PAN-GERMAN IDENTITY AND THE PRESS IN AUSTRIA, 1933-1938

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT

This thesis examines how and why Austrians thought of themselves as German in the years before Austria's annexation to the Nazi state. It argues that Austrians constructed their identity in ways that signified particular regional and local as well as universal belonging to the national community. These particularist and universalist aspects of Austrian identity are encapsulated in the term pan-Germanism, that is, the belief that by virtue of its historic ties to other Central European nationalities, Austria was uniquely both a German state and a part of the German nation.

By comparing three German-nationalist newspapers in Styria, Salzburg and Vienna between 1933 and 1938, this thesis demonstrates, firstly, the regional nuances of pan-German discourses in Austria and, secondly, the extent to which these discourses competed or overlapped with concurrent National Socialist and Austrofascist versions of pan-Germanism. However, it argues that German-nationalist editors and their readers did not always support exclusive Nazi designs for Austro-German unity, but negotiated their belonging to the national community in ways that often converged with Austrofascist ideas about Austria's identity as both a German state and a part of the German nation. Pan-Germanism was thus a contested national identity in which Austrofascists, German-nationalists and National Socialists all had a stake to claim prior to 1938.

This thesis fills a gap in the historiography of interwar Austria both in terms of methodology and sources, and in its overall assessment of the period preceding *Anschluss*. It is the only study of interwar Austria that investigates national identity through the lens of the daily newspaper. While newspapers have formed the basis of other studies of national identity elsewhere in Europe, this approach has not been undertaken for Austria. Moreover, the focus on three German-nationalist newspapers, rather than a systematic survey of the entire Austrian press in the years between 1933 and 1938, allows for an in-depth study of individual editors and newspapers writing for a select readership in particular regional settings. It also allows for a comparison of newspapers from a similar political-cultural milieu in order to draw broader conclusions about the polarisation of society and politics in interwar Austria. In particular, this thesis challenges the received wisdom of the *Lager* theory in Austrian political history by showing the overlaps between political-cultural milieux in interwar Austria.

With regard to its overall assessment of the years between 1933 and 1938, this thesis also makes an original contribution to debates on 'Austrofascism'. Studies of comparative fascism have reached a consensus that the regime in Austria between 1934 and 1938, like many of the other regimes in interwar Europe, was authoritarian but not fascist. This thesis suggests, on the contrary, that the points of convergence between the German-nationalist press, Austrofascism and National Socialism reveal in substance, if not in structure, a fascistic brand of nationalism in interwar Austria: pan-Germanism.

DECLARATION

This thesis contains no material that has been accepted for the award of any other degree or diploma in any university or other tertiary institution and, to the best of my knowledge and belief, contains no material previously published or written by another person, except where due reference has been made in the text of the thesis.

I give consent to this copy of my thesis, when deposited in the University Library, being made available for photocopying and loan.

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GLOSSARY

Antisemitenbund League of Anti-Semites, founded in Vienna in 1921.

Article 80 Clause in Treaty of St Germain (1919) that allowed citizens of the former Austro-Hungarian Empire to opt for citizenship in any successor state in which they identified either linguistically or racially with the majority of the population. Adopted into Austrian legal practice in 1920.

Besitzstand Ownership or property. A term used by German-nationalists and Christian Socials in the Austro-Hungarian Empire to denote German dominance over non-German nationalities in the political, cultural, intellectual, economic and artistic life of the Empire.

Burschenschaften University fraternities, whose student members (*Burschenschafter*) participated in secret ceremonies, invited politicians to speak at their meetings and, in the most radical fraternities, excluded Jewish students from membership and often carried out violent attacks against them.

CSP *Christlichsoziale Partei* (Christian Social Party).

Deutscher Schulverein German Schools' Association. Founded by liberal politicians in 1880 and grew to 200,000 members by 1914. Its main task was fundraising for local German schools in ethnically mixed regions. Different from the smaller *Schulverein für Deutsche* (Schools' Association for Germans), which Georg von Schönerer founded in 1886 as a breakaway organisation from the *Deutschen Schulverein*, and which explicitly excluded Jews from membership.

deutschnationale German-nationalist (adj.). In the Austrian context, this term is associated with the liberal political camp that became increasingly German-nationalist after the 1880s.

Fatherland Front (*Vaterländische Front or VF*). Single-party organisation founded by Chancellor Dollfuss in 1933 to replace political parties and party associations. Membership was compulsory for public servants.

GdVP *Grossdeutsche Volkspartei* (Greater German People's Party). Inaugurated in Salzburg in 1920, but National Socialists and the Agrarian League (*Landbund*) did not join.

gesamtdeutsch pan-German (adj.). Usually narrowly associated with the German-nationalist vision of a German nation that excluded Slavs and Jews, but Social Democrats and Christian Socials also used the term to mean German unity and German dominance over non-Germans. See *Gesamtdeutschtum*.

Gesamtdeutschtum Can be literally translated as pan-Germandom. The term first emerged in 1848 as German and Austrian liberals at the Frankfurt Assembly debated proposals for unification of all Germans in a constitutional nation-state. Revolutionary socialists also used the term to mean the unity of the entire German proletariat.

Gleichschaltung Coordination or levelling. A euphemistic term coined by Nazi Party leaders in Germany to mean the process of dissolving the autonomy of social and economic institutions in the state and placing them directly under the regime's authority.

grossdeutsch greater-German (adj.). This term originally meant in 1848 the inclusion of all Germans in a German state under Habsburg rule, as opposed to the exclusion of Austrian Germans from a little-German (*kleindeutsch*) state ruled by Prussia.

Grossdeutschland Greater Germany. Again, the term originally had liberal connotations of a German-nation state that included all Germans, but it was later also used by Hitler to describe his ambitions of German hegemony in Europe.

Gymnasium Tertiary-entrance secondary school.

Heimat Homeland. The term traditionally referred to local regional identity, as in the arts and crafts movement in the early twentieth-century, but it also came to be associated with national identity. Austrian German-nationalists used the term to mean both universal and particular belonging to the German national community, while Austrofascists typically invoked this term as a defence of 'Austrian' values and traditions against those they deemed to be 'German'.

Heimatrecht Right of domicile. This law referred to an individual's right to reside in a municipality or province and conferred citizenship rights on the individual by way of residency.

Heimwehren Home Guards. Local paramilitary organisations founded by war veterans immediately after World War One to defend the southern Austrian borders against Yugoslav troops. They had various provincial names, such as *Heimatschutz*, *Heimatwehr* and *Heimatdienst*. Formed into a loosely unified federal body after 1927, but most provincial organisations retained their original names and previous political allegiances with either the Christian Socials or Greater Germans, or the Nazis after 1932.

Historikerstreit Historians' controversy. The Austrian equivalent of the West German *Historikerstreit* in the 1980s was sparked by the German historian, Karl Dietrich Erdmann's, controversial thesis in 1976, which placed post-1945 Austria in a comparative historical framework along with the West and East German states.

kleindeutsch little-German (adj). See *grossdeutsch*. Bismarck's creation of a unified German state in 1871 was the fulfilment of the original Prussian designs for a *Kleindeutschland* that excluded Austria. Radical Austrian liberals, led by Schönerer, inverted the original Prussian definition of *kleindeutsch* to mean the dismemberment of Austria-Hungary and the inclusion of Austrian Germans in Bismarck's Reich.

Kulturkampf Culture war. Referred to the discrimination against and political repression of Catholics in the German Empire.

Lager Camp; the so-called *Lager* theory is based on an assumption that Austrians were divided into three political camps consisting of German-nationalist, Christian Socials and Social Democrats.

Mütterschutzwerk Mothers' Defence Action. Founded in 1934 as a subsidiary organisation of the Fatherland Front. Aimed to raise the birth rate by promoting motherhood as a patriotic duty and created a patriarchal welfare system that supported mothers.

Neues Leben New Life. Leisure organisation under the umbrella of the Fatherland Front, founded in 1936 and based on the Nazi and Fascist leisure organisations, *Kraft durch Freude* and *Dopolavoro*.

Republikanisches Schutzbund Republican Defence League. Paramilitary organisation of the Social Democratic Party, founded in 1923.

Schönerianer Supporters of Georg von Schönerer, mainly former student fraternity members. Those who later deserted Schönerer's political authority were known as Schönerianer-without-Schönerer.

SDAP *Sozialdemokratische Arbeiterpartei* (Social Democratic Workers' Party).

Ständestaat Corporate State. The official name for the Austrian state established by constitution in 1934, so-called for its division of labour and politics into *Stände* or corporations.

Tracht Folk costume.

INTRODUCTION

This thesis investigates how Austrians imagined their belonging to a national community in the years prior to Austria's annexation to Nazi Germany. It is different from previous studies of national identity in Austria both in its focus on the interwar period and its theoretical approach to national identity. Historians traditionally locate the emergence of an Austrian consciousness in the years after 1945 when Austria's national identity was apparently no longer wedded to the German nation. They argue that a sense of 'Germanness' was pervasive in the interwar years, but they rarely dissect the multiple meanings of such a vague and ambiguous term. Moreover, their approach to national identity, as I will demonstrate, creates an artificial and ahistorical distinction between 'Austrian' and 'German' and perpetuates the nationalist schools of historiography that grew up in Germany and Austria during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Recent constructivist approaches to nationalism and nationhood have shown us, however, that national identities consist of multiple layers and expressions of national belonging that are defined and contested over time. My thesis follows the constructivist school by showing that national identity in Austria was not only linked to the question of Austro-German unity, but also, and often more persistently, to questions about minorities in Austria, to its borders with other Central European nationalities, and to questions about citizenship and immigration.

I investigate interwar national identity through the lens of Austria's German-nationalist daily press. My methodology and sources are also important and original for several reasons. Firstly, as other studies of the press have demonstrated, newspapers are not only a rich source of information about social, political, cultural and everyday life, but they can also lead us to discover the ways people gave expression to and drew meaning about their sense of national belonging at a time of instability, ideological extremism and

psychological fixation on rebuilding or recovering a loss of collective identity. My intention has not been to amass evidence of public opinion or to chronicle everyday life from the pages of the popular press. I have been much more interested in how newspapers signified their belonging to a national community through editorial pieces, headline articles and topical essays. Secondly, my focus on three German-nationalist newspapers is not intended to be a systematic survey of the entire interwar Austrian press, but allows, instead, for a closer analysis of a particular political-cultural milieu. By investigating the construction of national identity in a single political-cultural milieu, my thesis seeks to demonstrate the points of convergence between German-nationalists and other political-cultural milieux in Austria on questions of national identity. These similarities across different political-cultural milieux throw into contention the received wisdom on the interwar period, the so-called *Lager* theory, which holds that there were three political camps in Austria: Catholic-conservative, socialist and German-nationalist. My thesis argues that this view cannot hold true in the light of overlapping visions of national identity across the political spectrum in interwar Austria.

A third reason for studying the German-nationalist press is that it allows for a comparison of newspapers from different cities and regions in Austria and shows how regional identities interacted with and influenced the construction of national identity. While regional studies of national identity abound for France and Germany, there have been few so far for Austria.[1] As I show in Chapter Two, Austria's German-nationalist press had built up an intellectual and cultural reputation in provincial cities, such as Graz and Salzburg. The leading daily newspaper in Styria, the *Grazer Tagespost*, had a circulation of

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[1] On Germany, see, notably, Celia Applegate, *A Nation of Provincials: The German Idea of* Heimat (Berkeley, 1990); Alon Confino, *The Nation as a Local Metaphor: Württemberg, Imperial Germany and National Memory, 1871-1918* (Chapel Hill, 1997). On France, Eugen Weber's standard study of regional identity, *Peasants into Frenchmen: The Modernization of Rural France, 1870-1914* (London, 1977) has more recently been supplemented by studies of regional and national identities in the borderlands of France. See, for example, Paul Lawrence, Timothy Baycroft and Carolyn Grohmann, "'Degrees of Foreignness' and the Construction of Identity in French Border Regions during the Interwar Period," *Contemporary European Studies* 10, 1 (2000): 51-71. One of the few studies of regional identity in interwar Austria is Peter Haslinger, "Building a Regional Identity: The Burgenland, 1921-1938," *Austrian History Yearbook* 32 (2001): 105-123.

around forty per cent of the total weekday newspapers in Styria during the interwar period. Similarly, its counterpart in Salzburg, the *Salzburger Volksblatt*, had more than half of the total circulation of Salzburg's weekday press. The German-nationalist newspaper with the largest readership in the interwar period, the *Wiener Neueste Nachrichten*, was actually based in Vienna, not in a provincial city, but this was due to the concentration of readers in a city of two million people. The *Wiener Neueste Nachrichten* was less representative of Viennese readers, who could choose from a large assortment of liberal, socialist and conservative dailies, than the Styrian and Salzburg newspapers were of provincial readers. Nonetheless, I have included it alongside the *Grazer Tagespost* and the *Salzburger Volksblatt* because these three newspapers tell us a great deal about German-nationalists as a whole.[2]

My focus on the German-nationalist press has added significance for the years between 1933 and 1938. This period coincided with both the emergence of a National Socialist state in Germany in 1933 and the creation of an Austrofascist state in 1934. My thesis shows that German-nationalist editors and their readers may have admired the success of National Socialism in Germany, but they did not always support Nazi designs for Austro-German unity and few were prepared to surrender unconditional allegiance to the Nazi cause. Instead, they negotiated their belonging to the national community in ways that often mirrored the Austrofascist government's attempts to construct its own version of a national identity. This is important because historians have so far neglected the connection between nationalism and indigenous fascism in Austria. As I will show later in this chapter, the term 'Austrofascism' is controversial, and most historians prefer to label the regime ruled by Chancellors Engelbert Dollfuss and Kurt Schuschnigg an authoritarian conservative dictatorship. My thesis makes an important contribution to this debate by showing that the Austrofascist state's construction of a national identity shared many

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[2] A more detailed discussion of these newspapers, and the Austrian press in general, follows in Chapter Two.

important similarities with, and in some cases was indistinguishable from, the national community envisaged by Nazis and German-nationalists. While mine is not the first study to show the relationship between Austrofascists and German-nationalists, I show this relationship at the local level, rather than at the federal political level between, say, Schuschnigg and the so-called 'National-Catholic' circles of men like Artur Seyss-Inquart. My thesis demonstrates that German-nationalist newspaper editors retained considerable editorial autonomy under the Austrofascist state and that this autonomy did not come at the expense of their own nationalist beliefs.

My thesis argues that German-nationalists, and Austrians in general, constructed their national identity in a dual sense. They embraced the universalist idea of all Germans belonging together in a common German national community, but they also signified their national belonging to particular local and regional identities. This duality of universalist and particularist discourses forms the basis of what I call pan-Germanism, a national identity that was historically contested and redefined in Austria. I use the term 'pan-German' deliberately to avoid unwanted connotations of a German *or* Austrian identity. My aim is also to broaden the term's usage beyond its previously narrow association with German-nationalist groups in Austria, which reinforces the *Lager* divisions in historiography and obscures the multiple meanings of pan-German identity in Austria. My argument rests on two major premises about pan-German identity. Firstly, pan-German identity did not reflect one particular type of nationalism, such as a civic or ethnic one, but combined both ethnic and civic nationalisms in ways that defined the boundaries of the national identity. We will see that the traditional distinctions between ethnic and civic nationalisms are superficial, far from clear-cut and essentialise Central and Eastern Europeans especially. The shift to an ethnic-and-civic approach does not assume the existence of ideal types of nationalism, as in the classical ethnic-versus-civic dichotomy. Rather, following the constructivists, I refer to the modes and practices by which

4

nationalists delimit national identity. I thus define ethnic and civic nationalisms as interactive processes of identity construction, rather than as separate categories of nationalism leading to particular models of nationhood. The combination of both civic and ethnic discourses in the case of Austrian pan-German identity worked to legitimate Austria's dual claim to be simultaneously a German state (particularist) and a part of the German nation (universalist). The second premise of my argument is that different groups in different places contested Austrian pan-German identity at any one juncture. This follows from the first premise: pan-German identity was contested precisely because it combined multiple processes of identity construction. I have already said that the *Lager* theory is flawed for the interwar period because pan-Germanism cut across traditional political-cultural distinctions and this will be discussed further in Chapter One. It needs only to be stated here that competition between and accommodation of different pan-German identities in the period from 1933 to 1938 highlights the fluid nature of national identity in interwar Austria. It was neither 'German' nor 'Austrian', but was constantly redefined and adapted to suit the ideological concerns of its stakeholders.

In order to explain the premises of my argument, I need to establish first of all a theoretical framework for national identity. The literature on nationalism and national identities is vast and it is essential that I show how my research fits within the existing theoretical parameters. The second section of the introduction will then elaborate on the historiography of national identity in Austria and explain how my thesis departs from traditional interpretations. I argue that Austrian historians have approached national identity through a matrix in which 'German' represents everything that 'Austrian' is not and that this approach has obscured our understanding of the multiple processes used to construct national identity in Austria. Finally, I will make a brief discursus on the Austrofascist state and consider the extent to which this state nurtured its own variant of pan-Germanism and accommodated concurrent versions in order to legitimate its authority.

As with nationalism, studies of fascism have produced little in the way of a theoretical consensus and I need to establish my understanding of 'Austrofascism' before I can demonstrate the relationship between fascism and nationalism in Austria and, in particular, the relationship between Austrofascists and German-nationalists. My introduction is long by necessity: it provides the theoretical and historiographical scaffolding for my thesis to contribute to a diverse and vast body of scholarship.

Theories of National Identity

To summarise the main theoretical approaches to national identity, I will refer to Benedict Anderson's widely influential concept of 'imagined communities' and show why the Andersonian model is most helpful for our understanding of national identity in Austria. I do not presume that Anderson's theory fits every case of modern nationalism; I simply point out that it provides the best explanation for the Austrian case. I will also argue that any definition of national identity must come to terms with the duality of ethnic and civic nationalisms and, furthermore, that these ethnic and civic nationalisms can be seen as interactive processes inherent to any one case of national identity.

First published in 1983, Anderson's *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* defines the nation as an imagined, limited and sovereign political community.[3] He argues that the members of this national community may never meet, but they are connected in the modern information era by newspapers and other sources of 'print-capitalism'. Through this simultaneous transmission of information, they learn about one another and form an understanding of the group, which builds a national consciousness.[4] Anderson's theory departs from other theories that see political traditions, ethnic origins or invented myths of national heritage as the basis of modern nationalism. His approach has opened up to students and scholars of nationalism the possibility of

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[3] Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London, 1983), p. 5.
[4] Ibid., pp. 35-36.

exploring national identity in terms of the creation of mentalities, rather than as the inevitable product of politics or myth making.[5]

On the heels of Anderson, there have been varied interdisciplinary attempts to explore further the formation of national identities. In a recent compilation of essays on nationhood, Prasenjit Duara argues that the national community is merely one of a number of historically formed identities that are 'imagined' simultaneously, often incongruously, according to political, class, gender or religious identification. Thus the boundaries of national identity are fluid and dependent on the exclusion or inclusion of certain individuals and groups.[6] Another contributor to the same volume, Liisa Malkki, addresses exclusion in her anthropological study of refugees and national identity. She argues that definitions of national identity must include the experiences of migration and displacement in order to explain how the sense of self as national becomes mobile, detached, defensive and nostalgic. National identity is 'partly self-construction, partly categorisation by others, partly a condition, a status, a label, a weapon, a shield [and] a fund of memories'.[7] Anderson's approach is also reflected in recent studies on German identity. Nancy Reagin, for example, has linked national identity in imperial Germany to constructed ideals of gender and domesticity in women's housekeeping magazines and journals.[8] Peter Morgan's study of German intellectuals after 1945 shows that individuals form their national identity through childhood memories or political activism.[9] From these select examples, we can see that the theory of 'imagined' national identity seeks a more nuanced

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[5] Apart from the field of the history of ideas, nationalism studies have only recently emerged in the fields of history of everyday life and '*histoire des mentalités*'. See Andreas Wimmer, *Nationalist Exclusion and Ethnic Conflict: Shadows of Modernity* (Cambridge, 2002), pp. 43-44.

[6] Prasenjit Duara, "Historicising National Identity, or Who Imagines What and When," in *Becoming National: A Reader*, ed. Geoff Eley and Ronald Grigor Suny (New York, 1996).

[7] Liisa Malkki, "National Geographic: The Rooting of Peoples and the Territorialization of National Identity among Scholars and Refugees," Ibid., pp. 447-48.

[8] Nancy Reagin, "The Imagined *Hausfrau*: National Identity, Domesticity and Colonialism in Imperial Germany," *The Journal of Modern History* 73, 1 (2001): 54-86.

[9] Peter Morgan, "'A Presence...called Germany': Personal History in the Construction of National Identity by Post-war German Intellectuals: Three Case Studies," *Journal of European Studies* 26, 3 (1996): 239-266.

definition than that of invention, which limits nation building to the spheres of the state or intelligentsia.

Like Anderson, the leading proponents of the invented nation theory, Eric Hobsbawm and Ernest Gellner, locate the origins of nations in the modern era. They differ from Anderson, however, in their respective theories of invention. Hobsbawm argues that popular national consciousness develops through the invention and appropriation of national traditions, such as uniforms, flag ceremonies and anthems. For example, when the German gymnastics associations changed their uniform colours from the revolutionary black-red-gold to the imperial black-white-red tricolour during the 1890s, this visual inauguration of a new national tradition in late-Wilhelmine Germany showed more saliently than the public statements by politicians and associational leaders a popular shift from liberal to right-wing expansionist nationalism.[10]

Hobsbawm's own recollection of learning Austria's national anthem while attending a Viennese primary school in the 1920s shows how such invented traditions are primarily intended for patriotic indoctrination. The republic's first chancellor and veteran Social Democrat, Karl Renner (1870-1950), wrote the lyrics of the Austrian anthem in 1919, which Hobsbawm describes as a 'travelogue' of overly saccharine geographical descriptions. The anthem later went through a stage of reinvention in 1929 under the Christian Social Party's efforts to revive imperialist sentiment in Austria. The new anthem, based on lyrics written by the Austrian priest and poet, Ottokar Kernstock (1848-1928), emphasised God and German national consciousness. Furthermore, while Renner's text had been set to music by a relatively obscure composer, the 1929 version was composed to the tune of Joseph Haydn's more familiar Habsburg anthem, '*Gott Erhalte*' and shared the

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[10] See Eric Hobsbawm, "Introduction: Inventing Traditions," in *The Invention of Tradition*, ed. Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger (Cambridge, 1983), p. 12; Eric J. Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality* (Cambridge, 1990), p. 121.

same melody with Germany's *'Deutschland, Deutschland über alles'*.[11] The (re)invention of Austria's anthem in the interwar period may well illuminate the political currents in a nation, particularly where collective remembering is engineered to institutionalise an 'acceptable' past.[12] Yet invention as a way of understanding nationalism is limited because it cannot reveal the popular understanding or construction of nationhood. Hobsbawm concedes that the first Austrian anthem was ultimately an unsuccessful example of invention because it did not correspond to any widespread grass-roots nationalism, unlike, for instance, British anti-German sentiment in the First World War.[13] Nonetheless, Hobsbawm's childhood experience might also have led him to concede that national rituals, even when they do reflect popular jingoism, do not necessarily allow for negotiation by the individual and, therefore, can become meaningless beyond the spectacle.

Gellner, on the other hand, links the invention of national consciousness to a common language. He argues that language facilitates the growth of an industrial society, which in turn facilitates the rise of nationalist sentiment. He points to the Reformation as the birthplace of modern national languages, through which the vernacular became the medium of new elite cultures. Although nationalism was largely secular when it emerged as a political movement in the late-eighteenth century, the invention and codification of national languages during the sixteenth century was a precursor for the development of national consciousness in Western Europe and was aided by such industrial advances as mass print production.[14] Often criticised for his 'reductionism', which sees nationalism as the product of industrialisation, Gellner nonetheless epitomises the modernist view that

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[11] Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism since 1780*, p. 92; Ernst Hanisch, *Der Lange Schatten des Staates: Österreichische Gesellschaftsgeschichte im 20. Jahrhundert* (Vienna, 1994), p. 160.
[12] On collective remembering and identity construction in post-1945 Czechoslovakia, for example, see Nancy M. Wingfield, "The Politics of Memory: Constructing National Identity in the Czech Lands, 1945 to 1948," *East European Politics and Societies* 14, 2 (2000): 246-267. For other examples of a 'staged' past, and the institutionalisation of invented national traditions, see Maria Bucur and Nancy M. Wingfield, eds., *Staging the Past: The Politics of Commemoration in Habsburg Central Europe, 1848 to the Present* (West Lafayette, 2001).
[13] Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism since 1780*, pp. 92-93.
[14] Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism* (Oxford, 1983), pp. 40-41, 78-79. See also Chapter 12 in Ernest Gellner, *Nationalism* (London, 1997).

progress in technology and industry contributed to the spread of nationalism.[15] A more serious flaw in Gellner's argument, however, and one which Anglophone historians rarely point out, is his underlying assumption that the trajectory of nationalism in Protestant and industrialised countries, specifically Britain, was the model for nationalism elsewhere in Europe. This assumption forms the basis for Gellner's subsequent zone-theory of nationalism, which, as we will see, essentialises entire nationalities in Central and Eastern Europe.

In his posthumously published work, *Nationalism*, Gellner argues that nations emerged through a 'marriage of state and culture', in which nationalism was not always the central historical agent. He distinguishes between Europe's four geographical 'time zones', stretching from the continent's west to east, to show that all European nations were created by elite cultures, albeit at different speeds and stages of development. France, Portugal, Spain and Britain, in the first and westernmost zone, were dynastic states with already recognisable cultural, linguistic and political identities that were never contested by nationalists.[16] In the second zone, Italy and Germany, on the territory of the former Holy Roman Empire, did not become political nation-states until the late-nineteenth century, but Gellner argues that suitable elite state (*staatsfähige*) cultures had existed among both Italian-speakers and German-speakers since the Renaissance and Reformation periods. The third zone includes the nationalities of Central Europe that gained independence after the demise of Austria-Hungary in 1918. Finally, the fourth zone incorporates those nationalities that became independent following the collapse of the USSR and Yugoslavia during the 1990s. According to Gellner, Zone Three and Four nations in Central and Eastern Europe were belated, and therefore more contrived and often aggressive products

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[15] Ross Poole, *Nation and Identity* (London, 1999), p. 23; Wimmer, *Nationalist Exclusion and Ethnic Conflict*, p. 49. In his review of Gellner's *Nations and Nationalism*, John Breuilly makes a counterpoint to Gellner by arguing that nationalism is more closely linked to post-industrial countries, in early-twentieth-century Germany, for example. John Breuilly, "Reflections on Nationalism," *Philosophy of the Social Sciences* 15 (1985): p. 69.

[16] Gellner acknowledges the creation of the Republic of Ireland as the one significant geo-political change in this zone, although we can also point to Welsh and Basque nationalism as more recent contestants of the central national identities in this region. See Chapter 7 in Gellner, *Nationalism*.

of invention by the cultural and political elites, than Zone One and Two nations in Western Europe.[17] His zone theory bears little credibility next to more sophisticated analyses of regional and national identities in Central and Eastern Europe. Czechoslovakia, for example, a multiethnic democratic state in the interwar period, is just one glaring oversight in Gellner's theory. However, it is worth pointing out a minor point of concurrency between the work of Gellner and specialised researches on Central and Eastern European nationalism. This will alert us to the main discrepancy between the two schools of invention and imagination.

In an edited volume on nationalism in the interwar Habsburg successor states, Ivo Banac and Katherine Verdery argue that the intelligentsia consciously sought to construct national identity through cultural, rather than political traditions.[18] For example, Hungarian folk art mythologised the indigenous peasant culture through such artefacts as shepherds' carvings and women's embroidery. Similarly, Hungarian ethnomusicologists, including the composer Béla Bartók, researched and recorded traditional peasant songs to recreate an authentic, autochthonous folk music culture.[19] In Romania, intellectuals on the Right and Left debated whether Romanian culture was 'occidental' or 'oriental', a polemic that focused narrowly on the place of Orthodoxy in Romania's national life.[20] Finally, the national idea in Czechoslovakia was disseminated through museums, literature, the press and schools by a form of cultural education. This education was similar to consumerism,

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[17] Gellner acknowledges the exception of national claims to political and cultural legitimacy, such as the Poles, but he makes a generalised argument that the 'patchwork of cultures and languages' in this region necessitated a formal codification of these cultures and languages in the nineteenth century. Ibid., pp. 54-55.

[18] Ivo Banac and Katherine Verdery, eds., *National Character and National Ideology in Interwar Eastern Europe* (New Haven, 1995).

[19] Tamás Hofer, "'The Hungarian Soul' and the 'Historic layers of national heritage': Conceptualisations of Hungarian Folk Culture, 1880-1944," in *National character and national ideology in interwar eastern Europe*, ed. Ivo Banac and Katherine Verdery (New Haven, 1995).

[20] See Katherine Verdery, "National Ideology and National Character in Interwar Romania," in *National Character and National Ideology in Interwar Eastern Europe*, ed. Ivo Banac and Katherine Verdery (New Haven, 1995); Keith Hitchins, "Orthodoxism: Polemics over Ethnicity and Religion in Interwar Romania," in *National Character and National Ideology in Interwar Eastern Europe*, ed. Ivo Banac and Katherine Verdery (New Haven, 1995). Hitchins' chapter describes how the renewed Orthodox spirituality was a rejection of Western materialism and the question of ethnicity was innately linked to the Orthodox faith. A person was born Romanian and Orthodox but 'converted' to the Protestant or Catholic faiths.

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whereby the intelligentsia 'sells' the national idea to the public 'consumer', who then identifies with and participates in national life.[21]

These examples underline Harold James' point in his study of German identity that where there is an absence of institutional traditions, national identity becomes an intellectual creation defined by cultural attributes and social behaviour.[22] Gellner would also agree with James and the colleagues of Banac and Verdery that educated elites invent and spread national ideas to facilitate the creation of modern nation-states. This is hardly controversial and not especially original. However, Gellner overextends this point by asserting, without due comparison to other regions of Europe, that twentieth-century nationalism in Eastern and Central Europe invented national homogeneity in the midst of ethnic plurality.[23] His assertion can best be countered by studies of interwar France, where nationalists did not hesitate to make racial distinctions at both the popular and elite level of social organisation. Elise Camiscioli, for example, has recently shown that the influential pro-natalist lobby, the National Alliance for the Increase of the French Population, opposed non-European labour immigration according to a policy of 'selective racial hybridity', which scaled immigrants from Italy, Spain and Poland higher than workers from Africa and Asia.[24] Gellner's claim that twentieth-century Central and Eastern European nationalisms were more aggressive and artificial than those in Western Europe is a banal attempt to explain the apparent propensity for 'ethnic cleansing' in this region in the second half of the twentieth century. He paints these broad brushstrokes by seeing the nation's invention primarily as an outcome, rather than a process, of historical events. It is to this latter point on the process of construction or imagination, which Anderson and others after him have made, that we again turn.

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[21] Andrew Lass, "'What are We Like?': National Character and the Aesthetics of Distinction in Interwar Czechoslovakia," in *National Character and National Ideology in Interwar Eastern Europe*, ed. Ivo Banac and Katherine Verdery (New Haven, 1995), p. 59.

[22] See Harold James, *A German Identity 1770-1990* (London, 1989).

[23] Gellner, *Nationalism*, pp. 54-58.

[24] Elise Camiscioli, "Producing Citizens, Reproducing the 'French Race': Immigration, Demography, and Pronatalism in Early Twentieth-Century France," *Gender and History* 13, 3 (2001): 593-621.

Anderson would agree with both Hobsbawm's and Gellner's view of nations as products of modernity, but he repudiates the idea that nations are invented. Directing his criticism in particular towards Gellner, Anderson believes 'invention' has come to mean 'fabrication', implying that national communities are false creations of myth making and exploited popular traditions. Anderson makes the point that all national communities, indeed all communities larger than villages, are products of imagination and that the way they are imagined is of greater relevance than the judgement of whether they are 'false' or 'genuine'. He does not deny the validity of popular rituals and traditions in this process of imagination. His major premise is that the reading of newspapers as 'simultaneous consumption...of the newspaper-as-fiction' at regular intervals during the day or week brings the national community into the public eye in the first place.[25] However, this ritualised 'consumption' of a national pastime is neither exploited nor invented for the purpose of nation creation, but is simply one of the means by which individuals negotiate their belonging to the nation.[26]

In response to seemingly endless permutations of Anderson's famous phrase, some critics have protested that national identity is not imagined exclusively. They point out that national ideas also contain within them overlapping ideas of political, religious, social or gender identity. Subjects that seemingly conjure up images of the nation do not always represent national identity as their leitmotif. State monuments and war stories often contain themes of personal sacrifice, heroism, charity and political sovereignty, in addition to their commemoration of the nation.[27] Antoine Prost has shown that France's 'monuments to the dead' erected in the interwar years commemorated republican, pacifist, religious, as well as

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[25] Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, pp. 15, 35-36.
[26] In his anthropological theory of modern nation-states, Wimmer applies the notion of a 'cultural compromise' to Anderson's model of a national community, in which individuals, elites and groups negotiate the meaning of the national idea. Wimmer, *Nationalist Exclusion and Ethnic Conflict*, pp. 24-25, 52.
[27] See Adam J. Lerner and Marjorie Ringrose, eds., *Reimagining the Nation* (Buckingham, 1993); Jean Bethke Elshtain, "Sovereignty, Identity, Sacrifice," in *Reimagining the Nation*, ed. Adam J. Lerner and Marjorie Ringrose (Buckingham, 1993).

national themes of sacrifice.[28] Jean Bethke Elshtain points out that the nation can also be the fulfilment of *publica caritas*, a medieval concept of civic duty and charity, or it can become an extension of the domestic ideal, as in the longing of World War One soldiers and civilians to return to the tranquillity of normal life. Central European intellectuals imagined yet another type of community in the late-twentieth century. The dissident playwright and first president of post-Communist Czechoslovakia, Václav Havel, wrote about community in terms of responsibility and rationality, rather than political power. In this sense, the nation is one of many communities in which individuals are bound together by reciprocal social and moral obligations.[29]

In each of these reinterpretations of the Andersonian model, the boundaries of national identification are fluid and merge with, or are transcended by other identity constructions. As we have seen, Duara and Malkki and others have made similar observations. Yet not even Anderson would dispute the fact of multiple imagined identities. His aim is merely to show how national communities emerged as a new and tangible possibility for larger group belonging. As Hobsbawm has put it, 'men and women did not choose collective identification as they chose shoes, knowing that one could only put on one pair at a time.' Preference for one or another identity only occurs when conflict arises between them. In 1914, for instance, workers from Britain, France and Germany rushed to enlist in the First World War, demonstrating that in this conflict, at least, defence of the nation was more pressing a concern than international class solidarity.[30]

Other critics of Anderson's work assert that nations cannot be imagined into existence without some form of symbolic continuity with their pre-modern past. The most prominent exponent of this view is Anthony D. Smith, whose theory of ethno-symbolism holds that nations must have developed enough linguistic and cultural traits to form

[28] Antoine Prost, "Monuments to the Dead," in *Realms of Memory: The Construction of the French Past*, ed. Pierre Nora (New York, 1997).
[29] Elshtain, "Sovereignty, Identity, Sacrifice."
[30] Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism since 1780*, pp. 123-34.

14

primordial ethnic clusters, or *ethnies*, which later could be constructed as the ethnic lineage of nations. He argues that nationalism in the modern period recalls this shared ethnic past by way of memories, myths, traditions, rituals, symbols and artefacts.[31] Smith is critical of Anderson's assessment that the origins of nations lie in 'print-capitalism'. He points out that capitalism did not exist in the early-nineteenth-century territories of Serbia or the Ukraine (nor in the Slovene-speaking provinces of the Habsburg Monarchy, to make Smith's point more representative), where germinal national movements were created by a handful of intellectuals, literati and priests (the latter especially being true in the Slovene case).[32] His concern is that to see nations only as discursive simplifies or ignores cause and effect explanations of how the nation gained its geographical, cultural, linguistic and ethnic composition.[33] Smith's theory is a useful analytical tool, in so far as ethno-symbolic practices are employed to gain ground over ethnic rivals in mixed regions, by awakening an apparently slumbering cultural and spiritual past, for example.[34] Where his work becomes relevant to my thesis, however, is in his recent contribution to the debate on ethnic and civic nationalism. Before we address this debate, we must first establish some general definitions of ethnic and civic nationalism.

Ethnic and civic nationalisms traditionally differ in how they define the boundaries of national belonging. Ethnic nationalism defers to ethnic criteria, such as language, descent, culture or religion. This form of nationalism usually excludes immigrants or descendants of immigrants who are deemed to be members of another ethnic or religious

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[31] See Anthony D. Smith, *The Ethnic Origins of Nations* (Oxford, 1986); Anthony D. Smith, *National Identity* (London, 1991). Also rejecting the school of 'invention' and, less emphatically, Anderson's 'imagined communities', Nick Miller argues that Smith's ethno-symbolic approach comes closest to a theory suitable for Serbian nationalism, which Miller sees as the exception to the modernist rule. Nick Miller, "Postwar Serbian Nationalism and the Limits of Invention," *Contemporary European History* 13, 2 (2004): 151-169.

[32] Anthony D. Smith, "The Nation: Invented, Imagined, Reconstructed?," in *Reimagining the Nation*, ed. Marjorie Ringrose and Adam J. Lerner (Buckingham, 1993), p. 21. For the clerical influence on Slovene linguistic nationalism, which became known during the nineteenth century as Catholic Austro-Slavism, see Robert A. Kann, *The Multinational Empire: Nationalism and National Reform in the Habsburg Monarchy 1848-1918* 2 vols., vol. 1 (New York, 1950), p. 295; Thomas M. Barker, *The Slovene Minority of Carinthia* (Boulder, 1984), pp. 49-57.

[33] Smith, "The Nation: Invented, Imagined, Reconstructed?," p. 19.

[34] See, again, Miller's work on postwar Serbian nationalism. Miller, "Postwar Serbian Nationalism and the Limits of Invention."

group. Since residency is disregarded in cases of ethnic nationalism, emigrants and their descendants living outside of the political borders of the state are eligible for citizenship if they have ancestral ties to the nation. Civic nationalism, by contrast, is primarily formulated as participation in the life of the nation by way of birth and residency in the nation. This allows immigrants and their descendants to join the nation as citizens.

France and Germany are classically regarded as the models of civic and ethnic nationhood, following the seminal ideas of the respective French and German historians, Ernest Renan and Friedrich Meinecke. The concept of civic nationhood had its origins in French republican nationalism, but was first formulated in 1882 by Renan in his famous lecture at the Sorbonne, *Qu'est-ce qu'une nation?* (What is a Nation?). Renan argued that nations are formed primarily by voluntary civic commitment to the political will of the national community. He contended that members of the nation either choose or eliminate categories of race, language, territory and religion to create the nation through 'a daily plebiscite'.[35] His model of a voluntary nation, or *Willensnation*, was an attack on Germany's unyielding territorial claims to Alsace-Lorraine following France's defeat in the 1870-71 Franco-Prussian War.[36] The public war between French and Prussian historians during this dispute was as polemical as the diplomatic standoff between politicians. In 1907, more than two decades after Renan's address at the Sorbonne, Meinecke published a lengthy defence of the Prussian school of history's belief in a German nation of 'language, blood and soil'. In his *Weltbürgertum und Nationstaat* (Cosmopolitanism and the Nation-state), Meinecke linked the development of the German nation to the influences of other national personalities. He distinguished between what he saw as the truly cosmopolitan German *Kulturnation* (cultural nation), and the overly

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[35] Ernest Renan, "What is a Nation? (1882)," in *Becoming National: A Reader*, ed. Geoff Eley and Ronald Grigor Suny (New York, 1996).

[36] Oliver Zimmer, "Boundary Mechanisms and Symbolic Resources: Towards a Process-Oriented Aproach to National Identity," *Nations and Nationalism* 9, 2 (2003): p. 175. The term '*Willensnation*' was originally coined by a Swiss constitutional lawyer in the 1880s to formulate Swiss national unity on the basis of state patriotism, rather than linguistic, religious or cultural homogeneity. Wimmer, *Nationalist Exclusion and Ethnic Conflict*, p. 235.

homogeneous French *Staatsnation* (nation-state).[37] These terms have since become the standard formulae for ethnic and civic nationhood, but I argue that even the French and German cases cannot be reduced to single ideal types. I have already pointed out the example of French pro-natalist policy in the interwar period, and I will show in Chapter One that the creation of a German nation-state in 1871 deferred to civic principles of territorial unity, rather than ethnic arguments about language and religion.

The ethnic-civic divide has also been seen more generally between East-Central European nations that promote shared lineage and culture as the basis of belonging, and Western European nations that adopt laws of citizenship based on residency. One of the first historians to develop this distinction between Eastern and Western European nationalism was the Austrian émigré historian, Hans Kohn, in *The Idea of Nationalism*. Published in 1944, Kohn's book was an attempt to understand the nationalist ideas that had led to Fascism in Italy and National Socialism in Germany and his home country of Austria. He sought to link nationhood with political behaviour by arguing that civic nations displayed rational political behaviour, while ethnic nations, including Italy and Germany, engaged in irrational political behaviour.[38] Kohn's approach has been favoured by a long line of successors from Gellner, as we have seen above, to more recent scholars, including Liah Greenfield, Michael Ignatieff, Rogers Brubaker and Jürgen Habermas, among others.[39] Brubaker, for example, has traced these distinctions between nationalisms in the laws of citizenship in France and Germany. Whereas France's citizenship law in 1889 was based on the law of birth (*jus solis*), which corresponds to a civic concept of nationhood, Germany's 1913 Reich Citizenship Act was based on the law of blood (*jus sanguinis*),

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[37] Zimmer, "Boundary Mechanisms and Symbolic Resources," p. 175.
[38] Geoff Eley and Ronald Grigor Suny, eds., *Becoming National: A Reader* (New York, 1996), p. 4; Hans Kohn, *The Idea of Nationalism: A Study in its Origins and Background* (New York, 1944).
[39] For a discussion of the Kohn school, see Taras Kuzio, "The Myth of the Civic State: A Critical Survey of Hans Kohn's Framework for Understanding Nationalism," *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 25, 1 (2002): 20-39. See also Zimmer, "Boundary Mechanisms and Symbolic Resources."

which constructs national belonging according to ethnicity.[40] However, this divide is less clear-cut when we consider that so-called civic nations also extend quasi-citizenship rights to those with ancestral ties to the nation, as in the case of Britain. Moreover, the requirement of these countries that immigrants assimilate to the state language and culture often blurs the distinction between ethnic and civic nationalism and almost always results in exclusionary policies of immigration and citizenship.[41]

While a few scholars have rejected Kohn's East-West distinction, their objections are grounded on historical exceptions to the rule, rather than any theoretical reassessment of the ethnic-civic divide. Taras Kuzio, for example, has argued that all nationalisms were ethnic and only became civic after the 1960s, except in the case of former Eastern bloc nations, which did not embrace civic nationhood until the 1990s. He contradicts himself, however, by pointing out that interwar Czechoslovakia in the 'East' was a democracy and thus presumably had embraced civic ideals well before the collapse of communism in the 1990s.[42] Moreover, his conclusion appears to reiterate Gellner's zone-theory by conceding that the 'more ethnic' nationalism in 'the East today may be…more to do with the different timing of similar processes [that occurred earlier in the West].'[43] Kuzio makes the same mistake as most other proponents of the ethnic-versus-civic school in his assumption that nationalist actors only emphasise either civic or ethnic forms of belonging, when in fact they can and often do invoke both.[44] We will turn now to the proponents of an ethnic-and-civic theory of nationalism.

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[40] Rogers Brubaker, *Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany* (Cambridge, MA, 1992); Zimmer, "Boundary Mechanisms and Symbolic Resources," p. 177.

[41] For example, in America, citizenship laws were only amended in 1934 to include Chinese immigrants and their American-born descendants. Women who had been American citizens but lost their citizenship when they married Chinese immigrants or their descendants were also granted full citizenship rights in 1934. See Nancy F. Cott, "Marriage and Women's Citizenship in the United States, 1830-1934," *The American Historical Review* 103, 5 (1998): 1440-1474.

[42] Kuzio, "The Myth of the Civic State," p. 24.

[43] Ibid., p. 29.

[44] He does concede, however, that proponents of a civic state often invoke ethnic factors in their nationalist rhetoric, but he qualifies this concession with his argument that as civic states evolve, they eventually move away altogether from an ethnic basis, an argument that idealises the civic state as much as Kohn himself did.

Anthony Smith was the first to criticise the ethnic-versus-civic approach and its use of 'ideal types' of civic and ethnic nationalism. In his more recent works, Smith revisits the writings of late-eighteenth-century nationalist thinkers and observes there a blend of both neo-classical (civic) and Romantic (ethnic) ideas. He points out that throughout the modern period ethnic criteria were always linked to territorial or civic categories of belonging, even if the civic was more overtly present in some nationalisms than in others.[45]

One of Smith's students, Oliver Zimmer, has made perhaps the most important contribution so far to this revision of ethnic-versus-civic bipolarity. He moves away from Smith's preoccupation with nationalist thinkers and political constructions of nationhood to see nationalism as a public process of defining and redefining the national identity.[46] He distinguishes between the 'symbolic resources' that nationalists draw upon in the process of constructing a national identity, and the 'boundary mechanisms' they use to do this at particular historical moments. The four main symbolic resources that Zimmer includes are political values/institutions, culture, history and geography, but there are numerous concrete examples within each of these groupings. Citizenship is the most salient example of a political institution, while folk costume, which had a particular symbolic function in southern Germany and Austria, represents a cultural example. Boundary mechanisms, on the other hand, are discursive processes: they can be manifest in legislation, political rhetoric, or, as will be seen in this thesis, in the press. The boundary mechanisms can be classified as ethnic or civic – categories which Zimmer renames 'organic' and 'voluntaristic' respectively. However, this thesis will retain the conventional terms, ethnic

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[45] On Smith's contribution to the ethnic-versus-civic debate, see Eric Kaufmann and Oliver Zimmer, "'Dominant ethnicity' and the 'ethnic-civic' dichotomy in the work of Anthony D. Smith," in *History and National Destiny: Ethnosymbolism and its Critics*, ed. Montserrat Guibernau and John Hutchinson (Oxford, 2004), pp. 70-75.
[46] Zimmer points out this limitation of Smith's work in Ibid., p. 74.

and civic, bearing in mind that these classifications do not refer to types of national identity, but to the processes of identity construction.[47]

Like Smith, Zimmer argues that nationalist actors used both ethnic and civic discursive 'mechanisms' to delimit and define national identity. Often they did this by using a certain kind of symbolic resource, such as language, in both ethnic and civic constructions of nationhood. The anti-Dreyfusards in France, for example, conceived of language in ethnic terms of descent, whereas French revolutionaries a century earlier had seen language as the path towards assimilation in a nation created by civic attachment to the state. Similarly, in Germany, language had a symbolic function in both ethnic and civic discourses of national identity. The German Romantics, for example, saw the growth of national consciousness in ethnic terms of an organic language, while late-nineteenth-century German liberals claimed that Polish minorities were part of the German state on the basis of their linguistic assimilation to the German language – a classic civic construction of national identity.[48] This is not to say that civic constructions of national belonging are never chauvinistic, or that ethnic discourses of identity do not have the state and its citizens as the central focus. For example, standardising public education in order to create the basis for civic equality actually enforces a common state language, which discriminates against other languages spoken by a part (or majority) of the population. Tara Zahra's important work on Czech nationalists seeking to reclaim children who had been raised in bilingual families, or who had attended German schools, demonstrates the presence of both ethnic and civic discourses, not unlike the attempts of French republicans to create a centralised French-language primary education system that could socialise

[47] Zimmer replaces 'civic' with 'voluntaristic' because of what he regards as the narrow association in scholarship of civic with political institutions, especially democratic institutions, which conflates a symbolic resource (political institutions/values) with a boundary mechanism (voluntaristic). Similarly, the term 'organic' is meant to convey a particular deterministic mode of construction, whereas 'ethnic' tends to be seen only as a particular concept of national identity. Zimmer, "Boundary Mechanisms and Symbolic Resources," p. 178. While Zimmer's organic-voluntaristic taxonomy fits well with his empirical study of polyethnic Switzerland in the 1930s, we will see in this study that the ethnic-civic taxonomy can be retained without otherwise departing from the central premise of Zimmer's theory of boundary mechanisms and symbolic resources.
[48] Ibid., p. 181.

children into the nation.[49] Similarly, during the 1860s and 1870s, Austrian liberals closed down bilingual schools and made German the language of public life, despite the fact that non-German-speakers represented a majority in the Empire. We will see further examples of these dual ethnic-and-civic mechanisms in Austria in Chapter One.

Zimmer's case study of Swiss nationalism in the late 1930s is particularly relevant to this study because of its similarity to the Austrofascist state's attempts to construct an Austrian pan-German identity in the corresponding time period. The 'organic' mechanisms used in Swiss nationalist rhetoric between 1933 and 1939 emphasised Swiss confederate history, geography and indigenous (Rhaeto-Romansch) language, while 'voluntarist' discourses upheld notions of work, society, honour, valour, and so on. In this way, Swiss nationalists created a more inclusive national identity that could appeal to broad sections of Switzerland's polyethnic population and counteract the *völkisch* propaganda of Swiss fascist groups immediately after 1933. The new brand of nationalism also helped to nurture anti-Semitism and underpinned Switzerland's anti-Jewish refugee policy in the late-1930s.[50] Similarly, we will see that the Austrofascist state merged state patriotism with nationalist rhetoric to construct political and national boundaries of exclusion, against Jews in particular. The extent to which these mechanisms of identity construction were appealing to the Austrian public is more difficult to gauge. However, I will argue that while ethnic discourses of pan-German identity were contested under the Austrofascist state, there was more likely to be consensus on the civic constructions of pan-German identity.

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[49] While Zahra does not explicitly link the actions of Czech nationalists to an ethnic-and-civic paradigm of nationalism, she does reject the binary understandings of liberal/illiberal, east/west and she makes the point implicitly in her conclusion that 'nationalist claims on children and reclamations of children were at the heart of Czech understandings and expectations of democracy.' Tara Zahra, "Reclaiming Children for the Nation: Germanization, National Ascription, and Democracy in the Bohemian Lands, 1900-1945," *Central European History* 37, 4 (2004): pp. 542-543. On French nationalist claims on children's rights, see, for example, Sarah Fishman, *The Battle for Children: World War II, Youth Crime, and Juvenile Justice in Twentieth-century France* (Cambridge, MA., 2002).

[50] Oliver Zimmer, "'A Unique Fusion of the Natural and the Man-made': The Trajectory of Swiss Nationalism, 1933-1939," *Journal of Contemporary History* 39, 1 (2004): 5-24. For another critique of the ethnic-civic dichotomy using the example of interwar Swiss nationalism, see Wimmer, *Nationalist Exclusion and Ethnic Conflict*, pp. 239-240.

Zimmer's theory of boundary mechanisms builds on the earlier approach of Anderson and others of national identity as a process of construction. This constructivist approach has been given the appearance of a consensus in Rogers Brubaker's most recent work. Following his study of nationhood as citizenship in 1992, Brubaker reconceptualised nationhood in a series of essays in 1996 that were intended as a commentary on the post-communist era of nationalism in Europe. In his analysis of the 'New Europe', he places greater emphasis on ethnic minorities within and outside of the territorial boundaries of the nation-state and draws historical parallels between, for example, the irredentist or 'homeland' nationalisms of Weimar Germany and post-Soviet Russia. He resists static ideas of nationhood and national identity but instead defines nationhood as 'a category of practice.'[51] Brubaker's definition has particular resonance in the Austrian context because of the institutional absence there of either Austrian or German nationhood prior to 1945. Even the period after 1945, as we will see below, was characterised by a political and institutional lacuna of a substantive national entity called 'Austria', and nationalists instead tended to define nationhood in terms of a '*Wir-Gefühl*', or notions of 'Us' and 'Them'.[52]

One critic of the constructivist school, John Breuilly, plays down the importance of national identities in the formation of nations and nationalist ideologies. Instead, he sees nationalism as a set of goals and strategies made and carried out by nationalists for social and political gain. He contends that:

> [n]ationalist ideology is neither an expression of national identity (at least, there is no rational way of showing that to be the case) nor the arbitrary invention of nationalists for political purposes....[Nationalists'] precise political projects and the manner in which these are carried through are the product of certain political situations rather than the expression of national needs....Precisely because their assumptions about national identity and need are not purely arbitrary they have a more or less plausible connection with existing social arrangements and needs, with actual beliefs and with often widespread political grievances. Of

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[51] Rogers Brubaker, *Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe* (Cambridge, 1996), p. 21.
[52] '*Wir-Gefühl*' is the principle of exclusion and inclusion, of defining one's own group according to a self-perception of what another group either is or is not. See Susanne Frölich-Steffen, *Die österreichische Identität im Wandel* (Vienna, 2003), p. 17.

> course the ideology is more than a reflection of those things; rather it incorporates them into a broader vision which transforms their significance.[53]

Breuilly's point is an important one: national ideologies are not created from the particular identities that nationalists try to promote, but nationalists do draw on the popular appeal of these identities as they devise and execute their ideological programmes according to perceived social and political needs. Therefore, we still need to look at national identities to find out what contextual meaning they have for nationalists and nationalist ideologies. They must be broad enough so as to be incorporated into nationalist programmes, but at the same time, particular so as to be meaningful at one time more than another. As we will see, the salience of pan-German identity in Austria was due partly to the fact that it was never singularly defined by any one group or programme, and partly because it attained broad consensus at particular moments of political and social crisis. In this way, Austrian pan-German identity was very much tied to those political situations to which Breuilly would want to draw our attention, namely, the exclusion of Austria from the North German Confederation in 1866, the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire in 1918 and the rise of Nazi Germany in 1933.

The above discussion can be summarised by restating two points. Firstly, the Andersonian understanding of nation formation allows for a more nuanced treatment of texts, such as newspapers, memoirs and diaries. In contradistinction to the theories of invented tradition or ethno-symbolism, the imagined national community does not rely on symbols, rituals or cultural artefacts. Instead, nationalists construct and defend the boundaries of the national community using statements of chauvinism, popular will, prejudice, exclusion and inclusion that are based on the felt social and political needs of that community. Secondly, ethnic and civic nationalisms, which traditionally refer to the German and French models of nationhood, are useful as descriptives of nationalist

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[53] John Breuilly, *Nationalism and the State*, 2nd ed. (Manchester, 1993), p. 63.

discourses, but they are not mutually exclusive in any one case of identity construction. We will turn now to the historiography of national identity in Austria.

Historiography and National Identity in Austria

Debates about Austria's national identity have entered both the academic and political arenas since 1945. However, even before the start of the Second World War, international observers differed in their interpretations of Austria's identity in the wake of the country's annexation to Nazi Germany. Some thought that Austria had finally succumbed to German-nationalist sentiments, while others remained convinced that the *Anschluss* was merely an interruption to Austria's 'manifest destiny' as mediator among the nations of Central Europe.[54] The former observation was especially predominant among journalists, who reported the scenes of jubilation in Austria at the arrival of Hitler's troops. The American journalist and wartime correspondent, William L. Shirer, renowned for his epic eyewitness account of Nazi Germany, *The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich*, was in Vienna on the eve of *Anschluss*. He observed first-hand the speed with which the Nazi takeover occurred and the lack of resistance to the pending invasion of German troops. On 12 March 1938, Shirer returned to Berlin to file his radio report for the Columbia Broadcasting System:

> This morning when I flew away from Vienna at 9 a.m. it looked like any German city in the Reich – red, white and black Swastika flags hung from the balconies of most of the homes. And in the streets people raised their hands in Nazi salute, and greeted each other with "Heil Hitler!" Arriving in Berlin three hours later I hardly realised I was in another country. It was the same picture, the same flag, the same ritual. And they were yelling the same slogan – "One Reich, one people, one leader". That's what they got. And very quickly, too.[55]

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[54] The Austrian historian, Fritz Fellner, gave a lecture on manifest destiny and historical memory of the Habsburg Monarchy at a joint UNO-Innsbruck symposium in Innsbruck in June 1995. See Günter Bischof, "Introduction," in *Austrian Historical Memory and National Identity*, ed. Günter Bischof and Anton Pelinka (New Brunswick, 1997), pp. 6, 12.

[55] William L. Shirer, *'This is Berlin': Reporting from Nazi Germany 1938-40* (London, 1999), p. 14.

From his academic post in America, Hans Kohn viewed the same events more optimistically than Shirer. He believed that National Socialism, an example of 'irrational' political behaviour, would ultimately be defeated in war and that Austria's historical mission among Central Europe's nations would then be realised. In 1939, he wrote in *The Journal of Modern History*:

> The urgent problem before Central Europe in the period between the two wars of 1914 and 1939 was the same as the Austrian problem had been at the beginning of the twentieth century, and will be the same after the present war – the problem of a federation of equal peoples, not in submission and uniformity, but in freedom and toleration.[56]

Of the two positions, Shirer's typified the journalist's response – fatalistic with a sense of immediacy to arouse popular fear on the basis of his limited, personal engagement with the events and people to which he was assigned as eyewitness. As an academic describing his country of birth, Kohn was reluctant to dismiss the future independence of Austria and, as an eminent historian of ideas, he wished to give an intellectual and spiritual dimension to that future to discredit the National Socialist ideology of the day. After the war, these ideological and political motivations continued to cloud the historical interpretations of Austria's recent past.

In the two decades after 1945, Austria's politicians and intellectuals were engaged in the urgent task of creating a national history that erased the German question from Austria's past. The amnesia of Austria's postwar elites was similar to what Nancy Wingfield has described as the 'collective forgetting' by Czechoslovakia's postwar communist leaders.[57] Austria's elites believed that the 1943 Moscow Declaration, in which the Allies had described Austria as 'the first free country to fall a victim to Hitlerite aggression', justified, indeed necessitated, their efforts to expunge the memory of recent German occupation, as they now referred to the period from annexation to 'liberation'. The Moscow text was later written into the Declaration of Austrian Independence in April

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[56] Hans Kohn, "*AEIOU*: Some Reflections on the Meaning and Mission of Austria," *The Journal of Modern History* 4 (1939): pp. 522-23.
[57] Wingfield, "The Politics of Memory."

1945, and eventually it became the founding myth of the State Treaty that ended the Allied occupation of Austria in 1955.[58] The postwar successor party of the Christian Social Party, the Austrian People's Party (ÖVP), led the campaign of forgetting. In October 1945, the party established its journal, *Österreichische Monatshefte*, which devoted lead articles to the concept of a 'Greater Austria'. The journal's chief editor, Alfred Missong, had been a member of the Austrian Action group of young left-wing Catholic intellectuals before the war. The old Christian Social vanguard had once regarded as radical the Austrian Action's ideas of an independent Austrian nation, but Missong's editorial views on the *Österreichische Monatshefte* reflected mainstream Catholic political thought after 1945.[59]

On the Left, Austrian socialists and communists were initially divided in their view of national identity after 1945. The leaders of the postwar Austrian Socialist Party (SPÖ) were sceptical of efforts to construct an Austrian national identity and continued to promote German cultural unity. They represented the intellectual heritage of the former Austromarxist School, whose leading thinkers, Otto Bauer (1881-1938) and Karl Renner, had frequently expressed ambivalence regarding the political relationship between Germany and Austria prior to and even after 1938. Renner, who occupied the presidency of the Second Austrian Republic, had infamously declared in a newspaper interview in early April 1938 that he would vote 'yes' for the *Anschluss* in a National Socialist plebiscite planned for 10 April.[60] Their successors believed that the future of social democracy still lay with 'Cultural Germany' after 1945. To this end, they engaged in sharp polemic with

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[58] Judith Beniston, "'Hitler's First Victim'? - Memory and Representation in Post-War Austria," *Austrian Studies* 11 (2003). For the original text of the Moscow Declaration, see The Moscow Conference, October 1943: Joint Four-Nation Declaration (The Avalon Project at Yale Law School, [cited April 2005]); available from http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/wwii/moscow.htm. For an extended treatment of the Moscow Declaration, the State Treaty and the 'victim thesis', see Hella Pick, *Guilty Victim: Austria from the Holocaust to Haider* (London, 2000).
[59] Fritz Fellner, "The Problem of the Austrian Nation after 1945," *Journal of Modern History* 60 (1988): pp. 268, 271-73.
[60] Hanisch, *Der Lange Schatten des Staates*, p. 347. The plebiscite result was an overwhelming unanimous result, in which 99.6 per cent voted 'yes' for *Anschluss* out of a total voting population of 99.7 per cent. However, this result also reflected the propaganda frenzy in the days leading up to the plebiscite. Hitler's appearance in the Vienna Town Hall was scheduled to finish one minute before midnight, for example, and planes wrote 'yes' in the sky. Moreover, some 200,000 people (those in jail) were prevented from voting in the plebiscite. Ibid., pp. 346-47.

the editors of the Austrian communist journal, *Weg und Ziel*, who in turn accused leading socialists, including Renner, of having pan-German or Nazi sympathies.[61]

The figurehead for the Austrian communists in the immediate postwar period was Ernst Fischer, who became Under Secretary of State for Education in the provisional government in 1945.[62] Fischer had been a Social Democrat but had joined the Communist Party in April 1934, fleeing to Moscow where he remained until the end of the war.[63] In 1945, he published a pamphlet, *Die Entstehung des österreichischen Volkscharakters* (The Origin of the Austrian National Character), in which he declared that the Austrian nation had defied the 'Prussian-German Nazi tyranny' and so become 'the creed of millions', presumably Austrians as well as other Europeans, who had finally 'come to realise the difference – yes, the opposition – between Germans and Austrians.' Fischer, like Missong, mapped the historical and geopolitical borders of the post-1945 Austrian nation onto the circumference of the hereditary German lands of the Habsburg Monarchy. Thus he, too, established a line of continuity between the sphere of Habsburg German dominance and the spatial boundaries of Austrian identity in the postwar era. He omitted to mention, however, that parts of the post-1945 Austrian state, including Salzburg, had not actually belonged to the Habsburg Monarchy until the nineteenth century. The German nation, by contrast, corresponded in Fischer's interpretation to those ruling dynasties and powers – Hohenzollerns, Prussians and National Socialists – who ostensibly posed a threat to this Austrian historical and geographical entity.[64]

Another protagonist in the debate on national identity, Fritz Fellner, has suggested that the postwar attempts to construct an Austrian national identity out of an anti-German stereotype resembled the stereotypes of Jews as Austria's national enemy in the pre-1945

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[61] Fellner, "The Problem of the Austrian Nation after 1945," pp. 275-77.
[62] Ibid., p. 268.
[63] See his autobiography, Ernst Fischer, *An Opposing Man*, trans. Peter and Betty Ross (London, 1974).
[64] Fellner, "The Problem of the Austrian Nation after 1945," pp. 268-70.

period.[65] His observation is itself an indication of the polemics on Austrian identity after

World War Two. He mistakenly compares the entrenched anti-Semitism in Austria prior to

1945 with a parochial attachment to all things Austrian after the war. For example, when

the ÖVP Federal Education Minister, Felix Hurdes, announced that the new school

curriculum would replace 'German Language' (*Deutschunterricht*) with 'Language of

Instruction' (*Unterrichtssprache*), the issue was not the alleged inferiority of the German

language, but rather, the insistence that Austrians learn and speak a national language.

Unlike anti-Semitism, such anti-German hostilities were not reflective of popular

sentiments. Many Austrians saw the new school curriculum as an invention of the elites

and contemptuously referred to the Education Minister's 'language of instruction' as

'*Hurdestanisch*'. Similarly, the Viennese party newspapers of the ÖVP and the SPÖ, as

opposed to the elitist party journals, avoided the question of an Austrian identity during the

years of Allied occupation for fear of alienating ordinary Austrians still sympathetic to

National Socialism.[66]

Meanwhile, another group of elites, the Austrian historical profession, diligently

went about its task of writing a national history that proved the case for Austrian

nationhood.[67] For nearly three decades after 1945, historians published almost exclusively

on the Habsburg lands and the history of the First and Second Republics. New academic

journals appeared, including the inaugural edition of *Österreich in Geschichte und

Literatur* in 1957. The first international monographs on Austrian identity emerged during

the 1970s, stimulated both by the international interest in the post-1945 Austrian state and

by the academic careers of émigré historians. The American political scientist, William T.

Bluhm, for example, argued that the Austrian nation was constructed in the post-1945 era

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[65] Ibid., p. 272.
[66] Ibid., p. 284; Frölich-Steffen, *Die österreichische Identität im Wandel*, p. 71.
[67] The following historiographical survey is loosely based on the discussions in Fellner, "The Problem of the Austrian Nation after 1945," pp. 280-88, and Frölich-Steffen, *Die österreichische Identität im Wandel*, pp. 28-34.

as an economic and a political necessity.[68] Two prominent Austrian Marxist historians,

who had been in exile since the 1930s, also turned their pen to the question of Austrian

nationhood. In England, Karl Stadler published his history of Austria from 1918 for the

Oxford Series on Nations of the Modern World in 1971, and in France, Félix Kreissler

published his two-volume *La Prise de conscience de la nation Autrichienne, 1938-1945-*

1978 in 1980. The German version of Kreissler's study, *Der Österreicher und seine*

Nation, appeared in the same year.[69] Spurred by their experiences of political exile, Stadler

and Kreissler argued that an Austrian national consciousness had triumphed through

resistance against National Socialism and German occupation. Indeed, most of the postwar

generation of Austrian historians concurred with Stadler and Kreissler that 'conversion' to

an Austrian national identity was the cumulative response of Austrians to annexation, war

and the economic prosperity of the Second Republic.[70] It has even become a trend among

historians and political scientists to 'measure' national identity through analysis of opinion

polls that show this conversion to an Austrian national consciousness since 1945.[71]

Friedrich Heer is perhaps the most notable exception to this group. His *Der Kampf*

um die österreichische Identität (The Struggle for an Austrian Identity) was published in

1981 and has been dubbed 'a psychohistory of Austria' for its complex account of a

nation's thousand-year search for its own identity.[72] He argues that Austria's national

consciousness was formed in the Catholic Baroque period and exhibited a kind of

Habsburg paternalism for the other nationalities of Central Europe, while also embracing a

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[68] William T. Bluhm, *Building an Austrian Nation: The Political Integration of a Western State* (New Haven, 1973).

[69] Karl Stadler, *Austria* (London, 1971); Felix Kreissler, *La prise de conscience de la nation Autrichienne, 1938-1945-1978* 2 vols. (Paris, 1980); Felix Kreissler, *Der Österreicher und seine Nation: Ein Lernprozess mit Hindernissen* (Vienna, 1984).

[70] See Thomas Angerer, "An Incomplete Discipline: Austrian *Zeitgeschichte* and Recent History," in *Austria in the Nineteen Fifties*, ed. Anton Pelinka and Günter Bischof (New Brunswick, 1995), p. 220; Peter Thaler, "National History - National Imagery: The Role of History in Postwar Austrian Nation-building," *Central European History* 32, 3 (1999): 277-309.

[71] See, for example, Erika Weinzierl, "Österreichische Nation und Österreichisches Nationalbewusstsein," *Zeitgeschichte* 17 (1989): 44-62; Peter Thaler, "How to Measure Identity: Austrian National Consciousness in the Mirror of Public Opinion," *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics* 3, 4 (1997): 69-93; Frölich-Steffen, *Die österreichische Identität im Wandel.*

[72] Bischof, "Introduction," p. 1.

German 'mission' among those nations. This was similar to the view of most historians and intellectuals during the interwar period. However, Heer points out that it was a 'silent (*anonyme*) nationality', which only found expression against the threat of more aggressive national ideologies. His epilogue recounts the ideas of Joseph Roth, the Galician-born Jewish journalist and author, who represented for Heer the supranational legacy of Austrian identity in the interwar period.[73]

Following these fledgling beginnings in the 1970s, the 1980s turned into a tumultuous time for the Austrian historical profession. In the wake of revisionist attempts to cast Austrian history into the pot of a combined German historical narrative, a *Historikerstreit* broke out pitting a younger generation of Austrian historians against their predecessors. In 1976, the German historian, Karl Dietrich Erdmann, proposed that Austria's post-1945 history should be included alongside the histories of West and East Germany within the broader framework of German history, which later he referred to as the 'Three States–Two Nations–One People' thesis.[74] Erdmann's views received scathing criticism from Austria's postwar generation of historians, although a few, including Fritz Fellner and Harry Ritter, welcomed the opportunity to place Austrian history in a wider German context. One of Erdmann's critics, Gerald Stourzh, objected that the notion of three German 'successor' states made Hitler's Greater Germany the historical norm by which the post-1945 histories of the two Germanies and Austria were to be gauged. He contended that this type of historicism undermined the important transition Austria had had to make from empire to republic.[75] Stourzh carved out a niche for himself in this respect,

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[73] Friedrich Heer, *Der Kampf um die Österreichische Identität* (Vienna, 1981).

[74] Erdmann's argument first appeared in his fourth volume contribution to the ninth edition of *Gebhardts Handbuch der deutschen Geschichte* and later, in an expanded argument of this thesis, in an article for *Geschichte und Unterricht* in 1985. Weinzierl, "Österreichische Nation und Österreichisches Nationalbewusstsein," pp. 44-45.

[75] For an overview of the various proponents and positions within the *Historikerstreit*, see Ibid.; Harry Ritter, "Austria and the Struggle for German Identity," *German Studies Review* 15, Special Issue on German Identity (1992): 111-129; Margarete Grandner, Gernot Heiss, and Oliver Rathkolb, "Österreich und seine Deutsche Identität: Bemerkungen zu Harry Ritters Aufsatz 'Austria and the Struggle for German Identity'," *German Studies Review* 16, 3 (1993): 515-520; Harry Ritter, "On Austria's German Identity: A Reply to Margarete Grandner, Gernot Heiss and Oliver Rathkolb," *German Studies Review* 16, 3 (1993): 521-523.

comparing Austria's post-1945 republican identity with the Swiss federalist model in his 1990 collection of essays, *Vom Reich zur Republik: Studien zum Österreichbewusstsein im 20. Jahrhundert* (From Empire to Republic: Studies on Austrian Consciousness in the Twentieth Century). However, Stourzh, caught in a historiographical cliché of emphasising only a post-1945 Austrian consciousness, glosses over the interwar and National Socialist decades. His evidence, at times, is superficial and lacks context: for example, he points to a listing in Vienna's telephone directories of the 1930s of over forty references to organisations with the prefix '*Reichs-*', which he interprets as a lingering Habsburg imperialism.[76] His more recent contribution on the interwar period has sought, among other things, to argue that Social Democrats as well as the Austrofascist state helped propagate the idea of Austria as the 'better German state' in opposition to the Nazi concept of German nationhood.[77]

For the interwar period, Michael Steinberg's analysis of the ideology of the Salzburg Festival is perhaps the most penetrating study of interwar Austrian identity. He argues that the Catholic-baroque ideology of the Festival expressed a major theme of Austrian identity in the First Republic through its mission to preserve religious belief, German universalism and cosmopolitanism. Steinberg shows that the Festival organisers and patrons invoked this Austrian pan-German identity as a counterpoint to Nazism specifically, and to Protestant Prussian German identity more generally. The state's pan-Germanism also later fed into Austrofascism and actually shared with Nazism the same idea of German cultural supremacy in Europe.[78] Steinberg makes a crucial and much under-recognised point about the period between 1934 and 1938, that the Austrofascist

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[76] Gerald Stourzh, *Vom Reich zur Republik: Studien zum Österreichbewusstsein im 20. Jahrhundert* (Vienna, 1990), pp. 25-26. For a critique of Stourzh's book, see Michael Steinberg's review in Günter Bischof and Anton Pelinka, eds., *The Kreisky Era in Austria* (New Brunswick, 1994), pp. 249-51.

[77] Gerald Stourzh, "Erschütterung und Konsolidierung des Österreichbewusstseins - vom Zusammenbruch der Monarchie zur Zweiten Republik," in *Was heisst Österreich? Inhalt und Umfang des Österreichbegriffs vom 10. Jahrhundert bis heute*, ed. Richard G. Plaschka, Gerald Stourzh, and Jan Paul Niederkorn (Vienna, 1995).

[78] Michael Steinberg, *The Meaning of the Salzburg Festival: Austria as Theatre and Ideology, 1890-1938* (Ithaca, 1990), p. 125.

state's attempt to define Austrian identity in defence against Nazism was thwarted by its very own manufacturing of a pan-German identity.

Elsewhere, Steinberg has called for the history of identities to embrace the perspective of historical 'outsiders' in 'transcending the historiographical repetition of historical exclusionism'. His cause for concern at the time of writing in 1994 was partly the continuing obsession of Austrian historians with the debate on Austria's German or non-German identity, in particular what he dismissed as the fallacious historical comparisons with Switzerland, and partly the war in Yugoslavia contiguous to Austria's borders. Steinberg's point was that historians of Austria had overemphasised the quest for a viable national identity in the years since World War Two, while neglecting the exclusionary dimensions of that identity. The arrival in Austria of refugees from war zones in neighbouring Yugoslavia had echoes of the thousands of Hungarian refugees who fled over the border to Austria some forty years earlier during the 1956 uprising. The prospect of another wave of immigration confronted the Austrian academic community, and their colleagues abroad, with the underside of Austria's fragile sense of national identity. Austrian national identity had been founded on a myth of homogeneity that disregarded the stories of immigrants, minorities and refugees from the process of identity construction.[79] My thesis supports Steinberg's point by showing that Czech migrants, Slovene minority schools and Jewish refugees in Austria were necessary for the construction of an Austrian pan-German identity in the 1930s.

