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https://hdl.handle.net/2440/16136
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DC Field | Value | Language |
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dc.contributor.author | Gamble, D. | - |
dc.date.issued | 2002 | - |
dc.identifier.citation | Language and Communication, 2002; 22(3):243-258 | - |
dc.identifier.issn | 0271-5309 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/2440/16136 | - |
dc.description | Copyright © 2002 Published by Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved. | - |
dc.description.abstract | The underlying question is how much and in what way speaker's understanding should be a determinant in theories explaining meaning. It is argued that semantic realism is best defined and defended within a metaphysical realism most naturally associated with externalist, causal, explanations of meaning. Attempts to defend semantic realism within a Wittgesteinian-Dummettian framework assume that theories of meaning must be theories of understanding, and that theories of understanding must be theories of use, such that use is manifestable in outward behavioural capacities. I argue that attempting to defend semantic realism in such frameworks leads inevitably to near paradoxical positions. © 2002 Published by Elsevier Science Ltd. | - |
dc.description.statementofresponsibility | Denise Gamble | - |
dc.description.uri | http://www.elsevier.com/wps/find/journaldescription.cws_home/616/description#description | - |
dc.language.iso | en | - |
dc.publisher | Pergamon-Elsevier Science Ltd | - |
dc.source.uri | http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s0271-5309(02)00005-8 | - |
dc.title | Defending semantic realism | - |
dc.type | Journal article | - |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1016/S0271-5309(02)00005-8 | - |
pubs.publication-status | Published | - |
Appears in Collections: | Aurora harvest 6 Philosophy publications |
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