Ober, J., *Mass and Élite in Democratic Athens*, p. 123.
143. Aristocratic flavour: Political clubs often developed from drinking clubs and friendships made in gymnasia, institutions that were often, though not exclusively, aristocratic in nature (Calhoun, G.M., *Athenian Clubs in Politics and Litigation*, p. 15-24). It is notable that towards the end of the 5th century some of the most prominent non-aristocratic politicians, Kleon, Hyperbolos and Peisander, seem not to have belonged to clubs (Connor, W.R., *The New Politicians of Fifth-Century Athens*, p. 29 n. 47). Loyalty: It is unsurprising that clubs made efforts to protect their members' interests. Andokides spends considerable time describing to his jury his agonising over whether to betray his fellow clubmen or, by inaction, be responsible for the deaths of his family and three hundred innocent men (1.51, 2.7). Evidently, such loyalty accorded with the popular view of clubs. At least some clubmen took oaths and perpetrated outrages together, apparently to reinforce the unity of the group. Andokides alleges that Euphiletos proposed the mutilation of the Hermai as one such 'pledge' (πίστις) (And. 1.67 cf. Lys. 13.21; Thuc. 3.82, 8.73.2-3; Dem. 54.39; Calhoun, G.M., *Athenian Clubs in Politics and Litigation*, p. 34-35, 39; Murray, O., "The Affair of the Mysteries", O. Murray (ed.), *Sympotica*, p. 153). Secrecy: It is only reasonable to suppose that such groups attempted to maintain the confidentiality of their activities, especially for their political and legal activities. Aristophanes' Paphlagon threatens to denounce the Sausage-seller's club for its secretiveness and treachery. His accusations are presumably exaggerated but with some point (Aristoph. *Kn.* 475-9). (There may be a further joke in the implausibility of the supremely humble Sausage-seller belonging an aristocratic institution.) The 'Ploutoi' club at Miletos provides an example of extreme efforts to maintain confidentiality: they had their discussions on a boat rowed out to sea (Plut. *Mor.* 298c) (Calhoun, G.M., *Athenian Clubs in Politics and Litigation*, p. 37-38).
144. And. 2.7; Thuc. 6.28.1. Calhoun, G.M., *Athenian Clubs in Politics and Litigation*, p. 36, 38 and Murray, O., "The Affair of the Mysteries", O. Murray (ed.), *Sympotica*, p. 150.
145. οὐ δημοτικὴ παρανομία - Thuc. 6.28.2. Cf. 6.27.3; And. 1.37ff. Murray, O., "The Affair of the Mysteries", O. Murray (ed.), *Sympotica*, p. 151-52, 158. On the significance of the Hermai to Athenian democracy, see especially Osborne, R., "The Erection and Mutilation of the Hermae", *PCPS* 211, 1985, p. 47-73.

146. E.g. Lys. 12.55 cf. Calhoun, G.M., *Athenian Clubs in Politics and Litigation*, p. 105-6, 111-13, 123-24.
147. Lib. *Ap.Soc.* 114 cf. 133.
148. While many aristocrats doubtless inclined towards oligarchy, not all oligarchs are aristocrats. Anytos is a prominent example (for his background and political inclinations, see Chapter 5 D2).
149. Pl. *Ap.* 23c.
150. Pl. *Soph.* 231d; ps.-Pl. *Thg.* 128a.
151. Pl. *Ap.* 19e-20b. Kallias' associates are intellectuals or parasites, depending whether the source is a philosopher or a comedian, see Chapter 2.1 A1.
152. E.g. Xen. *Hunt.* 13.9; Isoc. 13.14. On intellectuals' fees, see Chapter 4.3 A3.
153. Xen. *Mem.* 1.6.
154. See Chapter 2.1 B2 & n. 43.
155. Aristot. *E.E.* 3.5.7, 1232b cf. Thuc. 8.68.2. At a later date Isokrates' snobbery is evident in his claim that his father spent a great deal on his education and his denial, late in life, that he had ever composed speeches for money (Isoc. 15.161-62; Theopompos *FGH* 115F25; D.H. *Isoc.* 18). Non-Athenian intellectuals known in Athens known for their love of luxury include Prodikos and Hippodamos. Aristotle says that Hippodamos' affectations caused him to be considered by some to be eccentric and over-eager for distinction (see Chapter 4.3 n. 80, 81). Athens' first natural scientist and philosopher, Archelaos, also seems to belong to the traditional aristocratic milieu, if he dedicated poems to Kimon, though there was doubt about this ascription even in ancient times (*DK* 60B1 ap. Plut. *Cim.* 4.1, 4.9, quoting Panaitios). The only contemporary reference to Archelaos comes from Ion of Chios, himself Kimon's acquaintance (*FGH* 392F9).
156. Andokides – Hellanikos *FGH* 4F170. Kritias and Plato -Westerman *Biographi Graeci Minores* 382.8-9; D.L. 3.1.
157. Xen. *Mem.* 1.2.25. The Aristotelian *Athenian Constitution* says that Antiphon was nobly born but this is probably the author's schematism or guess as none of the others so described in the same section are known to be noble (ps.-Aristot. *A.P.* 32.2) (Rhodes, P.J., *A Commentary on the Aristotelian Athenaion Politeia*, p. 407). Plato's information about the wealth that Anaxagoras inherited may be exaggerated to emphasise his impracticality (Pl. *Hipp.Maj.* 283a; D.L. 2.7).
158. Cf. Chapter 4.3 A. Ober, J., *Mass and Élite in Democratic Athens*, p. 90.
159. See Appendix A.
160. Sources likely to preserve eyewitness accounts (within three generations) mention as Perikles' intellectual associates Damon (Pl. *Com.* fr. 207; Isoc. 15.235; ps.-Pl. *Alc. I* 118c; ps.-Aristot. *A.P.* 27.4), Anaxagoras (Pl. *Phdr.* 269e-270a; Isoc. 15.235; ps.-Dem. 61.45; ps.-Pl. *Alc. I* 118c; ps.-Pl. *Ep. II* 311a; see Chapter 4.1 C1), Aspasia (see Chapter 4.3 A1) and the music theorist Pythokleides (ps.-Pl. *Alc. I* 118c). Of these, Damon is Athenian anyway. Plato calls Pythokleides a sophist and a scholiast calls him a Pythagorean (Pl. *Prot.* 316e; schol. on ps.-Pl. *Alc. I* 118c). However, it says nothing about Perikles' intellectual interests that his father engaged a distinguished foreign musician as his music teacher.

Later sources and modern scholars name as Perikles' intellectual associates Protagoras, Zeno, Sophokles and Pheidias. (1) Protagoras: Protagoras was the lawgiver for the Athenian-sponsored colony of Thouria. Though it is likely that his appointment had Perikles' approval, this does not mean that he (or the other founders, including the famous Hippodamos of Miletos) was Perikles' intimate: the enterprise's explicitly panhellenist tone would have made their distinction in the Greek world the fact of the greatest importance (Kagan, D., *The Outbreak of the Peloponnesian War*, p. 162-64). Protagoras' description of Perikles' demeanour when his sons died, preserved by Plutarch, does not presuppose that there was a personal connexion between the two (Plut. *Mor.* 118e-f cf. *Per.* 36.4-5). The story that they spent all day discussing whether a man or his javelin is guilty of murder does not have an attributed source (Plut. *Per.* 36.2-3; Jacoby's assumption that it is Stesimbrotos of Thasos, whom Plutarch cites as the authority for the next item (*FGH* 107F11), is possible but not clear from the text). It is certainly a philosophical commonplace (cf. Antiphon's *Second Tetralogy*) and may simply have had famous names inserted for the sake of colour. (2) Zeno: Perikles is conspicuously not mentioned as one of Zeno's pupils in a Platonic passage of which he (Perikles) is the subject (ps.-Pl. *Alc. I* 119a). Plutarch's datum that Perikles heard Zeno may be a misinterpretation of this passage or may mean nothing more than Perikles went to hear a distinguished visiting philosopher, along with half of Athens' leisured classes (Plut. *Per.* 4.3). (3) Sophokles: Perikles and Sophokles served together as generals and doubtless came into contact at least in their official capacities. However, there is no reason to suppose that their relations had an intellectual dimension. In fact, their contemporary Ion of Chios highlights the incompatibility of their characters (*FGH* 392F6) cf. Plut. *Per.* 8.5). (4) Pheidias: Perikles' involvement in Pheidias' trial is explicable in political terms. It does not require that he was Pheidias' intimate or even that he had any special cultural or artistic interests – the policy of glorifying Athens was not necessarily aesthetic (see especially Stadter, P.A., "Pericles Among the Intellectuals", *ICS* 16, 1991, p. 111-24; for a general discussion, see Podlecki, A.J., *Perikles and His Circle*, p. 17-34, 91-93, 96-97).

Moreover, there is no evidence that Perikles subscribed to the New Education himself: Plato asserts that he gave Alkibiades a Thracian slave as his paedagogue and his own sons completely conventional educations, focusing on horsemanship, music and gymnastics. Their presence at Kallias' house in the company of many distinguished intellectuals in Plato's *Protagoras* is apparently on their own initiative (Pl. *Meno* 94b; ps.-Pl. *Alc. I* 122b cf. Pl. *Prot.* 319e-320a. Stadter, P.A., "Pericles Among the Intellectuals", *ICS* 16, 1991, p. 112-13).

161. There was probably one Antiphon, not two, see Chapter 1 n. 102.

162. Chapter 1 n. 6.

163. Lys. 12.67; ps.-Plut. *Mor.* 833a-834a cf. Archeptolemos is called an enemy of Kleon – Aristoph. *Kn.* 327 & schol.; cf. note in Sommerstein, A.H., *Aristophanes: Knights* (Aris & Phillips Ltd, 1981).
164. Xen. *Hell.* 2.3.2, 13-14, 46 cf. Thuc. 8.90-92; Dem. 58.6. Adeleye, G., *Studies in the Oligarchy of the Thirty* (Diss., Princeton University, 1971), p. 90-93.
165. σοφός γ' ἀνὴρ καὶ δεινὸς εἰς τὰ πάντα - Aristoph. *Fr.* 967-8.
166. ἀνὴρ οὔτε εἰπεῖν οὔτε γνῶναι ἀδύνατος - Thuc. 8.68.4.
167. Aischines Sph. fr. 34 (Dittmar) cf. schol. on Aristoph. *Cl.* 361. Later tradition says that Theramenes gave lectures and that his students included Isokrates. This is probably unhistorical. It is not attested before Dionysios of Halikarnassos who, in fact, expresses doubt about its truth (D.H. *Isoc.* 1). The story from the anonymous biography of Isokrates that he attempted to defend Theramenes at his trial is almost certainly a myth (ps.-Plut. *Mor.* 836f-837a; also schol. on Aristoph. *Fr.* 541; ps.-Zos. *Vita Isoc.* 101-2 (Dindorf); *Suidas* s.v. Ἴσοκράτης). Xenophon makes no mention of it in his *Hellenika* and Diodoros, in fact, gives another version in which Sokrates instead is named (D.S. 14.2.2). The tradition of Theramenes as a rhetorician is apparent also from Cicero, who counts him along with Kritias and Lysias (*de Orat.* 2.93), and Isokrates' biographer, who says that Theramenes published rhetorical manuals under the name Boton (ps.-Plut. *Mor.* 837a).
168. Xen. *Hell.* 2.4.19, *Mem.* 3.6 cf. Pl. *Charm. passim*.
169. Adeleye, G., *Studies in the Oligarchy of the Thirty* (Diss., Princeton University, 1971), p. 110.
170. Lys. 30.31.
171. *Ibid.* 10-12.
172. *Ibid.* 25 cf. 9, 31, 33-34.
173. Pl. *Tht.* 151a; ps.-Pl. *Thg.* 130a-b.
174. Kleitophon, who proposed the rider to Pythodoros' decree for a new oligarchic constitution in 411 BC and whom the Aristotelian *Athenian Constitution* describes as a moderate oligarch in the same breath as Theramenes and Anytos, could be the same as the son of Aristonymos who belonged to Athenian intellectual circles. He is Sokrates' interlocutor in the Platonic dialogue *Kleitophon* and is present in Kephalos' house during *The Republic*. He was a follower of the sophist Thrasymachos and an acquaintance of Lysias (Pl. *Rep.* 328b, 340a-b, *Kleit.* especially 406a; ps.-Aristot. *A.P.* 29.3, 34.3 cf. Aristoph. *Fr.* 697. Rhodes, P.J., *A Commentary on the Aristotelian Athenaion Politeia*, p. 375). Pythodoros, son of Isolochos, friend and student of Zeno and host to him and Parmenides (Pl. *Parm. passim*; ps.-Pl. *Alc. I* 119a), could perhaps be the same as the Pythodoros who became Archon of Athens at the time of the Thirty Tyrants (Xen. *Hell.* 2.3.1; ps.-Aristot. *A.P.* 35.1, 41.1), though, as he was exiled in 424 BC (Thuc. 4.65.3; Philochoros *FGH* 328F127) it is unlikely that he is also the author of the decree of 411 BC (ps.-Aristot. *A.P.* 29.1 cf. D.L. 9.54).
175. Ober, J., *Mass and Élite in Democratic Athens*, p. 165-66, 169.
176. Lys. 34.1-2, 5.
177. E.g. Thuc. 3.38.1; And. 2.1-2, 4, 28.

