Democratic assistance: A template for compulsory voting

Abstract

Compulsory voting could be a valuable aid in the prevention of civic demobilisation and the re-establishment of civic habits in established democracies that are currently experiencing a democratic deficit problem. Britain and the United States are just two examples. This paper seeks to provide a preliminary sketch of a compulsory voting regime suitable for adoption by established democracies considering a switch from a voluntary to a compulsory system. This ‘export’ standard template is based on Australian arrangements, though with modifications as suggested by practice in other regimes and experience of the dysfunctional aspects of Australian practice. Recommended changes include reforms aimed at limiting the coercive aspects of compulsory voting (e.g. carefully calibrating penalties for non-compliance) and measures aimed at offsetting the charge that compulsion limits democratic choice (e.g, regularisation of electoral law, provisions for optional preferential voting and ballot redesign).