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https://hdl.handle.net/2440/56761
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Type: | Journal article |
Title: | I won't do it! Self-prediction, moral obligation and moral deliberation |
Author: | Louise, J. |
Citation: | Philosophical Studies: an international journal for philosophy in the analytic tradition, 2009; 146(3):327-348 |
Publisher: | Kluwer Academic Publ |
Issue Date: | 2009 |
ISSN: | 0031-8116 1573-0883 |
Statement of Responsibility: | Jennie Louise |
Abstract: | This paper considers the question of whether predictions of wrongdoing are relevant to our moral obligations. After giving an analysis of ‘won’t’ claims (i.e., claims that an agent won’t Φ), the question is separated into two different issues: firstly, whether predictions of wrongdoing affect our objective moral obligations, and secondly, whether self-prediction of wrongdoing can be legitimately used in moral deliberation. I argue for an affirmative answer to both questions, although there are conditions that must be met for self-prediction to be appropriate in deliberation. The discussion illuminates an interesting and significant tension between agency and prediction. |
Keywords: | Actualism Possibilism Prediction Wrongdoing Obligation |
DOI: | 10.1007/s11098-008-9258-5 |
Published version: | http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11098-008-9258-5 |
Appears in Collections: | Aurora harvest 5 Philosophy publications |
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