Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
https://hdl.handle.net/2440/108972
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Full metadata record
DC Field | Value | Language |
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dc.contributor.author | Koska, O. | - |
dc.contributor.author | Staehler, F. | - |
dc.date.issued | 2014 | - |
dc.identifier.citation | Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 2014; 170(3):406-426 | - |
dc.identifier.issn | 0932-4569 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/2440/108972 | - |
dc.description.abstract | We investigate the optimal acquisition strategy of an investor who wants to acquire a target firm under incomplete information. The response to acquisition offers signals firm productivity, affecting future competition. We identify a competition effect (firms compete for acquisition) and a revelation effect (firms signal productivity). These effects reduce the rejection profits and increase the acceptance probability. If the investor makes simultaneous offers, the revelation effect is a potential threat: a firm may signal low productivity, but may not be acquired. If, however, the investor makes offers sequentially, this threat does not exist, making sequential offers the optimal acquisition strategy. | - |
dc.description.statementofresponsibility | Onur A. Koska and Frank Stähler | - |
dc.language.iso | en | - |
dc.publisher | Mohr Siebeck | - |
dc.rights | © 2014 Mohr Siebeck | - |
dc.source.uri | http://dx.doi.org/10.1628/093245614x14001382825101 | - |
dc.title | Optimal acquisition strategies in unknown territories | - |
dc.type | Journal article | - |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1628/093245614X14001382825101 | - |
pubs.publication-status | Published | - |
dc.identifier.orcid | Staehler, F. [0000-0002-5120-0286] | - |
Appears in Collections: | Aurora harvest 8 Economics publications |
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RA_hdl_108972.pdf Restricted Access | Restricted Access | 224.83 kB | Adobe PDF | View/Open |
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