A number of other historians agree with Steinberg. In a highly critical essay on Austrian *Zeitgeschichte*, Thomas Angerer points out that the contemporary debate on immigration in Austria 'takes place in a historiographical vacuum'. He suggests that historians should engage more rigorously with these historical perspectives in order to de-mythologise the origins of nationhood and look instead to the political or psychological

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[79] See his review of Stourzh in Bischof and Pelinka, eds., *The Kreisky Era in Austria*, pp. 250-51.

consequences of national identification.[80] We might paraphrase Angerer's point by asserting the need to focus on the processes of imagining the boundaries of a national identity, as my thesis does, rather than dwelling on the historical formation of those borders. Similarly, Gernot Heiss has advocated a 'historiography transgressing borders' that focuses less on the state and the nation and more on regional or cross-regional interactions.[81] He has contributed to this approach in a recent edited volume, with Oliver Rathkolb, on refugees and immigration in Austria from World War One to the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe.[82] As other historians have argued, an approach that goes beyond traditional nation-state interpretations may provide a way forward for understanding the historical processes and exchanges between Central Europeans in particular.[83] By exploring the ways that Austrians encountered Slovenes, Czechs and Jews, as well as other German-speakers, my thesis contributes to a 'transnational' historiography of national identity in Central Europe.

Austrofascist Excursus

As I stated at the outset of my introduction, the connection between nationalism and fascism in Austria can be seen in the relationship between pan-Germanism and Austrofascism and between German-nationalists and Austrofascists. We have seen that the term 'Austrofascist' itself is controversial, and few historians of the period, barring a minority of Austrianists and some scholars of comparative fascism, have engaged either

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[80] Angerer, "An Incomplete Discipline," pp. 226-27.

[81] Gernot Heiss, "Pan-Germans, Better Germans, Austrians: Austrian Historians on National Identity from the First to the Second Republic," *German Studies Review* 16 (1993): p. 426.

[82] Gernot Heiss and Oliver Rathkolb, eds., *Asylland wider Willen: Flüchtlinge im europäischen Kontext seit 1914* (Vienna, 1995). While other studies have focused specifically on Jewish refugees in World War One and the early interwar years, Heiss and Rathkolb's book points the way forward for Austrian history to consider the forms of exclusion by which national identity was continually constructed throughout the twentieth century. On Jewish refugees, see, notably, Beatrix Hoffmann-Holter, *'Abreisendmachung': Jüdische Kriegsflüchtlinge in Wien 1914-1923* (Vienna, 1995); David Rechter, "Galicia in Vienna: Jewish Refugees in the First World War," *Austrian History Yearbook* 28 (1997): 113-130.

[83] Philipp Ther has developed a model of comparative German and European history that draws on what he calls the 'entangled' histories of relational processes and structures within similar units of historical analysis, such as cities. See his "Beyond the Nation: The Relational Basis of a Comparative History of Germany and Europe," *Central European History* 36, 1 (2003): 45-73.

the term or the phenomenon in studies of the period. I will consider here the term's feasibility and show the significance of Austrofascism as a phenomenon among other European fascisms. Finally, I will briefly address the connection between pan-Germanism and Austrofascism, which will lay the groundwork for the rest of this thesis.

Historians of fascism who argue that the only fascist regimes were Italy and Germany tend to label the Austrian state between 1934 and 1938 authoritarian and compare it to the regimes in Portugal, Spain, Yugoslavia and Romania.[84] Stanley Payne's typology of the 'three faces of authoritarian nationalism' places Austria's Christian Social Party and the Fatherland Front in the category of 'conservative right', while defining the paramilitary *Heimwehr* as 'radical right' and the Austrian Nazi Party as 'fascist'. According to Payne, then, Austria between 1934 and 1938 was an alliance of the conservative and radical right against fascism, the latter (Nazism) only coming to power through outside military intervention from Hitler's troops in March 1938. Payne's conclusion on Austria introduces nothing new from specialised studies of Austria. He reiterates what has become a broader consensus among Austrian historians, that the regime itself was not fascist, but that it adopted fascist 'trappings' to thwart the attempts of fascist movements to come to power.[85]

The pre-eminent historian of fascist movements in Austria, Francis Carsten, actually came to a slightly different conclusion from Payne's, despite the fact that Payne drew on Carsten's work in his own study. Payne sees Nazism as the only genuinely fascist group in Austria, whereas Carsten regards both the *Heimwehr* and the Nazi party as two distinct fascist movements. Carsten argues that the *Heimwehr* became fascist as a result of the ideological patronage, weapons and financial support given to it by Mussolini after

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[84] The most recent exponent of this view is Philip Morgan, *Fascism in Europe, 1919-1945* (London, 2003).
[85] See Table 2.1 in Stanley G. Payne, *A History of Fascism, 1914-1945* (London, 1995), p. 15, and his more general account of Austria in pp. 245-52.

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1928.[86] More recently, Gerhard Botz has also defined the Nazis and the *Heimwehr* as two 'brands' of the 'genealogy' of fascism in Austria: the Nazis, representing 'national fascism' akin to German Nazism, and the *Heimwehr*, along with its close sibling, the *Frontkämpfervereinigung* (Front Veteran's Association), representing '*Heimwehr* fascism'. The Christian Social Party and the Fatherland Front fall outside of the Austrian family of fascism and, after the *Heimwehr* was absorbed into the Fatherland Front in 1936, the *Heimwehr* also ceased to be fascist, according to Botz.[87]

The most common objection to the fascist label – that the Austrian regime was authoritarian – is based on the assumption that the main intention of the ruling Christian Social Party was to widen the influence of the Catholic Church in Austria, not to create a fascist state. According to this view, the 'Christ-King' idea in Austrian Catholic teaching at the end of the 1920s sought the negation of democratic-pluralism and, in its place, the institution of the Church as Christ's temporal representative.[88] Thus, even before Dollfuss became Chancellor in 1932, and well before the 1934 constitution that formally established the new Austrian state, political Catholicism had begun to mobilise support for a new authoritarian society that would stamp out the single threat to the Church: social democracy. Proponents of this view especially dispute the label 'clerical-fascism', a term that was first coined by the leader of the *Partito Popolare Italiano* (PPI), Luigi Sturzo.[89] Ernst Hanisch sees 'clerical-fascism' as a political label, not a type of fascism, and argues that while the Vatican and the Austrian bishops formally supported the regime, they did

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[86] F.L. Carsten, *Fascist Movements in Austria: from Schönerer to Hitler* (London, 1977); F.L. Carsten, *The Rise of Fascism* 2nd ed. (London, 1980), pp. 223-29. On Mussolini's support for fascist movements in Hungary and Austria, see Lájos Kerekes, *Abenddämmerung einer Demokratie: Mussolini, Gömbös und die Heimwehr* (Vienna, 1966).

[87] Gerhard Botz, "Varieties of Fascism in Austria: Introduction," in *Who Were the Fascists? Social Roots of European Fascism*, ed. Stein Ugelvik Larsen, Bernt Hagtvet, and Jan Petter Myklebust (Bergen, 1980), p. 194.

[88] Ernst Hanisch, "Der Politische Katholizismus als Ideologischer Träger des 'Austrofaschismus'," in *'Austrofaschismus': Beiträge über Politik, Ökonomie und Kultur 1934-1938*, ed. Emmerich Tálos and Wolfgang Neugebauer (Vienna, 1988), pp. 57-58.

[89] John Pollard, "Conservative Catholics and Italian Fascism: the Clerico-Fascists," in *Fascists and Conservatives*, ed. Martin Blinkhorn (London, 1990), p. 31; Roger Eatwell, "Reflections on Fascism and Religion," *Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions* 4, 3 (2003): 145-166.

not help to establish it. He argues that the Church's presence within and support for the state prevented it from becoming fully fascist, which concurs with Philip Morgan's conclusion that authoritarian governments prevented fascist regimes from coming to power.[90] Similarly, Laura Gellot makes an important argument that on such issues as youth, the Austrian bishops dissented from the government's policies and successfully widened the influence of the Church laity in opposition to the state and in opposition to fascism.[91]

Historians have also drawn a distinction between fascist and Catholic corporatism. Officially, the regime in Austria was known as the *Ständestaat* (Corporate State) and the preamble of its constitution in May 1934 defined Austria as a 'Christian, German, federal state, on a corporative basis.'[92] Austrian corporatism is traditionally held to be Catholic in origin and based on the 1931 papal encyclical, *Quadragesimo Anno*.[93] Corporatist thought in Austria predated the 1931 encyclical, however, and was heavily influenced by Austria's pre-eminent corporatist thinker, Othmar Spann (1878-1950), professor of economics and sociology at the University of Vienna from 1919 to 1938. Spann's corporatism rejected democracy and promoted self-administrating occupational guilds in place of political parties. Although there was limited decentralisation in the autonomy of the guilds, Spann argued that all authority in 'the true state' rested exclusively on the government. Spann's theories attracted a wide circle of German-nationalist and Catholic students in Vienna, including the future chancellor, Dollfuss, and a number of younger *Heimwehr* leaders.[94] The 1926 programme of the Christian Social Party reflected these corporatist ideas so that, in 1931, party leaders boasted that there was no need to adapt the 1926 programme to

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[90] Hanisch, "Der Politische Katholizismus," p. 53; Morgan, *Fascism in Europe*, p. 8.
[91] Laura S. Gellott, *The Catholic Church and the Authoritarian Regime in Austria, 1933-1938* (New York, 1987).
[92] John Rath and Carolyn W. Schum, "The Dollfuss-Schuschnigg Regime: Fascist or Authoritarian?," in *Who Were the Fascists?: Social Roots of European Fascism*, ed. Stein Ugelvik Larsen, Bernt Hagtvet, and Jan Petter Myklebust (Bergen, 1980), p. 251.
[93] Morgan, *Fascism in Europe*, pp. 73, 170.
[94] John Haag, "Othmar Spann and the Quest for a 'True State'," *Austrian History Yearbook* 12/13 (1976/77): pp. 233-47. '*Der Wahre Staat*' (The True State) was the title of Spann's acclaimed book, published in Germany in 1921, which was based on his earlier lectures in Vienna.

incorporate the papal teachings in *Quadragesimo Anno*. In fact, the encyclical stated that individuals should be freely able to choose the type of government they wanted. Moreover, it criticised those who exploited corporatist ideas for political purposes, ignoring the social reform for which it was intended. Although these criticisms were primarily directed at Italian Fascists in 1931, they were also applicable to Austria's Christian Social leaders.[95]

Other interpretations reject the fascist label by comparing Austria with Italy and Germany. These critics emphasise the absence of both a grass roots fascist party and a leadership cult in Austria, and they point out the state's intention to create a patriotic, rather than totalitarian society.[96] With regard to the first point, it is true that Dollfuss did not envisage the Fatherland Front as a popular movement, but intended only to replace the various bourgeois parties with a supra-party structure that would counteract more effectively the dominance of the Social Democrats. But if we compare the Fatherland Front with the prototypical fascist party, the *Partito Nazionale Fascista* (PNF), we see that the Fatherland Front was numerically stronger: the PNF had 300,000 members when it emerged at the end of 1921, while the Fatherland Front had 500,000 by the end of 1933. Although the modes of recruitment varied – the PNF coerced factory workers and farm labourers to join on condition of keeping their jobs, while entire organisations joined the Fatherland Front on a collective basis – both organisations held a monopoly and thus neither can accurately be regarded as a populist or grass-roots party.[97]

Historians also conclude that the absence of a *Führer* or *Duce* figure is evidence that Austria did not embody fascism's cult of one leader. Bruce Pauley, for example, has argued that Austria was too divided by regional and class loyalties for a strong leader to emerge from either the *Heimwehr* or the Austrian Nazis. Dollfuss and Schuschnigg were

[95] Jill Lewis, "Conservatives and fascists in Austria, 1918-34," in *Fascists and Conservatives: The radical right and the establishment in twentieth-century Europe*, ed. Martin Blinkhorn (London, 1990), pp. 105-6.
[96] For an overview of the critics of 'Austrofascism', see Emmerich Tálos, "Das Herrschaftssystem 1934-1938: Erklärungen und begriffliche Bestimmungen," in *'Austrofaschismus': Beiträge über Politik, Ökonomie und Kultur 1934-1938*, ed. Emmerich Tálos and Wolfgang Neugebauer (Vienna, 1988), pp. 345-349.
[97] Emmerich Tálos and Walter Manoschek, "Politische Struktur des Austrofaschismus (1934-1938)," Ibid., pp. 97-98, 107; Morgan, *Fascism in Europe*, p. 48.

no more than 'semi-fascist dictators' because they saw themselves only as a temporary buffer against socialism and Nazism and held no plans to transform society into a new community of fascists.[98] Yet Pauley contradicts himself when he argues elsewhere that the Fatherland Front was organised according to the *Führerprinzip* with Dollfuss and then Schuschnigg having complete authority and demanding absolute obedience.[99]

The third objection - that the Austrian state did not harbour totalitarian ambitions - cannot hold true either without also calling into question the totalitarianism of the Italian and German states. These critics argue that the Austrian state sought to instil patriotism through its 'fascist-style capillary organisations' and that it had neither the intent nor the ability to create a truly fascistised society.[100] In contrast to fascist regimes, they argue, Austria did not try to spawn a new fascist man or woman.[101] Pauley has described this idea of authoritarianism-with-fascist-trappings as 'positive fascism', which intensified after 1936 in an attempt to stave off growing sympathies with Nazi Germany. He points to the example of the Fatherland Front's cultural organisation, *Neues Leben* (New Life), which was modelled on Germany's *Kraft durch Freude* and Italy's *Dopolavoro*. Established in 1936, it had grown to over 500,000 members by early 1938. Like its German and Italian counterparts, *Neues Leben* offered discounted theatre tickets and rail fares, ski holiday packages, held sporting events, sponsored cultural prizes for art, photography, film, music and plays, and established travelling theatre companies to keep actors in full-time employment. The Fatherland Front also developed a patriarchal welfare system through its *Mütterschutzwerk* (Mothers' Defence Action), which had been founded in March 1934 to promote motherhood as a patriotic duty and raise the Austrian birth rate. Among its many programmes, the *Mütterschutzwerk* offered summer retreats for mothers, infant-care

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[98] Bruce F. Pauley, "Fascism and the *Führerprinzip*: The Austrian Example," *Central European History* 12, 3 (1979): pp. 285-286.

[99] Bruce F. Pauley, *Hitler and the Forgotten Nazis: A History of Austrian National Socialism* (Chapel Hill, 1981), p. 161.

[100] See, for example, Morgan, *Fascism in Europe*, p. 73.

[101] Rath and Schum, "The Dollfuss-Schuschnigg Regime: Fascist or Authoritarian?," p. 253.

courses and financial payments to families with more than three children. Finally, in 1936, the Front merged all the existing paramilitary groups, including the *Heimwehr*, into a single paramilitary organisation, the *Frontmiliz*, and, in 1937, established its own storm troopers' brigade, the *Sturmkorps*, which was styled on the SS as an elite military body. Its slogan, 'Our Wish Shall Be Law' (*Unser Wille werde Gesetz*), was a staccato variation of the SS slogan, 'Honour For Us Means Loyalty' (*Unsere Ehre heisst Treue*).[102] A propaganda photograph shows the *Sturmkorps* standing under a portrait of Schuschnigg with a familiar-sounding motto, 'His Will is our Command, His Goal is our Victory' (*Sein Wille ist uns Befehl/Sein Ziel unser Sieg*).[103] This notion of 'positive fascism' has also been dubbed 'imitation fascism' for its apparent tendency to borrow from other fascist regimes.[104] Yet the claim that the Austrian state merely copied fascist regimes is rarely substantiated with reference to the limits of fascistisation in Italy and Germany, where mothercare and leisure programmes were equally aimed at instilling patriotism and keeping the consumers happy.[105] Scholars of comparative fascism, and most historians who deal with this period in Austria, accept the logic that the regime was a weaker and ultimately unsuccessful incarnation of Italian and German fascism and that its defeat by National Socialism in 1938 provides proof of its weak and ultimately unsuccessful imitation.

The logic of this argument is premised partly on unfamiliarity with the interwar experiences of countries in Central and Eastern Europe, and partly on a flawed determinism that seeks to explain Austria's path to National Socialism as if there might have been another less painful road that Austria might have taken. The first problem of unfamiliarity has less to do with sheer ignorance than with a lack of understanding about

[102] Pauley, *Hitler and the Forgotten Nazis*, p. 162. On the *Mütterschutzwerk*, see Laura Gellott and Michael Phayer, "Dissenting Voices: Catholic Women in Opposition to Fascism," *Journal of Contemporary History* 22, 1 (1987): pp. 105-6.

[103] Hanisch, *Der Lange Schatten des Staates*, p. 313. This and all subsequent translations are my own.

[104] Ernst Hanisch, "Die Salzburger Presse in der Ersten Republik 1918-1938," *Mitteilungen der Gesellschaft für Salzburger Landeskunde* 128 (1988): p. 362.

[105] Aristotle A. Kallis, "'Fascism', 'Para-fascism' and 'Fascistization': On the Similarities of Three Conceptual Categories," *European History Quarterly* 33, 2 (2003): 219-249.

nationalism and its connection with indigenous fascism in the interwar successor states of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. In spite of renewed academic interest in generic fascism, there have been few serious attempts to incorporate the countries of Central and Eastern Europe into wider theories and interpretations of fascism. At best, these case studies have served only to underline distinctions between fascist and authoritarian governments. A reappraisal of fascism that examines in particular its relationship with nationalism in the region of Central and Eastern Europe is long overdue.[106] The problem of determinism, however, might be solved if we can approach fascism not as a 'type' of regime or ideology, but as a process, much like national identity. Robert Paxton's *Anatomy of Fascism* initially strikes some scholars of fascism as the best recent attempt to reconfigure our understanding of fascism as a process, rather than a regime type or ideology. His is not the first, however, and his book suffers from an overly Western European approach to fascism.[107] More recently, Aristotle Kallis and Michael Mann have also contributed to a process-oriented approach to fascism, and a number of Austrian historians have also touched on this in their research.

As one of the newest regime theorists of fascism, Kallis seeks to overcome the distinction between 'fascism', that is, the Italian and German models, and all other interwar and wartime regimes that adopted fascist structures and organisations, which Kallis refers to as 'para-fascism'. He suggests that the difference between 'fascism' and 'para-fascism' is a difference of degree rather than substance, and argues that fascism should be seen as a processual category (fascistisation), which was unique in every regime because of the circumstances under which traditional elites co-opted fascist groups or fascist 'commodities'. In some cases, this process led to fascism coming to power (Italy and

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[106] See the upcoming issue of *East Central Europe/L'Europe du Centre-Est/Eine wissenschaftliche Zeitschrift* (ECE) on 'Fascism and Central Europe: A Reappraisal', to be published in 2007.
[107] For example, the bibliographical essay has two and a half pages of references on France, and six books on Austria. He makes a passing reference to the Dollfuss/Schuschnigg regime as a 'Catholic authoritarian regime' that repressed both socialists and Nazis. See Robert Paxton, *The Anatomy of Fascism* (New York, 2004), p. 115.

Germany) as the elites handed over leadership to fascist groups, which he describes as 'fascistisation as last resort'. In other cases, fascistisation was designed to fortify conservative rule without necessarily forming an alliance with fascist groups, a phenomenon Kallis calls 'voluntary fascism'. A third category, 'preventive fascism', describes those regimes that fascistised in order to ward off potentially more radical groups, as occurred in Austria under Dollfuss and Schuschnigg against, firstly, the Social Democrats and later the Nazi Party. While Kallis still seems to be making a distinction between Italy and Germany and everyone else in the latter two categories, his typology does not reduce the definition of fascism to only those regimes in Italy and Germany. Rather, he sees all regimes as a 'distortion' of fascist ideology because each regime adapted it to the perceived needs and conditions in that society. It is more fruitful, in Kallis' opinion, to focus on the trajectory of fascistisation in each country in order to assess the nature of the regime.[108]

Mann also rejects the fascist-conservative dichotomy. He proposes a continuum of ever radicalising authoritarianism in which four regime types emerge: semi-authoritarian, semi-reactionary authoritarian, corporatist and fascist. Although Mann only places Italy and Germany in the fascist category, while Austria falls in the corporatist basket, his definition of fascism is broader than the Italian and German models. Like Kallis, he sees fascism as a process, as a 'pursuit' of a particular form of nationalism that seeks radical solutions, employs paramilitary force and seeks to 'transcend' the nation-state through top-down tactics of coercion and control. Mann makes all the usual observations of the Austrian regime that it borrowed from fascist structures and ideology but lacked a grass-roots fascist party. Yet he also presents Austria as a special case study of fascism, arguing that Austrian fascists were disproportionately greater in numbers than in either Germany or Italy, despite the fact that they did not come to power until after Austria's annexation to

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[108] Kallis, "'Fascism', 'Para-fascism' and 'Fascistization'."

Germany.[109] This observation stems from Mann's analysis of former *Heimwehr* men who became Nazis well before 1938, suggesting that Mann has simply substituted 'fascists' for 'Nazis'. However, we need to look more closely at Mann's definition of fascism as 'organic' and 'cleansing' nationalism, which refers both to ethnic and political enemies, as well as his emphasis on 'anti-Semitic fascism', which widens considerably the ranks of fascists in Austria.

Well before the constitution of the Austrian state was drawn in 1934, Mann argues that the *Heimwehr* invoked *völkisch* nationalism in their attacks against the 'enemy' of the German people. In Styria and Carinthia, where this nationalism was particularly violent immediately after the war in border skirmishes between Austrian and Yugoslavian soldiers, the enemy was seen as irredentist Slavs, who had been the traditional ethnic rival of German-speaking Austrians in the Habsburg Monarchy. However, anti-Semitism had a different symbolic function in Austrofascist ideology. It thrived precisely in those areas where Jewish influence was weakest: in the provinces, in the civil service and in schools. This anti-Jewish stereotype, which was central to Austrofascism, Mann argues, was not only a symbol of 'urban domination', of socialist Jewry against Christian Austria, but it also paralleled another stereotype of the Jews as foreign, unassimilated and backward. This stereotype became 'a symbol for many Austrians (and others) of Eastern barbarism, the supposed antithesis of Habsburg Austrian Catholic civilisation, and the supposed antithesis in the interwar period of the civilised, Christian German nation.'[110] I address this stereotype of 'Eastern Jews' (*Ostjuden*) in the German-nationalist press in Chapter Five. Stereotypes of '*Ostjuden*' were also central to Austrofascist ideology, as Anton Staudinger has shown.[111] In this respect, Austrofascism pre-dates 1934 and has its origins in a longer

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[109] Michael Mann, *Fascists* (Cambridge, 2004), pp. 43-48. His actual definition is on p. 13.
[110] Ibid., pp. 209-11, 226-29.
[111] Anton Staudinger, "Austrofaschistische 'Österreich'-Ideologie," in *'Austrofaschismus': Beiträge über Politik, Ökonomie und Kultur 1934-1938*, ed. Emmerich Tálos and Wolfgang Neugebauer (Vienna, 1988). The extended version of his article is in Anton Staudinger, "Zur 'Österreich'-Ideologie des Ständestaates," in

tradition of anti-Semitism in Austria that underwent a radicalisation after the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Moreover, this form of fascism was especially entrenched in the Christian Social Party, which has traditionally been cast as the conservative partner of the fascist *Heimwehr*.

There is a further problem in drawing a distinction between the Christian Social Party and the *Heimwehr*. Jill Lewis has argued that the Christian Socials were not the 'reluctant allies' of the fascist *Heimwehr*, but were already on a trajectory towards fascism well before the *Heimwehr* formally joined the ranks of the Christian Social government in 1930. The Christian Socials were the driving force behind the steady repression of socialism in the provinces throughout the 1920s, especially in the industrial areas of Upper Styria, and it was the party's supporters – industry and banks – who actively encouraged the *Heimwehr* to broaden its political support base beyond the ruffians of its early days. Moreover, in some provinces, the *Heimwehr* had actually originated as the paramilitary arm of the Christian Social Party. In Tyrol, for example, the leader of the provincial Christian Social Party, Richard Steidle, founded the *Heimwehr*. The *Heimwehr* was partly financed by the party and most of its members were also loyal party voters. In the case of Upper Styria, the government specifically recruited the *Heimwehr* as a counter-force to the socialist trade unions, prompting the Social Democrats to form their own paramilitary organisation, the *Republikanische Schutzbund* (Republican Defence League), in 1923. While the *Heimwehr* in Upper Styria and Carinthia had greater sympathies with the German-nationalist parties, and in many cases joined the Nazi Party after 1932, the political and ideological loyalties of the majority of *Heimwehr* groups remained with the Christian Social Party. Thus, in February 1934, it was the Christian Social government, not the *Heimwehr* acting independently, which brutally defeated the Social Democrats in a

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Das Juliabkommen von 1936: Vorgeschichte, Hintergründe und Folgen, ed. Ludwig Jedlicka and Rudolf Neck (Munich, 1977).

brief civil war.[112] Only after they were firmly ensconced in power did the *Heimwehr*

agitate for a greater role in the provincial government. As we will see in Chapter Four, the

Heimatschutz in Salzburg (as the provincial organisation in Salzburg was known) accused

the Christian Social Party retrospectively of conciliation with the Social Democrats and

was a constant source of frustration to the provincial security director.[113]

Along with Lewis, a number of Austrian historians have also challenged the

dichotomy between fascism and conservative authoritarianism. In particular, Emmerich

Tálos argues that the failure of the Austrian regime to create an outwardly fascist state is

neither sufficient reason to dismiss or play down its intention to adopt fascism, nor can the

breadth of the 'Austrofascist' project be underestimated. He emphasises the imitative

elements of fascism – the monopoly of the Fatherland Front, the creation of a state youth

group and *Neues Leben*, the 'co-ordination' of the press and schools – as evidence that the

regime made little distinction between its own goals of transforming Austria and the

transformations that had already occurred in Italy and Germany.[114]

The example of schools under the Austrofascist state is particularly relevant. After

parliament had been prorogued in March 1933, the government initially sought only

disciplinary action against 'undesirable' teachers, that is, those who belonged to the Social

Democratic teachers' unions. In April, confessional education was reintroduced after

Dollfuss overturned the Glöckel Decree of 1919, named after the former Social

Democratic Under Secretary of State for Education, Otto Glöckel, who had banned

compulsory religious instruction and observance in schools. To save costs, history

textbooks remained unchanged and teachers were instructed to refer only to the sections

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[112] Lewis, "Conservatives and fascists in Austria." On Tyrol, see also Morgan, *Fascism in Europe*, p. 33.
[113] The *Heimwehr* was a loosely unified federal body after 1927 and most provincial organisations retained their original names and previous political allegiances with either the Christian Socials or German-nationalists, or the NSDAP after 1932. The *Heimwehr* groups were known as *Heimatschutz* in Styria, Carinthia and Salzburg, *Heimatwehr* in Tyrol and *Heimatdienst* in Vorarlberg. In some provinces, there were several organisations under different names. C. Earl Edmondson, "Heimwehren und andere Wehrverbände," in *Handbuch des politischen Systems Österreichs: Erste Republik 1918-1933*, ed. Emmerich Tálos, et al. (Vienna, 1995), p. 265.
[114] See his summary of the arguments by the volume's other contributors in Tálos, "Das Herrschaftssystem 1934-1938."

that discussed religious and imperial themes, while setting their pupils straight about the more deviant passages on the foundations of the Austrian republic and the Social Democratic Party. After February 1934, the government introduced new textbooks that left out the history of the republic and political parties altogether and emphasised Austria's military history, especially the First World War, and Austria's civilising mission of defending German Christianity in Europe. Thus the anti-parliamentary, anti-republican, anti-socialist ideology of Austrofascism rapidly pervaded classrooms and pedagogical journals after 1934. All teachers' unions, except Christian Social and German-nationalist ones, were banned and students were only allowed to attend the extra-curricular activities of the Austrofascist youth organisation, *Österreichisches Jungvolk* (ÖJV), or the larger Church-sponsored *Katholisches Jungvolk* (KJV), which retained autonomy under the terms of the May 1934 concordat.[115]

The example of schools also reveals the ideological consistency of Austrofascism with pan-Germanism. As we will see in Chapter One, the regime accommodated and propagated pan-German ideas to such an extent that the line was often blurred between Austrofascist and German-nationalist conceptions of national identity. While Austrofascists claimed to be the defenders of the true German nation against the aberrant Nazi vision, pan-Germanism in fact cut across these political distinctions. In this light, Austrofascism was an ideology of German supremacy concealed behind an Austrian patriotic veneer and propagated by those who used Christianity as a mask for pan-German identity. This link between Austrofascism and pan-Germanism demonstrates that the German-nationalist press had very little to conceal from the Austrofascist censors. It had only to navigate a path between pan-Germanism and open avowal of Nazi politics.

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[115] Herbert Dachs, "'Austrofaschismus' und Schule: Ein Instrumentalisierungsversuch," Ibid., ed. Emmerich Tálos and Wolfgang Neugebauer. The KJV had three times as many members as the ÖJV. On the May Concordat and church-state relations regarding youth policy, see Gellott, *The Catholic Church and the Authoritarian Regime*.

I have now established a theoretical and historiographical framework for my thesis. I argue that national identity is a process of constructing ethnic and civic boundaries of exclusion and inclusion. I define national identity in Austria as 'pan-German' to encapsulate both layers of particular and universal belonging to the national community, and to avoid the polarity of the historiographical terms 'German' and 'Austrian'. I show that pan-German identity crossed over political-cultural milieux in Austria: German-nationalists were not the only Austrians imagining a pan-German identity and, therefore, they cannot be regarded as a distinct political camp if they shared certain beliefs with other Austrians. I examine the relationship between different milieux under the Austrofascist state in order to show the connection between fascism and nationalism in interwar Austria. I argue that pan-German ideas undergirded the ideology of the Austrofascist state and drew German-nationalists and Austrofascists together in their construction of national identity.

The remaining chapters will provide evidence from my research in support of the arguments I have made here. Chapter One will trace the evolution and radicalisation of nationalism in Austria from the middle of the nineteenth century to 1938 and show how this process created multiple offshoots and varieties of what I call pan-Germanism. I argue that the convergence of these multiple constructions of pan-German identity at specific moments in Austrian history explains why pan-Germanism cut across political distinctions and helped to formulate a cross-milieu understanding of national identity in interwar Austria.

Chapter Two deals with the political press in Austria from its roots in the empire to its flourishing role in the First Republic to, finally, the restrictions against press freedoms after 1933. I examine the effect of censorship on the German-nationalist press under the Austrofascist state and contend that German-nationalists had considerable freedom to participate in the construction of an Austrian pan-German identity in concert with Austrofascists.

The remaining four chapters constitute a series of case studies of the newspapers. I explore the meanings and constructions of pan-German identity in each of the newspapers and, where possible, draw comparisons with Austrofascist press organs and other examples of identity construction in the public sphere, such as speeches, publications and legislation. Chapter Three presents a comparative case study of the *Wiener Neueste Nachrichten* and the *Grazer Tagespost*. It traces the different ways in which pan-German identity was constructed at the centre and the borderlands and demonstrates why some German-nationalists had more in common with Austrofascists and others were closer to National Socialists in their perceptions of the national community. These nuanced variations between the Viennese and Styrian examples help to elucidate regional understandings of national identity, particularly where there is an ethnically mixed population.

Chapter Four explores another regional example of national identity in my case study of the *Salzburger Volksblatt*. I argue that the particular intellectual and cultural currents in Salzburg drew Austrofascists and German-nationalists closer rather than apart in their interwar construction of pan-German identity. A key figure in my chapter is the owner of the *Salzburger Volksblatt*, Hans Glaser, whose diary gives a human face to both the private and public relationships between newspaper editors, journalists, politicians, clergy, censors and local state functionaries from a range of political-cultural milieux.

In Chapters Five and Six, I argue that pan-German identity was tied as much to civic arguments about immigration, citizenship and assimilation in the Austrian state as it was to the ethnic composition of the national community. Ethnic and civic constructions of pan-German identity went hand in hand, but there was more agreement across the political spectrum on civic discourses, especially on the question of Jews in Austria. Chapter Five highlights how anti-Semitism often had a particular regional overtone with regard to Jewish immigrants in Vienna's second district or Jewish artists in the Salzburg Festival. It also demonstrates that German-nationalists and Austrofascists were equally defamatory

and inconsistent in their anti-Semitism. An editor of a German-nationalist newspaper was no more predisposed to anti-Semitism than a functionary of the state, and vice-versa. Furthermore, I argue that a typology of anti-Semitism does not help us draw useful distinctions between the violent and genocidal actions of some anti-Semites and the 'merely' exclusionary and xenophobic attitudes and politics of others. Rather, I suggest that it is more fruitful to see anti-Semitism, like national identity, as a construction of civic and ethnic boundaries. Chapter Six shows how Austrians from different political-cultural milieux constructed legal, political, social and racial boundaries that excluded and discriminated against Jews. By restricting access to residency and citizenship after 1933, and by caricaturing and vilifying European Jews as unwanted immigrants and ethnic outsiders in the national community, Austrofascists and German-nationalists became joint custodians of a pan-German identity in Austria. My thesis argues that Austrians were more concerned with the boundaries of their own state than they were with the wider boundaries of the German nation in the years before 1938. They were not only imagining their identity as German-speakers in Europe in the interwar years: they were also imagining their identity as German-speakers on the new map of Central Europe.

PAN-GERMAN IDENTITY FROM EMPIRE TO REPUBLIC

I define pan-Germanism as the twofold belief, firstly, that Austria was a German state, meaning that it had German-language public institutions and its citizenry was defined by acculturation to the German language; and secondly, that Austria belonged with other ethnic Germans, if not in a single nation-state, then in some other collective arrangement that would represent the interests of all German-speakers. This chapter explores both aspects of pan-Germanism in the periods 1848-1918 and 1918-1938. It will show how a range of political-cultural milieux, including liberals, Christian Socials, Social Democrats, German-nationalists, Austrofascists and National Socialists, contested pan-German identity at different times throughout the period 1848-1938. While these groups often used different ethnic parameters to delimit a pan-German identity, they were more likely to be in agreement over how to define its civic boundaries. This is important because it identifies Austrian pan-Germanism as a national identity that was primarily concerned with the Austrian state and only secondarily with the wider imagining of the German nation.

From Liberal Ideals to Nationalist Solutions

The original nineteenth-century idea of pan-Germanism was a vague formulation that espoused the national and political unity of German-speakers in the German Confederation, which included Austria until 1866. It first emerged in the 1848 revolution as a liberal platform for reforming the Confederate states on the basis of the constitutional freedoms of education, private property and civic equality.[1] However, it was never

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[1] Hanns Haas, "Staats- und Landesbewusstsein in der Ersten Republik," in *Handbuch des politischen Systems Österreichs: Erste Republik 1918-1933*, ed. Emmerich Tálos, et al. (Vienna, 1995), p. 474. The liberal notion of civic equality rested on a division of the public and private spheres, in which educated, property-owning, enfranchised males were equals within the public sphere, while women, children, workers and the non-propertied lower classes remained within a hierarchical private sphere. Pieter M. Judson, "'Not Another

uniformly upheld by liberals, whose various nationalist programmes clashed and prevented the goal of German political unity from being realised. These different views of pan-German identity, firstly in the Confederation, and subsequently in the Austro-Hungarian Empire, reveal the trajectory of pan-Germanism in Austria from 1848 to 1918.

The competing *kleindeutsche* and *grossdeutsche* interpretations of German political unity were the cause of nationalist disputes in the German Confederation. German and Austrian liberals, who had gathered at the Frankfurt Assembly in 1848-9 to negotiate a constitution for a unified German state, were divided on the question of Prussian or Austrian leadership. Most German liberals favoured a *kleindeutsche* union that excluded Austrians and set the way clear for Prussian leadership. Austrian liberals, on the other hand, proposed a *grossdeutsche* solution that would incorporate all of German Austria, including the Bohemian and Moravian crown lands, into a Greater German Empire led by the Habsburg emperor in Vienna. This would have satisfied Catholics and radical democrats among the German contingent, who feared Prussian dominance, but it also would have necessitated a constitutional separation from the non-German Habsburg territories and the dismemberment of the Monarchy in all except dynastic ties. Neo-absolutism finally defeated both liberal visions after the Prussian king, Frederich Wilhelm IV, rejected the German liberals' offer of the crown of a *kleindeutsche* empire in March 1849. In December 1850, the Austrian Prime Minister, Prince Felix Schwarzenberg, backed by the newly acceded Emperor Franz Josef, and supported by Tsar Nicholas I, forced Prussia and the German kingdoms to accept a revived German Confederation, thereby restoring the pre-revolutionary status quo.[2]

The arguments put forward by each side of the *kleindeutsch-grossdeutsche* debate reveal on another level the clash between competing pan-German identity discourses. If the

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Square Foot!' German Liberalism and the Rhetoric of National Ownership in Nineteenth-Century Austria," *Austrian History Yearbook* 26 (1995): p. 89.

[2] Robert A. Kann, *A History of the Habsburg Empire 1526-1918* (Berkeley, 1974), pp. 256-62; Dieter Langewiesche, "Germany and the National Question in 1848," in *The State of Germany: The national idea in the making, unmaking and remaking of a modern nation-state*, ed. John Breuilly (London, 1992), p. 75.

immediate objective of *kleindeutsche* nationalists was a German state ruled by Prussia, then we can see the construction of a *kleindeutsche* state primarily as a civic discourse because it deferred to Prussian interests rather than ethnic arguments. This is evidenced by the proposed *kleindeutsche* solution's inclusion of Danes in the duchies of Schleswig and Holstein and Poles in East Prussia, but the exclusion of Germans in Austria.[3] The German liberal, Varnhagen von Ense, recognised the need for pragmatism when he declared nationality to be 'not the sole, nor even the most important basis on which to form states. Shared laws and freedoms are undoubtedly much more important than ethnic ties, especially when these ties have been broken and obscured.'[4]

In contrast to *kleindeutsche* nationalism, *grossdeutsche* nationalism was motivated by what Andrew Whiteside has referred to as the politics of 'ethnocentrism', that is, the subordination of all non-German nationalities to Germans in a German state.[5] Non-German nationalities were numerically stronger than Germans in the Habsburg Monarchy and the liberals wished to secure the *Nationalbesitzstand* (national ownership) of Germans over the Monarchy's territory, property and 'cultural capital'.[6] The proposed inclusion of Czechs, Slovenes and Italians in a *grossdeutsche* state was intended to maintain a German stronghold over non-Germans. It was proposed on ethnic grounds to secure German hegemonic aspirations in the Habsburg dominions. This differed, however, from the *kleindeutsche* solution of including Danes and Poles, which was a concession to Prussian state interests. After the liberals' defeat in 1849, Franz Josef and Austria's conservative elites pressured the liberals to support instead an economic union between the Habsburg Monarchy and the German Confederation under Habsburg leadership, a plan that became

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[3] William Carr, "The unification of Germany," in *The State of Germany*, p. 89.
[4] Cited in Dieter Langewiesche, "Germany and the National Question in 1848," p. 65.
[5] Andrew G. Whiteside, "The Germans as an Integrative Force in Imperial Austria: the Dilemma of Dominance," *Austrian History Yearbook* 3, 1 (1967): pp. 173-74.
[6] Andrew Whiteside has defined *Besitzstand* as the dominance of Germans in intellectual life, the civil service, army, Catholic Church and the dynasty. See ibid. In his more recent definition of *Nationalbesitzstand*, Pieter M. Judson refers to 'cultural and intellectual capital of an imaginary German nation [as] not only the achievements of German speakers and their cultural institutions, but also the degree of cultivation and the moral capacity of the larger German community.' Pieter M. Judson, "'Not Another Square Foot!': p. 83.

known as Greater Austria (*Grossösterreich*). This conservative design was similar to the

original *grossdeutsche* model and would have included all Germans together with

Magyars, Czechs, Slovaks, Slovenes, Serbs, Croats, Ruthenes, Romanians and Italians.

Although Britain, France and Russia opposed this 'Empire of Seventy Millions', it

remained at the forefront of Austrian liberal politics until 1866.[7]

The ultimate triumph of *kleindeutsche* nationalism through Austria's defeat in the

Austro-Prussian War in 1866 and Germany's unification under Bismarck in 1871 caused a

split between Austrian liberals. As we have seen, the moderate majority of Austrian

liberals were *grossdeutsche* nationalists but did not wish to see the empire break up.

Instead, they concentrated on domestic liberal reforms that would preserve the privileges

of the politically dominant German Austrians in a centralised Habsburg state. However,

after 1866, a younger generation of radical liberals, led by Georg von Schönerer (1842-

1921), advocated the union of 'German Austria' with Germany. The so-called Linz

Programme in 1882 was the formal outline of this solution, which called for the separation

of Austria and Hungary in everything except dynastic ties, the union of the German

hereditary lands with Bohemia and Moravia, excluding Dalmatia and Galicia, and a

constitutional alliance with Germany.[8] Ironically, the radicals' programme calling for

Austria's inclusion in the German Reich was known as *kleindeutsche* nationalism – the

inverse definition of the Prussian model of German unification that excluded Austria.[9] The

Austrian radicals' inversion of the original Prussian term is a fitting illustration of the

multiple constructions and meanings of pan-German identity. While one definition of

'*kleindeutsch*' was intended to serve Prussian state interests and exclude millions of ethnic

Germans in Austria, the other definition was a desperate attempt by those who felt

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[7] Carr, "The unification of Germany," p. 75; Langewiesche, "Germany and the National Question in 1848," p. 77. The customs union was the brainchild of the Austrian Minister of Commerce, later the Minister of Finance, Karl Friedrich von Bruck, but it was Schwarzenberg, and later the liberal Minister of State, Anton von Schmerling, who proposed this idea as a political entity. A.J.P. Taylor, *The Habsburg Monarchy, 1809-1918: A History of the Austrian Empire and Austria-Hungary* Paperback ed. (Chicago, 1967), p. 77ff.
[8] Kann, *A History of the Habsburg Empire 1526-1918*, p. 433; Andrew G. Whiteside, *The Socialism of Fools: Georg Ritter von Schönerer and Austrian Pan-Germanism* (Berkeley, 1975), pp. 91-92.
[9] Whiteside, *The Socialism of Fools*, pp. 13-14.

marginalised by their position outside the civic boundaries of the German state to restore the boundaries of that state along ethnic lines. Within one generation, the *kleindeutsch-grossdeutsche* debate had lost its original political meaning as the pan-German idea was reinvented for a new era of nationalist politics in Austria.

A decisive influence on this shift in definitions of pan-German identity was the Austrian student movement of the 1870s and 1880s. University fraternities (*Burschenschaften*) with Teutonic names, such as Walhalla, Norica, Frankonia and Markomannia, had been founded during the late 1850s after Austrian authorities removed previous restrictions on secret student societies. Fraternity members continued to shroud their activities and memberships in secrecy so that Austrian police authorities could only estimate that out of a total of 6,000 students attending Vienna's higher education institutes between 1880 and 1900, less than 500 were involved in German-nationalist fraternities. Mirroring the factions of the liberals in parliament, the *Burschenschaften* were split into moderate *grossdeutsche* and radical *kleindeutsche* camps. Yet even within the more extreme fraternities, few enthusiasts of *kleindeutsche* nationalism seriously considered overthrowing the Austro-Hungarian Empire to achieve their dream of uniting German Austria with Bismarck's Reich. After the 1879 Dual Alliance between Germany and Austria-Hungary, the majority of the *kleindeutsche* students slowly embraced Austrian patriotism, believing that their primary aim had been achieved.[10] Thus, the radical *kleindeutsche* nationalists, spurred by 'irredentist' politics after 1866, represented a fringe minority on the far left of the political spectrum.[11] The various proponents of *grossdeutsche* nationalism, including former student radicals after 1879, were only more moderate on the count of their loyalty to the Habsburg emperor. Their chauvinism toward Slavs and Jews would be seen in the twentieth century as right-wing extremism. But in the late-nineteenth century, they were the representatives of a moderate left-wing political

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[10] Ibid., pp. 44-51, 62.
[11] Haas, "Staats- und Landesbewusstsein in der Ersten Republik," p. 477.

ideology that sought, above all, to ensure that the Empire remained a German state in the hands of Germans.

Aside from irredentism, the issue that increasingly divided moderate and radical nationalists and ultimately weakened the *kleindeutsche* faction was anti-Semitism. In particular, the question of Jewish membership in German-nationalist groups was a cause for violent agitation by radicals. In the student fraternities, for example, there were many Jews who admired Bismarck and shared their fellow students' disdain for Habsburg rule. One of these students was the later leader of the Austrian Social Democrats, Viktor Adler, who had been a *Burschenschafter* in the 1870s before entering parliament as a radical democrat alongside Schönerer. But by the late 1870s, anti-Semitism in the radical fraternities resulted in membership bans and physical attacks on Jewish students. As the patron politician of the *kleindeutschen* student fraternities, Schönerer led the verbal assault on Jews with his increasingly truculent speeches in parliament during the 1880s. In 1884, he eventually split with his former democratic colleagues, including Adler, and, in 1887, he led a group of breakaway Young Liberals to form the *Deutschnationale Vereinigung* (German Nationalist Association) to press specifically for anti-Semitic laws in the Austrian parliament.[12] Two proposed items of legislation were modelled on the Californian Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 and sought a moratorium on Jewish immigration from Galicia and Bukowina as well as a university numerus clausus for Jewish students.[13] Yet while anti-Semitism brought additional strain on the relationship between moderate and radical German-nationalists, already fractured over the issue of Habsburg loyalty, it was not exclusively the ideology of the radical camp. Rather, it became a potent weapon in the hands of so-called moderates, who combined allegiance to the Austro-Hungarian Empire with verbal attacks on Jews in their attempt to broaden their base of support.

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[12] Whiteside, *The Socialism of Fools*, pp. 24-25, 51-52, 61-62, 102-3.
[13] Kurt Tweraser, "Carl Beurle and the Triumph of German Nationalism in Austria," *German Studies Review* 4, 3 (1981): pp. 413-14.

Schönerer's split with former colleagues in 1887 may also have been intended to avert a no-confidence vote in his leadership. His unwillingness to compromise and extreme anti-Semitism alienated many of his supporters – often referred to as Schönerianer – throughout the 1880s. One example of this was the *Deutscher Schulverein* (German Schools' Association). Established in 1880 as the associational arm of the Austrian liberals, it rapidly grew to over 100,000 members with almost a thousand local chapters. By 1914, it had doubled its membership to 200,000 members. The *Deutscher Schulverein's* principle function was to raise funds to build German schools in ethnically mixed borderlands, but it also provided subsidies for Jewish schools in German minority areas, such as Bohemia, which represented nearly half of the total membership and chapters of the *Schulverein*.[14] Schönerer's attempts to expel Jewish members by way of an Aryan paragraph in the constitution failed and he resigned from the organisation in 1886, promptly founding his own *Schulverein für Deutsche* (Schools' Association for Germans). Former *kleindeutschen* students who had become teachers joined Schönerer's organisation and indoctrinated their own pupils through schoolboy fraternities. However, Schönerer's all-or-nothing brand of anti-Semitic *kleindeutschen* nationalism failed to attract more than a handful of loyal deputies, who continued to support him when he spent four months in prison for assaulting a group of newspaper editors in 1888.[15] Schönerer spent the next nine years after his release in the political wilderness, but his absence from politics did not quash pan-German nationalism. Rather, the real strength of pan-Germanism lay in the provinces, where ex-fraternity members mobilised the middle-class pride and activist spirit of German-speakers. As these former students entered affluent society and matured

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[14] Judson's figures for 1886 show 107,835 members in 980 chapters, of which there were 44,608 members and 441 branches in Bohemia. Pieter M. Judson, *Exclusive Revolutionaries: Liberal Politics, Social Experience and National Identity in the Austrian Empire* (Ann Arbor, 1996), p. 210.
[15] Whiteside, *The Socialism of Fools*, pp. 25, 56, 124-26.

politically, they rejected the authoritarian leadership of their former mentor and a new phenomenon of pan-German nationalism emerged: 'Schönerianer-without-Schönerer'.[16]

Pan-Germanism in the Provinces

Pan-German nationalism was especially strong in ethnically mixed provinces, such as Bohemia and Styria, but it also made inroads in relatively homogeneous areas, such as Salzburg and Upper Austria, where German-nationalist associations and parties eclipsed the liberal establishment by the turn of the century. The following section will trace the rise of pan-German nationalism in Bohemia and Styria and then look at its growth in Upper Austria and Salzburg.

In Bohemia, tensions between Czechs and Germans escalated in the 1880s and 1890s during the reign of Prime Minister Count Eduard Taafe (1879-1893), who made several important concessions to the Czechs. The most significant of these was the enfranchisement of the lower middle classes in a fourth curia in 1883, which resulted in the Czech parties gaining a majority in the Bohemian parliament and the Germans subsequently boycotting the parliament. These tensions erupted in April 1897 when Taafe's successor, Count Kasimir Badeni, attempted to introduce language ordinances that required the entire civil service of Bohemia and Moravia to be fluent in both Czech and German. The Badeni Decrees sparked street riots in Vienna, Graz and throughout Bohemia, while radical and moderate German-nationalist politicians resorted to fistfights and obstructionist tactics in the Austrian parliament, forcing the successive resignations of three prime ministers and preventing any laws from being passed between 1897 and 1900. When Badeni resigned in November 1897, the Czechs held counter-demonstrations in Prague and the Austrian authorities had to impose martial law there in December. German-Czech economic relations in Bohemia were also disrupted as a result of the Badeni crisis:

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[16] Tweraser, "Carl Beurle and the Triumph of German Nationalism in Austria," p. 418; Whiteside, *The Socialism of Fools*, p. 130 passim.

German employers dismissed Czech employees who sent their children to Czech schools and Czech nationalists branded Czech clients of German and German-Jewish owned businesses as traitors.[17] Yet only a small number of Germans in northern Bohemia supported Schönerer and his goal of Austro-German unification. Pan-Germanism was grounded more widely at the local level of gymnastics associations and other sporting clubs, as well as the influential national workers' unions that represented the interests of German workers against their lower-paid Czech co-labourers.[18] Thus, what Breuilly has called 'communal nationalism' – antagonisms between different ethnic groups in a common environment – was characteristic of the nature of pan-Germanism in ethnically mixed provinces, where economic competition was politicised by a shift in power relations through franchise reform.[19]

In Styria, pan-German sentiments were fuelled by local resentment towards Slovenes who lived predominantly in the mixed borderlands of southern Styria and Carinthia and in the neighbouring Slovene province of Carniola. While the rural areas were Catholic-conservative, Styria's capital, Graz, was a bastion of liberalism and its leading newspaper, the *Grazer Tagespost*, was originally a liberal organ. German minorities in Slovene areas were the nests of liberals and German-nationalists; the Lower Styrian towns of Celje/Cilli and Maribor/Marburg were typical of the disproportion of Germans living in a Slovene hinterland with each town having its own German *Gymnasium* and German-language newspaper, the *Cillier Zeitung* and the *Marburger Zeitung*, respectively.[20] During the Taafe era and the Badeni crisis, Styria's German-language newspapers portrayed ethnic tensions in other parts of the Empire as a threat to the German-speakers of Styria. At times,

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[17] Catherine Albrecht, "The Bohemian Question," in *The Last Years of Austria-Hungary: A multinational experiment in early twentieth-century Europe*, ed. Mark Cornwall (Exeter, 2002), pp. 77-83; Whiteside, *The Socialism of Fools*, p. 219.

[18] F.L. Carsten, *The Rise of Fascism* 2nd ed. (London, 1980), pp. 38, 84; John Breuilly, *Nationalism and the State* 2nd ed. (Manchester, 1993), p. 134.

[19] Breuilly, *Nationalism and the State*, pp. 40, 71.

[20] This disproportion is evident from the 1890 census, which counted 4,452 people in the town of Celje/Cilli who used German on an everyday basis (*Umgangssprache*) and 1,577 who spoke Slovene, while in the surrounding region 36,299 spoke Slovene and only 965 used German. Judson, "'Not Another Square Foot!'": p. 87.

they accused Slovenes of having similar political motivations to the Czechs in Bohemia, printing disparaging reports about 'pan-Slavic chauvinism' from the perspective of Germans in rural communities. Articles in the *Marburger Zeitung* during 1887 referred to local Slovene newspapers as organs of the 'Slavic press' and the Slovene Credit Union as 'Slavic money'. German antagonism toward Slovenes rose sharply in 1895 with the approval for funding of parallel Slovene classes in the *Gymnasium* in Celje/Cilli. German-nationalist fraternity students at the University of Graz staged noisy demonstrations and riots on the streets of the Styrian capital and called for funding to be blocked. The Austrian parliament eventually cancelled budgetary funds for the school in January 1897. In the same year, the Badeni crisis assumed universal importance in Styria's German-nationalist press through reports of riots in other Austrian provinces and editorials that praised German courage amid national compromise.[21] Here we can see an important precursor to the arguments used by Styrian German-nationalists four decades later. By magnifying local tensions against a backdrop of broader nationalist conflicts in the Empire, the German-nationalist press used the Slovenes in Styria and the surrounding provinces as visible ammunition for projecting their national prejudices onto a larger target. Although the Empire had ceased to exist by the 1930s and only a small minority of Slovenes remained in interwar Styria, proportionality was still irrelevant to German-nationalists who saw the Slovenes as encroaching on their public space and accused them of directing their ethnic loyalties elsewhere.

In a relatively homogeneous province like Upper Austria, on the other hand, the strength of pan-German nationalism lay in its ability to provide political cohesion to the myriad liberal and German-nationalist associations. This was achieved by the creation of a successful German-nationalist party under the leadership of Carl Beurle (1860-1919). As a former *kleindeutsche* student in Vienna and an executive committee member of

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[21] Jill E. Mayer, "'By Drip and By Drop': The Discourse of German Nationalism in the Press of Habsburg Austria: Salzburg, Styria, Vienna, 1877-1897" (PhD, Manitoba, 1993), pp. 43, 61, 173-79, 224-31.

Schönerer's German Nationalist Association, Beurle belonged to the faithful minority of

Schönerianer who had remained loyal to their leader throughout the anti-Semitic campaign

of the 1880s. In 1883, he moved to Linz to pursue a legal career, where he encountered a

liberal establishment in the Chamber of Commerce, the city council and the Liberal-

Political Association. Beurle sought to overcome the liberals' stronghold by merging the

younger generation of German-nationalists with the newly enfranchised class of artisans

and shopkeepers to create a popular anti-Semitic party. Thus in 1888, he founded the

German Nationalist Association for Upper Austria and Salzburg, an autonomous regional

counterpart of Schönerer's German Nationalist Association, which succeeded in ousting a

liberal politican from the Upper Austrian parliament in 1890 and went on to win a seat in

the liberal-dominated Linz city council.[22] Meanwhile, the old liberal vanguard was

gradually being replaced by a younger generation of liberals who were prepared to

cooperate with Beurle's party against the growing Christian Social movement. In 1896,

this informal cooperation led to an electoral alliance between the liberals and German-

nationalists. The closer ties between liberals and German-nationalists were also in part due

to Beurle's private disillusionment with Schönerer, whose coarse anti-Semitism had

alienated the bulk of his sympathisers, especially in Upper Austria where anti-Semitism

was seen as a peripheral issue. In 1897, Beurle broke publicly with Schönerer by founding

the German People's Party for Upper Austria, an alliance of young liberals and German-

nationalists under a common programme of anti-clericalism and 'highbrow' anti-Semitism.

This brand of anti-Semitism argued against Jewish assimilation on the grounds of Zionist

claims to a Jewish nation and concentrated on such 'innocuous' themes as the problem of

international Jewish financiers. His party's anticlericalism also differed from Schönerer's

more aggressive anti-Catholicism. Schönerer's *Los von Rom* (No Bond with Rome)

movement in the 1890s had attempted to make conversion to the Lutheran Church a

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[22] Tweraser, "Carl Beurle and the Triumph of German Nationalism in Austria," pp. 409-15.

requirement of membership in German-nationalist organisations, but had been successful only in northern Bohemia. Beurle, on the other hand, provided a middle road for German-nationalist Catholics who wanted to keep their religion out of politics, and therefore did not join the Christian Social Party, but who also did not want to choose between their religion and their nationality.[23]

The success of Beurle's party was seen in the election of a German-nationalist mayor and two deputy mayors to the Linz city council in 1906. Moreover, many of the other city councillors were members of the *Deutscher Schulverein* and officiated over council funding requests for its projects. This kind of political power contributed to the street bravado of the German-nationalists, who demanded a ban on Czech services in St Martin's Cathedral, disrupted performances of Czech and Hungarian musicians, formed 'language purification' associations to replace foreign words with German words and launched a campaign to boycott Czech businesses and employees, despite the fact that less than a quarter of a percent of Linz's population spoke Czech or Slovak.[24] Pan-Germanism in Upper Austria was thus a local phenomenon supported primarily by youthful and upwardly mobile professionals in revolt against their liberal predecessors, but whose political success was dependent on the rising star of Beurle.[25] Beurle himself represented another kind of generational rebellion against Schönerer, who had once mesmerised his student followers but had become embarrassing and irrelevant to the increasingly confident provincial elites by the turn of the century.

German-nationalists in Salzburg had close ties with their Upper Austrian neighbours but never acquired the political weight of Beurle's party, due to the well-

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[23] Ibid., pp. 418-21. On the *Los von Rom* movement, see Chapter 10 in Whiteside, *The Socialism of Fools*, pp. 243-62.

[24] Helga Embacher, "Von Liberal zu National: Das Linzer Vereinswesen 1848-1938," *Historisches Jahrbuch der Stadt Linz* (1991): pp. 89, 95-100.

[25] This filial revolt was a literal phenomenon in Linz, where the sons of a number of prominent liberal parliamentarians of the 1870s became notorious German-nationalists in their university years. The students were motivated by what they saw as the oppression of the petty bourgeoisie by the upper middle classes, whom they identified as Jews and liberals. Ibid., pp. 73-74; Tweraser, "Carl Beurle and the Triumph of German Nationalism in Austria," p. 424.

established Catholic-conservative majority in Salzburg's provincial government.[26] Pan-Germanism's penetration into Salzburg was due to external influences in the province, in contrast to the local developments in Upper Austria or Styria. Pan-German ideas spread to Salzburg during the 1880s and 1890s as a wave of university-educated Bohemian and Moravian Germans fled the economic competition between Czechs and Germans to seek work opportunities in Salzburg in the civil service and teaching professions. As they joined Salzburg's liberal associations, they helped to export a politicised German identity to a region that had been relatively immune to nationalist ideas. Salzburg's leading newspaper, the *Salzburger Volksblatt*, founded in 1870, was representative of the generational gap between the older liberal elites and the younger German-nationalists from the borderlands. During the decades of nationalist tensions in the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the *Salzburger Volksblatt* hovered between conservative liberalism and outspoken German-nationalism, which meant that there was a noticeable tone of social concern and opposition to both clericalism and anti-Semitism in the newspaper, as well as the usual prejudices against Slavic nationalities.[27] Schönererianer were also active in the associational life of the province: in 1887, Schönerer's deputy in the German Nationalist Association, Anton Langgassner, founded the *Germanenbund* (Germania League) to spread the Teutonic cult through choral groups, sporting clubs and festivals. The aim of these local German-nationalist chapters was to socialise provincial townspeople and peasants into a milieu they would not otherwise have joined, particularly if it was violently opposed to the Catholic Church and the Habsburg emperor.[28] Pan-German nationalism was not a native phenomenon in Salzburg as it was elsewhere. It gained impetus through the careers of

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[26] After universal male suffrage was introduced in 1907, replacing the previous curial electoral system, the elections for Salzburg's parliament in 1909 resulted in 21 seats for the Christian Socials, 15 seats for the liberals and German-nationalists, and 2 seats for the Social Democrats. Nicole Felder, *Die historische Identität der österreichischen Bundesländer* (Innsbruck, 2002), p. 116.

[27] Ibid., pp. 115-16; Mayer, "By Drip and By Drop", pp. 76, 122-23, 144-54.

[28] Whiteside, *The Socialism of Fools*, pp. 122-23, 127.

Bohemian German émigrés as well as the efforts of a few Schönerianer who appealed to the German pride of middle-class and rural Salzburgers.

A Nationalist Movement?

As we have seen so far, Austrian pan-Germanism was a contested national identity whose twin aspects – Austria as a German state and Austrian Germans belonging with other Germans outside of Austria – were constructed using both civic and ethnic nationalist discourses. The salience of one particular discourse over another was dependent on political events. For example, the universal aspect of pan-German identity – all Germans living together in a single community – was rarely seen in civic terms due to the political manoeuvres to create a *kleindeutsche* state. Following the unification of Germany in 1871, only a handful of radical Austrian liberals espoused a civic interpretation of universal pan-German identity in their vision for the dismemberment of Austria-Hungary and the subsequent inclusion of all Germans in a new political state. Everyone else retreated to an ethnic conception of the universal nation, acknowledging that all Germans shared a common language and culture, but conceding that this could not feasibly work in a unified political arrangement. At the same time, those who used this ethnic discourse to construct a universal pan-German identity simultaneously defended a civic construction of Austria as a German state by seeking to maintain German political dominance in the Austro-Hungarian Empire. This differed from the ethnic discourses of Schönerer and others, who sought legal barriers of assimilation against Jews on the grounds of ethnic differences.

The contested nature of pan-German identity explains why it never formed the basis of a popular mass movement. Despite the inroads German-nationalists appeared to be making in provincial cultural and sporting associations, the liberal press and in public life, it is doubtful whether their efforts amounted to a nationalist movement. To be sure, the Badeni language ordinances became a cause célèbre for German-nationalists in the

borderlands and hinterlands of Austria, but much of the public sympathy for the Bohemian German minority came from the ranks of a small group of former fraternity students who had graduated to become teachers, lawyers and politicians in a predominantly liberal political culture. Newspaper journalists and editors writing for a wider readership also represented a minority elite and their views cannot be regarded as popular opinion. Andrew Whiteside has estimated that the radical German-nationalists constituted less than one percent of the adult German population (less than 100,000) with a further 2-3 percent who joined for a certain time. Another 10 percent sympathised with much of the movement's aims but rejected the violent extremes.[29] At best, these are generous estimates. The largest non-political association in the Empire, the *Deutscher Schulverein*, had between 100,000 and 200,000 members, which represented less than 2 per cent of the German-speaking population in Austria (excluding the Hungarian half of the Dual Monarchy), and suggests that only a small minority of Austrian Germans actively supported the campaign to Germanise the borderlands. Broader sympathies for such aims would be harder for us to substantiate from the statistical evidence available.

There is also a definitional problem of labelling pan-Germanism a national movement. Pan-Germanism, as we have seen, comprised both the particularist notion of Austria as a German state, which meant German hegemony in a multinational state, and the universalist idea embracing the unity of Austrian Germans with other Germans in Central Europe, but not necessarily in a unified political German state. If pan-Germanism was a belief in German hegemony and universal belonging, then it formed the basis for the collective identity of primarily middle-class Austrian German men and women. Although women were excluded from voting and holding office until after World War One, they had begun to seek greater visibility in many male-dominated associations by the turn of the century. For example, trouser-wearing women caused a sensation in the gymnastics

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[29] Ibid., p. 316.

leagues, where they were known as '*Jahnturnerinnen*' after the founder of the German gymnastics movement, Friedrich Ludwig Jahn. Middle-class women were also active in associations such as the *Deutscher Schulverein*. The rapid growth of women members in the *Schulverein* – 83 separate women's chapters with almost 10,000 members by 1885 – suggests that many women identified strongly with the German consciousness of their husbands, brothers, fathers and sons. It was almost certainly a woman who wrote in the *Schulverein* journal in 1884 that 'when the enemy threatens the most precious of natural possessions, the holiest legacy of our ancestors, our mother tongue, then a mother's heart is also affected.' [30]

The proponents of pan-Germanism may have succeeded in mobilising women for their cause, but they failed in all other ways to create a truly cross-class and cross-regional movement. In his otherwise comprehensive study, Whiteside's attempt to define pan-Germanism as a movement appears to refute his evidence that it was only a minority cause:

> Pan-Germanism in its original and most comprehensive sense meant no more than the general desire to promote the political and cultural unity of all Germans wherever they lived, and to make all Germans realise that to work for this unity was their highest mission....[It] repudiated the entire conventional political spectrum and the ethical, humanitarian, and religious principles that underlay the conventional political camps of both the Left and the Right....It was, in short, a movement that aimed at replacing the politics of consensus with the politics of extremism.[31]

However, the factions between *kleindeutsche* and *grossdeutsche* nationalists, between Schönerianer and Schönerianer-without-Schönerer, the generational gap between liberals and German-nationalists, and the eventual emergence of popular German parties by the 1890s, including the Social Democrats and Christian Socials (which will be discussed below), demonstrate the failure of pan-German nationalism to coalesce into a mass movement.

A further problem associated with the definition of 'pan-German' is the tendency of Anglophone historians to use the term to refer to both Schönerer's followers and the

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[30] Embacher, "Von Liberal zu National," pp. 42-45; Judson, *Exclusive Revolutionaries*, pp. 212-13.
[31] Whiteside, *The Socialism of Fools*, pp. 1, 3.

various groups advocating anti-Slav and anti-Semitic views.[32] Elsewhere, it has erroneously been rendered in English translation to mean 'greater-German'.[33] Most Austrian historians, however, use the term '*Deutschnationale*' (German-nationalists), which is more specific to the Austrian context of a multinational state and is also used in this thesis.[34] The Anglophone term causes confusion for two reasons: firstly, as we have seen, the original idea of *Gesamtdeutschtum* strove for the cultural, economic and political influence of Germans in Austria and in Central Europe generally. It was not restricted to the specific irredentist or xenophobic aspirations of any one group. Secondly, the term 'pan-German' featured in the programmes and rhetoric of all of the major political parties in the interwar period. These parties and their organs used the term repeatedly to mean both the national identification of Austria's German-speakers with other Central European Germans and the special identity of Austria as a German state. The term also later became associated with Heinrich von Srbik's pan-German school of history, which emphasised the ethnic, national and cultural histories of a universal German *Volk*. The multiple uses of the term 'pan-German' suggest that there were multiple constructions of pan-German identity in both the pre-1918 and in the interwar periods. We need to investigate these competing constructions of pan-German identity, instead of attempting to come up with broad-brush definitions of what that identity stood for. Then we can begin to dispense with such vague

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[32] For example, Whiteside takes the term 'Pan-Germans' from the translation of *Alldeutsche* (All-Germans). Whiteside, "The Germans as an Integrative Force in Imperial Austria," For this usage, see also Carl E. Schorske, "Politics in a New Key: An Austrian Triptych," *Journal of Modern History* 39, 4 (1967): 342-386; Roger Fletcher, "Karl Leuthner's Greater Germany: The Pre-1914 Pan-Germanism of an Austrian Socialist," *Canadian Review of Studies in Nationalism* 9, 1 (1982): 57-79; Tweraser, "Carl Beurle and the Triumph of German Nationalism in Austria;" Robert S. Wistrich, *Hitler and the Holocaust* (New York, 2001), p. 35. William T. Bluhm refers to pan-Germanism in connection with Schönerer, the Social Democrats and the National Socialists, which is typical of the ambiguity of this term in historiography. See William T. Bluhm, *Building an Austrian Nation: The Political Integration of a Western State* (New Haven, 1973), pp. 12-45.
[33] Michael Steinberg's reference to the 'Pan-German People's Party' is a mistranslation of the usual Greater German People's Party (*Grossdeutsche Volkspartei*). Michael Steinberg, *The Meaning of the Salzburg Festival: Austria as Theatre and Ideology, 1890-1938* (Ithaca, 1990), p. 166.
[34] For this standard usage, see Embacher, "Von Liberal zu National."

formulations as 'Germanness', which some historians, stuck for words over how to describe the ubiquitous nature of Austrian pan-Germanism, habitually use.[35]

Social Democrats, Christian Socials, and German-nationalists: The *Lager* Theory Reconsidered

The era of nationalism's ascendancy in Austria coincided with the rise of mass political movements, which began to make competing claims on the original liberal and German-nationalist idea of pan-Germanism. After the introduction of universal male suffrage in 1907, the Social Democratic and Christian Social parties overtook the liberal and German-nationalist parties in the imperial assembly and emerged as the two dominant political camps in the First Republic with a combined voting average of 80 per cent in national elections between 1919 and 1930.[36] The extent to which pan-Germanism also infiltrated these parties is important in considering their relationship to interwar German-nationalists, who continued to maintain an intellectual presence through their associations and newspapers in spite of their political divisions. The remainder of this chapter will show that rather than distinguishing German-nationalists as a third political camp alongside Christian Socials and Social Democrats, they are better seen as ideological contestants of pan-German identity, whose nationalism competed with and often complemented that of Catholics and socialists in interwar Austria.

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[35] Bruce Pauley, for example, states that 'Germanness' was 'one of the major ideological pillars of the Fatherland Front' during the 1930s. If it is major and ideological, it deserves a fuller investigation. Bruce F. Pauley, *Hitler and the Forgotten Nazis: A History of Austrian National Socialism* (Chapel Hill, 1981), p. 159.

[36] The elections between 1901 and 1911 revealed the growing strength of the Christian Social and Social Democratic parties at the expense of the liberal and German-nationalist parties: in 1901, the German People's Party had 48 seats, the Liberals 32, the Christian Socials 25, the Social Democrats 10, and Schönerer's radical All-Germans, whose constituencies were almost entirely in Bohemia, gained 21 seats (20 in Bohemia alone). In 1907, the Christian Socials became the largest party with 96 seats and the Social Democrats were the second largest with 88. The Social Democrats became the largest party in the imperial parliament after the 1911 elections. In the interwar period, the Christian Socials won 69 seats in the 1919 elections for the national assembly, 85 in 1920, 82 in 1923, 73 in 1927 and 66 in 1930, which represented an average of 40.6% of the electorate, while the Social Democrats won 72 seats in 1919, 69 in 1920, 68 in 1923, 42 in 1927 and 72 in 1930, an average of 39.9%. Whiteside, *The Socialism of Fools*, pp. 217-18, 282, 292; Erika Weinzierl and Kurt Skalnik, eds., *Österreich 1918-1938: Geschichte der Ersten Republik*, 2 vols., vol. 2 (Graz, 1983), pp. 1092-93.

The pan-Germanism of Social Democrats was evident from the outset of the party's inception in the 1880s. The founding leader of the Social Democratic Workers' Party (SDAP), Viktor Adler, was a former colleague of Schönerer, as was Engelbert Pernerstorfer, who joined the party amid the controversy over Badeni's language decrees.[37] In the wake of that crisis, the Social Democrats officially recognised separate national organisations within the Austrian labour movement at a party congress in Brno/Brünn in 1899, while at the parliamentary level the party continued to champion worker's interests and democratic reform. However, the party leadership remained self-consciously German and, after the party formally dissolved in 1911, its leaders fought to preserve the relative privileges of German workers vis-à-vis non-Germans in the Empire.[38]

The defining thinkers of Austro-Marxism, Otto Bauer and Karl Renner, who rose to prominence in the aftermath of the nationalist conflicts in the 1890s, advocated more forcefully the idea of national autonomy than their predecessors had. Renner's book, *Der Kampf der österreichischen Nationen um den Staat* (The Struggle of the Austrian Nations for the State), published under a pseudonym in 1902, described nationalities as modern 'cultural communities', as opposed to primordial ethnic clusters, and argued that individual nations within the multinational state should be given institutional autonomy on a federalist basis. He envisaged the administrative division of Austria-Hungary on national rather than territorial lines, which would allow individuals to 'opt into' national communities regardless of where they lived. Bauer's landmark study, *Die Sozialdemokratie und die Nationalitätenfrage* (Social Democracy and the Nationalities' Question), published five years after Renner's book, proposed a similar modernist view that nations were formed by a common language, which gave the working classes access to the national culture and distinguished nationalities from one another. He famously defined the nation as 'the

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[37] Whiteside, *The Socialism of Fools*, pp. 25, 91, 171.
[38] Roger Fletcher, "Socialist Nationalism in Central Europe before 1914: The Case of Karl Leuthner," *Canadian Journal of History* 17, 1 (1982): p. 38; Oliver Zimmer, *Nationalism in Europe, 1890-1940* (Basingstoke, 2003), p. 117.

totality of men bound together through a common destiny into a community of character',

and he saw workers as being more closely linked to the cultural nation than were peasants,

who identified with their region rather than the national culture. Building on Renner's

ideas, Bauer envisaged an international community of socialist nations that could be

integrated according to size and strength into the international production of labour. He

proposed, theoretically, that a surplus of German workers might be reduced by their

migration to southern Russia where a shortage of labour had occurred, but that the German

workers would remain culturally autonomous from the Ukrainians. This 'planned

colonisation' of workers would lead to a socialist society ordered according to nationality

with each member of the nation as equal participants in the national culture.[39]

Yet neither Bauer, nor Renner, nor many of the party leaders in the interwar period,

could shake their belief in German superiority, and they continued to uphold the

revolutionary ideal of German unity prior to World War Two and for most of the duration

of the war. After the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire in 1918, the SDAP was the

leading advocate of *Anschluss* in Austria. Middle-class German-nationalists, wary of

socialism, and the Christian Social Party, fearing another *Kulturkampf* against Catholics,

initially distanced themselves from union with Germany. Bauer was the chief architect and

spokesperson of the *Anschluss* idea after he succeeded Adler as party leader in 1918.

