Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
https://hdl.handle.net/2440/63344
Citations | ||
Scopus | Web of Science® | Altmetric |
---|---|---|
?
|
?
|
Type: | Journal article |
Title: | Thought insertion and self-knowledge |
Author: | Fernandez, J. |
Citation: | Mind and Language, 2010; 25(1):66-88 |
Publisher: | Blackwell Publ Ltd |
Issue Date: | 2010 |
ISSN: | 0268-1064 1468-0017 |
Statement of Responsibility: | Jordi Fernández |
Abstract: | I offer an account of thought insertion based on a certain model of self-knowledge. I propose that subjects with thought insertion do not experience being committed to some of their own beliefs. A hypothesis about self-knowledge explains why. According to it, we form beliefs about our own beliefs on the basis of our evidence for them. First, I will argue that this hypothesis explains the fact that we feel committed to those beliefs which we are aware of. Then, I will point to one feature of schizophrenia that suggests that subjects with thought insertion may not be able to know their own beliefs in that way. |
Rights: | © 2010 The Author. Journal compilation © 2010 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. |
DOI: | 10.1111/j.1468-0017.2009.01381.x |
Published version: | http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0017.2009.01381.x |
Appears in Collections: | Aurora harvest 5 Philosophy publications |
Files in This Item:
There are no files associated with this item.
Items in DSpace are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.