

Their reports were sent on to commissions and sub-commissions. He (the Professor) was attached particularly to the one which dealt with the responsibility for the war and the offences against international law committed during the war. The Council of Ten analysed the reports from the commissions and debated them. This caused delay, the British and French Parliaments became impatient, and the world clamoured for peace and for food. Therefore a radical change was necessary, and the Council of Four was formed. Then President Wilson found himself in a vice from which he and his fourteen points never emerged with safety. The meetings were informal and no minutes were kept. As Signor Orlando was absent from many of the meetings, it could be said that the Treaty with Germany was made by three men in three weeks. A Council of five Foreign Ministers dealt with lesser matters. It was strange that the three men—Wilson, Clemenceau and Lloyd George—should have been engaged in the task of reconstructing a broken world, seeing that none of them had ever before been recommended for any outstanding reconstructive work or policy. On May 6 the Peace Treaty was ready and on the 7th it was handed to the German representatives and, eventually, they submitted to the terms. Considering the strange circumstances and the enormous difficulties, the Peace Treaty was a great piece of work—none the less it had serious defects. The final signing took place on Saturday afternoon, June 28, 1919, at Versailles. Poetic justice had been done, for Germany had been laid in the dust in the very room where, in January, 1871, she had arisen in her might and glory.

At the conclusion of his remarks, the lecturer was cordially thanked.

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WORLD REBUILDERS PERSONALITIES AT PEACE CONFERENCE. LECTURE BY PROFESSOR PHILLIPSON.

Personal sketches of the leaders of the great nations at the Peace Conference, presented with candor, were the features of an exceptionally interesting lecture in the Institute, North-terrace, Adelaide, on Tuesday evening by Professor Coleman Phillipson, who was a member of the British delegation to the Conference. Mr. P. McMahon Glynn, K.C., who presided, referred to the experience and intellectual eminence of the lecturer.

Professor Phillipson said the future peace of the world depended on the work of the international organisations, the proper conduct of which depended to a large extent on the character, capacity, and insight of the persons who had established the organisations, and those who were carrying them on. He proposed, therefore, to consider the Paris Peace Conference from the point of view of its structure and working, and the personalities behind it. The Conference had to improvise solutions, compromise differences, and adapt itself to constantly changing circumstances. Paris was chosen as the centre because of French pressure. It had been the centre of activities of the Allies during the war, and France, remembering the bitterness of her downfall in 1871, desired to retaliate on Germany. Experience, however, showed that the atmosphere of Paris was little suited for peace negotiations, and for the calm reconstruction of the world. The shadow of death still hung over it; depression and anxiety prevailed. It was so terribly expensive, for only those with enormously long purses could find even a temporary home there. After the initial formal proceedings the ten leading delegates of the five Great Powers held what they called a conversation, and elected M. Clemenceau President of the Conference. Then was formed the Council of Ten.

Professor Phillipson explained the representation permitted to the various Powers, and added that there was at first much opposition, especially from the United States, to specific representation of the British Dominions, but as decisions were not taken by majority vote the principle of representation was not a vital element. Altogether there were 70 plenipotentiaries and 34 substitutes, the total number of all classes of delegates being 1,100, who were housed in the best hotels, which flew the various national flags. The Egyptians and the Irish tried to get a hearing, but could not be said to have had any locus standi at the Conference. In the conduct of the discussions there was no ceremonial, and despite Mr. Wilson's first "point" secrecy prevailed. Negotiations in the plenary Conference were at once ruled out as impossible. M. Clemenceau insisted that the five Powers which had placed twelve million soldiers in the field were to be the dominating Powers. Secrecy was inevitable, first for the convenience of discussion, secondly because it saved a good deal of time, thirdly because there were secret agreements during the war, and it was not expedient to make them public, and fourthly because compromise was essential in view of the conflicting claims. It was soon clear that men like M. Clemenceau and Mr. Lloyd George were more moderate in privacy. For instance, M. Clemenceau pledged himself to establish a buffer State on the Rhine. In private he could withdraw the claim when he found it unattainable, whereas in public he could scarcely do so with decency. Further, open diplomacy was tried in regard to the Italian claims on the Adriatic, but that experiment nearly wrecked the Conference, because the Italian representative (Signor Orlando) withdrew, and President Wilson found himself appealing to the Italian people, which was an extraordinary thing. The discussions of the Council of Ten took the form of conversations, and the reports were sent to the experts on the various commissions and sub-commissions which had been set up. The lecturer was attached to the commission which, more particularly, had to do with the responsibility for the war and offences against international law, and he, with a French representative, drew up a document of some 36 or 40 folio-size pages, analysing the offences of the Germans, Austrians, and Turks against the laws of war and humanity. Criticism of the reports of the Council of Ten by the experts turned the conversations of the ten into debates. This caused delay, and for this reason and as there was leakage of information, and further, because President Wilson preferred to play a lone hand, the Council of Four (sometimes called the Supreme Council) was formed. Now President Wilson found himself in a vice from which he and his fourteen points never emerged with safety. The meetings of this body were informal, and no minutes were kept. Consequently difficulties arose. Sir Maurice Hankey was appointed informal secretary, and kept brief records of the meetings. These constituted the basis of the Treaty. As Signor Orlando was absent from many meetings, it might be said the Treaty with Germany was framed by three men in three weeks (two weeks in April, 1919, and one in May). There was another Council of Five, called colloquially, the "second eleven." This body, which consisted of the Foreign Ministers of the Powers, dealt with the lesser matters, but had no initiative or authority. Sometimes the Five sat with the Four, but the meetings were not a success, because the tendency was to prolong discussions and arrive at no conclusions. The Council of Four met in President Wilson's quarters in the Hotel Murat (once the residence of the famous Prince Murat), called by resident Americans the "house of the flirt," because there once lived in it Mamie Paine, who married a banker named Bischoffsen. There she broke many hearts, and in the very same house Dr. Wilson tried to mend a broken world.

