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https://hdl.handle.net/2440/114460
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Type: | Journal article |
Title: | Policy polarization and strategic candidacy in elections under the alternative-vote rule |
Author: | Dellis, A. Gauthier-Belzile, A. Oak, M. |
Citation: | Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 2017; 173(4):565-590 |
Publisher: | Mohr Siebeck |
Issue Date: | 2017 |
ISSN: | 0932-4569 1614-0559 |
Statement of Responsibility: | Arnaud Dellis, Alexandre Gauthier-Belzile, and Mandar Oak |
Abstract: | We use the citizen-candidate model to study electoral outcomes under the alternative-vote rule, a voting method often proposed as a replacement to the prevalent plurality rule. We show that, like the plurality rule, the alternative-vote rule deters multiple candidate clusters and the presence of candidates at more than two positions. Moreover, the alternative-vote rule tends to support less policy polarization than the plurality rule. These results stand in contrast to those obtained under other proposed voting rules, approval voting in particular, which are prone to candidate clustering and, as a result, can support greater policy polarization than the plurality rule. |
Keywords: | Alternative-vote rule |
Rights: | © 2017 Mohr Siebeck |
DOI: | 10.1628/093245616X14799744684614 |
Published version: | http://dx.doi.org/10.1628/093245616x14799744684614 |
Appears in Collections: | Aurora harvest 8 Economics publications |
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