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Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/2440/111682
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dc.contributor.authorMcMahon, J.-
dc.contributor.editorMcMahon, J.-
dc.date.issued2018-
dc.identifier.citationSocial Aesthetics and Moral Judgment: Pleasure, Reflection and Accountability, 2018 / McMahon, J. (ed./s), Ch.4, pp.66-87-
dc.identifier.isbn1138553263-
dc.identifier.isbn9781138553262-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/2440/111682-
dc.description.abstractThe standard cognitive theory of art claims that art can be insightful while maintaining that imagining is motivationally inert [Walton 1990] even when some epistemic advantage is claimed for it [Currie 1995]. However, if we assume art as art can be insightful, we also assume that the imagining it occasions has a lasting impact on belief. In this chapter, I argue that imagining of the kind occasioned by art can be held non-occurrently [Schellenberg 2013] without delusion (cf. Egan [2010]) and can motivate behaviour [Gendler 2000, 2003, 2006a/b; Langland-Hassan 2016]. As such, certain features of imagination can be appreciated in a new light.-
dc.description.statementofresponsibilityJennifer A. McMahon-
dc.language.isoen-
dc.publisherRoutledge-
dc.rights© 2018 Taylor & Francis-
dc.source.urihttps://www.routledge.com/Social-Aesthetics-and-Moral-Judgment-Pleasure-Reflection-and-Accountability/McMahon/p/book/9781138553262-
dc.titleImagination-
dc.typeBook chapter-
dc.identifier.doi10.4324/9781315148496-
dc.publisher.placeNew York, US-
dc.relation.granthttp://purl.org/au-research/grants/arc/DP150103143-
pubs.publication-statusPublished-
dc.identifier.orcidMcMahon, J. [0000-0002-2400-0166]-
Appears in Collections:Aurora harvest 3
Philosophy publications

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