Dr. Wilson "a Tool."

Dealing with personalities at the Conference, Professor Phillipson said Dr. Wilson at home was regarded as a preacher, teacher, and politician, but Americans held that he was responsible for no new idea or policy. In thought, temperament, and character he was almost like a typical Scotsman. He attached great importance to principles of religion and conscience. He was an uxorious man (his

wife was always with him), and he possessed a deep filial piety and respect for the memory of his dead father. Like some Scotsmen, he "joked w' difficulty," and in that respect offered a great contrast to the late Colonel Roosevelt, whose laughter used to shake the chimney pots. Dr. Wilson did not betray his feelings. He possessed very little worldly wisdom and seldom sought counsel from others. He disregarded criticism, and was no judge of men. That helped to bring about his downfall in America. He was self-centred, stern, and obstinate. He loved his fellow-creatures in the abstract, but did not seem to possess the warm human heart of a Lincoln. Even his urbanity and amiability seemed somewhat artificial. Despite his intellect, which was largely academic in character, he was considered by Americans as unfitted by temperament to be at the Conference, and as not representing the feelings of the American people. His position was not questioned in Paris, because he came as a purveyor of provisions, as a lender of money, a healer of nations, and as the head of a large army. It was strange that a man of such high honor and highest principles should have come to be detested and maligned in the United States. Before the Conference started he appeared to Europe as a Moses come to lead the enslaved peoples out of their bondage; but in Paris he reckoned without his hosts. When he came down from the clouds to the market-place he had to begin bargaining and haggling with the Pharisees, who could not shake off the old diplomacy. His oneness of mind and strength of purpose surrendered to the bargain drivers; indeed, he had no knowledge of the situation, no grasp, no plan, and he was slow and unresourceful. He was not quick enough to follow Mr. Lloyd George, and he seemed to be sometimes almost in a maze during the arguments. He became practically a tool in the hands of the old Frenchman and the wily Welshman.

M. Clemenceau, the Tiger.

M. Clemenceau was now 80, and he was probably the most distinguished and ablest of the negotiators. He was certainly a great war leader, for he inspired France with amazing optimism. He had a heavy body, squat figure, and short limbs, in some respects not unlike the late General Botha, who was one of the most picturesque of the delegates. He wore a black square-tailed coat, generally, and, during the meetings, grey suede gloves, but why the gloves no one seemed to know. Despite his great age, he was particularly energetic. His knowledge was somewhat superficial, but, nevertheless, he was intense and brilliant and fond of epigrams and stinging phrases. He was at times very impulsive, dismissing his leading Ministers like so many subordinate officials. He was imperious; even after the armistice he issued orders to the soldiers, and when Marshal Foch took exception to his conduct he was on the point of dismissing the marshal who had won the war. Despite his heavy body and slow movements in debate, he delivered lightning thrusts, to which Dr. Wilson replied with formulas and principles. His religion and politics might be summed up in the words, "I love France and abominate Germany." He had poignant memories of 1870-1, and ideas of "revanche" were ever present in his mind. He showed little patience at the Conference unless his views were accepted. He spoke little, but had his eyes fixed on one goal. He had a venomous tongue, and was reported to have on one occasion described the Conference as a lot of pigs, except himself and M. Pichon—and he was doubtful about M. Pichon. His acid tongue and pen wrecked 18 Ministries—19 including his own. He was called "The Tiger;" as such he did not roar, but lacerate. He was cynical; he thought the League of Nations moonshine, preferring military guarantees. Whilst Dr. Wilson was an idealist, M. Clemenceau was a realist and Mr. Lloyd George an opportunist.