178. Thuc. 2.60.4, 3.43.5, 6.9.2-3, 8.1.1; Xen. *Hell.* 1.7.35 cf. And. 2.20.
179. Thuc. 8.1.1; Xen. *Hell.* 1.4.13-16.
180. It is only to be expected that assembly-goers made judgements, especially on complex issues, at least partially on the basis of their knowledge of the speakers' character (see Chapter 2 n. 178). Cultivated eloquence could conceivably undermine the validity of this decision-making process, as it provided a superficially plausible basis for judgement that was different from the listeners' knowledge of the speaker's character and his apparent personal conviction. Sensitivity about speakers' integrity also appears in the accusations of bribery made against orators, which attain a facile frequency in the popular genres of oratory and comedy (see Chapter 2 n. 208).
181. Dover, K.J., *Greek Popular Morality*, p. 23.
182. Aristoph. fr. 205 cf. Xen. *Mem.* 1.2.41-46 and, on Alkibiades' connexion to Sokrates, see Chapter 2.8 & n. 283.
183. Thuc. 6.17.7.
184. *Ibid.* 6.17.3.
185. Thuc. 8.68 cf. 56 cf. And. 2.27. Finley, M.I., "Athenian Demagogues", *P&P* 21, 1962, p. 17-18. On Antiphon and Theramenes, see Chapter 4.4 B3.
186. Thuc. 3.38 cf. 37.2, 5, 40.2-3; see Chapter 2.5.
187. Eur. fr. 219 (N) cf. Soph. *Aias* 293, fr. 61 (N); Bacchylides 3.94 (Pearson, A.C., *The Fragments of Sophocles* (Cambridge: C.U.P., 1917), ad loc; see Carter, L.B., *The Quiet Athenian*, p. 166-67).
188. E.g. Hdt. *passim*.
189. See especially Carter, L.B., *The Quiet Athenian*, p. 180-86.
190. Eur. fr. 185, 187, 188 (N) cf. *Med.* 294ff.; see Chapter 2.3 A2. Carter, L.B., *The Quiet Athenian*, p. 146-47, 163-73.
191. Pl. *Ap.* 17b-c, 36b, *Gorg.* 473e.
192. On Anaxagoras' trial and Perikles' involvement, which smacks of historical myth, see Appendix A (C). Sokrates' argument in Plato's *Apology* that Meletos has confused his beliefs for Anaxagoras' does not presuppose that the jurors, in fact, knew much about him (26d). On Aristophanes fr. 676b (Edmonds *FAC I*), see Chapter 2 n. 82.
193. Pl. *Hipp.Maj.* 281c cf. Hdt. 1.27, 170.
194. Aristot. *E.N.* 10.8.11, 1179a cf. Cic. *de Orat.* 3.56 etc. Gershenson, D.E. & D.A. Greenberg, *Anaxagoras and the Birth of Physics*, p. 336 and Carter, L.B., *The Quiet Athenian*, p. 132-33 cf. 145.
195. See Chapter 4.4 B2 & n. 160 above.
196. See n. 23 above.
197. Carter, L.B., *The Quiet Athenian*, p. 173-77.
198. Xen. *Mem.* 2.9, *Smp.* 4.29-32 cf. Old Olig. 1.13.
199. E.g. Pl. *Ap.* 31c, *Gorg.* 521d cf. Xen. *Mem.* 1.6.15. Sokrates insisted that the citizen had a duty to the state (e.g. Pl. *Krito passim*; Xen. *Mem.* 3.6).
200. Alkibiades rationalises his ostentatious lifestyle and desire for distinction in terms of the glory that reflected back onto Athens (Thuc. 6.16.3).
201. Those who justify their isolation from public affairs cite the hostility of the *demos* and the roughness of democratic assemblies (e.g. Thuc. 8.68.1; Pl. *Ap.* 31c-32a; Xen. *Mem.* 3.6), Plato and Isokrates also excuse their failure to engage in the political process directly on account of the rough-and-tumble

- of the Assembly (see, for example, the discussion of *thorubos* – Chapter 1.5). Carter, L.B., *The Quiet Athenian*, p. 56-63, 114ff.
202. See Chapter 2.7 A & 4.2 B
203. E.g. Hesiod *W&D* 225ff.; Solon fr. 4; Theognis 39-46, 131-2; Simonides fr. 542 (Page *PMG*); Pindar *Ol.* 13.4-10; Pl. *Prot.* 323a ff. Manville, P.B., *The Origins of Citizenship in Ancient Athens* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), p. 48, 50-53.
204. E.g. Hdt. 3.38 cf. *Dissoi Logoi passim*; Pl. *Prot.* 337c-d; Xen. *Mem.* 4.4.19.
205. Eur. fr. 1047, 1113 (N).
206. At least one intellectual, Sokrates' associate Aristippos, criticised the legitimacy and desirability of conventional political communities, asserting that liberty was being 'a stranger in every land' (fr. 84-86 (Mannebach)), and claiming that philosophy enabled one to live equally well with or without laws (fr. 24A-C, 27) (Guthrie, W.K.C., *A History of Greek Philosophy*, III, p. 495). Aristotle's description of the state as a 'natural entity' and terse dismissal of the stateless man as 'sub-human or superhuman' may allude to such views (*Pol.* 1252a ff.). Anaxagoras seems also to have held anti-patriotic views, though the evidence comes from late sources and may be an anachronistic reflection of later cosmopolitan philosophies such as Stoicism and Cynicism (e.g. Cic. *Tusc.* 1.104; D.L. 2.7, 11 cf. Aristot. *E.E.* 1.5.9, 1216a). Aristophanes represents the citizen's frustration with the state's failure to represent and protect his interests in *The Acharnians*. However, this is no critique of the concept of the state as such and Aristophanes, in fact, goes out of his way to assert that the problem, in his view, is individuals' lack of responsibility (e.g. 515ff.).
207. Ps.-And. 4.24, 35. His particular target, Alkibiades, is the outstanding example of individualism endangering political and social stability (e.g. ps.-And. 4.14, 19, 39; Thuc. 6.12.2, 15.2-4, 16.5, 28.2, 8.48.4; Aristoph. *Fr.* 1427ff.; Lys. *Alc. I, II passim*; Xen. *Mem.* 1.2.12ff., 41-46). Cf. Aristot. *Pol.* 1284a, 1302b. Damon was ostracised, though there is no direct evidence that his intellectualism was the reason (see Appendix A (A)). Later writers often represent ostracism as a means by which the Athenians brought down the talented out of fear and jealousy (Demetrios of Phaleron fr. 95 (W); D.S. 11.54.5, 55.3; Plut. *Them.* 22.3, *Arist.* 1.7, *Nic.* 11). This is patently untrue, as the case of the proverbially wretched (πονηρός i.e. non-aristocratic) Hyperbolos shows (see Chapter 2 n. 168). Cf. Seager, R., "Élitism and Democracy in Classical Athens", F.C. Jaher (ed.), *The Rich, the Well-Born, and the Powerful*, p. 17, 25.
208. Pl. *Smp.* 220b.
209. See Chapters 2.3 A1, 2.8 and 3 B.
210. Palamedes is taken completely by surprise by the prosecution but he guesses that his opponent's motives are 'envy, conspiracy or knavery' (φθόνῳ ἢ κακοτεχνίᾳ ἢ πανουργίᾳ). This must express his assessment of a probable response to men such as he (*Gorg. Pal.* 3; see also Chapter 3 B & n. 47). This is also the reaction of Medeia (Eur. *Med.* 294-305), Sokrates (Pl. *Euthph.* 3c-d; Xen. *Ap.* 14), and Antisthenes' Odysseus (*Antisth. Od.* 13). Aristotle cites education as one of the causes of envy (*Rhet.* 2.23.14, 1399a). Demetrios of Phaleron argued in the *Apology of*

Sokrates (c.300 BC) that Athenians were innately jealous of the talented (see n. 207 above), doubtless intended to justify his own position, having been exiled from Athens, and to establish his claim to be counted among the élite (cf. Dover, K.J., "The Freedom of the Intellectual in Greek Society", *The Greeks and Their Legacy*, p. 145).

NOTES TO CHAPTER 5

1. Pl. *Ap.* 21c-22d, 23e cf. 18d, 19c.
2. *Ibid.* 22a-c, 23e.
3. Pl. *Rep.* 607b. On Plato's criticisms of poetry, see Murray, P., (ed.), *Plato on Poetry* (Cambridge: C.U.P., 1996), p. 6-12. The 'ancient quarrel' probably reflects Plato's view of poetry and philosophy as timeless concepts, not the antiquity of any contention as such (Adam, J., *The Republic of Plato*, (Cambridge: C.U.P., 1979), II, p. 418).
4. E.g. Pl. *Ap.* 22c.
5. Cf. Chapter 1.2.
6. Cf. Humphreys, S.C., "'Transcendence' and Intellectual Roles: The Ancient Greek Case", *Daedalus* 104, 1975, p. 97-98 and Dover, K.J., *Greek Popular Morality*, p. 30. Pre-classical poets are occasionally explicit in citing the divine as a source for their information, especially Hesiod on seafaring in the *Works and Days* (646ff). Cf. Harriott, R., *Poetry and Criticism Before Plato* (London: Methuen & Co. Ltd, 1969), especially p. 43-51.
7. Xenophanes says that poets' stories of the gods cannot be true (*DK* 21B9, 10-41, 1.21-2). Herakleitos criticises poets' reliability as teachers, as they depend on popular beliefs and applause (*DK* 22B104 cf. 42, 57, 105, 106).
8. E.g. Chapter 3 n. 10, Chapter 4 n. 44.
9. See Chapters 2.1, 2.7 A1 & 2.8. Sokrates cannot have completely disregarded the musical arts if he became Konnos' pupil (see Chapter 2.1 A1) and he was moved to write Aesop's fables in verse when awaiting execution (Pl. *Phdo* 60d-61b).
10. See Chapter 2.1 D1, especially n. 86, and Chapter 4 n. 107.
11. φαῦλον χρηστὸν ἂν λαβεῖν φίλον / θέλοιμι μᾶλλον ἢ κακὸν σοφώτερον (Eur. *Ion* 834-5 cf. *Andr.* 481-2, *Med.* 294ff, fr. 289, 473, 635 (N)). One of Euripides' characters could even call Herakles φαῦλος, a curious compliment for the preeminent hero (fr. 473 (N)). Dodds, E.R., *Euripides: Bacchae*, on 430-3.
12. τὸ πλῆθος ὃ τι τὸ φαυλότερον ἐνόμισε χρῆταί τε, τόδ' ἂν δεχοίμαν (Eur. *Bac.* 431, tr. Seaford, Aris & Phillips).
13. The comment from the *Andromache* is especially strained in its context, developing awkwardly from an observation about Neoptolemos' taking a mistress as well as a wife (Eur. *Andr.* 465ff).
14. Aristophanes does allude to seers, probably specifically Lampon, as devotees of the Cloud-goddesses (*Cl.* 332).
15. Aristoph. *Wasps* 65, *Cl.* 520ff.
16. Carey, C., "Old Comedy and the Sophists", F.D. Harvey & J. Wilkins (eds.), *The Rivals of Aristophanes*, p. 429-30.
17. Cf. Aristophanes is said to have admitted that he owed something to Euripides' style (fr. 488). Ehrenberg, V., *The People of Aristophanes*, p. 285.

