Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/2440/109482
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dc.contributor.authorEnglmaier, F.-
dc.contributor.authorMuehlheusser, G.-
dc.contributor.authorRoider, A.-
dc.date.issued2014-
dc.identifier.citationEuropean Economic Review, 2014; 67:82-106-
dc.identifier.issn0014-2921-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/2440/109482-
dc.description.abstractAbstract not available-
dc.description.statementofresponsibilityFlorian Englmaier, Gerd Muehlheusser, Andreas Roider-
dc.language.isoen-
dc.publisherElsevier-
dc.rights© 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.-
dc.source.urihttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2014.01.006-
dc.subjectKnowledge workers; moral hazard; limited commitment; ex post outside option-
dc.titleOptimal incentive contracts for knowledge workers-
dc.typeJournal article-
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/j.euroecorev.2014.01.006-
pubs.publication-statusPublished-
Appears in Collections:Aurora harvest 8
Economics publications

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