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https://hdl.handle.net/2440/44281
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DC Field | Value | Language |
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dc.contributor.author | Bade, Sophie | en |
dc.contributor.author | Haeringer, Guillaume | en |
dc.contributor.author | Renou, Ludovic | en |
dc.date.issued | 2007 | en |
dc.identifier.citation | Journal of Economic Theory, 2007; 135 (1):551-557 | en |
dc.identifier.issn | 0022-0531 | en |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/2440/44281 | - |
dc.description.abstract | We show in this paper that for the class of two-player games with compact real intervals as strategy spaces and continuous and strictly quasi-concave payoff functions there exists a monotone relation between the size of strategy spaces and the number of Nash equilibria. These sufficient conditions for our theorem to hold are shown to be tight. | en |
dc.description.statementofresponsibility | Sophie Bade, Guillaume Haeringer and Ludovic Renou | en |
dc.description.uri | http://www.elsevier.com/wps/find/journaldescription.cws_home/622869/description#description | en |
dc.language.iso | en | en |
dc.publisher | Elsevier | en |
dc.subject | Strategic-form games; Strategy spaces; Nash equilibrium; Number of Nash equilibria | en |
dc.title | More strategies, more Nash equilibria | en |
dc.type | Journal article | en |
dc.contributor.school | School of Economics | en |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1016/j.jet.2005.08.009 | en |
Appears in Collections: | Economics publications |
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