Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/2440/109419
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dc.contributor.authorLong, N.-
dc.contributor.editorvon Mouche, P.-
dc.contributor.editorQuartieri, F.-
dc.date.issued2016-
dc.identifier.citationEquilibrium Theory for Cournot Oligopolies and Related Games: Essays in Honour of Koji Okuguchi, 2016 / von Mouche, P., Quartieri, F. (ed./s), Ch.12, pp.179-201-
dc.identifier.isbn3319292536-
dc.identifier.isbn9783319292533-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/2440/109419-
dc.description.abstractThis paper studies oligopolistic equilibria when not all firms behave in a Nashian fashion. The Kantian firms act according to norms of behavior that reflect the Kantian categorical imperative. We introduce the concepts of Exclusive Kant- Nash Equilibrium and Inclusive Kant-Nash Equilibrium to study such situations. Our model formalises Sen’s conjecture that in actual situations people often do not follow the selfish strategy because of the Kantian norm of behavior.-
dc.description.statementofresponsibilityNgo Van Long-
dc.language.isoen-
dc.publisherSpringer International Publishing-
dc.relation.ispartofseriesSpringer Series in Game Theory-
dc.rights© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2016-
dc.source.urihttp://www.springer.com/gp/book/9783319292533-
dc.titleKant-Nash equilibrium in a quantity-setting oligopoly-
dc.typeBook chapter-
dc.identifier.doi10.1007/978-3-319-29254-0_12-
dc.publisher.placeSwitzerland-
pubs.publication-statusPublished-
Appears in Collections:Aurora harvest 3
Economics publications

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