Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/2440/109419
Citations
Scopus Web of Science® Altmetric
?
?
Type: Book chapter
Title: Kant-Nash equilibrium in a quantity-setting oligopoly
Author: Long, N.
Citation: Equilibrium Theory for Cournot Oligopolies and Related Games: Essays in Honour of Koji Okuguchi, 2016 / von Mouche, P., Quartieri, F. (ed./s), Ch.12, pp.179-201
Publisher: Springer International Publishing
Publisher Place: Switzerland
Issue Date: 2016
Series/Report no.: Springer Series in Game Theory
ISBN: 3319292536
9783319292533
Statement of
Responsibility: 
Ngo Van Long
Abstract: This paper studies oligopolistic equilibria when not all firms behave in a Nashian fashion. The Kantian firms act according to norms of behavior that reflect the Kantian categorical imperative. We introduce the concepts of Exclusive Kant- Nash Equilibrium and Inclusive Kant-Nash Equilibrium to study such situations. Our model formalises Sen’s conjecture that in actual situations people often do not follow the selfish strategy because of the Kantian norm of behavior.
Rights: © Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2016
RMID: 0030067267
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-29254-0_12
Published version: http://www.springer.com/gp/book/9783319292533
Appears in Collections:Economics publications

Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormat 
RA_hdl_109419.pdfRestricted Access239.07 kBAdobe PDFView/Open


Items in DSpace are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.