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https://hdl.handle.net/2440/120288
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DC Field | Value | Language |
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dc.contributor.author | Shan, Y. | - |
dc.date.issued | 2017 | - |
dc.identifier.citation | RAND Journal of Economics, 2017; 48(1):94-124 | - |
dc.identifier.issn | 1756-2171 | - |
dc.identifier.issn | 1756-2171 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/2440/120288 | - |
dc.description.abstract | We study the agency problem between a firm and its research employees under several scenarios characterized by different Research and Development (R&D) unit setups. In a multiagent dynamic contracting setting, we describe the precise pattern of the optimal contract. We illustrate that the optimal incentive regime is a function of how agents' efforts interact with one another: relative performance evaluation is used when their efforts are substitutes, whereas joint performance evaluation is used when their efforts are complements. The optimal contract pattern provides a theoretical justification for the compensation policies used by firms that rely on R&D. | - |
dc.description.statementofresponsibility | Yaping Shan | - |
dc.language.iso | en | - |
dc.publisher | Wiley | - |
dc.rights | © 2017, The RAND Corporation | - |
dc.source.uri | http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1756-2171.12169 | - |
dc.title | Optimal contracts for research agents | - |
dc.type | Journal article | - |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1111/1756-2171.12169 | - |
pubs.publication-status | Published | - |
dc.identifier.orcid | Shan, Y. [0000-0002-8411-9230] | - |
Appears in Collections: | Aurora harvest 8 Economics publications |
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