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https://hdl.handle.net/2440/38116
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Type: | Journal article |
Title: | Privileged access revisited |
Author: | Fernandez, J. |
Citation: | The Philosophical Quarterly, 2005; 55(218):102-105 |
Publisher: | Blackwell Publ Ltd |
Issue Date: | 2005 |
ISSN: | 0031-8094 1467-9213 |
Statement of Responsibility: | Jordi Fernández |
Abstract: | Aaron Zimmerman has recently raised an interesting objection to an account of self-knowledge I have offered. The objection has the form of a dilemma: either it is possible for us to be entitled to beliefs which we do not form, or it is not. If it is, the conditions for introspective justification within the model I advocate are insufficient. If not, they are otiose. I challenge Zimmerman's defence of the first horn of the dilemma. |
Rights: | © The Editors of The Philosophical Quarterly, 2005. |
DOI: | 10.1111/j.0031-8094.2005.00389.x |
Published version: | http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.0031-8094.2005.00389.x |
Appears in Collections: | Aurora harvest 6 Philosophy publications |
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