Following a brief stint as foreign minister from 1918-1919, Bauer's chief forum until 1934

was the socialist journal, *Der Kampf*, in which he continued to promote Austro-German

relations. He argued that to reject *Anschluss* would give greater licence to the political aims

of Austrian National Socialists. The 1926 Linz Programme of the SDAP advocated

Anschluss 'by peaceful means' and the party only abandoned this goal in October 1933, ten

months after Hitler had come to power in Germany, although it had not been an active

policy of the party since 1927. Throughout his exile in Czechoslovakia, and briefly in

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[39] Zimmer, *Nationalism in Europe*, pp. 115-16; Otto Bauer, "The Nationalities Question and Social Democracy (1907)," in *The Nationalism Reader*, ed. Omar Dahbour and Micheline R. Ishay (Atlantic Highlands, N.J., 1995).

Paris, between 1934 and 1938, Bauer wrote for the journal of the underground Social

Democrats, *Der sozialistische Kampf*. In April 1938, he cautioned his readers not to resist

the political union between Austria and Germany because, he believed, the eventual defeat

of Nazism would ultimately bring about the 'pan-German (*gesamtdeutsche*) revolution'

first espoused by Marx in 1848. Not all workers shared these pan-German sentiments and

the left wing of the party did not support *Anschluss*; nevertheless, the party leadership

defended its position until 1943, in contrast to their socialist counterparts in non-German

states who fought for national independence under fascist regimes.[40] Bauer never retracted

his position that Austrians were simply a tribe (*Stamm*) within the German nation.[41] Renner

went even further than Bauer: he had already gone on record in 1918 in his address to the

Provisional National Assembly of German-Austria by declaring that Austrians and

Germans were 'one tribe [*Stamm*] and one community of destiny'.[42] Austrian socialists

could acquiesce in the political unity of Austria and Germany in 1938, not because they

lacked political muscle, but because they believed that socialism would ultimately triumph

and bring about harmonious relations between Germans and non-Germans in Central

Europe. That is, they aspired less towards German hegemony in Central Europe than

towards a German cultural community that would model socialism to non-German nations.

In this sense of idealised harmony between nationalities, the pan-Germanism of Social

Democrats contrasted with the goal of German hegemony in Central Europe that Christian

Socials and German-nationalists mutually upheld.

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[40] "Das 'Linzer Programm' der Sozialdemokratischen Arbeiterpartei Österreichs, 1926," in *Die Grundsatzprogramme der österreichischen Parteien: Dokumente und Analyse*, ed. Albert Kadan and Anton Pelinka (St Pölten, 1979), p. 93; Haas, "Staats- und Landesbewusstsein in der Ersten Republik," p. 482. The Austrian Socialists' active resistance against National Socialism gained impetus after the 1943 Moscow Declaration, which stated Allied intentions to create an independent Austrian state. Alfred D. Low, "Otto Bauer, Austro-Marxism, and the *Anschluss* Movement 1918-1938," *Canadian Review of Studies in Nationalism* 6 (1979): p. 56.

[41] Bauer's description of Austria as a German tribe appeared in an article in *Der sozialistische Kampf* in June 1938, shortly before his death. See Susanne Frölich-Steffen, *Die österreichische Identität im Wandel* (Vienna, 2003), p. 47.

[42] Bluhm, *Building an Austrian Nation*, pp. 25, 30.

While the Social Democrats embodied every facet of working class life, the Christian Social Party (CSP) provided only one dimension to the broader experiences of Austrian Catholics. Together with the Church and lay organisations, the CSP made up the whole spectrum of political Catholicism, which emerged during the late-nineteenth century in response to secular liberalism and represented a Catholic renascence in Austria not seen since the pre-1848 revival of popular religious practices during the era of Josephinist reformism.[43] These different dimensions within political Catholicism were sometimes at odds with one another, over questions about working wives and youth policies, for example, but they overlapped on other issues, particularly on the question of national identity.[44]

The Christian Socials were initially unconcerned with preserving German privileges, an issue they regarded as the domain of their liberal rivals. Instead they concentrated on gaining a wider support basis among the newly enfranchised artisans and shopkeepers using an anti-Semitic trump card. The founding father of the Christian Socials, Karl Lueger (1844-1910), began his political career as a Liberal but became a left-wing Democrat to defend the 'little people' of the Viennese petty bourgeoisie against their perceived foe of Jewish liberal capitalists. Schönerer initially had patronised the anti-Semitic artisans' association that fuelled the early Christian Social movement, but had split from this group in 1882 because its leaders rejected his irredentist nationalism. Lueger remained patriotic to the Empire and he embraced the popular slogans and Pope Leo XIII's appeals for Catholic political unity, although Lueger himself had not previously been a

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[43] Popular religion, emphasising the importance of rituals, pilgrimages and supernaturalism, often clashed with the church reformists who sought to give priests greater administrative and pastoral control at the local parish level. Bans on Catholic confraternities and other disputes about religious practices gave rise to a growing anti-clericalism, which erupted in the 1848 revolutions and finally led to legal recognition of lay associations. William D. Bowman, "Popular Catholicism in *Vormärz* Austria, 1800-1848," in *Catholicism and Austrian Culture*, ed. Judith Beniston and Ritchie Robertson (Edinburgh, 1999), pp. 51-56.
[44] Andreas Lüer, "Nationalismus in Christlichsozialen Programmen 1918-1933," *Zeitgeschichte* 14, 4 (1987): p. 151; Ernst Hanisch, "Der Politische Katholizismus als Ideologischer Träger des 'Austrofaschismus'," in *'Austrofaschismus': Beiträge über Politik, Ökonomie und Kultur 1934-1938*, ed. Emmerich Tálos and Wolfgang Neugebauer (Vienna, 1988), p. 55. On the relationship between the Catholic Church, the Austrian state and lay organisations, see Laura S. Gellott, *The Catholic Church and the Authoritarian Regime in Austria, 1933-1938* (New York, 1987).

practicing Catholic. His successful blend of anti-Semitism and Catholic populism attracted

artisans, the lower clergy, aristocrats and the middle classes, who eventually merged in

1889 to form the Christian Social Party. Lueger's firebrand anti-Semitism shocked

conservatives, however, especially those of the Old Catholic vanguard in the various

parliamentary clubs of the landed aristocracy and provincial clergy; after Lueger was

elected mayor of Vienna in 1895, Emperor Franz Josef refused to ratify his election, even

seeking papal intervention, before finally acceding in 1897.[45] In the same year, the party's

ethnocentrism was exposed when its leaders joined ranks with the liberals and German-

nationalists in parliament during the Badeni crisis. Where their conservative predecessors

had professed loyalty to 'God, Emperor and Fatherland', the Christian Socials now defined

their mission as 'a German party that would always stand for the protection of the German

people's spiritual and material ownership [*Besitzstand*].'[46] This statement in the 1907 party

programme resembled the liberals' rhetoric of 'national ownership' during the 1880s and

1890s and showed the appropriation of nationalist ideology that had occurred in the

Christian Social Party since 1897.[47] Pan-German sentiments were also evident in an

Austrian-wide revival of Catholic associational life after 1900. Catholic student

fraternities, for example, were more conservative and patriotic than the previous

generation, eschewing political activism in favour of social welfare: the future Austrian

chancellor, Dollfuss, taught evening stenography classes to residents of a workers' hostel

while a fraternity student in Vienna before the First World War. However, the Austrian

patriotism of these students in no way diminished the vitality of their pan-German

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[45] Whiteside, *The Socialism of Fools*, pp. 81-90, 124, 146-48; Schorske, "Politics in a New Key," pp. 355-65. Lueger formally stated his commitment to the Christian Social movement at a golden jubilee celebration of Pope Leo XIII's priesthood in February 1888. John W. Boyer, *Political Radicalism in Late Imperial Vienna: Origins of the Christian Social Movement 1848-1897* (Chicago, 1981), p. 220. The exact date of the Party's inauguration remains unclear due to the gradual expansion of the original party nucleus to include each of the representative groups. A more recent biographer of Lueger points out that Lueger first referred to the 'Christian Social Party' in 1891. See Richard S. Geehr, *Karl Lueger: Mayor of Fin de Siècle Vienna* (Detroit, 1990), p. 341.
[46] Whiteside, *The Socialism of Fools*, pp. 170-71; Haas, "Staats- und Landesbewusstsein in der Ersten Republik," p. 475; Lüer, "Nationalismus in Christlichsozialen Programmen," p. 152.
[47] Judson, ""Not Another Square Foot!""

sentiments. In 1904, students again led noisy street demonstrations against an Italian law faculty established at the University of Innsbruck.[48] These expressions of pan-German nationalism among Christian Social politicians and Catholic student associations after 1897 set the tone for the interwar period, when the idea of a German civilising mission took on new meaning for Austrian Catholics embroiled in a battle against ideological rivals.

After 1918, Christian Socials were divided on the issue of *Anschluss* and the republic, but their commitment to pan-Germanism did not waver throughout the interwar years. Backed by a predominantly agrarian sector that had been drained by the wartime economy, the party's republican wing tended to support *Anschluss* for economic reasons, while anti-republican groups with economic interests in the Habsburg successor states advocated a Danubian Federation.[49] These divisions were far from clear-cut and, as with the Social Democrats, views on Austro-German relations shifted during the interwar years. For example, the leader of the anti-republican wing, Ignaz Seipel (1876-1932), priest and twice-appointed chancellor of Austria during the 1920s, indicated his private views on *Anschluss* in an unofficial letter to the Paris representative of the Austrian State Railways, W. Bauer, dated July 1930. In his reply to Bauer's letter, which appealed to the Chancellor to uphold Austria's neutrality in foreign policy, Seipel revealed his underlying concern that Austrians had failed to perform their historical mission of holding together the non-German nationalities of Central Europe. He regarded Austrians as 'big-state people' (*Grossstaatmenschen*), for whom *Anschluss* still remained a plausible solution for cooperating with other Germans to fulfil their Central European role. Seipel explained that he was not opposed to *Anschluss* in itself, but only to popular 'agitation', which he regarded as a 'superficial and premature' response that avoided due debate on larger

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[48] Gordon Brook-Shepherd, *The Austrians: A Thousand-Year Odyssey* (London, 1996), p. 264; Whiteside, *The Socialism of Fools*, pp. 271-74.
[49] Lüer, "Nationalismus in Christlichsozialen Programmen," p. 150.

political, economic and national considerations.[50] Publicly, however, Seipel and the influential Viennese Christian Socials were much more reticent about *Anschluss*. The official party programme of November 1926 stated its dual commitment to reconciliation between nations and the equal right of self-determination for Germans. Moreover, the programme also stressed the party's task of 'cultivating German ways' (*Pflege deutscher Art*) and combating Jewish influence in intellectual and economic spheres, which revealed the deep roots of pan-Germanism in the Christian Social camp and, at the same time, the ambiguity of the party's German-nationalist politics.[51]

During the 1930s, the Christian Socials adopted a more explicit German-nationalist position in a calculated effort to recruit young Catholic German-nationalists to the party. Here we see, as with the Social Democrats under Bauer, a deliberate strategy of wedge politics aimed at marginalising the Nazis. Where Bauer had maintained a theoretical commitment to *Anschluss* throughout the 1920s as a stopgap measure against National Socialism, the Christian Socials attempted to juxtapose Austrian patriotism with German-nationalism by narrowing the terms of pan-Germanism to cultural identity rather than ethnicity. In his 1932 commentary to the 1926 party programme, Richard Schmitz, a close confidante of Seipel's and later mayor of Vienna during the Austrofascist period, interwove references to cultural German unity with statements about Austrian character. He distinguished between '*Volkstum*', which incorporated Austria's history, landscape, religion, customs, dialects, art and music, and '*Deutschtum*', encompassing the common language and culture of all German-speakers. The duty of the Austrian *Volk* was to work towards the progress of all German people by cultivating the Austrian community as a whole, and its right to self-determination, within the German nation. Schmitz also

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[50] Paul R. Sweet, "Seipel's Views on *Anschluss* in 1928: An Unpublished Exchange of Letters," *Journal of Modern History* 19, 4 (1947): 320-323; Kurt Skalnik, "Auf der Suche nach der Identität," in *Österreich 1918-1938: Geschichte der Ersten Republik*, ed. Erika Weinzierl and Kurt Skalnik (Graz, 1983), p. 15. For a definitive biography of Seipel, see Klemens von Klemperer, *Ignaz Seipel: Christian Statesman in a Time of Crisis* (Princeton, 1972).

[51] Lüer, "Nationalismus in Christlichsozialen Programmen," pp. 156-59; "Das Programm der Christlichsozialen Partei, 1926," in *Die Grundsatzprogramme der österreichischen Parteien: Dokumente und Analyse*, ed. Albert Kadan and Anton Pelinka (St Pölten, 1979), p. 116.

disparaged the National Socialist idea of race by claiming that the true 'national' idea embraced the mind, body and spirit of the people, whereas the *'völkisch'* idea in National Socialism devalued the people by emphasising only their ethnicity, race and natural history.[52] The extent to which these ideas swayed Catholic German-nationalists away from Nazism is difficult to gauge given that political parties and elections were banned following the dissolution of parliament in 1933. However, cultural associations continued to act as vehicles for pan-German nationalism within the official channels of the Austrofascist state after 1934.

Pan-German themes of 'blood and soil' and rural purity pervaded cultural life under Austrofascism and signalled the period's shift away from the values of the cosmopolitan centre to those of the provincial periphery. Notably, the popularity of the *Heimat* movement, with its revival of rural art and poetry and local ethnographical exhibitions (*Volkskunde*), also represented a rejection of Vienna's cosmopolitan influence.[53] The government stipulated in a 1934 document that all cultural and leisure activities, which merged in 1936 under the umbrella organisation, *Neues Leben*, should reflect the patriotic sensibilities of the Austrian people (*Volkstum*) and promote everything 'that developed out of the German nation and served to cultivate respect for German achievement, work and essence.' Accordingly, the Ministry of Education's annual state prize for literature was awarded to historical novels, war literature and works that emphasised rural and religious themes.[54] Similarly in art, the proponents of the 'new' Austrian expressionism abandoned the modern motifs of Schiele and Kokoschka and reinvented religious and earthy themes in a bold neobaroque style. The Carinthian painter, Herbert Boeckl (1894-1966), was the

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[52] Lüer, "Nationalismus in Christlichsozialen Programmen," pp. 160-62.

[53] C. M. Peniston-Bird, "The Debate on Austrian National Identity in the First Republic, 1918-1938" (PhD, St Andrews, 1996), p. 238. In 1936, an English tourist visited one such *Heimatmuseum* in Kitzbühel, Tyrol, and noted 'the iron cock which was anciently mounted on the tower of the parish church', and the wrought-iron signs that used to hang from Tyrolean inns 'like pencil sketches on the air – sketches of hounds and huntsmen, of deer and elephant and white horse; of bears and dragons and golden roses and eagles; of pewter pots and crowns and wild men and edelweiss.' Nina Murdoch, *Tyrolean June: A Summer Holiday in Austrian Tyrol* (London, 1936), p. 61.

[54] Peniston-Bird, "The Debate on Austrian National Identity", pp. 344-47.

leading figure of the new expressionism and the recipient of the Austrian State Prize in 1934, which earned him a teaching appointment at the Vienna Academy of Fine Arts.[55]

Perhaps the most prominent Catholic figure to espouse a pan-German cultural ideology was Hans Brečka (1885-1954), Viennese theatre critic and cultural editor of the Christian Social newspaper, *Reichspost*. In the interwar years, Brečka was director of the party's *Kunststelle für christliche Volksbildung* (Office for the Arts for Christian National Education), a government-sponsored theatre agency that subsidised tickets for workers, employees and students to performances and concerts deemed culturally appropriate for Catholic audiences.[56] Under the Austrofascist state, Brečka was given charge of the new *Österreichische Kunststelle* that replaced all of the theatre agencies, including those of the Social Democrats and other independent groups. During this period, Brečka promoted works by lay Catholic theatre companies (*Laienspiele*) alongside the professional repertoire, as well his other pet genre, folk-dialect dramas, which glorified rural life and elevated the moral stature of peasants. He also established links with the Berlin-based *Deutscher Bühnenvolksbund* (German National Stage Association), an anti-Semitic body that sponsored German folk theatre works, particularly those by the Catholic amateur drama troupes. After 1938, Brečka continued to direct the renamed *Deutschösterreichische Kunststelle* under the auspices of the Nazi Office for Regional Culture (*Landeskulturamt*). Shortly after *Anschluss*, Brečka wrote in the *Reichspost* that Vienna's theatres could now showcase '*German* theatre...provided by German performers and tied to our cultural duty

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[55] Among his other religious motifs, Boeckl's still-life works depicted death as part of the life cycle of birth and resurrection. On the interwar expressionists and their distance both from Austrian Secessionism and other contemporary trends in European art (Bauhaus, Dada, Surrealism, Cubism, Neue Sachlichkeit), see Wieland Schmied, "Die österreichische Malerei in den Zwischenkriegsjahren," in *Österreich 1918-1938: Geschichte der Ersten Republik*, 2 vols., vol. 2 (Graz, 1983), pp. 685-703. See also Ernst Hanisch, *Der Lange Schatten des Staates: Österreichische Gesellschaftsgeschichte im 20. Jahrhundert* (Vienna, 1994), pp. 331-32; Gerbert Frodl, *Herbert Boeckl* (Salzburg, 1976).
[56] For example, the inaugural season programme in 1920 featured performances of Mozart, Beethoven, Haydn and Nestroy, reflecting both patriotic Austrian and classical German choices, as well as works by the contemporary Austrian Catholic playwright, Richard von Kralik, and a series of church concerts and organ recitals.

to promote German art.'[57] However, Brečka had already exemplified this pan-German ideology in his earlier patronage of folk plays and Catholic drama troupes, which combined German-nationalism and religion in a distinctly Austrian cultural genre.

The leading exception to the pan-Germanism of Christian Socials was the sociologist and political writer, Ernst Karl Winter (1895-1959), most renowned as a member of the Austrian Action group of young Catholic intellectuals. This group took its name from a collection of essays, written by Winter, Alfred Missong, August Maria Knoll and others, which was first published in 1927 under the title 'Austrian Action'. Winter and his colleagues represented a small left-wing faction in the Christian Social Party, whose writings fused pan-European and Austrianist ideology into an idea of an Austrian nation in the tradition of a *Staatsnation*. They acknowledged Austria as the 'German-speaking centre of Europe', but rejected the Germanic myth, instead espousing the idea of an 'Austrian man', who was ethnically a mix of Slav and German and more concerned with humanity and knowledge than with power and progress. As left-wing Austrian patriots loyal to the imperial idea, they upheld the legitimacy of monarchical states and advocated a 'social monarchy' as a form of government that would 'stand on the right' against democratic liberalism, but 'think with the left' in its support of the proletariat.[58] After the ban on the Social Democrats in February 1934, Dollfuss appointed Winter third deputy mayor of Vienna to conciliate the workers' movement, but the government shut down this initiative in 1936 after it failed to attract workers' support. Winter fled Austria in 1938 and only returned in 1955, when his formerly radical ideas about Austrian nationhood and Catholic-

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[57] Judith Beniston, "Cultural Politics in the First Republic: Hans Brecka and the 'Kunststelle für christliche Volksbildung'," in *Catholicism and Austrian Culture*, ed. Judith Beniston and Ritchie Robertson (Edinburgh, 1999). Italics in original quote.
[58] Stanley Suval, *The Anschluss Question in the Weimar Era: A Study of Nationalism in Germany and Austria 1918-32* (Baltimore, 1974), pp. 198-102; Bluhm, *Building an Austrian Nation*, pp. 42-43. For a detailed discussion of the Austrian Action programme, and Winter's ideas on Catholic socialism, see Alfred Diament, *Austrian Catholics and the First Republic: Democracy, Capitalism and the Social Order, 1918-1934* (Princeton, 1960), pp.125-30, 220-29.

socialist cooperation became mainstream thought in the post-war successor party to the

Christian Socials, the ÖVP.[59]

In contrast to the populist Christian Social Party and the dense party networks of

the Social Democrats, German-nationalist parties remained splintered by factions that

continued to hinder their political success after 1918. In 1910, moderate German-

nationalists and liberals amalgamated for the first time in the German National Club

(*Deutsche Nationalverband*), which was hastily formed to recover German-nationalist

mandates lost in the 1907 election to the Social Democrats. The German Agrarian Party,

founded in 1905, and the German Workers' Party, formed in Bohemia in 1904, completed

the spectrum of German-nationalist parties in the pre-war period.[60] German-nationalists did

not play a major role in the foundation of the First Republic, winning only 26 of 170 seats

in the constitutional assembly of February 1919. As a result of this poor performance,

seventeen different German-nationalist parties united to form the Greater German People's

Party (GdVP) in time for the first national elections in October 1920; notably, the National

Socialists and the Agrarian League (formerly the German Workers' Party and German

Agrarian Party) did not join.[61] Immediately prior to the party's political debut, GdVP

leaders convened in Salzburg to formulate a programme, whose central basis was the two-

pronged idea of a '*Volksgemeinschaft*' comprising a 'labour community'

(*Arbeitsgemeinschaft*) and a 'cultural community' (*Kulturgemeinschaft*) opposed to the

internationalist influences of Judaism, Marxism and Catholicism.[62] However, the Greater

Germans' support fluctuated during the 1920s and the party often inflated its membership

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[59] Bluhm, *Building an Austrian Nation*, p. 43; Friedrich Scheu, *Der Weg ins Ungewisse: Österreichs Schicksalskurve 1929-1938* (Vienna, 1972), pp. 200-1; Fritz Fellner, "The Problem of the Austrian Nation after 1945," *Journal of Modern History* 60 (1988): pp. 271-73. For a biography of Winter, see K.H. Heinz, *Ernst Karl Winter: Ein Katholik zwischen Österreichs Fronten 1933-1938* (Vienna, 1984).
[60] Klaus Berchtold, ed., *Österreichische Parteiprogramme, 1868-1966* (Vienna, 1967), pp. 82-83; Carsten, *The Rise of Fascism*, p. 38.
[61] Friedrich Weissensteiner, *Der Ungeliebte Staat: Österreich zwischen 1918 und 1938* (Vienna, 1990), p. 36; Adam Wandruszka, "Das 'nationale' Lager," in *Österreich 1918-1938: Geschichte der Ersten Republik*, ed. Erika Weinzierl and Kurt Skalnik (Graz, 1983), pp. 277-82.
[62] "Das 'Salzburger Programm' der Grossdeutschen Volkspartei, 1920," in *Österreichische Parteiprogramme, 1868-1966*, ed. Berchtold Klaus (Vienna, 1967).

figures. It gained a lower overall percentile in the 1920 election than in 1919, and its most successful candidates in 1920 were in provincial centres, such as Salzburg (23.6%), Linz (21.1%) and Graz (21%). Initially, most of these voters saw the Greater Germans as the only party that represented their interests but, once the NSDAP had become an electoral contender, the Greater Germans' support plummeted in national and regional elections after 1930 and the party remnants finally disbanded in 1934.[63] Historians now regard the main contribution of the GdVP as having made National Socialism socially acceptable (*salonfähig*) in middle-class circles.[64]

Despite their political disarray, German-nationalists were influential beyond political life through their expanse of cultural associations and the provincial press. After the organs of the Nazi, Communist and Social Democratic parties were banned by the Austrofascist state, German-nationalist associations and publications continued to promote pan-German ideas alongside the official ideological apparatus of the state. For example, the powerful teachers unions that had been dominated by German-nationalists in the provinces since the 1880s were able to exploit the ambiguous national rhetoric of the Austrofascists towards their own end of broadening public sympathies for the *Anschluss*. Whereas the official pedagogical journals stressed religious and patriotic duty to the Austrian fatherland, German-nationalist journals asserted that 'true religiosity' was the identification with the German people. German-nationalist teachers also indoctrinated their pupils by adapting the patriotic propaganda in the state curriculum to promote *Anschluss*.

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[63] Thomas Dostal, "Die Grossdeutsche Volkspartei," in *Handbuch des politischen Systems Österreichs: Erste Republik 1918-1933*, ed. Emmerich Tálos, et al. (Vienna, 1995), pp. 198, 204; Herbert Dachs, "Das Parteiensystem," in *Handbuch des politischen Systems Österreichs: Erste Republik 1918-1933*, ed. Emmerich Tálos, et al. (Vienna, 1995), p. 146. See Weinzierl and Skalnik, eds., *Österreich 1918-1938: Geschichte der Ersten Republik*, pp. 1092-93 on figures for national elections. In 1932, the NSDAP won almost 21 per cent in Salzburg's regional elections, compared to less than 2 percent for the Greater Germans. Ernst Hanisch, "Salzburg," in *Österreich 1918-1938: Geschichte der Ersten Republik*, ed. Erika Weinzierl and Kurt Skalnik (Graz, 1983), p. 909. The NSDAP won 4 seats in the federal parliament on the basis of the result in 1932. Gerhard Jagschitz, "Die Nationalsozialistische Partei," in *Handbuch des politischen Systems Österreichs: Erste Republik 1918-1933*, ed. Emmerich Tálos, et al. (Vienna, 1995), p. 236. Once the Nazi Party came to power in Germany in 1933, the Greater Germans struggled to attract German financial backing because of pressure to align with the Austrian Nazis. The Greater Germans finally disbanded in 1934 after Germany formally withdrew its financial support. See Alfred D. Low, *The Anschluss Movement, 1931-1938, and the Great Powers* (Boulder, 1985), pp. 114-15.
[64] Dostal, "Die Grossdeutsche Volkspartei," p. 206; Hanisch, "Salzburg," p. 917.

As part of the elementary literacy programme, for example, teachers were required to teach an 'Austrian ABC' in which each letter of the alphabet corresponded to a patriotic term: 'C' for *Christentum* (Christianity), 'D' for *Deutschtum* (Germandom) and 'V' for *Vaterland* (Fatherland). But while Catholic teachers instructed pupils that Austrian Germandom was the heir of the Holy Roman Empire charged with the historical mission of bringing peace to the nations of Europe, their German-nationalist counterparts taught that Austrians' historical roots in the German nation demanded their inclusion in a greater-German state. Students, especially those in the larger towns where German-nationalist associations were strongest, remained sceptical towards the idea of an Austrian fatherland and tended to embrace Germany more enthusiastically.[65] In education, at least, German-nationalists were well established and influential in their role of promoting pan-German ideas at the local level. The Austrofascist propaganda machine was not able to dent those long-standing traditions.

The most significant evidence of the influence of German-nationalists in cultural and intellectual life was the provincial press. Chapter Two will analyse in more detail the development of the press in Austria from the period of the Empire to the Austrofascist state, but it should be pointed out here also that the leading German-nationalist newspapers in interwar Austria were published in provincial centres, such as Graz, Salzburg and Linz, where German-nationalists had infiltrated liberal circles in the 1880s. German-nationalist newspapers continued to circulate after 1934, albeit with surveillance from the Fatherland Front and *Heimwehr*, but they were also required to print official copy from the propaganda office and remain neutral on the question of Austro-German relations. During this period, the German-nationalist press pondered the issues of national minorities and Jewish immigration from their particular ideological vantage point of pan-Germanism.

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[65] Carla Esden-Tempska, "Civic Education in Authoritarian Austria," *History of Education Quarterly* 30, 2 (1990): pp. 203-11; Herbert Dachs, "'Austrofaschismus' und Schule: Ein Instrumentalisierungsversuch," in *'Austrofaschismus': Beiträge über Politik, Ökonomie und Kultur 1934-1938*, ed. Emmerich Tálos and Wolfgang Neugebauer (Vienna, 1988), pp. 186-94.

Whether or not these topics reflected the newspapers' genuine concerns, or whether they were merely intended to stave off a decline in the readership amid heavy censorship, German-nationalist editors betted correctly that pan-German rhetoric about German hegemony and homogeneity in Austria whetted the insatiable appetites not only of readers of the German-nationalist press, but also of the press functionaries of the Austrofascist state.

While pan-Germanism was a pervasive current in Christian Socialist and German-nationalist circles and, to a lesser extent, amongst the leadership of the Social Democrats, it also had become influential in certain academic quarters by the 1930s. After World War One, the Viennese historian, Heinrich von Srbik (1878-1951), sought to overcome the Prusso-centric view of German historians and the Austro-Catholic emphasis of much Austrian historical research by positing a new pan-German conceptual framework for history (*Gesamtdeutsche Geschichtsauffassung*). Srbik's pan-German historical thought adopted the Rankean idea of a *Zeitgeist* propelling individuals towards a common destiny, which, for Srbik, was the German desire for community. This pan-German idea sought to link the universal German nation, the Central European idea of German unity, and the tradition of German statehood within a common historical framework.[66] As a student, Srbik had belonged to a radical fraternity at the University of Vienna, although he rejected what he saw in Schönerer's followers as 'the narrow-minded beer-hall politics of the unshaven.'[67] Instead, he preferred to be politically engaged as a scholar, which was not unusual for scholars at that time in Austria or Germany. His 1925 biography of Metternich made him a public figure in Austria and, in 1929, he was appointed for one year as Minister of Education under Christian Social Chancellor Johannes Schober. He was in demand as a lecturer in Germany, even turning down the prestigious offer of a chair at the University of Berlin. In 1936, Schuschnigg mooted him as a possible candidate for vice-

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[66] Paul R. Sweet, "The Historical Writing of Heinrich von Srbik," *History and Theory* 9, 1 (1970): pp. 46-47.
[67] Whiteside, *The Socialism of Fools*, p. 143.

chancellor to appease growing public sympathies with National Socialism. After the

Anschluss, Srbik joined the NSDAP and the German Reichstag and was appointed

President of the Academy of Sciences in Vienna, remaining in his post until 1945.[68]

Srbik's pan-German historicism was best encapsulated in his second and

monumental work, *Deutsche Einheit* (German Unity). Published in four volumes between

1935 and 1942, this work dealt with the period from the Holy Roman Empire to Austria's

defeat by Prussia in 1866. Writing his conclusion four years after Austro-German unity had

been realised, Srbik stated that

> Germany has carried her 1000-year mission and role of leadership to the
> very frontiers of the Western World…. Not as imperialism, and not on
> the basis of a humanitarian ideal, but grounded rather in a new idea, that
> of *Volkstum*, which recognises the personalities of nations and
> organically attaches the small nations to the leadership of the great
> *Volk*.[69]

This statement summed up Srbik's belief that the German people as a whole were destined

for greatness in Europe and that National Socialism was the fulfilment of this pan-German

idea. In his third and final major work, *Geist und Geschichte vom deutschen Humanismus*

zur Gegenwart (The Spirit and History of German Humanism to the Present), published

posthumously by his former students, Srbik openly acknowledged that his own

historiographical position stood alongside other extreme nationalist theories of the early-

twentieth century. Although he distanced himself from Nazi barbarity, he defended his

historical concept of racial and national unity that was at the core of National Socialism

and he urged future generations of German scholars to continue the idealist tradition in the

spirit of Ranke and Goethe.[70]

The parallels between Srbik's historical thought and National Socialism raise

questions also about the importance of pan-German ideas in other political-cultural

milieux. As we have seen, pan-Germanism was present in much of the theory and political

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[68] John Haag, "Heinrich von Srbik," in *Encyclopedia of Historians and Historical Writing*, ed. Kelly Boyd (London, 1999), pp. 1142-43; Sweet, "The Historical Writing of Heinrich von Srbik," pp. 45, 51.
[69] Sweet, "The Historical Writing of Heinrich von Srbik," pp. 47-48.
[70] Haag, "Heinrich von Srbik," pp. 1142-43; Sweet, "The Historical Writing of Heinrich von Srbik," p. 56.

rhetoric of leading theorists and public figures within both the Social Democratic and Christian Social Parties and it became an all-consuming racial idea among German-nationalists. Yet historical scholarship of interwar Austria has still not addressed the extent to which pan-Germanism shaped the national identity of Austrians and allowed their perception of 'being German' to govern other political, social, religious or regional forms of identity. Although historians might give cursory consideration to the question of pan-German identity in the interwar period, it is, on the whole, glossed over.[71]

This astonishing lacuna in the historiography of interwar Austria reflects the tendency of most historians to interpret Austrian politics and society according to the so-called *Lager* theory, which has already been mentioned at the beginning of Chapter One. The Austrian historian, Adam Wandruszka, first developed this theory in 1954 and the vast majority of Austrian historians, including Anglophones, have accepted it uncritically.[72] Andrew Whiteside, for example, has argued that the three camps were established in 1895 with the formation of the Social Democratic, Christian Social and German People's Parties. Yet he is adept at tracing the political fissures and nomenclature of the so-called 'national' camp, which was divided into Greater-Germans, Little-Germans, All-Germans, German-Nationalists, German Liberals, German Libertarians, Greater Austrians, and so on.[73]

One critic of the *Lager* theory, Detlef Lehnert, whose comparative research on Weimar Germany and the First Republic deals with communal politics and political culture, argues that the 'three-camp' system is historically flawed and ideologically fraught for the interwar period. Firstly, it does not recognise the political divisions between Social Democrats and Communists in the 'socialist' camp and it overlooks the German-nationalist

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[71] An exception to the rule is Anton Pelinka, "Austrian Identity and the 'Ständestaat'," in *The Habsburg Legacy: National Identity in Historical Perspective*, ed. Ritchie Robertson and Edward Timms (Edinburgh, 1994). Anton Staudinger and Michael Steinberg have given more extensive consideration to the pan-German idea within Austrofascist ideology, though neither offers a particularly rigorous definition of pan-Germanism.
[72] Detlef Lehnert, "Politisch-kulturelle Integrationsmilieus und Orientierungslager in einer polarisierten Massengesellschaft," in *Handbuch des politischen Systems Österreichs: Erste Republik 1918-1933*, ed. Emmerich Tálos, et al. (Vienna, 1995), p. 431.
[73] Whiteside, *The Socialism of Fools*, pp. 25, 41.

sympathies of right-wing Social Democrats, notably Karl Renner. Secondly, it distinguishes between Christian Socials and German-nationalists, in spite of their mutual ideological sympathies in many cases and the fact that they were in a coalition government during the 1920s. Finally, and more seriously, the theory also seeks to give historical legitimation to the post-1945 party of rehabilitated Austrian Nazis, the League of Independents (VdU), which formed in 1949 and later was re-named the Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ).

Lehnert does not dispense with the notion of camps altogether, but he reconfigures their meaning in terms of 'orientation', that is, the party to which an individual gravitated, due to political convictions, family tradition, or by association, through membership in a union, for example. However, this 'orientation camp' could include multiple social and cultural 'integrative milieux' that socialised individuals or groups into a particular worldview.[74] A camp could consist of different milieux: militant anti-clericals and Catholic German-nationalists could be found in the same cafes, reading the same newspapers and attending the same rallies. As we have seen, prior to 1914, it was at the provincial associational level that a liberal politician, German-nationalist journalist and Catholic schoolteacher might have attended a village fundraiser for a new German school in an ethnically mixed region. Evan Burr Bukey has shown a similar pattern for Upper Austria during the 1920s, where a close network of cooperation existed between Social Democratic, Christian Social and German-nationalist politicians, based on shared *Anschluss* sympathies and an informal system of 'consociational democracy' aimed at containing the political ambitions of the *Heimwehr* and NSDAP in the early 1920s. Many of these politicians had held office before 1914 and developed a sense of solidarity during the war that they maintained after 1918. The Upper Austrian governor, Johann Nepomuk Hauser, dubbed the 'Red Prelate' for his conciliatory relations with Social Democrats in

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[74] Lehnert, "Politisch-kulturelle Integrationsmilieus und Orientierungslager."

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Linz, provides an interesting example of a public figure working in a provincial 'political-cultural milieu' within the 'orientation camp' of the Christian Social Party, but whose strained relationship with the ultra-conservative Bishop Johannes Gföllner in Linz also made him an outsider in the milieu of the Austrian clergy.[75]

A revision of the *Lager* theory might also help us further to understand the similarities and dissimilarities between the identity discourses of rival groups. It may help to explain why civic constructions of pan-Germanism tended to find broader consensus at times of political upheaval, in spite of competing ethnic visions of the national identity. For example, after the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, all of the major political parties in the new Austrian state envisaged pan-German identity in civic terms of a conjoined state of Germans in Germany and Austria, and it was only the Allied objection to this arrangement that prevented its fulfilment. The entry of National Socialist ideology into the contested arena of pan-German identity caused another shift in nationalist discourses. Those who rejected Nazi ideology, the Christian Socials and Social Democrats, also rejected the prospect of political unity under a National Socialist state and espoused instead an ethnic vision of universal pan-German identity. Those who supported Nazi ideology, by contrast, embraced the civic project of universal pan-German nationhood under the banner of National Socialism. They in turn rejected the alternative civic vision of Austria as an independent German state, which the opponents of National Socialism advocated more forcefully after 1933.

The persistent *Lager* theory may require further research if it is to be dismantled finally, or at least refined in the way that Lehner suggests and Bukey has probed in his provincial case study. Nonetheless, the breadth of pan-Germanism across diverse political-cultural milieux in the interwar period suggests that ideological sympathies and political relationships were more fluid than one would otherwise expect from a society locked into

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[75] Evan Burr Bukey, *Hitler's Hometown: Linz, Austria, 1908-1945* (Bloomington, 1986), pp. 39-74.

apparently divided political camps. Thus, while censorship and editorial coercion under the Austrofascist regime prevented the German-nationalist press from voicing its sympathies with National Socialism, there was also a wide margin of freedom in which the newspapers could continue to articulate their pan-German idea of the national community and still maintain a considerable degree of editorial autonomy. There was *Gleichschaltung*, but with healthy doses of pan-German rhetoric to assuage the editors' national consciousness and retain readers' interest. The next chapter will trace the political and intellectual landscape in which German-nationalist newspapers came to dominate the provincial public sphere, only to become a part of the landscape itself under Austrofascism.

2

PRESS AND POLITICS

This chapter sets the scene for the analysis of the German-nationalist newspapers in the remaining chapters. In the previous two chapters we were introduced to the newspapers and their political-cultural milieu and we observed how the press was not only a product of, but also a participant in the pan-Germanism that evolved and radicalised over the course of a century. This chapter weaves together both the traditional approach of examining the institutional role of the press in political and cultural life and more recent approaches of viewing the press as a text. It traces the growth of the political press from the birth of the first daily newspapers in the Austro-Hungarian Empire to the explosion of the popular press in the First Republic. It considers both the extent and limitations of viewing newspapers through the eyes of the reading public. Finally, it charts the political events of the late 1920s and 1930s that led to press censorship under Austrofascism and it looks especially at the status of the German-nationalist press vis-à-vis the regime's efforts to curtail press freedoms. My thesis argues that the relationship between German-nationalists and Austrofascists in this period was based more on cooperation than coercion and, therefore, we need to look at a specific example of this cooperation – the press – to enable us to draw conclusions from the case studies I present in subsequent chapters.

The Empire's Newspapers

The political and institutional traditions of Austrian journalism under the Habsburg Monarchy lagged behind those of France and Germany.[1] The expansion of France's press was the product of a reading 'revolution' that coincided with the French Revolution and corresponded with the growth of booksellers and book printing from the late-eighteenth

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[1] Kenneth E. Olson, *The History Makers: The Press of Europe from its Beginnings through 1965* (Baton Rouge, 1966).

century.[2] This 'revolution in reading' occurred half a century later in Germany and reflected a later trend of urbanisation after unification in 1871. The urban explosion in the German Empire saw Berlin's population increase from 400,000 in 1848 to 2 million in 1905, with a further 1.5 million inhabitants in the suburban belt around the city. Urban migration sent newspaper circulations soaring by the end of the century. Berlin's leading newspaper, the *Berliner Morgenpost*, had a circulation of 400,000 in 1914, which meant in a city of some 3.5 million approximately one in nine Berliners bought the city's main newspaper. Consequently, the numbers of readers for each newspaper decreased dramatically in Germany's urban centres. Figures for Bremen show that there were 25 readers for every newspaper in 1841, 5 by 1885, and only two readers per newspaper by the beginning of the twentieth century. By these standards, Austria was on a par with Germany's provincial cities. Vienna's newspaper readership was equivalent to that of Bremen, not Berlin, and the circulation of the leading Viennese newspapers was less than one-fourth that of the *Berliner Morgenpost*.[3]

Although this disparity can be partially attributed to Vienna's smaller population, around two million before the war, it also indicates a difference in political taste and consumption in the two capitals. The leading newspapers in Berlin were the flagships of the city's major publishing houses, boulevard dailies that peddled sensationalism and consumerism. The first of these, the *Berliner Lokal-Anzeiger*, first appeared in 1883 and rapidly became the city's largest newspaper with a circulation of 123,500 in 1889. It was soon overtaken by the *Berliner Morgenpost*, which embodied the new street-style journalism of local news and gossip columns. The *Morgenpost* also published national and international news and supported a democratic programme of civic improvement without any real political commitment to social reform. This formula obviously suited Berlin's working population: the *Morgenpost* sold outside factories and was a household item in

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[2] James Smith Allen, *In the Public Eye: A History of Reading in Modern France, 1800-1940* (Princeton, 1991), pp. 42-43, 52-53.
[3] Peter Fritzsche, *Reading Berlin 1900* (Cambridge, MA, 1996), pp. 7-8, 51-53.

workers' quarters, while the socialist organ, *Vorwärts*, relied on subscriptions and sold barely one eighth of the *Morgenpost's* circulation. Similarly, the other established political newspapers, including the *Welt am Montag* and the *Berliner Volkszeitung*, each sold less than 100,000 copies before World War One.[4]

In contrast to Berlin, the leading Viennese newspapers before the war were strictly partisan organs. The first Austrian newspapers to gain mass readerships were liberal and emerged after the failed revolutions of 1848. Austria's premier daily, the *Neue Freie Presse*, was established in 1864 and its circulation climbed steadily to 55,000 in 1901 with a large readership throughout the Empire and abroad.[5] Indeed, the press played an integral role in the rise of Austrian liberalism after 1848. Newspaper editors developed personal and professional relationships with politicians through the liberal clubs and reading circles that emerged in the revolutionary year. Liberal newspapers educated their readers in these clubs and circles about their civic responsibilities and political rights. Pieter Judson has argued that this voluntary associational model of political participation allowed for the growth and continuity of liberal ideology throughout the era of liberal politics.[6] However, while in France the growth in associational life and the press during the nineteenth century strengthened participation in a democratic political culture, the 'exclusive revolutionaries' of Austrian liberalism were constrained by their factionalism and ethnocentrism, as we saw in Chapter One.[7] Instead, it was the emergence of mass political movements in the late-nineteenth century that socialised individuals into political parties and eclipsed the liberals and German-nationalists on the eve of the First World War.

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[4] Ibid., pp. 72-78.

[5] Kurt Paupié, *Handbuch der Österreichischen Pressegeschichte, 1848-1959* 2 vols., vol. 1 (Vienna, 1960), p. 144.

[6] Pieter M. Judson, *Exclusive Revolutionaries: Liberal Politics, Social Experience and National Identity in the Austrian Empire* (1996), pp. 43-44, 96-97.

[7] Philip Nord has argued that the press was central to the formation of French republican political culture. Writing for or reading a newspaper was a way of participating in democratic citizenship in the Third Republic, similar to attending a civil funeral ceremony or visiting the local library. See Philip Nord, *The Republican Movement: Struggles for Democracy in Nineteenth-Century France* (Cambridge, MA., 1995).

While the liberal press facilitated the rise of liberal politics, the newspapers of Austria's mass political movements emerged through the parties themselves. The Social Democratic Party, for example, was founded in January 1889 and its organ, the *Arbeiter-Zeitung*, appeared in July the same year. By 1900, the newspaper had a circulation of 24,000, and had climbed to 54,000 by 1914. The *Arbeiter-Zeitung* initially had a smaller circulation than the major liberal dailies, but after the war its circulation rose dramatically to 112,000, surpassing the *Neue Freie Presse*, which peaked at 78,000 in 1930.[8] On the other hand, the Christian Social organ, the *Reichspost*, did not appear until four years after the party's inauguration in 1889. This reflected a generally later development of the Catholic press in Austria. In 1892, for example, Austria-Hungary had only six daily Catholic newspapers and around two-dozen weekly journals and newspapers. On average, there was one newspaper for 250,000 Catholics in the Austro-Hungarian Empire, while Germany had one newspaper for 65,000 Catholics. Austria's Catholic press had a more modest circulation than the liberal and socialist newspapers on the whole, since the parish priest remained the chief organ of political opinion for most rural Catholics. Against the wishes of clerical conservatives in the provincial parliamentary clubs, the leaders of the new Christian Social Party introduced the *Reichspost* as a cheap popular daily newspaper for Austrian Catholics. Consequently, while the provincial Catholic press remained largely in the hands and printing presses of the clergy and had a very low circulation, the *Reichspost* gradually increased its circulation from 6,000 in 1901 to 36,000 in 1914, peaking at 50,000 in 1923.[9]

The turn of the century had witnessed a growing confidence and progression in Austria's political press, matching Germany's press revolution in speed if not in output. But while Germany's leading newspapers played to consumer tastes, the Austrian press remained elitist and catered primarily for political readers. This was also partly due to

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[8] Paupié, *Handbuch der Österreichischen Presse*, pp. 83, 88-89, 144.
[9] Ibid., pp. 94-101.

imperial laws that banned street sales of newspapers, hampering the growth of the boulevard press until the interwar decades, as we will see below. Nonetheless, it could be said of Austria, as of the rest of Europe, that the press had come to represent a 'fourth estate' by the eve of World War One.[10]

The Press in the First Republic

In the aftermath of defeat, the self-pride and innovation that had characterised Austria's press revolution disappeared along with the loss of empire, which some tried to replace with radical ideologies and others with nostalgia for the past. The Viennese newspapers with the largest readerships prior to 1918 suffered the most losses after the dismemberment of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, a trend that was also evident in interwar France, where the provincial press grew at the expense of the Parisian newspapers.[11] In Austria, the loss of imperial territories reduced the overall size and influence of the Viennese press, although the capital remained the largest producer and consumer of news in the First Republic. Adding insult to injury, the boulevard press enjoyed a booming trade after an imperial ban on street and door-to-door selling (*Kolportagesverbot*) was lifted in 1922 and newspapers were sold from street vendors.[12] This development saw the circulation of popular tabloids equal or overtake the political press. In 1925, for example, the most popular tabloid, *Der Abend*, sold 100,000 copies daily while the *Arbeiter-Zeitung* sold 112,000 and the *Neue Freie Presse* and the *Reichspost* each sold 75,000 and 50,000 respectively.[13] Most of the newspapers founded during the interwar years were tabloids; 23

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[10] "Introduction" in Malcolm Gee and Tim Kirk, eds., *Printed Matters: Printing, Publishing and Urban Culture in Europe in the Modern Period* (Aldershot, 2002), pp. 4-5.

[11] Allen, *In the Public Eye*, pp. 42-43. In 1939, for example, France's provincial daily newspapers had 50 per cent of the country's total readership, which represented a 15 per cent increase from 1914. Theodore Zeldin, *France, 1848-1945* 3 vols., vol. 2 (Oxford, 1977), pp. 536-37.

[12] The ban, which had been in place since the 1870s, licensed the state-owned tobacco agents to sell newspapers, giving them a monopoly on press sales and allowing government officials to issue and revoke licences at will. Jill E. Mayer, "'By Drip and By Drop': The Discourse of German Nationalism in the Press of Habsburg Austria: Salzburg, Styria, Vienna, 1877-1897" (PhD, Manitoba, 1993), p. 94.

[13] Fritz Csoklich, "Presse und Rundfunk," in *Österreich 1918-1938: Geschichte der Ersten Republik*, ed. Erika Weinzierl and Kurt Skalnik (Graz, 1983), p. 718.

titles appeared in Vienna alone in 1933, an astonishing publishing surge that had not previously been seen since the revolutionary year of 1848. However, many of the new newspapers folded as quickly as they had sprung up due to lack of funding and a competitive market.[14]

As smaller newspapers struggled to get off the ground, the established newspapers also encountered the burdens of high production costs, taxes on advertising and the coffeehouse custom of providing in-house reading for patrons, which reduced the overall number of subscriptions.[15] This particularly affected the press industry in the years immediately following World War One, when paper and ink shortages and work strikes frequently disrupted publication schedules and newspapers often appeared with a reduced number of pages and illegible ink-print.[16] The low income of workers and farmers prevented many readers from affording the subscription rates of the daily newspapers. Thus the cheaper weekly press became the most popular medium in the interwar period, growing from 52 to 69 per cent of the newspaper market between 1914 and 1930, compared to a decline in the daily press from 7 to 6 per cent in the same time period.[17]

In spite of this loss of prestige, increased competition with tabloid newspapers and general economic hardship, the established press in Austria still maintained a high quality of news coverage by international standards. The Paris correspondent for the *Manchester Guardian*, Robert Dell, attested to the high standard of Austria's newspapers in an article he wrote for *Current History* in 1931. He blamed the comparatively lower standards and corruption of the French press on the meager salaries of journalists and the government-subsidised opinion journals. Alongside France, the state-monitored press in Italy and

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[14] Paupié, *Handbuch der Österreichischen Presse*, pp. 40, 58.
[15] Claudia Grillhofer, "Die Öffentlichkeitsarbeit wird 'amtlich': Zur Geschichte der Wiener 'Rathaus-Korrespondenz' in der Ersten Republik," in *Kreativität aus der Krise: Konzepte zur gesellschaftlichen Kommunikation in der Ersten Republik*, ed. Wolfgang Duchkowitsch, Hannes Haas and Klaus Lojka (Vienna, 1991), p. 176.
[16] Malcolm Bullock, *Austria 1918-1938: A Study in Failure* (London, 1939), p. 120.
[17] Paupié, *Handbuch der Österreichischen Presse*, p. 42.

Russia, and the increasingly monopolised British press, Dell singled out Austria and Scandinavia as the remaining examples of an independent press in Europe.[18]

The relaxation of press restrictions in the first decade of the First Republic also gave breadth to the newspaper genre. More than ever before, Austrian journalism could cater for every intellectual and political preference. The readership had remained high since the First World War, when newspapers had enjoyed increased circulation, in some cases up to 100 per cent higher, and many had published extra editions with daily news from the theatres of war.[19] Despite the greater diversity and flourishing role of the press after 1918, the sudden loss of a multinational empire also led to nostalgic tendencies, ideological zeal and escapism in the columns of the various newspapers. Those caught up in nostalgia included most of the old liberal standards and the leading party organs that were trapped in an 'intellectual imperialism' and could not come to terms with the small Austrian state after 1918. The second category, the 'republican' press, included all the newspapers that were founded after 1918 and were marked by a sensational and often politically radical tone, such as the National Socialist *Deutschösterreichische Tageszeitung*, the communist *Rote Fahne*, as well as the boulevard newspapers that were particularly prominent in the First Republic.[20]

A third type of newspaper that fell into both imperialist and republican categories was the *kleine Blatt* (small sheet), a tabloid-size newspaper that was a specifically Austrian phenomenon of the early-twentieth century. It functioned as an organ of the major political parties but catered for the mass readership, rather than the intellectual elite who read the established dailies. However, the *kleine Blätter* distinguished themselves from the gutter

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[18] Robert Dell, "The Corruption of the French Press," *Current History* 35 (1931): 193-197. The French government's subsidies for newspapers and bribery of journalists and editors were a means of promoting France's political interests, but, for the newspapers, these financial incentives also offset the loss of private revenue with the advent of poster advertising in the 1920s and 1930s. Zeldin, *France, 1848-1945*, pp. 524-25.

[19] Csoklich, "Presse und Rundfunk," p. 715.

[20] Gerhard Jagschitz, "Die Presse in Österreich von 1918 bis 1945," in *Die österreichische Tagespresse: Vergangenheit, Gegenwart, Zukunft. Ein Dokumentation von Vorträgen des Symposions „200 Jahre Tageszeitung in Österreich"*, ed. Heinz Pürer, Helmut W. Lang, and Wolfgang Duchkowitsch (Salzburg, 1983), pp. 43-44.

journalism of the boulevard-illustrated press by publishing the preferred topics of the 'little man'. They covered the major European headlines but with minimal political analysis, and they published an appealing array of local news, sport and travel stories as well as fashion and advertising.[21] The socialist newspaper, *Das Kleine Blatt*, founded in 1927, epitomised in name and style the *kleine Blätter*. In 1929, the Christian Social Party launched its own version, the *Kleine Volksblatt*, in association with its existing flagship, the *Reichspost*. In both cases, the *kleine Blätter* dramatically outsold the established party organs, partly also due to the post-Depression slump in newspaper subscriptions.[22] Thus the press of the First Republic was diverse in style, content and analysis, allowing readers to choose from either the elitist or middle-of-the-road organs of each political party.

With a third of Austria's population living in the capital, Vienna had the greatest proportion of newspapers and readers in any city or province in the First Republic. In 1925, the Viennese press could boast 1.2 million copies sold on weekdays while the combined circulation of the provincial newspapers was just 280,000. The Viennese newspapers also had the widest influence. The renowned Viennese dailies, including the *Neue Freie Presse*, the *Neue Wiener Tagblatt* and the *Reichspost*, still continued to circulate in the coffee houses of Prague, Zagreb and Budapest, and they were read widely in the Burgenland and Lower Austria, which were without their own newspapers.[23] Kurt Paupié's statistical survey of the Viennese press for the year 1930 shows the concentration of newspapers and readers in a city of almost two million in the interwar period. Vienna had 22 morning dailies, three midday newspapers, five evening newspapers and five weekly political newspapers. In addition, there were 34 weekly political journals, approximately 500 other journals and a further 500 magazines of varying genres. The daily

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[21] See Alexander Potyka, "Ideologie und Tagesgeschehen für den 'kleinen Mann': Das 'Kleine Blatt' 1927-1934," in *Kreativität aus der Krise: Konzepte zur gesellschaftlichen Kommunikation in der Ersten Republik*, ed. Wolfgang Duchkowitsch, Hannes Haas, and Klaus Lojka (Vienna, 1991). Franz Ivan, Helmut W. Lang, and Heinz Pürer, eds., *200 Jahre Tageszeitungen in Österreich 1783-1983: Festschrift von Ausstellungskatalog* (Vienna, 1983), p. 415.
[22] Paupié, *Handbuch der Österreichischen Presse*, pp. 93, 103-4.
[23] Csoklich, "Presse und Rundfunk," pp. 720, 716.

press in Vienna had an average weekday circulation of approximately 1,327,000 copies, broken down into 553,000 for the liberal press, 471,000 for the Social Democratic press, 206,000 for the Christian Social press, 57,000 for the German-nationalist press (including Greater Germans and National Socialists) and 5,000 for the communist press.[24]

Further analysis of the numbers of readers and party voters in Vienna reveals the tight cohesion of the Christian Social, Social Democratic and Communist party networks, in contrast to the disunity of liberals and German-nationalists. In all of the first three cases, the readership of the party newspapers was more than three times the number of copies sold. The numbers of party voters in the 1930 national election were on average slightly less than the numbers of those who actually read the party press, although the number of readers for the communist press corresponded exactly with the number of party voters. However, less than half the number of those who voted for either the Greater Germans or the National Socialists in 1930 actually read the German-nationalist press.[25] Those who voted for the Nazis in 1930 were unlikely to care for ideas and politics, but were primarily attracted to the dynamic and spontaneous elements of political participation, such as rallies, marches and tavern meetings. Statistics for Germany prior to 1933, for example, show that only one in twenty Nazi voters read the party newspapers, which suggests a similar pattern for Austria prior to the NSDAP's ban in 1933.[26]

The figures for liberal readers in Vienna also did not correspond with any of the voting patterns for the 1930 election. According to Paupié, some 1,659,000 people read the

[24] Kurt Paupié, "Das Pressewesen in Österreich 1918-1938," *Österreich in Geschichte und Literatur* 6, 4 (1962): pp. 167-68

[25] The Social Democrats had a total readership of 1,413,000 and gained 1,032,000 votes in Vienna in the elections of 1930. The Christian Socials had a readership of 824,000 and 695,000 votes; the Communist Party, had equally 15,000 voters and readers, while the Greater Germans and National Socialists had a total of 370,000 votes, compared with 171,000 readers of the German-nationalist press. Ibid.

[26] 17 million Germans voted for the NSDAP in March 1933, but the national circulation of Nazi newspapers was only 800,000. See Richard Grunberger, *The 12-Year Reich: A Social History of Nazi Germany, 1933-1945* (New York, 1971), p. 391. The circulation of National Socialist newspapers in Germany only rose after 1933. The *Völkische Beobachter*, the party's main organ, sold 127,500 copies daily in 1933 and 580,000 by late 1938. Thomas Pegelow, "'German Jews', 'National Jews', 'Jewish Volk' or 'Racial Jews'? The Constitution and Contestation of 'Jewishness' in Newspapers of Nazi Germany, 1933-1938," *Central European History* 35, 2 (2002): p. 197.

liberal press, which was consistent with the ratio of three readers for every copy sold. Even taking into consideration that the liberal press had a circulation outside of Vienna, this figure is astounding for a city of two million: every adult and older child would have had to have read one of the liberal flagships, at least cursorily in a café or on a tram, or in the family home. Supporters of other political parties would also have read the liberal press in addition to their own party newspapers. This pattern is corroborated by a close-up profile of the liberal reader. The Klaar family, Ernst, Stella and son, Georg, was middle-class, Viennese and Jewish. Ernst worked as an international banker in the Austrian *Länderbank* and Georg went to one of Vienna's best grammar schools. In his 1981 memoir, *Last Waltz in Vienna*, George Clare (he changed his name in 1941 three years after fleeing Austria) writes that his family read both the *Neue Freie Presse* and the *Neues Wiener Tagblatt*, yet voted for the Social Democrats. Clare explains that nearly all middle-class Jews supported the Social Democrats, not because they were attracted to socialism, but partly because the Social Democrats were the least anti-Semitic party and partly because most liberal Jews were left leaning anyway. As he writes: 'Their socialist convictions could easily have been knocked down with the feather of liberalism, had a worthwhile liberal party still been in existence.'[27]

The absence of a liberal political party in Austria was a crucial factor in what Detlef Lehnert has described as the 'structural deficit' of the liberal milieu. Unlike the socialist and Catholic milieux, which had built up a dense network of associational and political ties, a liberal milieu existed only in the sphere of cultural and professional life. It lacked a liberal-republican 'orientation camp' in which the liberal tendencies of such an organ as the *Neue Freie Presse* could find wider political expression and a democratic will.[28] The 'republic without republicans' cliché about Weimar Germany was equally

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[27] George Clare, *Last Waltz in Vienna: The Destruction of a Family 1842-1942* (London, 1982), p. 125.
[28] Detlef Lehnert, "Politisch-kulturelle Integrationsmilieus und Orientierungslager in einer polarisierten Massengesellschaft," in *Handbuch des politischen Systems Österreichs: Erste Republik 1918-1933*, ed. Emmerich Tálos, et al. (Vienna, 1995), p. 442.

applicable to Austria. It was not so much the strength of the Social Democrats, Christian Socials and Nazis in the interwar period, but rather, the chauvinism, fragmentation and radicalisation of nineteenth-century Austrian liberalism that undermined the wider reception to democratic ideas in the interwar period.

As we saw in Chapter One, the provincial German-nationalist press built up a solid following by a strategy, not unlike that of the earlier liberals, of educating and empowering the readers in their rights and responsibilities in the national community. The German-nationalist press dominated the provincial public sphere in interwar Austria and had even begun to rival the established Viennese newspapers by the end of the 1930s. The two most influential of these provincial newspapers were the *Grazer Tagespost* and the *Linzer Tagespost*, which had respective circulation figures of 35,000 to 40,000 and 28,000 to 35,000.[29] These newspapers had consistently higher circulation figures, in some cases more than double that of the Catholic and socialist provincial press. For example, the major Christian Social daily in Styria, the *Grazer Volksblatt*, sold 5,000 copies on weekdays and 7,000 on Sundays in 1935; the socialist organ, the *Arbeiterwille*, sold 20,000 copies daily in 1933 before it was banned in February 1934, while the German-nationalist *Tagespost* sold around 35,000 copies on weekdays. The only Styrian newspaper with a higher circulation than the *Tagespost* was the boulevard *Kleine Zeitung*, which was Catholic-owned but strictly non-partisan; at a third of the price of the political newspapers, it was especially popular among workers and the petty bourgeoisie and sold 44,000 copies on weekdays and 82,000 on Sundays in 1935.[30] From these figures, we can estimate the total circulation for Styria's weekday political and boulevard newspapers prior to 1934 at around 84,000, of which the *Tagespost* had just over 40 per cent of the total share.[31] Thus the *Tagespost* can be regarded as the leading political newspaper in Styria and the most

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[29] Csoklich, "Presse und Rundfunk," p. 720. The first figure for each newspaper refers to weekday sales while the second totals the number of copies sold on Sundays.

[30] Nora Aschacher, "Die Presse der Steiermark von 1918- 31 July 1955" (PhD, Vienna, 1972), pp. 13-37.

[31] These figures exclude the weekly press and the tabloid press, apart from the *Kleine Zeitung*.

renowned of the entire provincial press in interwar Austria. Moreover, selling over half the number of copies of that of the *Neue Freie Presse* and equal to that of the *Reichspost* by 1935, the *Tagespost* had become a formidable rival to the leading Viennese political organs by the late interwar years.

In Salzburg, the German-nationalist *Salzburger Volksblatt* also outsold the other newspapers, the socialist *Salzburger Wacht* and the Catholic *Salzburger Chronik*. Although the Christian Social Party always held a majority in the provincial government, gaining its highest result of 48 per cent in the 1927 regional elections, it did not have a large following in a daily newspaper.[32] Unlike the flourishing Catholic provincial press in interwar France, the daily circulation of the *Salzburger Chronik* remained under 4,000 during the interwar years.[33] The *Salzburger Volksblatt*, on the other hand, whose readership consisted of educated middle-classes and shop owners, sold up to 18,000 copies in 1919 and around 10,000 after 1922, representing more than 50 per cent of the total circulation of Salzburg's weekday press.[34]

Given the established footing that these German-nationalist newspapers had in the Austrian provinces, it is somewhat surprising that a Viennese German-nationalist newspaper became one of the leading German-nationalist newspapers in Austria during the 1930s. The *Wiener Neueste Nachrichten*, founded in 1894, was younger than most other German-nationalist organs that originated in the Empire. It had originally appeared as an independent Monday newspaper under various titles and represented the political colours of Lueger. After the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, however, it represented the German-nationalists and became a moderate alternative to the Nazi press. In 1925, it was formally established as the mouthpiece of the Greater German Party. The *Wiener Neueste*

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[32] Ernst Hanisch, "Salzburg," in *Österreich 1918-1938: Geschichte der Ersten Republik*, ed. Erika Weinzierl and Kurt Skalnik (Graz, 1983), p. 909.

[33] According to Zeldin, the success of the French Catholic press was due to its rich variety of genres, rather than trying to pitch one larger daily newspaper at every reader. Zeldin, *France, 1848-1945*, p. 563.

[34] Ernst Hanisch, "Die Salzburger Presse in der Ersten Republik 1918-1938," *Mitteilungen der Gesellschaft für Salzburger Landeskunde* 128 (1988): p. 354. The *Salzburger Wacht* sold around 5,000 copies during the 1920s.

Nachrichten had to compete with the more established and prominent liberal and social dailies (prior to the 1934 ban of the SDAP), but its circulation still rose from 25,000 copies in 1935 to 50,000 by 1938.[35] However, while this figure may have been impressive for the countryside, it represented less than 2 per cent of Vienna's total press circulation. Even if we compare its circulation to that of the other major daily Viennese political newspapers, excluding the more successful *kleine Blätter*, the *Wiener Neueste Nachrichten* still only had between 5 and 10 per cent of the total market share.[36] Nonetheless, it is essential to include the Viennese as well as the provincial German-nationalist organs in order to observe the consistency of German-nationalist readers, in spite of their smaller proportion in the capital.

From this survey of the press in the First Republic, we can conclude that Austria's newspaper revolution was not halted by the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, but was accelerated through new genres of journalism that brought greater diversity and market competition to the press during the interwar years. Despite the economic setbacks after the war and again after 1929, which reduced overall the number of subscribers and made the weekly press a more affordable alternative, the political press still remained the steady diet of a large number of readers. Liberal newspapers and their socialist counterparts were the leading organs of political opinion in Vienna, while the German-nationalist press dominated the countryside. However, newspaper preference was not always an accurate gauge of political preference. Economic depression forced rural and lower middle classes to reduce their news consumption by purchasing the cheaper weekly press or tabloids, while the educated urban middle classes, including many Viennese Jews, found intellectual solace in the liberal standards but otherwise were little engaged in

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[35] Paupié, *Handbuch der Österreichischen Presse*, pp. 111-12, 204-5; Jagschitz, "Die Presse in Österreich von 1918 bis 1945," p. 50.

[36] These figures are based on the 1930 survey, in which Vienna's total press circulation was 1,327,000 (see above), and the 1935 estimate for the *Wiener Neueste Nachrichten* of 25,000. The circulation figures of Vienna's daily political press (excluding the *kleine Blätter*) are based on the figures for the *Arbeiter-Zeitung*, *Neue Freie Presse* and the *Reichspost*, cited already in this chapter, and do not include the other major liberal daily, the *Neue Wiener Tagblatt*.

political or associational life. Although in the case of Jewish readers, such as the Klaars, the politics of exclusion forced this retreat from public life, the cleft between readers of the liberal press and political life was wider than the fissures wrought by anti-Semitism. This raises a broader question about the impact of newspapers on the reading public and, conversely, the impact of reading on the press as a transmitter of ideas.

Newspaper Reading

Studies of reading often situate newspapers in the context of urban life, since newspapers are viewed (by their readers as well as historians of society and culture) as guides to and commentaries on the metropolis. The Viennese feuilletonist, Anton Kuh, recognised this in 1918 when he wrote in the *Prager Tagblatt*, amid wartime strikes and chronic paper shortages: 'The city lives only when it reads itself in print.'[37] Without newspapers as both a source of information and a portal to modern urban living in an age of newspaper-driven media, the reader cannot navigate a pathway through the modern matrix of information, consumerism and pageantry in the city.

At the turn of the century, newspaper reading belonged to a culture of looking in which the reader participated in urban life as a 'reader, browser, stranger and spectator'.[38] Berlin serves here as a case study that models Vienna on a larger scale. *Fin-de-siècle* newspapers in Berlin 're-created' the city for their readers to read on trams or in cafés and offered practical tips for urban living by printing tram schedules, the stock exchange, and advertisements for film and theatre. The new genre of feuilletons reflected this obsession with city living through articles describing chance meetings between urban strangers, offering advice about whether to stand up for fellow commuters on a tram and other topics of public etiquette. Even novels, such as Alfred Döblin's *Alexanderplatz*, first published in

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[37] "Introduction" in Gee and Kirk, eds., *Printed Matters*, p. 7.
[38] Peter Fritzsche, "Readers, Browsers, Strangers, Spectators: Narrative Forms and Metropolitan Encounters in Twentieth-Century Berlin," in *Printed Matters: Printing, Publishing and Urban Culture in Europe in the Modern Period*, ed. Malcolm Gee and Tim Kirk (Aldershot, 2002).

1929, described city-dwellers reading newspapers in cafes and trams. Newspaper reading

paralleled other urban cultures of 'looking', such as riding a tram for a weekend excursion

into the city, which one third of Berliners did before World War One. As Peter Fritzsche

observes: 'Being in the city was becoming much like reading about the city.'[39]

In the same way that newspapers acted as a compass to the urban reader, reading

was also a pastime of provincials who relied on newspapers for information about the

wider world. The parochialism of provincial readers was no more exaggerated than that of

city-dwellers. While big-city newspapers saturated their readers with news about

metropolitan life, provincial newspapers refracted the world through the lens of the locale.

As we saw in Chapter One, prior to 1914 the German-nationalist press in Styria portrayed

Slovenes as 'Slavs' writ large to exaggerate the threat to German-speakers in ethnically

mixed borderlands throughout the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Provincial newspapers also

published the more mundane everyday news on a need-to-know basis. For example, the

Grazer Tagespost had a regular column informing its readers of local doctors' and dentists'

surgery consultation hours and whenever a doctor went on and returned from leave.

Newspapers not only invited their readers to explore their urban or provincial

surrounds, but they also reflected what the readers themselves wanted to read. Particularly

in the big-city newspapers, such as the *Berliner Morgenzeitung*, the journalist's eye was

trained only on the frivolous and obscure details of modern life. Journalists rarely wrote on

the city's asylums, shelters and factory floors, except to describe the 'unlikely characters'

who ventured there. In this way, newspapers practised exclusion at the level of social

difference and disadvantage by printing only what their readers could digest while

commuting to work or sipping coffee. They 'choreographed city life as a grand, ceaseless

parade in which difference and sameness coexisted on uneasy terms.'[40] The newspaper

reader's insatiable addiction to news and tidbits of information that would pass the time of

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[39] Ibid., pp. 99-100.
[40] Fritzsche, "Readers, Browsers, Strangers, Spectators," pp. 97-98.

a tram ride or a coffee cup was brilliantly satirised by Kurt Tucholsky (1890-1935),

political journalist and editor of the left-wing journal, *Die Weltbühne*, in his 'Newspaper

Reader's Prayer' (1927):[41]

> Dear God...[*sic*] I have to read them all, all of them.
> About the civil war between the North Chinese and the South Chinese;
> about the gymnasts' festival with straddle jumps and balance beams;
> about the flag conflict in Schaumburg-Lippe;
> about Abegg, Lübeck, Ahlbeck, Becker;
> about Schiller's executor;
> about the Prince of Wales and Richard Strauss -
> all that and more, each day at home!
> And still I buy the stuff, as soon as I see it,
> fixe Idee:
> "Acht-Uhr-Abendblatt! Acht-Uhr! B.Z.! Die Nachtausgabe!"
>
> I'll trot anyplace that has a newspaper -
> it's a craving
> for paper - always more paper -
> I stop and read on the street:
>
> The western Baltic very rough;
> Pola Negri finally rescued;
> Churchill overthrown; parliament furious;
> the Pope and Mary Wigman engaged;
> (suits him too!) - Storm in the Azores;
> missing: Ludendorff's dachshund's tail;
> boom in Greenland swimwear;
> one hundred farces for Pallenberg;
> Ain and Kabel to be filmed;
> the smallest bellybutton ever;
> Mussolini, black shirts, monograms
> news, news, telegrams, telegrams,
> telegrams.[42]

However, unlike the boulevard newspapers that aimed to please the hordes of

commuters and caffeine-addicted consumers, the political press had always had a serious

function of education and 'mass enlightenment', whether in a nineteenth-century liberal

newspaper or a Soviet organ of agitprop.[43] Yet readers did not represent mutually exclusive

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[41] On Tucholsky and the *Weltbühne* writers, see Istvan Deák, *Weimar Germany's Left-Wing Intellectuals: A Political History of the Weltbühne and Its Circle* (Berkeley, 1968).

[42] Fritzsche, *Reading Berlin 1900*, pp. 55-56.

[43] Matthew Lenoe, *Closer to the Masses: Stalinist Culture, Social Revolution and Soviet Newspapers* (Cambridge, MA, 2004), p. 2. The 'mass enlightenment project', which Lenoe designates for the period of the New Economic Policy (1921-1937) to mean in Soviet-speak 'making the New Soviet Man', refers to the efforts of party functionaries and non-party intellectuals, as well as newspapers, to educate and politicise the wider population in the new socialist state.

groups: they might be loyal subscribers to one newspaper, but peruse a discarded copy of a tabloid or another political organ out of curiosity or boredom. 'Readership' thus included anyone who picked up a newspaper in a cafe, or one left behind on a tram.[44] In this sense, newspapers might have written for their intended audience, but they could not control the reader's reaction. During the period of the New Economic Plan in Soviet Russia, for example, reader letters to central newspapers were one of the ways by which Soviet leaders gauged popular receptivity to reforms and adapted their propaganda accordingly.[45] We will see in this study of the Austrian German-nationalist press that journalists and editors wrote for a particular group of readers, who were likely to become offended or disenchanted if they deemed their newspaper to be no longer actively supporting *Anschluss*. Newspapers lost subscribers if they were seen to abandon the political goal that their readers held in common with the editors. It was crucial, then, that editors communicated to their readers, by way of an editorial disclaimer or veiled reference to the censorship laws, any coercion from the authorities that prevented them from freely publishing their views. In this sense, the impact of reading on newspapers was just as important as the reciprocal function of the newspaper's impact on readers.

