Sun Yat-sen and greater China

Abstract

The 'virtual' civil war between China and Taiwan has plagued both societies since their division in 1949. It was accepted on both sides that while they each had a different interpretation of its meaning, the 'One China principle' underpinned any possible détente. Meaningful negotiations for a peaceful settlement, which began in 1993, collapsed in 1995 when Lee Teng-hui visited the United States, and the prospect for their resumption worsened in 1999 when Lee announced that any future negotiations would take place only on a 'special state-to-state' basis. He later declared (in what seemed obvious to the outside observer) that Taiwan had a new 'national identity', and should be considered 'new Taiwanese' rather than Chinese. However, overt declarations of policy that appear obvious and rational are not always in the best interests of peace. Both the Mainland, and a significant section of Lee's Kuomintang, felt that these tacit declarations of quasiindependence betrayed the principles of Sun Yat-sen, which for many has been the philosophical key which bridged the gap between China and Taiwan's competing ideologies. With Hong Kong and Macau's reversion to formal Chinese sovereignty, and continued unrest in the peripheries, the absence of a shared, evolving ideological foundation places in doubt the quest for stability in, and a unified identity for, Greater China. This paper will argue that Sun's ideology still represents the best framework within which the fruitful reunification of Greater China can be accomplished. Sun Yat-sen Thought could serve in a dual capacity: as an acceptable rhetorical vehicle for both sides, and a substantive process for integrating -- within the form of a Federal structure -- prevailing, disparate sociopolitical perspectives. This structure would provide the political and social space for the recognition of the unique nature of the evolving identities of Taiwan and the alreadyincorporated territories of Hong Kong and Macau. Further, within such a Federal configuration the authority of the centre would be preserved, but would function within the context of a 'United States of China'. This would provide an unrivaled opportunity for Greater China to harmonize the interests of its component parts, and solidify the extent to which its development in the course of the 21st Century would be broadly based and balanced.