Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
https://hdl.handle.net/2440/109419
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Type: | Book chapter |
Title: | Kant-Nash equilibrium in a quantity-setting oligopoly |
Author: | Long, N. |
Citation: | Equilibrium Theory for Cournot Oligopolies and Related Games: Essays in Honour of Koji Okuguchi, 2016 / von Mouche, P., Quartieri, F. (ed./s), Ch.12, pp.179-201 |
Publisher: | Springer International Publishing |
Publisher Place: | Switzerland |
Issue Date: | 2016 |
Series/Report no.: | Springer Series in Game Theory |
ISBN: | 3319292536 9783319292533 |
Editor: | von Mouche, P. Quartieri, F. |
Statement of Responsibility: | Ngo Van Long |
Abstract: | This paper studies oligopolistic equilibria when not all firms behave in a Nashian fashion. The Kantian firms act according to norms of behavior that reflect the Kantian categorical imperative. We introduce the concepts of Exclusive Kant- Nash Equilibrium and Inclusive Kant-Nash Equilibrium to study such situations. Our model formalises Sen’s conjecture that in actual situations people often do not follow the selfish strategy because of the Kantian norm of behavior. |
Rights: | © Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2016 |
DOI: | 10.1007/978-3-319-29254-0_12 |
Published version: | http://www.springer.com/gp/book/9783319292533 |
Appears in Collections: | Aurora harvest 3 Economics publications |
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RA_hdl_109419.pdf Restricted Access | Restricted Access | 239.07 kB | Adobe PDF | View/Open |
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