The impact of reading on the readers themselves is more difficult to gauge. Anderson's theory that reading newspapers creates identification with the wider imagined community is only partially helpful in this respect. While we are able to trace discursive patterns, look for nuances in the text and analyse headings and photographs in the newspapers, we can only conjecture what meaning the readers themselves would have found. Some readers, distracted, bored or frustrated by politics, may have absorbed very little. Others may have scrutinised the pages more carefully to read between the margins of

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[44] Fritzsche, "Readers, Browsers, Strangers, Spectators," p. 100.

[45] Lenoe, *Closer to the Masses*, pp. 70-71. Soviet newspapers had to navigate a tone and style that would avoid 'self-flattery' over the NEP reforms, which otherwise might result in demands for higher worker salaries, and at the same time, steer away from too much criticism, which might undermine the system and encourage scepticism among the workers. The most effective compromise tactic for the newspapers was to scapegoat allegedly corrupt officials and denounce them as 'class enemies'. See ibid., pp. 78-87.

censorship, or read together in groups and discussed the headlines for broader impact. We can find out about readers in the nineteenth century who joined reading groups and participated in associational activities, which may reveal a link between reading and signifying national or political belonging. However, reading rooms and clubs were less representative for the mass political cultures of the 1920s and 1930s. Newspapers were not a strategy of appealing to Nazi voters in Weimar Germany, as we have seen. The limits of viewing newspapers through their readers in the early-twentieth century, therefore, rest on the historian's inability to reconstruct the past in all its hidden details of personal preference and social interaction.

Yet these limitations should never deter a historian from the craft of careful selection of the newspaper material and critical analysis of the text as historical evidence. Rather, one should expect to uncover evidence of the historical processes social actors used to construct meaning in their collective lives as members of particular community, whether of a village, town, parish, province, capital city, or nation. These processes were dynamic and relied as much on the readers as on the press magnates and journalists. As Theodore Zeldin has argued, readers, newspaper owners, and journalists all impacted equally on the press as both an institution and a cultural form. Moreover, he points out that the tendency of historians to rely on newspapers as a gauge of popular opinion is misguided, since newspapers did not sway or change public opinion, but merely reinforced it. Readers were not 'converted' through the press to a particular view, since they selected which newspapers they read, usually those which reflected their own or their family's opinions, or they selected which articles in the newspaper they read or recalled later.[46] James Smith Allen, following Stanley Fish, has referred to this aspect of reading as the 'interpretive communities' of readers. Censors are one example of an interpretive community, who read for a particular purpose. Writers, and we might add journalists, are an example of another

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[46] Zeldin, *France, 1848-1945*, pp. 492, 570.

community who read letters from their readers, or read the work of their peers or rivals in ways that in turn directed their own energies.[47] Thus the communities in which reading is interpreted are not just narrowly representative of ideology or politics.

In this sense, analysing the discourse of Austria's German-nationalist press points to the processes newspaper editors and journalists used to supply their readers with a daily diet of information, which could be processed by the readers at will. On another level, my thesis also looks at the processes German-nationalist newspapers used to evade the official censorship. Conversely, we will see how Austrofascist propaganda and the state's 'coordination' of the press guided those processes of constructing identity. We will see how German-nationalist newspapers were still able to articulate a pan-German identity in spite of the state's attempt to control the editorial views of those newspapers. The last section of this chapter will outline the process of *Gleichschaltung* of the press under the Austrofascist state and consider in particular the extent to which the state censored or accommodated the nationalist beliefs of German-nationalist newspapers.

Censorship and the Austrofascist State

Freedom of the press was still a relatively new concept in interwar Austria. Nineteenth-century censorship had been notorious under the iron reign of Metternich (1830-1848), with strict controls on publishable material, including newspapers, books and plays, as well as censoring what could be written on gravestone inscriptions, memorial cards, tobacco boxes, badges and cuff links. Under a system of pre-publication censorship (*Vorzensur*), or 'preventive' censorship, newspapers were required to submit their copy to the censor before going to press. This law was abolished in 1867 and replaced with a system of post-publication, or 'repressive' censorship. Under this system of censorship, government authorities scrutinised newspapers immediately prior to their distribution,

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[47] On the notion of 'interpretive communities', see Allen, *In the Public Eye*, pp. 103-10.

often at great financial and legal risk to the publishers who stood to lose money and their licence from having the printed newspapers banned from sale if they were found to contain offensive material.[48] The only other European countries to maintain similar regulations for the press up until 1914 were Germany, Hungary, Russia and Bulgaria.[49]

The outbreak of World War One ushered in a new era of information control. The War Surveillance Office in Vienna, which was attached to the War Ministry and had been established by the Army High Command, was responsible for the wartime emergency decrees that banned the publication of subversive information. Such material included 'unpatriotic' articles, reports about economic problems or popular protests, 'provocative' ideas related to religion, socialism or nationalism, criticism of the government, rumours and, lastly, pacifist propaganda. Censorship abated in 1917 after Emperor Karl reconvened parliament and abandoned the wartime emergency decrees, although the censor continued to operate with some inconsistency in different regions of the Empire. The final method of wartime censorship, introduced in mid-1918 to prevent disloyal newspapers from reaching the front soldiers, was by way of a military press index, which listed all the newspapers deemed by the War Ministry to be subversive.[50]

The end of war and simultaneous collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire in 1918 invoked unprecedented constitutional democratic freedoms of speech. On 25 October 1918, the provisional assembly of German-Austria declared censorship to be a violation of the basic rights of citizens. Three years later, on 1 October 1922, a new law guaranteeing freedom of the press came into effect.[51] We have seen above how the 1922 law generated exceptional growth of the boulevard press, but the new liberties also made the Austrian political press vulnerable to foreign influences. In 1924, German and Austrian newspaper

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[48] James Smith Allen has made this differentiation between 'preventive' and 'repressive' censorship for eighteenth-century France. Ibid., pp. 84-92.

[49] Robert J. Goldstein, "Freedom of the Press in Europe, 1815-1914," *Journalism Monographs* 80 (1983): pp. 9-11.

[50] Mark Cornwall, "News, Rumour and the Control of Information in Austria-Hungary, 1914-1918," *History* 77, 249 (1992): pp. 52-63; Mark Cornwall, *The Undermining of Austria-Hungary: The Battle for Hearts and Minds* (New York, 2000), pp. 29, 286.

[51] Jakob Waltraud, *Salzburger Zeitungsgeschichte* (Salzburg, 1979), p. 185.

publishers, editors and journalists met in Munich to discuss forms of cooperation and, for the next decade, German press agencies supplied Austria with foreign correspondence. The alliance of the German and Austrian press was partly an economic necessity, since most Austrian newspapers could not afford their own international correspondents.[52] However, in the case of Austria's German-nationalist press, financial backing from Germany was essential to its survival. At times, blackmail and financial bribes from nationalist leagues in the Weimar Republic could sway the political disposition of Austrian editors.

The example of the *Wiener Neueste Nachrichten* illustrates this financial and political influence of Germany over the Austrian press. In 1925, the Greater Germans purchased the newspaper in order to distance the party from its official organ, the *Deutschösterreichische Tageszeitung*, which had become increasingly sympathetic to the National Socialists. The Christian Social Chancellor, Rudolf Ramek, with whom the Greater Germans were in a government coalition, organised a loan of one million schillings through the *Zentralbank* for the purchase of the *Wiener Neueste Nachrichten*, but the newspaper was not profitable and could not pay back the loan. In 1926, an impending parliamentary inquiry into the *Zentralbank* prompted Ramek to approach Germany's foreign ministry to reimburse the one million schillings, fearing that the Social Democrats would uncover the loan. Unable to pay, the German Foreign Office instead took over the financial administration of the newspaper and remained in financial control until 1938.[53] The knowledge that Germany's diplomatic coffers propped up the *Wiener Neueste Nachrichten* would have constrained the criticism of some editors towards Nazi Germany after 1933. Furthermore, when it became illegal in Austria after 1934 to publish anything about Germany, the newspaper was caught between the Scylla of its Nazi German financiers and the Charybdis of the Austrian authorities.

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[52] Bullock, *Austria 1918-1938*, p. 120.
[53] Jagschitz, "Die Presse in Österreich von 1918 bis 1945," p. 50.

As we saw in Chapter One, the trajectory of Austrofascism began well before Dollfuss formally established a dictatorship in March 1933 and implemented the new constitution in May 1934. We can observe this progressive 'coordination' through the press laws on censorship and the establishment of government agencies that regulated and homogenised the press. The first step towards greater surveillance and propaganda was in 1929 when the Christian Social government amended the previous press law of 1922, making criticism of past or present government policy or a member of government illegal.[54] The next step occurred when Dollfuss, who had become Chancellor in 1932, prorogued parliament on 4 March 1933 following a deadlock in proceedings. Three days later, Dollfuss invoked the wartime Enabling Act of 1917 and proclaimed his personal rule by emergency decree. The Enabling Act had been introduced in July 1917 to organise the war economy and deal with food shortages specifically. The law was abandoned, but never annulled, when parliament was reconvened in October 1917.[55] Lájos Kerekes has suggested that Dollfuss' decision to prorogue parliament was prompted, firstly, by the Reichstag elections on the 5 March in Germany, in which the Nazi Party won 43.9 per cent of the vote, and, secondly, by an open letter to the Chancellor from the leader of the Austrian NSDAP, Alfred Proksch, demanding that he step down immediately and call new elections.[56] In fact, Dollfuss had already been deliberating over the terms of the Enabling Act before Hitler came to power, and he had stated publicly in November 1932 his government's intention to do away with 'parliamentary struggles', ostensibly as a necessary solution to the depressed state economy.[57]

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[54] Bullock, *Austria 1918-1938*, pp. 120-21.

[55] Gerhard Botz, *Gewalt in der Politik: Attentate, Zusammenstösse, Putschversuche, Unruhen in Österreich 1918 bis 1938* 2nd ed. (Munich, 1983), p. 211; Ernst Hanisch, *Der Lange Schatten des Staates: Österreichische Gesellschaftsgeschichte im 20. Jahrhundert* (Vienna, 1994), p. 491; Cornwall, "News, Rumour and Control," p. 59.

[56] Lájos Kerekes, *Abenddämmerung einer Demokratie: Mussolini, Gömbös und die Heimwehr* (Vienna, 1966), p. 133.

[57] Jill Lewis, "Conservatives and fascists in Austria, 1918-34," in *Fascists and Conservatives: The radical right and the establishment in twentieth-century Europe*, ed. Martin Blinkhorn (London, 1990), pp. 114, 117n.

The March emergency decree was similar to the 1867 law on post-publication censorship. It required newspapers to be inspected two hours prior to circulation for any information that might have caused 'injury to the patriotic, religious or cultural sensibility.' If copy was found to have offending material, it was either whited out or that day's edition of the newspaper was simply banned from circulation. This arbitrary practice by which a newspaper edition was prevented from appearing was known as 'confiscation' (*Beschlagnahme*), and it incurred penalties for the publisher who stood to lose sales for a day and the waste of expensive ink and paper. Dollfuss issued further restrictions in a decree on 10 April 1933, making it illegal to criticise publicly the domestic and foreign governments and heads of state. Communist and National Socialist newspapers were banned in May and June, respectively. From July 1933, any newspaper that was sympathetic to National Socialism, including the German-nationalist press, was required to publish official correspondence from the federal press agency. Foreign newspapers that supported any of the illegal parties were banned in October.[58] By the end of 1933, the government had heavily curtailed press freedom so that dissenting newspapers were banned or otherwise restrained by the official press authorities. While German-nationalist newspapers were allowed to continue publication after 1933, albeit with strict editorial controls, the Social Democratic press was banned following the civil war in February 1934.

After the ban of the Social Democratic press, German-nationalist newspapers were placed under heightened surveillance through the appointment of government commissioners to editorial posts. In June 1934, a government commissioner was assigned to the *Tagespost* as the Viennese correspondent and, in November, a *Heimwehr* official was appointed political editor.[59] Similarly, the *Salzburger Volksblatt* was forced to appoint a member of the *Heimatschutz* as political editor, or otherwise risked losing its publishing

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[58] Paupié, *Handbuch der Österreichischen Presse*, pp. 47-49.
[59] Harald Schmied, "'D'rum straff angezogen...den stahldrähtigen Maulkorb': Presse und Diktatur (1933-1938) am Beispiel der Steiermark" (MA, Karl-Franzens-University, 1996), pp. 65-66.

licence.[60] Only the *Wiener Neueste Nachrichten* was permitted to keep its previous chief editor, Hans Mauthe, although Mauthe also had to appoint a government commissioner to the general editorship.[61] By all appearances, the press was under the control of the *Heimwehr*, which effectively became the government's law and order force after the civil war.

Public interest in newspapers waned and subscription rates dropped overall as a result of the ban on the left-wing press and the suppression of the remaining non-government newspapers. The *Neue Freie Presse* dropped from 78,000 to 50,000, the *Neue Wiener Tagblatt* lost over 15,000 subscribers and the *Tagespost* lost 6,000.[62] Mitzi Hartmann, a medical student at the University of Vienna, wrote in her memoir, *Austria Still Lives*, published in England in 1938, that once the socialist press had been banned, the government newspapers also lost subscribers as people became disillusioned with the political press and gathered instead in coffee houses to read the international newspapers, especially the German-language foreign press from Switzerland and Czechoslovakia:

> The result of the suppression of a full news service was that no one
> believed anything anymore, that people read incredible meanings
> between the lines, and that Vienna became a city of rumours, political
> witticisms, and frequenters of cafes. Indeed, a miracle occurred, and we
> young people, who had always heartily despised sitting in cafes, were
> now ourselves forced to frequent cafes in order somehow to keep abreast
> of the times.[63]

Gleichschaltung of the press continued on the surface with the formation of a press chamber in July 1936. In the Austrofascist state, the press came under the corporation for the free professions. Along with the six other corporations, it did not have legislative power but acted only as a government advisory body.[64] In theory, the purpose of a press

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[60] Waltraud, *Salzburger Zeitungsgeschichte*, p. 191.

[61] Paupié, *Handbuch der Österreichischen Presse*, pp. 111-12. See also Milan Dubrovic, *Veruntreute Geschichte: Die Wiener Salons und Literatencafes* (Berlin, 2001), pp. 229-30.

[62] Paupié, *Handbuch der Österreichischen Presse*, p. 144; Schmied, "Presse und Diktatur", p. 64.

[63] Mitzi Hartmann, *Austria Still Lives* (London, 1938), pp. 109-10.

[64] Legislative power rested with a federal diet, composed of members from four legislative councils for state, culture, the economy and the provinces. Barbara Jelavich, *Modern Austria: Empire to Republic* (Cambridge, 1987), pp. 203-4; John Rath and Carolyn W. Schum, "The Dollfuss-Schuschnigg Regime: Fascist or Authoritarian?," in *Who Were the Fascists?: Social Roots of European Fascism*, ed. Stein Ugelvik Larsen,

chamber was to harmonise the interests of the newspaper publishers, editors and

journalists, but in practice it was intended to harmonise those interests with the

government's. The new press chamber began operation in November 1936 and it had

exclusive voting power over the licences of newspaper publishers, which meant that

known detractors or disloyal newspapers could easily be shut down.[65] In a move

consciously modeled on Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy, the Austrofascist government

also merged its federal press service (*Bundespressedienst*) with the propaganda office, the

Heimatdienst, into a single ministry for propaganda.[66]

However, détente between Austria and Germany in 1936 acted as an external

restraint on the Austrofascist state's repression of the German-nationalist press. In July

1936, Schuschnigg and Hitler signed an agreement, known as the July Agreement, under

which Germany pledged to stay out of Austria's internal affairs as long as Austria pursued

a common foreign policy with her.[67] The two chancellors also signed a confidential

'Gentlemen's Agreement', by which Austria made disproportionate concessions to

Germany. Schuschnigg had to agree a general amnesty of imprisoned National Socialists,

the inclusion of members of the 'national opposition' in the government and the

distribution of five newspapers from one country in the other. This last point became

particularly significant for Austria when, in clear violation of the terms of the July

Agreement, the German Ministry of Propaganda used one of the five German newspapers,

the *Essener National Zeitung*, an official party organ of the Nazis, to criticise the Austrian

government. The remaining four German newspapers were instructed not to offend

Austrian readers. Reports about the show trials of priests and monks in Germany were

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Bernt Hagtvet, and Jan Petter Myklebust (Bergen, 1980), p. 251. The other six corporations represented agriculture and forestry; industry and alpine works; business; trade and exchange; finance, credit and insurance; and the civil service. Gerhard Jagschitz, "Der österreichische Ständestaat 1934-1938," in *Österreich 1918-1938: Geschichte der Ersten Republik*, ed. Erika Weinzierl and Kurt Skalnik (Graz, 1983), p. 501.

[65] Paupié, *Handbuch der Österreichischen Presse*, p. 54.

[66] Elisabeth El Refaie, "Keeping the Truce? Austrian Press Politics between the 'July Agreement' (1936) and the *Anschluss* (1938)," *German History* 20, 1 (2002): p. 56.

[67] On the terms of the agreement, see Alfred D. Low, *The Anschluss Movement, 1931-1938, and the Great Powers* (Boulder, 1985), pp. 184-85.

banned, for example. On the Austrian side, two government organs, the *Wiener Zeitung* and the *Volkszeitung*, a Viennese liberal daily, the *Neue Wiener Journal*, and the German-nationalist organs in Upper Austria and Styria, the *Linzer Tagespost* and the *Grazer Tagespost*, were allowed access to the German market after July 1936.[68] Under the new terms of press censorship, the German-nationalist newspapers were able to express their Nazi sympathies, as long as they did not criticise the Austrian authorities or openly incite agitation for *Anschluss*.

Day-to-day censorship tended to be more indiscriminate, since the responsibility for monitoring press violations was in the hands of the local judicial and police authorities, rather than the federal press service. What the authorities understood as permissible copy varied from province to province, and often an identical article appearing in a pro-government newspaper was censored in another newspaper that was a known opponent of the government.[69] In early 1937, the head of the *Bundespressedienst*, Walter Adam, believed that censorship had become ineffective and reported that in some cases, government officials who were appointed to censor individual newspapers were paid a pittance for their efforts.[70] That censorship practices could be unreliable and indiscriminate was not unique to the Austrofascist state; it had already been a problem for imperial censors during World War One. Maureen Healy has argued in her study of in Vienna in World War One that censorship was a flawed system of control. Censors were subject to the same material deprivations as ordinary citizens, and the rates of absenteeism and threats of censor strikes meant that, while censorship was imposed from above, the actual day-to-day practice on the ground was not the work of a well-oiled machine but of human bureaucrats who wanted public holidays off, sick leave and extra pay for overtime.[71]

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[68] El Refaie, "Keeping the Truce," pp. 54-57; Kurt Schuschnigg, *Im Kampf gegen Hitler: Die Überwindung der Anschlussidee* (Vienna, 1969), p. 189.
[69] El Refaie, "Keeping the Truce," pp. 51-52.
[70] Ibid.
[71] Maureen Healy, *Vienna and the Fall of the Habsburg Empire: Total War and Everyday Life in World War I* (Cambridge, 2004), pp. 133, 139.

German-nationalist newspapers exploited these loopholes after 1936 and, while they still had to comply officially with the state by publishing government correspondence, they had a wide margin in which to promote their views.

Free Margins of the Press?

From this survey of the press and the political events that shaped its development, we can see that the daily newspaper was much more than just a commentator on the leading events and personalities of the day. It stood as an institution that had undergone changes since the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. As we have seen, the Austrofascist state curtailed press freedoms through censorship and surveillance, and the outright ban of left wing and National Socialist press. Yet while it is true that 'freedom of the press needs free individuals',[72] Austrofascism did not prevent German-nationalist editors from discussing questions of national identity nor their readers from absorbing these ideas. I argue that German-nationalist newspapers had sufficient scope to construct their vision of pan-German identity, as long as these views did not directly criticise the Austrofascist state. For these newspapers and their readers, the national community was linked as much with the issues of public schools, minorities and immigration laws, as it was with the question of Austro-German relations. As long as the state prevented the press from voicing a critical opinion about domestic or foreign policy, these issues came to the fore of identity discourses in the German-nationalist press.

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[72] Jagschitz, "Die Presse in Österreich von 1918 bis 1945," p. 52.

PAN-GERMANISM AT THE CENTRE AND THE BORDER

Both of Austria's leading German-nationalist newspapers, the *Wiener Neueste Nachrichten* and the *Grazer Tagespost*, saw in Austro-German unity the fulfilment of Austria's pan-German identity, yet each newspaper constructed that identity in different ways. The *Wiener Neueste Nachrichten* carried the flag for a Greater Germany in which non-German minorities were subordinate to a prevailing German language and culture. However, the Viennese newspaper also rejected the extremes of National Socialism and, by 1934, had abandoned political designs for Austro-German unity. Its sister organ in Styria, the *Grazer Tagespost*, was the established voice of the borderland 'East-March' Germans and upheld local traditions and expressions of belonging and participation in the universal national community. Unlike the *Wiener Neueste Nachrichten*, the Styrian newspaper remained committed to political unity under the banner of Nazi Germany throughout the period from 1933 to *Anschluss*. We will see in this chapter how both newspapers shifted the boundaries of pan-German identity to suit the new political climates of National Socialism and Austrofascism. We will also explore the parallels and dissonance between each newspaper's vision of the particular and the universal aspects of Austrian pan-German identity – Austria as a German state and Austria within the German nation – alongside the competing Austrofascist discourses of pan-Germanism.

The *Wiener Neueste Nachrichten's* Greater Germany

On 12 March 1938, the headline of the *Wiener Neueste Nachrichten* greeted the *Anschluss* with a proclamation of 'Long Live the Greater German Empire'. The next day, Hitler's rallying cry to his native homeland, 'Long Live National Socialist German

Austria', was boldly spread across the newspaper's front page.[1] The variation in heading may have gone unnoticed by the newspaper's jubilant readers, but it is significant for our assessment of interwar pan-Germanism. The newspaper's proclamation of a 'Greater German Empire' reflected certain ideological continuities with nineteenth-century pan-German ideas. As we saw in Chapter One, *grossdeutsche* nationalism had been spurred by German self-aggrandisement in the Habsburg Monarchy. In the interwar period, pan-Germanism was no longer bridled by problems of administrating a multinational empire and German-nationalists readily declared their allegiance to Germany. After 1933, some German-nationalists expressed caution at the violent extremes of National Socialism, but they remained unreserved in their belief that a genuinely nationalist movement, which included National Socialists, would ultimately bring about political unity in a Greater-German state. As we will see, the *Wiener Neueste Nachrichten* clung tenaciously to that goal and some of its chief editors went so far as to denounce National Socialism and curry favour with Austrofascists in order for their vision of Greater Germany to gain the appearance of mainstream respectability.

In the wake of Hitler's rise to power, the *Wiener Neueste Nachrichten* gave unreserved affirmation of National Socialism by denouncing any person or any institution the newspaper deemed to be an opponent of Austro-German unity. On 24 January 1933, the newspaper published an excerpt from Bishop Gföllner's pastoral letter, entitled 'On True and False Nationalism' (*Über wahren und falschen Nationalismus*), which condemned National Socialism's 'un-Christian' ideology and emphasised the spiritual and cultural, rather than racial dimensions of nationalism. These spiritual and cultural qualities translated into an anti-Semitic platform in the bishop's letter, but this went unmentioned in the *Wiener Neueste Nachrichten's* coverage.[2] The accompanying editorial comment in the

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[1] *Wiener Neueste Nachrichten*, 12 March 1938, p. 1; 13 March 1938, p. 1.
[2] Anton Staudinger, "Katholischer Antisemitismus in der Ersten Republik," in *Eine zerstörte Kultur: Jüdisches Leben und Antisemitismus in Wien seit dem 19. Jahrhundert*, ed. Gerhard Botz, et al. (Vienna, 2002), pp. 275-77.

newspaper instead sought to discredit the bishop's moral authority by claiming that his predecessors had been outspoken about such 'trivial' matters as the fashion industry, swimming after dark and girls' participation in gymnastics. More significant than its anticlericalism, however, the editorial sharply censured Bishop Gföllner's assertion that the Austrian state and not the German nation gave identity to Austrians. The newspaper argued that this diminution of German nationhood was offensive to the national sensibilities of Austrians and could unleash a dangerous political struggle in Austria.[3] By invoking such a tone of higher moral authority, the *Wiener Neueste Nachrichten* sought to undermine the Church's position in the matter of Austria's national interest.

A report about Bavarian voters in the March 1933 election in Germany revealed a similar attempt to discredit the Catholic Church and, in particular, the ruling Christian Social party. The *Wiener Neueste Nachrichten* claimed the National Socialists' success as an occasion for all Austrians to share in and pointed to the result in Bavaria, where the Nazi vote reached over 900,000, as evidence of the popular support for National Socialism in 'a stronghold of political Catholicism'.[4] However, the newspaper failed to mention that Bavarian peasants had been pressured by Nazis to vote, resulting in higher voter participation figures of up to 95 per cent in some areas, and it was these new voters who provided the biggest increase of votes for the NSDAP in Bavaria, from 30.5 per cent to 43.1 per cent, rather than significant losses by Catholic parties.[5] Moreover, the Catholic Centre Party actually increased its nation-wide support from 4.2 to 4.4 million votes in the March election.[6] Warning that the Nazis' electoral success in Germany sent a message to Austria's Christian Social government that nationalism was a more powerful force than 'political Catholicism', the *Wiener Neueste Nachrichten* declared to its readers that religion

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[3] *Wiener Neueste Nachrichten*, 24 January 1933, p. 4.
[4] *Wiener Neueste Nachrichten*, 7 March 1933, pp. 1-2. Figures for Lower Bavaria, according to the newspaper, were 281,072 and 632,705 for Upper Bavaria and Swabia, totalling 913,777 for the province.
[5] See Geoffrey Pridham, *Hitler's Rise to Power: The Nazi Movement in Bavaria, 1923-1933* (London, 1973), pp. 303-6. Table 7 on p. 306 lists the figures for rural districts of Lower Bavaria, showing that the NSDAP gained 97,900 votes from new voters while the Bavarian Peasants and Middle-Class League and the Bavarian People's Party had combined losses of 18,900.
[6] Dick Geary, *Hitler and Nazism* (London, 1993), p. 38.

was no barrier to national ideology. Here the newspaper showed a familiar strategy, used successfully three decades earlier by Beurle's Upper Austrian German-nationalists, of trying to appeal to a wider audience on the basis of national, rather than sectarian loyalties.

The newspaper's derision of 'political Catholicism', and of its representatives in Gföllner and the Christian Social Party, indicates how closely the newspaper stood to National Socialism at this point. References to 'political Catholicism' had multiple derogatory connotations in National Socialist rhetoric. It referred in the first instance to Catholics in public life who posed a threat to the political aims of Nazis. It was also used whenever a Church dignitary or organ of the Catholic Church criticised National Socialism or Nazi Germany, as in the case of Bishop Gföllner's pastoral letter. This particular usage was intended to imply that the accused bishop, priest or newspaper was an agent of the Vatican seeking to meddle in state affairs. Another common usage of the term 'political Catholicism' was to refer to known ideological opponents of National Socialism, but not necessarily on the grounds that they were Catholic.[7] This occurred in Germany during the height of the Nazi movement in the early 1930s, when Nazi leaders constantly attacked the Centre Party not because it represented Catholics, but because it had collaborated with the Social Democrats during the Weimar period.[8] The article in the *Wiener Neueste Nachrichten* describing Bavaria as a 'stronghold of political Catholicism' was similarly a reference to the dominance of the Centre Party there, but it was also term of derision aimed at the Christian Social Party in Austria.

The *Wiener Neueste Nachrichten* switched its assault onto the Dollfuss dictatorship after he introduced the March emergency decrees. The newspaper accused the government of attacking the civil liberties of German-nationalists and National Socialists and, in an editorial on 14 April 1933, called for a German-nationalist opposition front that would

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[7] Rudolf Ebneth, *Die österreichische Wochenschrift 'Der Christliche Ständestaat': Deutsche Emigration in Österreich 1933-1938* (Mainz, 1976), p. 33.
[8] Richard Steigmann-Gall, *The Holy Reich: Nazi Conceptions of Christianity, 1919-1945* (Cambridge, 2003), p. 56. Steigmann-Gall gives many examples of these attacks on 'political Catholicism' and 'Ultramontanism' before the NSDAP came to power as well as during the Nazi period.

prevent the anti-German extremes of the Dollfuss regime and restore Austria's diplomatic standing with Germany.[9] Relations between Austria and Germany finally broke off in May with Hitler's 1000 Mark tariff on German travel to Austria in retaliation against the Austrian government's expulsion of the Bavarian Justice Minister, Hans Frank. The *Wiener Neueste Nachrichten* responded to the latest diplomatic crisis by appealing again for a national coalition to rebuild ties with Germany and reiterating its earlier calls for the Austrian government to lift the political restrictions against members of the NSDAP.[10] The newspaper's overtures for an Austrian coalition of all German-nationalist groups was a vindication of National Socialists, whom the editors regarded as an integral, though not exclusive force in the quest for Austro-German unity.

The newspaper's support for National Socialists wavered in June, however, as Austrian Nazis waged a campaign of terror and violence across the country that lasted less than a month in its initial intensity but did not fully abate until July 1934. The violence began in Innsbruck on 11 June 1933, when a twenty-year-old German Nazi from Berlin attempted to assassinate the Tyrolean *Heimatwehr* leader, Richard Steidle. Over the next five days, three people were killed in a series of bomb explosions in predominantly Jewish-owned shops, cafes and department stores. Austrian government organs believed the perpetrators to be a small band, no more than two dozen, of German Nazi youths and claimed that German party activists supported the terror campaign by smuggling propaganda, finances, bomb explosives, weapons, and even Nazi assassins into Austria. However, as Gerhard Botz has pointed out, the internal radicalisation of the Austrian NSDAP cannot be underestimated and Hitler himself condemned the violence in August 1933, albeit after bowing to international opinion. Several thousand Austrian National Socialists, the so-called 'Austrian Legion', who had fled to Bavaria and were stationed in

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[9] *Wiener Neueste Nachrichten*, 14 April 1933, p. 3.
[10] *Wiener Neueste Nachrichten*, 31 May 1933, p. 1. Frank was expelled three days after his arrival in Austria on a visit that had turned into a propaganda tour, during which his speeches had urged opposition to Chancellor Dollfuss. See C. Earl Edmondson, *The Heimwehr and Austrian Politics, 1918-1936* (Athens, 1978), p. 190; Gordon Brook-Shepherd, *The Austrians: A Thousand-Year Odyssey* (London, 1996), p. 273.

military camps along the border, were responsible for carrying out the smuggling operation into Austria. Heightened agitation towards the Austrian government, and growing disillusionment with the Nazi German authorities who refused to settle them in Germany permanently, contributed to the sense of alienation among these Austrian refugees and fuelled their determination to bring about a violent coup in Austria.[11]

The *Wiener Neueste Nachrichten* was quick to distance its *Anschluss* agenda from terrorism, referring to acts of violence as the 'periphery' of National Socialism. Describing the explosions outside Nazi headquarters in Leopoldstadt, and two parcel bomb explosions in a jeweller's shop and a café in Meidling that killed two people and injured several bystanders, as 'deeds that originate in criminal instinct', the newspaper claimed that the violence was unrelated to politics.[12] A front-page editorial on 13 June supported the Austrian government's response to punish criminals and called for the country's leaders to put in place security measures that would reassure the masses of the government's commitment to justice and peace.[13] Yet the following day, the newspaper lashed out at the government's accusations of treason against Greater Germans and National Socialists. The newspaper argued that the majority of Greater Germans and National Socialists stood for the union of Austria and Germany and that the criminalisation of these parties by the government flew in the face of the 1918 constitution affirming German-Austria as a constituent member of the German Republic.[14] In declaring its abhorrence of violence, the *Wiener Neueste Nachrichten* upheld the legitimacy of a greater-German ideology, which the newspaper was careful to defend from anti-Nazi and anti-German attacks.

Dollfuss finally banned the NSDAP on 19 June 1933 after a hand grenade attack in the Lower Austrian town of Krems killed one person and injured thirty others. Undeterred by their illegal status, Nazis took to a country-wide campaign of violent attacks and

[11] Gerhard Botz, *Gewalt in der Politik: Attentate, Zusammenstösse, Putschversuche, Unruhen in Österreich 1918 bis 1938* 2nd ed. (Munich, 1983), pp. 215-17, 260-62.
[12] *Wiener Neueste Nachrichten*, 12 June 1933, p. 1; 13 June 1933, p. 5.
[13] *Wiener Neueste Nachrichten*, 13 June 1933, p. 1.
[14] *Wiener Neueste Nachrichten*, 14 June 1933, p. 1.

propaganda, painting swastikas in public places, on houses, streets, trees, rocks, on

scattered pamphlets and even burning swastika signs into hillsides. Chancellor Dollfuss

narrowly escaped an assassin's bullets in the Austrian parliament on 3 October, although it

was not the first assassination attempt on a government minister: Vice-Chancellor and

Minister of Security, Major Emil Fey, had already been the target of several planned or

aborted attempts in July and August. Between October 1933 and January 1934, Nazis

carried out tear gas attacks in cafes, shops and cinemas and detonated explosives in cars,

buildings and streets, using handmade bombs from paper, clay and chlorate when dynamite

could not be smuggled in from Germany. By the beginning of 1934, the number of daily

bomb explosions had reached 40 and 140 separate incidents were recorded for the

beginning of January alone. After a brief ceasefire during the February civil war between

Social Democrats and government troops, the violence began to rise again after Hitler's

birthday in April 1934.[15]

The continuing presence of terrorism throughout the latter half of 1933, and the

escalating number of terrorist acts between April and July 1934, forced the *Wiener Neueste*

Nachrichten to abandon its hopes for political unity between Austria and Germany. The

final nail in the coffin was the assassination of Chancellor Dollfuss by Nazi putschists on

25 July 1934. The putsch had been a year in the planning and was led by a band of Nazi

storm troopers, former soldiers who had been discharged from the Austrian army on

account of their membership in the NSDAP. The actual execution of the putsch was

clumsy, and a couple of key government figures had been forewarned, but some of the

putschists managed to occupy temporarily the building of the Austrian radio broadcaster,

Ravag, and announce that Dollfuss had resigned, which prompted short-lived uprisings by

National Socialists in the provinces. The putsch was put down within a few hours by

government troops, but not before one of the rebels, Otto Planetta, broke into Dollfuss'

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[15] Botz, *Gewalt in der Politik*, pp. 219-64; Ernst Hanisch, *Der Lange Schatten des Staates: Österreichische Gesellschaftsgeschichte im 20. Jahrhundert* (Vienna, 1994), p. 149.

office and fatally shot the chancellor.[16] The day after Dollfuss' assassination, the *Wiener Neueste Nachrichten* condemned the rebels' action and called finally for an end to the violence:

> It is clear that the death of Federal Chancellor Dr Dollfuss will not change anything about Austria's political system and that it most likely [...] will initially call into play a tightened course of action against National Socialism in which international politics will have a strong say. What has taken place in the past year in Austria and in the relationship between the two German states belongs to the saddest and most depressing chapter of German history. It is hoped that yesterday's black day will put an end to it. Stop the terrorism![17]

With this bleak assessment of the future, the newspaper closed the debate on national politics by acknowledging that National Socialist designs for the immediate future of Austro-German relations were tactless and seditious in an age of terrorism.

The newspaper's change of course, from affirming the role of National Socialism in Austrian politics to condemning the party's violent extremes, was due also in part to changes in the editorship. The newspaper's key personalities and their political bias have recently come to light in the memoir of one of Austria's most prominent liberal journalists in the twentieth century, Milan Dubrovic (1903-1994), of Croatian descent, who held editorial posts at the *Wiener Allgemeine Zeitung* and the *Neue Wiener Tagblatt*. In his memoir, *Veruntreute Geschichte* (Embezzled History), published in 1985, Dubrovic recalls that the greater-German ideology of the *Wiener Neueste Nachrichten* was made a mockery of in Viennese journalistic witticisms and Dubrovic himself divulges that the newspaper occasionally lapsed into 'a fantasy world of teutonic romance'. Yet Dubrovic writes that, at the time, 'one distinguished between *grossdeutsch-* and National Socialist-oriented journalists.' The most prominent greater-German journalist at the *Wiener Neueste Nachrichten* was Hans Mauthe, who became editor-in-chief of the newspaper in July 1933. Mauthe was, according to Dubrovic, a 'democratic-greater-German opponent of National

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[16] See Barbara Jelavich, *Modern Austria: Empire to Republic* (Cambridge, 1987), p. 206; Brook-Shepherd, *The Austrians*, pp. 287-93. For a detailed account of the putsch, see Botz, *Gewalt in der Politik*, pp. 266-75.
[17] *Wiener Neueste Nachrichten*, 26 July 1934, p. 1.

Socialism', who believed that the success of Hitler would bring about the destruction of the greater-German idea. The Austrofascist government apparently believed that Mauthe could be useful as an ally in their campaign against National Socialists. After Dollfuss' assassination, Schuschnigg appointed Mauthe as government commissioner of the *Wiener Neueste Nachrichten*, a position that normally was filled by functionaries of the Fatherland Front or the *Heimwehr*. Perhaps the fact that Mauthe's son, Jörg, was a member of Vienna's city council also persuaded the authorities to appoint him to such a trusted position. A government representative was appointed to the editorship as well, but Mauthe remained at the helm until 1938. Mauthe's views were anathema to some of his National Socialist colleagues at the newspaper. Alfred Petrou, for example, was foreign editor from 1929 to 1939 after previously editing the National Socialist newspaper, *Deutschösterreichische Tageszeitung*. Other colleagues shared Mauthe's opposition to National Socialism, including the feuilleton writer, Arnold Wasserbauer, and the theatre critic, Alois Nagler, who held only marginal influence next to a senior editorial figure, such as Petrou.[18]

On the other hand, Dubrovic fails to shed light on Mauthe's complicity with National Socialists. It is odd that such a prominent journalist as Dubrovic is apparently unaware, or sees no need to mention, that Mauthe was one of the representatives of the 'National Action' group, which met Schuschnigg in October 1934 to discuss the integration of Nazis and Nazi-sympathising German-nationalists into the Fatherland Front. After Dollfuss' assassination and Schuschnigg's succession as Chancellor, Schuschnigg adopted a conciliatory approach toward National Socialists. This approach could be seen,

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[18] Milan Dubrovic, *Veruntreute Geschichte: Die Wiener Salons und Literatencafes* (Berlin, 2001), pp. 213, 229-31. See also Fritz Hausjell, *Journalisten für das Reich: Der Reichsverband der deutschen Presse in Österreich 1938-45* (Vienna, 1993), p. 153; Gabriele Melischek and Josef Seethaler, eds., *Die Wiener Tageszeitungen: eine Dokumentation 1918-1938*, vol. 3 (Frankfurt am Main, 1992), p. 207; Kurt Paupié, *Handbuch der Österreichischen Pressegeschichte, 1848-1959* 2 vols., vol. 1 (Vienna, 1960), pp. 111-12; Gerhard Jagschitz, "Die Presse in Österreich von 1918 bis 1945," in *Die österreichische Tagespresse: Vergangenheit, Gegenwart, Zukunft. Ein Dokumentation von Vorträgen des Symposions „200 Jahre Tageszeitung in Österreich"*, ed. Heinz Pürer, Helmut W. Lang, and Wolfgang Duchkowitsch (Salzburg, 1983), p. 50.

for example, in his support for the Austrian Refugee Relief Society, which provided aid for the families of Nazis who were in prison or who had fled Austria.[19] Schuschnigg advocated that Nazis should join the Fatherland Front on an individual basis, rather than integrating them as a whole. He also encouraged the formation of a National Unity Front within the Fatherland Front, which would comprise all German-nationalist organisations and allocate some of the leadership positions to German-nationalist leaders, thereby dismantling the existing leadership structures of those organisations. The meeting on 27 October 1934 was held between representatives of the government, including Schuschnigg, his deputy, Ernst Rüdiger Prince Starhemberg, chief of home security, Walter Adam, and the head of the federal press bureau, Eduard Ludwig, and the representatives of 'National Action', including, among others, National Socialist leader, Walter Riehl, former Greater German representatives, Hermann Foppa and Franz Langoth, the ex-*Heimatschutz* leader in Salzburg and brother-in-law of Hermann Göring, Franz Hueber, as well as Mauthe. It became clear to Schuschnigg at this meeting that the radical wing of the NSDAP could not be held in check by any leadership of a proposed National Front and he committed instead to a regime of control and coercion inside the Fatherland Front.[20]

Mauthe's presence at this meeting showed that his collaboration with National Socialists in 'National Action' rested on a commitment to better relations between Austria and Germany and a sphere of political influence for German-nationalists within the Austrofascist state. To these ends, he supported National Socialists as long as they did not define exclusively a nationalist ideology in Austrian politics. Schuschnigg saw the pragmatic sense in this approach and, while he officially ended conciliatory talks with National Socialists, unofficially he ensured that Mauthe remained at the helm of the newspaper. Mauthe's participation in the 'National Action' alongside Nazis probably saved

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[19] Evan Burr Bukey, *Hitler's Hometown: Linz, Austria, 1908-1945* (Bloomington, 1986), p. 157.
[20] Gerhard Jagschitz, "Zwischen Befriedung und Konfrontation: Zur Lage der NSDAP in Österreich 1934 bis 1936," in *Das Juliabkommen von 1936: Vorgeschichte, Hintergründe und Folgen*, ed. Ludwig Jedlicka and Rudolf Neck (Vienna, 1977), pp. 163-67; Bruce F. Pauley, *Hitler and the Forgotten Nazis: A History of Austrian National Socialism* (Chapel Hill, 1981), pp. 148-50.

him from a worse fate after the *Anschluss*. Instead of being denounced to the Nazi authorities, Mauthe was simply replaced as chief editor of the *Wiener Neueste Nachrichten* by Walter Petwaidic, an Austrian Nazi, which explains the headline on 13 March 1938 heralding 'National Socialist German Austria'.[21] The Nazis apparently regarded Mauthe's collaboration with the Austrofascist government as a minor offence in light of his ideological commitment to the greater-German idea.

In this respect of redefining its pan-Germanism to suit the new climate of Austrofascist patriotism and anti-Nazi politics, the *Wiener Neueste Nachrichten* was no exception to Austria's leading Christian Social newspapers. The *Reichspost* was known in Austrofascist circles to harbour sympathies for National Socialism, a fact that had prompted Dollfuss in 1933 to lend support to the efforts of prominent German Catholic refugees to establish a weekly journal, *Der Christliche Ständestaat* (The Christian Corporate State), as an unofficial mouthpiece of the Austrofascist regime and a rival organ to the *Anschluss*-friendly *Reichspost*.[22] An example of the *Reichspost*'s pan-Germanism can be seen in an editorial on 1 October 1934 written by Heinrich Mataja (1877-1937), a former Christian Social politician and co-editor of *Die Reichspost*:

> We shall promote and support whatever is good and noble and pan-German in National Socialism. When it degenerates into intolerant party politics and an un-German despotism, then we will fight against it. While we welcome every move towards a common understanding, and well beyond that to pan-German brotherhood, as steadfast Austrians we shall oppose all force, all brutality. Long live the German people, Austria for the Austrians![23]

This final patriotic gesture was not an admission of belief in the Austrian state. Rather, Mataja's recoil from an 'un-German despotism' and the ignoble violent methods of Nazis was merely a defensive logic against the extremes of National Socialism, not against the

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[21] Dubrovic, *Veruntreute Geschichte*, pp. 230-31.
[22] On German Catholic refugees and *Der Christliche Ständestaat*, especially the rivalry with the *Reichpost* editors, see Ebneth, *Die österreichische Wochenschrift 'Der Christliche Ständestaat.'* See also Anton Staudinger, "Zur 'Österreich'-Ideologie des Ständestaates," in *Das Juliabkommen von 1936: Vorgeschichte, Hintergründe und Folgen*, ed. Ludwig Jedlicka and Rudolf Neck (Munich, 1977), pp. 209-12. I address this further in Chapter Six.
[23] Staudinger, "Zur 'Österreich'-Ideologie des Ständestaates," pp. 238-39.

movement itself. Like the *Wiener Neueste Nachrichten*, which showed only marginally less restraint than the *Reichspost* in endorsing National Socialism, Mataja's avowal of a 'pan-German brotherhood' indicated the extent of his ongoing commitment to Austro-German relations alongside National Socialist designs for unity.

One way that the *Wiener Neueste Nachrichten* was able to accommodate the Austrofascist state while continuing to promote its own vision of Austrian pan-German identity was by drawing attention to German minorities outside of Austria and Germany and non-German minorities within Austria. The newspaper's attention to German minorities represented an ethnic universalist discourse because it constructed the boundaries of the universal German nation along the lines of language and culture, rather than territory or political membership in the nation. This vision of a universal pan-German community included German minorities living outside of Germany and Austria and thus resembled the National Socialist vision of a *Volksgemeinschaft*. Unlike the Nazi vision, however, which defined the nation both in ethnic terms of a community of race and in civic terms of a politically unified territory of racial Germans, the *Wiener Neueste Nachrichten* constructed the boundaries of the universal nation only in ethnic terms, that is, in the sense of all Germans living in a shared community of language, culture and ancestry. The newspaper had been forced to abandon the civic project of Austro-German unity in the wake of Nazi terrorism in Austria. At the same time, by focusing on the place of non-German minorities in Austria, this shift from a civic to an ethnic discourse of universal pan-German identity reinforced on another level both the civic and ethnic discourses of the particularist aspect of pan-German identity. As we will see in the articles on Slovene and Czech minorities in Austria, the *Wiener Neueste Nachrichten* used a combination of ethnic and civic discourses of assimilation. The ethnic discourse drew on the symbolic resources of 'German' and 'Slavic' language and ethnicity. If 'Slavic' minorities were to be assimilated, it would be through their dissimilation from non-German ethnic identities. The

civic discourse, on the other hand, emphasised voluntary participation in a German-language education as the basis of assimilation to the state culture.

The universalist idea of a community of Germans united by language and culture was the focus of several editorials, articles and book reviews in the *Wiener Neueste Nachrichten* after 1933. The *Wiener Neueste Nachrichten* had already featured a series of articles in May 1933 on the Hungarian Germans and the prominent Hungarian German activist, Jakob Bleyer, a professor of German literature and former Minister of Nationalities.[24] It followed closely Hungarian students' anti-German demonstrations at the university against Bleyer, reporting how the demonstrations had disrupted Bleyer's teaching and forced him to relinquish his academic post after the Hungarian government failed to intervene on his behalf.[25] But despite expressing outrage at the treatment of Bleyer, the newspaper acknowledged that the Germans in Hungary were 'patriotic Hungarians' who were proud of their ethnic heritage.[26] This was somewhat of an overstatement, since not all Hungarian Germans supported Bleyer's endeavours to nurture an ethnic German consciousness. Many Hungarian Germans criticised his attempts to lobby for German minority schools, believing that these schools would hinder their children's fluency in Hungarian and disadvantage their opportunities for success.[27] Nonetheless, it is important to point out that the newspaper's statement that Hungarian Germans belonged to the German nation, but also to the state of Hungary, represented an ethnic discourse of universal pan-German identity. A civic discourse would have called for the inclusion of these German-speaking Hungarian patriots in a political nation-state of Germans.

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[24] On Bleyer, see N.G. Papp, "The German Minority in Hungary between the two World Wars: Loyal Subjects or Suppressed Citizens?," *East European Quarterly* 22, 4 (1988): 495-514.

[25] See *Wiener Neueste Nachrichten*, 11 May 1933, p. 8; 12 May 1933, p. 1; 19 May 1933, p. 1. See also Papp, "The German Minority in Hungary between the two World Wars," p. 501.

[26] *Wiener Neueste Nachrichten*, 20 May 1933, p. 3.

[27] Papp, "The German Minority in Hungary between the two World Wars," p. 499-500.

One prominent commentator on minority politics in the *Wiener Neueste Nachrichten*, Richard Bahr, published a book in 1933, *Volk jenseits der Grenzen* (The Nation on the Other Side of the Border), about the Germans in Hungary, Poland, South Tyrol, the Baltic countries, the Sudeten lands, Yugoslavia and Rumania.[28] In addition to the question of German minorities outside of Austria and Germany, Bahr also devoted attention to the question of non-German minorities in Austria. He believed that a more scholarly approach to this question could be found by researching the multinational Habsburg state. In an article that he wrote as a book review of a collection of essays about nationality laws in Austria-Hungary, he pointed to the cultural freedom of Poles and Czechs in having their own universities and technical schools, and the Supreme Court's practice of handing down verdicts in German, Italian, Czech and Serbo-Croatian, as evidence that Austrian governance of the multinational empire was fairer than most minority systems in any of the Habsburg successor states. For Bahr, the book's erudition pointed to the contribution that Austria could make, through both its history and its geographical position in Europe, on the question of national minorities:

> When one has read the nearly 800 pages of this volume, one can understand why an Institute for Nationality Law should be created precisely in Vienna. And why, as soon as winds start to blow again from a friendlier direction, these efforts should resume. Not only because Vienna lies, if not directly in the middle, still on the threshold of that tragic part of Europe between east and west, in which peoples and tribes have been so intermingled and divided up, one inside the other, through fate and centuries of development, that a clean division according to the pattern of west European nation-states will always be impossible. Also for another far more fundamental reason, that here for at least seven centuries – and not just for reasons of state or government – attempts have been made to achieve such a solution of squaring the circle…. Research into nationality law would be the field, above all else, in which Vienna's university could make its special and unique contribution to German scholarship.[29]

Bahr's statement was characteristic of the Austrian view of Greater Germany that regarded Vienna as the guardian and protector of Central European nationalities. Not only German-

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[28] Richard Bahr, *Volk jenseits der Grenzen* (Hamburg, 1933). See also Bahr's obituary in *Wiener Neueste Nachrichten*, 22 December 1936, p. 3.
[29] *Wiener Neueste Nachrichten*, 11 November 1934, p. 2. For the original text, see Appendix I.

nationalists like Bahr, but also many Christian Socials, shared these imperialist obsessions. We have already seen Ignaz Seipel's conception of Austria's pan-German mission as a bridge between Central European nationalities and he, like Bahr, believed that this mission could still be fulfilled through eventual Austro-German unity.[30] Unlike Seipel, however, whose personal view of the universal pan-German mission of Austria was also representative of the Austrofascist idea of pan-German identity, Bahr's Greater Germany resembled more closely the Nazi idea of a *Volksgemeinschaft*, to which all Germans belonged on the basis of ethnicity, even those outside the historical boundaries of the German nation, such as the Baltic Germans.

The universal national community was the leitmotif of an article to commemorate the *Wiener Neueste Nachrichten's* tenth anniversary edition in October 1935. In this article, the newspaper gave its clearest indication since 1933 of its commitment to the German nation, and to an anti-Semitic platform underpinning its vision of the national community:

> The immoveable guiding star, which directs our activities and actions, is the national community. We are committed to the pan-German idea, to the German people. The *Wiener Neueste Nachrichten* is a national newspaper, averse to any deformed internationalism and nebulous cosmopolitanism, and wants consciously to help in the development of the character of our people as a nation. That also governs our position on the Jewish Question.

At the same time, the newspaper echoed the pan-German sentiments of the Austrofascist state in its commitment to the Austrian 'homeland' (*Heimat*). The newspaper described Austria as a 'German country', distinguishing between the German Empire and the German nation, and affirmed that Austrians had a certain uniqueness that came with being German. However, the newspaper rejected the state's tendencies to see Austrians as a separate nationality and stressed instead the 'tribal' nature of Austrian identity within the German nation:

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[30] On Seipel's vision of Greater Germany, see Chapter One.

The *Wiener Neueste Nachrichten* is an Austrian paper. We do not see, as sometimes happens, cultivating love for our Austrian homeland as opposed to cultivating the pan-German idea, but rather, the one as an extension of the other. The Austrian is a German, and Germany – we differentiate the term Germany from German Empire – is not possible without Austria. Austria is a German country, and has been from the beginning, according to which, by virtue of its geographical position, its thousand-year history and the particular character of its culture and the nature of its inhabitants, it is allotted its own task within the framework of the German cultural mission in Europe. The Austrian has his own tribal particularity like every German tribe. It is our national duty consciously to cultivate these links with our native soil and our unique character in this day and age, which makes everything the same and reduces everything to the same level. However, one must guard against exaggerations – on both sides. It is just as false to see an Austrian as lazy, sloppy and weak, as it is wrong to regard him as a particular species, 'an Austrian man', or see him as part of a particular Austrian nation.

Finally, the newspaper added that its commitment to the whole German nation required it to come to the side of Germans in the borderlands and abroad 'whenever a cry for help is heard'.[31] It was irrelevant whether the cry was genuine, or contrived by the editors for their ideological purposes. No small 'exaggeration' on the part of the editorship was too great for the sake of the national community.

One example of how the newspaper used non-German minorities to construct a pan-German identity was in its articles about Roma and Sinti in the Burgenland. This example is noteworthy because the newspaper was also able to comply with the Austrofascist state with respect to the birth rate campaign and pro-natalist programmes of the Fatherland Front. The newspaper published reports on the 'Gypsy plague' and the efforts of the local authorities in the Burgenland to address the problems confronting the 'native' (*bodenständig*) population.[32] In December 1935, the newspaper decried the allegedly exorbitant health costs incurred through supporting the large 'Gypsy' families, which strained the resources of the local churches and hospitals.[33] Alongside these articles, the newspaper also promoted the work of the Fatherland Front's *Mütterschutzwerk*. An

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[31] *Wiener Neueste Nachrichten*, 27 October 1935, p. 2. For the original text, see Appendix I.
[32] See, for example, *Wiener Neueste Nachrichten*, 19 January 1933, p. 5. Roughly 11,000 Roma and Sinti made up a third minority in the Burgenland, alongside Hungarian- and Croatian-speakers. Nicole Felder, *Die historische Identität der österreichischen Bundesländer* (Innsbruck, 2002), pp. 131-32.
[33] *Wiener Neueste Nachrichten*, 29 December 1935, p. 9.

editorial on 10 January 1936 called for more state support for families, who the newspaper said represented the core of the 'national community' and were essential to 'national' growth and stability.[34] Thus the newspaper delivered a conspicuous statement about progeny in Austria: the large Roma and Sinti families in the Burgenland were seen as a threat to the welfare of 'native' Austrian families, while the official patriotic campaign to encourage women to have more children was directed only at German-speaking Austrians.

The question of minority rights was of special interest to German-nationalists in interwar Austria. In the First Republic, the rights of minorities were protected in the 1920 constitution under Article 149, which was taken directly from Article 19 of the 1867 Basic State Law Regarding the General Rights of Citizens. This article guaranteed equal rights for minorities in Austria, including the right to maintain and cultivate their own national identity and language. With regard to education in ethnically mixed regions, it stated that a child was entitled to 'the requisite means for education in its own language without the use of compulsion in regard to learning a second language of the province.' However, this provision was juxtaposed somewhat ambiguously against Article 8 in the 1920 constitution, which stated that 'the German language is the language of the state without affecting adversely the rights conceded by federal law to the linguistic minorities.'[35] At a grass roots level, these formal rights to cultivate a cultural and linguistic identity were whittled away under the influence of German-nationalist lobby groups in Carinthia.

As we saw in Chapter One, Slovene national and cultural autonomy in the Austro-Hungarian Empire spurred earlier efforts by Germans in the Empire to mobilise pan-German nationalism. Slovene nationalists in 1848 had fought for and won the right to an 'utraquistic' school system that streamlined Slovene-language classes alongside German classes. However, Slovene instruction in these bilingual schools had been discouraged after 1867 under the liberals' policy of Germanising public institutions and abolishing

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[34] *Wiener Neueste Nachrichten*, 10 January 1936, pp. 1-2.
[35] Thomas M. Barker, *The Slovene Minority of Carinthia* (Boulder, 1984), pp. 172-73.

confessional education, which reduced the numbers of church-paid Slovene teachers. By 1891, German-nationalists had relegated the Slovene language to the status of a remedial tool in the first years of schooling.[36] In the interwar period, Carinthian German-nationalists in the *Südmark* schools' organisation and the *Heimatbund* (Homeland League) waged a constant campaign against the Slovenes, which abated slightly under the Austrofascist government and regained momentum after the *Anschluss*. The *Heimatbund* was the unofficial arm of the Carinthian government, which after 1923 was formed from a coalition of the Agrarian League, the Greater Germans and the Christian Socials, despite the Social Democrats' standing as the strongest single party in the province during the interwar period. Prior to 1934, the *Heimatbund* carried out purges against Slovene schoolteachers and clergy: 58 Slovene priests were discharged from their clerical duties or transferred and replaced by German-speaking priests, 58 Slovene teachers were expelled from their posts, private Slovene-language schools were shut down and six utraquistic schools were also closed. Meanwhile, the *Südmark* schools' association built German schools and kindergartens in Slovene-speaking towns with funds received from Germany.[37] The influence of the *Heimatbund* began to subside toward the end of 1934, when the Carinthian parliament was finally dissolved and replaced by an Austrofascist government on 1 November 1934.[38] Despite this, both the *Heimatbund* and the *Südmark* continued to exert pressure on local authorities so that the Slovene language remained subsidiary in Carinthian schools. After the *Anschluss*, the *Heimatbund* became the instrument of National Socialism's policy of Germanisation: of the 78 Slovene and utraquistic schools in operation prior to *Anschluss*, 50 were closed down by the end of 1938. The resettlement and deportations of Carinthian Slovenes did not begin until after Germany's occupation of

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[36] Ibid., pp. 73-74. See also Tom Priestly, "Denial of Ethnic Identity: The Political Manipulation of Beliefs about Language in Slovene Minority Areas of Austria and Hungary," *Slavic Review* 55, 2 (1996): p. 377; Felder, *Die historische Identität der österreichischen Bundesländer*, p. 53.
[37] Hanns Haas and Karl Stuhlpfarrer, *Österreich und seine Slowenen* (Vienna, 1977), p. 42; Erwin Steinböck, "Kärnten," in *Österreich 1918-1938: Geschichte der Ersten Republik*, ed. Erika Weinzierl and Kurt Skalnik (Graz, 1983), pp. 810-13; Barker, *The Slovene Minority of Carinthia*, pp. 181-89.
[38] Steinböck, "Kärnten," pp. 817-19, 827.

Yugoslavia in 1941, as Nazi authorities in Berlin did not want to incite premature anti-German hostilities in Yugoslavia. By war's end, the Nazis had forcibly resettled around 1,300 Carinthian Slovenes and incarcerated another 1,000 in prisons and camps, including 200 who died in concentration camps.[39]

Carinthian German-nationalists alleged that the Slovenes could be divided into Slovene nationalists and assimilated Slovenes, or *Windische*. *Windisch* was originally a German word for Slav, but by the end of the nineteenth century the term had come to define the linguistic and ethnic separateness of Carinthian Slovenes from ethnic Slovenes, who spoke and wrote in Standard Slovene. The distinction between assimilated and unassimilated Slovenes formed the basis of the pseudo-academic *Windisch*-theory, which received scholarly attention in the interwar period from practitioners at institutes of *Südostforschung* (research of Southeast Europe). These researchers built on the anti-Slavic discourse of nineteenth-century Austrian statisticians, topographers, ethnographers and historians and paved the way for the theories and methodologies of Nazi racial science. Of particular importance for the popularity of the *Windisch*-theory, Martin Wutte (1876-1948), a local Carinthian historian, archivist and academic advisor to the Austrian delegation at the Paris Peace Conference, defined *Windische* in his historical writings as those Slovenes who identified culturally and racially with German-speakers through 'natural assimilation', or intermarriage. The imagined ethnic border between Slovenes and *Windischen* was seemingly affirmed by the result in the 1920 plebiscite in the ethnically mixed region of Lower Carinthia, in which 59 per cent voted in favour of Austrian rule while 41 per cent voted to join the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (SHS). Between 10,000 and 12,000 of the more than 22,000 who voted for Austria were Slovenes. Carinthian German-nationalists interpreted that statistic as evidence of a Germanised

[39] Haas and Stuhlpfarrer, *Österreich und seine Slowenen*, pp. 67-70; Barker, *The Slovene Minority of Carinthia*, pp. 189-90. On the National Socialist period, see Michael John, "Angst, Kooperation und Widerstand -- Die Autochthonen Minderheiten Österreichs 1938-1945," *Zeitgeschichte* 17, 2 (1989): pp. 74-77.

identity among Slovenes, although historians have suggested that Slovenes who identified with Austria did so out of class consciousness, rather than national loyalty. Conversely, the 15,000, presumably all Slovenes, who had voted for the SHS were seen as renegades and were targeted aggressively by groups such as the *Heimatbund* and *Südmark* schools' association. Later, under National Socialist rule, the *Windisch*-theory became the basis of Aryanisation policies in the province by Germanising the '*Windischen*' Carinthians and resettling 'ethnically conscious' Slovenes. After 1941, however, this distinction was abolished.[40]

At least two feature articles in the *Wiener Neueste Nachrichten* in 1936 discussed the alleged differences between the '*Windischen*' and 'Slovenes'. The first of these articles, entitled 'We Will Remain *Windische*' (*Wir bleiben Windische*), was a published letter to the newspaper from one such '*Windische*' Carinthian.[41] The letter was in response to an article that had appeared in the organ of the Carinthian Slovenes, *Koroški slovenec*, and the writer implored the editors of the *Wiener Neueste Nachrichten* to publicise the struggle of the *Windischen* in their quest to remain independent of the Slovene nationalists in the province:[42]

> Your newspaper has come to our aid on a number of previous occasions.
> We ask again for your help....We will not allow ourselves, nor our
> children, to be made into Slovenes, followers of the *Koroški slovenec*.
> We will remain *Windische*. And the more that the *Koroški Slovenec*
> opposes us and is suspicious of us, the more we will say why we do not
> want to be 'Slovenes' and what the difference is between 'Slovenes' and
> us '*Windischen*'.

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[40] Felder, *Die historische Identität der österreichischen Bundesländer*, p. 55; Barker, *The Slovene Minority of Carinthia*, pp. 165, 179; Brigitta Busch, "Shifting Political and Cultural Borders: Language and Identity in the Border Region of Austria and Slovenia," *European Studies* 19 (2003): pp. 130-31. On the *Windischentheorie*, see especially Priestly, "Denial of Ethnic Identity." On *Südostforschung* and the anti-Slavic discourse of Austrian 'experts' from the eighteenth to the early-twentieth centuries, see Christian Promitzer, "The South Slavs in the Austrian Imagination: Serbs and Slovenes in the Changing View from German Nationalism to National Socialism," in *Creating the Other: Ethnic Conflict and Nationalism in Habsburg Central Europe*, ed. Nancy M. Wingfield (New York, 2003), pp. 183-215.

[41] *Wiener Neueste Nachrichten*, 22 July 1936, p. 4. The second feature article was a review of a book about the Carinthian Slovenes. As with Bahr's book review on 11 November 1934, this was a popular editorial tactic by which the newspaper could publish its views by referring to academic texts without directly commenting on political questions. See *Wiener Neueste Nachrichten*, 24 September 1936, pp. 1-2.

[42] The appeal to the Viennese editors of the *Wiener Neueste Nachrichten* was made more significant since the *Koroški slovenec* was printed in Vienna. Barker, *The Slovene Minority of Carinthia*, p. 177.

The writer illustrated one of these alleged differences by drawing attention to the children of Carinthian Slovenes attending schools in Carniola (Krain) in Yugoslavia:

> Slovenes are those who send their children to Krain, so that they will return as fit Slovenian fighters. We *Windischen* let our children attend our Carinthian schools, they are just as good as the schools in Krain and our children learn to get along with the Germans, with whom they have to live.[43]

The letter's authenticity appears doubtful in light of the influence of such groups as the *Heimatbund* and the *Südmark*, and in view also of the widespread acceptance of the *Windischentheorie* by German-nationalists. It is plausible that the letter was simply written by a Carinthian German-nationalist and then printed in the *Wiener Neueste Nachrichten*. It was signed off 'with Carinthian greetings' from F. Kordesch, but this tells us little about the letter's provenance. Nonetheless, the letter's publication is important because it demonstrates the presence of both an ethnic dissimilationist and civic voluntarist discourse in the newspaper. Those Slovenes who went to foreign schools and learnt Slovenian still had a Slovene ethnic identity and thus were a threat to the 'German' state culture of Austria, while those who chose local German-language schools lost their ethnic Slovene attachment and became '*Windische*' – assimilated Germans.

The issue of Vienna's Czech community raised similar concerns about the rights of non-German minorities to cultivate their culture and language in Austria. The Brno Treaty, signed by Austria and Czechoslovakia on 7 June 1920, governed the respective rights of Czech- and German-speaking minorities to establish and maintain their private schools and to have access to state funding for bilingual public schools.[44] In Austria, the *Komenský Schulverein*, which had been founded in 1872, began establishing private Czech-language

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[43] *Wiener Neueste Nachrichten*, 22 July 1936, p. 4. For the original text, see Appendix I.

[44] Prior to the Brno Treaty, the Republic of German-Austria had banned bilingual schools altogether and, unless Czech-speaking children were already enrolled in the *Komensky* schools, they were forced to be home-schooled. Articles 17, 18, 19 and 20 of the Brno Treaty guaranteed the rights of Czech- and German-speaking minorities in Austria and Czechoslovakia respectively to establish and self-govern their own private schools, that there would be no discrimination between minority and majority speakers in the bilingual schools, and that these rights be reciprocated in each country. Further to this agreement, the Karlsbad Protocolls on 23 August 1920 stipulated that tolerance be upheld towards teachers and principles employed in Czech private schools. See Karl M. Brousek, *Wien und seine Tschechen: Integration und Assimilation einer Minderheit im 20. Jahrhundert* (Munich, 1980), pp. 39-41.

schools that taught both the Czech language and Czech history. By 1933, the Czech community in Vienna, which numbered between 80,000 and 100,000 in the interwar period, had 17 kindergartens, six primary schools, six technical high schools, two high schools, one trade school, one vocational school for women and a further nine Czech language schools in the surrounding Lower Austrian towns. Additionally, Czech-speaking pupils attended ten public schools in Vienna that taught Czech language classes, making a total of 5,264 Czech school students in Vienna and the surrounding Lower Austrian towns.[45]

The *Wiener Neueste Nachrichten* took exception to the Czech national pride that seemingly placed Czech minority schools in a better position than some Austrian schools. An editorial in August 1937 claimed that Austrian schools in non-metropolitan areas were left with insufficient enrolments because the *Komenský* schools' association was shuttling Czech-speaking children from the industrial districts in Lower Austria to Vienna to attend classes at the *Komenský* schools and, the editorial added, to get a free meal. One such school in Vienna's twelfth district had a large painting of Prague hanging in the main stairwell to remind the students, according to a *Komenský* textbook the editorial cited, that although Vienna was their place of residence, Czechoslovakia was their fatherland. Proving its point, the newspaper cited the wife of a Czech general who had remarked upon visiting one of the schools:

> In these schools, a child certainly does not have a feeling of inferiority.
> Such a damaging feeling is only implanted in the minds of children when
> they attend drab inhospitable schools. The *Komenský* schools are not
> only the pride of the Czech minority in Vienna but also the whole
> Czechoslovakian nation.[46]

The newspaper's attempt to cast Czechs as disloyal to Austria was constructed as a civic discourse, which attacked their seeming unwillingness to conform to the state German-language education system. As we have seen in the Slovene case, this civic discourse also

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[45] Ibid., pp. 45-47.
[46] *Wiener Neueste Nachrichten*, 6 August 1937, pp. 1-2.

merged with an ethnic discourse that marginalised minorities if they failed to dissimilate from non-German languages and cultures. The civic discourse apparent here was thus dependent on the ethnic discourse: non-German minorities could not participate in the state culture and language without first severing their ties with non-German ethnic identities. Another set of civic and ethnic discourses followed on from this: Only those Czechs and Slovenes who actively participated in the civic norm of a German-language state education could be considered as members of the Austrian body politic. In this way, German ethnicity could be interpreted as the basis for Austrian citizenship, even if this was not legally the case in Austria before 1938, as we will see in Chapter Six.

The newspaper's construction of a particularist pan-German identity can be seen in a similar vein to the statements of local Austrofascist authorities. For example, in Gänserndorf, near the Lower Austrian border with Czechoslovakia, the district governor protested in 1935 that 70 per cent of the students at one local primary school were permanent residents of Czechoslovakia and that their parents, who hardly spoke any German, wanted to live and work in Austria so they could send their children to Austrian schools.[47] There is also evidence that the Fatherland Front's subsidiary organisation, the Austrian Association for the Work of Germandom Abroad (*Österreichischer Verband für volksdeutsche Auslandsarbeit*), was directing its efforts against the non-German minorities in Austria. Established in March 1934 under Dollfuss' patronage, the Austrian Association for the Work of Germandom Abroad had originally sought to develop closer ties with minority German communities in the Habsburg successor states, but it was quickly infiltrated by members of the *Südmark* schools' association, which the government knew to be a cover organisation for National Socialist activities in the Austrian borderlands.[48]

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[47] Anton Staudinger, "Austrofaschistische 'Österreich'-Ideologie," in *'Austrofaschismus': Beiträge über Politik, Ökonomie und Kultur 1934-1938*, ed. Emmerich Tálos and Wolfgang Neugebauer (Vienna, 1988), p. 304.
[48] Ibid., pp. 307-8.

With regard to the Carinthian Slovenes, the Austrofascist position is more difficult to assess. Although the Austrofascist government did not officially condone the actions of German-nationalist lobby groups, and despite the fact that the state was constitutionally bound to uphold the equal rights of minorities, this did not translate into a pro-minority position on the government's part. Indeed, its ambivalent stance towards the Slovene minority became more transparent in other spheres of federal and local influence. At the local level, for example, the Carinthian leader of the *Ostmärkische Sturmscharen* – a paramilitary arm of the Christian Social party that Schuschnigg had founded in 1930 – declared Austria to be the 'cradle of Germany' and Carinthia to be 'purely German according to blood and race alone'. At the federal level, Carinthian Slovenes saw Schuschnigg, whose grandfather was Slovenian, as their advocate in the struggle against German-nationalists in the province. On the other hand, the chancellor's office had rejected an official Slovene translation of Austria's national anthem on the grounds that it was a mistranslation of the original German version. A more chauvinistic objection to the Slovene version can be detected in the lyrics of one verse in the original German, 'earnest and honest German work, tender and warm German love' (*deutsche Arbeit, ernst und erhrlich – deutsche Liebe, zart und weich*), which was translated into Slovene as 'a strong people lives here, honesty is at home here' (*Ljudstovo krepko tu trebiva, tu postenost je doma*).[49] The statement of the paramilitary leader in Carinthia was conditioned by local antagonisms towards the Slovenes and reflected a deeply rooted prejudice against all things Slavic in the Austrian borderlands. On the other hand, the federal chancellery's rather more bureaucratic attitude also revealed the official reticence to give public recognition to a Slovene identity that denied Slovenes the right to sing the national anthem in their native language.

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[49] Ibid., p. 304.

However, the comparisons between the pan-German identity discourses of the *Wiener Neueste Nachrichten* and the Austrofascist state can be seen not just in rhetoric, but in the state's actual policies towards non-German minorities. To be sure, there were local xenophobic reactions by Austrofascist state functionaries, such as the Gänserndorf district governor, or the leader of the *Ostmärkische Sturmscharen* in Carinthia, but these were exceptional and tended to be ignored by the central authorities. Despite local protests against Czech and Slovak migrant workers, federal Austrofascist leaders did not ban seasonal immigration and the annual quota of work permits issued by the Austrian Migration Office to these migrant workers continued to rise each year until 1938.[50] Moreover, although Nazi-sympathisers within the ranks of the Austrian Association for the Work of Germandom Abroad entertained plans to phase out non-German languages and institutions in Austria, the organisation's primary target minority group were Jews, not Slovenes or Czechs.[51] Unlike its imperial predecessor, the Austrofascist state could accommodate non-German minorities more easily since these no longer represented a threat to German dominance in the state.

When the *Wiener Neueste Nachrichten* greeted the *Anschluss* on 12 March 1938 as the long-awaited fulfilment of the 'Greater German Empire', the newspaper finally verbalised what it had long implied. The various ethnic and civic discourses that corresponded with both particular and universal visions of the nation need to be summarised here because they give a more precise understanding of the newspaper's pan-Germanism and explain the newspaper's reference to a 'Greater German Empire'. The newspaper's early support in 1933 for Austro-German unity was a civic universalist discourse that sought the political unity of Germans and Austrians under the banner of National Socialism. Following the wave of Nazi violence in 1933-34, the newspaper abandoned this civic universalist discourse and embraced an ethnic vision of a universal

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[50] Illigasch, "Migration aus und nach Österreich in der Zwischenkriegszeit," *Zeitgeschichte* 26, 1 (1999): pp. 19-20.
[51] See Staudinger, "Zur 'Österreich'-Ideologie des Ständestaates," pp. 235-37.

pan-German identity that included Germans outside of Austria. At the same time, the newspaper deployed another ethnic discourse that corresponded with the particularist understanding of Austrian pan-German identity. This ethnic discourse emphasised the dissimilation of non-German minorities living in Austria. The newspaper also deployed a civic discourse that excluded non-German minorities who apparently chose not to conform to Austria's German-language state education system, or was seen to be a burden on the majority German-speaking population of Austria. On the surface, this civic discourse appeared to have some similarities with the Austrofascist state, but these similarities ended at the point of rhetoric since the state did not carry out actual policies of discrimination or exclusion towards non-German minorities in Austria.

