Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
https://hdl.handle.net/2440/109478
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Type: | Journal article |
Title: | Mechanism design with ambiguous communication devices |
Author: | Bose, S. Renou, L. |
Citation: | Econometrica: journal of the Econometric Society, 2014; 82(5):1853-1872 |
Publisher: | Wiley |
Issue Date: | 2014 |
ISSN: | 0012-9682 1468-0262 |
Statement of Responsibility: | Subir Bose, Ludovic Renou |
Abstract: | This paper considers mechanism design problems in environments with ambiguity-sensitive individuals. The novel idea is to introduce ambiguity in mechanisms so as to exploit the ambiguity sensitivity of individuals. Deliberate engineering of ambiguity, through ambiguous mediated communication, can allow (partial) implementation of social choice functions that are not incentive compatible with respect to prior beliefs. We provide a complete characterization of social choice functions partially implementable by ambiguous mechanisms. |
Keywords: | Mechanism design; ambiguity; communication device; multiple priors |
Rights: | © 2014 The Econometric Society |
DOI: | 10.3982/ECTA10285 |
Published version: | http://dx.doi.org/10.3982/ecta10285 |
Appears in Collections: | Aurora harvest 8 Economics publications |
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RA_hdl_109478.pdf Restricted Access | Restricted Access | 165.19 kB | Adobe PDF | View/Open |
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