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https://hdl.handle.net/2440/71265
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Type: | Journal article |
Title: | Self-deception and self-knowledge |
Author: | Fernandez, J. |
Citation: | Philosophical Studies: an international journal for philosophy in the analytic tradition, 2013; 162(2):379-400 |
Publisher: | Springer |
Issue Date: | 2013 |
ISSN: | 1573-0883 0031-8116 |
Statement of Responsibility: | Jordi Fernández |
Abstract: | The aim of this paper is to provide an account of a certain variety of self-deception based on a model of self-knowledge. According to this model, one thinks that one has a belief on the basis of one’s grounds for that belief. If this model is correct, then our thoughts about which beliefs we have should be in accordance with our grounds for those beliefs. I suggest that the relevant variety of self deception is a failure of self-knowledge wherein the subject violates this epistemic obligation. I argue that construing this type of self-deception as a failure of selfknowledge explains two important aspects of it: The tension that we observe between the subject’s speech and her actions, and our inclination to hold the subject responsible for her condition. I compare this proposal with two other approaches to self-deception in the literature; intentionalism and motivationalism. Intentionalism explains the two aspects of self-deception but it runs into the so called ‘paradoxes’ of self-deception. Motivationalism avoids those paradoxes but it cannot explain the two aspects of self-deception. |
Keywords: | Self-deception self-knowledge |
Rights: | © Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2011 |
DOI: | 10.1007/s11098-011-9771-9 |
Published version: | http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11098-011-9771-9 |
Appears in Collections: | Aurora harvest 5 Philosophy publications |
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RA_hdl_71265.pdf Restricted Access | Restricted Access | 204.99 kB | Adobe PDF | View/Open |
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