Pan-Germanism on the '*Ostmark*': the *Grazer Tagespost*

The *Grazer Tagespost's* conception of the national community was more closely aligned with National Socialism. Like the *Wiener Neusten Nachrichten*, it used an ethnic discourse that resembled the Nazi idea of a *Volksgemeinschaft*. However, whereas the *Wiener Neueste Nachrichten* tactfully withdrew its support for political unity in the face of Nazi violence, the *Tagespost* continued to champion Austro-German unity on National Socialist terms. Similar sympathies for Nazism could also be detected in articles that expressed belonging to the Austrian '*Ostmark*' of the German nation and emphasised participation in local German culture. In this sense, the *Tagespost* constructed the particularist component of pan-German identity using a civic discourse of participation in local traditions. Consequently, an ethnic dissimilationist discourse featured more aggressively in the *Tagespost* than in the *Wiener Neueste Nachrichten* and bore a striking resemblance to Nazi racial theories and Aryanisation policies in the post-1938 period.

A front-page editorial on 4 January 1933 encapsulated the *Tagespost's* vision of a universal national community, in which all Germans worked together in a common

community of labour (*Arbeitsgemeinschaft*). The notion of a 'labour community' had originally been encapsulated in the 1920 Salzburg Programme, which defined the 'national community' (*Volksgemeinschaft*) as a two-pronged idea of a shared cultural and labour community.[52] The editorial on 4 January adapted this formula by claiming that a conscientious truck driver was just as German as an alpine farmer, regardless of the individual's political beliefs. However, the reference to 'conscientious' also belied the newspaper's prejudice against the stereotypical worker, who had a tendency to be less industrious, and perhaps less German, than the alpine farmer.[53]

The newspaper also claimed that this universal pan-German identity was dependent on the particular expression of what was uniquely Austrian in the German '*Ostmark*'. It even went so far as to give pre-eminence to the particular over the universal, pointing out that a 'strong sense of what is Austrian [and] a general sense of what is East March German [*Ostmarkdeutschtum*] does not stand in contradiction to pan-German ideas, but is, rather, the necessary pre-requisite.'[54] The newspaper's regional tone reappeared in an editorial on 4 July 1933, which again made reference to an *Ostmarkdeutschtum*. Commenting on the latest press law, which required German-nationalist newspapers to publish all official correspondence from the Fatherland Front propaganda office, the editorial lamented that the 'unfortunate feud' between the German and Austrian governments 'makes it seemingly impossible for the best person to be a good Austrian and a good German at the same time.' Without a 'synthesis of what is Austrian and German [*Österreichertum und Deutschtum*]', the editorial concluded that there could be no peace in Austria.[55] Analogous in tone to the editorial of 4 January 1933, this statement exactly six months later reaffirmed the newspaper's commitment to both a particular and a universal pan-German Austrian identity. Furthermore, we can interpret the *Tagespost's* claim that

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[52] On the 1920 Salzburg Programme, see Chapter One.
[53] *Tagespost*, 4 January 1933, p. 1.
[54] *Tagespost*, 4 January 1933, p. 1.
[55] *Tagespost*, 4 July 1933 (Abendblatt), p. 1.

the Dollfuss dictatorship, not Nazi violence, had damaged Austro-German relations as a civic universalist discourse about the political unity of all Germans under the banner of National Socialism. The ethnic construction of a universal nation bound by blood and soil was implicit in the image of the German alpine farmer in a German 'labour community', which can also be read as a reference to local Austrian traditions in the *Ostmark*.

Instead of condemning Dollfuss' assassins and the campaign of violence by Nazis like the *Wiener Neueste Nachrichten* had done, the editors of the *Tagespost* opted for expediency. In January 1934, the newspaper's editor-in-chief, Julius Keil, wrote to the director of the federal press service, Eduard Ludwig, to offer his willingness to publish official press releases. The manoeuvre won him high esteem from top ministry officials, including Chancellor Dollfuss, but the *Tagespost* forfeited a significant block of its readership for this back down from its previous support for National Socialism, losing 6,000 subscriptions over the course of nine months.[56] Keil was forced to make further concessions to the government in June 1934 by appointing a government official as the Viennese correspondent and, after Dollfuss' assassination in July 1934, a *Heimwehr* deputy, Baron Rudolf Kapri, was made political editor of the *Tagespost*.[57]

Apart from the official press releases and propaganda of both the Fatherland Front and the *Heimwehr*, the *Tagespost* published little else that was of direct importance to Austria. Indeed, the newspaper was well known in press circles for flouting the government censors by publishing official correspondence in small print and printing mainly international news.[58] Hans Glaser, the owner of the *Salzburger Volksblatt*, observed that 'the custom of the *Grazer Tagespost* to shove domestic political issues to the

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[56] Harald Schmied, "'D'rum straff angezogen...den stahldrähtigen Maulkorb': Presse und Diktatur (1933-1938) am Beispiel der Steiermark" (MA, Karl-Franzens-University, 1996), pp. 49, 52, 64. Prior to the drop in subscriptions, the *Tagespost* had sold around 30,000 copies on weekdays and 40,000 on Sundays. Schmied notes that the loss of readership was also attributed to a general readership fatigue in Austria that saw many readers drift away from established Austrian newspapers toward the international German-language press in Switzerland especially. See also Fritz Csoklich, "Presse und Rundfunk," in *Österreich 1918-1938: Geschichte der Ersten Republik*, ed. Erika Weinzierl and Kurt Skalnik (Graz, 1983), p. 725.

[57] Schmied, "Presse und Diktatur," pp. 65-66, 77-78.

[58] Nora Aschacher, "Die Presse der Steiermark von 1918- 31 July 1955" (PhD, Vienna, 1972), pp. 61-62.

side and publish lead articles about Yugoslavia or Japan would no longer be tolerated' by press authorities.[59] However, the dense coverage of news from Yugoslavia was not a ploy to evade the censors. Throughout the interwar period, the *Tagespost* regularly featured lead stories from Yugoslavia and other Habsburg successor states.[60] In the month of January 1933, for example, three separate reports featured news from Yugoslavia on the second page alone in one day's edition, while Hitler's appointment as German Chancellor on 30 January 1933 was only the second major news item of the day behind the lead story from Yugoslavia about tensions between the Catholic Church and the Sokol gymnastics association.[61] The prominence given to political events across the border suggested a lingering sense of ownership over ethnically mixed regions of the former multinational empire and indicated that interest in these regions had not diminished since 1918.

One regional point of interest for Styrian readers was the mixed Slovene and German population in Carinthia. From 1935, the *Tagespost* ran a regular feature column on Carinthia.[62] Styria's own Slovene minority in the interwar period represented less than one per cent of the province's population, but the proportion of Slovenes vis-à-vis Germans in the pre-1918 region of Greater Styria had been substantially higher: more than a third of all Styrians in the pre-war period were Slovenes.[63] The exaggerated reports of Slovene nationalism in the *Tagespost* during the last two decades of the Austro-Hungarian Empire had reflected German-nationalist sensitivities both to German-Slovene relations in Styria and to ethnic tensions generally in the empire. In the interwar period, however, the hotspot

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[59] Glaser, *Tagebuch*, 22 June 1934, Archiv der Stadt Salzburg, PA 024.
[60] Aschacher, "Die Presse der Steiermark", pp. 59-60.
[61] *Tagespost*, 4 January 1933, p. 2; 30 January 1933, p. 1.
[62] Aschacher, "Die Presse der Steiermark," p. 59.
[63] According to census figures of 1846 and 1850, Styria had 363,000 Slovenes, which represented 36 per cent of Styria's population. See Fran Zwitter, "The Slovenes and the Habsburg Monarchy," *Austrian History Yearbook* 3, 2 (1967): p. 159. The number of Slovenes in Styria in the interwar period is based on the 1939 Nazis census, in which 3,607 declared themselves to be Slovene. Felder, *Die historische Identität der österreichischen Bundesländer*, p. 43. However, there were two censuses in 1939 following the National Socialist takeover in Austria: one on the basis of 'mother tongue' (*Muttersprache*), and the second to determine those who identified ethnically with the *Volkstum*. We can be sure that the number of Slovene-speakers who identified themselves publicly with the Slovene *Volk* was dramatically lower than those who declared only that their mother tongue was Slovenian. Even the latter figure would have represented only a proportion of the population who could and did speak Slovenian, but had long been acculturated into German-speaking society. See John, "Angst, Kooperation und Widerstand."

for German-Slovene tensions was in Carinthia, not Styria, which explains why the *Tagepost* was more concerned with the issue of Slovenes in Carinthia, rather than the significantly smaller rural Slovene-speaking communities in southern Styria.

At first glance, the *Tagespost* appeared to be unconcerned with the standard German-nationalist complaints over Slovene language rights and schools. As we have seen already for the *Wiener Neueste Nachrichten*, the issue of non-German schools and, in particular, the pseudo-academic theory of assimilated Slovenes, were vehicles for dual ethnic and civic discourses of pan-German identity in the German-nationalist press. However, in a front-page editorial on 10 April 1936 devoted entirely to the Carinthian Slovenes, the *Tagespost* revealed a far more insidious agenda of denying any form of Slovene ethnic consciousness in Carinthia, which was closer to Nazi theories of race than to Austrofascism's Germanising mission.

The editorial's intention was to set the record straight about the Carinthian Slovene 'problem', which, the newspaper contended, was too often confined to a 'purely political' perspective. Carinthia was not ethnically mixed, the editorial went on to claim, in which case minority rights would otherwise come to the fore, but its culture and people had been woven together under a dominant German influence. The editorial firstly denied any Slovene Christian identity with its assertion that the German tribes had converted the Slavic inhabitants of Carinthia to Christianity in the eighth century. Secondly, the editorial alleged that most of the province's rural traditions and ways of life were traceable to a prevailing German influence in the province, claiming that, although there was some hybridity in music and regional dress, 'the Germans were always the givers, while the Slovenes were always the takers'. Finally, the editorial argued that the German influence and the intermixing of both groups had erased the ethnic divide between them and left only a marginal linguistic difference: 'Today when we are dealing with the concept "Slovenian", we do not mean the racial or the cultural characteristic, but only the

linguistic.' With reference to some vernacular words and phrases, the newspaper argued that the Slovene dialect spoken in Carinthia was actually a derivative of the German.[64] Here the newspaper abandoned civic discourses altogether with this assertion that there were no Slovenes in Carinthia, only Slovene-speakers. Moreover, the claim that a more superior and vigorous German language and culture had offset any lingering trace of Slovene dialect or dress, creating homogeneity where real ethnic diversity had apparently ceased to exist, was a foretelling of what later was to eventuate under the Nazis' policies of Aryanisation towards Slovenes in Austria after 1938.

The *Tagespost* had greater freedom to express its Nazi sympathies as a direct result of the July Agreement. As was mentioned in Chapter Two, the *Tagespost* was one of five Austrian newspapers permitted to circulate in Germany under the terms of the 'Gentlemen's Agreement'. This privileged position indicated the extent to which it was regarded as ideologically close to National Socialism. After the July Agreement, the newspaper's chief editor, Keil, also exerted pressure on the federal press authorities in Vienna to remove the *Heimwehr* official, Baron Kapri, from the political editorship. Keil had the support of the Styrian provincial governor, Karl Maria Stepan, and eventually on 4 November 1936, he was able to demote Kapri to the position of local news editor and replace him with the previous political editor, Max Zaversky.[65]

The change in editorial view was unmistakeable in the lavish front-page reports of German Foreign Minister Konstantin von Neurath's visit to Vienna in February 1937.[66] During the two-day visit, which was marked by Nazi demonstrations on his arrival and a counter-demonstration by the Fatherland Front on his departure, Neurath held discussions with the Austrian government, demanding that German citizens in Austria be allowed to wear the swastika and give the Nazi salute and that the government allow the repatriation

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[64] *Tagespost*, 10 April 1936, p. 1. For the original text, see Appendix I. As we have seen above, the term '*Wend*', like '*Windisch*', was also a word for 'Slav' that had been appropriated in the *Windischen*-theory during the interwar period. See Priestly, "Denial of Ethnic Identity."
[65] Schmied, "Presse und Diktatur," pp. 77-78.
[66] See both morning and evening editions of *Tagespost*, 24 February 1937, p. 1.

of Austrian Nazis who had fled to Germany as refugees since the party's ban in June 1933.

Neurath also cautioned the Austrian government of German military intervention should a

Habsburg Restoration take place.[67] Talk of a Habsburg Restoration had surfaced in April

1935 at the Stresa Conference, where the leaders of France, Britain and Italy had met to

discuss ways of containing German expansionism. In the latter half of 1935, both

Chancellor Schuschnigg and Vice-Chancellor Starhemberg had been in contact with Otto

von Habsburg in exile in Belgium; however, the Little Entente countries rejected any

suggestion of a Danubian Confederation and were especially mortified by the prospect of a

Habsburg returning to Vienna. Germany, too, was an opponent of this idea and established

a military plan known as 'Operation Otto' to occupy Austria by force should a Restoration

be imminent.[68] Neurath's visit to Vienna in 1937 was a pointed warning to Austrian

leaders of Germany's intentions in Austria and the *Tagespost* was fully aware of its

significance for the future of Austro-German relations.

The editorials became more daring after the Austrofascist government appointed

Artur Seyss-Inquart as 'trustee' of the Austrian German-nationalist press in July 1937. The

Austrian and German governments each had to appoint a trustee of the press after both

sides met one year after the July Agreement to reiterate their commitment to a propaganda

truce set out under the terms of the Agreement.[69] Seyss-Inquart was linked with the

Catholic-National movement, which proposed a *Zusammenschluss* (amalgamation) with

Germany, a union in which Austria was to be an equal partner. Historians have speculated

whether men like Seyss-Inquart were actually Hitlerian Nazis behind their Catholic

Austrian disguise.[70] Seyss-Inquart, for example, had been a member of the Styrian

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[67] Alfred D. Low, *The Anschluss Movement, 1931-1938, and the Great Powers* (Boulder, 1985), pp. 180, 202-3.

[68] Jelavich, *Modern Austria*, pp. 208-9, 221; Brook-Shepherd, *The Austrians*, pp. 303-4.

[69] Elisabeth El Refaie, "Keeping the Truce? Austrian Press Politics between the 'July Agreement' (1936) and the *Anschluss* (1938)," *German History* 20, 1 (2002): pp. 60-63.

[70] Low, *The Anschluss Movement*, pp. 100-1. *Zusammenschluss* was an 'illusion', in Low's assessment, given the economic and political disparity of Germany and Austria. On so-called 'Catholic-National' intellectuals, see John Haag, "Marginal Men and the Dream of the Reich: Eight Austrian National-Catholic Intellectuals,

Heimatschutz, which had merged with the Nazi Party in April 1933. Seyss-Inquart had

joined the NSDAP formally at that point, although party receipts show he had paid his first

membership dues in December 1931. Schuschnigg appointed him to the Austrian cabinet

as a member of the 'national opposition' in accordance with the July Agreement and, once

in cabinet, he gave tactical support to Austrian independence to pave the way towards

Austro-German unity.[71] After July 1937, Seyss-Inquart's responsibility was to ensure that

the German-nationalist newspapers adhered to the terms of the July Agreement by

refraining from polemical reporting about either the German or Austrian governments. At

the same time, he established a separate news agency for the German-nationalist press

under the editorship of a known Nazi, Herbert Friedl, and lobbied the press chamber to lift

restrictions against these newspapers.[72]

Subsequent front-page editorials in the *Tagespost* reflected the newspaper's

exasperation with the Austrian government's continued restrictions on National Socialists.

An editorial on 26 November 1937, entitled 'Wishes and Expectations', accused the

government of reneging on its commitment to build a 'state of national honour', a term that

the newspaper quoted directly from the Fatherland Front Secretary, Guido Zernatto.

According to Zernatto, the state should be formed by the young generation, it should not be

a state for 'the disinterested', nor for 'the reactionaries', but, rather, 'a state of organic

cooperation of the citizenry'. Turning Zernatto's original definition of the state on its head,

the editorial warned that opposition to the spirit of the July Agreement must be seen as

'reactionary' and a sign of apathy towards the future of this 'state of national honour',

meaning the Nazi state of German Austria:

1918-1938," in *Who Were the Fascists?: Social Roots of European Fascism*, ed. Stein Ugelvik Larsen, Bernt Hagtvet, and Jan Petter Myklebust (Bergen, 1980).

[71] Low, *The Anschluss Movement*, pp. 175-76, 179. Seyss-Inquart was appointed Minister of the Interior in February 1938 and replaced Schuschnigg as Chancellor on the eve of *Anschluss*. After *Anschluss*, he was made governor of the newly incorporated Austrian province, *Ostmark*, of Nazi Germany until May 1939 and, in 1940, he was appointed Reich Commissioner of Nazi-occupied Holland, where he remained until the end of the war. See Jelavich, *Modern Austria*, pp. 225, 227.

[72] El Refaie, "Keeping the Truce," p. 63.

> Whoever is against the 11th of July, is against the independence and security of the Austrian state. Whoever wants to create a problem out of the 11th July, the meaning of which was only recently spelled out by the Chancellor, upsets the applecart. Whoever wants to introduce distinctions among citizens other than that of being for or against the Austria of 11 July, disturbs the peace. Time has moved on past someone who confuses responsibility and rebuilding with fits of hysteria, who always wants only to hold demonstrations with outdated slogans or to carry out purges and meanwhile fails to notice that he is still embroiled in party rancour and civil war passions; such a person remains consumed by hate and stands as a living memorial to a reactionary past. There is no place for him in a 'State of National Honour', which the young generation is to shape. What positive energies full of a fanatic will for rebuilding, activity and joy in the future will have been gained for the state once they know that the state also belongs to them! A new field of action lies before us. If it is pursued and claimed, then only one victor will emerge out of the years of upheaval: German Austria![73]

The editorial's barely veiled references to the Fatherland Front's demonstrations during Neurath's visit to Austria, and to the role of the 'young generation', another play on Zernatto's words, as well as to the government's purges of Nazis, was the newspaper's boldest statement of support for National Socialism since the party's ban in 1933. Finally, the call to 'the new field of action' in 'German Austria' encapsulated the newspaper's commitment to Austria's inclusion in Nazi Germany.

A similar tone was evident a month later in the Christmas Day editorial for 1937:

> No one wishes to return to the time in which the right to free speech was abused in the most irresponsible fashion. But after all, working together these days means having one's say, and no one believes it possible to have a successful, objective discussion without differences of opinion, even if any demagogic, subjective exaggerations have to be eliminated from the discussion.

The newspaper hoped that such an objective discussion within the ranks of the Fatherland Front 'might turn into really Austrian discussions. Only these can produce the Austria that we all hope for, a peaceful, secure, free German Austria that acts according to the dictates of its own will'.[74] How vigilant the censors were likely to have been on Christmas Eve, when this editorial was submitted for post-publication scrutiny, is hard to gauge. The tone of this editorial was seemingly little different to others after July 1937. However, the

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[73] *Tagespost*, 26 November 1937, p. 1. For the original text, see Appendix I.
[74] *Tagespost*, 25 December 1937, p. 1. For the original text, see Appendix I.

newspaper's call for free democratic processes was an implicit call for National Socialists to be allowed to participate and voice their opinions in public political life, not on the streets as they had done prior to 1934. In this respect, the editorial was more subversive than others because it implied that the Austrofascist state was an illegitimate government, which did not act according to the will of Austrians. The newspaper's hope that a truly 'free German Austria' would act according to 'its own will' was thus a direct attack on the Austrofascist regime, whose authority the editors were still obliged by law to respect.

The meeting between Hitler and Schuschnigg on 8 February 1938 at Berchtesgaden was not immediately announced in the *Tagespost*, in compliance with an official communiqué from the press bureau that warned newspaper editors against premature agitation.[75] The meeting was more a summons than an agreement: Schuschnigg was forced to accept Hitler's demands of an alignment with Germany's foreign policy, the immediate appointment of Seyss-Inquart as Minister of the Interior and a general amnesty of all imprisoned Austrian Nazis. Furthermore, Hitler made clear his intention to occupy Austria militarily if Schuschnigg did not comply within three days on all of the major demands.[76] In a front-page announcement on 13 February, the *Tagespost* greeted the Berchtesgaden talks cautiously, although the headline story was actually the departure of the German Ambassador in Austria, Franz von Papen, who had been recalled to Berlin following the Berchtesgaden meeting.[77] A few days later, a front-page editorial announced with obvious jubilation that 'a happy day' had come to Austria and that the recent developments in Austro-German relations only affirmed what Austrians already believed to be their common future with Germany:

> In Austria it has never been questioned that the Austrian people can only
> pursue their further spiritual, cultural and material development within
> the framework of pan-German interests....There have been certain phases

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[75] El Refaie, "Keeping the Truce," p. 63.

[76] Low, *The Anschluss Movement*, pp. 365-66.

[77] *Tagespost*, 13 February 1938, p. 1. Hitler had originally sent von Papen to Vienna after the assassination of Dollfuss to replace Theo Habicht, who had masterminded the July putsch. See Hanisch, *Der Lange Schatten des Staates*, p. 321.

over the past two years when there have been deviations from this policy,
but these incidents could not shake the belief that everything would be
brought back into line in the near future.[78]

Like the earlier editorials in 1933, which spoke about a synthesis of '*Österreichertum*' and

'*Deutschtum*', this editorial on 16 February 1938 reiterated the newspaper's support for

political unity in the universal pan-German community. Here as before the newspaper used

a civic discourse of universal pan-Germanism in which statehood was the ultimate goal.

Subsequent editorials in February and March continued to deploy a civic discourse

of universal pan-German nationhood. The *Tagespost* had consistently upheld this civic

construction of universal pan-German identity through its support for Austro-German

relations and its ideological sympathies for National Socialism. At the same time, the

newspaper also asserted that Austria could only fulfil its particular pan-German mission in

Central Europe by recognising its full belonging to the German nation, rather than as a

separate German state with its own historical and confessional interests.[79] Once again, the

newspaper used the language of a synthesis between Austrian and German to illustrate this

pan-German mission. A front-page editorial on 5 March 1938 gave guarded praise for

Schuschnigg's speech at the opening of the Austrian Press Exhibition and welcomed the

chancellor's choice of 'wise and conciliatory words' that conveyed 'the necessary

synthesis of good German and good Austrian'. However, the newspaper qualified this

statement by claiming that 'much would already be gained if people finally stopped talking

at and not with each other, that is, not talking as if 'German' and 'Austrian' have to be

opposed to one another.' Furthermore, 'those who support the idea of a fatherland [should]

not…be afraid of saying the word "German"', the editorial went on, 'while, on the other

hand, the National Socialist should also not feel obliged to avoid mentioning anything

Austrian and so to reject it only because it is Austrian for the sake of putting strong

emphasis on the concept of 'national'. One must have the courage to admit, without being

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[78] *Tagespost*, 16 February 1938 (Abendblatt), p. 1. For the original text, see Appendix I.
[79] See, for example, *Tagespost*, 6 March 1938, p. 1.

afraid of losing one's own sense of identity, that on the other side of the border, great and wonderful things are also being done.'[80]

In view of these unambiguous motions of support for National Socialism and Austria's inclusion in the Nazi German state, it is surprising that swift personnel changes were made on the eve of *Anschluss*. Among those editors suddenly deposed by Nazi commissioners was the political editor, Zaversky, who had been replaced earlier by a *Heimwehr* editor in July 1934 and had then been reinstated following the July Agreement in 1936. The reason why he was replaced in March 1938 is unclear, since the fact that Zaversky was forced aside from the political editorship after the failed Nazi putsch and before the resumption of Austro-German relations is an indication of his own political sympathies with National Socialists. Another editor, Oskar Stanglauer, was also replaced on account of his Jewish wife.[81] The removal of Stanglauer from the newspaper is less surprising, however. As we will see in Chapter Five, the relative absence of anti-Semitic rhetoric in the *Tagespost,* in comparison to the *Wiener Neueste Nachrichten* and the *Salzburger Volksblatt*, explains why Stanglauer was able to keep his job until the Nazi takeover.

Despite the eleventh-hour intervention from the Nazi authorities, who presumably saw a change in personnel as the only sure means of adherence to the party line, the *Tagespost* had consistently promoted a vision of Austrian pan-German identity that closely resembled Nazi pan-Germanism. In this sense, it differed slightly from both the universal and particular aspects of pan-Germanism in the *Wiener Neueste Nachrichten*, and it held nothing in common with the Austrofascist state. As we have seen in this chapter, the *Tagespost* defined Austria's place within the universal German nation in civic terms of participation in a National Socialist state. On the other hand, the *Wiener Neueste Nachrichten* favoured a broader ethnic discourse of greater-German nationhood

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[80] *Tagespost*, 5 March 1938 (Abendblatt), p. 1. For the original text, see Appendix I.
[81] Stefan Karner, *Die Steiermark im Dritten Reich 1938-1945: Aspekte ihrer politischen, wirtschaftlichen-sozialen und kulturellen Entwicklung* (Graz, 1986), p. 71; Dubrovic, *Veruntreute Geschichte*, p. 257.

underpinned by a shared language and culture but not an exclusive political ideology. The newspapers' constructions of a particular pan-German identity also varied. The *Wiener Neueste Nachrichten's* commitment to Austria's identity as a German state can be seen in a similar light to the Austrofascist emphasis on a German state. This meant that the rights of minorities were often a point of irritation for the newspaper as they were for some state functionaries. The similarities ended here, however, since Austrofascists emphasised assimilation by participation, while the *Wiener Neueste Nachrichten* made participation conditional on dissimilation from Slavic ethnicity and culture. This ethnic discourse also appeared in the *Tagespost*, although the latter's aggressive dissimilationist tones were more akin to Nazi pseudo-theories of Aryanisation. Finally, the *Tagespost's* vision of Austria's *Ostmark* identity represented another type of civic discourse that emphasised the contribution of local traditions and customs to the life of the national community.

Thus for Austrian German-nationalists, the advent of Nazi politics appeared to be the necessary catalyst for propelling Austrians and Germans closer together in a single national community, but some were reticent to acknowledge National Socialism's exclusive ideological ownership over the nation. A number of prominent Austrofascist personalities and organs who sympathised with National Socialism also hesitated to disclaim Nazis altogether for fear of selling out the greater pan-German good. In this respect, we can begin to see the convergence of German-nationalist and Austrofascist interests between 1934 and 1938. This convergence rested on a shared commitment to Austria's place in the German nation and Austria's special role as a German state. The points of divergence can be seen in the different trajectories of civic and ethnic discourses, which shifted in some cases as a result of Nazi violence and Dollfuss' assassination. Other points of divergence can also be detected in the newspapers' secular vision of a Greater German state, in which membership depended on language and ethnicity rather than confessional loyalty. Neither the *Wiener Neueste Nachrichten* nor the *Tagespost*

acknowledged the role of religion in Austria's pan-German identity, other than to undermine the authority and position of the Catholic Church in matters of national interest. However, we will see in the next chapter that Salzburg's German-nationalist newspaper paid closer attention to the relationship between religion and nationality in a locale where strong provincial ties of belonging nurtured expressions of the national consciousness.

4

PROVINCIALS IMAGINING THE NATION

This chapter presents a case study of Salzburg in order to develop the two key ideas of my thesis. Firstly, it shows how Austrians thought about their national identity in a small-town provincial German-nationalist milieu, in this case, the editors and readers of Salzburg's leading newspaper, the *Salzburger Volksblatt*. Secondly, it shows the relationship between Austrofascists and German-nationalists at the local level of political and social interactions and in their respective intellectual and cultural production of pan-German ideas. I focus on a number of individuals, including the owner of the *Salzburger Volksblatt*, Hans Glaser, several of his editorial colleagues at the newspaper, prominent clerical figures, local Austrofascist functionaries and members of Salzburg's cultural elite, and I argue that the particular intellectual and social currents in Salzburg fused together German-nationalist and Austrofascist conceptions of pan-German identity during the interwar period in spite of their professed political and ideological differences. I will use the terms 'compliance' and 'consent' in this chapter to explain how German-nationalists complied with the Austrofascist state while showing consent for National Socialism. This relationship between compliance and consent is important because it illustrates the compatibility of pan-Germanism in different provincial political-cultural milieux in Austria, throwing into further contention the wisdom of the *Lager* approach in standard historiographical accounts of the interwar years.

A Two-Edged Sword: Pan-Germanism in Interwar Salzburg

As we saw in Chapter One, the crisis sparked by the Badeni Decrees in the Austro-Hungarian Empire mobilised common ideological sympathies among German-nationalists and Christian Socials in spite of their apparent political differences. Pan-Germanism proved

again to be a unifying ideology among German-nationalists and Christian Socials in Salzburg during the 1920s and 1930s, not only at the associational level, but also in cultural and intellectual life. The breadth of pan-Germanism during this period can be seen in the German-nationalist press and associations, in the ideas of local Catholic intellectuals, and in the efforts of cultural elites to create an international festival in the city of Salzburg. These diverse aspects of provincial life nurtured a symbiotic pan-Germanism, shaped by the many mutual private and professional contacts that were typical of a provincial elite culture, and fortified by a common commitment to 'German Austria'.

The *Salzburger Volksblatt* was representative of a German-nationalist milieu whose cultural and political roots lay in the Austro-Hungarian borderlands. Its owner, Hans Glaser (1877-1960), was part of generation of young Bohemian and Moravian German-speaking civil servants and educated professionals who migrated to Salzburg in the late-nineteenth century during one of the peaks of Czech-German hostilities. As they joined Salzburg's liberal associations, they helped to export a politicised German identity to a region that had been relatively immune to nationalist ideas.[1] Glaser himself had been born in Šumperk/Mährisch Schönberg in northern Moravia, which was almost entirely German except for a small Czech enclave that divided northern Moravia from the region around Svitavy/Zwittau.[2] However, in comparison with Bohemia, Moravia's German population was smaller, around 28 per cent of the inhabitants compared to 37 per cent in Bohemia, and the largely agrarian population of Moravia also meant that German-nationalism was more

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[1] Nicole Felder, *Die historische Identität der österreichischen Bundesländer* (Innsbruck, 2002), pp. 115-16.
[2] Mark Cornwall, "The Struggle on the Czech-German Language Border, 1880-1940," *The English Historical Review* 109, 433 (1994): pp. 941-42. The following description of Glaser's background and career is drawn from his obituary in the *Mitteilungen der Gesellschaft für Salzburger Landeskunde*, vol. 101 (1961), pp. 343-344, and his biographical entry in Adolf Haslinger and Peter Mittermayr, eds., *Salzburger Kulturlexikon* (Salzburg, 2001). In addition, Glaser's diary, hereafter referred to as *Tagebuch* (which is held in the Archiv der Stadt Salzburg, PA 024), provides biographical details of key personalities at the *Salzburger Volksblatt* and public figures in Salzburg.

moderate and Catholicism stronger than in Bohemia.[3] German and Czech peasants in Moravia were even renowned for pioneering language exchange programmes, swapping their children so that each could learn the other's language.[4] It would be fascinating to discover if Glaser was also a beneficiary of this type of cultural goodwill, but he does not mention his upbringing in his diary. We can only surmise that his early years would have been less tainted by German-Czech rivalries than if he had grown up in Prague, for example. At any rate, his first exposure to German-nationalists was just as likely to have been in Salzburg, given the penetration of Bohemian and Moravian German-nationalists there in the 1880s and 1890s. Glaser arrived in Salzburg in 1896, at the age of nineteen, to take up a position in a publishing company owned by Reinhold Kiesel, a German émigré from Stuttgart who had established the province's first daily newspaper, the *Salzburger Volksblatt*, in 1870.[5] Glaser married Kiesel's daughter and, after his father-in-law's death, eventually took over the reins of the newspaper in 1907.

Glaser's political connections with German-nationalists in the interwar period tended to be dictated by expediency, rather than ideology. He joined the Greater German Party after its inauguration in Salzburg in 1920, in part because the party leadership informed him that paper quotas would be allocated only to those newspapers that had the patronage of a political party. However, he was keen to extend his newspaper's reputation beyond the Greater Germans, whose Salzburg branch had barely 2,000 members, only a fraction of the

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[3]Robert A. Kann, *The Multinational Empire: Nationalism and National Reform in the Habsburg Monarchy 1848-1918* 2 vols., vol. 1 (New York, 1950), p. 207; Bruce F. Pauley, "Fascism and the *Führerprinzip*: The Austrian Example," *Central European History* 12, 3 (1979): p. 293.

[4] On this practice of *Kindertausch* in the Czech lands, see Erich Zöllner, "The Germans as an Integrating and Disintegrating Force," *Austrian History Yearbook* 3, 1 (1967): p. 229; Christian Promitzer, "The South Slavs in the Austrian Imagination: Serbs and Slovenes in the Changing View from German Nationalism to National Socialism," in *Creating the Other: Ethnic Conflict and Nationalism in Habsburg Central Europe*, ed. Nancy M. Wingfield (New York, 2003), p. 186; Pieter M. Judson, "Nationalizing Rural Landscapes in Cisleithania, 1880-1914," in *Creating the Other: Ethnic Conflict and Nationalism in Habsburg Central Europe*, ed. Nancy M. Wingfield (New York, 2003), pp. 135, 148n.15. See also Tara Zahra, "Reclaiming Children for the Nation: Germanization, National Ascription and Democracy in the Bohemian Lands, 1900-1945," *Central European History* 37, 4 (2004): 501-543.

[5] Michael Schmolke, "Das Salzburger Medienwesen," in *Geschichte Salzburgs: Stadt und Land*, ed. Heinz Dopsch and Hans Spatzenegger (Salzbug, 1991), p. 1975.

Figure 1: Hans Glaser (1877-1960)

newspaper's readership. Glaser wrote in his diary on 18 October 1920: 'I want an

independent *Volksblatt*, but in a tone and presentation that the supporters of other political

parties will also read. The newspaper cannot live off the Greater Germans alone.' He

eventually withdrew his membership from the party in 1929. With the Greater Germans in

internal disarray in 1931, he threw his weight behind the National Socialists with whom he

believed 'the youth, and so the future lies. It is true that they pour water into their wine, but

still.'[6] Glaser's reference to the mixing of water with wine reflected both his support for a

nationalist movement that sought the political unity of Austria and Germany, and his fear

that the Nazis might lose some of the potency of their aims with their street-style politics.

The NSDAP made decisive gains in Salzburg in the regional and municipal elections in

1932, winning just under 21 per cent, well above the national average of 16 per cent.[7]

Thereafter the National Socialists sought to reciprocate the relationship with the

Salzburger Volksblatt since they did not have an official organ in Salzburg. Nevertheless,

the newspaper was often under pressure to appease the party elite.[8] Glaser met NSDAP

leaders in Salzburg in early January 1932 and agreed to maintain a more neutral position

after the newspaper had publicly fended off what he regarded as 'impertinent' letters from

anonymous readers, presumably Nazis challenging the views of the editorship.[9]

On the other hand, Glaser's relationships with prominent Christian Socials in

Salzburg were more amicable than one would expect from the owner of an anti-clerical

newspaper. He was on friendly terms with the governor of Salzburg, Franz Rehrl, who

often confided in Glaser about the burdens of public life. Their relationship was both

professional and personal, evidenced by the fact that after the Gestapo arrested Rehrl in

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[6] Ernst Hanisch, "Die Salzburger Presse in der Ersten Republik 1918-1938," *Mitteilungen der Gesellschaft für Salzburger Landeskunde* 128 (1988): pp. 350, 356-57. The Salzburg wing of the Greater German Party unofficially dissolved itself in July 1932, thereafter joining ranks with the National Socialists until 1934, when the remaining members formed the obscure German People's Association for the Province of Salzburg (*Deutschen Volksverein für das Land Salzburg*). See Ernst Hanisch, "Salzburg," in *Österreich 1918-1938: Geschichte der Ersten Republik*, ed. Erika Weinzierl and Kurt Skalnik (Graz, 1983), p. 917.
[7] Hanisch, "Salzburg," p. 909; Philip Morgan, *Fascism in Europe, 1919-1945* (London, 2003), p. 72.
[8] Hanisch, "Die Salzburger Presse," p. 357.
[9] Glaser, *Tagebuch*, 24 January 1933.

May 1938, his sister, who had worked in the editorial offices of the Christian Social

newspaper, the *Salzburger Chronik*, visited Glaser to ask him to intervene on Rehrl's

behalf.[10] Glaser's political standing was also high among his colleagues in Austrian press

circles: in June 1934, he was elected chair of the Association of Daily Newspaper

Publishers (*Verband der Herausgeber der Tageszeitungen*), and he met regularly with the

head of the federal press bureau, Eduard Ludwig, to discuss changes to the press law. After

the creation of the new Austrofascist press chamber in July 1936, Glaser travelled regularly

to Vienna to participate in chamber sessions.[11]

These examples of both professional and political collaboration with the Christian

Social and Austrofascist elite showed that Glaser was more of an opportunist than an

ideologue. He cultivated diverse relationships with colleagues and public figures from a

Catholic cultural and political milieu. Glaser himself was not Catholic; at least, his wife's

family were Protestant and Glaser's diary records that his grandchildren had Protestant

christenings. Given his upbringing in predominantly Catholic Moravia, Glaser probably

converted when he married Kiesel's daughter. Many of Glaser's colleagues at the

Salzburger Volksblatt would also have been Catholic, even if they were also proponents of

the newspaper's German-nationalism. This is significant because, as we will see, the

newspaper promoted a form of 'positive Christianity' that crossed confessional lines and

sought to persuade readers that national identity superseded loyalties to dynastic or

religious traditions. Although this tactic was intended primarily to undermine the

Austrofascist notion of a 'Christian' state, it also demonstrates how German-nationalists

found common ground with Austrofascists in their attempt to construct an Austrian pan-

German identity. For German-nationalists, as much as for Austrofascists, Christianity was

integral to the notion that Austria was a 'German' state.

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[10] Glaser, *Tagebuch*, 29 December 1933; 10 May 1938; Hanisch, "Die Salzburger Presse," p. 359.
[11] Glaser, *Tagebuch*, 22, 23 June 1934; 30 October 1936; 29 September 1937. On the creation of the new
press chamber, see Elisabeth El Refaie, "Keeping the Truce? Austrian Press Politics between the 'July
Agreement' (1936) and the *Anschluss* (1938)," *German History* 20, 1 (2002): 44-66.

The pan-Germanism of local elites from a Catholic milieu can be seen briefly from the examples of two influential personalities in Salzburg, both priests, one the chief editor of the *Salzburger Chronik*, Leonhard Steinwender, and the other the archbishop of Salzburg, Ignatius Rieder. Since the emergence of the Christian Social movement, it had been common for Austrian priests to have a dual function in both political and parish life. Ignaz Seipel and Johann Nepomuk Hauser, for example, were two of the leading politicians in interwar Austria, as Federal Chancellor and Upper Austrian governor respectively. In November 1933, however, Austrian bishops called for priests to withdraw from active political life and instead focus their efforts on Catholic Action as the sphere of public influence.[12] Later, Catholic Action groups in Austria were granted full autonomy under the terms of the May 1934 Concordat, which the Austrian bishops had successfully negotiated to ensure that no loophole existed for state organisations to exploit the freedom of Catholic youth groups and welfare auxiliaries, as had already happened in Germany.[13]

In Salzburg, the absence of a lay Catholic intelligentsia meant that priests often had a second vocation as journalists. It was not unusual that Steinwender presided over the *Salzburger Chronik* at the same time as he carried out his duties as canon of Mattsee monastery. Steinwender was a proponent of the ubiquitous and ambivalent '*Ostmark*' idea, which German-nationalists also used in their pan-German discourses to refer to Austria's position on the borderlands of the German nation, as we saw in Chapter Three. However, for Catholic intellectuals such as Steinwender, the *Ostmark* idea described Austria's heritage as the seat of the Holy Roman Empire and heralded Austria's spiritual and cultural mission in Central Europe. In 1932, he wrote in the *Salzburger Chronik* that 'to be an East

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[12] Rudolf Ebneth, *Die österreichische Wochenschrift 'Der Christliche Ständestaat': Deutsche Emigration in Österreich 1933-1938* (Mainz, 1976), pp. 32-33.

[13] Catholic Action groups in Germany were to have been protected under Article 31 of the 1933 Concordat, but negotiations concluded before these groups could be specified in the wording of the document. In response, Austrian bishops demanded the inclusion of Catholic Action in Article 14 of the 1934 Concordat. See Laura Gellott, "Defending Catholic Interests in the Christian State: The Role of Catholic Action in Austria, 1933-1938," *The Catholic Historical Review* 74, 4 (1988): pp. 574, 580. See also Laura Gellott and Michael Phayer, "Dissenting Voices: Catholic Women in Opposition to Fascism," *Journal of Contemporary History* 22, 1 (1987): p. 101.

Marcher [*Ostmärker*], to be an Austrian' was 'a wonderful pan-German vocation.' In 1934, Steinwender became the director of propaganda for the Fatherland Front and editor of Salzburg's official Front publication, *Die Front in Salzburg*. The day after *Anschluss*, he was arrested and imprisoned, and eventually deported to Buchenwald concentration camp in November 1938.[14] He was released in November 1940 and, after the war, he published his reminiscences of the two years in Buchenwald under the title, *Christus im Konzentrationslager: Wege der Gnade und Opfers* (Christ in the Concentration Camp: Paths of Grace and Sacrifice). The book also included a collection of Steinwender's homilies given in secret in Buchenwald, which he wrote down only after his release. In both his reminiscences and homilies, Steinwender addressed at length the subject of the Austrian 'homeland' and acknowledged the mistakes of the past in persecuting Social Democrats and the comparable leniency towards National Socialists. In the midst of these 'paths of grace' that Steinwender found inside a concentration camp, the identification with the German nation lingered on, but with a renewed Christian faith in place of what he himself confessed was the 'idol' of Greater Germany:

> The idol that was presaged as a thousand-year reign has shattered. It
> stood on feet of clay. Under its rubble, the German nation lies in the
> deepest abyss of its history. Whoever still loves it [the German nation] in
> spite of everything, can only pray with deep distress '*De profundis*', the
> *de profundis* of the German nation....If after the bitter experiences of the
> last century, we are serious in acknowledging that only Christ and his
> law of justice and love can guarantee a humane life, then this call of
> distress from the depths of depths will not remain a cry of the dead, but
> will awaken new life.[15]

Steinwender's reflections after Buchenwald also serve as illustration of the earlier ambiguity of the pan-German idea. The belief that Austria's spiritual and cultural heritage was both 'Christian' and 'German', as expressed in the 1934 constitution of the Austrofascist state, was easily transposed into a nationalist discourse that, at times, blurred with the pan-Germanism of German-nationalists and National Socialists. Such ideological

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[14] Hanisch, "Die Salzburger Presse," pp. 359-60; Schmolke, "Das Salzburger Medienwesen," p. 1980.

[15] Leonhard Steinwender, *Christus im Konzentrationslager: Wege der Gnade und Opfers* (Salzburg, 1946), p. 133.

underpinnings of Catholicism only unravelled amid the moral, physical and spiritual deprivation of a Nazi concentration camp.

Archbishop Rieder also saw Austria as the promoter and custodian of German Christianity in Europe. Appointed Archbishop of Salzburg in 1918, Rieder was a leading figure in the Catholic renewal movement after World War One, in particular through his efforts to establish a German Catholic university in Salzburg and through his patronage of the Salzburg Festival. The German Catholic university was to provide a common intellectual and social 'meeting ground' for Catholics from southern Germany and Austria and was originally designed to be an extension of the existing theological faculty at the University of Salzburg. While prominent Austrian Catholic politicians, including Seipel and Dollfuss, were advocates of the idea, its opponents, notably Max Weber in Germany, rejected the proposal on the grounds that religious criteria would count in the appointment of academic positions. 'Such a university', Weber wrote in 1917, 'would naturally not be one likely to be viewed by academic institutions as of equal standing and rights.' Rieder was undeterred, however, outlining his proposal in an article entitled 'Reflections on a Catholic University of the German People in Salzburg' (*Denkschrift über eine katholische Universität des deutschen Volkstums in Salzburg*), which was published in approximately 1923. He located the origins of the idea itself in the period between 1848 and 1866, that is, during the decades when Catholic associational life grew exponentially prior to the Austro-Prussian War and the dissolution of the German Confederation. Rieder argued that the Austro-Prussian War had halted plans for a Catholic university, but that the time was right for the revival of this idea in the aftermath of defeat in 1918. Even in the title of his pamphlet, Rieder emphasised the pan-German idea of a common German people and,

implicitly, a common German Catholicism, without mention of a separate Austrian Catholic tradition.[16]

Rieder was equally vigorous in his support for the Salzburg Festival. If the Festival's founders, Hugo von Hofmannsthal and Max Reinhardt, were its artistic directors, Rieder was its spiritual guardian, especially in the early years after its inauguration in 1920. Hofmannstahl consulted with Rieder in 1922 for final approval of his manuscript for *Das Salzburger grosse Welttheater* (Salzburg's Great World Theatre) in return for permission to stage the play in Salzburg's Baroque Church.[17] Rieder also spoke out against the anti-Semitism in Salzburg that objected to a Jew, Reinhardt, staging Catholic motifs in Salzburg's sacred edifices. In 1924, he gave permission for Reinhardt to perform his play, *Das Mirakel* (The Miracle), in the Collegiate Church, amid a sustained campaign by the anti-Semitic organ in Salzburg, *Der Eiserne Besen*, to prevent Reinhardt from doing so.[18]

Despite his objections to anti-Semitism, however, Rieder formally endorsed the pan-Germanism of a group of younger German-nationalist Catholic intellectuals, the 'National German Working Group of Austrian Catholics' (*Volksdeutschen Arbeitskreis österreichischer Katholiken*), formed in 1932. This organisation produced a publication to mark the All German Catholics' Day (*Allgemeine Deutsche Katholikentag*) on 11 September 1933, entitled 'Catholic Faith and the German National Character in Austria' (*Katholischer Glaube und deutsches Volkstum in Österreich*), for which Rieder wrote the foreword. He also arranged to have the book published in Salzburg. In his contribution, Rieder stressed the 'pan-German' heritage of the 'Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation', describing 1933 as a 'holy year for Germans' because it commemorated the 250th

[16] Michael Steinberg, *The Meaning of the Salzburg Festival: Austria as Theatre and Ideology, 1890-1938* (Ithaca, 1990), pp. 130-31. On Dollfuss' support for a Catholic university in Salzburg, see Ebneth, *Die österreichische Wochenschrift 'Der Christliche Ständestaat'*, p. 8.
[17] Harald Waitzbauer, "'San die Juden scho' furt?': Salzburg, die Festspiele und das jüdische Publikum," in *Der Geschmack der Vergänglichkeit*, ed. Robert Kriechbaumer (Vienna, 2002), p. 256.
[18] *Ibid.*, p. 28. See also Steinberg, *The Meaning of the Salzburg Festival*, pp. 72-74.

anniversary of the victory over the Turks in 1683.[19] Rieder's statements reflected an

unofficial theme of the 1933 *Katholikentag* celebrations. Addressing the crowds on 11

September, Dollfuss also commemorated Austria's defeat of the 'hordes from the East',

calling for a 'Christian-German spirit of renewal' that would again repel the newest threat

from 'the East', namely, Jews and Communists, who were usually assumed to be

identical.[20] The actual anniversary was 12 September, but public commemorations were

held on several occasions throughout 1933 because the theme of liberation from

'orientalism' had contemporary resonance in the polemics against Jews and communism in

Austria.[21] Rieder died in 1934 and so did not live to see the collapse of such a Christian

German Austrian state, nor its nemesis in a National Socialist German *Ostmark*.

Nevertheless, he was representative of an influential Catholic elite who guarded Austria's

pan-German heritage with religious commitment. That he saw himself as the patron of a

spiritual, cultural and national mission, embodied in the Salzburg Festival, demonstrates

the pervasive nature of pan-German identity in Salzburg.

The pan-Germanism of Rieder and Steinwender was not only reflected in the

rhetoric of the Austrofascist state, but it was also encapsulated in the cultural ideology of

the Salzburg Festival, as Michael Steinberg has argued.[22] Hofmannstahl, for example,

described Salzburg as the historic heart of the Bavarian-Austrian tribal lands, whose

'instinctively German' folk ethos was the antithesis of Vienna's 'alien' intelligentsia and

obsession with novelty.[23] Similarly, in 1918, Max Reinhardt had stipulated that 'home-

grown' German art was to be the essence of the proposed Salzburg Festival: 'That

[19] Anton Staudinger, "Austrofaschistische 'Österreich'-Ideologie," in *'Austrofaschismus': Beiträge über Politik, Ökonomie und Kultur 1934-1938*, ed. Emmerich Tálos and Wolfgang Neugebauer (Vienna, 1988), pp. 290-92.
[20] Ernst Hanisch, "Der Politische Katholizismus als Ideologischer Träger des 'Austrofaschismus'," in *'Austrofaschismus': Beiträge über Politik, Ökonomie und Kultur 1934-1938*, ed. Emmerich Tálos and Wolfgang Neugebauer (Vienna, 1988), p. 61.
[21] For example, 40,000 *Heimwehr* troops marched in Vienna on 14 May to commemorate the 250th anniversary of the city's liberation. Friedrich Scheu, *Der Weg ins Ungewisse: Österreichs Schicksalskurve 1929-1938* (Vienna, 1972), p. 122.
[22] Steinberg, *The Meaning of the Salzburg Festival*.
[23] Kenneth Segar, "Austria in the Thirties: Reality and Exemplum," in *Austria in the Thirties: Culture and Politics*, ed. Kenneth Segar and John Warren (Riverside CA, 1991).

[German] art must be the master of the house who chooses to extend the hand of friendship to guests'.[24] A wider elite in Salzburg, including Glaser, who was an avid theatregoer and whose newspaper provided full coverage and reviews of the Festival programmes and performers each year, shared these beliefs about German superiority and hegemony. The Festival symbolised all that Salzburg's elite held sacred and shows how entrenched and widespread pan-German ideas were in Salzburg in the interwar years.

After the creation of a Nazi state in Germany, Austrofascists distanced themselves from National Socialism and Germany, while German-nationalists openly embraced both the movement and the regime. The latter's only cause for concern was the campaign of violence carried out by Nazis in Austria from 1933 to 1934, but even that was a pragmatic response to extremism, rather than moral objection to the political aims of the movement. The following sections will trace these ideological sympathies with National Socialism in the *Salzburger Volksblatt* after 1933. However, we will also see how the newspaper's construction of a pan-German identity during this period converged in many important respects with the pan-Germanism of the Austrofascist state.

'National Socialists are not Traitors'

From the outset of 1933, the *Salzburger Volksblatt* endorsed National Socialism's programme for *Anschluss* by giving dense coverage of events in Germany and of the party's activities in Austria. After Hitler came to power on 30 January 1933, the newspaper regularly published notices of rallies, public lectures and radio broadcasts of speeches by Nazi leaders in Germany. It was a blatant propaganda campaign made respectable by its appearance in an established newspaper. These notices were prominently displayed in the newspaper, which also made it clear that entry was for non-Jews only.[25] The day following the German election on 5 March, the *Salzburger Volksblatt* published a special morning

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[24] Steinberg, *The Meaning of the Salzburg Festival*, p. 48.
[25] See, for example, the notice for a public lecture in Salzburg by Ing. Vogl of the NSDAP in Munich. *Salzburger Volksblatt*, 31 January 1933, p. 6.

edition on 6 March with a boldface notice from the NSDAP calling for 'every upright

German-Austrian who wants *Anschluss* with the German Reich' to attend the *Anschluss*

rally that day.[26] The next day, it reported that the Salzburg Festival House, where the rally

was held, was filled to capacity, demonstrating that 'the German will for *Anschluss* had

also received powerful momentum in Salzburg.'[27]

Glaser, however, appeared to be distracted from the activities of the local Nazis and

Hitler's electoral result. His diary entries for March 1933 show that his preoccupation lay

not with the NSDAP, but with his newspaper's immediate prospects in the wake of

Dollfuss' new press laws.[28] The *Salzburger Volksblatt* responded to the new press laws by

accusing the government of creating an 'oligarchy' and calling for a return to the 1920

constitution and new elections.[29]

Dollfuss issued further restrictions in April, which made it illegal to endorse either

the German government or Austrian Nazis if such endorsement also directed critical

remarks against the Austrian state.[30] The *Salzburger Volksblatt* tried to circumvent the new

law by drawing attention to events on the other side of the Austrian border without directly

mentioning the Nazis. A special report on the May Day celebrations in Germany,

published on 2 May, related stories of men, women and children who expressed pride in

their identity as Germans, rather than as Saxons or Bavarians. The journalist asked one boy

where Adolf Hitler came from, to which he replied: 'From Germany.' The journalist

corrected him, saying that Hitler was in fact an Austrian, to which the boy answered: 'Then

he is still a German!' The journalist echoed the boy in reflecting on his own identity in the

article: 'I am proud to be an alpine Austrian but I am even prouder to be a real German [*ein*

ganzer Deutscher] first and foremost.'[31] The article was left uncensored in the newspaper

[26] *Salzburger Volksblatt (*Sonderausgabe), 6 March 1933, p. 2.
[27] *Salzburger Volksblatt*, 7 March 1933, p. 6.
[28] Glaser, *Tagebuch*, 7 March 1933.
[29] *Salzburger Volksblatt*, 10 March 1933, p. 2.
[30] On the April press law, see Chapter Two.
[31] *Salzburger Volksblatt*, 2 May 1933, p. 2.

and did not attract the penalties that subsequent reports did for expressing oppositional views to the Austrian government. It was an early example of the *Salzburger Volksblatt's* strategy of promoting a universalist pan-German identity under the sometimes loose reins of Austrofascist censorship. These reins tightened, however, whenever the editors were seen to be blatantly disregarding the official propaganda.

By the middle of May, the newspaper's hostile outbursts at the government resulted in three confiscations in swift succession. On 5 May, the edition of the newspaper was confiscated for the first time since 1918 following the publication of an article about the government's ban on uniforms, which amounted to incitement according to Paragraph 300 of the penal law code. Five days later, the newspaper was confiscated a second time for an article entitled 'The Government and its Public Servants'. In addition, the newspaper's chief editor, August Ramsauer, was forced to pay a fine of 1,440 Schillings for reportedly allowing the offending articles to go to print without having first read them. A third confiscation occurred on 12 May for an article that referred critically to the Geneva Disarmament Conference and, again on 7 June, the fourth in just over a month, this time for an article attacking the Austrian ambassador to Berlin. On 10 June, the government introduced a new decree that gave the Chancellor the power to ban newspapers for up to three months if they were confiscated more than twice. Given that it already had four strikes, the *Salzburger Volksblatt* then gave notice to its readers on 14 June that it 'was forced by the new press emergency decrees to exercise the greatest caution from now on in commenting on the political situation in Austria.' The newspaper announced that it would report only 'the bare facts' of Austrian politics and withhold editorial comments, but that it would continue in its capacity as a 'national paper' to represent the interests of the 'national idea'.[32]

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[32] Gerlinde Neureitner, "Die Geschichte des *Salzburger Volksblattes* von 1870 bis 1942" (PhD, Salzburg, 1985), pp. 201, 207-9. See also *Salzburger Volksblatt*, 14 June 1933, p. 1.

For the *Salzburger Volksblatt*, the national idea meant a community in which all Germans were bound together by blood, language and culture. It couched this idea in an ethnic universalist pan-German discourse that resembled the Nazis' vision of a *Volksgemeinschaft*. At the same time, the newspaper also used a civic discourse of universal pan-German identity in its support for National Socialists, whom both Glaser and the newspaper's editors defended as indispensable to the national movement. The editors were at pains to point out that this 'national idea' was not unpatriotic to Austria and defended Austrian Nazis as loyal Austrians, who should be seen first as members of the national community and second as members of a political party. A front-page editorial on 17 June declared that 'National Socialists are not traitors, they love their Austrian homeland, but they want to see it liberated and the whole of its population spoken for, not just one party.'[33]

The *Salzburger Volksblatt's* loyalty to National Socialists was diminished slightly in the wake of the June violence that erupted after the party's ban. Amid the ensuing terror of bomb explosions in cars and buildings, the *Salzburger Volksblatt* issued an impassioned plea to its readers that Austro-German unity be achieved by peaceful means. An editorial on 28 June 1933 sent a stern warning to those National Socialists involved in the terrorist attacks, which it likened to Gavrilo Princip's assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand on 28 June 1914:

> And now to you young ones! You are the hope of the national and liberal movement in Austria. You must not let it happen that foolish pranks get you thrown into jail – and rightly so if you rashly commit crimes! – and therefore excluded from the ranks of national fighters for a long time, perhaps even forever. You must hold onto your fresh courage, your enthusiasm, your power to attract votes and, when the time finally comes again, your votes for the national cause. You must not dirty your hands with deeds that, even if they might seem to some to be heroic, in truth can only be regarded as childish tricks! German youth must not sink to the methods of the assassins of the heir to the throne, which with the revolver shots in Sarajevo exactly nineteen years ago unleashed the fateful war that led to disaster for Austria and Germany....National unity

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[33] *Salzburger Volksblatt*, 17 June 1933, pp. 1-2.

is something that must come to fruition in peace, something that requires a very great deal of patience. Italy pursued this ideal for almost three quarters of a century before it came to fulfilment. But the goal was achieved. You young ones must save yourselves for that time, which we older ones will no longer witness. But you should enter the greater Fatherland with clean hands and hearts, not tainted by innocent blood that you spilled.[34]

The author of this editorial was the newspaper's long-standing editor-in-chief, Thomas Mayrhofer.[35] A former member of a German-nationalist student fraternity, Mayrhofer, along with Glaser, had joined the Greater German Party after its formation in 1920.[36] The editorial's reference to a 'national and liberal movement in Austria' reflected the pan-Germanism of Mayrhofer's and Glaser's generation, which advocated the dominance of Austria's German-speakers in a centralised liberal state. For this generation of German-nationalists, National Socialism represented the fulfilment of their youthful pan-German ideals, but the experience of a world war during their lifetime also caused them to recoil from the violent extremes of the Nazis, as Mayrhofer's editorial suggests. While he cautioned restraint in the goal of Austro-German unity, Mayrhofer also argued that National Socialists should be able to participate in Austrian public life. He argued that the priority for German-nationalists was to harness the energy of all 'liberal- and national-minded people in Austria' into a national front that could act as a democratic opposition to the Fatherland Front. He was adamant that the government would not be able continue to suppress opposition indefinitely or deny the political rights of those Austrians who did not wish to join the Fatherland Front. Moreover, he argued, this opposition front should be free to adopt National Socialist principles of government and ideology within the parameters of the Austrian state, as long as Austria remained politically separated from Germany. He guaranteed the implementation of 'all the ideas and methods of Adolf Hitler, which can be

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[34] *Salzburger Volksblatt*, 28 June 1933, p. 1. For the original text, see Appendix II.
[35] The editorial was written under the initial 'M', but Mayrhofer implied in a later editorial that he had written the editorial of 28 June to condemn acts of violence and also that he had openly and personally expressed his opinion to National Socialists regarding terrorism. See *Salzburger Volksblatt*, 4 January 1935, p. 5.
[36] Hanisch, "Die Salzburger Presse," p. 356.

used in Austria and do not contravene our laws' if such an opposition were to come into force in Austrian politics. However, he also reminded his readers that the primary goal of such a 'German liberation front in Austria...ought to be to bring about normal friendly relations between Austria and Germany' and, to that end, it would 'pursue Austrian goals until the international resistance against the establishment of Greater Germany can be overcome.'[37]

Mayrhofer's editorial received a response from one reader, who pointed out in a letter published two days later that National Socialism was not the exclusive path to Austro-German unity. Could not, the author asked rhetorically, that unity also be achieved under the banner of the Fatherland Front. 'It surely is not acceptable', the writer asserted, 'to stamp as second-class Germans all those who reject the swastika as the absolute and exclusive symbol of what is German, particularly if they do not live within the Reich. No lesser man than Bismarck once said that he was a Prussian first and then a German. Why should this saying, *mutatis mutandis*, not be able to be applied to us Austrians?' The reader also claimed that Austria's annexation by Nazi Germany was inevitable unless German-nationalists could be integrated into the Fatherland Front. 'In the interest of the liberal German national idea in Austria, and so, fundamentally, in the pan-German interest,' the writer concluded, 'I would think it absolutely desirable to have the widest possible participation of these groups in order to prevent what one must otherwise fear and would be inevitable.' The *Salzburger Volksblatt* published this letter with only the briefest comment that the points it raised 'could perhaps give cause for a fruitful political discussion.'[38]

It would be naïve to see Mayrhofer's editorial and the reader's response as representative of the only two positions that German-nationalists could take on the question of National Socialism and Austro-German unity. It was not a matter of either

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[37] *Salzburger Volksblatt*, 28 June 1933, pp. 1-2. For the original text, see Appendix II.
[38] *Salzburger Volksblatt*, 30 June 1933, p. 6.

lobbying for a German-nationalist opposition that included National Socialists on the one hand, or rallying to the Fatherland Front as a bulwark against National Socialism on the other. Mayrhofer argued that a legitimate 'democratic' opposition would in theory be able to adopt Hitler's mode of rule, which meant overriding the very democratic principles by which such an opposition would come into existence. Thus his position supported the views of those National Socialists who sought to come to power in Austria, not of those outside the party who sought similar pan-German aims but did not want to be coerced into following one particular party. Furthermore, the letter from the reader showed that real fears about National Socialism did exist among German-nationalists, if only a minority of them.

Yet such reservations did not always amount to ideological or political commitment to the Fatherland Front. As we will see below, Glaser joined the Fatherland Front partly because it was a more expedient option than the *Heimatschutz* and partly because it guaranteed a level of political immunity for his newspaper. Glaser's commitment to the National Socialist Party, on the other hand, only extended as far as his commitment to Austro-German unity. After the government banned the NSDAP, Glaser wrote in his diary that the remaining 'nationalist circles' would have to band together under a new leadership. His personal choice of candidate for the leader of this proposed new national front was Franz Hueber, former Austrian Justice Minister and Hermann Göring's brother-in-law, who resigned from the leadership of the Salzburg *Heimatschutz* on 28 June 1933 in protest at Dollfuss' anti-German politics.[39] Glaser was less of an ideologue than Mayrhofer, but he was equally steeped in the historic vision of a greater-German nation. We might describe Glaser's response to National Socialism as consent and his participation in the political life of the Austrofascist state as compliance. This meant that he continued to endorse the National Socialist programme of Austro-German unity, while seeking to protect the

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[39] Glaser, *Tagebuch*, 29 June 1933. On Hueber, see C. Earl Edmondson, *The Heimwehr and Austrian Politics, 1918-1936* (Athens, 1978), pp. 112, 114, 266.

position of his newspaper in the public sphere of the Austrofascist state. Glaser's stance towards both National Socialism and Austrofascism also highlights the shared stake that German-nationalists as well as Austrofascists held in an Austrian pan-German identity. This identity was not only concerned about the place of Austria in the German nation, and thus the question of Austro-German unity, but it also placed emphasis on the national character of the Austrian state itself.

Compliance and Consent: Pan-Germanism under Austrofascism

One tangible way of exploring the relationship between compliance and consent under Austrofascism is by tracing the interactions between functionaries of the state and editors of a provincial German-nationalist newspaper. These interactions reveal the extent to which German-nationalists promoted their own interests within a public sphere that was constantly monitored by the state. We will see below how the *Salzburger Volksblatt* complied with an official regime of censorship and surveillance, while continuing to show consent for the National Socialist vision of a universal German nation.

As we have seen, the *Salzburger Volksblatt* had come under increasingly stricter surveillance and penalties during the course of 1933, but it was forced to concede even more of its autonomy in 1934 with the appointment of a local *Heimatschutz* representative to the editorship. As we have seen, functionaries of the *Heimwehr* and the Fatherland Front were also appointed as government commissioners to the *Wiener Neueste Nachrichten* and the *Tagespost*. In the Viennese case, the newspaper's chief editor, Mauthe, was appointed to the position of government commissioner. In Salzburg, the process happened almost overnight. On 22 February 1934, Glaser received a summons from Salzburg's Director of Public Security, Rudolf Scholz, who informed him in writing that his licence would be revoked if he continued to publish the *Salzburger Volksblatt* under propietorship of the Kiesel publishing house. The specific offence which incurred this penalty was the

newspaper's report alleging that Tyrolean *Heimatwehr* soldiers in Hallein had violently attacked local residents, behaved in a 'scandalous' manner and should be removed. Two days later, Scholz's deputy, Helmut Hirschall, offered Glaser an eleventh-hour compromise: the appointment of a *Heimatschutz* commissioner, Konstantin Kreuzer, as the *Salzburger Volksblatt's* political editor in return for the withdrawal of the threat to revoke Glaser's publishing licence.[40]

The appointment of a *Heimatschutz* representative did not immediately end hostilities between the newspaper and the provincial authorities. This was partly due to the uneasy alliance between the Fatherland Front and the Salzburg representatives of the *Heimatschutz*. The leader of the *Heimatschutz*, Hueber, as we have seen, stood down in June 1933 because of his loyalties to the NSDAP, while the remaining *Heimatschutz* leaders declared their allegiance to Dollfuss. On 8 February 1934, they outlined a set of provisional demands to Governor Rehrl including the establishment of a committee to advise the provisional government comprising representatives of the Fatherland Front and the *Heimatschutz*, as well as the appointment of *Heimatschutz* representatives to every district and municipality and to every public office and school.[41] The appointment of Kreuzer as political editor of the *Salzburger Volksblatt* can therefore be seen as a concession by the Fatherland Front authorities to the demands of the *Heimatschutz* leaders. However, Kreuzer's militant language and his admiration for Mussolini were an affront to the Security Director, Scholz, a loyal Christian Social politician who distrusted the *Heimatschutz*. Consequently, the newspaper was again subject to confiscations several times between February and June. On frequent other occasions, the censors simply blacked out whole sections of print.[42]

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[40] Neureitner, "Die Geschichte des *Salzburger Volksblattes* von 1870 bis 1942," pp. 212-13; Glaser, *Tagebuch*, 22 February 1934; 24 February 1934.

[41] "Forderungsprogramm der Salzburger Heimwehr vom 8. Februar 1934", in Rudolf G. Ardelt, ed., *Salzburger Quellenbuch: von der Monarchie bis zum Anschluss* (Salzburg, 1985), pp. 262-64.

[42] Glaser, *Tagebuch*, 14 April 1934.

Under Kreuzer, the *Heimatschutz* press dispatches were particularly belligerent towards Christian Socials. One front-page article on 28 March 1934, entitled 'The Sins of the Parties', claimed that by defeating the Social Democrats in the civil war, the *Heimwehr* had done in three days what the Christian Social Party had been unable to do in fourteen years. To illustrate the party's ineptitude, the article pointed out that the leader of the Christian Social Workers' Movement, Leopold Kunschak, had shaken the hand of Vienna's socialist mayor, Karl Seitz, in the town hall just days before the civil war broke out. The article claimed that 'the new era demanded new men, not just a change in name' and called for 'the whole population and especially the nationalist groups in the population' to work together to eliminate all parties from the 'new state'.[43] The reference to 'nationalist groups' in a dispatch in the *Salzburger Volksblatt* showed that the *Heimatschutz* regarded Kreuzer's appointment as a tactical manoeuvre against the dominant Christian Socials in Salzburg.

Glaser, on the other hand, did not view the *Heimatschutz* as a mutual ally against the Christian Socials or the Fatherland Front. In fact, he joined the Fatherland Front in September 1934 to guard against Kreuzer's machinations to make the *Salzburger Volksblatt* an organ of the *Heimatschutz*.[44] His decision may also have been prompted by a wish to distance himself from National Socialists after some of his colleagues were implicated in the wave of Nazi violence in June and July 1934. Franz Krotsch, who had been editor-in-chief since May 1933, was accused in June 1934 of circulating memos to National Socialists with instructions for carrying out terror attacks. On 28 June 1934, he was arrested along with National Socialists who had detonated bombs in public buildings, cars and streets in the city and surrounding provincial areas of Salzburg. Criminal proceedings began against Krotsch in July, after which he returned briefly to the editorship in August, only to be finally discharged from his position at the end of 1934. Without

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[43] *Salzburger Volksblatt*, 28 March 1934, p. 1.
[44] Glaser, *Tagebuch*, 20 September 1934.

employment opportunities in Austria and with his professional reputation in tatters, Krotsch fled to Germany and only returned to Salzburg after the *Anschluss*.[45] Glaser was horrified by the violence and he wrote on 28 June 1934: 'No sensible person knows where these dangerous acts of terror, which can cause innocent people to come to grave harm, will lead.' On 27 July, two days after Dollfuss' assassination, he wrote that the violence was 'a crazy undertaking that has neither sense nor purpose and hurries the young people wantonly to their death. They must surely realise that their cause is long lost!'[46] Thus Glaser's reaction to Nazi terrorists, like his decision to join the Fatherland Front, was a pragmatic response born of fear and alarm at extremist politics, rather than a vote of confidence in the Austrofascist state.

The *Salzburger Volksblatt* maintained its distance from the Fatherland Front by publishing only the official dispatches from the Office of Propaganda and keeping all other Front notices to a minimum. By 1935, the newspaper had condensed the number of pages in the weekday editions to a dozen, including regular supplements on fashion and cooking.[47] Domesticity, at least, complied with the patriotic jargon of much of the Fatherland Front's propaganda, as the myriad notices for state-sponsored mothers' guilds and infant care programmes in the *Salzburger Volksblatt* attest. These were, however, mostly relegated to the back pages.[48] The newspaper also sought to compensate for the monopoly of Fatherland Front news by publishing correspondence from foreign press bureaus in Czechoslovakia, Poland, Switzerland, Italy and Germany: in September 1935, it was banned from publishing reports from the radio service of the Nazi press agency, DNB (*Deutsches Nachrichten-Bureau*). However, the editors managed to evade this latest

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[45] Glaser, *Tagebuch*, 14, June 1934; 28 June 1934; 26 July 1934; 13 August 1934; 26 November 1934; 1 January 1935. See also Hanisch, "Die Salzburger Presse," p. 363; Jakob Waltraud, *Salzburger Zeitungsgeschichte* (Salzburg, 1979), pp. 206, 211.
[46] Glaser, *Tagebuch*, 9 June 1934; 28 June 1934; 27 July 1934.
[47] Neureitner, "Die Geschichte des *Salzburger Volksblattes* von 1870 bis 1942," p. 216.
[48] See, for example, *Salzburger Volksblatt*, 3 January 1935, p. 8; 14 April 1936, p. 8.

interdiction by rewording the DNB reports and publishing them as reports from the *Salzburger Volksblatt's* own correspondents.[49]

In the limited space they had, the editors of the *Salzburger Volksblatt* continued to use an ethnic discourse of universal pan-German identity, often in extracts or reports of lectures by known Nazi sympathisers. For example, an article on 29 January 1936 gave a précis on a lecture given by Hueber to the *Salzburger Turnverein*. It described the German people as ethnically and culturally distinct from other nationalities and pointed out distinctions in folk costume, art and music.[50] Another article in February, from a lecture by the German ethnologist, Paul Rohrbach, depicted the nation as a universal community tied by language and culture. The article claimed that there were a total number of 90 million Germans in the world, including 68 million in the German Reich and a further 12 million in countries bordering Germany. The remaining 10 million Germans included emigrants and their descendants abroad, although the article pointed out that second-generation Germans in North America had lost their ties with the language and so were not included in the overall figures.[51] The second figure of 12 million was especially significant because it made no distinction between Austrian Germans, Baltic Germans or Sudeten Germans. This ethnic universal discourse in the newspaper differed from the Austrofascist vision of a resurrected 'Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation', in which Austria would play the leading role in its German Christian mission to the nations of Central Europe. The ethnic discourse of Austrofascists was about religion, not language and blood. But it can also be argued that these competing universalist strands of pan-Germanism only diverged at the margins of the public sphere, in the leftover spaces of the German-nationalist press. German-nationalists and Austrofascists had much more to agree on publicly when it came to the particularist aspect of Austrian pan-German identity, as we will see in the final section of this chapter.

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[49] Neureitner, "Die Geschichte des *Salzburger Volksblattes* von 1870 bis 1942", pp. 216-17.
[50] *Salzburger Volksblatt*, 29 January 1936, p. 5.
[51] *Salzburger Volksblatt*, 8 February 1936, p. 7.

Defending German Christian Austria

The *Salzburger Volksblatt* used a combination of ethnic and civic discourses to construct Austria's particular identity as a German Christian state. These discourses, at times, merged with the pan-German rhetoric of Austrofascist functionaries. We have already seen these points of convergence in the *Wiener Neueste Nachrichten's* and the state's attitudes towards minorities in Austria. The overlap in pan-German discourses in that case reflected a mutual desire to retain the 'German' character of the Austrian state and population. In Salzburg, the overlap reflected a commitment to defending the 'Christian' identity of Austria. Here, the respective attempts of German-nationalists and Austrofascists to give a spiritual dimension to pan-German identity after 1936 shows the site of least resistance to pan-German ideas in Salzburg in the pre-*Anschluss* era.

