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Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/2440/75175
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dc.contributor.authorJacquet, Nicolas Laurenten
dc.contributor.authorTan, Serene Sze-Chingen
dc.date.issued2011en
dc.identifier.citationJournal of Money Credit and Banking, 2011; 43(7):419-442en
dc.identifier.issn0022-2879en
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/2440/75175-
dc.description.abstractWe investigate the dual role of money as a self-insurance device and a means of payment when perfect risk sharing is not possible, and when the two roles of money are disentangled. We use a variant of Lagos–Wright (2005) where agents face a risk in the centralized market (CM): in the decentralized market(DM) money’s main role is as a means of payment, while in the CM it is as a self-insurance device. We show that state-contingent inflation rates can improve agents’ ability to self-insure in the CM, thereby improving the terms of trade in the DM.We then characterize the optimal monetary policy.en
dc.description.statementofresponsibilityNicolas L. Jacquet and Serene Tanen
dc.language.isoenen
dc.publisherOhio State University Pressen
dc.rights© 2011 The Ohio State Universityen
dc.subjectRisk sharing; monetary policy; bargainingen
dc.titleMoney, bargaining, and risk sharingen
dc.typeJournal articleen
dc.contributor.schoolSchool of Economicsen
dc.identifier.doi10.1111/j.1538-4616.2011.00444.xen
Appears in Collections:Economics publications

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