18. Chapter 2.1 & n. 5. Carey, C., "Old Comedy and the Sophists", F.D. Harvey & J. Wilkins (eds.), *The Rivals of Aristophanes*, p. 427-28.
19. Kopff, E.C., "Nubes 1493ff: Was Socrates Murdered?", *GRBS* 18, 1977, p. 117.
20. Aristoph. *Birds* 1281-2, 1554-5, *Fr.* 1491-2.
21. *Pl. Ap.* 19c cf. 18d.
22. *Pl. Smp.* 223c-d. Kopff, E.C., "Nubes 1493ff: Was Socrates Murdered?", *GRBS* 18, 1977, p. 121.
23. Aristoph. *Fr.* 1491-8, see Chapter 2.1 B3.
24. *Pl. Euthph.* 2b. Sokrates' comment on his age and obscurity may, of course, be derisive - *Pl. Ap.* 26e certainly refers to his level of maturity - but are unlikely to be totally inaccurate (cf. *Pl. Ap.* 23e, 26a). Blumenthal, H., "Meletus the Accuser of Andocides and Meletus the Accuser of Socrates: One Man or Two?" *Philol.* 117, 1973, p. 177-78.
25. *Pl. Ap.* 23e.
26. The information comes from scholiasts on Aristoph. *Fr.* 1302 and *Pl. Ap.* 18b. Cf. Gulick, C.B., *Athenaeus: The Deipnosophists*, Loeb, V, p. 503 n. e on Sannyrion fr. 2.
27. D.L. 2.40.
28. Meletos' possible Eumolpid connexion: (1) There was a Diokles who was a priest of the Mysteries, perhaps in the late 6th century (*Lys.* 6.54). A mid-4th century Diokles, a man wealthy enough to pay a liturgy, came from Pitthos, the same deme as Sokrates' Meletos (*Is.* 8.19; *Dem.* 21.62). (2) At a later date there is a Mousaios – a name best suited for a man connected to the Eumolpids - also of Pitthos (*CIA* 2.2479). (3) While Aristophanes probably required no factual basis to call a poet Meletos Thracian-born (*fr.* 453, from c.403 BC), there is a tradition that Eumolpos came from Thrace (*Apollod.* *Bibl.* 3.15.4). See further J.G. Frazer's note (*Apollodorus*, Loeb, 1921, II, p. 108, n. 1)). Hostility to Alkibiades' recall, see *Thuc.* 8.53.2. Burnet, J., (ed.), *Plato's Euthyphro, Apology of Socrates and Crito*, p. 10-11.
29. Sokrates' trial took place around February 399. Andokides' was most likely in autumn 400 (MacDowell, D., *Andokides: On the Mysteries*, p. 204-5). For a bibliography of discussions of the problem of Meletos' identity, see Blumenthal, H., "Meletus the Accuser of Andocides and Meletus the Accuser of Socrates: One Man or Two?" *Philol.* 117, 1973, p. 169.
30. *Ibid.* p. 170-71.
31. *Lys.* 6.42.
32. *And.* 1.92ff.
33. MacDowell, D., *Andokides: On the Mysteries*, p. 134 cf. 14 n. 4. MacDowell also suggests that the politician Agyrrhios may have delivered it but Andokides says that he did not speak (*And.* 1.133).
34. *Lys.* 6.54 cf. 10.
35. Dover, K.J., *Lysias and the Corpus Lysiacum*, p. 77-78. See also Chapter 1.6 B2.
36. Dover, K.J., *Lysias and the Corpus Lysiacum*, p. 80.

37. Lys. 6.1, 21-28, 30-32. Lysias invokes this supposition on another occasion, claiming that the unpleasant deaths suffered by Kinesias' friends among the *κακοδαίμονισταί* are proof of immorality and impiety (fr. 34 (Scheibe)). Cf. Lysias alleges that Andokides' willingness to go on hazardous sea-voyages, an obvious vehicle for divine retribution, is further evidence of his flagrant disdain for the gods (6.19).
38. Lys. 6.3, 15, 36, 55.
39. Ibid. §13-15, 53.
40. Ibid. §3, 11, 19 cf. 21ff.
41. Ibid. §13.
42. Lysias' anticipation of certain counter-arguments shows that he is conscious of more sophisticated views. For instance, his assertion that punishments often do not arrive until a long time after the offence, even being directed against evildoers' descendents (§20, 32), indicates awareness that faith could, in fact, be shaken by observing the prosperity of evildoers. His argument that religion transcends the bounds of the city-state is also not a traditional concept. It is clear from his language that he is working hard to establish the principle of universal religious morality, especially when he can only say that 'it is said' that foreigners ban impious Athenians (§16 cf. 17, 30, 54). Though Lysias' object may be to emphasise the heinousness of Andokides' crimes and to exploit his misfortunes abroad as evidence that his offences were recognised outside Athens, this argument suggests untraditional and sophistic religious views not in keeping with the rest of the speech. It is not necessary for his case as Andokides' offences are against the religious conventions of Athens – an appeal to patriotism would have sufficed.
43. Thuc. 8.23-24, 54-55, 73; Xen. *Hell.* 1.5.16, 1.6.16. MacDowell, D., *Andokides: On the Mysteries*, p. 133.
44. Pl. *Ap.* 32c-d, *Ep.* VII 324e-325a, 325c; Xen. *Mem.* 4.4.3, *Hell.* 2.3.39.
45. Plato's Sokrates describes how the Tyrants summoned him to the Tholos:

...ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴ ἐκ τῆς θόλου ἐξήλθομεν, οἱ μὲν
τέτταρες ᾤχοντο εἰς Σαλαμίνα καὶ ἤγαγον Λέοντα,
ἐγὼ δὲ ᾤχόμεν ἀπιὼν οἴκαδε.

"...But when we came out of the rotunda, the other four went to Salamis and arrested Leon, but I simply went home..."
(Pl. *Ap.* 32d, tr. H.N. Fowler, Loeb)

The natural reading of this account is that Sokrates received the order and left the Tholos in the company of the four others (cf. Pl. *Ep.* VII 324e). Even if he and Meletos managed to miss one another, it is hard to believe that Sokrates heard nothing further about the circumstances of Leon's death. He may not actively have investigated his prosecutors before his trial but it is implausible that his friends, who had more conventional attitudes about appropriate preparation (cf. Xen. *Ap.* 2ff), did not do so.

- As it happens, Sokrates (or Plato) clearly does know *something* about his prosecutor (Pl. *Euthph.* 2a, *Ap.* 23e).
46. Sokrates' apologists cite the Leon of Salamis affair precisely to illustrate his determination to avoid injustice and impiety (Pl. *Ap.* 32d; Xen. *Mem.* 4.4.3), which provides a direct incentive for a comparison with the lack of moral, legal and religious rigour shown by Meletos. Sokrates' apologists do not elsewhere shirk from highlighting his prosecutors' rashness, petty pride, incomprehension and lack of judgement (e.g. Pl. *Euthph.* 2c; *Ap.* 24c ff.; Xen. *Ap.* 29-31). Anytos' appearance in Andokides' support in his trial (And. 1.150) does not help to resolve the question of Meletos' identity. Though it seems unlikely that the two would combine against Sokrates after (or before) opposing one another in Andokides' trial, particularly in view of Andokides' prosecutor's attack on the advocates of the amnesty, of whom Anytos was among the most prominent (Lys. 6.13), Anytos' involvement in both trials is intelligible in terms of his general policy of defending the amnesty.
 47. This belief is suggested also in the earliest known anti-intellectual comment from a poet: "Pindar says that scientists 'cull the unripe fruit of wisdom'" (τοὺς φυσιολογοῦντας ἔφη Πίνδαρος· ἀτελῆ σοφίας καρπὸν δρέπειν) (fr. 209 ap. Stob. *Ecl.* 2.1.21. Adam, J., *The Republic of Plato* (Cambridge: C.U.P., 1979), II, p. 417). As φυσιολογέω and its cognates are not attested before Aristotle (*LSJ*) it is almost certain that Stobaios is paraphrasing Pindar's phrase. Whether the result accurately represents the original or not is impossible to know. If nothing else, we do know that a roughly equivalent term, μετεωρολόγος, was in use in poetry in the mid-5th century (see Chapter 1.2).
 48. Aristoph. *Kn.* 870, *Wasps* 136, *Peace* 270, 648; schol. on Aristoph. *Kn.* 44. The choregus Kleainetos in 460/59 BC may be Kleon's father (their tribe, Pandionis, is the same), and Kleon's son Kleomedon was choregus as well (Davies, J.K., *Athenian Propertied Families* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971), p. 318-19). The accusations that Kleon owed his wealth to corrupt practices come from those with personal or political reasons to blacken his name, Aristophanes (*Ach.* 6, *Kn.* 835, 932) and Kritias (*DK* 88B45) (Dorey, T.A., "Aristophanes and Cleon", *G&R* n.s. 3, 1956, p. 132-39). Other evidence for his background, such as the late-attested datum that he was a knight, is doubtful (schol. on Aristoph. *Kn.* 235 cf. Plut. *Mor.* 806f-807a; Connor, W.R., *The New Politicians of Fifth-Century Athens*, p. 151-52 & n. 32).
 49. Hermippos fr. 47.
 50. Aristoph. *Kn.* 773-6, 923-6 cf. Thuc. 3.19.1. Atkinson, J.E., "Curbing the Comedians: Cleon versus Aristophanes and Syracosius' Decree", *CQ* n.s. 42, 1992, p. 57.
 51. Dem. 40.25.
 52. Kleon does this to discredit the very process of reconsideration or to discredit some notably sophistic speakers who had spoken earlier or whom he expected to speak later. This does, in fact, apply to Diodotos

(Thuc. 3.41) but, as Thucydides does not introduce this datum until after Kleon's speech, this interpretation would be a little perverse.

53. Pl. *Hipp.Maj.* 282b; D.S. 12.53.2-5; D.H. *Lys.* 3; Paus. 6.17.8-9.
 54. Demosthenes' speech before the battle at Pylos in 425 BC resembles Kleon's Mytilene speech in its rejection of cleverness and calculation:

Ἄνδρες οἱ ξυναράμενοι τοῦδε τοῦ κινδύνου, μηδεὶς ὑμῶν ἐν τῇ τοιαύτῃ ἀνάγκῃ ξυνετὸς βουλέσθω δοκεῖν εἶναι, ἐκλογιζόμενος ἅπαν τὸ περιστὸς ἡμᾶς δεινόν, μᾶλλον ἢ ἀπερισκέπτως εὐελπις ὁμόσε χωρήσαι τοῖς ἐναντίοις καὶ ἐκ τούτων ἂν περιγενόμενος. ὅσα γὰρ ἐς ἀνάγκην ἀφίκται ὥσπερ τάδε, λογισμὸν ἥκιστα ἐνδεχόμενα, κινδύνου τοῦ ταχίστου προσδεῖται.

“Soldiers, my comrades in this present hazard, let no one of you at such a time of necessity seek to prove his keenness of wit by calculating the full extent of the danger that encompasses us; let him rather come to grips with the enemy in a spirit of unreflecting confidence that he will survive even these perils. For whenever it has come, as now with us, to a case of necessity, where there is no room for reflection, what is needed is to accept the hazard with the least possible delay.”

