Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
https://hdl.handle.net/2440/109201
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Type: | Journal article |
Title: | Repeated Nash implementation |
Author: | Mezzetti, C. Renou, L. |
Citation: | Theoretical Economics, 2017; 12(1):249-285 |
Publisher: | Wiley Online Library |
Issue Date: | 2017 |
ISSN: | 1933-6837 |
Statement of Responsibility: | Claudio Mezzetti, Ludovic Renou |
Abstract: | We study the repeated implementation of social choice functions in environments with complete information and changing preferences. We define dynamic monotonicity, a natural but nontrivial dynamic extension of Maskin monotonicity, and show that it is necessary and almost sufficient for repeated Nash implementation, regardless of whether the horizon is finite or infinite and whether the discount factor is “large” or “small.” |
Keywords: | Dynamic monotonicity; Nash implementation; Maskin monotonicity; repeated implementation; repeated games |
Rights: | Copyright © 2017 The Authors. This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial License, which permits use, distribution and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited and is not used for commercial purposes. |
DOI: | 10.3982/TE1988 |
Grant ID: | http://purl.org/au-research/grants/arc/DP120102697 |
Published version: | http://dx.doi.org/10.3982/te1988 |
Appears in Collections: | Aurora harvest 3 Economics publications |
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hdl_109201.pdf | Published version | 410.48 kB | Adobe PDF | View/Open |
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