The moral demands of affluence

Abstract

<jats:title>Abstract</jats:title><jats:p>How much are we morally required to do to help people who are</jats:p><jats:p>much worse off than us? On any credible moral outlook, other people’s pressing need for assistance can ground moral requirements on us to help them – requirements of beneficence.</jats:p><jats:p>How far do those requirements extend? One way to think about this is by means of a simple analogy: an analogy between contributing to aid agencies’ efforts to help people at a distance and saving someone’s life yourself, directly. Part I of the book examines this analogy, discusses the problems with it, and argues that a version of it is defensible. This argument draws on an extended discussion of the nature of moral requirements of beneficence and fairness.</jats:p><jats:p>This argument can seem to lead to an extremely demanding moral outlook – one that requires us to lead altruistically focused lives, and forbids practically all forms of personal fulfilment. Part II argues against this demanding view, on the grounds that it can be rejected from an appropriately impartial point of view. It only makes sense to accept that there are requirements of beneficence on the assumption that the non-altruistic interests around which our lives – rich and poor alike – are structured is not morally wrong to pursue.</jats:p>