(Thuc. 4.10.1, tr. Forster Smith, Loeb)

Demosthenes' speech differs from Kleon's in that it does seem to be 'required by the present circumstances' - sober calculation of the situation at Pylos may have undermined the soldiers' confidence - and does not comment on other issues. A military oration will focus on inspiring confidence and reinforcing patriotism and the unity of the group. As such, it is an example of traditional leadership. It does, however, confirm that such sentiments were not unique to a self-proclaimed populist like Kleon, and shows the rejection of another aspect of Perikles' description of the Athenian character, that its bravery was based on well-informed calculation (Thuc. 2.40.3).

55. Westlake, H.D., *Individuals in Thucydides* (Cambridge: C.U.P., 1968), p. 61-62. Note that Thucydides never uses the term *δημαγωγός*.
 56. Aristoph. *Kn.* 732-4, 1023ff, 1340-4 cf. *Wasps* 894ff. According to the mid- or late- 4th century pseudo-Platonic *Axiochos* these claims were characteristic of demagogues (639b).
 57. Eupolis fr. 331 cf. Aristoph. *Wealth* 322ff.
 58. Plut. *Mor.* 806f. Perikles displays similar devotion to the *demos* e.g. Thuc. 2.13.1, 43.1; Plut. *Per.* 7.5, 33. Connor, W.R., *The New Politicians of Fifth-Century Athens*, p. 121, 127-28.
 59. E.g. Aristoph. *Kn.* 1099, *Wasps* 197, 241. There is also an anonymous comic fragment in which Kleon 'leads the elderly and gives them pay again' (*γερονταγωγῶν κἀναμισθαρεῖν διδούς*) (com. adesp. fr. 740, tr. Olding).

60. Connor, W.R., *The New Politicians of Fifth-Century Athens*, p. 91-94, 97.
61. The charge may have been made against the producer Kallistratos rather than Aristophanes but this does not alter the incident's historicity and its illumination of Kleon's personality and interests.
62. In the 5th century εἰσαγγελία was used in the investigation of the mutilation of the Hermai and the exposure of the Mysteries (And. 1.14, 11, 37; Isoc. 16.6; Plut. *Alc.* 22.4 cf. Thuc. 6.27). Hypereides, in the mid-4th century, admits that it could be used in trivial cases (Hyp. 4.3 cf. 7-8, 29-30). In general, see MacDowell, D., *The Law in Classical Athens*, p. 183-86. It is possible that Kleon used Kannonos' law, which laid down the death penalty for those who 'wrong the *demos*', but its provision that the accused should be 'presented in chains to the Assembly' does not accord with Aristophanes' hearing before the *Boule* (Xen. *Hell.* 1.7.20) (Atkinson, J.E., "Curbing the Comedians: Cleon versus Aristophanes and Syracosius' Decree", *CQ* n.s. 42, 1992, p. 60).
63. Atkinson, J.E., "Curbing the Comedians: Cleon versus Aristophanes and Syracosius' Decree", *CQ* n.s. 42, 1992, p. 59. Kleon's intolerance of attitudes critical of conventional thought is reflected also in the story that he prosecuted Euripides for impiety, though the sources for this are late and unreliable. See Appendix A (F).
64. For these decrees, see Chapter 2 n. 100.
65. Thuc. 2.94.4 cf. Diod Sic 12.49. Cf. limitations on movement to and from Eleusis (*IG* i² 185) and the paranoia suggested by Aristoph. *Ach.* 715ff, *Kn.* 475ff, *Fr.* 359ff. Connor, W.R., "Two Notes on Diopieithes the Seer", *CPhilol.* 58, 1963, p. 116-17.
66. Schol. on Aristoph. *Kn.* 1085 cf. Connor, W.R., "Two Notes on Diopieithes the Seer", *CPhilol.* 58, 1963, p. 115-17. Cf. on εἰσαγγεῖαι, see Chapter 4.4 A2.
67. Xen. *Hell.* 3.3.3. If the oracle concerning the Spartan kingship were an 'official' one then only the Kings and Pythian ambassadors would have had access to it (Hdt. 6.57), in which case the man to whom Xenophon refers must be Spartan himself. However, the oracle need not be an official one. Xenophon mentions Diopieithes as though he were well known in his own right, 'a man with great knowledge of oracles'. Plutarch also refers to him as famous for his interpretive skill (*Lys.* 22.10-12, *Ag.* 3.6-7) and does not distinguish him from the man whom he mentions in *Perikles*. That the Spartans discounted his advice suggests that he was not very influential and militates against the view that he cannot have been a foreigner (Derenne, E., *Les Procès d'Impiété*, p. 21 n. 1). Hence, it is reasonable to suppose that the Diopieithes at Sparta is the same as the Athenian oracle-monger.
68. Thuc. 8.1.1. Bekker preserves a comment that the Athenians charged a Diopieithes with treason (*Anecdota Graeca* I, p. 186, 1.25; Connor, W.R., "Two Notes on Diopieithes the Seer", *CPhilol.* 58, 1963, p. 117 & n. 20).
69. Aristoph. *Kn.* 997ff; Thuc. 2.21.3 cf. 8.1.1; Connor, W.R., "Two Notes on Diopieithes the Seer", *CPhilol.* 58, 1963, p. 115-16.
70. Nilsson, M.P., *Greek Folk Religion* (N.Y.: Harper & Brothers, 1961), p. 123-32. For details of the public recognition of seers, see Garland, R.,

- “Priests and Power in Classical Athens”, M. Beard & J. North (eds.), *Pagan Priests*, p. 84-85.
71. Soothsaying was, at least in part, a learnable science, as non-specialists could also be expected to read signs and sacrifices (e.g. Xen. *Anab.* 5.6.29, 6.4.15; Nock, A.D., “Religious Attitudes of the Ancient Greeks”, *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society*, p. 475-76). Most comedians include oracle-mongers in the category of ‘expert’, usually on account of their pomposity and self-interest (cf. Carey, C., “Old Comedy and the Sophists”, F.D. Harvey & J. Wilkins (eds.), *The Rivals of Aristophanes*, p. 429). Aristophanes generally distinguishes them but alludes to Lampon among those whom the Clouds protect in the term Θουριομάντες (*Cl.* 332). However, the ability to interpret was not simply technical: the archetypal legendary seer Teiresias and Amphilytos, the oracle-monger attached to Peisistratos, prophesise while inspired (*Hdt.* 1.62-63; *Soph. OT* 300-1; Garland, R., “Priests and Power in Classical Athens”, M. Beard & J. North (eds.), *Pagan Priests*, p. 82-83).
72. *Pl. Crat.* 396d, 399a, 399e, 428c.
73. Tate, J., “Socrates and the Myths”, *CQ* 27, 1933, p. 78-79. On this subject, see especially Roth, P., “Teiresias as *Mantis* and Intellectual in Euripides’ *Bacchae*”, *TAPA* 114, 1984, p. 59-69. This undermines Nilsson’s suggestion that oracle-mongers may have felt that their status and livelihood were threatened by intellectuals’ explicit or implicit claim to be able to provide alternative interpretations of divine phenomena (Nilsson, M.P., *Greek Folk Religion* (N.Y.: Harper & Brothers, 1961), p. 133-34).
74. See Chapter 2.2.
75. *Lys.* 30.7ff.
76. τὰ τε τῶν νόμων γράμματα καὶ ἔθη διεφθείρετο (*Pl. Ep. VII* 325d). There may also be a political aspect to Nikomachos’ trial. He had ‘friends in the government’ appearing in his support (*Lys.* 30.31). The prosecutor suggests that expansion of other sacrifices will oblige the state to resort to extraordinary ruthlessness in raising revenue (§22), which would naturally be of most concern to the wealthy through the imposition of liturgies (Connor, W.R., “The Other 399: Religion and the Trial of Socrates”, *Georgica*, p. 52).
77. *Lys.* 30.1, 7, 12 etc.
78. *Ibid.* §7.
79. Todd, S., “Lysias against Nikomachos”, L. Foxhall & A.D.E. Lewis (eds.), *Greek Law in its Political Setting*, p. 104-5. For instances of εἰσαγγελία against public officials, see *Ant.* 6.35, 49; *Dem.* 47.41-43 cf. ps.-Aristot. *AP.* 45.2. For detail, see Rhodes, P.J., *The Athenian Boule* (Oxford: O.U.P., 1972), p. 147-62. Cf. n. 62 above. On εὐθυναί and the charges that could be brought against public officers, see MacDowell, D., *The Law in Classical Athens*, p. 170-72.
80. *Exegetai* may have been established when oracle-mongers were discredited after the failure of the Sicilian Expedition (*Thuc.* 8.1; Oliver,

- J.H., *The Athenian Expounders of the Sacred and Ancestral Law* (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1950), p. 8-17, 24-31, 40-46).
81. Garland, R., "Priests and Power in Classical Athens", M. Beard & J. North (eds.), *Pagan Priests*, p. 77-78, 85-87, 90-91.
 82. For possible reasons for this absence, see Humphreys, S.C., "'Transcendence' and Intellectual Roles: The Ancient Greek Case", *Daedalus* 104, 1975, p. 110.
 83. Antisth. *Od.* 7 cf. 9. Rankin, H.D., *Antisthenes Sokratikos*, p. 154 cf. 169-70.
 84. Pl. *Meno* 90a; Xen. *Ap.* 29; Theopompos fr. 58; Archippos fr. 31; schol. on Pl. *Ap.* 18b. He may be the same Anthemion as the son of Diphilos, who recorded on an inscription that he had been a *thes* who rose to become a cavalryman (ps.-Aristot. *A.P.* 7.4).
 85. Pl. *Meno* 90a-b. The normal Athenian concern with self-supporting activity, apparently at odds with intellectual contemplation, is encapsulated in their law against idleness (see Chapter 4.1 B).
 86. Pl. *Ap.* 23e. This may be the source for the late tradition that his hostility came from Sokrates' use of the word 'tanner' (*Epistle of Sokrates XIV* (see Chapter 2 n. 294); Lib. *Ap.Soc.* 26, 28; Dio Chrys. *Or.* 55.22).
 87. Ps.-Aristot. *A.P.* 27.5; D.S. 13.64.6; Plut. *Coriol.* 14.4; Harpokr. s.v. ΔΕΚΑΪΖΕΙΝ. These sources also record that Anytos' military failure led him to become the first person to bribe a jury. This may well be the scurrilous invention of some comedian, political opponent or Sokratic sympathiser. It cannot be literally true that he invented jury bribery as the Old Oligarch, writing c.425 BC, refers to the practice as a realistic possibility (3.7) (Calhoun, G.M., *Athenian Clubs in Politics and Litigation*, p. 66-67). It is possible that Anytos' entry into public life was as early as c.430 BC, if there is any foundation to the datum from the Hellenistic Diyllos that he proposed a reward for Herodotos for his praise of Athens, an act of fervent patriotism (*FGH* 73F3). However, the amount of the prize - ten talents - is incredible (cf. Isoc. 15.166; Momigliano, A., "The Historians of the Classical World and Their Audiences: Some Suggestions", *Contributo alla Storia degli Studi Classici e del Mondo Antico*, VI, no. 1, 1980, p. 365-67).
 88. Meno's ξένος, πατρικὸς ἐταῖρος (Pl. *Meno* 90b, 92d). Lysimachos (*ibid.* 94a).
 89. Plut. *Alc.* 4.4-5, *Mor.* 762c; Athen. 534e-f; schol. on Pl. *Ap.* 18b. Davies, J.K., *Athenian Propertied Families* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971), p. 40-41.
 90. Ps.-Aristot. *A.P.* 34.3. Cf. Xenophon implies that the Thirty Tyrants expelled Anytos from Athens (*Hell.* 2.3.42).
 91. E.g. Burnet, J., (ed.), *Plato's Euthyphro, Apology of Socrates and Crito*, p. 151. Plato names Anytos as the prosecutors' leader at *Ap.* 18b and, in the *Seventh Letter*, says that they were 'certain men in authority' (δυναστεύοντές τινες), which hardly accords with Meletos' obscurity (325b).
 92. Xen. *Ap.* 29-30.

