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https://hdl.handle.net/2440/89424
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Type: | Journal article |
Title: | Should we replace disabled newborn infants? |
Author: | Wilkinson, D. |
Citation: | Journal of Moral Philosophy, 2011; 8(3):390-414 |
Publisher: | Brill Academic Publishers |
Issue Date: | 2011 |
ISSN: | 1740-4681 1745-5243 |
Statement of Responsibility: | Dominic Wilkinson |
Abstract: | If a disabled newborn infant dies, her parents may be able to conceive another child without impairment. This is sometimes referred to as 'replacement'. Some philosophers have argued that replacement provides a strong reason for disabled newborns to be killed or allowed to die. In this paper I focus on the case for replacement as it relates to decisions about life support in newborn intensive care. I argue (following Jeff McMahan) that the impersonal reason to replace is weak and easily outweighed. I assess and reject several possible ways in which the impersonal reason to replace could be defended. I then address an alternative justification for replacement – as an individual-affecting benefit. The strongest justification for replacement may be the interests of parents. In the latter part of the paper I look at a related question. What role should replacement play in decisions about the funding of newborn intensive care? |
Keywords: | Impersonal reasons Newborns Replacement Utilitarianism Withdrawing treatment |
Rights: | © Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2011 |
DOI: | 10.1163/174552411X591348 |
Published version: | http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/174552411x591348 |
Appears in Collections: | Aurora harvest 2 Paediatrics publications |
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