1. Adelaide Research & Scholarship
  2. Schools and Disciplines
  3. School of Humanities
  4. Philosophy
  5. Philosophy publications
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/2440/108524
Citations
Scopus Web of Science® Altmetric
?
?
Full metadata record
DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorNestor, M.-
dc.date.issued2017-
dc.identifier.citationAustralasian Journal of Philosophy, 2017; 95(1):109-123-
dc.identifier.issn0004-8402-
dc.identifier.issn1471-6828-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/2440/108524-
dc.description.abstractMillikan [2000] has levelled a number of persuasive criticisms against Cummins's [1996] theory of mental representation. In this paper, I pave a middle path in the debate between Cummins [2000] and Millikan [2000] to answer two questions. (1) How are representations applied to targets? (2) How is the content of a representation determined? The result is a new theory of mental representation, which I call narrow structuralism.-
dc.description.statementofresponsibilityMatthew J. Nestor-
dc.language.isoen-
dc.publisherAustralasian Association of Psychology and Philosophy-
dc.rights© 2016 Australasian Association of Philosophy-
dc.source.urihttp://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2016.1153683-
dc.subjectMental representation; resemblance; isomorphism; mental causation; accuracy; narrow content-
dc.titleNarrow Structuralism: Paving a Middle Path Between Cummins and Millikan-
dc.typeJournal article-
dc.identifier.doi10.1080/00048402.2016.1153683-
pubs.publication-statusPublished-
Appears in Collections:Aurora harvest 3
Philosophy publications

Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormat 
RA_hdl_108524.pdf
  Restricted Access		Restricted Access506.42 kBAdobe PDFView/Open
Show simple item record


Items in DSpace are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.