93. There are a number of chronological pointers in Plato's account of Meno's visit to Athens, which, if they can be taken seriously, fix its date as precisely as January-February 402 BC (Morrison, J.S., "Meno of Pharsalus, Polycrates, and Ismenias", *CQ* 36, 1942, p. 76).
94. Pl. *Meno* 95a cf. 93c-94d. Plato pursues the political aspect of this argument in the *Gorgias*, asserting that statesmen should be assessed according to whether they made their citizens better or worse (515e ff.). Xenophon alludes to this as well (*Mem.* 1.2.32). The *Meno*'s focus on the education and virtue of Athens' statesmen is reminiscent of the comparison that Polykrates seems to have made between statesmen with and without intellectual mentors (see Chapter 2.8). Plato's reference to 'the wealth of Polykrates' when Sokrates introduces Anytos may allude to him (90a). This does not mean that Polykrates directly reproduced Anytos' attack or that the *Meno* is a direct refutation of the *Accusation of Sokrates*; rather, the *Accusation* was the best known apology for Sokrates' prosecution and prosecutors at this time. (The *Meno* was composed c.385 BC – Day, J.M., (ed.), *Plato's Meno in Focus* (London & N.Y., Routledge, 1994), p. 11.) N.B. Dr Doug Kelly, in a forthcoming paper, suggests that the Polykrates of the *Meno* is, in fact, not the Athenian rhetorician but Theban.
95. λώβη, διαφθορά (Pl. *Meno* 91c cf. 92e).
96. Ibid. 92a-b cf. 90c-e.
97. Ibid. 92b-c.
98. Ps.-Aristot. *A.P.* 40.2.
99. Isoc. 18.23.
100. Derenne, E., *Les Procès d'Impiété*, p. 133ff.
101. On the dramatic date of Pl. *Meno*, see n. 93 above.
102. Hansen, M.H., *The Trial of Sokrates*, p. 11-13.
103. Diogenes Laertios calls Lykon a δημαγωγός (2.38). Calling him a representative of the orators implicitly distinguishes him from the 'politicians' (πολιτικοί) (whom Anytos is said to represent), though there is unlikely to have been any practical difference. Plato may have chosen this term in order to include another class who presumed to speak authoritatively. ῥήτωρ may also be intended to imply that Lykon is a 'hired tongue' without interest in the case (cf. Chapter 2.4 A, especially n. 155). Thorough discussions of Lykon's testimonia are provided by Derenne (*Les Procès d'Impiété*, p. 130-31) and Hansen (*The Trial of Sokrates*, p. 33-34).
104. Aristoph. *Lys.* 270; Kratinos fr. 214; Eupolis fr. 61, 232, 295.
105. D.S. 14.34; Paus. 4.26.2, 10.38.5. Metagenes' phrase 'ornament of the agora' is a snide reference to stupid men (cf. Eur. *El.* 387) though it may also refer to a real statue that a foreign city gave the Athenians (Edmonds *FAC I* p. 843 n. b).
106. Scholia on Aristoph. *Wasps* 1169, *Lys.* 270 & Pl. *Ap.* 23e.
107. D.S. 14.5.7; Plut. *Lys.* 15.5 cf. Paus. 9.32.5.
108. καλὸς κἀγαθός (Xen. *Smp.* 9.1).

109. Cawkwell, G.L., "Introduction", *Xenophon: A History of My Times* (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books Ltd, 1979), p. 37-40.
110. Xen. *Hell.* 7.1.41-42, 7.5.19ff. Cawkwell, G.L., "Introduction", *Xenophon: A History of My Times* (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books Ltd, 1979), p. 36.
111. E.g. Xen. *Smp.* 3.12-13. Cf. Chapter 1.6 C1.
112. Paus. 6.17.9.
113. D.H. *Is.* 20; Demetr. *On Style* 120. Polykrates wrote a number of paradoxical works, including *encomia* on trivial subjects, such as mice, pots and pebbles, and on both Agamemnon and Klytaimnestra (Aristot. *Rhet.* 2.24; Menan. rhetor p. 611 Ald.; Demetr. *On Style* 120; Quintilian *Inst.* 2.17.4).
114. Isokrates says that Polykrates' defence of Bousiris admitted its subject's faults. Mentioning the *Accusation of Sokrates* in the same breath may suggest that this was also paradoxical, attacking Sokrates while enumerating points to his credit, such as his association with Alkibiades (*Isoc.* 11.5-6).
115. Lib. *Ap.Soc.* 102, quoted in Chapter 2.8.
116. Libanios' remark from his *Apology of Sokrates* - "You think that Sparta is a well-conducted society because it produces no sophists...?" (§134) - is probably simply rhetorical but may imply that he viewed his opponent as holding anti-Spartan views. Libanios' own attitude towards Sparta is fairly impartial (Tigerstedt, E.N., *The Legend of Sparta in Classical Antiquity*, II (Stockholm: Stockholm Studies in the History of Literature, Almqvist & Wiskell, 1965), p. 272-77). Athenaios quotes a lengthy extract from Polykrates' *Lakonika*, deriving from Didymos (*FGH* 588F1). It describes the Spartan Hyakinthia festival and is neither political nor denigratory. It could be a digression from a reference to Iphikrates' defeat of the Spartan troops occupying Lechaion who, Xenophon himself digresses, had been escorting Spartans returning home to celebrate the Hyakinthia (Xen. *Hell.* 4.5.11).
117. Pl. *Meno* 90a.
118. E.g. Pl. *Euthph.* 11e; *Isoc.* 5.144.
119. Ismenias' infamous acceptance of a Persian bribe did not occur until 395 BC, when both Sokrates and Meno were dead (Xen. *Hell.* 3.5.1; *Hell. Oxyrh.* 2, 12; Paus. 3.9.8; Morrison, J.S., "Meno of Pharsalus, Polycrates, and Ismenias", *CQ* 36, 1942, p. 58). On the dramatic date of Pl. *Meno*, see n. 93 above. Of course, anachronisms are not unknown in Plato.
120. *Isoc.* 11.1, 42.
121. *Hell. Oxyrh.* 12.1 cf. Xen. *Hell.* 5.2.25; Trogius ap. Justin 9.
122. Morrison, J.S., "Meno of Pharsalus, Polycrates, and Ismenias", *CQ* 36, 1942, p. 77-78.
123. See Chapter 2.1 C.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 6

1. E.g. Pl. *Ap.* 18a ff., 19c; Xen. *Mem.* 1.1.11-15.
2. D.L. 2.43, 6.10. This account may derive from Antisthenes himself, Anytos' contemporary, but his known propensity for vitriol and vindictiveness reduces his value as an authority. The item seems designed to prove that Sokrates' fame extended to the bounds of the Greek world (Thrace and Herakleia).
3. *Hell. Oxyrh.* 1.2, 6.2.
4. Lys. 22.8-9. Derenne, E., *Les Procès d'Impiété*, p. 178.
5. Xen. *Ap.* 31.
6. D.S. 14.37.7; D.L. 2.43, 6.9; *Suidas* s.v. Μέλητος.
7. Aischines 1.173; Hyp. fr. 14. There a comic fragment: "The wretch lies and stills his lips, which destroyed the twy-formed Sokrates' (κεῖται παρεστραμμένος ὁ τλήμων τὸ στόμα ὃ τὸν δίμορφον Σωκράτην ἀπώλεσεν) (Com. adesp. fr. 940, tr. Olding). This has an almost mystical air. The term δίμορφος recalls the description of Sokrates in Plato's *Symposium* (215a, 221d). The source may be a comic character based upon an Academician. However, it says nothing about the cause or manner of the death of any of Sokrates' prosecutors.
8. D.L. 2.43. It is disappointing to see these historical myths persist even in modern scholarship, such as Alain de Botton's *Consolations of Philosophy* (London: Hamish Hamilton, 2002), p. 41).
9. See especially Chapters 4.3 and 4.4.
10. Cf. Chapters 2.7 B and 4.3 D.
11. Plato preferred to use an otherwise unknown and possibly invented figure, Kallikles, to illustrate the worst moral and political consequences of the sophists' teachings. Perhaps there were, in fact, no sophists who were sufficiently immoral and ambitious and no well-known politicians who were sufficiently immoral and sophistic (Romilly, J. de, *The Great Sophists of Periclean Athens*, p. 157, 160).
12. Ps.-Alkid. *Od.* 22.
13. See Chapter 4.3 n. 92.
14. Aischines 1.173.
15. See Appendix A.
16. See Chapter 3 B and Chapter 4.3 B4.
17. See Chapter 2 n. 7.
18. Lefkowitz, M.R., *The Lives of the Greek Poets*, p. 96-97.
19. See Chapter 1 n. 38.
20. Aristoph. *Cl.* 627 ~ Pythagoras DK 14A19. The date that the tract was actually written is unknown (Dover, K.J., (ed.), *Aristophanes: Clouds*, ad loc.). Cf. on Sokrates' and Pythagoras' 'leading of souls' (ψυχαγωγεῖν) see Chapter 2.1 B6 & n. 68.
21. Aristoph. *Cl.* 218-9 cf. Menan. *Sam.* 41. Carter, L.B., *The Quiet Athenian*, p. 153.
22. See Chapter 4 n. 141.
23. Kopff, E.C., "Nubes 1493ff.: Was Socrates Murdered?", *GRBS* 18, 1977, p. 116-17.

24. Theopompos *FGH* 115F73; Appian *Mithr.* 28; Tertullian *Ap.* 46.13; D.L. 8.39; Iambli. *Vita Pyth.* 254 cf. D.L. 8.46. Burkert, W., *Lore and Science in Ancient Pythagoreanism* (Cambridge (Mass): Harvard University Press, 1972), p. 118-19.
25. Burnet, J., (ed.), *Plato's Euthyphro, Apology of Socrates and Crito*, p. 182-83. See Chapter 4 n. 61.
26. Connor, W.R., "The Other 399: Religion and the Trial of Socrates", *Georgica*, p. 51-53. Euthyphro is almost certainly a real person, as Plato mentions him elsewhere (see Chapter 5 n. 72).
27. See Chapter 4.4 A2. A personal vendetta seems to be the motive behind Andokides' trial - MacDowell, D., *Andokides: On the Mysteries*, especially p. 10-11 and Sealey, R., "Callistratos of Aphidna and His Contemporaries", *Hist.* 5, 1956, p. 182.
28. Xen. *Hell.* 3.1.4.
29. Xenophon's exile must have occurred after March 399 BC, as he was still able to consider returning to Athens at this time (Xen. *Anab.* 7.7.57). Xenophon may have been a known Spartan sympathiser even before he left Athens and became involved, as one of the Ten Thousand, with the Spartans Klearchos, Kleander the harmost of Byzantion, Anaxibios the navarch and Aristarchos, and then his service with Thibron, Derkylidias and Agesilaos in Asia. In a speech Deinarchos (late 4th century) emphasises Sparta's gifts to him (Deinarchos ap. D.L. 2.52 cf. D.H. *Dein.* 12). Xenophon himself implies, through Sokrates' mouth, that his connexion with Kyros in fact was the reason for his exile (Xen. *Anab.* 3.1.5 cf. Pausanias (5.6.5) and Diogenes Laertios (2.51, 58-59) cite both causes). Towards the end of the Peloponnesian War Kyros was a strong supporter of Sparta, providing them with money and abusing international protocols in his treatment of Athenian ambassadors (e.g. Xen. *Anab.* 3.1.5, *Hell.* 1.4.3-7, 5.2-9). However, were this the reason, we might have expected Xenophon's banishment to have occurred early in Kyros' expedition, not such a long time afterwards. His relationship with Kyros is more likely to be an ostensible reason, convenient both for the Athenians, who were still officially Spartan allies at this time, and also for Xenophon, so that he could avoid the suspicion that he was a traitor to his city (cf. Delebecque, E., *Essai sur la vie de Xénophon* (Paris: C. Klincksieck, 1957), p. 117-18, 121-22 and Anderson, J.K., *Xenophon* (London: Gerald Duckworth, 1974), p. 148-49).
30. Rankin, H.D., *Antisthenes Sokraticos*, p. 119.
31. Cic. *ad Att.* 13.21 cf. D.L. 1.2.
32. δέισαντας τὴν ὀμότητα τῶν τυράννων - Hermodoros ap. D.L. 2.106 cf. 3.6.
33. δυναστεύοντές τινες - Pl. *Ep.* VII 325b.
34. See Chapter 2 n. 279.
35. Connor, W.R., "The Other 399: Religion and the Trial of Socrates", *Georgica*, p. 54.
36. See Chapter 2.6 and Chapter 5 C2.
37. Pl. *Ep.* VII 325b.
38. *Ibid.*
39. E.g. Aristot. *Rhet.* 2.23.12, 1398b; Athen. 507a ff.