As we saw with the *Grazer Tagespost*, détente between Austria and Germany in 1936 dissolved some of the restrictions on the *Salzburger Volksblatt's* editorial autonomy. Initially the newspaper welcomed the July Agreement cautiously and reiterated the need for Austria to maintain its sovereignty.[52] Privately, however, Hans Glaser greeted the Austro-German détente with relief, writing in his diary that the agreement between Schuschnigg and Hitler was 'a rather major domestic and foreign political event that we have all desired for a long time.'[53] One important local consequence of the July Agreement was the departure of Kreuzer from the post of political editor. His departure meant that press correspondence, if any, from the *Heimatschutz* was relegated to the back pages of the newspaper and he finally left the newspaper altogether in March 1937. A Nazi sympathiser and former diplomatic envoy in Berlin, Adolf Frank, replaced Kreuzer in August 1936. Frank had made many contacts with National Socialists during his diplomatic posting in Germany. One of these contacts, Franz Krotsch, came to the *Salzburger Volksblatt* in 1924

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[52] *Salzburger Volksblatt*, 13 July 1936, p. 1.
[53] Glaser, *Tagebuch*, 12 July 1936.

175

on Frank's recommendation. Frank's appointment to the editorship, a direct result of the July Agreement and Austro-German détente, widened considerably the margins in which the *Salzburger Volksblatt* could voice its consent for National Socialism. Throughout the remainder of 1936, the newspaper openly championed political unity with Germany and expressed hope that Austria would actively take up its role in promoting the pan-German idea toward this end.[54]

It was significant, therefore, that a front-page article in November 1936 mentioned the July Agreement in connection with the Srbik school of pan-German historical thought. As we saw in Chapter One, Srbik developed historical and conceptual links between the universal German nation, the Central European idea of German unity, and the tradition of German statehood. The article in the *Salzburger Volksblatt* in November 1936 lauded his pan-Germanism as the 'spirit' behind the July Agreement and hoped for this spirit to prevail within the historical fabric that was 'certain to become the common basis of the new pan-German national reality.' Srbik's historicism gave credence to the National Socialist idea of Austro-German unity in the same way that the *Salzburger Volksblatt* sought to interpret the July Agreement as a step towards this goal. The November article explained that Srbik's pan-Germanism provided a more critical appraisal of the great personalities and feats of Austrian history within the broader framework of German history because it was able to overcome the biases of the separate Prussian and Austrian historical traditions.[55] In fact, this was not Srbik's intention when he began work on his magnum opus, *Deutsche Einheit*, in 1935. Rather, his goal was to uphold the imperial idea as the highest expression of German unity, embodied in the National Socialist vision of a thousand-year German empire. Nonetheless, this attempt to popularise Srbik's historical scholarship in the *Salzburger Volksblatt* was characteristic of Frank's National Socialist sympathies, which became more transparent in the course of 1936. Seen in this light, we

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[54] Glaser, *Tagebuch*, 14 May 1936; 31 March 1937. See also Neureitner, "Die Geschichte des *Salzburger Volksblattes* von 1870 bis 1942," p. 215, 218.
[55] *Salzburger Volksblatt*, 3 November 1936, p. 1.

can interpret the newspaper's appropriation of pan-German historical thought as tantamount to intellectual assent of National Socialism. That this assent was concealed in terms that also made a fleeting reference to Habsburg history shows how the newspaper could comply with Austrofascism's nostalgia for the past, while promoting Nazi ideas under the guise of a universal pan-German historicism.

Frank's Christmas Eve editorial in 1936 showed further the newspaper's affirmation of political unity with Nazi Germany. Frank paid homage to the 'great, glorious German homeland', but he also made two other points that indicated his ideological affinity with National Socialism. Firstly, he claimed that in the Sudeten territories, 'thousands and thousands were...denied the peace of Christmas in the German living-space':

> Hundreds of thousands of our national comrades in the outlying northern Bohemian areas are waging a desperate bitter struggle for a meagre and paltry existence under the oppressive yoke of an illegitimate foreign power. Countless fathers, mothers and starving children will spend Christmas Eve there in hopeless numb despair.

Frank's intimation that the dispossession of Germans in the German 'living-space' represented a national dishonour, showed his underlying commitment to Nazi foreign policy aims, in particular to the political unity of all Germans in Central Europe. Secondly, he also sought to discredit the Austrofascist notion of a 'Christian' state and replace it with a National Socialist version of Christianity. He claimed that Christmas was an ancient German custom, which retained its German character despite its appropriation by the Church. 'This festival,' Frank wrote, 'like no other, opens up to us the highest mystery of our being in symbolising joy, love and goodness, as well as our eternal urge and dim yearning for the German homeland.'[56] In elevating pre-Christian traditions to the status of true religion, Frank used similar language to Nazi paganists in Germany, such as Alfred

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[56] *Salzburger Volksblatt*, 24 December 1936, p. 1. For the original text, see Appendix II.

Rosenberg.[57] We do not know from this passage what Frank's religious background or beliefs were, but his claims represented a pan-German discourse that competed with Austrofascism's Catholic underpinnings. Where Dollfuss had called for a 'German-Christian spirit of renewal', and local state functionaries in Salzburg, such as Steinwender, described Austria's spiritual and cultural identity as 'a wonderful pan-German vocation', German-nationalists and Nazi sympathisers, such as Frank, also twinned 'German' and 'Christian' in their pan-German discourses but attached different meanings to those terms so as to undermine the Austrofascist version of pan-Germanism.

Not only did German-nationalists begin to contest the Austrofascist concept of a German Christian state, but also Austrofascists attempted to strike a more conciliatory position towards German-nationalists. One anonymous spokesperson for the Fatherland Front in Salzburg – identified only by the initials 'K.F.G.' – contributed several lengthy essays in the *Salzburger Volksblatt* on topics ranging from charity, the principle of individual freedom, the nature of fascism and anti-Semitism. The writer forcefully condemned National Socialism as a totalitarian ideology of fanatics and sought to justify Austrofascism's defence against the 'tyranny of the majority'.[58] The author was possibly an academic, for in an article in June 1936 he argued that academic research, religious beliefs, marriage and family life must not become subordinate to the state.[59] The editorials by K.F.G. became more prominent on the front pages of the *Salzburger Volksblatt* after 1936. Although these editorials were still grounded in the rhetoric of Austrofascism, they also consciously attempted to engage the newspaper's German-nationalist readership. For example, an editorial on 5 June 1937 distinguished between nationalism that had cultural value to the people, and that which only edified the ideology of the state. The writer illustrated this subordination to the state by arguing that the intellectual and religious icons

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[57] On Rosenberg and other Nazi paganists, see Richard Steigmann-Gall, *The Holy Reich: Nazi Conceptions of Christianity, 1919-1945* (Cambridge, 2003).
[58] See *Salzburger Volksblatt*, 1 September 1934, p. 2; 1 December 1934, pp. 2-3; 18 May 1936, pp. 1-2.
[59] *Salzburger Volksblatt*, 9 June 1936, pp. 1-2.

of nineteenth-century Russian nationalism had disappeared under Bolshevism. In contrast, he argued, the Austrian state should uphold and value the life of the Austrian people and thereby cultivate the collective expression of pan-German nationhood through the 'two-state nature of our German people' (*Zweistaatlichkeit unseres deutschen Volkes*). Such a 'healthy genuine nationalism', the writer concluded, regarded 'the life of the people [to be] worth more than the national costume'.[60] The combination of a universalist discourse ('our German people') with a particularist discourse (the Austrian state) stressed an Austrian pan-German identity that the newspaper's editors had upheld since 1934, and which they continued to promote in the era of Austro-German détente.[61]

The issue of Czechs and Slovaks in the Austrian borderlands provides one of the most striking examples of symmetry between the pan-Germanism of the newspaper and the state. On 25 August 1937, the *Salzburger Volksblatt* ran a front-page editorial decrying the 'Czechification of labour' (*Tschechisierungsarbeit*) in the Lower Austrian village of Dürnkrut on the Czechoslovakian border. Czech migrant workers who came to work on the sugar plantations in Dürnkrut were not only swamping the Austrian labour market, the editorial maintained, but they were also threatening to take over Austria's civic spaces. The newspaper claimed that the Czechs in Dürnkrut wanted to build a memorial to the Bohemian King Ottokar II, who had defeated the first Habsburg, Rudolf, in 1278. Calling on Austrians to fight 'with all available means' the 'attempt from the Czech side to give an Austrian border spot the character of a Slavic cultural bulwark', the editorial warned it readers that '[t]his memorial is not just directed against the German character of little Dürnkrut but, rather, against the entire Austrian German character.'[62] Given Glaser's own Moravian background, and the strong links between the German-Czech borderlands and Salzburg's German-nationalist milieu, it was not surprising that the *Salzburger Volksblatt* would magnify a local scenario of German-Czech rivalries into a larger question about the

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[60] *Salzburger Volksblatt*, 5 June 1937, pp. 2-3.
[61] *Salzburger Volskblatt*, 25 August 1937, p. 1.
[62] *Salzburger Volskblatt*, 25 August 1937, p. 1.

national identity of Austrian Germans. The newspaper's portrayal of local antagonisms as a 'Slavic' threat to 'German' Austria reflected a well-worn strategy of the German-nationalist press under the Austro-Hungarian Empire. As we saw in Chapter One, newspaper editors then had couched their references to Slovene and Czech national ambitions using such phrases as 'Slavic money' and the 'Slavic press' to imply a larger threat to German hegemony in the Empire. Here in a German-nationalist organ in Salzburg, Austrian pan-German identity was similarly constructed in both ethnic and civic terms of a 'Slavic' invasion of Austria's public spaces, which in turn were identified by the newspaper as bastions of 'German' hegemony. Czech migrants thus became civic invaders against whom Austrian Germans were urged to stage an ethnic defence.

We can see the *Salzburger Volksblatt's* editorial about German farmers in Dürnkrut in the same context as the Gänserndorf district governor's xenophobic remarks about Czechs and Slovaks in the borderlands. The bone of contention for this local Austrofascist functionary, as we saw in Chapter Three, was the number of Czech migrants living and working in Austria and sending their children to Austrian schools. This was a classic example of a civic discourse that emphasised participation in the state language and education system of Austria. The *Salzburger Volskblatt* and the *Wiener Neueste Nachrichten* used a similar civic discourse in their calls for Austria's public spaces to remain German. This discourse combined with an ethnic discourse of dissimilation or, in the case of the *Salzburger Volksblatt*, a discourse of ethnic defence. In other words, the newspapers insinuated that any wilful incursions by non-German minorities and migrants into these public spaces had to be held at bay until and unless these minorities and migrants lost their ethnic ties to non-German culture. The Gänserndorf district governor also used the language of ethnic defence. He warned of the threat posed by Slovak workers to the German character of Gänserndorf's farming and town communities and claimed that Austrian farmers were hiring Slovak labourers in the sugar plantations in preference to

German-speakers because the Slovaks allegedly lived off more modest wages, were better educated and were more desirable marriage partners.[63] Just as the *Salzburger Volksblatt* called on Austrian Germans to show ethnic solidarity in the face of a civic invasion from Czech migrants, the governor in Gänserndorf feared that the German pride of his community was under threat unless Austrian farmers desisted from employing and intermarrying with Slovaks. Austrofascists and German-nationalists were thus in agreement that Austria's borderlands remain in the possession of Germans if Austria was to retain its identity as a German state.

Other points of convergence between the newspaper's and the state's pan-Germanism could be seen in their respective attempts to define 'German Christian' Austria. A front-page editorial on 9 December 1937, once more signed K.F.G., is instructive in this respect. The editorial, entitled 'Fascism and Authority', sought to make a distinction between Nazi Germany and the Austrian state on the basis of Austria's claim to be both German and Christian. Firstly, the writer argued that fascism was foreign to the German people as a whole, claiming that 'the Germans on the other side of the border' only followed the path of fascism out of demographic and geopolitical necessity. He contrasted the German experience of fascism with the experience of other Europeans, whom he identified as speakers of Romance languages (*Romanen*) – presumably Italians and Spaniards – and whom he claimed had a psychological and historical predisposition towards fascism:

> It is characteristic that fascism became the destiny of two states, one of which did not yet possess the power that it needed and desired, while the other was in fact robbed utterly of the power, to which it undoubtedly had the most justified claim, by virtue of the essentially undiminished size of its population and territory. The totality principle of the state [*Allstaatlichkeit*], the primacy of the state ahead of the citizen, is more of a foreign concept to the German people, historically, nationally, and even racially, than to speakers of the Romance languages, who instinctively think as collectives.[64]

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[63] Staudinger, "Austrofaschistische 'Österreich'-Ideologie," p. 304.
[64] The term '*Allstaatlichkeit*', which can be roughly translated as 'totality of the state', has a specifically fascist nuance of the citizens being the machinery of the omnipotent and omnipresent state.

Thus the writer carefully avoided essentialist arguments about Reich Germans so as not to undermine the universal basis for pan-German unity, a sentiment that this Austrofascist writer shared with his German-nationalist readers.

Secondly, the writer hesitated to label Austria a 'Christian' state. The editorial asserted that Austria's claim to be authoritarian, and 'not outrightly fascist', rested on the principle of individual freedom, rather than on the right of the state to enforce its power:

> The Austrian state is neither in practice nor in theory intended to have unfettered power. It recognises the individual and his rights, in accordance with the Christian belief that the individual person is of highest value, since Christ came as a man to men and not to states.[65]

The timing was especially prudent to assert two weeks before Christmas that Christ had come 'to men and not to states'. While this statement still encapsulated the formal belief system of Austrofascism, the writer made a subtle departure from the usual rhetoric about Austria's Christian identity and mission. Instead there was a conscious attempt made to engage readers of the *Salzburger Volksblatt* by asserting the primacy of the individual over the state, national belonging over ideology, and faith over dogma. As we will see below, National Socialists also used this tactic to discredit the Austrofascist state and appeal to readers on the basis of national identity, rather than political loyalties.

The spiritual element of pan-Germanism in the *Salzburger Volksblatt* can be illustrated with an analogy to 'positive Christianity'. First formulated in 1920 under Point 24 of the NSDAP's 'Twenty-Five Point Programme', the doctrine of positive Christianity emphasised charity in place of theology, esteemed Christ as a model anti-Semite, and sought to develop a new syncretism based on the confessional traditions of both Catholicism and Protestantism, although it relied heavily on a liberal Protestant heritage.[66] Positive Christians upheld the spiritual contribution that Christianity made to the national community. Notably, Joseph Goebbels fiercely refuted the paganist label of National

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[65] *Salzburger Volksblatt*, 9 December 1937, pp. 1-2. For the original text, see Appendix II.
[66] Steigmann-Gall, *The Holy Reich*, p. 14.

Socialism in a speech promoting the Winter Relief Drive (*Winterhilfswerk*) in December

1935:

> Is it paganist to mount a winter relief drive, thereby feeding millions of
> people? Is it paganist to give back the *Volk* its inner freedom? Is it
> paganist to help poor brothers and neighbours? Is it paganist to restore
> the ethos of the family? And to give the worker a sense of purpose to his
> life? Is it paganist to erect a state upon moral principles, to expel
> godlessness, to purify theatre and film from the contamination of Jewish-
> liberal Marxism – is that *paganist*?[67]

Goebbel's positive Christianity represented the creed of those who sought to replace

institutional religion with a spiritual, social and racial vision of the national community.

Austrofascists contested this vision of the national community precisely through their

appeal to the teachings of institutional Christianity. Until 1937, German-nationalists who

sympathised with National Socialism were able to defend their secular vision of German

Austria within the discursive parameters of Austrofascist pan-Germanism. By the end of

1937, however, and even earlier with Frank's Christmas Eve editorial in 1936, the

Salzburger Volksblatt began to challenge Austrofascism's claim to represent true German

Christianity by asserting a positive Christian basis of Austrian pan-German identity.

The appointment of a national political advisor (*Volkspolitisches Referent*) to

Salzburg's provincial government in October 1937 gave further impetus to the *Salzburg*

Volksblatt's campaign of consent for National Socialism. Schuschnigg appointed an

advisor to each province part as part of his ongoing obligation to the original terms of the

July Agreement to coordinate the national movement in the Fatherland Front.[68] The

appointee in Salzburg was a lawyer, Albert Reitter, whose New Year's Eve editorial in the

Salzburger Volksblatt in 1937 marked the beginning of a renewed *Anschluss* offensive in

the newspaper.[69] Reitter's strategy was to declare National Socialism compatible with

Austrofascism's claim to represent an 'independent, Christian and German Austria'. He

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[67] Ibid., pp. 124-35. Emphasis in original quote.
[68] Ernst Hanisch, *Der Lange Schatten des Staates: Österreichische Gesellschaftsgeschichte im 20. Jahrhundert* (Vienna, 1994), p. 321.
[69] Hanisch, "Die Salzburger Presse," p. 363.

argued, firstly, that Austria's independence could only be guaranteed if Austrians were allotted the right of self-determination within the framework of 'a pan-German solution', that is, the right to choose political union with Germany. Secondly, he drew on positive Christianity to demonstrate National Socialism's compatibility with Christianity. Reitter clarified that the Austrofascist state's espousal of Christianity 'has nothing to do with a religious confession, but with a political confession of a bourgeois view of the state.' 'This view of the Christian state does not constitute a contradiction of National Socialism,' he argued. 'On the contrary, what it directly expects is more practical Christianity and less learned comment on the Scriptures.' Finally, Reitter argued that the National Socialist view of Austria as a 'German' state was in opposition to the attempts of those in Austria whose efforts were concentrated either on rebuilding the 'old Emperor's house' or on the Catholic Church. Rather, National Socialists committed themselves to building the 'German community of blood as the basis of a common historical destiny for all time', which would build a bridge over the fissure between Austria and Germany.[70] In this way, Reitter sought to persuade readers of the *Salzburger Volksblatt* that by committing themselves to Austria's universal and particular pan-German identity, and by rejecting the place of religious or dynastic traditions within that identity, they would be able to pledge allegiance to National Socialism.

Glaser, for his part, endorsed the National Socialist view of pan-German unity over the Austrofascist concept of Austria as a separate German state. However, as we have seen, his private attitude towards National Socialism was characterised by political, rather than ideological consent. He was never a member or close adherent of the Nazi Party and, even after 1938, did not join the NSDAP.[71] He saw in National Socialism the fulfilment of his generation's pan-German ideals and saw his role in this as facilitating National Socialism's path to power by endorsing it in his newspaper. At times, he was a critical observer of

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[70] *Salzburger Volksblatt*, 31 December 1937, p. 2. For the original text, see Appendix II.
[71] Ernst Hanisch, *Gau der Guten Nerven: Die nationalsozialistische Herrschaft in Salzburg 1938-1945* (Salzburg, 1997), p. 31.

Nazism and was not afraid to denounce what he regarded as the excesses of National

Socialists. For him, violence and terror were unacceptable, but he held no objection to the

political and racial aims of the party. He appears, though, not to have shared the Nazis'

distaste for 'degenerate' art: after visiting the '*Entartete Kunst*' exhibition in Munich in

January 1938, Glaser commented that Oskar Kokoschka's 'Old Man' was 'not all that bad

after all.'[72] Yet he was undeniably overjoyed and relieved with the political developments

as they unfolded after the Berchtesgaden talks between Hitler and Schuschnigg in February

1938. He wrote in his diary on 18 March, six days after *Anschluss*:

> One cannot put into words…the joy and satisfaction over the historical
> world event that is the unification of Austria with the Reich – one can
> only say, thank God we have found home![73]

In the light of his political consent for National Socialism, we can regard Glaser's

compliance under Austrofascism as professional expedience. His chief concern after 1933

had been the preservation of his publishing rights, to the point of exploiting the dissonance

between the *Heimatschutz* and the Fatherland Front in order to secure political immunity

for his newspaper. Even after he officially handed over the reins of his newspaper to his

son, Reinhold, in July 1935, Glaser continued to work in the editorial offices and to meet

with press officials in Vienna.[74] He complied with the regime whenever the interests of his

newspaper were at stake, and it was only due to his fortuitous professional and personal

connections that he advanced to a position of relatively high standing in the Austrofascist

press chamber for an owner of a German-nationalist organ in Salzburg.

The relationship between consent and compliance also highlights a broader

relationship between German-nationalists and Austrofascists. This relationship was not

nearly as difficult as it was under regimes where resistance and collaboration were fraught

with consequences far worse than censorship or the loss of a publishing licence. We have

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[72] Glaser *Tagebuch*, 26 January 1938.
[73] Glaser, *Tagebuch*, 18 March 1938.
[74] Neureitner, "Die Geschichte des *Salzburger Volksblattes* von 1870 bis 1942," p. 217. Reinhold Glaser was chief editor of the *Salzburger Volksblatt* from July 1937 to February 1938. See Waltraud, *Salzburger Zeitungsgeschichte*, p. 211.

traced these lines of consent for National Socialism in the *Salzburger Volksblatt's*

construction of a universal pan-German identity, which used an ethnic discourse to show

that all Germans belonged together, and a civic discourse to assert that National Socialism

was the best path by which this union could occur. Although articles after 1934 focused

mainly on the ties of ethnic solidarity between Germans in Central Europe, the civic

universal discourse did not disappear entirely. Glaser and some of the newspaper's readers

may have had private reservations about the political aims of the Nazis, but publicly his

newspaper continued to adhere to National Socialist doctrines, such as the *Lebensraum*

theory.

The lines of compliance with Austrofascism, on the other hand, can be seen in the

construction of a particular pan-German identity. Both the newspaper and provincial

Austrofascist functionaries used a combination of civic and ethnic discourses that focused

on Austria's identity as a 'German Christian' state. Although Austrofascists adhered to an

orthodox interpretation of Christian doctrines, while German-nationalists drew on the

notion of positive Christianity, both sought to link Christianity with the claim that Austria

was a German state. In this sense, the different ethnic discourses about 'Christian' Austria

converged at the point where 'German' Austria appeared threatened by non-German

minorities and migrants. When the threat appeared to come from Jews, as we will see in

the next chapter, the differences between Austrofascists and German-nationalists were

often imperceptible.

5

THE '*OSTJUDE*' AS ANTI-SEMITIC STEREOTYPE

The German-nationalist press and the Austrofascist state had a great deal on which to agree over the question of Jews in Austria. As we saw in Chapter Four, German-nationalists and Austrofascists used different ethnic discourses to construct the boundaries of pan-German identity, but they found common ground wherever the civic boundaries were concerned. They agreed, for example, that Austria was a 'German' state with German-language public institutions, in spite of their differences over religion. They also used separate ethnic discourses about Jews. Austrofascists tended to favour comparisons between Jews and Ottoman Turks as twin threats from 'the East', whereas the German-nationalist press concentrated its anti-Semitic rhetoric on vagrant Jewish criminals from Eastern Europe – the '*Ostjuden*'. However, Austrofascists and German-nationalists conflated these varied images of Jews into a single anti-Semitic stereotype of Jews as foreigners. In order to understand how and why this stereotype emerged, this chapter will first give a brief overview of anti-Semitism in the interwar period and then examine the position of Jews in the Austrofascist state as well as Jewish responses to anti-Semitism. I then trace anti-Semitic discourses in the *Wiener Neueste Nachrichten* and the *Salzburger Volksblatt* and show how German-nationalists and Austrofascists constructed the ethnic and civic boundaries of pan-German identity to exclude Jews from belonging and participating in the Austrian state.

Anti-Semitism in the Interwar Years

We cannot begin to understand anti-Semitism in all of its dimensions or even at its core by approaching it as a typology. Historians often make distinctions between types of anti-Semitism, but recognise at the same time the relative ease with which one type is

mobilised into another. Sigurd Paul Scheichl, for example, has argued that historical varieties of anti-Semitism form a gradient of ever-increasing extremism from personal prejudice, to anti-modernist criticism – often referred to as *Kulturkritik* – to, finally, racial anti-Semitism. He points out that personal dislike of Jewish students in the Austrian German-nationalist student fraternities rapidly developed into a political and racial programme under the patronage of Schönerer.[1] Günter Fellner agrees that a distinction should be made between different forms of anti-Semitism: one cannot compare a 'verbal' anti-Semite with a pogromist, but neither is it implausible that he or she might become a pogromist. Like nationalism, anti-Semitism cannot be understood in terms of static categories that tell us little about how it functioned in society. Rather, it needs to be seen as a constructed image of the Jew before we can understand its broader social function.[2] Such a mode of analysis also avoids a teleology of modern anti-Semitism that places its origins in the late-nineteenth century (Schönerer in Austria, the Dreyfus affair in France), the mid-point after World War One (the 'stab in the back' myth), and the final genocidal stage in World War Two.

The image of Jews-as-foreigners was a stereotype that became widespread in Austria after World War One. This stereotype, which Hannah Arendt has referred to as 'nationalistic anti-Semitism', was especially prominent in France after the war and developed out of a suspicion and fear of Germany as the national enemy.[3] Peter Pulzer has shown that it had a particular or 'exceptional' nature in Germany and Austria due to the specific debates about citizenship in both countries during the nineteenth century. These debates did not subside even after the introduction of civil codes of equality in the 1848

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[1] Sigurd Paul Scheichl, "The Contexts and Nuances of Anti-Jewish Language: Were all the 'Antisemites' Antisemites?," in *Jews, Antisemitism and Culture in Vienna*, ed. Ivar Oxaal (London, 1987), pp. 95-97. On anti-Semitism in the student fraternities, see Chapter One.
[2] Günter Fellner, "Antisemitismus in Salzburg 1918-1938" (PhD, Salzburg, 1979), pp. 8, 47, 55.
[3] Hannah Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism* 2nd ed. (London, 1958), p. 48.

Frankfurt Assembly in Germany and in the 1867 state laws in Austria-Hungary.[4] The loss

of empire and the regulation of citizenship in the new republics in Germany and Austria

meant that anti-Semitism, especially in the immediate interwar period, was directly

connected with debates and legislation on immigration and naturalisation, as we will see in

Chapter Six. While the antecedents for modern anti-Semitism lay in the experiences of a

multiethnic empire before the war, this chapter argues that the creation of an anti-Semitic

stereotype in the interwar period was a specific product of the wartime experience of

Jewish refugees on the eastern front and drew on images of Jews as illegal, stateless

criminals invading Austria's borders and marauding its public resources.

Most agitation against the Jews in the immediate aftermath of World War One was

directed against the 25,000 Galician Jewish refugees who remained in Vienna. Food and

housing shortages, coupled with the popular perception that Jewish refugees were using up

meagre resources, fuelled hostilities towards them in all sectors of public life in politics,

universities, the professions and the press. Not only Christian Social and Greater German

politicians called for their detention and deportation, but the Social Democrats also had

their own anti-Semitic spokesperson in the infamous governor of Lower Austria and

Vienna, Albert Sever.[5] In September 1919, Sever issued a decree for the expulsion of all

foreigners who did not have residency prior to 1914 in the territories that made up the post-

war Austrian state. The federal Social Democratic party leadership tried to distance itself

from the provincial party's actions, but in the final count, Sever only succeeded in

deporting around 12,000 of the refugees due to insufficient coal and transportation and the

unwillingness of Poland and Czechoslovakia to approve the transports through their

territory.[6]

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[4] Andrei S. Markovits, "Peter Pulzer's Writing on Political Anti-Semitism and the Jewish Question in Germany and Austria: An Assessment," in *Liberalism, Anti-Semitism and Democracy: Essays in Honour of Peter Pulzer*, ed. Henning Tewes and Jonathan Wright (Oxford, 2001), pp. 49-51.

[5] Vienna was part of Lower Austria until it became a separate province in 1920.

[6] Bruce F. Pauley, *From Prejudice to Persecution: A History of Austrian Anti-Semitism* (Chapel Hill, 1992), pp. 82-85; Beatrix Hoffmann-Holter, *'Abreisendmachung': Jüdische Kriegsflüchtlinge in Wien 1914-1923*

Radical anti-Semites took to the streets and their printing presses to protest against the refugees, often inflating the numbers of the refugees to represent the entire Jewish population in Vienna. The leader of the Nazi Party, Walter Riehl, played an active role in organising the street demonstrations. At a rally held in the Prater amusement park in September 1920, he called for the deportation of the city's 200,000 strong Jewish population to vacate housing for 150,000 homeless people in Vienna. The scars of defeat and the post-war economic crisis exacerbated this suspicion and resentment towards Jewish refugees. Consequently, the collective label of '*Ostjuden*' functioned as a means of alienating Jews from society and vindicating Austria's attempt to have them removed. As one Zionist daily newspaper in Vienna remarked caustically in September 1921:

> since the collapse [of the Austro-Hungarian Empire] the good people of Austria have condensed everything into the little word '*Ostjude*.'...[sic] It is a wondrous expression which alleviates every pain and takes away every shame. Complaints over the rising costs of bread, and the falling morals of women, over bad railroad transportation, the lack of coal, the unruliness of school children, and the watering down of milk find their solution: Out with the *Ostjuden*!'[7]

The stereotype of the *Ostjuden* also served to legitimate the efforts of anti-Semites to define Jews as a national minority in Austria. In this respect, Christian Social politicians proposed equally radical solutions in equally denunciatory tones as Riehl. In 1919, the leader of the Christian Social Party, Leopold Kunschak, proposed a bill that, had it been accepted, would have made Jews a legal minority in Austria by giving them separate political representation and placing on them a numerus clausus in the public service and academia. In 1920, Kunschak went even further by suggesting that Jewish refugees be given the choice either to emigrate or be interned in a concentration camp. Kunschak's views may have alarmed his more conservative colleagues – Ignaz Seipel counseled him

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(Vienna, 1995), pp. 162-63, 197-210; Gernot Heiss, "Ausländer, Flüchtlinge, Bolshewiken: Aufenthalt und Asyl 1918-1933," in *Asylland Wider Willen: Flüchtlinge im Europäischen Kontext seit 1914*, ed. Gernot Heiss and Oliver Rathkolb (Vienna, 1995), p. 90; Edward Timms, "Citizenship and 'Heimatrecht' after the Treaty of Saint-Germain," in *The Habsburg Legacy: National Identity in Historical Perspective*, ed. Edward Timms and Ritchie Robertson (Edinburgh, 1994), p. 160. See also George E. Berkley, *Vienna and its Jews: The Tragedy of Success 1880s-1980s* (Cambridge, MA, 1988), pp. 156-58.
[7] Pauley, *From Prejudice to Persecution*, pp. 80-82.

not to promulgate the bill in 1919, although he conceded it may well be a political possibility in the future – but the tolerance shown for such inflammatory debate revealed the high profile of anti-Semitism in Christian Social circles.[8]

Outside the sphere of parliamentary influence, radical anti-Semites banded together in 1921 in the *Antisemitenbund* (League of Anti-Semites) and began lobbying for political and legal measures against the Jews. In March 1921, the *Antisemitenbund* organised an international congress in Vienna for 40,000 Austrian and European delegates to discuss proposals to restrict citizenship rights and education for Jews, whom they defined as any person with a Jewish great-grandparent. The *Antisemitenbund* also went further than any other group in Austria by demanding the legal separation of Jews and non-Jews in government services, such as education and welfare support, and the total exclusion of Jews from law, medicine and teaching. In addition to these demands, its leaders called for a moratorium on Jewish immigration to Austria, the deportation of all Jewish arrivals since 1914, the official label of 'Jewish' for any business or newspaper that employed Jews, a pro rata restriction on Jews in the arts, disenfranchisement of the Jews and, finally, a prohibition on ownership of land or holding public office. After 1924, the Nazi Party forced its members to relinquish membership in the *Antisemitenbund* so that, until 1933, the Nazi Party virtually held a monopoly on all anti-Semitic activities in Austria. The *Antisemitenbund* reformed in 1933 after the ban on the NSDAP and continued its activities and publications under heavy scrutiny from the Christian Social government and later the Austrofascist state. However, the official scrutiny of the *Antisemitenbund* after 1933 was due to the government's suspicions that it was a cover for illegal Nazis, not because of its anti-Semitism. As we will see below, the Austrofascist state tolerated anti-Semitism in

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[8] Anton Staudinger, "Austrofaschistische 'Österreich'-Ideologie," in *'Austrofaschismus': Beiträge über Politik, Ökonomie und Kultur 1934-1938*, ed. Emmerich Tálos and Wolfgang Neugebauer (Vienna, 1988), p. 306; Anton Staudinger, "Katholischer Antisemitismus in der Ersten Republik," in *Eine zerstörte Kultur: Jüdische Leben und Antisemitismus in Wien seit dem 19. Jahrhundert*, ed. Gerhard Botz, et al. (Vienna, 2002), p. 272.

publications and newspapers as long as these only attacked the Jews and not the government.[9]

In universities, the German Students for the East March (*Deutsche Studentenschaft für Ostmark*) led a campaign to have the number of Jewish students at Austrian universities restricted to ten per cent of all student enrolments in accord with the demographic ratio of Jews to non-Jews in Austria. The numbers of Jewish enrolments were disproportionately high, constituting over a third of all tertiary enrolments at Austrian universities, partly due to the number of Jewish immigrants before and after 1918, and partly also to the tendency of Jewish families to place greater value on higher education for both males and females. Jewish enrolments at the University of Vienna, for example, rose from 27 per cent before 1914 to 42 per cent in 1920-21.[10] The *Deutsche Studentenschaft* was unsuccessful in its attempt to curtail Jewish enrolments at the University of Vienna, but their demands had the unstinting support of the university rector, Karl Diener, who declared in 1922 that:

> the large number of Eastern European students at the University
> represents a downright shocking invasion of racially and organically
> alien elements, whose culture, upbringing, and morals are far below
> every native German student; therein lies the true cancerous damage to
> our academic conditions. The reduction of the Eastern Jews must today
> take a leading place in the program of every rector and senate of a
> German *Hochschule*. The progressive orientalisation of Vienna must at
> least be stopped at the *Hochschulen*.

At the Technical College in Vienna, where more than 41 per cent of students were Jewish, the academic senate approved a numerus clausus on Jewish students in March 1923 by prohibiting Jewish immigrants from enrolling in those courses that already filled a ten per cent Jewish quota. When efforts to impose similar conditions on Jewish enrolments at the University of Vienna failed, student groups staged violent riots and disrupted lectures, forcing the university to close its doors temporarily in November 1923 for the first time since 1897, when students had rioted against the Badeni Decrees. The general climate of

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[9] Pauley, *From Prejudice to Persecution*, pp. 82, 185-87; Bruce F. Pauley, "Politischer Antisemitismus im Wien der Zwischenkriegszeit," in *Eine zerstörte Kultur: Jüdisches Leben und Antisemitismus in Wien seit dem 19. Jahrhundert*, ed. Gerhard Botz, et al. (Vienna, 2002), p. 256.
[10] Pauley, *From Prejudice to Persecution*, pp. 89-100.

academic anti-Semitism deterred Jews from seeking a university place so that, between 1921 and 1927, Jewish enrolments at the University of Vienna dropped from 42 per cent to 17.5 per cent.[11]

Conservative Austrians tended to look disparagingly upon the more extreme antics of these student groups, but their own views were no less hostile and were motivated principally by academic concerns. When the University of Vienna closed temporarily in November 1923, the Christian Social press and university professors condemned the violence because it disrupted teaching and research, not because it was racially motivated. The *Reichspost* warned that Jewish dominance would be contained not by violence but by the intellectual dissemination of pan-German ideas.[12] Jewish students had some allies at the university: Theodor Innitzer, who had been on the theological faculty since 1913, clamped down on student anti-Semitism during his appointment as rector of the University of Vienna between 1928 and 1929.[13] Later, however, after he was appointed Archbishop of Vienna in 1932 and Cardinal in March 1933, Innitzer formally endorsed the views of the rector of the German seminary in Rome, Bishop Alois Hudal, whose book, *Die Grundlagen des Nationalsozialismus* (The Foundations of National Socialism), published in 1936, argued in favour of racial laws on the basis that all races and people were equal before God, but that not all races and people were equal in their intellectual, moral and physiological capacities.[14]

Historians often want to box these different examples into political, economic, racial, academic or religious types of anti-Semitism in order to be able to classify a phenomenon that appeared to be more widespread and entrenched in Austria than anywhere else in Europe. But if we are to avoid the problematic categories of anti-

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[11] Ibid., pp. 89-100, 121. See also Peter Pulzer, "Spezifische Momente und Spielarten des österreichischen und des Wiener Antisemitismus," in *Eine zerstörte Kutur: Jüdisches Leben und Antisemitismus in Wien seit dem 19. Jahrhundert*, ed. Gerhard Botz, et al. (Vienna, 2002), p. 140.

[12] Pauley, *From Prejudice to Persecution*, pp. 97-98.

[13] Harriet Pass Freidenreich, *Jewish Politics in Vienna 1918-1938* (Bloomington, 1991), p. 187.

[14] Staudinger, "Katholischer Antisemitismus in der Ersten Republik," p. 278, 422 n.41.

Semitism as religious prejudice or racial beliefs and instead see how anti-Semitism functioned in society as a stereotype of Jews, then we must ask how and in what sense this stereotype was constructed by an individual, a group or a government. Then the views of a politician, a university professor, a newspaper or a cardinal become significant because they are connected with the social context in which those views were formed or expressed. There is little sense in arguing that anti-Semitism in its official guise under the Austrofascist state was less obstreperous than that of groups such as the *Antisemitenbund* or the *Deutsche Studentenschaft*. It is equally absurd to argue that all anti-Semitism, regardless of where it occurred or how it was formulated or by whom it was expressed, had similar intentions and equal consequences. It is much more significant to investigate how and why certain stereotypes of Jews emerged and became pervasive at a particular time. The stereotype of Jews as morally and materially corruptive in 'Christian Austria', for example, had evolved over a longer period than the stereotype of Jews as foreigners. Thus when Bishop Gföllner's pastoral letter in January 1933 condemned Jews for their 'mammonism' and blamed them for the 'spiritual trash' in society, and at the same time attacked National Socialism as 'un-Christian', we have to consider which anti-Semitic stereotype was behind the Bishop's denunciations.[15] Was the push to disenfranchise Jews from public life in Austria after 1933 prompted by stereotypes of the Jews as religious or ideological opponents of Austrofascism, or of another, more recent perception of the Jews as aliens in a society framed by ethnic and civic boundaries of belonging? The following section will briefly consider these questions in the context of the Austrofascist state help us to place the stereotype of the *Ostjuden* within a wider understanding of anti-Semitism in interwar Austria.

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[15] Freidenreich, *Jewish Politics in Vienna 1918-1938*, p. 187. See also the editorial about Bishop Gföllner's pastoral letter in the *Wiener Neueste Nachrichten* in Chapter Three.

Jews and Austrofascism

As we saw in Chapter Four, Austrofascist leaders and their publishing organs commemorated the 250th anniversary of the defeat of Ottoman Turks on the occasion of All Catholics' Day in September 1933. They did this by drawing on a number of symbolic resources, including historic battles and state religion, in order to conflate multiple enemy-invader stereotypes into a single threat to Austria embodied in the 'oriental' Jew. The language of 'orientalism' and 'the East' was ethnic in its reference to a geographically and culturally distinct civilisation from that of 'German Christian' Austria. However, the dominant discursive mechanism was civic because it defined Austria's pan-German heritage and mission in terms of a bulwark against Turks and international Jewry. The primary issue at stake for Austrofascists, therefore, was the protection of the Austrian state from foreigners and agitators against the state.

Officially, the 1934 constitution guaranteed the equality of all citizens and the freedom of all religions. In this respect, it was less of an evil for the Jews than the democratic freedoms that had allowed National Socialists to hold a mandate in the parliament.[16] Beneath the veneer of equality, however, the Austrofascist state regularly practiced discrimination against Jews. The dismissal of Jewish doctors from hospitals and Jewish schoolteachers after the 1934 civil war serves as one illustration of this 'silent anti-Semitism'.[17] The Association of Jewish Physicians in Vienna reported that 56 of the 58 physicians dismissed after February 1934 were Jewish, although the majority of them were not members of the Social Democratic Party and many non-Jewish doctors who were, kept their jobs. The report also claimed that no Jewish physicians had been hired in public hospitals since 1933, even after the Association of Jewish Physicians joined the Fatherland Front in February 1934. A similar pattern emerged in schools: only one-fifth of Jewish

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[16] Pauley, *From Prejudice to Persecution*, pp. 185-87.
[17] The quotation is from Edmund Schechter, cited in Freidenreich, *Jewish Politics in Vienna 1918-1938*, p. 180.

schoolteachers who were dismissed after 1934 were members of the Social Democratic Party.[18]

Confessional education in public schools was one of the most visible spheres of discrimination against Jews under the Austrofascist state. In April 1933, a year prior to the new constitution, Dollfuss annulled a law banning compulsory religious observance in schools, which had first been introduced in April 1919 by the then Undersecretary for Education, Otto Glöckel. The so-called Glöckel Decree had released teachers and students from obligatory classroom prayers and attendance at confession and religious processions, but the new law in 1933 was based on Pope Pius XI's 1929 encyclical, *Divini illius Magistri*, which called for confessional schools for all baptised Catholics. In September 1934, the Ministry of Education decreed that non-Catholic students were to be streamlined into parallel classes, ostensibly on the grounds that some middle and elementary schools were overcrowded and that it would release Jews and Protestants from the compulsory religious classes. Jewish leaders unequivocally condemned the segregation of Jewish and non-Jewish students, but disagreed among themselves over the nature of state-sponsored education for Jews. The Liberals, for example, advocated integration in public schools. Nationalists, on the other hand, wanted secular Jewish schools, but reiterated that these should not be made compulsory and that Jewish children should have the same educational opportunities as non-Jews. Finally, Orthodox Jews opposed the Nationalists' proposal for secular Jewish schools and instead favoured religious-based education.[19] A similar disagreement over youth groups arose after the Fatherland Front segregated Jews into their own youth group, *Jungvolk*, separate from the state *Österreichisches Jungvolk* but still under the umbrella of the Fatherland Front. Liberals again protested the segregation, but

[18] Pauley, *From Prejudice to Persecution*, pp. 268-72; Freidenreich, *Jewish Politics in Vienna 1918-1938*, pp. 189.

[19] Freidenreich, *Jewish Politics in Vienna 1918-1938*, pp. 198-200; Richard Olechowski, "Schulpolitik," in *Österreich 1918-1938: Geschichte der Ersten Republik*, ed. Erika Weinzierl and Kurt Skalnik (Graz, 1983), pp. 592, 603; Michael J. Zeps, *Education and the Crisis of the First Republic* (Boulder, 1987), pp. 33, 168; Herbert Dachs, "'Austrofaschismus' und Schule: Ein Instrumentalisierungsversuch," in *'Austrofaschismus': Beiträge über Politik, Ökonomie und Kultur 1934-1938*, ed. Emmerich Tálos and Wolfgang Neugebauer (Vienna, 1988), p. 180.

Orthodox and Nationalist Jews welcomed what they saw as greater autonomy for Austrian Jews.[20]

The example of confessional schools in the Austrofascist state allows us to look closely at the nature of official discrimination against Jews, its intended purpose and the anti-Semitic stereotype present in this context. We can glean some answers from George Clare's memoir, to which reference has been already made in Chapter Three. In 1936, fifteen-year-old Clare attended the prestigious grammar school, *Schopenhauergymnasium*, which had two classes in each year level: Form A, which Clare was in, had both Jewish and non-Jewish students, while Form B was for non-Jews only. Clare recounts a school scene in which both classes were required to take part in a military exercise in the Viennese Woods as part of the school curriculum's requirements for paramilitary training. During the march, the Form B boys started singing the *Horst-Wessel Lied*, the unofficial Nazi anthem that had been banned in 1933. When Clare informed the school's headmaster, he was expelled from the school, not on the grounds of his opposition to the song, but because Clare had flippantly remarked to a fellow Form A pupil that the physical education teacher (who had been supervising the students) was 'a Nazi anyway' and the student had in turn blown the whistle on Clare. The teacher in question, unknown to Clare at the time, was in fact a leader in the *Österreichischem Jungvolk* and thus a functionary of the Fatherland Front.[21]

From Clare's account, we see that the segregation in schools was not intended to separate Jewish students from non-Jews completely, since there were still mixed classes, but to reinforce the idea that Jews could not assimilate fully into the social and academic sphere of other Austrians. The effect of this discrimination was to foster a minority identity in Jewish students and leave them vulnerable to attacks or taunts from the majority

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[20] Pauley, *From Prejudice to Persecution*, pp. 271-72. See also Anton Staudinger, "Zur 'Österreich'-Ideologie des Ständestaates," in *Das Juliabkommen von 1936: Vorgeschichte, Hintergründe und Folgen*, ed. Ludwig Jedlicka and Rudolf Neck (Munich, 1977), pp. 233-34.

[21] George Clare, *Last Waltz in Vienna: The Destruction of a Family 1842-1942* (London, 1982), pp. 50-53.

population, often under the wilful supervision and encouragement of their superiors. The stereotype of Jewish students in this sense did not reflect religious or racial bigotry, although this was present in the act of discrimination. Rather, Clare's Jewishness was seen as a barrier to his full assimilation and became a means of first isolating and then excluding him entirely from the school, which also would have precluded him from obtaining a tertiary education.

Clare's ostracism in a middle-class school is also significant because he, like so many Viennese Jews, had worked very hard to leave this minority identity behind:

> I was already second-generation Viennese, and Viennese-born Jews felt resentment towards the less assimilated Jews from the East. We were, or rather thought we were, quite different from that bearded, caftaned lot. We were not just Austrian, but German-Austrian.

After immigrating to Ireland in 1938, Clare, along with other Jewish refugees, changed his name when he joined the British Army as an 'enemy alien' in 1941 in order to avoid capture by the Nazis. For Clare, however, this decision was also tinged with regret in the knowledge that the link to his forebears, who had risen to imperial rank in the military and medical fields of the Habsburg Empire, was severed. His great-grandfather, Herrmann Klaar, had been born in Bukowina but graduated from the University of Vienna with a medical degree, launching his career in the army and gaining him eventually the imperial title of Surgeon-Major. Clare held a warmer affection for his paternal grandmother, Julie, who he described as 'totally Viennese', than his mother's mother, Adele, who 'was very much the East European ghetto Jewess'. Both women had been born in the periphery of the Habsburg Empire, in Bukowina and Galicia respectively, but Clare's childhood memory drew a distinction between them on the basis of their assimilation to the language, education and culture of Viennese society, with which he also personally identified.[22]

Other Jewish memoirs recount anecdotal illustrations of antipathy between assimilated and unassimilated Jews. The assimilated Viennese Jews used such disparaging

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[22] Ibid., pp. 1-21, 37.

labels as '*Polak*' for the Galician Jews and, at soccer matches between Austria Wien and Hakoah Wien, Jewish spectators jeered the '*Ostjuden*' on the field. There was just as much retaliation from the new Jewish immigrants, who made fun of assimilated Jewish intellectuals through poetry and song lyrics and through schoolyard taunts of '*Assimilant*' against other pupils.[23] An indicator of the economic differences between assimilated and newly arrived Jews was also evident in the taxes each group paid to the Jewish community, *Israelitische Kultusgemeinde* (IKG). While Jews from Bohemia were one of the largest taxpaying groups, the Galicians, who constituted one-fifth of the Jewish population in Vienna between 1870 and 1910, represented only eight per cent of all IKG taxpayers. Religious differences also provoked some embarrassment on the part of assimilated Jews, who complained that the Orthodox Galicians were disruptive in the synagogue with their noisy, traditional prayers.[24]

Relations between assimilated and unassimilated Jews in Austria need to be seen in a separate context to anti-Semitic stereotypes. The feelings of resentment on the part of the Galician Jewish arrivals towards second- and third-generation Viennese Jews, and the social awkwardness on the part of the latter towards the new arrivals, stemmed from a protracted process of Jewish self-identification with the Austrian state. This process stagnated and regressed during the interwar period, as Marsha Rozenblit has shown, as Austrian Jews began to cultivate an ethnic Jewish identity in response to the loss of identification with the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Instead of identifying with the nation or the state, as they had done before 1918, and because the option to integrate fully into either the state or nation did not exist after 1918, Jews turned inwards to the Jewish community and especially to their family. This nascent Jewish ethnicity was not based on language,

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[23] Michael John, "'We Do Not Even Possess Ourselves': On Identity and Ethnicity in Austria, 1880-1937," *Austrian History Yearbook* 30 (1999): pp. 57-58.
[24] Robert S. Wistrich, *The Jews of Vienna in the Age of Franz Joseph* (Oxford, 1989), pp. 45-51.

but on religious and familial notions of Jewish identity.[25] We might see Clare's autobiography, for example, as a reflection of his primary identification with his family over several generations. While the formation and expression of Jewish self-identity in the interwar period led to friction and social barriers between the two groups, it differed, nonetheless, from anti-Semitism both in its intent and function in society. As we will see, German-nationalists and Austrofascists sought to exclude all Jews, not just unassimilated Jews, from the national identity by conflating both groups into a single stereotype of '*Ostjuden*'. Anti-Semitism was thus about boundaries of exclusion and inclusion in an Austrian pan-German identity. We turn now to the construction of an anti-Semitic stereotype in the German-nationalist press of Vienna and Salzburg.

'*Ostjuden*' in Vienna

Given the geographical proximity of Vienna's Jewish community to editors and readers of the *Wiener Neueste Nachrichten*, it is unsurprising that the newspaper sensationalised stories about assimilation, segregation and allegations of Jewish crime. These articles constructed a stereotype of the unassimilated immigrant Jew living in a Jewish neighbourhood where fraud and forgery were portrayed as endemic to a Jewish way of life. While this stereotype was built on civic notions about the rule of law and integration into public life, the language of civic nationalism was also a pretext for the newspaper to project an ethnic stereotype of *Ostjuden* and create a boundary that excluded all Jews, not just unassimilated ones, from Austria's pan-German identity. In this way, we see that German-nationalists combined ethnic and civic discourses to construct an anti-Semitic stereotype of Jews as foreigners.

The *Wiener Neueste Nachrichten* constructed an image of a Jewish 'ghetto' in Vienna's second district, Leopoldstadt by creating a physical and visible boundary of

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[25] Marsha L. Rozenblit, "Jewish Ethnicity in a New Nation-State: The Crisis of Identity in the Austrian Republic," in *In Search of Jewish Communities: Jewish Identities in Germany and Austria 1918-1933*, ed. Michael Brenner and Derek J. Penslar (Bloomington, 1998), pp. 134-153.

segregation and exclusion. The newspaper mapped the physical boundary onto the Danube

canal and Danube River that segregated Leopoldstadt and the adjacent district of

Brigittenau from the rest of Vienna. The newspaper further proposed that Leopoldstadt and

Brigittenau officially be renamed as the city's Jewish quarter.[26] A photographic essay

depicting the Jews of Leopoldstadt constructed a visible boundary of exclusion. The

photographs showed Jewish men with side-locks wearing caftans, standing in streets and

exchanging wares, women and children sitting on park benches, girls listening to a

gramophone and a woman making an exhibition of herself in a bathing costume.[27] The

photograph of the woman, in particular, reflected a popular anti-Semitic stereotype that

surfaced every summer in Austrian resort towns, where anti-Semites ran 'Jew-free'

campaigns to ban Jewish holidayers from hotels, cafes and entire towns, in a few cases.[28]

Readers would have seen at least two denoted images in the photographs. The first, most

obvious image showed Jews as foreign in their appearance and culture. The second image,

evident in the pictures of the girls and the woman at the beach, showed Jews audaciously

moving into Austria's public spaces with such an air of pretension that they became a self-

parody of their own alienation. Thus the 'ghetto' stereotype was about Jewish alienation

from mainstream Austrian society.

The pictures were not intended only as satire, however, but as a warning that the

Jews were growing steadily in numbers and gaining entry into society. The newspaper

claimed that the census in March 1934 had only counted Jews who formally identified with

Judaism and estimated that the real number with 'Jewish blood' was around 400,000, more

than double the census figure. Moreover, the newspaper explained that the rise in

population was not due to the Jewish birth rate, which was lower than the Austrian

average, but rather, to the 'continuous immigration and alarming increase in mixed

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[26] *Wiener Neueste Nachrichten*, 17 November 1934, p. 5.
[27] *Wiener Neueste Nachrichten-Bilder*, 6 May 1934, pp. 2-4.
[28] On the so-called 'summer vacation anti-Semitism' (*Sommerfrische-Antisemitismus*), see Robert Kriechbaumer, ed., *Der Geschmack der Vergänglichkeit: Jüdische Sommerfrische in Salzburg* (Vienna, 2002).

marriages', which had contributed to this growth to the point where there were allegedly more Jews in Vienna than in Palestine:

> Under such circumstances…it will be difficult not to deny the existence of a Jewish problem in Austria. Anti-Semitism is not a malicious invention of intolerant fanatics, but rather it is entirely endemic in Vienna and has its actual basis in the importunity of the Jewish population in this city. The characters that are captured in these pictures may yet be the least dangerous ones. But their children could, if it is allowed, assimilate as doctors, lawyers, journalists and Marxist leaders, and that is intolerable now and will continue to be so.[29]

The article used a combination of civic and ethnic discourses to show that Jews should be excluded from Austrian public life on the basis of their ethnicity. The ethnic discourse can be seen in the newspaper's reference to 'Jewish blood' and its assertion that the Jewish population had risen through marriage to non-Jews and immigration. The photographs denoting a stereotype of the Jews as foreign also revealed an ethnic discourse. The civic discourse, on the other hand, was found in the above text about Jewish assimilation from a 'ghetto' to middle-class society. The text provided the 'anchorage' to guide the reader from the denoted image of the Jews as foreigners to a connoted image of a Jewish cycle of assimilation from fringe-dwelling immigrants to prominent members of Vienna's middle class.[30] Here, the anti-Semitic stereotype functioned as a dual ethnic and civic boundary mechanism to exclude Jews from participation in the Austrian state.

The ghetto-stereotype of Leopoldstadt was not entirely an imagined construction of German-nationalists. It had been named in honour of Emperor Leopold I, who expelled the Jews living along the Danube in 1670. Jews began to resettle Leopoldstadt after Emperor Franz Josef granted them legal equality and lifted residential restrictions against them in 1867.[31] By the 1930s, approximately 65,000 Jews lived in Leopoldstadt, which represented

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[29] *Wiener Neueste Nachrichten-Bilder*, 6 May 1934, pp. 2-4. For the original text, see Appendix III.
[30] On the text as 'anchorage', and on denoted and connoted images, see Roland Barthes, "Rhetoric of the Image (1964)," in *Visual Culture: The Reader*, ed. Jessica Evans and Stuart Hall (London, 1999).
[31] Klaus Lohrmann, "Vorgeschichte: Juden in Österreich vor 1867," in *Eine Zerstörte Kultur: Jüdisches Leben und Antisemitismus in Wien seit dem 19. Jahrhundert*, ed. Gerhard Botz, et al. (Vienna, 2002), pp. 38. According to the 1934 census, there were 176,034 Jews in Vienna, which represented less than a tenth of Vienna's population. See "Einleitung der Herausgeber" Gerhard Botz et al., eds., *Eine Zerstörte Kultur: Jüdisches Leben und Antisemitismus in Wien seit dem 19. Jahrhundert* 2nd ed. (Vienna, 2002), p. 19.

around forty per cent of the neighbourhood's residents and a third of Vienna's total Jewish population.[32] Robert Wistrich argues that such figures do not reflect true segregation of Jews and non-Jews, which was considerably less in Vienna than in other major cities in the Austro-Hungarian Empire, such as Prague, and certainly less in comparison with the Jewish villages and urban ghettos in Galicia and Hungary. He points out that Viennese Jews had a high level of interaction with non-Jewish residents through the practice of subletting accommodation to boarders and apprentices to cope with housing shortages. Even in Leopoldstadt, which was the most densely populated Jewish neighbourhood in Vienna and where destitute immigrants crowded together in single rooms, Jews still lived among a non-Jewish majority.[33] On the other hand, Marsha Rozenblit has shown that segregationist tendencies were borne out by the fact that poorer Jews lived alongside middle-class Jews in the same neighbourhood, albeit in impoverished, cramped conditions and in a different street from their wealthier neighbours. She argues that neighbourhood encounters with Jewish shops closed on Saturday and women wearing wigs in compliance with Orthodox Jewish law on modesty, for example, reinforced the popular image of a Jewish ghetto in Leopoldstadt.[34]

Joseph Roth (1894-1939) - author, feuilletonist, journalist and himself a Galician Jew -immortalised the Jews of Leopoldstadt in his *Juden auf Wanderschaft* (Wandering Jews), first published in 1937. Roth wrote with curiosity and personal empathy for the displaced Jews, whom he encountered first in Vienna and later as a correspondent in Russia.[35] He famously described Leopoldstadt as a 'voluntary ghetto':

> Many bridges join it to the other districts of the city. Every day traders,
> peddlers, stockbrokers, dealers, all the unproductive elements of
> immigrant Eastern Jewry, cross over these bridges. But in the evenings
> the offspring of these unproductive elements, the sons and daughters of
> the traders, who work in the factories, offices, banks, editorships and art

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[32] Christine Klusacek and Kurt Stimmer, *Leopoldstadt* (Vienna, 1978), pp. 58-59.
[33] Wistrich, *The Jews of Vienna*, p. 48.
[34] Marsha L. Rozenblit, *The Jews of Vienna, 1867-1914: Assimilation and Identity* (Albany, 1983), pp. 77-79.
[35] On Roth's journalistic career, see Klaus Westermann, *Joseph Roth, Journalist: Eine Karriere 1915-1939* (Bonn, 1987).

studios, cross over the same bridges....Leopoldstadt is a poor district. There are many small apartments, where families of six live. There are dormitories where fifty, sixty people sleep on the floor overnight. The homeless sleep in the Prater. The poorest of all the workers live near the railway stations. The *Ostjuden* do not live any better than the Christian residents in this part of the city. They have many children, they are not accustomed to hygiene and cleanliness and they are hated. No one looks after them. Their cousins and coreligionists sitting in the editorial offices in the first district are "already" Viennese and do not want to be related to or confused with the *Ostjuden*....The *Ostjuden* are dependent on the support of middle-class charities. One is inclined to regard compassion to Jews as higher than it should be. Jewish charity is equally imperfect an institution as any other. Charity gratifies the charity-giver first and foremost. Often the coreligionists of the *Ostjude* or even his compatriots in a Jewish charitable institution do not treat him any better than Christians do. It is terribly hard to be an *Ostjude*; there is no lot worse than that of a foreign *Ostjude* in Vienna.[36]

Roth was not constructing a stereotype, however. He was simply highlighting the social isolation engendered by being both foreign and Jewish in Vienna. He was sensitive to the tensions that existed between assimilated and unassimilated Jews, and to the ways in which anti-Semites might perceive all Jews as 'unproductive elements'. But instead of seeing the geographical boundary separating Leopoldstadt from the rest of Vienna as a barrier to assimilation, as the *Wiener Neueste Nachrichten* did, Roth described a literal and allegorical bridge, joining the traditions of the past with the possibilities of assimilation for the children and grandchildren of the *Ostjuden*. The *Wiener Neueste Nachrichten* wanted to prevent this assimilation from happening, whereas Roth, who identified spiritually with Orthodox Jews and perhaps saw himself as the social conscience of Vienna's Jewry, chided the 'already' assimilated Jews for their moral failure to help integrate the newer arrivals.[37]

The *Wiener Neueste Nachrichten* exaggerated the disaffection between assimilated and unassimilated Jews in order to reinforce a stereotype of the foreign Jew. An article in March 1935 referred to the *Ostjuden* as 'guests' in Austria who had abused Austrian

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[36] Joseph Roth, *Juden auf Wanderschaft* 7th ed. (Cologne, 2000), p. 40.
[37] On Roth's spiritual affinity with Galician Jewry, see Wistrich, *The Jews of Vienna*, pp. 656-58.

hospitality and vexed the 'native' Jews. The article cited a letter, allegedly written by a

Jewish woman who had lived in Vienna since 1905:

> Again and again I bump into Polish Jews who have the best furnished
> houses, good businesses, who take part in all possible forms of dirty
> competition, and who make life difficult for the decent Jewish
> businessman. Nearly all of the businesses in the second district are in the
> hands of my co-religionists, who I am honestly ashamed of. [...] If you
> sell an article for 26 Groschen, just as swiftly a Pole comes along and
> sells it for 25 Groschen. [...] These immigrant Polish Jews are the ruin of
> us all.[38]

It is highly implausible that a Jewish woman would write to an anti-Semitic newspaper to

complain about other Jews. As with the (probably) fabricated letter from the *Windische*

Carinthian, which showed that both the newspaper and its readers were receptive to

pseudo-academic theories of dissimilation, it is also likely in this case that the *Wiener*

Neueste Nachrichten was simply exploiting a popular stereotype of *Ostjuden* as cunning

and deceitful. The letter did not attempt to validate the woman's concerns or point out the

positive contribution that she or any other 'decent' Jew had made to the community.

Rather, it highlighted that 'native' Jews were themselves recent immigrants to Vienna and

suggested that, in spite of their purported indignant response to 'Polish' Jews, these already

domiciled Viennese Jews still identified with their 'co-religionists'.

The most sensational articles in the *Wiener Neueste Nachrichten* featured anti-

Semitic stereotypes of guile and vagrancy. On 9 March 1937, the newspaper reported that

police at the Vienna Fair had arrested a pick-pocketing band of Jewish immigrants, whose

leader, a Jewish merchant, had been arrested two years earlier in a separate pick-pocketing

scheme at the Prague Fair. These tenuous claims were significant for their caricature of the

nomadic merchant Jew whose criminal activities had begun to seep into Austria.[39] In

September 1937, the newspaper published two reports on passport forgery operations run

by international rings of Jewish immigrants. The first article said that the suspected leader

of one organisation, Frau Silberstein, had been arrested in Paris along with six other Jewish

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[38] *Wiener Neueste Nachrichten*, 21 March 1935, p. 2.
[39] *Wiener Neueste Nachrichten*, 9 March 1937, p. 3.

immigrants from Czechoslovakia, Poland and Russia. More arrests of Jews from Poland

and Russia had reportedly been made in Danzig. The article highlighted the illegal

activities of *Ostjuden* in its headline – 'Frau Silberstein distributes passports to *Ostjuden*' –

giving the impression that Jews were helping other Jews cross Europe's borders illegally

and, more importantly, that they were helping those most unwanted of all Jews, the

Ostjuden.[40]

The second article reported that another 'international band of Jewish passport

forgers' had been uncovered in Pressburg (Bratislava), just across the Austrian border in

Czechoslovakia. The report told how this smuggling operation, based in Warsaw, falsified

documents to bring Polish refugees to France from Pressburg via Austria. The head of the

organisation in Pressburg, Judas Rubenstein, was himself a refugee from Poland who

operated under the name of Max Schöpfel, a remark that might have been construed by

readers to mean that Jews were posturing as Germans. The article also mentioned that two

arrests had been made in connection with the smuggling operations on the Austrian border

and that possible links between Pressburg and the Paris-based organisation under Frau

Silberstein were being investigated.[41] These allegations of a chain of Jewish gang

operations across Europe intimated that the porosity of international borders was playing

into the hands of Jewish immigrants.

The stereotype of Jews as criminals had first developed in late-nineteenth-century

academic and popular discourses of Jewish felony. Criminologists in Austria-Hungary and

Germany attributed the criminal behaviour of Jews to ethnic and cultural factors, such as

language, religion and ancestral heritage, often specifically related to the socio-economic

position and family vocations of Jews, rather than the racial idea of a biological pre-

disposition towards crime. Thus prostitution was construed as part of an international slave

trade run by Jews, rather than attributed to the sexual perversion of alleged offenders.

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[40] *Wiener Neueste Nachrichten*, 28 September 1937, p. 6.
[41] *Wiener Neueste Nachrichten*, 30 September 1937, p. 5.

Criminologists attempted to prove their theories by claiming that non-Jewish accomplices adopted the same behaviour, vocabulary and religious practices of Jews in the criminal underworld, reinforcing the notion that common linguistic and cultural traits were to be found among criminal populations. Austrian newspapers popularised these academic discourses by constructing a narrative of crimes committed, aided and defended by Jewish lawyers, journalists, scientists, and other perpetrators connected to a Jewish economic and social underworld. No specific crime was ever mentioned; instead, the newspapers collapsed multiple anti-Semitic stereotypes into a single stereotype of Jewish criminality.[42]

The German-nationalist press in the 1930s used a similar strategy of weaving multiple anti-Semitic references to Jewish behaviour and identities into a single stereotype of the foreign and fraudulent Jew, but this stereotype was specific to the interwar period in its association with illegal immigrants. Both in the *Wiener Neueste Nachrichten* and in the *Salzburger Volksblatt*, as we will see below, the stereotype of the *Ostjude* was created through civic boundary mechanisms of entry and participation in Austria's legal and public spheres. This stereotype had its origins in the prewar period, but the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and the creation of new Austrian borders meant that images of Jews in Austria were also reconstructed to fit the new era.

'Anti-Semitism without Jews': The Anomaly of Salzburg

According to the 1934 census, Salzburg had 239 Jews out of a total population of 245,801 (less than 0.1 per cent), a statistic that has prompted historians to describe the pronounced anti-Jewish sentiments in Salzburg as '*Antisemitismus ohne Juden*' (Anti-Semitism without Jews). Although this phrase is used mostly to refer to the period after 1945, Günter Fellner has suggested that it is also an apt description of anti-Semitism in

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[42] Daniel Vyleta, "Jewish Crimes and Misdemeanours: In Search of Jewish Criminality (Germany and Austria, 1890-1914)," *European History Quarterly* 35, 2 (2005): 299-325.

207

Salzburg during the interwar years.[43] Yet the nature of Salzburg's hostility towards Jews was exceptional because it was based neither on a perception that the local population was under threat from a minority group, nor was it associated with any of the traditional factors, such as an established Jewish presence in the economy, politics, society or culture.[44] Anti-Semitism in interwar Salzburg was directed instead at the Jewish artists of the annual Salzburg Festival, as well as middle-class Jews who holidayed each summer in the province's popular lakeside resorts.

The anti-Semitic protest against Jewish visitors in Salzburg reflected a general xenophobic reaction in Salzburg that was directed, firstly, at wartime refugees and, secondly, at tourists after the war who were seen to be consuming the meagre resources of the local population. During World War One, anti-Semites in Salzburg referred to the refugees from Russian-occupied Galicia and Bukowina as 'foreign objects' (*Fremdkörper*) and 'intruders' (*Eindringlingen*), even though not more than a fifth of all wartime refugees in Salzburg (about 2,000 out of a total 10,000-13,000) were Jews. Jewish relief organisations in Vienna were accused of 'robbing the state for Israel'. Jews in general were derided as 'war profiteers', whose 'material extravagance' (*Toilettenluxus*) amid the wartime food shortages reinforced the popular anti-Semitic stereotype of greed and self-preservation.[45] Hans Glaser summed up the views of many in Salzburg who resented the intrusion of the Jewish refugees and resented even more the Jewish agencies in Vienna. He wrote in his diary in January 1918: 'It is truly impossible, after the experiences we have had with the Jews in the war, to think as a Judaophile [*philosemitisch zu denken*].'[46] After

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[43] Fellner, "Antisemitismus in Salzburg", p. ii.

[44] Günter Fellner, "Judenfreundlichkeit, Judenfeindlichkeit: Spielarten in einem Fremdenverkehrsland," in *Der Geschmack der Vergänglichkeit: Jüdische Sommerfrische in Salzburg*, ed. Robert Kriechbaumer (Vienna, 2002), pp. 119-20.

[45] Fellner, "Antisemitismus in Salzburg", pp. 82-88. By the end of 1918, there were no remaining Jewish refugees in Salzburg. See Hoffmann-Holter, *'Abreisendmachung'*, p. 143. Maureen Healy gives many examples of the popular stereotypes of war profiteering and hording directed at Vienna's Jews. See Maureen Healy, *Vienna and the Fall of the Habsburg Empire: Total War and Everyday Life in World War I* (Cambridge, 2004).

[46] Ernst Hanisch, "Die Salzburger Presse in der Ersten Republik 1918-1938," *Mitteilungen der Gesellschaft für Salzburger Landeskunde* 128 (1988): p. 347.

the war, anti-Jewish sentiments were symptomatic of a general reaction to food shortages after the main supply regions in the newly independent states of Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Yugoslavia had been cut off from Austria. The resentment against foreigners in Salzburg extended to all visitors, not just Jewish, in the form of a strictly limited tourist season. Yet the desperate food situation in Salzburg also heightened animosity toward Vienna as the centre of a 'Jewish-Socialist republic' that profited from the post-war conditions while the rest of 'Christian-German Austria' starved.[47]

If there was a strong xenophobic undercurrent in Salzburg's response to Jews during and after World War One, provincial anti-Semitic stereotypes extended beyond the immediate period of economic crisis. Anti-Semitism became a permanent fixture of regional tourism in Salzburg during the interwar years, especially in the popular lakeside resort towns of St Gilgen, Bad Gastein and Wallersee, where hotels, businesses, restaurants and occasionally whole towns advertised themselves as Aryan-only (*judenrein*).[48] This form of anti-Semitism in the setting of summer tourism – '*Sommerfrischen-Antisemitismus*' – was also prevalent in Weimar Germany, especially in the seaside resort areas of the North and Baltic Seas, and belonged to a broader phenomenon of 'everyday anti-Semitism' in the Weimar era.[49] As in Germany, anti-Semitism in Austria's tourist industry facilitated the widespread acceptance of a popular stereotype that allowed it to enter mainstream politics and society. Jacob Borut's observation of Weimar Germany is equally applicable to interwar Austria:

> It was not the view of Judaism as an alien race, but the strong hold of stereotypes – old and new – regarding the Jews, which ensured that anti-Semitic actions initiated or supported by an anti-Semitic government would not encounter wide disagreement (let alone opposition).[50]

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[47] Fellner, "Antisemitismus in Salzburg", pp. 90-97.
[48] Kriechbaumer, ed., *Der Geschmack der Vergänglichkeit.*
[49] Jacob Borut, "Antisemitism in Tourist Facilities in Weimar Germany," *Yad Vashem Studies* 28 (2000): pp. 8, 26.
[50] Ibid., p. 50.

As the photographs in the *Wiener Neueste Nachrichten* showed, the popular stereotype of foreign Jews converged with another stereotype of Jews as would-be assimilated members of society. The provincial press and the tourist industry constructed and disseminated these stereotypes, fuelling a popular 'everyday' anti-Semitism that seemingly vindicated the actions of local anti-Semites.

A further aspect to this provincial anti-Semitism was the *Trachtvereine*, the local associations that promoted the wearing of folk costume (*Tracht*) as a symbol of identification with the national community. Many of these associations sprung up around 1900, partly through a revival of the rural idyll, and partly also as a defence against the cosmopolitan modernism of Vienna. *Tracht* symbolised 'carefree summer living, vivacity, sensuality and intimacy far away from the everyday world'. After 1918, it also represented nostalgia for the multinational empire, in which regional clothing and dialect had defined one's identity. *Tracht* also held symbolic meaning for Austrian Jews: it symbolised their assimilation under the Habsburg Empire and became an important source of identification with the summer lifestyle of Austria's middle classes.[51] Viennese Jewish women only ever wore the traditional dress (*Dirndl*) during the summer in Salzburg, never in Vienna.[52] George Clare and his parents always spent their summer at Bad Ischl and Clare reminisces in his memoir how they wore *Tracht* with pride and nostalgia for the past:

> On the other side of the river Franz Lehar was in his residence, you
> rubbed shoulders with Emmerich Kalman, you giggled when you saw the
> twin brothers Goltz, the operetta librettists, looking as alike as one egg
> from a Jewish mother hen looks to another, both rather incongruously
> disguised in the local dress, as we were, as genuine Austrian
> hillbillies....Mixing with the crowd at Zauner's tea-room as if they were
> just perfectly ordinary human beings, you saw princes and even
> Habsburg archdukes, and you felt sure that from somewhere up above the
> rain clouds, always plentiful over Ischl, the man who had made the spa so
> famous, had so loved its mountains, where he had stalked stag and

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[51] Ulrike Kammerhofer-Aggermann, "Dirndl, Lederhose und Sommerfrischenidylle," in *Der Geschmack der Vergänglichkeit*, ed. Robert Kriechbaumer (Vienna, 2002), pp. 317-18.

