Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
https://hdl.handle.net/2440/136546
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Type: | Journal article |
Title: | Investor-state dispute settlement and multinational firm behavior |
Author: | Schjelderup, G. Stähler, F. |
Citation: | Review of International Economics, 2021; 29(4):1013-1024 |
Publisher: | Wiley |
Issue Date: | 2021 |
ISSN: | 0965-7576 1467-9396 |
Statement of Responsibility: | Guttorm Schjelderup, Frank Stähler |
Abstract: | This paper shows that investor-state dispute settlements (ISDS) make multinational firms more aggressive by increasing cost-reducing investments with the aim to enlarge the potential compensation an ISDS provision may offer. While a larger investment reduces the market distortion, it will also make potential compensations larger. Consequently, potential compensations to a foreign investor do not imply a zero-sum game. ISDS may decrease domestic welfare, in particular if the investment leads to the establishment of an export platform, and we find that even global welfare may decline. |
Rights: | © 2021 The Authors. Review of International Economics published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd. This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial- NoDerivs License, which permits use and distribution in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited, the use is non-commercial and no modifications or adaptations are made. |
DOI: | 10.1111/roie.12532 |
Grant ID: | http://purl.org/au-research/grants/arc/DP190103524 |
Published version: | http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/roie.12532 |
Appears in Collections: | Economics publications |
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hdl_136546.pdf | Published version | 236.28 kB | Adobe PDF | View/Open |
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