Adelaide Research & Scholarship
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https://hdl.handle.net/2440/111682
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| Type: | Book chapter |
| Title: | Imagination |
| Author: | McMahon, J. |
| Citation: | Social Aesthetics and Moral Judgment: Pleasure, Reflection and Accountability, 2018 / McMahon, J. (ed./s), Ch.4, pp.66-87 |
| Publisher: | Routledge |
| Publisher Place: | New York, US |
| Issue Date: | 2018 |
| ISBN: | 1138553263 9781138553262 |
| Editor: | McMahon, J. |
| Statement of Responsibility: | Jennifer A. McMahon |
| Abstract: | The standard cognitive theory of art claims that art can be insightful while maintaining that imagining is motivationally inert [Walton 1990] even when some epistemic advantage is claimed for it [Currie 1995]. However, if we assume art as art can be insightful, we also assume that the imagining it occasions has a lasting impact on belief. In this chapter, I argue that imagining of the kind occasioned by art can be held non-occurrently [Schellenberg 2013] without delusion (cf. Egan [2010]) and can motivate behaviour [Gendler 2000, 2003, 2006a/b; Langland-Hassan 2016]. As such, certain features of imagination can be appreciated in a new light. |
| Rights: | © 2018 Taylor & Francis |
| DOI: | 10.4324/9781315148496 |
| Grant ID: | http://purl.org/au-research/grants/arc/DP150103143 |
| Published version: | https://www.routledge.com/Social-Aesthetics-and-Moral-Judgment-Pleasure-Reflection-and-Accountability/McMahon/p/book/9781138553262 |
| Appears in Collections: | Aurora harvest 3 Philosophy publications |
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