[52] Albert Lichtblau, "'Ein Stück Paradies..': Jüdische Sommerfrischler in St Gilgen," in *Der Geschmack der Vergänglichkeit*, ed. Robert Kriechbaumer (Vienna, 2002), p. 309.

chamois, Franz Josef himself, no less, looked down benevolently on his people, Jews and non-Jews alike.[53]

As self-proclaimed defenders of this national tradition, *Tracht* associations took their role seriously, aiming to refine the social art of wearing national costume so that it would best reflect the purity and probity (*Almseligkeit und Biederkeit*) of alpine Austrians and their middle-class aspirants. Salzburg had the dubious honour of founding in 1909 the First Austrian Imperial Organisation for Alpine National- and Mountain-Costumes Associations (*Erster Österreichischer Reichsverband für Alpine Volks- und Gebirgstrachtenvereine*), which, in 1913, began formally protesting against Jews wearing *Tracht*. After 1933, the organisation attached political meaning to the wearing of *Tracht* following the government's ban on uniforms. Members of the *Tracht* associations were instructed to wear shorter leather trousers with white buttons, often sewn with black and red thread to represent the Nazi tricolour. In 1935, the Austrofascist authorities in Salzburg introduced a civil uniform for teachers and civil servants, the so-called *Landestracht*, which the *Tracht* associations refused to wear. After 1938, *Tracht* became a symbol of racial belonging to the national community as the associations first banned Jews from wearing *Tracht*, then non-German minorities in 1939 and, in 1943, foreign workers, mainly Poles and other 'East workers' (*Ostarbeiter*) from Nazi-occupied Europe.[54]

Over the border in Czechoslovakia, *Tracht* also became a visual symbol of membership and participation in the national community. The construction of a Sudeten German identity in the 1930s was seen in the efforts of *Tracht* committees to research and modify folk dress, by removing 'Slavic motifs', for example, or by using inexpensive material to make it more affordable. Wearing of *Tracht*, especially the white knee-high stockings worn in summer, provoked reactions from Czech authorities who tried to ban it at festive gatherings and in schools, while Sudeten German leaders protested that it was not

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[53] Clare, *Last Waltz in Vienna*, pp. 144-45.
[54] Kammerhofer-Aggermann, "Dirndl, Lederhose und Sommerfrischenidylle," pp. 326-31.

a political uniform and that rural Germans in the region had worn it for centuries.[55]

However, while Sudeten Germans constructed national identity and symbols of belonging

to the national community using an ethnic discourse of difference against Slav-Czech

identity, the *Tracht* associations in Salzburg showed their belonging to the national

community using a combination of ethnic and civic discourses against both Jews and

Austrofascists. Jews who wore the local *Tracht* in Salzburg violated the lines of ethnic

German pride and assimilation into the local culture. Austrofascist attempts to regulate the

wearing of *Tracht* distorted the authentic expression of this national identity and thus

violated a civic code of solidarity with Nazi Germany. In this sense, *Tracht* was not only a

symbol of national identity, but, much like reading a newspaper, it also became a process

of defining the boundaries of that identity in both ethnic and civic ways.

The Salzburg Festival also became a focal point of local anti-Semitism. Austrian

Nazis were most vocal in the annual anti-Semitic campaigns against Jewish performers and

artists at the Festival. As we saw in Chapter Four, Nazi newspapers in Salzburg ran a

smear campaign against the Jewish director, Max Reinhardt, and tried to prevent him from

staging his plays in churches. An article from *Der Eiserne Besen*, which led the campaign

against Reinhardt in 1924, declared that '[s]moking Jewesses inside our Christian houses

of God, collected by the Semites Max Reinhardt, [Alexander] Moissi and [Hugo von]

Hoffmansthal [sic]' were not to be tolerated any longer.[56] The reference to Hofmannsthal

was characteristic of a particularly virulent expression of anti-Semitism posing as religious

distaste. Hofmannsthal's great-grandfather had been a Jewish rabbi, his grandfather had

converted to Catholicism and the young Hugo had been raised Catholic, only discovering

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[55] This information was generously given to me by Nancy Wingfield in a chapter of her manuscript, *Pitched Battles in Public Places: How the Bohemian Lands Became Czech, 1880-1948* (forthcoming, Harvard University Press).
[56] Michael Steinberg, *The Meaning of the Salzburg Festival: Austria as Theatre and Ideology, 1890-1938* (Ithaca, 1990), p. 167.

his Jewish heritage during his childhood.[57] Hofmannsthal's plays reflected his deep

religious faith and he sought guidance from the Archbishop of Salzburg with respect to his

work. For the editors and readers of the *Eiserne Besen*, however, he remained a Jew in the

company of Reinhardt and other Jewish performers in the Festival.

In contrast to these Nazi organs, the *Salzburger Volksblatt* saw the Festival solely

in terms of economic gain and distanced itself from any view that might be harmful in the

short term. The newspaper wrote in 1921 that it would be 'foolish' to show inhospitality as

the Festival visitors brought money into the province.[58] Yet on another occasion in 1921,

when the newspaper called for 'assiduous propaganda to attract Aryan travellers so that

there will be no room left for the Jews', its anti-Semitism chimed with the '*judenrein*'

platitudes elsewhere in the province.[59] In 1929, the newspaper published a letter from an

international Jewish visitor to the Salzburg Festival, who had written to the newspaper in

disgust over an article he had read in the *Eiserne Besen*:

> I am a German American, a Jew...[sic] and have just arrived in Salzburg.
> I happened to read a copy of *Der Eiserne Besen*. I was struck speechless.
> How is it possible, in a city that publicises international tourism, that
> such a paper, with such shameful language, which is really a cultural
> disgrace for Salzburg, can be tolerated? I immediately left this otherwise
> beautiful city, and I plan to propagandise against the Festival.

The *Salzburger Volksblatt* published the letter without comment, giving silent assent to the

views of the *Eiserne Besen*.[60] As we will see in the remainder of this chapter, the

Salzburger Volksblatt held to a course of latent anti-Semitism, distancing itself from Nazi

organs while tacitly endorsing discrimination against Jews.

The dilemma for the *Salzburger Volksblatt* was that it relied on advertising fees

from local Jewish businesses. In 1923, Salzburg's business leaders pressured Glaser to ban

Jews from advertising in the *Salzburger Volksblatt*, which would have lost the newspaper

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[57] Robert Kriechbaumer, "Statt eines Vorwortes - "Der Geschmack der Vergänglichkeit"," in *Der Geschmack der Vergänglichkeit: Jüdische Sommerfrische in Salzburg*, ed. Robert Kriechbaumer (Vienna, 2002), p. 22.
[58] Ibid., p. 12.
[59] Steinberg, *The Meaning of the Salzburg Festival*, p. 166.
[60] Stephen Gallup, *A History of the Salzburg Festival* (London, 1987), p. 59.

over 500 million crowns. Glaser refused and non-Jewish businesses in Salzburg boycotted the newspaper for several months.[61] However, in 1934, two Jewish firms, Ornstein and Pasch boycotted the *Salzburger Volksblatt* by only placing their notices in the rival *Salzburger Chronik*. Glaser wrote to the director of a third Jewish firm in Salzburg, Löwry, to inform him that their business relationship could no longer continue, presumably in view of the increased pressure from National Socialists from within the editorship and from outside businesses. After Glaser had informed the director of the Löwry firm that future notices in the *Salzburger Volksblatt* from the rabbinate would have to be paid for, the rabbi sought to mediate with the newspaper. Glaser himself was not an anti-Semite; he maintained purely professional relationships with Jewish business-owners, with Löwry in particular, who assured Glaser personally that his firm was not involved in the boycott.[62] Glaser's private notes in his diary carry no acrimony towards Jews. Although he had regular professional and personal contact with National Socialists, Glaser referred to the radical anti-Semites among them as 'fanatic' and 'peculiar birds'.[63] Thus we will see a pattern emerging between 1933 and 1938 that was consistent with the anti-Semitic position of the newspaper prior to 1933: quiet approval of anti-Jewish denigration and diligence in promoting the popular stereotype of the foreign Jew.

As we have seen, the *Salzburger Volksblatt* chose to voice greater tolerance of Jews when it came to the question of the economic benefits generated by tourism. This was made plain when the newspaper defended Max Reinhardt as an exceptional Jew, as opposed to other 'runaway *Ostjuden*'. An article in the *Salzburger Volksblatt* on 23 March 1933 contained an extract from the German Nazi newspaper, the *Völkische Beobachter*, denouncing Jewish refugees who had fled Germany to find work in Austria as 'nothing other than a pile of rabble-rousing *ostjüdischen* journalists and shallow literati.' Among the

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[61] Hanisch, "Die Salzburger Presse," p. 353.
[62] Glaser, *Tagebuch*, 3 August 1934.
[63] Glaser, *Tagebuch*, 2 January 1937; 9 January 1933.

list of names cited by the Nazi newspaper, the *Salzburger Volksblatt* singled out Reinhardt

because of his contribution to Salzburg's economy and international reputation:

> The city of Salzburg, in particular, has every reason to preserve enough
> objectivity of judgement to be clear about the fact that we have a great
> deal for which to thank Reinhardt, as much for economic as for artistic
> reasons. Furthermore, Max Reinhardt has never had a career as a
> journalist or literary figure who conducts smear campaigns, he has never
> drawn attention to himself politically. And it cannot be regarded as
> taking refuge if he takes up residence from time to time in Austria: he
> owns a property in Salzburg as well as the Josefstädter Theatre in
> Vienna.[64]

By virtue of Reinhardt's positive contribution to Salzburg's international cultural

reputation and tourism, the newspaper regarded him as a 'decent Jew' who knew his place,

did not assert his political opinions but quietly went about his business in the theatrical

world. However, this view was given short shrift in the *Salzburger Volksblatt*; the article

on Reinhardt appeared on page ten and there were no laudatory tributes to his successes

outside of Salzburg, in America for example.

Provincial Austrofascist functionaries were more emphatic that Jews who chose to

assimilate fully and contribute to Austria's public culture should be allowed to do so

without being heckled by anti-Semites. The writer in the *Salzburger Volksblatt*, K.F.G.,

addressed the issue of Jewish assimilation in Austria in an article on 4 November 1933. In

what he described as 'an attempt at a completely dispassionate discussion', he blamed the

decline of liberalism on the emancipation and assimilation of the Jews in the nineteenth

century. Unlike the editors of the *Salzburger Volksblatt*, however, he believed that the Jews

should be seen only as a religious community, not as a separate ethnic group. He lamented

that the anti-Semitism of Lueger and Schönerer had reinforced a distinct Jewish way of

life, instead of forcing them to adopt 'ours'. Fittingly, he proposed as a 'solution' to this

'problem' that those Jews who genuinely wished to identify themselves with 'us' –

presumably, Christian German Austria – should be accepted as such so long as they

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[64] *Salzburger Volksblatt*, 23 March 1933, p. 10. For the original text, see Appendix III.

215

contributed to this Austrian German Christian culture.[65] In another article in November 1935, the same writer rejected allegations by one of the editors of the *Salzburger Volksblatt* that the number of Jews in Vienna was up to four times higher than the number of practicing Jews. He argued on the basis of his 'own observations over many years', that the numbers of conversions and mixed marriages were higher in Germany than in Austria due to socio-economic differences between Jewish populations in both countries. Jews had immigrated to Vienna in large waves, had tended to work in manual jobs and were generally more religious than their counterparts in Germany. He also attributed the smaller number of conversions and mixed marriages in Austria to Austria's marriage laws, which had prevented Jews from marrying Christians unless they converted to Catholicism or unless their future spouse converted to Judaism or professed no religion. The writer argued that such gross misrepresentation of the facts, as the purported statistics of mixed marriages and conversions in the *Salzburger Volksblatt* were, was un-Austrian and that it 'was high time all internal differences in our Fatherland were moderated and levelled out.'[66]

The article in defence of Reinhardt, and the appeal of the Fatherland Front functionary that Jews be allowed to participate fully in Austrian public life if they chose to adhere voluntarily to the state religion and culture, were classic civic constructions of an Austrian state identity. However, another civic discourse of the Jews as foreign and deviant featured more prominently in the *Salzburger Volksblatt*. Like the *Wiener Neueste Nachrichten*, this stereotype was seen in reports of Jewish immigrants involved in illegal activities. One article on 9 November 1936, for example, reported that two currency smugglers had been arrested near Salzburg while attempting to cross the border into Germany. The article said that both men had claimed to live in Vienna but were, presumably in view of their names, Leib Schlosser and Raphael Lewinter, 'of eastern

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[65] *Salzburger Volksblatt*, 4 November 1933, p. 7.
[66] *Salzburger Volksblatt*, 20 November 1935, p. 6.

origin' and 'in high probability belong to an international smuggling ring.'[67] Since the particular discursive function of this stereotype was to exclude Jews from the legal and political spheres of the Austrian state, it can be seen primarily as a civic identity discourse. Although reports often alluded to differences of ethnicity and religion, the anti-Semitic stereotype in the *Salzburger Volksblatt* was conflated with xenophobia that excluded Jews not on the grounds of their Jewishness, but because they were illegal immigrants, criminals or both. For example, the newspaper ran regular court stories of Jews appealing against deportation orders and naturalisation laws. On 12 February 1937, the newspaper reported that Vienna's municipal court had denied citizenship to a Jewish grocery storekeeper, Moses Leider, on the basis of a federal decree in November 1933 suspending all naturalisations indefinitely.[68] The mocking tone of the headline, 'Moses Leider Wants to Become Austrian', and the pointed reference to the man's Jewish background, ridiculed the foreign Jew whose chances of acquiring respectable civic status were slim to preposterous. It is interesting to note that the article appeared among other stories of sensation, crime and tragedy, which made the Leider case simply another tale of popular intrigue.

Other reports in 1937 depicted Jews as illegal immigrants who posed a threat to public order. In March 1937, the *Salzburger Volksblatt* reported that a shop owner, Moses Schattner, had been brought before the trade practice authorities in Vienna for selling spoiled food products out of greed for profits.[69] The following month, the newspaper reported that a German Jewish immigrant, Albert Salomon, had been given a five-year expulsion order for entering and residing in Austria without legal documents. According to this report, Salomon had left Germany for Czechoslovakia in January 1935 and, in March of that year, had illegally entered and remained in Austria. The Public Security officer in

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[67] *Salzburger Volksblatt*, 9 November 1936, p. 11.
[68] *Salzburger Volksblatt*, 12 February 1937, p. 6. The 1933 law followed an earlier restriction on citizenship in 1925, which required applicants to have resided continuously in the same place for four years. See Jürgen Illigasch, "Migration aus und nach Österreich in der Zwischenkriegszeit: Bemerkungen zum Forschungsstand," *Zeitgeschichte* 26, 1 (1999): p. 14.
[69] *Salzburger Volksblatt*, 12 March 1937, p. 3.

Vienna ruled that he be deported but Salomon appealed to the federal court on the grounds that he was a refugee from Germany and was therefore under the protection of the League of Nations.[70] The court dismissed the appeal, the newspaper stated, because Salomon did not have the right to enter and remain in Austria without documents and because Austria's domestic laws were not bound by League of Nations' conventions.[71]

A different case, reported in the *Salzburger Volksblatt* in October 1937, involved a Polish citizen in Vienna, Jakob Frisch, who had received a court deportation order because he had been illegally hawking and had therefore 'violated the domestic public laws.' The article challenged the legitimacy of the man's Polish citizenship by placing the adjective "Polish" in quotation marks, whereas other foreign nationalities were left out of such speculation.[72] This use of 'ironic inverted commas', as Viktor Klemperer noted in his study of Nazi terminology, was also a common ploy of Nazi newspapers in Germany to 'declare that the reported remark [was] not true.'[73] Even the title of the article in the *Salzburger Volksblatt* – 'The Deportation of "Polish" Citizens' – suggested that Jakob Frisch's case represented a wider group of foreigners, namely Jewish Poles, whose status in Austria the *Salzburger Volksblatt* had declared illegal. Similarly, the article in April challenged the refugee status of the German Jew, Salomon, by referring to him in the headline as 'The Emigrant without a Passport.'

The headline of another article on 24 January 1938, 'Against Stealthy Refugees,' was exaggerated intentionally to imply a general trend of fraud and illegality among Jewish immigrants in Austria. This report involved the case of a Pole, Juda Buchsbaum, who had received a ten-year expulsion order from Austria for illegally entering Austrian territory. The alleged reason why he had fled his native Poland, the article added, was to

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[70] Presumably, that he came under the protection of the High Commission on Refugees (Jewish and Other) Coming from Germany, which was established in October 1933. See Michael R. Marrus, *The Unwanted: European Refugees in the Twentieth Century* (Oxford, 1985), p. 161.

[71] *Salzburger Volksblatt*, 30 April 1937, p. 7.

[72] *Salzburger Volksblatt*, 2 October 1937, p. 6.

[73] Klemperer, cited in Thomas Pegelow, "'German Jews', 'National Jews', 'Jewish Volk' or 'Racial Jews'? The Constitution and Contestation of 'Jewishness' in Newspapers of Nazi Germany, 1933-1938," *Central European History* 35, 2 (2002): p. 215.

evade a six-month parole sentence. The federal court had rejected Buchsbaum's appeal

because he had 'endangered the public interests' by entering Austria without a valid

passport. That his family was already living in Vienna was not a justifiable claim against

deportation, the article explained, even though his deportation would mean separation from

his family, 'because according to the law the public interests must be considered ahead of

the interest of the individual.'[74] The newspaper omitted to elaborate what the public

interests in Austria were, emphasising only that the protection of law and order was at

stake. The *Salzburger Volksblatt* staged each of these court cases as a dichotomous role-

play between the Jewish immigrant and the Austrian legal system, which drew attention to

a legal boundary of exclusion that resulted in Jews being expelled literally over Austria's

border.

We can see the similarities and differences between German-nationalists and

Austrofascists by briefly comparing the anti-Semitic discourses in the *Wiener Neueste*

Nachrichten and the *Salzburger Volksblatt*, with those of the Austrofascist state and its

functionaries. This chapter has shown how the German-nationalist press conflated a

number of stereotypes of Jews as foreign, devious, illegal immigrants, smugglers and

passport forgers into a single stereotype of *Ostjuden*, who were excluded from the civic

boundaries of the Austrian state. References to ethnic and religious difference, in particular

to the foreign appearances, names and customs of the '*Ostjuden*', were woven into this

civic discourse, as we have seen in the reports of court cases and stories about Jews in

Leopoldstadt.

Austrofascists also used a combination of ethnic and civic discourses. A civic

discourse was seen in the dismissal of Jewish physicians and schoolteachers, the exclusion

of Jews from Fatherland Front positions and the segregation of Jews in public schools and

state youth programmes. The articles by K.F.G. in the *Salzburger Volksblatt* showed

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[74] *Salzburger Volksblatt*, 24 January 1938, pp. 2-3.

another slightly different civic discourse that advocated Jewish assimilation in the Austrian state as long as they became true converts through full identification and participation in the German Christian culture and norms of the state. The reference to religion in this case represented an ethnic discourse. The Austrofascist authorities also tolerated more defamatory ethnic discourses within their own ranks and in the public sphere, as long as these did not criticise the Austrian state. A book advertisement in the *Salzburger Volksblatt*, picturing a blatant ethnic caricature of a Jew and the book's title, '*Der Jude*' (The Jew), printed in bold font at least three times larger any other headline on the page, did not attract the attention of the Austrofascist censors, for instance.[75]

This chapter has shown how German-nationalists and Austrofascists manufactured a stereotype of Jews as foreigners in Austria. While they might have disagreed over the place of religion and state traditions in the question of Austro-German unity, Austrofascists and German-nationalists could agree that Jews were ethnic outsiders in the Austrian state. Very few Austrofascists, and certainly none of their German-nationalist counterparts, distinguished between religion and ethnicity. I have also shown that Austrofascists and German-nationalists used a common civic discourse of assimilation and participation to create a stereotype of Jews as unassimilated, deviant and un-Austrian. That the stereotype of the Jew as foreigner was tied to civic arguments about participation and residency in the Austrian state shows how anti-Semitism functioned in the interwar years as a tool for excluding Jews from public life. It also demonstrates that Austrofascists and German-nationalists were equally committed to defending the boundaries of the Austrian state. As my final chapter will argue, Austrofascists and German-nationalists were more preoccupied with debates about citizenship and immigration than with the question of Austro-German unity before 1938.

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[75] One of many publications that were advertised in the *Salzburger Volksblatt* was a republication of Carl Spindler's book, *Der Jude: Deutsches Sittengemälde aus der ersten Hälfte des funfzehnten Jahrhunderts*. See *Salzburger Volksblatt*, 22 January 1934, p. 7.

CITIZENS, IMMIGRANTS AND REFUGEES

The debates on citizenship and immigration during the 1930s showed the boundaries of Austrian pan-German identity more clearly than any other identity discourse between the world wars. Austrofascists and German-nationalists had different views on who were legitimate refugees, but both sought to curb immigration, especially of Jews. This chapter will trace the *Wiener Neueste Nachrichten's* and the *Tagespost's* response to different groups of refugees and immigrants (terms that were ideologically construed to bolster the case for asylum) and argue that German-nationalists attached increasing importance to the right of the state to decide who could live in Austria. It will also show how this civic discourse in the German-nationalist press mirrored the civic discourse of Austrofascist press organs and converged with the state's attempts to introduce a new Alien Act after 1936. I argue that this law, which built on earlier legislation in the First Republic, represents a pan-German discourse that was principally concerned with the borders of the Austrian state. Whereas the discourses on minorities, Greater German unity and Jews had their roots in the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the discourse on immigration and citizenship was a novel way for Austrians of all milieux to define the ethnic and civic boundaries of belonging.

Immigration and Citizenship Laws in the First Republic

In order to understand the context in which a new Alien Act was mooted by the Austrofascist state and endorsed by German-nationalists after 1936, we need to survey the legislation on immigration and citizenship in the First Republic. The provisional National Assembly of the Republic of German-Austria created the first legislation on Austrian

citizenship less than a month after the declaration of the Republic on 12 November 1918.[1] The law of 5 December 1918 granted automatic citizenship in the Republic of German-Austria to anyone whose legal residence (*Heimatrecht*) had been in the territory of German-Austria prior to August 1914. As in the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the new law conferred citizenship rights through permanent residency in a municipality or region. These rights, known in German as *Heimatrecht*, referred primarily to citizenship and welfare eligibility, since the right of domicile or permanent residency was implicit in the Austrian definition of citizenship.[2] Individuals had to prove their citizenship by possession of a certificate (*Heimatschein*) that recorded their pre-1914 place of domicile as German-Austria. Everyone else who lived in the territory of the republic, but had their legal place of residence in one of the former dominions of the Monarchy, had one year after the law was passed to obtain residency in German-Austria and to state their allegiance to the German-Austrian state. This meant that imperial civil servants, railway workers, soldiers and officers, who had been domiciled outside the territory of German-Austria during the war, were able to gain Austrian citizenship after the war.[3]

However, the 1918 law explicitly excluded those whose legal residence was in Galicia, Dalmatia and Istria. This was a deliberate attempt to prevent Galician Jewish refugees in Vienna from applying for citizenship. Given the negligible migration from Dalmatia and Istria, the exclusion of the coastal crown lands was a legal ploy to deflect international accusations of discriminatory action against Jews. Jewish refugees from

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[1] The republic remained officially known as 'German-Austria' until the Allies insisted at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919 that the prefix 'German' be dropped.

[2] For a discussion of this term, see Gerald Stourzh, "Ethnic Attribution in Late Imperial Austria: Good Intentions, Evil Consequences," in *The Habsburg Legacy: National Identity in Historical Perspective*, ed. Edward Timms and Ritchie Robertson (Edinburgh, 1994), p. 79. Edward Timms has defined *Heimatrecht* elsewhere as the 'right of domicile'. See Edward Timms, "Citizenship and 'Heimatrecht' after the Treaty of Saint-Germain," in *The Habsburg Legacy: National Identity in Historical Perspective*, ed. Edward Timms and Ritchie Robertson (Edinburgh, 1994), p. 158. Michael John's analysis of the term takes into account the pre-1918 criteria for residency and welfare, according to which *Heimatrecht* was traditionally defined for citizens of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. See Michael John and Albert Lichtblau, *Schmelztiegl Wien - einst und jetzt: zur Geschichte und Gegenwart von Zuwanderung und Minderheiten* (Vienna, 1990), p. 13.

[3] Margarete Grandner, "Staatsbürger und Ausländer: Zum Umgang Österreichs mit den jüdischen Flüchtlinge nach 1918," in *Asylland Wider Willen*, ed. Gernot Heiss and Oliver Rathkolb (Vienna, 1995), p. 62; Timms, "Citizenship and 'Heimatrecht'," p. 161.

Bukowina were more fortunate than those from Galicia because a large number of German-speaking administrative personnel had been domiciled in Bukowina and any attempt to exclude that province also would have made both Jews and non-Jewish imperial servants ineligible for Austrian citizenship.[4] Thus from the outset, citizenship laws in Austria were intended to prevent Jews from becoming citizens in the republic.

International peace treaties after the war sought to govern the rules for citizenship in the new nation-states precisely in order to counteract such cases of discrimination. Article 80 of the Treaty of Saint-Germain, which Austria was forced to sign in 1919, included a provision that allowed citizens of the former Austro-Hungarian empire to opt for citizenship in any successor state in which they identified 'according to race and language' with the majority of the state's population. However, considerable ambiguity surrounded the wording of Article 80. It was often misquoted as race *or* language, which anti-Semites rejected on the grounds that German-speaking Jews could not be regarded as racially German.[5] The original terms of Article 80 were partially amended after Austria and Czechoslovakia signed the Brno Treaty on 7 June 1920, which recognised language, rather than race, as the mutual condition upon which citizenship could be claimed in either state. Nonetheless, Article 80 was finally adopted into Austrian legal practice on 20 August 1920 with the proviso that proof of one's identification with the German language had to be shown in graduation certificates from German primary, secondary or tertiary schools. This was an exercise in vain for Jewish refugees who usually had no such proof available and for whom retrieval of the necessary documents was next to impossible. Furthermore, Jews from Bohemia and Moravia spoke German ahead of Czech and were more easily able to prove their affinity with the German language than were Galician Jews, of whom many

[4] Beatrix Hoffmann-Holter, *'Abreisendmachung': Jüdische Kriegsflüchtlinge in Wien 1914-1923* (Vienna, 1995), pp. 155-56.
[5] Grandner, "Staatsbürger und Ausländer," pp. 71-75. See also Edward Timms, "The Kraus-Bekessy Controversy in Interwar Vienna," in *Austrians and Jews in the Twentieth Century: From Franz Joseph to Waldheim*, ed. Robert S. Wistrich (New York, 1992), pp. 192-93.

spoke only Yiddish and had recorded their nationality as Polish in the 1910 census.[6] One prominent exception was Galician-born Joseph Roth, who became an Austrian citizen on 8 June 1921 under the terms of Article 80, although his place of domicile in Brody would otherwise have made him a Polish citizen.[7]

Anti-Semites were eager to curb what they regarded as the liberal application of Article 80 in Austrian legal practice. They emphasised race, rather than language, as the basis for acquiring citizenship. The legal precedent for this reinterpretation of Article 80 occurred on 9 June 1921, when the federal administrative court, which was responsible for final appeals in citizenship claims, handed down a ruling on the grounds of racial attribution (*Rassenzugehörigkeit*). On this occasion, the court ruled that Galician-born Moses Dym had failed to produce 'tangible evidence for his attribution to the German race', even though he had submitted evidence of his attribution to the German language. The Dym ruling opened the way for the incoming Greater German Interior Minister, Leopold Waber, to interpret Article 80 in specifically anti-Semitic terms.[8] Whereas the interior ministry had previously granted citizenship on the grounds of language and ignored the reference to race, Waber disqualified thousands of cases for citizenship solely on the premise that Jews did not identify racially with the majority of the Austrian population. Waber never had the support of the Chancellor's office, however, and he was eventually replaced in December 1921. Nonetheless, throughout his six months in office, the interior ministry dismissed almost 180,000 cases for citizenship under the terms of Article 80. Furthermore, the administrative court rejected approximately 200 appeals in cases where the interior ministry had already denied grounds for naturalisation.[9] The relatively small number of appeals in the administrative court shows that legal practice at

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[6] Hoffmann-Holter, *'Abreisendmachung'*, pp. 229-34.

[7] Timms, "Citizenship and 'Heimatrecht'," pp. 161-62.

[8] Stourzh, "Ethnic Attribution in Late Imperial Austria," p. 80. Stourzh's rendering of the term 'Zugehörigkeit' in English as 'attribution' is intended to convey the arbitrary nature of its definitional use and application in a legal and administrative context, rather than the usual and more subjective translation of 'belonging'. See Ibid., p. 68.

[9] Hoffmann-Holter, *'Abreisendmachung'*, pp. 225-26, 246-57.

the highest federal level was well understood by potential appellants to be racially discriminatory against Jews.

Legal definitions of racial or ethnic attribution (*Volkszugehörigkeit*) actually had their origins in the Austro-Hungarian Empire. For example, Czech and German school board committees in ethnically mixed regions had appointed members on the basis of ethnic attribution. They determined this legally not only by language, but also by proof of the individual's activities and spheres of involvement in private, public and social life. Authorities also applied the principle of ethnic attribution to German and Czech voting registers in order to avoid 'Trojan Horse' tactics, by which individuals with sympathies for one nationality might deliberately have identified themselves as another nationality to agitate for their own national cause. In some cases, these decisions were based on the individual's own willingness to signify his or her ethnic belonging according to the legal criteria. However, in most cases, the decisions rested on the authorities' definition of 'objective' or 'tangible' proof of ethnic attribution, which almost always resulted in discrimination. This aspect of Austrian imperial law is important because of its continuity in the post-1918 legislation on citizenship, notably in the federal administrative court and in Waberian legal practice. There was also continuity in personnel where lawyers involved in cases for the imperial court prior to 1918 later applied the principle of ethnic attribution to citizenship cases during the early 1920s.[10]

In spite of the legal obstacles to acquiring citizenship in the Austrian republic, the number of naturalisations in Austria, including those of Jews, did not decline significantly until 1934. Approximately 120,000 individuals were naturalised between 1919 and 1936, although this figure, based on data from the *Statistischen Handbuch fur die Republik Österreichs* (Statistical Handbook for the Republic of Austria), excluded those who opted for Austrian citizenship under the terms of Article 80. More than 82,000 naturalisations –

[10] Stourzh, "Ethnic Attribution in Late Imperial Austria."

70 per cent of the total between 1919 and 1936 – occurred in Vienna under the city's

Social Democratic administration, and a further 20,360 citizenships were approved under

the terms of Article 80 for Jewish refugees in Vienna between 1920 and 1925.[11] The

statistics also show that the overwhelming majority of citizenships in Austria were

approved between 1923 and 1933 with only a slight drop after 1925. This refutes two

historical misconceptions about citizenship in the First Republic. Firstly, the evidence that

there were only 5,102 naturalisations between 1919 and 1921, while the record annual

figure occurred in 1923 with 17,650 naturalisations, counters the claim that most

naturalisations occurred immediately after World War One. Secondly, there was no

significant drop in naturalisations after 1925, in spite of a law on 30 July 1925 that

restricted citizenship to individuals who had resided permanently in the same town or

municipality for at least four years. Only after a federal decree of 24 November 1933

placed a moratorium on naturalisations did the annual figures drop dramatically – from

5,135 in 1933 to 2,178, and then to 928 in 1935.[12] Therefore, the statistics for

naturalisation should be seen in the context of the Christian Social government's gradual

repression of the Social Democrats after 1932, and the eventual ban of that party in

February 1934, rather than as evidence of an increasingly restrictive policy on citizenship

in the First Republic.

Naturalisation policies in the First Republic bore some similarities to citizenship

laws in the Weimar Republic. Like Austria, Weimar Germany inherited an old imperial

legal practice (and many of its practitioners) that conferred citizenship on the basis of

residency in a state or municipality. However, unlike Austria, the terminology of race had

already entered German legal practice before 1918. The German Reich Citizenship Act of

1913, which established the law of blood (*jus sanguinis*) as the determining factor in

[11] Jürgen Illigasch, "Migration aus und nach Österreich in der Zwischenkriegszeit: Bemerkungen zum Forschungsstand," *Zeitgeschichte* 26, 1 (1999): p. 14; Michael John, "'We Do Not Even Possess Ourselves': On Identity and Ethnicity in Austria, 1880-1937," *Austrian History Yearbook* 30 (1999): p. 47.
[12] Illigasch, "Migration aus und nach Österreich in der Zwischenkriegszeit," p. 14.

citizenship cases, marked a departure from previous laws when individual German states, not the Confederation or Empire (after 1871), had granted citizenship. Although the powers of naturalisation still rested with the individual states after 1913, the new law ensured that each state could veto naturalisations approved in other states, thereby preventing foreign-born Jews and Poles from acquiring citizenship in 'generous' states. The law also allowed emigrants from Germany to retain their citizenship rights, unless they became citizens of another country abroad.[13] The outbreak of war in 1914 delayed the strict application of this law in order to conscript Jewish soldiers into the army. In the first two years of the war, the imperial government naturalised more than eight times as many Jews than in the entire pre-war period. After the war, however, the strengthened federalist basis of the Weimar Republic meant that the question of citizenship re-emerged amid sharp regional differences along Social Democratic and Centre party political lines. In 1919, the Social Democratic Prussian Interior Minister, Wolfgang Heine, proposed that 'foreigners' (meaning Poles and Jewish immigrants from Eastern European) be naturalised if they or their sons had served in the German army in World War One. The Bavarian Centrist government, established after the defeat of the revolutionary socialists in May 1919, resisted Prussian attempts to relax the 1913 law. Repeated efforts to federalise the law floundered as the major parties and regional factions disagreed over whether Jews could be defined as immigrants of 'German descent' (*deutschstämmig*), or of 'foreign descent' (*fremdstämmig*). Authorities in Bavaria and Württemberg, on the one hand, interpreted the term '*deutschstämmig*' to mean that religion, rather than language proficiency or assimilation to German culture, precluded Jews from identifying with the German nation. On the other hand, the Prussian interior ministry regarded 'Jew' and 'German descent' as

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[13] Andreas Fahrmeir, "Nineteenth-Century German Citizenships: A Reconsideration," *The Historical Journal* 40, 3 (1997): 721-752. Fahrmeir's argument counters the established thesis of Rogers Brubaker, who distinguishes between nineteenth-century German and French notions of nationhood on the basis of descent (*jus sanguinis*) and birth and residence in the nation's territory (*jus solis*) for each country's respective citizenship laws. See Rogers Brubaker, *Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany* (Cambridge, MA, 1992).

mutually inclusive terms if the immigrant had upheld 'German language and customs' abroad. Yet even the Prussian administration restricted naturalisation during the early years of the Republic by increasing the requirement for prior residency from ten to twenty years. The Prussian interior ministry adopted a more liberal practice during the period of economic and political stabilisation between 1925 and 1929 by defining Jews from German-speaking areas in Poland as culturally of 'German descent'. The result was that more Jews from Eastern Europe were naturalised in the Weimar Republic than in the German Empire. Nevertheless, the failure of the Weimar era was that the period of stabilisation did not lead to a change of policy, merely a looser application of the existing law. This failure had disastrous consequences later in July 1933 when the Nazi government stripped approximately 7,000 of these new German citizens of their citizenship rights.[14]

While the Prussian interior ministry's actions after 1925 can be compared to the liberal application of Article 80 under Vienna's municipal government, the similarities should not be overstated. In Austria, the Social Democrats remained outside of federal government after 1920 and were a party already under siege by 1927. In 1929, therefore, the Christian Socials could embark single-handedly on a programme of systematic repression of the rights of foreigners, which culminated in the November moratorium on naturalisations in 1933 and set the scene for further restrictions under the Austrofascist state. The process of creating a border regime to regulate the entry and residency of foreigners in Austria was in place at a federal level by the end of the 1920s and, therefore, must be interpreted in a different light from the restrictive practices of some regional authorities in Weimar Germany. Moreover, that the Austrofascist authorities did not consider it necessary to introduce an Alien Act until 1936 shows the extent to which previous practices had already established sufficient barriers of entry and residency into Austria.

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[14] Dieter Gosewinkel, "'Unerwünschte Elemente': Einwanderung und Einbürgerung der Juden in Deutschland 1848-1933," *Tel Aviver Jahrbuch für deutsche Geschichte* 27 (1998): pp. 97-104.

Few studies of immigration and citizenship in Austria deal with the interwar period specifically. I pointed out in the introduction that Austrian historians have only recently begun to study immigration and citizenship in Austria as historiography has shifted to topics of federal and European political concern. Most research on immigration to Austria focuses on the Second Republic and characterises interwar Austria as a country of emigration, rather than immigration.[15] However, a recent study by Jürgen Illigasch has shown that immigration was actually higher than emigration in the interwar period, especially when seasonal labour immigration is taken into account. There are further discrepancies in view of that fact that the Austrian Migration Office did not begin to collect data on immigration to Austria until 1925. The Migration Office had originally been established in 1919 to facilitate emigration from Austria as a means of alleviating the war-shattered economy, but immigration statistics were not recorded until a law was introduced in 1925 to curb economic immigration. Thus the statistics for immigration between 1925 and 1937 present an incomplete picture of the interwar period as a whole.[16] Moreover, as Michael Marrus reminds us in his authoritative study of Europe's refugees in the twentieth century, statistical data on illegal immigration is notoriously difficult to obtain since refugees were excluded from census counts and the definition of who was a refugee varied in every country.[17] At best, we can only rely on official immigration data and surmise that the actual number of foreigners entering a country was significantly higher, particularly after German Jews began emigrating in 1933.

Austria was a destination for both political and labour immigration during the 1920s. Immigrants from Hungary, Italy, Germany, Russia and the Balkan states came to Austria seeking political refuge from authoritarian, communist and fascist governments.

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[15] See, for example, Heinz Fassmann and Rainer Münz, *Einwanderungsland Österreich? Historische Migrationsmuster, aktuelle Trends und politische Massnahmen* (Vienna, 1995); Heinz Fassmann, "Der Wandel der Bevölkerungs- und Sozialstruktur in der Ersten Republik," in *Handbuch des politischen Systems Österreichs: Erste Republik 1918-1933*, ed. Emmerich Tálos, et al. (Vienna, 1995).

[16] Illigasch, "Migration aus und nach Österreich in der Zwischenkriegszeit," pp. 6, 18-19.

[17] Michael R. Marrus, *The Unwanted: European Refugees in the Twentieth Century* (Oxford, 1985), pp. 12-13.

Hungarian communists fled to Austria in 1919 after the fall of Béla Kun's revolutionary government, including, briefly, Béla Kun himself. German communists fled after the collapse of the short-lived soviet regime in Bavaria and anti-fascist émigrés from Italy began arriving after Mussolini's March on Rome in 1922. German Nazis made up another group of political émigrés after the failed Beer Hall putsch in Munich in 1923. From the Balkan states, Greek legitimists, Croatian and Macedonian autonomists, and numerous Albanian and Montenegrin refugees, sought either transitory or permanent asylum in Austria. In addition, Russian tsarist supporters and Ukrainian military officials came to Austria in the 1920s as political refugees from the Soviet Union.[18]

One of Austria's literary discoveries of the twentieth century, Alexandra von Hoyer (1898-1991), represented the latter group of refugees from Soviet Russia. Her Austrian husband had been in a Russian prison camp in the First World War and, together with their young son, the couple fled their home in Siberia in 1925 to escape political persecution from communists. Writing in Austria under her pseudonym, Alja Rachmanova became famous through her diary, *Milchfrau in Ottakring* (The Milkwoman in Ottakring), which chronicles her experiences of social and intellectual isolation and daily survival in a foreign land after being forced to abandon her academic career in Russia for a meagre existence selling milk in a suburban Viennese shop.[19] Rachmanova's diary was eventually published in 1931 in three volumes and translated into 21 languages, selling 600,000 copies before the Nazis banned it in 1938 for its religious undertones.[20] *Milchfrau in Ottakring* is a poignant testament to the millions of refugees and immigrants forced to rebuild their lives during the massive population upheavals after the First World War, a

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[18] Gernot Heiss, "Ausländer, Flüchtlinge, Bolshewiken: Aufenthalt und Asyl 1918-1933," in *Asylland Wider Willen: Flüchtlinge im Europäischen Kontext seit 1914*, ed. Gernot Heiss and Oliver Rathkolb (Vienna, 1995), pp. 92-96.

[19] Alja Rachmanova, *Milchfrau in Ottakring: Tagebuch aus den dreissiger Jahren* 2nd ed. (Vienna, 1999). See also Dietmar Grieser, *Wien, Wahlheimat der Genies* (Munich, 1994), pp. 60-66.

[20] Grieser, "Foreword" in Rachmanova, *Milchfrau in Ottakring*, pp. 12-13. Rachmanova was devoutly Orthodox.

phenomenon often overshadowed in historical scholarship by the wave of emigration from Germany during the 1930s.[21]

Along with Belgium, Holland and France, Austria took steps to regulate its domestic labour market against foreign workers in the mid-1920s.[22] On 19 December 1925, the Austrian parliament passed a Domestic Workforce Protection Act (*Inlandarbeiterschutzgesetz*), which made it illegal for foreigners to work if they did not have permanent residency.[23] This measure was a result of pressure from both Social Democratic unions and Christian Social labour representatives on the government to reduce the numbers of Czech and Slovak textile workers and sugar plantation labourers.[24] However, statistics for the period 1925-1937 show that the Migration Office still approved an average annual quota of 6,419 immigration and work permits. Furthermore, the numbers emigrating from Austria outside of Europe between 1925 and 1937 represented half of all immigration and work visas issued in the same period – 41,253 and 83,441 respectively. This suggests that most immigrants tended not to stay long in Austria, but emigrated overseas instead. Furthermore, these figures exclude the seasonal migrants from Czechoslovakia, of whom there were over 140,000 in the period from 1925 to 1937. Therefore, we can see that the 1925 law did not have the desired effect of reducing the number of foreign workers in Austria, either through seasonal immigration or through

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[21] By 1926, there were a total of 9.5 million refugees in Europe. Most of these refugee populations were clustered in eastern European countries, such as Poland and Ukraine, where ongoing territorial disputes created precarious conditions for the permanent settlement of uprooted nationalities. For example, in 1923, Poland had already repatriated an estimated 703,250 people and were expecting a further 300,000 refugees. See Marrus, *The Unwanted*, pp. 51-52, 58.

[22] Belgium and Holland introduced protective laws as a reaction against the open asylum policies after World War One when foreign workers were recruited to make up the labour shortfall from massive wartime losses. In France, where more than 1.5 million foreign workers had arrived by 1928, a law for the 'protection of national manpower' was introduced in 1926 to regulate the type and duration of work permits. The law had the immediate effect of reducing the number of foreign workers arriving annually in France from 162,000 in 1926 to 64,000 in 1927. See Heiss, "Ausländer, Flüchtlinge, Bolshewiken," pp. 91-92; Jeanne Singer-Kérel, "Foreign Workers in France, 1891-1936," *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 14, 3 (1991): p. 287.

[23] Oliver Rathkolb, "Asyl- und Transitland 1933-1938?," in *Asylland Wider Willen: Flüchtlinge im Europäischen Kontext seit 1914*, ed. Oliver Rathkolb and Gernot Heiss (Vienna, 1995), p. 111; John, "Identity and Ethnicity in Austria," p. 47.

[24] Rathkolb, "Asyl- und Transitland," p. 111; John, "Identity and Ethnicity in Austria," p. 47.

work visas.[25] We might conclude, somewhat speculatively, that contemporary attitudes towards foreign workers varied to such a degree that it was possible to have a law in place to satisfy workers' protests, while in practice the government continued to approve visas and employers turned a blind eye to illegal workers in order to avoid paying union wages.

In contrast with these ineffectual protectionist policies against foreign workers, Austria's response to political immigration was one of hard-line intimidation and frequent deportations. The legal basis for deportation came from an obscure imperial law of 1871, the so-called '*Schubgesetz*', which justified deportation by a provincial or municipal authority of any individual who had become a public burden on charities and welfare, had a criminal record or had an infectious disease. This practice continued unofficially under the First Republic and was formalised in a law of 7 December 1929, which was Austria's first de facto Alien Act. It was used in many cases to justify the expulsion of Roma and Sinti from towns or outlying regions. The governor of Vorarlberg, Otto Ender, invoked the 1929 law to deport any jobless person who was not eligible for unemployment benefits in Vorarlberg if his or her legal residence was in another province. It also enabled local authorities to expel foreigners who had committed a criminal offence or disturbed the 'public order, safety and peace' of citizens. Consequently, Nazi putschists in 1923, and communists in general, were targeted and often deported for minor transgressions, such as giving false information to authorities or possessing foreign currencies. Although the authorities' actions were directed against political immigrants, they could only legally justify expulsion if foreigners were seen to be disrupting the peace. In 1932, for example, the Austrian State Secretary, Emil Fey, denied entry to the Czechoslovakian-born German communist, Egon Erwin Kisch, on the grounds that Kisch's proposed lecture on Russia and

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[25] Between 1925 and 1930, the statistics record only the numbers of immigration permits (*Zuzugsbewilligungen*), but from 1931, the figures show only work permits (*Arbeitsbewillingungen*). The number of immigration visas between 1925 and 1930 was 35,056 and there were 48,385 work visas issued between 1931 and 1937. Since the statistical handbooks specified the gender and profession of the recipients of both types of permits, we can assume that the work permits simply replaced the earlier immigration permits. See Illigasch, "Migration aus und nach Österreich in der Zwischenkriegszeit," pp.19-20. For emigration outside of Europe, see Ibid., p. 9 [Table 2].

China contained 'communist propaganda' that would undermine public order. Given that Kisch had still been allowed into Austria in 1930, Fey's statement indicated the government's growing inclination to ban left-wing political immigration to Austria.[26]

The practice of deporting foreigners for political reasons was not actually legislated until 1932, amid government opposition to the German leader of the Austrian NSDAP, Theo Habicht. Hitler had sent Habicht as his envoy to the Austrian party headquarters in Linz in July 1931 to unite the provincial Nazi groups and bring them under the control of the leadership in Germany. Habicht's appointment had met with objection from the Christian Social government and divided the Greater German camp, whose moderate wing in coalition with the Christian Socials was opposed to National Socialist dominance. In mid-1932, the Austrian government finally declared that foreigners who engaged in political activity would be deported according to Paragraph 8 of the Law of Assembly.[27] Habicht did not leave Austria until the ban on the NSDAP in June 1933, after which he continued to oversee the party's underground activities in Austria from his base in Munich. Nonetheless, his presence in Austria had been a catalyst for the government's policy shift. Whereas deportations of Nazis and communists had previously been justified for the sake of public order, the government's response to political immigration was couched in explicitly political terms after 1932, and increasingly after 1933. However, as we will see, concrete attempts to develop an immigration law did not begin until 1936 and remained unrealised at the time of *Anschluss*.

The above discussion has set the scene for the remainder of the chapter to investigate responses in the German-nationalist press to immigrants and refugees in Austria. We have seen that the government's vigilance against foreigners in restricting their claims to citizenship, residency and work opportunities, as well as clamping down on

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[26] Rathkolb, "Asyl- und Transitland," pp. 109-11; Heiss, "Ausländer, Flüchtlinge, Bolshewiken," pp. 96, 99.
[27] Rathkolb, "Asyl- und Transitland," p. 109; C. Earl Edmondson, *The Heimwehr and Austrian Politics, 1918-1936* (Athens, 1978), p. 176; Adam Wandruszka, "Das 'nationale' Lager," in *Österreich 1918-1938: Geschichte der Ersten Republik*, ed. Erika Weinzierl and Kurt Skalnik (Graz, 1983), p. 286.

their political freedoms, was directed against groups who threatened the political and social power of the Christian Socials, namely, Jews, Communists and Nazis. The federal government's increasingly hard-line approach after 1929, and especially after 1932, reflected the radicalising tendencies within the Christian Social Party that escalated during the period of Austrofascism. Under these conditions, it was relatively easy for the German-nationalist press to sensationalise reports on Jewish refugees from Germany and argue for a stricter border protection regime without violating the state censorship laws.

Responses to Emigration from Germany

We saw in Chapter Three how pan-German discourses in the *Tagespost* and the *Wiener Neueste Nachrichten* varied according to each newspaper's particular and universal view of the national community. Similarly, the newspapers also differed in their responses to immigration and refugees. While both newspapers depicted German Jews as unwanted refugees in Austria and Europe, the discourses of each newspaper reflected their different attitudes towards Jews. The anti-Semitic stereotype of the '*Ostjude*' was most evident in the *Wiener Neueste Nachrichten*, whereas the *Tagespost* appeared to be more concerned with a general theme of immigration and asylum. It was not surprising that the Viennese newspaper would attach such importance to the issue of Jewish immigration, but it was uncharacteristic of the Styrian newspaper to devote its attention to Jews, given its traditional defence against Slovene nationalism. However, as we will see throughout this chapter, the *Tagespost's* concern was not so much with the threat of Jewish immigrants in Austria, but, rather, with the perception that Austria's identity as a German state could potentially be tainted by an influx of 'non-Germans' into the country. In this respect, the *Tagespost's* hysteria was less sensationalism than it was fear originating from the unfamiliarity of the themes of immigration and asylum to Styrian readers.

The *Tagespost* defended the Austrian government's border block against political refugees in the immediate aftermath of Hitler's appointment as German chancellor. On 10 February 1933, the newspaper reported that State Secretary Fey had ordered police on the Austro-German border to refuse entry to all German political refugees and to deport back to Germany those found already on Austrian territory.[28] The next day, the newspaper explained that these measures were a matter of course 'for the protection of the native population' against 'non-Germans' (*Nichtdeutscher*) who were entering Austria from Germany 'in great hordes'. The article on 11 February explained that the concern of the government was not to restrict political asylum, but to keep political agitators out of Austria.[29] This sentiment was also echoed in press organs close to the government. Notably, the *Reichspost* headlined Austria's intent to ban the entry of any individuals claiming to be political refugees, whom the newspaper deemed to be criminals, presumably in view of their communist politics.[30]

The burning of parliament in Berlin on 27 February sparked more nervous reactions from both the government and the *Tagespost* about a potential 'invasion' of German communists. On 1 March, the *Tagespost* claimed that the burning of the parliament would put pressure on the Austrian border police units to check more thoroughly the documentation of Germans crossing the border and to deport 'suspicious persons' immediately.[31] On the front-page of that same day's evening edition, an editorial protested against a 'bolshevist invasion' and called for the Austrian government to refuse asylum to communists.[32] These reactions in the press matched the paranoia of the government, which had announced plans to expel any German citizen without a passport or immigration permit. According to reports in the *Arbeiter-Zeitung*, the police had also begun raids in

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[28] *Tagespost*, 10 February 1933, p. 1.
[29] *Tagespost*, 11 February 1933, p. 3.
[30] *Reichspost*, 11 February 1933, cited in Rathkolb, "Asyl- und Transitland," p. 113.
[31] *Tagespost*, 1 March 1933, p. 3.
[32] *Tagespost*, 1 March 1933 (Abendblatt), p. 1.

Vienna's working districts, arresting anyone with a German passport and deporting individuals suspected of left-wing political activities.[33]

The *Tagespost* continued to report on the government response to the refugees throughout the remainder of 1933. On 3 June, for example, the *Tagespost* reported the Lower Austrian government's proposal to denaturalise foreign-born individuals living in the province.[34] Another lead article on 1 September 1933 said that police in Vienna had ordered a group of German Jews to leave Austria because they had been unable to find work and had become dependent on state funds and private charities.[35] This report in September is corroborated by evidence that the Austrian authorities had begun to restrict the entry of anyone who could not produce evidence of adequate financial means. The fears of the Austrian government were such that border guards simply regarded all arrivals on the border as destitute immigrants. When a Jewish film writer in exile in Czechoslovakia was denied entry into Austria to attend a business meeting, the official statement from the Chancellor's office was that 'we cannot allow persons without identity papers and without sufficient funds to be let into Austria. Only when there is evidence to us of a secure existence, do we permit entry.'[36]

The government's alarm, and the *Tagespost's* support for a zero tolerance policy toward refugees who allegedly posed a political and material threat to Austria, was a disproportionate reaction to what was a comparably low level of immigration by international standards. According to a 1935 report from the League of Nations' High Commission for Refugees (Jewish and Other) Coming from Germany, which had been established in October 1933 under the helm of James G. McDonald, Austria was ranked eighth as a receiving country for refugees from Germany.[37] Austrian migration statistics

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[33] Rathkolb, "Asyl- und Transitland," p. 113
[34] *Tagespost*, 3 June 1933 (Abendblatt), p. 1.
[35] *Tagespost*, 1 September 1933 (Abendblatt), pp. 1-2.
[36] Rathkolb, "Asyl- und Transitland," p. 114.
[37] Marrus, *The Unwanted*, pp. 161-65; Klaus Mammach, "Deutsche Emigration in Österreich 1933-1938," *Bulletin des Arbeitskreises "Zweiter Weltkrieg"* 1-4, (1988): pp. 194-95.

indicate that 7,249 Germans acquired immigration and work permits between 1933 and 1937, a figure that only accounted for legal entries into Austria.[38] The number of illegal entries was at least half as high again: between January 1933 and April 1936, the *Israelitische Kultusgemeinde* in Vienna sponsored 4,600 refugees, which excluded the additional numbers of refugees who found other means of subsistence through black market employment or through family support.[39] Some of these refugees were Austrians who had been living and working permanently in Germany, including many who had acquired German citizenship and were not classified as returnees upon their arrival in Austria.[40]

By drawing attention to German Jews in other European countries as well as Austria, the *Tagespost* could create a sensational story of mass migration at the threshold of Austria's borders. Reports in April estimated that up to 300 Jews, communists and socialists had arrived in Switzerland from Germany in the three days after the burning of parliament, and that a further 3,000 Jews had fled to Switzerland following the anti-Jewish boycott on 1 April.[41] In the same month, another report from Poland said that 900 Polish Jews and 400 German Jews had crossed over the Polish-German border.[42] On 25 August, the newspaper reported that the numbers of German refugees in France had risen to 18,000. The next day, a report from Czechoslovakia warned that the growing number of Jewish refugees from Germany would become a burden to countries of asylum, such as Czechoslovakia and France.[43] Two articles in December reported that there were still 600 German Jews in Yugoslavia who had not yet immigrated to Palestine.[44]

[38] Illigasch, "Migration aus und nach Österreich in der Zwischenkriegszeit," p. 19.

[39] Ursula Seeber, "Österreich als Exil 1933 bis 1938," in *Asyl Wider Willen: Exil in Österreich 1933 bis 1938*, ed. Ursula Seeber (Vienna, 2003), pp. 8-9. Rathkolb estimates more conservatively that the number of Jewish refugees supported by charities in the same period was at least 2,500. See Rathkolb, "Asyl- und Transitland," p. 115.

[40] Mammach, "Deutsche Emigration in Österreich 1933-1938," p. 195.

[41] *Tagespost*, 3 April 1933 (Abendblatt), p. 2; 10 April 1933 (Abendblatt), p. 2.

[42] *Tagespost*, 5 April 1933 (Abendblatt), p. 6.

[43] *Tagespost*, (Abendblatt) 25 August 1933, p. 2; 26 August 1933 (Abendblatt), p. 2.

[44] *Tagespost*, 1 December 1933, p. 3; 1 December 1933 (Abendblatt), p. 1.

None of these reports in the *Tagespost* were misleading in the light of refugee statistics compiled by the League of Nations. In Switzerland, for example, some 10,000 German refugees entered the country through one border station alone between May and September 1933.[45] France had the highest intake of German refugees in Europe with 25,000 by the end of 1933, which substantiates the *Tagespost's* reports of up to 18,000 at the end of August.[46] The mass deportation of up to 20,000 Polish Jews from Germany in 1933 was also consistent with the *Tagespost's* reports of Jewish refugees crossing the Polish-German border.[47] If there was any hint that the newspaper might have inflated the statistics to exaggerate the threat of Jewish refugees, it was in the headline reports of Jewish refugees in Yugoslavia. Like the reports on Carinthian Slovenes, these reports on Jewish refugees south of the Austrian border reflected the newspaper's tendency to localise topics of concern to a German-nationalist readership. In this respect, the newspaper was simply continuing on an established editorial practice from imperial times when a threat to local identity could be magnified as a threat to the wider Austrian pan-German identity, as in the case of the Slovene nationalists in Styria who were conflated together with Czech nationalists in Bohemia into a single threat to the Germans of Austria.

As Yugoslavia was to Styrian readers, Jewish refugees were historically and geographically proximate to readers of the *Wiener Neueste Nachrichten*. Throughout 1933 and 1934, the Viennese newspaper kept a close watch on the various restrictions imposed on Jewish refugees in other European countries. A front-page article on 12 July 1933 defended Switzerland's right to pursue restrictive asylum policies against 'the stream of political refugees who have flooded into Switzerland to claim freedom of asylum'. The newspaper described the refugees as 'asylum politicians' (*Asylpolitiker*) whose intent it was to agitate against Germany and 'spin their communist webs of intrigue further'. The

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[45] Marrus, *The Unwanted*, p. 137.
[46] Claudena M. Skran, *Refugees in Inter-War Europe: The emergence of a regime* (Oxford, 1995), p. 50. See also Vicki Caron, *Uneasy Asylum: France and the Jewish Refugee Crisis, 1933-1942* (Stanford, 1999), pp. 14-15.
[47] Marrus, *The Unwanted*, p. 130.

newspaper defended the Swiss, who it claimed 'began seeing it as rather strange to take a growing invasion of Jews into their country, which threatened to turn the concept of asylum into its opposite. So the Swiss, who always show consideration for the individual, have decided not to remove the clause on asylum, for instance, but rather, to banish the unwanted intruders from the country by various emergency measures.'[48] The sentiment behind this veiled remark was that Jews, not refugees, posed a threat to European traditions of asylum because they allegedly abused the terms of asylum in order to spread their political influence. A separate editorial in the newspaper claimed that Jewish immigration to Switzerland had unleashed a heightened sense of national consciousness among Swiss Germans and pointed to the daily protest rallies and marches as evidence that 'feelings have been brought to life that until now have slumbered.'[49]

The *Wiener Neueste Nachrichten* also backed the efforts of European governments to restrict or ban refugees and immigrants from participating in the public life of the host country. An article on 29 November 1933 cited a report in the French right-wing newspaper, *Midi*, which claimed that 'certain Israelite circles' were attempting to influence France's relations with Germany.[50] Just over a month later, the *Wiener Neueste Nachrichten* reported that the French government had withdrawn the residence permits of approximately 2,500 German 'emigrants' in Alsace.[51] An article followed three weeks later with allegations that German refugees in England had been prohibited from practicing or training in medicine at English hospitals or universities.[52] These articles gave silent approval of discriminatory policies against refugees from Germany, thus justifying and promoting international measures against what the newspaper regarded as the universal threat of Jewish immigration in Europe.

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[48] *Wiener Neueste Nachrichten*, 12 July 1933, p. 3.
[49] *Wiener Neueste Nachrichten*, 20 December 1934, pp. 1-2.
[50] *Wiener Neueste Nachrichten*, 29 November 1933, p. 2.
[51] *Wiener Neueste Nachrichten*, 5 January 1934, p. 3.
[52] *Wiener Neueste Nachrichten*, 24 January 1934, p. 3.

Even the newspaper's faint sympathy towards the refugees housed in military barracks in Paris was overlaid with an entrenched anti-Semitic bias. A front-page editorial on 22 February 1934 described the 'floods' of Jews who 'swarm' around the Boulevard Saint-Michel with nothing to occupy their time. The newspaper referred to the barracks as a 'ghetto', whose occupants derived a meagre income from petty trading, because they 'are not used to physical work and manual labour [and because] the police ban peddling on the streets of Paris'.[53] This statement reflected an anti-Semitic stereotype that the newspaper depicted elsewhere in its reports about the Jews of Leopoldstadt, who conducted an allegedly unscrupulous trade in selling and exchanging small goods amongst each other.[54] The American journalist, Emil Lengyel, visited the military barracks in Paris at the end of 1933 and, observing the impoverishment and suicidal tendencies of the refugees, described their story as 'one of the darkest chapters of Europe's post-war history.'[55] However, the *Wiener Neueste Nachrichten* guarded against such compassion by omitting any reference to their physical or emotional duress, dehumanising them instead by likening them to insects, whose inability to do manual work precluded them from any productive or meaningful existence.

Responses to Non-Jewish Emigration in Europe

Unlike the articles on Jewish refugees, stories of Austrian Nazis crossing into Germany and Yugoslavia and reports of Germans and Austrians fleeing the Spanish Civil War presented a human face to refugees. These reports allowed the newspapers to ponder the issue of political asylum from their ideological vantage point and served to highlight a distinction between genuine 'refugees', whom the newspapers regarded as distinct from Jewish 'emigrants'. The Austrofascist state made a similar distinction by narrowing the

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[53] *Wiener Neueste Nachrichten*, 22 February 1934, p. 1.
[54] See *Wiener Neueste Nachrichten-Bilder*, 6 May 1934, pp. 2-4, in Chapter Five.
[55] Caron, *Uneasy Asylum*, p. 40.

definition of refugees to German Catholics, while also circumscribing the political freedoms of even these mutual enemies of Nazism.

Alongside the articles about Jewish refugees crossing over Germany's border into other European countries, the *Tagespost* published numerous front-page articles about Austrian Nazis crossing into Germany during the months following the party's ban in June 1933. These stories served two purposes: firstly, to delegitimise the Austrian government's struggle against a stronger foe across the German border and, secondly, to portray the heroism of Austrian Nazis as they risked life and possessions to escape the Austrian authorities. There were frequent reports of arrests on the Bavarian border as well as detailed reports on Austrian Nazis, and the smugglers assisting them, who successfully evaded the border guard as they fled into Bavaria.[56] Other articles gave extensive coverage to the government's border security measures intended to prevent both Nazi incursions from the German side as well as Austrians escaping into Germany. For example, two separate articles in July reported that a Nazi Party rally in the Bavarian town of Kiefersfeld across the border from Kufstein in Tyrol, attended by up to 4,000 German SA and SS soldiers, had prompted a full border alert by the Austrian authorities.[57] On 26 July, the *Tagespost* reported a border violation by a German airplane that had flown over the Austrian province of Vorarlberg and dropped fliers denouncing the Austrian government.[58] Further reports in September said that the Tyrolean border was to be patrolled by companies of the Tyrolean alpine hunting regiment, two companies of the Viennese infantry regiment and three police aircraft.[59] In addition to these security measures, the *Tagespost* also reported frequently on cases of denaturalisation in the wake of a law passed

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[56] For reports of border arrests see, for example, *Tagespost*, 4 August 1933, p. 2. For reports of Austrian Nazis and smuggler sympathisers, see *Tagespost*, 31 August 1933, p. 2; 11 October 1933 (Abendblatt), p. 1; 19 October 1933, p. 2.
[57] See *Tagespost*, 16 July 1933, p. 2; 17 July 1933 (Abendblatt), p. 1.
[58] *Tagespost*, 26 July 1933, p. 1.
[59] *Tagespost*, 5 September 1933 (Abendblatt), p. 1; 6 September 1933, p. 2. See also a report on Carinthia's border control, 9 September 1933 (Abendblatt), p. 1.

on 16 August 1933 that stripped Austrians of their citizenship if they fled to Germany.[60]

Although these reports were not allowed to criticise the Austrian government directly, the

newspaper could still protest indirectly through stories of Nazis being hounded by Austrian

authorities.

The newspaper's sympathy for Nazi refugees was most striking in the *Tagespost's*

coverage of Austrian National Socialists fleeing into Yugoslavia in the wake of Dollfuss'

assassination in July 1934. Five days after the putsch, on 30 July, the *Tagespost* reported

that Yugoslavian police had arrested several hundred Austrian refugees on the border and

were interning them in camps in Varaždin, Bjelovar and Slavonska Požega.[61] Further

reports in August described the relief efforts of the Yugoslavian Red Cross, which had

transported about two hundred of the refugees from their temporary accommodation in a

primary school to abandoned barracks in the Varaždin area.[62] The exact number of

National Socialist refugees interned in the camps was initially thought to be more than

1,000, according to the Austrian and German foreign ministries, but Austrian police

authorities later estimated there were up to 3,000, which probably included those who lived

outside of the main camps with relatives and acquaintances, as well as returnees to Austria

and later arrivals in November.[63]

Coverage of the National Socialist refugees in Yugoslavia intensified in early

September and October. The *Tagespost* reported on 4 September that Chancellor

Schuschnigg had dismissed rumours of an Austrian Legion being formed among National

Socialists in Yugoslavia.[64] A feature article on the refugees filed two days later from a

Viennese government organ, *Die Wiener Zeitung* (suggesting the government had greater

insight into the refugee situation than Chancellor Schuschnigg was admitting), described

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[60] See *Tagespost*, 24 September 1933, p. 3; 5 October 1933, p. 2; 3 December 1933, p. 2.
[61] *Tagespost*, 30 July 1934 (Abendblatt), p. 3.
[62] *Tagespost*, 11 August 1934, p. 4; 17 August 1934 (Abendblatt), p. 1; 24 August 1934, p. 2; 29 August 1934 (Abendblatt), p. 1.
[63] Dušan Necak, *Die österreichische Legion II: Nationalsozialistische Flüchtlinge in Jugoslawien nach dem misslungenen Putsch vom 25. Juli 1934*, trans. Franci Zwitter (Vienna, 1996), pp. 34-41.
[64] *Tagespost*, 4 September 1934 (Abendblatt), p. 1.

the daily living conditions in the camps at Varaždin and Maribor and gave a picture of a sophisticated camp system run largely by the refugees themselves with curfews and monetary and food distributions.[65] Several descriptions, for example of Austrian mothers travelling by train to visit their children in the camps, evoked sympathetic tones while carefully avoiding all references to the political reasons for asylum.[66] Subsequent coverage in October focused on the humanitarian needs of the refugees: one report said that forty women and some children were also in the camp at Varaždin and other reports suggested there were 60 women and 70 children among one transport of refugees being taken to Lipič because of overcrowding in the Varaždin camp.[67] The Varaždin camp included a separate camp for the unmarried female companions of the refugees, the so-called *Hitlermädellager*, and it was not uncommon for wives and children of refugees to follow their husbands and fathers to the camps by declaring themselves refugees once they arrived by train over the Yugoslavian border.[68] However, the *Tagespost* reported only the details concerning the humanitarian plight of the refugees and did not elaborate on the political motivations of either the men or the women. Finally, on 30 November, the *Tagespost* reported that the majority of the refugees had been transported to Germany while approximately eighty had chosen to return to Austria.[69]

Stories about interned refugees and concerned relatives held particular importance for Styrian readers, who may have had first-hand knowledge of the border crossings and the plight of National Socialists from Styria and Carinthia. The *Tagespost* was diligent in its task of supplying local news to its readers both in the refugee reports throughout 1934 as well as in many other reports on border incidents, shootings and illegal crossings on the

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[65] *Tagespost*, 6 September 1934 (Abendblatt), pp. 2-3. A police commissioner's report in the Carinthian town of Villach, dated August 30 1934, noted that Nazi SS members among the 1100 refugees in Varaždin were acting as camp police, holding morning roll-call and enforcing evening curfew. A later report revealed a tightly administered daily schedule in the camp that included physical exercises and political and military instruction. See Necak, *Die österreichische Legion II*, p. 105.

[66] *Tagespost*, 6 September 1934 (Abendblatt), pp. 2-3.

[67] *Tagespost*, 8 October 1934 (Abendblatt), p. 2; 24 October 1934, p. 2.

[68] Necak, *Die österreichische Legion II*, pp. 71-76.

[69] *Tagespost*, 30 November 1934, p. 3.

Styrian border.[70] However, the human-interest appeal of these stories was a smokescreen for the newspaper's real sympathies for National Socialism. The *Tagespost* paid fleeting attention to Social Democrats who fled to Czechoslovakia after the civil war in February 1934. Where there was newspaper coverage of Austrian émigrés in Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union, the emphasis in the narrative was on illegal migration, arrests, deportations, claims of espionage and expulsion.[71] Moreover, the newspaper referred to Social Democrats as 'emigrants', while the Austrian Nazis in Yugoslavia were cast sympathetically as political refugees.

The *Wiener Neueste Nachrichten* also included reports on the Austrian Nazis fleeing into Germany, albeit less frequently and empathetically than the *Tagespost*. One report on 31 August 1933 said that six armed National Socialist refugees crossing over the Bavarian border in Upper Austria had shot at a customs control officer on the border.[72] The report's detached tone, and its reference to the Nazis' weaponry and violence, was consistent with the *Wiener Neueste Nachrichten's* abhorrence of terrorism in the wake of Dollfuss' assassination. The report appeared on page five and thus did not receive the prominent attention that similar articles had in the *Tagespost*. While we cannot read too much into these reports about Nazis escaping Austria, we can draw some conclusions in light of what we already know about both newspapers' attitudes towards National Socialism. As we saw in Chapter Three, the *Tagespost* wore its Nazi sympathies on its sleeve, whereas the Viennese organ was more cautious and, at times, inclined to regard National Socialists as usurping the political clout of other German-nationalists in Austria. Given that the *Wiener Neueste Nachrichten* and its chief editor, Mauthe, advocated a German-nationalist opposition front in which National Socialists would play an important

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[70] See, for example, *Tagespost*, 7 December 1935 (Abendblatt), p. 3; 3 November 1936, p. 3. Other reports in 1934 told of returned émigrés, customs checks at the Yugoslav border and deportations from Yugoslavia into neighbouring Hungary. See *Tagespost*, 17 October 1934 (Abendblatt), p. 5; 19 May 1936 (Abendblatt), p. 2; 6 December 1934 (Abendblatt); p. 2.
[71] See, for example, *Tagespost*, 10 March 1934, p. 2; 11 June 1937 (Abendblatt), p. 1; 10 August 1937, p. 2.
[72] *Wiener Neueste Nachrichten*, 31 August 1933, p. 5.

but not exclusive role, the scant attention paid to the Nazi emigration from Austria may indicate the newspaper's dismissive attitude towards party radicals. Stories about Nazi border crossings thus carried greater ideological significance than they would at first suggest and illustrate the complex relationship between German-nationalists and National Socialism in the interwar period.

The newspapers' ideological rendering of refugees was further evident during the Spanish Civil War with the reports of Germans and Austrians fleeing Spain in 1936. The German and Austrian expatriates in Spain were mainly members of the Spanish business community and were sympathetic to Franco and the Nationalist rebels.[73] Others were long-term residents or had married Spaniards, as the reports in the *Tagespost* and *Wiener Neueste Nachrichten* showed. Towards the end of July, the *Tagespost* focused its attention on the plight of stranded German and Austrian refugees. The newspaper reported that several hundred German refugees from Spain had been transported by British and French warships to France and then by train to Germany where the German government had pledged 50,000 marks in emergency relief for the refugees.[74] On 3 August, the *Tagespost* reported that 70 Austrian refugees, including 25 locals from Graz, had arrived at the Innsbruck train station to be greeted by government officials.[75] More news of Austrian refugees continued throughout August and a report in January 1937 said that a total of 490 Austrians had fled Spain in 1936, according to official migration statistics.[76]

It was significant that these reports in August 1936 coincided with the resumption of diplomatic relations between Austria and Germany following the July Agreement of 1936. As we have seen, the *Tagespost* was one of five Austrian newspapers permitted to circulate in Germany under the terms of the Gentlemen's Agreement. The *Tagespost's*

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[73] Martin Blinkhorn, *Democracy and Civil War in Spain 1931-1939* (London, 1988), pp. 36, 48.
[74] *Tagespost*, 28 July 1936, p. 3. The British and French governments evacuated thousands of Spanish refugees fleeing anticlerical violence and Republican attacks. See Marrus, *The Unwanted*, p. 190.
[75] *Tagespost*, 3 August 1936 (Abendblatt), p. 2.
[76] *Tagespost*, 13 January 1937, pp. 3-4. For reports on Austrian refugees in August 1936, see *Tagespost*, 4 August 1936, p. 2; 5 August 1936, p. 2; 11 August 1936, p. 2; 12 August 1936, p. 2 and 14 August 1936, p. 2.

proximity to the Nazi propaganda machine explains why, on 18 August 1936, it published

an extract from the Bavarian National Socialist newspaper, *Der Angriff*, which sought to

discredit the Spanish Republicans who had fled to France and Britain in the wake of

Franco coming to power.[77] The *Angriff* article argued:

> If the leader of the front slaughters hostages like cattle and then escapes over the border into a neighbour country, then there can be no more discussion about the application of international terms. Rather, what is in the foreground in this case is the plain and simple application of basic human law, which bans such brutishness and atrocities and brings deserved punishment to the perpetrators. Political refugees always have the right to asylum; but murderers and mass killers must also grasp the full force of the law if, as in Spain, they think they can whitewash their bloody deeds with the colour of a questionable conscience.[78]

This statement was published barely one month after Austrian Nazis had succeeded in

assassinating Dollfuss, which shows that the *Tagespost* condoned terror and violence if it

advanced the cause of National Socialism. The *Tagespost* endorsed the Nazi organ's

assertion that only legitimate political refugees (National Socialists) be accorded

international protection, while other 'murderers' and 'perpetrators' (presumably, socialists

and communists) were liable to receive 'the full force of the law'. In short, the *Tagepost*

was in accord with the Bavarian newspaper that governments had a legal mandate to enact

wilful revenge and indiscriminate punishment on the enemies of fascism and nationalism,

whether in Spain, Germany or Austria.

The *Wiener Neueste Nachrichten* also portrayed the Spanish Republicans as

pillagers and murderers in its reports of German and Austrian refugees fleeing Spain in

1936. These stories graphically reported the persecution, violence and terror directed

against political and national opponents of the Spanish Republican Guard. Reports told of

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[77] The numbers of Republican refugees reached into the hundreds of thousands as Franco's military regime took hold. By April 1939, 450,000 Spanish soldiers and civilians had escaped to France. About half of these refugees were eventually repatriated to Spain, some 20,000 found asylum in Mexico, a small number went to the Soviet Union and thousands of remaining Spaniards enlisted in the French army, suffering the same fate as the French under Nazi occupation. See Marrus, *The Unwanted*, pp. 191-94.

[78] *Tagespost*, 18 August 1936 (Abendblatt), p. 2.

