The impact of rights-based management regimes on fishery productivity

Abstract

Property rights regimes are increasingly recommended and implemented in fisheries management around the world. While theoretical examination and anecdotal evidence suggest that these regimes are successful at increasing both productivity and sustainability, the empirical evidence on their effects is limited. This paper provides an empirical examination of the effect of a move to a property rights system on productivity in the Norwegian coastal cod fishery. Using a unique vessel-level dataset I conduct a parallel analysis using a traditional productivity approach and an index number decomposition to establish the source of productivity changes. The strength of conducting a parallel analysis is to be comparable with previous studies while exploiting the power of the decomposition to identify the component effects of the policy. Determining the important components of productivity changes, such as transferability of quota and flexibility in when to harvest, allows for the refinement of management to mimic the effect of property rights systems even when their full implementation may not be possible. Results suggest that the introduction of individual vessel quotas in the coastal cod fisshery increased productivity.