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https://hdl.handle.net/2440/16886
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Type: | Journal article |
Title: | Pettit on consequentialism and universalizability |
Author: | Gleeson, A. |
Citation: | Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics: philosophy of medical research and practice, 2005; 26(3):261-275 |
Publisher: | Kluwer Academic Publ |
Issue Date: | 2005 |
ISSN: | 1386-7415 1573-1200 |
Statement of Responsibility: | Andrew Gleeson |
Abstract: | Philip Pettit has argued that universalizability entails consequentialism. I criticise the argument for relying on a question-begging reading of the impartiality of universalization. A revised form of the argument can be constructed by relying on preference-satisfaction rationality, rather than on impartiality. But this revised argument succumbs to an ambiguity in the notion of a preference (or desire). I compare the revised argument to an earlier argument of Pettit’s for consequentialism that appealed to the theoretical virtue of simplicity, and I raise questions about the force of appeal to notions like simplicity and rationality in moral argument. |
Keywords: | Consequentialism desire impartiality rationality universalizability. |
Description: | The original publication can be found at www.springerlink.com |
DOI: | 10.1007/s11017-005-3983-y |
Published version: | http://www.springerlink.com/content/w2v6v8g42j51q021/ |
Appears in Collections: | Aurora harvest 6 Philosophy publications |
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