German-owned houses and businesses in Barcelona being raided and set alight.[79] The newspaper focused on personal stories of escape in the reports of Austrian refugee transports from Spain throughout August. An interview with one man who had married and settled in Spain recounted his evacuation by ship to France, where he stayed in a camp before arriving by three-day train to Austria.[80] More personal stories followed in a front-page article about the arrival of the first transport of Austrian refugees from Madrid. The article even mentioned the names and professions of some and told the story of an elderly woman who had lived in Spain for sixty years, whose nursing home residence had been burnt down by communists leaving her homeless.[81] These stories were personal in the same way that the *Tagespost*'s coverage of Styrian Nazis fleeing to Yugoslavia was intended to appeal to local knowledge and associations with the people connected to the events. Stories of Austrian refugees from Spain returning to their home countries also contrasted with the stark factual reports of Jewish refugees attempting to flee Germany in 1933.

One group of refugees whom the newspapers disregarded altogether was Catholics from Nazi Germany. Unlike communists, Catholics could not be denigrated in the German-nationalist press because of the 1933 censorship law prohibiting offences against the religious beliefs of Austrians. Yet the silence was also an indication of the newspapers' uneasy relationship with Austrian Catholics, as we have seen: on the one hand, there was mutual acclamation of Austria's pan-German identity and a hesitation on the part of the newspapers to offend Catholics who sympathised with National Socialists, but, on the other hand, the newspapers regarded the Catholic Church as an obstacle to German unity.

For the Austrofascist government, however, the arrival in Austria of German Catholic refugees vindicated its opposition to National Socialism. Many of the refugees were prominent journalists, academics, theologians and leaders of youth organisations,

[79] See, for example, *Wiener Neueste Nachrichten*, 28 July 1936, p. 2; 11 August 1936, p. 1.
[80] *Wiener Neueste Nachrichten*, 7 August 1936, p. 2.
[81] *Wiener Neueste Nachrichten*, 11 August 1936, p. 1.

who usually had contacts abroad and were better positioned to participate in international efforts to oppose Hitler's regime.[82] In Austria, they found work more easily than their Jewish counterparts, often in academic posts, and they had a wider support base in general through the Catholic Church. This support was formalised in January 1936 through the creation of a Caritas aid agency for Catholic refugees under the auspices of the Archdiocese of Vienna.[83]

One of the most prominent German Catholic refugees in Austria during this period was Dietrich von Hildebrand (1889-1977). After the Nazis introduced a law on 7 April 1933 excluding non-Aryans from holding public offices (*Zur Wiederherstellung des Berufsbeamtentums*), Hildebrand was forced to retire as Professor of Philosophy at the University of Munich because his grandmother had been Jewish. He came to Austria in September 1933 after Dollfuss promised that any Catholic professor who had left Germany would find a job in Austria. He was appointed to the theological faculty at the University of Salzburg in February 1934 and was made professor of philosophy at Vienna at the end of 1934, which automatically granted him Austrian citizenship. In December 1933, with Dollfuss' financial support, Hildebrand founded the weekly journal, *Der Christliche Ständestaat*, which aligned itself with the Austrofascist government's opposition to National Socialism.[84] The journal's chief editor, Klaus Dohrn, a journalist and relative of Hildebrand's who had also immigrated to Austria in 1933, concentrated the journal's main political themes on Germany, the issue of Nazism's defeat, opposition to communism, and the preservation of Austrian independence.[85] It was especially critical of Nazi organs in Germany and Nazi-sympathising newspapers in Austria. Several articles and commentary

[82] Werner Röder, "The political exiles: their policies and their contribution to post-war reconstruction," in *Biographisches Handbuch der deutschsprachigen Emigration nach 1933* (Munich, 1980), pp. xxix-xxx.
[83] Seeber, "Österreich als Exil 1933 bis 1938," p. 9; Peter Stuiber, "Chronik des deutschen Exils in Österreich," in *Asyl Wider Willen: Exil in Österreich 1933-1938*, ed. Ursula Seeber (Vienna, 2003), p. 118.
[84] Rudolf Ebneth, *Die österreichische Wochenschrift 'Der Christliche Ständestaat': Deutsche Emigration in Österreich 1933-1938* (Mainz, 1976), pp. 2, 8, 38-40.
[85] Mammach, "Deutsche Emigration in Österreich 1933-1938," pp. 199-200.

pieces between 1934 and 1936 singled out for attack the *Wiener Neueste Nachrichten*, for example.[86]

Yet even supporters of the Austrofascist state, such as Hildebrand and Dohrn, were subjected to official surveillance if they engaged in political activities that were directed against Nazi Germany. Following the July Agreement, Hildebrand and Dohrn faced growing criticism from within the ranks of both the Austrofascist state and the Catholic Church over their opposition to the Nazi regime. The *Christliche Ständestaat* was placed under surveillance by the *Heimatdienst* propaganda bureau and Dohrn's telephone calls were monitored between 1936 and 1937. In addition to his position as chief editor on Hildebrand's journal, Dohrn had also been an outspoken advocate for a 'third way' between Nazism and communism. In June 1936, he had established the Young German Catholics' Circle (*Ring deutscher Jungkatholiken*) and, in 1937, he founded the German Front Against the Hitler Regime (*Deutsche Front gegen das Hitler System*), which aimed to bring together all non-communist German exile groups into a common opposition front against Hitler. He was forced to disband the German Front, however, under pressure from the Austrian authorities and the Vatican. Catholic bishops and Vatican officials had expressed concern that this opposition movement would unleash a renewed propaganda war against the Church under the guise of a struggle against 'political Catholicism'. In April 1937, Hildebrand left the editorship of the *Christlichen Ständestaat* under pressure from the Austrian government to do so because of his criticism towards Nazi Germany.[87]

Another prominent German Catholic exile in Austria, Hubertus Prinz zu Löwenstein (1906-1984), was not only an opponent of the Nazis, but he was also critical of the Austrofascist government's suppression of the workers' movement. Since 1930, Löwenstein had been leader of the German Republican Youth Movement until Hitler dissolved it in 1933, and had begun a promising career as a political writer. As a

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[86] Ebneth, *Die österreichische Wochenschrift 'Der Christliche Ständestaat'*, pp. 86-87.

[87] Ibid., pp. 55, 197-98, 202, 207, 215-16. See also Mammach, "Deutsche Emigration in Österreich 1933-1938," pp. 200, 207; Stuiber, "Chronik des deutschen Exils in Österreich," p. 118.

consequence of his speech at a pre-election meeting of the Catholic Centre Party in February 1933, Nazi storm troopers had searched his house, prompting him and his wife to leave their home in Berlin for the relative peace of Tyrol, where he had spent his childhood at his family estate. In his 1942 memoir, *On Borrowed Peace*, Löwenstein writes that he had not anticipated staying longer than a few weeks in Austria: 'I was not in exile. We were leaving Germany only for a while, until the end of the present terror.'[88] Löwenstein stayed at his base in Tyrol, while continuing his work as a political writer for Austria's liberal press. He made many and varied contacts with public figures in Austria: he met with both Schuschnigg and Cardinal Innitzer, he befriended Jewish intellectuals, and established contact with the leaders of the Social Democratic Party, Julius Deutsch and Otto Bauer, as well as the leader of the Christian Social Workers' Movement, Leopold Kunschak. His interest in and support for the Austrian labour movement led him, while in England in February 1934, to send a telegramme to Dollfuss, undersigned by 60 members of the British Upper and Lower Houses, protesting against the murders of workers in the February civil war.[89] His political campaign against Nazi Germany was largely carried out abroad in England and America. In 1934, he co-founded the American Guild for German Cultural Freedom, a representative body of German intellectuals abroad that offered scholarships to support German writers-in-exile. He also proposed the formation of a Youth League of Nations and, in 1934, published his first book, *The Tragedy of a Nation: Germany, 1918-1934*. However, the frequent threats against Löwenstein's and his family's life from underground Nazis in Tyrol made it increasingly difficult for him to continue this political opposition from his Austrian base. His isolated outpost in rural Austria, close to the German border, exacerbated his sense of vulnerability. Referring in his memoir to the

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[88] Prinz Hubertus Löwenstein, *On Borrowed Peace* (London, 1943), p. 7. The original American edition was published in 1942. See also Mammach, "Deutsche Emigration in Österreich 1933-1938," p. 199. Löwenstein had been born into German and English aristocracy and had grown up at Schloss Schönworth in Tyrol. In 1933, he purchased NeuMatzen Castle near Brixlegg, where he and his wife, brother and servants lived prior to 1935.

[89] Mammach, "Deutsche Emigration in Österreich 1933-1938," p. 199.

murder in Czechoslovakia in August 1933 of the German-Jewish author, Theodor Lessing, by Nazi storm troopers who had been smuggled illegally over the border by local sympathisers, Löwenstein makes the point that exile was not a guarantee of protection from Nazis.[90]

Unlike Hildebrand and Dohrn, Löwenstein did not remain in Austria after the July Agreement, which otherwise would have made impossible his continuing political opposition to the Nazis. When his German passport expired at the end of 1934, Löwenstein was personally granted Czechoslovakian citizenship by Foreign Minster Edvard Beneš, allowing him to continue travelling overseas and, after 1935, immigrate permanently to America. With a secure existence and an international passport, he was more fortunate than most of his contemporaries. After the *Anschluss*, for example, he was able to use his connection with Beneš, by then President of Czechoslovakia, to arrange a Czech passport for his journalist friend, Richard Bermann, to escape from Austria to France via Czechoslovakia.[91]

These select examples of Hildebrand, Dohrn and Löwenstein are the most prominent of the wider community of German Catholic refugees in Austria after 1933. Although their prominence also means they are less representative, the German Catholic community as a whole, nonetheless, found broader acceptance in Austria than socialists, communists and Jews and received material and moral support through friends, colleagues and parishioners.[92] However, these individuals also faced professional and political isolation in Austria if they spoke out too loudly against the Nazi state. If they had fled Hitler once already in 1933, they were likely to leave again after *Anschluss*, as both

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[90] Löwenstein, *On Borrowed Peace*, p. 21.
[91] Ibid.
[92] There are no estimates for this group, given the notorious difficulty in accounting for political immigration. Mammach concedes that there were well over the official figure of 1,000 German refugees in Austria between 1933 and 1937, and he gives no clue about the breakdown into socialist, communist, Jewish, Catholic or otherwise. See Mammach, "Deutsche Emigration in Österreich 1933-1938," p. 207.

Hildebrand and Dohrn did, fleeing first to Czechoslovakia and eventually, during the war, to America.[93]

Fortress Europe

Although pressure mounted on German refugees to desist from public criticisms of Nazi Germany following the July Agreement in 1936, the Austrian government had already begun to draft new immigration legislation in June of that year, indicating that its attitude towards immigration was a domestic concern unrelated to the question of Austro-German relations. In June 1936, under direction from the Chancellery, the Austrian Migration Office produced the first draft of an Alien Act that would regulate the status of foreigners in Austria over the age of fourteen by way of a foreigner index system. The proposal was a decisive shift away from the previous law of 1929, which had directly invoked imperial decrees on deportation and the rights of municipal and provincial governments to authorise entry and residency in a town or province. The new federal law, on the other hand, was intended to allow the government to obtain data about foreigners in the country and to categorise them into different groups for the purpose of closer surveillance. It was based on similar laws already in place in neighbouring countries, including Czechoslovakia, which had passed an Alien Act in March 1935. As we have seen, Austria's immigration policies often corresponded with those of other European countries in the interwar period and the legislation drafted between 1936 and 1938 was simply a continuation of that trend.[94]

The proposed Alien Act underwent three revisions over an eighteen-month period, but was never finalised before *Anschluss*. In the final stage of negotiation, in January 1938, the government administration conceded that a system of indexing all 290,000 foreigners

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[93] Hildebrand immigrated to America via Czechoslovakia, Italy, Switzerland, France, Spain, Portugal and Brazil; Dohrn travelled via Czechoslovakia, then France, Spain and Portugal. He later immigrated to Switzerland from America. See Christina Kleiser, "Biografien," in *Asyl Wider Willen: Exil in Österreich 1933-1938*, ed. Ursula Seeber (Vienna, 2003), pp. 97, 100.
[94] Rathkolb, "Asyl- und Transitland," pp. 117-18.

in Austria was too costly an exercise and settled instead on a register for all those who had arrived in Austria since 1 January 1933. The Alien Act is significant, nonetheless, because it reveals the extent of official paranoia and the steps authorities were prepared to take to monitor the status of foreigners in Austria. That the law was a reflection neither of escalating immigration into Austria, nor of a widespread concern about job security among the general workforce, has been shown already at the beginning of this chapter. There were some economic considerations that surfaced during the ministerial talks, such as visa exemptions for wealthy tourists and self-supporting business visitors. But the law was primarily a political reaction against what was perceived as a wave of uncontrolled immigration that, if left unchecked, could potentially open the floodgates to more desperate and destitute refugees, genuine or otherwise.[95]

The *Tagespost*, in particular, had a seeming fixation on the immigration and surveillance policies of other European countries. The newspaper's reports were significant for their continuity of the earlier theme of Jewish refugees in Europe, but with a shift in focus from border crossings to border blocks. They were also important for their emphasis on law and order and the need to protect countries from foreigners who did not comply with the law. In February 1935, for example, the *Tagespost* reported that the Dutch government was planning to erect an internment camp for foreigners who were 'endangering the public order and safety.'[96] In the evening edition that same day, the newspaper said that fighting had broken out in a French internment camp in Toulouse among German Saarland refugees, who had fled over the border following the return of the Saar region to Germany.[97] Reports from Czechoslovakia told of the government's crackdown on illegal immigration and the expulsion of German 'emigrants' who did not have proof of identity. An article in May 1935 said that 25 German emigrants, some

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[95] Ibid., pp. 117-19.
[96] *Tagespost*, 15 February 1935, p. 2.
[97] *Tagespost*, 15 February 1935 (Abendblatt), p. 2. Until 1935, the Saarland had been under the administration of the League of Nations and had been an important haven for political refugees from Nazi Germany. See Marrus, *The Unwanted*, p. 133.

253

without documents and some whose identity papers were under suspicion, had been arrested in Prague. The report also alleged that a number of the emigrants had already been deported three times and had re-entered under different names with different papers.[98] A later report mentioned that twelve emigrants had been arrested following a quarter-annual police swoop on foreigners living in Prague.[99] In July, the *Tagespost* reported that the Czechoslovak government had passed a new amendment to the March Alien Act, requiring foreigners to obtain a residence permit within thirty days unless they had been living continuously in Czechoslovakia since October 1918 or had sought citizenship during that time.[100] Finally, the newspaper reported in October 1935 that Belgium had also intensified its border surveillance.[101]

These somewhat nebulous stories of European border security with their sensational headlines – 'New fortress ramparts in heart of Europe', 'Belgium reinforces border guard' – conveyed the appearance of a contemporary immigration crisis in Europe.[102] They also provided a wider context within which to address similar questions of surveillance, internment and deportation of foreigners in Austria. In mid-1936, the *Tagespost* reflected on the historical dimensions of this debate in a series of articles that examined the causes of and international responses to migratory patterns of Europeans in the medieval and modern period. The newspaper concluded that present-day restrictions on immigration were due to the worldwide economic depression, which had forced all countries 'to reduce the previously wide opening of the gates to quite a smaller crack'.[103] Thus, for the *Tagespost*, immigration controls were seemingly an economic necessity and served as a corrective to previously generous policies of unchecked immigration.

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[98] *Tagespost*, 7 May 1935, p. 2.
[99] *Tagespost*, 19 January 1936, p. 2.
[100] *Tagespost*, 10 July 1935 (Abendblatt), p. 2.
[101] *Tagespost*, 15 October 1936, p. 1.
[102] The headlines were from the above reports in December 1934 and October 1936.
[103] *Tagespost*, 21 June 1936, pp. 17-18; 19 July 1936, p. 13.

By the end of 1937, both the *Tagespost* and the *Wiener Neueste Nachrichten* were calling for an immigration law that would restrict, in particular, the arrival and long-term residency of Jewish immigrants in Austria. Not only these newspapers, but also organs of the Austrofascist state, justified their support for an immigration law in anti-Semitic terms, even if the government itself did not single out Jews as the target of its proposed legislation. In this sense, both German-nationalists and Austrofascists used a civic particularist discourse to define the legal borders of pan-German identity in Austria. The final section of this chapter will trace the development of this civic particularist discourse in the newspapers in response to a perceived immigration crisis.

'Austria should belong above all to the Austrians'

The German-nationalist press was a staunch defender of the government's tougher controls on immigration and residency in Austria. The *Tagespost* initially attempted to justify a more restrictive immigration policy by giving generalised and speculative examples of the burden of foreigners on the native labour force and by inferring that nearly all foreign workers in Austria were Jews. An editorial on 16 February 1937 claimed that as many foreigners had gained employment in Vienna in 1936 as Austrians had been looking for work. According to the editorial, the statistics showed the failure of the 1925 Domestic Workforce Protection Act to prevent foreigners gaining employment at the expense of Austrian citizens. It alleged that foreigners exploited the Austrian economy by taking the profits outside the country, enabling the families of these foreigners to seek passage to Austria at the expense and exploitation of Austrian families:

> It is, in the long term, an intolerable disparity when, on the one hand,
> there are nearly one and a half thousand unemployed, each with as many
> as two or three family members, whose dire need for subsistence is a
> noticeable strain on the economy, and an equal number of foreign
> workers on the other hand, who profit from the same economy.
> Moreover, a considerable fraction of the earnings of these foreigners does
> not even stay in Austria but instead is sent off to the family members
> who still temporarily remain back home.

The newspaper also drew a comparison between refugees during World War One and after

1933, conflating two different groups of refugees into one ostensible flood of unwanted

Jewish immigration:

> These foreigners belong almost entirely to a certain group of political emigres,
> who have once already moved to Austria and above all to Vienna in order to
> settle there, albeit partly for different reasons then. During the war and
> immediate post-war years, this influx, which was by no means always wanted
> as later became painfully apparent, came from the East. Now it is coming from
> the West....[104]

The *Wiener Neueste Nachrichten* drew similar parallels between the wartime and

post-1933 immigration. A front-page editorial on 17 December 1937 suggested that

Austria was an attractive destination for German Jewish refugees because they had

relatives in Vienna who had arrived from Poland and Russia after the war. The editorial

claimed that attempts by the Austrian authorities to restrict immigration would be

impossible, due to the well-organised, clandestine smuggling groups who allegedly

provided false identity papers for the refugees. The newspaper estimated that between 100

and 150 people arrived without passports each month and found lodging and black-market

work in Austria, prompting the newspaper to sound a clarion call for tighter controls on

Jewish immigration: 'Protect our borders and our country from a new flood of

Ostjüdische!'[105] Two days later, the newspaper published a letter to the editor, affirming

the editorial's view that it 'is the uncontested right of the state to ban or control

immigration.... Austria needs neither the labour nor the financial ownership of the Eastern

European Jews.'[106] There is further evidence that the *Wiener Neusten Nachrichten's*

readers were active participants in the debate on immigration. A notice in the newspaper

for a public lecture series on 'The Foreign Guest in Austria' suggests that there were more

than a few anti-immigration activists among both readers and editors alike.[107]

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[104] *Tagespost*, 16 February 1937 (*Abendblatt*), p. 1. For the original text, see Appendix IV.
[105] *Wiener Neueste Nachrichten*, 17 December 1937, pp. 1-2.
[106] *Wiener Neueste Nachrichten*, 19 December 1937, p. 4.
[107] *Wiener Neueste Nachrichten*, 17 March 1936, p. 4.

By the beginning of 1938, both the *Tagespost* and the *Wiener Neueste Nachrichten* reacted to a potential new wave of Jewish immigration from Rumania by demanding tighter laws on immigration in Austria. The fear that Rumanian Jews would soon arrive in Austria, following the election in December 1937 of Octavian Goga as prime minister, reached proportions of hysteria in both newspapers.[108] The *Tagespost* declared that it was 'the duty of the state to put a stop [to immigration] before Austria is at the mercy of a new flood of foreigners.'[109] Similarly, the morning and evening editions of the *Wiener Neueste Nachrichten* ran headline stories on the eve of 1938 calling for a border block (*Grenzsperre*) against the *Ostjuden*: 'Austria needs an immigration law that takes into account the changing circumstances and protects the native population from the invasion of a locust swarm from the east.[110] The New Year's Eve editorial even attracted the attention of *The Times* correspondent in Vienna, Douglas Reed, who agreed with the newspaper that Austria had 'been flooded with immigrants from Germany and Poland, a fair proportion of whom have criminal records' and predicted that 'a closer scrutiny is inevitable sooner or later'.[111]

Articles in January alleged that Rumanian Jews had already fled Rumania for safe haven in Austria and its neighbouring countries. On 3 January, the *Tagespost* reported that a group of Rumanian Jews had been denied entry into Austria by border guards on the Hungarian border and that similar border blocks had also been carried out by Yugoslavian and Hungarian authorities.[112] On 5 January, the *Wiener Neueste Nachrichten* said that Austrian border authorities had already deported a number of Rumanian Jews, who had been visiting relatives or receiving medical treatment in Austria.[113] Three weeks later, the Viennese newspaper claimed that Rumanian Jews were already in Vienna, just three days

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[108] Although King Carol dismissed Goga in January 1938, the Rumanian monarch himself publicly advocated the emigration of the Jews. See Marrus, *The Unwanted*, pp. 143-45.

[109] *Tagespost*, 31 December 1937, pp. 1-2.

[110] *Wiener Neueste Nachrichten*, 31 December 1937, pp. 1-2.

[111] Cited in George Clare, *Last Waltz in Vienna: The Destruction of a Family 1842-1942* (London, 1982), p. 158.

[112] *Tagespost*, 3 January 1938 (Abendblatt), p. 2.

[113] *Wiener Neueste Nachrichten* (Abendblatt), 5 January 1938, p. 1.

after the Rumanian government had decreed that a quarter of the one million Rumanian Jews would be stripped of their citizenship.[114] Aside from their sensationalism, these articles had an important function in perpetuating a stereotype of Jews as illegal immigrants. The article on 5 January, for example, underscored a recurring stereotype in the German-nationalist press that Jewish immigrants were well connected to the wider Jewish community and that they had no allegiances other than personal gain, which explained why allegedly they would seek medical treatment in a foreign country.

This stereotype was further evident in a caricature of Austria's border block against Rumanian Jews, showing a map of Central Europe with a physical barricade erected along Austria's border with Hungary and Czechoslovakia (See figure 2 on p. 259). Behind the barricade stood a white-collar worker, a farmer, a border police officer, a blue-collar worker and a Jew, dressed in Orthodox garb. The Jew was the only figure waving a welcome to the Rumanian Jews on the other side of the border. The others stood, arms crossed, defending their economic interests against the Rumanian Jews, who had fled Goga's clenched iron fist punching out of the map and carried backpacks that were labeled 'business projects', 'honest goods' and 'foreign currencies'. One of the Rumanian Jews was attempting to lift the barricade with his hands, while the caption read in dialect: 'Off you go on straight back, mind; we already have enough of your kind!'[115] On two further separate occasions in February, the newspaper described the reactions of the Lower Austrian Farmers' League and the Christian German Railway Union to Jewish immigration. One of the articles concluded that, in the question of Jewish asylum in Austria, 'the middle class, the farmer and the worker are all of the same opinion', a sentiment that had already been graphically illustrated in the cartoon in January.[116]

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[114] *Wiener Neueste Nachrichten*, 25 January 1938, p. 1. See also Rathkolb, "Asyl- und Transitland," p. 119.
[115] *Wiener Neueste Nachrichten*, 7 January 1938, p.1.
[116] *Wiener Neueste Nachrichten*, 1 February 1938, p. 1; 8 February 1938, p. 1.

Figure 2: *Wiener Neueste Nachrichten*, 7 January 1938, 1.

'Who's that coming over?'
    – 'We're coming from Goga!'
'Well off you go on straight back, mind,
We already have enough of your kind!'

A similar stereotype of the Jews as illegal immigrants was evident in the *Tagespost* in an editorial on 12 January. The newspaper argued that Austria had a right to protect its own citizens against those who abused its system of fairness and 'hospitality'. The editorial spoke on behalf of the 'native population', whose objections to immigration, in the eyes of the newspaper at least, had long gone unheard. With pointed reference to Vienna's Social Democratic government in the 1920s, the *Tagespost* was cynical about the motivations that had led to Jews gaining Austrian citizenship in the first place, inferring that the previous criteria for citizenship had been a political tactic to increase electoral appeal, 'since the freshly baked Austrian citizen immediately became the esteemed Mr Voter.' The editorial explained that Austria could no longer afford to accept immigrants in the country while so many 'fellow countrymen' remained on unemployment benefits, and was quick to defend its position as being patriotically concerned for Austrians:

> Hospitality is certainly a wonderful thing, and we wish that nothing should happen now or in the future that could damage our well-earned reputation. During and immediately after the war we were hospitable, even if perhaps not always from the same motives, when the great migration from the East of the old Monarchy brought us so many unwanted visitors, we were hospitable when a while ago some people in Poland found the ground under their feet to be too hot or even just too unsafe, and we have been hospitable with almost conspicuous zeal when the political upheaval in the German Reich brought many to search for another means of earning a living and a different business environment. We still want to remain the most hospitable country in Europe. But sooner or later comes a day when charity must begin at home and the concern for one's own existence is more pressing than what is often called humanitarianism, which tells everyone to share with everyone…. It is not a contradiction of such a worthy tradition to say that *this Austria should belong above all to the Austrians*. Neither are we of the view that the most recent political development in Rumania could pose such an overwhelming danger to us that it needs to be countered by special emergency regulations. But we wholeheartedly welcome the opportunity afforded by these events of dealing with the entire complex of problems pertaining to regulation and control of foreigners by means of a new Alien Act or, to keep to the official interpretation, to speed up the implementation of measures that have been planned for a long time. And we make a special request that the law be so carefully formulated that someone who, shall we

say, has the right contacts, cannot straight away slip through loopholes again.[117]

Thus the newspaper constructed the civic borders of Austria's state identity through this appeal to protect Austrian citizenry from 'foreigners', embodied in the stereotype of Jewish immigrants, who could 'slip through' a legal system because of their belonging to an underworld of forgery and assisted passage.

The newspaper's claim to an Austrian tradition of hospitality was not hubris. In 1881, the *Tagespost* had taken up a public donation for the Jewish refugees fleeing pogroms in Tsarist Russia.[118] When war broke out in 1914, the newspaper initially showed compassion in its reports about the Galician Jews fleeing the Russian frontline and being transported to provinces all over the Empire, including Styria. In September 1914, the *Tagespost* reported sympathetically on the arrival of 500 Galician refugees in Graz in September 1914. However, later in the war, the newspaper led public protests against the refugees, not just Jewish, who were housed in the refugee camp in Wagna bei Leibnitz in southern Styria and, according to the newspaper, had better provisions than the locals in Leibnitz.[119] Unlike the *Wiener Neueste Nachrichten*, the *Tagespost* never referred to the Jewish refugees as '*Ostjuden*'. To be sure, there were innuendos and pointed remarks about these 'foreigners', who had a tendency to band together in families, in black market industries and passport forgery agencies. The *Tagepost* was consistent in its anti-immigration stance throughout this period between 1933 and 1938, but it refrained from the ethnic stereotyping of the Viennese newspaper.

Over the month of February 1938, the *Tagespost* continued to report the details of the proposed laws on foreigners. One proposal under consideration required foreigners to obtain a permit to stay in Austria longer than three months regardless of whether they had means to support themselves, which effectively banned political refugees from living off financial

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[117] *Tagespost*, 12 January 1938, p. 1. My emphasis in italics. For the original text, see Appendix IV.
[118] Werner A. Vötsch, "Der Antisemitismus zwischen 1880 und 1890 im Spiegel der Grazer *Tagespost*" (Dipl.-Arb., Karl-Fraenzens-University, 1989), pp. 123-26, 142.
[119] Edgar Perko, "Jüdische Flüchtlinge in Graz 1914-1921" (PhD, Graz, 1996), pp. 34-35, 42, 65.

support from their co-ideologists.[120] The *Wiener Neueste Nachrichten* also drew attention to the government's draft legislation on immigration and residence permits, which was still in discussion before the state council at the end of the month. These legislative discussions focused on the initial maximum length of stay, the application procedures for obtaining a residence permit and whether the issuing authority in each case ought to be the provincial governor or, in Vienna, the mayor.[121]

Although the Austrofascist administration never explicitly referred to an uncontrolled stream of Jewish immigration, the newspapers that the state financed, or had editorial ties to, certainly did. The *Grazer Volksblatt* in Styria and the *Reichspost* in Vienna were as sensational and polemical in their coverage of the Rumanian Jews as the German-nationalist press. On 1 January 1938, the *Grazer Volksblatt* called for immediate legislation to restrict foreigners living and working in Austria. Two weeks later, the newspaper alleged that the Rumanian government intended to deport 500,000 Jews.[122] On 27 January, the *Grazer Volksblatt* published an article under the headline, 'Austria for the Austrians!', claiming that foreign workers in Austria were taking jobs from unemployed Austrians and citing Carinthia as an example with 11,000 foreign workers and 15,000 'native' Austrians out of work.[123] Similarly, the *Reichspost* claimed that Rumanian Jews had already been sighted in the Jewish quarter of Leopoldstadt.[124] Writing in the *Times*, Reed referred to both the *Reichspost* and the *Wiener Neueste Nachrichten* when he stated that the 'bulk of opinion in Austria sympathises with the views of these two newspapers' and defended these sentiments as having 'nothing to

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[120] *Tagespost*, 21 January 1938 (Abendblatt), p. 1; 26 January 1938, p. 2; 4 February 1938, p. 2; 9 February 1938, p. 1.
[121] See, for example, *Wiener Neueste Nachrichten*, 5 February 1938, p. 3; 23 February 1938, p. 4.
[122] *Grazer Volksblatt*, 1 January 1938, p. 3; 15 January 1938 [*Mittag*], p. 2.
[123] *Grazer Volksblatt*, 27 January 1938, p. 6.
[124] The *Reichspost* article was reproduced in *Grazer Volksblatt*, 15 January 1938 [*Mittag*], p. 2.

do with anti-Semitism', but with an apparently legitimate need for greater protection against the uncontrolled immigration of criminals from Germany and Poland.[125]

Neither the German-nationalist press nor the Austrofascist state explicitly framed their civic discourse in terms of Austria as a German state with German-speaking citizens and public institutions. The emphasis was instead on Austria 'for the Austrians', 'our borders', in other words, ownership of Austria's territorial and public space. It was not necessary to draw specifically on ethnic criteria, such as language or religion, in those instances where Austria's state and institutional borders were in question. It sufficed for both German-nationalists and Austrofascists to represent the Jew as the single threat to these borders, without actually referring to the Jew as an ethnic Other. An ethnic discourse was still visible in the references to German farmers, in the stereotyping of the Rumanian Jews, and the stories of German and Austrian refugees from Spain, for example. A more discreet ethnic discourse was also evident in the ideological rendering of the true refugee in Europe: Nazis were homeland heroes, while Jews were likened to locusts, stripped of any humanity. However, the discourse of Austrians living in Austria, standing in solidarity against foreign immigrants, showed more saliently the construction of civic borders around Austria's pan-German identity. In this sense, the real concern of both the German-nationalist press and the Austrofascist state in articulating a pan-German identity lay, first and foremost, with a defence of the Austrian state borders, and only in the last instance with the larger projection of a national community beyond those borders.

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[125] Cited in Clare, *Last Waltz in Vienna*, p. 158.

CONCLUSION

My thesis breaks new ground in the debate about Austrian national identity by exploring the multiplicity of nationalist discourses in Austria under the rubric of 'pan-German' identity. I have argued that Austrians imagined themselves both as members of the wider German-speaking community in Central Europe, and as citizens of a German Austrian state, and that these twin universal and particular layers of identity were present throughout modern Austrian history from the Habsburg era to the interwar years of the First Republic and the Austrofascist state. Austrian historians have so far tried to make sense of this dual identity by artificially distinguishing between a German and an Austrian identity. Some, recognising the blurred lines of distinction, have resorted to chameleonic terms such as 'Germanness', which have not helped to bring us any closer to understanding why Austrians believed they belonged to the German nation in the years before (and for some time after) 1938. However, my thesis makes an original and significant contribution to studies of nationalism and national identity in Austria by showing that pan-German discourses not only encapsulated the particular and universal elements of Austrian national identity, but that these discourses also deployed both ethnic and civic terms, which enabled Austrians to think of themselves as part of a national community linked by language and ethnicity, and as citizens who had ownership over the national community's public and civic spaces.

My study of the multiple pan-German discourses in Austria's interwar German-nationalist press is also original and important because it investigates national identity from the perspective of a particular political-cultural milieu in interwar Austria. It does this, moreover, by challenging one of the enduring orthodoxies of twentieth-century Austrian historiography. I have demonstrated that the overlapping pan-German discourses across different political-cultural milieux – liberal, German-nationalist, Christian Social, Social

Democratic, Austrofascist and National Socialist – show how these different groups contested pan-German identity, and on what points they agreed. The points of convergence and contestation between and within political-cultural milieux explain why, for example, Christian Socials had much in common with the various German-nationalist leagues in the Austro-Hungarian Empire over the issues of language ordinances in Bohemia or public funding for bilingual schools in Styria. They explain why German-nationalists were split into so many factions before World War One. They also explain some of the anomalies of the interwar period: why, for example, Social Democrats (especially those on the Right, such as Renner, and even a doctrinaire Austromarxist like Bauer) were not able to shed their Greater German vision of German socialism and articulate a separate Austrian identity prior to 1938. The cross-milieu cooperation of provincial Christian Social and German-nationalist elites in supporting and planning for the Salzburg Festival, which I described in Chapter Four, is another exception to the *Lager* theory that can be explained in terms of overlapping pan-German discourses.

By focusing on three German-nationalist newspapers, my thesis has delved deeper into the complex and often localised relationship between the Austrofascist state and the German-nationalist milieu. It was a complex relationship because, as I have shown, German-nationalists were not uniform in their beliefs or in their attitudes towards National Socialists. Not all German-nationalists were biding their time waiting for the Nazis to take over their country, as if they knew it to be imminent. We have seen that some German-nationalists had already adapted their concept of the national community to the Nazi vision before 1938, while some were more reluctant after 1933 to abandon their earlier dreams of a Greater German Empire in which Austrians had a central part to play. Others, like Glaser, chose the path of expediency and complied with a regime they did not want, while maintaining ideological and political consent for National Socialism. The lines of compliance and consent, which I traced in my case study of the *Salzburger Volksblatt*,

make it difficult for us to draw broad conclusions about the extent of cooperation or distance between German-nationalists and Austrofascists. Rather, I have argued that we must assess this relationship at the level of individual and local compliance and consent. My case studies have illustrated how, in Graz, Keil could appease the Styrian Fatherland Front authorities and, at the same time, give press coverage to Nazi refugees in Yugoslavia, while, in Salzburg, Glaser maintained close contact with federal press authorities in Vienna and was a trusted confidant of the highest Austrofascist authority in the province. We have seen further similarities between local German-nationalists and Austrofascists in their attitudes towards Czech agricultural workers and in their intolerance of the Slovene language in Austrian public institutions. This symmetry between German-nationalists and Austrofascists was most conspicuous in the examples of the newspapers' wholehearted support for the state's laws on policing the borders and regulating foreigners' rights to live in Austria. I have argued that German-nationalists and Austrofascists consistently agreed over the apparent need for Austria's borders to be protected from an invasion of illegal, foreign, Jewish immigrants.

That the campaign against immigration in the German-nationalist press and in organs of the Austrofascist state was carried out in the preceding months and weeks before *Anschluss*, as my thesis has demonstrated, is important evidence that German-nationalists and Austrofascists were intently preoccupied with maintaining the ethnic and civic boundaries of the Austrian state, rather than the question of Austro-German relations. I argued at the outset of my thesis that studies of national identity must address the duality of ethnic and civic nationalisms not as ideal types, but as interactive, dynamic processes that define membership in the nation and delimit participation in the public sphere. My thesis has shown how these ethnic and civic processes develop over time and often reappear in contested spaces. The reaction of German-nationalists to the alleged 'Czechification' of the Austrian borderlands is a classic illustration of German-Czech rivalries reappearing in a

266

historically contested public space. The evidence that German-nationalists in Salzburg, and at least one local Austrofascist representative in Gänserndorf, asserted ownership over this border space using a combination of ethnic and civic discourses, underscores my argument that national identities in the ethnically mixed borderlands of Central Europe were not clear-cut examples of 'ethnic' nationalism. Similarly, my thesis has illustrated how German-nationalists combined an ethnic dissimilationist discourse with a civic participation discourse to infer that Slovenes who sent their children to Slovene schools in Yugoslavia, and then returned to Austria as Slovene nationalists to set up schools and write for the Slovene newspaper, violated the civic standards of a German-language education and press in Austria. They also maintained that the well-funded private Czech schools undermined Austria's public school system and signified the Czech minority's belonging to Czechoslovakia instead of the Austrian state. In these ways, German-nationalists defined the ethnic and civic boundaries of the Austrian state using pan-German discourses about German ownership of Austria.

Furthermore, my thesis has shown that pan-German discourses were not only ethnic and civic, but Central European as well. The articles about Slovene schoolchildren, Jewish immigrants and Czech agricultural workers in the German-nationalist press provide a fragmentary glimpse of the myriad interactions between Central Europeans in the interwar years and show that Austrian pan-German identity was inextricably tied to the stories of other Central Europeans. Although the newspapers belittled and ridiculed Czechs, Slovenes and Jews, my thesis has demonstrated that they were necessary, nonetheless, for Austrians to construct the ethnic and civic borders of their national identity. In this sense of transcending the boundaries of 'national' history, my thesis is different from traditional studies of national identity in Austria. It has shown that Austrian pan-German identity was more concerned with the subjugation of Central European nationalities than with loyalty to Bismarck or Hitler. I have been able to reach this conclusion by placing my research within

a paradigm of 'transnational' history that has allowed me to see the interrelationship of Central European history in the multiplicity of pan-German discourses in Austria. Whereas nationalists in this region tried to appropriate the contested spaces for their own designs, my thesis has demonstrated the need for historians to peel back the layers of national identity to discover the multiplicity of Central Europe's pasts.

APPENDIX I

Wiener Neueste Nachrichten, 11. November 1934, 2.
Nationalitätenrecht
Von Dr Richard Bahr
[...]
Wenn man diesen Band von nahezu achthundert Seiten gelesen hat, versteht man, warum gerade in Wien ein Institut für Nationalitätenrecht geschaffen werden sollte. Und weshalb, sobald erst wieder freundlichere Winde wehen, das Bemühen von neuem aufzunehmen sein wird. Nicht nur, weil Wien, wenn schon nicht mitteninne, so doch an der Schwelle jenes tragischen Zwischeneuropas liegt, in dem durch Schicksal und jahrhundertelange Entwicklung Völker und Stämme so durcheinandergemengt und ineinander geschachtelt wurden, dass eine reinliche Scheidung nach dem Muster westeuropäischer Nationalstaaten immer unmöglich bleiben wird. Auch aus dem anderen, ungleich wesentlicheren Grunde, dass man hier zum Mindesten sieben Jahrzehnte - und nicht bloß von Staats und Regierungs wegen - um solche Lösung der Quadratur des Zirkels sich mühte.
[...]
Die Erforschung des Nationalitätenrechts vor anderen wäre das Feld, auf dem die Wiener Hochschule ihren besonderen eigentümlichen Beitrag für die deutsche Wissenschaft zu liefern hätte.
[...]

Wiener Neueste Nachrichten, 27. Oktober 1935, 2.
Zehn Jahre 'Wiener Neueste Nachrichten'
[...]
Der unverrückbare Leitstern, nach dem sich unser Tun und Handeln richtet, ist die Volksgemeinschaft. Dem gesamtdeutschen Gedanken, dem deutschen Volke sind wir verpflichtet. Die 'Wiener Neuesten Nachrichten' sind ein nationales Blatt, das, abhold jedem verwachsenen Internationalismus und nebelhaften Kosmopolitanismus, bewußt der Entwicklung der nationalen Eigenart unseres Volkes dienen will. Das bestimmt auch unsere Stellung in der Judenfrage.
[...]
Die 'Wiener Neuesten Nachrichten' sind ein österreichisches Blatt. Wir erblicken in der Pflege der Liebe zu unserer österreichischen Heimat und der Pflege des gesamtdeutschen Gedankens nicht, wie das manchmal geschieht, einen Gegensatz, sondern eine sinnvolle Ergänzung. Der Österreicher ist Deutscher, und Deutschland - wir unterscheiden die Begriffe Deutschland und Deutsches Reich - ist ohne Österreich nicht möglich. Österreich ist deutsches, urdeutsches Land, dem kraft seiner geographischen Lage, seiner tausendjährigen Geschichte und der besonderen Ausprägung seiner Kultur und der Eigenart seiner Bewohner gewiß eine eigene Aufgabe im Rahmen der deutschen Kulturmission in Europa zugewiesen ist. Der Österreicher hat seine Stammeseigenart wie jeder deutsche Stamm. Die bewußte Pflege dieser Bodenständigkeit und Eigenart in unserer alles gleichmachenden und nivellierenden Zeit ist nationale Pflicht. Man hüte sich jedoch vor Übertreibungen - auf beiden Seiten. Ebenso wie es falsch ist, im Österreicher einen faulen, schlampigen Schlappschwanz zu sehen, ebenso verkehrt ist es, ihn zu einer besonderen Gattung 'österreichischer Mensch' emporzuloben oder ihn gar einer eigenen österreichischen Nation zuzuzählen.
[...]

Daß die 'Wiener Neuesten Nachrichten' dem um sein nationales und kulturelles Eigenleben verzweifelt ringenden Grenz- und Auslandsdeutschtum hilfreich zur Seite stehen, wann immer ein Notruf ertönt, ist eine Selbstverständlichkeit.

[...]

Wiener Neueste Nachrichten, 22. Juli 1936, 4.

'Wir bleiben Windische'

Aus dem gemischtsprachigen Unterkärnten erhalten wir folgenden Brief:

Geehrte Wiener Neueste Nachrichten!

Ihre Zeitung hat uns schon mehrere Male geholfen. Wir bitten wieder um Ihre Hilfe.

[...]

Wir lassen uns nicht zu Slowenen machen, zu Anhängern des *Koroski Slovenec*, und auch unsere Kinder nicht. Wir bleiben Windische. Und je mehr der *Koroski Slovenec* gegen uns ist und sogar verdächtigt, desto mehr werden wir sagen, warum wir nicht 'Slowenen' sein wollen und welcher Unterschied zwischen den 'Slowenen' und uns 'Windischen' ist.

[...]

Slowenen sind diejenigen, die ihre Kinder nach Krain schicken, damit sie als tüchtige slowenische Kämpfer zurückkommen sollen. Wir Windischen lassen unsere Kinder in unsere kärntnerischen Schulen gehen, sie sind auch so gut wie die krainerischen und unsere Kinder lernen sich mit den Deutschen vertragen, mit denen sie zusammen leben müssen.

[...]

Mit Kärntner Heimatgruss zeichnet

F. Kordesch.

Tagespost, 10. April 1936, 1.

Die Slowenen in Kärnten

Immer wieder taucht in der Tagespresse das sogenannte 'Problem' der Kärntner Slowenen auf, und immer wieder wird diese Frage vom rein politischen Standpunkt aus aufgezäumt. Oft entbehren die dabei vorgebrachten Argumente der Sachlichkeit, die gerade bei Betrachtung dieser Frage wünschenswert und am Platz wäre. Um sich aber ein klares Bild der kulturellen und sprachlichen Verhältnisse des gemischtsprachigen Gebietes in Kärnten bilden zu können, muß man sich die Wechselbeziehungen der beiden Völker und ihr gemeinsames Schicksal vor Augen halten, um so die Schlagworte der Tagespolitik von den Tatsachen des historisch Gewordenen loszulösen.

[...]

Als im 8. Jahrhundert nach Christus bayrische und fränkische Kolonisten bis zu den Ufern der Drau vordrangen, fanden sie dort eine slawische Bevölkerung vor, die den friedlichen Siedlern keinerlei Widerstand entgegensetzte.

[...]

Das größte Kulturgut aber, das den Slowenen durch deutsche Vermittlung zuteil wurde, war das Christentum. Freisinger und Salzburger Bischöfe besaßen in allen Teilen Kärntens ausgedehnte Lehen. Die deutsche Geistlichkeit verpflanzte unter die Kärntner Slowenen die christliche Heilslehre. Die Stifte und Klöster übten als Kulturzentren auf die slawische Bevölkerung eine anziehende Wirkung aus. Die Überwindung altslawischer Religions- und Rechtsbegriffe und ihre Angleichung an die Werte christlich-abendländischer Kultur erfolgte ohne jeden Zwang und gleichsam organisch.

[...]

Die rein blutmäßige Vermischung beider Völker und die tausendjährige gemeinsame Schicksalsgemeinschaft haben nicht nur die Siedlungsgrenzen, sondern auch die nationalen Unterschiede, die anfangs zweifellos bestanden, einigermaßen verwischt. Das Einzige, was die deutschen und die slowenischen Kärntner heute wesentlich voneinander unterscheidet, ist ihre Sprache. Wenn wir heute also mit dem Begriff 'slowenisch' operieren, so meinen wir weder das rassische, noch das kulturelle Merkmal, sondern lediglich das sprachliche.

Das einzige Erbgut, das die Slowenen aus ihrer Urheimat in den Karpathen nach Kärnten mitbrachten, ist ihre Sprache. Dieser slowenische Dialekt, den man häufig als das 'Windische' bezeichnet, spiegelt so recht den deutschen Kultureinfluß seit Anbeginn bis in unsere Tage wider. Zahllose Gegenstände, die die Deutschen den Slowenen vermittelten, zahllose Begriffe und Einrichtungen, viele Hunderte von Zeit- und Eigenschaftswörten sind im Windischen aus dem Deutschen entlehnt worden.

[...]

Brauchtum und Sitte der Kärntner Slowenen weisen unverkennbar ein vorwiegend deutsches Gepräge auf. Viele Gebräuche, die noch eine Erinnerung an die vorchristliche Zeit darstellen und den Bauer und die Bäuerin das ganze Jahr hindurch bei ihrer Arbeit begleiten, sind den Deutschen wie den Slowenen in Kärnten gemeinsam. Die einzelnen Zweige der materiellen Kultur, wie Hausbau und Hofanlage, Verwendung einzelner landwirtschaftlicher Geräte, Trachten und Volkslieder, endlich der reiche Sagenschatz des Kärntnerlandes weisen bei beiden Landesvölkern weitgehende Übereinstimmungen auf, wie sie ja auch aus der jahrtausendalten Lebensgemeinschaft zu erwarten sind. Es läßt sich dabei nicht verkennen, dass der deutsche Einfluß überall das Leben der Kärntner Slowenen beherrscht. Anders ist es ja auch kaum denkbar. Waren doch immer die Deutschen das gebende, die Slowenen das nehmende Volk.

[...]

Tagespost, 26. November 1937, 1.

Wünsche und Erwartungen

Die Frontsperre hat, soweit sich die Ergebnisse übershen lassen, viele Österreicher zum Beitritt zur Vaterländischen Front veranlasst. Sie haben sich somit auf dem im Frontstatut vorgesehenen Wege zur neuen Verfassung und zum Staat bekannt. Dieser Staat hat nach den Worten des Generalsekretärs Zernatto 'eine staatliche Gemeinschaft im modernsten Sinn und nach der Gestaltung der jungen Generation, kein Staat für Desinteressierte und kein Staat für Reaktionäre zu sein, er ist der Staat der organischen Zusammenarbeit seiner Bürger'.

[...]

Möglichkeiten, Grenzen und Maßstäbe der Mitarbeit im Staat und in der Vaterländischen Front sind durch die Leitlinien des Staates gegeben. Eine dieser Leitlinien des Staates ist durch das Abkommen vom 11. Juli 1936 gekennzeichnet. Wer gegen den 11 Juli steht, steht gegen die Unabhängigkeit und Sicherheit des österreichischen Staates. Wer aus dem 11. Juli, dessen Sinngehalt erst letztens durch den Bundeskanzler erläutert wurde, ein Problem machen will, stört die Ruhe. Wer unter den Staatsbürgern andere Unterscheidungen einführen will als für oder gegen das Österreich des 11. Juli, stört den Frieden. Wer Verantwortung und Aufbau mit hysterischem Krampf verwechselt, immer nur mit überholten Phrasen demonstrieren oder immer säubern will und dabei gar nicht merkt, dass er noch in Parteigehässigkeiten oder in Bürgerkriegsleidenschaften steckt, über den ist die Zeit hinweggeschritten, er bleibt in Haß verkrampft und steht da als lebendiges Denkmal reaktionärer Vergangenheit. Für diesen ist kein Platz in einem 'Staate der nationalen Ehre', den die junge Generation gestalten soll. Wie viele positive Kräfte voll

fanatischen Aufbauwillens, Aktivität und Zukunftsfreudigkeit werden dem Staat gewonnen werden, wenn sie einmal wissen, daß der Staat doch auch ihnen gehört!

Vor uns liegt das Neuland der Tat. Wird es beschritten und gemeistert, dann wird aus den Jahren des Umbruches nur ein Sieger hervorgehen: das deutsche Österreich!

Tagespost, 25 Dezember 1937, 1.

Der Werk des freien Worts

[...]

Niemand wünscht die Wiederkehr der Zeit, in der das recht der freien Meinungsäußerung in der unverantwortlichsten Weise mißbraucht worden ist. Aber Mitarbeiten bedeutet nun einmal auch Mitreden, und wenn auch jede unsachliche, demagogische Übertreibung ausgeschaltet werden muß, so glaubt doch niemandm daß eine sachliche Erörterung sich ohne Meinungsverschiedenheiten vollziehen kann. Aus diesen soll und wird sich ja auch im Ständestaat der Volkswille bilden, durch sie innerhalb der Vaterländischen Front der Ausgleich zu einer Willenseinheit vollziehen. Im kommenden Jahre sollen die noch ausstehenden Wahlen in die einzelnen Stände durchgeführt werden; sie bekommen erst ihren Sinn, wenn es bis dahin möglich war, ihren Willen sich bilden zu lassen, in einem Meinungsaustausch, von dem wir wünschen, daß er sich zu wahrhaft österreichischen Gesprächen entwickeln möge. Aus ihnen allein kann sich das Österreich ergeben, das wir alle erhoffen, das befriedete, in sich gesicherte, auf seinen eigenen Willen gestellte freie deutsche Österreich, wie wir von der europäischen Aussprache erwarten, daß sie unseren Erdteil ohne neue Katastrophen in eine bessere Zukunft führen möge.

Tagespost, 16. Februar 1938 (Abendblatt), 1.

Ein Freudentag

[...]

Niemals ist in Österreich angezweifelt worden, daß das österreichische Volk seine geistige, kulturelle und materielle Fortentwicklung nur im gesamtdeutschen Interesse gestalten kann.

[...]

Es hat in den letzten zwei Jahren gewiß Phasen gegeben, in denen Abweichungen von dieser Linie festzustellen waren, aber diese Zwischenfälle vermochten den Glauben nicht zu erschüttern, daß eine nahe Zukunft die Vereinigung solcher Abirrungen bringen werde.

[...]

Tagespost, 5. März 1938 (Abendblatt) 1.

Aufbau

[...]

Über die notwendige Synthese aus gut deutsch und gut österreichisch hat gestern bei der Eröffnung der österreichischen Presseausstellung Bundeskanzler Dr Schuschnigg kluge und versöhnliche Worte gefunden. Er betonte, daß er nicht darum gehe, für einen inneren Zustand eine neue Formel zu finden, vielmehr darum, ein wirkliches Neben- und Füreinander herzustellen. Das Wie sei gewiß kompliziert und Übergangserscheinungen seien unvermeidlich, aber es wäre schon viel gewonnen, wenn vor allem das Nebeneinandervorbeireden aufhören wurde, derart, als ob deutsch und österreichisch in einem Gegensatz zueinander stehen müßten. Und er ermahnte die Träger des vaterländischen Gedankens, das Wort deutsch ohne Scheu auszusprechen - das, darf man wohl hinzufügen, manch einer in völliger Verkennung österreichischen Wesens glaubt

geradezu verfehmen zu müssen - während anderseits der Nationalsozialist auch einer starken Betonung des Nationalen zuliebe sich nicht verpflichtet fühlen soll, alles Österreichische zu verschweigen und deshalb abzulehnen, nur weil es österreichisch ist. Man müsse den Mut haben, einzubekennen, daß auch jenseits der Grenzen Großes und Schönes geschaffen were, ohne deshalb in Angst zü geraten, sich selbst zu verlieren.

[...]

APPENDIX II

Salzburger Volksblatt, 28. Juni 1933, 1-2.

Vergatterung

[...]

Und nun zu euch, ihr Jungen! Ihr seid die Hoffnung der nationalen und freiheitlichen Bewegungen in Österreich. Ihr dürft es nicht durch törichte Streiche dazu kommen lassen, daß ihr - wenn ihr unüberlegt Verbrechen begeht, mit Recht! - in Kerker geworfen und damit für lange Zeit, vielleicht sogar für immer aus der Reihe der nationalen Kämpfer ausgeschaltet werdet. Ihr müßt euren frischen Mut, eure Begeisterung, eure Werbekraft und, wenn es wieder einmal so weit ist, eure Wählerstimmen der nationalen Sache erhalten. Ihr dürft nicht eure Hände mit Taten beschmutzen, die, wenn sie auch manchem als ein kleines Heldenstück erscheinen mögen, in Wahrheit nur als Bübereien gelten können! Deutsche Jugend darf nicht in jene Methoden der Thronfolgermörder verfallen, die vor genau neunzehn Jahren durch die Revolverschüsse in Sarajevo jenen verhängnisvollen Krieg entfesselten, der zum Unglück für Österreich und Deutschland wurde.

[...]

Nationale Einigung, das ist etwas, was in Ruhe reifen muß, was viel, sehr viel, sehr viel Geduld voraussetzt. Italien hat fast drei Vierteljahrhunderte diesem Ideal nachgehangen, ehe die Erfüllung kam. Aber das Ziel ist erreicht worden. Ihr Jungen müßt euch für diese Zeit aufsparen, die wir Älteren nicht mehr erleben werden. Aber ihr sollt mit reinen Händen und Herzen in das größere Vaterland einziehen, nicht belastet durch das Blut Schuldloser, daß ihr vergossen habt.

[...]

Um alle diese Ziele verfolgen zu können, bedarf es aber, wie wir schon am Mittwoch ausführten, einer Zentrale aller national und freiheitlich Gesinnten in Österreich. Es kann nicht der Wünsch und der Wille der Regierung sein, alle Bürger dieses Staates, die sich nicht in die Vaterländische Front, also in ein Partei-Unternehmen eingliedern wollen, politisch rechtlos zu machen.

[...]

Sie sollen dabei die Gewähr haben, daß alle jene Ideen und Methoden Adolf Hitlers, die in Österreich anwendbar sind und mit unseren Gesetzen nicht in Widerspruch stehen, niemals verleugnet werden, sie sollen aber auch überzeugt sein, daß diese neue deutsche Freiheitsfront in Österreich, deren erstes Ziel die Herbeiführung normaler freundschaftlicher Verhältnisse zwischen Österreich und Deutschland sein müßte, bis zur Überwindung der internationalen Widerstände gegen die Errichtung Großdeutschlands österreichische Ziele zu verfolgen haben werde.

[...]

M.

Salzburger Volksblatt, 30. Juni 1933, 6.

Vergatterung!

Aus den zahlreichen Zuschriften, die uns in den letzten Tagen politischer Hochspannung zugekommen sind, möchten wir ohne Kommentar einen Brief veröffentlichen, der vielleicht Anlaß zu einer fruchtbaren politischen Diskussion geben könnte. Österreich ist an einem Wendepunkt seiner Geschichte angelangt; Sache der freiheitlichen und nationalen Kreise wird es sein, die Situation nicht ungenützt vorübergehen zu lassen. Der Brief lautet:

Verehrlicher Redkation! Mit Ihrem Artikel 'Vergatterung' haben Sie endlich das erlösende Wort gesprochen; sehr viele zu denen auch ich gehöre, werden Ihnen dafür dankbar sein. Es geht doch sicher nicht an, alle jene als Deutsche zweite Güte zu stempeln, die das Hakenkreuz als unbedingtes und alleiniges Symbol des Deutschtums ablehnen, zumal, wenn sie nicht innerhalb des Reiches wohnen. Kein Geringerer als Bismarck sagte einst, daß er zuerst Preuße und dann erst Deutscher sei. Warum sollte dieser Ausspruch *mutatis mutandis* für uns Österreicher nicht anwendbar sein können? Wenn Sie in vorerwähntem Artikel aber wiederum mit nicht gerade begeisterten Worten auf die Vaterl:andischen Front hinweisen, so bitte ich doch zu bedenken, was geschieht, wenn sich gerade die freiheitlich denkenden Kreise von derselben fernhalten. Ich würde im Interesse des freiheitlichen Deutschtums in Österreich und damit sehr wesentlich im gesamtdeutschen Interesse eine möglichst zahlreiche Beteiligung dieser Kreise für durchaus wünschenswert halten, um das zu verhindern, was andernfalls zu befürchten ist und zwangsläufig geschehen müßte.

[...]

Salzburger Volksblatt, 24. Dezember 1936, 1.
Weihnacht in deutscher Heimat
Wieder steht nun alles deutsche Land zur Weihenacht gerüstet. Und in der inneren Frömmigkeit, die dem zum Tiefgründigen, Metaphysischen hinneigenden Deutschen im Grunde seines Wesens eigen ist, trägt dieses traute Fest bewußt und unbewußt unsere unlösbare Verbundenheit mit jenem uralten Brauchtum grauer Vorzeit zur Schau, das auch durch die Ausstrahlungen der christlichen Religionen und deren Assimilierungstendenzen niemals seines deutschen Charakters entkleidet werden konnte. Wir sehen im Gegenteil vielfach deutsche Sitte und deutschen Brauch von der Kirche übernommen, in ihre Zeremonien eingeordnet und im Wandel der Jahrhunderte mit ihren Zielen geeint. Trotzdem ist Weihnachten bis heute so recht ein Fest des deutschen Volkes geblieben. Und dieses Fest erschließt uns wie kein anderes das höchste Mysterium unseres Seins, indem es nicht nur Freude, Liebe und Güte, sondern unsere ewig drängende, dumpfe Sehsucht nach deutscher Heimat zum Sinnbild erhebt.

[...]

Aber auch im deutschen Lebensraum bleibt diesmal Tausenden und aber Tausenden der Weihnachtsfriede verwehrt. Die jüngsten Berichte aus den Gebieten der Sudetendeutschen haben erschütternde Bilder von dem dort herrschenden Elend enthüllt. Hunderttausende unserer Volksgenossen im Bereiche der nordböhmischen Randgebiete kämpfen unter dem drückenden Joch einer ortfremden Herrschaft einen geradezu erbitterten Kampf um ihr karges, dürftiges Dasein. Ungezählte Väter, Mütter und hungernde Kinder werden dort in hoffnungsloser, dumpfer Verzweiflung den Weihnachtsabend verbringen.

[...]
Dr A. F.

Salzburger Volksblatt, 25. August 1937, 1.
An der Marchgrenze
In der breiten Masse der österreichischen Bevölkerung gibt es leider nur allzu wenige, die vom Leben und Treiben in dem am wenigsten besuchten Grenzgebiets unseres Heimatlandes die notwendige Kenntnis besitzen. Ein zäher Kampf zwischen deutschem und slawischem Volkstume spielt sich an der Ostgrenze Österreichs ab und zwar dort, wo das trübe Band der March unseren Staat von der Tschechenrepublik trennt. Eine ganze

Reihe von Orten liegen unmittelbar an der Grenze und sind deshalb, weil sie einerseits die Einfallstore in die fruchtbaren Niederungen des Marchfeldes bilden, anderseits in der österreichischen Zuckerwirtschaft mit ihren großen Industrieanlagen eine bedeutende Rolle spielen, seit den Umsturztagen die Zielpunkte einer planmäßigen Tschechisierungsarbeit.

[...]

Es sei hier nun festgestellt, daß in Dürnkrut wie in so vielen anderen Grenzgemeinden an der March auch Tschechen ansässig sind. Der überwiegende Teil der Bevölkerung aber besteht aus bodenständigen deutschen Bauerngeschlechtern, hat also mit den tschechischen Volkstum keinerlei Bindungen, sondern lehnt solche mit gebührendem Nachdruck ganz entschieden ab. Im demselben Maße, in dem also von Deutschen die Beziehung zum fremden Volkstum abgelehnt wird, ist auch jeder Versuch von tschechischer Seite, einem österreichischen Grenzort das Gepräge eines slawischen Kulturbollwerks zu geben, mit allen zu Gebote stehenden Mitteln zu bekämpfen. Werden wir uns darüber klar, warum überall in Österreich von den Tschechen Kulturstellen errichtet worden sind, dann wissen wir auch, daß dieser Denkmalbau nicht allein gegen den deutschen Charackter des kleinen Dürnkrut gerichtet ist, sondern einen Angriff gegen das österreichische Deutschtum überhaupt darstellt. Deshalb ist es unser aller Pflicht, den Dürnkruter Deutschen in ihrem Kampf gegen die Errichtung des Denkmals beizuspringen und das deutsche Volksbewußtsein in Österreich gegen diese neuerliche Tschechisierungsabsicht aufzurufen.

Nikolaus Benisch

Salzburger Volksblatt, 9. Dezember 1937, 1.
Fascismus [*sic*] und Autorität
Von K.F.G......n.
[...]

Es ist bezeichnend, daß der Fascismus für zwei Staaten Schicksal wurde, von denen der eine die Macht noch nicht besaß, die er benötigte und wollte, der andere aber jener Macht wirklich und vollständig beraubt ward, auf welche ihm die im wesentlichen unangetastet gebliebene Größe der Bevölkerung und des Gebietes unzweifelhaft berechtigtesten Anspruch gegeben. Dem deutschen Volke ist historisch, national, ja wohl auch rassisch das Prinzip der Allstaatlichkeit, der Vorrang des Staates vor dem Bürger weit fremder als dem instinktmäßig kollectiv denkenden Romanen.

[...]

Unser heutiger Staat will zwar autoritär, aber er will nicht geradezu fascistisch sein. Der Begriff der Autorität sagt zwar etwas aus über die Willensbildung im Staate, aber er sagt nichts aus über die Aufgaben des Staates. Der österreichische Staat, wie er gedacht ist, soll auch prinzipiell nicht, auch theoretisch nicht unumschränkt, allherrschend sein. Er erkennt den einzelnen und sein Recht an, wie es dem christlichen Gedanken des Hochwertes jedes einzelnen Menschen entspricht, denn Christus ist zu den Menschen und nicht zu den Staaten gekommen als solchen gekommen.

[...]

Salzburger Volksblatt, 31. Dezember 1937, 2.
Frontbekenntnis und Nationalsozialismus
Von Dr Albert Reitter.
[...]

Nationalsozialismus als Gesinnung und weltanschauliches Bekenntnis ist mit dem Bekenntnis zum selbständigen, christlichen und deutschen Österreich in Einklang zu bringen.

[...]

Der einzige Garant für die Unabhängigkeit und Selbständigkeit Österreichs kann immer nur das deutsche Volk selbst sein in der Erkenntnis seiner Aufgabe im europäischen Raum, alle anderen sind nur Interessenten. Selbständigkeit unseres Staates kann also nur heißen, die deutschen Österreicher müßen in voller Unabhängigkeit von allen wie immer gearteten Mächten über ihr Schicksal innerhalb einer gesamtdeutschen Lösung selbst entscheiden.

[...]

Ein zweites Merkmal unseres Staates ist, daß er sich als christlich bezeichnet. Auch diese Bestimmung hat durch eine zu engherzige Auslegung zu Mißverständnissen geführt, welche die VF in ihren authentischen Erläuterungen aufklärt. Danach können auch Nichtchristen in die VF aufgenommen werden, soferne sie sich nicht behindert fühlen, sich zu einem christlichen Staat zu bekennen. Dies ist zweifellos möglich, da es sich hiebei nicht um ein religöses Bekenntnis, sondern um ein politisches Bekenntnis zu einer bürgerlichen Staatsauffassung handelt. Nach dem Frontstatut soll keine Konfession oder Weltanschauung begünstigt oder ausgeschlossen werden, und wenn die Wirklichkeit in den letzten Jahren ein anderes Bild ergab, so ist dies jedenfalls weder im Gesetz, noch im Frontstatut begründet.

Christlichkeit heißt in diesem Zusammenhang nichts anderes als Bekenntnis zu einer sittlichen Kultur, wie sie in ganz Europa, mit Ausnahme Rußlands, herrscht. Diese Auffassung vom christlichen Staat widerspricht dem Nationalsozialismus nicht. Im Gegenteil, was er geradezu erwartet, das ist mehr praktisches Christentum und weniger Schriftgelehrtheit.

Österreich bekennt sich auch als deutscher Staat und hat diesem Bekenntnis im Vertrag vom 11. Juli 1936 einen besonderes verpflichtenden Inhalt gegeben. Vielfältige Bestrebungen sind auf dem Boden unseres Staates tätig. Die einen sorgen sich um das Schicksal unseres alten Kaiserhauses, die anderen um das der katholischen Kirche, unsere Sorge ist das Schicksal der deutschen Nation, mit der wir als zweiter deutscher Staat auf Gedeih und Verderb verwachsen sind.

[...]

Die deutsche Blutsgemeinschaft als Grundlage eines für alle Zeiten gemeinsamen, geschichtlichen Schicksales, der Ausbau und die Vertiefung der wirtschaftlichen, kulturellen und politischen Beziehung zwischen den beiden deutschen Staaten mit dem Ziel einer immer intensiveren gegenseitigen Befruchtung, mit einem Wort, die Zweiheit der Staaten überbaut durch die Einheit der Nation, das ist eine Aufgabe zu der sich jeder Nationalsozialist freudig bekennen muß.

Wiener Neueste Nachrichten-Bilder, 6. Mai 1934, 2-4.

Getto

Getto - so hieß früher der Stadtteil, der von den Behörden den Juden zur Bewohnung angewiesen wurde. Getto - so nennt man aber auch heute noch die Viertel einer von Juden reich bevölkerten Stadt, etwa Viertel in denen die orientalischen Bewohner hundertprozentig vertreten sind und mit ihren auffallenden und andersartigen Lebensgewohnheiten das Straßen- und Gassenbild beherrschen.

[...]

Zwar sind nur 10,8 Prozent der Wiener Bevölkerung Bekenntnisjuden; rechnet man aber alles, was jüdischen Blutes ist, zusammen, dürfte man für Wien mit der Behauptung, daß rund 400,000 seiner Einwohner jüdisch sind, nicht zu hoch greifen. Man kann also mit Gewißheit behaupten, daß ein Fünftel der in Wien ansässigen Bevölkerung dem Judentum zuzurechnen sei.

[...]

Unter solchen Umständen - jetzt hat sich auch noch herausgestellt, daß in Wien mehr Juden leben als in Palästina (400,000 gegen 245,000) - wird es schwer halten, das Bestehen eines Judenproblems in Österreich zu leugnen. Der Antisemitismus ist nicht eine bösartige Erfindung unduldsamer Fanatiker, sondern er ist in Wien durchaus bodenständig und hat in der Aufdringlichkeit der jüdischen Bevölkerung dieser Stadt seine reale Grundlage. Die Typen, die hier im Bilde festgehalten sind, mögen noch die weniger gefährlichen sein. Aber ihre Kinder schon würden, ließe man sie gewähren, als Assimilanten Ärzte, Rechtsanwälte, Journalisten und Marxistenführer sein, und das ist und bleibt unerträglich.

Salzburger Volksblatt, 23. März 1933, 10.

Max Reinhardt und die flüchtenden Ostjuden

[...]

Bei aller Befriedigung, die wir mit dem *Völkischen Beobachter* wegen der Flucht der ostjüdischen Hetzjournalisten nachempfinden können, möchten wir feststellen, daß es wohl nicht angängig ist, auch Max Reinhardt in den eidlen Reigen der Flüchtenden einzubeziehen. Gerade die Stadt Salzburg hat alle Ursache, sich soviel Objektivität des Urteils zu bewahren, um Klarheit darüber zu haben, daß wir Reinhardt sowohl in wirtschaftlicher wie in künstlerischer Beziehung so manches zu danken haben. Max Reinhardt hat sich übrigens weder als Hetzjournalist noch als Literat betätigt, er hat sich politisch nie bemerkbar gemacht. Und wenn er sich zeitweilig in Österreich aufhält, kann ihm das nicht gut als Flucht ausgelegt werden; er hat in Salzburg einen Besitz und in Wien das Josefstädter Theater.

[...]

Tagespost, 16. Februar 1937, 1.
Die Auswirkung der Emigration
[...]
Diese Ausländer gehören fast zur Gänze einer gewissen politischen Emigration an, die schon einmal, wenn auch damals zum Teil aus anderen Ursachen, nach Österreich und vor allem nach Wien übersiedelt ist, um hier seßhaft zu werden. Während des Krieges und in den allerersten Nachkriegsjahren kam dieser, wie sich später als schmerzliche Erkenntnis herausgestellt hat, keineswegs immer erwünschte Zustrom aus dem Osten. Jetzt kommt er aus dem Westen, aber dieser geographische Unterschied hat im wesentlichen nicht allzuviel zu bedeuten und er fällt noch weniger entscheidend in die Waagschale, wenn man die sonstigen Vergleichsmöglichkeiten berücksichtigt.
[...]
Fast anderthalbtausend Arbeitslose mit ihren zwei oder dreimal so viel Familienangehörigen auf der einen Seite, deren notwendigste Existenzerhaltung die Wirtschaft fühlbar belastet, und die gleiche Anzahl von ausländischen Arbeitskräften auf der anderen Seite, die aus derselben Wirtschaft Nutzen ziehen - das ist ein auf die Dauer unertragbares Mißverhältnis. Wozu noch kommt, daß ein wesentlicher Bruchteil der von diesen Ausländern in Verdienst gebrachten Lohnsummen gar nicht in Österreich bleibt, sondern von hier aus zum Unterhalt der vorläufig noch in der Heimat zurückgebliebenen Angehorigen wieder abfließt.
[...]

Tagespost, 12. Jänner 1938, 1.
Unzeitgemäße Gastfreundschaft
[...]
Man hat die reichlich weitherzigen Auffassungen, die an den zuständigen Stellen über ein Asylrecht in Österreich bestehen, in einer früheren Vergangenheit immer mit gewissen Rücksichtnahmen auf das Ausland zu begründen versucht, und daneben mußte häufig die Berufung auf die demokratischen Elementarbegriffe herhalten, um Unverständliches verständlicher zu machen. In Wahrheit sind damals in der Hauptsache parteipolitische Interessen maßgebend gewesen, denn der neugebackene österreichische Staatsbürger wurde ja gleichzeitig zum geschätzten Herrn Wähler.
[...]
Gastfreundschaft ist bestimmt eine schöne Sache, und wir wünschen, daß jetzt und in Zukunft alles unterbleibe, was unserem wohlerworbenen Ruf schaden könnte. Wir waren, wenn auch vielleicht nicht immer aus den gleichen Motiven, gastfreundlich, als während und unmittelbar nach dem Krieg die große Zuwanderung aus dem Osten der alten Monarchie uns so viel unerwünschten Besuch brachte, wir waren es als vor einiger Zeit in Polen manchen Leuten der Boden unter der Füßen zu heiß oder auch nur zu unsicher wurde, und wir sind es mit einer fast auffälligen Beflissenheit gewesen, wie der politische Umbruch im Deutschen reich viele eine andere Erwerbstätigkeit und damit eine andere geschäftliche Umwelt such ließ. Wir wollen auch weiterhin das gastfreundlichste Land Europas bleiben. Es kommt aber irgendwann doch der Tag, da einem das Hemd näher sein muß als der Rock un die Sorge um die eigene Existenz stärker bedrückt als die sogenannte Humanitätsidee, die einem mit jedem teilen heißt.
[...]

Es ist kein Widerspruch mit einer wertvollen Tradition, wenn wir meinen, daß dieses Österreich vor allem den Österreichern gehören soll. Wir sind auch nicht der Auffassung, das die jüngste politische Entwicklung in Rümanien für uns eine so übergroße Gefahr bedeuten könnte, daß man ihr mit besonderen Ausnahmsverfügungen begegnen müßte. Aber wir begrüßen es aufrichtig, daß diese Ereignisse den Anlaß bieten, den ganzen Fragenkomplex der Ausländerkontrolle durch ein neues Fremdengesetz zu ordnen oder, um bei der amtlichen Lesart zu bleiben, schon längst in Aussicht genommene Maßnahmen in der Durchführung zu beschleunigen. Was unter anderen Verhältnissen vielleicht noch Monate gedauert hätte, wird jetzt hoffentlich auf kürzerem Weg erledigt werden können: Die seit jeher notwendig gewesene Korrektur der geltenden Bestimmungen über den Aufenthalt und die Arbeitsmöglichkeiten der Ausländer in Österreich. Wobei noch besonders gebeten wird, das Gesetz so engmaschig zu machen, daß nicht gleich wieder jeder, der sich, sagen wir Beziehungen verschaffen kann, durchzuschlüpfen imstande ist.

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