Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
https://hdl.handle.net/2440/75575
Citations | ||
Scopus | Web of Science® | Altmetric |
---|---|---|
?
|
?
|
Type: | Journal article |
Title: | Identical preferences lower bound for allocation of heterogenous tasks and NIMBY problems |
Author: | Yengin, D. |
Citation: | Journal of Public Economic Theory, 2013; 15(4):580-601 |
Publisher: | Wiley-Blackwell Publishing Inc |
Issue Date: | 2013 |
ISSN: | 1097-3923 1467-9779 |
Statement of Responsibility: | Duygu Yengin |
Abstract: | We study the allocation of collectively owned indivisible goods when monetary transfers are possible. We restrict our attention to incentive compatible mechanisms which allocate the goods efficiently. Among these mechanisms, we characterize those that respect the identical-preferences lower-bound: each agent should be at least as well off as in an hypothetical economy where all agents have the same preference as hers, no agent envies another, and the budget is balanced. |
Keywords: | Welfare bounds collective ownership allocation of indivisible goods and money NIMBY problems imposition of tasks the Groves mechanisms the identical-preferences lowerbound k-fairness. |
Rights: | © 2013 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. |
DOI: | 10.1111/jpet.12031 |
Published version: | http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/jpet.12031 |
Appears in Collections: | Aurora harvest Economics publications |
Files in This Item:
File | Description | Size | Format | |
---|---|---|---|---|
RA_hdl_75575.pdf Restricted Access | Restricted Access | 250.04 kB | Adobe PDF | View/Open |
Items in DSpace are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.