Mr. Lloyd George.

The British Prime Minister, like M. Clemenceau, did magnificent work during the war as a leader of the nation, but he was not so good as a peace negotiator, and especially as a world rebuilder. It was thought his antecedents were somewhat against him, for many qualities were necessary in international negotiations which the modern politician did not often cultivate. He was considered somewhat of a quick-change artist, and that trait Englishmen did not like except on the stage. Opportunism was inevitable in such transactions, but there was a line beyond which changing from day to day, became shiftiness. Like Dr. Wilson and other plenipotentiaries, his knowledge was not always adequate—for instance, he did not know that the war-making power in the United States was in the hands of Congress and not of the President, and he did not seem to know where Transylvania was, and why the Roumanians claimed it. These deficiencies were

pretty general in the Conference. In parenthesis, it might be stated that when Dr. Wilson arrived in Paris he received a petition to espouse the cause of the Corsicans, and he promised that their case would be considered during the Conference, which was absurd, as Corsica was as much a part of France as the Isle of Wight was part of England. Mr. Lloyd George had not wit, but he possessed a fund of humor. He was a most clairvoyant; he had the eyes of a lynx and the wiles of a fox. He relied on intuition rather than on profound knowledge, and seized every chance that presented itself. Dr. Wilson might be said to have been harassed by the dictates of conscience, M. Clemenceau by obstacles to his "revanche" policy, and Mr. Lloyd George by menace of his position at home. After all, politicians and local preachers were not the best peacemakers and world rebuilders.

Signor Orlando was eloquent and very moderate, but he was hindered by his colleague, Baron Sonino, who was most uncompromising. Both confined themselves timidly to territorial questions, forgetting other matters. Signor Orlando was a popular figure, and various shrewd sayings were assigned to him. He said for example, "Small nations are like a number of chickens carried to market—they quarrel amongst themselves, yet they are doomed to the same fate." The Japanese delegates, Marquis Saionji and Baron Makino, were very reserved and taciturn. They generally sided with Mr. Lloyd George and Dr. Wilson until the matter of eastern Asia came up; then they showed their determination. They flew the flag of Russia beside that of Japan on their hotel. In future international diplomacy it would be necessary to consider the possibility of a combination of the Japanese and the Russians.

Professor Phillipson concluded with an eloquent description of the final scene—the signing of the Treaty at Versailles. Poetic justice had been done, he said, for Germany had been laid in the dust in the very room where she had, in January, 1871, risen in her might and glory.

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ELDER CONSERVATORIUM.

CHAMBER MUSIC RECITAL.

At the Elder Hall on Monday evening a Chamber Music recital was given by members of the Conservatorium staff, assisted vocally by Miss Muriel Day. There was a full attendance of music-lovers, all of whom were keenly appreciative of the numbers selected. The Schumann Quartet in E flat for piano-forte, violin, viola, and violoncello, was played by Mr. L. G. Reimann, Mr. Gerald Walenn, Miss Sylvia Whittington, and Mr. Harold Parsons. The performance was noteworthy in many ways, but principally for the extraordinary clearness of Mr. Reimann's technique, and for the perfection of part-playing. The work is a popular one from the soulful opening in which the strings announce the first subject—the "Scherzo." The Andante is of lofty inspiration, and the finale is a wonderful climax of profuse fugal contents. The quartet was much engrossed with variation of tone, and carefully announced the important matter used by Schumann. The String Quartet, written by Alexander Borodin, was played by Mr. Gerald Walenn, Miss Nora Kyffin Thomas, Miss Sylvia Whittington, and Mr. Harold Parsons. The work is full of melody, and appealed to everybody. Miss Muriel Day contributed four songs. "The dying moon-flower," by Thurlow Lieurance, was most artistic, and scored a definite success. Hugo Wolf's "Morning dew" was similarly acceptable. "The dreary steppe," by A. Greshaninov, and Richard Strauss' "Four prancing white steeds" were of dramatic type. Mr. Harold Walde's accompaniments were of well-judged effectiveness, notably in the Lieurance number.