40. See Chapter 2 n. 293.
41. Lévi-Strauss, C., *The Savage Mind*, p. 21-22.
42. Parry, A.M., *Logos and Ergon in Thucydides*, p. 21, 47-50.
43. White, M., "Reflections on Anti-intellectualism", *Daedalus* 91, 1962, p. 467.
44. Dover, K.J., *Aristophanic Comedy*, p. 32, 34-35.
45. Soph. *Phil.* 1246 cf. *Ant.* 99, *El.* 1023-4, 1027; Eur. *Phoin.* 1680. Dover, K.J., *Greek Popular Morality*, p. 117-18. Cf. Chapter 5 A1.
46. E.g. *Ant.* 5.71-72; *Lys.* 3.4, 31 cf. *Ant.* 2.3.3; *Lys.* fr. 22; Eur. *Suppl.* 581-2.
In the Mytilene debate Diodotos argues that irrationality is a basic component of human nature, somewhat ironically in view of his intellectualism and Kleon's attack on the validity of the intellectual process (see Chapter 2 n. 200). Plato depicts Sokrates and Protagoras agreeing that the primacy of the passions was the common but erroneous view (*Pl. Prot.* 352b-c, 353a). Xenophon ascribes this to Sokrates, probably displaying his own conventionality (*Oec.* 1.19-20). Dover, K.J., *Greek Popular Morality*, p. 125-26. N.B. the Greek tendency to personify gods and forces may serve to disown them as a controllable part of the self. Gorgias adopts this language: in the *Helen*, while his style of argument is systematic and logical, he speaks of *Logos* as 'a powerful master' (§8 cf. 12, 20). Cf. Dover, K.J., *Greek Popular Morality*, p. 144 and Lakoff, G., & M. Johnson, *Metaphors We Live By* (Chicago & London: University of Chicago Press, 1980), p. 33-34, 50, 134-35 cf. 39.
47. Snell, B., *Scenes from Greek Drama*, p. 54.
48. *Ibid.* p. 47.
49. *Pl. Gorg.* 491d, *Prot.* 352b, 353a.
50. Dodds, E.R., *The Greeks and the Irrational*, p. 197 n. 29. This view was characteristic of the Spartan approach, emphasising training and preparation (e.g. *Thuc.* 1.84 cf. 2.87.5, 5.9.9), admired by at least some Athenian sympathisers (e.g. *Xen. Mem.* 1.2.19ff. cf. *Cyr.* 7.5.75, *Hunt. passim*).
51. *Pl. Ap.* 24e-25a, *Meno* 92e-93a.
52. Lévi-Strauss, C., *The Savage Mind*, p. 234-36.
53. White, M., "Reflections on Anti-intellectualism", *Daedalus* 91, 1962, p. 458.
54. The association of rhetoric and democracy is not necessary but is well attested in Athenian thought (Dover, K.J., *Lysias and the Corpus Lysiacum*, p. 180, 183).
55. Aristoxenos fr. 48 (W) ap. D.L. 8.82; Strabo 6.3.4; D.L. 8.79 cf. *Pl. Ep. VII* 338c, *Ep. IX passim*.
56. Aristotle fr. 577 (Rose) ap. *Plut. Per.* 26.2-3; *Plut. Them.* 2.3; D.L. 9.24.
57. Gorgias (*Pl. Hipp.Maj.* 282b; D.S. 12.53.2, 5; Paus. 6.17.8). Prodikos (*Pl. Hipp.Maj.* 282c; Philostr. *Vita Soph.* 1.12); Hippias (*Pl. Hipp.Maj.* 281a-c; Philostr. *Vita Soph.* 1.2.5 (495)). In general, see Vatai, F.L., *Intellectuals in Politics in the Greek World, passim*.
58. See Appendix A (A).
59. Nothing is known of the circumstances of Thucydides' exile. The datum that Kleon was responsible is suggestive but may be a simple inference from Thucydides' obvious dislike of him (*Marcellinus Vita Thuc.*).
60. Cf. Chapter 2 n. 31 and Chapter 4 n. 160.
61. See Chapter 1 n. 31 and Chapter 4.4 n. 199, 201.

62. Lloyd, G.E.R., *Magic, Reason and Experience*, p. 173.
63. Ibid. especially p. 250-59.
64. Vatai, F.L., *Intellectuals in Politics in the Greek World*, *passim*.
65. In addition to Chapter 1 n. 83, see Pl. *Hipp.Maj.* 282b-c, 285c ff.; Xen. *Mem.* 4.4.6; Alkid. *Soph. passim*; Dikaiarchos fr. 87 (W); D.S. 12.53.2; Paus. 6.17.8; Philostr. *Vita Soph.* 1.9.4 (482, 493, 496). Apart from Aristophanes' *Achurnians*, which seems to parody Herodotos' exposition of the causes of the Persian Wars (1.1-5) with a series of abductions of prostitutes that 'caused' the Peloponnesian War (Aristoph. *Ach.* 524ff.), there are a few allusions to history writing in popular genres. Debates in oratory and political and philosophical pamphleteering generally do not use meaningful historical research (see Chapter 2 n. 174).
66. Aristotle ap. Aristoxenos *Harm.* 30-31.
67. Pl. *Gorg.* 456b; Xen. *Mem.* 4.2.5.
68. E.g. ps.-Hipp. *On the Art* 5, *On Breaths* 10; *On Disease I* 1. The author of *On Regimen in Acute Diseases* explicitly responds to the lost tract *Knidian Sentences*. Cf. Chapter 1.6 C.
69. E.g. also Isoc. 4.3, 11, 15.3.
70. Lloyd, G.E.R., *Magic, Reason and Experience*, p. 142.
71. Ibid. p. 21-24 cf. 157-68, 221-24.
72. Ibid. p. 91-98 cf. 24ff., 53-54, 72-79, 88.
73. See Chapter 4 n. 201.
74. Cherniss, H.F., *The Riddle of the Early Academy* (N.Y.: Russell & Russell, 1962), p. 7ff.
75. Vatai, F.L., *Intellectuals in Politics in the Greek World*, especially p. 110-11, 130-32.
76. Ibid. p. 120. For a discussion of the political background, see O'Sullivan, L., "Athenian Impiety Trials in the Late Fourth Century BC", *CQ* 47, 1997, p. 136-52.
77. φιλοσοφοῦμεν (and lovers of beauty - φιλοκαλοῦμεν) (Thuc. 2.40.1).
78. οὐ δι' ὀργῆς τὸν πέλας, εἰ καθ' ἡδονὴν τι δρᾷ (ibid. 2.37.2).

NOTES TO THE APPENDICES

1. Ps.-Plut. *Mor.* 1136e cf. Pl. *Rep.* 398e-399a. Damon's fragments and testimonia are collected in *DK I*, no. 37, p. 381-84; also biography and bibliographies in Guthrie, W.K.C., *A History of Greek Philosophy*, III, p. 35 n. 1 and Podlecki, A.J., *Perikles and His Circle*, p. 18-23, 182 n. 19, 20.
2. Pl. *Rep.* 400a-c, 424b-c.
3. Pl. *Lach.* 197b; Isoc. 15.235.
4. Pl. *Com.* fr. 207; Isoc. 15.235; ps.-Aristot. *P.A.* 27.4; ps.-Pl. *Alc. I* 118c.
5. *And.* 1.16.
6. Damon's ostraka: no. 52(K) cf. 53(V) in Brenne, S., *Ostrakismos und Prominenz in Athen: Attische Bürger des 5. Jhs. v. Chr. auf den Ostraka* (*Tyche* suppl. 3), Wien, 2001. Also Willemsen, F., & S. Bremme, "Verzeichnis der Kerameikos-Ostraka", *Ath.Mitt.* 106, 1991, p. 147 n. 2, p. 150 and Tod, M.N., *A Selection of Greek Historical Inscriptions to the End of the Fifth Century BC* (2nd ed.) (Oxford, 1946), p. 93. Cf. two post c.450 BC ostraka - *MDAI(A)* 40, 1915, 20-21, *IG i²*:912; Hamdorf, F.W., in Hoepner 1976, 210 no. K100.
7. *Lib. Ap.Soc.* 157. See Chapter 2.8.
8. Podlecki, A.J., *Perikles and His Circle*, p. 20.
9. Pl. *Lach.* 180d. *Laches'* dramatic date is between 424 and 418 BC and probably after 421 BC (Lane, I., *Plato: Early Socratic Dialogues* (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books Ltd, 1987), p. 69). Damon was dead by 415 BC if *And.* 1.16 refers to him.
10. *Plut. Per.* 31-32.
11. On ancient scholars' desire to identify 'deeper' political or personal motives, see Chapter 1.6 D. Plutarch's use of the term φιλοτύραννος to describe Damon's supposed offence is probably his own turn of phrase. It and related terms are unattested before the Roman period (e.g. D.H. 4.83.3; *Plut. Dion* 36.2; see *LSJ*).
12. Music's effect on the emotions and sanity (*Hom. Il.* 9.187ff; *Hymn to Hermes* 416-96; *Eur. Her.* 871-9, 892-9; *Plut. Mor.* 238b cf. *Aischylos Eum.* 306-11, 328-33). The drumming associated with Bacchism is another example. Its effect on morals and behaviour, especially to induce courage (Terpander fr. 12 (ap. Demetrios of Phaleron fr. 191 (W)), 14a-b (ap. *Philod. de Mus.* 1 F30.31-35 (p. 18 Kemke); 4 col 19.4-19 (p. 85-86 Kemke)); *Plut. Lyk.* 21, *Mor.* 238a-d). Its effect on civic harmony (Terpander fr. 15 (ap. D.S. 8.28); *Pindar Pyth.* 5.65-7; *Pl. Rep.* 398e ff, 424c). Music was even believed to affect bodily health (Theophr. fr. 87 (Wimmer)). Olympiodoros claims that 'Damon taught Perikles the songs by which he harmonised the city' (*In Plat. Alc. Comm.* 138.4-11; his authority is unknown). Wallace, R.W., "Private Lives and Public Enemies: Freedom of Thought in Classical Athens", A.L. Boegehold & A.C. Scafuro (eds.), *Athenian Identity and Civic Ideology*, p. 141-42.
13. See Henry, M.M., *Prisoner of History*, *passim*.
14. There are three other minor sources: schol. on *Aristoph. Kn.* 969; ps.-*Luc. Amor.* 30; and an anecdote in Syriac, printed in Ehlers, B., *Eine vorplatonische Deutung des sokratischen Eros: Der Dialog Aspasia des*

