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Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/2440/109478
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dc.contributor.authorBose, S.-
dc.contributor.authorRenou, L.-
dc.date.issued2014-
dc.identifier.citationEconometrica: journal of the Econometric Society, 2014; 82(5):1853-1872-
dc.identifier.issn0012-9682-
dc.identifier.issn1468-0262-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/2440/109478-
dc.description.abstractThis paper considers mechanism design problems in environments with ambiguity-sensitive individuals. The novel idea is to introduce ambiguity in mechanisms so as to exploit the ambiguity sensitivity of individuals. Deliberate engineering of ambiguity, through ambiguous mediated communication, can allow (partial) implementation of social choice functions that are not incentive compatible with respect to prior beliefs. We provide a complete characterization of social choice functions partially implementable by ambiguous mechanisms.-
dc.description.statementofresponsibilitySubir Bose, Ludovic Renou-
dc.language.isoen-
dc.publisherWiley-
dc.rights© 2014 The Econometric Society-
dc.source.urihttp://dx.doi.org/10.3982/ecta10285-
dc.subjectMechanism design; ambiguity; communication device; multiple priors-
dc.titleMechanism design with ambiguous communication devices-
dc.typeJournal article-
dc.identifier.doi10.3982/ECTA10285-
pubs.publication-statusPublished-
Appears in Collections:Aurora harvest 8
Economics publications

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