Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/2440/115261
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dc.contributor.authorPloeckl, F.-
dc.date.issued2017-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/2440/115261-
dc.description.abstractThe Zollverein, the German customs union of, was the institutional centrepiece of Germany, s economic unification. A bargaining model is applied to analyze the structure of its negotiation process and accession sequence. The existence of negative coalition externalities, the effect of a coalition on non-participants, led Prussia to choose sequential over multilateral negotiations. The nature of these externalities within the areas of financial revenues, trade policy and domestic political economy also explains the observed accession sequence. The choice of a customs union as institutional structure allowed Prussia to extract higher concessions from other states due to stronger coalition externalities.-
dc.description.statementofresponsibilityFlorian Ploeckl-
dc.language.isoen-
dc.publisherDepartment of Economic, University of Oxford-
dc.relation.ispartofseriesDiscussion Papers in Economic and Social History-
dc.rightsCopyright status unknown-
dc.source.urihttps://www.economics.ox.ac.uk/oxford-economic-and-social-history-working-papers/the-zollverein-and-the-formation-of-a-customs-union-
dc.subjectCustoms Union, trade agreements, coalition externalities-
dc.titleThe Zollverein and the formation of a customs union-
dc.typeWorking paper-
dc.identifier.doi10.25909/5bc963577e192-
pubs.publication-statusPublished-
dc.identifier.orcidPloeckl, F. [0000-0001-8500-9028]-
Appears in Collections:Aurora harvest 3
Economics Working papers

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