- Sokratikers Aischines*, p. 77 n. 158). All of these appear to derive from Aischines (Stadter, P.A., *A Commentary on Plutarch's Pericles*, p. 297).
15. Cf. Is. 6.50; ps.-Dem. 59.85-86, 113-14. Ostwald, M., *From Popular Sovereignty to the Sovereignty of Law*, p. 195. The late datum that she named her 'girls' after the Muses looks like a similar scandalous fabrication, whatever its source might be (schol. on Hermogenes (Walz *Rhet. Gr.* 7, 165)).
 16. Mansfeld, J., "The Chronology of Anaxagoras' Athenian Period and the Date of His Trial, II", *Mnem.* ser. 4, 33, 1980, p. 76. Cf. schol. on Aristoph. *Kn.* 696 tantalisingly refers to 'Aspasia and her legal protector (κύριος)' - Stadter, P.A., *A Commentary on Plutarch's Pericles*, p. 303.
 17. See Chapter 4.3 A1.
 18. Aristot. *Rhet.* 1.7, 1365a; Thuc. 1.115.2; Ion of Chios *FGH* 392F16. Frost, F.J., "Pericles, Thucydides, Son of Melesias, and Athenian Politics Before the War", *Hist.* 13, 1964, p. 396.
 19. Philochoros *FGH* 328F121. There is a contemporary source for Pheidias' scandal in Aristophanes (*Peace* 605).
 20. D.S. 12.39.2; Plut. *Per.* 31-32. Of course, the reliability of this information depends on the sources' historical rigor: Plutarch regards himself primarily as a biographer and Diodoros (Ephoros?) shows a tendency to gather related material together, for instance, treating Themistokles' exile and death and events in between under the one date (D.S. 11.54-59; Woodbury, L., "Anaxagoras and Athens", *Phoenix* 35, 1981, p. 308 n. 35).
 21. Stadter, P.A., *A Commentary on Plutarch's Pericles*, p. 298.
 22. Dover, K.J., "The Freedom of the Intellectual in Greek Society", *The Greeks and Their Legacy*, p. 138. On improper use of comedy as a historical source, see Chapter 1.6 D.
 23. Plut. *Per.* 31.1, 32.3, 36.5. Henry, M.M., *Prisoner of History*, p. 70-73. Perikles' tears at Aspasia's trial is nearly identical to Hypereides' behaviour at the trial of Phryne (see Chapter 2 n. 258), which raises the possibility that it is really a motif that may or may not reflect fact (Henry, M.M., *Prisoner of History*, p. 63).
 24. *Ibid.* p. 42-44.
 25. *Ibid.* p. 32. It is also possible that Athenaios' citation of Antisthenes should be confined to the comment on Perikles kissing Aspasia. The reference to her trial is separate and may belong to Herodikos' κωμωδούμενος, which Athenaios follows in the surrounding material (Stadter, P.A., *A Commentary on Plutarch's Pericles*, p. 297).
 26. See Chapter 4.3 A1. For bibliographies of pro-and-con the historicity of Aspasia's trial, see Stadter, P.A., *A Commentary on Plutarch's Pericles*, p. 297 and Henry, M.M., *Prisoner of History*, p. 135 n. 22.
 27. 438/7 BC is the most probable date for Anaxagoras' trial, if it occurred, though this may be due to simple inference by Ephoros, Diodoros and/or Plutarch (see the discussion on the date of Aspasia's trial). An alternative dating scheme puts Anaxagoras' departure in the early 440s BC (Woodbury, L., "Anaxagoras and Athens", *Phoenix* 35, 1981, p. 296-305). Mansfeld constructs a plausible historical context for the trial but this does not make its fact any more secure ("The Chronology of Anaxagoras'

- Athenian Period and the Date of His Trial, II”, *Mnem.* ser. 4, 33, 1980, especially p. 80-84).
28. Diodoros does cite the 4th century Ephoros as his source for the events surrounding the start of the Peloponnesian War, so may have provided information on Anaxagoras’ trial as well (as Jacoby believes - Ephoros *FGH* 70F196). However, it is simplistic to think that he *must* be Diodoros’ only source, even apart from Diodoros’ own qualification that he reproduces Ephoros’ narrative ‘in general’ (12.41.1).
 29. For Diopieithes’ decree, and the Greek for this quote, see Chapter 2.2. Elsewhere Plutarch says that Anaxagoras was brought to trial for impiety for having said the sun was a stone (*Mor.* 169e), and that he “was imprisoned and rescued with difficulty by Pericles...” (*Nic.* 23.3). He also refers to Anaxagoras’ imprisonment without giving details (*Mor.* 84f, 607f).
 30. Plut. *Mor.* 820d.
 31. Plut. *Per.* 16.7. Much of Plutarch’s information on Anaxagoras seems to be anecdotal, using terms such as λέγεται and παρειλήφασμεν (Plut. *Per.* 16.7, *Lys.* 12.2, *Mor.* 118d. Hershbell, J., “Plutarch and Anaxagoras”, *ICS* 7, 1982, p. 150). Plutarch’s account of the indictments of Perikles’ associates is framed with expressions of uncertainty (see n. 23 above).
 32. Derenne, E., *Les Procès d’Impiété*, p. 40; Frost, F.J., “Pericles, Thucydides, Son of Melesias, and Athenian Politics Before the War”, *Hist.* 13, 1964, p. 397-98; Woodbury, L., “Anaxagoras and Athens”, *Phoenix* 35, 1981, p. 304-5.
 33. E.g. Derenne, E., *Les Procès d’Impiété*, p. 30.
 34. E.g. Davison, J.A., “Protagoras, Democritus, and Anaxagoras”, *CQ* 47, 1953, p. 39-45 and Guthrie, W.K.C., *A History of Greek Philosophy*, II, p. 322-23.
 35. D.L. 2.7.
 36. *Ibid.* 2.14-15. Woodbury, L., “Anaxagoras and Athens”, *Phoenix* 35, 1981, p. 302 n. 22.
 37. Anaxagoras’ and Perikles’ relationship is attested no earlier than a sarcastic comment by Plato (*Phdr.* 269e-270a cf. Chapter 4 n. 160) but came to be used to explain Perikles’ lofty thought and powerful oratory and to illustrate the magnanimity of his character (Gershenson, D.E. & D.A. Greenberg, *Anaxagoras and the Birth of Physics*, p. 333-34).
 38. Cf. Woodbury, L., “Anaxagoras and Athens”, *Phoenix* 35, 1981, p. 312.
 39. Gershenson, D.E. & D.A. Greenberg, *Anaxagoras and the Birth of Physics*, p. 347-48 and Dover, K.J., “The Freedom of the Intellectual in Greek Society”, *The Greeks and Their Legacy*, p. 140-41.
 40. Alkidamas ap. Aristot. *Rhet.* 2.23.11, 1398b cf. n. 30 & 36 above.
 41. Cf. Mansfeld, J., “The Chronology of Anaxagoras’ Athenian Period and the Date of His Trial, II”, *Mnem.* ser. 4, 33, 1980, p. 81.
 42. Apart from those cited in the text, these are the major sources for the action against Protagoras for impiety:

...Atheniensium iussu urbe atque agro est exterminatus librique eius in contione combusti.

“...[For *On the Gods*] he was banished by order of the Athenians from city and countryside, and his books were burned in public assembly.”
(Cic. *N.D.* 1.23.63 ~ DK 80A23, tr. M.J. O’Brien in Sprague (ed.), *The Older Sophists*)

οὐ γὰρ ἠνείχοντο τοὺς φυσικοὺς καὶ μετεωρολόσχας
τότε καλουμένους... ἀλλὰ καὶ Πρωταγόρας ἔφυγε...

“Men could not abide the natural philosophers and ‘visionaries’, as they were then called... Even Protagoras had to go into exile...”
(Plut. *Nic.* 23.3, tr. Perrin, Loeb)

διὰ μὲν δὴ τοῦτο πάσης γῆς ὑπὸ Ἀθηναίων ἤλαθῃ ὡς
μὲν τινες, κριθεῖς, ὡς δὲ ἐνίοις δοκεῖ, ψήφου
ἐπενεχθείσης μὴ κριθέντι. νήσους δὲ ἐξ ἠπείρων
ἀμείβων καὶ τὰς Ἀθηναίων τριήρεις φυλαττόμενος
πάσαις θαλάτταις ἐνεσπαρμένας κατέδου πλέων ἐν
ἀκατίῳ μικρῷ.

“It was for this saying that he was outlawed from the whole earth by the Athenians; as some say after a trial, but others hold that the decree was voted against him without the form of a trial. And so he passed from island to island and from continent to continent, and while trying to avoid the Athenian triremes which were distributed over every sea, he was drowned when sailing in a small boat.”
(Philostr. *Vita Soph.* 494, 1.10, tr. Wright, Loeb)

διὰ ταύτην δὲ τὴν ἀρχὴν τοῦ συγγράμματος ἐξεβλήθη
πρὸς Ἀθηναίων· καὶ τὰ βιβλί’ αὐτοῦ κατέκαυσαν ἐν τῇ
ἀγορᾷ, ὑπὸ κήρυκι ἀνανλεξάμενοι παρ’ ἐκάστου τῶν
κεκτημένων... ἀνέγνω δ’ Ἀθήνησιν ἐν τῇ Εὐριπίδου
οἰκίᾳ ἢ, ὡς τινες, ἐν τῇ Μεγακλείδου· ἄλλοι ἐν
Λυκείῳ, μαθητοῦ τὴν φωνὴν αὐτῷ χρήσαντος
Ἀρχαγόρου τοῦ Θεοδότου. κατηγορήσε δ’ αὐτοῦ
Πυθόδωρος Πολυζήλου, εἷς τῶν τετρακοσίων·
Ἀριστοτέλης δ’ Εὐαθλὸν φησιν.

“For this introduction to his book [*On the Gods*] the Athenians expelled him; and they burned his books in the market-place, after sending round a herald to collect them from all who had copies in their possession... [H]e read it at Athens in Euripides’ house, or, as some say, in Megacledes’; others again make the place the Lyceum and the reader his disciple Archagoras, Theodotus’ son, who gave him the benefit of his voice. His accuser was Pythodorus, son of Polyzelus, one of the Four Hundred; Aristotle, however, says it was Euathlos [fr. 67 (Rose)].”
(D.L. 9.52, 54, tr. Hicks, Loeb)

- Aristotle comments that ‘men were justly disgusted with Protagoras’ promise’ (δικαίως ἔδυσχέρανον οἱ ἄνθρωποι τὸ Πρωταγόρου ἐπάγγελμα) to make the worse argument appear the better (*Rhet.* 2.24.11, 1402a). It should be noted that he does not say that this disgust was widespread, manifested in hostile action or directed at Protagoras himself.
43. Pl. *Meno* 91e. Burnet, J., *Greek Philosophy: Thales to Plato*, p. 111-12 and Dover, K.J., “The Freedom of the Intellectual in Greek Society”, *The Greeks and Their Legacy*, p. 143 n. 15.
 44. Aristoxenus fr. 131 (W) ~ DK 68A1 ap. D.L. 9.40, tr. Hicks, Loeb.
 45. A. Momigliano ap. Dover, K.J., “The Freedom of the Intellectual in Greek Society”, *The Greeks and Their Legacy*, p. 158 cf. 143-45.
 46. Philostr. *Vita Soph.* 494, 1.10; Hesych. *Onomat.* in schol. on Pl. *Rep.* 600c ~ DK 80A2-3.
 47. Φησὶ δὲ Φιλόχορος, πλέοντος αὐτοῦ ἐς Σικελίαν, τὴν ναῦν καταποντωθῆναι... (Philochoros *FGH* 328F217).
 48. See n. 42 above.
 49. See Chapter 2.8.
 50. Aristotle fr. 67 (Rose) ap. D.L. 9.54 cf. Chapter 2 n. 7.
 51. See Chapters 3, 4.1, 4.2 & 4.4.
 52. Pl. *Ap.* 19e, *Hipp.Maj.* 282c, *Crat.* 384b; Xen. *Smp.* 4.62 cf. Aristoph. *Cl.* 361, *Birds* 692.
 53. Sprague, R.K., *The Older Sophists* (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1972), p. 71 n. 1.
 54. Satyros fr. 39 col. 10, tr. Lefkowitz, M.R., *Lives of the Poets* (London: Gerald Duckworth & Co. Ltd, 1981), p. 168 n. 12.
 55. See Chapter 4.3 B1.
 56. Dover, K.J., “The Freedom of the Intellectual in Greek Society”, *The Greeks and Their Legacy*, p. 139. On Aristophanes and Kleon, see Chapter 5 B above.
 57. Ostwald, M., *From Popular Sovereignty to the Sovereignty of Law*, p. 279.
 58. Mejer, J., *Diogenes Laertius and His Hellenistic Background*, p. 24. For a bibliography of the ‘Diogenes or Anaxagoras’ debate, see Mansfeld, J., “The Chronology of Anaxagoras’ Athenian Period and the Date of His Trial, II”, *Mnem.* ser. 4, 33, 1980, p. 21 n. 98.
 59. On Demetrios’ *Apology of Sokrates*, see Chapter 4 n. 210. Dover, K.J., “The Freedom of the Intellectual in Greek Society”, *The Greeks and Their Legacy*, p. 145-46.
 60. Xen. *Cyr.* 1.2.6. On the problems of establishing exactly what ‘literacy’ means, complicated by writers’ habit of using it as shorthand for cultural sophistication, see Harris, W.V., *Ancient Literacy*, p. 5-8.
 61. Havelock and Goody give the most extreme form of the thesis that the adoption of facile tools for literacy led to the development of intellectualism. See Havelock, E.A., “Prologue to Greek Literacy”, C.G. Boulter, et al. (eds.), *Lectures in Memory of Louise Taft Semple* (University of Oklahoma Press, 1973), p. 331-91 and Goody, J. & I. Watt, “The

- Consequences of Literacy”, J. Goody (ed.), *Literacy in Traditional Societies*, p. 27-68 cf. Lévi-Strauss, C., *The Savage Mind*, p. 232-236. Objections to this thesis, at least in such a bald form, are that there is, in practice, no clear relationship between the development of skills for literacy and intellectualism. There is a gap of several hundred years between the appearance of written Greek and the earliest extended philosophical writings (see Chapter 1.2 A2). There is no clear relationship between the facility of tools for literacy and levels of literary and intellectual achievement. Non-literate societies differ from literate societies not in their methods of proof but in the self-consciousness, level of abstraction and rigour of their arguments (things that are, of course, implicit in writing). See Goody, J., *The Interface Between the Written and the Oral* (Cambridge: C.U.P., 1987), p. 64, 72; Harris, W.V., *Ancient Literacy*, p. 41). G.E.R. Lloyd views Greek political institutions as the crucial factor in the development of intellectualism (see Chapter 6 n. 63).
62. Harris, W.V., *Ancient Literacy*, p. 17 cf. 65-66. Thoukydides specifies that Athenians were uncommonly rusticated before the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War (2.14.2-15.2).
 63. Women reading book scrolls appear on vases from the beginning of the 5th century. This parallels a growth in interest in art in both literacy and women, so it does not prove that female education actually increased during this period (Immerwahr, H.R., “Book Rolls on Attic Vases”, C. Henderson (ed.), *Classical, Mediaeval and Renaissance Studies*, I, p. 27-28). For a detailed discussion of female literacy, see Gill, S.G., “Could Greek Women Read and Write?”, H.P. Foley (ed.), *Reflections on Women in Antiquity* (N.Y, London & Paris: Gordon & Breach Publishers, 1981), especially p. 223-28. On women in intellectual circles, see Chapter 4.3 A1.
 64. Aristoph. *Cl.* 18-24, 30-1.
 65. Zenobios *Ath.* 1.43 cf. D.S. 13.33.1.
 66. Eur. fr. 382 (N); Sophokles’ *Amphiaraus* (Athen. 454b-f); Achaios (fr. 33 (N) ap. Athen. 466e-f); Kallias’ *Grammatical Play* (Athen. 453c-e).
 67. Agathon fr. 4 (N); Theodektes fr. 6 (N).
 68. Harris, W.V., *Ancient Literacy*, p. 109.
 69. Thuc. 2.13.3-8 cf. Dem. 34.24-5.
 70. Ps.-Dem. 43.18. Harvey, F.D., “Literacy in the Athenian Democracy”, *REG* 79, 1966, p. 596-97, 614-15.
 71. Pl. *Krito* 50d, *Prot.* 325d-326c; Xen. *Mem.* 2.2.6, *Lac. Pol.* 2.1.
 72. Pl. *Laws* 689d; *Suidas* s.v. Harris, W.V., *Ancient Literacy*, p.103-4.
 73. Pl. *Ap.* 26d.
 74. Harvey, F.D., “Literacy in the Athenian Democracy”, *REG* 79, 1966, p. 597-98.
 75. *Ibid.* p. 591-92.
 76. Plut. *Arist.* 7.5, *Mor.* 186a-b. Harvey, F.D., “Literacy in the Athenian Democracy”, *REG* 79, 1966, p. 592-93.
 77. E.g. And. 1.40; Thuc. 2.2.4 cf. Aristl. *Pol.* 7.4, 1326b. Harris, W.V., *Ancient Literacy*, p. 78-79.

78. The pointed omission of Nikias from the memorial for those who died on the Sicilian Expedition is one example of the symbolic value of inscriptions (Paus. 1.29.9).
79. Cf. Chapter 1.6 & n. 153.
80. Cf. Dem. 20.93. Harvey, F.D., "Literacy in the Athenian Democracy", *REG* 79, 1966, p. 598-601.
81. Decrees for the erasure of official records (*IG* i² 91.10 ff.; And. 1.77-79); hoplite and cavalry rolls (Aristoph. *Kn.* 1369-71; Lys. 16.7). Dover, K.J., "The Freedom of the Intellectual in Greek Society", *The Greeks and Their Legacy*, p. 143-44.
82. Aristotle gives directions on how to bolster or denigrate written evidence opportunistically, the same as any other form of evidence (*Rhet.* 1.15.20-5, 1376a-b). The ease of forgery would also discourage the use of written materials, a common allegation (e.g. Ant. 5.53-56; Isoc. 17.23, 33-34; Is. 1.41; Calhoun, G.M., "Documentary Frauds in Litigation at Athens", *CPhilol.* 9, 1914, p. 134-44).
83. Harvey, F.D., "Literacy in the Athenian Democracy", *REG* 79, 1966, p. 593-96.
84. Nepos *Arist.* 1 cf. n. 76 above.
85. Chios (Hdt. 6.27.2); Astypalaia (Paus. 6.9.6); Eretria or Erouthrai (Ion of Chios *FGH* 392F6); Mykalessos (Thuc. 7.29). There are dubious anecdotes that refer to schools in Mytilene's 6th century empire (Ailian *V.H.* 7.15) and Troizen in c.490 BC (Plut. *Them.* 10.4). Aristophanes' reference to the schooling of those who fought at Marathon may also be anachronistic (*Cl.* 964-5). Harris, W.V., *Ancient Literacy*, p. 57.
86. Xen. *Hell.* 2.4.20.
87. Harris, W.V., *Ancient Literacy*, p. 58-59. On the pictorial evidence, see Immerwahr, H.R., "Book Rolls on Attic Vases", C. Henderson (ed.), *Classical, Mediaeval and Renaissance Studies*, I, p. 17.
88. Laws on hours and morals - Aischines 1.9 cf. Pl. *Prot.* 325d. Solon's law - Petit, *Leges Atticae*, II, 4. Freeman, K.J., *Schools of Hellas* (N.Y.: Teachers' College Press, Columbia University, 1969), p. 57-58, 68-69.
89. D.S. 12.12.4, 13.3-4.
90. Protagoras' legislation for Thouria (Herakleides Pont. fr. 150 (W)). Diodoros' error may have arisen from the tradition, attested from the early 4th century, that Charondas was responsible for all legislation in Magna Graecia (Pl. *Rep.* 599e). Aristotle says that that Charondas' only legal innovation concerned proceedings for perjury (*Pol.* 2.12, 1274b) (Harris, W.V., *Ancient Literacy*, p. 98).
91. E.g. Pl. *Ap.* 26d-e; Eupolis fr. 327; Nikophon fr. 10.
92. Xen. *Anab.* 7.5.14.
93. Harvey, F.D., "Literacy in the Athenian Democracy", *REG* 79, 1966, p. 628-29.
94. Immerwahr, H.R., "Book Rolls on Attic Vases", C. Henderson (ed.), *Classical, Mediaeval and Renaissance Studies*, I, p. 48.
95. Harris, W.V., *Ancient Literacy*, p. 59 cf. Nikias' desire that his son should learn Homer by heart - Xen. *Smp.* 3.5.

96. Euthydemos' library - Xen. *Mem.* 4.2.10. Harris, W.V., *Ancient Literacy*, p. 82.
97. *Ibid.* p. 19, 30.
98. Aristoph. *Kn.* 189. A Nikochares comedy includes the comment that 'the unlettered man is lazy' (τόν ἀναλφάβητον τὸν ἄπονον) (fr. 5; dating to c.400 BC). This could be the expression of a general sentiment or from the mouth of some intellectual snob.
99. Immerwahr, H.R., "Book Rolls on Attic Vases", C. Henderson (ed.), *Classical, Mediaeval and Renaissance Studies*, I, p. 17.
100. Thuc. 1.40.2; And. 1.85-87. Ostwald, M., *From Popular Sovereignty to the Sovereignty of Law*, p. 153.
101. Harris, W.V., *Ancient Literacy*, p. 77 e.g. Aristot. *Rhet.* 1.15.4-8, 1375a-b. Athenians envisaged unwritten laws as different from the written but, as laws passed by the Assembly are simply the concrete form of popular wisdom, a contrast between the two is not to be expected (Ober, J., *Mass and Élite in Democratic Athens*, p. 165). See especially Ostwald, M., "Was There a Concept of *Agraphos Nomos* in Classical Greece?", E.N. Lee, A.P.D. Mourelatos & R.M. Rorty (eds.), *Exegesis and Argument, Phronesis* suppl. I, 1973, p. 70-104.
102. Eur. fr. 578 (N) see Chapters 2.3 A1 & 3 B.
103. Harris, W.V., *Ancient Literacy*, p. 62-63, 99-100. Phaleas - Aristl. *Pol.* 2.7, 1266b.
104. Hdt. 6.27 cf. 4.138, 8.132.
105. Homer's redaction (Cic. *de Orat.* 3.34 (137) cf. Lyk. 1.102; ps.-Pl. *Hipparchos* 228b; D.L. 1.57); oracles (Hdt. 5.90, 7.6); Hermai (ps.-Pl. *Hipparchos* 228b-229d); library (Aul. Gell. *N.A.* 7.17.1 cf. Athen. 3a); Harris, W.V., *Ancient Literacy*, p. 52-53. On the scribe statues, see Payne, H., & G. Mackworth-Young, *Archaic Marble Sculpture from the Acropolis*, 2nd ed. (London: Cresset Press, 1950), pl. 118 & p. 47.
106. Cf. Aischylos *Suppl.* 944-9.
107. σήματα λυγρά, θυμοφθόρα πολλά, σήμα κάκον - Hom. *Il.* 6.168, 169, 178. Cf. Archilochos also refers to a 'grievous dispatch' (ἀχνυμένη σκυτάλη) - fr. 185 (West).
108. Palamedes: see Chapter 2.3 A1 & 3 B. Hippolytos: Eur. *Hipp.* 1311-2. In Herodotos e.g. 1.124-25, 3.128, 6.4 and Thoukydides e.g. 1.128-29, 137. Harris, W.V., *Ancient Literacy*, p. 48 n. 17, p. 88. Allegations of forgery and improper alteration of both public and private documents are not uncommon: see n. 82 above.
109. Ant. 5.53-56.
110. Pl. *Phdr.* 275a-276b, 277e-278b, *Ep. VII* 341c; Xen. *Mem.* 4.2; Oinopides DK 116B4; Alkid. *Soph. passim*; Antisth. fr. 66, 188 cf. Pl. *Rep.* 377a ff, 595a ff; Xen. *Mem.* 4.6-7; Antisth. fr. 61, 62, 174 (Caizzi)).
111. Hofstadter, R., *Anti-Intellectualism in American Life*, p. 309-10.
112. Beck, F.A.G., *Album of Greek Education*, p. 9.
113. See n. 65 above. After 380 BC Demosthenes mocks Aischines before a popular jury for having worked in a school as a young man (Dem. 18.258).
114. See Chapter 4 n. 88.
115. See Chapter 2 n. 326.

116. Dem. 27.46; Theophr. *Char.* 30.14. Forbes, C.A., *Teachers' Pay in Ancient Greece*, p. 29-30, 35. Cf. Chapter 4.3 A2.
117. Aristoph. *Kn.* 150ff; Eur. fr. 382 (N); Agathon fr. 4 (N); Plut. *Arist.* 7.5, *Mor.* 186a-b cf. Lys. 20.11. Harris, W.V., *Ancient Literacy*, p. 17.

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